

SECULARISM IN TURKEY

PAST AND PRESENT

Dođu Ergil



FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE

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FOREWORD

Turkish secularism has been a most misunderstood concept both in the East and the West. A certain section of public opinion in the West consider the role of religion in Turkish socio-political and cultural life similar to those in the middle eastern countries and are tempted to see the future of Turkey in religious fundamentalism and dismiss social reforms that have been carried out in Turkey as ill-fitting attires.

Adversely, considerable section of the middle eastern public opinion, regard the supporters of secularism in Turkey, as "bad muslims", if not "infidels" and Turkey's efforts to join the European Community as a near "betrayal" of Islamic religion and solidarity.

Yet, Turkey owes its democracy, economic development and social progress, to a great measure, to the secular nature of its state and tolerant character of its people. It is no wonder that a large number of young middle eastern scholars look on Turkish type of secularism as a precondition to achieve democracy and economic progress; hence, Turkey provides a paradigm to be emulated, especially because of religious reformation in Islam has never been welcome by anyone.

In reality, however, Turkish people are neither "atheists" nor "bad muslims". They share the Islamic belief and ethics and practice it. The separation of religion from state did not come about in Turkey as a fancy idea. It evolved into full-fledged concept and practice along with the decline and devolution of the Ottoman Empire and was turned into an immutable cornerstone of the Turkish Republic by our great leader Kemal Atatürk.

It is with the intention of helping to fill the gap of knowledge about the birth, nature and aim of secularism in Turkey that the Foreign Policy Institute has decided to publish Dr. Doğu Ergil's study.

I believe Dr. Doğu Ergil has ably explained how the Turkish people which had in the past fought innumerable wars of conquest for Islam and defended Islamic lands against Crusaders, have in the end relinquished Islam as the state religion, adopted the concept of secular state and put it into useful practice, without neglecting the challenges that secularism has been facing, and without relinquishing their faith and practice of their religion.

Seyfi TAŞHAN

INTRODUCTION

Secularism is an ethical system founded on the principles of natural morality and independent of revealed religion. Hence, it is based on freedom of thought and right to difference of opinion. Secularism "asserts the right to discuss and debate vital questions of moral obligation, the existence of God, immortality of the soul, and the authority of conscience(1).

Secularism is the acceptance that there is good, guidance and salvation in the present day and on this earth. What is important is that it does not negate alternative and often conflicting sources of mediums of goodness, guidance and salvation.

Furthermore, secularism embodies the spirit of reasoned inquiry: a sustained effort to construct a rational picture of the universe on the basis of scientifically established knowledge. In short, secularism is "a revolt against theological and metaphysical absolutes and universals, the same trend may be charted in the attitudes toward social and political institutions" (2).

The power of secularism in search of social justice and welfare in this world derives largely from its belief in and use of science.

With this definition in mind, let us follow the evolution of Turkish secularization in historical perspective.

History Of Secularization In Turkey

Chapter I.

I. The Ottoman Era

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I-A. An Overview

The Ottoman civilization was a mixture of institutions borrowed from the Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures, from the religion of Islam, from the Eastern and later Western civilizations. These institutions were never really integrated and never produced a harmonious system to provide the rationality and dynamism to sustain and improve itself in the face of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the ensuing Industrial Revolution.

The dominant religion of the Ottoman realm was Islam. Islam in principle draws no distinction between the religious and temporal spheres of life. Thus, the Muslim State is by definition religious.

However, the concept of rulership in the Islamic community had acquired different characters following sectarian and political divisions. But for all sects, *Şeriat* (divine law) remained the highway of righteous life leading to God. It includes law, moral principles and the creed to which every Muslim ought to subscribe.

Şeriat differs from Western legal systems in two principal respects. First of all, it encompasses all spheres of life. While other legal systems only regulate a man's relationship with his conscience and with his God. It is also concerned with man's morality, dictating not only what man is entitled or bound to, but also what he conscientiously should or should not do. "The *Şeriat* is not merely a system of law, but also of private and public activities" (3).

The temporal powers of the Caliphs gradually shifted to the Sultans and Amirs after the second half of the 10th century. They used the Caliph's authority for legitimacy. This *de facto* differentiation of the temporal and religious authority in the Muslim world ended when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I took on the title and sacred relics (of Prophet Mohammad) from the Fatimite Caliph following his conquest of Egypt in 1571.

The values and institutions that were later purged as contrary to modern civilization, such as polygamy, the seclusion of women, their low status, fatalism and ascetism etc., were imposed upon the Islamized Turks, chiefly through the infiltration of the Middle-Eastern cultures into the *fikh* (Islamic Jurisprudence)

books, into the *medrese* tradition, into the palace etiquette and the divan art that it produced (4). This amalgam body never deposed the Turkish ethos, but it functioned effectively to de-Turkify Ottoman intelligentsia. That is why Turkish nationalism centuries later started as a cultural movement against Ottomanism and Western cultural penetration.

A glance at pre-Ottoman history shows that, in the times of the Greater Seljuck Empire and Mamluks of Egypt, the headships of the nation and of the Islamic *ummet* were distinctly separated from each other. The Caliph was only performing religious functions of the Islamic *ummet* (community). Political authority was solely carried on by the Sultans of both states. When **Selim I.** of the Ottomans unified these two offices (1517) in his person, he was unaware of the dramatic difficulties to be experienced by his successors in separating them in the future.

According to the recorded history, however, Selim I. and his Şeyh-ul-Islam were very determined to differentiate between matters of piety from those of the Judiciary. For they were quite aware that, if the office of *itfa* (interpretation) was given legislative function, a system of multiple judiciary would be created (5). Their fear became a reality some generations later. The ensuing Turkish history became a struggle between the forces to keep it that way and obstruct change, and those attempting to separate them in order to establish a new social system.

The state is an all-encompassing machinery; it tends to legalize and formalize any social force and institution upon which it touches. When Islam fused with the political organization, it quickly grew to interpret and control every social force, institution and innovation. So, in Islam there were no distinct concepts of church and state as specifically "religious" and/or "political" institutions. Religion and state were believed to be fused together. The state was accepted to be the embodiment of religion, and religion as the essence of the state.

When the Caliphacy and the Sultanate were united in one person, the Ottoman state could not create an independent church organization. First of all, there was no need for such an organization as long as the ruler was strong and was the ultimate juridical authority. These were the times when the rulers derived

their power from the "man of the sword". But as the state got bigger and bigger, its administration required a large body of "man of the school". This group grew continuously in number and power and became a dominant element among the ruling elite. When the *sipahi* order collapsed and the sipahi corps (feudal cavalry) were dismissed, the Sultan lost an important source of his power. But the decisive blow came to the yet unchallenged authority of the Ottoman ruler when the Janissaries slipped from the control of the Sultan as his personal professional army due to the economic difficulties of the Empire. Under the pressures of a declining economy, the Janissaries became a property owning petty-bourgeoisie (artisans-craftsmen-traders). It is from this point on that they became an armed supporter of the *ulema* (corps of the *Şeriat* scholars) and an additional obstacle to change.

These developments, (late 17th Century) coincide with the inflation of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam's* power to gain juridical powers parallel to the monarch's rights, and even the authority to depose the ruler if his legislation did not conform with the *Şeriat*. Until then, the area left to the will of the ruler was free from the limitations of the *Şeriat*. There was no conception of legislation as distinct from the administrative and judicial branches of the government. Legislative, executive, and judicial powers belonged to the ruler. As long as he was powerful, no social force challenged his unique authority (6).

The *Ulema* maintained the continuity of law and tradition. They fought the anti-traditional tendencies which manifested themselves especially with the Western impact, after the seventeenth century.

With the erosion of the Sultan's absolute power, the highest ranking mufti; *Şeyh-ul-Islam*, became the highest religious authority. His official statements grew to cover not only matters of religious policy, but also such major concerns of the state as declarations of war, taxations, and innovations like the adoption of the printing press. This way, the power of *fetva* gained an official political sanction. Thus the religious outlook covered all aspects of social life and the final word on what was good and what was bad on all matters passed to the *ulema*. Once the *ulema* acquired this power, they aligned themselves with the traditional Ottoman

social orders. These orders felt as insecure as the *ulema* under the impact of Western influences and social demands from the incipient "worldliness". Together they successfully combatted innovations. When the Sultan attempted to introduce an innovation not supported by the *ulema*, he dramatically failed without the backing of an alternative power group. It is only after the annihilation of the Janissaries and formation of a new and loyal army, that centrally guided Turkish modernization started. But the opening of the age of "innovations" cost the Ottomans numerous Grand-Vezir heads, and the lives of two Sultans (Osman II. and Selim III). This age (18th century) also marks the emergence of absolute autocrats up to the Hamidian era, during which Turkish modernization and the seeds of secularization crystallized.

Beginning with Selim III in the eighteenth century, a series of reforming sultans and statesmen attempted to make major changes in the Turkish society in an effort to cope with increasingly desperate internal and external conditions. Where changes were made especially in areas remote from the central strongholds of religious law, the reforming party was so detached from popular support that it was unable to attain any ultimate legitimation in the eyes of the people. Periods of blind reaction followed periods of reformation although Turkish society was shaken to its foundation (7).

Due to the economic fetters of "capitulations" imposed on the Ottoman society by Western imperial powers, there was still no sign of a (middle) class or stratum to provide the driving force and creative ideology to pull the rest of the society to transcend its present format. Even in the late nineteenth century Ottoman state, there was no autonomous evolution of the religious institutions. Thus, Turkish secularization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took the form of a cultural dichotomy rather than a temporal (state) and spiritual (church) duality independent of each other. Nineteenth century constitutionalism had neither a popular base (it was an elitist scheme) nor a national identity, because "Ottomanism" was more international than national.

As a consequence of the efforts of Mahmud II and various modernist statesman to pass secular commercial and penal codes (based on European models) and to create secular schools in the

first half of the nineteenth century, the religious hierarchy gradually started losing its intellectual and moral leadership. But an equally important process was underway:

The *de facto* secularization of the Ottoman State occurred as the nationalities (*millets*) ceased to be mere religious communities and acquired national independence. Moreover, the idea of the "Islamic *Ümmet*" (international community of all Muslims) collapsed with the outburst of Arab mutinies. These historic developments gave birth to the Turkish nationalism as the popular ideology of the Young Turk movement. Young Turks were an assortment of Western educated and Western minded bureaucrats and modern professionals who believed in the amenability of the state if it were to be restructured in the model of its developed European counterparts.

The last of the reactionary periods in the Ottoman history coincides with Abdul Hamid II's reign which was overthrown by the "Young Turks" in 1908. The Young Turks clearly understood that the dualism in thought and practice, particularly extant in law and education, should be transmuted into a major social and cultural transformation if economic, social and political institutions were to support a modern nation-state.

The Young Turk generation who came to power in the first two decades of the twentieth century concluded that , it was the Turkish people, not the Islamic community (*ümmet*-the basis of Ottoman nationalism) that should be the fulcrum of social transformation. This resolution and, policy adopted thereafter, became the decisive motive behind Turkish secularism. Departure from the *ümmet* pattern of social-political organization was realized via nationalism.

There were contributing factors too: Sultan Mehmed (V) Reşad's appeal to all the Muslims of the world to unite in *Jihad* (holy war) against the non Muslims in the First World War went unheeded. Indian Muslims fought on the British side, and the Muslim Arabs of the Empire revolted against their Caliph. These events cast further doubts on the function of the Caliphate. Then the chronology of events roughly followed the below pattern:

When Turkey was invaded by the Allied powers in 1918, Sultan Vahidettin collaborated with the enemy and his *Şeyh-ul*

Islam declared Mustafa Kemal and his followers who were fighting the enemy, "infidels". On April 23, 1921 the nationalists convened the Grand National Assembly in Ankara as an organ of national sovereignty.

After the victory in 1922, the traitor Sultan was deposed. *Abdul Mecit* was recognized as Caliph on November 18, 1922 but without political power. On October 29, 1924, soon after the proclamation of Republic (1923), the Caliphate was abolished.

I-B. First Manifestations Of Change

The literature of the first half of the eighteenth century, especially of the Tulip Era (1717-1730) reveals that the tastes of the period are saturated with secular interests in education, arts and sciences (7). This change and incipient materialistic morality can be attributed to declining economic conditions and the drive for military and administrative reform. The interest in material life that was emerging constituted a large contrast to the ascetic military and religious ethics of the past. The traditional morality was under the attack of the new social demands and forces who manifested them.

The enlightened minds of the Tulip Era were aware of a new civilization and a new worldly polity rising in the West. They believed that if only the technical innovations could be implanted, the native Islamic soil would yield the same fruits. In the pursuit of the externalities of the West, the reformists of the eighteenth century created the highest obstacles to future change: the system of capitulations. The 1740 agreement with France extended the old extraterritorial privileges for foreign traders to an increasing number of nations. This failure to see the new character of European economic development cost Turkey the title of a "semi-colony" until the eve of World War I.

The Turco-Russian War (1768-74) disappointed the conservatives who believed more in the power of religion than in modern techniques which they constantly refused to accept. Thus, the need of technical improvement and institutional reorganization appeared to be more clear after the war. Reforms inspired by Halil

Hamid Paşa (1782-85) mark this change: **Mustafa III** invited **Baron de Tott** as a military consultant. The first military unit independent of the Janissary system, trained with Western methods, was created in 1774 by the French. This development fell within the scope of action recognized as permissible by the *ulema*. Following considerable maneuvering, the reformist administrators succeeded to secure the permission of establishing non-traditional educational institutions, and the translation of European works of science. But under pressure, they could not attempt to formulate an educational program for the Janissary corps, for traditional education was the prerogative of the *ulema*.

Staffed largely by French officers, a new engineering school was opened (1776) for naval officers. In addition to this, the abolished School of Engineering of the Tulip Era (by a conservative revolt that ended this period) was re-established in 1769.

Although there were reform minded members of the traditional military (Janissary) and the *ulema*, these organizations were nevertheless the strongholds of conservatism. The frequent Janissary uprisings were now partly rebellions of a discontented esnaf (petty traders and artisans) whose ranks were swollen with unpaid Janissaries due to the growing financial atrophy of the Ottoman State. This traditional alliance of out-dated soldiers and pre-capitalistic petty tradesmen was intended to halt the threatening economic innovations introduced by Western capital and entrepreneurship. They wanted nothing more than re-establishing the old *nizam* (order), because the old *nizam* would perpetrate their established privileges.

The *ulema* by and large sided with the Janissary because they could not afford to change the structure which provided them so much power. But with the increase in their numbers they also underwent some compositional rearrangements. The lower ranks of the *ulema* who could not be employed became more parasitical, or joined the sufi orders and disseminated "folk Islam" as opposed to orthodox Islam aligned with the ruling elite, now advocating change. In contrast, the higher ranks engaged in activities as selling offices, degrees, ranks, usury, tax-farming, expropriation of land, and most profitably controlling wakf (Turkish **wakıf**-religious endowments) properties (8).

Some of the mystic orders-like the *Bektaşî*-with liberal and flexible philosophies that once limited the power of the *ulema* and orthodox Islam, either lost their power or came to support ideologies of conservatism for the preservation of the old *nizam*. This, seemed to be more congenial when compared with an unknown future. Fear of total extinction placed the impoverished social strata in common opposition to reform. Their enemies were not so much the Western powers waiting at the borders, but the secular minded statesmen and modern trained officer corps. The general policy of the conservatives was to dominate the ruler, and, when this proved impossible, to incite the military, and the economic strata in decline. The clericals clearly grasped that once the *status quo* is tempered with, their survival was at stake. So the call that appealed to the people so much was the return to the pristine qualities of the Ottoman system.

Indeed with the large scale use of firearms, the *sipahi* (feudal cavalry) order, together with the Ottoman agrarian system collapsed. Turkish peasants never recovered from this disorder.

When the country was opened to foreign commerce, trade flourished in the Ottoman towns. But with the discovery of new naval routes to the Orient, Turkish commerce declined drastically. When the foreign trader reappeared with the European goods, the Ottoman industry and crafts gradually vanished. All these painful historical events accumulated in the folk memory as deep lying suspicion and hostility against modernization and, any form of social change for that matter. The source of the power of the Ottoman conservatives was this support which they found among the impoverished and dislocated masses.

