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Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars - 1


Editor : CSIS Date & Place : 2007, Washington
Preface : Pages : 600
Traduction : ISBN : 0–275–99250–0
Language : EnglishFormat : 155x235 mm
FIKP's Code : Liv. Ang.Theme : Politics

Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars - 1

Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars - 1

Anthony H. Cordesman
Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

CSIS

For most of the modern era, the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a ‘‘four cornered’’ balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf States.

Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other.

.....


Contents

Figures / xvii
Acknowledgments / xxi

Chapter 1: introduction: the new balancing act in the gulf / 1
Key factors changing gulf security dynamics / 2
The enduring dynamics of gulf (in) security / 4
A Southern gulf divided against itself / 4
The self-destructive north / 5
The destabilizing outside stabilizers / 8
A future of discord and dependence? / 10
A hollow gulf cooperation council and de facto reliance on the ‘‘Fifth Corner’’ / 11
Islamic extremism, terrorism, and insurgency / 11
The Iranian problem / 12
Iraq as a Power Vacuum / 12
Yemen at the Margins / 12
Squaring the Fifth Corner? / 13
Security developments in the southern gulf / 13
Going Hollow at Great Cost / 14
The Key Factors Shaping Southern Gulf Forces / 14
Key Issues in Force Development / 18
Military developments in the northern gulf / 23
‘‘Snapshots’’ of comparative force strength / 24
Broad Trends Affecting the Balance / 24
Trends Affecting Military Manpower / 25
Trends Affecting Land Forces / 26
Trends Affecting Air and Air Defense Forces / 29
Trends Affecting Naval Forces / 31
Adapting to the changing nature of military power / 32
Force Quality over Force Quantity: The Revolution in Military Affairs / 34
The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers / 48
The Threat of Asymmetric Warfare and Nonstate Actors / 56
The Vulnerability of Conventional Military Power / 61
Nonstate Actors as a Transnational Threat / 63

Chapter 2: Bahrain / 65
Military spending and arms imports / 68
Military manpower / 68
The Bahraini army / 71
Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 71
Artillery / 72
Antiaircraft Weapons / 72
Overall Assessment / 73
The Bahraini Air Force / 73
Combat Air Strength / 73
Other Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 75
Overall Assessment / 75
The Bahraini Navy / 75
Surface Combat Forces / 76
Overall Assessment / 77
Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Forces / 77
Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 78
Overall Assessment / 80
Bahrain’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 80
Socioeconomic Challenges / 80
Relations with Neighboring States / 81
Political Unrest / 83
Bahrain’s Struggle against Terrorism / 83
Ongoing Internal Stability / 84
Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 86

Chapter 3: Kuwait / 87
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 89
Military Manpower / 91
The Kuwaiti Army / 92
Force Structure / 92
Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 94
Artillery / 95
Overall Assessment / 96
The Kuwaiti Air Force / 96
Combat Air Strength / 98
Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 98
Overall Assessment / 98
The Kuwaiti Air Defense / 99
Major Air Defense Missiles / 99
Other Air Defense Systems / 100
Overall Assessment / 100
The Kuwaiti Navy / 100
Surface Combat Forces / 101
Amphibious and Support Boats / 102
Coast Guard / 102
Overall Assessment / 103
Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Forces / 103
Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 103
Kuwait’s Struggle against Terrorism / 106
Kuwait’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 110
Political Challenges / 111
Socioeconomic Challenges / 113
Relations with Neighboring States / 116

Chapter 4: Oman / 119
Oman’s Emergence as a Strategic Player in the Gulf / 121
Internal Politics and Stability / 122
Economic Reform, Diversification, and Stability / 123
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 124
Military Manpower / 125
The Omani Army / 126
Force Organization / 126
Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 126
Artillery / 129
Antiaircraft Weapons / 129
Overall Assessment / 129
Omani Air Force / 130
Combat Air Strength / 130
Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 130
Overall Assessment / 130
The Omani Navy / 132
Surface Combat Forces / 132
Amphibious Forces / 132
Overall Assessment / 133
Oman Royal Guards Forces / 134
Omani Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Services / 134
Trends in Force Structure / 136
Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 136
Oman’s Struggle against Terrorism / 138
Political Uncertainty / 139
Oman’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 139
Economic Challenges and Diversification / 139
Oil and Stability / 140
The ‘‘Demographic Time Bomb’’ / 141
Relations with Neighboring States / 141
Ongoing Internal Stability / 142
Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 143

