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PREFACE
It is often said that the Kurds have no friends, which unfortunately seems to be true. Having spent days and weeks at a time over the years with Kurds (who today probably number over 23 million), in their mountains and towns, at war, in victor), and defeat and in exile, one is constantly surprised how a people, who individually are so delightful, cheerful, helpful and hospitable, can at the same time be so quarrelsome amongst themselves, so vindictive towards each other and so ready to change allegiances.
The plight of the Kurds dawned on Western awareness when Saddam Hussein attacked them with chemical weapons in their villages, and afterwards drove many of them to perish in the snow-clad mountains of northern Iraq, prior to which few in the West knew much about them. Since then Amnesty International has made the Western world aware that a very dirty war between the Turkish army and insurgent Kurds seeking ethnic recognition has been in progress since 1984, in the course of which over 11 000 people have perished. More recently Westerners have become aware that a Kurdish terrorist organisation has been attacking Turkish diplomatic and commercial premises in Western Europe; and in 1994 they began a terrorist campaign to destroy the Turkish tourist industry. Several foreign tourists, including British, have already been killed or injured.
So who are the Kurds, what do they want, and why have they been unable to obtain it? It is hoped that this brief account will give some insight into their background, the milestones in their continuing struggle for a political goal, and something of their many misfortunes.
Upon the break-up of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War the Kurds, an ancient race composed of tribes, tribal confederations and feudal groups with martial traditions, were promised - for the first time in their long history - an independent state in their own mountainous homeland under the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. The appearance of what became the USSR caused this Kurdish dream to be brushed aside under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1922, whereby Turkey, in which half the Kurdish race resided, was to be made into a bulwark against communism. The contiguous Kurdish homeland was abruptly divided into segments that fell into Turkey, the USSR, Persia (now Iran) and Iraq, separated by new international frontiers. This gave each of these countries a ‘Kurdish problem’, which they mostly still retain. After the brief appearance of ‘Red Kurdistan’ (1923-8), the Soviet Union moved most of its troublesome Kurds away from the Kurdish contiguity.
In unifying his new Turkey, Ataturk enlisted the aid of the Kurds to eliminate the Armenians, but when this was accomplished he turned against them, refusing to grant them minority status. Officially there are no Kurds in Turkey, not even to this day, only ‘mountain Turks who have forgotten their own language’. Turkish Kurds, who live mainly in the south eastern provinces, have periodically risen in rebellion and are in open rebellion today.
Iraq was a new country put together from parts of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan by the British. They tried to counterbalance minority groups to ensure that none became too powerful or gained too large a share of the oil fields. However, the Kurds soon became a destabilising factor. Arabs on the Mesopotamian plains feared the mountain Kurds, who in Ottoman times had descended to raid their towns, farms and caravans. The Kurds held the Arabs in contempt, while the Arabs considered that ‘Allah sent three plagues - the rat, the locust and the Kurd’. During the interwar years the Arab Iraqi governments never really brought their Kurdish minority under control.
Kurds inhabiting the northwestern corner of Iran were a frontier problem to the shahs, who retained their tenuous loyalty by bestowing titles, honours and bribes and used them as frontier mercenary troops. During the Second World War, when northern Iran was occupied by Soviet armed forces, the Kurds were left to their own devices. On Soviet instigation, in January 1946 a collection of Kurdish leaders set up the tiny independent Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which lasted precisely one year before being extinguished by the shah’s army, when the Soviet troops pulled out.
Tribal followers of a prominent Iraqi Kurdish chieftain, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who had been accorded the rank of general by the Mahabad government, formed the effective part of a tiny Mahabad defence force. After the fall or Mahabad, Barzani made a fighting withdrawal to the Soviet Union, where he remained for a few years, his fame in Kurdish legend established.
Kurds formed a very small minority in Syria, itself a country of minorities, and as they were in scattered groups - ‘colonies’ founded by mercenary soldiers or traders over the centuries -they presented little trouble to various Syrian governments.
Returning to Iraq in 1958, Barzani tried to negotiate a form of autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds. When this failed he gathered together certain tribes and fought a 15-year war against the central government. Latterly he was assisted by the shah of Iran, who secretly provided him with weaponry, ammunition and other necessities. As long as Barzani stayed in his mountains and was supported by the shah, he was secure, as the Iraqi army lacked the capability to defeat him.