On the other hand, the failure of the reformists lay in the fact that reformism was initiated by the rulers and the ruling elite rather than by a new stratum with a wider social base and a new *weltanschauung*. The reformists did not only rely on any of the existing social strata nor did they encourage the birth of an economically active (entrepreneurial) class that could counteract minority and foreign entrepreneurs. Their belief was that the primary threat to Turkey was the militarism of Europe. Thus, they failed to see the secular social organization and the scientific revolution behind the growing economic power of the West. While accom-

plishing military reforms, the Ottoman reformist saw no need for the social and economic reorganization of the society in support of the reforms centrally engineered.

The age of these limited reforms came to an end with the disastrous result of the 1787 Turco-Russian War. Having lost the war, **Selim III** realized the necessity of more comprehensive reforms. Besides external threats, increasing impoverishment of lower social strata, mounting financial difficulties of the state, rise of strong local lords (*ayan*) defying the central government, and uprisings among the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire constituted the most legitimate excuses for a massive reform movement (9).

The reform proposals were incorporated into a report and were sent for the approval of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam*. Receiving a loan from a European country, a new idea for the time, was opposed on the grounds that it was against religion. However, no Muslim country was to be found able to lend money (10). During the reign of **Selim III** (1789-1807), Western culture and methods penetrated the religious crust of the Ottoman society. The most important event of this period is the appearance of scientific writings in Turkish and French by those who were educated in the new imperial schools or in Europe. The permanent embassies that **Selim** installed in European capitals functioned as very useful training grounds for the staff that carried on the Ottoman reformation.

Selim's actual intentions (which cost him his life) were not only to modernize the army but, by using it as a lever for his power, to crush the resistance of the *ulema* and their armed supporters, the Janissary corps. By restricting the authority of *Şeyh-ul-Islam*, he had planned to free himself to be able to launch a secular transformation of the Ottoman society independent of the clergy. But the traditional state had no independent established machinery for enacting secular laws and had very little strength to enforce them. The Sultan's decrees could always be repudiated by the *ulema*.

In the final analysis, the necessity of what must be done on the part of the government seemed much clearer at this period. Along with the idea of change, a small group of secular minded reformist statesmen and Ottoman intellectuals had cropped up on

the historical stage. These men assumed important duties in the reform movement initiated by **Sultan Selim**. The survivors of this group went to Egypt and worked under **Mehmet Ali** (11) after **Selim's** assassination in the tide of a devastating conservative uprising that ended his sovereignty.

A mutiny in May, 1807, instigated by the *ulema*, the Janissary and the *ayan* (local big landlords) against **Selim** and his statesmen led to unprecedented killing, plunder and destruction. The popular slogan was that **Selim** was no longer the defender of Islam but an "agent of the infidels" (12). This was the last struggle of the medieval mind with the ideas and cadres of modernization on such a massive scale. Even though the ideals of the French Revolution had not yet reached the Muslim peoples of the Empire, the traditional ideas and institutions were in decline. But contrary to the receptiveness of the non-Muslim peoples of the state, the new ideas to replace the traditional ones were far from being accepted. The devastating mutiny of the social groups which were the products of the traditional (precapitalistic) Ottoman order froze the reform movement for about a quarter century.

I. C. Towards a Secular State

After the downfall of the Ottoman reformation movement in 1807, important changes occurred in the national and international scene that left their mark on the scope and extent of the later reforms. These are: union of Western powers and the downfall of **Napoleon**; the industrial revolution; and the appearance of the steamship on the international scene. Changes on the national scene are: the massive efforts of the *ayan* to realize a hereditary feudal system independent from the central authority; the desperate and destructive struggle of the Janissaries to establish themselves as a dominant political power without a viable economic base; and the rise of nationalist-separatist movements among the Ottoman *millet*s mainly as a result of Western economic and ideological penetration.

Mahmud II (1808-39), after waiting for the right time, made a very radical move toward the transformation of the multi-

national, multi-religious Ottoman state into a secular polity. Actually, the seeds of such a development were sown during the year of Janissary dictatorship following **Selim's** assassination. When the Janissaries invited the *ayan* to a *meşveret* (consultative assembly) with the new monarch, an *ittifak* (pact of alliance) was signed, in which the divine authority of the Sultan was for the first time subject to a written document(13).

The importance of this pact was that it contained the idea of separating the government from the ruler. While all sides expressed their allegiance to the Sultan, every precaution was taken to prevent the ruler, the grand-vezir (imperial prime minister) and even the *Şeyh-ul-Islam* (in case they sided with the progressive rulers) from deviating from the *Şeriat*. Only a few of the *ayan* signed the *senet*; they had no intention of surrendering their newly won prerogatives to legal controls and loosing some of their exactions from the people. The Janissary and the *ulema* controlled the state apparatus for seventeen years.

At this time an intense propaganda against the Turk was carried out in the West. No more was the Turk needed as a buffer against Russian aggression. The French and Russian governments were making plans for the partition of the Ottoman estates.

It is these internal and external threats to the existence of the state that prodded **Sultan Mahmud** to create a new type of army(14). The Janissary terror and lawlessness had wiped from the minds of the people the last vestiges of acceptance and respect for their unruly order. Furthermore, the achievements of **Mehmet Ali** (Governor of Egypt) convinced many people that the road to reforms could be achieved through the destruction of the Janissary order. In 1826, **Mahmud's** new forces liquidated this five century-old institution in few hours(15). With the destruction of the Janissaries, the armed hand of the *ulema* was chopped off.

Sultan Mahmud is the first Turkish monarch who had the idea of purposeful change and of bettering the conditions of his people rather than preserving the traditional order. At first he did not find any support from any of the traditional social strata. But, by appearing among them and mixing in with common people, he broke down a sacred tradition and became a popular figure. He sought and found support within the totality of the people. He ad-

vocated the principles of governing by law, and equality before the law, irrespective of race and religion. This won him the title of "infidel sultan", together with "adil" (lawful or just).

After silencing the religious resistance to his new policies, Mahmud circumscribed the legal zone in which the *ulema* could operate. In the traditional Ottoman State two offices stood above all others: the *sadrizam's* (Grand-Vezir) and the *Şeyh-ul-Islam's*. These represented two supreme institutions: the first, administrative and judicial; and the second, consultative. The latter covered the realm of the *Şeriat* as well as the *kanun*. They represented the ruler's dual functions as **Sultan-Caliph. Mahmud** ended this system by abolishing the office of the *Sadrizam* as the absolute vicar of the monarch. The new government installed in its place was based on a different division of labour and authority. Under a new *başvekil* (prime minister) a number of *vekils* (ministers) were appointed to administer various departments of the government.

The office of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam* was placed outside the temporal realm of the government, and only religious matters were relegated to it. But, the greatest mistake of **Mahmud** in delineating the temporal-religious spheres for his newly established government organization was the transfer of the *Şeriat Courts* from the jurisdiction of the *Sadrizam* to the jurisdiction of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam*. Thus, although the latter's authority was only consultative (but had gained *de facto control of Şeriat* courts) in 1837, he was legally endowed with juridical powers of these courts. This change, which first appeared to be a restriction of the religious authority, later caused the biggest hardships for the reformers in the implementation of cultural reforms regarding areas like family and education.

Besides these changes, **Mahmud** established a council to work on legal and judicial matters outside the realm of the *Şeriat*. Through these provisions, in 1838, he promulgated the first Turkish public law outside the *Şeriat*(16).

Shockingly new to the people was the idea that under the provisions of law, statesmen of an absolute monarchy were in some way publicly responsible rather than solely responsible to the monarch. With these efforts, greater clarification between

criminal and civil, secular and religious, private and public law appeared(17).

In 1838, **Mahmud** made a public statement concerning secular education. Briefly, he declared that, religious knowledge served salvation after death, but science served perfection of man in this world.

Students entering new military, naval, engineering and medical schools lacked the proper reading of recently published Turkish books. This was because of the defectiveness of the primary education. So, the means of acquiring science and contemporary knowledge lay in giving a new order to the schools. But, elementary education was still under the religious realm covered by the *Şeriat*. Consequently, even though temporal authority could make recommendations, it could not decree the establishment of secular schools at the primary level. After much debate between the Government and the office of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam*, the idea of reforming primary education was converted to the rearrangement of ways and means of teaching *Kuran* and other traditional subjects(18). In brief, while the Turkish military pursued an autonomous and progressive educational course, Turkish civilian primary education continued to be a communal and religious affair until the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.

After this abortive effort, the Government decided on opening *Rüşdiye* schools for adolescents in order to initiate modern education. These were presented as the necessary link between the religious education of the primary schools and worldly education of the scientific higher learning. Although *Rüşdiye* schools were not yet created during **Mahmud's** time, a special school called *Mekteb-i Maarif* (school of secular learning) was established in 1839 to educate a limited number of promising boys to be employed as government functionaries. Some of the prominent figures of the *Tanzimat* (Turkish Reformation) era graduated from it. Additionally, the *Mekteb-i Ulum-u Edebiyye* (school of literary sciences) was opened to train government translators. The students of both schools studied Arabic grammar, French, geography, geometry, history, and political science(19).

The importance of these schools was that it removed yet another segment of governmental affairs from the monopoly of

the *medrese and Şeriat*. It also facilitated the translation of European scientific works into Turkish.

Mahmud's reign is a crucial point of Ottoman history in terms of secular transformation, because from this time onward, the concept "religious" acquired a new meaning. But in this process of gradual change, generations of Ottomans experienced the existing cultural duality they were faced with in their daily lives and reflected it in their mentality. *Usefulness* remained the chief criterion for adopting secular education for a long time, as did the view that modern institutions should be allowed only insofar as they transmitted the techniques and sciences of the West without disturbing the existing social structure and traditional culture.

While the heavy religious character of the elementary education continued, secular higher educational institutions became so successful that they constantly drained off the potential students of the *medrese* system. The gradual decline of the *medrese* system must indeed be considered as the triumph of the secular Turkish education that gained momentum in the nineteenth century.

In 1834, **Mahmud** opened the Military Academy separate from the religious institutions of the time. Besides its completely secular base, it found its roots in the populace and evolved as a national-popular institution, rather than an aristocratic breeding ground. That is why from **Mahmud's** time onward, the Turkish officers have been agents of social and political reformations. They have often appeared as populist leaders rather than the guardians of the ancient order.

Mahmud founded a newspaper press in 1831: *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events). It became a medium of forecast of **Mahmud's** policies. There were numerous hints in its issues of institutions still unknown to the Turks at the time. It is a historical irony that, the ideas of constitutionalism first filtered down from the vision of an absolute monarch to his people. The Ottoman reform movement hardly had a popular base as it lacked participation "from below".

These diverse educational endeavors and many parties of students sent abroad proved their significance later. Moreover, the Translation Bureau became in time, a college of foreign languages, diplomacy and statecraft. It was there that some of the

most prominent Turkish intellectuals got their "education". Even the roots of the present Turkish literature can be traced to this bureau.

I. D. The State As The Agent Of Social Change And Secularization.

With **Mahmud's** efforts, the old Turkish ruler's right of enacting *kanun* on temporal matters gradually became more consolidated and systematized, creating a body of public law separate from *Şeriat* law. Although there had been as yet no distinction between public and private law, the new administrative, military and penal enactments established the foundation of a future body of public law. Moreover, the increasing extension of public law tended to alter the important position of the Islamic law.

Additionally, the medieval concept of the temporal law as expression of the will of the ruler of Islamic practices (*örf*) began to give way to impersonal legislation based on reason and contemporary need. This process eventually culminated in the 1876 Ottoman Constitution.

But most important of all, while medieval conception of the state was to maintain the general "order" in accord with the traditional value system, the state acquired the role of ultimate mover; the agency for change and progress in **Mahmud's** time. Nevertheless, the weakest point of Turkish political transformation as stated before was that the reforms were not the product of a rising new class or classes with modern needs or aspirations. Rather, they were the creation of the traditional central authority struggling to maintain its existence under external and internal threats. This was basically due to the lack of a major social and economic upheaval. It was engineered by the central government without the consent and support of the peripheral traditional authorities. Thus, it lacked the swiftness and continuity of another centrally engineered transformation--that of Japan. Nor there was a drastic and distinct rupture with the traditional order such as the Industrial Revolution. This conspicuous character of Turkish

modernization will reveal its contradictions in subsequent periods.

Mahmud's next great service to the Turkish people was the economic enterprise he has set in motion. Although he had little chance to develop a new economic policy as the major instrument for modernization, he still deserves praise for initiating the etatist policy and for establishing leather, paper, textile and ammunition factories. The reasons why he could not further develop his economic policy that could have put Turkey in the league of "industrial" nations of our day can be summarized as follows: i) restrictions imposed by the Capitulations; ii) absence of external and internal peace and security; iii) the stagnant or basically non-commercial character of the Turkish agrarian sector divided between either subsistence farmers or non-capitalist big land owners that did not allow for the production and diversion of capital into industry; iv) absence of an enterpreneurial middle-class, due to; v) the existence of foreign merchants with extraterritorial privileges backed up by foreign powers; vi) accumulation of capital in the hands of non-Turkish elements of the Empire and capital loss through the partnership of these elements with foreign firms and entrepreneurs; vii) the inability and inexperience of Turkish statesmen to function as economic agents(20).

I.D. a. The Tanzimat Reformation

The years that fall between 1840 and 1870 are significant in bringing Turkey into closer contact and dependence on Europe. These years are also the crucial years of colonialist penetration of European economy into the Turkish soil.

During this period, the officially ignored *medrese* organization, became a refuge to the impoverished social groups. Sponsored by their rich endowments they fed a reserve army of reaction against the *Tanzimat* (reformation).

Another important character of this period is that it marks the emergence of a Turkish middle-class, less impressive economically but, crucial from the political and intellectual point of view. This class was composed of the upper layers of the adminis-

trative, military, legal and financial bureaucracy. *Medrese* members who showed a degree of achievement were also recruited as government functionaries, and are considered among this class.

The European economic penetration at this period clearly shaped the form of the economic rift between the Muslims and non-Muslims of the Empire. The myth that the Turk does not engage in industry and trade (created by Europeans) is a legacy of this period. It was not his inability to become an economic agent, but rather the circumstances that enabled his entrepreneurial potential to develop just like other nationalities of the Empire.

Before 1838, the West was no more than a source of inspiration of modern technology for the Turks. Its political and socio-economic organization was an excrescence in terms of local needs and aspirations. But, once Turkey was pulled into the Western economic and political "market", it became a part and a losing partner of it. The "development of Turkish underdevelopment" coincides with this period. A pre-capitalist and pre-industrial society could not compete with its capitalist and industrializing adversaries.

Under the impact of pressing needs and threats that required a national policy of reform and planned change, the Charter of November 3, 1839 was proclaimed. The common name of this Charter is *Tanzimat* (reformation) and has given its name to the ensuing period of reforms and Westernization. With the permission of the new Sultan, **Abdul Mecid**, this protocol was prepared by a Consultative Council (*Meclis-i Şura*). It briefly states that:

i) The old disarrayed social system has to be substituted by a new one based on new laws and principles. However, these laws must be in accord with the *Şariat*.

ii) The new body of laws will guarantee life, property and honor of individuals as fundamental principles.

iii) These laws and rules will be equally applicable to all citizens no matter what their religion may be(21).

Sultan Abdul Mecid took a written oath to comply with the principles of this Charter which was accepted by the Council as

the embodiment of the *Şeriat*. He also promised not to abrogate the laws enacted on the basis of *Tanzimat Charter*.

This is clearly the first constitutional document of the Islamic World, although it was not meant to be constitution. Later, however, equivocations in its terms would create serious problems. In general, although it did not contain any sign of popular sovereignty, it definitely carried some provisions to limit the arbitrary power of the ruler. This meant the renunciation of the key concept of the medieval meaning of sovereignty. The Sultan's prerogative to enact laws (*kanun*) according to his will (*irade*) in areas not covered by the *Şeriat* was now restricted by both the principles of the Charter and the legislative powers of the Council.

The source of new legislation would be deliberations of the Council or councils. The members of these organizations were all appointed by the Sultan. Even though they were invested with legislative powers (through discussion and mutual consent), their decisions acquired legal sanction only after ratification by the Sultan. However, the most equivocal part of the Charter concerned the Judiciary. There was no allusion to the independence or separation of the judicial function from the executive and legislative.

