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INTRODUCTION
Now look at the number of newspapers and magazines that are currently being published in Iran. What country has so many newspapers and magazines'? And they write whatever they wish.
—Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei February 199 J1
We are not opposed to the cinema, to radio, or to television; what we oppose is vice and the use of media to keep our young people in a state of backwardness and dissipate their energies.
—Late Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini February 19791 2
The apparent intensity of public debate, variety of publications and the wealth of artistic achievements in the Islamic Republic of Iran create an illusion of unrestricted discourse. But the limits of expression are defined in complex and often arbitrary ways by a government beset by internal power struggles and intolerance. The artistic and intellectual community’s resistance to state-imposed censorship has produced some relaxation of control since the early 1980s. But the parameters of what is permitted tend to shift quickly, in response to pressures within the ruling movement. It is never clear whether what can be said, written or filmed today will be cause for financial ruin, arrest or other punishment tomorrow.
The large-scale purges of academics and killings of dissidents, including writers, journalists and artists, that characterized the years following the 1979 revolution have not continued. Public debate has become somewhat more free and publications somewhat more various in recent years. Many of the government’s domestic and foreign policies are criticized in newspapers, although only by fellow partisans of the ruling movement. In some arenas, notably film, artistic achievement in the past decade has been astounding.
Despite these improvements, however, the limits of discourse are strictly defined, and the range of speakers is limited to the various factions of the ruling elite. There are no independent newspapers. Books and films are issued a release permit only after passing a rigorous process of political vetting. The moral character of magazine editors must be approved by the government, and every issue of a magazine must be submitted to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance after publication. Magazines are generally precluded from covering political issues and offering overt social criticism. In the case of "undesirable" stories, the magazine risks official closure, and its staff can face imprisonment and prosecution. Journalists are generally considered a suspect group and have the minimum of job security. They are restricted by forbidden realms of news - until such time as that news filters in through foreign broadcasts and publications. Artists and intellectuals run the risks of personal ruin, censorship or banning, and detention.
Laws are applied selectively and inconsistently, and there is uncertainty as to the governing norms. Hard-sought government permits provide no guarantee for the continued existence and distribution of the work approved or the protection of the artist or intellectual involved. The criticism of influential pressure groups can become an extrajudicial "public prosecution" of the artist or intellectual; on the other hand, legal prosecution is often conducted in disregard of the legal provisions and guarantees of domestic law. The accused are indicted under broad and all-encompassing charges such as "moral corruption," "anti-revolutionary behavior" and "siding with global arrogance."
The ineffectiveness of the legal system is combined with an element of anarchy, which directly threatens the artistic and intellectual community. Gangs of motorcycle riders or other vigilantes trash magazine offices and publishing houses and threaten lives as self- proclaimed enforcers of the law, in the name of protecting Islamic values. This they do with the evident tolerance of the authorities, without fear of prosecution. Vilification campaigns orchestrated by the state-affiliated press commonly assign intellectuals and artists such labels as submissive
servant of imperialism, activist of Communism, panegyrist of the Pahlavi regime and agent of SAVAK, the deposed Shah’s secret police.
The ebbs and flows of control and censorship, however, reflect interfactional conflicts. Forms of expression in Iran, whether book, film or a woman’s head cover, are invested with political significance; they may signal a loosening of control and increased tolerance of diverse views and values, or the converse. In striking at an author or film director, political factions aim at each other in their perpetual struggle for political power. Film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, in a letter to the state- affiliated press regarding its "public prosecution" of him and his work, stated:
The writer of these columns knows well that these arguments have nothing to do with him. The fight is over nothing other than the struggles between the different factions who seek power.3
Subsequent to the "public prosecution," his work was banned.
In this report, which covers primarily the period 1989-1993, Middle East Watch examines the various mechanisms of state control of expression and presents more than sixty individual cases (and one group case involving 162 persons) of Iranian writers, filmmakers, journalists and intellectuals who have been imprisoned, prosecuted or otherwise punished for the content of their work or whose work has been banned and censored. The breadth of censorship goes well beyond the cases examined here; these only serve to illustrate tactics of direct and often violent pressure by vigilante groups, of vilification campaigns, of formal censorship, and of the power play between different pressure groups within the ruling elite. The report’s focus is on artistic and journalistic expression, but we also include material on some well-known cases of suppressed political expression. Also included are general assessments of the academic environment and Iranian cultural heritage.
