

JACOB M. LANDAU

RADICAL
POLITICS
IN
MODERN
TURKEY


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The fact that the active and organized involvement of radical movements in Turkish politics is a recent development renders its investigation difficult. To be meaningful, the terms "Left," "Right," and "Islamist" have to relate to specific situations, and against a background of freedom of action. In Turkey, therefore, the main field of study should be the years following the 1960 Revolution — the period which is the main concern of this book.

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
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SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
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POLITIQUES DU MOYEN ORIENT

VOLUME XIV

JACOB M. LANDAU

RADICAL POLITICS
IN MODERN TURKEY



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL

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**RADICAL POLITICS
IN
MODERN TURKEY**

BY

JACOB M. LANDAU



**LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL**

1974

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"Novarum rerum cupidi..."
Cicero, *Pro Rabirio*, 33

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PREFACE

Turkey is European in orientation, but has one of the lowest per-capita incomes and probably the highest rate of illiteracy in the Continent. These disadvantages are, to a great extent, offset by the determination of its leadership to modernize its economy and political culture. Turkey is indeed a fascinating country for the student of politics, no less than for the tourist. In recent years political analysts, both Turkish and others, have published an impressive body of research on modern Turkey. Its emphasis, however, appears to have been on the larger political formations. On the Turkish political scene other aspects of domestic policies have been rather less thoroughly investigated. One of these is the current radicalization of politics, that is the tendency to adopt extreme ideological attitudes.

There are perhaps two main reasons for this neglect:

a. In relation to the total Turkish population of over thirty millions in the 1960's, the number who actively participated in radical politics was small. However, like the drop of dye that suffuses the wool, it was they who colored the political life of the decade.¹

b. The very newness of active and organized radical involvement in Turkish politics renders its investigation difficult. In order to be truly meaningful, "left" and "right" have to relate to a situation where they can be defined as such in the context of freedom of action. In Turkey, therefore, they should be studied chiefly in the years following the 1960 Revolution — a period which is the main concern of this book.

In the following pages, the terms "left" and "right" will be used frequently. The fact that the Turks themselves employ them regularly in their press and political literature, as *sol* and *sağ*, respectively, does not mean that they are exact equivalents of those terms when used in Europe or the United States. Such terms mean different things to different men and, as noted by Professor Lipset² and others, their use varies from country to country (and from time to time inside countries, for that matter).

¹ To give one instance: the term *devrimci*, which formerly meant "reformist," acquired, through radical usage, the connotation of "revolutionary" — which is its almost-general meaning today.

² S. M. Lipset, *Political man: the social bases of politics* (New York: 1963), ch. 5.

To approach Turkish politics in such terms would be an obvious oversimplification. Leftist and rightist parties in Turkey have their own, local characteristics; a fact which is of even greater significance, since this study is concerned with radical organizations. While the center parties in Turkey tend to be conservative, both the extreme left and the extreme right are committed to change, although their messages are distinct. The journalist Nadir Nadi, in a leading article, in the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet*,³ expressed this as follows, "Where does the extreme right start? — Beyond Atatürk's reforms. Where does the extreme left start? — Where totalitarian trends begin." Actually, the situation is more complex. As Professor Weber has pointed out,⁴ left has ceased to be synonymous with progressive, right with reactionary (and, then, what precisely is "progressive" and "reactionary"). Indeed, both radical extremes, and some other groups in-between, address their socio-political credo to much the same strata, usually the masses, the basic difference being one of approach and emphasis, that is, tactical rather than strategic. This would seem to apply to the politics of many states, Turkey included.

Since to the best of my knowledge this is the first attempt to discuss the radical left and right in Turkey in book form, it is evidently far from complete. I have scarcely touched on external ideological influences — a topic that deserves full treatment in a tome of its own. Instead I have concentrated on the domestic ideological propaganda of radical groups and on the political activity of organized parties. Although this is necessarily a profile, rather than a full-scale portrait, it is hoped that the materials brought together and the conclusions reached will interest those concerned with the nature of politics in Turkey.

The following study is based on extensive reading of the available Turkish press and political literature of the 1960's, as well as on election results and other statistical data. These sources are so vast that I have preferred to remain within the context of domestic politics, touching only briefly on the economic and social situation in Turkey, and only incidentally on its foreign relations. Nor have I been able to conduct quantitative research by systematic interviewing during my visits to Turkey. Conducting empirical surveys in Turkey is not impossible, but the difficulties involved are so great,⁵ that in the context of the present

³ Feb. 7, 1965, reprinted in Nadi's *27 mayıs'tan 12 mart'a* (Istanbul: 1971), p. 200.

⁴ Eugen Weber, in his introduction to Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European right: a historical profile* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1966), pp. 1 ff.

⁵ L. L. Roos and N. P. Roos, "Secondary analysis in the developing areas," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (Princeton, N. J.), XXXI: Summer 1967, pp. 272-278. E.

study their usefulness was open to doubt. I have, however, attempted to verify some disputed facts and several of my premises and conclusions with political scientists in Turkey, to whom I offer my thanks for their unstinting advice.

The book is published with the help of a grant from the late Miss Isobel Thornley's Bequest to the University of London. I am grateful, for this and, also, for research grants, to the Central Research Fund and the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the Ford Foundation, whose grant was received through the Israel Foundations Trustees, Tel-Aviv; the Mashav Devorah Company, Tel-Aviv; and the Mif'al Hapayis, Tel-Aviv, and its President, Mr. Isaac Oren. My assistants, Y. Zingil and A. Fattal, were particularly helpful. The views expressed in the following pages do not necessarily reflect those of the above institutions and persons. I accept responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment that remain.

J. Cohn, "The climate for research in the social sciences in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* (further: *MEJ*) (Washington, D.C.), XXII (2): Spring 1968, pp. 203-212. Nevertheless L. L. Roos and N. P. Roos did administer questionnaires, in 1956 and 1965, and published the results in their *Managers of modernization: organizations and elites in Turkey (1950-1969)* (Cambridge, Mass: 1971).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFDI	<i>Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul.</i>
DİSK	Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions Federation).
DP	Democrat Party.
JP	Justice Party.
LPT	Labor Party of Turkey.
MEA	<i>Middle Eastern Affairs</i> (New York).
MEJ	<i>The Middle East Journal</i> (Washington, D.C.).
NAP	Nationalist Action Party.
NDR	National Democratic Revolutionaries.
NUC	National Union Committee.
PNO	Party for National Order.
RP	Reliance Party.
RPNP	Republican Peasant National Party.
RPP	Republican People's Party.
SBFD	<i>Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi</i> (Ankara).
TYIR	<i>The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations</i> (Ankara).
UP	Union Party.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY: TURKEY IN THE 1960's

a. THE BACKGROUND

This introduction will examine briefly the conditions under which Turkish domestic politics¹ developed in the 1960's. The period chosen is conveniently defined by the military interventions of May 1960 and March 1971, when the armed forces for a time virtually controlled Turkey (although not in an identical manner, as we shall see). For the political analyst, one of the most interesting developments in this period of almost eleven years is the growth of radical groups and their increasing involvement in domestic politics. Some Turks too must have considered political radicalism important, for the military intervention of March 1971 was to no small extent directed against extreme radical groups.

Perhaps the most momentous decision affecting Turkish domestic politics in the post-Atatürk period was the move of the People's Party, later renamed the Republican People's Party (further: RPP), in 1945, to change Turkey's single-party system into a multiparty one — with free elections.² New parties were set up and each began to assiduously court the voting masses, who were, and are, primarily the villagers. Each established local branches in all large communities and in many of the small ones, including most of the villages. In this manner, new vistas towards political modernization were opened.³ This does not mean that apolitical peasants⁴ changed overnight and became politically alert.

¹ My work will not touch on Turkey's foreign relations, which have been extensively dealt with by others. For recent studies, see F.-W. Fernau, "La Turquie, l'alliance atlantique et la détente," *Orient* (Paris), 47-48: 2e semestre 1968, pp. 73-89; and E. Weisband, *Turkish foreign policy 1943-1945* (Princeton, N. J.: 1973).

² On which move the best work is still K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's politics: the transition to a multi-party system* (Princeton, N. J.: 1959). Cf. id., "Political developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), VIII (3): Oct. 1972, pp. 349-375. See also "Türkei," in: Dolf Sternberger and Bernhard Vogel (eds.), *Die Wahl der Parlamente*, vol. I (Berlin: 1969), pp. 1331-1363.

³ As observed on the spot by J. S. Szyliowicz, *Political change in rural Turkey: Erdemli* (The Hague and Paris: 1966), pp. 156, 175, 199.

⁴ That is, apolitical with regard to state problems. On the villagers, in addition to Szyliowicz's book, see Paul Stirling, *Turkish village* (London: 1965). U. S. Agency for International Development, *Yassıhöyük: a village study* (Ankara: 1965). Joe E. Pierce, *Life in a Turkish village* (N. Y.: 1967). İbrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan* (Ankara: 1957). Id., *Yirmibeş yıl sonra Hasanoğlan köyü* (Ankara: 1969).

However, their interest was stimulated; and there are indications that in subsequent years they began to differentiate between the parties. Indeed, according to local interviewing by Professor Roos, increasing political instability contributed to the politicization of Turkey, including its rural element. This was already felt at the start of the multiparty era and the pace of change later quickened.⁵

The 1946 general elections to the National Assembly were contested by several new parties which, however, lacked the necessary time to organize adequately. The result was that the RPP gained a majority of the vote. In 1950, however, a rival party, the Democrat Party (further: DP), led by dissidents from the RPP, and an active contender for the vote in 1946, after an extensive grass roots campaign, won an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly⁶ and in subsequent elections managed to retain its majority. DP Cabinets, consequently, governed Turkey from 1950 to 1960.

The decade of DP rule concerns us here only insofar as it affected the 1960 Revolution and subsequent events in Turkey; particularly so, as a detailed Ph.D. thesis on this party has recently been published in monograph form.⁷ Domestic politics during the 1950's were characterized by the struggle between the two largest parties, the DP and RPP. There was an obvious sharp personal rivalry between the leader of the RPP, the elderly İsmet İnönü,⁸ Atatürk's trusted aide and Prime Minister, and subsequently his successor as Turkey's President, and the DP's leaders Celal Bayar, Prime Minister in 1937-1939, and State President during the 1950's and Adnan Menderes,⁹ the Prime Minister. Obviously, however, more than mere personal rivalry was at stake.

Although led and generally supported by not dissimilar groups of urban and rural notables, there were some basic differences in the makeup and appeal of the RPP and DP. Since both parties were composed of various interest groups, banded together to attain certain objectives, the differences between them were not always well-defined. However, among others, two cardinal variations in approach stood out. First, the DP

⁵ L. L. Roos, "Attitude change and Turkish modernization," *Behavioral Science*, XIII (6): Nov. 1968, pp. 433-444.

⁶ For the significance of this event see Bernard Lewis, "Recent developments in Turkey," *International Affairs* (London), XXVII (3): July 1951, pp. 320-331.

⁷ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat parti (tarihi ve ideolojisi)* (Ankara: 1970). A French summary is appended *ibid.*, pp. 215-221.

⁸ On whom see, for the 1950's and early 1960's, Ş. S. Aydemir, *İkinci adam, III. 1950-1964* (Istanbul: 1968).

⁹ *Id.*, *Menderes'in dramı (1899-1960)* (Istanbul: 1961).

limited the RPP's earlier economic etatism (which had imposed and maintained strict state monopolies in many fields) and encouraged private enterprise at its expense, being also less strict and officious in its daily contacts with the population. Secondly, it took a less ardent attitude towards secularism, allowing — according to its rivals, even encouraging — an Islamic revival in Turkey, complete with permission to use Arabic in the call to prayer and in the printing of Arabic books. As a result, Islamic groups increased their political activity¹⁰. The DP had much less support than the RPP among the intellectuals who, after all, had been reared on loyalty to the latter party. However, the DP successfully sought support among the large landowners (who, incidentally, controlled the peasant vote) and strove to ensure the village vote by the extensive development of the rural economy.¹¹ Indeed, thanks to massive United States financial aid, which included some 40,000 tractors, the DP was able to finance a large program of farm mechanization, which resulted in an economic boom in the countryside. A comparative easing of state controls, helped by government road-building plans and increasing hydro-electric power, encouraged both agriculture and industry.¹²

Initially after attaining power, the DP enjoyed great popularity in Turkey — among businessmen, who benefitted from the move away from etatism; religious Turks, who could again practice their faith in public; and, above all, the peasants, who had good harvests in the early 1950's and appreciated the advantages of the government's rural development plans — the most obvious sign of which was the many new roads. In 1954, the DP won 503 out of the 541 seats in the National Assembly (the success was partly due, indeed, to the electoral system — based on the plurality vote). However, the economic boom was deceptive and partly dependent on unusually good harvests. From the middle 1950's, crops were less successful (Turkey had to import agricultural products once again), there was an unsound over-extension of economic activity, imports greatly exceeded exports and inflationary trends were very much in evidence. The cost of living rose by approximately 150 per cent between 1953 and 1958.¹³ Inflation affected the peasants less, since they could subsist, at least

¹⁰ This is discussed at greater length below, ch. 5.

¹¹ On which see, *inter alia*, J. S. Szyliowicz, "The political dynamics of rural Turkey," *MEJ*, XVI (4): Autumn 1962, pp. 430 ff.

¹² K. H. Karpat, "Economics, social change and politics in Turkey," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* (further: *TYIR*) (Ankara), I: 1960 (publ. 1961), pp. 2-5.

¹³ D. J. Simpson, "Development as a process: the Menderes phase in Turkey," *MEJ*, XIX (2): Spring 1965, pp. 150-151.

partly, on what they produced.¹⁴ However, even their loyalty to the DP was somewhat shaken, when DP governments were less able to assist them financially. In the towns, economic hardship underscored political differences.¹⁵ Opponents were quick to point out that DP Cabinets had not planned the development of Turkey's economy seriously and had paid insufficient attention to its socio-cultural problems, notably education (during the 1950's, reportedly, more mosques were built than schools¹⁶). In foreign affairs, the stalemate in Cyprus, under conditions which many saw as a Turkish political defeat, was also blamed on the DP leadership. The latter's reaction, natural perhaps but unwise, was to show increasing impatience with criticism, shut down newspapers, generally muzzle the press, and intimidate the Opposition.¹⁷ This attitude on the part of DP ruling circles became even more pronounced after the fall in the party's majority in the National Assembly in the 1957 general elections.¹⁸ There were unmistakable signs that the party was determined to perpetuate itself in power by authoritarianism.

A classical situation was therefore developing in which DP opponents and critics were faced with the lack of any democratic alternative to gain power (or even to air their views). Violent upheaval seemed the only immediately available option for sweeping change. And the agent of change was, as it had been earlier, after the First World War, the Turkish armed forces, with their great number of dedicated officers.

Among the elements which the Turks call "the vigorous forces" (*zinde kuvvetler*)¹⁹ referring to the intelligentsia, the youth and the military, the last-mentioned have a very special place. All three, indeed, are largely made up of people who are both out-of-money and educated,

¹⁴ See, e.g., R. D. Robinson, *The first Turkish republic: a case study in national development* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1963), ch. 6. On these peasants, see also J. F. Kolars, *Tradition, season and change in a Turkish village* (Chicago, Ill.: 1963) and Eva Hirsch, *Poverty and plenty on the Turkish farm* (N. Y.: 1970).

¹⁵ Nuri Eren, "Turkey: prospects for democratic development," *Journal of International Affairs* (N. Y.), XIX (2): 1965, pp. 170-180.

¹⁶ F.-W. Fernau, "Le néo-kémalisme du comité d'union nationale," *Orient*, 16: 4e trim. 1960, p. 56. Indeed, the expense of some of the mosques which were built was defrayed by public donations.

¹⁷ Examples in Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (further: *MEA*), X (2): Feb. 1959, pp. 55-72; and Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey: The end of the first republic," *The World Today* (London), XVI (9): Sep. 1960, pp. 377 ff.

¹⁸ On which see K. H. Karpat, "The Turkish elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (2): June 1961, pp. 436-459.

¹⁹ Cf. Bernard Vernier, "L'armée turque et la république néo-kémaliste," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), XXX (3): 1965, pp. 259-279.

while most other social groups in Turkey are generally either out-of-money and uneducated, or well-off and educated. The intelligentsia, youth and officers have much in common, in their attitudes towards social reform and modernization. Many intellectuals and young people in Turkey, conscious of the immensity of these problems, sought refuge in political radicalism.²⁰ In the past century, however, the military have probably been the most active modernizing force in the country, and have never given up this role. They also form a very substantial group numerically, for Turkey now has about half-a-million men under arms. During the 1950's, when fewer in number, Turkey's military Establishment was extensively modernized with United States assistance and by increasing military expenditure.²¹ Simultaneously, they continued to be an instrument for general cultural development in areas near military installations, and among the trainees in general — thus contributing to "rising expectations" and "rising frustrations."²² It was considered by almost everybody as the mark of sovereignty for Turkish statehood, and as such was universally respected.

Nevertheless, the Turkish military were reluctant to take a hand in politics — a tribute to the policy of depoliticization in the armed forces, energetically pursued by Atatürk and, after his death, by İnönü. Atatürk's rule was a remarkable case of a military oligarchy contributing fundamentally to social modernization; he insisted, however, that this be done within a civilian framework and officers who wished to be active in politics had to resign from the armed forces.²³ Indeed the military were precluded from voting. Menderes, however, increasingly drew the military towards politics, particularly in the late 1950's, when he sensed that his popularity was waning. His *protégés* were appointed to key positions. More than that — to quote Professor D. A. Rustow — "by his indiscriminate use of martial law, he was forcing the army willy-nilly into a political role; in the end the officers could choose only

²⁰ Aydın Yalçın, "Turkey: emerging democracy," *Foreign Affairs* (N. Y.), XLV (4): July 1967, pp. 706-714.

²¹ Daniel Lerner and R. D. Robinson, "Swords and ploughshares: the Turkish army as a modernizing force," *World Politics*, XIII (1): Oct. 1960, pp. 19-44. F. C. Shorter, "Military expenditures and the allocation of resources," in F. C. Shorter (ed.), *Four studies on the economic development of Turkey* (London: 1967), pp. 33 ff.

²² Lerner and Robinson, p. 39.

²³ See Morris Janowitz, *The military in the political development of new nations: an essay in comparative analysis* (Chicago: 1967), pp. 104-105. Janowitz considers this in some respects a unique case.

whether they were to be in politics for Menderes or against."²⁴ This was particularly true, since the military were practically the only important organization not penetrated by the government's *Millî Emniyet* or "National Security."

b. THE 1960 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

Both the role of the Turkish military in politics²⁵ and the 1960 Revolution itself²⁶ have been extensively researched and will be treated here only summarily. The fact that the officers' plot was prepared carefully for some time (several months, according to some sources, a few years, by other accounts) and afterwards widely supported by the armed forces, indicates the existence of serious grievances. Most of these trends were

²⁴ D. A. Rustow, "Turkey's second try at democracy," *Yale Review*, LII: 1962, p. 523.

²⁵ On which see Ergun Özbudun, *The role of the military in recent Turkish politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1966). E., "Le rôle de l'armée en Turquie," in Léo Hamon (ed.), *Le rôle extra-militaire de l'armée dans le Tiers Monde* (Paris: 1966), pp. 215-257. Robinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 9. Lerner and Robinson, *op. cit.*, in *World Politics*. Vernier, *op. cit.*, in *Politique Etrangère*. G. S. Harris, "The role of the military in Turkish politics," part 2, *The Middle East Journal* (further: *MEJ*), XIX (2): Spring 1965, pp. 169-176. J. A. Brill, "The military and modernization in the Middle East," *Comparative Politics*, II (1): 1969, pp. 41-62. Wolfgang Höpker, "Türkische Revolution und türkische Armee," *Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart), XI (12): Dec. 1960, pp. 789-804.

²⁶ On which see Ali Fuad Başgil, *La révolution militaire de 1960 en Turquie (ses origines)* (Geneva: 1963). W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish revolution 1960-1961: aspects of military politics* (Washington, D. C.: 1963). Weiker's book was translated into Turkish by Mete Ergin along with two other works on the 1960 revolution (in French and Russian) and published as *1960 Türk ihtilâli* (Istanbul: 1967). See also Geoffrey Lewis, *op. cit.*, *The World Today*, XVI (9): Sep. 1960, pp. 377-386. Eric Rouleau, "Les nouveaux 'Jeunes Turcs,'" *Etudes Méditerranéennes* (Paris), VIII: Nov. 1960, pp. 67-73. M. Perlmann, "Upheaval in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XI (6-7): June-July 1960, pp. 175-179. Id., "Turkey on the eve of 1961," *ibid.*, XII (1): Jan. 1961, pp. 2-7. E. D. Ellis, "Post-revolutionary politics in Turkey," *Current History*, XLII (248): April 1962, pp. 220-226, 232. G. S. Harris, "The causes of the 1960 revolution in Turkey," *MEJ*, XXIV (4): Autumn 1970, pp. 438-454. М. А. Гарсагян, „Мероприятия комитета национального единства в государственном строительстве Турции“, *Краткие сообщения Института Народов Азии* (Moscow), LXXIII: 1963, pp. 179-186. Much has also been published in Turkish, e.g.: Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, *Birinci cumhuriyet biterken* (Ankara: 1960). Vecdi Bürün, *Şanlı Türk ordusunun zaferi: kansız ihtilâl* (N. p.: 1960). Haydar Vural, *Hürriyet savaşımız* (Istanbul: 1960). Avni Elevli, *Hürriyet için 27 mayıs 1960 devrimi* (Ankara: 1960). Yalçın Günel, *Seçkin devrim: 1960 millî inkılâbın ilim ve sanat yönünden izahı* (Ankara: 1960). R. Ümit Toker, *İnkılâp mevzuatı* (N. p.: 1960). Ali İsmet Gencer, *Hürriyet savaşı* (Istanbul: 1961). Muhittin Koran, *İhtilâlim* (N. p.: 1961).

grouped under a commonly-agreed slogan of "a return to Atatürkism" or "Neo-Kemalism".²⁷ The Turkish military, in its role as guardian, applied what Prof. Huntington calls a "veto coup,"²⁸ to prevent a further appeal of the government to the more religious-minded and conservative rural masses. Even so, one may still observe noticeable variations of emphasis, depending on ideological approach or personal view. Most officers in the plot, perhaps all, stood for speedier modernization, more comprehensive reforms and the safeguarding of democracy. These points coincided with their own individual grievances. It was simple to contrast their own straitened circumstances, rendered more difficult by inflation, with the luxurious life of reportedly corrupt DP politicians who neglected the military, since they were barred from voting. Officers believed that what looked like vote-oriented uneconomic spending in rural areas could more profitably be directed to planned reform, to development geared to Turkey's modernization, and to improvements in the armed forces, including their own financial lot.²⁹

The chain of events that led to the military coup was a logical consequence of the DP's use of the military against its political foes—both real and potential. This was expressed in ordering the army (instead of the police) to stop the train on which İnönü was traveling to deliver a speech in Kayseri (April 1960), or to forcibly disperse anti-government demonstrations of students in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Rioting, if on a minor scale, became a daily occurrence in April and May. Probably the most striking event leading up to the coup was the silent procession along one of Ankara's main avenues by about a thousand cadets of the officers' academy. This served notice that the armed forces now considered themselves truly involved—and not necessarily on the side of the government. Indeed, to quote Professor M. Halpern, "the army intervened because its established role of political neutrality was in danger. Either it must willingly become Menderes' tool for repressing all opposition, or it would

²⁷ These have been variously analyzed in Turkey and abroad. For two different interpretations, see F.-W. Fernau, "Le néo-kémalisme du comité d'union nationale," *Orient*, 16: 4e trim. 1960, pp. 51-68; and Илдыз Сертель, „Экономическая политика кемализма и отношение к ней современной турецкой интеллигенции“, *Народы Азии и Африки* (Moscow), 1967, no. 2, esp. pp. 31 ff. See also Э.Ю. Гасанова, „Об идеологических основах кемализма и их современном толковании в Турции“, *ibid.*, 1968, no. 3, pp. 25-35.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political order in changing societies* (New Haven: 1968), pp. 223-224; cf. *ibid.*, p. 221.

²⁹ Which was in fact improved after the Revolution, when, on March 1, 1961, a law came into effect increasing the salaries of military personnel.

have to intervene at its own initiative to protect both Turkish democracy and its own position above parties."³⁰ Nevertheless the DP leadership was surprised when a group of thirty-eight officers struck in the early hours of May 27, 1960. Following well-prepared plans, trusted units seized key points, took over the radio station and other offices, and simultaneously arrested the State President, the entire Cabinet and the DP members of the National Assembly. All this was done with virtually no bloodshed (only two were killed).³¹

The success of the military coup was due mainly to its brilliant planning and execution, which forestalled resistance by the Democrat Party or by anyone else. Many who had reason to be dissatisfied with the rule of DP hailed the coup joyfully and expectantly. The thirty-eight revolutionary officers, grouped in a National Union (or Unity) Committee (further: NUC), enhanced their popularity by proclaiming their desire to be political umpires rather than rulers. In practice they were soon to find out that this was hard to achieve. Numerous decisions had to be taken, and the practical political experience of NUC members was limited. This was apparent at once in the NUC's expressed desire to return the government to a civilian parliament, within three months; the transfer actually took nearly fifteen. This was due to the over-optimistic estimate of three months, the complexity of the problems NUC had to tackle, and, lastly, to differences of opinion within the NUC itself.

Among the subjects occupying the attention of the NUC in the first months were the public trials of more than four hundred of the ousted DP leaders, which ended with severe sentences on the accused. Menderes and his Ministers of Finances and Foreign Affairs, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüstü Zorlu were executed; President Bayar's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on account of his advanced age. Many other DP members were jailed for various terms.³² These trials did not end with the sentences, which were regarded by many as harsh (although the fairness of the legal proceedings was so obvious that it was never

³⁰ Manfred Halpern, *The politics of social change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N. J.: 1963), p. 315.

³¹ In addition to sources quoted in previous footnotes, see also René Giraud, "Vers la seconde république turque," *Orient*, 14: 2e trim. 1960, pp. 18 ff.

³² These trials had a strong echo both in Turkey and abroad. See, *inter alia*, Tekin Erer, *Yassıada ve sonrası* (2 vols., Istanbul: 1964-1965). Tarık Güryay, *Bir iktidar yargılanıyor* (Istanbul: 1971). Weiker, *op. cit.*, ch. 2. R. Giraud, "La vie politique en Turquie après le 27 mai 1960," *Orient*, 21: 1er trim. 1962, pp. 19-21. Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey: the thorny road to democracy," *The World Today*, XVIII (5): May 1962, pp. 187-188.

questioned). Powerful elements demanded an amnesty of those imprisoned — a matter which became an important political issue in subsequent years.

Meanwhile, the NUC was no less firm in dealing with the vestiges of the DP's rule: it liberalized press censorship; allowed suppressed newspapers to reappear;³³ attempted to control food-prices; and issued several decrees of a social character (such as an eight-hour work day).³⁴ It seems however to have considered its main task as returning government to civilian hands, under a new and better constitution, and with representative institutions elected under revised election laws.

Immediately after the coup the NUC commissioned several university professors to prepare a new constitution.³⁵ In actual practice, its drafting and approval took just over a year. After lengthy consultations, and some pressure from the political parties,³⁶ a draft constitution was finally approved by a national referendum on July 9, 1961. The voting figures were as follows:³⁷ 12,735,009 had the right to vote, of whom 10,322,169, or 81 %, cast their ballots. Of these, 10,282,561 were valid votes. 6,348,191, or 61.5 % of these, voted "yes"; 3,934,370, or 38.5 %, voted "no." On closer inspection it is clear that the constitution gained very low proportionate support — indeed, the number of those voting "yes" was just under half of those having the right of vote. It amounted in fact, to a snub to the National Union Committee and the 1960 Revolution. This was certainly true of the heavy "no" vote in Western Anatolia, a DP stronghold.

The 1961 Constitution³⁸ contained much from that of 1924, as well as a number of concepts and ideas from the Constitutions of several West

³³ Sulhi Dönmezer, "Evaluation of legislation regulating and limiting the freedom of the press," in *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul* (further: *AFDI*), XVI (23–25): 1966, esp. pp. 161–177.

³⁴ Further details in V. I. Danilov, "Le caractère du coup d'état du 27 mai 1960 en Turquie," *Etudes Balkaniques* (Sofia), V: 1966, especially pp. 15–19.

³⁵ For the report of the Constitutional Commission, in a slightly abbreviated French translation, see *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, pp. 241–245, reprinted *ibid.*, XVI (23–25): 1966, pp. 267–271.

³⁶ Weiker, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff.

³⁷ Published in the official gazette of July 20, 1961, and reprinted in *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, p. 307 and again, *ibid.*, XVI (23–25): 1966, p. 335.

³⁸ On which see E. E. Hirsch, *Die Verfassung der türkischen Republik* (Frankfurt a. M. and Berlin: 1966). İsmet Giritli, "Some aspects of the new Turkish constitution," *MEJ*, XVI (1): Winter 1962, pp. 1–17. C. H. Dodd, *Politics and government in Turkey* (Manchester: 1969), ch. 8. J. S. Szyliowicz, "The 1961 Turkish constitution," *Islamic*

European states.³⁹ Furthermore, it was obviously inspired by the social, economic and juridical debates among Turkish intellectuals in the years following the Second World War, as well as by reaction from the authoritarianism of the Bayar-Menderes era. Consequently, the Second Turkish Republic was to assume a "social" character in addition to a "democratic and secularist" character. Out of the new constitution's 157 basic articles, 19 (arts. 35-53) were devoted to "social and economic rights and duties." Briefly, the 1961 Constitution guaranteed the Turks individual liberties considered fundamental in West European democracies. Individual rights were complemented by the duties assigned to the state (chiefly in welfare and planning).⁴⁰ Among other concepts, the new constitution laid down that political parties are necessary in a democracy (arts. 56-57), hence may be formed freely and function unhindered, although accountable for their revenues and expenditures. Parties there-

Studies (Karachi), II (3): Sep. 1963, pp. 363-381. R. Devereux, "Society and culture in the second Turkish republic (the new constitution)," *MEA*, XII (8): Oct. 1961, pp. 230-239. Mümtaz Soysal, *Anayasaya giriş* (Ankara: 1968). Id., *Anayasann anlamı* (Istanbul: 1969), esp. pp. 58 ff. J. A. Орнатская, „О конституции 1961 года“, *Проблемы современной Турции* (Moscow: 1963), pp. 110-128. Hamza Eroğlu, "La constitution turque de 1961 et les relations internationales," *TYIR*, II: 1961 (publ. 1963), pp. 62-90. Bahri Savcı, "Yeni bir anayasa rejimine doğru gelişmeler," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (further: *Sbfd*) (Ankara), XVI (1): Mar. 1961, esp. pp. 81 ff.; XVI (4): Dec. 1961, pp. 93-145; XVII (1): Mar. 1962, pp. 21-87. Nermin Abadan, "1960 S.B.F. anayasa seminerlerinde beliren esas düşünceler," *ibid.*, XVII (2): June 1962, pp. 251-280. Bahri Savcı, "1961 anayasasının müdir prensiplerine ve müesseselerine mukayeseli kısa bir bakış," *ibid.*, XIX (3-4): Sep.-Dec. 1964, pp. 11-36. Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, "Les traits dominants de la constitution de la seconde république turque," *AFDI*, XVI (23-25): 1966, pp. 240-263. Yavuz Abadan, "Die türkische Verfassung von 1961," in *Das Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart*, Neue Folge, XIII: 1964, pp. 325-436. This comprises, *ibid.*, pp. 412-436, a German translation (by E. E. Hirsch) of the 1961 Constitution. English translations of the text have appeared in *MEJ*, XVI (2): Spring 1962, pp. 215-235; in *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), XLIII (1-2): Jan.-Feb. 1963, pp. 1-28, reprinted in *Islamic Studies* (Karachi), II (4): Dec. 1963, pp. 467-519; and in İsmet Giritli, *Fifty years of Turkish political development, 1919-1969* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 167-224. A French translation of the 1961 Constitution (by Tefvik Orman) appeared in *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, pp. 246-307; and a revised version *ibid.*, XVI (23-25): 1966, pp. 272-335. Selected paragraphs were also translated into French in *Orient*, 21: 1er trim. 1962, pp. 160-164. A useful summary will be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* for Mar. 17-24, 1962, pp. 18647-18649.

³⁹ For legal borrowing, see "The reception of foreign law in Turkey," *International Social Science Bulletin* (UNESCO), IX (1): 1957, pp. 7-81.

⁴⁰ A. Ülkü Azrak, "Sosyal devlet ve 1961 Türk anayasasının sistemi," *Istanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XXVII (1-4): 1962, pp. 208-224.

fore became institutionalized under the new constitution.⁴¹ However, the 1961 Constitution and a later "Party Law"⁴² stipulated that political parties which violated constitutional principles or threatened Turkish democracy might be dissolved. However this could be done only by the Constitutional Court—a new institution, brought into existence by the 1961 Constitution to safeguard it and all freedoms. Further, a Senate was added to the former National Assembly.⁴³

We have already referred to some difficulties within the National Union Committee itself. Besides a probable clash of personalities, there was a strong difference of opinion on the role of the military in politics, in which ambition and outlook played a part. While no officer dared speak out publicly against the dissociation between the armed forces and politics, some of the younger and more ambitious junior officers on the NUC wanted the continuation of military rule, in order to ensure the execution and safeguarding of reform and modernization. A return to civilian rule was never in any serious doubt; however, the younger officers claimed that if carried out prematurely, it would afford the politicians an opportunity to do away with the high ideals of the revolutionary officers. Not unexpectedly, perhaps, these officers also considered themselves most suitable to supervise future reform and modernization. The problem the NUC faced, therefore, was how to restore civilian government and yet see carried through a thorough program of reform.⁴⁴

In August 1960 the NUC purged from the military forces over 5,000 officers, including many generals and admirals; forcibly retired 147 University professors and assistants; and exiled a number of large land-owners to other parts of Turkey. It now felt strong enough to act against

⁴¹ Şerif Mardin, "Opposition and control in Turkey," *Government and Opposition* (London), I (3): Apr. 1966, p. 386.

⁴² The Party Law was adopted finally — after heated debate — on July 13, 1965, and conformed to the principles of the 1961 Constitution. It was largely inspired by the bill for the law on political parties in Federal Germany. Cf. Mehmet Ali Yalçın, *Siyasi partiler kanunu ve seçim kanunları* (Istanbul: 1965). Sait Çeşniçil, *Anayasa ve siyasi partiler kanunu* (Ankara: 1967). Yavuz Abadan, "Das türkische Parteiengesetz," in K. D. Baracher and others (editors), *Die moderne Demokratie und ihr Recht* (Tübingen: 1966), pp. 283–304. Id., "Türk siyasi partiler kanunu, *SBFD*, XXI (3): Sep. 1966, pp. 171 ff. Erdoğan Teziç, "Loi sur les partis politiques: note d'introduction," *AFDI*, XVII (26–28): 1967, pp. 341–347. For a French translation (by Ch. Crozat and E. Teziç), cf. *ibid.*, pp. 355–415.

⁴³ For the main political institutions, see B. N. Esen, *La Turquie* (Paris: 1969).

⁴⁴ See Jacques Lecercle, "Les problèmes internes et externes de la Turquie," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (Paris), XXII: Feb. 1966, p. 283.

the "radical" minority within its own ranks — those who were said to have advocated the continuation of military rule. On November 13, 1960, a majority of 23⁴⁵ dismissed a 14-member group from the NUC, retired them from the armed forces and sent them as advisers to Turkish diplomatic missions abroad. Foremost among "the fourteen" was Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, senior in rank and apparently the leader of this group of junior officers.⁴⁶ His political involvement will be discussed below.⁴⁷ The NUC then hoped to turn to the normalization of political life and the orderly transfer of government to the hands of constitutionally elected civilians. Soon after "the fourteen" were removed a Constituent Assembly was convened, which was "packed" with members of the RPP or its sympathizers.⁴⁸ This body considered and ratified the draft of the new constitution in May 1961. As mentioned above, the constitution was subsequently approved by a national referendum. The next step was the general elections held on October 15, 1961.⁴⁹ However, since no political party obtained an absolute majority in the new representative bodies, the officer junta, although technically it had ceased to exist, still felt it had to supervise politics in order to prevent a return to the pre-revolutionary situation, in other words to prevent the rehabilitation of the DP and the delay of reform and modernization. This was a distinct possibility, as the 1961 vote indicated that the Menderes regime had left behind it a large body of sympathizers.

Indeed, Turkey's political infrastructure had remained essentially the same as that before the 1960 Revolution.⁵⁰ The civil service, on both the national and local level, was almost unchanged. In addition, the leadership had put down two attempted military putsches by junior officers who apparently echoed certain views of "the fourteen" (on February 22,

⁴⁵ One of the 38 had died in a road accident.

⁴⁶ Nur Yalman, "Intervention and extrication: the officer corps in the Turkish crisis," in: Henry Bienen (ed.), *The military intervenes: case studies in political development* (N. Y.: 1968), esp. pp. 133 ff.

⁴⁷ See ch. 6.

⁴⁸ Cf. Bernard Vernier, *Armée et politique au Moyen Orient* (Paris: 1966), ch. 2, esp. p. 18. On this body's debates, see Suna Kili, *Turkish constitutional developments and assembly debates on the constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul: 1971), pp. 64-145.

⁴⁹ See below, ch. 7.

⁵⁰ Cf. Piero Pettovich, "La vie politique et les partis en Turquie," *Res Publica* (Bruxelles), V: 1963, p. 74.

1962, and May 20–21, 1963).⁵¹ Supervision of the civilian government seems to have worked in three ways: a. Meetings — official and unofficial — between the high command of the military forces and the civilian Cabinet, in which the views of the former (on matters of principle) were made known to the latter. b. Officers who had carried out the Revolution — except “the fourteen” — remained Senators. c. General Cemal Gürsel, who had been retired from the military forces by Menderes shortly before the May 27, 1960 Revolution, and who had been chosen by the conspirators as their head, was elected President of the State. Of the other 23 officers, 22 (one had resigned from the NUC) became life members of Turkey’s newly-established Senate. In order to take their seats in the Senate, they had to retire from the military forces and agree not to join any political party — so as to serve collectively as an effective watchdog of democracy.

In retrospect, it seems that after the exile to foreign posts of “the fourteen” and the quashing of the putsches, those revolutionary officers in favor of maintaining the democratic process, even at the risk of slowing down socio-economic change, carried the day. They created no new system, but were apparently content with a moderate political regime based on a new constitution. This had the advantage of delaying the growth of antagonisms within the Turkish public, and steering it towards a comparatively high degree of consensus. The drawback was that this approach took the *élan* out of the revolutionary movement.⁵² Or, as Professor Türkkaya Ataöv has phrased it, the 1960 military intervention was essentially “a revolution that shook but did not change her (Turkey’s) political body.”⁵³ Even so, the NUC’s greatest problem⁵⁴ remained how to reintroduce democratic processes without jeopardizing the fate of the Revolution; and, when these processes were restored, how to ensure a positive, active stance towards reform by the new civilian governments,

⁵¹ W. F. Weiker, “The Aydemir case and Turkey’s political dilemma,” *MEA*, XIV (9): Nov. 1963, pp. 258–271. Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç ihtilâlin hikâyesi* (Ankara: 1966).

⁵² As observed by Pierre Rondot, “Quarante années de république turque: du kéralisme au plan quinquennal et à l’association à l’Europe,” *Etudes* (Paris), 318: Sep. 1963, p. 198.

⁵³ Türkkaya Ataöv, “The 27th of May revolution and its aftermath,” *TYIR*, I: 1960 (publ. 1961), p. 13.

⁵⁴ For this and other problems of the military officers in 1960, see J. S. Szyliowicz, “Political participation and modernization in Turkey,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (2): June 1966, esp. p. 280.

without actually intervening and affecting the democratic process — something which later, in March 1971, they were forced to do.

Despite the realization that the military represented the ultimate power and that its supervision continued,⁵⁵ the general impression in Turkey and abroad was that this would be a remote control and that a multiparty parliamentary regime had been reconstituted, under civilian government. This was particularly so after the nineteen months of martial law ended, on November 30, 1961. What must have worried the May 27 revolutionaries and other Neo-Kemalist officers, however, was the fact that the whole civilian Establishment was little changed from pre-1960 days. The socio-economic facts of life in Turkey could not be transformed overnight, and the *ağas*, or large landowners, along with the urban uppermiddle class, were still behind most important decisions.⁵⁶ Ex-DP members and religious functionaries encouraged opposition activities against the NUC by handbills, speeches, small-scale demonstrations, and the spreading of rumors.

C. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1960's

Nor was there much that was essentially new in the political parties.⁵⁷ True, the Democrat Party had been outlawed, but on January 13, 1961, the ban on party activity was lifted; parties were permitted to resume their activity, provided they registered within one month. Several did so.

Two pre-1960 parties resumed activity, the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP). The Republican People's Party, or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, has already been mentioned as Atatürk's own party, dating from 1923, which, after having chosen to institute a multiparty system, was outvoted by the DP in 1950. First led by Atatürk, then by İsmet İnönü, it has shown a relatively high degree of cohesiveness. Although, like most other Turkish parties, it is made up of various groups, which sometimes quarrel among themselves,

⁵⁵ H. N. Howard, "Changes in Turkey," *Current History*, XLVII (285): May 1965, p. 296.

⁵⁶ Cf. E. J. Cohn, *Turkish economic, social and political change: the development of a more prosperous and open society* (N. Y.: 1970).

⁵⁷ Dodd, *op. cit.*, ch. 9. F.-W. Fernau, "Les partis politiques de la deuxième république turque," *Orient*, 39: 3e trim. 1966, pp. 35-59. For political parties before the 1960's see D. A. Rustow, "The development of parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political parties and political development*, ch. 4. Further materials on several parties will be found in chs. 3-7 of our study.

in the RPP's case only a few of these groups have splintered off and left the party, because of the quality of leadership and its sense of purpose. After all, its program was identified with the principles guiding state policies. In the 1950's, during DP rule, the RPP was the largest opposition party, and rivalry between it and the DP was one of the main causes of the political tensions leading to the May 27, 1960 coup. In opposition, the RPP campaigned for sweeping constitutional reform under three main headings: the setting up of a second Chamber, the establishment of a Constitutional Court, and the introduction of a proportional representation system (instead of that allocating all seats in the National Assembly, in each electoral district, to the party gaining a plurality of the vote). All these were enacted in the early days of the second Turkish republic. The party has enjoyed considerable prestige, but has also appeared to suffer from having governed alone for an entire generation. Similarly, İnönü enjoys much personal fame, but his age (he was born in 1884) may well fail to attract the young.

The Republican Peasant National Party, or *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, founded in 1948, took this name after the 1957 general elections. It was led by a group of conservatives, a substantial part of whose support came from the landowners of rural Turkey. The party was weakened visibly when, late in 1961, Osman Bölükbaşı, formerly a leader of the Nation Party (NP), which had merged with the Republican Peasant Party into the RPNP, left the RPNP with his followers and reestablished the NP, a similarly conservative party, representing landed interests.

In addition to the RPP and the RPNP, four new parties that stood out on the political scene in the early 1960's were the Justice Party, the New Turkey Party, the Labor Party of Turkey, and the refounded Nation Party. Several others were set up, but were of little or no consequence.

The Justice Party (JP)⁵⁸ or *Adalet Partisi*, set up in February, 1961, chose its name to express the desire of its leaders to redress the wrongs done to the DP. An amnesty for those condemned at the DP trials in 1960-1961 became for several years one of the most hotly debated political issues. Indeed, while formally accepting the May 27 Revolution, the JP attempted nonetheless to reestablish all the local organizations and recruit the support which the DP had enjoyed, by claiming unofficially to

⁵⁸ On which see, *inter alia*, W. B. Sherwood, "The rise of the Justice Party," *World Politics*, XX (1): Oct. 1967, pp. 54-65. Cf. Aydemir Balkan, "La Turquie à la croisée des chemins," *Orient*, 32-33: 4e trim. 1964-1er trim. 1965, pp. 130-133.

be its successor and, by implication, its avenger. The proofs of this claim were its closely similar ideology and the similarity of its leadership. In fact, the JP was not only headed by very much the same circles of notables, officials and politicians⁵⁹ which had led the DP, but many ex-DP members even became increasingly active in the JP, some in prominent positions. This — and particularly the party's hold on the DP's extensive organization — enabled the JP in the 1961 elections to come second to the RPP in the National Assembly and first in the Senate. The writing on the wall was clear: the effects of the May 27 Revolution were wearing off rapidly.

The Labor Party of Turkey (LPT) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), also established in February 1961, were very much smaller. The former, an articulate Marxist group, will be discussed in detail below.⁶⁰ The latter, in Turkish *Yeni Türkiye Partisi* and perhaps the most liberal⁶¹ of the conservative parties, appears to have made insufficient contact with the Turkish masses, and not to have projected effectively its somewhat abstract and intellectual program. In addition, the relatively moderate stance of the NTP's leader, Ekrem Alican, an ex-Finance Minister, was hardly calculated to attract wide support. Nevertheless, the party did win over part of the ex-DP followers, for whose vote it competed with the JP; in the 1961 elections, it came third, scoring best in eastern Turkey. However, the JP's substantial electoral gains in the following years were largely at the expense of the NTP. The Nation Party, already briefly mentioned, was headed by a group which had broken away from the RPNP, under Bölükbaşı's leadership. Even more conservative than other right-wing parties, the NP was strongly anti-communist and inclined, at least by implication, towards Islamic tradition within the limits of the laws safeguarding secularism.

Several other parties were set up in the course of the late 1960's, of which two will be mentioned here. Firstly, the Unity Party or Union Party (UP), or *Birlik Partisi*, was founded in October 1966 by a group

⁵⁹ Together with the military these make up Turkey's elite — which still comprises relatively few managers, technocrats and scientists. See Bülent Dâver, "Az gelişmiş ülkelerde siyasi elit (seçkinler)," *Sbfd*, XX (2): June 1965, esp. pp. 531-535.

⁶⁰ See chs. 4 and 7.

⁶¹ Firouz Bahrapour, *Turkey: political and social transformation* (N. Y.: 1967), pp. 57-58. For further details about this and other parties, see W. F. Weiker, "Turkey," in T. Y. Ismael (ed.), *Government and politics of the contemporary Middle East* (Homewood, Ill.: 1970), pp. 138-140. Nuri Eren, "Turkey: problems, policies, parties," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (1): Oct. 1961, pp. 96 ff. For their programs, see Ferruh Bozbeyli, *Parti programları* (Istanbul: 1970).

of people, including its chairman, Hasan Tahsin Berkman, a retired general, and its secretary-general, Cemal Özbey, a lawyer. Later, its chairman became Hüseyin Balan, a member of the National Assembly for Ankara, who left the NP to join the party. While the party's opponents accused it of being supported and financed by Alevites, the UP maintained that it was a progressive, Kemalist party. The party's program declared for reforms and against all forms of capitalism, communism, fascism and fanaticism. Essentially a centrist party, the UP was torn by rifts and personal strife soon after its formation, which limited its effectiveness.

Secondly, the Reliance Party (RP), or *Güven Partisi*⁶² was founded in May 1967 by a group of members in the National Assembly and Senators who had resigned from the RPP in the previous month — accusing the latter of having moved too far left-of-center. The new party was led by ex-Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, Member for Kayseri in the National Assembly. Its slogan was "Internal security, external security, rely on the Reliance Party!" The party platform claimed to be Kemalist, not socialist, but sympathetically inclined to the redress of economic grievances and social reform. Nonetheless, its strong support of the private sector underlined the fact that this was a party with a middle-class, bourgeois leadership. While its politics were anti-RPP and against all forms of leftism, the RP had to compete for popular support with several other right-of-center parties, mainly the Justice Party.

The impact of the May 27 Revolution on domestic politics in the subsequent decade is evident in the party system and the aggressive rivalry between the parties. The RPP-DP rivalry of pre-1960 days now changed into an equally bitter contest between the RPP and JP, particularly after 1965, when the JP, as the DP had done, obtained an absolute parliamentary majority. As in the pre-1960 period, compared with the large parties, the others had very little parliamentary influence and little impact in the country as a whole. The bi-polarity between the RPP and JP, and the unsatisfied ambitions of the smaller parties, were forcibly ventilated in the frequent general elections between 1961 and 1969.⁶³ Except for 1967, not a single year passed without elections to the National Assembly, or the Senate (a third of which changed every two years), or the municipalities and local councils. Extensive use of the state-owned radio and other

⁶² Its name was also translated as "The Security Party." The party has recently changed its name to *Millî Güven Partisi*, i.e., National Reliance (or: Security) Party.

⁶³ In 1970 the elections to a third of the seats in the Senate were postponed. The main electoral contests will be discussed in ch. 7.

mass media increasingly brought the acrimonious electoral propaganda into the living-room of every home.

The growing trend towards extremism in politics was not checked at the outset in the early 1960's because the military was unwilling to interfere again in lawful political activity, even if extreme, and because of the peculiar character of the Cabinets which followed the return to civilian government. After the May 27 coup, the NUC governed through an appointed Cabinet of civilians and military officers. However the 1961 elections, for the first time in Turkey's electoral history, did not give an absolute majority to any one party. In the National Assembly, at least, this was partly due to the new proportional representative system: its 450 seats were divided as follows: RPP 173, JP 158, NTP 65, RPNP 54. In the Senate the composition of the 150 elected Senators was JP 70, RPP 36, NTP 28, RPNP 16 (and, in addition, 15 appointed by the State President and the 22 Life Senators).⁶⁴ The differences were mainly due to the elections to the Assembly being proportional, and to the Senate — by simple plurality.

Retired General Cemal Gürsel, who had been elected State President in a joint session of both houses by a large majority, had the greatest difficulty in convincing the rival parties to form a coalition cabinet. This was composed of both RPP and JP ministers under İnönü's Premiership, lasted for only six months, and merely served to emphasize the abyss between the large parties. The same holds true of subsequent coalition Cabinets of the RPP and smaller parties, with the JP as the major opposition party, shrewdly placing the blame for every failure or inaction on the others. While successive amnesties of many DP members, sentenced at the 1961 trials, somewhat eased tension, mutual recrimination over the impasse reached in Cyprus and personal bickering kept controversy alive. The JP's achievement in gaining a plurality of the popular vote, both during the municipal and local elections of 1963 (when it came first in 42 provinces, while the RPP came first in only 23) and in those to a third of the Senate, in 1964 (where it gained eight additional seats⁶⁵), encouraged it to think it might soon obtain an absolute majority. Consequently some of its spokesmen spoke lightly of the May

⁶⁴ B. Lewis, "Turkey," in Ivison Mcadam (ed.), *The annual register: world events 1961* (London: 1962), pp. 276 ff. K. H. Karpat, "Recent political developments in Turkey and their social background," *International Affairs* (London), XXXVIII (3): July 1962, pp. 317-319.

⁶⁵ Cf. Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey, 1962-4," *The World Today*, XX (12): Dec. 1964, p. 520, for this and the other election results.

27 Revolution and of the military. The answer came immediately, in the form of a warning by the Chief of Staff of the Turkish armed forces. The warning was not lost, and may have been a contributory factor in the election of Süleyman Demirel to the chairmanship of the JP, at the end of November 1966, after the sudden death of the party's first leader, retired general and ex-Chief of Staff Ragıp Gümüşpala.

Demirel was regarded as a moderate and not too involved in the DP's politics, a fact which apparently helped him to defeat other candidates for the party chairmanship. He had been a protégé of Menderes and a very able administrator of the state water and irrigation services. He was a skillful politician and the first technocrat to reach a top position in a party — positions usually held in Turkish politics by retired military men or notables.⁶⁶ It was he, also, who had served as Deputy Prime Minister, along with other JP ministers, in a broadly-based caretaker Cabinet on the eve of the 1965 elections to the National Assembly. In these elections, the JP obtained 240 out of 450 seats in the National Assembly, a figure which it even improved on slightly in those of 1969.⁶⁷ From 1965 until the renewed military intervention on March 12, 1971, the JP held an absolute majority in the National Assembly and in the Senate, and Demirel was Prime Minister at the head of a JP Cabinet.

True, the Justice Party government was somewhat restricted in its decision-making by the discreet supervision of the military and the fact that the State President was a retired general. In 1966, indeed, Cevdet Sunay, the Chief-of-Staff, succeeded ailing Cemal Gürsel as President — thus serving “to institutionalize the partnership of the armed forces in the country's political power structure.”⁶⁸ It was also hampered in the freedom of its political action by the very nature of the 1961 Constitution — for example, by the functioning of a Constitutional Court. These differences notwithstanding, there is a striking similarity between JP rule from 1965 to 1971 and DP rule in the years 1950–1960. Both in turn grew increasingly impatient with criticism and tended to perpetuate themselves in power. Oriented towards the West in their foreign policies, both DP and JP used western financial aid, initially for economic development, with an élan that was calculated to increase the party's popularity with the peasant masses, and was consequently viewed as retrogressive

⁶⁶ See Andrew Mango, *Turkey* (London: 1968), p. 98.

⁶⁷ On these and other elections, see ch. 7.

⁶⁸ To use an apt phrase of A. J. A. Mango, “Turkey,” *The annual register: world events 1966*, p. 291.

by many intellectuals.⁶⁹ Further, the economic policies of both the DP and JP eventually brought about rising inflation, reportedly accompanied by a brisk black-market.⁷⁰ Both virtually ignored the social effects of inflation and generally paid scant attention to solving Turkey's socio-economic problems — even such pressing ones as overt or covert unemployment and the relatively slow increase in education and literacy. Development in the late 1960's barely kept pace with the rapid annual rise in population of about a million (net growth). Equally, governments did almost nothing to stop the large emigration from village to town, which (along with growing urbanization) considerably changed the ratio of the urban-rural population, as follows:⁷¹

TABLE 1. URBAN-RURAL POPULATION IN TURKEY, 1927-1965

Census year	Urban Population		Rural Population	
	No.	%	No.	%
1927	2,236,085	16.4	11,412,185	83.6
1935	2,684,197	16.6	15,473,821	83.4
1940	3,214,471	18.0	14,606,479	82.0
1945	3,441,895	18.3	15,348,279	81.7
1950	3,885,865	18.5	17,065,525	81.5
1955	5,328,846	22.1	18,735,917	77.9
1960	6,999,026	25.2	20,755,794	74.8
1965	10,805,817	34.4	20,585,604	65.6

As the table shows this movement gathered force during the 1950's and 1960's. The result was a host of other problems which were ignored by the government. The most blatant was the squalor and poverty in the shacks, or *gecekondu*,⁷² of the

⁶⁹ J. S. Szyliowicz, *op. cit.* in *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (2): June 1966, p. 283. Sherwood, *op. cit.* in *World Politics*, XX (1): Oct. 1967, pp. 63-65.

⁷⁰ *Varlık Yılığ 1968* (Istanbul: Dec. 1967), p. 16.

⁷¹ Tomris Ersoy, "Mobility of rural labour in Turkey: an econometric approach," *İstatistik: Türk İstatistik Derneği dergisi* (Quarterly, Ankara), I (6-7): Dec. 1969-Mar. 1970, p. 56. Unofficial estimates indicate that the trend continues.

⁷² Literally, *gecekondu* means "set up during the night," which accurately describes the way the shacks were hastily and illegally built. Official statistics estimated that in Turkey in 1966 there were 425,000. Assuming 5.5 persons per *gecekondu*, this meant that 2,338,000 people, or 7.45% of the total population (21.63% of the urban population) lived in these conditions. See Turkey, Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement, Special Directorate of Housing, Social Research Department, *Urbanization and the Housing Situation in Turkey* (Ankara: 1966). For additional data, cf. Dominique Van Neste, "La Turquie et le problème d'intégration," *Civilisa-*

shanty-towns around Turkey's cities, put up by poor migrants from the villages.⁷³

d. SOME RADICAL TRENDS IN THE LITERATURE OF THE 1960's

The mood of the time was reflected in the Turkish press and literature of the 1960's. While the next chapter of this study will deal with the press in greater detail, we might glance here at some relevant trends in the literature of the period.⁷⁴

Works sympathetic to communism, or at least of the type called "progressive" by the Soviets, started to appear in Turkey in small numbers after the end of the Second World War.⁷⁵ More books of this type were published in the 1960's as part of the liberalization of censorship during the Second Republic, on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a result of the general increase in book-printing. The following official figures illustrate this growth (for comparison's sake, the growth of newspapers and periodicals is also shown.)⁷⁶

The steady increase in the publication of books relating to the social sciences should be noted. This is particularly striking in the sharp rise from 1962 to 1963, that is, as soon as the liberalization of governmental censorship became evident. While such works obviously covered the whole range of the social sciences, some dealt with Turkey's own political

tions (Bruxelles), XV (2): 1965, pp. 188-205. Acc. to the Turkish press of April 1969, the number of *gecekondu*s increased to 450,000; in 1970, they reached half a million. The most recent studies on the subject appear to be İbrahim Yasa, "L'urbanisation aux communautés des bidonvilles d'Ankara," *Sbfd*, XXVI (1): Mar. 1971, pp. 1-12; and Ruşen Keleş, *100 soruda Türkiye'de şehirleşme, konut ve gecekondu* (Istanbul: 1970).

⁷³ On which see Cevat Geray, "Urbanization in Turkey," *Sbfd*, XXIV (4): Dec. 1969, pp. 157-174.

⁷⁴ The growth in both quantity and extremism of Islamic and Pan-Turk literature is discussed below, in ch. 5.

⁷⁵ A. A. Бабаев, „Некоторые вопросы послевоенной турецкой прогрессивной литературы“, *Краткие Сообщения Института Востоковедения*, XXII: 1956, pp. 37-44. This was amplified in Babayev's *Очерки современной турецкой литературы* (Moscow: 1959). See also K. H. Karpat, "Social themes in contemporary Turkish literature," *MEJ*, XIV (1): Winter 1960, pp. 29-44; XIV (2): Spring 1960, pp. 153-168.

⁷⁶ Source: *1968 statistical yearbook of Turkey* (Ankara: 1969), p. 121. *Türkiye istatistik yılı 1969 (ek yayın)* (Ankara: 1970), p. 25. A few slight variations in Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye 1968* (Istanbul: 1969), p. 97. The 1969 data were generously supplied by the State Institute of Statistics in Ankara.

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS, PUBLISHED IN TURKEY, BY YEAR

Year	Books		Newspapers and periodicals	
	Total	In the social sciences	Total	In the social sciences
1960	4,195	1,115	1,658	290
1961	4,357	1,218	1,573	294
1962	4,842	1,296	1,653	272
1963	5,426	1,636	1,722	314
1964	5,745	1,720	1,739	334
1965	5,442	1,842	1,890	365
1966	6,099	2,015	2,078	460
1967	5,688	1,765	2,222	464
1968	5,492	1,700	2,347	482
1969	5,669	1,797	2,453	490
1970	5,854	1,896	2,470	507

and socio-economic problems. Of these an increasing number were either concerned with socialism, or were socialist-inspired. We will examine several of the more relevant ones later; it is of course impossible to refer to all, or even most, of them. Mentioning a few may, however, help to gauge the mood of some politically-minded intellectuals in the 1960's.

One of the most prolific and influential socialist writers in the early 1960's was Hilmi Özgen, a journalist connected with several of the largest Istanbul dailies. In his book on the concepts of Turkish socialism,⁷⁷ Özgen analyzed the situation in Turkey and reached the conclusion that a five-point economic formula was needed in order to apply socialism in Turkey: a. A reform in land-holding. b. Nationalization of foreign trade. c. Nationalization of banking. d. Nationalization of the insurance business. e. Nationalization of big industry and of natural resources.⁷⁸ Several of these points were repeated in a collection of essays on Turkish socialism published in the following year.⁷⁹ Moreover, Özgen found socialism everywhere and in everything — in Ottoman history, Islam, and in the sacred books of other religions. In another book, he put together several essays on agricultural society, mainly in Turkey, and on its need, on economic grounds, for socialism.⁸⁰ He subsequently publish-

⁷⁷ Hilmi Özgen, *Türk sosyalizminin ilkeleri* (Ankara: 1962).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, *passim*, esp. p. 12.

⁷⁹ Hilmi Özgen, *Türk sosyalizmi üzerine denemeler* (Ankara: 1963).

⁸⁰ *Id.*, *Tarımda sosyalizm* (Ankara: 1964).

ed a collection of essays on the central role socialism should have in Turkey's economic development.⁸¹ Özgen's largest work, a further collection of his own essays,⁸² was published in 1969 and again devoted to Turkey's economic problems — as seen through the eyes of a convinced socialist. This book, however, concentrated on the situation of the workers in Turkey and ways in which to improve it.⁸³ The subject became a favorite with many socialist writers in contemporary Turkey.

Naturally, there were different approaches to the workers' lot and their conditions of employment. One of the most frequently discussed topics, in this context, was the attitude towards strikes. Perhaps the clearest exposition of the socialist view in this respect was that of Dr. Çetin Özek, a lecturer in law at Istanbul University, who also has to his credit a book⁸⁴ attacking, on legal and socio-political grounds, paragraphs 141 and 142 of the Turkish penal code, which forbid subversive — particularly, communist — propaganda. Özek argued that these laws were adapted from similar ones in fascist regimes. This was largely Özek's premise in his discussion elsewhere of the laws concerning strikes.⁸⁵ Less legalistic, but more forceful in approach, is a book by Dr. Kurthan Fişek, written when he was an assistant in the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University.⁸⁶ His main argument was that "the State, operating within the framework of capitalistic society, as a web of institutions, is inevitably geared to the interests of the ruling classes, i.e., the bourgeoisie... In Anatolian society... the state inevitably bears a class content and, in the final resort, its institutionalized forms have faced the Turkish working class as a capitalist employer."⁸⁷ Fişek's conclusion, elaborated in his other works⁸⁸ also, was that strikes are a political weapon in the hands of the working class.

One of the first books of socialist theory to be published in Turkey during the 1960's was Cemil Sait Barlas's 131-page book on "The ways

⁸¹ Id., *Kalkınma ve sosyalizm* (Ankara: 1966).

⁸² Id., *Ekonomik sorunlarımız* (Ankara: 1969).

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 255–286.

⁸⁴ Çetin Özek, *141–142* (Istanbul: 1968).

⁸⁵ Id., *Emekçi sınıfı ve grev* (Istanbul: 1969).

⁸⁶ *Türkiye'de devlet-işçi ilişkileri açısından devlete karşı grevlerin kritik tahlili* (Ankara: 1969).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁸⁸ E.g., *Türkiye'de kapitalizmin gelişmesi ve işçi sınıfı* (Ankara: 1969). *100 soruda sosyalist devlet* (Istanbul: 1970).

of socialism and the realities of Turkey," which appeared in February, 1962.⁸⁹ The main thesis of the author, a jurist turned professional journalist, was that Turkey's development should be geared towards that of socialist regimes.⁹⁰ Barlas demonstrates this by using Marxist tools. He concludes, *inter alia*, that, although the outward cause of the May 27, 1960 Revolution was the struggle for democracy, its real cause was the pressure of inflation.⁹¹ Following Barlas, many other books examined from a Marxist point of view "the state of the Turkish nation." They blamed capitalism for much of their country's backwardness and for all its evils, e.g. *Yağma edilen Türkiye* by Demirtaş Ceyhan;⁹² or *Türk toplumunda sosyal sınıflar* by İbrahim Türk,⁹³ a teacher and activist in the teachers' association. It was as if an increasing number of Turkish writers were adopting essayist Fethi Naci's slogan, "I maintain that to believe in socialism means to believe in Turkey."⁹⁴

An even more famous book, indeed the subject of a *cause célèbre*, was written by a local judge, Ali Faik Cihan, and called simply *Sosyalist Türkiye* ("Socialist Turkey"). The 175-page book first appeared in February 1965, but an Istanbul court ordered it collected and impounded, on the grounds of subversion. The following year, Cihan was sentenced to jail, and the sentence was quashed only in 1967 and again, upon the prosecution appealing, in 1968. The book was then reprinted⁹⁵ in October 1968, again in March 1969, and sold freely. The book gives one the impression that much of what Cihan writes — a Marxist interpretation of Turkey's socio-economic situation — is not essentially new. By 1965, when the first edition was published, such ideas were bandied about frequently and freely among Turkish intellectuals both orally and in print. It is, perhaps, Cihan's aggressive style that goaded the authorities into impounding his book and bringing its author to court. The last line of the book, "The sound is beginning to be heard of the march of millions of feet,"⁹⁶ is indeed more of a revolutionary call than a mere appeal for

⁸⁹ Cemil Sait Barlas, *Sosyalistlik yolları ve Türkiye gerçekleri* (Istanbul: 1962). His use of *sosyalistlik* (for "socialism") was not generally adopted.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁹² Istanbul: 1968.

⁹³ Istanbul: 1970.

⁹⁴ Fethi Naci, *Az gelişmiş ülkeler ve sosyalizm* (2nd ed., Istanbul: 1966), p. 16. Cf. his *Az gelişmiş ülkelerde askerî darbeler ve demokrasi* (Istanbul: 1966). Fethi Naci is also referred to in chapter 2.

⁹⁵ In Ankara. 249 pp.

⁹⁶ Ali Faik Cihan, *Sosyalist Türkiye*, 1965 ed., p. 175 (1969 ed., p. 249).

reforms. This sense of impending socialist revolution pervades much of the book. It is also the main theme of another work by Cihan,⁹⁷ a booklet calling on Turkish youth to organize and rebel against authority, and pointing out the ways by which they can assist the working class to seize power.

Fiction during the 1960's reflected this "opening to the left," both in its frequent choice of social themes, and in its sympathetic treatment of the poor and of rebels. The works of Mahmut Makal, Yaşar Kemal, Fakir Baykurt and others may serve as examples.⁹⁸ Their novels and stories were widely read and commented upon, and many went through several editions. Poems and songs expressing a desire for social equality and economic reforms became increasingly popular, and some were anthologized.⁹⁹

Socialist themes, mainly relating to Turkey,¹⁰⁰ permeated a number of magazines, too, which are discussed in Chapter 2. The classical works of Marxism were translated. According to the Turkish national bibliography, *Türkiye Bibliyografyası*, in the 1960's Turkish translations (generally from French, less often from English) were published of many works of Marx,¹⁰¹ and not a few of Engels and Lenin. Most were selections in a small and inexpensive format. These were followed by selected translations of Harold J. Laski,¹⁰² John Strachey,¹⁰³ Roger Garaudy,¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Id., *Gençlik için strateji ve taktik* (Ankara, 1st ed.: 1968, 2nd ed.: 1969).

⁹⁸ Details in İbrahim Tatarlı and Rıza Mollof, *Hüseyin Rahmi'den Fakir Baykurt'a marksist açıdan Türk romanı* (İstanbul: 1969). This is a large (275 page) and useful study, with selections of Marxist fiction in Turkish. See also S. Velikov, "L'écrivain turc Fakir Baykurt et son roman 'Le dixième village,'" *Etudes Balkaniques*, IV: 1966, pp. 153-162.

⁹⁹ E.g., *Değişler* (Ankara: 1970).

¹⁰⁰ Even a booklet by an old fighter for Marxism, the physician Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *Marks-Engels hayatları* (2nd ed., İstanbul: 1970) had a chapter on "Turkey and Marx-Engels" (*ibid.*, pp. 24-26).

¹⁰¹ Again, Marx's views on Turkey were considered of special interest, see Karl Marx, *Türkiye üzerine (şark meselesi)*, transl. by Selâhattin Hilâv and Atillâ Tokatlı (İstanbul: 1966).

¹⁰² E.g., H. J. Laski, *Demokrasi nedir?* (İstanbul: 1962).

¹⁰³ E.g., John Strachey, *Sosyalizm nedir?* (1st ed., İstanbul: 1961; 2nd ed., İstanbul: 1962. This book is discussed at greater length below). *Büyük uyanış ve demokrasinin üstünlüğü* (1st ed.: 1964; 2nd ed., İstanbul: 1965. These are translations of Strachey's *Great awakening* and *The challenge of democracy*).

¹⁰⁴ E.g., Roger Garaudy, *Jean-Paul Sartre ve Marxism* (1st ed., İstanbul: 1962, 2nd ed., İstanbul: 1965). *Sosyalizm ve ahlâk* (İstanbul: 1965). *Sosyalizm ve islâmiyet* (1st and 2nd eds., İstanbul: 1965). *Gerçeklik açısından Kafka* (1st ed., İstanbul: 1965; 2nd ed., İstanbul: 1966; 3rd ed., İstanbul: 1967). *Yirminci yüzyılda marksizm*

Herbert Marcuse and many other leftist thinkers. In addition, numerous Russian novels and stories were published in Turkish translation.

Obviously, only a portion of the works published in Turkey during the 1960's had any socialist content or flavor. Quite a few books — in the social sciences, as well as fiction — defended the status quo, on nationalist or other grounds. A characteristic example for "A defense of our regime" is an 87-page book, bearing this name, by Tunç Umay.¹⁰⁵ In company with others, he generally approves of Turkey as it is, but strongly recommends planning and reform, albeit less radical than suggested by the extreme left. It should be emphasized that this approach is symptomatic — as the need for planned reform had been accepted by the consensus of articulate opinion in Turkey during the 1960's, starting with the official program of the National Union Committee itself.¹⁰⁶ However the question as to scope and methods remained open.

One of the most striking facets of Turkish public opinion in the 1960's was the growing anti-American sentiment, in some respects a mirror-reflection of the formerly prevalent anti-communism. A. V. Sherman's statement, that "Turkey has remained immune from political anti-Westernism for a variety of reasons,"¹⁰⁷ may apply to an earlier period. In the 1960's the situation changed visibly. A large share of the change was fostered by leftist writing in Turkey. In a style strongly reminiscent of Moscow's propaganda, such works usually singled out the two main aspects of United States assistance to Turkey — military and economic. As they interpreted it, with relentless persistence, such aid had been granted solely with a view to ending Turkey's independence and taking over its whole economy. Although farfetched, the very extremism of such claims influenced in no little degree those who had no occasion to hear or read the other side of the argument, namely, that the Americans were going to tremendous expense and effort to modernize Turkey's army and economy. Indeed, the latter argument was not brought up either by Muslim religious circles, which had no reason to feel grateful for the "new foreign penetration;" or by the ultra-nationalists, who wanted a

(Istanbul: 1968). *Karl Marx'ın fikir dünyası* (Istanbul: 1969). *Sosyalizmin büyük dönemeçi* (1st and 2nd eds., Istanbul: 1970).

¹⁰⁵ Tunç Umay, *Düzenimizin bir müdafaası* (Istanbul: 1969).

¹⁰⁶ For text see Kâzım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti hükümetleri ve programları* (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 467 ff. İsmail Arar, *Hükümet programları: 1920-1965* (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 308-324.

¹⁰⁷ A. V. Sherman, "Turkey — a case in constructive nationalism," *Commentary* (N. Y.), XXX (8): Aug. 1960, p. 98.

Turkey oriented towards itself or (some maintained) towards Pan-Turkism. Even those who might have appreciated American support for Turkey, such as the coalition-Cabinets headed by the RPP and, afterwards, the JP administration, failed to come out openly in defence of United States involvement in Turkey. Demirel was actually under frequent attack by his political opponents for being too "pro-American" (as they claimed); this pushed him, tactically, into a position of having to prove that he was "pro-Turkey," so that he, too, could not, or would not, emphasize the merits of American aid to Turkey. Characteristically, this applied mainly to the urban population; in the 1965 electoral contest JP propaganda in the villages made use of a photograph of Demirel with President Johnson.

However anti-Americanism in Turkey during the 1960's (particularly towards the end of the decade) went further than mere political tactics. Even those acknowledging American assistance argued that the United States had not helped enough.¹⁰⁸ It would be no exaggeration to say that it became a prevalently fashionable attitude to be anti-American and blame the Americans for everything.¹⁰⁹ Even books with scholarly claims could not avoid an anti-American stance.¹¹⁰ Similarly, even moderate journalists were bitter in their recriminations over United States' neutrality in the Cyprus controversy between Turkey and Greece. Some started writing about what they considered Turkey's enslavement to the United States, on account of American aid;¹¹¹ while journalists of the extreme left accused American monopolies of planned economic penetration into Turkey and of intentionally refraining from (and even hampering) the adequate development of Turkey's petroleum deposits, over which they had been granted almost monopolistic concessions.¹¹² Consequently, some of those who thought otherwise about the United States and its connections with Turkey were careful not to commit themselves openly.

¹⁰⁸ For this and other forms of anti-Americanism, cf. R. C. Lawson, "New regime in Turkey," *Current History*, LII (306): Feb. 1967, pp. 105-110, 128. Cf. H. N. Howard, "Turkey: a contemporary survey," *ibid.*, LVI (331): Mar. 1969, esp. p. 145.

¹⁰⁹ See examples in İsmet Giritli, "Turkey since the 1965 elections," *MEJ*, XXIII (3): Summer 1969, p. 354.

¹¹⁰ For instance İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de geri kalmışlığın tarihi* (Ankara: 1970), *passim*.

¹¹¹ Such opinions were gleefully reported in the Soviet press. See, e.g., M. Yuriev, "Dollar jig in Turkey," *International Affairs* (Moscow), X (10): Oct. 1964, pp. 66-69.

¹¹² Sedat Özkol, *Emperyalizm, tekelci kapital ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: 1970).

Many Turkish writers of the 1960's acquiesced silently, or joined vocally, in the criticism of everything American, as for example put ably by Nevzat Üstün, a leftist poet, novelist and essayist. His three-volume *Türkiye'deki Amerika*¹¹³ (translatable approximately as "America in Turkey") accurately expresses the main accusations against Americans living in Turkey. In addition to more general claims of alleged economic exploitation or of supposedly sinister activities by the C.I.A. and the Peace Corps,¹¹⁴ many references are made to more tangible, everyday matters — which may well have had a greater impact on many readers. Üstün blames Americans living in Turkey for receiving larger salaries than Turkish officials, and for clanning together in compounds in the most elegant urban quarters.¹¹⁵ Another related accusation (probably not wholly unfounded, in this case) was that Americans in Turkey, since they generally lived among themselves, had no meaningful rapport with local people. In other words, an anti-American posture, even if not accepted everywhere, became widespread in Turkey during the 1960's, among both the left¹¹⁶ and the Islamic right¹¹⁷ — although for obviously different reasons.

These general accusations against the Americans in Turkey were further amplified by more specific claims. Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv, then a lecturer at Ankara University, argued in his book on the United States, NATO and Turkey¹¹⁸ that practically everything the United States did in Turkey was motivated by American economic and military self-interest. Even its cultural assistance had ulterior motives.¹¹⁹ This argument was taken up and elaborated in a book by M. Şükrü Koç, a journalist and RPP Member of the National Assembly since 1961.¹²⁰ Chiefly concerned

¹¹³ 3 vols. Istanbul: 1967–1969. A Russian translation of selections from the three vols. appeared in one vol., Невзат Устюн, *Америка и американцы в Турции* (Moscow: 1971).

¹¹⁴ A small library could be compiled of Turkish books and articles about (and often enough, against) the Peace Corps activities in Turkey and elsewhere. Many of these arguments have been summed up in yet another anti-American book, by Müslim Özbalkan, *Gizli belgelerle barış gönüllüleri* (Istanbul: 1970), documented with names of Peace Corpsmen in Turkey and a detailed list of their activities.

¹¹⁵ Nevzat Üstün, *op. cit.*, II, p. 11, who calls these quarters "Little Americas."

¹¹⁶ Examples in Üstün, *op. cit.*

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Ahmet Kabaklı, *Kültür emperyalizmi (manevi sömürgecilik)* (N. p.: 1971), esp. pp. 169–171.

¹¹⁸ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (2nd ed., Ankara: 1969).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 228–240.

¹²⁰ M. Şükrü Koç, *Eğitimde emperyalizm ve yabancılaşma* (Ankara: 1970).

with the American impact on education in Turkey, Koç argued that the United States, through its assistance and expert advice, had brought about the Americanization of Turkish education — in a methodically-planned way, designed to refashion all education in Turkey on a capitalist model.

e. TURKISH YOUTH AND RADICAL ACTIVITIES

In order to understand better the chain of events that led to increasing violence in 1970 and 1971, and to the resulting military intervention in March 1971, one should briefly examine the role of Turkish youth and its increasing participation in political life and extremist organizations. Post-adolescent socialization has an important impact, and many social scientists tend to agree that, although certain attitudes are acquired early in life, political learning is accomplished fully in adult life only. Socializing within the family, as is common among the greater part of Turkey's population, tends to make political socialization a strongly conservative force. The ensuing political culture comes into conflict with modernized political structures which find it difficult to alter political orientations acquired and developed in early years. When affected by their peer groups, Turkish and other youths sometimes react violently, and significant changes may occur in their political orientation. This appears to be particularly the case among university students. Even when it directly involves only a minority, it also affects many others.¹²¹

The strongly nationalist education in Turkey's *lycées* (an institution providing three years of instruction, roughly equivalent to high school in the United States) conditions interest in politics among *lycée* graduates, including, of course, those who continue their education in institutes of higher learning. There political socialization continues, with other components being added to form the political culture of Turkish students and of youth in general.¹²²

¹²¹ See, e.g., R. E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political socialization* (Boston: 1969), esp. pp. 172 ff.

¹²² Much has appeared about Turkish youth, some of which will be cited in subsequent footnotes. Some of the more useful recent books are: Muammer Taylak, *Öğrenci hareketleri* (Ankara: 1969). Aydın Yalçın, *Demokrasi, sosyalizm ve gençlik* (Istanbul: 1969). Seha L. Meray, *Üniversite sorunları* (Ankara: 1969). Özcan Köknal, *Türk toplumunda bugünün gençliği* (Istanbul: 1970). İsmet Giritli, *Gençlik hareketleri ve ötesi* (Istanbul: 1970). Mehmet Bican, *Devrim için gençlik hareketleri* (Ankara: 1970).

During the Atatürk period, and until the end of the single-party era in Republican Turkey, students were relatively little involved in direct political activity.¹²³ The charismatic leadership of Atatürk attracted their support for his modernizing activities; after his death in 1938, the Second World War atmosphere and the strong measures taken by Turkey's government to safeguard the state's neutrality dissuaded intensive political action. With the end of the War in 1945 and the beginning of the multiparty era in Turkey a year later, students became increasingly active in politics — first as individuals, then through their organizations, although these were officially barred from involvement in politics. Particularly in the 1950's and even more so towards the end of the decade, students increasingly protested their frustration at what they considered the DP's sacrifice of Atatürk's reforms, as well as its repression of all political opposition. Their nationalism-oriented education,¹²⁴ at all levels of schooling, had so conditioned the students, that they then spontaneously displayed strongly nationalist attitudes, even when asked very broad open questions.¹²⁵ Evidently, at the end of DP rule, this nationalism found expression in the defence of Kemalism.

While Turkish youth could not remain impervious to the wave of socio-political involvement which was sweeping the youth of many other countries in the 1960's, there was more to it than mere imitation. A very pronounced "youth culture" regularly pervades certain areas of Turkish life.¹²⁶ We have already seen in this chapter that Turks include youth — along with the intelligentsia and the military — in "the vigorous forces." Atatürk had called on youth to watch over the Republic and independence, in a speech which every Turkish child has to learn by heart. While students participated actively in popular movements in Ottoman times, it was their dramatic success in clashing with the government forces (mainly the police) in 1960 which gave them a heady feeling of importance. Although they did not participate directly in the 1960 coup, they played a major role in creating the intolerably tense pre-coup

¹²³ Details in J. S. Szyliowicz, "Students and politics in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), VI (2): May 1970, pp. 152 ff.

¹²⁴ To be discussed at greater length below, ch. 5.

¹²⁵ In interviews carried out during 1957 and 1958. See H. H. Hyman, Arif Payashoğlu, and F. W. Frey, "The values of Turkish college youth," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Princeton, N. J.), XXII: 1958, esp. pp. 282-285.

¹²⁶ See F. W. Frey, "Education," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 235.

atmosphere,¹²⁷ by rioting and demonstrating. The repeated proclamations and demonstrations of Turkish students during the 1960's showed that, along with the educated youth in the rest of the world, they maintained their active interest in politics. Indeed, student leaders soon found out that demonstrations or sit-ins could also be effectively used in the universities.

Another reason for the increase in the political involvement of the Turkish youth, and more particularly students, was the slowly but steadily growing number of those registered in the universities, as the following table shows.¹²⁸

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, BY YEAR

1960-61	44,461	1965-66	55,583
1961-62	45,002	1966-67	60,023
1962-63	46,561	1967-68	63,235
1963-64	48,654	1968-69	67,764
1964-65	52,768	1969-70	75,522
		1970-71	73,228

Together with those registered in other institutions of higher learning, the number was considerably larger, totalling 97,309 in 1965-66; 108,707 in 1966-67; 125,647 in 1967-68; 143,279 in 1968-69; 160,334 in 1969-70; and 155,358 in 1970-71.¹²⁹ If one notes that most study in the major cities, chiefly Istanbul and Ankara, their possible impact becomes more pertinent. Increasing numbers come from out of town and feel alienated in their new environment. It should be remembered, also, that the relatively limited opportunities of accepting students in the sciences induced many to study in fields promoting a comparatively great interest in politics, such as law, political science, sociology, economics and public administration.¹³⁰ From this aspect, the situation is not dissimilar to that in Egypt where, at the same time, student discontent grew for kindred reasons.

Another result of the increase in the number of *lycée* graduates desirous of enrolling in Turkish universities was a two-way disappointment. First,

¹²⁷ L. L. Roos, N. P. Roos, and G. R. Field, "Students and politics in Turkey," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, Mass.), LXXXVII (1): Winter 1968, esp. p. 191.

¹²⁸ 1968 *statistical yearbook of Turkey*, *op. cit.*, p. 117. *Türkiye istatistik yılığı 1968 (ek yayın)*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹²⁹ *Türkiye istatistik yılığı 1968 (ek yayın)*, p. 17.

¹³⁰ Nermin Abadan, "Values and political behavior of Turkish youth," *TYIR*, IV: 1963, p. 102.

the majority of applicants are not admitted, as there is no place for them, even since the opening of two new universities in Erzurum and Trabzon. In 1969, 64,183 *lycée* graduates applied for admission to Turkey's seven universities, and sat for objective entrance tests, but only about 13,000, or a fifth, were admitted.¹³¹ The frustration of those rejected is obvious. Secondly, even those admitted, although fortunate in having some of Turkey's brightest intellects as their teachers, not infrequently attend courses they would not have chosen, but which are the only ones not overcrowded. They have to contend with huge classes, lack of tutorials, inadequate library facilities, and crowded dormitories. Limited participation of student-government has been an oft-voiced complaint. A system that permits students who fail in their examinations to repeat the year has caused further crowding in the lecture halls, libraries, and dormitories. Many barely subsist: according to a report of the medical services at Istanbul University in 1967, 19.9% of the students had a monthly income of TL 50-200, 41.3% of TL 200-300, 24.5% of TL 300-400, and only 14.1% of more than TL 400¹³² (at the time \$1.-was equal to TL 9.-).

