Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars - 1
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
CSIS
For most of the modern era, the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a ‘‘four cornered’’ balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf States.
Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other.
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Contents
Figures / xvii Acknowledgments / xxi
Chapter 1: introduction: the new balancing act in the gulf / 1 Key factors changing gulf security dynamics / 2 The enduring dynamics of gulf (in) security / 4 A Southern gulf divided against itself / 4 The self-destructive north / 5 The destabilizing outside stabilizers / 8 A future of discord and dependence? / 10 A hollow gulf cooperation council and de facto reliance on the ‘‘Fifth Corner’’ / 11 Islamic extremism, terrorism, and insurgency / 11 The Iranian problem / 12 Iraq as a Power Vacuum / 12 Yemen at the Margins / 12 Squaring the Fifth Corner? / 13 Security developments in the southern gulf / 13 Going Hollow at Great Cost / 14 The Key Factors Shaping Southern Gulf Forces / 14 Key Issues in Force Development / 18 Military developments in the northern gulf / 23 ‘‘Snapshots’’ of comparative force strength / 24 Broad Trends Affecting the Balance / 24 Trends Affecting Military Manpower / 25 Trends Affecting Land Forces / 26 Trends Affecting Air and Air Defense Forces / 29 Trends Affecting Naval Forces / 31 Adapting to the changing nature of military power / 32 Force Quality over Force Quantity: The Revolution in Military Affairs / 34 The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers / 48 The Threat of Asymmetric Warfare and Nonstate Actors / 56 The Vulnerability of Conventional Military Power / 61 Nonstate Actors as a Transnational Threat / 63
Chapter 2: Bahrain / 65 Military spending and arms imports / 68 Military manpower / 68 The Bahraini army / 71 Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 71 Artillery / 72 Antiaircraft Weapons / 72 Overall Assessment / 73 The Bahraini Air Force / 73 Combat Air Strength / 73 Other Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 75 Overall Assessment / 75 The Bahraini Navy / 75 Surface Combat Forces / 76 Overall Assessment / 77 Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Forces / 77 Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 78 Overall Assessment / 80 Bahrain’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 80 Socioeconomic Challenges / 80 Relations with Neighboring States / 81 Political Unrest / 83 Bahrain’s Struggle against Terrorism / 83 Ongoing Internal Stability / 84 Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 86
Chapter 3: Kuwait / 87 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 89 Military Manpower / 91 The Kuwaiti Army / 92 Force Structure / 92 Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 94 Artillery / 95 Overall Assessment / 96 The Kuwaiti Air Force / 96 Combat Air Strength / 98 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 98 Overall Assessment / 98 The Kuwaiti Air Defense / 99 Major Air Defense Missiles / 99 Other Air Defense Systems / 100 Overall Assessment / 100 The Kuwaiti Navy / 100 Surface Combat Forces / 101 Amphibious and Support Boats / 102 Coast Guard / 102 Overall Assessment / 103 Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Forces / 103 Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 103 Kuwait’s Struggle against Terrorism / 106 Kuwait’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 110 Political Challenges / 111 Socioeconomic Challenges / 113 Relations with Neighboring States / 116
Chapter 4: Oman / 119 Oman’s Emergence as a Strategic Player in the Gulf / 121 Internal Politics and Stability / 122 Economic Reform, Diversification, and Stability / 123 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 124 Military Manpower / 125 The Omani Army / 126 Force Organization / 126 Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 126 Artillery / 129 Antiaircraft Weapons / 129 Overall Assessment / 129 Omani Air Force / 130 Combat Air Strength / 130 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 130 Overall Assessment / 130 The Omani Navy / 132 Surface Combat Forces / 132 Amphibious Forces / 132 Overall Assessment / 133 Oman Royal Guards Forces / 134 Omani Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Services / 134 Trends in Force Structure / 136 Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 136 Oman’s Struggle against Terrorism / 138 Political Uncertainty / 139 Oman’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 139 Economic Challenges and Diversification / 139 Oil and Stability / 140 The ‘‘Demographic Time Bomb’’ / 141 Relations with Neighboring States / 141 Ongoing Internal Stability / 142 Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 143
Chapter 5: Qatar / 145 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 146 Military Manpower / 147 The Qatari Army / 148 The Qatari Air Force / 150 Qatar Air Defense / 152 The Qatari Navy / 152 Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Services / 154 Continuing Strategic Challenges / 154 Qatar, the GCC, and the Broader Middle East / 155 Qatar, Iran, and the North Field / 155 Qatar’s Uncertain Domestic Environment / 156 Qatar and Terrorism / 157 The Youth Explosion and the Radicalization of Qatar’s Youth / 159