Our analysis of mechanisms of state control includes nominally non-governmental pressure groups and entities, such as foundations and newspapers. Power struggles within Iran’s ruling elite and the lack of centralized authority mean that elements as diverse as semi-autonomous foundations led by influential clergy4 and state-affiliated newspapers aligned with different political factions5 play a pivotal role in defining how journalists, writers and artists may express themselves on issues of personal and political importance. The government’s role in institutionalizing control and censorship ranges from the deliberate unleashing of the more uncompromising pressure groups to taking shelter behind a real or purported inability to counter their force and will.
The Iranians whose cases are described in this report have little organized support in their home country, yet most of them continue to speak out. The relaxation of censorship during Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Khatami’s tenure (1989-1992) was largely their doing, the product of their persistent and often lonely protests. Since Khatami’s resignation, however, even those small gains are newly endangered. The marks of his more conservative successor, Ali Larijani, a former deputy minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and close ally of Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, are already apparent in the workings of the Ministry and, more generally, an atmosphere of renewed restriction to which numerous sources for this report attested. Two signs of this shift are the cancellation of invitations issued to the organizers of Western international film festivals to attend the Iranian Fajr Film Festival in February 1993, and increasingly frequent, unchecked vigilante attacks against the press and publishing houses in the past year. Another is the recent, severe crackdown on "vice and social corruption" in Tehran, which has included the arrests of more than 500 women in late June and ongoing arrests through July. The women were arrested for violations of the dress code such as wearing sunglasses; 300 men were also held for wearing short-sleeved,T-shirts.6
Mechanisms of Control
Limits on freedom of expression in Iran defy simple definition. It is not possible to trace censorship to any single source within the government structure. Rather, there often exists no regulation relevant to the "offense" at hand, and in a given case the Anti-Narcotics Section of the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor, the Ministry of Intelligence, a state- affiliated newspaper or a semi-autonomous foundation has as much de facto power to monitor expression as the government’s designated official for this function, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.
In certain cases, censorship is accomplished by official banning orders, or through imprisonment and mistreatment of offenders. In most cases, the means of control are more subtle and indirect. The government exercises control "unofficially" through binding "suggestions" and "advice." Official orders are delivered orally and individuals directed to write them down in their own handwriting — leaving no official paper trail. Other forms of government control include distribution of paper for books and newspapers, and setting prices for books and admission to films. The financial loss associated with books banned after publication and films banned after production also serves as an effective tool of government retribution.
To implement its censorship policies, the government relies on a variety of nongovernmental players. A common means of control and censorship are unchecked vigilante attacks against the press and publishing houses. In the 1992-1993 period alone, there have been at least nine such attacks in Tehran. At any time, any piece of work may become the object of attacks orchestrated primarily through the mass media for being anti-Islamic and anti-revolutionary, regardless of whether the work has been previously approved by the government and issued a permit. Crowds of angry protestors or hezbollahi7 may appear in the streets, vilifying the targeted individual, destroying and looting property, deriding "lax" government policies and demanding strict official retribution. These crowds often gather at the invitation of the state- affiliated media and generally act without meaningful police restraint or fear of prosecution.
Some officials may object to the hezbollahis’ tactics, but blaming the victim is also common. In early June 1993, after sixty motorcyclists attacked a magazine, a spokesman for the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance told the newspaper Salam, "We cannot stop them, but we also do not approve of their attitude and behavior." On the other hand, he said, "our publications should behave in a way not to offend the sentiments of the hezbollahis."8
Officials who take a stronger stance in defending expression are subject to attack themselves. For a system that lays claim to embodiment of Islamic principles, charges that one is anti-Islamic and antirevolutionary carry great power. Especially in a government as divided within itself as that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such charges serve as an effective way of putting state officials on the defensive. Once a politically-created jaw? signals a sufficient level of instability and outrage within the ruling elite, the government responds by banning work, often previously approved, and imprisoning and prosecuting the individuals responsible. The accusation of who is more Islamic reverberates widely and strongly not only against the secular but the determinedly devout.
