Comparative investigation of 19th-century wars, combined with a knowledge of Ottoman, Balkan, and Middle Eastern historical developments can afford some understanding of the wars that transpired in the Ottoman Empire from 1853 to 1878. Certain fields lend themselves to comparative study, and one such field is military history. Generals and military establishments have dwelt in a constant need to learn about the progress of other armies, especially their enemies. When an army has failed to keep abreast of developments, the results are not only obvious, but devastating for the laggard. In the 19th century, the Ottoman army had begun to make efforts at change, but ambitions exceeded results. Change occurred, but not the sort that the reformers had planned. Most Ottomanists and Turcologists seek to portray “reform” as a unilateral proposition undertaken by the Ottoman elite with a definable purpose, and a sense of discipline. Even if the reformers failed, their vision for the future prevailed in new emanations during future reform efforts. Comparative studies enable a more realistic picture to emerge.
Comparative investigation has particular benefits for the Ottoman army in the 19th century in that British, Hungarian, Polish, French, German, Austrian, and even Austrian Croatian officers held rank in the Ottoman
Table of Contents
Illustrations / 11
Chapter 1: Introduction / 21 I. Introduction / 21 II. Forms of Internal Conflict / 21 HI. Content of the Book / 25 IV. State of the Field / 26 A. Crimean War / 26 B. Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878 / 39 V. Social and Psychological Aspects of Ottoman Collapse and the Era of Wars / 47 A. Methodology / 47 B. Social and Psychological Perspectives / 51 VI. Why War? / 56
Chapter 2: Regular Army and Control of Empire / 58 I. Introduction / 58 n. Army and Control of Empire / 59 A. The Nizam [Regular Army]. Myth and Reality / 59 1. The Myth of Army Control over Ottoman Subjects / 59 2. The Reality of Ottoman Efforts to Control Subjects / 60 B. Military D Strategy, Tactics, and Communications / 61 C. Provincial Military Garrisons / 65 1. The Balkans / 65 2. Anatolia / 70 3. The Arabic Provinces / 75 III. Dynamics of Military Operations / 75 A. Tanzimat Military Reforms on European Models / 76 1. Chain of Command / 76 2. Army Organization and Regimental Systems / 77 3. Creating an Army Capable of the Offensive Operation / 83 IV. Corruption: The Chief Obstacle to Military Operations / 86 A. Corruption: Issues and Examples / 86 B. Structured Analysis of Corruption by Type / 91 1. Corruption Originating in Institutional Problems / 91 2. Dishonesty of Officers and Officials / 96
Chapter 3: Irregular Soldiers and Civil Disorder /105 I. Introduction. Definitions /105 II. Origins /105 III. Mercenaries and Militarized Societies in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire and Greece /114 A. Introduction: Structure, Genesis, and Function /114 1. Reasons for the Existence of Irregular Troops in the 19th Century / 115 2. Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Definitions of Irregulars / 115 3. Greek Definitions / 121 B. Composite Bands, or Bands of Mixed Origin / 123 1. The Composite Band: Dynamics of Unit Morale and Operation / 123 2. The Composite Band and the Marginal Man / 127 3. A Composite Force in the Crimean War: General Yfisuf s Irregular Cavalry / 127 C. Bands of Common Cultural or Tribal Origin / 131 1. Albanians [Arnavflts / 133 2. Circassians or Cherkes / 137 3. Kurds / 154 III. The Band as an Enterprise / 161 IV. Functions of Irregular Cavalry / 163 A. General / 163 B. Scouting, Picket, and Guard Duty in No Man’s Land / 164 C. Courier and Escort Service / 164 D. Skirmshing Activities / 165 E. Cavalry Screen for Marching Army, or, an Advance Guard / 166 F. The Raid / 167 G. Provincial Garrison Troops / 171 V. Military Customs and Unit Order of Irregular Bands and Soldiers / 172 A. Military Customs / 172 1. Administrative Customs / 172 2. Habits on Campaign / 172 VI. Conclusion / 174
Chapter 4: Rebellions and Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1835-1878 / 175 I. Ottoman Society and Social Attitudes / 175 A. Introduction. Ottoman Race Theory / 175 1. Perso-Islamic and Ottoman Perceptions of Social Order: Race Theory / 175 2. Ottoman Philosophy of Tyranny and Conservative Political Philosophy / 176 B. Traditional and Historical Ideas of Race in the 19th Century / 182 C. Xenophobia and Paranoia / 185 D. Assimilationism and Anxiety / 187 E. Orientations / 189 II. Rebellion and Revolution in the Ottoman Empire / 189 A. Introduction / 189 B. Semi-autonomous Military and Local Authorities not in Revolt but Resistant to State Authority and control / 190 1. Uncontrollable “Loyal” Chieftains / 190 2. The Government’s “Ability” to Control Irregulars / 193 3. Vendetta, Blood Feud, Vigilantism and Terrorism / 198 III. Insurrections / 204 A. General / 204 B. Case Studies / 205 1. Armenian Conflicts - 1848 / 205 2. Afshar Revolt. 1852 / 209 3. Cretan Insurrection. 1866-1869 / 212 4. Kurdish Revolts. Millingen - 1860s / 225 5. Montenegro - 1876-1877 / 229 IV. Conclusion / 232 A. Movements and Rebellions / 232 B. Suppression of Revolts / 234