On the other hand, a very important practice was instituted with the proclamation of the *Tanzimat Charter* without a *fetva* by the *Şeyh-ul-Islam* for its legitimization⁽²²⁾. Hence, the appearance of the Charter constituted the first formal breach between the temporal and the religious spheres which the *Tanzimat philosophy* (and practice) established.

Not only for the Muslims, but also for the other *millet*s (Ottoman national communities), the Charter's "fundamentals" were bound to create the difficulty of reconciling statute laws with practices based on the *Şeriat*. Yet, complete legal equality was quite foreign for the period. *Tanzimat* marks one of the most complicated periods of the Ottoman history in terms of its relations with Europe. While the European powers were demanding equality and secularism to protect of their citizens and business-partners (minorities) alike, they were also pressing for the distinct identity of these *millet*s through legal and political freedom within the confines of the Ottoman State. But the *millet* organization was based on religion and religious organization. A reconciliation of the

overall secularization policy of the state and the preservation of the religious character of the *millet*s became a headache of the *Tanzimat* period.

Difficulties that followed the declaration of the *Tanzimat Charter* culminated in the proclamation of the *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) on February 18, 1856(23). Its provisions contained:

i) Complete freedom and guarantee for the exercise of all religious beliefs and practices,

ii) confirmation of the rights granted by the *Tanzimat Charter* but also arrangements for their fullest application,

iii) confirmation of all previous spiritual and temporal privileges and immunities granted to the Ottoman *millet*s,

iv) representation of religious communities in the discussions of the Supreme Council,

v) implementation of legal, political, educational, religious, economic, and moral reforms in which the freedom, equality, wealth and rational training of all citizens could benefit(24).

It became obvious in this period that the Ottoman State could be secularized only when the *millet*s became solely religious communities rather than politically autonomous bodies; and when they became individually equal and responsible before the laws of the state. Only in this way would the *Şeriat* cease to be the basic law of the Empire and become the private law of the Muslim population.

The *Tanzimat* did not bring about a substantial change in the composition of the ruling strata. With the exception of the initiation of legal reforms, the ruling elite's failure may be attributed to the absence of any real effort to launch an overall campaign of economic transformation. Furthermore, the *Tanzimat* provided no constitutional structure for regulating relations between the ruler and the ruled or between the legislative--administrative--and judiciary authorities and functions.

In an overall assessment it can be said that, *Tanzimat* indicated the direction for future change when the Council of Judicial Enactments was transformed into a judiciary body. The new secular court system (*adliye*) was established upon the principle of

universal justice (*adalet*) and outside the realm of religious law (*Şeriat*) and the ruler's will (*kanun*)(25).

During the *Tanzimat*, each ministry came to have a permanent council to prepare the necessary projects and establish new rules. These organizations gradually departed from the influence of the *Şeriat* and *kanun* as their *ulema* members were replaced by secularly educated functionaries. In time, these councils became the legislative organs of the government(26). The Council of Judicial Enactments (or Supreme Council) installed by **Mahmud** functioned as the supreme organ above all these. The creation and functions of the Supreme Council may be deemed as the first steps taken towards parliamentary rule. Nevertheless it must be noted that representation was far from being popular. The members of the Council were all recruited among the highest civil officials, the highest ranking *ulema*, and the leaders of the *millet* organizations(27).

The internal strife among the *millets* after 1840 indicated the need for establishing greater articulation in the relations between the government and the people. The modernist statesmen felt that it was time to try their ideals (parliamentary rule) in disguised form. Delegates were invited from the provincial councils founded by **Mahmud** to the capital to attend the meetings of the Supreme Council. These delegates were representative of the *millet* organizations and were elected for one year. Their function was to express the needs of their religious communities. But most importantly, as a part of the reorganization project of the provincial administration, the Provincial Councils were made representational bodies in 1864. From this date on, their members were elected by their local constituents(28).

In 1868, the Supreme Council was divided into two organs: the Board of Judicial Enactments (*Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye*) and the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). The first became the highest judicial organ and was later transformed into the Ministry of Justice with jurisdictional authority over the secular *adliye* courts(29).

The Council of State was directed by the famous statesmen and reformist **Midhat Paşa**, and soon became the nest of constitutional movement that created the 1876 Constitution. The intended

aim of this reorganization was the separation of the executive power from the judicial and religious powers.

It is an irony of the Ottoman reformation that the Muslim Turks did not really benefit from the *Tanzimat* secularism and the *Reform Edict* of 1856. This is mainly due to the fact that contrary to other *millets*, the Muslims (especially Turks) did not have a communal-political organization outside the imperial state machinery. Neither the reforms without a supportive political organization, nor the loose *ümmet* texture and ideology--international in character-- provided the necessary *elan* to transmute the religious community (*ümmet*) to a national entity among the Turks. Furthermore, the Muslims of the Ottoman State were devoid of national homogeneity, both ethnically and ideologically. But the Turks of all Muslims were confronted with the most confusing circumstances. Because they were devoid of a national or communal identity other than being mere Muslims. Now they were told that they would be ruled by an avowedly secular administration which they could not identify with.

The reform programs of the Ottoman State in the nineteenth century brought to light the basic weakness for such a policy to take root in a society ridden with different allegiances but ruled by a non-representative administration. First, new reforms fell short of facilitating the independent evolution of the religious institution. Second, the existing dichotomy among the cultural institutions remained intact as the union of the state and "church" continued. Third, nineteenth century constitutionalism could neither build a popular regime (remained an elitist scheme), nor nation-state, for, the prevailing "Ottomanism" was more international in essence than national(30).

These weaknesses of the *Tanzimat* created discomfort among the Turkish element who benefited least from its policies. But still, this reaction was not nationalistic. The *anti-Tanzimat* movement personified by the New Ottomans was constitutionalist and religious in character. In this sense, the reaction which it engendered was more participatory but less secular than the *Tanzimat* outlook. This reactionary ideological crystallization later was very wisely utilized by **Abdul Hamid** to shape his Islamic State.

I.D.b. Tanzimat and Şeriat

Although the *Tanzimat Charter* had declared loyalty to the *Şeriat*, it also made clear the necessity of promulgating new laws. It was stated in the new government program that, because neither *Şeriat* nor the *kanuns* were publicly announced, confusion and injustice was common. The *Şeriat* was not a codified law. The *kanuns* were written and declared, but they were not accessible by the people. Furthermore, they were subject to the will of each different ruler. So, codification became one of the most important aspects of the *Tanzimat* and laid down guidelines for later statesmen to differentiate between law and religion.

Whether it was based on *Şeriat* or not, to formulate religious fundamentals as a positive codified law was a leap forward. Moreover, doing this in compliance with a non-religious criterion and through deliberations of a secular authority, implied great strides toward secularization.

Ottoman legal secularization started with increasing commercial relations with outsiders--an area which basically remained outside the domain of the *Şeriat*. In the 1850's, the codification of a commercial law and the organization of first commercial courts, independent of both the *Şeriat* courts and non-Muslim ecclesiastical courts took place⁽³¹⁾. A second commercial code, again borrowed from France was added to the first one in 1860. This was followed by the *Code of Maritime Commerce* (1863)⁽³²⁾.

These institutions were the first secular Ottoman courts created outside the jurisdiction of the *ulema* (*Şeyh-ul-Islam*). To take an oath according to one's own religious rite was one of the new innovations. The second and most important of such innovations was the effort toward codifying legal principles and procedures in areas presently covered by the *Şeriat*. This attempt was first experimented within the area of the Ottoman penal system. Penal law was basically dependent on the *kanuns* enacted by the Sultans⁽³³⁾.

The first Penal Code was prepared and promulgated by the Supreme Council in 1840. Another one followed suit in 1851. The latter screened and rearranged the principles of the *Şeriat* and pre-

vious *kanuns*. But, after the declaration of the Reform Edict, a completely new Penal Code was drawn up (1858) based on the French Penal Code(34). This code remained in force until the end of the First World War (1918) and was the first secular Ottoman code in the area of civil law. Thus, for the first time, the principles of individual responsibility and equality among citizens of diverse religions, and arrest for only specified acts entered into the Ottoman legal system. However, the 1858 Penal Code still did not abrogate the penal provisions of the *Şeriat*. Its codification remained within the limits not covered by the penal and personal ruling of the divine law(35).

The new Penal Code was filled with numerous conflicts between the religious and secular principles incorporated in its structure. This conflict reached frustrating levels in the ensuing court practices. The new codes became operational in the *adliye* or *nizamiye* (statutory) courts, which were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. These secular courts operated side by side with *Şeriat* courts which were under the jurisdiction of the *Şeyh-ul-Islam*. Because of the interconnections and the fluid nature of the boundaries existing between the secular and religious domains, the application of civil law through two different court systems became increasingly untenable(36).

Finally, the decision for establishing secular courts for civil law outside the jurisdiction of *Şeyh-ul-Islam* came with the creation of the *Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye* in 1868 as the highest court of the new statutory court system.

There were two departments of the new Divan: civil and penal. Commercial and criminal cases were heard and judged according to the *Şeriat*. One big difference was introduced though; the court was placed under the control of a temporal authority(37).

The long dispute between the Ottoman intellectuals who advocated the adoption of the French Civil Code and those who defended the idea of codifying a civil law based on Islamic jurisprudence, ended with the Government's decision to adopt the second thesis. Cevdet Paşa was appointed as the head of the committee of the *Hanafi* school of law. When the *Hanafi* scholars disagreed, the principle of utilizing *nass* (revealed commands in the

holy texts) and the demands of the day was accepted(38). The outcome of this endeavor was the *Mecelle*.

Between 1869 and 1876, the *Mecelle* compiled a part of the Islamic law in its sixteen books. However, it refrained codifying the marriage, family and inheritance laws which were the core of the *Şeriat*. The new *Şeyh-ul-Islam*, **Hasan Fehmi** declared that any such function fell under his jurisdiction, not that of the Ministry of Justice(39).

The continuous conflict about the specific areas of each legal system was partially cleared by a government statement in 1886. In this statement, marriage, divorce, alimony, retaliation, wills, inheritance and blood-right were deemed to be under the jurisdiction of *Şeriat* courts. Commercial and criminal matters were exclusively given to the statutory courts. The remaining matters were left to the parties who chose between the two court systems(40).

With these provisions, the Ottoman legal structure was divided into three parts: i) *Şeriat*, ii) codified parts of the *Şeriat*, iii) secular laws based on French codes. Their irreconcilable nature was a reflection of the transformation of the society from being a theocracy to a secular polity based on popular representation. The very essence of the *Şeriat* rendered impossible the accommodation of the interests of the rising social classes which felt bogged down by the static and unchanging character of the divine law; and the traditional social strata who were clinging to it as their savior against extinction.

Tanzimat innovations did not worry the *ulema* very much because the new laws were regarded as being outside the realm of *Şeriat*. But still, the preparation of the *Mecelle* was a product of a temporal authority. This was a move toward opening the gates of *içtihat* (free opinion) through the ruler's reactivated royal capacity to enact mundane laws (*kanun*). Thus, the *ulema* corps would eventually take over only spiritual matters and could constitute the basis of an "Islamic church". The Ottoman clergy and the *ulema* ranks understood this perfectly. They did not only fight the *Me-*

celle fiercely but they also opposed the secular university system which was rapidly reducing their influence in teaching and indoctrination along religious sciences. Their efforts succeeded under **Abdul Hamid** when *Şeriat* again became the central legal and moral core of social life. Further codification was prohibited and the *Mecelle* Committee was dismissed. Hence, the *Tanzimat* secularization reached only the peripheries of the *Şeriat*.

I.E. Ottoman Nationalism And Constitutionalism

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Turkish was not an official language.. It was the language of the peasants, and of the lower classes--even for some of the non-Muslims. Whereas, Arabic was the language of the *medrese* education. Arabic and Persian were the language requirements of the secondary schools. Turkish was not taught in any one of the educational institutions(41). The state and literary language was called Ottoman; a hybrid of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. The traditional ruling elements were unable to teach or write anything in Turkish. Not only did the *medrese* oppose the translation of the *Kuran* into Turkish but they also opposed writing anything in Turkish. According to the *medrese*, the *Kuran* was not intended to be understood. It was the highest symbol of divine mystery, which could only be interpreted by them(42). This hiatus between the people and medrese alienated the latter from the masses to a great extent. Village (rural) communities had allegiance to religious figures quite different than the *ulema*. Indeed they had different saints, superstitions and and spiritual leaders (of *sufi* orders) called sheiks.

The impact of *Tanzimat* encouraged the cultivation of Ottoman and its adoption as the language of learning instead of Arabic. With its international character--reflecting the edifice of the state--it quickly became the language of secular education and the government(43). This was another blow on the isolated *medrese* system. The language barrier further dislocated cadres of Islam from the political and social developments of the time.

The Ottoman language movement was also an intellectual reaction against the growing influence of French as well as Arabic,

the latter being associated with traditionalism and religious dogmatism. The codification of the Ottoman language starts at this period.

Some Turkish intellectuals used the new Ottoman Turkish for teaching Islam outside the *medrese* circles. For example Cevdet used Ottoman Turkish in his books on the history of Islam and the Caliphate. With these efforts, the gap between the language of the elites and the masses became so obvious to everyone that not only language, but also changing the script, became an issue⁽⁴⁴⁾.

At this time (1850's) the positive effects of the Translation Bureau, created by Mahmud II, began to show itself in the translations beyond scientific books. The influx of translated French literature, now understandable to the Turkish people, brought new ideas, cultural values, and most of all, the intellectual foundations of the French Revolution.

I.E.a. Towards A Constitution

The *Tanzimat* Reformation further exposed the social structure of the Ottoman State which was built on religious communalism. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was no more a Muslim state. Nor was it a national state. The Turks did not have a national consciousness yet to formulate it as a state policy. If the Ottoman State was based on the economic hegemony of certain classes--that is, if it was a state satisfying the economic needs of certain classes--these were definitely not Turkish. Thus, the *Tanzimat* regime lacked both the traditional pillars of national sovereignty and a constitutional politics based on the popular will. But, it is safe to say that the first constitutional ideas in Turkey originated under the impact of economic, cultural and political crises. These ideas were formulated by the ascending but meager middle class.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the traditional (religious) foundations of the Empire were becoming increasingly unstable. The instability of the cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire provided an opportune excuse to whet the appetite of Western powers in search of new colonies. Their aggression against the

Turk grew in proportion with their colonial ambition. In an age when Turkey was Westernizing in spite of Western aggression, the Turk had denounced his national identity to be a Muslim. With the continuous impoverishment of the Turkish element when the non-Muslim millets were prospering under the aegis of Western economic penetration, it became urgent that Ottoman transformation should have a viable social basis. However, both lacking national consciousness as Turks, and being irritated by the possible outcome of provoking national feelings among the cosmopolitan ethnic mosaic of the Empire, the Ottoman ideologies found their religion the only unifying basis of the polity. For them, the Ottoman State had to be an Islamic state-but a Constitutional one(45). In this sense, this movement voiced by the New Ottomans was anti-Western and Constitutional in character.

An immediate religious opposition grew to oppose developing constitutionalism. One of such reactionary organizations was "The Society for the Preservation of the *Şeriat*" (*Muhafaza-i Şeriat*). Their plot to overthrow the Government was soon exposed and among those arrested were army officers of the old order, *ulema* of different ranks, sheiks of various religious orders, *me-drese* teachers and students, etc.(46).

Another secret society which came to existence in 1865 was *Ittifak-ı Hamiyet* (Patriotic Alliance). It became the nucleus for the New Ottoman Movement(47). The main aim of this society was to fight and change the absolutist Ottoman regime to a Constitutional one(48). This movement always remained as an intellectual opposition and influential propaganda source for Islamic patriotism and democracy.

Their basic arguments focused on the poverty of the masses, economic difficulties of the government which later (1875) had to declare bankruptcy; Turkey's military, economic and political dependence on the West; and the arbitrary rule of the monarch which could be curbed by constitutional law and a popular government(49).

Almost all of the New Ottomans were unanimous in these aims. However, they differed in the ways of achieving them within the traditional structure of the Ottoman polity from which they did not want to depart. They were very resentful of the Western

anti-Muslim prejudices, and held the *Tanzimat* statesmen responsible for this.