Under the Algiers Agreement (1975) the shah ceased supplying arms to Barzani in return for concessions on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, part of the Iran-Iraq frontier. Once again Barzani had to make a fighting withdrawal, although he had gained formal recognition for Kurdish autonomy from the Baghdad government. Old and sick, Barzani was taken under the wing of the American CIA, to die in a hospital in America in March 1979.
The Islamic Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in February 1979, and internal chaos to that country. A strong centralist, Khomeini crushed Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, and upon their formation the revolutionary guards were given the Kurdish problem to deal with.
The next major saga in this region affecting the Kurds was the Iran-Iraq War (1980-8), which soon stalemated along a 600-mile entrenched defensive line that loosely coincided with the mutual border. Both countries subverted and used the other’s Kurdish factions. The Baghdad government paid Iranian Kurds to fight against the Tehran government, while the Tehran government paid Iraqi Kurds to fight against that in Baghdad. Kurds were also conscripted into the armies of both sides, and generally gave a good account of themselves in battle.
When the Iran-Iraq War ended through military exhaustion, both governments set about settling accounts with their rebellious Kurdish factions. In Iraq the government launched punitive military expeditions into its northern Kurdish mountains, but with only partial success. In Iran the revolutionary guards, who were responsible for internal security, strove to bring rebellious Kurdish factions to heel, while a covert assassination campaign was mounted against insurrectionary Kurdish political leaders in exile. In both Iran and Iraq Kurdish factions fought against each other on their home ground.
During the latter stages of the war Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran, but these were deployed with greater intensity against his own rebellious Kurds, then fighting in the pay of the Tehran government. The main attack was against the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, when a probable 5000 Kurds perished from chemical weapon effects.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 an Allied coalition was formed under UN authority to oust him, a task accomplished by March 1991. Kurds played no part in the Gulf War except as conscripted soldiers.
Anticipating the defeat of Saddam Hussein and his fall, an impromptu Kurdish uprising occurred in Iraq in March 1991. This had not been anticipated by Kurdish leaders, who were carried along with it, and it was probably the first ‘popular’ Kurdish uprising in which the people led the way rather than factional or tribal leaders. As soon as Saddam Hussein had dealt with a southern Shia revolt, he moved northwards to wreak vengeance on his Kurds, causing a mass exodus from cities, towns and villages.
Fear that Saddam Hussein might once again use chemical weapons caused panic among fleeing Kurds, who sought refuge in remote mountains, and in Turkey and Iran.
The international media spotlight settled on Kurdish families freezing to death on snow-covered mountainsides, evoking a swell of sympathy in Western countries. Tardily, the American, British and French governments were pressed by public opinion to help the Kurds. ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ (called ‘Operation Poised Hammer’ by the Americans) was activated to provide aid and ‘safe haven’ camps for Kurdish refugees. Iraqi troops were ordered to remain south of the 36th Parallel, and Allied combat planes monitored what became a no-fly zone over Kurdish terrain.
Under Allied and then United Nations encouragement and help, the Kurds held elections within in the ‘safe-haven’ zone.
The two main groups - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and its rival the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) - jointly formed an administration to govern what became known as the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR). In May 1994 cordiality broke down, and hostilities re-erupted between the two groups. This continues to rumble on, giving weight to the allegation that the Kurds are forever quarrelling amongst themselves.
Existing precariously under UN military protection, the Kurds fear that the Allies are about to abandon the defenceless KAR at a time when the Iraqi army is mustering just south of the 36th Parallel.
Meanwhile, the faction-ridden Turkey of the 1970s and 1980s was additionally plagued with a discontented Kurdish population that constantly bordered on open insurrection. Several Kurdish resistance groups were active, but one - the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Ocalan - came to dominate the Kurdish scene. By 1980 its military arm, the People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK), claimed a strength of some 12 000 guerrillas, who originally lived within the Kurdish community.
A Turkish military government (1980-3) cracked down on the PKK and its ARGK, killing many, making mass arrests, holding mass trials and (until 1983) carrying out mass executions. Survivors either went deeper underground or sought refuge across borders. Ocalan escaped and was given sanctuary by Syria, then in confrontation with Turkey over the distribution of the Euphrates waters and other matters. He was allowed to operate from Damascus, while remnants of his ARGK were housed in camps in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, then under Syrian control.