Chapter 6: Saudi Arabia / 163 Saudi Strategic Dynamics / 165 The Saudi National Security Apparatus / 168 The Search for Jointness / 168 Slow Improvement in Jointness in the Regular Services / 169 Establishing Broader Jointness for Counterterrorism / 170 The Importance of Consensus and Consultation / 171 The Role of the Saudi National Security Council / 173 Saudi Military and Security Spending / 173 Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure / 174 Saudi Arms Imports / 176 The Impact of the Gulf War / 178 Arms Imports since the Late 1990s / 179 Manpower / 181 The Saudi Army / 181 Force Strength and Structure / 184 Saudi Armored Forces / 185Saudi Antitank Weapons / 187 Saudi Artillery / 188 Saudi Light and Medium Air Defense Weapons / 188 Saudi Army Aviation / 189 Facilities and Infrastructure / 191 Overall Capabilities / 193 The Saudi National Guard / 194 Strength and Organization / 195 Major Combat Equipment / 197 Modernization and New Mission Requirements / 197 Overall Capabilities / 198 The Saudi Navy / 199 Strength and Organization / 199 Main Surface Combatants / 199 Smaller Combat Ships, Mine Warfare, and Support Forces / 202 Submarines? / 203 Marine and Amphibious Forces / 203 Naval Aviation / 203 Saudi Border Guard / 204 Roles, Missions, and Capability / 205 The Saudi Air Force 206 Strength and Structure / 207 Combat Aircraft / 207 Possible Upgrades to RSAF Combat Aircraft / 211 Upgrading the RSAF Tornados? / 212 Purchasing the Rafael? / 213 The Eurofighter Typhoon / 213 Reconnaissance and Early Warning / 214 Training Aircraft / 215 Refueling, Transport, and Support / 215 Munitions and Spares / 216 Support, Training, Logistics, and Sustainment / 216 Overall Capabilities / 216 Saudi Land-Based Air Defenses / 217 The Saudi Air Defense Force / 218 The Patriot and the I-Hawk / 219 Other Land-Based Air Defenses / 220 Overall Capabilities / 220 Saudi Missile Forces and the Possibility Of Saudi WMD / 221 Modernizing the CSS-2 / 222 What Comes Next? / 225 NBC Defense Capabilities / 227 Saudi Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Services / 227 Saudi Arabia’s Main Internal Security Forces / 228 The Pivotal Role of the Ministry of Interior / 228 The Police and Security Services / 230 General Security Service / 233 The General Intelligence Presidency / 233 The Changing Role of the GIP / 234 Changes in the GIP Leadership / 235 The Future Role and Capabilities of the GIP / 235 Border and Coastal Security / 236 The Role of the Border Guard / 236 The Option of a Border Surveillance and Defense System / 238 Saudi Border Guard Development Program / 238 The Expanding Mission of the Border Guard / 239 Security and the Role of the Judicial System / 240 The Judicial System and Internal Security / 240 The ‘‘Mutawwa’in’’ or Religious Police / 241 An Effective Internal Security Force ? / 242 Saudi Arabia’s continuing strategic challenges / 243 Terrorism and Counterterrorism / 247 Saudi Internal Security before 9-11 / 248 Saudi Response to 9-11 / 249 The Impact of May 2003 / 251 Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts since May 2003 / 251 Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia / 253 Saudi Petroleum Security Apparatus / 254 Asymmetric Threat to Energy Security / 255 Assessing the Saudi Security Forces’ Performance at Abqaiq / 256 The Uncertain Future of Iraq / 259 Iraq as a Conventional Military Threat to its Neighbors ? / 260 The Creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite Block’’ in the Gulf? / 261 Saudi Views on Iran’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Affairs / 263 Regional Insurgency: The Potential Spillover Effect / 265 The Threat from Foreign Fighters / 265 The Threat of a Fragmented Iraq ? / 267 The Threat from Iran / 269 Key Iranian Threat / 270 Saudi Reaction to Iran’s Nuclear Program / 271 Collective Security and Relations with the GCC / 272 Counterterrorism Cooperation / 273 Military Cooperation / 275 Socioeconomic Challenges / 275 Economic Reforms / 276 Addressing the Demographic Pressures and Unemployment / 278 Prospects for Saudi Stability / 281
Chapter 7: united Arab Emirates / 283 Command structure of armed forces / 285 Military spending / 285 Military manpower / 287 The UAE army / 287 Force Structure / 290 Armor / 290 Anti armor / 291 Artillery / 291 Air Defense Holdings / 292 Other Recent Developments and Acquisitions / 293 Overall Assessment / 293 The UAE air force / 294 Fixed-Wing Air Strength / 294 Helicopters / 294 Uncertain Strength and Capabilities / 297 Recent Developments and Acquisitions / 298 Summary Assessment / 299 UAE land-based air defense / 300 The Pantsir-SIE / 301 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense / 301 The Facade of Integration / 301 Summary Assessment / 302 The UAE navy / 302 Ship Strength / 302 Naval Aviation / 304 Naval Modernization / 304 Summary Assessment / 306 Paramilitary, Security, And Intelligence Services / 306 The United Arab Emirates’ Continuing Strategic Challenges / 309 Political Uncertainty / 309 Iran and the United Arab Emirates / 310 The GCC and the United Arab Emirates / 311 Territorial Dispute with Saudi Arabia / 312 Economic Challenges / 313 Demographic Challenges / 314
