Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action
Ian Johnstone
Lynne Rienner Publishers
Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991—the Gulf crisis cease-fire resolution—is in many respects a more important milestone for the United Nations than the Gulf War itself. It represents a major effort by the UN to control the future behavior of a country. Unprecedented and far-reaching obligations are imposed on Iraq relating to its border with Kuwait, its weapons of mass destruction, and war reparations. Both economic sanctions and military action have been employed to compel compliance with the substantive provisions. While the precise circumstances of the Gulf crisis and its aftermath are unlikely to recur, the resolution raises issues in areas the UN is sure to face again in the years to come.
Implementation of the resolution ...
Contents
Acknowledgments / 7
1 Introduction / 9
2 Negotiating History / 13
3 Legal Basis for the Substantive Obligations / 19
4 Implementing the Substantive Obligations / 25
5 Measures to Compel Compliance with the Resolution / 35
6 Lessons from the UN Action / 43
7 Conclusion / 61
Summary of Guidelines and Recommendations / 63
Notes / 67
About This Occasional Paper / 82
The International Peace Academy / 83
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Research for this paper included twenty-seven interviews with United Nations diplomats, United Nations officials, and government officials with direct experience in the drafting and implementation of Resolution 687. The interviews were conducted on an off-the-record basis between January and April 1993. I would like to thank those individuals for their generous time and assistance.
I would also like to thank the following members of the International Peace Academy (IPA) Research Program Steering Committee for their reactions to an oral presentation of this paper: Ambassador Richard Butler, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, Professor Robert Keohane, Ambassador Razali Ismail, Professor John Ruggie, Mr. George Sherry, and Sir Brian Urquhart. Many of their suggestions were incorporated in the paper. I also benefited enormously from the assistance of Mr. Olara Otunnu, Professor Michael Doyle, and Mr. F. T. Liu of the International Peace Academy. They guided me in the research and, along with Professor Oscar Schachter, commented on a complete written draft of the paper.
I would also like to thank IPA interns Richard Conroy, Robin Wishnie, Alexandre Mansourov, and Paul Freedman, all of whom provided invaluable research assistance as well as a steady flow of ideas and inspiration.
Finally, I would like to thank Pew Charitable Trusts, whose support for IPA’s Issues in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Program includes funding for the research and publication of this Occasional Paper.
Introduction
Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991—the Gulf crisis cease-fire resolution—is in many respects a more important milestone for the United Nations than the Gulf War itself. It represents a major effort by the UN to control the future behavior of a country. Unprecedented and far-reaching obligations are imposed on Iraq relating to its border with Kuwait, its weapons of mass destruction, and war reparations. Both economic sanctions and military action have been employed to compel compliance with the substantive provisions. While the precise circumstances of the Gulf crisis and its aftermath are unlikely to recur, the resolution raises issues in areas the UN is sure to face again in the years to come.
Implementation of the resolution has not proceeded smoothly. Iraqi officials ceased to participate in the meetings of the commission established to demarcate the boundary and have not accepted its decisions. Weapons inspectors have conducted over sixty visits to the country, yet their access to facilities has regularly been impeded. No compensation to victims of the invasion has been paid, and uncertainty remains about the fate of hundreds of prisoners, detainees, and missing persons.
Two related tensions lie at the heart of these difficulties. The first is generated by the resolution’s dual character as the continuation of enforcement measures and as a peace treaty.1 The objective of Security Council Resolution 678 and the subsequent military action against Iraq—to compel its withdrawal from Kuwait and “to restore international peace and security in the area”—had been only partially achieved by April 1991. Resolution 687 is designed to complete the task by redressing the consequences of the invasion and neutralizing the continued threat Iraq is perceived to pose. The resolution calls for Iraqi acceptance of its provisions, a tacit recognition that at least a minimal degree of cooperation is required for the conditions to be fulfilled. Although Iraq signified its acceptance shortly after the resolution was adopted, its cooperation has been grudging. The Security Council, for its part, has sought to induce greater Iraqi cooperation without appearing to bargain on what are, after all, mandatory obligations.