Chapter 5: Qatar / 145
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 146
Military Manpower / 147
The Qatari Army / 148
The Qatari Air Force / 150
Qatar Air Defense / 152
The Qatari Navy / 152
Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Services / 154
Continuing Strategic Challenges / 154
Qatar, the GCC, and the Broader Middle East / 155
Qatar, Iran, and the North Field / 155
Qatar’s Uncertain Domestic Environment / 156
Qatar and Terrorism / 157
The Youth Explosion and the Radicalization of Qatar’s Youth / 159

Chapter 6: Saudi Arabia / 163
Saudi Strategic Dynamics / 165
The Saudi National Security Apparatus / 168
The Search for Jointness / 168
Slow Improvement in Jointness in the Regular Services / 169
Establishing Broader Jointness for Counterterrorism / 170
The Importance of Consensus and Consultation / 171
The Role of the Saudi National Security Council / 173
Saudi Military and Security Spending / 173
Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure / 174
Saudi Arms Imports / 176
The Impact of the Gulf War / 178
Arms Imports since the Late 1990s / 179
Manpower / 181
The Saudi Army / 181
Force Strength and Structure / 184
Saudi Armored Forces / 185Saudi Antitank Weapons / 187
Saudi Artillery / 188
Saudi Light and Medium Air Defense Weapons / 188
Saudi Army Aviation / 189
Facilities and Infrastructure / 191
Overall Capabilities / 193
The Saudi National Guard / 194
Strength and Organization / 195
Major Combat Equipment / 197
Modernization and New Mission Requirements / 197
Overall Capabilities / 198
The Saudi Navy / 199
Strength and Organization / 199
Main Surface Combatants / 199
Smaller Combat Ships, Mine Warfare, and Support Forces / 202
Submarines? / 203
Marine and Amphibious Forces / 203
Naval Aviation / 203
Saudi Border Guard / 204
Roles, Missions, and Capability / 205
The Saudi Air Force 206
Strength and Structure / 207
Combat Aircraft / 207
Possible Upgrades to RSAF Combat Aircraft / 211
Upgrading the RSAF Tornados? / 212
Purchasing the Rafael? / 213
The Eurofighter Typhoon / 213
Reconnaissance and Early Warning / 214
Training Aircraft / 215
Refueling, Transport, and Support / 215
Munitions and Spares / 216
Support, Training, Logistics, and Sustainment / 216
Overall Capabilities / 216
Saudi Land-Based Air Defenses / 217
The Saudi Air Defense Force / 218
The Patriot and the I-Hawk / 219
Other Land-Based Air Defenses / 220
Overall Capabilities / 220
Saudi Missile Forces and the Possibility Of Saudi WMD / 221
Modernizing the CSS-2 / 222
What Comes Next? / 225
NBC Defense Capabilities / 227
Saudi Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Services / 227
Saudi Arabia’s Main Internal Security Forces / 228
The Pivotal Role of the Ministry of Interior / 228
The Police and Security Services / 230
General Security Service / 233
The General Intelligence Presidency / 233
The Changing Role of the GIP / 234
Changes in the GIP Leadership / 235
The Future Role and Capabilities of the GIP / 235
Border and Coastal Security / 236
The Role of the Border Guard / 236
The Option of a Border Surveillance and Defense System / 238
Saudi Border Guard Development Program / 238
The Expanding Mission of the Border Guard / 239
Security and the Role of the Judicial System / 240
The Judicial System and Internal Security / 240
The ‘‘Mutawwa’in’’ or Religious Police / 241
An Effective Internal Security Force ? / 242
Saudi Arabia’s continuing strategic challenges / 243
Terrorism and Counterterrorism / 247
Saudi Internal Security before 9-11 / 248
Saudi Response to 9-11 / 249
The Impact of May 2003 / 251
Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts since May 2003 / 251
Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia / 253
Saudi Petroleum Security Apparatus / 254
Asymmetric Threat to Energy Security / 255
Assessing the Saudi Security Forces’ Performance at Abqaiq / 256
The Uncertain Future of Iraq / 259
Iraq as a Conventional Military Threat to its Neighbors ? / 260
The Creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite Block’’ in the Gulf? / 261
Saudi Views on Iran’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Affairs / 263
Regional Insurgency: The Potential Spillover Effect / 265
The Threat from Foreign Fighters / 265
The Threat of a Fragmented Iraq ? / 267
The Threat from Iran / 269
Key Iranian Threat / 270
Saudi Reaction to Iran’s Nuclear Program / 271
Collective Security and Relations with the GCC / 272
Counterterrorism Cooperation / 273
Military Cooperation / 275
Socioeconomic Challenges / 275
Economic Reforms / 276
Addressing the Demographic Pressures and Unemployment / 278
Prospects for Saudi Stability / 281