Chapter 8: Iran / 317 Iran’s Changing Role in Regional Security / 317 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 320 Military Manpower / 322 The Iranian Army / 322 Iranian Tank Strength / 323 Other Iranian Armor / 329 Iranian Anti armor Weapons / 330 Iranian Artillery Strength / 331 Iranian Army Air Defense Systems / 334 Iranian Army Aviation / 335 Iranian Army’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) / 335 Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability / 335 The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) / 336 IRGC Land Forces / 336 The IRGC Air Force / 337 The IRGC Naval Forces / 337 Proxy and Covert CBRN Operations / 338 The Quds (Qods) Forces / 338 Role in Iran’s Industries / 339 The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces / 340 The Iranian Air Force / 340 Iranian Air Strength / 343 Iranian Aircraft Development / 344 Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness / 345 Iranian Land-Based Air Defense / 347 The Iranian Navy / 350 Iranian Antiship Missiles and Missile Craft / 352 Iranian Mine Warfare Capabilities / 355 Iranian Amphibious Assets / 356 Iranian Naval Air / 356 Iran’s Submarine Forces / 357 The Role of the Naval Branch of the IRGC / 359 Naval Force Deployments / 359 Overall Naval Capabilities / 360 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Program / 360 Chemical Weapons / 361 Official Estimates of Iranian Capability / 361 Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability / 363 NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability / 363 Biological Weapons / 364 Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program / 365 The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s / 366 Continuing Alarms and Excursions / 366 The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers / 367 Possible CBW War-Fighting Capability / 368 Possible Nuclear Weapons Programs / 371 Problems in Analyzing Iran’s WMD Program: A Case Study / 372 Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources / 374 Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments / 376 Plutonium Production / 376 Uranium Enrichment / 377 A Continuing Process of Discovery / 385 Iran’s Long-Range Missile Arsenal / 387 Shahab-1/SCUD-B / 389 Shahab-2/SCUD-C / 391 CCS-8 or Tondar 69 / 393 Shahab-3 / 393 Missile Development / 393 Uncertain Performance / 395 Mobility and Deployment / 398 Shahab-3A/3M/3D/IRIS / 398 Shahab-4 / 399 Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 / 400 Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 / 401 Raduga KH-55 Granat/Kh-55/AS-15 Kent / 402 Paramilitary, Internal Security, And Intelligence Forces / 403 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) / 404 The IRGC Intelligence Branch / 405 The Basij Resistance Force / 405 The Uncertain Role of the Ministry of Interior / 406 Iran’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 406 Iran’s Nuclear Program and Its Strategic Consequences / 410 Economic Sanctions / 410 Military Strikes / 413 Iranian Defense against U.S. Strikes / 414 Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes / 416 The Strategic Implications of a Military Strike against Iran / 419 The Future of Iraq / 419 Other Challenges / 423
Chapter 9: Iraq / 425 A Pattern of External and Internal Violence / 425 Iraq’s Strategic Importance / 428 Iraqi Military Development / 430 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 434 Iraqi Military Manpower / 438 The Iraqi Army / 440 Equipment Holdings and Issues / 443 Support Forces / 445 The Iraqi Air Force / 446 The Iraqi Navy / 448 Paramilitary, Security, Police, And Intelligence Forces / 450 The Ministry of Interior as a ‘‘Threat’’ / 451 Real vs. Authorized Strength / 453 The Status of Special Security Forces / 454 Force Size and Readiness / 455 Steps toward Reform / 456 The Regular Police / 457 Increases in Police Strength /458 The ‘‘Year of the Police’’ / 458 Ongoing Reform / 459 Equipment and Training / 460 Dealing with Divided Loyalties / 461 Facility Construction / 461 Department of Border Enforcement / 462 Coalition Border Transition Teams / 462 Border Forces Equipment and Training / 463 Uncertain Progress in Facilities / 463 Other Developments in Border Enforcement / 464 Facilities Protection Forces, Private Security Personnel, and ‘‘Ministry Armies’’ / 464 The Facilities Protection Services / 464 The Infrastructure Protection Forces and Other Non-MOD/MOI Paramilitary Elements / 465 Intelligence / 467 Iraq’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 467 The Growing Level of Violence in Iraq / 467 The Dangers of Strategic Uncertainty / 469 Socioeconomic Challenges / 472 An Aging Energy Sector / 476 Political Conciliation vs. Civil War / 479 Insurgent Attacks Push Iraq toward More Intense Civil War / 482 The Future of the Insurgency and the Prospect of Large-Scale Civil War / 484 The ‘‘Nationalist’’ Need for Compromise / 484 The ‘‘Islamist’’ Need for Civil War / 485 The Threat from Shi’ite Death Squads and Militias / 486 Links to the Iraqi Police and Special Security Forces / 487 Questionable Loyalties / 489 The Kurdish Question / 492 Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias / 493 Tensions between the Kurds and Other Iraqis / 493 Uncertain Kurdish Unity / 496 The Problem of Resources and Oil / 497 The Turkish Question / 498 Relationship with Neighboring States / 498 Creating a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’? / 498 The Arab Gulf States / 499 Jordan / 499 Turkey / 501 Iran / 502 Syria / 508