New Ottomans were progressives but never revolutionists. They were either members or sons of the traditional Ottoman ruling elite(50). Only their education and social status separated them from the other traditional classes. In the absence of an economically independent Turkish middle-class, they were dependent on either the government or their relatives who constituted the power base of the monarchy.

The Young Ottomans examined both the elements of their own culture and of the Western civilization to find out which elements were harmful to adopt. Through this process of elimination, they reached the important conclusion that religion was not an obstacle to development. **Namık Kemal**, one of their lot was the first to capitulate on the economic penetration of the West and its distorting effect on the society and the polity(51). **Namık Kemal**, as their spokesman, was exalting Islam by asking:

"Is there any other religion in the world which has succeeded in associating justice with moral virtue and thereby transforming moral obligations into legal obligations"(52).

Thus, with this statement New Ottomans were considering everything, including the Constitution within the domain of religious legislation. It is not that they were not unaware of the historical secularization of the Western state. They simply did not believe that a similar process was necessary for the Islamic state, because in their belief the Islamic state was closest to a constitutional rule(53).

The pro-Westernist sentiments of the *Tanzimat* era quickly became anti-Western. The anti-Turkish (and anti-Muslim) feeling of the West now met its opposite in Ottoman lands. This development put the Turkish reformers in an awkward position. The West's reaction to Turkish reformers undermined the Turkish "liberalism" and Constitutionalism when they were just "taking off", and paved the way to the Hamidian absolutism. This trend was also helped by the irresponsible expenditures of the *Tanzimat* era rulers and coupled with Western economic exploitation, all of which culminated in the official bankruptcy of the state in 1876.

In the meantime, there was a growing sentiment among the Muslim people that the *Tanzimat* reforms had given too many concessions to the non-Muslim *millet*s to the degree of jeopardizing the traditional basis of the Islamic State(54). Under the influence of this sentiment, **Sultan Abdul Aziz** instructed his government that the new reforms should be carried out only in terms of the established customs and traditions and, by no means should the *Şeriat* be violated(55).

In the final analysis, the New Ottomans' ideology of patriotism was pan-Ottomanism colored with an Islamist nationalism(56). The national and religious differences of a multitude of Ottoman peoples did not seem to attract their attention.

It is interesting to note their idea that reforms could only succeed if they were implemented in compliance with Islam; and their belief that Islam is essentially compatible with contemporary civilization and constitutionalism. This belief recurred in almost all Muslim countries in later periods.

I.E.b. The 1876 Constitution and The Constitutional Era

President of the *Şura-yı Devlet* (Council of State) **Midhat Paşa**, an influential leader of the New Ottomans and his friends, deposed **Sultan Abdul Aziz** in May 1876 and under **Murad V** (believed to be mentally unstable) started the preparations of a constitutional regime(57). This was the first constitutional experiment in Islamic history.

In the first meeting convened to discuss the matter, the representative of the *Şeyh-ul Islam*, presented views no different than the **Sadrizam** himself. He said:

"The state has been entrusted to you...How can you assemble those ignorant Turks of Anatolia and Rumelia and consult with them on the affairs of the state? It is necessary to run the affairs of state according to the Şeriat. Have recourse to the holy fetva whenever you are in doubt"(58).

The *Sadrizam* and the *ulema* did not accept the institution of sovereign government. Their idea of sovereignty did not exceed the philosophy of an Islamic state and traditional Turkish statecraft. However, breaking path toward constitutional rule, **Midhat Paşa** was trying to assuage the opposition by pointing at external pressures and Western threats. In this endeavor he was encouraged by Prince **Abdul Hamid**'s pro-Constitutional appeals(59). According to a final agreement reached between the two, a cabinet system that would allow executive independence from the Monarch and collective (through the prime minister) responsibility would be instituted. Additionally, a constitution would be prepared and immediately promulgated(60). Following this agreement, **Murad V** was deposed with a *fetva* (from *Şeyh-ul-Islam*) on the grounds of insanity, and **Abdul Hamid** was installed on the Ottoman throne in September 1876.

Shortly after his accession to the throne, the new Sultan started to differ with **Midhat Paşa** on the prerogatives of the ruler, government and, the powers of the parliament on legislative and religious matters.

Both internal strife and international interventions which fueled separatist-nationalist movements worked to the advantage of Sultan **Abdul Hamid**, who shortly after his enthronement began to evince absolutist tendencies. Indeed, **Abdul Hamid** believed that only an efficient and powerful central authority could hold the disintegrating Empire together. So, he wanted unchecked powers as the Sultan. On the other hand, the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire were up in arms fighting for their independence. Emphasizing Islam as an ideological vehicle of cohesion among the Muslim peoples seemed to be a viable maneuver to create a power base in order to hold on the rest of the Empire.

This conscious policy reinforced the office of the Caliph and gave it a spiritual meaning which previous monarches did not enjoy. That is why **Sultan Hamid** is still popular among present day Islamists in Turkey.

The aggressive Western, especially British policy was further helping the anti-Constitutionalists. The pro-Western, anti-Western strains and intellectual confusion of the modernists culminated in a document far from what they desired in establishing

the rights of the people. Instead, the constitutional document re-interpreted the rights of the ruler and sacredness of the Caliph. It formally anchored these themes which became the legal groundwork for the Hamidian absolutism(61).

Even in this form, the Sultan eliminated almost all the other items in the document, except the institution of a General Assembly. The justification for a constitutional government was found in employing the traditional practice of searching the *Kuran* and finding verses and sentences to apply to the problem. In this case *Surah* iv, verse 59 was used(62).

The advances toward a Constitutional regime confused the public with intense propaganda for and against it. The *ulema* instigated the public and medrese students against "infidels" like **Midhat Paşa** and his friends. These "infidels" introduced anti-Muslim practices and brought Christians to the assembly where they passed laws contrary to the *Şeriat* such as the abolition of the veil for women(63). **Abdul Hamid** quietly but gleefully watched the events.

It is interesting to note that, even the hard core *Şeriatists* were against an absolute rule where they would have no say in government matters. Although they were against a constitutional regime advocated by the reformists, they were for a *meşveret system* (*deliberations of Şeriat*) written in the *Kuran*. But neither of the parties departed from the principles that the Ottoman State was an Islamic State, and that the *ümmet* must be made supreme controller of the government regulated by the *Şeriat*.

The function of the Assembly did not curtail the sovereign rights of the ruler. Hence, approval and execution of the laws (*Şeriat* or secular) were within the authority of the ruler.

After cutting it down to size, in December, 1876 **Abdul Hamid** signed the Constitution. According to the political doctrine behind it, it was granted by the ruler, sovereignty did not lay in the people but it belonged to God and, his representative the Sultan. Hence, the basic law was the *Şeriat* of which the Constitution was only a part. The legislative power was still in the hands of the monarch. No liberty or initiative was given to the Assembly to introduce or pass a bill, or to introduce a bill amending or chang-

ing a law. Thus, the Assembly was reduced to only a consultative council(64).

On the same day of the declaration of the Constitution (23 February 1876) the Istanbul Conference was convened with the aim of restructuring Ottoman polity. The European powers did not heed the new Ottoman Constitution. Instead they handed down a list of unacceptable demands, for reform which were duly rejected by the Ottoman Government. In response, Russia declared war against Turkey. **Abdul Hamid's** mistrust of the West was substantiated, whereas **Midhat** and the Constitutionalists were left in a very difficult position.

After the war and ensuing Ottoman defeat, the Berlin Conference brought heavier terms than that of the Istanbul Conference. From this point on **Abdul Hamid** became the absolute leader of the state until his overthrow by the "Young Turks" in 1908.

Soon after the promulgation of the Constitution, **Midhat** and his "liberal" friends were either deported or sent to exile. With their disappearance, Turkey went into thirty years of isolation and traditionalism. During this period, **Abdul Hamid** built the most efficient machinery of despotism in modern Turkish History, and he did this on the basis of the Constitution which gave him this right(65). The efficiency of this coercive state machinery nevertheless would not prevent the rise of a new popular movement and ideology represented by a new generation of Turks, which is commonly referred to as the "Young Turks".

I.F. The Hamidian Era and Reaction 1878-1908

The nineteenth century is the landmark of Western penetration into Muslim countries all over the world. When the French occupied North Africa, the peoples of Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya turned their eyes towards Turkey(66). Egypt fell to the British and became a center of anti-Western Muslim nationalism. A number of educated men from the Turkish-speaking regions of Asia that had fallen under Russian dominion (Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Cri-

mea, Kazan, and Turkestan) came to Turkey. The Ottoman state was the only political rallying point on which the Muslim peoples of occupied lands in three continents could fall back(67). In the 1880s **Abdul Hamid** was saluted as the Caliph of all Muslims then under foreign yoke. In the absence of secular nationalist currents, the Caliphate for the first time had acquired a central position in the struggle of all Muslims against foreign intervention and exploitation. Neither the Turkish nor Arabic nations had yet appeared on the stage of history. They were mere Muslims with differing ethnic origins.

In the domestic scene, **Abdul Hamid** became the symbol of salvation after the economic measures of the reformists failed one by one. Modernization appeared to be the acceptance of European economic bondage and impoverishment of the masses. The people hailed the Hamidian regime because it was closed to Western ideas of change. It was Islamist, tradition-bound and governed and sustained by domestic forces. The Caliph seemed to be the only ruler since the golden ages of the Ottoman Empire. No body cared much whether the Empire was being torn a sunder, or the blood of their economy was being sucked by the "Ottoman Debts Administration" and pumped out to European capitals, or if there was a flood of immigrants from lost lands. The people were enjoying the official policy of escape from worldly misery and the virtues of their religious faith as materialized in the personality of their Caliph. **Hamid** was so firmly established in the popular mind that at the onset of the 1908 Young Turk revolt, the revolutionaries did not think of deposing him at once. He was deposed a year later.

Sultan **Hamid** created a number of special committees that advised him on military, political and religious matters. His political regime was a resemblance of the *meşveret* (counselling) system advocated by the New Ottomans as the basis of Islamic Constitutionalism(68). But power mostly came from the massive support of the people.

After he had either eliminated or controlled the modern elite in administrative cadres , he surrounded himself with the traditional elite (*ulema*). His palace started to fill with *şerifs*,

seyyids, amirs, and sheiks of various religious communities from Syria, Africa and Arabia(69). These people symbolized the link between the Caliph and the Muslim *umma* (communities), and constituted the religious aristocracy.

The lower echelons of the religious cadres also benefited from the new regime. Mystic orders and the *medreses* began to swell again(70). Not only the existing *tarikats* (orders) like *Nakşibendi, Sathili, and Rifai*, became more popular, but new ones like the *Tijaniyya* tarikat came from North Africa and established themselves in the form of healers, breath-curers and emulet writers journeying from town to town and from village to village. Outward religious expression became a character of this period(71). This religious fanfare proved to be a powerful medicine to ease the problems of the troubled people in a world that was soon going to collapse on them.

Everything that was printed had to be inspected by the government agents. An army of informers were put together to convey even the simplest events to the palace. For this purpose, telegraph wires reached to such remote corners where there were no roads yet.

On the ideological side of the Hamidian period, a pan-Islamic ideology started to take shape. Excluding the non-Muslim nationalities, the Pan-Islamists called on all the Muslims of the Empire to unite against the West and its local collaborators.

On the social and economic side of the reality, the European economic penetration into Anatolia started creating new social forms and strata. A working class started to merge. The appearance of women in business life coincides with this time. Rural migration to the cities increased. An educated youth of army officers, school teachers and professionals became a powerful intellectual stratum at this period.

In the midst of Hamidian absolutism, the secular schools became centers of enlightenment and dissatisfaction. These schools on the one hand, the Empire's complex and insoluble financial and diplomatic problems on the other hand, contributed to the destruction of the ideological and political foundations of the Hamidian regime.

Severe control over anything published on social and political subjects, led the newspapers and magazines to publish novels and cultural news of Europe(72). The secularizing effects of the new publications upon the traditional institutions came with the new written language which became increasingly popular. The new generations tried to avoid the symbolic allusions, which were meaningful only to those with classic literary training. The appearance of pictures and illustrations in new publications created a different atmosphere in a short time. Newly written or translated scientific books shattered the traditional views of learning propagated in classical schools and through religious instruction(73).

In his policy of escape and relative tranquility in the home front, **Abdul Hamid** allowed two developments to occur that jeopardized the continuation of his rule. First,

"by establishing the omnipotence of his devlet (state), Abdul Hamid imperiled the din (religion). There came into existence a cleavage in the minds of the intellectuals between the two"(74).

The strength and oppression of the Hamidian *devlet* was so embracing that religion became an ideological tool in the hands of the Caliph--not an end in itself. So, in practice the control of the religion over temporal affairs came to an end during the reign of this celebrated Islamist monarch.

Secondly, the Hamidian regime brought no viable remedies either to the exploitation of Turkish economic resources by the foreigners, or to the permeation of Western influence into all spheres of Ottoman daily life. The customs were in the hands of the Westerners and wide open to European artifacts, including revolutionary publications.

The more the Hamidian regime became oppressive, the more European cultural and ideological elements filled the developing vacuum. The incapacity their own government in curbing Western modes of thought and behavior made many Turkish intellectuals believe that European patterns of government and culture were much better than theirs(75).

The Hamidian absolutism gradually created its anti-thesis: a wide intellectual opposition which also incorporated the "Young Turks". Now we have enough evidence that this catch-all term does

not denote all the opposing factions of the Hamidian regime. For, they were diverse in their ideologies and many in number(76). So, by "Young Turks", we mean a group of Ottoman Intellectuals who constituted a political alternative to the Hamidian despotism, and who replaced it by overthrowing **Abdul Hamid** in 1908.

I.G. The Young Turks and the Emergence of Turkish Nationalism

"Turks" for the Ottomans were conceived as their pre-Islamic forefathers, who mainly inhabited and ruled Asia(77). We do not see any trace in the writings of the Young Ottomans about Turkism and turkological subjects. Their patriotism was Islamic and pan-Ottomanist. For them, a Turk was still a peasant or an uncivilized Tartar(78). This misconception was somewhat altered by European works of history and anthropology in the minds of numerous Ottoman political exiles of the Hamidian regime.

The emergence of Turkish nationalism occurred through two historical processes which were closely related:

i) the breakdown of the Ottoman *millet* system, and its replacement by national-political communities;

ii) the waning of the concept of *ummet* and, its gradual replacement by nationalism. In both cases the basic social and political concepts of the traditional polity had undergone a process of secularization, slowly shedding their religious content.

Starting with the Greek *millet*, Bulgarians, Serbians, Roumanians ceased to be religious communities and became nation-states. But the Turkish element in the beginning of the Hamidian era was still not differentiated from the Islamic *ummet* along national lines. This situation remained unchanged until the rise of nationalist movements among the non-Turkish Muslim peoples. Albanian, but especially Arab political movements played a decisive role in the secularization of Turkish nationalism. Thus, the Turkish national identity, renounced in the name of the "univer-

sal brotherhood of Islam" (*ümmet*), gradually came back to the Turk through a differentiation (nationalization) of his co-religionists(79).

The first signs of this differentiation occurred in the language as a revolt against Arabic and the *Medrese* system which upheld it. It is interesting to note that, political nationalism was still absent at a time when the Turkification of the language and literature was going on(80). In fact, all factions of the Young Turks at first advocated Ottomanism when the Empire was being torn by national struggles and colonialistic policies of the West.

Only after the 1908 revolution, would Turkish nationalism gain strength in the battlefield against both Western powers and numerous Muslim and non-Muslim nationalities of the state who were fighting for their independence.

I.G.a. Meşrutiyet (Constitutional Rule) and the Committee of "Union and Progress", 1908-1918

The 1908 revolution that overthrew **Abdul Hamid** and his regime stands out as the first political movement that, even partially, the Ottoman people had participated in on a massive scale. These people were young army officers, students, professionals, petty bourgeoisie, and the uprooted urban folk of the lost territories(81).

In the absence of national and cultural institutions separate from religion, the Turkish element of the Ottoman Empire came to identify strongly with the state. The state's importance was accentuated more through religion in Hamid's reign. Especially after the decline of the *ümmet* concept, the Young Turks realized that their religious patriotism and Ottomanism had no social basis. Consonant with this reasoning they started organizing-people's councils and hundreds of branch offices of their political organ, Society (later, Party) of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Ter-*

akki) all over the Empire. Soon the society became a national organization, and hearth of Turkish nationalism.

