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FOREWORD
Andrew T. Parasiliti
Among the most important issues facing the Middle East, and US policy there, is the future of Iraq. Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States has sought to contain Iraq's military capabilities and regional ambitions in three ways: first, by a United Nations sanctions regime, which has limited Iraq’s ability to sell its oil. except for food and humanitarian supplies; second, through the work of the United Nations Special Commission to eliminate and monitor Iraq’s non-conventional weapons programs; and third, by US-enforced “no-fly” zones in northern and southern Iraq. Until 1996 and possibly beyond, the United States also sought to de-stabilize and. if possible, topple. Saddam Husayn’s government through Central Intelligance Agency (CIA) support for Iraqi opposition groups such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the National Accord. For the most part, these policies combined to limit Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors, and, therefore, were viewed as successful by their proponents.
Events in 1996 appeared to challenge US policy towards Iraq on a number of levels. In June. Iraqi government agents infiltrated the US-backed National Accord and exposed a plot from within Iraq's military to unseat Saddam Husayn. In August 1996, Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani invited Saddam Husayn's forces to assist the KDP in its battles with the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The re-introduction of Iraqi military forces into formerly opposition-controlled northern Iraq dealt a serious blow to US policy. The INC, whose political influence had declined since the outbreak of fighting between the PUK and the KDP in 1994. suffered a major setback. The organization lost its base in northern Iraq, 100 or so of its members were killed, and many others had to flee the region. These developments led CIA director John Deutsch to tell the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 19, 1996, that
We have to see that he [Saddam Husayn] has survived for six years.... [T]here is exactly that sense that he’s going to be there for a while and no political opposition in his own country has been permitted to emerge. Our other efforts have not been successful, so, yes, the answer is I think we do drink he’s going tentative.
Cracks also appeared in the regional and international coalition against Iraq. On the regional level, Arab governments expressed concern that a weak Iraq was itself a potential cause of regional instability. Which other country would, or could, balance Iran, for example? The plight of Iraq’s population under sanctions provoked widespread criticism of the policy throughout the Arab world on humanitarian grounds. At the international level, Russia, France and China—members of the UN Security Council—showed interest in developing commercial relations with Iraq, for example, by signing oil production-sharing agreements with Saddam Husayn's government. Although these contracts would begin only after sanctions were lifted, they provided an incentive to support an end to the sanctions regime. Both France and Russia had fairly extensive economic, military and political relations with Iraq prior to 1990. The developments of 1996 showed that while the coalition remained united on containing Iraq and limiting its weapons capabilities, there was less unity on whether or not the removal of Saddam Husayn should be a condition for the lifting of sanctions—an implicit, and increasingly explicit, condition of US policy.
In December 1996, Iraq accepted UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986. Sponsored by the United States, which allowed it to sell $2 billion worth of oil for food and medicine every six months. While the United Nations strictly controlled Iraq's revenues and expenditures under the agreement, the UN resolution, in addition to the events described above, gave the impression to some that Iraq, and Saddam Husayn, might be back in business.
Despite its strategic importance, including its rich oil reserves and resources, Iraq has generally been relegated to the back burner of Washington think tank and seminar topics. Little new information or creative analysis about the topic has been forthcoming. One reason is the long-standing difficulty of obtaining reliable "inside” information and analysis about Saddam Husayn’s Iraq. Iraqis who travel into and out of the country understandably shy away from public seminars. Many independent Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans also felt alienated by the course of US-Iraq relations, especially the sanctions policy. Therefore, the Iraqi participants at Washington policy forums about Iraq generally tended to be individuals affiliated with the established opposition groups such as the INC, PUK, and KDP.
Beginning in February 1997, the Middle East Institute (MEI) began a series of public and private seminars and conferences in order to stimulate discussion about the future of Iraq. In addition to respected US and international specialists on Iraq, these programs included analysts of Iraqi origin whose views had not often been heard in Washington policy forums. Our programs have also involved prominent members of the Clinton Administration. In March 1997, MEI and Georgetown University co-sponsored a conference on “Iraq: Challenges for the Second Clinton Administration,” which featured US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s first major policy address on Iraq, and is included in this volume (see appendix). Also appearing in this volume is the keynote address for MEI’s May 27-28 conference on “The Future of Iraq,” delivered by Bruce Riedel, special assistant to the president and director for Near East and South Asian Affairs of the US National Security Council.
This publication is the product of the May 27-28 conference. While the Middle East Institute does not take an institutional position on US policy towards the Middle East, we hope that the important papers published in this volume will contribute to a more informed and creative analytical dialogue about the future of Iraq.