As anarchic as the process may appear, there is no evading censorship in Iran. Any person can become the indirect agent of censorship, be it the book publisher or the film producer who rejects or modifies work that may in any fashion be controversial out of fear of unbearable financial sanctions imposed by the government, and of prosecution. The artist or intellectual also is caught in the grip of selfcensorship, remembering colleagues who in the past have lost their lives or liberty for their ideas, and facing everyday fear and uncertainty. The role of self-censorship in Iran cannot be underestimated. The hands of the government need descend on relatively few to silence many others.
Scope of Controls
Expression that poses a serious threat to the supremacy of the prevailing system — by reaching large or crucial segments of society or by propagating alternate systems of thought and governance — is not tolerated. On such matters, the government speaks with a single voice and decisively.
Freedom to organize political parties not aligned with the government and the freedom of such parties to express political views are strictly and uniformly prohibited, despite the constitutional guarantee of free association. Political speech that is genuinely independent or critical of the government is not tolerated. Offenders are sentenced before the Islamic Revolutionary Courts to long prison terms. There are also a large number of political executions in Iran.10
The Constitution places radio and television under the direct supervision of the religious leader and the three branches of government. Radio and television in Iran, a country that is forty-eight percent illiterate,11 exclusively promote government policy, and the content of their programs is predominantly religious.
Educational control is also considered crucial to the government’s consolidation of power. The faculty and curricula of all teaching institutions were purged and Tslamicized" during the revolution’s first years, to ensure the ideological purity of the information available to young people. Universities, traditional centers of dissent under the monarchy, were closed for two years and, upon their reopening, were reserved for students ardently committed to the values of the revolution and the Islamic government. While ideological and character screening has abated in recent years, especially at the undergraduate level, it remains a persistent feature of the Iranian educational system for graduate and post-graduate studies. Since the reopening of the universities, approximately forty percent of student admittance has been reserved for released prisoners of war, the revolutionary guards, paramilitary volunteers (bassiji) and the relatives of martyrs. These students serve as the "eyes and ears" of the government authorities and report on those teachers and fellow students suspected of harboring anti- Islamic or anti-regime sentiments.
Denial and distortion of the Iran’s pre-Islamic cultural heritage have also been strong components of the government’s agenda. Celebration of the Iranian New Year, Nowruz, or the ancient Zoroastrian "fire festival" Chahar Shanbeh Soori was impeded by the authorities for years. This has also meant that literary giants whose work is not in line with the prevailing value system have been either banned outright, de- emphasized or reinterpreted. Significant public resistance has forced the government to abandon much of its original agenda, yet certain of its elements persist. Parents, for example, are denied a birth certificate if they plan to give their newborn child a name that connotes Iran’s pre- Islamic or monarchical past.
The barriers of intolerance and control are compounded in the case of women. Women artists and intellectuals, and the depiction of women in art, are subject to severe constraints arising from tradition and superstition. While these impulses have strong social bases, the government has manipulated these traditions wherever possible to tighten controls and promote its preferred value system. Post-revolutionary law bars women from a number of fields in education and educated professions such as engineering, and severely restricts their personal freedoms. For example, after the 1934 mandatory unveiling imposed by Reza Shah, Iranian women must once again endure the excesses of the state, this time the mandatory veiling imposed since the revolution.
The scope of government control and censorship, as is well known, has extended across continents and oceans by way of a religious edict or fatwa. Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 death sentence against novelist Salman Rushdie and all others associated with the publication of his book The Satanic Verses has already led to the murder of the novel’s Japanese translator and the attempted murder of its Italian translator. Since the issuance of the fatwa, Rushdie himself has been forced to live in hiding. Iranians in exile who have supported Rushdie’s right to expression, by openly condemning the death sentence against him, have been threatened with death as well, their work has been banned in Iran and their publishers threatened with reprisals.
Vigilante attacks and vilification campaigns in the state-affiliated press do not stop with criticism of the work deemed offensive or even character assassination of the artist or intellectual but extend as well to government officials, usually those within the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and even occasionally the President, and call into question their legitimacy to govern. In one instance reported here, employees of the Ministry were prosecuted alongside writers and publishers whose ’’anti-revolutionary" work they had approved.