The Society was the organ of the Turkish nationalist elite: "*...it did not encompass the peasantry... it did not gain the allegiance of the conservative generations and classes... The mass basis of the Society was amorphous and evolving; this was reflected in the shapelessness of its ideology. Its class basis gradually shifted... to the esnaf (artisans) and the tüccar (merchants) of the towns--the class out of which the Party of Union and Progress sought to forge a Turkish bourgeoisie. Most of the leaders were uprooted Turks, or Turks who had broken with tradition through education, or non-Turkish Muslims who had been Turkified by modern education. Army officers, doctors and teachers were prominent among them. By Hamidian standards, they were all dehris (innovators in religious matters) in their politico-religious views; they were firm believers in progress.*" (82)

After becoming instrumental in establishing Constitutional monarchy, its popularity allowed the Society to become the Party of Union and Progress in 1913. The Union had two rival political parties in the parliament: *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* (Liberal), Westernist, and *İttihad-i Muhammedi* (Mohammedan Union, Islamist). The interests of these parties were contradictory as well as their opinion concerning the relationship between state and religion, and between state and non-Muslim *millet*s.

The Unionists' idea of secularism meant a religiously ineffectual, but educationally and economically strong central government. At the beginning, their nationalism was still Ottomanism. But later, Ottoman *millet*s had become political nationalities either by fighting or aspiring for their own nation-states. At this juncture, the Unionists vacillated for years. In their belief, the basis of Ottoman unity could not be nationalism, for, there were numerous nationalities within the state. Nor could it be Islam, because there were millions of non-Muslim citizens of the state. Struggling with this dilemma, the Young Turks chose to reinforce the central government and economy to sustain the unity of the Ottoman mosaic. But the severest opposition to these policies came not from the non-Muslim nationalities but from Muslim Arabs.

The rebellion of the Muslim *millet*s delivered the final blow to the idea of Muslim nationalism and unity and paved the way for Turkish nationalism separated from religion. Despite the reaction of the Islamists to this development, writers and ideologues like **Ziya Gökalp** insisted that Turkism did not mean breaking away from the spiritual community of the Islamic world.

I.G.b. Meşrutiyet Secularism and The Young Turk Reforms

The disastrous result of the Balkan Wars once again brought out the urgent need for large scale social and administrative reforms. This move revived the controversy over the share of Islamic, Western and nationalistic proportions of the new reforms.

For the Islamists, the "appropriate" elements of the Western civilization were its science and industry. However, they were not cognizant of the fact that these elements were closely related, in fact organically linked with, the social, cultural and economic institutions of the Western society and the value system which upheld it. Although unconsciously, nevertheless, they sensed an intrinsic danger for Islam in the adoption of any practice or institution emanating from the Western civilization. *Srat-i Mustakim*, an Islamist journal (No. 57, 1909), lashed out at the Muslim students studying in Europe, when their pictures wearing hats appeared in the press.

The extreme Islamist view of reforms was that anything not covered by the *Şeriat* was open to change and adoption of new ways. But in the meantime, they persistently sought policies, arguments and public support for enlarging the scope of the *Şeriat* to cover areas that were traditionally outside its grips.⁽⁸³⁾ This, they tried to do by including mores into the body of *nass* (sacred injunctions) and giving them the strength of the latter. Hence, for them, change was impermissible even in matters of custom that were thought to be outside the realm of *Şeriat*.

The adoption of Western sciences always remained a confusing subject for the Islamists. This confusion is very evident in their publications at the time (and even now). One of the ways they

found to guard themselves from the dangers of modern science was to declare that the current scientific theories were contained in the *Kuran*. Since religion embraced everything, social reform could be achieved best by saving traditional customs (established social behavior) from decadence by bringing it under the sanction of religion.

With these efforts, which inevitably failed, the Islamists rendered a useful service which was ignored by the Ottoman Westernists. They focused on the importance of the traditional elements of culture, and the limits of borrowing foreign cultural institutions.

The Turkists were in agreement with the Islamists on refusing a total imitation of the West. But, the Turkists differed in pointing out that the traditional institutions were in a state of decline and were thus factors of cultural maladjustment. Therefore, they should be eliminated as a pre-condition of reforming those parts of social life related to them. (84)

For the Turkists, the roots of the Islamists' ideology were no more in dynamic institutions. Religion taken as a political philosophy upheld a rather stable or even a stagnant social order that could not keep pace with the necessities of a modern life style. The social organization that had created those traditional institutions was an *ümmet*, whose source of legitimacy was religion. But the Turkish society was in the process of transforming itself from an *ümmet* organization to a nation. Like all other modern societies, Turkish people could now only be motivated by national ideals. And by definition, nationalism could not accept a superior will over and above the will of the nation to govern its mundane affairs.

Before deciding what should be taken over from the West, it was necessary to secularize those institutions that had been put under *Şariat* and made identical with Islam. Most of them were anachronistic and had to be eliminated(85).. Modernization efforts could only bear fruit following this "elimination" process. Thus, the Turkish reform program came to mean secularization through Turkification. This programme was quite different from those of the Islamists and Ottoman Westernists. In fact, this was a programme of the incipient "cultural revolution".

In the absence of a concrete social stratum that would serve as the source of modernist ideology and political power behind social reforms, the Young Turks became conscious of the need of organizing such a stratum. It was through the participation of the people in the political process that they believed the cosmopolitan Ottoman society could be transformed into nationhood(86).

For this purpose, the Young Turks attempted to accomplish two tasks: i) to pull the Turkish people out of the *ümmet* pattern of life and ensuing introvert consciousness, and ii) to furnish this newborn national community with economic and technical enterprises to sustain its independence. Approaches to the first problem were taken in the fields of education, law and liberation of some customs from the grips of religion.

While the modernizing reforms in these areas were being implicated, the *Şeyh-ul Islam* launched a campaign to expand his authority in education, law and customary practices. Translation of R. Dozy's *Essai sur l'Histoire de l'Islamisme*, and the first translation of the Kuran (in 1914) were confiscated before they were even completed, and their further publication prohibited. These events, were followed by the arrest of some teachers teaching evolutionary theory, despite *Şeyh-ul Islam's* ruling to the contrary(87).

The *Şeyh-ul Islam* insisted on using his executive powers, over the judiciary and legislative organs that were gradually coming under complete Unionist control. The emerging conflict eventually culminated in the Islamist-led Mutiny of March 31 1908. The declared reason of the reactionary uprising was to restore *Abdul Hamid* to full power(88).

The Islamists received a heavy blow after the suppression of the mutiny. But they kept insisting that the parliament was not *entitled by Islam* to legislate, and it was a blasphemy to do so. For them, the *Şeriat* was the constitution of the Islamic polity, and the *ulema* were its protectors and interpreters (89).

The Young Turk's answer to the Islamists' view was simple. For them, the Turk had carried the burden of Islam for centuries, and still served as its protector. Islam had become his national religion and would remain so, but for the sake of Islam he had forsaken his nationality, his language and his past. As a consequence the Turk had suffered a cultural discontinuity. Having lost his national identity, the Turk's existence has begun to be denied --even by the Turks themselves.

In the meantime, the signs of change were evincing themselves in many spheres of daily life. With the coming of the new Unionist regime in 1908, violations appeared in the traditional dressing habit. Some women adopted European dresses with no veil, especially when they started working during the First World War. The number of girls' schools increased. Trade schools for girls were increased and reformed. Day and night courses in child care, cooking, sewing and nursing were initiated. The first girl's high school was opened in 1911. Girls were admitted to secretarial and commercial courses. Women became active members in organizations and social events. They started to appear in family businesses. Thousands of women were employed in the industry during the War. The government took great pains to increase the number of women primary school teachers especially after the primary education was liberated from the control of the *ulema*. From this new generation of young female teachers, prominent figures of national liberation and the Republican era emerged.(90)

Although these changes were slowly assimilated in the urban centers, women still could not go to the restaurants (even with their husbands). They sat in partitioned sections of street-cars and ferry boats. Sea bathing was still forbidden to them. Plays, lectures and concerts were repeated for women. They entered the University during the First World War, but sat behind curtains drawn across each class-room. Proportionately, more non-Muslim women benefitted from the new freedoms(91).

Even this much liberty was detested by the Islamists. In *Sirat-ı Müstakim* (no.2, 1908, and No.3, 1909) they wrote that, one of the obligations of the Muslims was the covering of women because they were inferior and that was " one of the great truths of Islam."

Although they differed in almost all areas, all three political groups of the *Meşrutiyet* (Islamist, Turkists, and liberal-Westernist) agreed that without economic progress, the Ottoman State was doomed. The Islamists declared the permissibility of adopting the Western technology and industry. The liberal Westernists blamed their own society for backwardness and never accused Western colonialism for causing it. While the Westernists firmly believed in capitalism, the Islamists defended neither capitalism, nor socialism. They looked at these as the evil creations of the Western civilization that was built on wrong moral principles(92).

The Islamic economic views were basically shaped by the principles of a pre-capitalist economy: fair competition, equity, a more or less just price system, rejection of insurance and of formal interest or interest transaction, non-intervention in the worker-employer relations. The latter principle disavowed the claim of the laborers to organize for protection against the whims of their employers(93).

The economic classes which the Islamist ideology appealed-- and still appeals--most were (are) the small businessmen and traders, medium and small farmers, the *esnaf*; artisans and craftsmen, who aspired to a system free from the threats of big industry, big business and labour organizations. Reflecting this mentality, Hacı Mustafa wrote a book to refute the materialism of Ludwig Buchner (Kraft und Stoff), in which Mustafa scoffed at insurance as the most absurd manifestation of materialistic mentality, because, insurance meant disbelief in God's will(94). This belief has re-emerged in the economic agenda of the Iran Islamic Republic under Ayetullah Houmeyni.

Seeing the danger in perpetuating the confusion in social and legal life, the Unionist Government launched a series of reforms in 1916. According to these new measures:

1. The *Şeriat* courts were transferred from the jurisdiction of the *Şeyh-ul Islam* to that of the Ministry of Justice.
2. The *Şeyh-ul Islam* was removed from the cabinet.
3. The *medreses* were severed from the jurisdiction of the *Seyh-ul Islam* and, management of all financial matters of re-

ligious institutions were transferred to the newly constituted Ministry of *Evkaf* (*Pious Endowments*).

Thus, consonant with the policy of separating state affairs from the influence of religion, judicial, legislative, educational and financial institutions were secularized. With the new arrangements, the powers of religion were confined to matters of piety. Following these measures, the Law of *Şeriat* Courts Procedure was promulgated in 1917 for the unification of the judicial procedure. In the same year for the first time in a Islamic country, the Law of Family Rights was codified. Before this law, all matters relating to marriage and divorce, inheritance, wills, and guardianship were not codified and were subject to the interpretations (*fetva*) of the *muftis* (*juriconsults*)(95). This code incorporated provisions of the *Şeriat*, secular European, Christian and Jewish communal usages; and was equally resented by these millets and the Islamists. The latter criticized the Code because it transferred the conclusion of marriage contract to the authority of the state. Secondly the Code accepted the right of women to initiate a divorce in cases when: a) the husband wanted to take a second wife and, b) the husband violated one of the conditions which the bride had incorporated into the marriage contract(96). This code was replaced by the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, but continued to exist in Syria and Jordan until 1953. To the best of our knowledge it is still used among the Muslim communities in Lebanon and Israel.

The second area that was subjected to secularization was education, especially primary education. The Unionist government took great strides in replacing sibyan schools with secular elementary schools for the first time in Ottoman history(97).

This way, primary education was detached from the office of the *Şeyh-ul İslam* and tied to a national authority and program. Courses in literature, history and philosophy were introduced anew into secondary education. The new University of Istanbul opened up departments of philosophy, sociology, fine arts, Turkish history and literature(98). Among the political and ideological forces of the *Meşrutiyet*, the Turkists were clearer about the economic program of Turkish modernization. Influenced by both the collectivist ideas of the day, and inspired by the great economic advances of the Turkish ethnic bourgeoisie in Russia (before the

Revolution), the Young Turk government developed a program of economic nationalism and etatism. This programme defined two basic goals: a) to free Turkey from the fetters of European economic and military imperialism; b) to foster the growth of a middle-class which would both provide economic entrepreneurship, and be the standard bearer of nationalism against foreign intruders(99).

The First World War--although ending in disaster--provided the Unionists opportunity to abolish the capitulations, to launch a policy of nationalization and Turkification of non-Turkish businesses, and with the aid of state-promoted banks, to create the nucleus of a national entrepreneurial class (100).

The First World War, Allied occupation and the War of National Liberation (1919-1922) did not allow the seeds of the Young Turk reforms to grow to maturation. However, their implementation pointed the direction for rapid advancement of the Turkish Republic.

Chapter II.

The National Struggle

Institut Kulte de Paris

II. A. The Era of the Grand National

Assembly (1919-1922)

The Ottoman Empire collapsed with its anachronistic institutions and contradictory ideologies in October, 1918. A new nation-state emerged out of a prolonged struggle against the victorious Allied Powers following World War I. This struggle which lasted for three years (1919-1922) is referred to as the "War of National Independence".

The ensuing Turkish nationalism may be characterized as a reaction to two perceived external threats: Western colonialism and communism. Both levels of struggle required heavy doses of nationalist and populist ideologies in order to engender popular unity.

In the holocaust of the war for national independence, all classes and social groups united in various organizations to resist Western aggression and occupation. It is interesting to note that at the beginning, the vast peasant population which constituted the flesh of Turkish armies and the bulk of the productive forces remained outside these organizations. After eight years (1911-1918) of continuous wars, the economic and physical exhaustion of the peasantry was so complete that they had no desire to follow either the Nationalists or the Communists, but only wanted to survive peacefully. It is only after the occurrence of invasion and the unification of resistance movements by **Mustafa Kemal** and the Grand National Assembly that almost all layers of Turkish people were drawn into the national liberation struggle.

The factors behind the successful organization and the general character of the national liberation front may be stated as follows:

1. Western imperialism shifted tactics from indirect exploitation to *de facto* occupation.

2. The Sultan-Caliph, **Mehmed VI (Vahidettin:1918-1922)** turned against the Anatolian nationalist movement be-

cause he believed that he could at least survive as the Caliph of all Muslims within a colonial state under Western protection.

Furthermore, **Vahidettin** abrogated all the Young Turk reforms and appointed the ultra-conservative and anti-nationalist Mustafa Sabri as his *Şeyh-ul Islam* who also collaborated with the enemy.

In the end, both of these events helped the nationalists to point out that the Turks as a national entity were not really dependent on the existence of a sultanate; and that religion could be made a tool against the true believers.

3. The effects of the Bolshevik Revolution across the border inspired the Turkish revolutionaries not so much as an ideology and universal philosophy, but as a successful war waged and won against Western imperialism through mass mobilization(101) Mass mobilization was only possible by the call of nationalism which functioned to forge all social groups toward a common end. Wide-spread proprietorship, lack of industry and divisive conflicts of an industrial society and the strong influence of local leaders such as semi-feudal large land-owners and *sufi* sheiks on the vast rural population allowed no other ideology to suit the purpose of the nationalist leadership. Needless to say, the social origins and ideological leaning of the leading cadre did not leave much room for vacillation. Moreover, the Russian ambivalence towards influencing and distorting the Turkish revolution caused the Turkish transformation to take a nationalistic-modernist line.

4. The unique leadership provided by **Mustafa Kemal** and his modern minded friends (Kemalists hereafter), have been crucial in the development of secularism, republicanism and democracy against the forces of imperialism, communism and theocracy in the following years.

The Grand National Assembly, the legislative and administrative instrument of the Nationalists against the invader and the Sultanate, convened for the first time in Ankara on April 23, 1920. There were huge differences of opinion concerning the authority and the duties of the Assembly. The Kemalists and the Conservatives first clashed over the issue of instituting a revolutionary government based on popular sovereignty(102). The second group wanted to go on with the liberation struggle, but not to transgress

the existing constitutional system (with the Caliphate at the center). They looked at the National Assembly as a temporary body to serve the Sultan-Caliph for the duration of the liberation movement. Only **Mustafa Kemal** and his close associates looked at the Assembly as a permanent convention exercising the legislative and administrative functions of the Turkish people on its own behalf(103).