With very real grievances, educational and financial, university students and other youths in the same age-groups have naturally taken to protest. In times of public tension, their specific complaints have been added to those of a more general political and socio-economic nature, and have erupted into violence. This was the case in the late 1950's, at the height of the DP repression; early in the 1960's, when the general situation seemed far from stable; and, again, in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when political and socio-economic considerations appear to have been the prime movers of organized youth violence. Insofar as can be ascertained from the available preliminary data, a subtle change in the catchwords of students' public statements, meetings, boycotts and silent marches, may be observed during the late 1960's (and particularly since 1968).¹³³ The tone has changed; instead of merely deploring the situation in moderate terms, demands were voiced loudly and insistently, and were sometimes expressed by violent deeds. The substance of the catch-

¹³¹ Id., "The politics of students and young workers in Turkey," *SBFD*, XXVI (1): Mar. 1971, p. 96.

¹³² Summarized in Süleyman Genç, *12 mart'a nasıl gelindi* (Ankara: 1971), pp. 104-105.

¹³³ Data as in footnote 131, pp. 91-101. Cf. Szyliowicz, *op. cit.* in *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, p. 160.

words has changed no less; even in matters concerning them closely, the students did not simply emphasize their personal grievances in the late 1960's, but also demanded sweeping university reform. In more general domestic matters, they have become increasingly critical of the government and police. In foreign affairs, while students were formerly concerned mainly with the Cyprus issue, other international problems have been looming larger in the late 1960's and early 1970's — such as anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, neutralism, foreign capital, and the Vietnam war.

Professional non-student organizers have been suspected of agitation among students, of promising them material rewards if they participated politically, and threatening them physically if they did not. More factual explanations for the changing mood of Turkish students and for the circumstances of its radicalization are offered in what is probably the best empirical study of the political orientations of Turkish university students.¹³⁴ Prepared as a doctoral dissertation at Ankara University during 1964 and 1965, its conclusions are still largely valid. Although only 2.7% of the entire student body was interviewed, the findings were obtained by a randomly selected sample which enhances the value of the results. Three hundred and seventeen students and another hundred and nine student leaders, from eight of Ankara University's ten faculties, were interviewed. If one accepts Professor Elihu Katz's hypothesis of "the two-step flow of communication," one appreciates even more the significance of student leaders' attitudes. Indeed, the student leaders, that is those who set the tone, were found to be more leftist than the other students. The Labor Party of Turkey, known for its Marxist platform, was chosen as the party of preference by 24.8% of the former, but only by 6% of the latter.¹³⁵ Of the student leaders 80.9% and of the others 63.4% read dailies inclined to the left, while 6.1% of the former and 10% of the latter read dailies inclined to the right.¹³⁶ Similar, although not identical, preferences governed the choice of reading-matter in leftist magazines.¹³⁷ Further, those interviewed indicated definite preference for political articles or news, rather than other items—with the student leaders even more so inclined:¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Özer Ozankaya, *Universite öğrencilerinin siyasi yönelimleri* (Ankara: 1966).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75, table II/46.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33, table II/12.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–38.

¹³⁸ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 39, table II/16.

TABLE 4. PREFERENCES FOR NEWSPAPER MATERIALS AMONG ANKARA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

<i>Reading material</i>	<i>317 students</i>	<i>109 student leaders</i>
Political articles and commentary	49.2%	62.2%
Domestic political news	8.8	10.0
Foreign political news	7.2	4.4
Other news and articles (science, sports, fashion, cinema, theater, etc.)	26.0	23.1
No reply	8.8	—
	100.0%	99.7% ¹³⁹

The impact of reading newspapers and magazines — and, probably, books — was enhanced by the fact that less than half of either the student leaders or the others listened to a news broadcast daily,¹⁴⁰ possibly because they could not afford a transistor radio of their own (their financial circumstances explain, too, why they attended the theater so rarely¹⁴¹). That this is not a function of their indifference to politics is evident from the time they invested in discussing politics with their friends.¹⁴² An overwhelming majority of students interviewed — 89.9% of the student leaders and 81.8% of the others — maintained that they preferred to discuss such topics with their friends, rather than with their families or teachers.¹⁴³ Since most students came from middle-class families,¹⁴⁴ one may deduce that they found among their peers, rather than at home, a more congenial atmosphere for the discussion of such topics as economic development and reform in land-holding, which, to the student leaders, were of absorbing interest.¹⁴⁵

The approach of the students interviewed to socialism is no less relevant than the substance of their replies. While most students (74.3%

¹³⁹ The figures do not add up to 100% in the original.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46, 66 *ff.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 45. None was even prepared to discuss politics with his teachers, a striking instance not only of the very formal teacher-student relations, but also of the decline of the value placed on the opinions of university teachers, which previously were never questioned.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46, table II/22. The Cyprus issue, which is of considerable intrinsic interest, may then have been prominent in the student discussions because of its topicality.

of the leaders and 61.8% of the others) considered socialism a more equitable system, and supported the nationalization of foreign trade (78.9% and 70.7%, respectively), as many or more among the students — but not among the leaders — supported a middle road in politics and state support for private enterprise.¹⁴⁶ Ozankaya rightly concludes¹⁴⁷ that, although the popularity of certain socialist ideas among the students interviewed was undeniable, many had only a superficial idea of the concepts of socialism and were merely attracted by its slogans. This may be so, and one might indicate, also, that this was the case in some recent “student revolts” in Western Europe. However, one should point out that this was not the case with the Turkish student leaders and, judging by the organized violence in the early 1970’s, a sizable part of the politically-conscious students were imbued, to a growing extent, with radical concepts, chiefly of the left. One notices too a certain erosion in students’ former loyalties to the larger parties, the RPP and JP, late in the 1960’s. Some joined the Federation of Idea-Clubs (*Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*), sponsored — or at least encouraged — by the Labor Party of Turkey, or more extremist leftist organizations, which are mentioned below. Meanwhile others joined the “commandos” or other youth organizations established by the right-wing Republican Peasant National Party in the late 1960’s.¹⁴⁸ While these organizations were staffed by university students and other youths, it was the former who were the leaders and main activists, at least those of the left. Their aggressive political activity was possibly nurtured at that time by the large number of books and newspapers¹⁴⁹ preaching extreme doctrines, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, by the disparity between the aspirations of students and other youths aiming at the professions and what they could actually achieve.¹⁵⁰ This mixture of discontent with public affairs and personal frustration, in varying degree in each individual, was a powerful recipe for violence.

While right-wing youth groups¹⁵¹ were fewer in number and generally had common ideological roots in Turkey’s past with its message of na-

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63, table II/34.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 60–62.

¹⁴⁸ To be discussed more fully below, ch. 6.

¹⁴⁹ Discussed in this and in the next chapter.

¹⁵⁰ This is one of the main conclusions from questionnaires completed by Turkish students in the early 1960’s. See A. M. Kazamias, *Education and the quest for modernity in Turkey* (London: 1966), esp. pp. 241–242.

¹⁵¹ See below, chs. 5 and 6.

tional glory, leftist youth-groups had no such common inspiration. These proliferated, with each looking to its own admired prophet — Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, Roger Garaudy, or Herbert Marcuse. Frequently they adopted a platform composed of the teachings of two or more of these or other thinkers, whom they had generally read in a Turkish translation. The situation resulted from an almost unavoidable trend of splitting into ever more extremist groups, but also reflected Turkish politics late in the 1960's and early in the 1970's — in which frustration and fragmentation were commonplace. Among various youth groups, however, the reflection of the Turkish political scene was more radical than the image itself; indeed, it was characteristically revolutionary.¹⁵²

As in the case of the DP a decade earlier, the last years of JP government were characterized by an undeclared civil war, expressed in violent clashes between ideologically opposing groups and rival demonstrations, mainly in the urban centers. In the mid-1960's the internal situation in Turkey was so troubled, that the *Türkiye Yıllığı* — a privately-published, useful "Yearbook of Turkey" — regularly provided a list of well-known people arrested or imprisoned. Further rioting occurred in 1966 and 1967; but from 1968 to 1971 disturbances became wider in scope (involving thousands of people) as well as more frequent and violent. Left-wing and right-wing militants attacked one another bodily in the streets and at the universities. Indeed, most institutions of higher learning were hit by strikes, boycotts, or sit-ins. While certain student demands for university reform were no doubt justified, the students disrupted courses and examinations to such an extent that the very functioning of the universities was jeopardized.

Violent clashes with police increased in number, as did those of workers striking for higher wages and social improvements, or occupying factories in the same way students were occupying universities. The complaints of workers and others about rising prices were well-grounded. According to data released by the State Institute of Statistics,¹⁵³ between April 1970 and March 1971 (that is, in the year preceding the military intervention), the cost-of-living increased by an average of 15% in Istanbul and Izmir and 13% in Ankara. However the wholesale price of

¹⁵² For an exposition of some of these views see, e.g., the special 8-page supplement to the weekly *Ant*, 44: Oct. 31, 1967. For a later one, see the annual *Milliyet 1970*, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-68.

¹⁵³ Summed up in *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 29, 1971. For a general survey of the economy, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Turkey* (Paris: 1972).

food, which mattered most to wage-earners, increased in the course of the year by an average of 17.5%.

Significantly, talk in the street and the press, early in 1971, was often not about rising prices alone, but also about revolution. People suspected — wrongly, as it turned out — that the two major parties were conniving at postponing all reforms indefinitely. Others feared anarchy and expressed somewhat exaggerated charges of an impending takeover by Turkish communists. The general mood was one of disquiet and pessimism, with rumors increasing the excitement already spread by sensational reporting in some sections of the press.

No less portentous was the breakup of parts of the political leadership institutionalized in the patterns of formal parliamentarism. In the 1969 elections to the National Assembly,¹⁵⁴ both the JP and RPP succeeded in increasing visibly their strength in the Assembly at the expense of the smaller political parties. One result was the growth in power of both Süleyman Demirel in the JP and Bülent Ecevit in the RPP — leaders, respectively, of the moderate right-of-center and moderate left-of-center groups in their parties. Indeed, Demirel surrounded himself with moderates in the Cabinet he formed in November 1969. Not a few members, opposed to these moderate views, left the two major parties, before or after the 1969 elections. Another case¹⁵⁵ was that of Necmettin Erbakan, an erstwhile JP Member of the National Assembly, who left to set up a rightist theocratic organization, the Party for National Order, in January 1970. Yet another conservative party, adopting the name Democratic Party¹⁵⁶ was set up in December 1970 by another group of conservatives (headed by Ferruh Bozbeyli, ex-Speaker of the National Assembly), who had seceded from the JP and from the Reliance Party (meanwhile renamed National Reliance Party).¹⁵⁷ The Democratic Party soon had the third largest parliamentary group, numbering, in March 1971, 38 Members of the National Assembly and 7 Senators. The increase in the number of parties and other political associations in 1969 and 1970 was symptomatic of the troubled mood in Turkey. Yet another sign was the

¹⁵⁴ Discussed in ch. 7, below.

¹⁵⁵ To be examined at greater length in ch. 5, below.

¹⁵⁶ Perhaps to distinguish it from the banned Democrat Party.

¹⁵⁷ I have been unable to consult a recent book about this party, *72'ler hareketi ve demokratik parti*, reviewed in the weekly *Yankı*, 20: July 12–18, 1971, p. 28. For the names of the founders and an appreciation of the Democratic Party, see the annual *Milliyet 1970, op. cit.*, pp. 157–158. For the party's program, see its *Demokratik parti: tüzük ve programı* (Ankara: n.d.).

riffs within the Labor Party of Turkey,¹⁵⁸ at least part of which may be attributed to disappointment with the party's failure in the 1969 elections.

Furthermore, various personalities and groups, frustrated with the results of the 1969 elections, fostered different types of extra-parliamentary opposition (in Turkish: *Parlamento dışı muhalefet*). It appears that the initiators and activists were LPT members and more extreme leftist intellectuals.¹⁵⁹ The high priest of the extra-parliamentary opposition's ideology was Çetin Altan, a witty and popular journalist and ex-LPT Member of the National Assembly.¹⁶⁰ In his articles, late in 1969,¹⁶¹ Altan elaborated the theory that, since there was no democratic alternative, extra-parliamentary opposition was the only possible outlet conditions allowed. This type of opposition, smacking of revolutionism, spread mainly among intellectuals, youth groups and — to a lesser degree — junior officers. Many of these had avowedly abandoned hope of achieving power through a democratic process of elections, and preached revolution by violent means. Consequently, some extremist groups now had a sort of moral justification for the use of force in order to achieve power — even if this meant employing force against the Establishment. Bloody clashes of workers with security forces in June, 1970 brought about the temporary imposition of martial law in Istanbul.¹⁶²

The use of violence was adopted as the method not of workers, however, but of extremist youth groups. They robbed banks, shot at policemen, placed bombs near or in public buildings, and physically attacked American military personnel in Turkey. These groups were small; at least part of their activity remained underground. Therefore, its complete description will probably not be available for some years. What follows is but a brief and preliminary discussion.¹⁶³

The intensive newspaper reading of university students, particularly among student leaders, has already been referred to. So, too, has the favor which leftist newspapers found with them. In the 1960's, with the newly guaranteed freedom of the press, leftist magazines began to appear,

¹⁵⁸ To be analyzed below, ch. 4.

¹⁵⁹ *Varlık yılığ* 1970 (Istanbul: Dec. 1969), p. 15.

¹⁶⁰ Of whom we shall have more to say below, chs. 2 and 4.

¹⁶¹ A fair selection may be found in Çetin Altan, *Suçlanan yazılar* (Ankara and Istanbul: n.d. [1970]), esp. pp. 157-158 and *passim*.

¹⁶² Details in the annual *Milliyet* 1970, pp. 86 ff.

¹⁶³ This is chiefly based on press reports which, however, are contradictory and, at times, vague. Three recent books touch on the activities of these groups, from different points of approach: Mehmet Bican, *Devrim için gençlik hareketleri*, *op. cit.*; Metin Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar* (Ankara: 1971); and Süleyman Genç, *op. cit.*

then multiplied (as will be examined at length below, in ch. 2). Although varying in their interpretation of Marxism and its applicability to Turkey, the most extreme among these magazines started, chiefly in the late 1960's, to call openly for resistance to the government and revolution.¹⁶⁴ While the scope of resistance and revolution, its timing, ways, and perpetrators (intellectuals, or a union of workers and peasants) varied from one magazine to the other, the prescription was identical and the need for resistance and revolution was never doubted. If anything, impatience was the order of the day among the contributors to the revolutionary-minded magazines, as it has been a characteristic of many Turkish intellectuals in recent years.

Nurtured on such food and on Marxist literature, original and translated (some of which has been mentioned above), several of the more radical students decided to associate in a political youth organization, led and mainly staffed by students. In so doing, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing student-organization which, barred by law from political involvement, was too timid for these activists. Some leaders of the new organization were drawn from the Federation of Idea-Clubs and other groups, and therefore possessed some organizational experience. Indeed, the new organization practically took over the federation. Established in the autumn of 1969¹⁶⁵ it was named *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* ("The Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey"), or, briefly, *Dev Genç*.

The goals of *Dev Genç* were never in doubt, although its organization and some of its activities were kept clandestine. According to the formulation¹⁶⁶ of its first chairman, Atilla Sarp, a student at Ankara University's Faculty of Agriculture,¹⁶⁷ *Dev Genç* was a political youth organization with a Marxist ideology. Mainly comprising university students (although its ideas seem to have appealed to *lycée* pupils, too¹⁶⁸), it also sought connections with working and peasant youth. Consequently, in addition to the goal of introducing a socialist consciousness, in place of a bourgeois, into the universities, members of *Dev Genç* aimed at joining the peasants in a revolutionary struggle, jointly directed against

¹⁶⁴ As, for instance, in a 118-page book by Çetin Yetkin, *Siyasal iktidara karşı direnme ve devrim* (Ankara: 1970).

¹⁶⁵ Toker, *op. cit.*, p. 53; and Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 141, 293.

¹⁶⁶ In *Ant*, 162: Feb. 3, 1970, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ After his arrest, he was succeeded by Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who was himself arrested with nine others on Dec. 26, 1970.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *Yankı*, 4: Mar. 22-28, 1971, p. 29. Genç, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

imperialism. As Sarp elaborated later, in the first issue of *Dev Genç's* own monthly, *İleri* ("Forward"),¹⁶⁹ the main organizational task of this revolutionary proletarian movement was to organize cadres of militants — convinced ones, free of petit-bourgeois concepts. Redefining the goals of *Dev Genç's* struggle, a later series of articles in *İleri*¹⁷⁰ presented them as the fight against fascism and imperialism, and a popular struggle for the ideological independence and liberation of all Turks and other peoples. In this context manifestoes of the *Dev Genç* in Ankara frequently called on all Turkish workers, intellectuals, patriotic soldiers and officers, all progressives, and all patriots to rise and join the struggle against the regime.¹⁷¹ *Dev Genç's İleri* was insistent on the importance of a well-developed revolutionary theory, repeatedly quoting a dictum of Lenin, "Without a revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary movement."¹⁷² However, theory was important, but not sufficient. As seen by Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Sarp's successor as *Dev Genç* chairman, in order to change the regime of a Turkish democracy that was exploiting the workers, not mere propaganda was needed but armed action.¹⁷³ Indeed, as time passed, the leaders of *Dev Genç* came to accept as axiomatic that the employment of brutal terror was imperative in order to gain control of the state. The main differences of opinion related to timing and method. For instance, fervent debate went on for a while between those favoring urban or rural guerilla — with the outcome that the partisans of the latter, finding themselves in a minority, split from the *Dev Genç*.¹⁷⁴

During its brief existence, *Dev Genç* served as a sort of roof-organization for several revolutionary youth groups, most of which preferred, for tactical reasons, to remain within its framework.¹⁷⁵ Usually led by students, the association was started in Ankara and spread to other universities — although it seems that the organizational ties were rather loose and that each local *Dev Genç* group acted largely on its own. Sometimes, rival groups cooperated on a local basis. As a rule, each new group was more extremist than the existing ones and, with few excep-

¹⁶⁹ *İleri*, 1: n.d. [prob. Apr. 1970], p. 3. This appeared in Ankara.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 6: Jan. 1971.

¹⁷¹ Summarized in *Yankı*, 2: Mar. 8-14, 1971, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷² See, *İleri*, 6: Jan. 1971, pp. 21 ff. For an exposition of its ideology by an opponent of *Dev Genç*, see Toker, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁷³ Kürkçü, in *Bayram* daily, Dec. 2-3, 1970, reported by Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 ff.

¹⁷⁴ Details in Genç, *ibid.*, pp. 294-295, 325, 344 ff.

¹⁷⁵ See examples in *Ant*, 154: Dec. 9, 1969, p. 7. For some of the more important groups cf. Toker, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff. and the official Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, *Türkiyede demokrasi saldırı karşısında* (Ankara: 1972).

tions, published a magazine to propagate its views and attack those of the others as well as of all those they considered bourgeois. In general discipline within each local group was strongly enforced.

One of the most noteworthy of these radical groups was the *Sosyalist Aydınlik* ("Socialist Enlightenment") circle, so-called after its monthly, which was published in Ankara from 1968. Regular contributors have included well-known leftist thinkers, like Mihri Belli¹⁷⁶ or Muzaffer Erdost. The circle, following Belli's precepts, favored a "national democratic revolution." It aimed at achieving Marxism-Leninism in collaboration with other forces (which it would then discard)—preferably the radical military, rather than the proletariat. A more extreme group within the *Dev Genç* was the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* ("The Revolutionary Proletarian Enlightenment"), so called after a monthly of the same name published in Ankara. Led by Doğu Perinçek, an ex-university assistant, the circle split from Belli's leadership in June 1970. Ideologically, it assigned to the proletariat the role of vanguard of the revolution that was intended to lead Turkey's backbone, the peasant masses.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, it appears that this circle led the "rural guerillas" group that had split from *Dev Genç*. It was smaller than the *Sosyalist Aydınlik*, and its propaganda had a Maoist flavor.

Two other extremist groups, originating within the circles of the *Dev Genç*, deserve mention. One was the *Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*, or "The Turkish People's Liberation Army," sometimes called *Gerillaclar*, or "guerillas." This organization had initially been founded by leftist students at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, with the aim of cleansing it, as they maintained, from American influence (tuition at the University was in English). The next goal was to struggle for Turkey's complete independence (from what they considered American imperialism, supported by local collaborators). This goal, they argued, justified armed bank robbery and further violence. Members were organized in clandestine cells and seemed to prefer action to ideological discussion (apparently, they had no regular organ). Some of their members were trained in the camps of the Arab "Palestine Front for Revolutionary Popular Liberation" or of the *Fath*.¹⁷⁸ This fitted well with their concept

¹⁷⁶ Who will be discussed below, in ch. 2 and subsequently.

¹⁷⁷ These views were aired in the other magazine of the Revolutionary Proletarian Enlightenment circle, *İşçi-köylü* ("Worker-Peasant"). See also *Genç*, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-349.

¹⁷⁸ Starting in the summer of 1969, as transpired at their trial. See the weekly *Ortam* (Istanbul), 1: Apr. 19-26, 1971, p. 13. Cf. *Genç*, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-296.

of a revolution that was to embrace the whole of the Middle East. Their leader was a student at Istanbul University's Faculty of Law, Deniz Gezmiş. Although only 22 years old when he joined the group in 1969, Gezmiş had already been tried and sentenced to imprisonment for extremist political activity. Indeed, he had already founded and headed a violently radical group in Istanbul, named *Devrimci Öğrenci Birliği* ("Union of Revolutionary Students"). We shall presently have more to say about him.¹⁷⁹

The other group was the *Türk Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi*, or "The Turkish People's Liberation Front," connected with a *Türk Halk Kurtuluş Partisi*, or "Turkish People's Liberation Party." Both were practically one organization. Members were reportedly trained in Syria, then smuggled into Turkey.¹⁸⁰ The idea of a "National Liberation Front" had been systematically discussed in the leftist press in Turkey, during the 1960's,¹⁸¹ and it was not surprising that it readily found supporters. Led by Mahir Çayan (they were sometimes labeled in the press "Çayanists") the members of this organization had a compact Marxist-inspired ideology, which they elaborated in their monthly *Kurtuluş—İşçilerin-Köylülerin Gazetesi* ("Liberation: the Magazine of Workers and Peasants"), published in Ankara in 1970. They called for mutual support between workers and peasants, and appealed to revolutionaries to assist them against the landowners. While they called on all Turks to resist (*direnme*), their appeal was aimed largely at the youth. Further, the Çayanists urged the Turkish and Kurdish peoples¹⁸² to unite in a popular struggle against their common enemy. They attacked imperialism, the United States, and rival youth groups, for example labeling the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* circle as "Maoists of the campus."

Until they started terrorist activity, little was known about these groups (except for their publications). Well-informed sources in Turkey estimated their adherents as at most several thousands. This is difficult to determine, however, since membership was fluid, and there was some mobility between the various groups. Many were devoted to the cause,

¹⁷⁹ For his early activities, see Bican, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 77, 103 and *passim*; Genç, *op. cit.*, p. 141. For his later career *Ortam*, 2: Apr. 26—May 3, 1971, pp. 12-13; *ibid.*, 9: July 26-Aug. 2, 1971, pp. 12-13.

¹⁸⁰ Acc. to the daily *Son Havadis*, Feb. 6, 1972.

¹⁸¹ Examples collected by Aclan Sayılğan, *Soldaki çatlaklar (1927-1966)*, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff., 56 ff.

¹⁸² *Kurtuluş*, 6: Dec. 1970. Plural number intentional despite official Turkish policy to consider the Kurds in Turkey as Turks.

some bordering on fanaticism. This became obvious when the rival groups passed from verbal or written competition to militant deeds. Most accepted as facts the propaganda that Turkey was not independent, but bound by internal and external exploiters, that "a second war of independence" was imperative, and that the time was propitious for a Marxist revolution. Considering themselves the only anti-Establishment force (for the LPT had seats in the National Assembly), they trained their members in the use of firearms, and apparently planned to create a "Vietnam situation" in Turkey. The peasant masses, led by a proletarian party, would strike at the local feudal elements. As revolutionary rule would be established in some areas, reactionary elements in the Turkish armed forces, together with foreign troops, supporting imperialism, would have to intervene jointly. A popular war would then start, led by a Front for National Liberation. The enemy would in the rural parts be repulsed into the sea, while "urban guerilla warfare" would clean up the towns. Victorious Revolution would then lead to the establishment of Socialism in Turkey."¹⁸³

In practice, the results were very different, probably because the leaders of *Dev Genç* and other youth groups had been mistaken in gauging the mood of the military. They apparently thought that the Turkish armed forces were as anti-imperialist as they had been during the War of Independence in the early 1920's (this the armed forces were; but they were not anti-American). Accordingly, *Dev Genç* members tried to penetrate the military with their propaganda, and did have some limited success with a few junior officers¹⁸⁴ — another reason for the military to intervene in March 1971. The immediate reason for the military intervention was, however, the violence with which the civilian government was unable to cope effectively. There were armed bank robberies, bloody clashes with the police on university campuses and elsewhere, bombings of public buildings,¹⁸⁵ and two kidnappings in February and March 1971, in which five United States servicemen were abducted. The youth groups had become the center of public attention and the object of grudging admiration by some.¹⁸⁶ To others, their armed violence was

¹⁸³ Summed up in Toker, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff., 83 ff.

¹⁸⁴ Exact data are not yet available. See, however, *Ortam*, 1: Apr. 19-26, 1971, pp. 6-7.

¹⁸⁵ For a list of the incidents from August 1968 to March 1971, see *Yankı*, 2: Mar. 8-14, 1971, pp. 6-7; and *Genç*, *op. cit.*, pp. 349 ff., 374-376.

¹⁸⁶ To judge, at least, by a long article in *Ant* monthly, 12: Apr. 1971, pp. 6-21, which praised the kidnapping by the Turkish People's Liberation Army of four

alarming, as was their recruitment of Kurdish youths and their plain talk about "a Kurdish people,"¹⁸⁷ which smacked of inciting the Kurds in Eastern Turkey to secede. Indeed, this was the peak of leftist propaganda directed at the Kurds in Turkey.

f. THE 1971 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

The events of March 12, 1971, are not yet precisely known. Internal security was deteriorating so rapidly that, early in the month, it was obvious there would be some form of military intervention. *Yankı* ("Echo"), a news' weekly just established in Ankara, came out in its first issue¹⁸⁸ with a cover and editorial asking "On whose side are the armed forces?" There is some evidence that a sizable group of middle-rank officers were secretly planning a military takeover, in the name of law and order. Personal ambitions apart, it seems that they were imbued with the same spirit which had inspired a minority faction among the perpetrators of the 1960 coup, viz., that only a military regime could ensure reform and modernization for Turkey, in what they considered the true Kemalist tradition. Early in March 1971, details of the plot came to the knowledge of the supreme command of the armed forces, which moved to forestall it. The President of the Republic, Cevdet Sunay (a retired Chief-of-Staff himself), presented the armed forces memorandum to Demirel's Cabinet, demanding its resignation. Signed by the Chief-of-Staff and the Commanders of the army, navy and air force, this was more in the nature of an ultimatum, for it threatened a military takeover, unless a new reform-minded Cabinet was installed. The military's patience with the government of the Justice Party had been spent. Demirel was reluctant to resign, even though the JP majority in the National Assembly had dwindled to one, because of mass resignations from both the party's parliamentary groups — which dealt a serious blow to the Establishment's credibility and supplied further arguments to radical groups. Soon, however, he agreed; perhaps the memory of Menderes's fate influenced him in making up his mind. President Sunay appointed as Prime Minister fifty-nine-year old, former Professor of Law, Nihat Erim; he was known to be reform-minded and an opponent of conserva-

U. S. soldiers as an act conducive to "cleansing Turkey of all Americans, foreigners and traitors."

¹⁸⁷ Examples in Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-330.

¹⁸⁸ *Yankı*, 1: Mar. 1, 1971.

tive policies. Since his role was to be independent, he resigned from his party, the RPP, of which he was a member sitting in the National Assembly. While Erim was selecting a Cabinet of moderate parliamentarians and of non-political technocrats,¹⁸⁹ — to consider socio-economic reform and amendments to the constitution — the supreme command of the armed forces moved again. It forcibly retired a number of officers implicated in the earlier mentioned plot and sent others to remote parts of the country; over one hundred were disposed of in this manner.

Martial law, proclaimed in eleven of the more populous of the country's provinces, was extended in May 1971 after the Israeli Consul-General in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom, was abducted by the Turkish People's Liberation Front, and then several further times. His murder at their hands impelled the military to further tighten their control of internal security and other state affairs. In the same month, several extreme left ist newspapers and magazines were closed, as well as a number of those favoring a return to Islam and attacking secularism.¹⁹⁰ Stocks of those already on sale were impounded in the bookshops and removed by military units. Many youth groups, both of the extreme left and of the extreme right,¹⁹¹ were disbanded. The search for extremists, of both fanatics for a Muslim revival¹⁹² and of leftist youths, was intensified, and many arrests were made. Among these held for questioning were many distinguished Professors of Law and Political Science. Most were released, but several were brought to trial, including Professor Mümtaz Soysal, Dean of Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science, who was charged with preaching communism in his textbook *Anayasaya giriş* ("Introduction to the constitution") and several articles.¹⁹³ According to an official White Paper, distributed early in April 1972, in the year after the military Memorandum, 687 people were sentenced by military law courts. Meanwhile, the hunt for armed extremists continued relentlessly.

Deniz Gezmiş and twenty-three associates, who had meanwhile been apprehended, were charged in mid-July with a long list of subversive and

¹⁸⁹ For the names of the Cabinet Ministers and their political affiliation, cf. *Yankı*, 5: Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1971, p. 5. For the first time the Cabinet included a woman, Professor (of Medicine) Türkan Akyol, the Minister for Health and Social Welfare.

¹⁹⁰ Details *ibid.*, 11: May 11-16, 1971, p. 7.

¹⁹¹ See below, ch. 6.

¹⁹² See below, ch. 5.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Ortam*, 19: Oct. 4-11, 1971, pp. 3-9; *Yankı*, 33: Oct. 11-17, 1971, p. 20.

violent actions.¹⁹⁴ These included kidnapping, bombing and armed bank robbery. Gezmiş confessed to the kidnapping of the United States servicemen and two bank robberies; he and seventeen others were sentenced to death, on October, 9, 1971.¹⁹⁵ When asked his profession, he claimed that he was a revolutionary,¹⁹⁶ and indeed the military court considered him and his colleagues as such, although not in the positive spirit he had meant it. In 1972, Gezmiş and several of his associates were executed. Similarly, Mahir Çayan and twenty-five of his associates were being tried in another military court, charged with having conspired to carry out a proletarian revolution in Turkey, establishing a secret organization, bank-robbery, and the kidnapping and murder of Consul-General Elrom.¹⁹⁷ Later, in November 1971, Çayan and several associates escaped from the military prison; however in February and March 1972, most (including Çayan) were killed by security forces. One of those accused with Çayan, Necati Sağır, made a most pertinent observation during his trial. He denied that he and his colleagues were Atatürkists, adding that "Atatürkism cannot be reconciled with our goals. We are socialists."¹⁹⁸ Here is the gist of the ideological stand of these youth groups and the motivation for the military to intervene. For this is a turning point, in which, for the first time, Atatürkism formally ceases to be of relevance to organized political groups, albeit outside organized political life.

Meanwhile the National Assembly and the Senate continued to sit under the impact of the "coup-by-memorandum." Aware that the only alternative to parliamentary rule was government by the armed forces, almost all parties — certainly the larger ones — lent their support to the Erim Cabinet. In these circumstances, an interparty commission prepared suggestions for amending the 1961 Constitution; its report was approved early in September 1971 in the National Assembly by 362 votes to 2. The main amendments limited personal freedoms to preclude subversive

¹⁹⁴ The charges were printed in the press. See, e.g., the monthly *Toprak* (Istanbul), XV (8): Aug. 1971, pp. 11, 18-23. For the trial, see, e.g., *Yankı*, 22: July 26-Aug. 1, 1971, pp. 8-9 and subsequent issues.

¹⁹⁵ Details in *Yankı*, 34: Oct. 18-24, 1971, p. 16.

¹⁹⁶ *Ortam*, 1: Apr. 19-26, 1971, p. 13.

¹⁹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, August 24, 1971. *Ortam*, 13: Aug. 23-30, 1971, pp. 9-10; *ibid.*, 15: Sept. 6-13, 1971, p. 10. *Yankı*, 26: Aug. 23-29, 1971, pp. 10-11.

¹⁹⁸ Reported in *Milliyet*, Sep. 2, 1971, p. 9. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, in an empirical research among students, discovered that this was not an isolated view; see *Yankı*, 2: Mar. 8-14, 1971, p. 11.

activity, noxious to state and nation.¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile work continued feverishly in government offices on socio-economic reform projects.

The ousted JP had five prominent members (but not Demirel) in the Cabinet, but its position became increasingly difficult, as its Members in the National Assembly and Senate were expected to adhere to and support policies of far-reaching socio-economic reform contradicting its stand during the preceding years. On October 5, 1971, several of the JP Ministers resigned from the Erim Cabinet, on the party's orders. Subsequently the Erim Cabinet resigned, but its resignation was not accepted. Later it was, but Erim was requested to form a new one. No matter what developed, the military was watching the situation closely. The March 1971 military intervention had possibly been what Sulzberger termed "a kind of demi coup d'état."²⁰⁰ But the armed forces were in direct and decisive control, as one of their spokesmen phrased it, "for liberty and against anarchy."²⁰¹

The military command, in the true Atatürkist spirit, succeeded in persuading the National Assembly and the Senate to pass the constitutional amendments which were a prerequisite both for restoring law and order and the introduction of long-due social and economic reforms. Both of Erim's Cabinets, and that of Ferit Melen which followed them, sought public consensus. With a strong pledge to re-establish order and security, meaning, in the right's interpretation, to wipe out leftist violence, and an equally strong commitment to enact the socio-economic reforms insistently advocated by the left, the Government seemed to aim at speedily solving the whole range of public controversies which had raged prior to the military intervention of March 12, 1971.

These hopes were over-optimistic, in view of the political, social and economic background and the magnitude of the task of solving Turkey's internal problems. Although the authorities clamped down on political suspects (more, however, on leftists than on rightists), closed down youth organizations (both left and right), and prohibited student groups from meddling in politics — violence continued, even if on a smaller scale, and took the form of sabotage, kidnapping and the hijacking of two Turkish planes to Sofia. Radical groups still appeared to find sympathy and support among part of the Turkish youth, mainly the students, and

¹⁹⁹ Text of the amendments and a report of the debate in the National Assembly in the weekly *Meydan* (Istanbul), VII (347): Sep. 7, 1971, pp. 3-6.

²⁰⁰ C. L. Sulzberger, "Two revolutions in one," *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 1, 1971, p. 6.

²⁰¹ Reported in *Yankı*, 11: May 10-16, 1971, p. 15.

among the workers. Some groups, too, allegedly received clandestine assistance of firearms and funds from abroad. Consequently new cells were organized and methodical military operations failed to crush entirely the so-called "guerillas".

Equally incomplete results were achieved on the reform-front. Two years after the March 12, 1971 military intervention the parliamentarians were still arguing over reforms, seeking a compromise acceptable to both the reform-minded and the conservatives. However the clamor for socio-economic reform raised by the left in the 1960's could not be easily disregarded. The moderate democratic left wing of the Republican People's Party, in a 'take-it-or-leave-it' struggle, drove out İnönü and some of the party's veteran leadership. The winner was the party's former General-Secretary and present Chairman, Bülent Ecevit, the champion of the party's "left-of-center" ideology, who now speaks in a moderate socialist tone reminiscent of the early 1960's.

The general mood in Turkey can perhaps be gauged from the outcome of the Presidential crisis of March 1973. As the term of office of the State President, Cevdet Sunay, was nearing completion, the National Assembly and the Senate convened to elect his successor. The Members of these bodies refused to elect General Faruk Gürler, who had resigned as Chief-of-Staff to run for the office, presumably as the candidate of the armed forces. An attempt to prolong President Sunay's term also failed to obtain the necessary majority. Finally, a widely-respected Senator and retired Admiral, once the colleague of Atatürk, Fahri Korutürk, was elected to the Presidency of the State — without the armed forces attempting to impose their will. Prime Minister Melen resigned, and a neutral, Naim Talu, formed a coalition Cabinet with a majority of Justice Party members — without the participation however of the Republican People's Party or of the Democratic Party. In the summer of 1973, with martial law limited to only four of Turkey's provinces, the Cabinet and both Houses established security courts to deal with armed subversion, hastened the enactment of reforms, and began the task of preparing the country for the October 1973 general elections.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TURKISH MARXIST AS JOURNALIST

a. RADICALIZATION OF THE TURKISH PRESS

It is difficult, even hazardous, to examine the characteristics of the unorganized left in Turkey. While the organization, activities and ideology of the Labor Party of Turkey, and even of the clandestine Communist Party of Turkey are relatively easy to follow (despite schisms and changes of attitude), the unorganized left is fluid and consists of a bewildering array of small groups and varying opinions. Nevertheless, it is important to know something of its character in order to gain an understanding of the radical mood of Turkish intellectuals during the 1960's. Therefore an attempt in this direction must be made. Turkish scholars are only beginning to show interest in the subject; the few works which have been published have apparently been written by Marxists. These include people like Yıldız Sertel,¹ a leftist sociologist and economist who studied in London, New York and Paris, and in recent years has been lecturing at the University of Paris, or Hikmet Kıvılcımlı,² a physician who has allegedly been a prominent communist,³ and was active in establishing Marxist groups, such as the short-lived *Vatan Partisi* (Fatherland Party) and publishing Marxist books and articles for which he spent years in jail.⁴

The following analysis of radical leftist trends will take into account such studies, but it is based mainly on a reading of relevant periodicals and books, written by radical intellectuals in the 1960's. Naturally, those that seemed more immediately influential and important have been selected for mention.

There were varying answers to the problems raised in the public debate which followed the May 27, 1960 Revolution. The elites were committed to an identification with the Turkish nation and Republic (at least in what they wrote and said). This did not, however, diminish

¹ Yıldız Sertel, *Türkiye'de ilerici akımlar ve kalkınma davamız* (Istanbul: 1969).

² Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *27 Mayıs ve Yön hareketinin sınıfsal eleştirisi* (Istanbul: 1970).

³ Acc. to Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Türkiye'de sosyalist ve komünist faaliyetler* (Ankara: 1967), pp. 424, 466, 500, 648.

⁴ Later, in May 1971, he was alleged by the press to have been involved in the violent Front for the Liberation of Turkey and to have fled the country.

the inter-elite conflict.⁵ In addition to the conservatives, who wanted to preserve the economic status quo,⁶ and the Neo-Kemalist officers who had carried out the 1960 Revolution and desired planned development within a guided economy⁷ there were several leftist approaches to Turkey's problems. In this chapter, we shall examine the intellectual activity of several Marxist groups and their radical periodicals from 1961 on. They shared a growing disappointment with the workings of the multiparty democracy in Turkey — as practised during the post-1946 period.⁸

b. *Yön*

Perhaps the most noteworthy of the radical trends which sprang up after the 1960 Revolution was that expressed in the weekly *Yön* ("Direction") which opened its pages for several years to some of the most alert and sophisticated of Turkish leftist intellectuals. These included LPT leaders, although *Yön* by no means accurately reflected the party ideology. The weekly appeared in Ankara and comprised 24 pages (then 20 pages and later 16), in a large format. The first issue appeared on December 20, 1961 and *Yön* continued to be published up to June 30, 1967. The editor was Doğan Avcıoğlu, about whom we shall have more to say; during the first years, he wrote the editorials regularly. For the five-and-a-half years of its publication, it was undoubtedly one of the most discussed periodicals in Turkey. A study of Ankara University students in 1965 indicates that *Yön* was their favorite magazine;⁹ it was the most widely read periodical among student leaders (40.4%) and second to the popular weekly *Akis* only among others (16%). It was admired, as well as bitterly attacked, in the press and in special¹⁰ publi-

⁵ Suna Kili, *Turkey: a case study of political development* (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 38-39, sees this in terms of "vertical identification" and the lack of "horizontal identification."

⁶ Sertel, *op. cit.*, calls them *gelenekçiler* ("traditionalists") and discusses their economic views on pp. 179-186.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 187 ff., describes it as a sort of neo-etatism.

⁸ See also Turan Güneş, "Tendances intellectuelles et sociales des élites turques d'aujourd'hui," *Synthèses* (Bruxelles), 205-206: June-July 1963, pp. 297-298.

⁹ Özer Ozankaya, *Üniversite öğrencilerinin siyasal yönelimleri*, *op. cit.*, p. 35. See also J. S. Szyliowicz, "Students and politics in Turkey" *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, pp. 160 and 162, n. 28.

¹⁰ For example, see the anonymous 106-page *İçimizdeki düşman* ("The enemy within us") (N. p.: n. d.) [1965]). This is an out-and-out attack on *Yön*, accusing it of insidious communist propaganda.

cations. *Yön* certainly filled an intellectual void, and its initial success brought an increase in its circulation to about 30,000¹¹ (a huge one for a Turkish weekly at that time), but then dropped considerably. In 1965, it seems to have had a weekly printing of about 6,000 to 7,000.¹² These figures may assist one in gauging the reaction of the reading public to *Yön*.

At least some of the initial success was due to the two page *bildiri*, or "statement of opinion," in *Yön*'s first issue.¹³ It was discussed outside Turkey, and translated into English¹⁴ and French,¹⁵ by Professors Frank Tachau and René Giraud, respectively. The statement was not completely original; some of its principles had already been expressed in the *Kadro* magazine, about thirty years earlier,¹⁶ and others had been discussed since. Nonetheless, it was an eye-opener in at least three respects: its contents, its timing and the character of those who signed it.

The statement began pointing out that Turkey was beset by very grave problems — economic, political and social — but that it aspired nevertheless to realize its historical destiny. The statement did not pretend to solve all Turkey's problems, but claimed, modestly enough, to open a debate. The following paragraph was the most important, "We believe that the aims assumed by the Atatürk reforms, such as the attainment of the level of modern civilization, the final solution of the problem of education, the enlivening of Turkish democracy, the realization of social justice and the establishment of a democratic regime on firm foundations, depend upon the success we will achieve in rapid economic development — that is, in the rapid increase in the level of national productivity."¹⁷

Rapid economic development was considered the key to all other aspects, indeed to the very future of Turkey. Westernization was measured by approaching the productivity-rate of the West; the rise in productivity would do away with the dichotomy between town and village and solve the country's social problems. The consequent disappearance of hunger, unemployment and homelessness would bring about democracy

¹¹ Acc. to Karpát, "The Turkish left", in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, I (2): 1966, p. 185.

¹² *Современная Турция (справочник)* (Moscow: 1965), p. 274.

¹³ *Yön*, I (1): Dec. 20, 1961, pp. 12-13.

¹⁴ In *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XIV (3): March 1963, pp. 75-78. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 72-75, for Frank Tachau's comments.

¹⁵ In *Orient*, VI (21): 1962, pp. 135-142. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 30, for Giraud's comments.

¹⁶ Kuvülcümlü, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 41, for a critique of the "statement".

¹⁷ Acc. to Tachau's translation in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XIV (3): Mar. 1963, p. 75.

and social justice.¹⁸ Teachers, writers, politicians, trade union leaders, businessmen should agree on a philosophy of development for Turkey. A backward agriculture was compounded by landlessness, and unemployment by a speedy population increase. Those who governed Turkey did not understand these phenomena, or the correct philosophy of development.

A new concept of etatism was needed: Although the Turkish economy would continue to be a combination of private initiative and state enterprise, the former is merely profit-seeking, while the latter aims at the general good. Judicious state intervention is therefore desirable. It could encourage savings and increase the yield of taxation while making it more equitable. Total planning should place key industries under state control and regulate large economic units through cooperatives. Etatism would also be the best way to avoid inequitable distribution of income, achieve social security, and raise the wages of workers — at the expense of unjust profits of middlemen and speculators. Etatism would help the masses to secure control of democracy, achieve equal education, strengthen the trade unions and pave the way for a fundamental reform in land-holding.

It is significant, too, that this was published, no doubt after careful preparation, just after civilian rule had been re-instated in Turkey. That those who drew up this statement knew well that the military was still watching them is evident from their cautious avoidance of such terms as “socialism,” although not a few of the roles they attributed to etatism, in the name of social justice (perhaps we may call it a “neo-etatism”) fell within a possible definition of socialism, Turkish style.

The more than 160 people who signed the statement (in alphabetical order) were later joined by many others in subsequent issues of *Yön*, bringing the total number to over 500. According to Tachau's calculation,¹⁹ of the original signatories, 36 were on university faculties, 36 were journalists, and another 19 were writers — together more than half the total. Most university personnel held junior positions at the Faculties of Political Science, Ankara; of Law, Istanbul; and Economics, Istanbul. Other large groups were made up of 23 economists, 11 engineers, 8 lawyers, and 8 civil servants. There were also several Members of the National Assembly, past or present, as well as three Life Senators (i.e., the former officers who had engineered the 1960 Revolution).

¹⁸ *Sosyal adalet*, in Turkish. The term is used advisedly in place of “socialism.”

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XIV (3): Mar. 1963, p. 74.

While the background of the original signatories of the statement is evidently significant, a detailed look at the occupational division of all those who signed (including those already analyzed) is even more revealing.²⁰

TABLE 5. OCCUPATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF SIGNATORIES OF YÖN STATEMENT

Students ²¹	150	Merchants	6
Writers and journalists	80	Senators	5
Officials and clerks ²²	63	Members of the National Assembly	4
Schoolteachers	48	Painters	3
Engineers	37	Stage-directors	3
University assistants	35	Housewives	3
Lawyers	23	University professors	2
Physicians	19	Farmers	2
Economists	17	Landowner	1
University lecturers	10	Football player	1
Military officers ²³	10		
Workers	9	Total	531

Altogether, this is a markedly elitist group, intellectually and politically. It is no less meaningful that among those who signed the statement or subsequently joined are some of the best-known men of Turkish letters and politics of the day. While their political, social and economic views were by no means identical, most shared a sympathetic attitude towards socialism (as each understood it) and a wish to introduce it into Turkey as a potent, even decisive, force. Among the prominent were socialists like Professor Sadun Aren, columnists Çetin Altan, Fethi Naci, or Murat Sarıca; leading writers such as Kemal Tahir, Necati Cumalı, and Mahmut Makal; journalists of the caliber of Abdi İpekçi, İlhami Soysal and İlhan Selçuk; and internationally-known scholars like Arif Payaşlıoğlu (Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at Ankara's Middle East Technical University), Bahri Savcı (Professor of Political Science at Ankara University), İbrahim Yasa (a leading sociologist), Türkkiye Ataöv (now Associate Professor of International Affairs at Ankara University), and Profes-

²⁰ Based on data calculated by *Kıvılcımlı, op. cit.*, pp. 39-41.

²¹ These include 72 students of law, 28 of political science, 27 of economics, and 23 high-school (*lycée*) pupils.

²² Including 4 retired officials.

²³ Including one general.

sor Mümtaz Soysal (then an assistant in political science). Personalities from the left-wing of the Republican People's Party also signed: Turan Güneş, Şükrü Koç and others; a letter of support came²⁴ from Bülent Ecevit, then serving as Minister of Labor on behalf of the RPP, and later the party's Secretary-General and the man responsible for giving it a "left-of-center" direction. There were also people less committed to socialism, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, an erstwhile leftist and editor of an ideological journal, *Kadro*, who had joined the Establishment during Atatürk's days, a prolific political writer who is now generally regarded as a Western-type social democrat.²⁵ In brief, the signatories were a sample of a much wider circle of intellectuals, increasingly radicalized.

Some of the signatories and others wrote in *Yön*, with varying frequency — so that it is difficult to speak of its having any political and socio-economic consensus. The general tenor of the "statement" was preserved: an uncompromising demand for fundamental reform and speedy development, a radical opposition to (even animosity towards) the existing social order and its representatives — wealthy landowners and moneyed businessmen. In other words, although *Yön* did not shun politics (as we shall see), the spearhead of its attack on the status quo in Turkey was mainly in the socio-economic arena. It considered itself, first and foremost, "progressive" (*ilerici*). This, however, meant for the contributors "socialist" rather than "communist;" indeed, they took pains to explain the differences between the two and to reject the indiscriminate use of the term "communist" (a use labeled as "an opium of words"²⁶). Indeed, as Doğan Avcioğlu wrote incisively in his editorial in the final issue,²⁷ *Yön* was progressive, socio-economically, and stood for Turkey's complete independence, politically. He might have added — without any danger of boasting — that *Yön* had also served many articulate intellectuals as a market-place for their ideas.²⁸

²⁴ And was printed in *Yön*, I (2): Dec. 27, 1961, p. 8.

²⁵ Acc. to Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

²⁶ İlhan Selçuk, in *Yön*, I (4): Jan. 10, 1962. See also Avcioğlu, *ibid.*, I (5): Jan. 17, 1962. Cf. *ibid.*, I (7): Jan. 31, 1962 (an issue devoted to socialism); III (81): Oct. 16, 1964, an article on communist propaganda and *Yön*, VI (205): Mar. 3, 1967.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, VI (222): June 30, 1967.

²⁸ The following preliminary examination of the approach in *Yön* to some focal problems is based on an extensive reading of this weekly, also taking into account comments of Sertel, *op. cit.*, and Kivilcimlı, *op. cit.*; the former defends *Yön*, while the latter criticizes it strongly.

The “neo-etatism” (*yeni devletçilik*) theory came out, first and foremost, against any ties, economic or otherwise, with the West. It opposed private enterprise which, even when supported by the West, could guarantee only slow development — much slower than Turkey needed.²⁹ The neo-etatism was directed, in the main, against the rich feudal landlords in Turkey’s east³⁰ and the urban upper middle class³¹ rather than against the lower and middle-middle class. In true Marxist fashion, its advocates envisaged an alliance of workers (for whose benefit they strove³²) and the lower and middle-middle class — to be led by intellectuals. The general aim was to institute social justice (*sosyal adalet*)³³ in Turkey, through Turkish socialism (*Türk sosyalizmi*). It was prudently maintained that the Turkish military sided with those desiring social justice;³⁴ and that, without social justice, speedy development could well pave the way for communism.³⁵ Turkish socialism (they emphasized repeatedly) was very different from communism, and was a brand of socialism specially suited for Turkey and other underdeveloped countries; it was based on “Kemalism” and on “laborism” (a type of Western-style social democratism). The combination appealed to those intellectuals loyal to the Kemalist principles, but wishing socio-economic change within a changing world context in which Kemalism had ceased to be an answer to every problem. The 1961 Constitution was there and, although it would be imprudent to speak against its tenets, it was clear to some at least in the *Yön* circle that the Constitution was helping preserve the hold of the upper middle class and its supporters on Turkey’s economy and to perpetuate the socio-political status quo. The *Yön* circle, in its search for an alternative to this status quo, seems to have decided on “Turkish socialism,” an intentionally nebulous term, which presumably meant different things to different people. Basically, Turkish socialism,

²⁹ D. Avcioğlu, in *Yön*, I (4): Jan. 10, 1962.

³⁰ E. g., *ibid.*, in the feature “Ağaları tanıyor musunuz?” Cf. Sami Katırcıoğlu, *ibid.*, II (61): Feb. 13, 1963.

³¹ See, e.g., for their luxurious homes and cars, and spending habits, Çetin Altan, *ibid.*, I (5): Jan. 17, 1962.

³² See, e.g., Seyfi Demirsoy, President of *Türk İş*, *ibid.*, I (2): Dec. 27, 1961. See *ibid.*, I (3): Jan. 3, 1962, for support of bakery-workers; cf. Ahmet Top, *ibid.*, II (56): Jan. 9, 1963.

³³ The term had already appeared in the first issue of *Yön*, I (1): Dec. 20, 1961, in the title of Avcioğlu’s editorial “Kemer sıkalım..ama önce sosyal adalet.” Kıvılcımlı, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 ff., ridicules the use of the term in *Yön*.

³⁴ İlhan Selçuk, *ibid.*, I (5): Jan. 17, 1962.

³⁵ Avcioğlu, *ibid.*, I (4): Jan. 10, 1962.

Yön-style, was modeled on ideas of Western socialist groups, chiefly those of the British Labor Party: social advantages rather than profits in production, nationalization of key industries, a fair division of national wealth, a parliamentary democracy with weighty representation for workers, and protection for workers against their employers. These and several other principles, rather remote from the original conception of Kemalism, provided an eclectic philosophy which claimed to be particularly suitable for Turkey and its needs.

The basic complaint of those who preached neo-etatism in the pages of *Yön* was that the Kemalist type of etatism had been confined to the economy, and only to part of it, at that. The prophets of neo-etatism wanted an approach that would be both radical and comprehensive. As they saw it, the new system would be one of "broad etatism" (*geniş devletçilik*). The state should take control of all the key-points of the economy — banks, insurance, financial organizations, foreign commerce, and basic industries. Turkish industries should be protected and exports encouraged by a system of premiums. The private sector would continue to exist; it would be encouraged to invest in industry, but prevented from prospering at public expense. Central planning was considered essential to develop the economy and protect it from crises. Price control and regulation of investments would be necessary to prevent market fluctuations which harm the salaried most of all. An article³⁶ maintained that during the years 1938–1959, the cost of living in Turkey rose by 1,405%, while the average official's wages increased (in real buying power) only by 289%. Only the state could solve such crucial problems as economic stagnation, unemployment, insecurity of investments, or migration from village to town. Consequently, the state should take over the major part of the means of production and control the part that would remain in private hands.

The future state would be supported by the masses, which should have a majority representation in parliament (Avcıoğlu speaks of 75%³⁷), to ensure their maintaining control of power and the continuation of reforms. However, if the masses are to support neo-etatism, intellectuals should hold the leading positions; they are the ideological spokesmen in what they term "the current stage of Turkey's War of Independence." It is for this that the intellectuals should prepare many cadres. The regime that Turkish socialists (intellectuals, primarily) would establish would be neither a bourgeois state, nor a socialist one (obviously, the term

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I (2): Dec. 27, 1961.

³⁷ *Yön*, I (13): Mar. 14, 1962, quoted by Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

“socialist state” would have reminded Turks of communism; consequently, it was and is taboo). The term that some neo-etatists use, at a later stage, is a “national democratic state” (*millî demokratik devlet*). This would have to be a progressive state, adapted to the needs of an underdeveloped country. The intellectuals would lead it, and rely not only on the workers, but on also the lower strata of the bourgeoisie, such as the officials and clerks who are so important in Turkey in such roles as state administration. This is particularly relevant, in view of the fact that the workers’ masses are under-represented in parliament.³⁸ More important, it was believed that those masses did not show, as yet, sufficient political consciousness, while the majority of the people had only begun to awaken. But, again, the main responsibility for radical reform, under such conditions, would fall on the intellectual cadres.

This being so, that intellectual circle writing in *Yön* led a relentless campaign against the urban class and against the rural bourgeoisie, both of which they considered obstacles to progress of the kind they wanted. This anti-bourgeois drive was directed at rich merchants, bankers, factory owners and others who rated the name of “local capitalists,” as well as against the root of all evil — foreign capital.³⁹ Examples are given of the activities of foreign companies in the Turkish steel and petroleum industries. The conclusion which Çetin Altan drew from this was⁴⁰ that the wealthy in Turkey had a common tie with the foreigners, the bond of interest. Even when the United States (which received its full share of the censure) donated wheat and food for Turkey’s hungry east, poor organization and transport prevented effective relief.⁴¹ One should be warned, and protected, against these “capitalists” and their illegal gains, asserted several *Yön* articles.

More than one contributor to *Yön* touched upon the need for reform in land-holding and for saving the village from its backwardness. While there seems to have been a consensus among intellectuals on the need for radical rural reform, opinions in *Yön* naturally differed as to ways and means. The general view was that the reforms that were rumored after the 1960 Revolution, even if carried out, would be blatantly inadequate. Articles in *Yön* called for limiting the economic — and, consequently-political — power of the land *ağas* (owners of large estates) and institut-

³⁸ Çetin Altan, in *Yön*, I (4): Jan. 10, 1962. Cf. *ibid.*, III (80): Oct. 9, 1964, Avcioglu’s article on the legend of development by means of foreign capital.

³⁹ Cf., e.g., İlhan Selçuk, *ibid.*, I (3): Jan. 3, 1962.

⁴⁰ “Yaşasın liberalizm,” *ibid.*, I (1): Dec. 20, 1961.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I (3): Jan. 3, 1962.

ing a broad cooperative system, along with a sweeping reapportionment of land: large landowners would be given generous compensation for their lands, which would then be distributed to peasants who owned very little land or none. While one view, expressed by Professor Mümtaz Soysal, was that every peasant should be given his plot of land and only later, when it became economically imperative, should cooperatives be formed, Avcıoğlu saw the establishment of broad cooperatives as the immediate task, for the abolition of exploitation of peasants on the one hand, and on the other for making agriculture truly profitable. In this context, the lively discussion in the pages of *Yön* concerning agrarian reform, touched upon numerous relevant topics, such as the change in the semi-feudal production methods by abolishing the *agalık* system, the eradication of middlemen and unscrupulous money-lenders — particularly in Turkey's east, south and southeast.

The term "socialism" (*sosyalizm*) had no precise connotation as employed by the *Yön* group, since the various contributors seem to have understood it in more than one sense. They reverted to it time and again, convened round-table discussions and published their transcripts, and translated the ideas of foreign thinkers and labor leaders.⁴² In Yıldız Sertel's capable summing-up⁴³ of the interpretation of socialism in *Yön*, there are three basic ideas: a. Production should not be directed towards profit-making, but rather towards social advantages. b. Socialism should be introduced gradually, by parliamentary means. c. Social reforms should be instituted and broad democratic rights granted to people — in order to prevent the aggravation of conflicts between social classes. To some extent the argument was influenced by a chapter from John Strachey's *Socialism looks forward*, which had just been translated into Turkish⁴⁴ by N. Erken and went through several editions. *Yön* collaborators adopted his approach, that socialism does not abolish private ownership, but only nationalizes the large industries and services; all the means of production belong to the public, but this does not mean that the state owns everything. Strachey's arguments on this point⁴⁵

⁴² Examples in *Yön*, I (7): Jan. 31, 1962.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 242 ff.

⁴⁴ Under the title of *Sosyalizm nedir* ("What is socialism?"). The chapter's name, in English, is "What can we put in its place?" (N. Y.: Philosophical Library, n.d. [1946], pp. 101-122). The Turkish translation makes no mention of the fact that Strachey's work has a totally different title in the original.

⁴⁵ John Strachey, *Socialism looks forward*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102: "I was in favor of individual, private property...but Socialism...means taking property in the means of production, as we call it, out of private hands."

were probably accepted⁴⁶ because they were close to the views of the *Yön* circle.

The above approach had an element of revolution in it, which found expression in the frequently used terms of "social justice" and "social advantages." For the *Yön* circle social justice (*sosyal adalet*) meant greater equity in income and taxation, even if this necessitated a redistribution of wealth. Social advantages (*sosyal fayda*) meant a social purpose for production, rather than mere profit, even if this required central planning for the whole economy and state control over a part of it. While the former term had often been bandied about in Turkey during the 1950's — and a leftist monthly even adopted the slogan as its name in 1964 — the latter appears, again, to have been borrowed by the *Yön* circle either from another of John Strachey's works, *How socialism works*, or possibly as an interpretation of Fabianism. Adopting these principles as guidelines meant accepting socialism — the one and only way for Turkey's development, according to *Yön's* editor, Avciöglü, and other contributors. This is so, they argued, because only a socialist order would organize the economy for a social purpose, *i.e.*, the public good. Although the *Yön* circle seems to have gone a little further than the Fabians in the socio-economic role it ascribed to socialism, it generally kept quite close to the way the term was understood and employed by the Fabians and the British Labor movement.

Again, influenced by the Fabian approach,⁴⁷ the majority of those who wrote on socialism in *Yön* rejected the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, insofar as Turkey's situation required; and expressed a preference for a British-type democratic socialism, based on a multi-party parliamentary regime. Some called it "reform socialism" (*islahatçı sosyalizm*), thus emphasizing the socio-economic reform to be carried out by Turkish socialists which would be the best bulwark against class-war and communism. Indeed, reform was one of the main slogans of the *Yön* circle, and the alleged lukewarmness of Turkey's government reform was one reason for criticizing it severely.⁴⁸ However, a more impatient minority in *Yön* thought that mere reforms would not do; they

⁴⁶ As were Strachey's (and others') views of the importance of changing the economic system as a condition to social progress (*ibid.*, p. 97), or of fighting "the profit as the regulator of the system" (*ibid.*, pp. 108-109) and exploitation — *the sin* (*ibid.*, pp. 116 ff.)

⁴⁷ E.g., Abdi İpekçi, who quotes it in *Yön*, I (5): Jan. 17, 1962, also summarized by Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁴⁸ E.g., Avciöglü, *ibid.*, I (6): Jan. 24, 1962. Cf. İlhan Selçuk, *ibid.*

wanted a more revolutionary, radical type of Turkish socialism. They pointed out that, as opposed to British workers, the Turkish were incapable of obtaining a majority in parliament. The minority, consequently, asked for a more radical struggle against the bourgeoisie (particularly, the upper-middle class). Most intellectuals who wrote in *Yön*, nonetheless, inclined towards "reform socialism." Since it would be achieved through democratic channels, some of them hoped that it would lead to what they termed "a socialist democracy" (*sosyalist demokrasi*), which they interpreted as "a social-minded democracy." Needless to say, the *Yön* circle did *not* use this term as it was used, before the First World War, to denote revolutionary workers' parties, but rather in its post-War meaning of official, non-revolutionary labor parties. For the contributors to *Yön*, this concept meant that parliament was a means of achieving socio-economic reform. Propagation of the socialist doctrine among the masses and their organization would lead to their exerting sufficient pressure on parliament, to pass the desired reforms.⁴⁹

While the *Yön* circle did acknowledge that the RPP's left wing (intellectuals like Bülent Ecevit or Turan Güneş), and some of the officers who had carried out the 1960 Revolution, were sympathetic towards socio-economic reform, the columns of *Yön* also carried articles which stated (or implied) that they could not be expected to go far enough because of their ties with the Turkish Establishment and foreign interests (such as Turkey's membership in NATO). As opposed to the views of these groups, intellectuals writing in *Yön* maintained that their brand of "neo-etatism" or "reform socialism" for "a socialist democracy" was particularly suited to underdeveloped countries, and characterized "Turkish socialism" as anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. Evidently, this approach — which pointed to the fact that the *Yön* circle was not communist — added to its respectability. The *Yön* circle could then brand its opponents as feudal or as imperialists.

The task of the *Yön* intellectuals was not made easier by the controversy in the weekly's columns as to whether there was one or several types of socialism. Some insisted in a dogmatic way that there was only one, while others — apparently a majority of those who discussed the issue — thought that more than one type existed, and they advocated the kind that best suited Turkey and underdeveloped countries. The latter held that there was actually a transitional stage to socialism in underdeveloped countries, a stage aiming first at economic independence; this they called

⁴⁹ See quotes from *Yön* in Sertel's *op. cit.* pp. 254–257.

“national socialism”⁵⁰ (*millî sosyalizm*), and characterized it, in Marxist fashion, as the non-capitalist road to economic independence and, presumably, to the victory of socialism. According to Avcıoğlu⁵¹ at least, the non-capitalist road would lead — in underdeveloped countries — to a struggle for profound social revolution. He maintained that bourgeois revolutionaries would join this struggle against the upper-middle class and the feudal elements; the regime that would ensue, temporarily, was to be a “national democracy” (*millî demokrasi*), neither a bourgeois nor a socialist democracy, but a transitional stage between the two. In a bourgeois democracy, the bourgeoisie rule; in a socialist democracy, the working class does; in a national democracy, however, all the national forces of a national democratic society — anti-imperialist and anti-feudal — would share in government. The national democracies would allocate to workers and peasants an important role, although power would be invested in a National Front (*millî cephe*).⁵²

Such a National Front was necessary in Turkey, according to several articles in *Yön*, because conditions in the country differed from those in many underdeveloped lands, mainly in respect of a. the rise of a large bourgeoisie in the last half century; b. the fact that the working class had not yet completed the process of obtaining all its rights; c. the special ties with the United States, economic and politico-military — since Turkey was a member of both NATO and CENTO.

The rather eclectic grasp of socialism, as expressed by the intellectuals writing in *Yön*, acquired a further nuance by references to an “Islamic socialism” (*İslam sosyalizmi*).⁵³ The term began to be used in *Yön* from 1963, that is at the same time that the relation of Islam to Arab socialism was being debated in Egypt, as well as in *Ba'th* circles in Syria and Irak. The *Yön* discussion received further impetus in 1965 and immediately thereafter,⁵⁴ through the impact of a work on socialism and Islam by Roger Garaudy, the well-known French leftist ideologist. His book was translated into Turkish that year by Doğan Avcıoğlu, as *Sosyalizm ve islamiyet*.

⁵⁰ Obviously not to be confused with Nazism.

⁵¹ In *Yön*, May 14, 1965, summarized by Sertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 267 ff.

⁵² Which of course is what the Turkish Communist Party and its front organizations also advocated, time and again, after the Second World War. One naturally wonders whether Avcıoğlu, who had been close to the TCP for a time, was somewhat influenced by it.

⁵³ Literally, “a socialism of Islam.”

⁵⁴ As already noted by Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 277; see also p. 286.

As a rule earlier contributors to *Yön* were indifferent to religion, or took a dim view of the *şeriatçılar*, those Turks who saw in Islam not just a faith, but a complete — and desirable — socio-political system.⁵⁵ However Professor Cahit Tanyol,⁵⁶ of the Institute of Sociology at Istanbul University, apparently one of the chief proponents in *Yön* of Islamic socialism, believed that this trend attempted to bridge the gap between socialism and Islam. According to the ideologist of Islamic socialism, the religious feelings of the masses had been exploited by unscrupulous politicians, both during the 1950's (the Democrat Party) and later (a reference to the Justice Party and other conservative parties). The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, by its uncompromising secularist stand, had become the foe of religion; other intellectuals, both bourgeois and progressive, could also be considered hostile to Islam. Consequently a deep abyss separated the devout peasant masses from the intellectuals. If the peasants maintained such an attitude, it could and would obstruct the carrying out of progressive reforms; this was even more so, as the reactionary bourgeoisie was using religion as a weapon. Surely, just as a bridge between socialism and Islam had been successfully constructed in some Arab states, it could be built in Turkey too (particularly as Islam was interpreted as the poor man's religion).

All this referred mainly to socio-economic reform — through radical social change and economic development. In addition, a reform in education, its enlargement and improvement, was strongly advocated,⁵⁷ supporting, *inter alia*, students' demands to participate in university administration⁵⁸ and enjoy better conditions for study.⁵⁹ All these received considerable attention, but this does not mean that *Yön* neglected to express political views. This the contributors did, and quite boldly. However, in politics there was considerably less than a consensus; a divergence of opinions was even more noticeable than in the socio-economic arena. Socio-economic complaints against Turkey's government frequently served as a starting point of attack against the government's politics — both its foreign relations and domestic policies. In the former, *Yön's* drive was against the close collaboration with the

⁵⁵ For example, Nejat Yardımcı, in *Yön*, II (56): Jan. 9, 1963.

⁵⁶ On whom see in Osman Nebioğlu's *Türkiye'de kim kimdir 1961-1962* (Istanbul: n.d.), s.v.

⁵⁷ *Yön*, I (8): Feb. 7, 1962; I (10): Feb. 21, 1962; II (55): Jan. 2, 1963; II (61): Feb. 13, 1963.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II (58): Jan. 23, 1963.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, II (64): Mar. 6, 1963.

United States, NATO and CENTO.⁶⁰ There was however more frequent coverage of internal politics with emphasis on the government itself and on political parties.

As has been said, the Turkish government was attacked because of what the *Yön* writers regarded as its socio-economic *laissez-faire* and its consequent political moves to preserve the status quo or even to turn the clock back. This started with several articles in the first issue,⁶¹ and continued. Some writers equated it with the Turkish Cabinets in the 1950's,⁶² particularly in ignoring Turkey's future,⁶³ its peace and security.⁶⁴ Since the government was invariably identified with one of Turkey's two largest parties — the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party — these received a larger share of political criticism in *Yön* than the government itself. In these and in some other political parties, Avci-oğlu maintains,⁶⁵ all decisions were made by interest groups opposing both free thought and any kind of reform. Mehmed Kemal, in comparing the JP and RPP, asked, "which of the two is more dangerous?"⁶⁶ and condemned them both. The only party which was looked upon with some favor in the pages of *Yön* (particularly in its later years) was the Labor Party of Turkey. Without identifying with it — and certainly it was not an organ of the party — *Yön* supported several of the LPT's opinions and aims, and criticized others. Some regular *Yön* contributors — such as Sadun Aren, Çetin Altan, and others — were also prominent members of the party. Consequently, *Yön* not only reported LPT activities in an amicable spirit,⁶⁷ but also found occasion to praise it, albeit not excessively.⁶⁸

To sum up, *Yön* remained throughout uncommitted to any political organization, not even to the Labor Party of Turkey (despite certain

⁶⁰ E.g. *ibid.*, II (55): Jan 2, 1963; III (78): Sep. 25, 1964; III (79): Oct. 2, 1964; III (86): Nov. 20, 1964; VI (198): Jan. 11, 1967; VI (202): Feb. 10, 1967; VI (204): Feb. 24, 1967; VI (207): Mar. 17, 1967.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, I (1): Dec. 20, 1961.

⁶² *Ibid.*, I (3): Jan. 3, 1962, İlhan Selçuk's article. *Ibid.*, III (88): Dec. 4, 1964, Demirel is condemned as "the heir of Menderes."

⁶³ *Ibid.*, VI (220): Jan 30, 1967.

⁶⁴ Avcioglu, *ibid.*, I (2): Dec. 27, 1961.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, I (3): Jan. 3, 1962.

⁶⁶ In an article with this title, *ibid.*, III (82): Oct. 23, 1964.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II (61): Feb. 13, 1963; III (79): Dec. 2, 1964; VI (199): Jan. 20, 1967; VI (207): Mar. 17, 1967.

⁶⁸ Bahir Ersoy, *ibid.*, I (2): Dec. 27, 1961; VI (197): Jan. 6, 1967; VI (199): Jan. 20, 1967; Adil Aşçıoğlu, *ibid.*, VI (205): Mar. 3, 1967. Regarding the *Yön*-LPT controversy on socialism, see Metin Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, pp. 35, 40-48.

ideological similarities to it, as well as contacts on the personal level). Differences of opinion among contributors could not but result in an eclectic socio-economic philosophy, which in turn led to political non-commitment. This was the greatest weakness of the *Yön* circle and brought on its head scoffing criticism from more systematic leftist thinkers, such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı.⁶⁹ It was, however, also its greatest strength; for this eclecticism permitted a freer flow and exchange of ideas which contributed greatly to arousing the interest of at least part of the Turkish intelligentsia in economic, social and political issues.

Professor Rustow has succinctly summed up the critical attitude of *Yön*.⁷⁰ "Its pages are replete with acid criticism of the surrounding political scene... *Yön's* present cast of mind reveals a disenchantment with the prevalent ideologies of republicanism and nationalism, an impatience with all attempts at gradual reform, and disillusionment with democracy itself." However, while there is no doubt about the seriousness and sincerity of what the contributors to *Yön* were writing, it was all what John Strachey once called "A kind of verbal socialism — a socialism of the hereafter."⁷¹ It was considered as such by other leftist intellectual groups, which adapted a more extremist ideological stance and called more insistently for activism. We have seen that the most radical of these later took matters into their own hands. However, let us first discuss the journal *Ant*, which was *Yön's* more extremist heir and which intellectually nourished many of the more radical leftists in the late 1960's and the early 1970's.⁷²

c. *Ant*

Ant ("pledge," "oath") began to appear a short while before *Yön* ceased publication. It started as a 16-page weekly in Istanbul (while *Yön* was appearing in Ankara) on January 3, 1967, and continued in the same size, for 173 issues, until April 21, 1970. From May 1970, it appeared as a monthly, comprising 84 pages (though in a much smaller format), costing the same as four weeklies. It continued publication for a year until the authorities decided in May 1971 to forbid its publication, as part of their crackdown on the country's radical leftists.

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff. and *passim*.

⁷⁰ D. A. Rustow, "Turkey's second try at democracy," *Yale Review*, LII: 1962, pp. 531-532.

⁷¹ John Strachey, *The coming struggle for power* (N. Y.: 1935), p. 300.

⁷² Cf. criticism of *Yön* by these circles, in a more moderate journal, the monthly *Barış Dünyası* (Istanbul), e.g., IV (39): Aug. 1965, pp. 464-469.

From the first *Ant* gathered a select group of intellectuals, at least some of whom had earlier supported and contributed to *Yön*, but were disenchanted with what they considered *Yön*'s moderate tone. *Ant*'s founders⁷³ were Doğan Özgüden (who was also the publisher and the writer of the editorials⁷⁴), Yaşar Kemal, one of Turkey's foremost novelists, and Fethi Naci, a successful journalist already mentioned as a signatory of the *Yön* "statement" (and who had since veered to the more extreme left⁷⁵). The cover of the first issue announced as contributors such well-known left-wing socialists as Çetin Altan, Aziz Nesin and Abidin Dino (there were many others). In the center of the first issue's cover was the presumed slogan of *Ant* — "For independence and social justice."⁷⁶

While in its first issue *Ant* did not publish anything nearly as definite and comprehensive as the "statement" of the opening issue of *Yön*, one may still get an idea of the purpose of the periodical from Doğan Özgüden's editorial, "Why *Ant*?"⁷⁷ He wrote that the ruling classes in Turkey had formed a front against the recent great popular awakening. Indeed, socialism was at last in a position to fight, everyday and everywhere, the comprador capitalism and the land *ağalık* which were already on the defensive. In the forefront of this socialist fight stood the working class, the peasants, socially-conscious (*toplumcu*) intellectuals, youths, low-income people — that is to say, the whole nation. There was a growing participation of socialists in public life; the socialist movement was becoming an embodiment of the progressive movement of the suffering Turkish people. However strong the pressures against it might be, this movement would be victorious, sooner or later, by democratic means — because historical development was on the people's side. *Ant* would be a forum for the free expression of ideas in support of socialism; it considered itself the journal of those who sided with the victory of socialism attained by the people's democratic struggle and who joined both the socialist and the anti-imperialist struggle. Summing up, the article declared that *Ant* stood for social justice and independence, against exploitation and imperialism.

While all this was hardly original, from the beginning *Ant* took a more

⁷³ *Ant*. 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 16.

⁷⁴ And later was to edit the *Ant* monthly, too.

⁷⁵ As in his book *Kompradorsuz Türkiye* ("Turkey without compradors") (Istanbul: 1967). This collection of articles was sympathetically reviewed in *Harоды Азии и Африки* (Moscow), 1970, fasc. 3, pp. 174–176.

⁷⁶ *Bağımsızlık ve sosyal adalet için*.

⁷⁷ "Niçin *Ant*?" *Ant*, 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 3.

activist and radical stand than *Yön* in its approach to socialism. In the same issue, Fethi Naci, another of *Ant*'s founders, explained this activism in even clearer terms.⁷⁸ As he put it, 1966 was the year when the word "left" (*sol*) was being repeated every day and everywhere: in books, magazines, newspapers, chambers of commerce, youth meetings, even at the conventions of rightist parties. However, Naci pointed out, the real importance of the year 1966 was that the left had become more than just an idea; ideas alone would not have had such a far reaching effect. It was, rather, the result of the active intervention of a leftist party in practical politics; for socialists desired not only to enlighten the world, but to change it. Such a change would be effected only when the ideas influencing the masses became a material force. This two-pronged activity on the ideological and practical levels, Naci continued, had been, and was being, successfully carried out by the Labor Party of Turkey.

Indeed, energetic support for the LPT, its activities and ideology, at least for a time, was a constant feature of *Ant* and could well lead one to believe that the LPT — with no regular organ of its own and only lukewarm and occasional support in *Yön* — might have had a hand in setting up *Ant*. This assumption is bolstered by the fact that several of the more prominent writers in *Ant* were members or sympathizers of the LPT. Nonetheless, *Ant* was never the official organ of the LPT or its mouthpiece. In his article in the first issue of *Ant*, Naci praised the LPT's combining of the socialist with the anti-imperialist struggle;⁷⁹ he labeled it the most important single factor in Turkish socialism, and maintained that the LPT's way was the right one to establish socialism in Turkey, under the current constitution. In addition, LPT activities were reported, and its leading figures interviewed⁸⁰ and occasionally asked to contribute articles.⁸¹ Nevertheless, a careful perusal of *Ant* leaves the impression

⁷⁸ "Türk solu 1966," *ibid.*, *ibid.*, special New Year supplement, pp. 1-3.

⁷⁹ See also Naci's article *ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, p. 7. Cf. *ibid.*, 6: Feb. 7, 1967, pp. 4-5; 17: Apr. 25, 1967, p. 7; 39: Sep. 26, 1967, p. 7.

⁸⁰ E.g., M. A. Aybar, *ibid.*, 7: Feb. 14, 1967, pp. 8-9. See also 18: May 2, 1967; 25: June 20, 1967; 27: July 4, 1967, p. 4; 30: July 25, 1967, p. 6; 31: Aug. 1, 1967, p. 5; 35: Aug. 29, 1967, p. 5; 36: Sep. 5, 1967, pp. 10-11; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 6; 57: Jan. 30, 1968, p. 5; 61: Feb. 27, 1968, p. 5; 76: June 11, 1968, p. 5; 132: July 8, 1969, p. 7.

⁸¹ E.g., Aybar, "Anayasa, asıl bugünkü kapkaç düzenine kapalıdır," *ibid.*, 23: June 6, 1967, p. 7. Id., "Türkiye NATO'dan çekilmelidir," 26: June 27, 1967, p. 7. See also 40: Oct. 3, 1967, pp. 8-9; 41: Oct. 10, 1967, pp. 8-9; 43: Oct. 24, 1967, pp. 8-9; 44: Oct. 31, 1967, pp. 8-9; 47: Nov. 21, 1967, p. 5; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 10; 56: Jan. 23, 1968, p. 7; 66: Apr. 2, 1968, p. 7; 93: Oct. 8, 1968, p. 7.

that the sympathy of the magazine lay not just with the party as such, but rather with the more radically activist group within the LPT, as represented, for instance, in Çetin Altan's articles.⁸² This trend became even more pronounced in the late 1960's after the dispute within the LPT leadership became public knowledge. *Ant* sided with the more radical faction in the party leadership and took a clear-cut stand against party chairman Aybar, blaming him and "Aybarism" (i.e., Aybarist ideology) for the LPT's failure in the 1969 elections to the National Assembly, and demanding his removal from the leadership of this party.

Marked sympathy for, and frequent support of, the Labor Party of Turkey was by no means the only leftist trend represented in *Ant*. While initially its general approach to socialism as the only solution to Turkey's socio-economic problems was not basically different from that of *Yön*, a subtle change occurred in time towards a bolder advocacy of revolutionism. *Ant* warmly supported⁸³ the break from the Federation of Trade Unions (*Türk İş*)⁸⁴ of the Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions (DİSK), as it encouraged "revolutionary teachers" to stand up for their rights,⁸⁵ and revolutionary students not to fear the university administration or "police" terrorism⁸⁶ — as part of "the needed revolution in education."⁸⁷ Indeed, *Ant* preached a combination of revolutionary theory and practice: "Without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary practice," wrote Selâhattin Hilâv,⁸⁸ the man who had written the intro-

⁸² E.g. 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 5; 3: Jan. 17, 1967, p. 5; 6: Feb. 7, 1967, p. 8; 7: Feb. 14, 1967, p. 5; 15: Apr. 11, 1967, p. 5; 33: Aug. 15, 1967, p. 5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 6; 7: Feb. 14, 1967, p. 7 (F. Naci, greetings to DİSK); 8: Feb. 21, 1967, p. 6; 14: Apr. 4, 1967, p. 6.

⁸⁴ Which it accused of accepting American funds and expert advice, and of using a non-political attitude as a pretext for ensuring continuation of the capitalist order. See *Ant*, 7: Feb. 14, 1967, p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 10; 12: Mar. 21, 1967, p. 8; 16: Apr. 18, 1967, p. 6; 37: Sep. 12, 1967, p. 11; 38: Sep. 19, 1967, pp. 10–11; 43: Oct. 24, 1967, p. 10; 44: Oct. 31, 1967, pp. 10–11; 51: Dec. 19, 1967, p. 5; 68: Apr. 16, 1968, p. 11; 79: July 2, 1968, p. 6; 88: Sep. 3, 1968, p. 7; 121: Apr. 22, 1969, pp. 10–11; 135: July 29, 1969, p. 4; 156: Dec. 23, 1969, p. 6; 165: Feb. 24, 1970, pp. 8–9; 166: Mar. 3, 1970, pp. 10–11; 167: Mar. 10, 1970, pp. 10–11.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 4: Jan. 24, 1967, pp. 4–5. See also 29: July 18, 1967, p. 6; 34: Aug. 22, 1967, p. 7; 41: Oct. 10, 1967, pp. 14–15; 44: Oct. 31, 1967, pp. 14–15; 69: Apr. 23, 1968, p. 10; 79: July 2, 1968, pp. 4–7, 10–11; 82: July 23, 1968, pp. 4–10; 109: Jan. 28, 1969, pp. 10–11; 113: Feb. 25, 1969, pp. 1–11; 129: June 17, 1969, p. 6; 162: Feb. 3, 1970, pp. 4–5; 168: Mar. 17, 1970, pp. 6–7.

⁸⁷ "Eğitimde devrim gereklidir," *ibid.*, 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 10.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, p. 15.

duction to a selection in Turkish of Karl Marx's ideas on Turkey.⁸⁹ Also, true to form, Yaşar Kemal and others attacked international imperialism and capitalism,⁹⁰ mainly the United States and its policies, and in particular what they considered American meddling in Turkey's internal affairs.⁹¹ Other articles discussed sympathetically Nazım Hikmet's literary and political work,⁹² Karl Marx,⁹³ Lenin⁹⁴ and Mao,⁹⁵ — not to speak of Ho Chi Minh,⁹⁶ Che Guevara and Régis Debray.⁹⁷

The increasingly revolutionary attitude of *Ant* also expressed itself in anti-Establishment propaganda, partly bordering on incitement. Demirel's government was accused of every iniquity and failure⁹⁸ — with a large share of the blame laid on the police and the state security services,⁹⁹

⁸⁹ Called *Türkiye üzerine* (Istanbul: 1967). See *ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹⁰ E.g., *Ant*, 25: June 20, 1967, pp. 10–11; 36: Sep. 5, 1967, p. 7; 38: Sep. 19, 1967, pp. 6–7, 13; 41: Oct. 10, 1967, pp. 12–13; 48: Nov. 28, 1967, p. 3; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, pp. 12–13; 115: Mar. 11, 1969, pp. 8–9, 13; 116: Mar. 18, 1969, pp. 8–9; 119: Apr. 8, 1969, pp. 14–15; 133: July 15, 1969, p. 16; 162: Feb. 3, 1970, pp. 12–13; 166: Mar. 3, 1970, pp. 12–13.

⁹¹ E.g., *ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, pp. 10–11; *ibid.*, 6: Feb. 7, 1967, p. 5. See also 15: Apr. 11, 1967, p. 4; 16: Apr. 18, 1967, pp. 8–9; 37: Sep. 12, 1967, pp. 8–9; 40: Oct. 3, 1967, pp. 3, 4, 12, 13; 48: Nov. 28, 1967, pp. 12–13; 53: Jan. 2, 1968, pp. 10–12; 57: Jan. 30, 1968, pp. 8–9; 64: Mar. 19, 1968, p. 6; 67: Apr. 9, 1968, pp. 6–7; 101: Dec. 3, 1968, pp. 12–14; 146: Oct. 14, 1969, pp. 1, 8–9.