The resignation of Mohammad Khatami, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, in July 1992 was brought about by such attacks. Khatami was an outspoken opponent of lawlessness and the influence of vigilante groups. His three-year term was a period of relative freedom for cultural and artistic endeavors, and in response to this, he was harshly criticized by hard-line newspapers such as Keyhan and by Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. In his letter of resignation, submitted on May 24, 1992, he explained his departure by citing "the climate of insecurity that increasingly bedevils cultural activities" in Iran, warning that this situation threatened to condemn "intellectuals, artists and even faithful friends of the Islamic Revolution" to "indifference."12
Background
Four periods of relative freedom of expression in Iranian modern history were the constitutional movement of 1905-1911; the years following the abdication from power of Reza Shah in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, from 1941-1953; a period of political crisis from 1960-1963; and the revolutionary era from March 1978 to mid-1980. Each period ended as the ruling powers consolidated their power. Censorship and control are deeply rooted in Iran. Many who are censored, imprisoned and exiled today were similarly punished in the past.
In some respects, however, the current situation is unique. The nature of censorship in Iran cannot be separated from the system of governance established since the revolution of 1979 based on velayat-i faqih or the "guardianship of the jurisprudent."13 Velayat-i faqih presupposes a need for supreme guidance in the average person’s conduct of everyday affairs, and considers that the faqih is uniquely qualified to provide such guidance, dictating the single acceptable way of life or value system consistent with Shi’a Islam. Fundamental is the belief that every good and pious citizen, like a child, may be steered wrong by a "perverse" word, film or music, and thus what the citizen reads, sees and hears must be closely monitored by the governing authorities. Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in this regard:
If someone should ask you, "Why has God, the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?" you should answer him as follows: . . . ”[M]en would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others."14
Thus, censorship in Iran is not only proscriptive but also prescriptive. The Iranian writer, journalist, film director or painter is required to steer clear of sensitive topics, such as critical and candid assessment of the system of government, sources of authority and Islam. Additionally, however, he or she must write, direct or draw in a manner that conforms with the prevailing value system. In fact, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Press Law of 1985 place on every Iranian citizen an affirmative duty to serve the prevailing Islamic value system and promote the "public good," as construed by the government.
The process of content control on the basis of Islamic principles, however, is complicated by the fact that Islam itself is subject to differing interpretations. In an interview with the magazine Cineaste, film director Abbas Kiarostami stated:
[I]n Iran, everyone has a completely different interpretation. They’re free to think what they want. The danger comes when someone wants to say, "No, my interpretation is the only right one.”15
The divergent interpretations of Islam are mirrored in the divisions within the governing elite — especially as regards expression.
Legal Framework
The laws governing public discourse in Iran provide no effective protection for dissent or even deviation. The Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of expression is crippled by exceptions requiring compliance with "the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public." The Press Law adds further debilitating exceptions. Provisions in both instruments, apart from setting the limits of discourse, also dictate its content: every citizen has the duty, in all aspects of his or her life, "to enjoin the good and forbid the evil," a Koranic phrase for the framework of the moral life. The press may not publish material that promotes "prostitution" or "wastefulness" or "harms the bases of the Islamic Republic." Even eligibility to start a publication, under the Press Law, is limited to those who exhibit "moral fitness" for that function.
The Constitutional and Press Law provisions requiring that press offenses be tried openly and in the presence of a jury were ignored until 1992. In that year, the two separate trials of the editors of the magazines Farad and Gardoon were conducted in general courts and in the presence of the press jury. The press jury consists of clergy, government officials and editors of state-affiliated press. In one of these cases the initial stages of prosecution, prior to trial, were marked by violations of the Press Law and by the involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor.