Introduction
John Calabrese
The chapters in this volume explore the “Future of Iraq.” As all of the authors acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, trying to determine what lies ahead for Iraq is unusually difficult. Besides the normal risks entailed in making predictions, charting Iraq’s future is clouded by uncertainty as to how long sanctions will remain in place and how long Saddam Husayn will remain in power. Nevertheless, these authors also acknowledge that Iraq’s experiences during the 1970s and 1980s have had long term consequences for the country. Furthermore, the authors point out, Saddam and sanctions have already left a lasting imprint on Iraq, regardless of how much longer either one survives.
In the first two chapters, Adeed Dawisha and Isani Al-Khafaji examine Iraqi politics and evaluate the prospects for civil society. Dawisha reveals how Saddam Husayn's changing concepts and methods of rule have restructured Iraqi politics. He focuses on Saddam’s survival strategy, which has produced new political linkages. Dawisha argues that Saddam’s system of rule has accentuated sub-national differences, thereby undermining Iraqi national identity and dimming the prospects for vibrant and peaceful political participation by various segments of Iraq’s population.
Al-Khafaji states explicitly that the formation of Iraqi civil society under successive republican regimes was incomplete. He points out that Ba’athist rulers were more successful dismantling, subordinating or suppressing traditional autonomous associations than in helping to construct new ones. He argues that, under Saddam, the progressive atomization of Iraqi society has continued. Al-Khafaji asserts that Iraqis are linked individually to the regime, and that the divisions within Iraq’s fragmented society cut across ethnic and sectarian lines. In the absence of collective organizations and societal consensus, Al-Khafaji regards the prospects for democracy in Iraq in the short term to be grim.
The next three chapters deal with the future of Iraq’s economy. Sarah Graham-Brown concentrates on the costs that war and sanctions have imposed on Iraqi society and development prospects. She maintains that the authoritarian nature of successive Iraqi regimes, and the social and economic structures that they had erected prior to 1980, rendered Iraq vulnerable. Graham-Brown documents how war and sanctions have adversely affected the various segments of Iraq’s population in different ways. She also observes signs of change in Iraqi attitudes towards, for example, education. Graham-Brown maintains that the lack of access to basic services, coupled with the devaluation of the importance of education, may have a long term adverse impact on Iraq’s economic development.
Recognizing the centrality of the energy sector in Iraq’s economy, Issam A. R. Al-Chalabi discusses the prospects for the recovery and expansion of the petroleum industry. He considers the revival of Iraq's oil industry as indispensable to its economic recovery and prosperity, but regards this as a daunting task. Nevertheless, Al-Chalabi cites evidence of Iraq’s huge energy potential, and documents the regime’s recent successful negotiation with foreign companies of preliminary contracts to restore and expand oil production capacity.
Sinan Al-Shabibi's analysis is concerned less with the prospects for recovery of Iraq’s energy sector perse, than with the prospects for the growth of the Iraqi economy as a whole. While recognizing the importance of the petroleum industry, Al-Shabibi focuses on the availability of financial resources to propel this growth. Al-Shabibi constructs several scenarios to test the hypothesis that relief—partial or total—from debt service, compensation and reparations obligations is necessary to ensure that Iraq achieves at least a modest level of growth.
The third set of chapters examines Iraq's foreign relations at the regional and international levels. The chapter by Giandomenico Picco explores Iraq's future in terms of the ongoing struggle between Iraqi authorities and members of the international community. From Picco’s perspective. Iraq is waging a battle on many fronts—military, economic and political—with a diverse group of countries. Picco argues that, although sanctions have severely constrained Iraq, they have not permanently jeopardized the country’s future. According to Picco. once sanctions are lifted, opportunities for Iraq’s physical and political recovery will surface because of the assets the country possesses and the competing interests of neighboring countries and others.
The chapter by Ahmad Hashim concentrates on Iraq’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Hashim traces Iraq's rise to. and fall from, the status of a regional superpower. On the one hand. Hashim demonstrates that despite its current problems. Iraq will remain a key player in the Middle East strategic balance of power. On the other hand, he shows that the external pressures upon, and the unresolved differences between, Iraq and its neighbors will limit the extent of improvements in their relations.
Paul Wolfowitz examines US policy towards Iraq since the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In reviewing Bush and Clinton administration policies towards Iraq, Wolfowitz contends that the United States has been reluctant to identify Saddam Husayn as the key problem in US-Iraq relations. He shows how this reluctance, coupled with a number of missed opportunities to precipitate or prevent events that might have led to Saddam’s fall from power, have narrowed US options in dealing with Iraq. Wolfowitz suggests alternatives to the current US policy towards Iraq, though he regards the shift from a strictly sanctions-based approach to be unlikely.
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