⁹² E.g., *ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, p. 14; 4: Jan. 24, 1967, pp. 6, 8–9; 14: Apr. 4, 1967, pp. 10–11; 23: June 6, 1967, pp. 14–15; 29: July 18, 1967, pp. 8–9; 30: July 25, 1967, pp. 8–9; 31: Aug. 1, 1967, pp. 14–15; 60: Feb. 20, 1968, p. 15.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, pp. 14–15; 29: July 18, 1967, pp. 14–15; 165: Feb. 24, 1970, pp. 10–11.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 153: Dec. 2, 1969, pp. 8–9; 154: Dec. 9, 1969, p. 7; 158: Jan. 6, 1970, p. 14; 160: Jan. 20, 1970, pp. 8–9; 161: Jan. 27, 1970, pp. 8–9.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: Jan. 17, 1967, pp. 12–13; 15: Apr. 11, 1967, p. 12; 158: Jan. 6, 1970, p. 14; 163: Feb. 10, 1970, p. 10.

⁹⁶ E.g., *ibid.*, 62: Mar. 5, 1968, p. 11; 72: May 14, 1968, p. 12; 98: Nov. 12, 1968, p. 12; 141: Sep. 9, 1969, pp. 1, 8–9. The North Vietnamese are constantly praised and supported.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 37: Sep. 12, 1967, pp. 12–13; 41: Oct. 10, 1967, pp. 10–11; 43: Oct. 24, 1967, pp. 12–13; 45: Nov. 7, 1967, p. 6; 47: Nov. 21, 1967, pp. 12–13; 49: Dec. 5, 1967, p. 11. Series of Che's memoirs, *ibid.*, 66: Apr. 2, 1968 and subsequent issues.

⁹⁸ E.g., *ibid.*, 5: Jan. 31, 1967, p. 4; 6: Feb. 7, 1967, pp. 7, 10, 16; 13: Mar. 28, 1967, pp. 2–5; 29: July 18, 1967, pp. 10–11 (open letter by Aziz Nesin); 33: Aug. 15, 1967, pp. 4–5; 40: Oct. 3, 1967, pp. 4–5; 49: Dec. 5, 1967, pp. 4–5; 83: July 30, 1968, pp. 1–9.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4: Jan. 24, 1967, p. 6; 8: Feb. 21, 1967, p. 5; 9: Feb. 28, 1967, p. 11; 15: Apr. 11, 1967, p. 6; 28: July 11, 1967, p. 16; 32: Aug. 8, 1967, pp. 12–13; 33: Aug. 15, 1967, pp. 14–15; 34: Aug. 22, 1967, pp. 14–15; 35: Aug. 29, 1967; 36: Sep. 5, 1967, pp. 14–15; 56: Jan. 23, 1968, p. 6; 60: Feb. 20, 1968, p. 4; 84: Aug. 6, 1968,

the "unjust Justice Minister,"¹⁰⁰ the Education Minister,¹⁰¹ and on the parties supporting the government and the JP, and, indeed, all political parties, except the LPT.¹⁰² The authorities were constantly criticized for what *Ant* considered the difficult economic condition of the workers (whose strikes *Ant* strongly supported¹⁰³) and their small, diminishing share of the national income,¹⁰⁴ or the sorry plight of East Anatolian peasants — ¹⁰⁵ for all of which, again, the bourgeois Establishment was considered responsible.¹⁰⁶ Local big business (allied to foreign interests) was considered one of the Establishment's main supports.¹⁰⁷ The rich, in particular, were ceaselessly attacked; for example, they were accused of not paying their proper share of taxes;¹⁰⁸ Yaşar Kemal compared the *houses* of the poor with *mausoleums* specially erected for the rich;¹⁰⁹ or Faruk Şensoy wrote a feature on children who had to work — including those in a goldsmith's, with a caption reading: "Their hands are full with gold, their stomachs — empty."¹¹⁰ Similarly, a full page was devoted to the detailed reporting of a society wedding, where

pp. 4-6; 118: Apr. 1, 1969, pp. 4-5; 130: June 24, 1969, pp. 4-5; 158: Jan. 6, 1970, p. 6; 162: Feb. 3, 1970, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 4: Jan. 24, 1967, p. 6. See also 11: Mar. 14, 1967, pp. 4, 7; 32: Aug. 8, 1967, pp. 4-5; 65: Mar. 26, 1968, p. 6; *cf.* also 171: Apr. 7, 1970, pp. 7-9.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 54: Jan. 9, 1968, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 7: Feb. 14, 1967, pp. 4-5; 8: Feb. 21, 1967, pp. 4-5; 13: Mar. 8, 1967, pp. 4-5, 16; 17: Apr. 25, 1967, p. 16; 18: May 2, 1967, pp. 1-7; 32: Aug. 8, 1967, pp. 4-5; 43: Oct. 24, 1967, p. 16; 49: Dec. 5, 1967, p. 6; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 4; 59: Feb. 13, 1968, p. 6; 67: Apr. 9, 1968, p. 5; 69: Apr. 23, 1968, pp. 1-7; 73: May 21, 1968, pp. 1-5; 146: Oct. 14, 1969, pp. 8-9; 163: Feb. 10, 1970, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 59: Feb. 13, 1968, pp. 4-5; 163: Feb. 10, 1970, pp. 1, 4; 165: Feb. 24, 1970, p. 7; 166: Mar. 3, 1970, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5: Jan. 31, 1967, pp. 8-9; 10: Mar. 7, 1967, p. 7; 23: June 6, 1967, pp. 10-11; 35: Aug. 29, 1967, pp. 8-9; 49: Dec. 5, 1967, p. 14; 51: Dec. 19, 1967, p. 14; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 11.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 11: Mar. 14, 1967, pp. 8-9; 12: Mar. 21, 1967, pp. 10-11; 13: Mar. 28, 1967, pp. 8-9; 14: Apr. 4, 1967, pp. 8-9; 15: Apr. 11, 1967, pp. 8-9 (a series by Mahmut Makal). See also 38: Sep. 19, 1967, pp. 8-9; 39: Sep. 26, 1967, pp. 10-11; 53: Jan. 2, 1968, p. 7; 76: June 11, 1968, pp. 10-11; 90: Sep. 7, 1968, pp. 8-9; 91: Sep. 24, 1968, pp. 8-9; 92: Oct. 1, 1968, pp. 8-9; 116: Mar. 18, 1969, p. 7; 139: Aug. 26, 1969, pp. 12-13; 140: Sep. 2, 1969, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 7: Feb. 14, 1967, p. 4; 9: Feb. 28, 1967, p. 5; 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 5.

¹⁰⁷ E.g., *ibid.*, 138: Aug. 19, 1969, pp. 10-11; 139: Aug. 26, 1969, pp. 1, 8-9; 151: Nov. 18, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 112: Feb. 18, 1969, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 8: Feb. 21, 1967, pp. 8-9; 9: Feb. 28, 1967, pp. 8-9; and 10: Mar. 7, 1967, pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 64: Mar. 19, 1968, pp. 12-13.

guests gorged themselves in festivities that went on for three days and three nights, and compared this with the dire poverty of needy children.¹¹¹

For those in authority this kind of writing, in a mercilessly biting tone, was not easy to take. In its first year of publication *Ant* was hauled to court. Yaşar Kemal was accused of writing an article inciting class hostility in Turkey, and Doğan Özgüden, the publisher of *Ant*, was charged with printing it.¹¹² *Ant* contributors, such as Çetin Altan, Fethi Naci, Hüseyin Baş, Can Yücel and Yaşar Uçar, were similarly charged with incitement to terrorism, the prosecution demanding stiff prison-terms,¹¹³ allegedly totalling 133 and a half years,¹¹⁴ or — according to another calculation — 175 and a half years.¹¹⁵ The sentences imposed by the Courts were actually much lighter.¹¹⁶ Nonetheless, the fact that the authorities sued frequently, and the Courts imposed prison terms and fines, indicates that the influence of *Ant* was sufficiently strong to worry the Turkish Establishment.¹¹⁷

One is impressed by the activist approach of the weekly. As formulated by Fethi Naci, in an article on “Degenerated concepts,”¹¹⁸ it can be rather difficult to find a coherent plan of action in *Ant*. Indeed, its pages were replete with just the kind of writing that its cautiously-couched call for activism appeared to deprecate. Indeed, *Ant* was in practice unquestionably less committed than *Yön* to Turkey’s economic development and industrialization.¹¹⁹ Its emphasis was on the country’s social and political situation. However, even in this area, most of what it said was *against* the Establishment and its allies, in all forms and ramifications. On the other hand, it was less evident what *Ant* was really fighting *for*. It generally — but not always — supported the Labor Party of Turkey; this could hardly be considered as extraordinary activism.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 57: Jan. 30, 1968, pp. 10–11.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 38: Sep. 19, 1967, p. 5.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 42: Oct. 17, 1967, pp. 4–5.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 50: Dec. 12, 1967, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 71: May 7, 1968, p. 10.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 94: Oct. 15, 1968, pp. 4–5; 102: Dec. 10, 1968, p. 4; 130: June 24, 1969, p. 4.

¹¹⁷ Even more so, possibly, since journalists were also brought to court and jailed for articles in other publications, see examples, *ibid.*, 95: Oct. 22, 1968, p. 2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 14: Apr. 4, 1967, p. 7.

¹¹⁹ These were infrequently discussed, see e.g. Sadun Aren, *ibid.*, 24: June 13, 1967, pp. 10–11. Cf. *ibid.*, 48: Nov. 28, 1967, pp. 6–7; 58: Feb. 6, 1968, pp. 10–11, 14; 77: June 18, 1968, pp. 10–11.

Consequently, one has to extend this call for activism to *Ant*'s campaign for every manifestation of revolutionary activity, or what it regarded as such — in the leftist trade-unions, teachers' unions, students' organization and the like. *Ant* sent a questionnaire to the members of the Turkish Bar, too, and published the replies of those lawyers supporting revolutionary ideas.¹²⁰ *Ant* entered the publishing field and issued several paperbacks of a revolutionary character: Che Guevara's memoirs, Emile Burns' Handbook of Marxism, Stokely Carmichael's *Black Power*, Yaşar Kemal's novel *Ortadirek* ("The central pillar"), and Nazım Hikmet's *Polemics*, introduced by Kemal Süiker.

There is, throughout, an insistence on Turkey's passing through an historic epoch,¹²¹ with a heightened sense of impending revolution in Turkey and elsewhere, exemplified by the call of the publisher, Doğan Özgüden, to institute "education for revolution."¹²² The weekly grandly assumed the mantle of radicalism when Özgüden proclaimed, "Yes, we are extremist leftists!"¹²³ However, at the same time it merely campaigned for votes for the LPT in an election year.¹²⁴ Some hesitation about the proper course for the revolution in Turkey notwithstanding, there was no doubt about the attitude of *Ant*, in general, and of its increasingly extremist tone, particularly after the autumn of 1969. It was expressed in much more aggressive support by *Ant*¹²⁵ for University students, their demands and riots; for the more radical faction within the leadership of the LPT; of speedier revolutionary reform; and a stand against Turkey's government and Establishment, as well as its alleged allies abroad. More and more frequently the tone and style bordered on incitement. The content grew increasingly similar to, often identical with, the "scientific socialism" preached from early 1970 by the more doctrinaire and extremist LPT leadership. Indeed, four full pages in the first issue of *Ant* in 1970¹²⁶ were taken up by a manifesto entitled "We appeal to socialists for ideological and organizational unity!" Perhaps the most important thesis in this manifesto was that favoring "a national democratic revolution" as a means of achieving power. Consequently, *Ant* ascribed a

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 61: Feb. 27, 1968, pp. 10-11.

¹²¹ E.g., Çetin Altan, *ibid.*, 30: July 25, 1967, p. 5.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 90: Sep. 17, 1968, p. 3. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹²³ "Evet, aşırı solcuyuz," editorial, *ibid.*, 121: Apr. 22, 1969, p. 3.

¹²⁴ "Eylem zamanıdır," *ibid.*, 54: Jan. 9, 1968, p. 3.

¹²⁵ In almost every issue of the weekly.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 158: Jan. 6, 1970, pp. 8-11. Amplified *ibid.*, 167: Mar. 3, 1970, pp. 8-9.

revolutionary role to youth, to leftist trade-unions,¹²⁷ and to other groups; particularly insistent was its call, echoing Lenin's, to intellectual youth to organize and lead the masses of workers and peasants.¹²⁸ This was followed up by opening the weekly's pages to more extremist Marxists such as a group of intellectuals calling themselves *Proleter Devrimciler* ("proletarian revolutionaries"), or Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı,¹²⁹ already mentioned as the author of a Marxist book on the *Yön* movement, and a recognized Marxist intellectual,¹³⁰ who was to flee from Turkey in May 1971, in connection with the police roundup of extreme leftist students suspected of subversion and violence, and later died in Belgrade.

Ant ceased publication as a weekly with the April 21, 1970 issue. It began to appear as a monthly the following month (as we have already explained), with Doğan Özgüden continuing as publisher-editor. The monthly's full title, *Ant — sosyalist teori ve eylem dergisi* ("Ant: a journal of socialist theory and action"), truly reflected its growing penchant for leftist radicalism, and an analysis of the articles in the *Ant* monthly confirms this impression. There were lengthy papers on the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, and N. Hawatme (a leader of the Palestine Popular Front). Others harangued against imperialism, revisionism and facism, and condemned the devaluation of the Turkish currency and the Common Market.

The main trend of *Ant* monthly, however, was expressed in a loud appeal for revolution. The title of the editorial in the first issue, "The duty of a revolutionary is to make revolutions,"¹³¹ was no idle call. Its theme, "We call on all Turkish socialists to be united in ideology and organization, under the banner of scientific socialist theory," was expressed time and again. The situation in Turkey was evaluated in undisguised Leninist-Marxist terms,¹³² and conditions were considered ripe for revolution. The Turkish working class was deemed worthy of and

¹²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 163: Feb. 10, 1970, pp. 4-5; and *passim*.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 169: Mar. 24, 1970, pp. 4-5, 10-11; and *passim*. It was not a coincidence that most of the final issue of *Ant* weekly (173: Apr. 21, 1970) was devoted to the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 161: Jan. 27, 1970, pp. 4-5, 10-11. Cf. *ibid.*, 173: Apr. 21, 1970, p. 7.

¹³⁰ For some of his views at that time, cf. his article in the leftist monthly *Aydınlık* ("Enlightenment") (Ankara), 10: Aug. 1969, pp. 261-275.

¹³¹ "Devrimcinin görevi devrim yapmaktır," *Ant* (monthly), 1: May 1970, pp. 2-3.

¹³² E.g., Mehmet Reşat, *ibid.*, pp. 5-13.

suitable for this historic task.¹³³ The way to achieve this was by first organizing the proletariat according to the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.¹³⁴ The Marxist principle of “ceaseless revolution for the victory of socialism”¹³⁵ was enunciated. With this end in view, the working class should join forces with other popular revolutionary forces against fascism;¹³⁶ most important was the union of workers with peasants¹³⁷ (While *Yön* had preached an alliance between leftist intellectuals and the military). As long as the main aim was kept in view, *Ant* held the means were of lesser importance. Indeed, early in 1971, it unequivocally defended the leftist youths who had been robbing banks; they were, according to *Ant*, just “the children of the people, fighting against a brigand regime.”¹³⁸ Similar reasoning was employed to praise those who had kidnapped four United States soldiers, who were, after all, striving to cleanse Turkey of foreigners and traitors and make it truly independent.¹³⁹

One of the most revealing articles in *Ant* monthly was entitled “Our people will resist fascism.”¹⁴⁰ While its argumentation was not new, it is interesting to observe the pervading conviction of the writer that socialism — by which he generally meant support of leftist ideologies — was winning increasing support among intellectual, artistic, worker and peasant circles. While it is evidently impossible at the present time (and perhaps will never be possible) to verify this contention by quantitative methods, many people living in Turkey in recent years would agree that this was the case with intellectuals and artists, as well as with the ever increasing numbers of educated townspeople. One is further convinced of this by even a brief examination of the fare available to the reading public, in addition to *Ant*. Apparently, Nihat Erim’s government and the military forces also thought that socialism was becoming much more militant: in May 1971 they closed down *Ant* and several other publications and cracked down on leftist leaders.

¹³³ Oya Sencer, *ibid.*, pp. 14–28.

¹³⁴ Faruk Pekin, *ibid.*, 2: June 1970, pp. 42–61; see also pp. 62 ff.

¹³⁵ See article by this name *ibid.*, 3: July 1970, pp. 13–38.

¹³⁶ Çetin Özek, *ibid.*, pp. 39–59; *ibid.*, 4: Aug. 1970, pp. 33–51.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5: Sep. 1970, pp. 46–49.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 10: Feb. 1971, p. 3.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 12: Apr. 1971, p. 6.

¹⁴⁰ “Halklarımız faşizme karşı direnecektir,” *ibid.*, 4: Aug. 1970, pp. 2–29. The article was unsigned and presumably written by the editor.

d. OTHER RADICAL JOURNALS

Yön and *Ant* were comparatively long-lived, had large circulations and were influential; in the late 1960's there also appeared a plethora of other leftist periodicals, characterized to a lesser degree by these qualities. The extent of their radicalism varied and — since it is impossible to deal with all of them in this study — several characteristic ones will be briefly examined.

While the large-circulation daily *Akşam* often sympathized with views commonly held by the Turkish left (Çetin Altan was a regular columnist), it was not formally committed to it. In many instances, it presented the case of the trade unions federated in *Türk İş*, which bought *Akşam* a while later.¹⁴¹ Yet another daily, appearing in Ankara, *Yeni Gün* ("New Day"), has been consistent in its leftist tendency, in recent years (formerly, it was moderately conservative). Its masthead now proclaims it as "a political daily newspaper,"¹⁴² and the name is symbolic of its general ideological trend. It started publication, in its leftist new look, in Ankara on May 19, 1968; each issue is six pages, and at the time of writing it is still being published. Slanted towards the non-intellectual, its original price of 25 kuruş (about two U. S. cents) was maintained when all other dailies doubled theirs. The publisher is Kemal Bayram Çukurkavaklı; its editor was first Mehmet Savaş, later Teoman Yalazan, then Ahmet Nadir Caner.

While the news in *Yeni Gün* was essentially no different from that in other Turkish dailies, the articles had a special flavor. They paid particular attention to the problems of workers and related matters — without neglecting other internal or international affairs (sometimes copied from other Turkish newspapers¹⁴³). Ideologically, *Yeni Gün* supported the 1960 Revolution, particularly for its democratic approach to the regime in Turkey¹⁴⁴ and spoke up, in leftist fashion, for *sosyal adalet*.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, *Yeni Gün's* main argument against the RPP was that it had failed to bring about *sosyal adalet* in its forty years of existence.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, it emphasized that the 1961 Constitution referred to *sosyal Türkiye*, while the LPT desired a *sosyalist Türkiye*, and *Yeni Gün* took this party too

¹⁴¹ See *Milliyet* daily, July 9, 1971.

¹⁴² *Günlük siyasi gazete*.

¹⁴³ Examples in *Yeni Gün*, May 20, 21, and 22, 1968.

¹⁴⁴ "Bugün elbette bayramdır," *ibid.*, May 29, 1968.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, June 2, 1968.

to account for its approach.¹⁴⁷ In later issues, *Yeni Gün* showed increasing interest in economic and financial matters, becoming increasingly leftist in approach. For instance, it gave prominence to the LPT's announcement that the August 1970 devaluation — carried out by Demirel's Government — was bound to increase unemployment in Turkey;¹⁴⁸ and to the pessimistic views of *Türk-İş*'s Secretary-General that, while merchants received an increase (*zam*), workers were merely given advice (*nasihat*).¹⁴⁹ This contrasted somewhat with the earlier tone in *Yeni Gün*, which was usually more moderate; for example, it did not then try to encourage student riots in Turkey.¹⁵⁰

A much more radical leftist-revolutionary newspaper was the weekly *Türk Solu* ("Turkish Left"). This was published first in Ankara, then in Istanbul, in an 8-page newspaper format, and from January 7, 1969, in a 16-page smaller format. It started publication on November 17, 1967 and ended abruptly with its 126th issue on April 14, 1970. Its general character was proclaimed on the front page of *Türk Solu*'s first issue: "For a truly democratic Turkey, fully independent — against imperialism and those who collaborate with it — revolutionary solidarity — union of national forces."¹⁵¹ The editorial in this issue, entitled "The problem of the Turkish left," elaborated these principles more fully. Its writer, Life Senator Suphi Karaman (who was to contribute to *Türk Solu* repeatedly), held that every administration was oriented against society, by its very nature, as it favored private, individual interests. Revolutions, on the other hand, were popular movements. The duty of the Turkish left was to protect democratic freedoms, to infuse the people with a desire for revolution, and to carry out a democratic revolution.

Although flavored by a touch of nihilist anarchism (the implication that every administration is partisan and, therefore, undesirable), the theme of this editorial was its insistent call for revolution, to be brought about by the Turkish left. In varying tones and undertones, this was often repeated in subsequent issues. True, *Türk Solu* tried to keep within the limits of the law, but no more than was strictly necessary. In so doing,

¹⁴⁷ "Anayasa ve TİP," *ibid.*, May 26, 1968.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Aug. 21, 1970.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Budak Gençosman, "Üniversite'deki boykot," *ibid.*, June 16, 1968, and subsequent issues.

¹⁵¹ *Türk Solu*, I (1): Nov. 17, 1967: "Tam bağımsız gerçekten demokratik Türkiye için — Emperyalizme, işbirlikçilerine karşı — Devrimci dayanışma — Ulusal güçbirliği."

it was more radically extremist than most leftist publications we have mentioned, and parallels the general tenor of the monthly *Ant*. Without entering into too many details, one may observe several frequently recurring themes in *Türk Solu*.¹⁵²

a. A new definition was worked out for *milliyetçilik*, or “nationalism,” meant perhaps to compete with the strictly patriotic one propounded by the Turkish right, as represented at the time by Alparslan Türkeş and his followers. As the contributors to *Türk Solu* understood it, *milliyetçilik* was an integral part of Kemalism, which (it was maintained) equated it with *millî bağımsızlık* (“national independence”).¹⁵³ Following this thesis, Suphi Karaman later defined *milliyetçilik* as *istiklâl* (independence) plus *devrim* (revolution).¹⁵⁴ Ex-Senator Niyazi Ağırnaslı went a step further and, in an “Appeal to the *Milliyetçi*,”¹⁵⁵ called on all nationalists to fight the United States and its “colonial exploitation.” The struggle against what *Türk Solu* considered United States colonialism was binding on Turkish nationalists in every way, including opposition even to the manufacture of American soft drinks in Turkey.¹⁵⁶

b. Socialism was the way to total independence — and this was a brand of socialism that was (or ought to be) revolutionary in character. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, whom we have already mentioned, examined the regime in Turkey with the tools of Marxist analysis.¹⁵⁷ The weekly’s Marxist approach, although based on Lenin’s interpretation, was somewhat selective, emphasizing the revolutionary aspects.¹⁵⁸ Erdoğan Başar spelled out the duty of the Turkish left, which was to determine the road to be followed, i.e., to draw the lines of socialism, in theory and practice.¹⁵⁹ İlhami Soysal argued that only by a united front of all the bodies which constitute the Turkish left, was there any chance for a concerted, and therefore successful, action against imperialism.¹⁶⁰ The exact nature of socialist action was further elaborated in a review article by Ziya

¹⁵² See also Aclan Sayılğan, *Soldaki bitmeyen kavga* (Ankara: 1970), pp. 40 ff. for a different interpretation. Cf. M. Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, pp. 62–64, for yet another interpretation.

¹⁵³ “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” *Türk Solu*, I (1): Nov. 17, 1967.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I (3): Dec. 1, 1967.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ İlhan Selçuk, “Alaadin’in lâmbası,” *ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, I (4): Dec. 8, 1967.

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., the extracts translated from Lenin, *ibid.*, III (124): Mar. 31, 1970.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, I (4): Dec. 8, 1967.

Oyikut, in which he maintained that Turkey needed a new national revolutionary development administration.¹⁶¹

c. The concept of revolutionary socialism, frequently identified in *Türk Solu* with nationalism, dictated the weekly's socio-economic-political policy. It wanted true democracy for Turkey,¹⁶² in all areas; e.g. the writer Aziz Nesin was revolted by the fact that the censorship laws banned certain books,¹⁶³ while Nuri İyem wrote "Towards a free, independent Turkish drawing-art."¹⁶⁴ In an article on reform in land-holding¹⁶⁵ Sami Küçük rejected what some circles were suggesting — agricultural improvement instead of reform in land-holding. Nothing less than the latter would do; it was imperative for the establishment and continuation of a democratic regime. Furthermore, the weekly supported every sign of leftist radicalism. For instance, it represented the more doctrinaire and extremist faction in the leadership of the Labor Party of Turkey.¹⁶⁶ Not content with encouraging in general terms¹⁶⁷ the "proletarian revolutionaries" (*proleter devrimciler*), it supported teachers and other intellectuals who showed signs of non-conformity or insubordination. For example, Haydar Karaveli supported the 50,000-member Teachers' Union and urged them to action.¹⁶⁸ Another article supported a protest meeting of officials demanding equal pay for equal work.¹⁶⁹ However, the real drive of *Türk Solu*, among intellectual groups, was aimed at youth, particularly at university students. It praised a youth meeting in Ankara which had denounced imperialism and the United States; the article was entitled "Youth has understood the problem!"¹⁷⁰ It protested against a "socialist group" not being allowed to run in the student elections at the Faculty of Language-History-Geography (November, 1967).¹⁷¹ It opened its pages to a manifesto of the Union of University Assistants — signed by its leader, Osman Yiğit —¹⁷² which

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁶² A. B. Kafaoğlu, *ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967.

¹⁶³ See his article, *ibid.*, I (1): Nov. 17, 1967.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, I (3): Dec. 1, 1967.

¹⁶⁵ "Toprak reformu," *ibid.*, I (6): Dec. 22, 1967.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, III (112): Jan. 6, 1970; III (113): Jan. 13, 1970; III (124): Mar. 31, 1970; III (125): Apr. 7, 1970; III (126): Apr. 14, 1970.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, III (126): Apr. 14, 1970.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I (6): Dec. 22, 1967.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, III (112): Jan. 6, 1970.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, I (3): Dec. 1, 1967.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, III (112): Jan. 6, 1970.

proclaimed that the university assistants and students were fighting for a better future for the Turkish people. In this vein, *Türk Solu* encouraged "revolutionary students" to win student union elections.¹⁷³ It was equally eager to publicize and encourage students to action by other means too. When in 1970 small but alert groups of "revolutionary youths," or *Devrimci Gençlik* (briefly called *Dev Genç*) began to organize both inside and outside the universities, *Türk Solu* hailed them joyfully, in true revolutionary brotherhood fashion.¹⁷⁴

d. In accordance with these attitudes, features and articles on international affairs were presented in *Türk Solu* through the prism of "the anti-imperialist struggle." In later issues there was even a regular section on "The world's people against imperialism."¹⁷⁵ The weekly supported what it regarded as popular movements in Cyprus,¹⁷⁶ Viet-Nam,¹⁷⁷ Laos¹⁷⁸ and Cambodia.¹⁷⁹ It printed poems in honor of Che Guevara,¹⁸⁰ an article about Fidel Castro,¹⁸¹ and the program of the Democratic Popular Liberation Front of Palestine.¹⁸² Its numerous articles against what *Türk Solu* considered anti-popular regimes, although directed mainly against the United States, also singled out Greece and the rule of its military junta.¹⁸³ This astutely combined the abhorrence of *Türk Solu* for the existing regime in Greece with the age-long antipathy of many Turks for the Greeks.

Probably the most forceful writer in *Türk Solu* was Mihri Belli, who, in earlier years, was alleged to have been a member of the Turkish Communist Party.¹⁸⁴ He tried the Labor Party of Turkey, found it much

¹⁷³ For Istanbul university students, cf. *ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, III (118): Feb. 17, 1970; III (123): Mar. 24, 1970; III (124): Mar. 31, 1970; III (125): Apr. 7, 1970; III (126): Apr. 14, 1970.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, III (124): Mar. 31, 1970; III (125): Apr. 7, 1970.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967; I (4): Dec. 8, 1967.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967; III (112): Jan. 6, 1970.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, III (124): Mar. 31, 1970.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, III (123): Mar. 24, 1970; III (125): Apr. 7, 1970.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, I (2): Nov. 24, 1967.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I (6): Dec. 22, 1967.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, III (126): Apr. 14, 1970.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, I (6): Dec. 22, 1967 (two articles).

¹⁸⁴ He was also sentenced to a prison term on this account, acc. to Darendelioğlu, *Türkiye'de komünist hareketleri*, II, pp. 13, 19, 85, 99. See also Aclan Sayılğan, *Soldaki bitmeyen kavga*, op. cit., pp. 19 ff. On Mihri Belli's earlier position within the TCP see also below, in our discussion of this party. At the time of writing he is being sought after, by the police, with an arrest warrant.

too moderate for his taste and came out with a biting 4-page *Warning*¹⁸⁵ against the party leadership. In the late 1960's he wrote even more aggressive articles in *Türk Solu* and other extreme left periodicals. Many, possibly most, were unsigned or signed with various pseudonyms. The fact that quite a few were collected in his 392-page *Yazılar, 1965-1970* ("Writings, 1965-1970"),¹⁸⁶ makes it evident that they are, indeed, his. Mihri Belli's articles were among the most radical and violent in *Türk Solu*. They frequently concentrated on Marxist-Leninist and socialist theory — and its application to the *proleter devrimciler* in Turkey. His call for a *millî demokratik devrim* ("a national democratic revolution"), total and rapid, sounded sincere and (for some readers at least) compelling.¹⁸⁷ This call was a continuation, in a more extreme form, of the earlier one for "a national democratic state."¹⁸⁸

It is impossible to measure precisely the real impact of *Türk Solu* and Mihri Belli on their readers. As *Türk Solu* reflected some of the views of the *proleter devrimciler* and of the *devrimci gençlik*, it was certainly read by a fair number of them. This may be of some importance, since the *Dev Genç* assumed such an activist role in 1970-1971 (including armed robberies in banks, and violent attacks on American establishments and various personalities). It was probably no coincidence that Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, who published Marxist articles in *Türk Solu*, was allegedly involved in violence along with the *Dev Genç*. Be that as it may, *Türk Solu* contributed its share, along with *Ant* (particularly when it was a monthly) and other periodicals, in assisting in the radicalization of leftist opinion in Turkey in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

e. AVCIOĞLU AND *Devrim*

Doğan Avcioğlu, one of the intellectual leaders in the *Yön* circle and a frequent contributor to it (including numerous editorials), did not remain inactive for long after *Yön* closed down. In addition to writing articles in *Ant* and other publications, he wrote a remarkable book named *Türkiye'nin düzeni: dün-bugün-yarın* ("Turkey's setup: yesterday-today-to-

¹⁸⁵ Mehmet Mihri Belli, *Ihtarname* (N. p.: 1967). Mainly addressed to Mehmet Ali Aybar and Behice Boran.

¹⁸⁶ Mihri Belli, *Yazılar, 1965-1970* (Ankara: 1970).

¹⁸⁷ Some of Mihri Belli's views on this matter are contained in his book *Millî demokratik devrim* (Ankara: 1970).

¹⁸⁸ On which see above, p. 57.

morrow”) and then started work as editor-in-chief of a new revolutionary weekly. Within one year, the book went through four editions —¹⁸⁹ unusual, in Turkey or elsewhere, for so bulky a work. It was an ably written summary on socio-economics as viewed by Avcıoğlu and the Turkish socialists who were close to him. It was also a sort of balanced synthesis of a major trend within *Yön*, and the foundation-stone of a new weekly, *Devrim*, to be examined below.

The earlier chapters of Avcıoğlu’s book deal with the westernization and development of Turkey during the last centuries of Ottoman rule and the Kemalist period. The later chapters — of greater interest to us — are devoted to the years immediately following the Second World War; that on “America in Turkey”¹⁹⁰ is the key to understanding the others and the whole book. Avcıoğlu’s main argument¹⁹¹ is that, since 1947, Turkey has had no independent foreign policy; its foreign policy has been dictated by the United States. Gradually the United States, through its “dollar politics,” also gained increasing influence in the decision-making in many other sectors of Turkish life. According to Avcıoğlu, the Americans laid down as a condition of their financial aid that they would have a say in those areas which they were assisting: in military matters,¹⁹² in agriculture¹⁹³ and in industry.¹⁹⁴ Avcıoğlu then leads the reader through the details of what he terms “development — the American way.”

However, the book is much more than an anti-American tract. Based on extensive reading and a close familiarity with Turkey’s social and economic situation, Avcıoğlu draws some conclusions and makes suggestions of his own. In late Ottoman times, he maintains, Europeanization manifested itself mainly among the well-to-do and in the coastal cities, while agricultural Turkey continued to live from hand-to-mouth,¹⁹⁵ ruled over by feudal lords, unscrupulous moneylenders and middlemen. Under the Republic very little was changed in agriculture; the income of the peasants remained low, and the government obtained little in taxes. Capitalism became even more firmly entrenched in business and com-

¹⁸⁹ December, 1968, February, July, and December, 1969. I am referring to the fourth edition of *Türkiye’nin düzeni* (Ankara), in 2 vols., 769 pp.

¹⁹⁰ “Türkiye’deki Amerika,” *ibid.*, pp. 363–385.

¹⁹¹ See particularly p. 375.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 378 ff.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 401 ff.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 451 ff.

¹⁹⁵ The Turkish expression is *bir lokma, bir hurka* (“one mouthful, one coat”). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 568.

merce, with Greek, American and Jewish compradors being associated with large foreign firms: local capital shunned industry, despite government urging. The government was left to initiate itself the first steps in industrialization.

Further, Avciöğlu maintained that, at the time of writing, conditions had undergone no fundamental change. The loansharks had become even wealthier, by skillfully lending money to the peasants, while the owners of large estates still lived as they had in the pre-capitalist era. These landowners and others, instead of using their capital to buy modern agricultural machinery, preferred, like the moneylenders, to spend their profits on luxury consumption. Consequently, production and income were low, and the poor peasants, who rented small plots of land, were the main sufferers. The pre-capitalist and capitalist sectors, along with the classes that ruled in the agricultural regime, together made up a group of parasites and wasteful reactionaries. In order to preserve the status quo and to oppose all talk of land-reform and leftist trends, they formed a strongly-organized group, fighting under the leadership of the capitalist landowners.

According to Avciöğlu, exporters, like agriculture, merited special mention. Before the Republic, exporters were mainly agents for foreign firms, e.g., for tobacco or hazel-nut exports. Currently, they were in league with foreign firms, not only for making huge profits, but also for illegally depriving Turkey of hard currency. As for the import business, it was as thriving as the export business, due to the considerable demand for imported goods. In Istanbul's Chamber of Commerce alone, about 6,000 importers were registered, as compared to 300 exporters.¹⁹⁶ Considering its proportions, the import business had become a major branch of Turkish commerce. Again, as in the case of exporters, importers have also become disproportionately rich. While, theoretically, importers should have competed with local industry, in actual practice they have worked hand in hand, for the sake of mutual profits. Indeed, Vehbi Koç, the biggest industrialist in Turkey, was — again according to Avciöğlu — also a large importer and representative of foreign firms.¹⁹⁷ Since Turkish industrialists were dependent on foreign firms for capital, patents, machinery, technical skills, and raw materials, they may well be considered "contractors" (*müteahhitler*) of foreign firms, with no interest in developing national industries. Indeed, Turkish industrialists (presum-

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 573.

¹⁹⁷ The same Vehbi Koç was heatedly criticized in *Ant*.

ably, along with exporters and importers) were to be regarded as compradors.

As Avcıoğlu sees it, the ruling circles in agriculture, commerce, finance and industry have coalesced to preserve the status quo. This coalition was supported, as recent elections have shown, by a majority of peasants who were in bondage, artisans and the lower middle class, on the one hand; and on the other hand, by loans from the United States, which assisted all groups and enterprises committed to the continuation of the status quo. Consequently the great majority of educated Turks considered the United States to be on the side of reaction. As a result the reform movement was not only directed against Turkish conservatives, but also against Americans. The United States was described by Avcıoğlu as actively penetrating Turkey — by its AID program and manifold contracts, providing an American education to thousands of Turks, granting military assistance, introducing numerous American experts into the upper echelons of the Turkish military and civil service, and so forth. After the 1960 Revolution, the United States decided to support the Justice Party, as “their own people.” All this gave the United States a very strong position of influence in Turkey and a large share in the decision-making. However Turks, and not Americans, should decide whether Turkey requires missiles, or how it ought to reform its university system (which should not merely copy its American counterpart), or when it was going to grant recognition to Communist China.

Progressive forces in Turkey were increasingly struggling against this coalition. The number of workers was growing; but their role was not yet felt proportionately, for many of them were employed in small workshops, in a paternalist system, and were afraid to unionize. While workers in the west had a long tradition of fighting for a just and progressive order, this was a new concept for the Turkish working class. Nevertheless the latter had begun to move forward. Avcıoğlu calculated that in the years 1963–1967 there were 199 strikes; of these 20% were in the public sector, and 80% in the private sector, in which working conditions were even worse than in public employment. The number of daily workers in agriculture was also rising: many were dissatisfied with their employers and wanted a change in the system of land-holding. On this last point, the Labor Party of Turkey obtained numerous votes in 1965 through its electoral propaganda for reform in land-holding. The party was led by intellectuals and formed the basis of the contemporary nationalist-revolutionary movement (*milliyetçi-devrimci hareket*). However, Avcıoğlu maintains that the nationalist revolutionaries were dissatisfied with the

existing system and desired a new one. They had started to understand that the ruling coalition was the greatest obstacle to the new social forces that aspired to form a new order which would work for the country's development under social justice. Evidently, only a trial of strength would remove the coalition which represented the old order.

Avcıoğlu equates the development of Turkey with a total change in its regime, and devotes the last part of his book to elaborating this point.¹⁹⁸ He is convinced and eloquently persuasive that Turkey could stand in the forefront of contemporary civilization — but for imperialism, which was committed to a capitalist philosophy of development. Lenin-style, Avcıoğlu argues for a non-capitalist method of development as most suited to Turkey, which would then cease to merely imitate the United States. Realistically, he does not claim that the change of order, which he wants nationalist revolutionaries to bring about, will at once solve all of Turkey's problems. However he does maintain that, within fifteen or twenty years, the ensuing total change in development — on all levels — will make Turkey one of the leading states in the world. Finally, Avcıoğlu argues that the people who are to carry this out ought not to be merely would-be reformers, but real revolutionaries.¹⁹⁹

In Avcıoğlu's nationalist-revolutionary philosophy, the revolutionary element obviously prevailed and lent its name to the weekly he soon began editing, *Devrim* ("Revolution"). This started publication in eight pages (with the format of a daily newspaper) in Ankara, on October 21, 1969. It was closed down after the military Memorandum of March 12, 1971; the last issue appears to have been that of April 27, 1971 (no. 79). The publisher was Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, a lawyer who had been an RPP member in the National Assembly; he is alleged to have financed both *Yön* and *Devrim* and possibly too some publications of the Turkish Communist Party.²⁰⁰ However, Avcıoğlu's views were very much in evidence. In every issue, under the weekly's name, *Devrim*, there appeared the slogan, quoted from Mustafa Kemal, "A circle of reformers cannot carry out a fundamental revolution."²⁰¹ The implication seems clear: reformers would not do — Turkey needs revolutionaries! The combination of selective reporting and articles, as well as its aggressive tone, supports this contention. Avcıoğlu's own editorial in the first issue²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 587 ff.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, particularly pp. 740-743.

²⁰⁰ Reported by M. Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, pp. 35-36.

²⁰¹ *İdare-i maslahatçılar esaslı devrim yapamaz.*

²⁰² *Devrim* 1: Oct. 21, 1969, pp. 1, 5.

dealt with "the coalition of reactionaries,"²⁰³ into which he lumped Prime Minister Demirel, Vehbi Koç, and the "big pashas" supporting them. His article in the same issue on "The Turkish army and the United States, 1947-1969,"²⁰⁴ was a sharp attack on the United States and NATO. Other articles, e.g., by the well-known legal scholar, Professor Muammer Aksoy,²⁰⁵ followed in the same vein.

Indeed, practically any subsequent issue of *Devrim* would show that this journal was mostly a week-to-week elaboration and application of the general ideas laid down in Avcioglu's book *Türkiye'nin düzeni*. The regime of the compradors and their supporters was roundly attacked. The anti-Establishment drive even included feature reporting against Aybar and his faction within the Labor Party of Turkey.²⁰⁶ To make *Devrim* more attractive, CIA activities (true or imaginary) were printed²⁰⁷ and exploited, as were scandal rumors involving the brothers of Prime Minister Demirel.²⁰⁸ Above all, there was the persistent call for revolution, not only as necessary for a change of order leading to development,²⁰⁹ but as the only way to resolve Turkey's problems, and make it completely independent.

There appear to be, however, important differences, in this respect, between *Devrim* and *Ant* which also became more pronouncedly revolutionary at that time. The two journals were in competition, though published in two different cities, Ankara and Istanbul: both addressed themselves to the same audience of intellectuals and junior officers, and reported with the same eagerness on what they considered the radicalization of the workers' movement in Turkey.²¹⁰ Nonetheless, two basic differences stand out. First, perhaps because *Devrim*, as the newcomer, was attempting to undermine *Ant*, it often bordered on sensationalism in its reporting, and was less rigidly Marxist. Second, *Devrim* attempted, in various ways, to involve the military forces. On the one hand, it reported (whether altogether truthfully or not, one cannot say) many

²⁰³ The Turkish term employed is *tutucular* which carries a pejorative meaning, distinct from the more neutral *muhafazakâr*.

²⁰⁴ *Devrim*, 1: October 21, 1969, p. 3; it was subsequently serialized.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 2. For his participation in *Devrim*, see *ibid.*, 33: June 2, 1970, pp. 1, 7.

²⁰⁶ E.g., *ibid.*, 5: Nov. 18, 1969, p. 8.

²⁰⁷ E.g., *ibid.*, 11: Dec. 30, 1969, p. 8.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 18: Feb. 17, 1970, pp. 1, 7; 27: Apr. 21, 1970, pp. 1, 7; 30: May 12, 1970, pp. 1, 7.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 21: Mar. 10, 1970, p. 8.

²¹⁰ Examples *ibid.*, 36: June 23, 1970, pp. 1, 3, 8.

signs of discontent in the military forces²¹¹ with the regime in Turkey and reminded them, in no uncertain terms, of revolution as conceived by Mustafa Kemal.²¹² On the other hand, it apparently strove to intensify the call to revolution to such an extent that the military would have to intervene²¹³ and thereby, by their expected authoritarian rule, rouse opposition that would lead to even more favorable conditions in Turkey for popular revolution.²¹⁴

Not unexpectedly, *Devrim* hailed the March 12, 1971, military intervention, with the proclamation that "The army has stopped the anti-Kemalist course [of the government]."²¹⁵ A full-page article, in the issue immediately following the military intervention, discussed "The army and the people;"²¹⁶ its basic assumption was that, in many developing countries, the military play an increasingly progressive role. At the same time, however, *Devrim* continuously attacked Nihat Erim's civilian government as unsuited to carry out real reform.²¹⁷ The weekly attacked all parties, but forbore from criticizing the military — which may explain why it was not closed down immediately after March 12, 1971, but some time later.²¹⁸ Afterwards Avcıoğlu and Eyüboğlu were arrested and charged in court with planning — together with other civilians and military officers — to violently overthrow the Government in favor of a Marxist regime.²¹⁹

While the precise impact of journals like *Yön*, *Ant*, *Yeni Gün* or *Türk Solu* on their civilian readers cannot be measured accurately, or publications such as *Devrim* on the military it presumably meant to influence, there are indications that radical youths at least were influenced. This is especially so in the case of *Ant* in its later years, and particularly *Türk Solu* with Mihri Belli's forceful writing.

²¹¹ Examples *ibid.*, 10: Dec. 23, 1969, p. 1; 14: Jan. 20, 1970, p. 1.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 25: Apr. 7, 1970, pp. 1, 3. For this open revolutionary call to the military forces, Avcıoğlu and Assistant Editor Uluç Gürkan were taken to court. See *ibid.*, 31: May 19, 1970, pp. 1, 8.

²¹³ As actually happened in March 1971.

²¹⁴ This is implied rather than explicitly written. Cf. *ibid.*, 35: June 16, 1970, pp. 1, 7.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 73: Mar. 16, 1971, p. 1.

²¹⁶ "Ordu ve halk," *ibid.*, p. 8.

²¹⁷ E.g., *ibid.*, 75: Mar. 30, 1971, pp. 1, 7; 76: Apr. 6, 1971, p. 1; 79: Apr. 27, 1971, pp. 1, 7.

²¹⁸ For a summary of D. Avcıoğlu's views, presented from an opposing viewpoint, cf. Aclan Sayılğan *Soldaki çatlaklar*, *passim*.

²¹⁹ *Yankı*, 100: Feb. 12-18, 1973, p. 21.

Clear echoes of the above fill the pages of *İleri*. This was the organ of the already-mentioned *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* ("The Federation of Turkish Revolutionary Youth") or, in short, *Dev Genç*. This organization, which was founded in the late 1960's and achieved world-notoriety in 1971 — on account of the violence and terror attributed to it by the Turkish authorities — made its views public in *İleri*. Its publisher was Atilla Sarp, then Ertuğrul Kürkçü; and its editor-in-chief was first Ersen Olgaç, then Engin Erkiner. Issued in Ankara, it had 32 pages in its first two issues, 44 and 52 in later ones (in 8°). The first issue was not dated, but must have been published early in 1970, for the second was dated April 20, 1970, and the third June 1, 1970. The last issue in hand is the sixth, dated January 1971; it was probably discontinued soon after, or closed down following the military intervention on March 12, 1971.

While the deep admiration for Lenin, expressed by the contributors to *İleri* is striking, but not unusual, one is impressed even more by their commitment to world revolution and the clearly expressed desire for a Marxist, violent upheaval in Turkey — which some of the *Dev Genç* members were, indeed, ready to attempt soon. Starting with the assumption that Turkey was a semi-dependent state,²²⁰ *İleri* tried to define the role of youth within the revolutionary proletarian movement. As seen by Atilla Sarp, chairman of *Dev Genç* and publisher of *İleri*, this was to organize themselves as militants — convinced ones and free from bourgeois concepts. Redefining, later, the aims of the struggle led by *Dev Genç* and *İleri*, a series of articles²²¹ presented it as a struggle against fascism and imperialism, for ideological independence and the liberation of peoples — including that of the Turks and Kurds. The articles laid special emphasis on the need for developing a well-reasoned revolutionary theory, or, as they phrased it, "A revolutionary movement is impossible without a revolutionary theory."²²²

Variations in style notwithstanding, in the late 1960's and early 1970's it was not always easy to perceive differences of content and emphasis in the various journals committed to the radical left. Opponents were sometimes inclined to lump them together as "loudspeakers of *Bizim Radyo*"²²³ (the name of the Leipzig-based propaganda radio station in

²²⁰ *İleri*, 1: undated, article by Muzaffer Erdost.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 6: Jan. 1971.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 21: "Devrimci teori olmadan, devrimci hareket olamaz."

²²³ This is also the name of a recent booklet by Aclan Sayılğan, *Korsan radyolar: "Bizim Radyo" ve Türkiye'deki hoparlörleri* (Ankara: 1969). With varying success

Turkish). This blanket accusation of communism, however, ignored the fact that in every journal many non-communists wrote. The result was tangible differences in the tone of every single journal.

The disparity in approach or emphasis is reflected in the sharp criticism directed by leftist journals at one another.²²⁴ Soviet publications, too, attacked these Turkish journals as "pseudo-socialist," tainted with "bourgeois reformism" or "Muslim socialism" and remote from scientific socialism.²²⁵ Undoubtedly, some of these accusations were well-founded — but this did not prevent the journals from being widely read by intellectuals involved in leftist party politics. These are the subject of our next two chapters.

the author compares broadcasts from *Bizim Radyo* with excerpts from *Yön, Ant, Türk Solu* and the dailies *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam*.

²²⁴ E.g., the criticism directed at *Yön* in *Barış Dünyası*, 39: Aug. 1965, pp. 464–469.

²²⁵ Э. Ю. Гасанова, „Новые веяния в общественной мысли Турции (о „Турецком социализме“),“ *Породы Азии и Африки*, 1965, no. 1, pp. 26–34. An English summary may be found in *Mizan: A Review of Soviet Writing on the Middle East and Africa* (Oxford), VII (5): May 1965, pp. 13–15.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ORGANIZED LEFT: FROM TRADE UNIONISM TO COMMUNISM

a. TRADE UNIONISM

Until recently Turkish trade unions (*birlik* or *sendika*¹) have consistently kept out of politics. Some members may have sympathized with one political group or another and even have joined them, but have done so as individuals. Organized trade unions have generally abstained from openly supporting any particular political party. This is in part the result of a long history of trade unions being forbidden by Turkish law to meddle in politics;² and partly due to a reluctance to split their organization along party lines and thereby exacerbate tendencies towards division.³ The fact that Turkish trade union leaders have variously supported leftist and rightist parties (which, indeed, tried hard to attract them) highlights the danger of such a split.

Trade unions in Turkey developed slowly in the years between the two World Wars.⁴ Atatürk regarded the role of the workers in the modernization of Turkey important; he let them organize but did not encourage any political activity by trade unions. These were first formed in the

¹ From the French, "syndicat."

² On legislation concerning the Turkish trade unions see Metin Kutsal, "Quelques aspects du mouvement syndical en Turquie," *Sosyoloji Dergisi* (Istanbul), XV: 1960, pp. 41 ff.

³ Among the works available on Turkish syndicalism are: Toker Dereli, *The development of Turkish trade unionism: a study of legislative and socio-political dimensions* (Istanbul: 1968). Kemal Sülker, *Türkiyede sendikacılık* (Istanbul: 1955). Id., *Türkiyede işçi hareketleri* (Istanbul: 1968). Sedat Ağralı, *Türk sendikacılığı* (Istanbul: 1967). For the early stages, Oya Sencer, *Türkiyede işçi sınıfı: doğuşu ve yapısı* (Istanbul: n.d.). See also Orhan Tuna, "Les syndicats en Turquie," *Revue Internationale du Travail* (Geneva), XC (5): Nov. 1964, pp. 467-487. Cahit Talas, "Türk sendikalizminin bugünkü durumu ve gelişme şartları," *SBFD*, IX (4): Dec. 1954, pp. 1-15. Id., "Türk sendikacılığı," in Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, *Yüzüncü yıl armağanı* (Ankara: 1959), pp. 223-244. P. П. Корниенко, „Рабочий класс Турции и его профсоюзы после Второй мировой войны," *Проблемы современной Турции*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-93. H. Gösel, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Mar. 22, 1962. For details of the civil service unions see Cemal Mihçioğlu, *Türkiyede kamu personeli sendikaları* (Ankara: 1968).

⁴ As reflected, e.g., in the articles of Muvaffak Şeref in *Sendika* and elsewhere, later collected in his book *Türkiye ve sosyalizm* (Istanbul: 1968).

early 1920's, in Istanbul, then Edirne, Adana, Eskişehir, Bursa and other urban centers. Possibly the authorities were worried by this proliferation and from 1925 regulations have been in force governing the formation and activities of trade unions. The famous Labor Law (*iş kanunu*) of 1936 was patterned on the current labor laws in Italy, and strictly forbade strikes. This did not stop the Turkish government, however, from enacting laws which benefitted the workers' position. In the same way, Turkey became a member of the International Labor Office in 1932 — but Turkish trade unions were not permitted to affiliate with international workers' organizations. In the period between the two World Wars, the trade unions were limited to mutual aid activities. They were not allowed to deduct trade unions dues from members' wages. These and other restrictions — and close government control — continued during the Second World War and until after the 1960 Revolution. The authorities, particularly the police, regarded the trade unions with suspicion, as possible sources of leftist propaganda. In particular several trade union leaders were suspect as potential or active agents of communism.

After the Second World War, trade union membership grew, as the following table shows.⁵

TABLE 6. TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP, 1948–1968

Year	Number of members	Year	Number of members
1948	52,000	1959	280,786
1949	72,000	1960	282,967
1950	76,000 ⁶	1961	298,679
1951	110,000	1962	307,839
1952	130,000	1963	295,710
1953	140,000	1964	338,769
1954	180,387	1965	360,285 ⁷
1955	189,595	1966	376,909 ⁸
1956	209,155	1967	834,580 ⁹
1957	244,853	1968	1,057,928 ¹⁰
1958	262,591		

⁵ Tuna, *op. cit.*, p. 480. Dereli, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 205.

⁶ Acc. to Tuna. Dereli lists 78,000 for 1950.

⁷ Acc. to Yıldız Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 144, the approximate figure for 1965 was 600,000.

⁸ Trade union spokesmen claimed to have more than 800,000 members in 1966, but informed observers considered this an exaggeration. See Dereli, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–206. Cf. Halis Okan, in *World Marxist Review* (Prague), X (10): Oct. 1967, p. 37.

⁹ Acc. to Prof. Türkkaya Ataöv, "The place of the worker in Turkish society and politics," *TYIR*, VIII: 1967, p. 111. This appears somewhat exaggerated.

¹⁰ Same source. Same question as to the figure.

By 1952 the trade unions were strong enough to establish a Federation named *Türk İş* (an abbreviation meaning "Turkish labor"). In 1946 the law requiring permission to set up an organization had been rescinded; the following year, a new more liberal Trade Union Act was passed. Both the Republican People's Party and the newly established parties courted the votes of workers — which gave them a new sense of power after the 1946 and 1950 general elections. Nonetheless, during the decade (1950–1960) in which the Democrat Party governed Turkey single-handedly, the activities of trade unions were restricted and closely supervised. It took *Türk İş* several more years — until July 1963 — to have the restrictive Labor Law changed and to have new ones passed by the legislature. Several factors were responsible. The number of trade union members, although generally increasing each year, remained relatively small. The number of urban, particularly industrial workers is unimpressive, compared to the agricultural ones; the latter have consistently numbered more than 70% of Turkey's labor force. Even urban workers are, to a large extent, illiterate or semi-literate; some are seasonal workers; many consequently are not very interested in, and many are indifferent to, class struggles and unionizing.

The May 1960 Revolution, although not initiated by the trade unions, but by military and student circles, also brought benefits to the workers. Individual liberties were the order of the day and found due expression in the 1961 Constitution. Several members of the National Union Committee seem to have been interested in furthering the well-being, as well as the professional organization, of Turkish workers.¹¹ The Constituent Assembly of 1961 included six trade union leaders. Prominent trade unionists were invited for an exchange of views with the President of the Republic and, severally, with Cabinet Ministers. In 1961 *Türk İş* was permitted to affiliate to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

It was, however, the new Labor Laws of 1963 which gave the trade unions a considerably increased scope of action. They¹² made the esta-

¹¹ Cf. E., "Le rôle de l'armée en Turquie," in Léo Hamon (ed.), *Le rôle extra-militaire de l'armée dans le Tiers Monde*, pp. 233–234.

¹² Both the *sendikalar kanunu* ("syndicate law") and the *toplu iş sözleşmesi ve lokavt kanunu* ("law of collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs") were published in the Official Gazette in July 1963. They have been reprinted several times, e.g. in the annual *1964 Türkiye yılığı*, pp. 145–164 and 165–192. The 1963 trade union law was transl. by Tevfik Orman in *AFDI*, XIV (20): 1964, pp. 310–334. The 1963 law on collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs was transl. by Orman, *ibid.*, pp. 335–371.

blishment of trade unions and federations of trade unions a comparatively simple matter. Social benefits were guaranteed, as were the rights of collective bargaining and of striking under certain conditions. At the same time, employers were allowed to lock out their workers. Both strikes and lock-outs were permitted however only after a mandatory conciliation period.¹³

Free association of, and activity by, the trade unions were guaranteed both by the 1961 Constitution and the new 1963 trade union laws. While nobody is compelled to join, it is a straightforward matter to set up a trade union. It possesses juridical capacity and has the right of collective bargaining; its activities are however limited to the aims common to its members.¹⁴

Understandably, beginning in 1963, new trade unions sprouted. The growth in membership and in the number of trade unions, however, made it more difficult for Türk İş to preserve its unity and cohesion. This was especially the case in the 1960's with the increased politicization in Turkey and the growth of political participation — expressed in part by the lessened activity in Türk İş of several leaders who entered party politics. Leaving the trade unions altogether, or limiting participation in their activities, though not common, reflected individual impatience with their apolitical character, and was a reaction to the neglect of Türk İş as a body by Turkey's ruling circles. True, there had been several formal meetings with the Head of State; but hardly any trade unionists had succeeded in being elected to the National Assembly in 1961. Only one — Ömer Ergün, the treasurer of Türk İş — was appointed to the Senate late in the same year by Turkey's President, Cemal Gürsel; this had been at the suggestion of the trade unions.

Despite its traditional policy of concentrating purely on the struggle for improvement of working conditions,¹⁵ in the 1960's Türk İş was increasingly drawn into national politics. An example was its attitude towards the draft of the new Turkish Constitution prepared by a Constituent Assembly in 1961. Since the draft constitution was to be submitted to a popular referendum, Türk İş had to take a stand. It guaranteed the basic rights of the workers, such as setting up unions and striking

¹³ See also Türkaya Ataöv, *op. cit.*, *TYİR*, VIII: 1967, pp. 91-93.

¹⁴ Cf. H. K. Elbir & M. K. Oğuzman, "Le statut juridique des syndicats en Turquie," *AFDI*, XVII (26-28): 1967, pp. 99-120.

¹⁵ Prof. Cahit Talas, in his article "Türk sendikacılığı," *op. cit.*, p. 244, aptly sums up trade union demands in the late 1950's as "justice, liberty and bread." See also Alpaslan Işıklı, *Sendikacılık ve siyaset* (Ankara: 1972), esp. pp. 331 ff.

(which Türk İş had lobbied for); consequently, Türk İş came out very strongly in its support.¹⁶ Afterwards, it seems, Türk İş discovered that neutral inaction did not necessarily further the interests of the workers. Inflationary trends and unemployment increasingly roused the unions not merely as formerly to demonstrations and strikes, but also to approaches to the government and political parties, or to start protest movements. Consequently, something of an oppositionist trait gradually took hold.

The interests of the workers remained the main factor determining the attitudes and activities of Türk İş. In the 1965 general elections to the National Assembly, a black list of anti-worker politicians was drawn up, which consisted of certain JP, RPP, NP and NTP candidates. More significantly, when the bruited reform in land-holding came to nothing but a slogan ritually intoned by practically all political parties, at its Fifth National Convention (1964), Türk İş vehemently demanded, from all parties, a comprehensive solution of land-holding problems: within a maximum period of five to ten years land should be equitably distributed. Obviously, such demands did nothing to endear the trade unions to the wealthy decision-makers in those parties. The same was true of the other economic principles, which Türk İş formulated in the 1960's: the encouragement of foreign investments only when necessary to Turkey's development, and the nationalization of the State's natural resources and foreign trade.¹⁷

These and other principles enunciated by Türk İş appear very similar to those of the Labor Party of Turkey, which we shall discuss in the next chapter. However in the late 1960's Türk İş was not competing with the LPT, but rather with its own more impatient members, some of whom felt that Türk İş was too moderate in its demands or, indeed, that it did not answer their needs.¹⁸ This was even more true of the attitude of other more radical trade unionists, who claimed that Türk İş had moved too far to the right,¹⁹ that Türk İş, by its passive policy, was deferring to the JP, the party in power.²⁰ In this context, the years 1965 and 1966 seem to have been crucial. In 1965, a rival *Türkiye Hür-İş Konfederasyonu* ("Turkish Free Workers' Confederation") was formed, but soon dispersed. Another grouping of seven trade unions called *Türkiye işçi sendikaları*

¹⁶ Details in Ağralı, *op. cit.*, pp. 167 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-196.

¹⁸ Sülker, *Türkiyede işçi hareketleri*, pp. 54 ff.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁰ Dereli, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

dayanışma konseyi ("The council of solidarity with the workers' trade unions of Turkey") was established soon after and proved more durable. Although the leaders of Türk İş maintained that the *Dayanışma konseyi* had no more than five thousand members, the very fact of its existence was worthy of note and, for Türk İş, a source of worry.

From the point of view of Türk İş the worst was still to come. Following the example of the *Dayanışma konseyi* and possibly maintaining contact with it, members of several trade unions previously affiliated to Türk İş broke away in January 1967. Most of these²¹ were leaders of those employed in the rubber industries, printing, food-production and the mines (the miners had earlier shown dissatisfaction²²). More radical than others, leaders of these groups attacked what they considered the lukewarm support by Türk İş for an 83-day strike in 1966 at the glass-works of Paşabahçe. The new Federation affirmed its radical character in the name it chose, *Devrimci işçi sendikaları konfederasyonu* ("The Federation of reformist — or revolutionary — workers' trade unions") or DİSK.

The founding members maintained that Turkey's government was oriented against the workers who suffered most from the rising cost-of-living, while a minority of foreigners were exploiting the country's resources. Those who supported this order of things²³ were evidently working against the principles of social justice guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution. Consequently, they claimed that unhampered advocacy of socialism was really support of the constitution; socialism was the basis of the DİSK's philosophy. Other demands included the nationalization of all foreign trade, private banking and the insurance business; a complete redistribution of land; and the planning of the economy, with the aim of improving the workers' lot. At the same time, although they acknowledged that they were interpreting nationalism in social terms, DİSK's spokesmen were quick to deny any communist leanings.²⁴ Indeed several DİSK leaders (like Kuas) held prominent positions in the LPT.²⁵

The official founding of DİSK on February 12–13, 1967, caused the Secretary General of Türk İş, Halil Tunç, to accuse the Labor Party of

²¹ For the names of their leaders, see *Ant*, 1: Jan. 3, 1967, p. 3.

²² A different list of unions involved is mentioned by Dereli, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

²³ An allusion to Türk İş?

²⁴ Because communists "spoke with Moscow's mouth." See article by Kemal Türkler, DİSK's chairman, in *Son Havadis* daily, April 23, 1967, quoted by Sülker, *Türkiyede işçi hareketleri*, p. 62.

²⁵ Cf. Ataöv, *op. cit.*, in *TYİR*, VIII: 1967, p. 100.

Turkey and Mao's disciples of setting up DİSK. The latter accusation seems farfetched. Joining the fray, however, DİSK's Secretary General, İbrahim Güzelce, frankly explained²⁶ why Türk İş's organization was no longer acceptable, "Türk İş holds to an idea that exists neither in undeveloped areas, nor in Europe — that of keeping above party politics."²⁷ In order to serve the working-class in Turkey, İbrahim Güzelce concluded, DİSK should and would enter party politics and support the Labor Party of Turkey.

In other words, DİSK regarded itself much more committed to the class struggle and party strife in Turkey than Türk İş. It assumed an anti-American stand from the very start by violently accusing Türk İş of accepting United States funds,²⁸ and therefore discrediting itself — from the standpoint of DİSK. Generally DİSK was more radical than Türk İş in demanding marked improvements for its members, for example a 25% raise in their salaries.²⁹ Its extremist attitude attracted additional unions, or rather sections of unions, which had followed their leaders out of Türk İş, for example part of the leather workers' union in April 1967.³⁰ DİSK also seems to have maintained better discipline within its ranks than Türk İş, perhaps because its membership was so much smaller, 60,000 at most³¹ in 1967. It has been estimated that DİSK represented about 15% of Turkey's organized workers in 1969 and 1970, compared with Türk İş's approximate 85%.

In day-to-day terms, the competition between the two organizations expressed itself in the strikes they organized in factories — particularly large ones — to protect and further the interests of their members, or to attract other workers to membership. The most frequently employed slogans were those demanding better pay and lower prices for consumer goods.³² In 1969 and 1970, such strikes became increasingly common in Turkey, with alarming effects on production. Employers who tried to keep neutral and steer clear between the two organizations found them-

²⁶ In an article printed in 1967, see long quote in Ağralı, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–213.

²⁷ The Turkish term is *partilerüstü politika*.

²⁸ For details, see *Ant*, 15: Apr. 11, 1967, pp. 10–11; 23: June 6, 1967, p. 11. For DİSK's pronounced stand against "American imperialism," *cf. ibid.*, 61: Feb. 23, 1968, p. 3.

²⁹ *Cf. ibid.*, 14: Apr. 4, 1967, p. 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 18: May 2, 1967, p. 3.

³¹ Acc. to DİSK's own figures. Dereli, *op. cit.*, p. 206, thinks that 30,000 is a more likely figure.

³² А. Гусейнов, „Турция в ожидании перемен“, *Азия и Африка сегодня*, July 1971, pp. 50–51.

selves faced with strikes by both. In any event greater commitment and better discipline enabled DİSK to organize increasingly violent street demonstrations in the late 1960's which culminated in heavy fighting with the police and army in the summer of 1970.

b. THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY

The increasingly extreme stand of the Turkish left, within the trade unions, political parties and smaller groups, cannot be fully appreciated without a brief reference to the activities of the Communist Party. Although banned by law (it still is),³³ organized communism continued to work underground.³⁴ Although its leaders were jailed and its publications seized, the Turkish Communist Party (further: TCP)³⁵ seems to have had a marked share in the leftist activity in Turkey — and its impact, originally of nuisance value only, has in recent years found an echo in the doctrinaire pronouncements of other leftist organizations. Although tiny in numbers, the TCP has had a considerable influence on Turkish intellectuals and on their attitudes to politics and socio-economics. This is particularly true since the end of the Second World War. Official circles in Turkey as well as certain unofficial groups (such as the religious-minded or Pan-Turk groups) have considered communism a serious danger. The authorities have kept up their surveillance of known or suspected communists, and brought many to trial, while private individuals and groups have published numerous anti-communist tracts.³⁶

³³ For the legal aspects, including some cases that have been tried, see Abdullah Üner and A. N. Gencer, *Komünizm — sosyalizm ve ilgili yargıtay kararları* (Ankara: 1969).

³⁴ For an original personal account, see С. Устюнелъ, *В тюрьме и на „воле“* transl. from Turkish by R. Fish (Moscow: 1952). This takes up the story to the year 1950.

³⁵ In Turkish, *Türkiye komünist partisi*, literally "the Communist Party of Turkey."

³⁶ This has continued up to the time of writing and some are discussed later in the chapter. The following are several examples of publications in the 1960's. Two booklets were published, charging large-scale communist infiltration into the *Köy enstitüleri* (the "village institutes," set up to bring literacy to rural Turkey). See Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Türkiyede komünizma ve köy enstitüleri* (Istanbul: 1962); Yücel Hacaloğlu, *Neden köy enstitüleri* (Istanbul: 1962). Cf. also the following anti-communist booklets: Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, *Su uyur komünist uyumaz* (Istanbul: 1962); Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Her cephesile komünizma* (Istanbul: 1962); Mehmet Şevket Eygi and others, *Kızıl tehlike* (Istanbul: 1964); Ahmet Çiftçi, *İnsanlık düşmanı: sosyalizm-maskeli komünizm* (Istanbul: 1965).

The early history of organized communism in Turkey is fairly well-known, thanks to two painstakingly written books published recently.³⁷ Its later years, on the other hand, are not as well known, because of the natural reticence of an illegal party.³⁸ In fact most available information is based on the inflammatory writings of the party's opponents in Turkey,³⁹ or obviously partisan Soviet publications.⁴⁰ Even so, the latter are often disappointingly brief and all too frequently treat of the early period in the party's history only.⁴¹ Somewhat more evenly balanced information about the TCP has become available recently⁴² — and even this is incomplete and not always objective.

The early history of organized communism in Turkey in brief: beginning its activities on Turkish soil among Turkish émigrés led by Mehmet Mustafa Suphi soon after the First World War, organized communism never became a mass movement or a potent force in Turkish politics (the claim of Soviet publications notwithstanding). However the role

³⁷ G. S. Harris, *The origins of communism in Turkey* (Stanford, California: 1967). Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de sol akımlar (1908-1925)* (Ankara: 1967). For the early years of communism in Turkey, see also Feridun Kandemir, *Atatürk'ün kurduğu Türkiye komünist partisi ve sonrası* (Istanbul: n.d. [1965-1966]). Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World* (Seattle, Wash.: repr. 1967), esp. pp. 78-79, 108-127. A Cerrahoğlu, *Türkiyede sosyalizm: 1848-1925* (Istanbul: 1968).

³⁸ A good, though brief, account may be found in W. Z. Laqueur, *Communism and nationalism in the Middle East* (2nd ed., London: 1957). A longer account, but ending in approximately 1951, is K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's politics, op. cit.*, ch. 14.

³⁹ Such as the following: E. Darendelioglu, *Türkiyede komünist hareketleri* (2 vols., 2nd ed., Istanbul: 1962); Aclan Sayilgan, *Yakin tehlike: komünizm* (Ankara: 1963); Refik Korkud, *Komünistler* (Ankara: 1966). Fethi Tevetoglu, *Türkiye'de sosyalist ve komünist faaliyetler* (Ankara: 1967).

⁴⁰ In addition to various periodicals, such as *La Nouvelle Revue Internationale* (Paris), cf. P. П. Корниенко, *Рабочее движение в Турции 1918 - 1963 гг* (1963); Д. И. Вдовиченко, *Борьба политических партий в Турции 1944 - 1965 гг.* (1967). See also Landau in *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), VI (2): May 1970, pp. 212-214, and VI (3): Oct. 1970, pp. 346-349.

⁴¹ For example vol. VII of *The Soviet Historical Encyclopaedia* (in Russian, Moscow: 1965) devotes numerous pages to the various communist parties, but only 33 lines, including bibliography, to the TCP (columns 725-726).

⁴² E.g., Aclan Sayilgan, *Solun 94 yılı (1871-1965): başlangıçtan günümüze Türkiye'de sosyalist — komünist hareketler* (Ankara: 1968) (further: Sayilgan). İsmet Bilgin, *Türkiye'de sağ ve sol akımlar ve tatbikatı* (N. p.: 1969). Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de soldaki bölünmeler (1960-1970): tartışmalar, nedenler, çözüm önerileri* (Ankara: 1970). See also the articles on Turkey in the *1966 Yearbook on international communist affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: 1967), pp. 156-158; *1968 Yearbook on international communist affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: 1969), pp. 576-578; *1969 Yearbook on international communist affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: 1970), pp. 798-804.

communism has played in Turkey for half a century, although not impressive by the standards of an organized party struggle for power, has not been without consequence in its propaganda value. In a state conditioned for revolutionary reform by its leadership, communism has consistently had to compete with a strong nationalism which has been considerably more powerful. The Kemalist leadership watched communist activity closely in the early 1920's. A paragraph in the 1924 Constitution, forbidding any change in the state's system of government, was probably directed against communism. In 1923, and again in 1925, after communism had reorganized in Turkey, the government decided to clamp down on it. As soon as the government felt secure enough, it banned the party, arrested its leaders and activists, and closed down the Union of Turkish Communist Youth — continuing, nevertheless, its normal, even friendly, relations with the Soviet Union. Again, although communism later reorganized, under various guises,⁴³ its impact remained solely on the ideological level. Communist writings, such as the ably-edited periodical *Aydınlık*⁴⁴ ("Enlightenment") perceptibly influenced some Turkish intellectuals and better-educated workers. Paradoxically, Atatürk's brilliantly conceived reforms contained a framework for social change and therefore stole a good part of the Turkish communists' thunder, on one hand; on the other hand, it kept alive an interest in further social reform.

In his years of leadership Atatürk achieved a high degree of consensus among the Turkish elite in support of his socio-economic and political policies. In his day this success narrowed the support for such ideologies as communism to the fringes of the elite, who were further weeded out by imprisonment or exile.⁴⁵ In the late 1920's, and again in the 1930's, the TCP was again weakened by several leaders being won over by government offers for interesting, lucrative jobs, as well as by the more extremist

⁴³ Examples in Sayılğan, pp. 182 ff. Sayılğan's works are particularly important as he was himself connected with the TCP from 1943 and denounced it in the 1950's, see his *İnkâr fırtınası* (Istanbul: 1962), pp. 17 ff. and Darendelioglu, *Türkiyede komünist hareketleri*, op. cit., II, pp. 76-77.

⁴⁴ Karpaz, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 355-356, detects an influence of the Spartacist movement on the Turkish intellectuals who wrote in *Aydınlık*.

⁴⁵ Acc. to Üstünel, "Ceux qui dissipent les ténèbres," *La Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, XIV (1): Jan. 1971, claims that in 1931 the TCP's membership was 90% workers, which seems doubtful. See also Laqueur, op. cit., p. 213: "The communist groups which existed in the late 1920's and 1930's contained a number of poets, but hardly a peasant and few workers."

factions carrying out purges repeatedly and splitting from the main body.⁴⁶

If the TCP continued to exist and carry on an uninterrupted, precarious activity underground, this was for several reasons: a. The unflagging enthusiasm of the small core of active members, who kept up a skeleton-organization, branching out in tiny clandestine cells (members skimped and saved to assist jailed comrades and their families). b. Support, the nature and extent of which are not quite clear, from the Soviet Union and the Comintern.⁴⁷ c. The slowdown of reform after Atatürk's death in 1938, and particularly during the years of the Second World War. In that period and afterwards, Turkish communists made a determined effort to monopolize the demand for socio-economic reform. In this, they were less than successful, at least in immediately measurable results. The main reasons appear to be the imprisonment or self-exile of practically the whole veteran leadership in the late 1920's and the surveillance by the Turkish authorities of the remaining cadres.⁴⁸ Ideological conflicts, personal rivalries, rifts and purges within the party played into the hands of the secret police. Clandestine activity, its romantic appeal notwithstanding, was rather a hindrance in propaganda work. This was particularly true since the police had tracked down many, if not all, of the cadres.

One of the immediate consequences of the mass arrests in 1927 and trials of those suspected of membership in the TCP was that those who remained free dispersed to Izmir, Gaziantep and Bursa; and later to Samsun, Edirne, Adana and elsewhere. The party in Istanbul (and Turkey in general) was weakened, but it spread to different parts of the country, albeit thinly (e.g. among the tobacco workers in Izmir, or the railway workers in Eskişehir). In 1928 there appear to have been some eight cells in Istanbul,⁴⁹ and fewer in other towns. It became increasingly difficult to print the party's publications; generally mimeographed, they were either posted on walls or distributed by children. This was done on the First of May and other occasions. When the party succeeded in publishing a bulletin — illegally, of course — this was usually at great

⁴⁶ Harris, *Origins*, epilogue.

⁴⁷ Acc. to Sayılğan, pp. 185, 189–190, 226, 465, n. 10, and 466, n. 20, thousands of dollars were given, every three months, by the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul to the TCP, *Aydınlık*, etc. If correct, this assistance could well have continued in later years.

⁴⁸ Full details in Sayılğan, pp. 190 ff. See also Karpát, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 356–357.

⁴⁹ Sayılğan, p. 194.

risk and for a brief while only. Such were, for example, *Kızıl Yıldız — İstanbul* ("The Red Star — İstanbul") or *Komünist*, in 1928.

Demands made by the Turkish Communists in the 1930's were mainly of a tactical nature, as is evident from even a casual reading of the manifestoes and periodicals which have reached us. In 1931 they demanded the right to hold meetings in factories, barracks, villages and streets; organize demonstrations; obtain legal recognition of the Communist Party and the release of jailed Communists.⁵⁰ Accompanying slogans, of a socio-economic character, were frequently of a quasi-ritual nature.

Despite all the difficulties, party work continued, although in certain places only sporadically, and after 1934 greater attention seems to have been given to organizing cells of communist youth.⁵¹ Aged 13 to 21, members were not many in number, and served as reserves for future recruits to the party's ranks, to fill the void left by the imprisoned and the exiled. In the late 1930's TCP members made relatively few attempts, although vigorous ones, to spread their ideas in high schools, among University students (chiefly in the Faculty of Law), and even within the precincts of several military schools.⁵² In these years the TCP worked on two levels: the illegal, in clandestine cells, as in former years; and the legal (or semi-legal), e.g., in forming "anti-fascist leagues," the guiding spirit of which were communists. The latter were used to propagate communism and recruit new members and adherents. Simultaneously, communist tracts were distributed, in modest, but growing, numbers.

During the Second World War the TCP's leader and central figure was again Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, then back in Turkey. He and the small number of activists had a difficult time, as the TCP was closely watched to ensure the continuation of the official policy of Turkish neutrality; arrests and trials, followed by prison terms or exile, occurred time and again.⁵³ Those few leaders and members who managed to evade police surveillance focused their activity on leftist propaganda among young intellectuals and some workers, either by word of mouth or, more usually, by the publication and distribution of Marxist periodicals or pamphlets in several of Turkey's cities and towns. Because of strict wartime censorship regulations, these publications usually prudently skirted Turkish politics, and printed mainly emotion-loaded revolutionary poems, literary pieces on Marxist ideas, and popular essays on the dialectics of

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

⁵² Examples *ibid.*, pp. 216 ff.

⁵³ Instances are mentioned *ibid.*, pp. 228 ff. and Laqueur, pp. 214-215.

historical materialism. In all these printed publications the communists attempted to remain on the right side of the law. Party members, however, received illegal mimeographed bulletins.

Nevertheless in the later years of the Second World War, in order to keep in closer touch with their readers, the communists resorted, in such journals as *Tan*, to writing more about Turkey's problems. They demanded stricter controls on the prices of commodities and other anti-inflation measures, as well as greater freedoms for the population and a more popular government. For instance a booklet, legally published in the summer of 1943 and distributed in 1943 and 1944, and entitled *En büyük tehlike* ("The greatest danger"), dwelt on social differences in Turkey. It was distributed among University students, and reportedly⁵⁴ stirred some excitement and even some support (ephemeral, as it turned out) for a recently-founded "Front Against Fascism and Speculation."

This was followed by other "anti-fascist" fronts, whereby the communists tried to broaden their base of support and find allies from within groups dissatisfied with the government. These efforts generally had little success, due to the not infrequent break-off of splinters from their own organization. For instance, the Front Movement (*Cephe Hareketi*) claimed in 1944 to have added 500 university students to its original 150,⁵⁵ but it is questionable how many of these continued to show any zeal and for how long. Most seem to have been sympathizers, rather than adherents, and their interest soon flagged, particularly when meeting-places were harassed by police, and ringleaders arrested and put on trial (chiefly in Istanbul).

As in the years preceding the Second World War, communist activity continued underground, too, side by side with the quasi-legal activity just described. Under Şefik Hüsnü Değmer's leadership, the TCP functioned warily. Thus it skirted political issues in publications which were intended for a wider circulation, like *Yeni Edebiyat* ("New Literature") which, despite its name, was not a purely literary journal, but the TCP's unofficial organ. It was seized and closed by the authorities in 1941, after 26 issues had appeared. The usual round of arrests and trials followed, straining even further the manpower resources of the underground cadres. After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the TCP's activity unfolded mainly on the legal level, by enthusiastic, although restricted, propaganda for Turkey's entry into the War, on the side of the

⁵⁴ Sayılğan, p. 233.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

Soviet Union. This, as has been said, was done mainly by so-called "anti-fascist fronts" which came out openly against the official policy of neutrality adopted by the Turkish government, following Mustafa Kemal's famous formula of "Peace in the Fatherland, Peace in the World." Underground the TCP joined in expressing such opinions, even more forcefully than its legal counterparts. In addition to the legal *Tan*, ably edited by such dedicated leftists as Zekeriya Sertel and his wife Sabiha, other quasi-legal periodicals like *Yurt ve Dünya* ("Fatherland and the World") and *Adımlar* ("Steps") appeared, as did a number of pamphlets.

After the Second World War, the TCP leadership seems to have decided on an all-out effort to enlarge the previous "Anti-Fascist Front," which by now was called "The Front for the Struggle Against Fascism and Profiteers,"⁵⁶ into an alliance of elements opposing the ruling party. While "The Front of Progressive Democrats" which they tried to set up in the summer of 1945 did not amount to much, the new detailed program presented by Değmer on July 31, 1945 for the projected "Front" rates more than a passing mention. It was circulated not only among TCP members and sympathizers, but to various political personalities known to be in opposition to the RPP and its one-party regime. The program is important for three main reasons: a. It voices the general feelings and opinions of the TCP leaders at the time; b. It indicates the main points on which they hoped to obtain a consensus among other opposition personalities; and c. It influenced — directly or indirectly — other leftist ideologies in Turkey in the 1950's and 1960's, which bear a striking resemblance to the 1945 TCP program.⁵⁷

The program⁵⁸ began with a preamble stating that it sought to express the wishes and goals of those political parties with progressive views, trade unions, cultural societies and all independent democratic groups hostile to fascism and reaction, honorable patriots one and all.

The 26-point program aimed at 1. removing from power Şükrü Saracoğlu's government — which the communists considered racist and representative of profiteering merchants, large contractors and wealthy landlords, as well as hostile to democracy and to the Soviet Union; 2. for-

⁵⁶ In Turkish, the term *vurguncular* has a wider pejorative connotation; it also means "usurer," "speculator," etc.

⁵⁷ This is an elaboration of the party's 1931 program, summarized by Karpat, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 359-362.

⁵⁸ Turkish text reprinted in Sayılğan, pp. 251-259.

ming a government out of worthy citizens clearly committed to Atatürk's reforms and the principles of democracy; 3. demanding the dispersal of the National Assembly and the free election of a new one, based on secret universal ballot, in which all popular groups might compete, free of pressure; 4. purging the government bureaucracy, the army and the schools of fascist and racist elements; 5. allowing free expression of all views — except those of fascists, reactionaries, or enemies of progress and democracy; 6. demanding the unhampered formation of trade unions, organizations, and political parties; 7. expressing freely all opinions — except those of fascists and reactionaries — orally and in writing, in open or closed meetings; 8. printing newspapers, periodicals and other publications without the need for official permission or censorship controls — except those expressing fascist and racist ideas; 9. recognizing the rights of organization and representation of workers, by unions and syndicates; 10. opening the way for organized political activity by abrogating reactionary laws which limit democratic freedoms, and arranging for free, secret and general elections to the National Assembly; 11. freeing of all those jailed for political activities — except racists and fascists; 12. distributing land, free-of-charge, to the landless and to those who do not have enough, and securing work for them by supplying agricultural implements, giving instruction in their use and granting credit; 13. paying the debts of needy peasants to the large land-owners, usurers, and the Ziraat Bankası;⁵⁹ 14. securing for all national minorities, large and small, full equality of opportunity for work, equal taxes, and personal safety; 15. appointing a commission to examine the debasing minority-tax⁶⁰ and drawing up proper measures in the matter; 16. securing education for needy youths, as well as opportunities for them to enter trade schools and other educational institutions, including universities — and safeguarding their interests; 17. demanding from the state agencies a guarantee for the rights of all needy children to receive an education, and to be protected from indignities and exploitation; 18. guaranteeing women equal opportunities for membership in professional, scholarly and political organizations, for equal work and equal pay to that of men; 19. fighting for etatism, to guarantee maximum benefits for the masses; 20. lowering the prices of basic commodities, as a first step for state control on the economy; 21. creating two new departments, "The State Central Purchasing Office" and "The State Central Works

⁵⁹ Agricultural Bank.

⁶⁰ Imposed in Turkey during the Second World War.