Books, non-journalistic publications and films are regulated separately. Vaguely-worded requirements in the regulations on book publication make authors responsible for "guarding the positive outcomes of the Islamic revolution" and forbid them from writing anything that "profanes and denies the meanings of religion." A commission under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance oversees the publication of books and other printed matter. Filmmakers, on the other hand, are overseen by four councils within the Ministry -- one to review a summary of the screenplay, one to review the full screenplay, one to review the completed film and issue or withhold a release permit, and the fourth to review, occasionally, films denied a release permit. Forbidden topics in film include any that "denies or weakens the principles of Islam," "depicts foreign culture, politics, economy or society in a misleading manner," or "presents any material that is against the interests of the country."16
In the meantime, a number of offenses related to the press, writers and intellectuals based on the content of their work remained unlawfully before the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Islamic Revolutionary Courts were instituted as a temporary measure to process the large numbers of people arrested in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. They have since become a permanent feature of the Iranian legal system, and are notorious for their disregard of international standards of due process and for their harsh sentences. The government invokes the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts in offenses which, in its opinion, are not punished severely enough by the general court — disregarding the jurisdictional limits of these courts under domestic law. Thus, journalists and intellectuals may be prosecuted for the content of their work under the general rubric of acting "against internal or external security."
Cases
This report covers more than sixty incidents involving the prosecution, imprisonment or harassment of writers, filmmakers, journalists and intellectuals based on the content of their work. A few cases serve as illustrative.
The most widely known example of Iranian censorship is Ayatollah Khomeini’s issuance of a religious edict or fatwa against a non- Iranian writer living outside Iran in response to the content of a novel. On February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses, and all others associated with its publication were sentenced to death for apostasy and that it was a duty incumbent on every Muslim to enforce this sentence.
The day after the edict, Hojatoleslam Hassan Sane’i, the head of the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation, offered a bounty of $ 1 million to whomever carried out the death sentence; since then, the bounty has been twice increased, once in March 1991 to $2 million and again in February 1993 by an unspecified amount. Meanwhile, agents of the fatwa struck on different continents: in July 1991 both the novel’s Japanese translator, Hitoshi Igarashi, and its Italian translator, Ettore Capriolo, were stabbed by unknown assailants - the former fatally. Since 1989, Rushdie has lived in hiding and under police protection. Four years later, the fatwa remains in force and has been reiterated by leading Iranian government officials and by vote of its parliament.
Less well known are the reprisals against Iranians, living in exile, who have opposed the fatwa. On the third anniversary of the edict, a group of fifty Iranian writers, intellectuals and professionals in exile in Europe and the United States issued a declaration condemning the death sentence. In response, Ayatollah Janatti, a member of the Council of Guardians,17 banned the works of all those signatories to the declaration. The newspaper Jumhouri-ye Islami, affiliated with Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, announced that those Iranians who spoke against the fatwa had joined the list of "infidels" deserving of the death sentence. Nevertheless, by the fourth anniversary of the edict, in February 1993, the number of signatories had increased to 162. The government has effectively banned the works of all the current signatories.
Two of Iran’s best-known artists have been particularly outspoken critics of the Islamic Republic’s censorship and harassment policies - of which they themselves are targets. In the case of Ali-Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, a writer and social critic, the government initially notified him that it had no objection to his work. After eight of his books were published, however, the government banned their release, thereby imposing an unbearable financial burden on him, his family and his publishers. All his other work is now also banned.
Film director Bahrain Beizai has also suffered under government- imposed financial constraints and self-censorship. In response to influential pressure groups, the government required extensive modification of his most recent film, Mosaferan (Travelers) — after having previously censored, issued an approval permit and even given an award to the film. He was denied the right to travel with another of his films to an international film festival in 1992, the screening of which was approved by the Iranian government. For thirteen years, he has been unable to work in the theater due to the withdrawal of his work permit.
Prison, fifty lashes and the prospect of further imprisonment are the price that cartoonist Manouchehr Karimzadeh has paid since the April 1992 banning of the science magazine Farad, which carried a drawing of an apparently crippled soccer player who, for some readers, resembled the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Tried not in general court as required for press offenses but in the Islamic Revolutionary Court, as if he had attacked national security, Karimzadeh was sentenced to one year in prison for having created that drawing. In blatant disregard for his rights, almost at the end of his prison term, the Supreme Court "revoked" his sentence and required that he be "re-tried." A trial date has yet to be announced.