Mustafa Kemal and his nationalist followers not only had to struggle with enemy on the battlefield, but also with their conservative counterparts in the Assembly, and numerous reactionary uprisings instigated in the name of the Caliph by sheiks, *ulema* (clergy), and semi-feudal landlords, etc.. The biggest of these uprisings took place in Düzce, Bolu, Yozgat, Zile, Konya and Sivas. A man called Eşref posed himself as the expected **Mahdi** and the protector of *Şeriat* and started a large scale uprising in the Eastern provinces against the national movement. All of these bloody events were instigated and led either by men of religion or traditional country notables who identified with the Sultanate and the Caliphate. They all received aid from the Istanbul government. The adverse effects of religion drew more uncommitted intellectuals to the nationalist cause and organizations. Ankara became the symbol and center of a new mentality and political movement.

The conditions of those days can be summarized in a few sentences.: war-sick peasants of the Anatolian plateau, living on or under subsistence level were left to the mercy of the nature and of large land owners . Forsaken villages were closed to the rest of the world. No evident political or national consciousness existed in this amorphous mass to take action towards their interests. It was the incipient modern Turkish middle-class who was leading the struggle for survival against both colonialism and the traditional legacy of a decadent Empire. But this class had not yet created a solid base for its vested interests independent of foreign and non-Turkish minority business groups. Because of their fluid and underdeveloped character, the Turkish entrepreneurial elements were not yet antagonized by either an organized working class or the peasantry. This point was successfully utilized by the nationalist leadership to rally all social groups into the liberation movement under foreign threat. This drive marked the establishment

of a national pact (later regime) and a supporting populist ideology on the basis of the sovereignty of the people

The nationalist struggle for independence was also involved in a constant battle against the *Şeriatists* and *Khalifatists*. Just after the opening of the Assembly, the conservative group wanted to come to a conciliation with the Sultan-Caliph.(104) But **Kemal**, being the inevitable leader of the movement, kept insisting that sovereignty belonged to the nation and, no person could be above it. Thus, the Grand National Assembly would be the ultimate legislative and executive organ of the people.

During these impetuous discussions in the Assembly about the fate of the Sultanate-Caliphate, the **Kemalists'** view was that as soon as the Caliph was rescued from the captivity of the enemy, he would take his place within the framework of the decisions taken by the Grand National Assembly(105).

In September, 1920 **Mustafa Kemal** prepared and submitted a project to the Assembly called the "Program of Populism". The bill on this project anchored concepts such as national sovereignty and people's government into the Turkish political life. The new Constitution adopted on January 20, 1921 (after five months of tempestuous discussions) incorporated the article: "Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the people; and the principle of government is based on the people's direct rule over their destiny."(106) For the Kemalists, this was a popular Government. But it was a provisional government for the conservatives, established to free the Sultanate-Caliphate from the enemy.

In the difficult years of the War of Independence, the Assembly operated under the influence of an amalgam of ideologies consisting of anti imperialism, nationalism, populism, socialism, Western type of conservatism and Islamism. There was no expression of diverting or extending the national struggle to a full scale revolution to alter the basic social structure of the society. In the urgency of the existing conditions, the "revolutionary changes" accomplished in this and later periods were based on compromises between the bureaucratic leadership on the one hand, and propertied traditional social strata whose interests were endangered by an all-out invasion on the other.

Despite the acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty, the Sultanate and Caliphate were constitutionally existing institutions. The final duel of the progressive and conservative factions of the Assembly had been postponed by both sides until after the War of Liberation.

In the meantime, the power of Islamism frequently surfaced in the discussion of some new bills. The clerical deputies introduced proposals rendering educational matters back to the jurisdiction of the new *Ministry of Şeriat* prohibiting the unveiling of women making poligamy compulsory, etc. These proposals were tactfully postponed by the Kemalists with the excuse that time was precious in the middle of a war for survival.(107)

Toward the end of the War of National Liberation, the conservative and reactionary elements in the Assembly became so active that no substantial decision could be reached without compromise. To curb their power, **Mustafa Kemal** gathered the progressive members into a group called the "Parliamentary Group". After this division the conservatives were referred to as the "Second Group" (108). Coinciding with this re-organization, two clerical deputies of the Assembly founded a society called the Society for the Preservation of the Sacred Traditions (*Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti*). **Mustafa Kemal** himself revealed the intentions of this Society under the guise of fighting with communism. Their aim was to preserve the rights of the Sultan-Caliph and to work for the absolute avoidance a the republican form of government which they believed would bring harm to the country and Islam(109).

After the war, the Allies committed the mistake of inviting the Sultan's government to the Lausanne Peace Conference. This mistake was tactfully used by **Mustafa Kemal**. After winning a war that went on for three years (1919-1922), the Allied naivete to refuse the Ankara Government as the only legitimate representative of Turkish people angered all factions of the National Assembly. On November 1, 1922, in a long and effective speech **Mustafa Kemal** explained how harmful the Sultan's behavior had been to the nationalist cause, and now that the sovereignty belonged to the people, the Caliphate might be detached from this title and the Sultanate could be abolished.

The conservatives protested this proposal and pro-pounded that the Sultanate could not be separated from the Caliphate. **Mustafa Kemal** responded:

"Gentlemen, sovereignty has never been given to any nation by scholarly disputation. It is always taken by force and with coercion... The Turkish nation has now taken back its usurped sovereignty by rebellion. This is a fact. The question facing us now is not whether or not this sovereignty will be left to the nation, but the simple matter of declaring that this is a fact..." (110)

After this speech, the bill for the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate was passed in a few hours.

Vahidettin was deposed as the last Ottoman ruler and Caliph on November 17, 1922. He left Istanbul under British protection under which he had placed himself four years ago.

The next day, **Abdülmecid** (another Ottoman Prince) was elected by the Parliament as the Caliph of all Muslims. From this moment onward, the conservatives began to look at the Caliphate as the foundation of the still not secular state, and a power to check the Kemalists. Both sides were feeling at the brink of a final showdown. The time had come either to establish a new Islamic state under the leadership of the Caliph (like the medieval Papacy), or to establish a Republican regime.

The expansion of debates over khilafatism from the National Assembly to the press alarmed the Kemalists. The Assembly dissolved itself in April 1923 for new elections. The Kemalist group of the (single) People's Party won only a slight majority. Almost all of the khilafetist members were back in the Parliament. This impasse left only one alternative to solve the problem: to declare the new Turkish state either Islamic or secular-representative. (111).

In the confusion of a long cabinet crisis, **Mustafa Kemal** gave a speech explaining that this was not a cabinet crisis, but a Constitutional one and that with a slight alteration in the Constitution the present system could be named Republic. The conservatives were caught defenceless. In this confusion, without allowing too much time for debates, the bill declaring the republic was accepted on October 29, 1923. For the price of this great victory the

Kemalists had given one concession to be incorporated into the amended Constitution: Article 2 stated that "The religion of the Turkish state is Islam".

Mustafa Kemal was elected to be the first president of the Turkish Republic. A scrutiny of historic documents shows that the Caliphate could have survived had it stayed as a spiritual authority. But the new government became increasingly irritated by the propaganda of the new Caliph that he was the true ruler of all believers. Not only did the Ottoman family occupy their palaces, but **Abdulmecid** was inclined to revive the court life and ceremonies. He also appointed envoys to foreign countries. But **Mustafa Kemal** leashed back when the Caliph demanded the creation of a separate Caliphal Treasury. **Mustafa Kemal** *once* more used his genius for arousing nationalistic sentiments over religious zeal, and after a week-long vehement struggle in the Parliament, the bill abolishing the Caliphate was passed in March 1924.

Chapter III.

The Republican Era

Institutkunde de Paris

IIIA. The Republican Secularism and Social Reforms

Following the abolition of the Caliphate, two more important bills were passed. These abolished the Ministries of *Şeriat* and *Evkaf* (religious endowments), all religious orders (*tarikats*) and their convents.

Under the provisions of the new laws, the *Şeriat* courts were closed. A law passed in 1934 prohibited the use of religious titles like molla, hacı, (pilgrim), and *hafız* (men who recite the *Kuran* from memory) in official business. The clericals were only allowed to wear their religious attire while conducting their duties.

Forming societies for the purpose of religious prayer and practice was not forbidden. But the 1938 Law of Associations prohibited political parties from participating in religious activities, from making religious propaganda, and from forming of societies based on religion, sect and order. The 1926 Penal Code prohibited any propaganda against the secular laws and principles of the Republic.

Although opening religious schools or institutions for religious instruction was not forbidden, the new educational laws making secular primary education universal and compulsory (up to the age of twelve) did not leave too much room for the development of religious schools.

Furthermore, after the adoption of the Latin script (1928), teaching in Arabic alphabet was prohibited in schools unless authorized by the Ministry of Education.

But the final touch of secularism on Turkish life came with the secularization of the Civil Law. After the abolition of the Caliphate, the Ministry of Justice formed a special committee to prepare a new family law. The resulting draft was devoid of the principles needed to produce a unified system of codes. At the end of the ensuing discussions that went on for two years, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in February 1926.

In the new regime, the revolutionary character of its legal policy was to transform the traditional social relations according to a model shaped by practical necessities and modern concepts that upheld the Western civilization. They believed that this model could create new social institutions and release the social energy heretofore "frozen" under the old regime. The new Civil Code brought completely new principles pertaining to the areas of property, contract, mortgage, financial responsibilities, the integrity of the monogamous family, marriage and divorce.(113).⁴

With the promulgation of this code, the men of religion lost their function as agents of law. Marriage became an entirely secular contract.(114) Under the *Şeriat*, the husband had un-reciprocal freedom in the case of divorce. He lost this prerogative with the new Code. Polygamy was abolished.

The effects of the new code on the status of women soon started to show itself in the full and equal franchisement of women and their achievements in social, professional and economic life.

The process of secularization quickly expanded to cultural matters. With the 1925 "hat law" the new regime launched a campaign to eliminate symbols of traditionalism from appearance. Informal measures were taken to unveil women.

After some preparations, **Mustafa Kemal** and his government opened a massive educational campaign in, August 1928, to teach the new Turkish alphabet based on Latin script. A law followed this vigorous national campaign that prohibited the use of Arabic script in all public affairs (after December 1928). Arabic scripture was not only considered to be alien and inept to express Turkish vowels, but it was also deemed to be a symbol of *ummet*, a pre-national social formation. Following the same logic, the teaching of Arabic and Persian was removed from the secondary school syllabus the same year. This task was relegated to specialized departments in the universities.

One of the conspicuous achievements of the new regime was the unification, consolidation and universalization of primary education. In 1924, all education came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. *Medreses* were closed. A Faculty of Divinity was established in Istanbul and was later replicated in Ankara. The Ministry of education founded a number of *Imam-Hatip*

(Secondary) Schools for the training of religious personnel such as ministers and preachers only in 1968.

As for the ideological structure of Kemalism, its basic principle, "sovereignty of the people" took a form different from both the liberal and communist philosophies. Actually, this principle, which found its official expression in "populism" was shaped in the push and pull of these two dominant doctrines, and developed as a reaction to both. The Turkish intellectuals and the Kemalist leadership looked at the national struggle not only as an anti-colonial struggle, but also as a revolution aimed at eliminating the power and privileges of certain traditional social strata that had become fetters to economic and cultural development.

These strata included the Ottoman dynasty, the royal bureaucracy including the *ulema*, foreign and minority entrepreneurs whose rule brought the country to disintegration. For the Nationalists, they were alien, anachronistic and harmful. They were obstacles lying between their underdeveloped, oppressed society and its bright, modern ("civilized" as it was called) future.

In this context, "populism" came to mean the interdependence of all social groups under state guidance (and entrepreneurship when private endeavor proved insufficient). Hence, the "people" had to be purified from the residues of traditional privilege, inequality and obscurism. A popular regime could not accept any source of legitimacy other than the people's will to govern itself.

What could be a better guide than science to show the way leading to contemporary civilization. Thus, thought had to be separated from belief, because, without freedom of thought there could be no science. Without science, there could be no development. (114)

Following this line of reasoning, republican secularism reached its final stage when Article 2, which stated that Islam was the religion of the state, was removed from the Constitution in 1928. However, the principle of "secularism" was incorporated into it only in 1937.

III.B.a. The Reorganization of Religion as a Spiritual Domain

One of the main goals of the new regime, especially of its leader, was to teach religion in Turkish to a people who had been practicing Islam without understanding it for centuries. So, religious enlightenment of the people became a government policy. This campaign was also designed to eliminate the last stronghold of the ulema, who claimed executive monopoly over religious interpretation. This was the source of their vested interests.

In 1924, the Department of the Affairs of Piety was constituted (Public Law No. 430) to manage the administrative affairs of religion. Its head was selected by executive appointment among the competent and technically qualified religious personnel. This office would confer no extratemporal or spiritual leadership to its chief. The department was prohibited from receiving donations or income from *vakfs*, now under the administration of the General directorate of Religious Endowments (*Vakflar Umum Müdürlüğü*). The tasks of the Department were translating, editing and publishing religious works "for the purpose of supplying the public with authentic religious information and literature." It was given no educational functions.

The religious policy of the new regime was to eliminate all kinds of anachronistic fetters on religious expression and to separate all legal and political considerations from affairs of piety.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's personal appeal, leadership and personality, to the men of religion and to the masses, soon bore fruit. Without promulgating any law concerning the subject, *ezan* (call to prayer) and the sermons came to be given in Turkish starting by 1931. It is interesting to note that what Mustafa Kemal Atatürk could achieve with public consent was made a law in 1941 (three years after his death) and reverted back to Arabic by another law in 1951 by the Democrats in the multi-party political period, as a concession to conservative circles in return for political support.

Atatürk's highest goal in the religious field was the translation of *Kuran* into Turkish. **Atatürk** finally overcame the opposition of the Turkish Islamists, but their fight was taken over by the Egyptian *ulema*. Shaikh **Rašid Rida**, in his *Tarjamat al-Qu'an*, (Cairo, 1922) declared the Turks' effort of translating the *Kuran* into their tongue as *kufir* and pronounced Kemalist Turkey heretical. According to the Shaikh these actions were expressions of Turkish nationalism, which was another heresy. He based his stand on twelve quotations from the *Kuran*, which he believed showed that translating the *Kuran* was heresy.(115)

This resistance and failure of the Islamists to translate the *Kuran* into Turkish made more Turks doubt the outcome of the theocratic state that these men would be running. (116)

The first full length translation of the *Kuran* was produced in 1924. Other and better translations followed.

The formalization of Turkish secularism was first anchored by an amendment of the 1937 revised Constitution which stated that the Turkish Republic was a secular state. Other principles that were incorporated into various codes may be listed as follows:

a) Article 9 of the Law of Associations prohibits the formation of associations on the basis of sect and order (*tarikati*).

b) Political parties and associations were prohibited from seeking particularist religious support.

c) Penal Code (1949 revision) prohibited anti-secularist attacks on the Republican regime and the legal system.

In the light of these principles and prohibitions, Turkish secularism was interpreted by the new regime as the disassociation of social, economic, political, legal institutions of the state from religious principles. Hence the Republican secularism was a reaction against the idea of an Islamic polity.

Kemalism brought an effective political leadership and style to Turkish transformation. This period of reconstruction was without wide popular support and lacked a strong, modern national bourgeoisie with political leverage and modernist ideological fervor. The principles of "solidarity" and "nationalism" (expressed as anti-imperialism, anti-communism and anti-lib-

eralism) voiced by a nationalist bureaucracy wielding state power constituted the basis of Turkish modernization.

Donald E. Webster has presented a systematic classification of Turkish reformation during its formative years. (118)(See the Appendix A).

III.B.b. Politics of Secularism and Social Reorganization

It is evident that with the republican reforms, administration of religious affairs was rendered a bureaucratic task. Religion was subjugated to the state, and hence, to the forces who controlled the state. Independent organization of religion was not allowed. Thus, bifurcation of political authority and legitimacy outside the realm of politics was consciously prevented. Religion was a sacred but personal phenomenon for the republican regime. It could and should not acquire a political character, in that it should never become the source of legitimacy of a mundane authority.

Nationalism replaced Islam as the ideology of cohesion and solidarity in the political culture of the newly created nation-state. The primary aim of the Republican state was the creation of a modern nation out of the *ümmet* (communion) of believers. Thus, nationalism was and had to be secular both by definition and by intention.