Office", headed by specialists, to do away with the excessive gains of those contractors now supplying the state and army or undertaking public works; 22. confiscating — for the benefit of the state — the illegal gains amassed during the War years by contracting for state and municipal public works, profiteering and other dishonest ways; 23. using the millions of Turkish pounds thus acquired, all or in part, for a comprehensive social security plan and welfare organizations — to provide for health, accidents, unemployment and old-age benefits to all officials, employees and workers, in the public and private sectors alike; 24. speedily introducing a progressive income tax — not to apply to those having an annual income of TL 1,200 or less — instead of the municipal tax and earnings tax now oppressing the artisans and workers, and instead of several indirect taxes, in order to make Turkey's financial system more democratic; 25. fixing graduated inheritance tax, starting at 25%, on all legacies of more than TL 25,000; 26. establishing, as the basis of Turkey's national independence, close friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and making these the first and last conditions for guaranteeing Turkish independence — for which purpose a government should be formed, made up wholly of persons committed to a policy of close relations with Turkey's big neighbor.

The program, after the twenty-six point exposition, added a nine-slogan part entitled "What kind of Turkey are we fighting for?" In brief this went as follows: 1. A free and independent Turkey, saved from the tyranny of a single party representing solely the profiteers and land usurpers. 2. A happy Turkey, truly enjoying Popular Democracy. 3. A progressive Turkey, in which workers, peasants and intellectuals can work and cultured persons can live together. 4. A just Turkey, rid of racial and national discrimination, acknowledging equal rights to all compatriots, of whatever people and religion they might be. 5. A secure Turkey with its foreign relations safe, living in brotherly harmony with all its neighbors, without coveting foreign territories. 6. A peace-loving Turkey, allied with the Soviets by way of an overall agreement and assistance pact. 7. A powerful Turkey, strong not in its strongarm rule and police-organization, but in its inner being, due to the economic and cultural progress of the people and its democratic national unity. 8. A revolutionary Turkey, guaranteeing that nobody is exposed to prosecution and torture because of his convictions and opinions, and safeguarding the complete freedom of conscience. 9. A popular and prosperous Turkey, in which villagers and peasants own the lands they work, after they have been cleansed of parasite-like gangsters.

The above has been reported in some detail, not only because it was presented by the TCP's Değmer as a neatly-packaged panacea for all Turkey's socio-economic and political ills in 1945, but also because it clearly reflects the party's purposeful sense of direction in subsequent years. Not less significant, these views and demands of the TCP have had a strong echo in pronouncements and activities both of communists and of other leftist groups and parties, both then and later.

Throughout the period after 1945, the communists in Turkey continued their limited activity all the while on two levels, of which the legal one — through several front organizations — was more in evidence. In this way, the tiny TCP was able to afford its members and sympathizers an opportunity for political action and expression⁶¹ that clandestineness would obviously have denied them, under the stronghanded rule of the Democrat Party. While the available data are evidently incomplete, it appears that communists infiltrated to a minor degree into some of the lower echelons of the opposition parties; and, to a greater degree, as we shall see, they left an impact on the general development of leftism in contemporary Turkey. This is true of the 1960's no less than of the 1950's.

The TCP's hopes of acquiring a status of legality after the May 27, 1960 Revolution were dashed when communists were barred from acting openly, while other groups were permitted to organize and register freely, without prior permission of the authorities. Again, the only solution left to the TCP was to act through various fronts. Such communist groups competed with other leftist organizations in Turkey, some of them Marxist in character, in order to impress the public and convince the police that they were not communist. Consequently, the TCP itself had generally to stay underground and act so circumspectly that an Italian socialist magazine even wondered in 1965 whether the party existed at all.⁶² This honest doubt existed despite the participation of the TCP in communist party gatherings in Moscow, in 1957 and 1960,⁶³ and despite — or perhaps because of — the forceful assertion of the TCP's Secretary General⁶⁴

⁶¹ However, the TCP continued on its own, and was the subject of a long report to the National Assembly by the Minister for the Interior, Şükrü Sökmenster, on January 30, 1947 — see Tekin Erer, *Türkiyede parti kavgaları* (2nd ed., Istanbul: 1966), pp. 410–412. This was again confirmed by the 1951–1952 mass arrests and trials of communists.

⁶² *Corrispondenza Socialista* (Rome), VI (6): June 1965, pp. 302–303.

⁶³ *The Soviet Historical Encyclopaedia*, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, p. 726 (article on the TCP).

⁶⁴ He goes under the double title of "First Secretary of the TCP's Central Committee" and of "First Secretary of the TCP's Foreign Bureau." See *Yön*, V (158): Apr. 8, 1966, p. 16.

in the 1960's, Zeki Baştımar, alias Yakup Demir ("Jacob Iron"), who wrote rather grandiloquently in communist organs abroad, that the TCP was one of the foremost political forces in Turkey and ready to take over the government.⁶⁵ Or, in Demir's own words, at the workers' meeting held in Moscow on November 3, 1967 for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, when he claimed that the TCP was heading a working-class that "is numerically large and organizationally strong, a major factor in the country's social and political life, that plays the leading role in the anti-imperialist movement currently gaining momentum in Turkey."⁶⁶

It is impossible to verify Demir's assertion, unless one has access to the secret files of the party or to those of the Turkish police. In practice, however, it would seem that most TCP activity in the late 1960's and practically all since 1971⁶⁷ was outside Turkey. It was certainly directed from abroad. Most of the members of the 13-men Central Committee — including Demir himself — live in Moscow, although one of them resides permanently in Prague, where he serves on the editorial board of the *World Marxist Review* and prepares its Turkish edition, *Yeni Çağ* (i.e., "New Era"). Party groups in Sofia and Baku are apparently charged with liaison work between the Moscow-based Central Committee and the underground rank-and-file in Turkey. Others are employed in Leipzig at broadcasting in Turkish from *Bizim Radyo* ("Our Radio"). Strenuous attempts have been made in recent years to infiltrate and take over Turkish workers' groups in West Berlin, Köln, Stockholm and elsewhere in Europe; there are conflicting reports as to the measure of success obtained. Some have sought refuge in Paris, where their main activity is writing letters to the press. While brief secret visits of TCP leaders to Turkey have not strengthened the party, they seem

⁶⁵ Examples in *La Nouvelle Revue Internationale — Problèmes de la Paix et du Socialisme* (Paris), VI (11): Nov. 1963, pp. 43-58; *ibid.*, XIII (4-5): Apr.-May, 1970, pp. 32-47. *Bulletin d'Information — Documents des partis communistes et ouvriers, Articles et interventions* (Prague), 1964, fasc. 19, pp. 1072-1073; 1965, fasc. 20, pp. 20-21; 1966, fasc. 19, pp. 13-15.

⁶⁶ *Information Bulletin — Documents of Workers' Parties, Articles and Speeches, Special issue: Revolutionary Peace Forces Hail October* (Prague: 1968), p. 188. Cf. Demir's "Probleme der Einheit der Linkskräfte in der Türkei," *Probleme des Friedens und Sozialismus* (Prague), XIV (155): July 1971, pp. 927-934.

⁶⁷ To judge from Demir's "Faschistische Militärdiktatur wütet," *Informationsbulletin: Materialien und Dokumente kommunistischer und Arbeiterparteien* (Prague), 1971, fasc. 15, pp. 701-702.

to have helped the flow of anti-American and anti-Demirel and JP propaganda.⁶⁸

Disregarding Demir's claims of numbers and importance, it is nonetheless worthy of note that despite its enforced restricted activity, the TCP succeeded in remaining in existence. This was at least partly due to its tight organization and methods of propaganda. While our knowledge of these is incomplete, one does get an idea from the official proceedings in the 1951-1952 trials of communists;⁶⁹ and probably the information is generally valid for later years too. *Grosso modo*, it is not different from what one knows of other communist parties in non-communist states today.⁷⁰ It is, however, particularly adapted to regimes where the party is illegal and has to function underground.

Maximum secrecy characterized the TCP's organization and work, from the party's central bodies down to the individual cells. The standard pyramidal structure of communist parties was well-suited for clandestine activity; the Russian, rather than Chinese, organizational patterns served as a model (the TCP has consistently supported Moscow in its quarrel with Peking). Practically all members worked for the party without pay. Members considered themselves the soldiers of revolution, and discipline was generally enforced. Recalcitrant members were punished, with punishment taking various forms, from a reprimand or temporary suspension to permanent expulsion from the party. Decisions of both major policy and personal matters were handed down the party's ladder. No member could leave Turkey, for example, without the permission of the Central Committee. The latter's control was usually effective, probably because of the party's small membership: while figures are not available, Karpat's estimate, that "the number of convinced leftists in Turkey in the nineteen-forties probably never exceeded a thousand,"⁷¹ appears reasonable, while Enver Esenkova's estimate in 1964, that the TCP's membership amounted at the time to about three thousand,⁷²

⁶⁸ Further details in *1969 Yearbook on international communist affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 798-804. See also *Le Monde*, Nov. 2, 1972, p. 5.

⁶⁹ Summarized by Sayilgan, pp. 405-436. Cf. also Sayilgan, *Inkâr fırtınası*, *op. cit.*, pp. 128 ff.

⁷⁰ Cf. M. M. Czudnowski and J. M. Landau, *The Israeli communist party and the Elections for the fifth Knesset, 1961* (Stanford, California: 1965).

⁷¹ K. H. Karpat, "The Turkish Left," *Journal of Contemporary History*, I (2): 1966, p. 177.

⁷² Enver Esenkova, "Le communisme en Turquie," *Est et Ouest* (Paris), XVI (326): Sep. 16-30, 1964, p. 21, footnote 24.

seems quite high. Western estimates, in the late 1960's, ranged between 1,200 and 2,000 members.⁷³

The TCP's Central Committee was made up of five to seven members of whom three formed a Central Executive Committee. However there are indications that several others party members were frequently consulted — a sort of enlarged inner circle. The Central Committee was apparently set up in consultation with Moscow and kept in touch with the Soviets;⁷⁴ many of its members had visited Russia. Prominent among them until his death in 1959 was Şefik Hüsnü Değmer (or Deymer),⁷⁵ who was for many years First Secretary of the TCP's Central Committee, the party's key position in policy-making and in all major decisions. Due to the need for underground work, and because of police surveillance and arrests, the day-to-day work of the TCP was carried out by a three-man Central Executive Committee, presumably elected, but in fact approved (and nominated) by the party's First Secretary.

The Secretary of the Central Executive Committee was a powerful figure, vying with the First Secretary for prestige and leadership. Since 1944 the post has been filled by Yakup Demir (Zeki Baştımar). He received all funds, such as those sent by the party's branches (monthly membership fees, less expenses) and decided how to spend them. He handed down decisions to all ranks of the party down to the cells, and supervised all groups connected with the party, such as youth associations, university student organizations and women's groups. Although the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee might — and did — delegate control of those bodies to other members of the Committee, centralized control remained his responsibility. The same was true when the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee delegated some of the decision-making to another member, as was the case in the early 1950's, when Tevfik Dilmen, the Secretary of the Istanbul district of the TCP, acted in the name of Demir.

In general, members of the Central Committee kept in touch with the secretaries of TCP branches in the *vilayets* (or provinces) by using pseudonyms and employing couriers trained in the use of passwords.

⁷³ 1969 *Yearbook on international communist affairs*, *op. cit.*, p. 798, which also estimates that the TCP may have an additional 10,000–15,000 sympathizers.

⁷⁴ According to Sayılğan, p. 410.

⁷⁵ On whom see Darendelioğlu, *Türkiyede komünist hareketleri*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 28–33, 52 ff., 129 ff.; II, 18, 99. For a collection of his articles in 1921–1925, see his *Seçme yazılar* (Ankara: 1971).

As a rule, the TCP's Central Committee met three or four times a month. Its decisions were carried out by the Central Executive Committee, which sent directions to the provincial committees which, in turn, were passed on to the districts, to quarters, and then to the cells. In the same manner bulletins were sent out reporting the party's decisions and views. These were either secretly printed, or mimeographed, or type-written. In the opposite direction, the TCP's Central Committee received news, reports and newspaper cuttings from cells through party branches. After these had been processed, some used for the party's bulletins, and others stored in the party's files, the rest were burned; the bulletins too were destroyed after being read by party members. Very few members knew where the printing-press or the mimeograph-machine was. The same was true of the party's secret archives, held by a member whose inactivity kept him beyond police suspicion. Even so, the party seemed to have prudently smuggled a large part of its archives abroad for safekeeping. They are reportedly in Sofia and Prague.⁷⁶

An alternate Central Committee was always ready to take the place of the original one, in case the latter was arrested or otherwise incapacitated.

The province (*vilayet*) committees of the TCP generally appear to have consisted of three members; their appointment required the approval of the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. The secretary of the province committee had identical duties and responsibilities (on a provincial scale) with the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. He was, in addition, personally in charge of all illegal activity, including the distribution of bulletins and other materials. His contacts were with the respective secretaries of the lower rungs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, he reported monthly and annually to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee on all that had happened (especially, TCP activities) in the province. However the main tasks of the province committee and its secretary were to arrange meetings to hear Marxist lectures and readings of Marxist literature (supplied by the party), or to convene political gatherings.

The area (*mintika*)⁷⁷ committees were set up by the secretary of the TCP province committee or one of its other members. Generally, the secretary of the area committee maintained contact with the quarter

⁷⁶ Acc. to Sayilgan, p. 433.

⁷⁷ Which in this case was loosely defined, being determined by membership in a given area.

committees, whose location and number varied according to conditions. The quarter committees, sometimes named "main cells," were frequently known by code-numbers — no doubt to ensure secrecy. The cell (*hücre*) was the basic unit of the TCP, and the lowest rung in its structural ladder. In Turkey, three persons were the minimum for setting up a cell, and most cells had from three to five members. The cells, too, bore code-numbers or were known by their geographical location. Secrecy was strictly enjoined on every individual TCP member, who was expected to take every possible precaution to cover up his party connections; use passwords or mutually-agreed signs for recognition; and initiate social contacts with non-communists — preferably, apolitical Turks — if he felt that the police were over-interested in him. Otherwise, every TCP member was expected to attend all party meetings, to assist party propaganda and its distribution — assiduously avoiding the police at all times. Names were carefully covered up in party correspondence and publications and the use was made of trustworthy, innocent-looking couriers.

Data about the age, education and occupations of the TCP's members are obviously unavailable outside the party. These data are very difficult to obtain (it may be said in passing) for the legal political parties too, although they act openly in Turkey; Professor Frey had to invest many years in studying such data pertaining only to the National Assembly Members of three legal parties.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, one can get at least an idea of TCP membership from the largest round-up of communists in modern Turkey. In September 1951 the police arrested and later brought to trial 167 persons, about a third of whom were found guilty,⁷⁹ although practically all had some connection with communist activity. Those arrested do not seem to be characteristic of the rank and file of the TCP, as the accused included the whole Central Committee and other prominent communists. Yet at least they are an indicator of what the party's leadership was like at the time. It is not strictly representative of the elite, either, since one notes that almost a third were illiterate. The following data are based on the separate computation of Esenkova⁸⁰ and Sayılğan.⁸¹

⁷⁸ F. W. Frey, *The Turkish political elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1965).

⁷⁹ Acc. to Yavuz Abadan, "Les activités subversives en Turquie," *TYIR*, II: 1961, page 102.

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, in *Est et Ouest*, XVI (326): Sep. 16–30, 1964, p. 19.

⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 326–327. Some additional data may be found in Darendelioglu, vol. II.

The average age of the seven Central Committee members was 51.7 years: Ş. H. Değmer was 66, Halil Yalçınkaya 56, Ahmet Fırınçı 53, Mehmet Bozer 52, Reşad Fuad Baraner 49, Zeki Baştımar 48, and Mihri Belli 38. The average of the whole group of 167 was lower — 32.1 years, with a very strong emphasis on the younger age-groups:

Age	20-29	76
	30-39	60
	40-49	24
	50-54	6
	66	1
<hr/>		
Total		167

One hundred and thirty six were under forty, 160 under fifty. Also, out of the seven who were 50-years old and over, four were members of the Central Committee, while two other Central Committee members were aged 48 and 49 (the only younger member, aged 38 at the time, was Mihri Belli, a gifted polemicist, already mentioned for his leftist writing).

As to education:

Graduates of Institutions of Higher Education	35
Students at Institutions of Higher Education	29
Graduates of a <i>lycée</i> (senior high school)	19
Graduates of an <i>ortaokul</i> (junior high school)	22
Graduates of an <i>ilkokul</i> (elementary school)	10
Illiterates	52
<hr/>	
Total	167

Occupationally this was a slightly bewildering array⁸² which does not conceal, however, the predominantly middle-class composition of those arrested (and possibly of the party itself⁸³).

⁸² Sayılğan's details tally more closely than Esenkova's. The above is based on both. Sayılğan had apparently joined the communist underground in 1946 and been detained in the 1951-1952 mass arrests; see Karpat, in *Journal of Contemporary History*, I (2): 1966, p. 172, n. 4.

⁸³ Cf. A. H. Hanson, "Turkey today," *The Political Quarterly* (London), XXVI (4): Oct.-Dec. 1955, p. 331.

Workers and artisans ⁸⁴	47
Officials and clerks ⁸⁵ (private sector and government)	41
Students ⁸⁶	32
Merchants and pedlars ⁸⁷	7
Actors and artists ⁸⁸	7
Teachers ⁸⁹	6
Manufacturers ⁹⁰	4
Physicians	3
Lawyers	2
Geologists	2
Forestry expert	1
Farmer	1
Driver	1
Unemployed ⁹¹	13
<hr/>	
Total	167

While a good part of TCP propaganda was directed at its own members, much — perhaps most — was intended for outside consumption. Considering its illegal status in Turkey, its best hope of reaching the outside was by creating a front (in Turkish: *cephelisme*) with others. Demir himself put it as follows, "Calling for a united national-democratic front, the Communist party — the vanguard of the working-class

⁸⁴ Including, among others: 3 shoemakers, 2 tailors, 2 stone-masons (or bricklayers), 2 basket-weavers, 1 fountain-pen repairman, 1 tanner, 1 shoeshine, 1 blacksmith, 1 weaver, 1 carpenter, 1 machinist in a printing-press, 1 fitter of heating-devices, 1 sign-painter (in oil-colors).

⁸⁵ Including: 3 book-keepers, 2 translators, 2 tramway ticket-sellers, 2 construction technicians, 1 letter-carrier, 1 land-survey technician, 1 inspector (or overseer?).

⁸⁶ That is: 29 undergraduates, 2 at reserve officer cadets' schools, 1 graduate student.

⁸⁷ That is : 4 pedlars (including one book-hawker), 2 greengrocers, 1 merchant.

⁸⁸ That is: 3 theater actors, 2 orchestra musicians, 1 opera singer, 1 decorator.

⁸⁹ That is: 4 *lycée* teachers, 1 university professor (Sadun Aren, in economics), 1 university lecturer (Mübeccel Kiray, at the Middle East Technical University).

⁹⁰ Including: 1 producer of musical equipment, 1 owner of an oil-cake factory.

⁹¹ That is: 1 Ph. D. and 2 housewives who were university graduates; the other ten were apparently unskilled workers.

— proceeds on the basis that its structure should not be built on the principles of domination by any one class or obligatory leadership by any one party. The front should unite all patriotic forces, including the national bourgeoisie, and work to rid the country of imperialist oppression.”⁹² The TCP generally suited this and other slogans for its front organizations to the then-prevailing mood and situation. During the Second World War its catchword was “an anti-fascist front.” In the decade following the 1960 Revolution the themes of the TCP’s propaganda were: opposition to the West and to capitalist methods of development; support for national exploitation of Turkey’s mineral wealth and for the allegedly persecuted minorities (Alevis and Kurds).

Such views evidently did not make the TCP more popular in Turkey, and anti-communist propaganda continued unabated; indeed, it probably gathered force in the 1960’s. An idea of its scope and tenacity may be formed from reading a bulletin, printed in Ankara, from 1965, called *Komünizme ve Komünistlere karşı Türk basını* (“Turkish press against communism and communists”). Four issues appeared in 1965 and at least six in 1966: they are replete with emphatically anti-communist newspaper articles and extracts. This attitude of much of the press and the activity of the authorities hampered the TCP in its direct propaganda in the 1960’s no less than the 1950’s. Therefore, the TCP propagated its view either through front organizations in Turkey itself, or through the *Bizim Radyo* station⁹³.

These topics, approached and expounded in a Marxist spirit, became quite common in a great many leftist — but not necessarily communist — intellectual circles in Turkey. This is proof, if any be needed, of the partial success of communist propaganda in Turkey. It is therefore often extremely difficult for even an informed observer to know who are communists and who are not; more particularly so, since many leftists, probably including communists, labeled themselves “socialists” after the 1945 switch to a multiparty system — and especially after the 1960 Revolution — to escape arrest and prosecution on a charge of communism. In the following pages we shall attempt to deal with several contemporary leftist groups and organizations, their aims, programs and activities, and point to communist influence, wherever evident.

⁹² Y. Demir and H. Okan, “Turkey: ways of development,” *World Marxist Review*, VIII (5): May 1965, p. 49.

⁹³ Examples in Sayılğan, p. 393 and *passim*.

C. OTHER LEFTIST PARTIES AND GROUPS

There is a striking similarity between the sprouting of leftist groups in the post-1945 and the post-1960 periods. In 1945 communists and others, whose political expression had been bottled up during the era of one-party rule, and tightened even further during the War years, came out in political groupings as soon as the law permitted the formation of new parties. The fact that not a few leftists found refuge in the newly-founded Democrat Party left the rest even more resolute in pursuing their political struggle. In 1960, after a decade during which the Democrat Party had effectively prevented any meaningful open leftist activity — very moderate trade unionism excepted — several leftist groups entered politics (of which the most durable was the Labor Party of Turkey, to be discussed in the next chapter). They used the new approach reflected in the 1961 Constitution which promised unhampered political activity to any group, unless subversive.

After 1945 numerous political groups and associations, and some twenty self-styled political parties were established. Most did not survive, but even their relatively brief existence was important enough to deserve mention. Of particular interest is the serious effort made in the late 1940's by communists and their sympathizers to penetrate urban Turkish youth groups, particularly in intellectual circles — with a special emphasis on students. For instance, in 1946 they initiated a Youth Association of Turkey (*Türkiye Gençler Derneği*) in Ankara, and a similar group in Istanbul, a Higher Education Youth Association (*Yüksek Tahsil Gençlik Derneği*).⁹⁴ Both opened their membership to all Turkish youths, except the enemies of communism, while the Ankara group specifically mentioned the Turanists as not being acceptable. Both aimed at creating an "anti-fascist front."

The Ankara group claimed to have had 206 members, all aged less than thirty-five; while the majority of members were not communists, it appears that an absolute majority of this group's 12-member Executive Committee were known TCP militants. Of the other members, 43 were convicted in 1951–1952 of being members of the TCP. The Ankara group started campaigns "to assist the poor villagers in harvesting" and "to open a clinic for free medical consultation" in Altındağ. These slogans

⁹⁴ Further details in Sayılğan, pp. 260 ff., who also lists the leading members of both groups. See also Tevetoğlu, pp. 582–584 for the first, and pp. 522, 633 for the second.

and others served the propaganda of the Ankara group and its efforts to increase membership. Apparently, it was successful enough to attract the attention of anti-leftists among Ankara University students. In December, 1947, when the students demonstrated against the resignation of Şevket Aziz Kansu, the Dean of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, they destroyed the club of the Youth Association of Turkey. This Association proclaimed its disgust at such violence and its firm intention to continue its activities. Suspected by the authorities of secret contact with TCP leaders and with the World Federation of Communist Youth Groups, the Youth Association of Turkey seems to have ceased all activity, and to have disbanded in 1949.

Much more active, the Higher Education Youth Association appears to have been an offshoot of another Istanbul organization, the "Union of Progressive Youth," an illegal group affiliated to the TCP during the Second World War. The Higher Education Youth Association was legal: its guiding spirits were, however, known communists, and its "basic rules" were modeled after — several were indeed identical to — Değmer's 1945 program for the Front of Progressive Democrats, summarized above. Its membership of 218, largely composed of students of Istanbul University, was apparently more committed to communist affiliation than the parallel Ankara group. Indeed several were among the 167 who were tried for communism in the 1951–1952 trials. Some received prison-terms; others went abroad, to join the activity of leftist Turks in Europe, chiefly in Paris. Nevertheless, the existence of the Istanbul Association continued well into the early 1950's.

The Association's official mouthpiece, the journal *Hür Gençlik* ("Free Youth") chose as its slogans: For free education — Real liberty — Eternal peace. It supported the Turkish Movement for Peace (of which more below) and protested against the arrest of communists in Turkey and Spain, vigorously demanding the release of the Turkish poet Nazım Hikmet. In May 1950, it printed and distributed in all Istanbul quarters 48,000 copies (a huge number by Turkish standards of the times) of a manifesto to this end. The manifesto was a characteristic example of an appeal for the formation of a wide front for obtaining Hikmet's release; again, typically, it was signed not only by leading members of the Association, but also by personalities not connected with it or with communism, including some leading Turkish intellectuals and white collar professionals. All this may well have carried some weight with the authorities, which granted an amnesty to Hikmet later in 1950 (he fled to the Soviet Union the following year, and lived there until his death in 1963).

An even greater indication of the penetration of leftist radical ideas among urban circles was the activity of the "peace movement" in Turkey in the early 1950's. Inspired by a worldwide appeal launched by the Soviet Union in 1950, local peace movements sprouted. This started in Turkey, with the formation in Istanbul in May 1950 of the *Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti* ("The Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers").⁹⁵ The association claimed to be non-political, but its activities paralleled, to a degree, those of the TCP. However, the founders were not all communists, but included hard-core leftists such as Adnan Cemgil, a journalist and erstwhile University lecturer of philosophy, and Behice Boran, then a lecturer in sociology at Ankara University (and a woman of whose activity we shall have much more to say in the next chapter). The Peace-Lovers protested, in July of the same year, Turkey's entry into the Korean War, in a manifesto of which they claimed to have distributed 24,000 copies. As a result, several initiators of the manifesto, including Cemgil and Boran, were arrested, tried and sent to prison in 1951 for short terms (from ten to fifteen months). However their journal, *Barış Yolu* ("The Way to Peace") continued to appear clandestinely. At the time of the Korean War the TCP — both directly and, in a parallel way, via its adherents among the Peace Lovers and other groups — started the anti-United States campaign that was to be a mark of leftist groups in Turkey for the next twenty years.

While these groups were more in the nature of voluntary associations, several leftist political parties sprang up following the political liberalization of 1945–1946 and, more particularly, after the Law on Associations was amended in 1946.⁹⁶ Most did not last long, and some were without much political consequence. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them — albeit briefly — since they were noted by politically-alert Turks at the time and

⁹⁵ Details in Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi (anılar)* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 412 ff. Sayılğan, pp. 266 ff. Tevetioğlu, pp. 584, 624 ff. Darendelioğlu, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 102 ff. Hasan Jelal, "Comunisti e socialisti in Turchia," *Corrispondenza Socialista*, VI (6): June 1965, pp. 302–309. Karpat, *Turkey's politics*, p. 359, calls them *Barışseverciler*.

⁹⁶ The most reliable studies of Turkish political parties are still T. Z. Tunaya *Türkiyede siyasi partiler 1859–1952* (Istanbul: 1952) and K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's politics*, *op. cit.* See also C. H. Dodd, *Politics and government in Turkey* (Manchester: 1969), ch. 2. A. T. Payashoğlu, "Political leadership and political parties. B. Turkey," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, N. J.: 1964), pp. 411–433. D. A. Rustow, "The development of parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political parties and political development* (Princeton, N. J.: 1966), pp. 107–133. F.-W. Fernau, "Les partis politiques de la deuxième république turque," *Orient*, X (3): 1966, pp. 35–59.

have had some impact on the increasing awareness of the left and the interest in its doctrines. In the following pages they are listed according to the chronological order of their foundation.⁹⁷ It should be remembered that these are only some of the groups, calling themselves political parties, which sprouted in Turkey after the Second World War.

The Social Justice Party (*Sosyal adalet partisi*)⁹⁸ was founded in Istanbul on September 13, 1945, with the name of Social Democrat Party, but had to register with a name less similar to the Democrat Party, so they were known by the new one, from February 28, 1946. The party had neither a political structure, nor a regularly-published organ; nor did it participate in the 1946 or the 1950 elections. Indeed, it remained in existence until the early 1950's, without being overly active. Nonetheless, it seems to have been the first legal political party in post-Second World War days to inscribe socialism on its banner. True, the socialism was rather moderate and associated with democracy, etatism and even support for the idea of Pan-Islam. The party's publications show that its etatism was somewhat lukewarm ("etatism is not identical with monopolies"), while its socialism was understood as the defense of the masses of neglected workers, as well as of landless or almost landless peasants. Interestingly the party came out against luxury, by which it meant extravagant wealth.

The Turkish Social Democrat Party (*Türk sosyal demokrat partisi*)⁹⁹ was founded in Istanbul on April 26, 1946. Although it did not have any known political structure, or a regular publication, it did try its luck in a number of elections, apparently without success. It dissolved in 1951 after the death of its founder Cemil Alpay. Its program expressed considerable interest in individual rights, social security and other social matters, including reform in land-holding. Consequently it was thought of as moderately socialist. One of the party's more original demands was to have a Ministry for Workers in the Cabinet, in addition to the existing Ministry of Labor.

⁹⁷ For the parties considered here cf. the chronological report, often based on firsthand experience, of Tekin Erer, *Türkiyede parti kavgaları*, op. cit. (the following vols. appeared as *Yassıda ve sonrası*). See also N. C. Akkerman, *Demokrasi ve Türkiye'de siyasi partiler hakkında kısa notlar* (Ankara: 1950). F. H. Tökin, *Türk tarihinde siyasi partiler ve siyasi düşüncenin gelişmesi* (Istanbul: 1965). Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Forces politiques dans la Turquie moderne* (Ankara: 1968).

⁹⁸ Akkerman, pp. 44-45. Tunaya, p. 693. Tökin, p. 81. Tevetoğlu, pp. 532-534.

⁹⁹ Akkerman, pp. 48-49. Tunaya, pp. 695-696. Tökin, p. 81. Tevetoğlu, pp. 536-537.

The Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye sosyalist partisi*)¹⁰⁰ was founded on May 14, 1946 in Istanbul, by such well-known leftists as Esat Adil Müstecablıoğlu, Aziz Uçtay, and others. The suspicion of the authorities that the founders were communists, and the party's strongly-Marxist program brought about its official closedown in December 1946 by virtue of martial law. The founders were tried for communism and acquitted; the prosecution appealed, but the Court of Appeals upheld the verdict. Consequently, in 1950, the party was revived. As it knew it was being watched, the party had to be very cautious not to lay itself open again to charges of communism. Its activity was hampered by this and, in 1951, in the Istanbul elections, it polled only 220 out of about 175,000 valid votes.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, its organ, *Gerçek* ("Fact" or "Reality"), was read and commented upon. In 1952, the party was closed down again, and its leaders again hauled into court on a charge of disseminating communist propaganda. After an eight-year trial, the accused were acquitted, but the party does not seem to have been reactivated.

The party's program was much more socialist than those of the earlier-mentioned parties, and was explicitly Marxist; this was, apparently, the first avowedly Marxist program of a lawful political party in Turkey.¹⁰² The party claimed to be democratic, nationalist, socialist, internationalist and secularist. Its socialism was expressed in its demands for raising the level of the people's prosperity, culture and health; doing away with economic and social injustice; and raising the dignity of labor. Internationalism was expressed in the party's stand for international cooperation and against so-called imperialist and exploiting blocs. However, this was no mere matter of terminology. The whole party's program, and much of its later writing, was suffused with passionate, yet purposeful, advocacy of socialist principles — as interpreted by Turkish Marxists, and reminding one of earlier communist propaganda in Turkey. Its attitudes and demands included: To develop the country; to safeguard its political and economic independence; to struggle for a world system made up of independent nations; to guarantee work for every Turk, and do away with unemployment; to increase production; to honor private ownership, but nationalize the means of production and large farms; to guarantee that the state would pay workers compensation in case of illness, disability, and old age; to have the state assume responsibility for the care and

¹⁰⁰ Akkerman, p. 49. Tunaya, pp. 696-701. Tökin, pp. 81-82. Sayılğan, pp. 271-272. Tevetoğlu, pp. 538-541. Darendelioğlu, II, pp. 100 ff.

¹⁰¹ Karpas, *Turkey's politics*, p. 358.

¹⁰² The basic principles of the party are reprinted in Tunaya, pp. 698-701.

education of children, building of new hospitals and schools and enacting of a broad social security law, forbidding the employment of children, guaranteeing freedom of expression — in thought, speech, printing, strikes and demonstrations; to ensure that these freedoms would not be restricted by law; to ensure full liberty of conscience, independence of religion, secrecy of correspondence and freedom of travel; to guarantee free and compulsory elementary education, to be conducted in the mother tongue;¹⁰³ and free high school, technical and higher education; to obtain from the state maximum assistance for needy families; to fight gambling, crime and alcoholism; to secure help for the chronically-ill in body or mind; to form cooperatives with state support.

Subsequent paragraphs in the party's program dealt gingerly with political matters, avoiding commitment as to the details of the political regime desired by the party. The emphasis was laid on Turkey's being a republic, on increased powers for the National Assembly and on new judicial bodies.

The Turkish Socialist Workers' Party (*Türk sosyalist işçi partisi*)¹⁰⁴ was founded on May 24, 1946, in Istanbul. It was a moderate group, with social, rather than socialist, demands; it was inactive, publishing no organ and establishing no branches out of Istanbul. Apparently the party closed down the same year. One of its avowed aims was to oppose communism (and presumably offer an alternative to it). Other aims were to establish cooperatives, and improve the general conditions of workers and of their families — while safeguarding the rights of private ownership.

Of greater consequence was the Socialist Party of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (*Türkiye sosyalist emekçi ve köylü partisi*).¹⁰⁵ The name had already been used, years before, for a communist group. Established on June 19–20, 1946 in Istanbul, it counted among its founders several known communists, notably, Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, who was also to be the Chairman and Secretary General of the new party's Executive Committee. The party put out a periodical, *Sendika* ("Trade Union"), and was supported in part by another, *Yığın* ("The Masses"). Accused of communist propaganda, the party was dissolved by an order

¹⁰³ This would imply alternatives to Turkish — the party's favoring of minority rights?

¹⁰⁴ Akkerman, p. 50. Tunaya, p. 701. Tökin, p. 82. Tevetoğlu, p. 542.

¹⁰⁵ Akkerman, pp. 51–52. Tunaya, pp. 704–706. Tökin, pp. 82–83. Sayılğan, pp. 271 ff. Tevetoğlu, pp. 547–576. Tekin Erer, *Türkiyede parti kavgaları*, esp. parts IV–V. Корниенко, pp. 108–109.

of the martial law authorities on December 16, 1946, and its leaders brought to trial.

Despite its brief six-month existence the party was not without impact, due to the vigorous campaign it led in writing. Its proclaimed aims were not basically different from those of the Socialist Party of Turkey. Its program,¹⁰⁶ later elaborated in the periodical which supported it, *Sendika*, called for guaranteeing workers a decisive say in internal and external politics; struggling against fascism and reaction and protecting workers and peasants from all types of exploitation; guaranteeing national independence by buttressing national and democratic organizations; assisting the conditions for the institution of a socialist society in Turkey, by helping the masses of workers and peasants to join ever-growing economic and political movements; eradicating exploitation and putting all means of production under the joint control of the whole nation; ensuring, within a socialist democracy, a high standard of living and a happy life for every individual. Until the above is within reach: the abolition of all laws which were against the interests of the workers; forming trade unions, socio-economic and cultural associations, clubs, evening reading-rooms, and assisting the same, for the sake of the masses; organizing the workers and peasants of Turkey, as well as those who agree with them, on the social plane, against local and foreign types of capitalist exploitation and against political pressures; guaranteeing for all workers, according to progressive democratic principles, sanitary working conditions, the right to collective bargaining, social security and the protection of trade unions.

This program is as Marxist in its conception as that of the Socialist Party of Turkey, established five weeks earlier; if anything, more outspoken. It is not clear why two socialist parties, with closely resembling platforms, should have been formed in Istanbul at almost the same time — unless, perhaps, because of personal differences of opinion among the founders. Indeed, negotiations were afoot for a merger when both were declared illegal. What is evident, though, is that despite their short span of activity, both parties left a mark on several leftist intellectuals who were connected with the parties, read their publications and then discussed their views. Indeed, many of these views were repeated, and others echoed, in the leftist journals of the 1960's. The Socialist Party of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey particularly emphasized pro-

¹⁰⁶ Extracts of the program in Tunaya, pp. 705-706. Summary in Karpas, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 362 ff.

paganda. In bulletins sent to them only, party members were urged to persuade suitable people to join the party, by presenting it to them as a pioneering and progressive new group.¹⁰⁷

The Independent Turkish Socialist Party (*Müstakil Türk sosyalist partisi*) was founded in Istanbul on September 19, 1948.¹⁰⁸ Although it was established about two years after the above-mentioned socialist groups, and had an almost free hand — as the others had been dissolved or were inactive — it appears to have been of little consequence. It distributed manifestoes, in 1949, in some of the provincial towns, and participated passively in the 1950 general elections. With these exceptions, however, it was generally inactive and appears to have disbanded soon after, following the death of its leader and founder Arif Oruç.

The party's program intended to reform the existing regime, without jolting the national structure, by establishing a socially-just and economically-fair structure. It proclaimed that it was socialist, and that its socialism was for the good and would not harm the people. Nonetheless, it demanded that unused land and properties of over three hundred dönüms be divided and distributed among landless peasants capable of working it. Other demands were: to fight against all forms of exploitation; to use Turkey's natural resources for the profit of its people; to increase productivity everywhere; to guarantee decent pay and working conditions — according to socialist principles — to all workers, peasants, officials and employees; to safeguard personal liberties, as well as the freedoms of conscience, thought, speech, writing, assembly and religion.

Despite the varying degrees of emphasis and the different order of priorities, there are certain remarkable similarities in the programs of the socialist groups in the late 1940's, and those set up in the 1950's, such as the short-lived *Vatan Partisi* ("Fatherland Party") in 1954. It was not a coincidence that all were established in Istanbul and were active there, for this was Turkey's intellectual and industrial center. More characteristic, Turkish socialism at the time, although paying lip-service to Marxist definitions of an overall revolution, generally deferred this upheaval (implicitly or explicitly) to some future date. In the meantime, they insisted on more immediate socio-economic and political reforms. Indeed, the Turkish left of the 1940's (perhaps with the exception of the TCP) was decidedly reformist rather than revolutionary. We shall attempt to

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Karpat, *ibid.*, p. 365, for further details.

¹⁰⁸ Akkerman, pp. 60, 81–83. Tunaya, pp. 735–736. Tökin, p. 85. Tevetoğlu, pp. 627–628.

examine, in the next chapter, how these two tendencies developed and crystallized in the following years.

One point to ponder in this context is¹⁰⁹ that in the Turkey of the 1940's and 1950's, it was generally unwise for parties and individuals alike to express liberal ideas and defend them — as this made them liable to be labeled “leftist” and “subversive”; parties would consequently lose political ground, while individuals might well be prosecuted by law. Indeed, there was often no distinction between liberal and leftist ideas. As a result, the Communists and some socialist groups monopolized practically all the demands for socio-economic reform; short-cut solutions were presented in simple, straightforward language, frequently with a deep sentimental undertone. Since Marxist ideology was the only one, at the time, to define Turkey's socio-economic problems and offer solutions, some intellectuals embraced Marxism as fashionable, while others accepted it, *faute de mieux*. Hence the intensive journalistic activity of Marxist intellectuals in the 1960's; hence, also, the intensive political activity of the Labor Party of Turkey.

¹⁰⁹ As elaborated by Karpat, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 368–369, 385–386.

LAWFUL MARXISM: THE LABOR PARTY OF TURKEY

a. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

The leftist parties so far discussed were either illegal, or ephemeral, or both. The Labor Party of Turkey (further: LPT), or *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (translated literally, "The Workers' Party of Turkey"), has been the largest and most durable of legal socialist parties in Turkey; it has participated actively in national and local elections and published numerous propaganda tracts. A detailed analysis of its workings and ideology is necessary in order to understand the nature of the Turkish left.¹

The formation of the LPT in 1961 was, firstly, the culmination of previously short-lived attempts at establishing legal socialist parties. Secondly, it reflected the more liberal mood towards political radicalism intimated in the 1961 Constitution, for example its emphasis on the "social" character of the Second Turkish Republic.²

The rise of the LPT should be understood not only in the light of its Marxist commitment, to be examined later, but also within the context of Turkish politics. Turkey's sprawling size, its more than 40,000 villages — large and small — as well as the special laws governing elections, caused each party after 1960 to intensify its propaganda, extend its local organization and strive to outbid its competitors, all of whom were seeking the support of very much the same type of people. Although political participation cannot be said to embrace the entire population, it steadily increased in the multiparty period after 1946, under the eager prodding of competing political parties. Like other political parties, the LPT has tried to infiltrate the civil service and many professional organizations.³ The fact that some, such as the chambers of commerce, were practically closed to it, served to goad the LPT into intensifying its attempts to

¹ In addition to the party's own publications and those of its supporters and detractors — to be referred to below — see also K. H. Karpat, "Socialism and the labor party of Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, XXI (2): Spring 1967, pp. 157-172. Tökin, pp. 107-108. Sayılğan pp. 379-404. All these, however, get no further than the mid-1960's.

² See above, ch. 1.

³ See, *inter alia*, A. T. Payaşlıoğlu, "Political leadership and political parties. B. Turkey," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, N. J.: 1964), esp. pp. 423 ff.

infiltrate, and even dominate, other institutions — such as trade unions and student organizations.

We shall first describe the establishment and fortunes of the Labor Party of Turkey and then analyze its ideology.⁴

February 13, 1961 was the deadline set by the officers' National Union Committee for the registration of parties intending to participate in the projected general elections. It was on this day that the LPT was set up and duly registered. Its founders were a dozen trade union leaders; this is noteworthy, for earlier socialist parties in Turkey had been established and led by intellectuals. In this case, however, the trade unionists felt that Türk İş's policy of abstaining from politics was not the best way to promote and safeguard the interests of workers. They believed that an organized political party, suitably represented in the coming parliament, was a considerably better guarantee.

Although the twelve founders came from different trade unions, they did not act as their representatives. All twelve lived in Istanbul and were relatively young⁵: At the time only two were over fifty (52 and 58), and only three were over forty (41, 46, and 48), while all the others were younger (one 33; four 35; one 38 and one 40). Their average age was just 41.3 years. They apparently valued their trade unionist activity at least as highly as their leadership of the LPT. Some were even reluctant to give up their former membership in another political party; the LPT's first chairman, Avni Erakalın (a textile workers' trade unionist) preferred to remain a member of the New Turkey Party and resigned from the LPT.

⁴ While the LPT's views have been discussed by several Turkish scholars, its history and political activity have had much less attention. Still valuable for the LPT's earlier years is K. H. Karpat, *op. cit.* in *MEJ*, XXI (2): Spring 1967, pp. 157-172. In Turkish, see Sayılan, ch. 16. Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ve siyasi bilimler açısından 1965 seçimlerinin tahlili* (Ankara: 1966), ch. 8. Kemal Sülker, *100 soruda Türkiye'de işçi hareketleri* (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 68 ff. The party's own pamphlets are a useful source, as are publications about the party by its supporters, e.g., Murat Sarıca and Nurkalp Devrim, *Türkiye işçi partisini tanıyalım* (Istanbul: 1969). No less important are some publications of LPT's detractors, e.g.: Kenan Öztürkmen, *Türkiye işçi partisinin iç yüzü* (Istanbul: 1965). İçişleri bakanı Dr. Faruk Sükan *perdeyi araladı. İşte TIP* (Ankara: 1968). N. C. Yamakoğlu, *Ben bir TIP'li idim* (Istanbul: 1968). A. M. Uludoğan, *Türkiye işçi partisi işçinin partisi değildir!* (Ankara: 1968).

⁵ Name, address and year of birth of each in *Türkiye işçi partisi tüzüğü* (Ankara: 1961), p. 34. From the start these trade unionists appear to have been in contact with Turkish intellectuals, about the establishment of the new party. See Luciana Castellina, "Una forza politica che nasce dai sindacati: motivazioni e obiettivi del partito operaio turco," *Rinascita* (communist weekly, Rome), XXII (4): Jan. 23, 1965, pp. 13, 15.

Several others were under pressure from their unions to resign from, or at least be inactive in, the LPT; for many leading union members still favored the continuation of the traditional Türk İş conception of a strong pressure-group in parliament, which would be above the party struggle.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the LPT did not — or could not — participate in the 1961 general elections, the first held under the new constitution. There was therefore no LPT representation in either house of parliament, until it obtained what later proved to be ephemeral support in the Senate. First, Esat Çağa, a Senator appointed by the President of the Republic, joined the LPT; however he left the Senate in 1963 at the end of his term.⁶ On February 10, 1963, another Senator, Niyazi Ağırnaslı, who had been elected to the Senate from Ankara on the RPNP ticket, switched to the LPT. He later resigned from the party; the LPT maintained that he had embarrassed it by a visit he paid to Eastern bloc countries.

The man who changed the character of the whole party and turned it into an active political force was Mehmet Ali Aybar. He was unanimously offered the chairmanship of the LPT by its founders and accepted it on February 1, 1962, when he was fifty-two⁷ and already an active and well-known socialist. Born in Istanbul to a father who served in the regular army, Mehmet Ali Aybar studied at the prestigious *lycée* of Galatasaray, then graduated at Istanbul University's Law Faculty. Later, he continued his legal studies in Paris, where he also became better acquainted with Marxist literature. He did not practise law, but became a senior lecturer (Turkish: *doçent*) in the same faculty in Istanbul. However his academic career was marred by his leftist tendencies, and it was interrupted in 1946. Aybar appears to have started his political writing in earnest in Ahmet Emin Yalman's daily *Vatan*, in 1945; he then wrote articles criticizing Turkey's one-party system. A year later, he started publishing a weekly in Istanbul, *Hür* ("Free"). When this was closed down by the martial law authorities, Aybar continued his oppositionist writing in the Izmir weekly *Zincirli Hürriyet* ("Liberty in Chains"). His writing caused offence to both the President and the government of Turkey; he was tried and sentenced to imprisonment, but was soon pardoned following the 1950 amnesty. He then practiced law in Istanbul, but continued his

⁶ Esat Çağa became chairman of LPT's Ankara branch, but resigned from the party on May 19, 1964. His *İstifa mektubu* ("letter of resignation") (N. p. [Ankara]: 1964) states the reasons for his action: differences of opinion with the LPT over its Cyprus policy; he was for supporting the Turks.

⁷ According to another report, he was born in 1912, not in 1910.

political writing, agitating against Turkey's participation in the Korean War.⁸ Prior to the 1960 Revolution, Aybar took part in youth protests against the government and was again arrested.

Because of his strong personality, legal training, writing experience, political agitation, and his well-known stand for socio-economic reform, Aybar was a natural choice for leader of the newly-formed Labor Party of Turkey, when its founders fell out with one another. Formally nominated as LPT chairman in 1962, Aybar was responsible (along with several associates) for the party's general direction, its growth, successes and failures. His approach was not only more radical than that of the founders; it was also more energetic and purposeful. For example, in their press release of February 8, 1962⁹ — announcing Aybar's appointment to the chairmanship — the founders still spoke of "basic reforms" in rather general terms. Aybar was more specific, from the start.

Led from 1962 by Aybar and a group of intellectuals with a Marxist philosophy, the LPT encountered difficulties in broadening its scope of action anywhere outside the larger towns — in establishing branches and attracting the popular support. Not surprisingly, perhaps, many workers were wary of the new party, whose theorizing was often highbrow and too complicated for their understanding.

The leadership set about organizing it on modern lines, setting up central bodies, founding branches and preparing for future elections — after failing to take part in the general elections of October 1961. Aybar started work in 1962 by making an extensive tour¹⁰ of Eastern Turkey, where he delivered speeches and founded LPT branches in six provinces.

Only in the beginning of 1964 did the LPT leaders feel secure enough of their control of the party to convene its first countrywide congress, which met in Izmir on February 9 and 10, 1964, and was quite an impressive affair.¹¹ The 52 delegates (out of the expected 76) were so divided among themselves that the party officials had a decisive majority. Delegates were all members of the Central Executive Committee and Central Control Committee (the Party's Court of Honor), or of the equivalent bodies in the provinces; there was also one provincial delegate for every 1,000 registered and paid-up members (obviously, very few). By then, the

⁸ For a selection of his writings in this period, see M. Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, demokrasi, sosyalizm: seçmeler, 1945-1967* (Istanbul: 1968), *passim*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-194.

¹⁰ A 3,600 km. tour, acc. to *Le Monde*, June 16, 1962. For the 1965 elections Aybar is said to have traveled almost 6,000 kms.

¹¹ Described by Sayılğan, pp. 382 *ff.*, as well as by other sources.

LPT had quite a few branches in the towns and districts (*ilçe*) but not in the villages — since the Party Law of the Second Turkish Republic forbade it. In the convention hall there were some 200 guests from various political and other associations, reportedly including a fair sprinkling of secret police. After several welcoming speeches and congratulatory messages the agenda of the congress was agreed upon, and Aybar delivered the opening address. His speech gave a sense of purpose and direction to the LPT in subsequent years.

Characteristically, Aybar declared that the party's task was to work to solve the neglected problems of the people. The most severe of these problems, as he saw them, were: the productive capabilities of the people were not being used; covert unemployment had reached five and a half million in agriculture and one and a half million in industry; until the Turkish labor force was gainfully employed, Turkey would remain a backward society; Turkey's balance of payments had a deficit of 430 million dollars; its system of taxation had grave deficiencies and discriminated against the workers, whose standard of living had hardly risen; although a fairly large number of workers were members of trade unions, they were only on the threshold of political awareness; despite the new constitution and its guarantees, only a hero dared to utilize the promised freedoms, such as that of expression — because of the government's policies. Aybar then promised that the LPT would be alert in defending the constitution, demanded a just share of the national income for every citizen, called for immediate land reform and for Turkey's speedy industrialization. He maintained that victory in the war for political independence had been followed by defeat on the economic front, as expressed in the growing power of the large landowners. Aybar concluded by casting doubts on the government's sincerity in its avowed intention to bring about reforms, and pointed out that the budget had allocated nothing to this end.

Among those who took part in the general debate which followed were ex-Professor Sadun Aren, who had been arrested in 1951–1952 as a communist suspect; Fethi Naci, an editor of and frequent contributor to *Ant*; Yaşar Kemal, also of *Ant* fame, a gifted Turkish bestseller writer, with several provocative novels of rousing social content, portraying the plight of the Anatolian peasant, to his leftist credit;¹² and Behice Boran, ex-lecturer in sociology. Aybar's speech and these others obviously in-

¹² Seven years later, in July, 1971, Yaşar Kemal was sentenced to a prison term for his extreme leftist activity.

fluenced the "program of action" adopted by the congress: Turkey's natural resources were sufficient for the country's development; the basic cause of its backwardness was the private ownership of capital; the death penalty and other anti-democratic laws should be abolished; land-holdings of over 500 dönüms (a dönüm equals about a quarter of an acre) should be distributed to the landless.

At the end of the congress, elections were held for the 13-member Central Executive Committee and for the 28-member Central Control Committee. The former included Aybar as Chairman, Rıza Kuas (a prominent trade unionist leader from Ankara) and Cemal Hakkı Selek (a lawyer from Izmir) as General Secretaries, and Behice Boran. Six of the thirteen were workers. The latter committee included Senator Niyazi Ađırnaslı and Sadun Aren. Aybar was unanimously re-elected as Chairman of the party. Obviously, the party leaders and members of the central bodies had succeeded in imposing their views on the congress and in retaining control of its decision-making organs.

The second general congress was held in Malatya in November 1966. It was a much larger affair, and was attended by 196 delegates from 40 provinces.¹³ Several modifications were introduced in the party's regulations and there were a few changes in the personal composition of the central bodies, but the basic occupational division was preserved. The 13-member Central Executive Committee, elected on November 1966, comprised the following people.¹⁴

1. Mehmet Ali Aybar, Chairman, born in Istanbul in 1910, lawyer and lecturer in law at Istanbul University, party Chairman from February 1, 1962, and a Member of the National Assembly from 1965.

2. Sadun Aren, born in Erzurum in 1922. A professor of economics in Ankara, he abandoned his academic career for politics. Joining the LPT in 1963, he was one of the party's most prominent members, and served during the years 1965-1969 as an LPT Member of the National Assembly (for Istanbul).

3. Şaban Yıldız, an active trade union leader. Born in 1915. He was one of the founders of the LPT and its first Secretary-General. In 1967 he was chairman of the important Istanbul branch of the party.

¹³ Apparently not all branches sent delegates, for several weeks later, in February 1967, the party's Secretary-General, Nihat Sargın reported that LPT branches existed in 59 (out of 67) of Turkey's provinces. See *Ant*, 7: Feb. 14, 1967, p. 11.

¹⁴ Chiefly based on Sargın's above report, *ibid.*, and Nebiođlu's *Türkiye'de kim kimdir*, *op. cit.*

4. Rahmi Eşsizhan, a factory worker and trade union organizer. Born in İzmir in 1917. He was the chairman of the İzmir branch and a member of several of LPT's central bodies.

5. İbrahim Çetkin, a lathe-turner and trade union organizer. Born in Kandıra in 1927. He set up the party organization in Kocaeli and was a member of some of the party's central bodies.

6. Minnetallah Haydaroğlu, a lawyer from Ankara. Born in 1916. He joined the LPT in 1962 and served in the party's central bodies.

7. Nihat Sargın, a physician, was born in İstanbul in 1926. At İstanbul University, he was active in student affairs; for a period of ten months in 1946 he published *Hür Gençlik* ("Free Youth"), a student journal. He was arrested and tried for having written against the despatch of Turkish forces to Korea, but his sentence was quashed.

8. Rıza Kuas, born in Kocaeli in 1922 and already mentioned as a trade union leader (he was chairman of the rubber industries trade union), was one of the founders of the party. He served in the party's central bodies, and from 1965 was an LPT Member of the National Assembly (for Ankara). Simultaneously, Kuas continued to be active in Türk İş and later become a central figure in DİSK (as of February 1967).

9. Behice Boran, one of LPT's chief ideologists, was born in Bursa in 1910. Long involved in politics, even while a lecturer in sociology at Ankara University, she had been a contributor to various leftist journals in Turkey, an initiator of the already mentioned Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers, and a protester against the despatch of Turkish troops to Korea (for which she was sentenced to 15 months in jail). She joined the party in 1962 and from 1965 to 1969 served as an LPT Member in the National Assembly (for Urfa).

10. Kemal Nebioğlu, a trade union organizer, an LPT founder, and in 1966 a Secretary-General of the party. Born in Rize in 1926. Served in several of LPT's central bodies, and at the same time was a central figure in DİSK (as of February 1967).

11. Burhan Cahit Ünal, a lecturer in theoretical physics at Ankara University. Born in Balıkesir in 1930. He joined the LPT in 1964 and was a member of several of its central bodies.

12. Tarık Ziya Ekinci, a physician. Born in Lice in 1922. He joined the party in 1963 and soon became one of the central figures in its Diyar-

bakır branch. In the years 1965 to 1969, he was an LPT Member in the National Assembly (for Diyarbakır).¹⁵

13. Şaban Erik, a trade union organizer and Chairman of the union of railwaymen. Born in 1926. He joined the party in 1962 and served in several central bodies; from 1965 an LPT Member in the National Assembly (for Malatya).

As in the Committee from 1964 to 1966, six of the thirteen members of the LPT's Central Executive Committee were workers. The others were intellectuals and professionals. Several had served in the former Central Executive Committee, and six out of the thirteen, including Aybar, were also LPT Members of the National Assembly.

While they came from all parts of Turkey, from Istanbul to Erzurum, their age-group was roughly the same. In 1967 they were between 37 and 57 years old. Aybar and Boran were 57, three others between 50 and 52, while the remaining eight were younger, between 37 and 45.

It became known only later that this leadership was bitterly divided within itself by a combination of ideological differences and personal rivalries. From the LPT's foundation, the official policy of the party was to achieve power in Turkey by parliamentary means. The staunchest advocate of this policy was Aybar himself. However, there were factions in the LPT that disagreed and became more vocal after 1966. The National Democratic Revolutionaries (NDR) (*Millî Demokratik Devrimciler*) faction accused the LPT — and particularly Aybar — of revisionism. Their leaders were "old socialists," who maintained that the revolutionary strategy should aim at a national and democratic uprising against imperialism. In 1966 they were expelled from the LPT, which had a different interpretation of socialism,¹⁶ and warfare broke up between the two camps.

Prominent among the NDR group was Mihri Belli, who was the ideologist of this small but determined group;¹⁷ this and other articulate groups were active, in the name of radical labor, *outside* the LPT, a serious matter. Their organs were *Türk Solu*, *Aydınlık*, and *Ant* (in its later

¹⁵ For some of Ekinci's views, see his article in *Ant*, 17: Apr. 25, 1967, pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ See details on the rift in Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41. That the quarrel was going on as late as 1970 seems to indicate the threat of the NDR to the LPT. See Hüseyin Ergün's lengthy defense of the LPT's version of socialism and strong attack on the NDR's in the newly-established socialist monthly *Emek* (Ankara), 3: Aug. 1970, pp. 55-84.

¹⁷ As recorded in M. Belli's book *Millî demokratik devrim*, *op. cit.*

years).¹⁸ These groups and their journals not only competed with the LPT among the same circles of intellectuals; but by their extremism, they bolstered the party's left against the somewhat more moderate Aybar-led wing, which they accused of bourgeois tendencies.

In foreign policy, the party leadership could not reach a consensus over the Cyprus issue. A still more damaging conflict within the LPT leadership occurred, however, in 1968, after the "Czechoslovak spring" brought about the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. While accounts about what happened in the LPT vary, it is clear that, no less than in leftist parties elsewhere, the LPT was confused and shocked by the Soviet move. Aybar spoke out against the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces. At the local convention of the Istanbul branch of the LPT, in November 1968, he came out for a new ideology, a "humane socialism" (perhaps under the influence of Garaudy), especially suitable for Turkey. This is described as a "libertarian" Turkish socialism—preserving the so-called "bourgeois liberties;" by these terms, Aybar understood the separation of powers, etc. The more dogmatic LPT leaders, Behice Boran, Sadun Aren and Çetin Altan, took a diametrically-opposed view of socialism and of the party's way, and accused Aybar of unscientific "populism." The 41-member Central Control Committee supported Aybar in crucial votes over this issue,¹⁹ and he was re-elected Chairman of the LPT. In an extraordinary party congress at the end of December 1968, the group led by Aren and his associates obtained 11 out of the 41 votes of the Central Control Committee. This was still a victory of the Aybar faction, but his all-embracing authority had been undermined. The 13-member Central Executive Committee dissociated itself from this vote and published a statement (*bildiri*) in which it maintained that it was not bound by what Aybar might say, unless the speech was first cleared with the Central Executive Committee.²⁰ Murat Sarıca and several others worked for a compromise, but failed. The rift widened, several LPT deputies and local organizations of the LPT siding with Aren and Boran, even though Aybar for a while maintained his hold on the party.

The rift in the party leadership, and the fact that the rift became public knowledge, was probably the worst thing that could have happened to

¹⁸ Cf. the two perceptive (albeit hostile to the LPT) articles of Orhan Türkdoğan in the Ankara weekly *Devlet*, 6: May 12, 1969, pp. 6-7; 7: May 19, 1969, pp. 6-7.

¹⁹ Acc. to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1969, by 37-4.

²⁰ İ. Giritli, *Fifty years of Turkish political development*, op. cit., pp. 154-156. Id., "Turkey since the 1965 elections," *MEJ*, XXIII (3): Summer 1969, pp. 357-358.

the LPT. We shall see²¹ that this affected adversely the party's fortunes in the 1969 general elections to the National Assembly. Following the party's failure in the 1969 elections and the strife within its central bodies, Aybar resigned from his functions in the LPT on November 15, 1969, and next day Mehmet Ali Aslan was elected party Chairman.²² He was soon after succeeded by the above mentioned Şaban Yıldız, then by Boran. The LPT leadership grew increasingly aggressive in its pronounced Marxism, perhaps in order to forestall further rifts — such as a group of self-styled “Proletarian Revolutionaries,” who published an irregular bulletin in 1970, *Öncü: Devrimci TİP Haberleri* (“Vanguard: News of the Revolutionary LPT”).²³ They strongly opposed what they termed “The Boran-Aren clique,” and later seceded from the party.

Early in 1971, the LPT intensified its activities in, for example, its “Say No to Fascism” demonstrations. In February 1971 it was taken to court by the authorities, which demanded the party's shutdown. The charge was that in the LPT's congress in October-November 1970 decisions had been passed in favor of the Kurds (i.e., supporting the recognition of their separate entity, consequently anti-constitutional) and in support of communism (therefore, a violation of the constitution as well as of paragraph 141 of the penal code). Although the party lawyers fought well, in the mood prevailing after the March 12 military Memorandum there was strong public feeling against the LPT. The Constitutional Court decided unanimously to suppress the party (July 20, 1971) and to ban forty-one of its officials, for five years, from setting up a new political party. Meanwhile, early in June 1971, LPT leaders were arrested,²⁴ and several brought to trial: Behice Boran, Şaban Erik, Sadun Aren, and others. In October, 1972, a military court in Ankara sentenced fifteen to prison terms ranging from twelve and a half to fifteen years.

Because of the quarrels in the LPT's leadership and the ensuing rift, in its later years party membership appears to have declined. While no definite or official figures of the total party membership are available, it seems that in 1965–1967, it reached a peak of over twelve thousand,

²¹ In ch. 7, below.

²² *Varlık Yılığ* 1971, p. 247.

²³ Published in Ankara by İlhami Aras. 1: May 1970; 2: July 1970.

²⁴ Eighty-eight people, acc. to *İttihad* weekly, 186: June 7, 1971, pp. 13–16. For the trials, see, e.g., *Yankı*, 75: Aug. 21–27, 1972, p. 17.

including some five thousand in Istanbul,²⁵ but this number fell off after the 1968–1969 rift.

As for a detailed breakdown of party membership, some very interesting data have been provided by two different sources, using roughly the same materials. The first is LPT leader Behice Boran, in a recent book,²⁶ relating to the occupations of party members.²⁷ According to a count of 11,804 forms filled out by those seeking admission to the LPT, party membership could be divided as follows:

Workers	27.4%
Artisans and tradesmen	26.3%
Agricultural laborers	9.0%
Small farmers	17.0%

Boran does not say what the occupations of the others were, but it is reasonable to assume that the remaining fifth was largely made up of professionals. However white-collar workers had a relatively weightier role in the various party bodies.

Our second source is the research carried out in May 1968²⁸ by members of the LPT's Scientific and Research Council (the same body whose data were used by Boran²⁹) on a slightly larger number of membership cards — 12,695. The results were published early in 1969. According to the published data,³⁰ the overall picture is not very different; it is, however, more detailed and instructive. The following tables illustrate the distribution of membership by areas³¹ and their origin by type of locality.³²

²⁵ As reported to me by Professor Murat Sarica, of Istanbul (a leading LPT member), in a conversation on September 15, 1970. This tallies roughly with the estimate for 1964 of K. H. Karpat, "Society, economics and politics in contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, XVII (1): Oct. 1964, p. 66, of approximately 10,000 members from the trade unions. This implies others who were not trade unionists.

²⁶ Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve sosyalizm sorunları* (2nd ed., Istanbul: 1970), p. 161, n. 3.

²⁷ Unfortunately, Boran gives no date for this information, but it appears to refer to the late 1960's.

²⁸ Indeed, one wonders whether it is not one and the same study.

²⁹ Which raises, again, the question in the preceding footnote.

³⁰ Presented by Doğu Perinçek in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, 3: Jan. 1969, pp. 205–226; also summed up by Ataöv, *op. cit.*, in *TYİR*, VIII: 1967 (publ. 1970), pp. 101 ff.

³¹ Perinçek, *ibid.*, pp. 206–208.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 224, table 14.

TABLE 7. LPT MEMBERSHIP, BY AREA

<i>Region</i>	<i>LPT membership, 1968</i>		<i>Total Population</i> ³³	
Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean	7,986	62.91%	12,200,871	38.86%
Central Anatolia	2,019	15.90%	8,041,579	25.62%
Black Sea	1,094	8.62%	4,819,338	15.35%
East and Southeast Anatolia	1,596	12.57%	6,329,633	20.17%
Total	12,695	100.00%	31,391,421	100.00%

TABLE 8. LPT MEMBERSHIP, BY AREA AND TYPE OF LOCALITY

<i>Type of locality</i>	<i>Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean</i>		<i>Central Anatolia</i>		<i>Black Sea</i>		<i>East and Southeast Anatolia</i>		<i>Total</i>
Cities	4,839	60%	1,261	63%	306	28%	564	35%	6,970
Small towns ³⁴	975	13%	198	9%	185	17%	617	39%	1,975
Villages	2,172	27%	560	28%	603	55%	415	26%	3,750
Total	7,986	100%	2,019	100%	1,094	100%	1,596	100%	12,695

In 1968, of the party membership 62.91% came from the Marmara-Aegean-Mediterranean region, that is Western Turkey, an area with only 38.86% of Turkey's population. In the other three regions, the LPT had a much lower proportion of members, compared with the total population, because a majority of the LPT's membership came from cities or larger towns. Further, Western Turkey is the country's most urbanized region. Another reason is that this area is the most industrialized in Turkey and probably has more politically alert workers. However, as Professor Ataöv has aptly pointed out,³⁵ the party succeeded less, proportionately, in recruiting members in such western industrial centers as Zonguldak, Karabük and Ereğli than in underdeveloped areas in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. There and in the Black Sea region, a large share of its membership obviously came from smaller localities — which was the prevalent type of settlement.

Also of interest (and roughly confirming the data adduced by Boran, above) is the number of bureaucrats and intellectuals among party

³³ Acc. to the 1965 population census. No exact data are available as yet for 1968.

³⁴ Or *kasabas*, townlets with a population of less than 10,000 inhabitants.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, in *TYIR*, VIII: 1967, p. 101.

members, totaling 1,367 in 1968.³⁶ These included 94 lawyers, 51 engineers and architects, 38 journalists, 32 professors and other teachers, 31 physicians and dentists, and 59 miscellaneous: actors, painters, sculptors, stage-directors, cartoonists, writers and musicians.³⁷

We have already seen that intellectuals — not surprisingly — had a disproportionate share in the party's policy-making bodies. According to a recent study,³⁸ it seems that on the province and district level, those bodies were composed of intellectuals, artisans and workers.³⁹ In the party's central organs, however, intellectuals (chiefly members of the free professions) were often in a majority⁴⁰ and certainly held the key positions. Moreover almost all were men of higher education; most workers on the central bodies had completed a *lycée* or vocational school.⁴¹

We shall now consider the LPT's formal regulations (Turkish: *tüzük*).⁴² Prepared in 1961, they were only slightly modified later.⁴³ They filled eight pages, comprising thirty-four paragraphs. Altogether, they were not very different from organizational rules adopted by other Turkish political parties in the republican era — and these may have served a model for the twelve trade unionists, when they established the Labor Party of Turkey in 1961. They had also to conform to prevailing laws on the establishment of associations. The LPT's 1961 regulations appear to have remained in force until the party's dissolution in 1971.

They start by asserting that the Labor Party of Turkey was established according to the Associations' Law and that it is a political association. Its central office is in Istanbul, but may be moved to Ankara, if the party's central bodies so decide. The goals of the party are to bring about the realization of the principles enunciated in its program: To have all Turks enjoy prosperity and social security, administer themselves without having to depend on others, and carry out their historic role in the world.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 142, table 48.

³⁷ Perinçek, *op. cit.*, in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, 3: Jan. 1969, p. 218.

³⁸ Artun Ünsal, "TİP yönetim kurullarının sınıfsal yapısı," *Ant*, 12: Apr. 1971, pp. 54-69.

³⁹ Further details *ibid.*, pp. 54-61.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63 for more detailed data.

⁴¹ Details *ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴² *Türkiye işçi partisi tüzüğü* (Ankara: 1961).

⁴³ As in 1968, when the extraordinary LPT convention added the term "socialist" as characteristic of the party.

Concerning membership, whatever a person's material situation, he or she, if dedicated to the concept of democracy, may join the party. The party is open to all Turks, especially intellectuals, workers, peasants, officials, artisans and small tradesmen. The conditions for joining the LPT are: a minimum age of eighteen; agreement with the party's principles and preparedness to work for them; Turkish nationality with complete civil rights; recommendation in writing from the party members; payment of monthly dues — a minimum of TL 2 and a legal maximum of TL 10; and membership in no other political party at the same time.

The party's organization consists of: the general congress (*büyük kongre*), the party council (*parti meclisi*), the party's central executive committee (*parti merkez icra komitesi*), the party's parliamentary group (*parti meclis grubu*), the party's central and provincial control committees (*merkez haysiyet divanı ve il haysiyet divanları*),⁴⁴ local conventions (*ilçe ve il kongreleri*), and local executive committees (*ilçe ve il idare kurulları*).

The party Chairman (*parti genel başkanı*) represents the party, presides *ex officio* over the first meeting of the general congress and all those of the central executive committee. Should he be elected President of Turkey, he would be considered as having resigned from the party. When the post falls vacant, a member of the party council, elected by secret ballot, fills the post until the next general congress.

The party council is the most important body of the party between general congresses. It directs, and is responsible for, all party activity. It comprises no less than 120 members, including all former party chairmen, the chairmen of the provincial administrative organizations and control committees. The party council meets at least once every six months; it may be called into extraordinary sessions by the party Chairman or central executive committee. A third of the party council makes up a quorum. A simple majority vote of those present suffices for decision-making. From among the members of the party council, a Secretary-General and a 13-member central executive committee are elected; both are responsible to the party council.

The central executive committee directs party activity when the general congress and the party council are not in session. The Secretary-General serves as the link between the central executive committee and the two other bodies.

⁴⁴ The exact rendering of the Turkish term would be "disciplinary committees" or "courts of honor."

The control committees supervise the decisions at all levels of the party's official bodies. They can discipline members by warning them and by temporary suspension from the party or by ousting them permanently.

The party holds conventions at the local level and general congresses at the national level — the former annually, the latter biennially; extraordinary ones may also be called. The general congress is opened by the party Chairman. The general congress alone is competent to modify the party's regulations and program, examine its accounts, approve its budget, and decide on its dissolution (the latter only by a two-thirds majority). It elects the party Chairman, central control committee and party council. It examines the party's activities and sets guidelines for its future.

Party activities are financed by dues, by contributions and by other means, such as lotteries, shows, concerts, balls, wrestling-matches, races, trips, and other competitions or entertainment;⁴⁵ party badges or membership-cards. Local branches are expected to forward funds to the central executive committee. Money is kept in the banks and strict accounting is kept. Interestingly, that is practically all that one knows about the party's revenues. No reliable data are available about the financing of LPT activities, nor for that matter on other Turkish political parties.⁴⁶

An examination of the ideology of the Labor Party of Turkey⁴⁷ is essential not only for a better grasp of what this party was really fighting for, but also for a clearer picture of the characteristics of the Turkish left and the nature of its radicalism. However, this is more complicated than it may seem. A serious difficulty is that the party never had a regular organ of its own. True, upon its foundation it published a bulletin, *Sözce*,⁴⁸ but this contained mainly organizational matters, along with some declarations on policy — but no ideological discussion. Later, *Sosyal Adalet* ("Social justice"), although not an official organ of the

⁴⁵ These are definitely not the usual ways socialist parties raise funds. One may assume that they were detailed in the Regulations to dispel any suspicion of financial assistance from abroad.

⁴⁶ Works discussing this have dealt mainly with the legal aspect. See A. N. Yücekök, "Siyasi partilerin masraf denetimi," *Sbfd*, XXVII (2): June 1972, pp. 65-81.

⁴⁷ Perhaps the most detailed and balanced analysis to date is in Yıldız Sertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 293 ff. The drawback of Sertel's analysis is that she sometimes glosses over differences and discrepancies between the programs and the opinions of the party leaders.

⁴⁸ For which see *International Affairs* (Moscow), VII (9): Sep. 1961, pp. 112-113.

party, closely reflected its views and opened its pages to the opinions of LPT leaders. It appeared in Istanbul as a weekly from March 19, 1963 and as a monthly from April 1964; the last issue was that of November 1965. The name of the periodical characterized its general tone — an insistent demand for social justice. The LPT's point of view was explained and defended, party activities reported, and the speeches of party leaders reprinted. Further, *Sosyal Adalet* published articles by such LPT spokesmen as Aybar, Aren, Boran, Senator Niyazi Ağırnaslı, trade-unionist Kemal Türkler, Professor Türkaya Ataöv, and writers or journalists such as Aziz Nesin, Fethi Naci, Mahmut Makal, and others. Subsequently, other magazines espoused the LPT cause, either in part or completely. One of these was the monthly *Emek*, published in Ankara during 1970 by party Secretary-General, trade unionist Şaban Erik. *Emek* presented LPT views in lengthy elaborate articles, on a variety of economic and socio-political themes.

b. IDEOLOGY

These periodicals have to be combined with many other materials for an analysis of the party ideology. One may best start with its official programs which however do not always agree with the pronouncements of the party leaders, another important source for understanding the LPT's ideology.

The first platform of the Labor Party of Turkey, published and distributed in 1961 in a 16-page booklet⁴⁹ divided into a preamble and six chapters, is indicative of the party's views and goals upon its foundation.

The preamble affirms that the Labor Party of Turkey is the best defender of rights and freedoms of the people — indeed the party itself is one of the basic institutions of a democratic regime. The LPT considers that its political struggle should be altruistic and worker-oriented; the struggle is aimed at greater progress and freedom. It sees every person as the possessor of rights that may not be revoked or suppressed because of color, race, religion, language or sex; consequently, no discrimination can be tolerated. Peace in international relations, creative work, knowledge, and deep love for human beings are the party's targets.

The first chapter is named "State, republic, government and justice." This is subdivided into sections on each of the first three, and a discussion

⁴⁹ *Türkiye işçi partisi programı* (Istanbul: 1961).

of justice. The LPT sees the Turkish Republic as a state built on democracy, secularism, and social labor. Within this republic, the Turkish people has unlimited and unconditional sovereignty. It is the duty of the state to solve all economic, social and scientific problems — with a view to improving the conditions of life, in liberty. The LPT's principle is that government should be of the people, by the people and for the people. All Turks should be equal in their rights and opportunities. As to justice, this is demanded vigorously: open trials in all courts, presumed innocence of all accused until guilt is proved, abolition of the capital penalty except for offences explicitly specified in the military laws, reform of prisons and separation of imprisoned children from adult convicts, absolute independence of judges, facilitation and hastening of court procedures, doing away with all laws modeled on fascist patterns and not in the penal codes of the most advanced democracies.

The second chapter deals with education. The party calls for free education, supported by scholarships for the needy. Equal educational opportunities should be offered both to children and to adults, in village and town alike. Evening courses for workers should be opened, as well as new universities for the people. All these should be secular institutions. Primary schooling should be expanded in scope and lengthened by the addition of a grade; high schools should offer courses in technical and commercial subjects, as well as in the liberal arts. The products of this education would be lovers of mankind and, at the same time, active and healthy.

The party is also in favor of increasing research activities, intended to deepen scholarly and cultural life and to promote economic and social development. Similarly the party encourages all cultural, scholarly and artistic work, including radio, television and sports (which, however, should not be commercialized). Factory workers, who have not had the benefits of an education, should receive general and professional instruction. For all these citizens, a special effort should be made to translate foreign works into Turkish.

Economics is the subject of the third chapter, which is also the longest and most detailed. The LPT's goal is to organize the national economy in a way that will accelerate production and guarantee a just distribution of income and wealth. To achieve this aim, all economic enterprises should be coordinated and directed by society as a whole and all means of production utilized. Natural resources, banks, electric power and certain other enterprises should either be nationalized or brought under public control. The LPT believes in assisting old and new private enterprises

with credits, provided they benefit the economy; costs and prices should, however, be closely controlled. Planning is needed to end the waste of labor and prevent overt and covert unemployment. As for agriculture, the party wants to bring water, light, roads, schools, doctors, and all services to the villages, and to do away with the status of landless peasants. The government should distribute land to the peasants and assist them in choosing the most rational and profitable employment. Considering the proportionately large number of peasants in Turkey, a modern land-holding system should be set up by law — agricultural cooperatives should be established, agricultural insurance instituted, all land speculation, in towns and villages, prevented, and, most important, reforms in land holding should do away with the *ağalık*.⁵⁰ The LPT will also help the landless peasants who have migrated to the cities, and strive for the introduction of industries into rural areas. Forests belong to the public and should be protected and used accordingly. As for industry and mineral resources, the LPT stands for industrialization, for which sacrifices are needed from the whole Turkish nation, not just from certain classes. Minerals belong to the people, and new laws must regulate their extraction and distribution in Turkey and abroad. In finance and commerce, the party calls for the stabilizing of Turkish currency and more supervision of commerce.

The fourth chapter is on taxation. The LPT demands that taxes be general and that no class be exempt. An income adequate for conducting a decent life for every Turk should be tax-exempt. The party wants the abolition of all taxes on consumer goods. The tax-rolls should not serve for political pressures on individuals. Taxes on moving, inheritances and buildings should be estimated at the real value. Taxes should be calculated in a manner that would ensure a more equitable division of income.

A rather lengthy fifth chapter is devoted to social policies — mainly housing and development. It starts with an affirmation that the duty of the state is to guarantee conditions of work for everyone. Minors, mothers and elderly persons should be provided with suitable work. Special provision should be made for the unemployed. The rights and interests of all those individuals and groups who work have to be protected, for example by trade unions; Turkish trade unions should be allowed to join any international labor organization. No limitation on the right

⁵⁰ *Ağalık* is the system whereby the *ağas* or quasi-feudal large landowners not only hold large estates, but lord it over the peasants in those estates.

to strike or on collective bargaining should be imposed. A country-wide social security system must be instituted. The party maintains that the freedom of thought, knowledge, speech, press, movement, research and artistic expression should be completely unrestricted. Health services, so widely needed, should be nationalized. The duty of the state is to plan a modern equipped apartment for every family — and do away with the *gecekondus* in the cities; speculative building should be forbidden and the construction of luxury houses restricted; the erection of low-cost housing for inexpensive rental should be encouraged. Development works should be financed from the general state budget or a special one. All public works should be kept free of political intervention, through overall planning by an independent department with specially earmarked funds.

The last chapter deals with internal and external politics. The LPT aims at domestic policies based on the national will, as expressed in democratic elections. In foreign relations, the party supports the idea of world peace and the independence of all nations. The party also supports international disarmament and active international cooperation.

The LPT 1961 program reflects much more than the personalities of its formulators. True, the fact that all twelve founders of the party (who signed this program) were active trade unionists left its mark on the unexpectedly short discussion of external politics. The emphasis is on internal matters, including a reference to the trade unions and their important role. Moreover, the party founders and leaders were concerned from the very beginning with its image. It was particularly important for them to avoid the label of communism, another reason for the brevity and general tone of the sixth chapter — that devoted to external politics. Furthermore, even internal affairs centered on well-known grievances in the socio-economic field, with hardly any mention of politics, except repeated quotations from the writings of Atatürk. Even the remedies which the party had thought up for socio-economic ills were generally cautiously phrased. The recurring panacea of state control and planning, although it certainly had Marxist overtones, was accepted as respectable in Turkey and, indeed, had been widely practiced and advocated by the Republican People's Party, both in government and in opposition. The LPT's radicalism was subdued and bound up with admiration for Turkey's past, hope for its future, and love for all mankind. Although nationalization was mentioned several times, it was usually in relation to Turkey's natural resources, without going into specific details. The single notable exception was reform in land-holding which was manifestly

connected with a direct attack on the ownership rights of the rich landed *ağas*.

In subsequent years, with the change in leadership and the party's participation in several electoral campaigns, the ideology did not essentially change,⁵¹ but its radical character became more pronounced and more dogmatically formulated. This was particularly the case after Aybar and several other intellectuals joined the party. What appears to be the party's next program⁵² was a much more detailed 166-page book, presented and approved by the LPT's 1964 general congress. It appears to have remained in force until the party was closed down in 1971.

The new program reaffirms that the party is a political organization that strives to achieve power by lawful means. It gives a general description and Marxist analysis of Turkey's economic, social and political situation. The frank conclusion it reaches is that Turkey is an underdeveloped country with very inadequate technological means of production. It has, however, the human potential for progress. The program then deals with Turkey's socio-political structure, which it characterizes as capitalistic and hardly altered since medieval times. Its conclusion is that a radical change in the social structure is necessary — to be brought about by enlightening the masses and endowing them (under LPT leadership) with a broad share of political power. Only then would democracy, as formulated in the 1961 constitution, cease to be an empty word. The road to development requires nationalization of the larger means of production, government investment in industry, reform in land-holding, relating education to economic development, eradicating unemployment, friendly international relations, and ceasing the exploitation of man by his fellow.

The program then lays down a series of "basic concepts" (*temel ilkeler*): a. A scientific basis for all policies; b. Democracy in everyday life; c. Planned etatism;⁵³ d. Populism and republicanism; e. Revolutionism; f. Nationalism; g. Opposition to all kinds of exploitation; h. Support for peace; i. Secularism, freedom of conscience, religion and thought; j. Private property; k. Attention to the needs of one's fellow men. Although somewhat lofty (like the oft-repeated desire to fight exploitation and reaction, or a reaffirmation of the dignity of work), this is all reform-

⁵¹ See K. H. Karpat (ed.), *Political and social thought in the contemporary Middle East* (London: 1968), pp. 358-360.

⁵² *Türkiye işçi partisi programı* (Istanbul: 1964). Reprinted in Ferruh Bozbeyli, *Parti programları*, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-367.

⁵³ The term *devletçilik* is used.

ist rather than revolutionary. For instance, emphasis is put on the rights of private property and inheritance — which the party promises to respect.

The last chapter is entitled “Where shall we bring our compatriots?” This is approximately half the program and lists the reforms which the party aims at in the economy, industry and mining; artisanship; commerce, banking and insurance; the financing of development; justice; labor and social security; education; culture and art; health, housing; transportation; the press, radio and television; tourism; foreign relations and national defense. The party’s purpose of bringing prosperity to all Turks is restated although it emphasizes the interests of the workers and peasants, for whom the right of collective bargaining and striking is demanded. Again, although the promise of a change for the better is prevalent, its tone is usually moderate, except in the economic field. Far-reaching land reform by a radical redistribution of land is demanded as well as state control of a sizable part of the not sufficiently productive private sector.

Then and later, commentators in Turkey pounced on the 1964 program of the LPT and maintained that it contained elements of communism and contradicted the 1961 Constitution. One anti-LPT book⁵⁴ on this subject ran through at least three editions in one year. This, however, is less immediately relevant than the fact that, as of 1964, the party had a cogently written-down ideology.

Some of the materials officially published and distributed by the LPT and its main spokesmen afford us further insight into the main components of the party’s ideology. It will be observed that not all the parts making up the 1961 and 1964 programs received equal emphasis. It is a fair assumption that those points which were stressed often are the really important ones — at least insofar as the rank and file of the LPT and Turks outside it grasped the party’s ideology.

For example — a look at a 1963 handbill about the LPT’s main goals.⁵⁵ In just one page, the party lists five cardinal points of faith: a. We believe that the highest value is in a society of labor; we are against the exploitation of one man by another. b. We are in the forefront of the Turkish working-class and watch over the rights, freedom and interests of all the working masses; thus we guard the truest interests of the Fatherland. c.