Chapter 5: Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856 / 236 I. Introduction / 236 II. The Danube Campaign. 1853-1854 / 242 III. Greek Insurrection, Siege of Silistra, and the Dobruja Expedition. 1854 / 248 A. Greek Insurrection / 248 B. The Siege of Silistra. May to June, 1854 / 254 C. The Dobruja Expedition. July, 1854 / 262 1. Battle at Giurgevo. July 7, 1854 / 262 2. Dobruja Expedition / 262 D. The Crimea and Beatson’s Bash'i-Bozuks. 1854-1856 / 268 1. The Crimea / 268 2. Beatson’s Bash'i-Bozuks / 269 IV. Anatolia. 1854-1855 / 278 A. Ottoman Failures and European Soldiers-of-Fortune. 1853-1854 / 278 B. The British Military Commission and the Siege of Kars. 1854-1855 / 281 V. The Transcaucasian Campaign. 1855 / 294 VI. Rebellions and Early Terrorism / 297 A. Revolt in Armenia. 1854-1855 / 297 B. Revolt of Yazdan Shir Bukhti, 1855 / 298 C. 1859 - Kiileli Vak'asi [Incident] [Ottoman Empire / 303 VII. Conclusion / 306
Chapter 6: Balkan Revolutions and Russo-Turkish War, 1875-1878 / 307 I. Ottoman Military Reform and the Ottoman Army: to 1877 / 307 A. Balkan Revolts: 1875-1876 / 308 B. Cherkes Hasan Incident. 1876 / 311 II. Course of the War: 1877-1878 / 315 A. The Danube Campaign / 317 B. The Anatolian and Caucasian Campaigns / 342 C. Refugees. Social and Psychological Issues / 352 1. Ottoman Refugees: the Bulgarian Theater / 352 2. Derangement / 355 3. Alienation / 355 4. The Refugee Problem / 356 III. Court-Martial of Suleyman Husnu Pasha: War Strategy and Tactics on Trial / 357 IV. cAli Sûavi Vakcas'i / 367 A. Background / 367 B. Chiraghan Palace Incident - 17 Cemaziyel-evvel, 1295/20 May, 1878 368 C. Psychological Ramifications. Paranoia / 372 V. cAbdiilhSmid II / 376 A. Hamidian Autocracy / 376 B. Denial / 379 VI. Conclusion / 385
Chapter 7: Psychological Factors: Soldiers in an Era of Warfare / 386 I. Destructiveness of War / 386 A. The Psychology of Violence in War and “Peace” / 386 1. Psychological Conditions / 386 2. Aggression / 386 B. General Studies. War Stress and Associated Syndromes / 402 1. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder / 402 2. Life-Death Continuum / 404 C. The Crimean War / 406 1. War and Death in 19th-Century Armies / 406 2. War Stress and Crimean War Soldiers / 407 D. American Civil War, 1861-1865 / 415 1. Life-Death Continuum / 415 2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Life-Death Continuum / 417 3. Sadism and PTSD / 420 E. Franco-Prussian War. 1870-1871 / 424 II. Psychological Factors in the Ottoman War Experience: 1839-1878 / 427 A. Ottoman Common Soldiers: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder / 427 1. General Comments / 427 2. Soldier’s Attitudes / 429 3. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder / 431 B. Aggression and Sadistic Attitudes indicated by Atrocities / 438 1. An Institutional Practice Encouraging Sadistic Behaviour in Soldiers: Impalement as a Punishment for Rebels / 440 2. Rape, A Non-Institutional Aftereffect of Conquest / 442 3. Looting and Atrocities / 445 4. Aggression and Sadism as a Consequence of War Experience / 447
III. Conclusion / 456 Conclusion / 458
Appendix I: Society, Social Change, and Rebellion / 460 Appendix II: Psychological Profiles of Generals in the Ottoman Army / 466
Bibliography and Abbreviations / 492
Index / 502
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to give special thanks to Dr. Dittmar Dahlmann of the Seminar für Osteuropäische Geschichte at Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, for the great pains he took to read through my manuscript. The ideas represented within the text are the author’s own, and Professor Dahlmann should not be held responsible. I also wish to thank Mr. Vincent Sieveking of Franz Steiner Verlag for his useful suggestions in editing, and his patient coordination of the publication.