It is not hard to see that secularization in Turkey is not a product of the differentiation of state and "church" organizations that could have created two separate and independent institutional infrastructures. Unlike "organizational" religions, "organic" religions like Islam do not foresee the separation of the state and church as such. There is no source of legitimacy other than God. There can be no legal system outside the realm of *Kuran* and what the Prophet Muhammed has said (*hadis*) and done (*sünnet*). Hence Islam is a state philosophy as well as a specific form of theology.

In a society where religion is both the source of political legitimacy and guiding principles of legal and administrative systems, secularization involves a particularly severe upheaval.

However, the basic conflict in secularism is not necessarily between religion and worldly values and institutions as has often been claimed. The conflict is more fundamentally between the forces of tradition, which tend to promote sacred law and the perpetuation of the social structure legitimized by this law, and the forces of change. This struggle is likely to be more fierce in societies where there is no organized church authority independent of the State structure. (120)

Indeed it was thus in the Turkish case. Having a firm belief in their mission to transform a traditional if not a medieval society, the Republican elite had no patience for piecemeal change.

"Evolution" of archaic social transformations, institutions and values meant surrender to contemporary civilization and eventual dissolution.

In this respect, Turkish secularism mainly started as a policy of change implemented "from above" by the state. It was less of an evolutionary process generated by radical socio-economic transformation. Nor was it born out of a mass movement "from below". So the existing social relationships and values among more traditional elements of the society were less affected by the changes brought about by the National (Republican) Revolution (1919-1922), and thus basically remained intact.

Undoubtedly, in this traditional setting, religion remained a formidable cultural institution, influencing both social and political behavior. Thus, secularization of Turkish life under the Republican regime had to be forcefully implemented without generating sufficient popular support especially in the countryside where more than 70% of the nation's population dwelled until the 1950's.

It is not a surprise that such a centrally engineered reform along with other "nation-building" practices would engender reaction amongst pre-national and anti-national communal elements.

The first reaction to Republican secularism occurred in 1925, two years after the national revolution. This took the form of a massive revolt of feudal landlords which quickly spread to 14 east Turkish provinces. The declared aim of the **Sheikh Said** rebellion (named after its chief instigator) was to return to the past theocratic order. But the true reason for the rebellion was the revolt of the powerful feudal lords against the expansion of the authority of the new central Government into their once semi-independent territories. Each of these feudal lords owned numerous villages and their entire populations. For example, **Sheikh Rıza** of **Dersim** owned 230 villages. According to reliable evidence, he had taxed men of his region for their labour in cities as far away as Istanbul. Another of these powerful land-lords, **Musa** of **Mutki**, is reported to have exacted a right of passage from his lands even after the establishment of the Republic. (123)

The abolition of their religious titles, the reinforcement of the southern border from where they used to smuggle sheep and cattle into Arab lands, and bureaucratic intervention into their hitherto unchallenged political power in their own territories induced them to rise against the Government. The revolt was hastily quelled and many of the leaders were hanged.

Similar but smaller uprisings followed the **Sheikh Said** rebellion in 1925 and 1926, when **Kemal Atatürk** prohibited the use of Eastern clothing and adopted Western dress in October 1925.

The *Menemen rebellion* (named after the town in which it took place) of 23 December, 1930 was another such popular uprising. It was instigated by **Derviş Mehmet**, a dispossessed religious figure, after the abolition of religious convents. The revolt was supported largely by the rural petty bourgeoisie and some peasants.

In the early 1930s (during the world depression) the Turkish farmers were subject to heavy economic pressures caused by falling prices. They were exploited by the usurers who took the opportunity to buy their products cheap and lend money at exorbitant interest rates. (124) However, none of these objective causes was acknowledged throughout the revolt. The mob tortured and killed a young reserve officer (**Kubilay**) whom they deemed the symbol of the administration which was the source of their

miseries. The rebels wanted to re-establish the caliphate and bring back the *Şeriat*, the law of divine justice, equality of all believers and an "unchanging" social order. The reaction of the Republican People's Party (*RPP*) regime, which controlled the state apparatus was a new series of executions.

The Second World War brought worse conditions for the Turkish rural population. They had during the difficult years of the War of Independence (1919-1922), the 1930 depression and the last Great War, but were unable to take a bigger share of the advantages of the peaceful years enjoyed by the upper social strata following WW II. Turkey's peasants and small commodity producers repudiated the RPP in the 1950 elections. They followed the lead of the *Democratic Party*, and later (after 1960) of the *Justice Party*. Both of these liberal parties were dominated by entrepreneurial and professional groups who opted for a free market economy, hence, were intent to end the supremacy of the bureaucracy in Turkish politics. With the support of the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie they easily achieved their goal. Generous government subsidies, nepotism in official transactions and religious permissiveness (both in expression and organization) proved to be successful instruments of political manipulation.

This period (1950 and onward) coincides with the economic boom of post WWII era. Agricultural production had to be increased in order to feed a devastated Europe now under construction. Turkey utilized this demand together with inflowing loans from international sources, especially from the U.S.A(125).

Coupled with the business oriented policies of D.P. and J.P. Governments, favorable economic conditions soon led to the modernization of the Turkish agricultural economy. Mechanization spread rapidly. More efficient inputs and production techniques were adopted. An enormous dynamism took hold of the Turkish countryside(126).

More efficient techniques of production released a considerable portion of the agrarian work-force from their traditional habitat. Investment of the capital generated in the countryside into industrial and commercial ventures drew part of this excess population to urban centers. Cities grew. So did the vital functions of the country both in qualitative and quantitative terms.

Cities were, so to speak, the natural "hot-house" of secular republican reforms. The rural masses entered this modern milieu with optimism and expecting a brighter future.

Despite considerable freedom of religious expression, the secular nature of the regime had not been seriously questioned or challenged between 1950-1970. Uprooted rural populations found new hope and means of livelihood either in major Turkish or European cities where they were readily accepted.

Growth of industry and services, and increasing commercial activities absorbed many former peasant families. Not only did the proportion of urban population exceed the rural population, but the ratio of agrarian production *vis a vis* industrial production decreased substantially(127).

Nation-wide use of secular codes in the regulation of daily life and standardized secular education at all levels on the one hand and, urbanization, industrialization (rationalization of the work process), and increasing contact with Western cultures on the other hand enlarged the popular base of secular mentality. The elitist secularism of a bureaucratic cadre increasingly took on a popular character and transformed into a sociological process "from below".

However, there was a concomitant and countervailing development in the direction of resistance and reinforcement of traditional values. Symbolizing traditionalism, Islam remained a powerful factor in influencing political inclinations. Traditional social strata were easily manipulated by politicians expressing their opposition to the secular and statist elite (mainly of bureaucratic origin). Religion was one of the instruments of opposition of the "periphery" (peripheral economic and social strata) to the authoritarian secular center. This center represented the continuity in the reformist ideals "from above". In order to challenge the "center" in their quest for political supremacy, the rural and peripheral elite had to mobilize the electorate which was predominantly rural and traditional.(128). It was crucial to develop a new terminology that reflected periphery's antagonism to the "center". In order to tap and channelize opposition, this terminology had to incorporate demands such as a wider base of political

participation, free enterprise, free association and freer religious practice and expression.

Despite the change of cadre and content in Turkish politics the Western model of development did not come under serious challenge. However, the means employed in its realization underwent change. The strategy of "centrally engineered social change" was replaced with initiative via private entrepreneurship. This was the natural outcome of the peripheral elite's electoral victory in 1950.

An industrial consumer society guided by free enterprise was to be created not on its own accord but rather after the U.S. model. Turkey would be "little U.S.A.", as the Democrat Party leaders aspired(129). However, with the appearance of the new social strata and leadership on the Turkish political stage, new organizational and ideological forms gained momentum. Strict and "centrally defined" secularism of the Kemalist Government was drastically relaxed both in practice and expression. The traditional social strata from which Democrat Party drew its political support increasingly pressed and secured freedoms such as religious expression, organization; and proliferation of religious education. Consequently, freer pursuit of religious fulfillment, and freer religious organization, (basically along sufi orders) came to stay. These were basically alternative organizations to the state sponsored central religious bureaucracy and (their) formal interpretation of Islam. Nevertheless, such organizations did not gain supremacy for two reasons:

1. National consensus over the basic paradigm of socio-economic transformation along Western (capitalistic) lines had not dissolved or been challenged by the new ruling elite whose basic character was entrepreneurship.

2. a. None of the religious and pious social groups sought or proposed alternative ways of socio-economic development other than the established one.

- b. The aforementioned religious groups and organizations were neither strong enough nor financially self supporting to initiate a massive political movement independent of the state which had so far preserved its secular character.

3. Free market economy and private entrepreneurship fared relatively well between 1950 and 1970 for even petty entrepreneurs and small property owners who constituted almost eighty per cent of the working population in Turkey. However, this consensus came to wane in the 1970s when economic problems began to mount up.

III. B.c. Toward a Crisis

The forces of economic growth and social development worked relatively well until the seventies. It is in this decade that the import-substitution oriented Turkish economy began to evince production and productivity bottle-necks. The growing rate of inflation and accompanying stagnation (together stagflation) began to erode income levels. Depressed income levels did not allow further growth of industry. The only breakthrough could be opening up to the world market. Neither the entrepreneurs nor the size and sophistication of domestic enterprises were suitable for such a forward leap.

Balance of trade deteriorated up to the point of bankruptcy. Rampant unemployment excluded a substantial portion of the youth from the ranks of the gainfully employed. Petroleum purchases consumed almost all of Turkey's export earnings. New investments came to a grinding halt.

People, especially the youth, began to lose faith in the capability of successive governments. But, more importantly, they lost faith in the regime. Consensus over the Republican regime by and large eroded in the second half of the 1970s. Political divisions in the nation became irreparable. Insufficiency of Governments to contain the crisis and their partisan conduct further galvanized and polarized the society.

Politics of division generated many labels for the warring factions. But for the sake of simplicity, let us use the two broad categories of Right and Left. The Left split into Social Democrats and Socialists. The latter shortly after splintered into democratic Socialists, Communists and armed terror groups. The Right split into Liberals and Radicals. Radicals splintered into Neo-fascists

(ultra nationalist-authoritarian) and religious zealots. The radical right formed its political parties and participated in the national elections as did their left wing counterpart. The religious alternative was represented by the National Salvation Party (*NSP*) which received 12% and 8% of the total votes cast in the 1973 and 1977 national elections respectively. The ultra-nationalist-authoritarian Nationalist Action Party did not fare better. Hence, their interest lied not so much in conventional electoral politics, but in agitation and mass mobilization around radical programs.

Both of the radical right wing parties shared the Islamic reference system in their understanding of ethics, polity and even economy. The central concept of nationalism shifted from being a secular nation-state to the community of believers (*ümmet*) once again. But this time it was tinted with imperial nostalgia.

The community to be created would be trans-national (including all Muslims), prosperous, industrialized and militarily independent and powerful. But most of all, it would be ethically pure and devoid of subversive Western cultural influences, hence, categorically anti-western. Return to pristine Islamic values and practices would not only put an end to the perceived moral decadence, but it would be instrumental in building the foundations of a just order on non-western values and institutions.

It is precisely from this perspective that one must see the character of contemporary Islamic resurgence. Namely it is a protest movement or, better a protest ideology. It has declared its hostility to two main targets in Turkey:

1) The national state and its dominant ideology, secularism.

2) Materialization and modernization of daily life and the decline of traditional morality.

Let us try to analyze the rationale behind the traditional opposition.

1) Nationalism is an ideology that refers to a political, thus, a speculative entity called the nation. It is extremely difficult to define its parameters in material terms. The safest way of delineating a nation is that it adheres to a civic culture that holds people together who have the desire to govern themselves relying

only on their own free will. Its agenda is full of challenging tasks like creating its own political legitimacy and cultural identity.

Traditional pillars of legitimacy are rather concrete and easy to comprehend and to identify with: religious law and dynastic rule. They have their roots deep in history. But nationalism is quite speculative and transparent. It requires a level of political sophistication to grasp and a will to participate in its making.

Both the concept of national state and its ideological vehicle nationalism, become opaque when the national state succeeds in meeting the basic needs of the society and proves itself capable of generating proper solutions in order to cope with new challenges. Then and only then the national state will not be confronted with major legitimacy crises and challenges against its authority. Similarly, no major problems will arise concerning its (re)definition of the nation. There is no exception to this rule, be it a developed or developing society.

This analysis is partially applicable to the Turkish case in the 1970's. The incapacity of the successive administrations in coping with terrorism as well as political, economic and educational problems necessary to elevate the society to a higher level of development led to wide-spread political turmoil and economic bottlenecks. The military establishment felt obliged to intervene on behalf of the integrity of the Republican regime (1980). The bureaucratic character of the cadres, determined to uphold the secular state, once again evinced itself in a crisis situation. So did their central place in the system.

The military Government that came to power on the 12th September, 1980 had delineated two subversive targets that it saw as a threat to the Republican regime: 1) Left and Right wing extremists who had adopted terroristic methods to overthrow the existing system; 2) anti-secular Islamic fundamentalists who were gaining momentum in the suitable atmosphere of deepening social crisis.

2. As regard the materialization of daily life and decline of traditional morality, the deterioration perceived in social life was based on obvious objective criteria. "Making money" had become almost a religion in itself. Not merit; not qualities like education, specialization or expertise, hard work, scientific or ar-

tistic endeavor; but merely having money had become the guiding principle of life.

The society is exerting pressure on individual to become wealthy and powerful, but it is hardly providing the means to accomplish them. The hiatus between the "ends" and the "means" is often filled with illegal enterprise. Rise in the rate of criminality, suicides and divorce; proliferation of organized crime; use and sale of drugs; contraband rather than honest commerce; and drawing interest rather earning a clean profit are presented as clear evidence of social decay.

Visible corruption among civil servants is basically attributed to the lack of fear of God as well as to their caricature income. These and the growing disparities between the living standards of social strata are additional reasons of discontent and distrust of "modern life".

The crystallization of the belief that hard and honest work can get one nowhere had a very negative impact on large groups of people who had nothing to rely on except their labor. Considering that most of these are of rural origin, either still living in the countryside or have crowded the cities in the last few decades, they may be considered as the standard bearers of traditionalism.

The perceived objective criteria of social malaise are easily translated by these social groups into explanations of moral decadence. Fore example, glorification of material values over spiritual virtues and social values such a justice, righteousness and clemency has cultivated the understanding that everything, including virtue and honesty can be bought off or traded with money. Money not only corrupt public officials, breeds greed and envy among individuals but it also lures women out of their homes. Since what they can possibly is a meager sum, women are forced into dishonorable conduct under the influence of conspicuous consumption and the desire to emulate the well-to-do.

Traditional culture is basically built on feelings of honor and shame. For the fundamentalists, honorable women should not intermingle with men. They should not even shake hands with men outside the immediate family circle. Their world must be limited to family life and motherhood. Transgression of womanly roles is shameful. Shameful women must cover themselves if not kept se-

cluded altogether. Only shameless women wear libertine clothes and seek equal status with men. In fact, a new conservative style of dressing is on the spread as a symbolic gesture of opposition to the increasingly "shameless" society/world.

Deepening social inequality is giving way to an amoral perception of society in which only the rich and the powerful can get away with anything. This is blasphemy because it destroys supreme social values such as justice equity and peace, all of which are qualities of an ideal society promised in the Holy Book. Hence, modesty, clemency and frugality must replace vanity, cruelty and corrupting consumerism which infest modest and pious people (the believers) and lead them astray.

Of course, the source of all these illnesses are the values and institutions adopted from the West. So resisting these alien influences and their domestic agents is not only necessary to purify the society, but it is also a divine recompense.

III.C. Secularism in the 1980's

What constitutes the popular base of Islamic movement in Turkey today? To begin with, one ought to say that Islam is not re-discovered. The Turks never doubted that their religion was Islam. The question is how influential religion is in their daily lives. As a creed, Islam has always been important in the personal lives of Turks. The debate in the 1980's erupted not over its function as a belief system, but rather over its new role as a political and legal system. It was presented as a panacea for the illnesses of the society that could not be surmounted by the secular nation-state.