Women artists and intellectuals, and the depiction of women in art, are subject to especially strict constraints, and any deviation from government norms is treated with severity. Shahrnoush Parsipour, a novelist of much acclaim, was twice imprisoned by the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor for her book Zanan Bedoun-e Mardan (Women Without Men), once with her publisher Mohammad-Reza Aslani. They were tried in the general courts along with two officials of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance who had reviewed and issued a permit for her book, and all four were acquitted. Despite their acquittal, Aslani’s publishing house, Nashr-e Nogreh, was bombed by vigilantes, and Parsipoor’s work remains banned.
Another woman novelist, Moniroo Ravanipoor, who draws her inspiration from Iranian folk tales, started experiencing censorship with the banning of her book Sanghay Sheytan (Devil’s Stones) after vehement attacks in the press in 1990. After this banning, her previously published work was subject to more intensive scrutiny and censorship at subsequent printings. Her book Kanizoo was banned in 1991 at its third printing; it was published in 1993 after twenty months of negotiated modifications.
Historical, literary and cultural texts not in line with the prevailing ideology are revised, reinterpreted or banned outright. The life-long work of Ahmad Shamlu, a renowned modern poet, has been banned on this basis. His Ketab-e Koucheh (Book of the Street) is a compilation of 120 volumes of popular Persian sayings, slang and proverbs. The popular lexicon in Iran has strong secular and anti-clerical elements.
Mohsen Makhmalbaf entered the film industry after the revolution with a history of imprisonment under the Shah and strong hezbollahi convictions. But, when his fourth and fifth films examined the poverty and hopelessness of daily life for some Iranians, official attitudes hardened: two of his later films were banned and a third censored. Most recently, Makmalbaf sought the film board’s approval for a script on the 1991 Gulf war, and it was rejected partly on the grounds that it had not sufficiently focused on the plight of the Shi’a people. (Iran’s population is overwhelmingly Shi’a, as is its ruling clergy.)
The government, acutely aware of the influence of the foreign news media, generally treats foreign journalists well once they are allowed to enter the country. Iranian journalists working for foreign news organizations, however, are particularly vulnerable to government pressure and manipulation. With the permission of the government, Iranian photojournalist Kaveh Golestan prepared a video on the situation of journalists working in Iran, which presented an unvarnished portrait of the constraints on expression. He lost his journalist card in June 1992 after the video was broadcast in England and its transcript published by the free-expression group Index on Censorship. He has also been prevented from leaving Iran. The government has not indicated the basis for its ongoing "investigation" of Golestan and the cancellation of his accreditation.
Jahangir Jahanbagloo, an Iranian journalist, had his journalist card canceled by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in November 1992. He has been the official representative of the American television network NBC in Iran since 1991. Over the past nine months, the Ministry has failed to provide any meaningful explanation for its cancellation of his accreditation. The financial consequences to Jahanbagloo have been serious.
Upon his return to Iran to cover a news report for a foreign television network, an Iranian freelance cameraman, Bahrain Molaie, was arrested in 1987. Without being charged or tried for any offense, he was imprisoned for forty-five days, and his accreditation was canceled. Long after his release from prison, in 1991, the government informed him that there was nothing in his file, and that it was now closed. He is still unable to work as a journalist in Iran, however.
The Press Law, passed in 1985, was applied for the first time in 1992 for the prosecution of two magazines editors before the general courts and with a press jury. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor was unlawfully involved in the preliminary stages of one case. In both instances, government prosecutions were initiated as a follow-up to mob attacks against the offices of the magazines.
Nasser Arabha, editor of the science magazine Farad, was imprisoned pending trial, then tried and sentenced to six months imprisonment on the charge of "acting against internal security." Farad had published a cartoon deemed by the government to be insulting to Ayatollah Khomeini. The magazine remains banned.
The Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor, exceeding his mandate and usurping the functions of the general courts, indicted Abbas Maroufi, editor of the cultural magazine Gardoon, for insulting and spreading rumors against the holy system and propagating monarchical culture, and banned the magazine. The cover of the August 1992 issue of Gardoon was deemed anti-revolutionary. Although finally acquitted in criminal court, Maroufi was not able to resume publication of the magazine immediately after trial. A government representative "unofficially" informed him that he should not publish his magazine until the jaw was more appropriate, and that the government could not be responsible for his life if he defied the suggestion. The magazine subsequently resumed publication.
