|
PREFACE
Beginning in the 1960s, when the political, cultural and economic demands of various social groups began to be more strongly reflected in the public sphere, the totalitarian policies of nation-states began to falter. In particular, authoritarian practices aimed at creating a common national identity and a single national language began to meet with significant objections. Groups that had been at odds with the prevailing majority on ethnic, linguistic and religious grounds and that had up to that time been kept at a distance from the administrative centre began to demand the preservation and protection of their identities and cultures.
These demands were also reflected in Turkey. The concept of citizenship developed by the Republican regime and the imposition of a common identity and lifestyle for people of varying languages, religions and ethnic origins met with significant objection from the late 1980s onwards. After the partial easing of the oppression arising from the coup d’état of 1980 especially, ethnic and religious groups thought of as damaging to national identity established by the capital, Ankara became more visible within society and began to participate more actively in politics. Groups that had not considered themselves part of acceptable society began to put forth demands for their unique character to be socially accepted and preserved. Women rebelled against the dominant male culture and adopt a variety of methods to fight sexist discrimination. Homosexuals drew attention to their oppression; they began to fight to gain equality as citizens with a different sexual orientation both in the private and the public sphere. Islamic circles also became involved, with their demands that women not be deprived of their rights because of their headscarves and that children be brought up in line with their faith. The Alawis challenged the Sunni character of the regime and put pressure on both political and legal mechanisms for the abolishment of obligatory religious lessons in schools. Non-Muslims expressed the necessity of coming to terms with the discrimination they have been subjected to in the past and present and to solve current issues deriving from this discrimination.
The demand for the recognition of Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity is of distinctive importance among these demands, which over the years have increased in type and variety. In this context, the most-emphasized demand and the one that forms the predominant part of the cultural rights claim consists of the use of the mother tongue – Kurdish – in education. Kurds base their demands in this area on three main principles.
First, the use of one’s mother tongue in education is a human right. The framework of much contemporary law identifies education in one’s own language as a right and considers the provision of equal services for all citizens as part of the state’s responsibility. The state’s duty is therefore to fulfil the requirements arising from this right. In Turkey however, throughout the Republican Period, the state has always considered the Kurdish language a threat to its policy of monolingualism; further, the nation has always denied the very existence of Kurdish. The fact that Kurdish is still perceived as a threat constitutes an anachronism at a time when the nation-state model is under serious revision, to say the least. It has now become imperative for Turkey to forgo its past policies and ensure the necessary conditions for the use of the Kurdish language in education.
Second, the use of the mother tongue in education is a “sine qua non” for the preservation and development of the Kurdish language. Language is not only a means of communication; it is also a means of sustaining a culture. That is why the development and flourishing of a culture is directly related to the use of its language. A language used in education renews itself continuously, adapts to changes in all areas of life, leaves room for the development of new concepts, interacts with other languages and acquires richer content. However, when it is forbidden in education and in the public sphere, it remains trapped in daily life; over time it weakens and declines. The Kurdish language is currently faced with this danger and the only way to ward off this calamity is to use Kurdish in education.
Third, the use of Kurdish in education will make a positive contribution towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue, the most important issues currently facing Turkey. Different Kurdish political circles have developed very different perspectives for the solution of the Kurdish issue. But the certitude that Kurdish must be used in education is a point on which all Kurdish movements agree. In fact, the use of Kurdish in education is a point on which not only all Kurdish political and non-governmental groups agree, but also one that those who seek democratic methods for the resolution of the conflict also agree on. Findings by academics working in the fields of pedagogy, linguistics, sociology, political science and developmental psychology strongly point to the necessity of this outcome.
This requirement and the aforementioned demands constitute the starting point of this study, which aims to set forth the political, social, economic, psychological, educational and linguistic inequality and discrimination arising from the interdiction of using Kurdish in education and to contribute to the development of measures aiming at finding solutions to the outcomes.
The first two chapters of this study present the theoretical and historical background of the issue. Particular emphasis has been given to the prevention of the use of the mother tongue in education and to the connection between language and education policies of nation-states. The main thrust behind the emergence and growth of this issue in Turkey has been identified as the Turkish Republic’s historical policy aiming at building a national identity based on a single ethnic character. This chapter also discusses the imposition, via education and language, of this national identity that ignored differences within society and how the eradication of the public visibility of other identities has deepened this wound.
Chapters three and four contain a field study and its evaluation. The aim of this study is to present the way in which students, teachers and parents have been experiencing and are harmed by the inability to use Kurdish in education. To elucidate this claim, in-depth interviews were held with Kurdish students who went to school in varying years and places, with both teachers who speak and do not speak Kurdish and who have taught students who were completely unfamiliar with Turkish when they began school, and, finally, with parents. The findings from these interviews have been elaborately analyzed in parallel with local, international and theoretical studies and proposals for solutions to the issue have been presented.
Three country examples are examined in Chapter Five [with the aim of ] conducting a parallel reading of these proposals. The examples presented by the Corsican language in France, Basque in Spain and Uygur in China, models where minority languages are used in education are debated, taking into consideration their historical and political contexts. This debate also aims at establishing the shortcomings and benefits of these models and what they can offer for the issue taken in this study. We hope that these observations will provide inspirations in the way through the development of models for the use of Kurdish in education.
Chapter One
Nation-States, Education and Language
The present-day state structure is mainly a product of modernity. In the Europe of the 16th and 18th centuries, sweeping changes in almost all areas of social life were brought on by acceleration in industrialization and of the co modification of economic relations, a transition to capitalist economy, a growth in the division of labour, an increase in scientific exploration, rapid urbanization and intense efforts towards democratization. This radical change resulted in a complete transformation of social and political institutions. It therefore became impossible for any institution, especially social and political ones, to preserve their traditional and pre-modern structure.1
The process of modernity also brought about a change in the structure of the “state.” The state strengthened its administrative capacity by gathering its territory under a single administration, enabling public participation in administration and establishing the borders of its sovereignty in an absolute way. While eliminating the powers, other than itself, that could use violence, it created new types and mechanisms of violence. The modernity of the state was based on its “central power;” thanks to geographical, legal and political centralization, the modern state acquired a more deterrent power than its predecessors. This power transformed the modern state into one of the elements ensuring that the general process of modernity was spread from Europe to other regions of the world. Furthermore, along with the process it represented, over time the modern state itself also became a universal model for the process.2
In comparison to earlier political structures, the modern state, based on centralization and financed via taxes, was able to fulfil necessities arising from social, economic and cultural modernity in a more efficient and functional way. Previous political structures were neither separated via absolute borders, nor did they encourage internal integration or homogenization. Although the feudal elite held vast territories under its command, it only possessed a minimum of military power and a limited capacity to command daily life. Empires had the power to impose taxes on their subjects, but they did not bother to form a cultural homogeneity.3 However, the modern state covered a precise territory and had absolute power on it. This situation caused the identity of people living on lands with clear cut borders to be cast into a mould and a tendency arose according to which only people with a set identity could lay claim on the lands in question. The modern state therefore began to be identified with an entity called “nation” and the “nation”, an imagined community, came to form the source of the state’s sovereignty.4
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (London: Yale University Press, 1968), 142.
2 Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 55.
3 Craig Calhoun, Milliyetçilik (Nationalism), Transl: Bilgen Sütçüoğlu, (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 93-94
4 Benedict Anderson, Hayalî Cemaatler (Imagined Communities), Transl: İskender Savaşır, (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1993). Also Vahap Coşkun, Ulus-Devletin Dönüşümü ve Meşruluk Sorunu (The Transformation of the Nation-State and the Issue of Legitimacy), (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2009), 171-177.
|