Chapter 10: Yemen / 513 Military Spending and Arms Imports / 515 Military Manpower / 517 The Yemeni Army / 518 Armor and Antiarmor Weapons / 518 Artillery / 522 Antiaircraft Weapons / 522 Ballistic Missiles and Rockets / 523 Overall Assessment / 523 The Yemeni Air Force / 523 Combat Air Strength / 525 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft / 525 Overall Assessment / 526 Yemeni Air Defense Forces / 526 The Yemeni Navy / 526 Surface Combat Forces / 526 Amphibious Forces / 529 Overall Assessment / 529 Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Forces / 530 Main Security and Paramilitary Forces / 530 Yemen’s Struggle against Terrorism / 531 Pattern of Attacks / 534 Political Unrest / 536 Yemen’s Continuing Strategic Challenges / 537 Socioeconomic Challenges / 537 The Bab al-Mandeb / 539 Relations with Neighboring States / 539 Ongoing Internal Instability / 540 Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs / 543
Chapter 11: Conclusion: The New Balancing Act in the Gulf / 545 The Need for More Effective Security Structures / 546 Meeting the Islamist Extremist Challenge / 548 Taking Responsibility vs. Continuing Exercises in Futility / 548 Notes / 551
INTRODUCTION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF
For most of the modern era, the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a ‘‘four cornered’’ balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf States.
Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other.
Two outside powers, Britain and the United States, have been the ‘‘fifth corner’’ in this security structure. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all host U.S. bases and power projection facilities, and Oman has close ties to Britain. The United States, in particular, has effectively dominated the regional security structure whenever it chose to directly intervene. These interventions included aiding North Yemen against South Yemen, intervening in the Iran-Iraq War by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers in 1987–1988, leading the liberation of Kuwait in 1990–1991, and invading Iraq in 2003. In the process, the United States has gone from being ‘‘over the horizon’’ to ‘‘constantly in sight.’’
In spite of the creation of regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, Gulf ‘‘security’’ has been the product of largely uncoordinated national efforts. Iran and Iraq have always acted as independent powers. Each of the southern Gulf States has pursued its own path to national security, and the smaller Gulf countries have relied on the power projection forces of the United Kingdom and the United States for security and as a counterbalance to their neighbors.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to so many people who have contributed in so many ways to this book. We want to thank many regional, U.S., and European officials, who cannot be mentioned by name, for offering their time, comments, suggestions, and data to earlier versions of this book. We are also grateful to so many research assistants who have contributed to the drafting and research of this book, including William D. Sullivan, Paul S. Frederiksen, Nikos Tsafos, and William Elliott.
The analysis in this book relied heavily on the work of many governmental and nongovernmental agencies, particularly the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Jane’s, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), GlobalSecurity.org, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and many other defense and energy agencies. In addition, the analysis relied heavily on the work of many regional, military, and security experts. The analysis of the Saudi internal security forces drew heavily on the work by Dr. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid’s work on the Saudi National Security in late 2005.
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars
CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars Volume 1 Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
Praeger Security International Westport, Connecticut - London
Praeger Security International Advisory Board
Board Cochairs
Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.)
Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.)
Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)
Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.)
The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France)
Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, and Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.)
Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.)
Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.)
Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia)
Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.)
Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)
Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cordesman, Anthony H. Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0–275–99250–0 (set : alk. paper) ISBN 0–275–99399–X (vol 1 : alk. paper) ISBN 0–275–99400–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper) 1. Middle East-Armed Forces. 2. Asymmetric warfare-Middle East. 3. National security-Persian Gulf States. 4. Persian Gulf States—Military relations. 5. Armed Forces. 6. Balance of power. 7. Military readiness. I. Al-Rodhan, Khalid R. II. Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) III. Title. UA832.C67028 2007 355’.0330536—dc22 2006031049
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006031049 ISBN: 0–275–99250–0 (set) 0–275–99399–X (vol. 1) 0–275–99400–7 (vol. 2)
First published in 2007
Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States of America ∞ The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