⁵⁴ Avni Elevli, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi programı ile anayasaya aykırıdır. Kurulmak istenilen yeni düzen korkunçtur* (1st, 2nd and 3rd ed., Istanbul: 1968).

⁵⁵ *T. İ. P. nin amacı* (Ankara: 1963).

We want the national income divided according to effort (work). d. We want a planned-state system, favoring the workers and carried out by them. e. We work for a peaceful foreign policy, founded on friendly relations with all states, on an equal footing and prizing our own national existence and independence above everything.

While the above sound like catchwords or slogans, the LPT also knew how to elaborate. One example may be found in a series of fifteen lectures delivered over the state radio by LPT representatives before the November 1964 Senate elections, later reprinted by the party in a 95-page booklet.⁵⁶ They were by the party chairman, Aybar, other party leaders such as Senators Niyazi Ağırnaslı and Esat Çağa, the party's Secretary-General at the time, Dr. Orhan Orsal, the writer Yaşar Kemal, and several party activists from all over the country. While the lectures evidently had different emphases, a markedly radical denunciation of exploitation prevailed, in the spirit of "on one hand spending, on the other poverty!"

Another guide to LPT thinking appears in the party's reply to a questionnaire. On July 28, 1965, that is, just before the October 10, 1965 general elections to the National Assembly, three Turkish Youth Associations (Tarım Gençliği, İşçi Gençliği, Yüksek Öğrenim Gençliği), grouped in the National Association of Youth in Turkey,⁵⁷ sent a 38-point questionnaire to all the competing political parties. The JP and NP did not respond, but the others did, and their replies were printed by these Associations.⁵⁸ The LPT's replies to the questionnaire were straightforward enough. After asserting that youth is the most progressive force in Turkish society, the party laid down its views on Turkish youth and plans for it, under three main headings — rural, urban, and university youth.

In the section dealing with rural youth, the party's replies demanded the reopening of "village institutes" (*köy enstitüleri*),⁵⁹ to prepare teachers for rural schools. Graduates of these institutes should be given

⁵⁶ *Türkiye işçi partisi radyo konuşmaları. Yurt sorunları ve çözüm yolu* (Ankara: 1964).

⁵⁷ This was an umbrella for youth organizations. See J. S. Szyliowicz, "Students and politics in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, p. 162, n. 24.

⁵⁸ Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı, *Gençlik partilere soruyor* (Istanbul: 1965).

⁵⁹ An original educational project, set up in 1940, to train village youngsters, then send them back to their villages as instructors. The LPT wanted its resumption both for their educational value and as a possible propaganda channel for its own ideology.

opportunities to continue their studies in institutions of higher learning. According to location, groups of villages could enjoy such services as a health center, sportsground, library, cinema and theater; when necessary, health teams and mobile libraries could tour the villages. Equal opportunities should be given to village children — by scholarships and dormitories — to reach the highest positions; and everything should be done to remove handicaps originating from their having been born in a rural environment.

As to urban youth, the party maintained that equal opportunity in all stages of education should be a guiding principle. Consequently, the number of scholarships and possibilities for dormitory facilities should be increased. Similarly, the LPT considered it imperative to open evening schools and universities for working youths, to help them develop their abilities and advance their position in life. Facilities for sports, entertainment and recreation should be established for youth.

University youth was so important for the party that its consideration of this group is lengthier than the two previous ones combined. The LPT's first demand, in this context, is for a sizable increase in the number of students by the opening of new universities in various parts of Turkey. The curricula should be re-examined, with the country's needs in mind. So that students can get the feel of the problems of the people, they should spend the summer vacation working in factories or fields, with government scholarships or pay. The universities themselves should set up sport and cultural facilities in the country for their students. For working people, evening-universities ought to be established and increased in number, so that these people may advance educationally and professionally.

Although it succeeded less than it had expected in the 1965 general elections to the National Assembly, the LPT felt sufficiently encouraged to carry on. Its ideological platform does not appear to have undergone any substantial change in subsequent years, but it was set forth with greater self-assurance. A clear sign of this was the party's printed attacks on the government and on the JP, the party to which all the Cabinet ministers belonged; in these attacks, the LPT set its own ideology against that of the JP. For instance, in a one-page handbill,⁶⁰ the LPT accused the Turkish government of dishonesty and of subverting the truth. The handbill stated that the government, in its new program, had asserted that it would remain neutral in relations between workers and employers,

⁶⁰ T. İ. P., *Olayların başlıca sorumlusu HÜKÜMET'tir* (N. p.: n.d. [1966]).

and that Turkey would consequently be a "social state." The LPT challenged the government's claim that contemporary Turkey had earned the title of a social state and denied the government's contention of a neutral stand in labor relations. The party reminded the government that the new Turkish constitution had charged the state with the duty of protecting the worker. The LPT maintained that very many workers were hard pressed financially — in face of unchanging wages and daily rising prices. This, the LPT claimed, was a situation that ought to be changed by radical, comprehensive action. The party stood for a different approach to the workers and the poor, opposing, for instance, the use of the security forces for evicting *gecekondu* dwellers, and then keeping them in jails for months on end.

The defence of the poor masses as the backbone of LPT socio-economic ideology is evident in other publications, such as the 4-page "LPT reveals the facts."⁶¹ In this leaflet, the LPT accused the JP of having done nothing, seven months after the October 1965 elections to the National Assembly, to fulfill its election promises. It had failed to lower prices, institute labor exchanges for the unemployed, open a credit for every Turk who wanted to own a home, make the *gecekondu*s habitable, introduce equity into taxation, and improve the financial resources of workers. The JP had not taken the side of the workers in the strikes that had occurred in those months. It is the LPT that cared about these matters and looked after the interests of the workers. The LPT, then, presented the protection of workers' interests as the main pillar in its ideological structure. It is in this light that it subsequently catalogued the party's efforts and deeds, e.g. its struggle (in the National Assembly and outside it) for the nationalization of petroleum and other minerals for the public benefit; its opposition to the eviction of *gecekondu* dwellers; its siding with the interests of the masses in the parliamentary debate on the budget, and its resisting bills harmful to the workers. In addition, the party had prepared and submitted bills of its own, which it maintained were all intended for the good of the people: a land-holding reform act, a land tenancy act, a petroleum act, an unemployment insurance act, an embracing old-age pension act. This, they claimed, was the way to work for an independent, progressive Turkey.

Of more than passing interest is another LPT one-page handbill, published soon after in the Ağrı province (near Turkey's eastern frontier)

⁶¹ *Türkiye işçi partisi gerçekleri açıklıyor* (N. p.: n.d. [1966]).

and addressed to "Our suffering brethren."⁶² The sheet emphasized that the LPT was the only party that would save landless peasants or those that had but little land, unemployed workers, low-paid officials, and others. While this is not necessarily original, what is relatively new, at least in emphasis, is the party's proclaimed intention to struggle for the development of what it calls "backward eastern Anatolia" (a sensible promise, obviously, in the Ağrı province). Also remarkable was the handbill's addressing the Kurds, Lazes and Circassians, together with the Turks, and asserting that the party opposed any discrimination against minority groups and considered them equal partners in Turkey. In so doing, the LPT broke one of the taboos of Turkish politics in the Republican era, that is, it brought the minorities into the center of the political struggle. Turkish governments have made efforts to integrate the Kurds and other smaller national minorities into the Turkish body politic, and all parties have consistently avoided interfering. For years, Turkish authorities have maintained that they had no minority problem, and almost no minorities for that matter (the Kurds were called "Mountain Turks"). It would appear that the furor which the LPT handbill occasioned in governmental and other circles would suggest that complete integration is still on its way. The LPT seems to have sensed that it touched a raw nerve and increased its support for minority groups in subsequent years — making it appear that complete integration of all minorities, and the cessation of alleged discrimination against them, is a part of the LPT's ideological platform.

The incident illustrates certain points of emphasis in LPT ideology, as well as new tactics employed after the 1961 and 1964 programs of the party. These points, however, are mostly incidental and do not join together in a comprehensive and coherent ideology. In order to obtain a fuller picture of the LPT's political ideology, together with its socio-economic fundamentals, one ought to turn to the writings and speeches of the spokesmen of the party in the 1960's. Unfortunately these pronouncements do not always follow the same vein and sometimes show differences of approach — not necessarily contradictory, but at times incompatible and reflecting differences of background and temperament. Again, several wrote in more general terms than others. Of the spokesmen, one may begin with some of Professor Murat Sarıca's work. For instance, in a lecture interpreting the LPT's ideology,⁶³ Sarıca, after a dutiful attack

⁶² T. İ. P., *Çilekeş kardeşler* (N. p. [Ağrı?]: n.d. [1966]).

⁶³ Murat Sarıca, *Toplumcu açıdan halkçılık-milliyetçilik-devrimcilik* (İstanbul: 1966).

on capitalism, strives to prove that the LPT is for populism (*halkçılık*), because it opposes capitalist penetration of underdeveloped countries — Turkey included. However, as the LPT sees it (according to Sarıca), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) also plays an important role in its program, the LPT understanding it as the joint life in Turkey of all compatriots, without regard to their religion, language, or origin. As for the LPT's attitude to revolutionism (*devrimcilik*), Sarıca recalls that Turkey's War of Independence was a revolution in itself; today, the party maintains, there is a great need for social revolutionism, directed against exploitation.

C. AYBAR, AREN, BORAN, AND ALTAN

Other LPT spokesmen have treated the party's ideology in more detail and at greater length. They are Mehmet Ali Aybar, Sadun Aren, Behice Boran, and Çetin Altan. A full account of their socio-economic and political ideas must await the historian of contemporary thought in Turkey, but one may at this stage analyze some of their radical ideas on the Turkish political scene, which were adopted by the Labor Party of Turkey. Although perforce selective and incomplete, it is hoped that this brief account will provide some help in understanding certain radical currents in contemporary Turkey.

Mehmet Ali Aybar was so closely identified with the LPT from 1962 on, that it is not always easy to distinguish between his own view and those of the party in these years. We will therefore refer here only to those opinions presented and subscribed to by him personally. In addition to several radio lectures and party pamphlets which he signed, there is a useful selection of his articles and speeches, characteristically named "Non-dependence, democracy, socialism."⁶⁴ The 672-page volume includes selections from the years 1945 to 1967, arranged chronologically, each article and speech annotated with source and date. Almost five hundred pages refer to his LPT activities and are of interest to us.

Aybar was nominated party Chairman by the LPT's founders on February 1, 1962. One week later a press release was issued on the matter.⁶⁵ On February 9, 1962, Aybar came out with a statement of his

⁶⁴ Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, demokrasi, sosyalizm: seçmeler, 1945-1967*, *op. cit.* For a Marxist critique of this work, see Muzaffer Erdost, "Türkiye sosyalizmi" ve sosyalizm (Ankara: 1969), pp. 7-89.

⁶⁵ Reprinted by Aybar *ibid.*, pp. 191-194.

own to the press.⁶⁶ In it he forcefully stated his interpretation of Turkey's current situation and listed his principles for dealing with it. Although he was to elaborate on them in later years, these briefly enunciated views may well have served as guidelines for future action. Aybar maintained that Turkey was in the middle of a grave crisis, whose roots lay in the country's history and of which political uneasiness was only a superficial sign. Turkish society could not be truly civilized, so long as it was burdened with a medieval economy. Speedy industrialization was the solution — as agriculture, too, ought to be based on strong industry and advanced technology, to reach the level suited to Turkey's needs. Absolute non-dependence on others is a condition for the advance of science and technology. In order that the working masses could have a decisive say in these and other matters, a political force should be established. The aims ought to be: etatism and planned economy, on the one hand, and a decisive role in Turkey's life for the popular masses, on the other. The LPT program — Aybar added — maintains that only a union of working intellectuals with other workers could advance Turkey along the road of contemporary civilization. It was impossible to separate the demand for a human standard of living for the working popular masses from the demand for letting them have a decisive say in the affairs of their homeland; these were but two sides of one demand. He summed up by saying that the small LPT, by working steadily and scientifically for Turkey's highest interests, could step in and fill a void in the recently-created democratic order, and reach a position of great power.

Stripped of the rhetoric, this meant that the working-class should take matters into its own hands and reach a position of power to save Turkey by industrialization and planning, and thereby also improve the workers' standards of living. Put together, this was the theme of LPT aims under Aybar's chairmanship. Obviously, an ideological framework was needed to rationalize and explain them, and Aybar's writings and speeches went a long way towards one.

Nurtured by his Marxist reading in France during his studies there, Aybar's dialectical approach was simplistic, and seems to have allowed only for "right" and "wrong," "good guys" and "bad guys", with nothing in-between. The LPT stood for social justice (*sosyal adalet*), others were against it; even if they employed the term — then very much in use — this was only lip-service.⁶⁷ The LPT was for overall economic plan-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

⁶⁷ M. A. Aybar, *Türkiyeyi adalet partisi kalkındıramaz* (Istanbul: 1966). This is the text of his speech in the National Assembly.

ning and etatism, for the benefit of the masses, including reform in land-holding, equitable taxation and widespread education. Its opponents (mainly the JP) were for private enterprise, allied to foreign investments aiming at exploiting Turkey's natural resources and at developing areas convenient to this exploitation, not necessarily consonant with Turkey's interests.⁶⁸ The workers, led by the LPT, were the defenders of democracy and the constitution; their opponents were capitalists using fascist laws.

As Aybar saw it, the only possible way to break the vicious circle of economic crises was to enable the Turkish workers to control the means of production for their own interests and the interests of Turkey — not for foreign markets.⁶⁹ A planned economy directed by the working masses would do away with exploitation, bring about extensive reform in land-holding and develop Turkey's poverty-stricken areas. The LPT wanted private enterprise to continue, but not to predominate. This is "an open regime," one of complete equality, as the LPT understood it, without a preferred minority.⁷⁰ In other words, the Turkish worker should get his share of the national income.⁷¹ Aybar considered this true democracy and the only safe way to defend Turkey from fascism.⁷²

All this — and much more — hinges on what Aybar's concept of socialism, Turkish style, really was (or what he wanted it to be). In this respect, a recent pronouncement of his, delivered in Ankara on February 15, 1968, appears to be a fairly detailed exposition of his views.⁷³ Elsewhere, he had labeled socialism as the "philosophy of life."⁷⁴ He had also honestly sounded a note of warning, that "there is no ready-made recipe for socialism."⁷⁵ In the long discourse under consideration, "socialism" is, for Aybar, the regime that puts an end to exploitation and grants man real liberty. In Turkey, such a regime could be established only after a struggle: when the LPT comes to power, it would liquidate the capitalist regime and establish socialism.⁷⁶ This could be achieved only through

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* and Aybar's *Hodri meydan* (Ankara: 1967). This was another speech by Aybar in the National Assembly.

⁶⁹ Aybar, *Bağımsızlık...*, pp. 200 ff.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 217 and *passim*.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 211–212.

⁷³ "Türkiye sosyalizmi," *ibid.*, pp. 639–668.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 308 ff.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 476–481.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 639.

sacrifices;⁷⁷ special efforts were necessary for socialism to succeed, for Turkey still was “an Ottoman-type state.” The LPT was a completely new party, with different party regulations and a new program. The difference lay in the party’s concept of socialism, which Aybar explained in detail.⁷⁸

The main characteristic of Turkish socialism was change, directed at the current capitalist regime, with its three elements — the *ağas*, the compradors, and the American-type bureaucrats — all three working to the benefit of American imperialism and international capital. These elements doubled their wealth and influence annually, while the working classes suffered greater unemployment, landlessness and poverty. Turkish socialism — led by the LPT — aimed at fundamental changes in the present regime in Turkey, which it considered bad and unjust, and the establishment of another in its place. Politics is a struggle for existence, a fight between the exploiting and exploited classes. This struggle was carried out under the aegis of the constitution, within an equilibrium of forces that typified the democratic way. The constitution sided with the people and guaranteed their social rights. However, the ruling coalition of *ağas*, compradors and American-type bureaucrats did not apply these paragraphs of the constitution. The JP strove for the amendment of the constitution — thus aiming to legalize what Aybar labeled the “usurping regime.” The present regime contradicted the constitution; changing the regime was to uphold the constitution. Bringing the working popular masses to power — by voting the LPT in — was the only way to obey the constitution and save the situation.

According to Aybar, the first matters to be attended to by the working popular masses, led by the LPT, to bring about a socialist Turkey, were the following:

a. Reform in land-holding. According to the provisions of the constitution, land should be redistributed to landless peasants and to those not owning enough land. This should be taken away from the *ağas*; each individual *ağa* should possess no more than 500 dönüms, and no more than 100 dönüms in those areas where plenty of water was available for agriculture. All land above this maximum, as well as state land that was not being worked, would then be redistributed to the peasants free of charge. State agriculture stations would be established throughout Turkey, to offer technical advice to those peasants who wanted it. Peasants who so desired might join cooperatives. It was a lie to say that the

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 662.

LPT wanted to make the peasants serfs on the land. On the contrary, it aimed at making each peasant the owner of his land — which had formerly belonged to the *ağas*.

b. Nationalization of foreign trade and insurance. These branches were the mainstay of capitalism. Imports and exports should be regulated by the state, in a manner that would control prices and prevent the flight of hard currency from Turkey. These policies would reflect favorably on internal trade, too. Nationalization of banking and insurance was equally necessary for breaking down the current corrupt regime. In a socialist Turkey ruled by the LPT, foreign trade, banking and insurance would be nationalized immediately, for these measures were closely connected with reform in land-holding and the taking over by the state of industrialization. Such measures would put an end to harmful speculation and direct credit to the productive popular elements. Nationalization of private insurance companies would enable the establishment of social security.

c. Speedy economic development, based on rapid industrialization. This was a *sine qua non* for the progress of society. It could not succeed in underdeveloped countries through private enterprise which, anyway, had no desire to undertake this — private enterprise being interested only in gain. Private enterprise was after more profitable industries, as well as foreign trade and the erection of luxury buildings. When it came to power, the LPT would see that the workers and the state set up heavy industries, including the production of machine tools, and build new factories. In our times, the “center of gravity” of the national economy should be in the public sector. The maintaining of this gravity in the private sector would be harmful to the popular interests. An LPT government would create new branches of industry, through the state agencies employing the most suitable techniques.

The private sector should be maintained, but it should be bound up with the development planning. Nobody thought of abolishing the private sector, but it would not be permitted to exploit the people. It would be encouraged to invest in suitable projects which would serve the national development. This was the type of private sector envisaged by the Turkish constitution. Since the center of gravity would then be with the workers, there was bound to be a continuous improvement of the living standards of the workers, needy peasants, small traders, artisans, and clerks — all of whom were now barely existing.

Side by side with increasing state revenues, the LPT in power would work for a systematic change in the present unjust distribution of income.

In a society where the highest income is 22,000 times the lowest, there was neither democracy nor justice, and there could be no development. Salaries, fees, profits and taxes would be readjusted to fit the concept of "everyone's income according to everyone's work." This would also mean a progressive income tax scale. The changes of the regime would be associated with basic reforms, in order to put an end to "usurping capitalism." This would go together with driving away the *ağas*, compradors, and American-type bureaucrats. Turks were called on not to allow the compradors to be their partners in exploiting petrol, borax and Turkey's other national resources. Finally, all treaties tying Turkey with NATO should be abrogated.

The concluding paragraphs of Aybar's article on how the LPT viewed socialism in Turkey were aptly entitled "Socialism and books." The main thesis was that socialism was the sole way to liberation — both for Turkey as a country and for its working, needy and suffering people. The constitution, too, upheld this idea. Socialists considered it their duty to go to the people and awaken them, organize them within the LPT, and assist them to gain power. Consequently, whatever socialism might mean, members of the LPT should know their goal well. This was so because on their shoulders lay the historic responsibility of establishing socialism in Turkey. Before everything else, LPT members should understand that socialism was not an easy matter to grasp. In order to establish socialism they should know well the historical facts and evaluate them properly. Socialism could not be established by decisions written in books and repeated around a table; LPT members should remember that its establishment was an extremely difficult and serious matter. Undoubtedly books taught one the basic ideas of socialism. However, in order to establish socialism, it was not sufficient to be strictly bound to whatever was written in books. This attitude was alien to socialist thought and always led to harmful results — because every society had its own characteristics, based on its history. Every society is distinguished by its own particular historical conditions, and these should be evaluated before establishing socialism. The LPT believed that there was no place to establish socialism by "bookishness," imitation and dogmatism. In order to establish socialism, the LPT had to know Turkey's historical circumstances and socio-economic conditions. They should understand the conflicts between classes, consider internal and external factors, conduct research among the working masses, organize them, and as a result preserve the weight of the workers in the balance of political forces. In other words, the LPT should be writing the book of socialism, based on knowledge.

After all, new theories were born and new books were written. Members of the LPT, faced with the responsibility of founding socialism in Turkey, were not content with knowledge that was buried in books, but considered books as half-open doors.

Aybar concluded, somewhat dramatically, "Our way is the socialism of Turkey... We shall certainly establish a democratic, socialist Turkey with our calloused hands and our enlightened heads. And the people will smile for the first time."⁷⁹

Aybar's comprehensive interpretation of socialism and of its role in Turkey is illuminated and amplified — but not basically changed — in his other articles and lectures. While these reflect tactical shifts of emphasis, the fundamental demand is restated that working people should live like human beings — not only for their own sake,⁸⁰ but for the sake of democracy in Turkey.⁸¹ The working people are the best fighters against the exploitation of capitalism, and the staunchest bulwark against fascism.⁸² In the name of social justice,⁸³ Aybar called for the opening of the class-struggle which, as a true Marxist, he knew to be inevitable. He also had no doubts about the final victory of the working masses, aided by the intellectuals⁸⁴ — with the consequent socio-economic changes.⁸⁵ However, contrary to many other Marxists, including even several within his own party, Aybar steadfastly maintained that the victorious outcome of the class struggle in Turkey should be achieved by the working class' coming to power by parliamentary elections. Indeed, he labeled as "scandalous" press reports that the LPT was preparing a revolution and claimed that, on the contrary, it had always adhered to constitutionality.⁸⁶ He frequently emphasized these points to rebut charges of communism leveled at the LPT by its political rivals; and he stood by this concept even in the difficult days after the 1969 elections, when the LPT had secured only two seats in the National Assembly. Along the same lines, in a speech on the Cyprus problem on September 6, 1964, Aybar stated that his party was against Turkey becoming a satellite of either the

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 668.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 220 *ff.* and *passim*.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 225 *ff.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 227–228.

⁸³ *Sosyal adalet* (then a frequently employed slogan, as well as the name of the leftist monthly, in which Aybar had often written the editorials from its appearance in March 1963). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 232, 254.

⁸⁴ E.g., *ibid.*, p. 233 and *passim*.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 249–253.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, e.g., pp. 381–382, 554 *ff.*

United States or the Soviet Union⁸⁷ (the speech, indeed, is a scathing attack on NATO,⁸⁸ but not a criticism of the Soviet Union). He could not avoid speaking up for Turco-Soviet rapprochement,⁸⁹ although, again, he consistently pleaded for strict non-alignment, to preserve Turkey's absolute independence.⁹⁰

Professor Sadun Aren, another central figure in the Labor Party of Turkey and one of its best brains, is as much an intellectual as Aybar. He is a well-known economist, and the author of a book on employment, money, and economic policies, which went through at least three editions;⁹¹ a second book dealt with inheritance taxes,⁹² and another was an introduction to economics.⁹³ While his scholarly work steered clear of politics, a long section of Aren's first book⁹⁴ was devoted to "development policies" in underdeveloped countries. Much of what he had to say was aimed at Turkey, even if he did not say so specifically, but pursued a theoretical approach. Thorough state planning was his oft-repeated and clearly-elaborated solution.

Aren seemed slated for a successful academic career. Born in Erzurum in 1922, he graduated at the age of twenty-two from Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science. A year later he was appointed as assistant in economics at the same university; in 1950 he was already a lecturer, and seven years later was appointed professor. Between 1951 and 1958 he repeatedly visited Switzerland, England, France, and the United States to do research in economics; he reads both English and French.⁹⁵ In the early 1960's he made his way up through the main LPT institutions and soon became influential. In 1965 he was elected to the National Assembly from Istanbul on the LPT ticket. Thereupon he resigned his university position⁹⁶ and sat in the National Assembly until 1969. After

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 337-343, 376-380, 576 ff. and *passim* for his opposition to NATO and to Turkey's membership in it. He, too, used the popular slogan "Americans, go home!" — see *ibid.*, p. 583.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

⁹⁰ E.g., *ibid.*, pp. 396 ff., 493 ff. However Aybar did attack the U.S.A. bitterly in other speeches, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 433 ff., 442 ff., 459 ff., 462 ff., 490 ff.

⁹¹ Sadun Aren, *İstihdam, para ve iktisadi politika* (Ankara: 1st ed., 1960; 2nd ed., 1963; 3rd ed., 1968).

⁹² *Id.*, *Veraset vergisi üzerinde bir deneme* (Ankara: 1952)

⁹³ *Id.*, *İktisada başlangıç* (Ankara: 1965).

⁹⁴ Pp. 249 ff.

⁹⁵ For these and other details, cf. *Türkiye'de kim kimdir*, *op. cit.*, s. v.

⁹⁶ According to Karpat, *Political and social thought ...*, p. 356.

the LPT's defeat in the 1969 elections to the National Assembly and the consequent weakening of Aybar's standing, Sadun Aren and Behice Boran seem to have held the decision-making positions in the party.

In his youth Aren was allegedly connected with the Turkish Communist Party,⁹⁷ and his Marxist views probably date from this period. It is not easy, however, to work out Aren's political ideology in the years he was connected with the LPT. One difficulty is his frequently expressing himself in abstract economic terms; another that there was a gradual shift in his position towards leftist radicalism, and it is not quite clear how (or exactly when) this took place. In the early 1960's he often elaborated the economic and political approach which he had already presented in his work on employment, money and economic policies. The articles he wrote in those years in *Yön*⁹⁸ and other journals were written from the point of view of etatism. He advocated that the public sector should be favored over the private by economic competition rather than legislation, but that the private sector be allowed to continue to exist. These views — with certain variations — appear to have been shared by Aybar and a number of other Turkish intellectuals, both inside and outside the Labor Party of Turkey.

In the later 1960's, however, Sadun Aren, although generally following the party line (for instance, in his speeches in the National Assembly) appears to have moved further left, to have preached a more rigid Marxist type socialism — favoring nationalization and restriction of the private sector. Some of these views are even expressed in his popular handbook of economics, first published in 1968, with a second edition coming out in the following year.⁹⁹ This is mainly a general introduction to economics, written in a straightforward style, but is of particular interest in its frequent reference to Turkey's own economy. These are generally interpreted in the light of Marxist theory, with the LPT's solutions appended. Examples may be found in Aren's discussion of the agricultural situation in Turkey (calling for a reform in land-holding through land-redistribution¹⁰⁰), or of the industrial problem¹⁰¹ (advoc-

⁹⁷ Aclan Sayılğan, *Komuna* (Istanbul: 1969).

⁹⁸ For an English translation of one of Aren's articles in *Yön*, see Karpat, *Political and social thought...*, pp. 356–358.

⁹⁹ Sadun Aren, *100 soruda ekonomi el kitabı (Türkiye ekonomisinden örneklerle)* (1st ed., Istanbul: 1968; 2nd ed., enlarged, Istanbul: 1969).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 2nd ed., pp. 149 ff., 155–156.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 162 ff.

cating speedy industrialization). In short, this is an ably written book which probably had its use as a propaganda tool.

Mrs. Behice Boran, formerly a lecturer in sociology at Ankara University, is considered by many "the strong woman" in the party. Active on the party's central committees and influential in its inner circle, she was a vocal LPT Member in the National Assembly from 1965 to 1969. She led the more extreme faction in the 1969 struggle for party leadership, which resulted in Aybar's ouster from the chairmanship of the party. While it is difficult to say who in fact was in control of the party from late 1969 to its closedown in 1971, it was probably the Boran-Aren group.

Behice Boran has lectured and written extensively, both before and after joining the LPT.¹⁰² Claims that she was connected with the Turkish Communist Party in the 1940's or the 1950's¹⁰³ have never been substantiated. Nevertheless, her brand of Turkish socialism seems more rigidly oriented towards classical Marxism than that of Aybar and even that of Aren — although, naturally, during the 1960's she had to keep close to the LPT's official platform. A fair indication of her views may be found in her recent book on Turkey and the problems of socialism.¹⁰⁴ It is dedicated to "My colleagues in the party, who are carrying the torch of socialism to the four corners of Turkey, despite all the difficulties and pressures." It is systematically divided into eight chapters: The historical direction of Turkey; the socialist movement in Turkey after May 27, 1960; Turkey versus the capitalist and socialist worlds; the social structure of the Turkish socialist movement; the constitution and socialism; religion, the constitution and socialism; the method of development; the foreign relations of Turkey.

One of the more interesting chapters in Boran's book is the introduction to its second edition.¹⁰⁵ She chose this occasion to settle her accounts with Aybar and to scoff at his preference for "a socialist orientation suited to Turkey." She dismissed the talk about Turkish socialism being

¹⁰² Both in specialized journals and in more general publications, such as *Ant*, e.g. 55: Jan. 16, 1968, p. 10. For earlier articles of hers, cf. Sayılğan, *Soldaki çatlaklar*, pp. 89-93.

¹⁰³ However, she was connected with several front organizations. See above, ch. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve sosyalizm sorunları* (1st ed.: 1968; 2nd ed.: 1970). I refer below to the 301-page 2nd edition (slightly amplified from the first one). The 2nd edition was sent to press in June 1969, i.e. when there were rifts in the party leadership.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9.

sui generis. Such views, maintained Boran, were not new. Views like those of Aybar, about there being various types of socialism, were a nationalist deviation typical of the approach that "the contents are one and the same (*i.e.*, socialist), while the manner of application varies (nationalist)." This she rejected, on the grounds that coincidence contradicted historical inevitability, while relativity contradicted scientific materialism. Boran also criticized the attempt by her opponents — presumably Aybar's group — to minimize the issue by pooh-poohing the variations in interpretation. These, she declared, showed basic contradictions which were a product of basic differences of opinion. She then added that her insistence on the correct interpretation of socialism within the LPT was due to her appreciation of the party as the broadest organization striving for socialism in Turkey.

Boran regarded Turkey as an underdeveloped country both intellectually and socio-economically, and she pointed at the close correlation between these two aspects of backwardness (or what she considered as such). Socialist intellectuals, however, ignored this correlation and attempted to raise the level of socialist thinking in Turkey. The implication was that she, too, shared in fulfilling this duty — and her book was the result.

Consequently, Boran developed an ideological approach that aimed at the practical solution of Turkey's problems, but within the theoretical framework of socialist thinking as she interpreted it. Not surprisingly, she considered that Turkey's development hinged on its industrialization which, in turn, depended on planning; all this was tied up with a scientific and technological revolution, along with its socio-economic implications. This could be understood solely within the framework of class-struggle.¹⁰⁶ In other words (and this was emphasized in the introduction to the book's first edition),¹⁰⁷ Boran searched for the basic ideas and general theory and method that would put Turkey and the Turkish socialist movement on the world map; that is, provide a general conceptual framework for Turkish socialism, its theory and practice. It is the work of a sociologist who is a member of the Labor Party of Turkey and who has discussed it with other members; she believes that the book expresses the basic opinions of the party (although she concedes there may be differences in detail).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

Boran considered the May 27, 1960 Revolution one of the major events in Turkey's modern history.¹⁰⁹ Although it had not resolved the country's basic problems or fulfilled the basic wishes of its people, it gave them a good constitution, as well as means to change the capitalist regime. It also gave the socialist movement in Turkey a good opportunity to develop legally, organize freely and bring out its own publications. Thus the LPT could come into being as the party representing the workers of Turkey and their ideology. The LPT united within it the theory and practice of socialism. Both within the party and outside, the socialist movement started to deal with what Boran regarded as the country's concrete problems: the distribution of income, land and credit, unjust taxation, and foreign loans. While other socialist groups in Turkey were founded and staffed by intellectuals, the LPT was established by twelve trade-unionists, none of whom had a high income. The character of an independent workers' party was preserved and distinguished the LPT from the bourgeois parties.¹¹⁰ Indeed it was formed as a reaction to indifference by the other parties to the rights of workers. Its establishment was a social event and ought to be analyzed by methods suited to the interpretation of social phenomena. In Turkey this meant — as in some other countries — that the workers had taken over their rights. Although the struggle of Turkish workers had not been as lengthy and violent as that of workers in the West, there were similarities, chiefly in their actions being within the context of centralized bourgeois regimes.

The LPT was joined by intellectuals, who knew more precisely what socialism was. The close collaboration of workers and intellectuals had made the party what it was. Together workers and intellectuals prepared regulations and a program adapted to conditions in Turkey.¹¹¹ There had been different views as to the stand the party ought to adopt towards populism, that is, whether or not to become a mass-party.¹¹² Boran emphasized the role of the LPT as a vanguard; she saw this as the basic principle of the party's activity. The LPT could stay in the vanguard of the workers' movement by fighting for those causes which were shared by and agreed upon by the whole workers' movement, *i.e.* for Turkey's industrialization and against any exploitation of the workers by ruling capitalist groups, both foreign and local. While in the industrialized

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57 ff.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹¹¹ As Boran wrote this before the split in the party leadership, she did not criticize this approach, which she rejected in the introduction of the book's second edition.

¹¹² A dig at Aybar's "populist" view?

countries of the West, industrial workers were the core of the development and struggle of the working class, in non-industrialized Turkey the workers had to unite in order to fight the bourgeoisie, both in parliament and out of it. Before 1965 the working-class voted in parliamentary elections, but its members were never elected. In 1965, fifteen candidates of the LPT became Members of the National Assembly — on behalf of the workers. The masses understood very well the unfairness of taxation on consumer goods, the opposition of those in power to land reform, the huge profits from import and export of a handful of merchants, the discrimination against the poor in education and medical care. Obviously, the LPT had been explaining all this to them, along with the principles of socialism. The explanation was being carried out by party intellectuals, whose numbers gradually grew, with additions from the ranks of non-organized socialism, e.g., among university youth, and journalists such as Çetin Altan.

As in other underdeveloped countries, in Turkey the economic and political impact of the West brought with it new ideas: nationalism, democracy, secularism, and socialism.¹¹³ Only those socialist theories which seemed to suit the new Turkish republic were adopted in its early years; socialism was not expressed by a movement of workers and laborers. Only as a result of the 1961 Constitution could a socialist movement be established in Turkey — totally independent and completely free of contacts with foreign elements; related to the structure of Turkish society and its historical development.

The socialist movement in Turkey during the 1960's had steadily grown stronger and broader despite external and internal struggles — a matter in which it did not differ from other socialist movements. Recent events within the LPT, asserted Boran, might be characterized under two main headings: a. As the LPT was a socio-political movement, it was inevitable that, in the course of the years, inner differences of opinion would appear. The upper levels of the party succeeded in maintaining a balance between these differences and keeping them within bounds; but as soon as a rift occurred, it became public knowledge. b. Side by side with its socialism, the party's growth and development called for many practical decisions. Such questions as democracy within the party assumed cardinal importance. In this respect, certain vulnerable spots became apparent. An important one was the weakening of the socialist character of the workers' movement, following the LPT drive to

¹¹³ An attempt to show that Turkish socialism was not communist-inspired?

broaden its appeal. The ideological danger was obvious. Socialism was essentially the revolutionary ideology — economic and political — of the working-class; by broadening the party's appeal, at the expense of its ideology, one risked that the LPT would become a lower-middle class party in those areas (such as parts of Anatolia) where there were no industrial workers. Winning the votes of lower-middle class circles would make it very difficult to preserve the Socialist nature of the LPT. While the party strove to reach power through parliamentary elections, within the provisions of the constitution, it did not solicit votes. It wanted only the votes of the truly aware voters (*bilinçli oy*), that is of those workers and laborers who were class-conscious and intended to gain positions of power because they considered it necessary to change the regime and give it a socialist direction. Only if the LPT won power with the support of such convinced voters could it achieve its goals. She also doubted whether an electoral success by other means would last for the four-year term of the National Assembly.

The correct way of bringing about these changes was by instilling consciousness amongst the working masses and educating them to support change and fight reactionary forces. In order to bring the working masses to this situation, it was first necessary to strengthen the party cadres, let them ripen and become conscious, knowledgeable and courageous. This should be undertaken by the party as a long-range systematic project. All these necessary steps had been neglected by the LPT due to the pressures of frequent elections — to the National Assembly, the Senate, and the local authorities. Indeed, at the top of the party's lists of candidates one found people who were ignorant of the need for socialist action. The LPT had overemphasized its desire to attract electoral support from lower-middle class circles, rather than concentrate on the education and preparation of cadres. As a result, socialist youth movements in the universities had organized and acted parallel to the LPT, instead of being at one with it. This happened because the party was intent on gaining votes and had not grasped that education within the party and preparation of cadres were matters of life or death for the LPT. Party education meant reading and discussing socialist literature, organizing courses, lectures and seminars; the reading included socialist novels and books on economics, while the discussions compared conditions in Turkey to those in other countries. Since Turkey was open to the impact of what happened abroad, it was natural that what went on, was written, discussed and pondered in the world socialist movement and elsewhere should attract attention.

Boran had no doubt as to whether the LPT should be a mass party or a party of cadres.¹¹⁴ Cadres were essential for recruiting the support of the working masses after having imparted consciousness to them. Practical knowledge was important, but one should not take a stand antagonistic towards formal, "bookish," education in politics. The best was to prepare conscious and educated leaders from within the working masses and cadres, from among the intellectuals, trained by practical experiences to lead the masses in the future. This, however, required planned and systematic application. As it was now, the LPT was not striving for a truly socialist order: it envisaged a "mixed economy," with room for a private sector. The land reform, too, which the party promised to carry out when in power, was bourgeois rather than socialist in character — even though no bourgeois party had spelled out such a reform in its program.

Behice Boran returned to some of these problems in another chapter of her book, that on "Turkey versus the capitalist and socialist worlds." At the end of the chapter¹¹⁵ she stressed that the Turkish socialist movement was meticulous in its support for the country's independence.¹¹⁶ While socialism was an important part of mankind's joint cultural heritage, in every country the workers' movement applied it according to the specific conditions of that country. The LPT, the only political organization of the socialist movement in Turkey, was well aware of general socialist theory, but evaluated it in the light of conditions in Turkey. Nowadays no socio-political movement — or state, for that matter — could remain without some connection with others; workers' movements everywhere pooled their efforts against the economic exploitation of underdeveloped countries by international capitalism. However, in mutual relations between states, the workers' movements insisted, in theory and practice, on absolute independence and equality. Without minimizing the differences and contradictions among societies, each workers' socialist movement was first and foremost concerned with its own nation and country — and with their specific problems.

This argument was intended to dispel suspicion of the LPT's trying to bring Turkey into the Soviet orbit. Written before the 1969 rift in the LPT's leadership, it seems more like an echo of Aybar's views than

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 132–135.

¹¹⁶ Turkey's foreign relations, touched upon here, rated a special chapter later in Boran's book, pp. 263–301.

Boran's. Perhaps because of this, in what appears like an addendum,¹¹⁷ Boran argued that the basic concepts of socialism, a minimum subscribed to by all socialist parties — presumably, including the LPT — were: a. Creation of an alternative system to capitalism, a more progressive social order; and b. Ownership of the means of production. This could conceivably be a dig at Aybar's concern with lesser matters, such as vote-getting. And, indeed, Boran then accused the governing labor parties of England and Sweden of not being socialist parties, their names notwithstanding, but rather a disguise for capitalism. The implication seemed to be that she feared a similar development in the socialist movement in Turkey.

Further on, in another chapter on "the Turkish socialist movement, from the point of view of social structure,"¹¹⁸ Boran argued that Turkey's socio-economic backwardness was so great, that only a socialist overall solution could help it, as in the case of other underdeveloped countries. In Turkey, as Boran saw it (this was the accepted view of the LPT, too) the situation was compounded by the country's feudal regime,¹¹⁹ mainly in the east and southeast. Turkish reaction to the alliance between this feudal regime and foreign capital could be gauged by the increasing political awareness of Turkish workers, their increasing support for the LPT, and the formation of the leftist trade union organization DİSK — as against the relatively political neutral Türk İş, as well as the anti-American and anti-NATO demonstrations. The general growth of the working-class in Turkey prepared a favorable climate for all these trends. This was meaningful, since the peasant masses in Turkey did not have an ideology of their own and tended to adopt a bourgeois ideology. In numbers, however, they were an important base for the socialist movement; their political involvement would increase with land reform and the mechanization of agriculture. The small artisans and tradesmen resembled the capitalist class in their places of work and the working-class in their physical labor. They were estimated at 1.5 million in Turkey and like other workers were unjustly exploited by capital. Their basic pro-bourgeois feelings were exploited by the leadership of the Turkish bourgeoisie, as when Demirel promised them that they would become factory-owners. However industrialization would turn many of them into factory workers, with the attendant consequences. Finally, the social-

¹¹⁷ Note, *ibid.*, pp. 133-135.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-194.

¹¹⁹ In Turkish, *Derebeylik düzeni*, literally, "the order of the feudal chieftains."

ist movement in Turkey, led by the LPT during the 1960's, was in a position to win over the intellectual classes, too. Since the people, including the working masses, were still largely under the influence of bourgeois ideologies, Boran argued for an all-out effort to spread socialism and explain its egalitarian views. Only in this way would the social state (*sosyal devlet*) envisaged by the 1961 Constitution come into being — an idea which Boran elaborated further, in her chapter on “constitution and socialism.”

Boran's socialist thought is only briefly analyzed here. Other opinions of hers, equally interesting and ably expressed, as on Turkey's development and the direction it ought to follow,¹²⁰ are more in line with the LPT's official policy. Boran does not always bridge her former attitude to socialism (consonant with that of Aybar) with her new one, as expressed in her book's second edition. For instance, there is some discrepancy between her earlier approach to socialism — as having to suit local conditions — and her later more rigid view of the worldwide and immutable laws of socialism. There is, however, little doubt about her no-nonsense attitude towards elections and vote-getting, which she scorns. She clearly prefers to stress educational-propagandist efforts for the preparation of cadres, to lead Turkey to socialism. This is much more than just a tactical difference of approach: it refers both to LPT ideology and its whole strategy of political action.

Çetin Altan was a younger thinker in the top ranks of the LPT, remarkably influential in certain youth circles. He was born in Istanbul in 1927 and graduated from the renowned Galatasaray *lycée*, then from Ankara University's Law Faculty. Altan, who reads both English and French, has traveled extensively.¹²¹ He has published poetry and several plays¹²² (some of which have been performed), but is even better known for his journalistic activity.¹²³ In the 1950's and 1960's he was one of the most widely-read leftist journalists — at least in intellectual youth circles. A study among Ankara University students, for example, found that he was their favorite columnist.¹²⁴ After having joined the LPT in the early 1960's, he was elected in 1965 to the National Assembly, but was not reelected in 1969. His speeches in the National Assembly, along with his

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 235 ff.

¹²¹ He described part of these travels in his *Bir uçtan bir uca* (Istanbul: 1965).

¹²² For instance his *Dilekçe* and his *Tahtirevalli* (publ. together in Istanbul: 1966).

¹²³ See *Türkiyede kim kimdir*, *op. cit.*, s. v.

¹²⁴ Özer Ozankaya, *op. cit.*, quoted by Szyliowicz. *op. cit.*, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, p. 160.

indefatigable writing, so provoked others (particularly the JP), that an attempt (which failed) was made to withdraw his parliamentary immunity and bring him to trial.¹²⁵

Çetin Altan's speeches in the National Assembly followed the party line, only more emphatically. Being irritating was their most striking characteristic. For instance, in a long speech on November 8, 1965,¹²⁶ he vehemently criticized the JP government's program and accused it of keeping Turkey one of the world's ten most backward states and many of its workers at the poverty level of TL 5 to 10 daily wages. He denounced the capitalist exploitation of underdeveloped countries and called for the only way out — industrialization as socialists understand it. In another speech a month later,¹²⁷ Altan violently denounced the country's black market, describing it as characteristic of corruption, speculation and shady dealings. Similarly, on July 20–21, 1967, speaking on the move to withdraw his parliamentary immunity,¹²⁸ he posed as the champion of free speech and free writing, and accused his detractors of fascism, barbarism and similar evils.

However forceful his speeches were, they were more in the nature of tactical moves to support or propagate LPT attitudes than part of a crystallized ideological approach — although party doctrine is expressed in them. Altan's numerous newspaper articles contain a more consistent formulation of his view of Turkish socialism. They are written in a stunningly effective combination of literary Turkish and colloquial idiom, enlivened by a personal approach and popular wisdom, and frequently couched in the satirical vein which the Turks call *hiciv*, or "satirical wit."¹²⁹ Obviously, an attempt to deal with the literally thousands of articles that Altan has produced would require a separate study. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a brief account of some of Altan's views which tie up with the LPT's ideology in the years he was most active in the party.

¹²⁵ Çetin Altan himself has recorded his parliamentary activity in his *Ben milletvekili iken* (Ankara: 1971).

¹²⁶ Reprinted as a 40-page booklet: Çetin Altan, *Hükümet, kapitalist bir hükümettir* (Istanbul: 1966).

¹²⁷ Reprinted — with the reply of Mehmet Turgut, Minister for Industries — as a 63-page booklet: Çetin Altan, *Demir ve çimento: Karaborsanın içyüzü* (Istanbul: 1966).

¹²⁸ Reprinted in Çetin Altan's *Suçlanan yazılar, op. cit.*, pp. 276–308.

¹²⁹ A fairly representative sample has been collected in Çetin Altan's 288-page *Geçip giderken* (Istanbul: 1968), and in his smaller, 119-page, *Taş: gerçekçi bir yazarın notları* (Istanbul: 1964).

Çetin Altan's scathing views on colonization and imperialism are a constant theme in his writing (for instance, his 95-page book "War on the Exploiters!"¹³⁰); his own brand of socialism is more difficult to grasp and define. Perhaps the best source for this is a book he wrote, which appeared in the summer of 1967 and went through at least three printings in the same year, "As they awaken: the handbook of Turkish socialists."¹³¹ It is actually a combination of two different works: an instructive collection of eighty letters Altan received while at the National Assembly by Turks from all strata of society are published verbatim, while the book's first 70 pages are a reply of sorts to the letters, and amounts to Altan's own socialist credo. Characteristically, it is dedicated "to the peasants, artisans, small tradesmen, clerks without backing, and the exploited, hard-pressed, ill-treated working-class."

In what he termed "an unpretentious simple explanation,"¹³² Altan drew a picture of the class contrasts in Turkey. According to him, bourgeois circles were guilty of unlimited dictatorship, which Altan labeled "fascism." He saw in capitalism a pack of lies, first and foremost of which was the claim that it was a free system; if so, this was freedom for the bourgeois only. There existed no equality within the capitalist order: the child of the rich was born wealthy, while the child of the needy was born poor; one child would be literate, the other illiterate. The respective risks of boss and worker were unequal: the latter might become an invalid, the former could find refuge in bankruptcy. In a capitalist regime banks helped employers rather than their employees. In times of crisis, the workers suffered most; Turkey had about a million overtly or covertly unemployed. In the United States official figures showed there were more than five million jobless. The ruling bourgeois class was evidently interested solely in its gains, while a planned economy would take into account the interests of the whole population. Only an economy geared to the interests of the workers would use Turkey's natural resources for the general good. Capitalism, which is essentially exploitation, would not lower prices and thereby its profits; it would prefer overproduction and subsequent unemployment. To solve their own problems, factory owners increasingly produced weapons and munitions. In the United States (according to Altan), nearly half of all workers were employed by the defense industries. A planned economy would be able to

¹³⁰ Çetin Altan, *Sömürücülerle savaş* (Istanbul: 1965).

¹³¹ Id., *Onlar uyarırken, Türk sosyalistlerinin el kitabı* (Istanbul: 1967).

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

direct workers towards more peaceful work.¹³³ Meanwhile, Altan maintained, the capitalist system should be forced to give the workers their due wages, weekly leave, social security, and let them have a say in the management of their places of work.¹³⁴ Such measures were insufficient, however, and capitalism should and would be uprooted.

In an article entitled "The changing meaning of happiness,"¹³⁵ Altan came close to saying more specifically how he understood socialism and what he expected of it. The way he saw it, before the revelation of scientific socialism, happiness was synonymous with owning the most. Everybody wanted to possess more and more, and security seemed safeguarded by wealth alone. The state had no social goals. Afterwards, however, it gradually became evident that the eagerness for greater personal wealth brought misery rather than happiness. Chasing profits strengthened the imbalance between the classes. Being a progressive people would bring, collectively, greater security than could wealth. Capitalism could not give humanity any new horizons, once it was based solely on the premise of increasing personal riches. Only workers' socialism, on the other hand, was capable of opening the gates to completely new possibilities and of creating a wholly different freedom — for the world of tomorrow.

In yet another article on "Turkey's situation,"¹³⁶ Altan traced the country's sorry conditions to the alliance between the "duchy" of Istanbul and the *ağas* and usurers in Anatolia ("A colony of the Istanbul duchy"). In "the colony of Anatolia," which Altan saw as the most backward of colonies, people were purposely kept illiterate; the same was true of the poor health conditions. The opposite was true of the Istanbul duchy, where a fortunate minority of Turks continued to enjoy a high income, regardless of changes in Turkey's governments. Any popular forces of workers and peasants who criticized this situation were immediately labeled "communists." This pejorative label included, in the view of those using it, all that was wicked: spying for the Russians, lack of faith in Allah, hatred for the institution of the family, even procuring. Altan scoffed at this approach. Without, however, committing himself to saying that communists are progressive, he firmly rejected the commonly held opinion that "West-European" equals "progressive."¹³⁷ As Altan

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11–23.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23 *ff.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–28.

¹³⁶ "Türkiye'nin durumu," *ibid.*, pp. 28–32.

¹³⁷ "İlericilik-gericilik tartışmasındaki oyun," *ibid.*, pp. 36 *ff.*

said it, the progress that Turkey needed was in reform of land-holding and industry.

Perhaps because Çetin Altan's articles are generally short and concentrated on one specific point, it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint the underlying ideological approach. However, the article "The place, method and aims of Turkish socialism,"¹³⁸ is a useful summary of his conception of socialism. Anchored in the 1961 Constitution, Turkish socialism had grown from tiny beginnings into a popular mass movement. On May 27, 1960, the "comprador" circles had been dealt a serious blow, and the 1961 Constitution emphasized the equality of all. Now Turkish socialists stood up to the compradors. Some ideas of these socialists went even beyond the constitution, as constitutions, by their nature, safeguard the status quo and strive to maintain it. However, because of their greed, the Turkish capitalists were outside the protection of the constitution. Turkish socialists understood this and grasped that they had to prevent the development in Turkey of a replica of the classical western democracy. In the latter, the bourgeois continued to rule and obtain the support of the workers, to whom they granted material compensation. The compradors argued that Turkish socialists were the enemies of democracy, adding lies and spreading rumors, thus influencing public opinion. It was as if a small minority pretended to own the constitution. However Turkish socialists knew two things very well: a. The constitution would break the class rule of the compradors, characteristic of a western type of democracy, and thereby paralyze the exploitation of this class. b. Under pressure from the working-class, Turkey would suddenly make greater efforts towards socialism. Socialists, understanding the constitution and real democracy, put forward several goals: a. Absolute independence. b. Reform in land-holding — to do away with land *ağas*, in favor of landless peasants and those owning little land. c. Nationalization of banks — to be put under the control of the popular masses. d. Removing foreign trade from the hands of compradors. e. Nationalization of all insurance. f. Nationalization of all heavy industry. The combined effect of these measures should break the compradors and stop exploitation; planning would then assist the Turkish working masses to own their own persons, and assure them bread and freedom. With equal opportunities for all, education would be free, and technical education stressed. In order to guarantee such a radical change, workers had to become alert

¹³⁸ "Türk sosyalizminin yeri, metodu ve amaçları," *ibid.*, pp. 54-58. See also pp. 58 ff.

and organize themselves against the comprador class, which was possible only if their weight was decisive in the management of the State. No cadres, outside the organized workers, could guarantee socialism, because in the long run such cadres slipped into fascism. Socialism was not merely an abstract method. In order to safeguard the freedom of the working class, an organization, strong in numbers, was necessary. Socialism was not merely a matter of personalities and cadres, but of a class. This is why the primary task for Turkish socialism nowadays was to awaken the working masses, organize them, and bring them as a class into politics.

Briefly put, Çetin Altan seems less systematic in his theoretical approach to the LPT's ideology and to socialism in general than Aybar, Aren and Boran. He is more of a tactician, who spearheaded the party's attack on capitalism rather than formulating a cogent theory of Turkish socialism. We have, however, given an account of his opinions, for Altan's numerous articles in *Yön*, *Ant*, *Akşam*, and elsewhere were widely read and he had far-reaching influence.

The 1960's were a decade when old loyalties were breaking up — particularly in cities and towns — and new ones being forged. While there was no consensus as to what they should be, at least some of these loyalties were attracted to the party program, rather than to a personality. It was before this backdrop of new commitment to ideologies that Turkish left radicals organized a party, and came forth with their universal message. The fact that the RPP has been moving "left of center," particularly since 1965, only served to prod the LPT into emphasizing even more that it is the first and only avowedly socialist party in Turkey. Through its Marxist heritage, the LPT (like many radical left parties elsewhere), affirmed its disapproval of the capitalist way, which, it argued, had not solved the country's basic socio-economic problems.¹³⁹ The party proclaimed its desire for an egalitarian, internationalist regime, which spelled a better future for the world, and for all Turks — even if only one class, the workers allied with the peasants, was going to create the New Turkey and guide its destinies.

LPT ideology is well suited to attract the votes and political support between elections of those who are clawing their way upward. However, while the views of the intellectual circles around *Yön*, *Ant*, *Devrim*, and others, have much interest *per se*, the program of the LPT has to be

¹³⁹ In terms which did not essentially differ from those of the TCP. See Y. Demir and H. Okan, *op. cit.*, in *World Marxist Review*, VIII (5): May 1965, p. 45.

weighed also in terms of its applicability to, and feasibility in, Turkey. An *organized* political party, like the LPT, had to present an ideology that is relevant to the situation in Turkey in recent years and offer some practical answers to the problems affecting it. It is in this context that the party's rigid Marxism, copied with hardly any meaningful modification from another environment, is irrelevant. Indeed, although current Soviet works on Turkey¹⁴⁰ refer to the TCP and the short-lived Socialist Party of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey rather than to the LPT in their discussion of radical reform,¹⁴¹ much of what they write parallels LPT demands — particularly concerning reform in land-holding.¹⁴² The same is true, to a great extent, of what the LPT has advocated as "the socialist way of development."¹⁴³

The discrepancy between Marxist theory and socio-economic feasibility in Turkey has recently been pointed out, incisively, by Edwin J. Cohn,¹⁴⁴ an American economist who spent twelve years in Turkey in the 1950's and 1960's. He argues persuasively that those intellectuals who spoke for the party were so dogmatically Marxist that they failed to perceive that Turkey during the 1960's was basically different from early nineteenth-century England. Unlike Western Europe, Turkey has not passed through an Industrial Revolution. Much of its industry is still hand-produced in artisans' workshops, and industrial entrepreneurs can hardly be considered as controlling a significant part of the Turkish economy and holding their workers in virtual bondage. Indeed, "almost half of Turkey's factory industry (excluding small artisan-type workshops), three-quarters of its mining, the entire railroad, telephone, and telegraph systems, and virtually all of the electric-power and gas industry are already in the hands of the government, which also controls, directly or indirectly, a number of the larger banks."¹⁴⁵

In these conditions, it is somewhat unrealistic to speak of overall nationalization, just as it is farfetched to promise a wholesale redistribution, of land (expropriated and other) to needy peasants. The latter are so

¹⁴⁰ Some of which have been discussed in my "Recent Soviet books on Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, pp. 212-214.

¹⁴¹ One of the most thorough, among the recently published, is П. И. Моисеев, *Аграрный строй современной Турции* (Moscow: 1970), pp. 274 ff.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, *passim*.

¹⁴³ See also Yıldız Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

¹⁴⁴ E. J. Cohn, *Turkish economic, social and political change: the development of a more prosperous and open society* (New York: 1970), pp. 145-149.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

numerous, that such land can never be allocated to them all, unless the share they receive is so tiny as to be uneconomical. The same strict doctrinaire approach, based on rigid adherence to Marxist ideology, is noticeable in the LPT's contention that foreign investments are penetrating Turkey in order to exploit its raw materials and cheap labor. Actually, the few West-European and American companies that have opened branches in Turkey have done so mainly to protect their sales position in the Turkish domestic market and hardly export any of their products.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, the party's contention that American bases in Turkey exploit local workers and humiliate them is not supported by facts. In actual practice, they have created many new jobs, relatively well-paid, for local manpower and training in various skills for some of the Turks employed there. This is not of course to say that there were no social, economic and political evils in Turkey for the LPT to fight against. It is simply to point out that the party singled out — both in its ideology and for tactical use — those evils that accorded with its doctrinaire Marxist ideology. Whether the facts actually fitted the situation, or whether the solution proposed went well with Turkey's needs and possibilities, was not always considered in the party's "aggressively articulate"¹⁴⁷ propaganda.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁴⁷ To borrow a term from Nuri Eren, "Turkey: prospects for democratic development," *Journal of International Affairs*, XIX (2): 1965, p. 174.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF ISLAMIC AND PAN-TURK GROUPS

a. ISLAM AND POLITICS

Despite its obvious importance in Turkish politics, religion has not yet been adequately studied in this context.¹ For centuries, Islam has been a powerful force in Turkey, institutionalized in the Establishment, although it has no clerical hierarchy of its own. It is now apparent that the Kemalist drive for secularization was less successful — particularly in Turkey's rural areas — than was generally assumed at the time.² The abolition of the Sultanate, the Caliphate, the Office of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, the closing down of the Islamic law courts and religious colleges, the introduction of secular, instead of religious, law, the change from Arabic to Roman script, and the definition of the Turkish Republic in an amendment to the constitution as "secular" were, indeed, national measures,³ but influenced the countryside only to a limited degree. The more remote a village from the capital, or from any large urban center, the more likely were its inhabitants to be hardly aware of the secularization laws (among others) and the more liable to ignore them — rather than resist them.⁴ Indeed, the government in Atatürk's time and in the years immediately following invested considerable efforts in disestablishing Islam, but did not persecute its adherents. It left religious practice to the conscience of the individual.⁵ Consequently, it brought secularization, in terms of everyday life and outlook, more to the towns and cities than to the countryside.⁶

¹ Cf. Şerif Mardin, *Religion as ideology* (N. p. [Ankara]: 1969) (Hacettepe University Publications, 1), pp. 11-12.

² Bernard Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey* (London: 1961), esp. pp. 410 ff. Cf. W. C. Smith, *Islam in modern history* (Princeton, N. J.: 1957), ch. 4 ("Turkey: Islamic reformation?"). Paul Stirling, "Religious change in republican Turkey," *MEJ*, XII (4): Autumn 1958, pp. 395 ff.

³ See Uriel Heyd, *Revival of Islam in modern Turkey* (Jerusalem: 1968), p. 11.

⁴ Examples in J. S. Szyliowicz, *Political change in rural Turkey: Erdemli, op. cit.* and Paul Stirling, *Turkish village, op. cit.*

⁵ See D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," in R. N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* (Hague: 1957), esp. pp. 82-86.

⁶ One of the most interesting attempts to examine empirically popular attitudes in Turkey towards religion is Şerif Mardin, *Din ve ideoloji* (Ankara: 1969).

However, even among the urban intelligentsia, where secularization made more headway, religious sentiment did not disappear. In a survey carried out in the 1960's of the religious attitudes of 673 male students (at the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara, the School of Social Welfare in Ankara and the Academy of Economics and Business Sciences in Eskişehir), it was found that 40.3% maintained that religion was highly important for them, 27.6% moderately so, while only 32.1% considered religion of little importance.⁷ While not necessarily representative of all intellectuals — or even of all students — nevertheless this evidence is significant.

However it is the rural areas that remained the fortress of Islamic sentiment. After Atatürk's death in 1938, village resistance to secularization became more noticeable. People in the countryside were hit less by inflation than were the townspeople. Nevertheless during the Second World War and immediately afterwards, financial hardship contributed to a general feeling of discontent that for many changed their indifference to the non-religious attitude of the Republican People's Party to resentment against the party — which they began to consider as anti-religious. Local religious leaders and others with grievances against the state authorities or the RPP fanned this initial resentment and accused the government, identified with the RPP, of imposing secularism on the Islamic-minded population. That this was fairly widespread is evident from the fact that the RPP — from 1946 in competition with other parties for the popular vote — made some important goodwill gestures towards the increasingly outspoken religious circles.⁸ Of these, perhaps the most notable was the restoration of religious education in primary schools, as an elective subject, and the inauguration in 1949 of a faculty of theology (*İlâhiyat fakültesi*) at Ankara University,⁹ to prepare qualified religion teachers for state schools.¹⁰ The dervish orders, which had continued to exist underground, awoke to renewed activity in the late 1940's,¹¹

⁷ G. R. Field, "Religious commitment and work orientations of Turkish students," *Human Organization* (Lexington, Ky.), XXVII (2): Summer 1969, pp. 147-151. See also L. L. Roos, N. P. Roos and G. R. Field, "Students and politics in Turkey," *Daedalus*, LXXXVII (1): Winter 1968, esp. pp. 195-196.

⁸ For the connection between the emergence of the multiparty system and the more permissive attitude towards religion, see E. D. Ellis, "Turkish nationalism in the postwar world," *Current History*, XXVI (210): Feb. 1959, pp. 88-89.

⁹ On which see H. A. Reed, "The faculty of divinity at Ankara," *The Muslim World*, XLVI (4): Oct. 1956, pp. 295-312; XLVII (1): Jan. 1957, pp. 22-35.

¹⁰ Details in B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 412-413.

¹¹ Cf. L. V. Thomas, "Recent developments in Turkish Islam," *MEJ*, VI (1):

and a stream of popular literature on Islamic themes was published.¹²

Here, indeed, was a new situation. Professor Eisenstadt, comparing Turkey and Mexico in a recent study, concluded that, among the major orientations of protest, some main ones came "from within the more traditional groups like the peasants and the orthodox Muslim circles in Turkey, which wanted to utilize the greater flexibility of the new setting for the implementation of the more traditional settings and goals."¹³ Even though these were bound to come into conflict with more "modern" groups, such as professionals and intellectuals, the latter were a minority. Due to the arithmetic importance of the votes no political group in the multiparty period could afford to ignore religious feeling as a potent element in recruiting electoral support. While the RPP Cabinet must have had just that in mind in the years 1946-1950, with its retreat from uncompromising secularism, this was even truer of the Cabinets of the Democrat Party, from 1950 to 1960.¹⁴ Indeed the importance in politics of religious sentiment increased during those years, as became clear in the 1957 elections to the National Assembly.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the picture drawn by the rivals of the DP, portraying it as a party dedicated to religious revival,¹⁶ seems somewhat exaggerated. The DP did not give way on such vital issues as restoring the Pious Foundations to the management of religious leaders; further, the authorities, during the 1950's, brought to court members of the outlawed dervish orders and ultra-religious groups, when these became too prominent.¹⁷ In fact the DP resisted demands by some of its members for

Winter 1952, pp. 22 ff. Prof. Thomas' article gives many perceptive illustrations. A more recent work is Abdülbâki Gölpinarlı, *100 soruda Türkiye'de mezhepler ve tarikâtlar* (Istanbul: 1969).

¹² The subject is discussed by Paul Stirling, *op. cit.* in *MEJ*, XII (4): Autumn 1958, pp. 395-408.

¹³ S. N. Eisenstadt, "The development of socio-political centers at the second stage of modernization — a comparative analysis of two types," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Leiden), VII: 1966, p. 135.

¹⁴ R. D. Robinson, "Mosque and school in Turkey," *The Muslim World*, LI (2): Apr. 1961, pp. 107-110.

¹⁵ K. H. Karpat, "The Turkish elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (2): June 1961, pp. 443-444.

¹⁶ T. Z. Tunaya, *İslâmcılık cereyanı* (Istanbul: 1961), pp. 188 ff.; Çetin Özek, *100 soruda: Türkiye'de gerici akımlar* (Istanbul: 1968), *passim*.

¹⁷ Cf. Bülent Dâver, "Secularism in Turkey: a dilemma in Turkish politics," *Sbfd*, XXII (1): Mar. 1967, p. 59.

the abolition of secularism and an official return to Islam, and expelled them from its ranks.¹⁸ However, DP Cabinets did restore the Arabic call to prayer (instead of the Turkish) and allowed broadcasts of the Koran over the state-owned radio. Many new mosques were built — some 15,000 between 1950 and 1960 —¹⁹ and Muslim tombs were reopened to the general public for devotions. In the case of the latter, the official reasoning was that they were to be considered historical monuments. The authorities, moreover, refrained from preventing intensive religious instruction to groups of children in many rural localities.²⁰ Substantial funds were earmarked for religious education, including schools for prayer-leaders and preachers (*imam-hatip okulları*). These institutions offer a regular Turkish high-school education, but nearly half of the curriculum-hours are spent on courses in Arabic, the Koran and religious instruction. The faculty of theology at Ankara University also received considerable assistance in its development. Just six years after its establishment in 1949 it had its own building, a large staff headed by seven professors, eighty-three students, and an annual budget of more than a million Turkish pounds.²¹

Later, DP candidates took full advantage of the above measures at election times — as did their opponents, who used Muslim sentiment frequently and sometimes in an equally unscrupulous way. Indeed, the small Nation Party was banned, and its leaders indicted in 1954, simply on account of its intensive propaganda for the restoration of the *şeriat* or Islamic traditional law.²²

That there was a trend towards religion was by now obvious; yet interpretations as to its real significance varied. The “Neo-Kemalist” officers, responsible for the May 27, 1960 Revolution, appear to have

¹⁸ H. A. Reed, “Secularism and Islam in Turkish politics,” *Current History*, XXXII (190): June 1957, p. 338.

¹⁹ Acc. to G. L. Lewis, in *The Muslim World*, LVI (4): Oct. 1966, p. 235. Bülent Dâver, “Secularism in Turkey,” *Sbfd*, XXII (1): Mar. 1967, p. 59, mentions 5,000 only. See also Gotthard Jäschke, “Der Islam in der neuen Türkei: eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung,” *Die Welt des Islams*, N. S., I (1–2): 1951, pp. 162–163.

²⁰ Details in Т. П. Дадашев, *Просвещение в Турции в новейшее время (1923–1960)* (Moscow: 1972), ch. 4.

²¹ H. A. Reed, “Revival of Islam in secular Turkey,” *MEJ*, VIII (3): Summer 1954, p. 273. Cf. *The Muslim World*, XLVI (1): Jan. 1956, pp. 81–82. See also Reed, “Turkey’s new imam-hatip schools,” *Die Welt des Islams*, N. S., IV (2–3): 1955, pp. 150–163; and his “Religious life of modern Turkish Muslims,” in R. N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West*, p. 111.

²² See also *The Muslim World*, XLIII (4): Oct. 1953, p. 306.

been concerned²³ about religion encroaching upon secularization in the spirit of Atatürk. Although, in general, the officers were careful not to commit themselves openly on the issue, the 1961 Constitution, drawn up according to the guidelines of the National Union Committee and with its approval, was quite explicit on this point.²⁴ It not only reaffirmed a general separation of Islam and state, as well as complete freedom of worship, but threatened with criminal prosecution and penalties any misuse of religion for political purposes. This is almost certainly an allusion to the misdeeds of the DP (and of some other parties) in this respect. No less relevantly, the 1961 Constitution envisaged enforced dissolution of political parties and other organizations manipulating religion for their own political ends.

The above constitutional provisions notwithstanding, little was done in the 1960's to insulate religion from politics. As we shall see, the main change was probably in tone — the parties and other political groups being more careful, as regards religion in their propaganda. The memory of the 1960–1961 trials and the punishments meted out to members of the Democrat Party was still vivid during the 1960's. In any case, religion received a fair amount of support from the authorities, as several examples might illustrate. About six thousand new mosques were built between 1960 and 1964,²⁵ approximately the same annual rate as in the 1950's. Islam, although still an elective subject, was given increasing attention in the curricula of the state schools.²⁶ The imam-hatip schools grew swiftly, in the numbers of institutions, teachers and students.²⁷ This is particularly noticeable in the late 1960's:

²³ Cf. the evidence of Ali Fuat Başgil, *İlmin ışığında günün meseleleri* (Istanbul: 1960), pp. 152–153.

²⁴ In addition to the constitution itself, see also Devereux, *op. cit.* in *MEA*, XII (8): Oct. 1961, esp. pp. 233–234. Bahri Savcı, "Lâik görüşü açısından 'anayasada inanç hürriyeti'nin mütalâası," *Sbfd*, XVII (2): June 1962, pp. 179–195. Çetin Özek, *Türkiyede lâiklik: gelişim ve koruyucu ceza hükümleri* (Istanbul: 1962), pp. 48 ff. Id., "Türk anayasa hukukunda lâiklik kuralı ve gelişimi," *Istanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XXVII (1–4): 1962, pp. 96–207. Muzaffer Sencer, *Dinin Türk toplumuna etkileri* (Istanbul: 1968), pp. 157–161.

²⁵ G. L. Lewis, *op. cit.* in *The Muslim World*, LVI (4): Oct. 1966, p. 236.

²⁶ For an analysis on a comparative basis with Federal Germany and Austria cf. Hakkı Maviş, *Almanya-Avusturya ve Türkiye'de din eğitimi* (Istanbul: 1970). Further details in İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, *Türkiye'de din eğitimi* (Ankara: 1966).

²⁷ Based on the 1968 *statistical yearbook of Turkey* (Ankara: 1969), p. 115, table 84; and, for 1968–69, on its *Ek yayın* ("supplement") (Ankara: 1970), p. 22, table 84. See the analysis of these statistics in A. N. Yücekök, "Türkiyede din eğitimi örgütlerinin illere göre dağılımı," *Sbfd*, XXV (2): June 1970, pp. 123–141. For

TABLE 9. İMAM-HATİP SCHOOLS, BY YEAR

<i>School-year</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Students</i>
1960-61	337	4,548
1961-62	388	5,375
1962-63	436	7,040
1963-64	484	9,824
1964-65	508	10,961
1965-66	558	13,478
1966-67	736	20,208
1967-68	1,090	29,132
1968-69	1,173	37,862
1969-70	1,263	44,275
1970-71	1,547	49,308

Religious education grew ever stronger in the villages,²⁸ where most of the extra-curricular Koran courses were held. Of these, in the late 1960's, about 10,000 were under the supervision of the government Authority for Religious Affairs, while another 40,000 were privately arranged each year — mostly during the summer months.²⁹ Further, a great deal of religious literature was published and sold at low prices. The latter included both books and magazines — of which more will be said presently. All in all, observers familiar with the internal scene in Turkey were struck by the intensity of religious feeling throughout the country.³⁰ The topic of religion versus secularism remained a cardinal one in the 1960's and frequently arose in different forms of public debate.³¹

Two questions that one may ask at this point are: a. What type of literature were the proponents of Islam publishing in the 1960's? and

an attack on these schools, cf. M. E. Bozarslan, *Hilafet ve ümmetçilik sorunu* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 359 ff.

²⁸ R. B. Scott, "Turkish village attitudes towards religious education," *The Muslim World*, LV (3): July 1965, pp. 222-229. Id., "Qur'an courses in Turkey," *ibid.*, LXI (4): Oct. 1971, pp. 239-255.

²⁹ Reported, for 1968, by Fehmi Yavuz, *Din eğitimi* (Ankara: 1969), p. 22; and *id.*, *Din eğitimi ve toplumumuz* (Ankara: 1969), pp. 70-72. The latter book contains considerable information on the place of religion at every stage of Turkish education. For statistics of teachers and students of the Koran courses from 1932 to 1965, see Yusuf Ziya Bahadın, *Türkiyede eğitim sorunu ve sosyalizm* (Ankara: 1968), p. 151.

³⁰ Heyd, *Revival of Islam in modern Turkey*, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Franz von Caucig, "Um die Zukunft des Kemalismus in der Türkei," *Aussenpolitik* (Freiburg), XIX (10): Oct. 1968, pp. 629-630.

³¹ Bahri Savcı, "Laiklik prensibinin 'Türkiye şartları' içinde mütalâası," *SBFD*, XIX (2): June 1964, pp. 139-153.

b. What organizations did they set up to further their goals and what was their political importance?

The first question is easier to answer perhaps, due to the large number of such publications. As Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out,³² out of several thousands books printed in Turkey in 1939, only a dozen were on religious subjects. In the 1950's, however, there were many more: in addition to popular booklets for the pious, there appeared works on Islam, the life of its Prophet and other dignitaries, Islamic history and mysticism, and commentaries on the Koran. The trend continued into the 1960's, when numerous books and booklets were published, explaining the dogmas and rites of Islam in a simple, straightforward way to adults³³ and schoolchildren.³⁴ Textbooks for learning the Arabic of the Koran were printed.³⁵ Collections of *hutbes*, or Friday-sermons,³⁶ provided the faithful with additional information, while books — on the history of Islam or certain of its episodes³⁷ — were published for the more intellectual reader. Islamic classics were translated into Turkish, such as Muslim's *Sahih*, al-Gazzali's works, modernists like Muhammad Kutb, and others. A new Encyclopedia of Islam was prepared and its fascicles sold at a reasonable price. In addition a great amount of apologetic literature was written in the 1960's, of which a characteristic example was the attempt to prove, by quotations from Western authors, that Islamic civilization was the real source of Western civilization.³⁸ Perhaps the most suprising type of apologetic works were those striving to prove — with meticulous quotations — that Atatürk was a good Muslim.³⁹

³² In his "Islamic revival in Turkey," *International Affairs* (London), XXVIII (1): Jan. 1952, p. 42.

³³ Such as Ali Kemâl Belviranlı, *İslâm prensipleri* (1st ed.: 1962; 9th ed., Istanbul: 1971), or Mehmet Karagülle, *Dua ve kurtuluş* (Istanbul: 1971).

³⁴ Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, *Din dersleri* (Istanbul: 1970). This 368-page book was especially prepared for the 4th and 5th grades in elementary schools.

³⁵ E.g. Münif Çelebi, *Kur'an dili alfabeti ve okuma kaideleri* (Ankara: 1970).

³⁶ E.g. İsmail Coşar, *Minberden mü'minlere* (2 vols., Ankara: 1970). Süleyman Ateş, *Hatiplere hutbeler* (2nd ed., Ankara: n. d. [1971]).

³⁷ Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *İslâm tarihi* (2 vols., Istanbul: 1971). Naci Kâşif Kıcıman, *Medine müdâfaası yahut Hicaz bizden nasıl ayrıldı* (Istanbul: 1971).

³⁸ İsmâil Hâmi Dânişmend, *Garp menba'larına göre garp medeniyetinin menbaı olan İslâm medeniyeti* (2nd ed., Istanbul: 1971).

³⁹ For such a collection of Atatürk's reflections on religion, see the booklet by Hafız Yaşar Okur, *Atatürkle on beş yıl: dinî hatıralar* (N. p.: 1962).

In number, books on religion and theology ranged from 150 (out of a total of 4,357) in 1961, to 291 (out of a total of 6,099) in 1966,⁴⁰ but their impact might well have been greater than these figures indicate, as they were issued in inexpensive soft-cover editions which were sold in numerous shops and book-stalls — a fact which caused considerable worry to the champions of secularism.⁴¹ Several subjects seem to recur in many of these pro-Islamic publications:

a. Islam is a moral, desirable way of life.

b. The decline in Muslim faith and practice was a major cause of the fall of the Ottoman Empire.⁴² A return to Islam would bring back past glories: “A Great Turkey will be a Muslim Turkey.”⁴³

c. No basic contradiction exists between secularism and Islam. Turkish secularism is not anti-religious; indeed, enlightened secularism supports Islam.⁴⁴

d. Nor is there any contradiction between Islam and Turkish nationalism: they complement one another;⁴⁵ indeed, Islam and Turkism are the two sacred foundations of Turkey,⁴⁶ and Islam has consistently been an important element of Turkish culture;⁴⁷ the Turks had come to the assistance of the Muslim world centuries ago and have continued to collaborate with it ever since.⁴⁸

e. Equally compatible are Islam — the essence of oriental culture — and western civilization; a synthesis of Turkish Islam with West-European civilization (in which the former would predominate, apparently) is both feasible and desirable.⁴⁹

f. Consequently all the talk about “progressive” (*ilerici*) and “reactionary” (*gerici*) in Turkey and the classification of religious Muslims amongst the latter is complete nonsense — for what can be more pro-

⁴⁰ 1968 statistical yearbook of Turkey, *op. cit.*, p. 121, table 93.

⁴¹ See Nadi, *op. cit.*, pp. 218, 350 and *passim*.

⁴² E.g., Kadircan Kafli, *Türkiye'nin kaderi?* (Istanbul: 1965), pp. 49 ff.

⁴³ Ahmet Kabaklı, *Müslüman Türkiye* (Istanbul: 1970), p. 12.

⁴⁴ E.g., A. N. Kırmacı, *Türkiye'nin geleceği* (Istanbul: 1965), pp. 43–45.

⁴⁵ Müşid Altaylı, *Türk milliyetçi-toplumcu doktrinin umumi esasları* (Istanbul: 1969), *passim*.

⁴⁶ *Türkiye milliyetçiler birliğinin görüşü* (N. p.: 1964), pp. 7–8.

⁴⁷ Osman Turan, *Türkiye'de mânevî buhran: din ve lâiklik* (Ankara: 1964), pp. 18 ff. Osman Keskiöglü, *İslam dünyası dün ve bugün* (Ankara: 1964), pp. 8 ff.

⁴⁸ This is the main thesis of Yılmaz Boyunağa's book, *Dost ve düşman gözü ile Türk-İslâm sentezi* (Istanbul: 1970). See also Süleyman Sürmen, *Ülkü kavgası* (2nd ed., Ankara: n.d.), esp. p. 135.

⁴⁹ A leading exponent of this thesis was the late Peyami Safa, see his *Doğu-batı sentezi* (Istanbul: 1963). Cf. his earlier *Türk inkılabına bakışlar* (2nd ed., Istanbul: n.d.).

gressive than faith, virtues, morals, and justice?⁵⁰ If anything, Islam has always been distinguished by a forward-looking interest in the welfare of the individual and in the well-being of the worker, as well as by opposition to all forms of exploitation and of fanaticism.⁵¹ Indeed, so the argument goes, it is preposterous to note that the anti-religious have been labeling all anti-communists and all believers as reactionary!⁵²

In other words, recent pro-Islamic literature in Turkey has identified Islam with the Turkish nation,⁵³ an approach not merely restricted to the orthodox, but apparently quite prevalent among many Turks.⁵⁴ This literature has also been prone to identify the non-religious, and particularly the anti-religious, with the communists and other groups, which are vehemently opposed.

In recent years, the spearhead of pro-Islamic literature in Turkey has been directed more against communists than against any other group. This seems to have been so both for inherent reasons (as the godlessness of communism was a constant challenge to faithful Muslims) and for tactical considerations (as denunciations of communism have always found a ready ear in Turkey). With arguments borrowed from Islamic writings and past history, communism was described as "the deceitful enemy"⁵⁵ and the persecutor of Muslims wherever it ruled.⁵⁶ All types of leftism were lumped together as variations of communism.⁵⁷ Much of the invective, naturally, was directed at communist activity in Turkey.⁵⁸ Socialism and communism, past⁵⁹ and present,⁶⁰ were considered poison

⁵⁰ E.g., Osman Turan, *Türkiye'de siyâsî buhranın kaynakları* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 104 ff. and *passim*. Süleyman Sürmen, *Lider kimdir?* (Ankara: 1967), pp. 77-80. Id., *Sağ-sol kavgası* (Ankara: 1969), pp. 195 ff.

⁵¹ Examples in Sadık Albayrak, *Sömürüye karşı İslâm* (Istanbul: 1971), *passim*. Faruk Güventürk and Fuat Kadioğlu, *Din ışığında yobazlık, Atatürkçülük* (Ankara: 1967), pp. 3 ff., 39-41.

⁵² Cf. Necmeddin Erişen, *Türkiyede altıncı filo hâdiseleri ve gerçek emperyalizm* (İstanbul: 1969), p. 61. Fuat Kadioğlu, *Gericilik ve ötesi* (Zonguldak: 1965).

⁵³ Ali Muzaffer Ersöz, *Millî strateji* (Ankara: 1965), pp. 62-63 and *passim*.

⁵⁴ Cf. Heyd, *Revival of Islam in modern Turkey*, pp. 25-27.

⁵⁵ Salih Doğan Pala, *Sağ-sol meselesi ve islâmın hükmü* (Bursa: 1966), p. 55.

⁵⁶ E.g., Cavit Ersen, *Kızıl zindanlar* (3 vols., several editions in the late 1960's).

⁵⁷ S. D. Pala, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁵⁸ See for example İbnü'tayyar Semahaddin Cem, *İslâm ilâhiyatında Şeyh Bedreddin*, pp. 45 ff., where Nâzım Hikmet is constantly referred to as "Nazım Hikmetof."

⁵⁹ A. Cerrahoğlu, *Türkiyede sosyalizm* (Istanbul: 1965). İsmail Sağırlı (ed.), *Yeşil komünizm kavgası* (Istanbul: 1970).

⁶⁰ See attack on *Yön* articles concerning Islam, in A. Cerrahoğlu, *İslâmiyet ve Osmanlı sosyalistleri; İslâmiyet ve yöncü sosyalistler* (N. p.: 1964).

and both alien and unsuited to a Turkey peopled by faithful Muslims.⁶¹ Worldwide freemasonry,⁶² missionary activity,⁶³ and "an international Jewish plot"⁶⁴ were denounced, also, because of their alleged ties with communism. Indeed all were considered a single dark plot.

Such and related views, defending Islam and recommending it to the Turks, and defaming whatever and whoever was regarded as hostile to Islam, were not limited to books. Newspapers and magazines, too, voiced these opinions: many treated extensively, and sometimes even passionately, a diverse range of matters related to Islam and Turkish attitudes towards it — including politics, economics, education, radio and television. A fair sample of these may be found in the collected articles of Ahmet Kabaklı, a lawyer and lecturer, in the daily *Tercüman* and elsewhere, in the late 1950's and through the 1960's.⁶⁵

An Islamic-minded press in Republican Turkey was not, however, a wholly new phenomenon; in the early 1950's there had appeared journals with a similar orientation, mostly rather poor in content.⁶⁶ In the 1960's the number of religious and theological newspapers and periodicals ranged from 13 (out of a total of 1,653), in 1962, to 24 (out of a total of 1,739), in 1964.⁶⁷ The dailies most closely identified with a pro-Islamic policy seem to be *Bugün*⁶⁸ ("Today"), *Babı Ali'de Sabah* ("Morning"), *Yeni Asya* ("New Asia"), and *Hakikat* ("Truth"), all published in Istanbul. Another Istanbul daily, the mass-circulation *Tercüman* ("Interpreter") is generally sympathetic to Islam, although perhaps less committed than the other four. In general, all defended the *şariat* and accused its opponents of atheism; secular intellectuals were branded as communists.⁶⁹

⁶¹ Examples in Peyami Safa, *Sosyalizm, marksizm, komünizm*, a collection of articles edited by E. Göze and N. Kösoğlu (Istanbul: 1971).