The second tension arises from two often-conflicting needs: the need for collective decisionmaking in keeping with the spirit of the UN Charter and the need to demonstrate the resolve to carry through on Security Council decisions. Questions have arisen about who is in control of efforts to secure a lasting peace in Iraq: the Security Council as a whole or its most powerful members? Dominance of both the drafting and implementation of Resolution 687 by a “steering committee” of the United States, the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, France has troubled some members of the international community. Furthermore, Iraq has exploited divisions in the coalition states by characterizing the situation as a Western campaign against Saddam Hussein. Sustaining indefinitely international support for obligations of the sort imposed by Resolution 687 has proven to be difficult. To keep pressure on Iraq, the combination of great power leadership and passive acquiescence by the rest of the Security Council may well have been necessary.
These two tensions are related. On the one hand, a demonstrated commitment to enforce decisions adopted under Chapter VII, without an explicit authorization from the Council if necessary, helps compel compliance with the obligations. Collective deliberation and action, on the other hand, may be more effective in inducing compliance. As the Iraqi case illustrates, a delicate balance between these two approaches must be struck. Although the former approach may be necessary to achieve short-term objectives, the latter is a better means of securing a stable and lasting peace.
The purposes of this paper are threefold: to provide a record of the drafting and implementation of Resolution 687, to assess that record, and to draw lessons for the future. I examine the three main elements of the resolution—demarcation of the border, the weapons- related obligations, and the compensation scheme—as well as the measures taken to compel compliance, sanctions and military action. I do not consider all aspects of the economic sanctions (for example, the humanitarian impact or the costs to other states) but rather focus on the conditions for lifting them set out in the resolution.2 Nor do I deal at length with Resolution 688, which calls for an end to the repression of the civilian populations in Iraq, except to the extent that implementation of the two resolutions has become entangled.
The paper takes up these issues in the following order:
- Chapter 2 reviews the negotiating history of Resolution 687.
- Chapter 3 analyzes the legal competence of the Security Council to adopt the main elements listed above, concluding that the resolution is intra vires.
- Chapter 4 describes the progress made in implementing the three elements.
- Chapter 5 examines the economic sanctions adopted and military action taken to pressure Iraq into compliance.
- Chapter 6 draws a number of lessons from the experience and offers recommendations for future UN action in the field of border disputes, control of weapons of mass destruction, and compensation. It also makes recommendations on the decisionmaking process of the Security Council and on preserving the collective nature of measures to compel compliance with Council decisions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Negotiating History
Befoie reviewing the negotiations that led to the adoption of Resolution 687, the main elements of the final text can be summarized:
- Iraq is required to respect the inviolability of the international boundary set out in the 1963 “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq.” A Boundary Demarcation Commission was established to demarcate the border, and the Security Council guaranteed its inviolability, authorizing “as appropriate all necessary measures to that end.” In addition, the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was deployed to monitor a demilitarized zone along the border.
- Iraq is required to accept the destruction of its chemical and biological weapons, as well as its ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. It is also prohibited from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or material that can be used to produce them. Under the terms of two long-term monitoring plans, Iraq must indefinitely allow United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to all military and civil installations with a potential weapons capacity, to all laboratories and research projects, and to all scientists and technicians working there.
- The resolution reaffirms Iraq’s liability for losses caused by the invasion, including environmental damage, and establishes a mechanism for applying a percentage of Iraqi oil revenues toward the compensation claims.
- The conventional arms embargo and economic sanctions, with modifications to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, are maintained.
Ian Johnstone
Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action
Lynne Rienner Publishers
Lynne Rienner Publishers
International Peace Academy
Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action
Ian Johnstone
International Peace Academy
Occasional Paper Series
President of the Academy
Olara A. Otunnu
Editorial Board
Michael W. Doyle, Vice President,
International Peace Academy
Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
F. T. Liu, Special Adviser, International Peace Academy
former Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations
George L. Sherry, Professor of Diplomacy and World Affairs,
Occidental College former Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs,
United Nations
Lynne Rienner Publishers
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Published in the United States of America in 1994 by
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© 1994 by the International Peace Academy. All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Johnstone, Ian, 1960-
Aftermath of the Gulf War: an assessment of UN action / Ian Johnstone.
p. cm.—(International Peace Academy occasional paper series)
Includes bibliographical references
ISBN 1-55587-487-8 (pbk: alk)
1. United Nations—Iraq.
2. United Nations. Security Council— Resolutions.
3. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Iraq.
4. Economic sanctions—Iraq. I. Title. II. Series.
JX1977.2.I7J64 1994
341.23'567—dc
93-38921
CIP
British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.