Chapter 7: united Arab Emirates / 283
Command structure of armed forces / 285
Military spending / 285
Military manpower / 287
The UAE army / 287
Force Structure / 290
Armor / 290
Anti armor / 291
Artillery / 291
Air Defense Holdings / 292
Other Recent Developments and Acquisitions / 293
Overall Assessment / 293
The UAE air force / 294
Fixed-Wing Air Strength / 294
Helicopters / 294
Uncertain Strength and Capabilities / 297
Recent Developments and Acquisitions / 298
Summary Assessment / 299
UAE land-based air defense / 300
The Pantsir-SIE / 301
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense / 301
The Facade of Integration / 301
Summary Assessment / 302
The UAE navy / 302
Ship Strength / 302
Naval Aviation / 304
Naval Modernization / 304
Summary Assessment / 306
Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Services / 306
The United Arab Emirates’ Continuing Strategic Challenges / 309
Political Uncertainty / 309
Iran and the United Arab Emirates / 310
The GCC and the United Arab Emirates / 311
Territorial Dispute with Saudi Arabia / 312
Economic Challenges / 313
Demographic Challenges / 314

Chapter 8: Iran / 317
Iran’s Changing Role in Regional Security / 317
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 320
Military Manpower / 322
The Iranian Army / 322
Iranian Tank Strength / 323
Other Iranian Armor / 329
Iranian Anti armor Weapons / 330
Iranian Artillery Strength / 331
Iranian Army Air Defense Systems / 334
Iranian Army Aviation / 335
Iranian Army’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) / 335
Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability / 335
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) / 336
IRGC Land Forces / 336
The IRGC Air Force / 337
The IRGC Naval Forces / 337
Proxy and Covert CBRN Operations / 338
The Quds (Qods) Forces / 338
Role in Iran’s Industries / 339
The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces / 340
The Iranian Air Force / 340
Iranian Air Strength / 343
Iranian Aircraft Development / 344
Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness / 345
Iranian Land-Based Air Defense / 347
The Iranian Navy / 350
Iranian Antiship Missiles and Missile Craft / 352
Iranian Mine Warfare Capabilities / 355
Iranian Amphibious Assets / 356
Iranian Naval Air / 356
Iran’s Submarine Forces / 357
The Role of the Naval Branch of the IRGC / 359
Naval Force Deployments / 359
Overall Naval Capabilities / 360
Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Program / 360
Chemical Weapons / 361
Official Estimates of Iranian Capability / 361
Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability / 363
NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability / 363
Biological Weapons / 364
Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program / 365
The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s / 366
Continuing Alarms and Excursions / 366
The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers / 367
Possible CBW War-Fighting Capability / 368
Possible Nuclear Weapons Programs / 371
Problems in Analyzing Iran’s WMD Program: A Case Study / 372
Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources / 374
Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments / 376
Plutonium Production / 376
Uranium Enrichment / 377
A Continuing Process of Discovery / 385
Iran’s Long-Range Missile Arsenal / 387
Shahab-1/SCUD-B / 389
Shahab-2/SCUD-C / 391
CCS-8 or Tondar 69 / 393
Shahab-3 / 393
Missile Development / 393
Uncertain Performance / 395
Mobility and Deployment / 398
Shahab-3A/3M/3D/IRIS / 398
Shahab-4 / 399
Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 / 400
Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 / 401
Raduga KH-55 Granat/Kh-55/AS-15 Kent / 402
Paramilitary, Internal Security, And Intelligence Forces / 403
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) / 404
The IRGC Intelligence Branch / 405
The Basij Resistance Force / 405
The Uncertain Role of the Ministry of Interior / 406
Iran’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 406
Iran’s Nuclear Program and Its Strategic Consequences / 410
Economic Sanctions / 410
Military Strikes / 413
Iranian Defense against U.S. Strikes / 414
Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes / 416
The Strategic Implications of a Military Strike against Iran / 419
The Future of Iraq / 419
Other Challenges / 423