⁶² Cevat Rifat Atilhan, *Masonluk nedir?* (4th ed., n.p.: n.d.). Id., *Masonluğun iç yüzü* (3rd ed., Istanbul: 1970).

⁶³ E.g., Sâmîha Ayverdi, *Misyonerlik karşısında Türkiye* (Istanbul: 1969).

⁶⁴ Cevat Rifat Atilhan, *Yahudi dünyayı nasıl istilâ ediyor?* (Istanbul: 1962). Id., *Fesat programı ve protokollar* (Istanbul: 1968). Id., *İğneli fiçî* (4th ed., Istanbul: 1969). Kemal Yaman (ed.), *Millet düşmanlarının ihânet plânları (belgeler)* (Istanbul: 1971).

⁶⁵ See Ahmet Kabaklı, *Müslüman Türkiye, op. cit.*, and *Mabed ve millet* (Istanbul: 1970), *passim*.

⁶⁶ Examples in B. Lewis, *op. cit.* in *International Affairs*, XXVIII (1): Jan. 1952, pp. 44-45.

⁶⁷ 1968 statistical yearbook of Turkey, *op. cit.*, p. 121, table 94.

⁶⁸ On which see M. Şahap Tan, *Bugün'ün dervîşi (Mehmet Şevket Eygi) kimdir?* (Istanbul: 1970).

⁶⁹ Cf. Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78 and *passim*.

Among the weeklies, one may mention *İttihad* ("Union"), which started to appear in Istanbul on October 24, 1967. Its publisher was Salih Özcan, but its editor-in-chief and moving spirit was N. Mustafa Polat. The "statement of purpose" in its first issue left no doubt as to its goals. *İttihad* maintained that the Muslim world was beginning to awaken, faced as it was with the challenges of Western materialism and of the Northern (viz., Russian) sickness of atheism. It claimed, further, that social life, in all its aspects, was facing bankruptcy. The future, however, belonged to Islam, and no Muslim, therefore, should despair of the future. Faith in Islam could lead to a wholly new system, which might be arrived at by a union of all Muslims. The main goal of *İttihad* was to save Muslims from materialism and all types of atheism and to encourage the union of all Muslims so as to foster material and spiritual progress.

İttihad, indeed, pursued these goals persistently and ceaselessly. Intended for the unsophisticated and written simply, it has been reporting steadily on Muslim affairs in Turkey and other countries. It has supported those domestic policies which have shown a favorable attitude towards Islam and has attacked those hostile to Islam — particularly communists, socialists and the Labor Party of Turkey. Since 1965 it has been also criticizing the "left-of-center" policy of the RPP. In 1971 it did not hesitate to attack the Erim Cabinet for supposedly being anti-religious.⁷⁰ Much of the information in *İttihad* was on Ottoman history or Muslim feasts and practices, which served as an incentive for the study of the Koran and Islam.⁷¹

İslâm, a monthly appearing in Ankara from April 1956, continued well into the 1960's.⁷² It was interested in distributing knowledge of Islam and teaching the Koran in Arabic, with a Turkish translation. Articles included expositions of Islam's views on such matters as the position of women, medicine and bribery. The backwardness of Turkey was related to the neglect of Islam.⁷³ Some articles dealt with events from Muslim history, others with current affairs such as the Turco-Greek dispute over Cyprus, which was presented in a pro-Muslim spirit.⁷⁴ Supplements for Muslim youth were also published.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ *İttihad*, 182: Apr. 27, 1971, p. 10.

⁷¹ See also J. M. Landau, "Turkey from election to election," *The World Today*, XXVI (4): Apr. 1970, p. 163.

⁷² The last issue to hand is September 1965. There may, however, be later ones.

⁷³ *İslâm*, July 1965, p. 295.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 1965, pp. 219-220

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 1964, p. 300.

A quarterly review, *İslâm Düşüncesi* ("The ideas of Islam"), appeared in Istanbul, published by M. İhsan Babalı and edited by İshak Erdebil. It began publication in March, 1967, that is at approximately the same time as *İttihad*. *İslâm Düşüncesi* however was not involved in politics, but aimed mainly at instructing its readers in Islam and closely-related matters. Its writing was in a style replete with Arabic terms, with the Turkish equivalents rendered in parentheses. It may still be appearing, but not regularly.⁷⁶

Perhaps the most aggressive of all magazines with strong Islamic leanings is a relatively new weekly, *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* ("The Struggle for Independence — Anew"⁷⁷), which began publication, in 16 pages, in Istanbul early in February, 1970. The publisher then was Ömer Ziya Belviranlı and the editor Selim Arkoç. If anything, it is even more aggressive than *İttihad* and slightly more sophisticated. The weekly has printed regular features on Muslim points of belief, sometimes going into a more detailed exposition of faith.⁷⁸ It has included reports on Islamic events in Turkey and on Muslims abroad — such as in the Soviet Union, Kashmir, and North Africa.⁷⁹ It has pursued a relentless campaign against communism, in almost every issue, and has connected the communists with other alleged enemies of Turkey — Christians (particularly missionaries)⁸⁰ and Jews.⁸¹ Freemasons were attacked only slightly less violently.⁸²

As we have said, it is more difficult to pinpoint organized Islamic movements in contemporary Turkey, although some information has become available in recent years. While reports of the existence in Turkey of a widespread network of Islamic cells, manipulated by the international Muslim Brotherhood,⁸³ seem exaggerated and unreliable, less systematic organized activity does continue. One knows, for instance, that there exist numerous religious associations (*dernekler*) to assist the

⁷⁶ II (6): Nov. 1968; II (7): May 1969; II (8): Oct. 1969.

⁷⁷ Probably referring to a renewal of Atatürk's War of Independence.

⁷⁸ E.g., *Yeniden Milli Mücadele*, 33: Sep. 15, 1970, p. 13.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 25: July 21, 1970, pp. 7, 11; 27: Aug. 4, 1970, p. 13.

⁸⁰ E.g., *ibid.*, 27: Aug. 4, 1970, pp. 1, 3, 14; 28: Aug. 11, 1970, pp. 11, 13; 29: Aug. 18, 1970, p. 2.

⁸¹ E.g., *ibid.*, 26: July 28, 1970, p. 16; 27: Aug. 4, 1970, pp. 7, 11; 28: Aug. 11, 1970, pp. 6, 16; 29: Aug. 18, 1970, p. 16; 32: Sep. 8, 1970, pp. 5, 16; 33: Sep. 15, 1970, pp. 4, 14, 16.

⁸² E.g., *ibid.*, 29: Aug. 18, 1970, p. 4.

⁸³ *Ant*, 64: Mar. 19, 1968, pp. 4-5; cf. *ibid.*, 66: Apr. 2, 1968, p. 6. Cf. Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 and *passim*.

imam-hatip schools, courses for learning Koran, pious institutions with a philanthropic character, and holy shrines and memorials.⁸⁴ Mention should be made of Islamic groups within the University students' organizations; the *Türkiye Kur'an kursları kurma, koruma ve idame ettirme dernekleri* ("Associations for establishing in Turkey Koran courses, supporting them and maintaining their existence"); the *Türkiye din adamları yardımlaşma federasyonu* ("Federation of associations for assisting men of religion in Turkey"); the *İlim yayma cemiyeti* ("Society for distributing knowledge") — claiming seventeen branches; the *Yeşil ay* ("Green crescent") — an anti-alcoholism group; and numerous others — reaching, in 1968, 10,730, or 28.4% of all associations in the country.⁸⁵ While these were not necessarily politically-slanted, they represented an important potential for recruitment to action in political organizations: some, indeed, combined social welfare activities with the imparting of politico-religious notions.

Religious groups with more obvious political aims had been common in the Ottoman Empire, and it is no wonder that they did not disappear overnight with the establishment of a Republic. The Tıcani sect, for example, was active in the 1930's, calling for the reinstatement of the call-to-prayer in Arabic, and even going so far as to smash statues of Atatürk.⁸⁶ The latter activity moved the organizations of Turkish students — nurtured on Atatürk's reforms — to repeated protests.⁸⁷ The Tıcanis appear to have numbered several thousands.⁸⁸

After the decline of the Tıcani sect and its virtual disappearance from political activity, a more widespread religious order came to the fore — that of the *Nurcular*, or "disciples of Nur."⁸⁹ Their founder and

⁸⁴ See lists in the appendices to A. N. Yücekök, *op. cit.* in *SBFD*, XXV (2): June 1970, pp. 128-141.

⁸⁵ Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, *op. cit.*, p. 131. Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136. The most recent study, in considerable detail, is A. N. Yücekök, *Türkiye'de örgütlenmiş dinin sosyo-ekonomik tabanı (1946-1968)* (Ankara: 1971).

⁸⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 401, 414. G. L. Lewis, *op. cit.* in *The Muslim World*, LVI (4): Oct. 1966, p. 236.

⁸⁷ Nermin Abadan, "Values and political behavior of Turkish youth," *TYIR*, IV: 1963, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁸ Acc. to Marcel Colombe, "La Turquie et l'Islam," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, V (4): Oct.-Dec. 1955, pp. 761-771.

⁸⁹ There is quite a body of literature on the Nurcular. See, e.g., Tunaya, *İslâmcılık cereyanı*, pp. 232-239. Çetin Özek, *100 soruda...*, pp. 180-194. Neda Armaner, *Nurculuk* (Ankara: 1964). Yılmaz Çetiner, *İnanç sömürücüleri: nurcular arasında bir ay* (Istanbul: 1964). Faruk Güventürk, *Din ışığı altında nurculuğun içyüzü* (2nd

leader was Saidi Kürdî, sometimes called Saidi Nursî (after the village Nurs or Nuris, where he was born in 1874 or thereabouts). Saidi had a traditional education only and participated in a conservatiye counter-revolution against the Young Turks in 1909. After the First World War, he found himself in a new situation. Until the beginning of the multi-party era in 1945, Saidi cautiously kept out of the limelight. He was careful not to speak against secularism, but rather for Islam, to his steadily increasing number of admirers. In 1945 he came into the open as their *Üstad*, or Master of an order. During the 1950's, Saidi took advantage of the relatively favorable climate towards religion by traveling around the country, preaching and writing. Several volumes of his speeches and writings were collected both in his lifetime and after his death in Urfa (1960).

The Nurcular continued their activity in the 1960's and appear to have increased their following.⁹⁰ The crackdown on the Nurcular by the authorities after the 1960 Revolution and repeated arrests⁹¹ did not appear to hurt their popularity. They continued preaching and practicing their rites, in defiance of the law.⁹² A clandestine school of theirs was discovered in Kuleönü, a village in the province of Isparta, and raided by the police in January 1971. 85 students, aged between eight and twenty, wearing religious robes and turbans, were arrested while learning Islam and Arabic. Nine sacks of Nurcular publications were seized. The school was a boarding institution, housing students from sixty of Turkey's provinces, while the official school, built in 1924, could not recruit enough pupils.⁹³

The Nurcular considered Saidi a *veli*, or saintly person, who could perform such miracles as being in two places at the same time, move through locked doors, or live without food. They also considered him "a peerless philosopher," but an examination of his basic ideas does not support this contention. They claim to be a twentieth-century interpretation of the Koran — most suitable for our times. All the answers to con-

ed., Istanbul: 1964). Gölpınarlı, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-230. M. Sencer, *Dinin Türk toplumuna etkileri*, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-224.

⁹⁰ See previous footnote. Conflicting reports about the Nurcular appear at intervals in the Turkish press.

⁹¹ See, e.g., *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 3, 5, 6 and 7, and Sep. 9, 1960.

⁹² See *The Times* (London), Dec. 31, 1962, for the arrest of fourteen Nurcular. Cf. *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1963.

⁹³ Reported in the weekly *Outlook* (Ankara), V (219): Jan. 27, 1971, p. 12. The Nurcular also gave financial assistance to promising University students — thus training future cadres.

temporary problems are in the Koran, and the *Nurculuk* (or doctrine of the Nurcular) brings them to believers. It claims to be not a *tarikât*, or dervish order, but a theoretical system, based on a spiritual idea of the need for a theocratic state to end "the 27-year period of irreligion." Religious schools (to include instruction in Arabic) are to be established; indeed, Saidi demanded, in a letter to Menderes, that his collection of speeches, *Risale-i Nur* ("The message of light"), become a part of the curriculum in all of Turkey's schools. The Nurculuk identified secularism with irreligion and considered them both contrary to Islam. Since Islam contains everything, it should be the basis of the state. The head of state and the members of the National Assembly ought to be religious Turks. There is no need for any constitution except the Koran, and the *şeriat* should be the law of Turkey. Saudi Arabia is cited as a successful example. The Nurcular frankly recommended polygamy, traditional dress and other measures consonant with the *şeriat*.

Without openly attacking Atatürk or daring to insult him, the Nurcular nonetheless condemned the era of his administration as one of irreligion and decline, which had opened the way for communist infiltration into Turkey. Such open accusations had been rarely voiced in the rule of the Republican People's Party, but were more frequently heard after 1950. Indeed, there seems to have existed some form of tacit collaboration, based on a community of interests, between the leadership of the Democrat Party and the Nurcular. Insofar as it can be ascertained, this resulted in the authorities not generally interfering with the activities of Saidi and his followers. Although they called themselves *Hizb-ül Kur'an* or "Party of the Koran," the Nurcular do not appear to have set up a tightly-knit political organization, certainly not on the lines of the other political parties in Turkey. One may assume that setting up a formal Islamic party would not only have been contrary to the Turkish Constitution, but would have united against it all the secular elements and the existing political parties.

Consequently, several Islamic organizations planned to work clandestinely or semi-clandestinely. For instance, in the 1960's, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, a former soldier and author of a hate-campaign against freemasons and Jews,⁹⁴ set up a small group, the Islamic Democratic Party, which aimed at teaching village children, *inter alia*, "the sublime and moral bases of Islam, purified of accretions, superstitions and Jewish

⁹⁴ See above, footnotes 62 and 64, for his books. Cf. D. A. Rustow, *op. cit.*, in R. N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West*, pp. 98-99.

fabrications.”⁹⁵ Another example was an underground association, the *Süleymanlılar* (“Suleymanists”), in Turkey’s more remote Eastern provinces. Named after its founder, Süleyman Seyfullah (1863–1946), the group preached a type of popular İslam, extremist in character, whose goal was a theocratic state. Meanwhile, they condemned anything foreign as the work of the devil, and those supporting foreign works — as the army of the devil. Indeed, they considered themselves an army against anything from abroad. They were great partisans of, and participants in, the Koran courses. Some of their leaders were educated at al-Azhar in Cairo and at the Umayyad Medrese in Damascus.⁹⁶

The Nurcular and some lesser groups continued their missionary activities — on the fringe of legality — in the 1960’s, further eroding the country’s secularist structure. While their clandestine activities in those years are not known in detail,⁹⁷ the frequent calls in *Bugün* in the late 1960’s for mass prayers and Holy War reflected their views. Also, it appears that some Muslim organizations in Turkey were involved in student demonstrations, during which they raised banners calling for a “Muslim Turkey,” or proclaiming that “Islam is coming!”⁹⁸ Anyway, the military authorities considered these organizations, particularly the Nurcular, enough of a danger, in the months immediately following the presentation of the March 12, 1971 military Memorandum, to have many of their members arrested and brought to trial charged with subversive activities. According to the Turkish press, in August 1971 six Nurcular were sentenced to prison terms of up to nine years on charges of religious agitation, while three others were found innocent. Early in September of the same year, fifty-four Nurcular were brought before a military court in Izmir and accused, in a 36-page charge, with having organized religious meetings intended to destroy the existing order in Turkey and set up, instead, a state based on the *şeriat*. The accused were 6 preachers (*vaiz*), 3 merchants, 2 lawyers, 1 journalist, 2 engineers, 14 students and 26 workers and peasants.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Quoted by H. A. Reed, “Secularism and Islam in Turkish politics,” *Current History*, XXXII (190): June 1957, p. 338.

⁹⁶ Çetin Özek, *100 soruda etc.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–202. Gölpınarlı, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–226. Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–235.

⁹⁷ It is known that their supporters were occasionally brought to court and charged. See Dâver, *op. cit.*, in *Sbfd*, XXII (1): Mar. 1967, p. 65. For subsequent years, see Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 *ff.*

⁹⁸ *Der Spiegel* weekly, June 30, 1969, p. 100.

⁹⁹ *Akşam*, Sep. 3, 1971. *Yankı*, 29: Sep. 13–19, 1971, p. 21.

While the trials of the Nurcular in 1971 were not as spectacular as those of the leftists accused of conspiracy, bank robbery, and murder, they were equally significant as an indication of persistent political activity. What is also interesting is the fact that — like the Turkish left, which was inspired, and possibly assisted, by an ideology from abroad — the Muslim right, too, was assisted by extreme religious organizations in Saudia and Jordan. From 1967 Ahmet Selah el-Ali, a Palestinian living in Lebanon, was reported to be increasingly active in Turkey, first for the Islamic Hizb-üt Tahrir, a fanatical underground political party banned in Jordan,¹⁰⁰ and set up a central office in Beirut; then, for an Islamic organization in Saudia, Rabitat-ül Alem-i İslâm. El-Ali reportedly held public meetings in Ankara, Konya and Niğde, and formed branches of the above politico-religious organizations in these towns. At those meetings, religious and political tracts were read and interpreted, and plans for broadening propaganda activities discussed (with the setting up of a theocratic state in Turkey as a final goal). The boldness of Hizb-üt Tahrir reached its peak in May 1967, with the publication and distribution of political handbills dealing with current events in Turkey.¹⁰¹ The police was alerted. In August 1967, several leading members of the party were arrested. In the following month, the police broke up a party cell, which comprised Jordanian students of agriculture at Ankara University.¹⁰² In July 1968, too, many other party members were arrested.¹⁰³

Indeed, in the late 1960's, the involvement of Islamic circles in politics became increasingly evident. At a national convention of *mukaddesatçıs* (or "those revering sacred Islam"), held in Bursa early in 1968, it was claimed that sovereignty was Islam's, not the nation's; that the law courts ought to be based on religion; and that in Islam, religious and state affairs were conducted together.¹⁰⁴ Further, there were indications that a sustained effort was being made by religious circles to infiltrate education — particularly the universities — the press, the judicial system, and even the military forces.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, such activities were supported, possibly even co-ordinated by a new body with political aims, set up on November 18, 1967. Named *Millî Mücadele Birliği* ("Union for National

¹⁰⁰ For its ideology and objectives, cf. J. M. Landau (ed.), *Man, state and society in the contemporary Middle East* (New York: 1972), pp. 183–188.

¹⁰¹ See text in *Ant*, 23: June 6, 1967, p. 6.

¹⁰² *Cumhuriyet*, Aug. 6 and Sep. 8, 1967.

¹⁰³ Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.

¹⁰⁴ See Nadi, *op. cit.*, pp. 386–387.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 452–454, 461–462. See also Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.

Struggle”), it claimed to represent a “wide front of the scientific right” of all trends — based on Islam and patriotism. Moreover it frankly fought leftism and secularism by oral and written propaganda and through its branches within the imam-hatip schools.¹⁰⁶

These activities notwithstanding, no political party could be established with Islam as its platform. This was patently impossible in the Kemalist Republic; neither the Neo-Kemalism of the National Union Committee nor the military command would have allowed it in the 1960’s. Indeed the Party Law of 1965 explicitly forbade the establishment of political parties conflicting with the principle of secularism. So it was not before the beginning of 1970 that an Islamic group set itself up formally as a fully-fledged political party.

The Party for National Order (PNO) (*Millî Nizam Partisi*) was founded on January 26, 1970, by Necmettin Erbakan and was closed down on May 20, 1971,¹⁰⁷ as part of the drive undertaken by the military to disband and bar from active politics both the radical left and the Islamic right. While the left was more spectacularly involved in physical violence, by late 1970 the Islamic Right, too was echoing a similar activism in its call for a “Revolutionary Religion” (*devrimci din*).¹⁰⁸

Erbakan had been a Professor at the Technical University, worked in several industrial enterprises then and was also the secretary and afterwards the chairman of the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.¹⁰⁹ In politics, he had been a prominent leader of the Justice Party, where he was credited with heading the more conservative, Islamic-minded faction. An extreme advocate of private initiative, Erbakan was trying to outbid Demirel.¹¹⁰ Shortly before the 1969 elections to the National Assembly, he fell out with Demirel; the latter knew that Erbakan was challenging him as party leader, and also wished to give the JP a younger, less conservative look. The JP vetoed Erbakan’s candidacy; he succeeded nevertheless in being elected to the National Assembly as an independent member from Konya. After maneuvering for a while, Erbakan became Chairman of the newly-founded party.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Genç, *ibid.*, pp. 235–246.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *Yankı*, 13: May 24–30, 1971, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ See, e.g., Talât Halman, in *Milliyet 1970*, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

¹⁰⁹ E. Güresin, “Yeni parti,” *Cumhuriyet*, Jan. 27, 1970.

¹¹⁰ *Varlık Yılığ* 1970, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

¹¹¹ On the foundation of PNO, cf. *Devlet*, 44: Feb. 2, 1970, pp. 4–5. *Milliyet 1970*, pp. 155–157. *The Guardian*, Jan. 28, 1970. *Le Monde*, Feb. 6, 1970. See also the following footnotes.

Other leaders of the party elected in its first meeting on January 26, 1970, were Hasan Aksay, responsible for organization, propaganda and information; Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, head of electoral affairs and of groups affiliated to the party; Süleyman Arif Emre, Secretary-General; İsmail Müftüoğlu, Assistant Secretary-General and Ömer Faruk Ergin, Accountant-General (treasurer).¹¹² Some were ex-JP members, all were conservative in their politics. The press and the public considered the new party and its leaders committed to the bolstering of Islam in Turkey by political means. Both the *Bugün* and *Babı Ali'de Sabah* dailies, strongly supporting Islam, hailed the PNO. The former, indeed, was apparently the only newspaper to announce the party's establishment even before it was set up;¹¹³ it assured its readers that the PNO would be a party of rightists.¹¹⁴ The latter was even more vehement in its support. It greeted the PNO as the party expected by every *mukaddesatçı*¹¹⁵ in Anatolia,¹¹⁶ the answer to all those who thought that the JP had veered leftwards,¹¹⁷ a right-of-center party to protect the real interests of all rightists.¹¹⁸ The proof, from the point of view of *Babı Ali'de Sabah*, was that the party was truly anchored in Islam.¹¹⁹

The founding congress of the Party for National Order convened in Ankara on February 8, 1970. The party leadership claimed that 1,500 people joined it on the day of its foundation,¹²⁰ and about 500 attended the above congress, where speeches were made, slogans supporting religion displayed, and poems against freemasonry and communism read.¹²¹ The party seems to have recruited some support from among well-to-do townsmen and devout Muslim villagers¹²² and to have invested no little effort in establishing branches throughout Turkey. Unconfirmed

¹¹² *Babı Ali'de Sabah*, Jan. 28, 1970.

¹¹³ Refik Özdek, "Yeni parti," *Bugün*, Jan. 25, 1970.

¹¹⁴ *Bugün*, *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Or "one who respects sacred things." This is frequently used instead of "Islamist," as employing the latter term might stir up the angry opposition of the secularists.

¹¹⁶ "Yeni bir parti," *Babı Ali'de Sabah*, Jan. 28, 1970.

¹¹⁷ İsmail Oğuz, "Millî nizam partisi," *ibid.* This refers to the "new look" given by Demirel to his Cabinet after the 1969 elections.

¹¹⁸ Münevver Ayaşlı, "Selamlarız," *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1970.

¹¹⁹ Necmi Hakkatapan, "Millî nizama doğru," *ibid.*, Feb. 13 and 14, 1970.

¹²⁰ *Yeni Gün*, Feb. 9, 1970.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Tekin Erer, "Millî nizam partisi!" *Son Havadis*, Feb. 2, 1970. Cf. Muzaffer Sencer, *Türkiye'de siyasal partilerin sosyal temelleri*, pp. 364-372.

reports have it that known Nurcular were among the members;¹²³ the support of commercial circles, mainly in Anatolia, was more in evidence. There is a vivid description of how Erbakan set up a branch of the party in Kütahya on November 21, 1970, after careful preparations.¹²⁴ Erbakan himself arrived in Kütahya for the event and was met by such cries as "The commander of the army of faith is coming!" or "The renovator of our time has come!"¹²⁵

Erbakan had maintained at its foundation that the party was ideological¹²⁶ with a forward look.¹²⁷ Its program¹²⁸ set out to prove this claim in a hundred paragraphs. Its "basic aims" were listed as realizing the potential of the Turkish nation for morals and virtue, bringing order, freedom from anxiety and social justice to society, happiness and peace to all Turks, and moral recovery, based on the positive sciences and technology. Further, the party called for moral and material progress, a synthesis of Turkey's great historical values and the democratic rule of law — to bring about prosperity and happiness, together with a civilization that would serve as a model for the world.

While the program emphasizes its devotion to true democracy, anyone reading between the lines of the preamble or the paragraphs that follow can see that the PNO is no less devoted to Islam. While the party was legally prevented from inscribing Islam in its program, the constant repetition in the document of "morals and virtue," *ahlak ve fazilet* (both Arabic terms with strong Islamic connotations) was a clear indication of its general orientation. The program explained social justice, too, in terms of morals and virtue; it defended freedom of conscience, but also stood for the need for religious education. It opposed the exploitation of religious feelings for political gains, but approved at length of the work of the government Authority for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet işleri teşkilâtı*) and of its importance as well as that of other religious bodies; for all these the party demanded full freedom of action. Perhaps the clearest indication of the party's attitude toward Islam was its stand on secularism (§ 6). While it could not legally oppose secularism *per se*, it affirmed that the party opposed any interpretation of secularism which

¹²³ See Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 230, 307.

¹²⁴ As reported by Erer, "Erbakanın bankası," *Son Havadis*, Dec. 24, 1970.

¹²⁵ "İman ordusunun kumandanı geliyor!" "Asrın müceddidi geliyor!"

¹²⁶ Cf. *Babı Ali'de Sabah*, Feb. 12, 1970.

¹²⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, Jan. 27, 1970.

¹²⁸ Published in the press, then reprinted by Ferruh Bozbeyle, *Parti programları*, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-432.

might be hostile to religion. In saying this, the PNO actually adopted one of the basic tenets of the first program, dated 1945, of the now defunct Democrat Party, namely, that the DP "rejects the erroneous interpretation of secularism in terms of enmity towards religion."¹²⁹

Probably the same positive attitude towards Islam, and the desire to capitalize on religious feeling, which had moved the DP in 1945, moved the PNO in 1970. However, while in the DP's program, it had a relatively inconspicuous place among 87 other points, in the PNO's program, although one of 100 paragraphs, the approach to religion permeated the document and gave the party as Islamic a character as the laws of Turkey permitted. The omission, too, of any reference to Atatürk in the PNO's program was hardly accidental.

At least as important as the program, for practical considerations, was the image which the Party for National Order attempted to create in Turkey. While several commentators were reminded of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's ideology,¹³⁰ and others of that of Nazism,¹³¹ there were those who took it at its face value as an extreme Islamic party. Erbakan himself tried to emphasize that the PNO was different from all other political parties,¹³² as well as truly progressive in many respects.¹³³ Two somewhat more detailed expositions of his views, as party leader, are instructive. The first is from the beginning of 1970, the other from the end of the same year, that is roughly spanning the first year of the party's official existence.

In a press conference Erbakan gave on January 26, 1970, he announced¹³⁴ that the newly-founded Party for National Order would accept anyone as a member except freemasons, communists and Zionists. The party stood for democracy, social justice,¹³⁵ freedom of conscience and other liberties, an orderly administration, planning and development — with special attention paid to Turkey's underdeveloped areas. The PNO strongly opposed any form of population-planning or birth-control, both of which it considered detrimental to the national interest (and

¹²⁹ Quoted by D. A. Rustow, *op. cit.* in R. N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West*, p. 91.

¹³⁰ F. Atay, "Politika," *Dünya*, Feb. 12, 1970.

¹³¹ Erer, in *Son Havadis*, Feb. 2 and Dec. 24, 1970.

¹³² Abdi İpekçi, "Bir kısım sağcılar için yeni bir çatı," *Milliyet*, Jan. 27, 1970.

¹³³ Ahmet Güner, "Millî nizam partisi," *Bugün*, Feb. 9, 1970.

¹³⁴ Reported in *Cumhuriyet*, Jan. 27, 1970.

¹³⁵ Which he characteristically termed "içtimai adalet," using the Arabic term, not "sosyal adalet," more generally employed in Turkey.

opposed to Islam, presumably). The party's "new order" was to include the abolition of the Senate, limitation of the membership in the National Assembly to 300, election of the State President directly by the people, strengthening of the national morals in the universities, radio and television, and the overhauling of education.

This presentation of party goals was amplified by Erbakan in a lengthy speech in the National Assembly at the end of December 1970.¹³⁶ Investing himself with the role of public censor, Erbakan expressed stiff opposition to Turkey's increasing ties with the Common Market. Of special interest are his main arguments, specifically based on an Islamic approach. According to Erbakan, the Common Market had been set up by six Catholic states and was essentially a Jewish and Zionist organization. His view was that Turkey would do better to strengthen its connections with the world's 1,000 million Muslims.

Many of his views are identical with those expressed in the weekly *Yeniden Milli Mücadele*, so much so, that some well-informed people in Turkey believe that this magazine is the mouthpiece of the Party for National Order. The fact that the first issue was published on February 3, 1970 — a week after PNO's foundation — is pertinent in itself. However, the party was short-lived and seems to have been of limited significance as a political force, chiefly as a symptom of the importance of Islam and of its potential in the mainstream of Turkish politics. The weekly, however, has continued publication regularly during 1971, after the party was banned. Recent issues have continued to reflect Erbakan's views and even echo his style, although they do not mention the party.¹³⁷

Nurcular, the Party for National Order, and several other groups, differed in their ideologies from dervish orders and strictly religious organizations in at least one important respect — their attitude towards Turkish nationalism. By talking and writing about a relatively new concept, *İslam milliyetçiliği*, or "Islamic nationalism,"¹³⁸ their spokesmen attempted to identify Turkish nationalism and Islam. As they emphasized repeatedly, Islam was a strong contributing factor to the formation of a Turkish nation, and the Turks were the foremost soldiers of Islam.

¹³⁶ Reported by Tekin Erer, "Kaç yalan söyledi?" *Son Havadis*, Dec. 25, 1970.

¹³⁷ For a scathing attack on this weekly, see Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, p. 105. In 1971, before the party was banned, PNO had published a magazine for its youth organization, *Tek nizam* ("Unique regime") which appeared in Ankara twice a month.

¹³⁸ Literally, "The nationalism of Islam." See Çetin Özek, *100 soruda ...*, pp. 193 ff.

One of the most appealing formulas for such a synthesis was worked out by the influential Dr. Rıza Nur (1879–1942). During the Kemalist era, Rıza Nur daringly called for a return to Ottomanism. While he accepted the Republican form of government, he wanted Islam to be the official religion and the Arabic script to coexist with the Latin script. At the same time there was a strong Pan-Turk streak in Rıza Nur's ideology. He advocated a reunification of all Turks, led by those of Anatolia.¹³⁹

b. PAN-TURK TRENDS

Most thinkers who preached a combination of Islam and Pan-Turkism conveniently disregarded such objective difficulties as that while practically all Turks were Muslims, certainly not all Muslims were Turks. For this reason and others, an almost diametrically-opposed view was taken by certain radical Pan-Turk groups which, without openly disowning Islam, relegated it to a secondary place, emphasizing the national-radical element in their ideological framework and propaganda activities. As we are unable to deal with all nationalist ideologies in contemporary Turkey,¹⁴⁰ we will examine Pan-Turkism only, especially because it became one of the cardinal doctrines in the radical response of the political right in Turkey in the late 1960's.

To be distinguished from Pan-Turanism (a movement that aimed at the union of all Turkic, Mongolian and Finno-Ugric peoples), Pan-Turkism¹⁴¹ still attracts many Turks. Although it has earlier origins, Pan-Turkism started about one hundred years ago, chiefly in the writings of intellectuals who were looking for a common bond as a response to Ottoman weakness and military defeat. Although there were varying points of view, it seems that the common denominator of these Pan-

¹³⁹ For an evaluation of Rıza Nur's personality and work, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Doktor Rıza Nur üzerine üç yazı — yankılar — belgeler* (Ankara: 1965).

¹⁴⁰ For several of these, see İ. E. Darendelioğlu, *Türkiyede milliyetçilik hareketleri* (N. p.: 1963) (further: Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*) and K. H. Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey after the revolution of 1960: nationalism and socialism," *TYIR*, VI: 1965 (publ. 1966), pp. 68–118.

¹⁴¹ There is a considerable literature on Pan-Turkism. See, e.g., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 342 ff. C. W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: the Turks of the world and their political objectives* (London: 1957). Id., "The Turks and Soviet Central Asia," *MEJ*, XII (3): Summer 1958, pp. 261–269. S. A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1960); a Turkish translation appeared in 1971. Frank Tachau, "The search for national identity among the Turks," *Die Welt des Islams* (Leiden), N. S., VIII: 1962–1963, pp. 165–176. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hâtıralar* (Istanbul: 1969).

Turkists (and of those who followed) was the unity, as a people, of all tribes of Turkic descent, from the Eastern Mediterranean to Sinkiang, and from the Volga to southern Anatolia. The premise of Pan-Turkism was the common heritage of all these from a joint stock in Central Asia. First cultural in character, early in the twentieth century Pan-Turkism acquired a political nature. New associations and clubs discussed Pan-Turkism and published journals supporting the idea. During the First World War, Pan-Turkists hoped for union with their brethren in Russia, and, indeed, Enver Paşa died in attempting to lead into battle soldiers of Turkic origins in Russia. However, the establishment of the Soviet Union and its growing might temporarily dampened these hopes. Atatürk worked hard to instill into his people feelings of Turkish patriotism for the new Republic, instead of vague sentiments for a nebulous Pan-Turk homeland. In the Second World War the Germans cleverly used Pan-Turk aspirations to form military units of Soviet war prisoners of Turkic descent. However, although official circles in Turkey were interested in the future of Turkic communities in Soviet Central Asia, in case of a possible Soviet defeat in the war, and although certain negotiations with the Germans in the matter were initiated, the Turkish government was careful not to commit itself prematurely.

The officially reticent attitude of their government by no means dictated the hopes and attitudes of private individuals or groups in Turkey. In the course of the Second World War, various circles in Turkey absorbed Nazi propaganda; these were pro-German and admired Nazism, which they grasped as a doctrine of warlike dynamism and a source of nationalist inspiration, on which to base their Pan-Turk and anti-Soviet ideology. In the years immediately following the War, Pan-Turkism remained fashionable in certain circles, including the younger generation at school in the 1930's or early 1940's. At that time the teaching of history, literature and language had been permeated with the concept of the Central Asian heritage and with racist myths associated with it. In the 1950's, when the Cabinets of the Democrat Party took a more permissive attitude towards Islam, Pan-Turk nationalism acquired a conservative religious tinge — at least in the countryside, where militant teachers added an Islamic ingredient to Pan-Turkism.¹⁴²

Pan-Turk sentiment has been expressed in various ways. The press frequently reported news concerning "the Outer Turks" (*Dış Türkler*);

¹⁴² See Karpat, *op. cit.*, in *TYIR*, VI: 1965, pp. 87-89. Karpat maintains that in the 1960's nationalism of this type was on the defensive (*ibid.*, 89-91). If so, it was a very articulate and energetic defensiveness.

in the 1950's and 1960's, pamphlets appeared, and politicians used these sentiments skillfully. All in all, there has been considerable interest in, and alertness towards, the situation of the Outer Turks, particularly when they had grievances. There were reactions among the Turkish public, expressed at meetings and street-demonstrations, and in the press, whenever it was felt that a group of Outer Turks was in danger of losing its Turkish identity — as, for example, when the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China intensified their shaping of Turkic peoples into a new mold, or the Turks in Kirkuk were reportedly denied permission by the Iraqi authorities to learn Turkish,¹⁴³ or the position of the Turks in Cyprus was felt to be in danger.

Journals supporting Pan-Turk nationalism such as *Bozkurt* ("Grey Wolf," symbol of the ancient Turks), appeared during the Second World War. It was published from 1941 and was edited by Reha Oğuz Türkkan who also later set up a clandestine Pan-Turk organization.¹⁴⁴ Another, the weekly *Çınaraltı* ("Under the Plane-Tree"), edited by Orhan Seyfi Orhon, appeared from 1941 to 1944. *Tanrıdağ* (a name for the Tien Shan mountain-range, home of the ancient Turks) started publication in May 1942, with Rıza Nur writing the editorials.¹⁴⁵

At the end of the Second World War, Pan-Turk groups started their activity anew, several with racist, Nazi-style, undertones. Probably the most prominent Turk active, at that time, in Pan-Turkism was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a poet and writer. Among his numerous works are several plays,¹⁴⁶ a 600-page biography of Abdül Hamid II (first serialized in *Yeni İstanbul*),¹⁴⁷ a collection of essays of an autobiographical character,¹⁴⁸ and a book of precepts, mainly on Islam.¹⁴⁹ His chief claim to fame, however, is that he started the publication of an aggressive maga-

¹⁴³ In this case, the Iraqi authorities went to the trouble of denying it in a book written by the Iraqi press attaché in Ankara, İbrahim Dâkûki, *Irak Türkmenleri* (Ankara: 1970). This is a translation from the Arabic. For a work defending the Turks in Irak, see Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Musul mes'elesi ve Irak Türkleri* (İstanbul: 1972).

¹⁴⁴ See also his *İleri Türkçülük ve partiler* (İstanbul: 1964), *passim*.

¹⁴⁵ For this and others, cf. Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, pp. 202 ff.

¹⁴⁶ *Para* (1st ed.: 1942; 2nd ed., İstanbul and Ankara: 1970). *Reis bey* (1st ed.: 1964; 2nd ed., İstanbul and Ankara: 1971). *Kanlı sarık* (İstanbul and Ankara: 1970).

¹⁴⁷ *Ulu Hakan Abdülhamid Hân* (2 vols., 2nd ed., İstanbul: 1970). This respectful, revering book broke a taboo; Abdül Hamid II had been under constant attack in Republican Turkey.

¹⁴⁸ *Yılanlı kuyudan — hapishane hatıraları* (1st ed.: 1955. 2nd ed., İstanbul and Ankara: 1970).

¹⁴⁹ *Efendimiz, kurtarıcımız, müjdecimizden nur harmanı* (İstanbul: 1970).

zine, *Büyük Doğu* ("The Great East")¹⁵⁰ and was also apparently the main ideologist of an association bearing the same name. The association appealed to Islamic sentiment, in fanatical terms, simultaneously attacking secularism, westernization, freemasonry and Jews. In May 1951, the association disbanded voluntarily to avoid pending legal prosecution, but reorganized a year later as *Yeni Büyük Doğu* ("New Great East").¹⁵¹ It seems to have disbanded soon after, but *Büyük Doğu* continued to appear on and off for a while¹⁵² and, in 1954, its criticism of Atatürk's reforms brought sharp protests from student associations in Istanbul.¹⁵³

In the quarter-century following the Second World War, a relatively large number of periodicals appeared supporting the Pan-Turk cause. In several, one senses the influence of Nazi racist theories.¹⁵⁴ *Azerbaycan*, which in 1971 was in its twentieth year of publication, had the following English sub-title: "Monthly Turkish cultural periodical of Azerbaidzhanian Turks." Its commitment to the cause of this community of "Outer Turks" has never been in doubt. Published by İskender Aküzüm and edited by Ahmet Karaca, it has systematically featured anti-Soviet and anti-communist articles, along with poems about Azerbaijan and its Turks, selections from their prose, poetry and folklore, and a chronicle of events, mostly a list of Soviet persecutions.¹⁵⁵ In a similar vein, the interests of the Outer Turks in Turkestan are taken up by a magazine, which appears irregularly, entitled *Milli Türkistan* ("National Turkestan"). It is particularly worth noting that it appears in Düsseldorf, and is written in both Latin and Turkic characters, with an English summary, which suggests that it is directed at Turkish workers in Federal Germany, Turkic people in Turkestan, and world opinion. It usually contains strong attacks of the Soviet Union and its policies.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Cf. B. Lewis, in *International Affairs*, XXVIII (1): Jan. 1952, pp. 44-45. Acc. to Karpat, *op. cit.* in *TYIR*, VI: 1965, p. 86, n. 1, the Democrat Party supported the magazine financially.

¹⁵¹ Reported by H. A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish politics," *Current History*, XXXII (190): June 1957, p. 338.

¹⁵² It is not known exactly when it ceased publication. Not to be confused with the monthly *Büyük Türkiye 1970*, appearing in Istanbul since 1970.

¹⁵³ See Bülent Dâver, in *Sbfd*, XIV (3-4): Sep.-Dec. 1964, pp. 51-52.

¹⁵⁴ For some others, cf. Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, esp. pp. 367-383. Darendelioğlu himself publishes and edits the Istanbul monthly *Toprak* ("Earth").

¹⁵⁵ A typical issue, in this respect, is the 57-page issue of January 1971.

¹⁵⁶ E.g., *Milli Türkistan*, XVII (28): Jan.-May, 1970.

Two monthlies of a much wider appeal, both with marked Pan-Turk leanings, began appearing in Ankara in the 1960's. *Türk Kültürü* ("The Culture of the Turks") started publication in 1962. It is a prestigious journal, comprising both scholarly and popular articles, mainly literary and historical studies concerning Turkish civilization. Nevertheless, *Türk Kültürü* bills itself as "the magazine of the Turkish world."¹⁵⁷ While it would be unwise — and, probably, illegal — to proclaim its Pan-Turk sympathies more fully on the cover, this clearly indicates its general tone. The monthly carries articles with a Pan-Turkish content and often expresses its Pan-Turk sympathies in the monthly essays on Turkish nationalism. *Türk Kültürü* also opens its pages to anti-communist propaganda, written by such well-known anti-communists as Fethi Tevet-oğlu.¹⁵⁸

Türk Birliği ("The Union of Turks") was founded in April 1966 by Kerim Alhan, who is still the publisher-editor. It is more socio-political and less sophisticated in character than *Türk Kültürü*. There is little doubt, however, about its Pan-Turkism. The first issue of *Türk Birliği* proclaimed that it was "a nationalist, cultural and artistic monthly — the voice of Turkism in Anatolia, the Caucasus and Azerbaijan."¹⁵⁹ From the second issue until the time of writing, this was changed to "a nationalist, cultural and artistic monthly [which] works for Turkish unity and Turkism."¹⁶⁰ The general goal of *Türk Birliği* was expressed in numerous articles on current events, history and language, in stories, plays and poems concerned with Turkish nationalism and the past and present situation of the Outer Turks, particularly in Azerbaijan and Turkestan, whom the monthly hopes will one day be joined with their brethren in Turkey. The Soviet Union is presented as the enemy not only of Turks, but of all good people.¹⁶¹ Not surprisingly, *Türk Birliği* also opposes all forms of socialism in Turkey.¹⁶²

Possibly the most distinguished of the Turkish fighters for Pan-Turkism was Professor A. Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970), who fought for the

¹⁵⁷ Literally, "of the world of Turks": "*Türk Kültürü* Türk dünyasının dergisidir."

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., *Türk Kültürü*, IV (42): Apr. 1966, pp. 512–518.

¹⁵⁹ "Anadolu, Kafkas, Azerbaycan Türklüğünün sesi aylık, milliyetçi, kültür ve san'at dergisi."

¹⁶⁰ "Türk birliği, Türklük için çalışır aylık, milliyetçi kültür ve san'at dergisi."

¹⁶¹ E.g., a biting attack on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, reprinted from *Cumhuriyet*, in *Türk Birliği*, III (30): Sep. 1968, pp. 3–6.

¹⁶² E.g., Sayılğan's article in *Türk Birliği*, I (9): Dec. 1966, pp. 5–6.

cause indefatigably by political action, speech and writing.¹⁶³ Among his published works are very useful scholarly studies on Outer Turks, their history, literature and languages: some are colored by Pan-Turk propaganda, others are free of it. Perhaps Togan's most significant work on Pan-Turkism is a collection of articles and speeches on the subject dating from the 1950's and the 1960's and reprinted as "The Values of Turkism."¹⁶⁴ In this book Togan emphasized the danger for Turkey in the long-range plans of organized communism and socialism and maintained that the idea of Pan-Turkism had more relevance than ever before. As he understood it, in a world sharply divided into two opposing camps, with two different ideologies, the Russians would be doing their utmost for the speedy Russification of all the peoples in the Soviet Union; this is exactly what Pan-Turkism should actively strive to prevent.¹⁶⁵

Works by others on Pan-Turkism are generally more popular and easier to digest. Some have explained nationalism, at least to some extent, in Pan-Turk terms.¹⁶⁶ Others have tried to prove that the Kurds — in Turkey, at least — are really Turks.¹⁶⁷ Still others have dealt with the history of Pan-Turkism abroad, particularly in Russia.¹⁶⁸ A favorite subject has been that of current Pan-Turk problems, such as Soviet Turkestan and the grievances of Turks there.¹⁶⁹ This is especially impassioned in its forceful protest against what it describes as "the Russification of the Turks in Turkestan."¹⁷⁰ Written with equally deep feeling are works on the Turks in the Caucasus, which accuse the Soviet authorities of genocide during the Second World War and after against these people — complete with documents and photographs.¹⁷¹

¹⁶³ See his memoirs: *Hâtırat*, *op. cit.*, and other works. An English translation of *Hâtırat* is in preparation (at Brill, Leiden), under the title *Memoirs. Turkestan and the nationalist and cultural struggle of the Muslim Eastern Turks*.

¹⁶⁴ *Türklüğün mukadderatı üzerine* (Istanbul: 1970).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 88 ff.

¹⁶⁶ E.g., among the more recent ones, Ali Kemal Meram, *Türkçülük ve türkçülük mücadelesi tarihi* (Istanbul: 1969); İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin meseleleri* (Istanbul: 1970).

¹⁶⁷ K. M. Fahrettin, *Kürtler'in türk'lüğü* (Ankara: 1968). Mahmut Çapar, *Doğu illerimizdeki aşiretlerin türklüğü* (Istanbul: 1972).

¹⁶⁸ E.g., İlber Ortaylı, *Çarlık Rusyasında Türkçülük hareketleri ve Gaspıralı İsmail Bey* (Ankara: 1968). Tahir Çağatay, *Kızıl emperyalizm* (4 vols., Istanbul-Ankara: 1958-1969).

¹⁶⁹ Ziyaeddin Babakurban, *Dış Türkler ve Türkistan davası* (Istanbul: 1962).

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 20 ff. See also Arın Ergin, *The voice of Turkism* (Istanbul: 1964); H. Ali Çakar, *Türkistan dramı* (Istanbul: 1972).

¹⁷¹ E.g., Ahmet Hazer Hızal, *Kuzey Kafkasya (hürriyet ve istiklâl davası)* (Ankara: 1961).

We have already referred to the not easily reconcilable concepts of Islamism and Pan-Turkism. While certain works with Pan-Turk content rejected Islam as not consonant with Pan-Turkism (or Turkish nationalism, for that matter),¹⁷² others attempted to prove that all, or most Turks — in Turkey and abroad — were Muslims and that the Turkish bond is (or should be) cemented by Islam.¹⁷³ The latter view, which did not sound implausible to an untrained mind, was not altogether convincing for intellectuals. Some of these, particularly if trained in a secularist approach, have looked for another basis for their Pan-Turk ideology. They have found it in recent years in nationalism, or *milliyetçilik*, which in certain circles has plainly meant “chauvinism.” The possibility of a common bond between chauvinism in Turkey and Pan-Turkism is fairly obvious. Casting around for what other peoples had said about nationalist ideologies, certain Turkish writers were fascinated by racist theories.¹⁷⁴ They found, indeed, some support in earlier works of Turkish ideologists such as Ziya Gökalp.¹⁷⁵ It was only a short step to agitation against the non-Turk minorities, such as the Greeks and Americans, e.g. in the book “Turkey above everything.”¹⁷⁶ A racist approach to nationalism and such agitation (although some said they should not be over-emphasized) suited the “Vision of a Great Turkey,” which is, incidentally, the name of Mehmet Kaplan’s collection of articles.¹⁷⁷

Mehmet Kaplan, a professor of literature at Istanbul University, is a well-known figure in *milliyetçi* or “nationalist” circles. As Kaplan and others saw it, for “the Great Turkey of tomorrow”¹⁷⁸ *milliyetçilik* could provide all the answers, in such fields as the character of the political regime, socio-economic reforms and education.¹⁷⁹ In other words, the

¹⁷² Necmeddin Erişen, *Türkiyede altıncı filo hâdiseleri ve gerçek emperyalizm* (Istanbul: 1969).

¹⁷³ Enver Aydın Kolukısa, *Dinde türkçülüğe dönüş* (Ankara: 1970). A somewhat similar approach had been taken earlier by Kısakürek in his above *Büyük Doğu*, as well as in several of his books.

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., Mehmed İzzet, *Milliyet nazariyeleri ve millî hayat* (Istanbul: 1969), esp. pp. 40–49, discussing “nation and race” (*milliyet ve ırk*).

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42. On Gökalp’s views, cf. Niyazi Berkes (ed.), *Turkish nationalism and Western civilization: selected essays of Ziya Gökalp* (N. Y.: 1959); and Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish nationalism: the life and teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: 1950).

¹⁷⁶ Cemal Anadol, *(Ne Amerika, ne Rusya) Her şeyin üstünde Türkiye* (Istanbul: 1970). See pp. 34–36 for agitation against the minorities.

¹⁷⁷ Mehmet Kaplan, *Büyük Türkiye rüyası* (Istanbul: 1969).

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17 *anâ passim*.

¹⁷⁹ See, for another example, Ali Muzaffer Ersöz, *Millî strateji* (Ankara: 1965).

milliyetçis tried to offer an overall plan for Turkey's future, which would rival in its scope — as well as in its goals and strategy — the programs of the Turkish leftists. Just as the Turkish left offered a multitude of solutions, so the *milliyetçis* presented a variety of plans for making Turkey great again and fighting communism — apparently the only two goals on which a consensus existed among *milliyetçis*.¹⁸⁰ Some *milliyetçi* wrote and spoke for a "scientific nationalism" (*bilimsel milliyetçilik*),¹⁸¹ an answer to "scientific socialism." Others were the proponents of a "nationalist socialist system" (*milliyetçi toplumcu düzen*) which, they explained, had nothing to do with the national socialism of the Third Reich but, rather, concentrated on a type of nationalism that was to benefit the people by emphasizing socio-economic development.¹⁸² This, again, appears a studied reply to the claim of Turkish leftists to monopolize socio-economic reform. Yet others added a Pan-Turk ingredient to their *milliyetçilik*, maintaining that bringing the Outer Turks into the fold was essential to making Turkey truly great again. Indeed, the exponents of Pan-Turkism practically always worked among the *milliyetçis* and sought their support in organized political activity. Actually, because Pan-Turk activities were illegal in Turkey, the proponents of Pan-Turkism had to organize and act within and through various nationalist groups, such as the *Büyük Doğu* association.

Their clandestineness or semi-clandestineness notwithstanding, something is known of organized Pan-Turk activities.¹⁸³ Based on strong nationalist sentiment and anti-Soviet feeling in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War, several nationalist associations sprang up of a marked Pan-Turk character. Perhaps the most noteworthy ones were the *Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği* ("Association for Studies on Turkish Culture") and the *Türk Gençlik Teşkilâtı* ("Group of Turkish Youth"), both set up and led by university students in 1956.¹⁸⁴ These and several others were established with the goal of promoting historically-hallowed Turkish ideals, encouraging and assisting Outer Turks, and resisting the

¹⁸⁰ For a combination of these two in the doctrine of *milliyetçilik*, see Tevetoğlu, *Açıklıyorum* (Ankara: 1965), pp. 253-262 and *passim*.

¹⁸¹ E.g., Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, *Bilimsel milliyetçiliğe giriş. Nerede duruyoruz* (İstanbul: 1971).

¹⁸² See Kurt Karaca, *Milliyetçi Türkiye. Milliyetçi-toplumcu düzen* (Ankara: 1971). Tahsin Yahyaoğlu, *Tarım kentleri. Milliyetçi-toplumcu düzen* (Ankara: 1971).

¹⁸³ Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, although not always objective, is one of the main sources for inside information about nationalist and Pan-Turk organizations.

¹⁸⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 158-162.

spread of communism in Turkey.¹⁸⁵ They supported the publication and distribution of *milliyetçi* books and magazines, and organized nationalist meetings and anti-communist demonstrations. Since their goals were practically the same, the two organizations and several smaller ones fused in May 1951 into *Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği* ("Association of Turkish *milliyetçis*").

During the 1950's the Association of Turkish *milliyetçis* was in contact with various groups and organizations defending the cause of the Turkish minority in Cyprus.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, the identification of many Turks on the mainland with their brethren in Cyprus injected a more palpable element of Pan-Turkism into the activist *milliyetçi* groups. Some claimed that the Turks in Cyprus were in danger of being persecuted by a Cypriot majority that was both Greek and communist; they considered Cyprus a part of Turkey. Later, in March 1961, demonstrations and marches were arranged by several *milliyetçi* groups in order to commemorate and protest the persecution by the Iraqi authorities of Outer Turks in Kirkuk, two years earlier.¹⁸⁷ Turkish journalists, who had been invited to visit the Soviet Union, soon afterwards, wrote on their return articles about the Turkic minorities there — which inflamed public feeling in Turkey still further.

During the 1960's with the general rise in political participation, at least partly as an answer to growing leftist activity, the increase in *milliyetçi* organization and activity was very much in evidence. Among the many new groups of *milliyetçis* which sprang up throughout Turkey, one of the most important was the *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği* ("Union of Turkish Nationalists"), which was established at a general congress in Ankara in August 1964. It actually drew mainly on the membership of another group, the *Türkçüler Derneği* ("Association of Turkists"), which had been set up somewhat earlier. The 1964 congress elected as Chairman of the Union of Turkish Nationalists Nejdet Sançar, and as Vice-Chairman Dr. Hikmet Tanyu, both well-known political writers and personalities who supported *milliyetçilik* and Pan-Turkism. The Union of Turkish Nationalists was an association of militant patriots whose center was in Ankara and which soon opened branches in Istanbul, Kayseri, Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Polatlı, Boğazlayan, Antalya, Izmir and Yeşilhisar. In addition, many "hearths" or "homes" (*ocaklar*) were inaugurated. All these were

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Karpas, *op. cit.* in *TYIR*, VI: 1965, p. 87.

¹⁸⁶ For some of these, see Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, pp. 215 ff.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 302-303.

meant to instill *milliyetçi* consciousness and drum up support for the Union of Turkish Nationalists. The Union also published works advocating nationalism and Pan-Turkism.¹⁸⁸

Led by other, probably rival personalities (in this case, Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu), a general congress of *milliyetçis* was convened in 1967, which decided on organizing a seminar, as part of their second general congress, in Istanbul in May 1969. The 216-page proceedings of the latter¹⁸⁹ are instructive. Five committees of the seminar separately debated the communications presented to each, and afterwards presented their reports to a plenary session of the congress. The first committee dealt with *milliyetçilik* and its problems. One of its interesting conclusions was that, as in the early twentieth century, Turkish *milliyetçilik* still had to fight against separatist and underground movements of minorities¹⁹⁰ and, simultaneously, to be active against destructive trends that endanger Turkey.¹⁹¹ The second committee discussed education, the arts, and the press. *Inter alia*, it sounded a note of warning that the largest teachers' federation, since its 1962 convention in Aydın, was led by a group of self-avowed leftists. The third committee dealt with economic and development matters, including reform in land-holding and natural resources. The fourth committee debated Turkey's geopolitical situation and foreign relations. This included a discussion on the Outer Turks, which were listed by countries and claimed to total 69,500,000.¹⁹² The fifth committee discussed the relationship between *milliyetçilik* and morality and religion. It asserted unequivocally that Islamism (*Müslümanlık*) was an integral component of *milliyetçilik* and ought to be an integral part of the education for *milliyetçilik*.¹⁹³

The conclusions of the fifth committee in the 1969 congress of the *milliyetçis* are a reminder of the interrelation of some *milliyetçi* groups (or their leaders, at least) with Islamic circles in Turkey. Another example of this connection and its relevance for political action in the 1960's is expressed in a pamphlet, published in Turkish, Arabic and English. The

¹⁸⁸ Such as *Türkiye milliyetçiler birliği'nin görüşü* (N. p.: 1964) or its *3 mayıs türkçüler günü antolojisi* (vol. I, Ankara: 1967). For this Union, see also Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, pp. 351-352. Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, p. 159.

¹⁸⁹ *Milliyetçi Türkiye'ye doğru (10-11 Mayıs 1969'da yapılan milliyetçiler ilmi seminerinde varılan neticeler)* (Istanbul: 1969).

¹⁹⁰ Probably refers to the Kurds.

¹⁹¹ That this refers to Marxism is evident from the report, *Milliyetçi Türkiye'ye doğru*, op. cit., p. 47.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 190-198.

English title is *A memorandum concerning Great Turkistan which we offer to the governments and heads of states of all Muslem and peace loving countries about the resolutions passed, but not put into practice by the Muslem Conferences*.¹⁹⁴ The memorandum was prepared by İsa Yusuf Alptekin, self-styled "Former secretary-general of the Eastern Turkistan government. President of the national centre of Eastern Turkistan." This is an interesting document, both in terms of contents and presentation. It claims to be an authentic protest against the physical suffering of Outer Turks ruled by the Soviet Union and Communist China, their deprivation and harsh treatment, as well as against the planned efforts to assimilate them against their will, by Turkey's "two arch enemies." The memorandum was presented in 1962 to two World Muslim Congresses held, respectively, in Karachi and Mecca; in 1963 to the World Muslim League, the founders of which were then meeting in Mecca; in 1964, to the 6th World Muslim Conference, held in Mogadishu; and, in 1965, to the General Islamic Congress, assembled in Mecca. The memorandum concludes that, despite the positive decisions in these gatherings in support of the Turks and Muslims of Turkestan, absolutely nothing has been done.

A further example is the case of an active and well-known organization of *milliyetçis*, whose main goal was to fight communism in Turkey, as its name plainly indicated, *Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* ("Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey").¹⁹⁵ Three associations bearing this name, differently staffed, have been active in Turkey — in Zonguldak between 1950 and 1953, in Istanbul between 1956 and 1960, and in Izmir since 1963. All three, while idealizing the small town mentality and moral values of Anatolian society, have drawn part of their inspiration from Pan-Turkism. Their chief objective has remained to oppose communism. The first of these three associations, headed by Nejdet Sançar, published various anti-communist tracts and rented Zonguldak cinema halls to show anti-communist films. The second, led by Burhanettin Şener, called on the youth of Istanbul to join the struggle against communists, anarchists and traitors. Public lectures were organized, and — since the association had been joined by students — high caliber lecturers were invited. Among these were renowned thinkers like Peyami Safa and University Professors like A. Zeki Velidi Togan. The

¹⁹⁴ Istanbul: 1967.

¹⁹⁵ On which see Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, pp. 222-224, 286-289, 353-360. Karpat, *op. cit.* in *TYİR*, VI: 1965, pp. 87-88.

third association, however, appears to be the most active of the three. Set up by forty-one persons from all walks of life,¹⁹⁶ it aims simultaneously at fighting communism and strengthening the values of Turkism — chiefly the patriotic sentiment. Branches were speedily established throughout Turkey, reportedly reaching 110 in 1965.¹⁹⁷ For a brief while, State President Cemal Gürsel agreed to serve as the association's honorary president — which lent it considerable prestige. The association organized numerous lectures and meetings, addressed by such known anti-communists as Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Kadircan Kafı, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Aclan Sayılın, Fethi Tevetoğlu, and İlhan E. Darendelioğlu. It also published several books, including a translation of the *Pankowski Memoirs*, and encouraged the printing of nationalist and anti-communist articles in the Turkish press.¹⁹⁸ The association appears to have enjoyed strong support among conservative, Islamic circles. Its funds were reportedly provided by the Justice Party, and by allocations from the budgets of provincial councils and of other bodies which sympathized with the association.¹⁹⁹

While it may be premature to assess the full scope of Islam and of Pan-Turkism in the recent domestic politics of Turkey, it would seem that this is far greater than is generally thought, particularly when both are used, separately or jointly, to redefine Turkish nationalism. The next chapter provides a concrete example.

¹⁹⁶ For a list of their names and occupations, see Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, pp. 353–354.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 355, 357. Acc. to p. 360, the number of branches later rose to 177. For a detailed distribution, by years and localities, see A. N. Yücekök, *Türkiye'de dernek gelişimleri (1946–1968)* (Ankara: 1972).

¹⁹⁸ Of these, one may get an idea from the monthly *Komünizme ve Komünistlere Karşı Türk Basını*, appearing in Ankara from early 1965.

¹⁹⁹ See Genç, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 30–33, 76–77 — which lists the allocations by the quarters of Istanbul.

CHAPTER SIX

THE POLITICAL RESPONSE OF THE RIGHT: TURKEY ÜBER ALLES

a. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

While a legally constituted Marxist party was in existence during the 1960's, the extreme right did not formally organize a political party until 1965. This was so probably because the right — as one understands the term in Europe — was amply represented in the Democrat Party (later in the Justice Party) and smaller right-of-center political parties. To a large extent, the extreme right formed a political party in response to the left's having done so. From the end of the Second World War (if not earlier), radical anti-communist youths, chiefly among university students, had rioted against Ankara University professors and lecturers suspected of communism to obtain their dismissal (among them Behice Boran, in 1947). Similarly in Istanbul the National Student Union was active in fighting communism in Turkey.¹ Such events were repeated, and the mood for organizing a party of the extreme right was there: the change-of-order concept, introduced by the 1960 Revolution and the 1961 Constitution, provided the opportunity; the establishment and activity of the LPT provided the motive; *milliyetçi* and Pan-Turk groups, strongly anti-leftist, provided the support.

The Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP), or *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*,² represented — as of 1965 — a radical group that might be termed the militant party of the Turkish right.

As the takeover of this party in 1965, when it changed its earlier character and became a new organization in everything but name,³ was mainly the work of one man, Türkeş, it is to his career and personality that we turn first.⁴

¹ Karpal, *Turkey's politics*, pp. 372-374.

² Literally, "The Party of the Republican Peasant and of the Nation."

³ Except for party publications there is little material on the RPNP, especially since 1965. See however Dodd, pp. 157-162. Kışlalı, pp. 59-65. N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ...*, pp. 209-225.

⁴ Outside his own party (and attacks by his political opponents), very little has been published on Türkeş. See, e.g., Fuat Uluç and M. Özdağ, *Alparslan Türkeş* (Ankara: 1965). Fuat Uluç, *İşte liderler* (Ankara: 1965), esp. pp. 13-15. Bekir Berk and N. M. Polat, *İslami hareket ve Türkeş* (N. p. [Istanbul]: 1969). Weiker, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-127, was among the first to note Türkeş's importance and potential; see also *ibid.*, pp. 69, 121, 130, 131, 137.

A colorful and controversial figure, Alparslan Türkeş was born in 1917 in Cyprus, in Nicosia (which the Turks call Lefkoşe) and lived there until he was fifteen years old, when his family moved to Istanbul. He was a voracious reader of history, literature (including journals of all kinds), and philosophy, a fact he always took care to emphasize. He graduated from the military academy in 1938 and chose the army as his career. In 1944 he was involved in an anti-communist demonstration, arrested and tried (apparently for his pan-Turanian propaganda — of which more below). Although acquitted, the affair haunted him; to his opponents it proved his extremism, and to his admirers his devotion to nationalism. Later he wrote a book on the episode,⁵ stressing his patriotic behavior. He spent some time in Germany, served in the office of the Turkish military attaché in the United States (he reads and speaks English fluently), then in the NATO command in Ankara. In 1957 he appears to have been one of a group of colonels and other ranking officers who planned a military movement to prepare a coup d'état (which was not, however, carried out).⁶

Türkeş, then a colonel, had been deeply involved in the plot which brought about the May 27, 1960 Revolution. It was he who first announced over the Turkish radio that a military coup had sparked the Revolution. He soon became Executive Aide to General Cemal Gürsel, the head of the National Union Committee (NUC) which had carried out the coup, and which continued to guide the fortunes of Turkey for the next year and a half. Other officers envied his privileged position and the fact that people listened to what he said, and some admired his speeches, which were widely reported in the press.⁷

At the same time, however, there seems to have existed a serious cleavage of opinion which also involved Türkeş.⁸ The NUC was divided on the best way of achieving reform (that there was a pressing need for reform was about the only matter on which all NUC members agreed). A group of fourteen officers in the NUC — generally, junior in rank and younger than the others — the spokesman of most of whom was Türkeş, although not opposing democracy as an intrinsic value, stood for strong-

⁵ Alparslan Türkeş, *1944 milliyetçilik olayı* (Istanbul: 1968).

⁶ According to Ali Fuad Başgil, *La révolution militaire de 1960 en Turquie*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁷ See *e.g.*, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, *Milliyetçiliğimizin ön hedefleri* (Istanbul: 1962), pp. 19–20 — reprint of an article written on November 7, 1960.

⁸ Already mentioned briefly in ch. 1. See also B. И. Данилов, *Средние слоы в политической жизни современной Турции* (Moscow: 1968), ch. 4.

handed social and educational reform, in the spirit of Atatürk. They maintained that authoritarian rule was well known in Ottoman history and had been reintroduced in Republican Turkey by Atatürk himself; and that only the military could provide such government. They added that, in any case, the people considered the military as representing the state. Consequently, it was obvious that only the military could lead Turkey into the atomic age. It followed, these officers said, that continued military rule was preferable to early parliamentary elections.⁹ Their view has been admirably summarized by Rustow, "Dynamic and authoritarian leadership is required to secure social justice, mass education, and economic development; since bickering politicians are incapable of such leadership, the military must provide it."¹⁰

Apparently, in 1960 Türkeş and his radical colleagues felt strong enough to initiate the dismissal of 147 university teachers. However, those elements opposing Türkeş and favoring a speedy return to a multiparty, parliamentary regime, had the upper hand. Twenty-three of the NUC's thirty-seven members (one of the original thirty-eight, İrfan Baştuğ, had died in a car accident) decided to expel the other fourteen from the NUC. Türkeş, who was sent to New Delhi, was one of several expellees posted to Turkish missions abroad. However the fourteen kept in constant touch. Several met in Paris in October 1961, then all gathered in Brussels in July 1962.

In February 1963 Türkeş returned triumphantly to Turkey and soon entered politics.¹¹ He was briefly detained after Aydemir's second attempted coup in May 1963 and probably suspected of having been implicated. Türkeş's first political commitment (in writing, at least), appears to have been a 72-page booklet he wrote, together with two of his closest associates among "the fourteen," Rıfat Baykal and Muzaffer Özdağ. The book contained the defence¹² by each of his share in the 1960 Revolution and subsequent events. It also included an introduction.

⁹ See Bahri Savcı, "Bir otoriter ideoloji denemesi üzerine mütalâalar," *SBFD*, XVIII (3-4): Sep.-Dec. 1963, pp. 71-103. Cf. Başgil, *op. cit.*, p. 173, who maintains that Türkeş wanted the military to retain power for four years.

¹⁰ D. A. Rustow, "The military. B. Turkey," in: R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey*, p. 384.

¹¹ F.-W. Fernau, "Le retour des 'quatorze' en Turquie," *Orient*, 25: 1er trim. 1963, pp. 17-24. Id., "Impressions politiques de Turquie," *ibid.*, 34: 2e trim. 1965, pp. 33-34.

¹² Alparslan Türkeş, Rıfat Baykal and Muzaffer Özdağ, *Bazı gerçekler (savunmalar)* (Istanbul: 1963).

by Türkeş,¹³ foreshadowing some of the political ideas he expressed later. He spoke for rationalism, liberty and dignity, and proclaimed the need for a Turkish renaissance (*Türk rönesansı*).

After their return, Türkeş and several others of "the fourteen" appear to have considered forming a political party of their own, but finally preferred joining an existing one and assuming its leadership. They chose the Republican Peasant National Party, which they considered ripe for a takeover, and where some members sided with their ideas. This was a small, conservative party that had obtained 14% of the vote in the 1961 election to the National Assembly. A year later, however, the RPNP's dynamic leader, Osman Bölükbaşı, left it, along with a group of National Assembly members, to found the Nation Party. In subsequent years, the party did not do so well — in fact recording poor results in both the local election of 1963 and the elections to a third of the Senate in 1964. Ahmet Oğuz, the party's Chairman, was not providing it with sufficient leadership and there were those in the party who disagreed with his policies.

The situation was ably exploited by Türkeş and his associates. At the end of March 1965, Türkeş and four other members of "the fourteen" joined the RPNP (by the end of June, ten of "the fourteen" had joined);¹⁴ Türkeş was appointed Inspector-General of the party — a position he had apparently bargained for before joining. He astutely used his new position to contact personally local branches of the RPNP and persuade them to send pro-Türkeş delegates to the party's national convention to be held at the end of July 1965. The RPNP old guard sensed what was going on, and Hasan Dinçer, ex-Minister of Defense and a member of the party's Supreme Control Committee was quoted as saying that Türkeş should be ousted from the RPNP, as he intended to use the party for his own designs. Similar opinions were voiced by A. Tahtakılıç, the candidate of the RPNP old guard for chairmanship of the party.

The RPNP national congress,¹⁵ which met in Ankara at the end of July 1965, was packed with Türkeş sympathizers who acclaimed him as the savior. Youths with brick-red armbands — of whom Turkey was to see more in following years — carried written orders to "his" delegates on how to vote; they were also the ones who gave him the loudest ap-

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-10.

¹⁴ Three joined the RPP, and one the LPT. See Bernard Vernier, "L'armée turque et la république néo-kémaliste," *Politique Etrangère*, XXX (3): 1965, p. 271.

¹⁵ This was described in detail in the weekly *Akis* (Ankara), 581: Aug. 7, 1965, pp. 3-4, 6-11.

plause. Even apart from this his passionate oratory and his well-reasoned arguments contrasted with the staid speeches of the veterans of the RPNP who had preceded him to the rostrum. Türkeş contrasted Turkey's poverty with her human and economic potential, pleaded for overall reform in education and other spheres, and advocated strong leadership. He repeatedly used (to good effect) the terms *vatan* (fatherland) and *millet* (nation), stressed that Turkey was an indivisible entity and that the Turks were the equals of, or even superior to, any other people. Türkeş spoke for Pan-Turanism, and proclaimed that "Islam was the religion of the Turkish nation" (probably for the benefit of the congress as a whole, and particularly for the Anatolian delegates).

The speech was skillfully delivered and inspiring; it was frequently interrupted by applause from Türkeş's supporters, who gave him a rousing ovation at its end. Not unexpectedly, on August 1, 1965, the national congress elected Türkeş Chairman of the RPNP by 698 votes to 516 for Tahtakılıç,¹⁶ no mean feat for a newcomer to a party. Oğuz, Tahtakılıç and several others walked out of the party, but Türkeş even put this to good use, by inviting back to the fold several people who had left after a quarrel with the old guard. Simultaneously, he changed the personal composition of the party organs to include his supporters and to ensure him a majority. One of his close associates among "the fourteen," Muzaffer Özdağ, became Assistant Secretary-General of the RPNP, others became close collaborators. Secure in his chairmanship, Türkeş set about molding the party anew.

Except for these personnel changes and several subsequent ones, Türkeş did not rush into introducing any structural alterations in the RPNP. However from the very beginning of his takeover he did give it a more centralized and authoritarian character. Various observers have commented on the quasi-military directives Türkeş sent the party's functionaries and on his preference for deciding all important matters personally. At the same time he himself drew up the cardinal points of the RPNP's new ideology. Summarized and published late in 1965, his *Dokuz Işık* ("Nine Lights") was a booklet, couched in simple language, which became the *Urim and Thummim* of the party. The work embodied a more extremist approach to etatism than that of the RPP, and commentators in Turkey and abroad¹⁷ were quick to pounce upon this and accuse

¹⁶ See *The Times* (London), Aug. 2, 1965.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Nadi, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-229. F.-W. Fernau, "Die Entwicklung der Mehrparteidemokratie in der Türkei," *Europa Archiv — Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik* (Bonn), XXI (9): May 10, 1966, p. 355.

Türkeş and his supporters of Neo-Nazism (citing, also, the use of the terms "nationalism" and "socialism" in the "Nine lights"). Türkeş was quick to refute such accusations and to proclaim that he was far from Nazism or fascism; and that, on the contrary, his was the only correct interpretation of Kemalism. Opponents, however, were equally quick to point out that Türkeş's and the party's casual interest (at best) in the future of democratic institutions in Turkey, their special attention in fostering youth groups,¹⁸ and their arranging para-military marches and youth demonstrations, were reminiscent of the practice of fascist parties elsewhere.

While the party had perforce continued to use the RPNP regulations, even after Türkeş took it over (and, insofar as it is ascertained, no new ones were introduced), the change of the party's name early in 1969 afforded an opportunity to prepare brand-new regulations. The 133-paragraph, 26-page book of regulations of the Nationalist Action Party¹⁹ (NAP) merit a brief analysis, if only for comparison's sake with those of the Labor Party of Turkey.

The NAP's headquarters is in Ankara, with branches elsewhere. The party's declared aims are the following: To serve the establishment and development of real democracy; and to work for the solution of Turkey's problems in order to safeguard the prosperity and happiness of the Turkish nation.

Eligible for membership are Turks, who have attained their majority and who enjoy their rights; those who have never been sentenced to long jail terms or found guilty of shameful crimes; those who were not found to have sunk to ideologies contrary to the republic, democracy, secularism, and law; those who are neither communists nor communist sympathizers; those who are not government officials, especially not if they are in managerial and decision-making roles; and those who were not banned in 1961 from playing an active role in political life.²⁰ Those who are qualified to join should obtain signed recommendations from two party members. Applicants who have been rejected may appeal to

¹⁸ The RPNP even founded a special body to research the problems of Turkish youth, the *CKMP gençlik meseleleri araştırma ve inceleme kurulu*, which published such booklets as *Türk gençliği için hizmet plânı* (Ankara: 1965).

¹⁹ *Milliyetçi hareket partisi tüzüğü* (N. p.: n.d. [1969]). The party's new name may also be translated "Nationalist Movement Party." The summary which follows adheres closely to the order of the regulations in the original.

²⁰ Probably, leading members of the defunct Democrat Party.

a higher level in the party. Nobody may be rejected on grounds of language, race, sex, religion, creed, class, or occupation.

Members are expected to explain to their compatriots, on every possible occasion, the party's program and decisions; create an atmosphere of sincere camaraderie among all Turks; fight against any thought or movement which may damage the public peace of Turkey — such as sentiments of malice, hate or partisanship; avoid using the party and its services for their own private interests or those of others — on the contrary, a feeling of service to public prosperity and happiness should prevail among NAP members; work for solidarity within the party and oppose destructive elements that threaten party unity.

The party's main institutions are the general congress (*genel kongre*), the general executive board (*genel idare kurulu*), the presidium of the party²¹ (*genel başkanlık divanı*) various control committees or Courts of Honor (*haysiyet divanı*), and the consultative council (*istişare meclisi*). The chief officers are the party Chairman, his assistants, and the Secretary-General.

The general executive board, which is the NAP's decision-making and administrative body, comprises 37 members: the party Chairman, the general chairmen of the NAP's women organizations and youth organizations, 28 members elected by the general congress, and another six co-opted by the general executive board itself. Within forty-eight hours of its election, the general executive board meets to elect the party Chairman, from among its own members. The general executive board takes all the administrative and other decisions between meetings of the general congress; appoints the bodies of the party's local branches; arbitrates between members in case of dispute; takes measures to increase the party's financial resources; interprets the party's regulations and program; increases the budget allocations when necessary; and keeps in touch with the party's deputies, senators and representatives in local bodies.

The presidium of the party is made up of eleven members: the party Chairman himself, three assistants, the Secretary-General, the Accountant-General (that is, treasurer) and his two assistants. This body follows the directives issued by the general executive board; it also sets the agenda of the meetings of the general executive board.

The supreme court of honor (*yüksek haysiyet divanı*) is the highest disciplinary body of the party. It coordinates the work of the provincial

²¹ The exact translation of the Turkish term is "general presidium."

courts of honor (whose duties, along with other provincial bodies, are detailed later).

The party Chairman presides over all the party bodies, except the control committees; this includes the sessions of the NAP's parliamentary groups. He represents the party, conforming to its regulations and program and to the decisions of the general congress and the general executive board. It is he, too, who sees to it that these are carried out. The party Chairman contacts the government and representatives of other parties on behalf of the party, after seeking the advice of his bureau. He publishes statements in the party's name and carries out propaganda trips. He is accountable to the general congress.

The party Chairman has three assistants. They are each responsible for one of the following spheres: a. Propaganda and information, including the printing, publication and distribution of NAP materials, open-air and indoor meetings and press relations. b. Organization. This includes inspection and control, arranging the official travels of the party Chairman, of the members of the general executive board and of the party's National Assembly Members and Senators, as well as having responsibility for the party's conventions on the local level. c. Elections and finances — the planning of the party's election strategy, directing party activity during elections and checking the results afterwards; it also involves finding new financial resources, controlling income and expenses, and inspecting the accounts kept by the party's Accountant-General.

The Secretary-General's office is the nerve center for all the party's organizational affairs. The Secretary-General — in addition to the party Chairman — represents the party in all legal matters; he also coordinates the work of the party Chairman and his three assistants. The Secretary-General has three assistants of his own, who are, respectively, in charge of collecting information, of propaganda, and of organizational matters.

The Accountant-General and his assistants are responsible for all the party's finances and the control thereof.

The party Chairman and the members of the general executive board — no matter what their duties — receive no payment from the party.

The consultative council is the party's main advisory body. It is presided over by the party Chairman and composed of the members of the general executive board, the general Chairmen of the NAP's women's and youth organizations, all the former party Chairmen, representatives of the party's provincial branches and all of its National Assembly Members and Senators, and other party members who have distinguished themselves in Turkey's economic or cultural life (and are, therefore,

appointed by the NAP's general executive board to serve on the consultative council). At the invitation of the party Chairman, the consultative council meets at least twice a year and prepares memoranda or passes advisory decisions on the party's internal affairs and general policies.

A lengthy chapter of the book of regulations of the NAP deals with conventions at various levels and details all the formalities and technicalities involved therein. Of particular interest is the composition and competence of the party's general (that is, national) congress, which is considered the NAP's supreme body. Participants are drawn from the party's parliamentary faction, together with those elected to the congress at local conventions by the branches. The general congress elects the party Chairman, the general executive board, and the supreme control committee. It may alter the party's regulations or program if necessary; approve or reject the budget and accounts; pass recommendations or binding resolutions on subjects connected with state and society, or party policy (these have first to be presented in writing by the party Chairman, the general executive board, or 5% of the delegates to the general congress, then examined by a commission which presents its report); decide on the party's dissolution or its union with any other, and what to do with its assets. It is the only body that may pass decisions in these matters.

The party's funds are drawn from the following sources: Members' registration fees and monthly dues; the sale of party publications, flags, badges, membership cards; balls, banquets, entertainment, concerts, sports competitions, lectures, trips, and the like; lotteries; revenues from the party's possessions; donations; loans; and contributions from the state, in accordance with the law.²² As in the case of the LPT, discussed above, there is no reliable data for other ways of financing the RPNP's activities.

On the surface, the NAP 1969 regulations are not very different from those of the LPT in 1961 — allowing for the difference in date and for the NAP's pronounced anti-communist stand. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the similarity is deceptive. The NAP's regulations are longer, and the mass of details is evidently meant to increase the hold of the party's central bodies on all branches and on all members. Without conceding the central bodies' control and decision making powers, the

²² All these seem hardly sufficient to cover the party's expenses. One wonders whether landowning *ağas* contributed to party finances, as reported in "Und ein Rentner inspiziert die Truppen," *Europa Report* (Munich), II (8): Aug. 1969, p. 25.

LPT — at least formally — attempted to build the party more as a grassroots organization. The NAP, on the contrary, was constructed in a vertical pattern of authority, somewhat reminiscent of a military organization — probably due to Türkeş's background and that of some of his closest collaborators. In the LPT, the party Chairman held considerable power; but the NAP Chairman was an even more powerful figure, and chaired practically all of the party's central institutions; ways and means were granted him to convene meetings and initiate measures — more so than in the LPT or other Turkish parties at the time. While much of this is covered-up by democratic trappings, the strong hand of Türkeş is evident behind several of the more authoritarian regulations, as is his determined day-to-day leadership of the party.

A further feature of the RPNP-NAP has been the character of its youth groups. These may serve as an instance of a programmed, coordinated attempt by a political party to transmit its central values to the younger generation. The party drew on several Pan-Turk associations (mentioned in the preceding chapter); it was generally believed that such organizations as the *Türkçüler Birliği*, later called *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği*, were connected with the RPNP-NAP. A smaller group, *Vatansever Türk Teşkilâtı* ("Patriotic Turkish Association") was headed by RPNP National Assembly member İsmail Hakkı Yılanlıoğlu.²³ The *Ülkü Ocakları Birliği* ("The Union of Homes of Ideals") and the *Genç Ülkücüler Teşkilâtı* ("Association of Young Idealists") were both sponsored by the party.²⁴ The latter, called later *Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Teşkilâtı* ("Idealist Youth of Turkey"),²⁵ was responsible in 1970–1971 for publishing in Istanbul a monthly, *Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Dergisi* ("The Magazine of the Idealist Youth of Turkey"), which brought the party's message to Turkish youth of either sex.

While all Turkish political parties have attempted to form youth organizations — with varying degrees of success — the RPNP-NAP invested far more heavily than others in this venture. The party made great efforts to take over student organizations, not unsuccessfully — for, even when it failed, it was not infrequently runner up. It also set up its own youth groups which were organized on new lines.

Typically called (and calling themselves) "commandos" (Turkish, *komandolar*), they began to make their presence felt in public life only

²³ Toker, *Solda ve sağda vuruşanlar*, pp. 158–159.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

²⁵ Or possibly a parallel organization.

in 1969, although they probably started training in the summer of 1968.²⁶ The three main training camps were organized in or near Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, Turkey's three largest cities; smaller ones were reportedly held near Samsun and in Anatolia.²⁷ Newspaper accounts that the party was planning to establish a total of thirty-four camps (ultimately to train 100,000)²⁸ are evidently far-fetched and intended to create an impression that a large commando-corps was in the making. Persistent rumors that the youths were being instructed in the use of firearms²⁹ have been categorically denied by the party.³⁰

The party's semi-official publication, the monthly *Milli Hareket* (published in Istanbul)³¹ gives the following account of the daily schedule of the three-week camp that summer: Prayer, two hours of physical training (including judo, wrestling, and boxing), breakfast, reading period, lunch, two more hours of physical training (as above, plus rope-walking and wall-scaling), prayer, long marches and sports, prayer, dinner, and lectures (e.g., on the essence of nationalism, as opposed to communism). It appears that prayers were introduced for the religious participants.

While the ultimate goal may have been to reach a higher figure, in practice estimates of the actual number of the commandos in 1969 and 1970 varied from a few hundreds to five thousand.³² As the term *komando* was of foreign origin, the youths preferred to be known, with party approval, as *Milliyetçi Toplumcular* ("National Socialists"³³), then *Bozkurtlar* (roughly, "Grey wolves"). They demonstrated in the streets,³⁴ at first peacefully enough; their first violent action occurred on

²⁶ Sam Cohen, "Right-wing Turks go militant," *The Guardian*, Feb. 3, 1969.