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism for its generous support in the writing of this book. The Center sponsored research trips to Crete, Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, and to Getty Museum Los Angeles. The faculty and staff of the Vryonis Center also proved invaluable in their support of this project. The author gives a special thanks to Mr. Angelo Tsakopoulos whose support of the Vryonis Center has proven invaluable. Thanks are also extended to Dr. Speros Vryonis, Jr., Dr. Christos Ioannides, Dr. Stelios Vasilakis, Mr. Constantinos Pouhtos, Ms. Janet Coles, Mr. Michal Roche, Mr. William Riddle, Ms. Sabrina Guidi, Mr. David Lindstrom, and Ms. Stacey Leitner among others for their assistance and support in this endeavor. In addition to the Vryonis Center, the author wishes to thank Ms. Janey Morris and the staff of the special collections department at Duke University Library for their help and cheerful assistance in unearthing the Crimean War material held by their library. Also of assistance was Dr. Peter Boyden of the National Army Museum, rich in materials relating to the Crimean War. The staff of the Photographic Department in the J. Paul Getty Museum, including Julian Cox and Jaclyn Bums proved quite accommodating in the assistance they gave me with some of the photographs reproduced in this volume. The ideas in this writing are the author’s own, and they must not be held responsible for any conclusions made in this book.
Chapter 1: Introduction
I. Introduction
Comparative investigation of 19th-century wars, combined with a knowledge of Ottoman, Balkan, and Middle Eastern historical developments can afford some understanding of the wars that transpired in the Ottoman Empire from 1853 to 1878. Certain fields lend themselves to comparative study, and one such field is military history. Generals and military establishments have dwelt in a constant need to learn about the progress of other armies, especially their enemies. When an army has failed to keep abreast of developments, the results are not only obvious, but devastating for the laggard. In the 19th century, the Ottoman army had begun to make efforts at change, but ambitions exceeded results. Change occurred, but not the sort that the reformers had planned. Most Ottomanists and Turcologists seek to portray “reform” as a unilateral proposition undertaken by the Ottoman elite with a definable purpose, and a sense of discipline. Even if the reformers failed, their vision for the future prevailed in new emanations during future reform efforts. Comparative studies enable a more realistic picture to emerge.
Comparative investigation has particular benefits for the Ottoman army in the 19th century in that British, Hungarian, Polish, French, German, Austrian, and even Austrian Croatian officers held rank in the Ottoman army. Until the present, those who have written about Ottoman military reform in the 19th century have spoken only of “European” influences without reference to individual officers. The reason for this hesitance to peer more deeply into the personal and official documents left by these European officers becomes apparent upon perusal of the documents. One could speak of change without reform. Corrupt Ottoman officers abused their offices for their personal benefit, and at the expense of their soldiers’ lives, killing many before musket or cannon fired one shot. In addition to military inadequacies, these “European” officers presented a picture of bloody local conflicts, “uncontrollable” bands of aggressive soldiery [whom the Ottoman state supplied with Winchester repeating rifles in the 1870s], and the ruthlessness of certain Ottoman generals that many would prefer to see disappear.
II. Forms of Internal Conflict
The author originally had the intention of including an entire section of the book considering forms of internal conflict. Since these issues have received coverage elsewhere, the book will begin with a summary of these issues. The problem of violence in Ottoman society owed its origin to the fact that the Ottoman legal system had ceased to function actively in the management of social interactions between the 17th and 19th centuries. The idea of a civil society came into the Ottoman Empire only very late despite the fact that Tanzimat reformers had earlier sought to reintroduce the idea of law during the course of reforms. This inability to regulate social conflicts through legal means resulted in two problems. First, society itself fell into factions that engaged in the vendetta with its customs and practices that sometimes imposed limitations ...
James J. Reid
Crisis of the Ottoman Empire
Franz Steiner Verlag
Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart Crisis of the Ottoman Empire Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878 Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des ostlichen James J. Reid
Quellen und Studffin zur Geschichte Des Ostlichen Europa
Band 57
Begrundet Von Manfred Hellmann, Weitergefuhrt Von Erwin Oberl Ander Und Helmut Altrıchter, In Verbındung Mit Dem Vorstand Des Verbandes Der Osteuropahıstorıker E. V. Herausgegeben
Von Dittmar Dahlmann
Cover illustration see p. 19
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Reid, James J.: Crisis of the Ottoman empire : prelude to collapse ; 1839 - 1878 / James J. Reid. - Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000 (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des ostlichen Europa ; Bd. 57)