Chapter 9: Iraq / 425
A Pattern of External and Internal Violence / 425
Iraq’s Strategic Importance / 428
Iraqi Military Development / 430
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 434
Iraqi Military Manpower / 438
The Iraqi Army / 440
Equipment Holdings and Issues / 443
Support Forces / 445
The Iraqi Air Force / 446
The Iraqi Navy / 448
Paramilitary, Security, Police, And Intelligence Forces / 450
The Ministry of Interior as a ‘‘Threat’’ / 451
Real vs. Authorized Strength / 453
The Status of Special Security Forces / 454
Force Size and Readiness / 455
Steps toward Reform / 456
The Regular Police / 457
Increases in Police Strength /458
The ‘‘Year of the Police’’ / 458
Ongoing Reform / 459
Equipment and Training / 460
Dealing with Divided Loyalties / 461
Facility Construction / 461
Department of Border Enforcement / 462
Coalition Border Transition Teams / 462
Border Forces Equipment and Training / 463
Uncertain Progress in Facilities / 463
Other Developments in Border Enforcement / 464
Facilities Protection Forces, Private Security Personnel, and ‘‘Ministry Armies’’ / 464
The Facilities Protection Services / 464
The Infrastructure Protection Forces and Other Non-MOD/MOI Paramilitary Elements / 465
Intelligence / 467
Iraq’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 467
The Growing Level of Violence in Iraq / 467
The Dangers of Strategic Uncertainty / 469
Socioeconomic Challenges / 472
An Aging Energy Sector / 476
Political Conciliation vs. Civil War / 479
Insurgent Attacks Push Iraq toward More Intense Civil War / 482
The Future of the Insurgency and the Prospect of Large-Scale Civil War / 484
The ‘‘Nationalist’’ Need for Compromise / 484
The ‘‘Islamist’’ Need for Civil War / 485
The Threat from Shi’ite Death Squads and Militias / 486
Links to the Iraqi Police and Special Security Forces / 487
Questionable Loyalties / 489
The Kurdish Question / 492
Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias / 493
Tensions between the Kurds and Other Iraqis / 493
Uncertain Kurdish Unity / 496
The Problem of Resources and Oil / 497
The Turkish Question / 498
Relationship with Neighboring States / 498
Creating a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’? / 498
The Arab Gulf States / 499
Jordan / 499
Turkey / 501
Iran / 502
Syria / 508