In 1984 Ocalan declared war on the Turkish government and demanded independence. As his ARGK recovered and grew in strength, it seeped back into southeastern Turkey to resume guerrilla activity, A very dirty war began and atrocities were committed by both sides. Amnesty International reports made horrific reading. The political section of the PKK established front organisations in Western European cities amongst Kurdish exiles, who issued propaganda and organised demonstrations to bring their cause to Western notice and attract support and sympathy.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Prime Minister (later President) Ozal of Turkey eagerly joined the Allied coalition. The Allies were allowed the use of Turkish bases, for which Ozal expected material reward in due course, his eyes being on the oil fields of Kirkuk. After Saddam Hussein’s technical defeat the Allies cooled towards Ozal and they certainly had no intention of rearranging international frontiers for his benefit.
Committed, and hopeful, Ozal assisted the Allies in Operation Provide Comfort, even though he was taking ruthless military action against his own Kurds. The ARGK became bolder, standing up to the Turkish army in the ‘dirty war’ but coming off second best in set-piece encounters. Eventually the ARGK was forced out of Turkey to seek sanctuary in the mountains of northern Iraq, which brought it into violent conflict with hostile Iraqi Kurds.
The PKK, which was regarded with some toleration by governments in Western Europe who were critical of the Turkish government’s record on democratic rule and human rights, found that its policy of largely peaceful demonstrations was proving unsuccessful. In June 1993 attacks were mounted on Turkish diplomatic and commercial premises, followed in November by a fire-bombing blitz on them. Western attitudes hardened and the PKK found itself under intense police scrutiny, whereupon Ocalan switched his attention to attacking Turkey’s booming multi-billion dollar tourist industry.
On several occasions Ocalan had sought political contact with the Turkish government, but he had always been ignored. Suddenly, in March 1993 he declared a unilateral cease-fire, by which time he had modified his political demand to that of autonomy. The Turkish army ignored the offer and battled on, but the ARGK remained passive, while the government seemed to sit back and ponder. This lull was abruptly shattered when the ARGK ambushed and massacred Turkish troops. The action was said to have been carried out by a maverick ARGK commander, without Ocalan’s authority.
In April 1994 the PKK again appealed for a dialogue, emphasising that it was not speaking from weakness and boasting that it now had over 30 000 armed guerrillas. There was no response from Ankara. The Turkish army knew it was doing well, and thinking it had got the ARGK on the run it had no intention of stopping, overlooking the fact that a military victory over the ARGK would not solve Turkey’s Kurdish problem.
Turkey is in a precarious internal position, plagued not only by the PKK but also by the revival of the powerful left-wing Dev Sol movement and a revitalised Islamic Fundamentalist Welfare Party, which seeks to establish Turkey as an Islamic state, similar to that in Iran, and which had unexpected successes in local elections.
As long as adjacent countries continue to give sanctuary to PKK activists the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey will remain almost unquenchable. Like the Kurds, Turkey has no real friends. Sustained by funds gained from controlling a piece of the main Asian-Caucasian-European drug route, the PKK can sustain its present tempo almost indefinitely. The same cannot be said for the Turkish government. A political solution means a form of autonomy within Turkey for its 12-14 million Kurds. An unlikely, but not impossible, future scenario could be one in which the PKK sides with the government against the Dev Sol and the Welfare Party, the PKK’s price being autonomy. Much will depend upon whether Ocalan is able to hold the PKK together, and on a steady political and military course.
Edgar O’balance
The Kurds: Approximate Numbers and Locations
Country / Total Population / Kurds
Turkey / 59 200 000 / 12-14 000 000
Iran / 58 900 000 / 6 500 000
Iraq / 18 400 000 / 3 500 000
Syria / 13 800 000 / 800 000
Armenia / 3 400 000 / 300 000
Lebanon / 2 700 000 / 60 000
Germany / 79 700 000 / 330 000
Elsewhere in the diaspora / 20 000
Total / 23 530 000
Sources: IISS, Kurdish Life, Kurdish Times, The Middle East.
Note that these figures represent a consensus of assessments and claims. Accuracy cannot be guaranteed, but in the absence of anything more reliable they form a rough guide.
Kurds are Muslims, some 85 per cent being of the mainstream Sunni sect, the remainder being Shia or other minority sects, such as Yezedi.
In the UN there are 135 nations whose people number less than the Kurds (Kurdish Life).
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