Recently, one magazine was banned and another attacked by unchecked vigilantes on political grounds.
In April 1993, the magazine Rah-e Mojahed published by Lotfollah Meissami was banned for printing statements by Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. At one time the designated successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri is now an opponent and critic of Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rafsanjani.
In May 1993, the office of the scientific magazine Kiyan was attacked by a group of motorcycle riders who called for the closure of the magazine and the death of its editor, Reza Tehran!. At issue was an interview the magazine had published with Mehdi Bazargan, the former Prime Minister and head of the banned political organization Nehzat- Azadi (Freedom Movement).
Recommendations
To the extent that the atmosphere for expression in Iran has improved since the early years of the revolution, a large measure of credit must go to the Iranians who have been determined to continue speaking, writing, creating and thinking as they choose. Yet recent indications are that even this small opening may be closing up again. The Iranian government must change its policies to protect their right of free expression, both through legal provisions that guarantee protection and through the punishment of acts that seek to undermine that protection.
1) To the government of Iran
Middle East Watch calls upon the Iranian government to amend its laws so as to comply with international legal standards on freedom of expression:
- Amend the Constitution to remove those portions that restrict the exercise of free expression (e.g. Arts. 9 and 24), such that speech is protected consistent with international instruments to which Iran is a party;
- Replace the existing Press Law with legislation whose definition of libel and registration requirements for publications do not infringe on protected speech and freedom of opinion.
Furthermore, in order to bring state conduct into conformity with international law, Middle East Watch calls on the government of Iran to: •Abolish book and film censorship boards;
- Cease all legal actions against newspaper editors, journalists, writers, publishers and political activists that are based on criticism or deviation from government policy;
- Bring about the rescission of Ayatollah Khomeini’s/aZwo against Salman Rushdie and others associated with the publication of The Satanic Verses, and the cancellation of the bounty offered by the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation for the murder of the author.
- Bring about the rescission of the fatwa as extended to the 162 Iranian signatories to the declaration condemning the death sentence against Rushdie; and annul official restrictions on the presentation and publication of their works in Iran;
- Prosecute vigilante groups that attack and destroy property and threaten lives in cases involving the press, book publishers and other targets chosen in reprisal for their views;
- End the use of government-distributed paper (e.g. for books and the press) and government-set prices (e.g. for books and film) as means of control and censorship;
- Issue all government orders and directives officially and in writing; •Abolish ideologically-based criteria for admission to university.
In order to encourage free and diverse expression, Middle East Watch calls on the government to:
- Allow non-governmental voices access to state-owned radio and television;
- Permit the establishment of independent radio and television stations;
- Permit the establishment and circulation of privately-owned and -published newspapers and political magazines.
Finally, Middle East Watch urges Iran to reverse its recent policy of denying entry to the U.N. Special Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl.
2) To the European Community
Middle East Watch calls upon the European Community to:
- Adopt a Community-wide position that decisions regarding any EC aid and aid from individual member states to the Iranian government - other than that for humanitarian purposes — will be linked to grave abuses of the right to free expression, including the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and those associated with The Satanic Verses and the bounty for Rushdie’s murder, and the Iranian government’s arbitrary detentions and prosecutions of journalists, writers, filmmakers and artists on the basis of their opinions, as well as violent intimidation of such persons by groups that operate with impunity;
- Pass a strong resolution highlighting the overlooked plight of those Iranian artists and intellectuals whose right to free expression inside Iran is seriously curtailed, and of the 162 exiled Iranian writers and artists who have publicly condemned the fatwa. The Council of Ministers should warn Iran that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists and intellectuals living in EC member countries will be treated as an attack on any EC citizen; and
- Use the leverage provided by its growing trade and investment links with Iran, to press Iranian officials to permit a broad range of political and artistic expression.
3) To other trading partners of Iran
Middle East Watch urges these nations, in particular Japan, to:
- Use the leverage provided by their trade and investment contacts with Iran, to press Iranian officials to permit a broad range of political and artistic expression; and
- Warn Iran that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists and intellectuals living in their national territories will be treated as an attack on a citizen of their countries.