No matter how traditionalist they may be individually. However, there is a fervent organizational activity among "sufi" orders and other self made religious political groups who see their success and chances of survival in self support and political/organizational independence(135). They are financed through donations from pious individuals, business enterprises which they have created, Turkish workers abroad, and foreign Islamic foundations and official circles(136).

The civilian government established following the 1983 General Elections revitalized the trust in the Western model of development. A heavy dose of ideological emphasis was put on the relationship between private enterprise, ownership and democracy. The combination is labeled as "liberalism" by the Motherland Party (MP) Government which emerged victorious in both the 1983 and 1987 national elections. Serious efforts to join the EC were undertaken. Creation of a Ministry of State for this single purpose indicates the sincerity of the Turkish political and economic elite to be a member of the Western community.

The fact that there is no basic difference (perhaps only on the strength of emphasis on political freedoms rather than economic enterprise) between the middle class intelligentsia and the leading business community (together the ruling or strategic elite) in their economic and political targets is a safety mechanism against reactionary movements.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that popular movements can be repressed solely by state power. But, their maneuvers to get hold of the state apparatus can be curbed if there is consensus among the ruling elite regarding the model of development, and if this model is implemented with relative success.

With this reservation in mind no one can deny that there is religious reaction (or reaction expressed in religious terms) to the secularist Western oriented development model in Turkey today. It even has a legal party in defense of its ideas and ideals (Welfare Party-WP). But, more importantly, the movement has an underground organizational network that advocate an Iranian type socio-political organization. How effective are they in the open?

In the 1987 National Elections the Party that ran on a religious platform, the WP, received approximately seven per cent of the total votes and could not surmount national (10%) or local election barriers. So, it could not put any representatives in the parliament. It means that the religious alternative does not have a powerful enough following to demand an overhaul of the Turkish political and economic structure via established (legal) means of competitive politics. Nor has it harnessed enough popular support to threaten the basic values and principles that uphold the Republic, namely, democracy and secularism.

But, nonetheless, the existing Islamic reaction in Turkey must be analyzed in order to understand the kind of opposition it airs and the kind of needs it demands.

Resembling similar movements in the Middle East, the Islamic reaction in Turkey is basically an opposition to "undesirable" societal change by traditional groups. But the blame is put on symbols or agents such as callous or corrupt governments, domination of big business and labor organizations in the economy, and the Western "infidel" as the chief instigator of the above(130). In defense of fair business, small (non-exploitative) enterprise and private proprietorship, the Islamic reaction calls for a harmonious society where there will be no oppression and no exploitation of the meager and the disposed.

The stable nature of the society built on traditional values and institutions is expected to endure the pressures of contemporary social change, simply because it is divinely ordained --hence ideal. There might not be equality in such a society in absolute terms but certainly there is social justice. The "small" will obey the "big"; but the "big" will protect the "small" in return. Respect and prudence will be reciprocal between social strata. The principles of modesty and distaste against voracity will not allow for destructive competition, the result of which can be the elimination of the small and the weak. Existing social categories, their economic functions, their ascribed group status and identity will acquire permanency.

None of these wishes or expectations are religious. However, they are qualities of an idealized harmonious and stable social system attributed to religion (Islam). Moreover, religion provides a reference system, the symbolism and moral values of which have deeper roots than any other cultural or political reference system. Furthermore, it offers a social, political and moral alternative which is non-western and culturally familiar (traditional).

The Islamic movement in Turkey and the Middle-East in general is anti-secular, because secularism is associated with Western penetration; social injustices incurred by corrupt rulers and greedy businessmen cooperating with alien powers; and, cultural pollution caused by both. These "predators" usurp the na-

tional wealth; infest national culture with consumerist values, and immoral alien beliefs and deeds(131).

The Islamic fundamentalists call for a just society which can only be created by the true believers on the basis of *Kuranic* or early Islamic law and social (communal) organization. In this sense, the Islamic revivalist movement seems to be revolutionary in character in that it presents itself as anti-imperialist at the international level and relatively equalitarian and participatory at the communal /national level. However, its social frame of reference is not the nation. It is the community of believers, thus international and irredentist. In fact, for the Islamic fundamentalists "nationalism" is an artificial concept imposed on us by the West to undermine the Islamic social order based on justice, solidarity and moral purity.

By looking at the Iranian and Egyptian examples, one can safely propound that the mere presence of a secularist ruling group in power is not sufficient for generating a major Islamic opposition against its mandate(132). This leadership must be associated with Western exploitation, oppression, cultural infestation and with material gluttony by the peasants, rural migrants, traditional economic strata such as artisans and craftsmen, and students of humble social origins. Needless to say, religion and religiosity has always been an important factor in the daily lives and cultural heritage of these groups. However, transformation of religion into a political ideology or a political instrument of salvation is a matter of the degree of social polarization and organizational sophistication. This of course must be coupled with the failure or sustained crisis of the secular model of development implemented by Western minded political elite.

One of the likely outcomes of the processes mentioned above is a shift in the paradigm of social transformation, namely "from modernization to the moral purification of a corrupt society"(133). When this happens, it means that a revolutionary Islamic movement is in the making.

The revolutionary paradigm is as follows: Our society is not backward, but rather it is corrupt. The source and reason of this corruption is imitation and domination of the West(134). The, Islamic resurgence in Turkey and elsewhere is a reaction not to this

or that modernization effort, but rather it is an ideological reaction to the total experience of the entire (in the Turkish case, Republican) regime; its policies and basic values.

Now it seems appropriate to ask the question whether the Republican regime would survive this new challenge or not.

There are five basic reasons to be optimistic:

1) Taking account of the total votes received by the Welfare Party at the last (1987) national elections and its failure in getting any representatives elected to the Parliament, it may be assumed that support behind political Islam (Islamic Government) does not yet pose a serious danger to the established mode of government

2) "Clerics" are government officials in Turkey. Hence, they have no economic or organizational independence outside the state apparatus. They cannot collect religious taxes (there are no religious taxes officially declared and collected) and the income of pious endowments. Moreover, they cannot run religious institutions such as the mosque system and schools at any level independently as their Iranian counterparts can. Hence, they have no economic and organizational independence outside the formal organization of the state. This has always been an effective vehicle of official control over religious affairs and cadres in Turkey.

Lacking independence, religious officialdom has not been a vanguard of traditionalist opposition in the country no matter how traditionalist they may be individually. However, there is a fervent organizational activity among "sufi" orders and other self made religious political groups who see their success and chances of survival in self support and political/organizational independence.(135). They are financed through donations from pious individuals, business enterprises which they have created, Turkish workers abroad, and foreign Islamic foundations and official circles(136).

Independence and self sustenance of reactionary organizations are closely watched by the Government. So far, two political parties founded on religious principles have been banned since 1970. Members of religious associations are tried and detained if and when they engage in subversive (revolutionary) or divisive ac-

tivities in breach of the Constitution. For example, there have been several purges from the civilian and especially military officialdom in recent years.

So far religious fundamentalism has not been observed as a serious threat to the regime. Furthermore, Islamic morality is even observed as a safeguard against left-wing extremism which is partially conceived as amoralism and faithlessness.

Additionally, official circles in Turkey regard the present Iranian regime as a temporary phenomenon. They believe that the only revolutionary Islamic experience so far realized in Iran, is unique and will dwindle away either by war or under the duress of political and economic problems in the post war era. Then, the reactionary current which this "revolution" generates and supports in neighboring countries such as Turkey (by way of doctrine, training and financial aid)(137). will cease to exist soon.

In synopsis, the Islamic movement in Turkey is more or less in the open, rather than being clandestine. Moreover, it is closely observed by forces who are quite convinced that so far it has been kept under control and there is no reason that it cannot be contained in the near future.

3) The majority of the Turkish people have not given up hope on the established paradigm of social transformation. This paradigm consists of democracy, secularism and reformism. There is an intrinsic bias for freedom over tyranny; private enterprise over collectivism; thought (science) over belief (faith) in this paradigm. The target is obvious: To be a part of contemporary (Western) civilization(138).

If this target is to be reached and sustained through democracy, there is strong evidence against deviating from it in the foreseeable future. Recently published results of a nation-wide public opinion poll (*Sabah*, May 3, 1988 issue) reveal that 76.4% of the Turkish people believe that "whatever its shortcomings are, the best political regime to abide by is democracy". Only 12.4% of the population believe that "democracy is a luxury" for Turkey. Newly obtained data is even more refreshing. A nation-wide poll taken by *Kamar* (*Hürriyet*, November 9, 1988) following a heated debate in the public opinion concerning the merits of allowing the creation of a Communist Party and a *Şeriatist* party for the sake of ex-

panding Turkish democracy reveal that 51.5% (18.7 undecided) reject the establishment of the first, and 58.4% (21.7 undecided) reject the latter. The figures point to the fact that, a greater number of Turks consider a non-secular political party more dangerous than a communist one. Taking into account that Turkish people are traditionally anti-Communist in general, their common sense is indicative of the deep-rootedness of secular mentality over any other value system in Turkish social life.

Considering that the main opposition party is social democratic (*Social Democratic Populist Party*), it seems that reactionary currents do not have too much room at the present to flourish as massive popular opposition movements. Both the party in power and the main opposition are secularist and modernist in principle.

4-The Turkish democratic Left has no intention of embarking on an adventurous journey with religious fundamentalist who are also revisionists in their own accord. So there is no chance that we will see the Turkish democratic Left committing the same mistake which their Iranian counterpart have in the past by cooperating with and helping the Mullahs rise to power. They are cognizant of the fact that this will not only be their own end, but also the end of democracy.

On the other hand, notwithstanding their anachronistic character, Islamic fundamentalists are revolutionaries. They are determined to overthrow the existing system rather than reforming it, for it is already formed on false premises. So the existing system must be replaced with a new society built on traditional (pre-national, pre-capitalistic) Islamic values and institutions, the dereliction of which has caused the insurmountable evils of the present day.

Albeit in defense of other principles and a different socio-economic model, the "extreme left" is equally revolutionary. In Iran, these two revolutionary forces found it expedient to cooperate in order to topple the **Shah** and his government. The same phenomenon seems rather remote in the Turkish case. This is simply for the basic reason that, except for an extremist minority, the Turkish Left on the whole is democratic and shares no revolutionary ideals with either extremist groups, Right or Left.

5-Religious organizations and associations are heterogeneous in Turkey. Not only do they have different world views, but they often have conflicting programs. The various "sufi" orders and mainstream *Sunni* philosophy on the one hand and *Sunni* and *Shia* traditions on the other hand contradict each other. The *Shiites*, quite opposite to their counterpart in Iran are progressive and democratic in Turkey. Perhaps due to being a religious minority, they have traditionally been supporters of Atatürk, his secularism and democratic ideals. Generally speaking, religious groups and organizations are far from being united in a common ideological framework and an action program. They are united only in their opposition to perceived moral decadence, economic corruption and administrative mismanagement of daily life. Their most salient second quality is search of a unique, independent individual and national identity visibly discernable from what they see as a threat to their existence. At the "national" level, this threat emanates from the West.

6. The business community has not and can not renounce their traditional support of the principles of the Republican regime. In fact these principles are the *raison d'etre* of the modern sectors of this community which have been the creation of the Republican administration and philosophy.

The organic relationship between the larger entrepreneurial community and the State on the one hand, and the internationalization of the Turkish businesses of scale on the other hand, do not leave room for their defection to a political camp whose economic policies are anachronistic. Indeed, the economic philosophy of the religious zealots in Turkey favor small business over the big, and offers ascetism and xenophobia as a cure to existing economic problems. Moreover, they exalt the merits of pre-industrial forms of labor-capital relations, and call for procrustean extra-economic conduct to support these stringent measures in economic relations.

However, the same confidence cannot be extended to smaller business, especially of traditional character. Peasants, artisans, craftsmen and minor tradesmen who survive at the margins of the market mechanism feel uneasy and insecure. They are aware of the likelihood of their eventual social extinction. This state of

mind sensitizes them to alternative routes of salvation, promises of 'brighter' or 'safer' futures.

In this future, there will be spiritual comfort as well as an 'ideal' society resistant to rapid and disruptive change. All social groups will live in harmony and cooperation without the fear of extinction.

However, present conditions are not altogether devoid of concrete safety mechanisms to appease the traditional or lower social strata. Opportunities of gainful employment abroad in the last two decades have been instrumental in introducing cash (worker remittances) and improving life-standard of many families in the Turkish countryside and small-towns.

Employment abroad, especially in Western Europe, has provided handsome incomes for nearly one and a half million workers and their dependent family members whose proportion is estimated to be around 1/10 of the total Turkish population.

Large sums of earnings sent or brought home during or after years of toil in Europe have been a convenient vehicle for upward mobility. Needless to say, improvement means, improvement of social position and loyalty to *status quo*.

Furthermore, the influence of Western culture, less on the first generation of workers, but definitely more so on the second (now there is a third generation) serves as a vaccination process between the two "worlds". But it is not simple as that: the clash of cultures also brings about a defensive reaction in the direction of re-traditionalization or over-attachment to the *status-quo* however it is conceived and conceptualized.

Yet, there is another strong undercurrent that encourages some categories of small business to get out of their traditional settings and market relations. Some of the traditional small businesses, especially the ones in the line of production met the challenge of the developing national economy. Indeed, they succeeded in integrating themselves with large scale industry (i.e. automotive and electronics) through the system of subcontracts. Their interest naturally is in the future rather than the past, the same as their superior patrons. For both of them 'future' means growing and be-

coming competitive so that they can still survive when Turkey becomes a full EC member.

Given these circumstances, it does not seem likely that the great majority of the modern Turkish business community will lend support to alternative socio-economic models other than the present one. Of course this prediction will not hold true if there is an extended and insurmountable crisis which threatens the very existence of small business. But until then, politicized Islam will appear to be too confining to the modern business community because it claims total control of all vestiges of daily life. Hence, it is unduly restrictive for social strata whose very existence is based on freedom-freedom of action and freedom of decision.

7-After 65 years of parliamentary politics and democratic government, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish people seem resolute in defending the secular Republican regime. So is the majority of the civilian and military officialdom who see themselves as the hereditary guardians of the modernist secular tradition in statecraft. (139). Altogether, these factors assure the continuity of the secular Turkish Republic.

Under the light of these facts, no drastic social changes able to shake the foundations of Turkish secularism are foreseen the short or medium time frame.

NOTES

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127. 1987 *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey*. Ankara: Prime Ministry, State Institute of Statistics, 1988, p. 20, 30.

128. İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1970. Cem's account of the reasons of peasant support of Democratic Party is realistic and interesting.

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Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 33. 1 (Winter, 1979), pp. 1-19.

133 A. Najmabadi, *Ibid.*, p. 203.

134 *Ibid.* Also, W. E. Shepard, *op. cit.*

135. Gencay Şaylan, *İslamîyet ve Siyaset, Türkiye Örneği*. Ankara: V Yayınlar, 1987.

136. Uğur Mumcu, *Rabıta*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1987.

137. *2000'ne Doğru* (April, 17, 1988, no. 17).

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TURKISH REFORM MOVEMENT

Year	General	Secularization	Emancipation of Women	Literary Factors
1st*	Proclamation of Republic. Fridays made weekly holidays. Military Service reduced. Constitution adopted.	Caliphate abolished. Government Ministries of Religious affairs and endowments abolished. Schools transferred from Muslim to State control.		
2nd	Tithe Tax abolished.			
3rd	Hat law. Adoption of international calendar and clock setting. Modern law codes adopted.	Abolition of Monastic orders. First statue unveiled.	Equal Civil status.	
5th**		Religious clauses in constitution deleted.		
6th				Alphabetic Reform. Adult Education.
7th	Liberal Parties.		Vote in Municipal Elections.	
8th	Primary instruction restricted to Public Schools. Revolutionism Plank adopted by Party Congress.			
11th**	Metric system enforced.			
12th				Pure Turkish.
13th		Family names adopted. Ecclesiastical Garb Law, limited religious attires to clerics. Sunday made weekend holiday.	Vote in National Elections.	Language Theory in support of pure Turkish.
14th			First year full enrollment in Red Crescent Nursing School. Military training for girls, and co-education universalized.	
15th	Fixed Price merchandizing.			

* Beginning October 29, 1923. This designation of time employed for convenience. It is not a Turkish mode of reckoning.

** Nothing was done in 4th, 9th, and 10th year.

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