²⁷ İstanbul, İzmir, Samsun kampları açıldı," *Devlet* (weekly, Ankara), 16: July 21, 1969, pp. 4-5, 8.

²⁸ Reported in *Ant.*, 136: Aug. 5, 1969, pp. 4-5. Genç, *op. cit.*, p. 224, wrote about "35 camps." Peter Flinn, "Turning point for Turkey," *The New Middle East* (London), 13: Oct. 1969, p. 15, reported "some 30 camps."

²⁹ See hints in *Ant.*, 88: Sep. 3, 1968, pp. 10-11.

³⁰ *Devlet*, 16: July 21, 1969, p. 4.

³¹ Fasc. 38: Sep. 1969, p. 4. See also *Devlet*, 18: Aug. 4, 1969, p. 4.

³² Sam Cohen, in "Turkish commandos with Nazi ideas," *The Guardian*, Aug. 19, 1969, estimated them at 4,000-5,000. Alan Seymour, in *The Observer Foreign News Service*, no. 26154: Feb. 4, 1969, thought they numbered 300 only.

³³ An evocation of "Nazis," or merely a coincidence? The term was also used by others at the time, as noted in ch. 5. Anyway, the party rightly pointed out that "toplumcu" meant "social-minded" rather than "socialist."

³⁴ A special marching song was composed for them — reprinted in *Devlet*, 68: July 20, 1970, pp. 6-7.

December 31, 1968, when they broke into the quarters of leftist students at Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science.³⁵ Subsequently, they broke up leftist meetings, smashed windows of bookshops selling leftist literature,³⁶ and were even reported to have disrupted a World Health Organization seminar on birth-control with shouts of "The great Turkish nation is going to be made impotent!"³⁷ Commentators could not help observing certain similarities between the training and behavior of these youths and those in paramilitary organizations in Europe in the 1930's. The fact that *Milli Hareket* advertised Turkish translations of Nazi books did nothing to dispel this image.

As stated by the party the real aims of these youth groups are not very clear. The party's semi-official weekly *Devlet* declared that their goal was to revive and re-establish Turkish-Islamic civilization; and that they had no part in politics, nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) being their only guiding principle.³⁸ Türkeş, who assumed responsibility for the organization, candidly acknowledged that the *Bozkurtlar* were essentially set up to assist the party in defending Turkey from communism.³⁹ Two of Türkeş's closest collaborators (members of the activist military officers in 1960), Dündar Taşer and Rifat Baykal, directed the commando training camps in Ankara and Izmir, respectively. One of the youth leaders in Istanbul, Niyazi Adıgüzel, followed Türkeş's lead in 1969, maintaining that their duty was to fight for Turkey, against communism and Eastern or Western imperialism, but Yılmaz Yalçiner, one of the youth leaders in Ankara, saw more immediate targets for the commandos. A student himself, he claimed that communist students (as he phrased it) had gone too far in university disorders, late in 1968 and early in 1969, and should be taught a lesson. Consequently, the commandos perpetrated "raids" on faculties and clubs dominated by left-wingers. According to press reports — published, admittedly, by their opponents — tens of these commandos beat up university students who were members of rival organizations in several major cities, and only the police prevented bloody violence.⁴⁰ As a reprisal, Yalçiner himself was beaten up by his classmates at Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science. Demonstrations by these

³⁵ Reported in *Milliyet*, Jan. 1, 1969.

³⁶ According to the weekly *Der Spiegel*, June 30, 1969, p. 100.

³⁷ Acc. to *The Times* (London) and *The Daily Telegraph*, both of Apr. 8, 1969.

³⁸ *Devlet*, 16: July 21, 1969, pp. 4-5.

³⁹ Sam Cohen, *op. cit.*, *The Guardian*, Feb. 3, 1969, and the Turkish press.

⁴⁰ *Ant*, 106: Jan. 7, 1969, p. 6; 117: Mar. 25, 1969, p. 6; 136: Aug. 5, 1969, pp. 4-5.

commandos continued, even after the March 1971 military intervention.⁴¹

No less than the political activity and propaganda of the RPNP-NAP, the organizing of the *Bozkurtlar* and their subsequent strong-handed behavior are evidence of increasing violence in Turkey's public life. The growing readiness of both left and right to use extremist slogans and accompany them by no less extremist acts indicates a growing radicalization of Turkish extreme politics. This is further evidenced by the ideology of the RPNP-NAP.

b. IDEOLOGY

The doctrines propounded by the Labor Party of Turkey are essentially Marxist although employed selectively in a framework of "Turkish socialism," where it has to compete with other leftist ideologies. The approach of the Republican Peasant National Party after 1965, and since 1969 as the Nationalist Action Party, echoes certain ideologies typical of the twentieth century European right. In the Turkish context, it is probably the only rightist ideology which is of real political significance. Interestingly, the RPNP-NAP ideology is a mirror image of that of the LPT as regards the diagnosis of the situation and the necessity for radical reforms. However, the remedies prescribed and the methods for carrying them out are notably different.

Several of the focal points of RPNP-NAP ideology have already been mentioned briefly, and must be referred to again, in an attempt to present a more systematic analysis of its ideology. It should be remembered that the party's program and other publications were always written under the guidance of Alparslan Türkeş; often indeed they were directly penned by him.

The party program,⁴² although intrinsically interesting, actually rated scant and rare mention in the speeches and writings of the party spokesmen — as opposed to that of the LPT. Its 254 paragraphs, indeed, seem to have served mainly as raw material for the pronouncements of party leaders, who quoted it without mentioning it. Türkeş's own writings were cited far more frequently. Indeed, Türkeş's personal leadership of the party has never been in doubt, and the few who disagreed with him left the party. This situation differs from the LPT, where a small group jointly

⁴¹ *The Guardian*, Feb. 3, 1969. See also Ali Kazancıgil, in *Le Monde*, Jan. 8, 1969. For later activities, see *Yeni Ortam* (daily), May 22, 1973.

⁴² Reprinted by Ferruh Bozbeyleli, *Parti programları*, op. cit., pp. 175-238.

decided on ideology and policies and several personalities seem to have made major decisions collectively. In the RPNP-NAP setup, Türkeş's figure predominates throughout; although he unavoidably delegated authority, in true military fashion he gave directions for political activity and ideological propaganda and supervised these as closely as he could. Consequently, his own writings and speeches are the main sources for determining the exact nature of his party's ideology. These sources, corroborated by the party's publications which have appeared in recent years, generally present a lucid, coherent political philosophy.

A brief note on Türkeş's ideological make-up is necessary. Two events seem to have greatly influenced his life — his participation in Pan-Turanist, anti-communist demonstrations in 1944 and his subsequent arrest and trial; and his participation in the May 1960 Revolution and subsequent exile to New Delhi. Of the two, the first seems to have left a deeper impression on the young officer. The *türkçülük*, or "Turkism," which he and his friends demonstrated in 1944, became Türkeş's early credo. These same friends, who had been accused and tried with him in 1944, were later active (during Türkeş's absence in New Delhi) in forming a *Türkçüler Derneği* ("Association of Turkists") established on September 16, 1962. This changed its name, on August 30, 1964, to *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği* ("Union of the Nationalists of Turkey"), who founded *ocaks* throughout Turkey. Its leading members were N. Nihal Atsız, Nejdet Sançar, Dr. Hikmet Tanyu, and M. Zeki Sofuoğlu — all implicated with Türkeş in 1944. It is not known what connections Türkeş maintained with them during his exile and after his return to Turkey in 1963. However, he undoubtedly read their publications⁴³ and his speeches after 1965 often reflected their views on politics, especially in everything relating to *türkçülük*. Furthermore, Türkeş frequently ended his speeches with the slogan of the *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği*, "God protect the Turks!"⁴⁴ This had also been the slogan of the *Türk Gençlik Teşkilâtı*, in the years immediately after the Second World War.⁴⁵

The RPNP's platform for the 1965 general elections to the National Assembly is a fair indication of the party's ideology soon after it was

⁴³ For example, *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği yayınları: I. Türkiye milliyetçilerin görüşü. İlk bildiri* (N. p.: 1964). *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği Ankara Ocağı yayınları: I. 3 Mayıs Türkçüler günü antolojisi*, vol. I (Ankara: 1967). Süleyman Sürmen, *Ülkü kavgası* (Ankara: n.d.). Id., *Lider kimdir?* (Ankara: 1967). Ali Kemal Meram, *Türkçülük ve Türkçülük mücadeleleri tarihi* (Istanbul: 1969).

⁴⁴ *Tanrı Türkü korusun!*

⁴⁵ Cf. Darendelioğlu, *Milliyetçilik*, p. 162.

taken over by Türkes. Called "The RPNP program for a prosperous and strong Turkey,"⁴⁶ the 66-page booklet was obviously geared for vote-getting, but it nonetheless reflects the party's new mood. Its 254 paragraphs covered the party's aims in detail and explained the ways and means of carrying them out. The party aspired to establish in Turkey a secure political system which would speedily bring about human rights and freedoms, personal and general prosperity and social security. With this aim in mind, the party would strive to institute a progressive style of life and structure the nation according to modern science and technology; indeed, the party wished to have scientific thought and the concept of planning dominate both the administration of the state and the life of the people. The party's goals were permeated by the following concepts: a state which should be nationalist, democratic, secular and based on social laws; freedom, nationalism, morals, knowledge, social consciousness,⁴⁷ development, populism, care for the peasants,⁴⁸ and industrialization.

The party's view of the role of the state was that it existed to permit society to live in peace. As for the Republic of Turkey, the essence of its will and the concept of its development were to enable the Turkish nation to live continuously in liberty, peace and prosperity. It was therefore the duty of the state to serve the people and to assist the individual in freely forming his own personality. The relations between the state and the individual should be harmonized in justice.

The Turkish nation was understood by the party as having a continuous historical and social personality. The party believed in the great past and enlightened future of Turkism, at the same time rejecting the concept of racism. While the party conceded the existence of classes and organizations within the Turkish nation, it was against any form of human exploitation and opposed the idea of the class-state and of class-war. It maintained that the interests of groups and classes could be taken care of in harmony within the dictates of the law. The party, indeed, considered itself champion of the political, social and economic rights of all those who worked — peasants, laborers, tradesmen, artisans, officials and members of all the professions.

⁴⁶ *Müreffeh ve kuvvetli Türkiye için C.K.M.P. programı* (Ankara: 1965).

⁴⁷ The Turkish term, *toplumculuk*, sometimes rendered as "socialism," has a somewhat different connotation in this context, as already explained.

⁴⁸ The Turkish term *köycülük* has no exact equivalent in English. "Being peasant" is the closest, perhaps.

Further, the party considered all political parties that strove to attain power by election as democratic; it opposed the mentality that advocated seizing power by other means.

The ideas of Kemalism⁴⁹ (*Atatürkçülük*) guided the party. It aspired to build a Turkish nation living in peace within itself and with other nations, in a world free from fear, exploitation and pressures. The party believed that the whole world was one unit, in which Turkey should live in understanding and good neighborliness with all nations. It supported the basic concepts of justice, in all its political, economic, social and legal aspects. Similarly, it accepted the freedoms of religion and conscience, and opposed the exploitation of religious sentiments for any purpose. While the party was for secularism, it did not equate this concept with atheism; it maintained that the regime ought to support religious institutions.

The RPNP program then placed particular emphasis on the need for an overhaul of the state and social organization, to be expressed in administrative reforms, general education (both professional and technical), land reform, agricultural development, industrialization, and the mobilization of the means of production. This should be concomitant with a general improvement in services — which would be speedy, inexpensive and easy to obtain.

Since the RPNP considered itself truly nationalist, its program explained its nationalist outlook in some detail. It defined Turkish nationalism as “feelings for and service to the Turkish nation, its culture and state.” Nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) is a creative and progressive source of inspiration for the Turkish nation, spiritually, emotionally and physically. The party regarded Turkish nationalism as anti-imperialist, peaceful, libertarian, and democratic; it had adopted these characteristics from Turkish history, the credo of the people, and the ideas of Atatürk. The party’s nationalism strove to make Turkey an equal and honorable member of the family of nations: keep awake the Turkish spirit of independence and freedom; safeguard the development of the Turkish nation, united in language, goal, culture, and fate; work for a modern nation, and create the spirit of sacrifice and revolutionary mentality required for economic, social, and cultural advance. The party’s basic approach to development was that it came through a combination of scientific planning and revolutionary progress. Scientific thought should be encouraged to drive away superstition.

⁴⁹ On which the most recent work in English appears to be Suna Kili’s *Kemalism* (Istanbul: 1969).

The party's populism (*halkçılık*) was taken to mean that the common welfare of the people should be above the happiness of the individuals, although the program was quick to affirm its high regard for family life. Social justice (*sosyal adalet*) was duly praised and associated with the need to develop backward regions and with tax reforms. The program took a lenient view of the future economic role of the private sector, expressed interest in agricultural reform, afterwards dealt more lengthily with the hoped-for industrialization, which it considered essential to Turkey's economic future. It was ready for radical reforms which would lead to a new organization of production based on the principles of modern technology and science. The party considered this as the second chapter in Turkey's War of Independence. With this goal in view, the state should plan accordingly and organize all the nation's material and spiritual resources; modernize the national economy; increase production; arrange the necessary training and jobs for the unskilled and jobless; encourage the economic and cultural advance of the nation; improve working conditions; safeguard the dignity of labor; and integrate Turkey's economy with that of the world. In order to build a Turkey with a population of a hundred millions, the state should establish health, social, economic and financial institutions and furnish material assistance to large families.

The rest of the program was an elaboration of these principles. It explained in some detail how modernism and planning should be applied to administrative reform, education (at all levels), culture and the arts, national defense (oriented towards modernization and development), foreign affairs (good relations with all states, particularly Islamic states and Turkey's neighbors), agricultural development (an overall effort for rural reform), establishment of agricultural cooperatives (to be helped by bank credits), forestry policies, animal husbandry, fisheries (to be developed), nutrition and housing of Turks (to be vastly improved), migrants from village to town (to be assisted generously), industries and handicrafts (to be encouraged), commerce (special emphasis on foreign trade), financial matters (easier financing), justice (to be administered more speedily and cheaply), communications, tourism, health, social security (for children and the aged), children, women, working problems (including special care for Turkish workers abroad).

While all this appears to be a relatively complete list of the RPNP's list of demands and promises, they were specially geared to the 1965 general elections. They were so all-embracing that they could hardly be considered strictly as the party's own ideology. This ideology has, indeed, been formulated by Alparslan Türkeş himself. Although not divorced

from the above program, it appears more to the point and concise and thus perhaps easier to analyze. Some of Türkeş's numerous speeches and occasional articles will be examined later;⁵⁰ they contain much that refers to specific occasions and are therefore of limited value. By contrast, his books generally express a more rounded ideology, which in recent years has been synonymous with that of the party he has led. His "A case of nationalism, 1944"⁵¹ describes his nationalist attitudes of that time (when he was arrested and tried), and his part in the May 27, 1960 Revolution and the unjust treatment he later received from his fellow officers. This is more an *apologia pro vita sua* and revelation of Türkeş's personality than of the ideology of the party he led, and it is consequently of less immediate concern.

In addition to this autobiographical work, Türkeş published three books, each one complementing the other. The first, chronologically, is "Our foreign policies and Cyprus", a 36-page booklet,⁵² based on a lecture to the Turkish Culture Society for Cyprus,⁵³ a Pan-Turk group, on December 17, 1965. Briefly, Türkeş spoke on three main subjects: Turkey's foreign relations and policies, Turkish ideological movements, and the Cyprus question. According to Türkeş, a state, in its relations with others, watches over its own interests, guided by a certain philosophical approach; the philosophy of Czarist Russia, for instance, differed from that of the Soviet Union. Basic policies — thus varying from day-to-day politics — are geared to the state's long-range interests. Turkish foreign policy was still influenced by the four destructive wars it had participated in — Turco-Italian (1911), Balkan (1912–1913), First World War (1914–1918), and War of Independence (1919–1922). His survey of the ideas and movements for a Greater Turkey — all of which he sympathized with — led Türkeş to a somewhat warlike definition of *milliyetçilik*, which meant for him "defending the Turkish *millet* (nation)." The Cyprus question, evidently, was the meeting-ground of the previously discussed issues of foreign relations, the idea of a Greater Turkey, and *milliyetçilik*. Türkeş spoke of Cyprus' being Turkish since 1571. Greeks leaving Turkey settled in Cyprus, and Turks were compelled to emigrate from Cyprus to Turkey — to Mersin and other areas — a total of 250,000 to 300,000 Turks. Some 125,000 remained in Cyprus. The Cypriot Greeks, who were for union with Greece, had imported many weapons into the island,

⁵⁰ See below, ch. 7.

⁵¹ Alparslan Türkeş, *1944 milliyetçilik olayı*.

⁵² Id., *Dış politikamız ve Kıbrıs* (Istanbul: n.d. [prob. 1966]).

⁵³ Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği.

but the Turkish government did nothing for the Cypriot Turks. Türkeş maintained that the latter wanted union with Turkey, and that he himself would have sent Turkish forces to Cyprus, informing Great Britain and Greece that the earlier agreements had been broken anyway. Cyprus, he claimed, is as Turkish as Anatolia, Western Thrace and Salonica!⁵⁴

These were Türkeş's basic views on the foreign policy of Turkey. In this particular case, Türkeş seems to have been poignantly effective — perhaps because he was a Cypriot Turk himself and had lived in the island during his childhood and early youth (1917–1933). Otherwise, however, his usual aggressive style — particularly whenever Pan-Turk issues cropped up — contrasted with the bland pronouncements of the 1965 RPNP program about good neighborliness and its importance. While Pan-Turkism was never ignored for long, Türkeş's other two books placed more emphasis on domestic affairs.

Türkeş's second theoretical work is his 16-page booklet "Nine Lights."⁵⁵ First published in Istanbul in 1965, it was reprinted several times,⁵⁶ and soon became the *vade mecum* for party activities — its price remaining constant at TL 1,⁵⁷ inflation notwithstanding. The ideas set forth in the "Nine Lights" were not aired for the first time in 1965. More than two years before the first edition appeared, Friedrich-Wilhelm Fernau, writing from Turkey in March, 1963,⁵⁸ commented on the fact that "nine principles" (nearly identical to the 1965 "Nine Lights") were being attributed to the circle of officers, led by Türkeş, who had returned to Turkey the preceding month. Some of the ideas, indeed, may be traced back to the *milliyetçi* groups of the post-Second World War years, or, indeed, to Atatürk's time.

Because of the impact of this work on party circles — it was studied, frequently quoted and interpreted⁵⁹ — we shall analyze the 1965 booklet

⁵⁴ The last two became part of Greece after the First World War — but Türkeş nevertheless considered them Turkish.

⁵⁵ *Dokuz ışık* (1st ed., Istanbul: 1965; later editions available).

⁵⁶ I have a copy of the fourth edition (Istanbul: 1967) and of the fifth (Istanbul: 1969). A more recent edition, with some interpretative additions, appeared in Istanbul in 1972.

⁵⁷ A Turkish *Lira* (pound) was worth about 7 U.S. cents by 1971.

⁵⁸ Cf. his "Le retour des 'quatorze' en Turquie," *Orient*, 25: 1er trim. 1963, pp. 17–24.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Alpaslan (sic!) Türkeş, *Millî doktrin DOKUZ IŞIK'ın iki prensibi: milliyetçilik-toplumculuk* (Ankara: 1971); Enis Gökyiğit Yörükoğlu, *Dokuz ışık'ta nüfus politikası* (Ankara: n.d. [1971/72]). Necmettin Hacıeminoğlu, *Milliyetçi eğitim sistemi. "Dokuz Işık" üzerine bir inceleme* (Istanbul: 1972).

in detail. The nine⁶⁰ lights and their elaboration by Tūrkeş are as follows,⁶¹ more or less in his own words, somewhat abbreviated:

a. Nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) is the deep sentiment feeding the Turkish nation. A Turk is one who feels he is one and is proud of it. We consider it a duty to work for this nation. This is a deeply-rooted feeling, which seeks to carry Turkey forward, using the most modern and scientific methods. Our nationalism is not nourished by feelings against anyone. It is a sentiment born of a desire to bring Turkey into an advanced state of civilization — removed from fear and pressure, prosperous, happy and modern. In addition our nationalism means Turkism (*Türkçülük*). Ideologically, this means conforming in all spheres to the Turkish spirit and traditions and to assistance to all Turks and the Turkish nation in everything.

b. Idealism (*ülkücülük*). We are idealists. A man may wish to serve mankind, but he should first serve his own nation; by so doing, he serves mankind too. For one who is loyal to his family is also loyal to mankind. Our ideal is to bring Turkey, in the shortest way and within the briefest time, to the highest level of civilization — in happiness, prosperity, independence, and liberty. Freedom for individuals and independence for nations are among our main principles — for men are born free and equal. Consequently, everyone should be afforded equal opportunities. This is equality in its simplest meaning. In this context Tūrkeş mentions the Turks living outside Turkey's frontiers, all of whom he loves and will never renounce. Under the principle of self-determination, they should be permitted to decide their fate. Nevertheless, he continues, our ideology will always be realistic, and we will never push Turkey into risky ventures.

c. Morality (*ahlâkçılık*). Morals are the basis of everything. A society without morals cannot succeed. The bases on which our morality stands are the concept that the morals of the Turks should conform to Turkish traditions, spirit, and to the beliefs of the Turkish nation; at no time will they contradict the laws of nature. Morality will raise the level of the Turkish nation.

d. Social-mindedness (*toplumculuk*)⁶² has here a special meaning, with a local flavor; Tūrkeş gives it three characteristics: 1. Private enterprise should be protected and encouraged, provided that the dangerous anta-

⁶⁰ In ancient times the Turks considered the number nine lucky.

⁶¹ The order of the "lights" is according to the first edition. Others (such as the fourth edition) list them in a slightly different order.

⁶² The term *toplumculuk* is consistently used by Tūrkeş and his party, as distinct from *sosyalizm*.

gonism between employers and workers is controlled. 2. Holders of small capital should be encouraged to unite it with larger enterprises. State support is essential for such enterprises, if they are large; this is usual, for instance in the United States, in atomic and space research, as well as in other fields of scientific research. 3. Welfare and social security should be organized, for they are sorely lacking at present. Our aim is that nobody in Turkey should be afraid of remaining helpless, unprotected, or unemployed. When the head of a family dies, his children should immediately be protected and they should continue their education; the widow should be given a job. All this should be undertaken by a wide organization. This could take care of all injustices and tragedies; health matters and legal costs; and inject new hope into those in despair.

e. Scientism (*ilimcilik*). Our attitude is that research and study should be based on a scientific mentality. This is true also of our approach to any event or situation related to the state. Everything should be examined only according to scientific principles — observation, research, analysis, experiment, and a proven conclusion.

f. The guaranteeing of freedoms (*hürriyetçilik*). We understand this to apply not merely in the political sense, but in all realms of life. We refer to the freedoms laid down in the United Nations Charter — freedom of speech, conscience, writing, research, social and economic freedoms, freedom from fear, pressures, and poverty. All these ought to be guaranteed to every Turkish citizen.

g. Care for the peasants, or being pro-peasant (*köycülük*). Since seventy per cent of our people are peasants, we consider rural development of special importance. The 43,000 villages in Turkey need the same number of schools, clinics and agricultural experts. The figures are staggering. Villages ought to be grouped, by size, in units of ten, for example. Then one would need only 4,300 schools, doctors, midwives, agricultural experts and machinery centers (for agricultural cooperatives). This makes it more feasible — as the Turkish villages are in dire need of doctors, midwives, teachers, schools, and modernization of agriculture. Most urgent is the modernization of agriculture; experts can help by introducing the most modern implements and the most advanced methods — to guarantee the most profitable yields. Agricultural reforms, however, also mean a reform in land-holding. In some parts of Turkey, particularly in southeastern Anatolia, some people own up to fifty villages, while the peasants who live there are landless, income-less and half-starving. It is in the national interest to assist these peasants. Agricultural mechanization will enable one or two people to do the work of tens or hundreds,

and the rest could be transferred to industry.⁶³ The peasant is not a slave, he is free like everybody else. Thanks to mechanization, those remaining in agriculture would find it very profitable, while others will make a decent living in industry or in other economic sectors. In central or western Anatolia, on the other hand, agriculture is endangered by the current inheritance laws, which divide a man's landed estate among his male heirs, thereby causing a ridiculously unprofitable diminution in the size of land-holdings. Changes in the inheritance laws and the introduction of agricultural machinery — shared on a cooperative basis — would remedy the situation. Special studies should be undertaken on the land, to precede the above reforms; new institutes for agricultural research should be founded, which as part of their activities would process all pertinent statistical data. The villages will remain separate entities, but the proposed units will benefit from the advice of these institutes and all the other services, including cultural and technological ones.

h. Development and populism (*gelişmecilik ve halkçılık*). People are never content with their situation and strive for better conditions, to be reached by harnessing the forces of nature. Had they been satisfied, civilization would have remained static. However, the situation today is not that of five years ago, and will be different — and better — five years hence. Thus dissatisfaction is the basis for progress and development. This attitude does not reflect adversely in any way on our part — for a nation's history is a continuous flow. Consequently, all our future activities and our drive for progress and development are suited, in every detail, to our national spirit and traditions. As for populism, we understand this to mean that everything we do is of the people, by the people and for the people.

i. Industrialization and technology (*endüstricilik ve teknikçilik*). Today the world has entered the atomic and space era. The steam era is gone; the electric one, too, is soon to be a thing of the past. A nation can enter this new atomic and space era only by advanced technology — in a state that industrializes and places the emphasis on large, heavy industries.

Türkeş unfolds the above Nine Lights in a simple, straightforward manner, written in an easily understandable style. There are frequent repetitions and elaborations of the basic point. Obviously the work is aimed at a popular audience. The emphasis is on *milliyetçilik*, which is

⁶³ This seems a rather odd conclusion, for Turkey does not lack manpower but skills, and it is over-optimistic to expect numerous unskilled peasants to be easily absorbed and gainfully employed in industry. It is, however, attractive propaganda.

simply defined as serving the Turkish nation; all the other "Lights" are interpreted and evaluated in terms of service to the Fatherland. The party members, indeed, often described themselves as *milliyetçis* first and foremost and scoffed at others who pretended, also, to be *milliyetçis*. Türkeş obviously considered himself to be the high priest of *milliyetçilik*⁶⁴ and probably also of *türkçülük*. Quantitatively, however, the *toplumculuk* and *köycülük* take most space, over four pages each, or over half of the booklet between them. One realizes, upon re-reading them, that the former tries to impress both employers and workers, while the latter attempts to recruit the support of the peasant masses. Even the ending of the booklet testified to an obvious desire for a wide appeal. Türkeş asks for strength (to carry out the above) from Ulu Tanrı, *i.e.*, Almighty God.⁶⁵

More recently, Türkeş has elaborated his (and his party's) ideology, at greater length, in a book named "The problems of Turkey,"⁶⁶ which ran during 1969 into at least two editions; according to the publishers, the first edition sold out within a month. The book includes photographs, too, most of them of Türkeş speaking to the people or mingling with them. The publisher's preface⁶⁷ introduces Türkeş as "not only the party's general Chairman, but also its creative force and spirit." The book appears to be the most detailed exposition to date of Türkeş's views, which he presents quite candidly. If a general reader finds it less systematic than the *Nine Lights*, this is because it is a collection of speeches and articles (even including the above booklet on foreign policy and Cyprus).

The first article, "Turkey's problems,"⁶⁸ (which gives the book its name) is largely concerned with *milliyetçilik*. Apparently based on a speech of Türkeş to the Nationalist Action Party, it elaborates the term—in its Turkish context—more fully than in the "Nine Lights." Our main role as *milliyetçis* (asserts Türkeş) is to improve Turkey's situation and defend it. Any movement in Turkey that does not subscribe to these principles ought to be considered illegal. For every nation desires to advance to a higher level, to a more prosperous, fortunate, civilized and progressive position. Nations lacking this sacred sentiment are con-

⁶⁴ Cf. Türkeş's introduction to Süleyman Sürmen, *Ülkü kavgası* (Ankara: n.d.)

⁶⁵ Significantly, not Allah. As we shall see, at times Türkeş's attitude to religion appears ambivalent.

⁶⁶ *Türkiye'nin meseleleri* (1st and 2nd editions, Istanbul: 1969). In our account, we shall refer to the 232-page 2nd ed.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-16.

demned to lag behind and disappear. True *milliyetçilik* aspires, first and foremost, to make Turkey the most prosperous, strongest, and most civilized nation on earth. This in spite of the fact that today's Turkey lags much further behind Germany and Great Britain than it did a hundred years ago. At the present rate of development, it will take Turkey 249 years to reach the level of European states. Obviously, this should be greatly speeded up.

Türkeş then considers Turkey's basic problems. The first is the spiritual crisis through which the nation is passing. While such crises are not unknown elsewhere, they are particularly destructive if they create disorder and confusion. Some people blame Islam for Turkey's backwardness, but Türkeş disagrees and sees no direct connection between the two. According to him, the crisis confronting Turkey is expressed in the indecisiveness, levity and powerlessness of the administration. Before everything else, a state should maintain order and establish its authority; otherwise, subversive movements, aiming at the state's destruction, may carry out their designs. Another immediate problem is to change Turkey's system of education, in order to prepare highly qualified scientists and technicians. Yet another is the social inequality which exists in Turkey and the absence of socially-oriented organizations. Further problems are the gap between the low productivity (due to antiquated methods of production) and the high consumption (which apes western countries). Many are ready to imitate the consumption in the west, but only few strive for a level of production that would increase Turkey's prosperity and wealth. This is a grave mistake; an equilibrium is needed between production and consumption.

Türkeş then passes on to the problem of the intellectuals. These, he claims, are often educated in foreign ways, remote from Turkey's mainstream. Indeed, they dwell in ivory towers and look at their fellow Turks from above — refusing to share the life of the Turkish masses. This attitude has been a major factor in the slow development of the Turkish people. The situation is different in all (*sic*) other nations, where development is due to cooperation between the intellectuals and the masses. In Turkey this has led to a dearth of truly capable administrators. No wonder that many Turkish teachers are so immature and egotistic that they do not impart a spirit of *milliyetçilik* or other values to their pupils, simply knowledge. As a result, many youngsters, just out of school, refuse to work in agriculture or as artisans, but, instead, crowd the doors of offices, looking for clerical jobs, that is become a charge on society. This is yet another sign of immaturity.

Another of our problems, continues Tūrkeş, is the absence of industry. Today's advanced, powerful and prosperous nations have managed to establish and control their own modern means of industrial production. In Turkey children are not given an education suitable to the development of industry. Indeed one of the destructive ideas spread about, from time to time, is that Turkey is an agricultural country; that agriculture should be developed, along with light industries, on a small scale; and that Turkey needs no other industries. Those who say so are the foes of Turkey's development. Actually, in order to enable Turkey to stand on its own feet and be strong — indeed, so that it may exist — it is imperative to teach Turkish schoolchildren technical skills and science, and establish factories, to conform with the modern era.

All the investment policies — reflected in taxation and budgets — are wrong and create further problems. For Turkey's development, investments should be channeled to industry. Other investments should be secondary. A government which encourages, instead, the erection of theaters and other buildings is acting unwisely.

Preliminary conditions for embarking upon development, continues Tūrkeş, are the establishment of national unity and its protection, the institution of security, and the defence of territorial integrity. All these are endangered by subversive activities. Chief among these is communism, which aims at weakening the Turkish nation from within, destroying its unity and breaking up its fatherland. Communism is an ideology invented by a Jew in a foreign country; it clashes with the concepts of nationalism, religion, and family; it is recognized everywhere as the bait offered to sabotage a nation and subject it to the most fearful and cruel imperialism — that of Moscow. This can be seen in the lands of the communist camp, first and foremost in Czechoslovakia. The communists are spies, servants of Turkey's enemies and traitors to the Turkish nation.

For more than a century, Turkish intellectuals have mistakenly believed that Turkey's progress depended on copying the regimes of foreign states. This mistaken mentality presupposed that imitation is the panacea for the immediate cure of all Turkey's ills. Since at the time, Great Britain and France lived in a liberal capitalist system, this was adopted although it did not necessarily suit Turkey's conditions. Mere imitation can never be a solution. Nowadays, some of our intellectuals show the same mentality and wish to imitate either the neo-liberalism of the west or Moscow's communism. Turkey, with its special conditions and its own history, national traditions and spirit, will never be saved and developed by imitating others. Turkey, with its own heritage and characteris-

tics, will progress in its own way. This is why we have thought out a one hundred per cent local doctrine, that of the Nine Lights. Our movement and our ideology are our own, hence the most suitable.

The main components of Türkeş's ideology are listed above, in the problems which he considers vital to Turkey's future, and in the solutions he offers here and has offered in his two earlier works. This book on Turkey's problems elsewhere lists some other points which fit neatly with the doctrines of Türkeş and the NAP. Türkeş wishes to see not only a scientifically-advanced, but also a well-populated Turkey of eighty millions by the year 2000.⁶⁹

To strengthen Turkey, close relations should be established with what he calls "the Outer Turks" (*Diş Türkler*).⁷⁰ This refers to Cyprus⁷¹ and other lands. For the same reasons, Türkeş openly opposes any form of birth-control, labeling it a scheme of Turkey's enemies to limit its population.⁷² Not surprisingly, he also supports Turkish as the language of instruction in all Turkey's educational establishments, including the universities (some of which employ English).⁷³

Special attention is given, time and again, to Turkish youth and its problems and goals.⁷⁴ Türkeş rightly gauges that part of Turkish youth, particularly students, was traditionally sympathetic to the Pan-Turk ideals so dear to him.⁷⁵ While he knows that Turkish youth is not a single entity in its attitudes, he sees it, in general, as the vanguard of Turkey. Since he grasps that all political parties vie with each other to attract youth, he attempts to infuse it with *milliyetçilik*. He has observed among some university youths the same defects and shortcomings that characterize a sector of Turkish society: a. Lack of purpose and of patriotic thoughts; b. Lack of seriousness; c. A dislike for discipline and a lack of respect for the rights of others.⁷⁶ He places these students in leftist movements and considers them a serious danger. Proper education of Turkish children may avoid such dangers in the future. He promises Turkish youth a better future⁷⁷ and tries to convince it to adopt the Nine Lights.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, "Meseleler ve bazı görüşlerimiz," pp. 17-18. On pp. 59 and 97, he speaks of 100 millions.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, "Görüşlerimiz ve politikamız," *ibid.*, pp. 36 ff.

⁷² *Ibid.*, "Doğum kontrolü," pp. 76-77.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, "Dil dâvası," pp. 78-83.

⁷⁴ E.g., *ibid.*, pp. 91-102.

⁷⁵ Cf. Szyliowicz, *op. cit.*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI (2): May 1970, pp. 152-155.

⁷⁶ Türkeş, *Türkiye'nin meseleleri*, p. 95.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 96 ff.

Then all youth will have equal opportunities, along with free health care, good working conditions and an array of cultural and educational establishments.⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, these opinions were reflected (even though in varying sequence) in the party publications directed towards youth,⁷⁹ as well as in Türkeş's brief reply to a circular addressed by Turkish youth organizations to all political parties in September 1965, that is shortly before the general elections to the National Assembly.⁸⁰ All this is consistent with the NAP use of its own youth organization, in the late 1960's, for demonstrations, for training in commando methods, for violence against its opponents and for taking over several student groups.

Perhaps the only point in his ideology in which Türkeş appears to have wavered, even changed his mind somewhat, is his attitude towards Islam. While the 1965 RNP program, drawn up under his general direction, spoke of a secular state, Türkeş's later pronouncements, as we have just seen, praise Islam as an important part of the Turkish heritage. In the 1969 electoral campaign to the National Assembly, he broke with several of his close collaborators who would not agree with what they considered his tactical move towards Islam for the purpose of vote-getting. That orthodox Turks had some doubts, in 1969, about the sincerity of Türkeş's conversion to a religious outlook is evident from a booklet published at the time.⁸¹ In it, N. M. Polat, a journalist with orthodox Islamic views,⁸² interviewed a lawyer, Bekir Berk, considered a leader of the Nurcular, concerning Türkeş's opinions on Islam. Quoting from Türkeş's own writings, Berk maintained that Türkeş had consistently shown a secularist approach. According to Berk, in 1962 Türkeş wrote an article in a daily newspaper strongly disclaiming that he and his fellow revolutionaries had any intention of establishing in Turkey a state based on Islamic culture; he had accused the Justice Party of exciting religious fanaticism in 1965, and in 1967 had reaffirmed his secularist approach. Worse still, from the point of view of Polat, Berk reminded

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁷⁹ C.K.M.P. Gençlik Kolları Genel Merkez — Müteşebbis Heyeti, *Yurtsever Türk genci* (Ankara: 1965). *Id.*, *Türk gençliği için hizmet plânı* (Ankara: 1965).

⁸⁰ Türkiye Millî Gençlik Teşkilâtı, *Gençlik partilere soruyor*, *op. cit.* Türkeş replied on September 12, 1965, expressing great affection for youth.

⁸¹ Bekir Berk and N. Mustafa Polat, *İslamî hareket ve Türkeş* (N. p. [Istanbul]: 1969).

⁸² At the time he was editor of *Babı Ali'de Sabah*, a conservative Islamic daily newspaper. See *Millî Hareket* (Monthly), fasc. 11: June 1967.

him that, in the "Nine Lights," Türkeş had advocated a youth with free thoughts and a free conscience. All this fits in with what we have said of Türkeş and relates to his attitude towards Islam before 1969; after that date, he seems to have compromised with Islam, to a degree, possibly in response to pressures from within his own party. We will mention several instances in the next chapter, of this affecting the party's propaganda in the course of the electoral campaign of 1969.

C. PERIODICALS SUPPORTING THE PARTY

Before summing up its political and socio-economic philosophy, it might be worthwhile to analyze briefly the attitudes of the party's press to Turkey's problems; an exhaustive inventory would require a separate work. The fact that two journals⁸³ were identified with the RPNP (later the NAP) and closely reflected its ideology and politics, was impressive — compared, for instance, to the LPT. The latter, despite its high regard for propaganda, has had no regular organ of its own, even though several newspapers or magazines intermittently supported it. The reason appears to be a chronic lack of funds, so that the LPT has had to disseminate its views by handbills, pamphlets and books. However, although the RPNP-NAP was able to support two publications, it never attempted to issue a daily, an enterprise which only the larger parties could afford. Paradoxically, indeed, the LPT probably reached a larger readership, through sympathetic writers in such unaffiliated dailies as *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, than the RPNP through its affiliated periodicals.

Milli Hareket ("National Action" or "National Movement") was a monthly published in Istanbul, each issue comprising twenty pages (including the cover). Its masthead described it as "a magazine of ideas, art and politics." It began to appear in October 1966,⁸⁴ but suspended publication in August 1971.

Devlet ("State") is a weekly, first published in Ankara.⁸⁵ Each issue comprises twelve large pages (including the cover). Its masthead cites

⁸³ More recently, since May 1971, a monthly, *Töre* ("Custom"), published in Ankara, expresses views close to the NAP's, as does a daily, *Orta Doğu* ("The Middle East"), published in Istanbul.

⁸⁴ The first issue is undated, but the second is marked November, 1966. In several instances it appeared twice a month.

⁸⁵ Repeated attempts have shown that it is well-nigh impossible to buy *Milli Hareket* outside Istanbul, or *Devlet* outside Ankara. It is therefore fair to assume that they were almost exclusively directed to these cities. As of May 10, 1971, *Devlet* moved its office to Konya, however.

a famous saying of Atatürk, "Oh, Turk, turn unto thyself!" It began publication on April 7, 1969, but on September 6, 1971 announced that in the future it would be published only every fifteen days.

To take the older *Milli Hareket* first, its chief role was evidently to serve as an organ (and, for its first thirty months — the only one) of the party; to inform members of party news and other affairs in Turkey (and, more rarely, abroad); react to various events and phenomena of interest — such as student demands and activities,⁸⁶ Korygin's visit to Turkey,⁸⁷ or devaluation of the Turkish Lira;⁸⁸ praise Türkeş and his activities,⁸⁹ extol him as a leader who ought to be a Cabinet Minister,⁹⁰ and denigrate his opponents;⁹¹ attack other political parties, chiefly the JP⁹² (competing with the RPNP in the same social circles) and the LPT, whose socialism it equated with communism, the enemy of Turkey⁹³ (freemasonry is the next worst⁹⁴). Leftists of all types are attacked, and the reader warned of their hold on the press, cinema, theater and radio.⁹⁵ Youth, to whom an appeal is frequently made,⁹⁶ is particularly warned against these evils.

Most of this reflects the general views of the party leadership, and particularly of Türkeş, who sometimes wrote in *Milli Hareket* or granted it interviews.⁹⁷ His own concept of *milliyetçilik* was not infrequently elaborated by other writers in the magazine⁹⁸ and presented as meaning "service to the Turks."⁹⁹ As one article put it, "Socialists (communists) cannot be *milliyetçis!*"¹⁰⁰ Later, with the party's rapprochement with

⁸⁶ *Milli Hareket*, fasc. 2: Nov. 1966; 24: July 1968; 29: Dec. 1968; 54: Jan. 1971.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 4: Dec. 15, 1966.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 50: Sep. 1970.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 8: Mar. 1967; 10: May 1967; 17: Dec. 1967; 19: Feb. 1968.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966; 10: May 1967; 11: June 1967.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966 calls Çetin Altan a traitor (*hain*).

⁹² *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966; 4: Dec. 15, 1966; 5: Jan. 1, 1967; 19: Feb. 1968.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966; 5: Jan. 1, 1967; 8: Mar. 1967; 9: Apr. 1967; 17: Dec. 1967; 18: Jan. 1968; 24: July 1968; 33: Apr. 1969; 43: Feb. 1970; 45: Apr. 1970.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966]; 7: Feb. 1, 1967; 15: Oct. 1967.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 8: March, 1967.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966; 4: Dec. 15, 1966; 7: Feb. 1, 1967; 9: Apr. 1967; 10: May 1967; 24: July 1968; 29: Dec. 1968; 32: Mar. 1969.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3: Dec. 1, 1966; 9: Apr. 1967; 11: June 1967; 13: Aug. 1967; 17: Dec. 1967; 19: Feb. 1968; 20: Mar. 1968; 25: Aug. 1968; 31: Feb. 1969; 34: May 1969; 37: Aug. 1969.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966]; 3: Dec. 1, 1966; 39: Oct. 1969.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966. The definition is by Nejdet Sançar.

¹⁰⁰ Mehmet Eröz, "Sosyalist (Komünist) Milliyetçi olamaz," *ibid.*, 28: Nov. 1968, pp. 7-8.

İslam, *milliyetçilik* is also examined in terms of *İslam*, emphasizing the parallels between the two terms.¹⁰¹

A contents analysis shows, however, that the most frequently alluded-to topic, as well as the most emphasized one, is the idea of Pan-Turkism — no doubt because it appealed to a wide readership, on the one hand, and was apparently the only major theme not exploited by other political parties, and consequently easily monopolized by the RPNP-NAP.

Pan-Turkism was explained and adopted from the first issue of *Milli Hareket*,¹⁰² in its “statement of purpose” (*amaç*) drawn up by Muammer Işın, the magazine’s first publisher.¹⁰³ This starts with the fiery assertion that, “After leaving Central Asia, the Turkish nation became a great state.” The revival of a “Great Turkey” is a recurrent theme,¹⁰⁴ and one way of achieving this (in addition to industrialization and opposition to birth-control)¹⁰⁵ is through militant Pan-Turkism. The tone is markedly more aggressive than the Pan-Turk theories of Ziya Gökalp early in the 20th century, whom *Milli Hareket* frequently quotes and whose ideas appear to have served at least partly as a model. The Turkish language is the main link uniting Turks within Turkey and elsewhere.¹⁰⁶ Pages are devoted to lists of Turkish words and their etymology.¹⁰⁷ The Kurds and Alevis, living in Turkey, are described as Turks who regard themselves as such.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, any Kurdish agitation within Turkey is attributed to communist incitement.¹⁰⁹ Inflated figures are adduced to show that most Turks still live outside of Turkey’s political frontiers, e.g., 70 millions in Russia, 30 millions in China, 12 millions in Iran, 3 millions in Irak, and 2 millions in the Balkans.¹¹⁰ Strong support is given the Turks in Cyprus;¹¹¹ demands for Turkish schooling are voiced on behalf of the Turks in the Kirkuk area;¹¹² attention is given to the Turkmens of the

¹⁰¹ E.g., “İslâmiyet ve milliyetçilik,” *ibid.*, 46: May 1970. See also Nahit Dinçer, *ibid.*, 48–49: Aug. 1970.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966].

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, page 2. Later the publisher was Ahmet B. Karaca, and the editor-in-chief Sakın Öner.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966]; 3: Dec. 1, 1966; 25: Aug. 1968; 31: Feb. 1969; 44: Mar. 1970; 47: June 1970.

¹⁰⁵ İ. H. Yılanlıoğlu, “Doğum kontrolü,” *ibid.*, 31: Feb. 1969.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, *ibid.* 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966]. Ahmet Kabaklı’s article.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 2: Nov. 1966; 7: Feb. 1, 1967; 8: Mar. 1967.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 45: Apr. 1970, pp. 1, 3.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: n.d. [Oct. 1966]. Cf. *ibid.*, 7: Feb. 1, 1967 (M. S. Aran’s article).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10: May 1967; 17: Dec. 1967; 18: Jan. 1968; 19: Feb. 1968.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 13: Aug. 1967.

Taurus Mountains;¹¹³ hundreds of thousands of Turks are said to live in Western Thrace,¹¹⁴ and the geopolitical situation in the Balkans is examined in the light of Turk concentrations there.¹¹⁵ Elsewhere, Muzaffer Özdag, one of the party's main ideologists, maintains that Mustafa Kemal himself had been very concerned about the Outer Turks,¹¹⁶ living outside Turkey's frontiers. While minimalists write about Cyprus, the islands¹¹⁷ and Western Thrace becoming a part of Turkey proper,¹¹⁸ the maximalists dream of "Tomorrow's Turanian state."¹¹⁹ The maximalists believe that the Turkish ideal should be to reach the roads leading to India and China: Azerbaijan (with its 5.5 million Turks), the Caucasus, Bukhara, Samarkand, Aksu, Manchuria's borders (Turkestan),¹²⁰ the Northern Turks — to the Volga and Siberia — not to speak of the Balkans. Evidently, the party's concern for the situation of Turks — and Muslims, for that matter¹²¹ — in the Soviet Union fitted well with its anti-communist, anti-Russian feelings.

Much of what has been said applies also to the weekly connected with the NAP — *Devlet*. There are some differences, evidently, but mostly subtle ones. Short poems and readers' letters give the weekly a more personal touch, as does more detailed reporting on recent events inside Turkey (a regular feature). *Devlet* adds some insight into party views and policies in recent years — since this weekly started publication only on April 7, 1969. Certainly, the Pan-Turk drive for a *Yüz milyonluk Türkiye* ("Turkey of a hundred million people"), and the memory of past glory and grandeur are there,¹²² too, as are the unequivocal anti-communist

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 19: Feb. 1968.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 26: Sep. 1968 (Güngör Aslan's article).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 22: May 1968 (same writer).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19: Feb. 1968. See also *ibid.*, 44: Mar. 1970, p. 15.

¹¹⁷ The islands in the Aegean?

¹¹⁸ *Milli Hareket*, 18: Jan. 1968 (Gökçeoğlu's article).

¹¹⁹ "Yarıncı Turan devleti," *ibid.*, 20: Mar. 1968. Seyfettin also published a pamphlet bearing this title.

¹²⁰ In another issue Mirat Özçamlı complains that the Turks in Turkestan are treated by the Soviets as second-class citizens. Cf. *ibid.*, 28: Nov. 1968.

¹²¹ See, e.g., "Sovyet Rusyada Müslümanların durumu," *ibid.*, 42: Jan. 1970. "Türk edebiyatı ve tarihi üzerine Rus baskısı," *ibid.*, 45: Apr. 1970. "Sovyetler ülkesinde din meselesi," *ibid.*, 46: May 1970.

¹²² See, e.g., *Devlet*, 2: April 14, 1969, pp. 5-7; 5: May 5, 1969, p. 9; 6: May 12, 1969, p. 4; 10: June 9, 1969, p. 2; 12: June 23, 1969, pp. 5, 9; 14: July 7, 1969, p. 5; 15: July 14, 1969, pp. 5, 11; 23: Sep. 8, 1969, pp. 6-7; 24: Sep. 15, 1969, p. 2; 31: Nov. 3, 1969, pp. 6-7; 33: Nov. 17, 1969, pp. 2, 11; 40: Jan. 5, 1970, pp. 6-7;

propaganda¹²³ and the call for development and industrialization,¹²⁴ through the party's revolutionary approach to social affairs.¹²⁵ If anything, the main differences between *Devlet* and *Milli Hareket* are in tone and emphasis. *Devlet*, for instance, seems to lay greater stress on attacking both socialism (which it equates with communism) and capitalism (which it sees in the light of United States economic influence in Turkey¹²⁶ — while *Milli Hareket* emphasizes the anti-communist crusade. Perhaps *Devlet* intended to create the image of a party nearer the center of the political spectrum.

Then, too, a much more favorable attitude towards Islam emerges from *Devlet*, possibly because it started publication only several months before the 1969 elections to the National Assembly, and in the period when the party's policy had veered closer to Islam. Indeed, the very first issue of *Devlet* contained an article by Dr. Yaşar Kutluay, of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Ankara, recommending in no uncertain terms the bold expansion of Islamic education in Turkey.¹²⁷ The positive attitude of *Devlet* towards Islamic education was kept up steadily, and, as late as September 1971, Cezmi Kırımlioğlu was writing to protest the proposal, then being considered by the new Minister of Education, to close down certain courses of the Hatip schools, as an economy measure; Kırımlioğlu maintained that the people wanted these courses and that this should be the prevailing consideration.¹²⁸ Other articles support the impression that a rapprochement with Islam was the

43: Jan. 26, 1970, pp. 6-7, 9, 12; 46: Feb. 16, 1970, pp. 6-7, 11; 51: Mar. 23, 1970, pp. 9, 11; 57: May 4, 1970, pp. 6-7.

¹²³ E.g., *ibid.*, 2: Apr. 14, 1969, p. 3; 4: Apr. 28, 1969, p. 2; 7: May 19, 1969, p. 8; 8: May 25, 1969, p. 8; 11: June 16, 1969, p. 2; 12: June 23, 1969, p. 2; 13: June 30, 1969, p. 9; 19: Aug. 11, 1969, p. 3; 31: Nov. 3, 1969, pp. 6-7; 43: Jan. 26, 1970, p. 11; 47-48: Mar. 2, 1970, pp. 6-7; 54: Apr. 13, 1970, p. 4; 55: Apr. 20, 1970, pp. 5, 11; 58: May 11, 1970, pp. 6-7, 12; 63: June 15, 1970, p. 5 (connecting Kurds and communists).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2: Apr. 14, 1969, p. 12; 5: May 5, 1969, p. 12; 8: May 25, 1969, p. 7; 10: June 9, 1969, pp. 6-7; 11: June 16, 1969, pp. 6-7; 12: June 23, 1969, pp. 6-7; 13: June 30, 1969, pp. 6-7; 43: Jan. 26, 1970, pp. 6-7, 10-11; 67: July 13, 1970, pp. 6-7.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: Apr. 21, 1969, pp. 6 ff.; 10: June 9, 1969, pp. 6-7; 21: Aug. 25, 1969, pp. 10-11; 32: Nov. 10, 1969, pp. 6-7, 11; 35: Dec. 1, 1969, pp. 6-7, 10; 36: Dec. 8, 1969, pp. 6-7; 37: Dec. 15, 1969, pp. 6-7; 38: Dec. 22, 1969, pp. 6-7, 10-11; 41: Jan. 12, 1970, p. 11.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4: Apr. 28, 1969, p. 3; 5: May 5, 1969, p. 3; 7: May 19, 1969, p. 5; 14: July 7, 1969, pp. 4 ff.; 17: July 28, 1969, p. 3; 55: Apr. 20, 1970, p. 7.

¹²⁷ "Türkiye'de din eğitimi," *ibid.*, 1: Apr. 7, 1969, p. 8.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 127: Sep. 6, 1971, p. 4.

deliberate policy of *Devlet*¹²⁹ and of the party at the time. The general tenor is that Islam adds strength to Turkey (that is, without entering a discussion on the merits of Islam).

Yet another subtle difference was in the greater emphasis of *Devlet* of its support for the Turkish military. Indeed, it interpreted the March 12, 1971 Memorandum, as a warning to both communists¹³⁰ and anarchists¹³¹ and supported it unreservedly. *Devlet's* attitude towards the military was further expressed in an article by Recep Doksat,¹³² in which the writer took the view that while the Turkish officer was *milliyetçi* and *inkılâpçı* (in this context, "nationalist" and "reformist"), he was neither *devrimci* nor *ihtilâlcî* (in this context, both mean "revolutionary"). Indeed, *Devlet* expressed the hope that the army would break the hands of all traitors¹³³ — by which it most probably referred to all leftists and possibly to others. It may be assumed that this unconditional support of the military was one of the reasons *Devlet* was not closed down, as were some other extremist magazines, after the March 1971 military intervention.

Devlet published a series of five articles by Dr. Orhan Türkdoğan on the "Anatomy of the NAP" which presents an interesting self-image of the party.¹³⁴ A lecturer in sociology at Atatürk University in Erzurum, Türkdoğan's sympathies are with the party — he may well also be a member — but he writes in a scholarly detached style. Even so, the fact that the party weekly printed his articles tends to show that *Devlet* generally agreed with the image drawn by Türkdoğan.

Türkdoğan sees the NAP as Turkey's first organized nationalist party. It drew on the myths and legends of the early Turks, which some Turks tend to mix with real history. In the multiparty era since 1945 no other party has appealed to public opinion as forcefully as the NAP. Actually, Türkdoğan points out that the NAP is the youngest of Turkish political

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9: June 2, 1969, p. 3; 14: July 7, 1969, pp. 6–7; 15: July 14, 1969, pp. 4–5; 16: July 21, 1969, pp. 10–11; 17: July 28, 1969, p. 5 (Türkeş praying in Samsun); 21: Aug. 25, 1969, pp. 3, 9; 22: Sep. 1, 1969 (the fire at al-Aksa Mosque); 27: Oct. 6, 1969, pp. 4–9; 31: Nov. 3, 1969, pp. 6–7; 34: Nov. 24, 1969, pp. 2–3, 10–11; 64: June 22, 1970, p. 10.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 102: Mar. 15, 1971, pp. 1, 3.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 111: May 17, 1971, p. 1.

¹³² "Türk ordusu devrimci değildir!" *ibid.*, 103: Mar. 22, 1971.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 114: June 7, 1971 p. 1.

¹³⁴ "Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi'nin anatomisi," *Devlet*, 17: July 28, 1969; 18: Aug. 4, 1969; 19: Aug. 11, 1969; 20: Aug. 18, 1969; 21: Aug. 25, 1969.

parties and its establishment was the logical result of the conflict between left and right — a process which had not yet reached completion. The idealist youth leading the party are determined to carry out its historical mission. It is different from other Turkish parties, which were set up by an order from above, or formed from the remnants of other parties. The NAP is a party that has adopted the basic values of the nation and the ideals of society — like the Conservative Party in Great Britain. Indeed, the NAP is an ideological party in the western sense. It is as aware as are Turkey's leftist parties of the socio-economic gap within the country, and is the only political party to stand up to the left with a systematic nationalist (*milliyetçi*) ideology. It is, actually, the only organization opposing the now legal Labor Party of Turkey, with an ideology of its own that is both nationalist and social-minded (*toplumcu*) and, consequently, it embodies an economic doctrine. It is in the essence of its ideology — which is based on the traditions of Turkey's national culture, social structure, and state policies — that the NAP differs from both communist and fascist parties. Thus in Turkey the RPP has been used to single-party rule, fascist-style, while the LPT would like to see one class governing the whole of society — instead of democratic relations between society and parties. The NAP, on the other hand, would prefer a. to have a strong elitist cadre to realize the nationalist and social progress of Turkey. b. to serve as a powerful counter-weight to the communism which threatens Anatolia and to protect Turkish society — taking into account Turkey's geopolitical situation. As to the NAP's place amongst political parties, Türkdoğan maintains that, in the Turkish context, it would be erroneous to see it as rightist, because of its emphasis on sacred national values; its very real concepts of social justice bring it close to a leftist party, in the West-European sense.

Further, Türkdoğan analyzes the party-leader relations within the NAP, which he approaches in terms of power-elite. Such relations are conditioned, seemingly, by the state of society in a given country. Türkeş, the NAP's founder, himself came from a middle class family and entered politics after an army career. Türkdoğan sees him as an idealist, a devoted patriot, full of sympathy for national and social ideas, a decision-maker who expresses himself briefly and determinedly. After the May 27, 1960 Revolution, western political analysts referred to him as "the strong colonel." Among political parties, the NAP is characterized as strong-willed and disciplined, and, at the same time, patriotic. These terms also describe the personality of Türkeş himself. His nationalist stand was evident as early as 1944 and has continued. Despite pressure from all

sides in his four years as party leader,¹³⁵ Türkeş never renounced his principles. Nevertheless, this does not make him either a fascist or a Nazi, as he has been labeled by the leftist press. He and the NAP are both anti-communist and anti-fascist. They oppose both racism and the idea of dialectic class-struggle; and would like to institute a harmoniously compatible society in Turkey, on the Japanese model. This would enable the establishment of the prosperous state envisaged in the Nine Lights for everyone,¹³⁶ not just for a preferred class or group (as the other parties desire).

Türkdoğan then examines the Nine Lights at some length and adds another, "militancy" (*militanizm*), expressed in what he actually calls *komandoculuk*, or "commando activity." This is an activism tailored for youth, to replace the bright slogans attracting them to anarchism.¹³⁷ In a way, the NAP's militancy for youth is a direct continuation of the *Türk milliyetçiler derneği* ("Association of Turkish nationalists"), a movement of patriotic youths, which in the early 1950's opened numerous branches in Turkey, but was shut down by the Democrat Party. The "commandos" have already made their mark among university students.

Finally, Türkdoğan turns to the NAP symbols: the three crescents of the party's emblem and the term *Bozkurtlar* for its commandos. He points out that these are obvious symbols of Turkey's past, of the party's patriotic sentiments, and of its combination of nationalism and religion. As he sees it, the NAP, far from being a theocratic party, resembles Christian-Democrat or Christian-Socialist parties in the west, which respect the values of religion.

In our evaluation of the RPNP-NAP and its ideology, one does not have to accept Türkdoğan's assessment of the party as exhaustive. Obviously it can be regarded, at least in part, as an *exposition* of the image which he and some party leaders desire to disseminate among *Devlet's* readers — which in itself is instructive.

The organized right in Turkey, represented by the RPNP-NAP, resembles the organized left (the LPT), in their extremism and in some of their slogans, but not necessarily in the content of their respective ideologies. There is a definite similarity between right and left in Turkey in their hatreds — generally directed at the *laissez-faire* of the ruling party or, in the early 1960's, at the coalition of parties which promised moder-

¹³⁵ This refers to the years 1965–1969.

¹³⁶ Actually *tüm toplum*, or "the whole society."

¹³⁷ A problem that worried NAP constantly. See the characteristic "Marksist kafalar," *Milli Hareket*, 54: Jan. 1971, p. 15.

ate economic reform but achieved little. Consequently, the appeal of both right and left was material and aimed at change in the economic and political status quo. Current shortcomings assumed larger proportions and were criticized with growing impatience. Both right and left in Turkey are pessimistic as to the present, optimistic as to the future.

However, side by side with these similarities, there are basic differences in both content and tone.

As a political movement, the right in Turkey lacks the uniformity of the class basis that the left has and therefore its cohesion. The RPNP-NAP proclaims itself as being above classes in Turkey, indeed of opposing the class-war. It purports to be a centrist, rather than a rightist, party (and, in some respects, at least, reminds one of what Professor Lipset calls "the fascist center"¹³⁸). Accordingly, it claims to stand for more general ideas and ideals — nation, race, state grandeur. This claim entitles it (so the leaders of the RPNP-NAP say), more than other parties — surely more than the LPT — to become a mass party. The Turkish right's alternative to class-war is economic and technological competition with other peoples, a competition geared to Turkey's speedy development in a classless society. This general approach is the strength of the RPNP-NAP, for it carries a wider appeal than the left; it is also its weakness, for it has no immediately obvious potential supporters, as the LPT has. The propaganda of the left in Turkey, mainly aired in socio-economic protest, unintentionally served as fuel for the RPNP-NAP. The party felt (and said so) that the propaganda of the left was not only inspired by alien sources, and therefore abhorrent, but also promised its solutions at a remote future time. Consequently, the RPNP-NAP claimed to be the bearer of a more urgently immediate message.

Having distinguished itself from the left, the organized right in Turkey had the tougher job of dissociating itself from conservatism and the reactionism associated with it in many people's minds; in other words, they had to become "the New Right."¹³⁹ While conservatism in Turkish politics has shown an inclination to compromise — displayed in the 1960's in various degrees by the JP, RPP, RP, and UP — the RPNP-NAP's radicalism has been expressed first in its intransigent extremism, then in its message of modernism (whose keyword was to bring Turkey into the atomic and space age). Militant nationalism (*milliyetçilik*)

¹³⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 129 ff.

¹³⁹ As formulated so well, in another context, by Hans Rogger, in his "Afterthoughts" to H. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 575-576.

blends the future goal of power through modernization to a glorification of the Turkish nation and race, both within Turkey's frontiers and outside. The grandeur of the past of the Turkish nation is held up as a model for a brilliant future in an ideological mixture that comes close to an apocalyptic myth of a great, highly industrialized Turkey of more than a hundred million Turks (in addition to the "Outer Turks"), the equal of the Great Powers, and particularly of the Soviet Union.

As was the case of the right in some European states in the 1920's and 1930's, in Turkey, too, the right assumes a sense of destiny, to which only the RPNP-NAP can presumably lead the people, saving them from the danger of anarchy brought about by the left.¹⁴⁰ Sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly, the RPNP-NAP maintains that it knows best what Turkey really needs. Although careful not to attack parliamentary government head-on, the party's ideology did imply that democratic rule in Turkey had brought it little good. It wanted total power, allegedly for the sake of Turkey. It did not inveigh against the state it wanted to preserve, but against the established political, economic and social order. It attacked leftism and the anarchy it foreshadowed, and spoke out for Law and Order. The uniforms, marches and flags of the *Bozkurtlar* were symbols of this Law and Order, as well as a reminder that the RPNP-NAP was not above using violence (despite official denials by the party of any such intent).

Lastly, in Turkey as elsewhere, the personalities of the leaders in the rightist parties are generally more decisive than in other political movements. The lack of a sophisticated doctrine, and the absence of a well-defined class on which to base its support, have increased the relative importance of a capable, charismatic leader in a rightist political organization. His personal role is frequently crucial to the party's fortunes, his hold on both organizational activities and ideological pronouncements much stronger than on other political parties in Turkey. This is particularly so in the case of Alparslan Türkeş who, a Colonel by training and experience, seems more conditioned than other politicians to an authoritarian approach. His patriotic past (the Pan-Turk nationalist incident of 1944) is extolled; his service to the Fatherland at a historic hour (active participation in the 1960 Revolution) is duly praised. He is presented by his party as both old enough to inspire confidence in the middle-aged,

¹⁴⁰ It is interesting to remember that, while RPNP-NAP attacked the left vehemently, the LPT devoted only a minor part of its propaganda to attacks on the RPNP-NAP, as its quarrel (and competition) was chiefly with the JP and RPP.

and young enough to appeal to Turkish youth. Although roughly the same age as the LPT leaders, Ecevit of the RPP, and Demirel of the JP — he is actually slightly older than some of them — his party has laid considerable emphasis on its appeal to youth. Again, this not only repeats the customary practice of the European right, but is no less a mirror reflection of the LPT's approach. Indeed, most radical organized groups have been doing the same, in Turkey and elsewhere — much more so than the so-called moderate parties.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

TURKISH ELECTIONS: LEFT VERSUS RIGHT

a. THE PARTIES AND THE ELECTIONS

From 1946, the time of the first multiparty elections in Turkey, the holding of political elections was never in doubt. After a brief interlude in 1960, electoral competition resumed. Elections were frequent: in the Second Turkish Republic hardly a year passed without elections being held for the National Assembly, the Senate, or the local administration. More and more social groups grew bolder in their political consciousness and participation, and the rising number of political parties participating and the ever sharpening cleavage of opinion added their divisive effect. In part both the increased participation and divisiveness were due to the sustained activity of the Labor Party of Turkey and the Republican Peasant National Party.

One way to evaluate the political activity of the organized left and right in contemporary Turkey is to trace the electoral efforts¹ (and their results) of both the LPT and RPNP. True, both were small political parties, with no reasonable chance at that time of winning a majority in any democratically-run elections. Nevertheless, both parties were quick to grasp the significance of free electoral propaganda and the importance of getting a small number of spokesmen into the two houses of parliament.

The period we shall discuss is a limited one, starting after the 1961 general elections² — the first of the Second Turkish Republic. The LPT had just been established and hardly had enough time to organize party branches in fifteen provinces — the minimum required by law in order to qualify for an electoral contest. Indeed, its founders apparently thought that the party was not ready to run in national elections against the con-

¹ We shall refer in this chapter mainly to national elections, and local ones only to a lesser degree. For the election laws in force in the 1960's two handy compendia are available: one edited by M. A. Yalçın, *Temel kanunlar ve seçim mevzuatı* (Istanbul: 1968); the other by A. Ş. Efem and N. Köknar, *Bütün değişiklikleriyle seçim kanunları* (Istanbul: 1968).

² On which see Cemal Aygen, "Memleketimizdeki seçimler ve neticeleri," *Sbfd*, XVII (1): Mar. 1962, pp. 203-287.

servative, well-established parties.³ The LPT ran for the first time in 1963. The RPNP, on the other hand, assumed the character of a radical rightist party in 1965, and its role in the elections of that year will be considered.

The electoral activity of both these parties indicates that they must have hoped for considerable success at the polls. Their leaders had not necessarily read Lipset's estimate⁴ that the electoral response to political parties aiming at social change depends, *inter alia*, on effective channels of communication and on the absence of ties to a traditional party. However, they did sense the existence of many non-committed voters and the possibility of influencing them through mass-communication — particularly the radio. By law the state-owned radio had to offer free time to all registered parties (and every party made full use of this opportunity). This made it easier for small parties to compete with the larger and wealthier ones with their extensive electoral propaganda. In estimating the full importance of this medium, one should bear in mind that the number of licensed radio sets (not to mention the numerous unlicensed ones) grew from less than a quarter of a million in 1948 and just under a million in 1955,⁵ to 1,816,437 in 1963.⁶ This is particularly significant, if one notes that 401,972 of these — or between a fifth and a quarter of the total — were located in the villages. In this manner, radio election propaganda could attempt to reach the illiterate — particularly as a large number of licensed radio sets were located in coffee-houses and similar public places (47,325 in 1963). For comparison's sake, the following are the figures for licensed radio sets in subsequent years (it will be observed that the ratio of those in villages to the total increased from one quarter in 1964 to one third by 1970 — considerably more than the relative population increase):

³ On the parties competing in the 1961 elections, see Nadir Nadi, "Evolution de politique intérieure," *Synthèses* (Bruxelles), 205–206: June-July 1963, p. 226.

⁴ *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 261. Lipset refers there to left voting, but in our context this appears equally relevant to both the LPT and RPNP-NAP.

⁵ Acc. to Cohn, *op. cit.*, p. 173. More detailed data pertaining to the years 1938 to 1958 may be found in F. W. Frey, "Political development, power, and communications in Turkey," in L. W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and political development*, esp. pp. 320–321.

⁶ This and the figures which follow closely are based on the State Institute of Statistics — Turkey, *Statistical yearbook of Turkey 1968* (Turkish and English) (Ankara: 1969), p. 281; and on its Supplement (*Ek yayın*) (Ankara: 1970), p. 78. See also its *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 1971, V-VII* (Ankara: 1971), p. 44, table 25.

TABLE 10. LICENSED RADIO SETS IN TURKEY, BY YEAR

Year	Total	In the villages
1964	2,079,322	514,095
1965	2,195,501	583,915
1966	2,383,990	701,890
1967	2,720,959	830,859
1968	2,885,120	921,377
1969	3,072,135	996,000
1970	3,136,498	1,048,000

The first opportunity for the LPT to use the state radio for its propaganda presented itself (even before the party's first national congress) in the November 17, 1963 provincial and municipal elections. A case in point — and an instructive one — is Aybar's election speech over Ankara radio on November 5, less than two weeks before election day.⁷ He addressed himself to workers, peasants, small shopkeepers, daily workers, pensioners, widows, people on a low-income, social-minded intellectuals, and all those in favor of the people and of labor. As Aybar phrased it, all political parties had solicited their vote since 1946, but the situation remained much the same, seventeen years later: no homes, no work, no running-water, no roads, no electricity, no doctors and no medical care. They were illiterate, and so were their children. In many parts of the country, there were no cinemas, theaters or concerts. Aybar then reminded his listeners that the national income was very unevenly and unjustly divided, and appealed to them to remember all these facts at the polls — and particularly that the LPT was the only party that cared, and that would bring about the sorely-needed reforms.⁸

It became evident, when the votes were counted, that the LPT was not yet sufficiently organized and that its appeal was still limited. The party had put forward candidates in nine provinces only, and in only seven of these did it get any tangible results, and modest ones, at that — as follows:⁹

⁷ Reported in full in the LPT's pamphlet, *Türkiye işçi partisi genel başkanı Mehmet Ali Aybar'ın seçim bildirisi* (Ankara: 1963).

⁸ The other LPT radio speakers on the eve of the 1963 elections, such as the party's Secretary-General Kemal Sülker, followed Aybar's line. See the collection of these talks reprinted as the 95-page *Türkiye işçi partisi radyo konuşmaları: yurt sorunları ve çözüm yolu* (Ankara: 1964).

⁹ Acc. to Sayılğan, *Solun 94 yılı*, pp. 381–382. Slightly different figures in the official returns cited by Karpat, *op. cit.*, in *MEJ*, XXI (2): 1967, p. 161, and in Abadan,

Valid votes for the LPT, 1963 local elections
(in 7 provinces)

Istanbul	14,675
Izmir	7,131
Ankara	5,919
Diyarbakır	2,389
Kayseri	2,282
Adana	1,776
Gaziantep	1,334
<hr/>	
Total	35,506

From the LPT's point of view, the election returns were disheartening. The party succeeded in obtaining merely one municipal councillor, in Diyarbakır.¹⁰ On a countrywide basis, the LPT obtained just over a third of one per cent of the total valid vote (more precisely, 0.36%), but it received an average of nearly 3% of the vote in the provinces it contested. About two-fifths of its valid vote came from Istanbul, the party's center and main field of operation. While in absolute numbers the Istanbul LPT results were not so bad, relatively they were even a poorer show for the party than countrywide. Interestingly, the votes for the LPT generally came from well-to-do districts; observers at the time thought that they were cast by intellectuals, including students. While the latter point obviously cannot be substantiated, the party's decision-makers seem to have drawn the lesson that their propaganda was too sophisticated. An example is a theoretically phrased 32-page booklet, prepared just before the 1963 elections by the party's research bureau.¹¹

In subsequent elections, they not only intensified their propaganda, but brought it down-to-earth. Instances of this change of tactics may be observed before the 1965 general elections, the first in which the LPT participated on a country-wide basis. It was better prepared after the party's 1964 national congress. Its propaganda was not hampered by local, narrower interests, as in 1963 — when it had to battle against

Anayasa hukuku ve siyasi bilimler açısından 1965 seçimlerinin tahlili (Ankara: 1966), p. 229.

¹⁰ *1964 Türkiye yılığı* (Istanbul: n.d. [1964]), pp. 136-137. See also P. J. Magnarella, *Regional voting in Turkey, The Muslim World*, LVII (3): July 1967, pp. 224-234, and LVII (4): Oct. 1967, pp. 277-287.

¹¹ *Türkiye işçi partisi—Ankara araştırma ve yayın bürosu, Amacımız — yolumuz — yöntemimiz* (Ankara: 1963).

firmly-established vested interests. In 1965 not only was the LPT's electioneering inherently better suited to a national, rather than a local, campaign, but it could capitalize on the inability of recent coalition cabinets to agree on joint action, and accordingly blame the government parties for the neglect of socio-economic reform.

b. THE 1965 ELECTIONS

There is quite a body of literature on the 1965 elections in Turkey,¹² although the part played by both the LPT and RPNP (to be dealt with subsequently) is often passed over, because of the relatively small share of the vote either of them obtained. However, the strenuous campaign of both parties and their not unimpressive achievement — relative to the results obtained by other, better-established parties — certainly merit a longer discussion. We shall first look at the LPT, then at the RPNP.

The LPT's election campaign in 1965 appears particularly relevant in the light of the party's growing involvement in leftist politics. While it may be argued that the increasing popularity of leftist journals, like *Yön*,¹³ was confined in the early 1960's to a comparatively limited circle of social-minded intellectuals, the concern of government circles and parts of the Establishment over leftist activity is an indication that it was taken seriously. To give one example, in March 1964, Bertold Brecht's play *The good woman of Setzuan* was suspended by the martial law authorities, after demonstrators claimed that it was pro-communist. The demonstrators broke up the performance, tore up posters and threatened the actors and the theater staff with violence (shouting "To Moscow, to Moscow" and "Off with the actors' heads"). Counter demonstrations were staged in favor of the play by university students, who posted

¹² The most detailed analysis is a book by Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ve siyasi bilimler açısından 1965 seçimlerinin tahlili*. See also J. S. Szyliowicz, "The Turkish elections: 1965," in *MEJ*, XX (4): Autumn 1966, pp. 473-494. M. Steed and N. Abadan, "Four elections of 1965," *Government and Opposition*, I (3): April 1966, pp. 297-344 (Turkey: pp. 335-344). P. J. Magnarella, *op. cit.* in *The Muslim World*. J. M. Landau, "Turkey from election to election," *The World Today*, XXVI (4): Apr. 1970, pp. 156-166. Bahri Savcı, "1965 milletvekilleri seçimi üzerinde bir analiz," *SBFD*, XX (4): Dec. 1965, pp. 177-218. Nermin Abadan and Ahmet Yücekök, "1961-1965 seçimlerinde büyük şehirlerde gelir durumuna göre oy verme davranışları," *ibid.*, XXI (4): Dec. 1966, pp. 103-117.

¹³ See above, ch. 2.

slogans on the walls ("Democracy means freedom of thought" and "This is not fascist Spain").¹⁴

In this tense atmosphere, the LPT and several other political parties campaigned in 1965 with high expectations of winning a number of seats in the 450-member National Assembly — for which elections were being held. Their hopes were largely pinned on the changes introduced into the electoral system in Turkey. Under the First Republic, national election results were computed by electoral districts, according to a plurality system that simply spelled "Winner take all" (and, by implication, all other votes were lost). This system clearly favored the large parties. A proportional representation system to the National Assembly based on "remainders," introduced in 1961, was further elaborated before the 1965 elections to this body. Briefly this worked as follows. In every electoral district, seats in the National Assembly were first allocated to the candidates whose parties obtained the necessary number of votes. Secondly, all votes not used for this purpose ("remainders") were then added up on a countrywide basis. Thirdly, all these remainders were then credited to the parties and divided by the number of still-vacant seats.¹⁵ Obviously, this computation favored the small parties.

The LPT was the only party which had not participated in the 1961 elections and was running, in 1965, for the National Assembly for the first time. It was hailed in some places as the champion of a reform in land-holding; these instances however were rare and were a reaction to over-exploitation by the landowners. The party was furthest to the left of all those competing (the Turkish Communist Party was barred by law from running). This laid it open to facile charges of communism which often led to rioting, and several times to LPT candidates being beaten up and troops having to protect them during election rallies. This happened, for example, in Akhisar on March 5, 1965, when the local LPT officials were pelted with oranges and stones at an open-air rally, then physically attacked. Again in Bursa on July 4, 1965, LPT members were attacked by adherents of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey.¹⁶ Worse from the LPT's point of view, it was led into bitter

¹⁴ *The Times* (London), March 26, 1964. The play was later allowed to resume its run.

¹⁵ Erdoğan Teziç, "L'évolution du système électoral turc sous la seconde république," *AFDI*, XVIII (29-32): 1968, pp. 170-187.

¹⁶ *The Times*, London, and *Le Monde*, both of July 6, 1965. About this organization, cf. Sayılğan, pp. 393-394, and ch. 5 of our study.

competition with the still powerful Republican People's Party, which was running for first place against the Justice Party, popularly considered the heir of the defunct (and banned) Democrat Party. However, the LPT and RPP basically sought the vote of very much the same people. While hoping that LPT propaganda might deprive their arch-rival, the JP, of some votes in the agricultural areas of Eastern Turkey, the RPP election strategists were apprehensive that in cities and towns, the LPT might attract votes from workers and intellectuals who had supported the RPP. Bülent Ecevit, leader of the left wing of the RPP, succeeded in convincing the RPP strategists to promote a "left-of-center" image for the party in the 1965 elections. He explained the new attitude clearly and concisely in his 125-page book *Ortanın Solu* ("Left of center"), which ran into several editions. Later (from 1966 to 1971), Ecevit was Secretary-General of the RPP and ensured that supporters of the "left-of-center" policy held all key-posts, except that of party Chairman, which was still held by İnönü. It should be noted, then, that the RPP's new attitude had drawn closer to that of the LPT and therefore to a greater extent they sought to attract the same voters.

The other parties contesting the 1965 elections, in addition to the RPP, JP and LPT, were the Nation Party (NP) (*Millet Partisi*), the New Turkey Party (NTP) (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*), and the Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP). All three were right-of-center parties, and as such, rivals of the LPT, but hardly competing for the same vote. In the years following the 1961 elections the RPP first ruled in a coalition with the JP, then with the other three right-of-center parties, without the JP. The LPT's election tactics were to sell itself to voters as the agent of change in internal affairs, and anti-American in foreign policy. In the latter field it worked hard to stir anti-U.S. feelings, first with slogans ("Americans, go home!"), then with deeds, and tried to exploit the sentiments it had aroused for its own propaganda — while smearing its opponents as "servants of the United States."

The LPT used its allotted time on the radio, organized meetings, and published and distributed numerous pamphlets. For its radio talks, the party mobilized its very best: Rıza Kuas, a trade unionist and a founder of the party; chairman Aybar; ex-Professors Sadun Aren and Behice Boran; influential journalist Çetin Altan; popular novelist Yaşar Kemal; renowned poet Can Yücel; and several others. The talks,¹⁷ all given in

¹⁷ Reprinted in a booklet, *Yaşasın emekçiler, yaşasın Türkiye* (Ankara: n. d. [1965-1966]).

September and October 1965, were personal in style, but designed for the widest possible appeal.

In addition to these talks, the LPT used written material, which was of limited value in a country which had then an illiteracy rate of about 45%. The daily press at that time printed only one-and-a-half million copies per day, of which some 80% were sold in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.¹⁸ Consequently, the LPT, which had no official daily of its own (even though several supported it), was in some need of publishing and distributing pamphlets and manifestoes, hoping they would reach the literate, at least. It is impossible to obtain reliable data about the quantity in which the above materials were printed and distributed.

One booklet of 16 pages *Gelin canlar bir olalım* ("Come, friends, let us unite!")¹⁹ includes poems and bits of folklore, old and new, to win support for the LPT. The message was driven home that the LPT "is the party of the worker, peasant, small shopkeeper, driver²⁰ and artisan. Let us look for these in the lists of candidates."

TABLE 11. WORKING PEOPLE AS CANDIDATES IN 1965 ELECTION, BY LISTS²¹

<i>Working people among the candidates</i>	<i>LPT</i>	<i>JP</i>	<i>RPP</i>
Workers, trade-unionists, technicians	137	5	5
Peasants	21	0	0
Drivers, small shopkeepers, artisans	54	0	7
Total	212	5	12

The pamphlet then added that, furthermore, most of these candidates were at the top of the LPT's lists and consequently had good chances of being elected.²²

¹⁸ Cf. N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku* ..., p. 260 and footnote 15.

¹⁹ Published by the party (Istanbul: n.d. [1965]).

²⁰ In Istanbul drivers are a well-organized group.

²¹ *Gelin canlar bir olalım*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

²² Apparently more complete, later data were cited by Sertel, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148. She mentioned 216 workers and provisional laborers out of the LPT's total of 382 candidates for the 1965 elections. See also below, the discussion of the election results.

Emphasizing the social background of its candidates was only one aspect of the many-faceted election propaganda of the LPT in 1965. The LPT had to present a convincing program of its own and, at the same time, refute the accusations of other parties and attack them in turn. The election platform contained the following points.²³

1. Nationalization of all heavy industry, including the iron and steel works in Ereğli.
2. Institution of a 5-day, 40-hour week, with wages linked to the cost-of-living.
3. Legal prohibition of lockouts.
4. The slowing-down of migration from village to town.
5. Handing over of the lands they work to those peasants who are landless or do not own sufficient land.
6. Ownership and exploitation of all minerals, particularly petroleum, by the nation.
7. Nationalization of foreign trade and banking — to stop the flight of hard currency abroad.
8. Dissociation from the Common Market and abolition of the Law for Encouraging Foreign Investments.
9. Opening of Village Institutes for the instruction of the peasants.

Obviously, not all of these aims could be crowded into every single manifesto or pamphlet. After all, the party had started its election campaign in January 1965, with a speech by Aybar — later printed — in which he assured the Turks that “the good, happy days are not far off.” Characteristic of the LPT’s 1965 electioneering is a one-page appeal to workers and others.²⁴ It was addressed to Turkish workers, tobacco growers, builders, peasants, artisans, small tradesmen, intellectual youths, progressive intellectuals, and low-salaried clerks. The appeal took up what it considered the grievances of each of these groups in turn, “Tobacco growers,²⁵ burdened with numerous children, you work an 18-hour day, spend days at the doors of the bank [for a loan], then tobacco-merchants rob you and become rich — without anything remaining in your hands. Construction workers, you wear yourselves out, building apartments, without getting anything for yourselves. Peasants, don’t you have the right to own the lands you’ve been working on for years, to live like human beings, to have your children know how to

²³ Summarized by N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku* ..., pp. 241–242.

²⁴ Türkiye işçi partisi, *Emekçi kardeşler* (N. p.: n.d. [1965]).

²⁵ The LPT also devoted a special one-page appeal to tobacco growers: Türkiye işçi partisi, *Tütünde taban istiyor* (N. p. [Izmir]: n.d. [1965]).

read? Artisans — blacksmiths and shoemakers — what do you get for your work? Don't you want to live like men? Tradesmen, peddling your wares in the markets, can you support a family, educate your children and furnish them with clothes? Intellectual youths, why do you delay in taking your place in the democratic struggle against those who retard the second war for independence — the war to save the Turkish nation from its misery? Let all those who desire equal education, land and medical care, constant employment and a suitable price for their agricultural produce, vote for the LPT."