4) To the United States
Middle East Watch urges the U.S. government to add to its already strong position on Iran the public declaration that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists and intellectuals living in the United States will be treated as an attack on a U.S. citizen.
1 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 1993, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia Daily Report [hereinafter FBIS], February 8, 1993.
2 Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations (London: KPI Limited, 1985) (Hamid Algar trans.), p. 254.
3 Film (Iran), March 1991, p. 125.
4 Some foundations in Iran, such as Bonyad-e Mostazafin (Foundation of the Dispossessed), led by Mohsen Rafiq-Doost, the former minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, are explicitly recognized as government agencies. Others, such as Sazman Tabligath Islami (Islamic Propagation Organization), led by Hojatoleslam Ahmad Jannati — also a member of the influential Council of Guardians - and Bonyad-e Poonzdah Khordad (Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation), led by Hojatoleslam Hassan Sane’i, are nominally independent entities. Despite this distinction, most foundations are headed by influential clergy, and share the common goal of preserving and promoting the Islamic system and values. Also, they all find their origin in the aftermath to the 1979 revolution, when the new government bequeathed property it had confiscated to the private ownership of foundations, to be administered by their leadership.
These foundations have since become independent and influential decisionmaking
bodies, accountable to no government entity and sustained by their access to large amounts of capital. We refer to them collectively and for the sake of simplicity as semi-autonomous foundations.
5 Chapter 2 assesses the political affiliation and state sponsorship of each of the eleven national dailies.
6 New York Times, June 23, 1993, p. A4, and Iran Times, July 2, 1993, p. 1.
7 Hezbollahi literally means "the partisans of God." They see themselves as followers of the path of Ayatollah Khomeini.
8 Agence France-Presse, June 3, 1993, as reported in FBIS, June 4, 1993.
9 In Persian, jam means atmosphere. This term has gained particular currency and significance in Iran since the revolution in reflection of the government’s frequent and explicit reliance on the "public" mood and atmosphere in its policy making and application of the law. In order to better capture this phenomenon, the term jam will be used in this report.
10 It is extremely difficult to be precise about these cases. However, Amnesty International has estimated at least 2,500 political executions in 1988, the highest number for any year since the immediate post-revolutionary period. For 1991, AI documented 775 executions, of which at least sixty were the result of convictions on political charges; and for 1992,330 executions of which at least 140 of the executed had been formally charged with political offenses.
11 The Europa World Yearbook 1992 (London: Europa Publications, 1992), Vol. I, p. 1422.
12 Agence France-Presse, July 18, 1992, as reported in FBIS, July 20, 1992. President Rafsanjani had refused to accept a previous resignation offer, but was eventually compelled to bow to the tide of hard-line opinion.
13 A jurisprudent is one learned in the principles and ordinances of law; a faqih is a jurisprudent of Islamic law and faith.
14
Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 52.
15 Miriam Rosen, "The Camera of Art: An Interview with Abbas Kiarostami," Cineaste, Vol. XIX, Nos. 2-3, December 1992, p. 39.
16 Regulations translated by Middle East Watch.
17 The Council of Guardians is an influential government entity, composed of six qualified Muslim jurists and six lay Muslim lawyers. It supervises elections and examines legislation adopted by the parliament, ensuring that it accords with the Constitution and with Islamic precepts.
1
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
International Law
As a member of the international community of nations and as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 Iran is bound by universal norms guaranteeing freedom of expression. The Iranian government of President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is in violation of these norms.
Article 19 of the Covenant reads in part:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
Violations of Article 19 must be punished by the government "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity (Article 2(3)(a))." The government is required to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated shall have an effective remedy, which includes adopting "such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized" in the Covenant (Art. 2(2)). It also provides that a "competent judicial, administrative or legislative" authority determine the rights of a person claiming such remedy; and that a "competent" authority enforce such remedies when granted (Art. 2(3)).
Furthermore, Article 17 protects individuals against unlawful attacks on their dignity and property by anyone and imposes on the government a duty to safeguard this right. Article 17 reads:
.....
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was signed by Iran on April 4, 1968, and ratified on June 24, 1975.
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