Chapter 10: Yemen / 513
Military Spending and Arms Imports / 515
Military Manpower / 517
The Yemeni Army / 518
Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 518
Artillery / 522
Antiaircraft Weapons / 522
Ballistic Missiles and Rockets / 523
Overall Assessment / 523
The Yemeni Air Force / 523
Combat Air Strength / 525
Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 525
Overall Assessment / 526
Yemeni Air Defense Forces / 526
The Yemeni Navy / 526
Surface Combat Forces / 526
Amphibious Forces / 529
Overall Assessment / 529
Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Forces / 530
Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 530
Yemen’s Struggle against Terrorism / 531
Pattern of Attacks / 534
Political Unrest / 536
Yemen’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 537
Socioeconomic Challenges / 537
The Bab al-Mandeb / 539
Relations with Neighboring States / 539
Ongoing Internal Instability / 540
Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 543

Chapter 11: Conclusion: The New Balancing Act in the Gulf / 545
The Need for More Effective Security Structures / 546
Meeting the Islamist Extremist Challenge / 548
Taking Responsibility vs. Continuing Exercises in Futility / 548
Notes / 551


INTRODUCTION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF

For most of the modern era, the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a ‘‘four cornered’’ balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf States.

Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other.

Two outside powers, Britain and the United States, have been the ‘‘fifth corner’’ in this security structure. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all host U.S. bases and power projection facilities, and Oman has close ties to Britain. The United States, in particular, has effectively dominated the regional security structure whenever it chose to directly intervene. These interventions included aiding North Yemen against South Yemen, intervening in the Iran-Iraq War by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers in 1987–1988, leading the liberation of Kuwait in 1990–1991, and invading Iraq in 2003. In the process, the United States has gone from being ‘‘over the horizon’’ to ‘‘constantly in sight.’’

In spite of the creation of regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, Gulf ‘‘security’’ has been the product of largely uncoordinated national efforts. Iran and Iraq have always acted as independent powers. Each of the southern Gulf States has pursued its own path to national security, and the smaller Gulf countries have relied on the power projection forces of the United Kingdom and the United States for security and as a counterbalance to their neighbors.

.....



Acknowledgments

We are grateful to so many people who have contributed in so many ways to this book. We want to thank many regional, U.S., and European officials, who cannot be mentioned by name, for offering their time, comments, suggestions, and data to earlier versions of this book. We are also grateful to so many research assistants who have contributed to the drafting and research of this book, including William D. Sullivan, Paul S. Frederiksen, Nikos Tsafos, and William Elliott.

The analysis in this book relied heavily on the work of many governmental and nongovernmental agencies, particularly the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Jane’s, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), GlobalSecurity.org, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and many other defense and energy agencies. In addition, the analysis relied heavily on the work of many regional, military, and security experts. The analysis of the Saudi internal security forces drew heavily on the work by Dr. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid’s work on the Saudi National Security in late 2005.


Anthony H. Cordesman
Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars
Volume 1
Anthony H. Cordesman
Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C.

Praeger Security International
Westport, Connecticut - London

Praeger Security International Advisory Board

Board Cochairs

Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public
and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.)

Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board,
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St.
Andrews (U.K.)

Members
Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director,
Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.)

The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission,
and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France)

Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University,
and Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.)

Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.)

Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director,
International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.)

Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War,
All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia)

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of
Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.)

Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (Indonesia)

Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cordesman, Anthony H.
Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0–275–99250–0 (set : alk. paper)
ISBN 0–275–99399–X (vol 1 : alk. paper)
ISBN 0–275–99400–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper)
1. Middle East-Armed Forces. 2. Asymmetric warfare-Middle East. 3. National security-Persian
Gulf States. 4. Persian Gulf States—Military relations. 5. Armed Forces. 6. Balance of power. 7.
Military readiness. I. Al-Rodhan, Khalid R. II. Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Washington, D.C.) III. Title.
UA832.C67028 2007
355’.0330536—dc22 2006031049

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2007 by Center for Strategic and International Studies
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced,
by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006031049
ISBN: 0–275–99250–0 (set)
0–275–99399–X (vol. 1)
0–275–99400–7 (vol. 2)

First published in 2007

Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984)
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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