Another characteristic appeal, published in the Bilecik district (in northwestern Turkey, east of Bursa),²⁶ was couched in more general terms and meant both to recruit support for the LPT and refute accusations against it. Addressed to all Turkish workers, peasants, small tradesmen and young intellectuals, the appeal began by stating that Turkey was a country where only the wealthy half a million could afford to live. They lived off the work of another twenty-nine-and-a-half millions who could barely subsist — an injustice scarcely known elsewhere on earth. The appeal then called on the workers and peasants to wake up and remember that the Turkish constitution considers all those living in Turkey equal. It reminded them that they would not attain their rights and their work's worth by entreaties — but only by seating in the National Assembly LPT candidates, who would watch over the workers' interests. The appeal then called on the voters not to believe accusations, such as that LPT members were communists, atheists, or enemies of family life;²⁷ such false rumors were spread by the wealthy who wanted to continue their parasitical and selfish existence, building one apartment on top of another and spending on cars. The LPT, in the National Assembly, would fight unemployment, try to provide equal education opportunities for all, to let the peasant keep the whole income of his yield, to have everyone own a home and earn enough for his family's needs, and to guarantee a pension to everybody over the age of sixty.

Realizing such sweeping electoral promises meant radical reforms. This was also implied in the LPT's motto *Köylüye toprak, herkese iş* ("Land for the peasant, employment for everyone!").²⁸ This spelled nationalization, and in the 1965 electoral campaign the LPT candidates

²⁶ Türkiye işçi partisi — Bilecik il başkanlığı, *İşçi, köylü, küçük esnaf, genç aydın vatandaş!* (N. p. [Ankara]: 1965).

²⁷ In Turkish: *Komünist, dinsiz ve aile düşmanı.*

²⁸ Other slogans raised on banners in the LPT's Istanbul open-air meetings included: "For free education" or "No force can stop the awakening people."

explained that their party favored extensive nationalization (for instance, of petroleum), along with sweeping reform in land-holding and a 40-hour week. The LPT's opponents were quick to equate these demands with revolutionary communism; and the LPT's avowed anti-Americanism appeared to lend some credence to the accusations that the party was a stooge of the Soviet Union. The charge was repeated by JP candidates and others, who openly asserted at election meetings that certain LPT candidates were registered members of the communist party, and that the LPT's methods were communist. Such claims reappeared in declarations of various other bodies, such as chambers of commerce or the stock exchange. They were also repeated in writing. For example, a 48-page booklet, by a Police Inspector,²⁹ accused LPT members of being communists in a socialist disguise, and compared the speeches of Aybar, Kuas, and other LPT leaders (about the rich landowners being the enemies of the workers) to what Karl Marx had written in his *Communist Manifesto* and to communist propaganda in developing countries in general; the booklet then went on to list the most dangerous of the LPT candidates, implying that some at least were certainly communists. The same accusations appeared in several handbills and many newspapers — for instance in a special 18-page supplement to the *Toprak Dergisi* of September 25, 1965, "Who leads the LPT and who supports it — here are the documents."³⁰

Accusations of communism were rejected outright by the LPT. Acting on the principle that attack is the best defense, pamphlets written by LPT members (or sympathizers) and by the party itself responded vigorously. For example, a pamphlet written by the former Associated Press correspondent in Turkey, İffet Aslan,³¹ argued that there ought to be socialist Members in the National Assembly. It praised the LPT candidates and attacked others, particularly those of the RPNP. The pamphlet branded the RPNP under its new leadership as "the new RPNP" or "RPNP number 2." A more extensive LPT pamphlet³² attacked even more forcefully the party's opponents, chiefly Demirel and his supporters. The pamphlet addressed itself to the whole nation, before which it charged the JP leaders with failure in foreign affairs and exploitation in domestic policy. As for Demirel himself, he was accused of being the ally and servant of American interests and of having caused Turkey consider-

²⁹ Kenan Öztürkmen, *Türkiye işçi partisinin iç yüzü* (Istanbul: 1965).

³⁰ *TİP'i kimler idare ediyor kimler destekliyor. İşte vesikaları.*

³¹ İffet Aslan, *İktidar adayları* (Ankara: 1965).

³² Türkiye işçi partisi, *Bunlar halk düşmanlarıdır* (N. p.: n.d. [1965]).

able financial loss, for his own, as well as American, gain. The same applied — so the pamphlet alleged — to Demirel's close associate in the JP, Mehmet Turgut. These were the people, according to the LPT pamphlet, who falsely accused the LPT of communism and tried to alienate the people from the LPT, with rumors of the party's immorality and irreligion, or its subservience to Russia. While the pamphlet scorned such accusations ("they are groundless"), it took pains to reply to them, by maintaining that there was no known, convicted communist amongst the LPT's candidates; on the contrary, their detractors were the agents of foreign exploitation. Presumably, this referred to the JP. The pamphlet saw the RPNP and the other parties as accomplices of the JP, and attempted to discredit the other parties as being part of a regime of exploitation — opponents of the distribution of land to the peasants, of the nationalization of foreign commerce, banking and insurance, and of increasing taxes levied on the wealthy. That is to say, foes of workers, of the people and of democracy.

The RPNP approached the 1965 elections to the National Assembly with certain handicaps, of which nobody was more conscious than Türkeş and his close collaborators. The party had been weakened, first, by the breakaway of Bölükbaşı and his followers in 1962 and their formation of the Nation Party; the RPNP stood to lose support in several of its local branches. The departure from the RPNP of Ahmet Oğuz, then of Tahtakılıç and part of the party's old guard — after Türkeş's takeover — was a further blow; several joined the JP and could expect the votes of their followers and friends. Türkeş and his collaborators were also hampered in the electoral contest by their being held responsible for outlawing the Democrat Party and bringing its leaders to trial. They could count on their voting appeal and his personal prestige to offset these expected losses; but this meant considerable effort and much hard work. Türkeş himself toured the country tirelessly, covering nearly 6,000 kms.³³, visiting Konya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Bursa and Istanbul twice, and chartering a plane for part of his tour.

Both his speeches during this campaign and the written propaganda were unusually outspoken, even if somewhat repetitive, as all campaign speeches tend to be. In most of his actions one detects a steady effort to improve his own image and that of his party. Since some of his themes were echoed by the LPT — and, for that matter, by the underground TCP — Türkeş came out strongly against the Turkish left, all of which he

³³ Acc. to N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku* ..., p. 216.

labeled as communist. By implication, the RPNP was Turkey's best bulwark against communism.

The strongly-nationalist, anti-communist image was driven home in the 1965 campaign, as were other elements from the 66-page program approved by the 1965 congress of the RPNP, "The RPNP program for a prosperous and strong Turkey."³⁴ Here we will treat only the points repeated in the 1965 campaign,³⁵ which were expressed in the party's 34-page booklet condensed from the program in a form suited to a wider public, "Our basic principles, our main demands, and our working plans,"³⁶ and in a 29-page booklet, "A bulletin for the 1965 elections."³⁷ According to these the party aimed at establishing a new order, based on the "Nine Lights." Although the first booklet mentioned the term "social" frequently, it rejected the concept of class-struggle and sought other ways to secure equal opportunities for every citizen. Ambitious goals were drawn up: to strive for a prosperous Turkey of the future with a population of one hundred millions; unite small villages into larger entities; provide modern services for rural Turkey; guide Turkey's agricultural society in the path of an industrial order; guarantee by the state of work for everybody;³⁸ assure nationalized free health services for everyone, unemployment insurance for all workers, and pension rights for all women over 55 and all men over 65. In concrete terms, "every family ought to be able to afford daily half a kilo of meat, and every Turk one glass of milk."

State-planning was considered the best method for achieving these and many other aims. The necessary finance would be available, provided that everyone paid taxes according to his means; much would be provided by the proper exploitation of Turkey's natural resources by the state. In other words, the RPNP's election platform rejected the so-called "gradual balanced development" of Turkey, and pleaded for "a great leap forward," based on Turkey's natural resources and human potential. For this purpose foreign capital, too, was acceptable to help speed industrialization. The party was for a more assertive foreign policy, neutrality (favoring the United States, however), and closer relations

³⁴ *Müreffeh ve kuvvetli Türkiye için C.K.M.P. programı* (Ankara: 1965).

³⁵ See also N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ...*, pp. 217-225.

³⁶ CKMP, *Temel ilkelerimiz, ana dâvalarımız, icraat plânımız* (Ankara: 1965). Possibly the work of the party's leading ideologist, Muzaffer Özdamak (one of "the fourteen").

³⁷ C.K.M.P., *1965 seçim bildirisi* (Ankara: 1965).

³⁸ A reply to the *herkese iş* slogan of the LPT?

with Asian and African states — particularly with Turkey's neighbors and Islamic states.

While these booklets were fairly representative of the party's views, its election propaganda generally emphasized what it considered the RPNP's activism — usually described as “dynamic centrism,” by which it meant assuming a central, but intrinsically active, position. Indeed, the party frequently attacked the left as agents of communism (a favorite topic) and the right, as past-oriented. It maintained that the RPP had been a forward-looking party only under Atatürk's leadership and that later it became fossilized and fascist-minded. Further, the RPNP stressed some, but generally not all, of the party's goals, sometimes suiting the choice of subject-matter and emphasis to its audience. For example, in Antalya in late September 1965, Türkeş attacked the LPT's aim of distributing all land-holding above 500 dönüms, and claimed that such a step would make communists of all Turks; the RPNP was against land redistribution.³⁹ The party held that the solution should be different: raising the level of agriculture, encouraging Turkey's industrialization, and transferring landless peasants to industry or other sectors of the economy.⁴⁰

On some occasions, Türkeş or someone else was the sole speaker; on others, quite a few speakers took part.⁴¹ However, the speeches of Türkeş and his collaborators did not stir much public interest outside Istanbul and Ankara, except in Afyon, Eskişehir, and a few other places⁴² — despite youth marches, festive music and the like. Perhaps aware of this the RPNP worked as hard as its rival parties in publishing and distributing handbills and pamphlets — mostly written for the election campaign.

In the relatively unsophisticated economy of Turkey's rural provinces, artisans and merchants, socially two very conservative groups, have long been interconnected, since many artisans doubled as traders selling the wares they produced. In a handbill addressed to them,⁴³ the RPNP maintained that it was well aware of their concern at the political, economic and financial instability in Turkey and at increasing taxation. The

³⁹ Reported in *Cumhuriyet*, Oct. 1, 1965, and quoted by N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ...*, p. 221.

⁴⁰ *Yeni İstanbul*, Oct. 7, 1965, quoted *ibid.*, p. 222.

⁴¹ For instance in an open-air meeting in Ankara, near the Faculty of Agriculture, on Oct. 9, 1965, eight party speakers plus the local candidates of Ankara were slated to address the meeting. See the invitation: C.K.M.P., *Saygıdeğer yurttaş! Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi'nin son büyük mitingine katıl!* (N. p.: n.d. [1965]).

⁴² N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ...*, p. 224.

⁴³ C.K.M.P., *Saygıdeğer tüccar ve esnaf vatandaşı* (N. p.: n.d. [1965]).

party, which struggled for a happy, strong and prosperous Turkey, would find a remedy for the anxiety of the merchants and artisans. Particularly so, since the RPNP opposed communism. The aim of the party, in the field of commerce, was to assist and serve them. A basic principle of the party was to protect the spirit, creative thought and power of private enterprise, and to increase private initiative by assisting it with government capital and information. Artisans and tradesmen had an important place in the party's plans for the modern industrialization of Turkey. In the urban industrializing areas, special place and credit were to be allocated to small tradesmen and artisans. Commercial relations would be increased with other countries in the Middle East. Exports would increase and their real worth be assured. National development plans would guarantee the realization of complete social justice. The taxation system would be rectified, so that needy people and those with a low income would be tax-exempt. The appeal ended by calling on merchants and artisans to "Trust us!"

Another handbill, directed at peasants,⁴⁴ began by affirming that the peasants made up the strength of the nation, and were the founders and the protectors of the state, the basic element of Turkey's people. Nevertheless, the handbill pointed out, peasants lived in dire need; their villages still lacked roads, water, electricity, medical care and education for the children. Their work and sweat were bought very cheaply, while the commodities they wanted were sold to them at high prices. They had no part in the administration, and their situation remained unchanged. The RPNP offered its services to the peasants and promised to provide comfort and dignity; good pay for their labor; farming equipment and cheaper fertilizers; easy-term and sufficient credit; roads, water, electricity and a school for every village — comparable to those in the town; adequate and free health care; continuing education at state expense, so that the children of peasants could be physicians, engineers, lawyers, or officers; government assistance for improving the land and its yield, along with insurance against drought, fire and similar calamities; accident and old-age insurance; help in finding lodging and jobs for those peasants who had moved to town. The pamphlet promised to speak up for the peasants in the National Assembly, since it considered itself *their* party.

A different appeal was contained in a handbill prepared by a lawyer named M. E. Türkmen, an RPNP candidate in Kırklareli (in Thrace).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ C.K.M.P., *Sevgili köylü yurttaşlarımız için* (Ankara: 1965).

⁴⁵ C.K.M.P. *Kırklareli milletvekili adayı avukat Mehmet Edip Türkmen* (Ankara: n.d. [1965]).

His electioneering was typical in that he took local conditions into account. Türkmen started by telling the story of his life, education, and public service (military career and civilian legal posts). Not unexpectedly, he laid special emphasis on his legal work and political activity since 1947 in Thrace — chiefly in nearby Edirne (Adrianople). He maintained that he knew the area, including all its villages, as well as any Thracian (he himself had been born elsewhere). He praised the glorious centuries-old Turkish historical tradition of the area — a persuasive argument anywhere in Turkey, and particularly in a province bordering Greece. Then Türkmen moved to social and economic matters: he asked his readers in Kırklareli why they were not living like human beings, their children were illiterate, they themselves were unemployed or had a low income, or — when employed — they worked under difficult conditions; also, why job-seekers had to look for jobs in the lands of the infidels.⁴⁶ The state should help, by exploiting the manifold riches in Turkey's soil. By proper work, the situation could be improved, as the examples of Germany and Israel proved. The RPNP could guide the people to this end and be of true service to the Thracians, protect their rights, bring them prosperity, and find suitable ways to develop the country. The party would watch over justice, public security, freedom of thought, speech and writing. All these were part of a widely-embracing plan, published in the RPNP's program. After sounding a note against the other candidates, whom he accused of simply wanting to buy votes, Türkmen asked the readers to allow him to enter into their service.

Professor Nermin Abadan, of Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science, who has had considerable experience in the contents analysis of the Turkish press,⁴⁷ has more recently turned her attention to the contents analysis of the radio campaign speeches, as delivered by the party spokesmen just before the 1965 elections to the National Assembly. From her data, some items that are relevant to the Labor Party of Turkey and the Republican Peasant National Party have been extracted.⁴⁸

This relates only to domestic policies, for the differences in outlook on foreign policy are so evident that it seems unprofitable to compare them on a quantitative basis. Not surprisingly, there is an almost equal number

⁴⁶ Presumably western Europe (esp. Germany).

⁴⁷ For instance, of *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* in the years 1939, 1946, 1953 and 1960 — which she has summarized in *Sbfd*, XVI (2): June 1961, pp. 93–118.

⁴⁸ N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku ...*, p. 253. See also her "Some aspects of political behavior in Turkey: the role of regional opinion leaders during the 1965 elections," *TYIR*, VI: 1965 (publ. 1966), pp. 161–169.

TABLE 12. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED OVER THE RADIO IN THE 1965 CAMPAIGN

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Times mentioned</i>	
	<i>LPT</i>	<i>RPNP</i>
1. Programs and future actions	5	3
2. Praise of the party and its leaders	3	11
3. Attacks against other parties	8	9
4. Socio-economic matters:		
a. Reform in land-holding	15	5
b. Petroleum	15	2
5. Attitude towards extremist trends:		
a. Criticism of the extremist left	—	7
b. Criticism of the extremist right	3	3
6. Praise for religion	1	6

of times in which self-praise and rival-denigration were employed; praise of its leader seems more appropriate for the RPNP than for the LPT. A reform in land-holding and the nationalization of petroleum were more natural subjects for the LPT than for the RPNP, as was the LPT's sparing praise for religion (it probably asserted that it was not against it), compared to the RPNP's rather favorable attitude to Islam. While criticism of the extreme left comes naturally to the RPNP, it is interesting to note that it criticized the extreme right too — and as often as did the LPT. This could be explained by the RPNP's desire to appear as the party of the center, critical of both left and right, although in practice far more against the extreme left.

The results of the 1965 elections to the National Assembly will be discussed briefly; we shall revert to them when dealing with the 1969 national elections. The October 10, 1965 elections were held according to the detailed election law of April 25, 1961 (with the modifications as to the final computation of remainders on a countrywide basis already explained). The results were as follows.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Based mainly on Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *12 ekim 1969 milletvekili seçimi sonuçları (il ve ilçeler itibarıyla)* (Ankara: 1970), p. 8. See also N. Abadan, *op. cit.* in *Government and Opposition*, I (3): Apr. 1966, p. 343. Cf. *Cumhuriyet*, Oct. 14, 1965, quoted by Szyliowicz, in *MEJ*, XX (4): Autumn 1966, p. 491; Landau in *The World Today*, XXVI (4): Apr. 1970, p. 157.

TABLE 13. THE 1965 VOTE FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Party	Vote	Vote	National		Seats (Total)
			Seats	Remainder	
JP	4,921,140	52.9%	204	36	240
RPP	2,675,905	28.7	102	32	134
NP	582,823	6.3	6	25	31
NTP	346,209	3.7	3	16	19
LPT	276,191	3.0	2	13	15
RPNP	208,798	2.2	—	11	11
Independents	296,588	3.2	—	—	—
Total	9,308,238	100.0	317	133	450

Most of the parties were surprised, in varying degrees, by the results — including the Justice Party, which now had an absolute majority in the National Assembly, and the Republican People's Party, which suffered (percentagewise) its worst electoral defeat up to that date. Nonetheless, these two parties together polled 81.6% of the total vote and between them won 374 (or just about five-sixths) of the 450 National Assembly seats. Consequently, the pattern established in 1950 of both mass parties carrying with them most of the country was repeated in 1965, despite the obvious intention of the 1961 election law to favor smaller parties. Of particular significance was the absolute majority gained by the JP, despite, or perhaps due to, its being the successor of the DP. In a sense, this might be considered a vote against the Neo-Kemalism of the military who had carried out the 1960 Revolution.⁵⁰ As for the smaller parties, the Labor Party of Turkey did less well than it had expected, but not too badly at that. It ran ahead of the Republican Peasant National Party and not far behind the New Turkey Party. We shall first consider the LPT's performance and then that of the RPNP.

On the face of it, the LPT did well to obtain fifteen seats, in its first campaign for the National Assembly. Even *The New York Times*⁵¹ was impressed and considered the LPT a growing political force. More closely examined, it ran candidates in 51 (out of Turkey's 67) provinces — more than any of the competing parties, except the JP and RPP. The

⁵⁰ See also Charles Zorgbibe, "L'évolution politique de la république turque," *Revue Juridique et Politique* (Paris), XX (3): July-Sep. 1966, pp. 408-409.

⁵¹ Nov. 16, 1965.

party described its 382 candidates as follows:⁵² 101 workers, farmers and agricultural workers, 36 lawyers, 27 trade unionists, 27 artisans, 23 small tradesmen, 22 members of various liberal professions, 21 technicians, 20 journalists, 18 teachers, 15 retired officers, 14 officials, 11 engineers, 10 retired teachers, 10 businessmen and contractors, 5 drivers, 4 professors, 4 women, and 3 artists. On the slates themselves, intellectuals usually had the favored places, in particular those serving on the LPT's various bodies — to increase their chances of election. Even so, a third of the LPT's candidates were trade unionists.⁵³ The fact that 13 out of the 15 elected candidates entered the National Assembly thanks to the national remainders points to a rather scattered vote, and to the LPT's being well-known in various parts of Turkey, without achieving a strong hold on any single province. Even so in many cases it failed to penetrate workers' centers on a countrywide basis (in the mining area of Zonguldak, for example, which comprised about 40,000 miners, it received a bare 4,856 votes). It did much better in towns with a population of over 100,000, obtaining an average of 6%, as opposed to a national average of 3%. It did best in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Gaziantep, large centers with numerous intellectuals and industrial workers.⁵⁴ Actually, nearly a third of the LPT's valid votes were cast in three out of the fifty-one provinces in which it ran, as follows:

Istanbul	49,422
Ankara	20,264
Izmir	15,840
<hr/>	
Total	85,526

These three are among the most populous provinces; in the other forty-eight provinces in which it ran, the LPT obtained an average vote of about three to four thousand.⁵⁵ Its main support was undoubtedly in the cities and larger towns, where it appears to have drawn some intellectual and urban worker support from the RPP, and less so among

⁵² Summed up by Karpat, in *MEJ*, XXI (2): Spring 1967, p. 167. See also Y. Sertel, *op. cit.*, p. 148. Originally the party had planned to have 507 candidates run in 54 of Turkey's provinces (see N. Abadan, *Anayasa hukuku* ..., p. 344), but apparently later thought it wiser to concentrate its efforts.

⁵³ See Y. Sertel, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Cf. computation in N. Abadan and A. Yücekök, *op. cit.* in *SBFD*, XXI (4): Dec. 1966, pp. 114 ff.

⁵⁵ Actually, considerably less, if one remembers that the LPT obtained in the province of Kars 9,333 votes and in Adana 7,926.

peasants in rural areas — where the JP held fast and even increased its vote, compared with the 1961 elections.

The LPT's poor showing among workers in 1965 may be attributed to several factors: a. the electoral conservatism of numerous Turkish voters, particularly those who had migrated to the towns recently and were still rooted in their village traditions. b. the comparatively difficult and somewhat abstract propaganda of the LPT, which was also too radical for many. c. The LPT's lack of sufficient funds and inadequate organization in Turkey's social infrastructure. d. as most of the propaganda was carried out on two levels — logical for the educated, and emotional for those with little or no education — the lack of a good, grassroots organization to explain this difference was all the more felt. e. the bitter campaign against the LPT by all the other parties. f. the antagonistic attitude towards the LPT of the *Türk İş*, whose prominent leaders openly accused the LPT of being a disintegrating force in the workers' movement. Indeed, the *Türk İş* optimistically hoped that *all* political parties would adopt and carry out a pro-labor policy.⁵⁶ All these tended to reduce the identification of workers with the LPT.

An ideological cleavage on social policies was therefore an important factor in a Turkish election for the first time. In 1965 social reform first appeared as a meaningful issue. In previous elections, the RPP and DP (and in 1961, the RPP and JP), along with several minor parties, campaigned on opposite platforms: state control over the economy versus private initiative. The secularism of the RPP was confronted with the half-avowed traditionalism and religiousness of DP. In the election campaign of 1965, however, and in the voting itself social attitudes had a major share, expressed in the social radicalism of the LPT, with its insistent demand for urgent reform, as opposed to all those elements implicitly or explicitly supporting the status quo. The RPP seems to have fallen between these two extremes.

If, despite its appeal, the LPT obtained such meager results, something must have been wrong (apart from its organizational and tactical deficiencies) with the image it presented. True, certain intellectuals could grasp the differences between socialism and communism, and, liking the radical approach of the LPT to social reform, gave their support. Many others, however, could not easily reconcile the LPT's pronounced sympathies for a certain type of political regime, with its radical socio-economic doc-

⁵⁶ Aybar replied and attacked the *Türk İş* vigorously, maintaining that their policy of neutrality had been imported from the United States and would benefit only the exploiters of labor.

trines, which appeared close to anti-democratic communism (a belief assiduously fostered by anti-LPT propaganda). The planned etatism in social reform, in which the LPT combined both approaches, antagonized the adherents of private initiative, or was already advocated by the supporters of the RPP's understanding of economic etatism. In coming years the LPT had to seek ways to improve its popular image.

The RPNP did no better than the LPT in the 1965 elections to the National Assembly; if anything, it did worse, running last. Not only did it obtain fewer seats — eleven to the LPT's fifteen — but in no electoral district did it collect enough votes to seat a deputy. All the party members reached the National Assembly thanks to the national adding-up of remainders.

There are several reasons for the failure of the RPNP to achieve better results on a countrywide basis. Probably the most important was the splits in the party, when first Bölükbaşı and his followers left to form the Nation Party, and then several others broke with the party after Türkeş had taken over its leadership. In 1961 the RPNP obtained about 14% of the vote in the elections to the National Assembly. In 1965 the 5.3% of the Nation Party, led by Bölükbaşı (RPNP's leader in 1961) may be discounted, as well as some of the JP vote and that of some independents.

If this were all, the RPNP may be considered not to have done so badly in 1965, obtaining only 2.2% of the vote. But actually this was not so — for in 1965 the RPNP did not address itself solely to the conservative electorate wooed by the party in 1961: it appealed to a much larger section of the electorate, and on a wider plank of socio-economic reform and political progress. The party's failure to impress many voters in 1965 was also undoubtedly due to its lack of organization, which is the second major reason for its failure. Türkeş and his associates had succeeded in persuading many local branches of the RPNP to send pliant delegates to the July 1965 national congress, and consequently in obtaining a majority in the central bodies of the party — but this did not necessarily mean that they had all the party's branches in their hands. Some remained loyal to the old guard — Oğuz, Tahtakılıç and their associates — while others were disorganized and demoralized as a result of the sudden change in leadership.

Another reason may lie in the image which the new leadership presented to the electorate. While the relative youth of Türkeş and his associates was appealing (compared to Tahtakılıç), sympathizers of the outlawed DP remembered the NUC's responsibility in bringing the DP leaders to trial. Others could not, and did not, forget that these youthful officers

had been exiled in November 1960 by the NUC, allegedly for supporting the continuation of military rule in Turkey. Perhaps this was the reason why, out of the ten NUC officers who joined the RPNP, only half (including Türkeş) were elected to the National Assembly in 1965. The very radicalism of the RPNP's "new look," with its emphasis on overall planning and speedy industrialization under state control, which might have appealed to some intellectuals, frightened away others, who were led to believe that the RPNP was assuming a fascist character. Although the party denied it, the Führer-like behavior of its leader did little to dispel the allegation.

There is therefore a similarity in the problems faced by the two parties. The RPNP had to prove that its strong-handed leader-oriented line did not denote fascism; while the LPT had to persuade the country that its socialist solution for Turkey was not communism. Both failed to convince the mass of voters of this, then and later — perhaps because they did in fact smack of such extremism.

A closer look at the detailed results of the 1965 elections⁵⁷ shows that the RPNP generally failed to make its mark even at the local level. The party ran in only 48 of Turkey's 67 provinces: in only two did it obtain more than ten thousand votes (11,899 in Ankara, and 10,657 in Niğde). In Istanbul, where 623,543 valid votes were cast, it obtained just 9,250 or 1.5%. One other interesting feature is the relative distribution of its vote. While the vote for the LPT in 1965, in the districts in which it ran, was generally between 2% and 4%, i.e. within reasonable distance of its countrywide average of 3%, the RPNP's proportionate vote differs widely from district to district: 18% in Muş, 11.8% in Ağrı, 10.3% in Niğde; and, on the other hand, 1.5% or less in ten districts, in which the party ran in 1965: in Balıkesir, Gaziantep, Hakkâri (0.8%), Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Tekirdağ, and Trabzon. The RPNP therefore scored well in isolated pockets only.⁵⁸

c. SENATE ELECTIONS, 1966–1968

The Senate is a new institution in Turkey, introduced after the 1960 Revolution to improve the system of checks and balances. Senate elections are held every two years, in different provinces, to elect a third of

⁵⁷ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *12 Ekim 1969 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları (il ve ilçe itibarıyla)*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁵⁸ For the results of the 1965 elections, see also Lecercle, *op. cit.* in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, XXII: Feb. 1966, pp. 287–289.

the membership. The LPT, which had not participated in 1965, did so in both 1966 and 1968, as did the RPNP. Both increased the tempo of their publications — perhaps more so than the other minor parties, larger than either of the two.

The tone of the LPT publications became more caustic, and provoked a response in kind. Although such a phenomenon was not new in Turkey, the controversy seems to have engendered a good deal of bitterness. This was not assuaged by the fact that the LPT's result in the elections was no worse (actually a little better) than in the 1965 elections to the National Assembly.

While the LPT's election propaganda does not seem to have differed in the two elections, the RPNP seems to have stepped up its efforts. Between May 21 and June 4, 1966, Türkeş and other RPNP leaders delivered fifteen radio talks. They expressed his view and those of the party in some detail.⁵⁹ In summarizing their contents we have retained as far as possible the characteristic style of the speakers.

a. Turkey's rulers have left the people in dire need. Three main movements endanger our unity: communism, separatism (*bölgecilik*⁶⁰) and sectarianism (*mezhepçilik*). Communist organizations in Turkey, under various names, are connected with either Moscow or Peking; they all desire, however, to obtain the seat of power. They also want to divide Turkey. In Cyprus, we wanted a Turco-Greek federation, but this did not work out. The RPNP is very alert to the Cyprus situation and will never agree to Enosis. Turkey is not a hard-pressed country; on the contrary, it has vast natural resources and a great potential — provided we use them.

b. In order to ensure the development and progress of Turkey, great projects are urgently needed. In a state based on social justice, everyone ought to have the same opportunities. This is not so in a country 71 % of whose population are villagers.⁶¹ Most of our villages lack a school, a doctor, and a road. Morality is an important basis for every society. Our morals, however, are corrupt; we are today, indeed, in a state of moral crisis. The government should set an example, by basing everything on justice.

⁵⁹ The talks were reprinted in a 91-page booklet, *CKMPnin 5 haziran tarihinde yapılan kısmi Senato seçimleri münasebetiyle yaptığı radyo konuşmaları* (Ankara: n.d. [1966]).

⁶⁰ The term may also mean "regionalism."

⁶¹ Or peasants. The Turkish term is *köylü*.

c. Since the May 27, 1960 Revolution Turks have been beset by disquiet and hesitation. Shooting has occurred at Ankara University. The government has brought in both the police and the armed forces — unsuccessfully. One observes a fragmentation, in society and politics, into numerous small groups. The Justice Party, winner of the 1965 elections, is the representative of reaction; its leader claims that he must retain his hold on power.

d. The RPNP is the party dedicated to Turkey's freedom and prosperity. Other parties have failed to answer the needs of the Turkish nation; they are of the past. The RPNP will help the villagers and establish social security for all Turks.

e. The RPNP is a nationalist (*milliyetçi*) party, in its program, organization-rules, leaders and cadres. The party's nationalist concept (*milliyetçilik*) is based on Turkey's great and honorable past and aims at obtaining for Turkey an honorable position in international relations, at raising its economic, social and cultural level, at fostering a reformist mentality and a spirit of sacrifice, and at doing away with unemployment and ignorance. This contrasts with other parties, which are encouraging the penetration of foreign interests into Turkey.

f. The coalition governments after 1961 are no different from those that ruled before 1960. They claim to be for democracy and nationalism, but are hypocrites. All they have created is hostility in our midst. We are a people dating back hundreds of years; Turkey will yet serve as a light for the world.⁶²

g. The new constitution allows the setting up of political parties. The RPP and the communists have been accusing us of being fascists, Hitlerists (*Hitlerci*) and racists (*ırkçı*) and of other falsehoods. I, Türkeş, announced to you on May 27, 1960⁶³ what was taking place. Now I call on you again, for the sake of peace, tranquility, prosperity, happiness and human dignity. The RPNP will assist the arts and sports; send intellectuals and youths to assist the villages, foster culture, and bring Turkey into the space and atomic age.

h. "The Fourteen," within the National Union Committee, thought of the Nation first — while many others were just supporting İnönü.

After Türkeş had delivered these eight talks, the next six were given by various party leaders, like Ahmet Er (chairman of the RPNP's Central

⁶² A clear "sense of mission."

⁶³ That is, on the day of the Revolution.

Control Committee), İffet H. Oruz (chairwoman of the party's women association), and Mustafa Kaplan (the party's Secretary-General); the fifteenth was then delivered by Türkeş himself. These mostly elaborated the earlier lectures, emphasizing that the RPNP was a party of nationalist, but practical, idealists — the only choice between the leftists and their reactionary opponents who anyway have done nothing to curb communism.

While the party's radio talks were obviously intended for a wide audience, the RPNP's would-be Senators' written appeals were largely pitched at local audiences, although combined with the party's general strategy. Let us examine two such appeals, one for the Senate elections of 1966, the other for those of 1968.

In 1966 the party's candidate for the Uşak electoral district (in western Turkey, south of Kütahya) was Erhan Löker. His 8-page election appeal⁶⁴ opened with a letter to the people of Uşak. He introduced himself as a lawyer, much interested in Turkey's general problems — legal, economic, social, cultural, and political — who wished to convey his views to the people of Uşak for their decision. Subsequent pages listed several biographical details: Born in nearby Kütahya, his family was well-known in Uşak; he had traveled and seen a great deal, had published twelve books and had another six ready in manuscript. There followed a list of several of his articles, in economics and politics, with summaries. In one of these he had written about his twenty years of legal work for trade unions. In another, "Turkey's political system today," he had examined the multiparty system, and maintained that it had not prevented civil strife, as confirmed on May 27, 1960. The RPNP held that party politics weakened the state. A new constitution could not save the situation, which was approaching another crisis. One of the results of the multiparty system was that certain groups had moved from the concept of "social justice" to "socialism," thence to so-called "scientific socialism," and lastly to communism. The latter had now been penetrating the universities, too. The implication of Löker's booklet was that a one-party system — presumably based on the RPNP — was the only way to stop communism and save Turkey.

This was not necessarily the approach of every RPNP candidate. Two years later, RPNP candidate Mehmet Orhun,⁶⁵ running for the

⁶⁴ C.K.M.P. *Uşak ili senato adayı Erhan Löker* (N. p.: n.d. [1966]).

⁶⁵ On whom see *Türkiye'de kim kimdir 1961-1962*, op. cit., s.v., p. 472. This, the second edition, seems to be the latest available Turkish *Who's who*.

1968 Senate elections, published an 8-page appeal,⁶⁶ directed at the voters in Çankırı district (north of Ankara). Orhun, a chemical engineer, born in Edirne in 1917, who had traveled and studied in Turkey and abroad and had published technical books, addressed the people of Çankırı as "Turks and Muslims." He thought that the main reasons for the present backwardness of Turkey were that it was ruled by persons who had lost pride in being Turks, who were deprived of Muslim morals, and who did not understand science and technology. They were men who were not worthy of governing since after they had collected great sums in taxes, they had not provided the people with schools, roads, water, bridges and electricity. Under their rule, there flourished lewdness, bribery, corruption, injustice, along with communism — the enemy of the Turkish nation and religion — and freemasonry. The RPNP, the true nationalists, would faithfully represent the people and provide for justice, virtue, prosperity, Turkism and Islam.

The representatives of Çankırı had formerly been lawyers or men with similar occupations; when industrial projects were proposed, they did not know enough, and these were allocated to other provinces. To place Mehmet Orhun, a chemical engineer, in the Senate would make sure that industry would come to Çankırı; his expertise and experience were described in glowing terms. The appeal then added more of the RPNP's aims of creating a Great Turkey, with all that was best in morality, national education, proper administration, industry, agriculture, and financial-economic reforms. It ended with an appeal to Allah and Islam.

In addition to the usual attack on Turkey's incumbent rulers and praises for the RPNP, along with a list of its intentions, one observes the appeal to the people's economic interest — bringing industry to Çankırı. However, there was in this booklet an additional, significant element — the sentimental appeal to Islam, still a potent force in rural Turkey. As we have pointed out,⁶⁷ the RPNP gradually veered closer to a pro-Islamic stance, although there was by no means a unanimity of views in party circles concerning the place of Islam in the party's platform.

It is noteworthy that the Labor Party of Turkey ranked fourth in the results of the 1966 Senate elections. Its descent to fifth place in the Senate elections of 1968 was partly due to the appearance of the con-

⁶⁶ *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, Çankırı ili idare heyeti bildirisi — Çankırı ili senatör adayı Mehmet Orhun* (Ankara: 1968).

⁶⁷ See ch. 6.

TABLE 14. SENATE ELECTION RESULTS, BY PARTY, 1966-1968⁶⁸

Party	1966 (21 provinces)		1968 (22 provinces)	
	Vote	%	Vote	%
JP	1,417,614	57.4	1,505,935	49.1
RPP	727,522	29.4	821,688	26.8
NP	135,368	5.5	192,392	6.3
LPT	79,014	3.2	143,731	4.7
RPNP	48,703	2.0	60,984	2.0
NTP ⁶⁹	62,839	2.5	—	—
RP ⁷⁰	—	—	284,234	9.2
Independents	980	0.0	58,264	1.9
Total	2,472,040 ⁷¹	100.0	3,067,228 ⁷²	100.0

servative Reliance Party, which split from the RPP. Of greater significance was the LPT's advance from 3.2% to 4.7% of the vote. Since it related to different parts of Turkey from those which participated in the 1966 Senate elections, this result is not, however, as meaningful as it would otherwise have been. Thanks to a law, promulgated in 1964 which modified the electoral system so that vote remainders could be used by the competing parties,⁷³ the LPT obtained one seat in the Senate in 1966—a woman Senator from Kocaeli, named Fatma Hikmet

⁶⁸ Computed on the basis of Devlet istatistik enstitüsü, *5 haziran 1966 cumhuriyet senatosu üyeleri kısmi seçim sonuçları* (Ankara: 1967) and *2 haziran 1968 cumhuriyet senatosu üyeleri kısmi seçim sonuçları* (Ankara: 1969). See also Bahri Savcı, "1966 kısmi senato seçimleri tahlili," *Sbfd*, XXI (3): Sep. 1966, pp. 161-169.

⁶⁹ Did not participate in 1968, as it had been weakened considerably.

⁷⁰ Did not participate in 1966. This new party, the Reliance Party (RP) (*Güven partisi*), was founded in 1967 by a group of conservative Members of the National Assembly and Senators who had left the RPP, displeased with its recently proclaimed "left-of-center" policy. Later, it changed its name to National Reliance Party (*Milli güven partisi*). See also above, ch. 1.

⁷¹ The official *2 haziran 1968 cumhuriyet senatosu üyeleri kısmi seçim sonuçları*, *op. cit.*, p. XI, sums up these same figures as 2,472,109. For unknown reasons, these figures (which I have accepted as the later ones) differ slightly from those of the earlier official returns, *5 haziran 1966 cumhuriyet senatosu üyeleri kısmi seçim sonuçları*, *op. cit.*, p. VII, table I.

⁷² *2 haziran 1968 ...*, p. IX, sums up these same figures as 3,067,057.

⁷³ Details in Teziç, *op. cit.*, in *AFDI*, XVIII (29-32): 1968, p. 175.

İşmen. However, since competition from other parties was tougher in 1968, the LPT did not win representation.

Another characteristic was the LPT's running in 20 out of 21 electoral districts in the Senate elections of 1966, and in all 22 districts in the Senate elections of 1968. The RPNP, however, ran in only 16 electoral districts in both 1966 and 1968, or in less than four-fifths. This was one of the reasons that its overall result was only 2%, the lowest of all parties that participated, and a slight drop, also, from the national average of 2.2% which the RPNP had obtained in the 1965 general elections to the National Assembly. One can understand the RPNP's reluctance to run for seats in all districts, for after all it was evident that in most of them the JP or RPP would win easily. The fact that other small parties and the RPNP ran, however, was no doubt to make their presence felt, by using the radio and other means of propaganda — with an eye to the 1969 general elections to the National Assembly. Nevertheless, its efforts did not provide the RPNP with any Senate seats, and in fact gave it rather poor results. Thus in 1966, with the exception of Ankara (where it polled 11,225 votes), Adana (5,048 votes) and Kayseri (4,306 votes), it merely received from 1,000 to 3,700 votes per electoral district. In 1968 the vote it obtained was slightly more evenly divided, ranging from 1,063 votes in Adiyaman to 7,286 in Konya — although from 1966 to 1968 its overall percentage did not change.

The two large parties, the JP and RPP, together polled 86.8% of the vote in the Senate elections of 1966; in 1968 they polled only 75.9% — an obvious drop for each. In 1968, even before the Senate elections, the JP moved to amend the National Assembly election law, proposing to cancel the adding-up of local remainders in the computation crediting the parties on a national basis. It will be remembered that in the proportional representation system of election to the National Assembly in 1965, the remainders of each party in the various electoral districts were added up to enable it to seat more deputies. We have seen how the smaller parties seated *most* of their members into the National Assembly in 1965 in this way (The NP, 25 out of 31; the NTP, 16 out of 19; the LPT, 13 out of 15; the RPNP, all of its seats). The JP move was obviously intended to liquidate — or, at least, render ineffective — future parliamentary opposition by the small parties. Although the latter fought the bill vehemently, the JP (with the support of the RPP) succeeded in passing it and thus amending the electoral law (March, 1968). The amendment set up a quota arrived at by simply dividing the total vote cast in an electoral district by the number of seats to be filled in it. Seats were

then divided proportionately among the parties that exceeded this quota; parties obtaining fewer votes than the quota in that district were not allotted seats.⁷⁴

This controversy further embittered party politics. The National Assembly of 1965-1969 — and to a somewhat lesser degree the Senate — grew accustomed to impassioned speeches, accusations and counter-accusations more frequent and biting than those of several preceding legislatures. As the LPT was affected, although its fifteen Members in the National Assembly were new (or perhaps because of this), they spoke comparatively often and trenchantly. Particularly irritating to the other parties were Aybar, Behice Boran and Çetin Altan. Altan so annoyed Members of other parties in the National Assembly, that they cast around for legal ways to remove him (an evident indication of his success). A sub-committee of the National Assembly moved on April 7, 1967 to suspend Çetin Altan's parliamentary immunity on charges of communist subversion in his writings. After a stormy, twelve-hour debate, the National Assembly suspended Altan's immunity (July 21, 1967). The decision was, however, quashed by the Constitutional Court, since it found that the composition of the parliamentary sub-committee which had presented its recommendation to the National Assembly was at fault.⁷⁵

The "Çetin Altan affair" is symptomatic of the LPT's aggressiveness and of its rivals' response. The year 1968 seems to have been a high point in inter-party strife, at least judging from the quantity of publications and their virulence. They were further exacerbated by the struggle over the amendment to the electoral law for the National Assembly and by the Senate election campaign. To give a few examples:

In a 54-page booklet, Uludoğan⁷⁶ promised to show what kind of party the LPT was — that it was not a workers' party. He analyzed the LPT booklet *Yeni düzen* ("New order") and its claim that Turkey was for the workers. Uludoğan then asked, "Well, what about all others?" He also took issue with the LPT's slogan of "land for the peasant" and

⁷⁴ *The Times* (London), Mar. 4, 1968. *Le Monde*, Mar. 5, 1968. Rodolfo Gil Benumeya, "Lo nacional y lo mundial en la actualidad de Turquía," *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), fasc. 106: Nov.-Dec. 1969, pp. 135-142. The amendment itself is reprinted by Mehmet Ali Yalçın (ed.), *Temel kanunlar ve seçim mevzuatı*, op. cit., pp. 302-304. For a Turkish comment, see Teziç, op. cit. in *AFDI*, XVIII (29-32): 1968, p. 170.

⁷⁵ *The Times* (London), April 8, 1967; *Le Monde*, July 22 and Aug. 4, 1967.

⁷⁶ Attila M. Uludoğan, *Türkiye işçi partisi işçinin partisi değildir!* (Ankara: 1968).

asked who would then pay the peasants for their work, should the LPT's promises be realized. Uludoğan ended by asserting that nobody should exchange reality for empty slogans.

This appeal to continue the status quo and ignore the LPT's radical propaganda was buttressed with further accusations. Dr. Faruk Sükan, Turkey's Minister of the Interior, spoke in the parliamentary budget commission about "extremist trends" and his speech was then published by his party, the JP, as a 28-page booklet.⁷⁷ Sükan stated that there was a movement afoot to destroy the state. Lately, the LPT had arranged numerous meetings in Ankara and the eastern parts of Turkey suggesting that the inhabitants of this area were not Turks, but Kurds or Alevis — a very sensitive matter.⁷⁸ Sükan denied that the LPT spoke for "scientific socialism;" he considered the LPT Marxist, for its methods were identical to those of the TCP, and its contacts were with communist parties abroad. He concluded by asserting that the LPT's ideas conflicted with Turkey's constitution, that their Allah was Stalin and their Ka'ba was Moscow.

An equally aggressive tone characterized a 161-page book written by Nural Cengiz Yamakoğlu, who claimed he had been a member of the LPT.⁷⁹ The book started by saying that it was a duty to unmask Turkey's enemies — the communists — who had kept quiet until the 1960 Revolution, after which they had begun open activity. He called the members of the LPT communists and traitors, accusing them of using communist methods and selling communist propaganda, such as Nazım Hikmet's works. All they wanted was to break up Turkey into hostile camps and destroy it, along with everything that was sacred to it. All the LPT's leaders were known leftists, many of them well-known communists, and several had a criminal record. Aybar was campaigning for abolishing those paragraphs in the penal code that forbade communist activity, and he was responsible, also, for numerous clashes and quarrels. Yamakoğlu then listed 111 LPT members, with a few details about each, to prove they were either communists or extreme leftists. Afterwards, he maintained that the LPT had contacts with communist parties abroad, and that socialism, although it talked about social reform, was nothing but a disguise for communism.

⁷⁷ *İçişleri bakanı Dr. Faruk Sükan perdeyi araladı. İşte TİP* (Ankara: 1968).

⁷⁸ Which indeed it was, for successive governments had tried — in varying ways — to integrate them into Turkey.

⁷⁹ Nural Cengiz Yamakoğlu, *Ben bir TİP'li idim* (Istanbul: 1968). With an introduction by İlhan E. Darendelioğlu. Postscript by Faruk Sükan — the latter being a reprint of the material mentioned in footnote no. 77.

Some of the LPT's response was as aggressive as the accusations leveled at the party, some balanced and moderate in tone. An example of the latter was a 30-page booklet by Dr. Murat Sarıca (a Professor in the Law Faculty of Istanbul University and a prominent LPT member) and Nurkalp Devrim.⁸⁰ Published by the party, the booklet repeated some previously published facts and ideas about the LPT and elaborated on them. It stated that although the bulk of Turkey's population was made up of workers, peasants, artisans, small tradesmen, and clerks — they all received only a small part of the national income. It accused the RPP of having done too little for Turkey and for most Turks during its lengthy rule. As the LPT saw, the way to independence (economic and otherwise) was to stop foreign exploitation of Turkey. Land-reform, limiting the maximum holdings to 500 dönüms per person, was imperative, as was social security and other benefits for working people. As a socialist party, the LPT also believed in planned etatism.

The above polemics between the LPT and other political parties did not reveal a most important factor — a bitter controversy within the LPT itself, which led to several splits in the party during the late 1960's — already alluded to above. While splits are not unusual in Turkey's political parties, a small political grouping like the LPT was perhaps worse hit by them than larger parties. The split in the LPT's leadership was its worst, and the party entered the 1969 general elections to the National Assembly deeply demoralized and disunited, with one faction calling the other "Soviet agents" and the other replying with "United States spies."

The RPNP, meanwhile, had problems of its own — even though they were apparently less serious than those of the LPT. While no open split occurred, the party leadership was hurt by the desertion (and generally retirement from politics) of several of Türkeş's main collaborators — including some of "the fourteen" — shortly before the elections. While personal differences with Türkeş may have had a minor part in their decision, it seems that the major causes were disappointment in the party's limited success and differences in their ideological approach — for instance as to the stand of the RPNP towards Islam. An interesting example in practical politics is Osman Yüksel's electoral radio talk in October 1969, just before the elections.⁸¹ Yüksel was an RPNP National Assembly Member from Antalya and an Assistant-Chairman of the party, and was

⁸⁰ Dr. Murat Sarıca and Nurkalp Devrim, *Türkiye işçi partisini tanıyalım* (Istanbul: May 1968).

⁸¹ Reprinted as *Serdengeçti Osman Yüksel'in radyo konuşmaları* (Ankara: 1970).

running as the party's candidate again. In his three radio speeches on behalf of his party, he interspersed (in a circumspect, but obvious way) his call to *milliyetçilik* with allusions to Islam.

Desertions notwithstanding, Alparslan Türkeş continued to be the acknowledged leader of the party, the *başbuğ*, as his admirers called him, using an old Turkish appellation for chieftain. In the RPNP's general congress, Türkeş delivered the major address, on November 24, 1967,⁸² with his accustomed self-assurance, and carried the convention with him. The major points he made were the following:

The general congress meets amidst events vitally important for Turkey. We support the government's foreign policy and its stand for peace and membership in NATO — but we should draw closer not only to the West, but also to the Muslim Middle East and the awakening Afro-Asian nations. Regrettably, the government neglects Cyprus; it is only forty miles from Turkey and was ruled by Turkey for 350 years; it has never belonged to Greece, and without doubt should be in Turkey's hands. We should remember the Turks in Cyprus. As for internal matters, Turkey's development and general situation are first and foremost dependent on internal unity and security. One should watch out for such phenomena as partisanship, regionalism, racism and communism — which endanger the body-politic of our nation. We believe that the divisive and confounding forces of communism are the greatest peril we face — we who have lived in honor, shoulder-to-shoulder, during the 900-year existence of our State. Democracy is the best form of government for us, but it has flaws which should be corrected — for example, the institution of Life Senators should be eliminated.⁸³ The most pressing reforms that we stand for are in the fields of education, society, administration, industry, agriculture, and finance.⁸⁴

In the same convention, Türkeş also delivered the closing speech,⁸⁵ in which he criticized the current situation in Turkey, saying that democracy was sold for the price of spinach (that is, very cheaply), corruption abounded and villages waited endlessly for tap-water. He ended by appealing to the youth and intellectuals to work for a Great Turkey.

⁸² Reprinted by the party as a 14-page booklet, *Genel başkan Alparslan Türkeş'in VIII. büyük kongreyi açış konuşması* (N. p.: n.d. [1967-1968]).

⁸³ The "Life Senators," permanent members of the Senate, were those officers in the NUC who had exiled "the fourteen."

⁸⁴ A brief explanation of his Nine Lights follows. See above, ch. 6.

⁸⁵ Reprinted in a collection of speeches by A. Türkeş, *Nifak zamanı değil* (Ankara: n.d. [1969]), pp. 29-32.

Interestingly, the party's name at this convention was referred to as *CKMP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, or the RPNP — the Nationalist Action Party.⁸⁶ A monthly with a very similar name, *Milli hareket*, had started publication at the end of 1966;⁸⁷ it was published by the RPNP or by circles very close to it. The action of the congress was apparently one of the official steps in changing the name of the party to the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). This was then formalized at an extraordinary congress of the party in Adana, in February 1969, which approved the new statutes.⁸⁸

In his speech at this convention (on February 8, 1969), Türkiye made the following observations.⁸⁹ With the weakening of France and England in the Second World War, the way was cleared for Soviet pressures in the Middle East. Turkey has joined NATO, but the Czechoslovakian crisis and the Arab-Israeli fighting keep the danger of war near Turkey. Economically, Turkey is tied down to a backward agriculture, having failed in its industrialization. Planning is inadequate and policies are confused. The nationally-minded groups want happiness and prosperity for Turkey; others aspire only to increase divisiveness and social conflicts; the non-national economy still reigns in Turkey. The Islamic faith and the feeling of Turkism need new expression and a new organization geared towards the twenty-first century, the age of space, the atom and electronics: a new society, social security, land reform, and industrialization that will bring about economic independence.

That the above was not intended merely for his party, but for all Turks — with an eye to the approaching general elections to the National Assembly — is quite clear from another speech entitled “The third road,”⁹⁰ in which he attacked the Justice Party, with the following comparison: the gap between Turkey and the developed nations has increased rather than decreased. Thus during Sultan Abdül Aziz's day, Napoleon III's France was twice as advanced as Turkey, while De Gaulle's France is five times as advanced as Turkey in the age of Demirel — despite huge sacrifices by the Turks!

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20–28. The name may also be translated as the RPNP — the Nationalist Movement Party.

⁸⁷ Probably in October 1966. See above, ch. 6.

⁸⁸ Published in a 26-page booklet, *Milliyetçi hareket partisi tüzüğü* (N. p.: n.d. [prob. 1969]).

⁸⁹ Reprinted in his *Nifak zamanı değil, op. cit.*, pp. 3–11.

⁹⁰ “Üçüncü yol.” Reprinted *ibid.*, pp. 12–19.

d. THE 1969 ELECTIONS

The 1969 electoral battle was as violent as that of 1965,⁹¹ the small parties putting even greater efforts into the battle because of the severe handicap created by the 1968 amendment to the election law.⁹² The two larger parties, however, felt that for them, too, the approaching election was crucial: the JP leadership, headed by Süleyman Demirel, felt that it had to increase party representation in the National Assembly above the bare majority it had attained in 1965, and strive for a two-thirds majority. The moderately left-of-center leadership of the RPP, directed by the party's Secretary-General, Bülent Ecevit, also felt that the party had to increase its contingent in the National Assembly, to compensate for recent desertions by a number of members, to prevent a more extremist group from asserting itself, and, also, to justify the "left-of-center" policy he had advocated.

One might add that a certain malaise, already reflected by elements of the press, was in evidence throughout the election campaign. Like every malaise, it was a rather complex, confused amalgam: Turkey's difficulty in catching up with more developed and modern countries, with its population gaining close to a net million per year; that almost half of all Turks were still illiterate; the feeling that many socio-economic ills persisted, that the cost-of-living was rising more than many liked (particularly the prices of consumer goods, chiefly food) and an overall frustration that no Messiah was in view to bring easy, comforting solutions. The increase in roads and in the means of mass communication, as well as the universal character of compulsory military service, brought at least some information about these events to every village; while the constant migration from village to city brought some realities of village-life to the towns.

The platforms of the various parties, reprinted in innumerable handbills, wall slogans, pamphlets, magazines, and speeches, held little that

⁹¹ Having witnessed both, this is my general impression, supported by the opinion of other on-the-spot observers. For an instructive and entertaining account, see Sadi Koçuş, *Bir seçim böyle geçti* (Ankara: 1970). Cf. Peter Flinn, "Turning point for Turkey," *The New Middle East*, 13: Oct. 1969, pp. 13-16.

⁹² On the electoral campaign and the elections themselves, see W. F. Weiker, "Turkey's elections may bode ill," *Mid East* (Washington, D. C.), IX (6): Dec. 1969, pp. 10-13, 32-34. M. P. Hyland, "Crisis at the polls: Turkey's 1969 elections," *MEJ*, XXIV (1): Winter 1970, pp. 1-16. W. M. Hale, "Aspects of the Turkish general election of 1969," *Middle Eastern Studies*, VIII (3): Oct. 1972, pp. 393-404. Landau, *op. cit.* in *The World Today*, XXVI (4): April 1970, pp. 156-166.

was new — but the old themes seemed more impassioned. The JP pointed to its four-year record of relative economic and political stability, and to the annual 7% rise of the gross national product; it presented a middle-of-the-road image and campaigned for law and order. All other parties claimed to stand, in varying degrees, for a “change of order” policy — and thus took some of the wind out of the sails of the LPT and RPNP.

The LPT campaigned, as formerly, for the improvement of the workers’ lot and the expansion of education; this time, however, it emphasized its desire for an independent — rather than a socialist — Turkey. This was part of Aybar’s electoral policy, designed to appeal to a wider electorate, as opposed to several of his more dynamic rivals for party leadership.⁹³

As for the Nationalist Action Party, the general tenor of its campaign was not essentially different from that of the party under its old name, the Republican Peasant National Party. In general, it repeated earlier themes, and particularly those laid down by Türkes at the extraordinary party congress in Adana, in February 1969. If anything, the change of name involved a more militant approach, also expressed in meetings and demonstrations of the party youths, *Bozkurtlar*, or “grey wolves,” using the emblem of the ancient Turks and the symbol of the Turkish race.⁹⁴ Militancy also expressed itself in a more openly favorable attitude to Islam, and in a more aggressive stance towards other political parties and to what the NAP considered hostile groups.

One example, taken from Sivas, illustrates these tendencies. The election handbill⁹⁵ was written by M. T. Betin, director of the Sivas branch of the Pamuk-Bank⁹⁶ and NAP candidate in the 1969 elections to the National Assembly. Betin pointed out that he was born in 1934 and had experience in banking and a great deal of public spirit. He added that in 1965 he had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. This was an obvious pointer, as was the general style of writing, for religious-minded Muslims among the electorate of Sivas. However, most of what he said was directed at youth, “the hope of tomorrow’s Turkish nation.” He warned against false promises by candidates of other parties, and lumped them together with what he termed the godless lies of communism, Zionism and freemasonry. Betin and the NAP, on the contrary, believed

⁹³ See above, ch. 4.

⁹⁴ See above, ch. 6.

⁹⁵ Hacı M. Tevfik Betin, *Çok muhterem vatandaşlarımız, sevgili yurtdaşlarımız* (Sivas: 1969).

⁹⁶ The name means “Cotton Bank.”

that Turkey's progress and the prosperity of all were feasible only in a spirit of unity, grounded in Turkish and Islamic morals. This was the way to general development and individual happiness.

One can gather, from the pro-NAP weekly *Devlet*, an idea of the NAP's candidates, at least as regards their occupations. *Devlet* printed⁹⁷ these details in 27 (out of Turkey's 67) electoral provinces (when it ran in some of the others, this must have been on a minor scale). Accordingly, the 231 candidates can be classified as follows:

TABLE 15. BREAKDOWN OF 231 NAP CANDIDATES IN 1969,
BY OCCUPATION

Merchants	37	Of independent means	6
Lawyers	27	Housewives	6
Retired military officers	18	Economists and financiers	5
Officials ⁹⁸	15	Industrialists	4
Teachers and educators ⁹⁹	12	Artisans and small tradesmen	3
Engineers	11	Drivers	3
Contractors	9	<i>Hatips</i> ¹⁰⁰	3
Workers	8	Pharmacists	3
Physicians	7	Booksellers	2
Technicians	7	Insurance agents	2
Accountants	7	Electricians	2
Landowners	6	Others	16
Journalists	6		
Trade unionists	6	Total for these 27 electoral districts	231

The "others" were a group in which the occupation of each of these sixteen candidates was different. Among those specifically listed above, the merchants predominated, followed by the lawyers — a naturally articulate group. The 18 retired military officers (to whom we might add another police officer, from the "others" group) was prominent, too, and tended to distinguish the NAP from other political parties at the time. Also noteworthy was the relatively large number of people of means and with a sound economic position — contractors (mostly in the construction business), landowners, economists and financiers, industrialists and

⁹⁷ 24: Sep. 15, 1969, p. 9; 25: Sep. 22, 1969, p. 9; 26: Sep. 29, 1969, p. 11; 27: Oct. 6, 1969, p. 12.

⁹⁸ Including 4 retired officials.

⁹⁹ Including 4 retired teachers.

¹⁰⁰ On which see above, ch. 5.

men of independent means. Not less remarkable was the candidacy of three *hatips* (to whom we might add a *müftü*, in the "others" group) — undoubtedly an indication of the party's rapprochement with Islam shortly before the 1969 elections. The fact that six housewives were among the candidates is also interesting, although by this time it had become standard practice for women to run in elections.

The official results of the 1969 vote to the National Assembly were not unexpected. Their main characteristic was that, although votes for the two large parties declined both proportionately and in absolute figures, they gained deputies at the expense of the smaller parties, because of the amendment to the election law abolishing the adding-up of remainders.

TABLE 16. ELECTION RESULTS, 1969-1965¹⁰¹

Party	No. of Votes		%		No. of Seats	
	1969	1969	1969	1965	1969	1965
JP	4,229,712	46.5	52.9		256	240
RPP	2,487,006	27.4	28.7		143	134
NP	292,961	3.2	6.3		6	31
NTP	197,929	2.2	3.7		6	19
LPT	243,631	2.7	3.0		2	15
NAP ¹⁰²	275,091	3.0	2.2		1	11
RP ¹⁰³	597,818	6.6	—		15	—
UP ¹⁰⁴	254,695	2.8	—		8	—
Independents	511,023	5.6	3.2		13	—
Total	9,086,296	100.0	100.0		450	450

Particularly interesting is the manner in which the vote was divided between rural and urban areas.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Mainly based on Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *12 ekim 1969 milletvekili seçimi sonuçları (il ve ilçeler itibarıyla)* and its larger *12 ekim milletvekili seçimi sonuçları* (both — Ankara: 1970).

¹⁰² In 1969 the party changed its name from the Republican Peasant National Party to the Nationalist Action Party.

¹⁰³ Had not participated in 1965.

¹⁰⁴ Had not participated in 1965. This was a small party led by Hüseyin Balan, and based largely on local Shiite support.

¹⁰⁵ Based on Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *12 ekim milletvekili seçimi sonuçları*, *op. cit.*, p. XXIV.

TABLE 17. RURAL AND URBAN VOTE, 1969

	Rural Vote (%)	Urban Vote (%)
JP	46.4	46.9
RPP	24.7	32.9
NP	3.5	2.8
NTP	2.6	1.4
LPT	2.6	2.8
NAP	3.0	3.0
RP	7.7	4.1
UP	3.0	2.4
Independents	6.5	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0

In absolute figures, obviously, the picture was somewhat different, for, in 1969, 6,222,054 valid votes were cast in the rural areas, and only 2,867,302 (or less than half that number) in the urban ones. Percentage-wise however the NP, NTP, RP and MP, all conservative parties, obtained greater support in the villages than in towns and cities. The RPP, always centering in urban areas and said to be less efficient, organizationally, in the rural areas, did better in the former. The JP obtained approximately equal support — percentage-wise — in village and town, which shows its great overall strength. The NAP did exactly the same in both, and the LPT almost so, which perhaps indicates a more equitable distribution of effort and a growing awareness of the party's existence in the rural areas (both parties, particularly the LPT, had previously been more urban-oriented).

The results, in numbers of seats in the National Assembly, were particularly galling to the four small parties which had also participated in the 1965 elections: The NP lost, proportionately, about half of its vote (6.3% to 3.2%), but its parliamentary group was reduced from 31 to 6. The NTP lost just over a third of its vote, but the number of its seats were reduced from 19 to 6. The LPT lost a tenth of its vote (3% to 2.7%),¹⁰⁶ but its seats dwindled from 15 to 2. Strangest of all, the RPNP (NAP) *increased* its proportionate vote (from 2.2% to 3%), yet obtained only 1 seat instead of the 11 it had had in 1965! This was due only to a limited extent to the participation of two new parties, the RP and UP, which together obtained 23 additional seats in the 1969 National Assem-

¹⁰⁶ For a detailed analysis of the LPT's losses, see *Ant*, 147: Oct. 21, 1969, pp. 8-9.

bly; or to the success of 13 independents in gaining seats in that year. The main cause was the amendment of the electoral law, for the JP increased its National Assembly contingent by 16 (compared with 1965), or 6.7%, despite the loss of about 700,000 votes, or 6.4%; and the RPP increased its seats by 9, or 6.7%, despite the loss of 200,000 votes or 1.3%.

Since a party represented in the National Assembly must have at least ten seats to qualify as a fully-fledged parliamentary group — with office prerogatives and procedural rights — all small parties were disqualified, except for the Reliance Party. Needless to say, this still further increased the power of the JP and RPP parliamentary groups. The small parties reacted in varying ways. Türkeş was the only NAP candidate to be elected (in Adana, where the NAP received 21,641 votes). At first, he refused to see reporters, who wanted his views about the election results. Then, however, he recovered and, in a remarkable interview he gave Abdi İpekçi of the daily *Milliyet*, sounded a more cheerful note. What he said was that, although disappointed that the NAP had now only one Member in the National Assembly, its vote had risen by about 35%. He added that from pre-election polling of public opinion they had hoped for even better results.¹⁰⁷

In any event, Türkeş succeeded in keeping his party together. Not so the LPT. Divided by internal discord before and during the 1969 elections, the party was further rent by its failure at the polls. Aybar and Kuas were the only LPT candidates to win seats (both in Istanbul, where the LPT received 34,633 votes). Aybar was held responsible for the LPT's relatively poor showing; his opponents, led by Aren and Boran, accused him of sacrificing principles in order to gain votes, and of having lost both. This view was expressed in a series of articles in *Milliyet*,¹⁰⁸ by İsmail Cem, attributing the failure of the LPT in the elections to the party's continued inability to formulate a solid ideological basis. Aybar resigned from the LPT's chairmanship on November 15, 1969, although he still had support among some party veterans, who for a time regarded him as a sort of grey eminence.¹⁰⁹ In 1970, however, the effective decision-makers were Boran, the party's Secretary-General, and Aren, who was an

¹⁰⁷ Reprinted in an interesting collection of pre-election and post-election interviews of party leaders by Abdi İpekçi, *Liderler diyor ki (Röportajlar)* (Istanbul: 1969), pp. 291 ff. Some of the interviews also appeared in *Milliyet*.

¹⁰⁸ Oct. 15–18, 1969, reprinted in İsmail Cem's *Türkiye üzerine (araştırmalar)* (Istanbul: 1970), pp. 60–65.

¹⁰⁹ At least, acc. to an article from Ankara, in *Le Monde*, Nov. 26, 1969.

influential member of the party's Central Executive Committee. Their combination was apparently stronger than any views the party's new Chairman, Şaban Yıldız, a former trade union leader, might have had.

Although Aybar was one of the LPT's two Members in the National Assembly, it seemed he had progressively less of a say in the decisions of the party's directing bodies. While it is not clear when he completely dissociated himself from the party, the rift in the LPT grew wider still, when Aybar published an open letter in the press in April 1971.¹¹⁰ Directed to workers, peasants and laborers, Aybar stated that the LPT had collapsed internally. He accused the party's Central Executive Committee of having become severed from the nation. The LPT he knew had become a club of intellectuals, whose officials were paid by the limited funds of the party. He added ominously that he was receiving letters pressing him to found a new party for working-people, and that he was considering it.

The split of the LPT into two large feuding groups and several smaller ones — generally more rigidly Marxist — rendered the party's activity in 1970 and 1971 ineffective, except perhaps on the propaganda level. Even here it had to compete with numerous other groups which advocated various degrees of leftist extremism, not to mention several rightist Islamic groups (one of which developed into a small political party). Suffice to say here that political fragmentation became the order of the day in the months following the 1969 elections.¹¹¹

This fragmentation visibly increased throughout the 1960's and may well be one of the most important signs of the politicization of Turkey's masses. Since reliable figures of party-memberships are not available, one has to examine more readily-found statistics.¹¹² While in the 1961 elections to the National Assembly, four parties competed, in 1965 the figure rose to six, and in 1969 to eight. In addition in 1969 thirteen independents were elected, as opposed to none in 1961 and 1965. If this is seen in the light of the proportionately lower voting participation in 1969 (a national average of 64.3%, as compared to 71.3% in 1965), the fragmentation becomes even more evident.

Elections to the Senate are less reliable as an indication of voting behavior, because the basis for comparison is weakened by the fact that every two years a different part of the Turkish electorate elects a third of the

¹¹⁰ *Milliyet, Yeni Gazete, Son Havadis* — all of April 14, 1971.

¹¹¹ See above, ch. 1.

¹¹² The following is based on the official Turkish statistics, as well as on data and sources mentioned earlier in the present chapter.

Senators.¹¹³ Even so, a brief examination is instructive. In 1961 all of Turkey's 67 provinces elected the entire Senate. Then, in 1964, 1966, and 1968 (but not in 1970), about a third of the provinces elected a third of the membership. Again, the number of competing parties had risen from four in 1964 to six in 1966 and 1968. Of equal relevance, parties were increasingly running in more electoral districts. The New Turkey Party, for example, had candidates in only 11 of out 24 electoral districts in 1964, but ran in 15 out of 21 districts in 1966.¹¹⁴ The Labor Party of Turkey ran in all districts in 1968; in 1966 it had failed to put candidates in one district.¹¹⁵

A similar picture emerges from the analysis of the results in the country-wide elections to provincial councils, mayoralties, municipal councils, and local councils on June 2, 1968.¹¹⁶ Participation was 65.7% and the votes were divided among eight parties and numerous independents. The latter obtained 6.8% of the valid vote, even more than independents were to get in the elections to the National Assembly in 1969 (5.7%) — as to be expected in local elections.

The lively interest shown everywhere in Turkey during the 1968 local elections was natural, since candidates were known locally and their personalities were bound to determine the material interests and day-to-day concerns of voters. Probably, too, rural landlords reminded voters to go to the polls. If anything, one wonders why participation was not larger on the national level. Part of the answer lies in the relatively low participation in those provinces with large urban centers. If one looks at the three provinces with Turkey's largest cities, the answer becomes clearer: participation was 62.5% in the province of Ankara, and a mere 43.6% and 58.8%, respectively, in those of Istanbul and Izmir.¹¹⁷ In the 1968 voting, participation was usually higher in the rural than in the urban areas.

While the swift increase in political alertness in Turkey's cities is self-evident and hardly needs elaboration, it is the gradually growing politicization of rural Turkey that is the more interesting — and, possibly, the

¹¹³ The Life Senators and those appointed by the State President are irrelevant to these comments on elections.

¹¹⁴ The NTP did not compete in 1968, as it had been weakening — although it did participate in local elections in the same year.

¹¹⁵ It had not run in 1964 at all, due to lack of preparedness for an electoral contest.

¹¹⁶ See Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *2 haziran 1968 mahalli seçimler sonuçları* (Ankara: 1969).

¹¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. V-VI.

more portentous — phenomenon. That this was so has already been observed, for instance by Professor Szyliowicz.¹¹⁸ In more recent years, the phenomenon was connected to regional voting by Professor Magnarella.¹¹⁹ However, it is rather in terms of participation in *political* elections that the growing interest in national (as distinct from local) politics should be measured.

In this context, an instructive picture emerges from a preliminary examination of voting in recent political elections. This is noticeable since the 1946 general elections, when the voters first had a choice between competing political parties. The wooing of the voters by the major parties — particularly, the RPP and DP — continued through the 1950's and gave the people a new sense of power. In the decade starting with the 1961 elections the process of intensive recruiting of electoral support and the ensuing politicization gathered pace, apparently due to three main causes:

- a. the improvement in mass communication, particularly the radio.
- b. the growth of the reading public, who could better absorb the violently aggressive tone and content of the more radical press.
- c. the growth in the number of political parties and in their skill in making use of the radio and press.

In addition a major factor in the increase in political participation in Turkey was the radicalization of politics. As the Republican People's Party had ruled supreme and virtually alone until 1946, so the political scene was dominated since, and particularly as of 1950, by two parties, the DP and RPP, which together were the decisive political forces. In the 1960's, there were still two major parties, the JP and RPP. There were evident differences, however. Firstly, no political party before 1965 had a majority in the National Assembly, and consequently coalition governments were necessary, with the cooperation of the top military command. Secondly (and more significantly), since 1965 two far-off-center parties became increasingly active during elections and between elections. The proportionate decline of the national vote of the JP in 1969 to 46.5% (from 52.9%) and that of the RPP to 27.4% (from 28.7%) indeed can be attributed, in large measure, to public dissatisfaction, as well as to the activity of the LPT and RPNP, and to that of other small parties.

In other words: votes in 1969 were almost everywhere widely distributed among the competing parties — indeed, much more so than in 1965.

¹¹⁸ *Political change in rural Turkey: Erdemli, op. cit.*

¹¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, in *The Muslim World*, LVII (3): July 1967; LVII (4): Oct. 1967, pp. 277–287.

Smaller parties, including the LPT and RPNP (now called the NAP) had by 1969 organized well enough to compete nearly everywhere. In 1965 the LPT had run in 51 out of Turkey's 67 provinces; in 1969 in all 67. In 1965, the RPNP had run in 48 provinces, in 1969 (as the NAP) in 60. It is clear that much of the effort of these two (and other) parties was directed at the urban population. It is interesting to note that, in the 1969 parliamentary elections, students in forty university dormitories (whose participation reached 93% of those having the right of vote) gave the LPT 18%, and the NAP 12%, of their total vote¹²⁰ — a substantially higher percentage than the national average. The election propaganda disseminated by candidates of these two parties and by their respective national party organization apparently succeeded, however, in penetrating even remote rural corners in eastern Turkey, too — to judge by the results of the voting. A comparison of the electoral results in 1965 and 1969¹²¹ shows that while in 1965 quite a few of Turkey's 67 provinces gave practically no votes to several of the parties, in 1969 this was the rare exception. Indeed in 1969 there were hardly any districts in which parties obtained no vote. Sometimes their aggregate support amounted to merely a handful of votes, of some tens or some hundreds at most, but the trend was unmistakable. This is noticeable, also, in a more minute breakdown.¹²² Of course not every poll included votes for every party, but most villages and all larger places did so.

This trend seems to indicate not only a greater penetration of radical propaganda into the Turkish countryside, but also a significant change in the political behavior of rural Turkey. In this respect, our examination of recent Turkish political elections confirms the conclusions reached by Professor Frey concerning the growing socialization of Turkish peasants under the impact of the mass media.¹²³ Indeed, as a result of interference in rural life by mass media, education, and intensive electoral propaganda, the landowners no longer received from their tenants the same automatic compliance as formerly, in voting. An impressive number of peasants,

¹²⁰ Official election results, reported by Genç, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹²¹ See e.g., Devlet istatistik enstitüsü, *12 ekim 1969 milletvekili seçimi sonuçları (il ve ilçeler itibariyle)* (Ankara: 1970), pp. 8–9.

¹²² For full details, cf. the much larger *12 ekim 1969 milletvekili seçimi sonuçları*, also prepared by the Devlet istatistik enstitüsü (Ankara: 1970), *passim*.

¹²³ F. W. Frey, "Surveying peasant attitudes in Turkey," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII (3): Fall 1963, pp. 335–355. Id., "Socialization to national identification among Turkish peasants," *The Journal of Politics*, XXX (4): Nov. 1968, pp. 934–965.

who had started believing in the secrecy of the ballot, voted with material or other considerations in mind (e.g., ethnic, as in the case of parts of the electorate in areas inhabited by Kurds) — in a manner showing considerably more self-appraisal of, and sometimes involvement in, politics.¹²⁴ A recent examination of political culture among a sample of Turkey's villagers has revealed that a very sizable number of landless peasants voted — against the wishes of the local *ağas* — for the LPT.¹²⁵ Political participation in Turkey, both rural and urban, although still determined by socio-economic variants, has been steadily increasing.¹²⁶ The radicalization of politics, with its emotional charge, has played a substantial part in the process of change.

¹²⁴ For an evaluation of material versus other considerations in the voting of Turkish peasants, see Szyliowicz, *op. cit.*, in *MEJ*, XVI (4): Autumn 1962, pp. 430–442.

¹²⁵ Özer Ozankaya, *Köyde toplumsal yapı ve siyasal kültür* (Ankara: 1971), esp. p. 228.

¹²⁶ Deniz Baykal, *Siyasal katılım: bir davranış incelemesi* (Ankara: 1970), *passim*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

IN CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages I have tried to analyze some of the main trends in the radicalization of politics in Turkey in the eleven years after the May 27, 1960 Revolution. If a political culture of a nation is the sum total of its orientation at a given moment in history, then Turkey's political culture in the 1960's is best characterized by radical orientations. More than any others these influenced the general course of Turkey's political history in that decade, and this despite the small membership of organized extremist groups.

Military involvement in politics appears the most significant event in Turkey's recent domestic affairs. In both May 1960 and March 1971, a non-politicized army intervened to oust the leader of the majority group in the National Assembly and to violate the principle of civilian supremacy in order to save the essence of civilian supremacy. To understand this move of the armed forces, one must remember the profound concern of the Turkish military for reform. An elitist group, which is naturally and professionally oriented towards enhancing national strength and prestige, the military has grasped that these ideals are largely a function of Turkey's economic development. In the 1960's, although the military high command closely watched political developments, its supervision was discreet and mostly invisible. Therefore, despite the importance of military-civilian relations in the period of May 1960 to March 1971, they cannot be considered a major facet of Turkish domestic politics. The situation after March 1971, although not yet finally crystallized at the time of writing, seems to have changed. The difference in the attitude of the military command can be related to two factors. Firstly, it has learnt the lesson of the failure of the 1960 coup, and has grasped that remote control of a skillful civilian government is not always effective. Consequently, it is inclined to see through the initiation of pressing socio-economic reforms. Secondly, it has found that military personnel, including junior officers (many of whom had been university students before being drafted) are not immune to radical propaganda. It has therefore ordered the retirement or transfer to other posts of some junior officers and has been supervising the political activity of others.

Increased political participation is another hallmark of this era. Again, it is not its main characteristic, for participation had also been a factor in Turkish politics in earlier years, particularly from the end of the Second

World War. However the period following the 1960 Revolution is peculiar in its speedy diversification (if one may be permitted to use the term in this sense). We have shown that the rival political parties succeeded practically everywhere in bringing out voters in their favor — even in remote places. For this purpose, the parties generally employed unsophisticated language. Polls often indicated support of all, or most parties, including such opposing extremes as the Labor Party of Turkey and the Republican Peasant National Party (Nationalist Action Party). This contrasts sharply with the pre-1960 situation where all of the vote, with few exceptions, went to the two major parties.

No less remarkable a political fact is that this growing and more diversified participation has increasingly affected rural Turkey. The urban-rural dichotomy has not disappeared, nor is it likely to do so overnight. Several forces, however, have contributed to a change in its character, such as the multiparty system and the improvement in transportation and mass communication. As put succinctly by Professor Szyliowicz,¹ “The increased contacts with the nearby towns set in motion ... the arousal of a whole complex of the new wants... their list of necessities now included radios, bicycles, running water, electricity and Western-style clothing. This was politically significant because these new expectations led to a marked preoccupation with ways and means of fulfilling them, and the inhabitants now realized that the sources of satisfaction lay outside the immediate community, i.e., in the national political system...”

Much of the political participation, in the period 1960–1971, bears the marks of increasing radicalization. True, this applies more to urban, rather than rural Turkey, with the intellectuals, particularly, showing marked political involvement. However, with large-scale immigration from the village to the city (frequently characterized by settling in shantytowns of *gecekondus*) and admission of many students of peasant origin into institutions of higher learning, this distinction does not necessarily hold. Radical politicians seem to find support among all strata, with youth supplying the ingredient needed for speedier fermentation. The relevance of growing radicalization in politics is striking when one compares what lay behind the two military interventions of 1960 and 1971. The former was essentially a coup against a majority party which had entrenched itself in power with rural support and, in broad terms, was neglecting reform and, consequently, modernization. The latter was a coup that was

¹ Erdemli, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

set in motion by, in addition to very much the same causes as that of 1960, the rising political activity of violently radical groups, chiefly of extreme leftist youths who were finding sympathy from certain urban elements (which indoctrinated them) and rural ones (which gave them shelter and hiding). While leftist groups set up in the years immediately following the Second World War were essentially political clubs and did not particularly worry the military unduly then or later, in 1971 radical youth activities caused serious concern to the military command. The unrelenting manhunt for fugitives belonging to these radical groups, and their continuing trials by martial courts, with all the attendant publicity, reflect military concern — if not at the physical force of these groups, at least at their impact. This attitude of the military is confirmed by the continued prosecution and banning by the courts of the Labor Party of Turkey and of the Party for National Order (although proceedings against them had been initiated before the March 12, 1971 Memorandum). Again, this attitude was reflected in the military authorities' ban on numerous extreme left and strongly Islamic newspapers and magazines.

The major feature of Turkey's radicalization in the period 1960-1971 remains, however, the visibly increasing involvement in politics of both left and right (these terms being used with all the caution stated in our Preface). This applies in varying degrees to the legal or quasi-legal activities, under the new Constitution and Party-Law, of the LPT, militant Islamic and Pan-Turk groups, the RPNP-NAP, and to the *Dev Genç* and its subsidiaries. All of the LPT, the Party for National Order, the *Dev Genç* and the leftist militant groups have been banned. Their relative importance to the radicalization of Turkish domestic politics remains, however, a matter of considerable interest.

There are some striking similarities between certain attitudes of many, perhaps most, of the radical groups that we have mentioned in this study. Both the left and the right recognized that politicization, like modernization, was an irreversible process in Turkey, and each contributed its share to the process. All of the LPT, the RPNP-NAP, and the Islamic groups, despite their varying ideological approach, recognized the interests of a large part of the population in material benefits and improvements. While there was no consensus among the national elites as to the best way to development, its need was not in doubt, and practically all political forces advocated it. Indeed, economic development was favored by all as one of the paths to social justice, or *sosyal adalet*, in its nineteenth-century meaning of "just treatment of all, irrespective of

creed or social standing, according to enacted laws.”² Of course, for Islamic groups, the concept was flavored with Islamic connotations, while the *Dev Genç* youths and others went further towards a more radically revolutionary approach combining social, economic and political desires for a total change of regime.

All these radical groups rejected close association with Europe and the United States, for varying reasons and with different degrees of emphasis. The left feared that association with the Common Market or with United States business would increase the capitalist hold (as they regarded it) on the country. The right, *Türkeş*-type, feared that foreign influence would undermine Turkish nationalism, while Islamic groups feared it would supplant religion with foreign values. All were apprehensive lest such an association would make it difficult, or even impossible, to establish and safeguard the kind of Turkey that each desired. The result was violent anti-foreign propaganda, chiefly anti-American, and (except for the left) anti-Russian.

It was somewhat more difficult to find a positive identification with the population. Since the political orientations of a large part of the population, particularly the “isolates” in Turkey’s eastern regions, were still neutral, Atatürk’s father-figure, the constitution, Islam, or the military forces were used variously by all radical groups to shape public opinion the way they wanted it. Both left and right adopted a patriotic tone, in order to identify with the nationalism of the masses. The right emphasized patriotism more insistently than the left, but the left’s frequent repetition of its desire for “a completely independent Turkey” was geared to very much the same theme as the right’s call for “a Great Turkey.” In order not to lose ground to either the LPT or the RPNP, conservative parties have also had to adopt strongly worded nationalist slogans and, in addition, have increasingly turned for political support to the religiously oriented rural population. This is what probably caused the RPNP, in the late 1960’s, to draw closer to Islamic circles, and even the LPT generally refrained from openly antagonizing these circles. What distinguished the politics of the other parties from the JP was that the former tried, with some success, to lessen citizen support for the government.

The frequently-voiced argument against the left in Turkey went roughly as follows. Since Communism is illegal in Turkey, every Communist

² For this meaning of *sosyal adalet*, see Niyazi Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: 1964), p. 511.

states he is a socialist or a leftist. This was largely accurate, but the implication was that everyone who claimed to be a socialist or a leftist was a covert communist. This was far from true, and the left went to great pains to reject this emphatically. Much the same applies to active Islamic circles, which had to convince the authorities that they were neither fanatic, nor regressive; and to the militant right, which had to prove that it was not fascist and racist, but nationalist and Pan-Turk.

Despite these similarities in tactical operation, there were naturally basic differences in the ideological premises and political strategies of the different radical parties and groups. Politically-minded Islamic groups, such as the Nurcular or the Party for National Order, attacked secularism, considering it hostile to religion, and campaigned for a return to tradition and the establishment of a theocracy. The Labor Party of Turkey, although maintaining that it was socialist, not communist, was hardly less vocal than the illegal Turkish Communist Party in its opposition to a society in which conspicuous consumption existed side by side with widespread poverty; its spokesmen openly advocated a "Socialist Turkey." The Republican Peasant National Party, then the Nationalist Action Party, repeatedly claimed that it was a centrist party, with its own brand of social-mindedness; called *toplumculuk*, Türkeş's, indeed, somewhat resembles Abd al-Nasser's earlier stage of "Arab socialism," in its being anti-communist (and a substitute for communism), as well as being combined with a strong dose of nationalism and Islam. Lastly, the interpretation of socialism by the *Dev Genç* and other impatient youth groups, with their leanings to violent revolution, was closer to that of the TCP. In recent years their struggles have largely shaped Turkey's political culture.

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