Anthony H. Cordesman Ahmed S. Hashim WestviewPress
With this multivolume study, Anthony H. Cordesman once again proves that he is a leading authority on the affairs of the Middle Eastern states. Cordesman led this comprehensive net assessment of the political, economic, energy, security (both internal and external), and military trends in each of the Gulf states, as well as the power projection capabilities of the U.S. forces in the Gulf.
Each volume provides a wealth of information, including an analysis of the key historical trends affecting security issues in the country under scrutiny; tensions involved in its external relations; the character of potential threats; developments in its politics and internal security; trends in its economy and government budgets; trends in military spending and arms purchases; trends in oil and gas export capability and economic diversification; trends in demographic, ethnic, and sectarian conflicts; trends in the shape of its military forces; and the changing strategic role of the United States in Gulf affairs. Avoiding the pitfalls of other works on this region, this six-volume account incorporates a wide range of concerns to paint a detailed and multifaceted picture of each state in the volatile Gulf region.
Emphasis is placed on hard data and substantive analysis. Detailed tables and charts are provided for each critical area, along with an overview of national data, data provided by international organizations such as the World Bank and International Energy Agency, unclassified U.S. government data, and the results of original research done by CSIS. This volume provides analysis of the state of Iraq’s security and of current Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. It also examines the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraq’s future role as an oil exporter, the U.S. policy of “dual containment” in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future.
Anthony H. Cordesman has served in senior positions in the office for the secretary of defense, NATO, and the U.S. Senate. He is currently a senior fellow and Co-Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, and a special consultant on military affairs for ABC News. He lives in Washington, D.C. Ahmed S. Hashim is a fellow in Political-Military Affairs and the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he specializes in strategic issues. Previously, he was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He lives in Virginia.
Contents
List of Tables and Illustrations / ix Acknowledgments / xiii
1 Introduction / 1 The Policy Options for Dealing with Iraq, 1 Key Policy Complications in Dealing with Iraq, 3 A Lack of Present and Future Consensus, 5 Policy and the Role of Analysis, 6
2 Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War / 8 Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War, 8 The Informal and Formal Basis of Iraq's Power Structure, 10
3 The Informal Politics of the "Center" / 12 Sunni Popular Opinion and the "Center" Immediately After the Gulf War, 12 Sunni Popular Opinion and the "Center" Since the Gulf War, 13 Growing Alienation and the Death of "Reform," 16 Problems with the Key Clans, 19 Problems in Saddam's Family and Coterie, 21 Current Trends in Iraq's Informal Power Structure. 31 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 33
4 The Formal Politics of Iraq's Instruments of State Power / 36 The Revolutionary Command Council, 36 The Ba'ath Party, 37 The Cabinet and Government Leadership, 40 Financial Resources, 42 The Security Structure, 44 The Iraqi Armed Forces, 49 The "Old Boy" Network and the Interaction Between Informal and Formal Instruments of Power, 57 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 58
5 The "Periphery": Opposition Movements and Ethnic and Sectarian Issues / 59 An "Artificial" State, 59 The Politics of Conspiracy and Violence, 60 Opposition Parties, 63 Iraq's Crisis with the Kurds, 70 The Role of the Kurds in a "Centrist" or "Peripheral" Strategy, 95 Iraq's Crisis with Its Shi'ites, 97 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 109
6 The "Periphery": Political Alienation and Abuses of Human Rights / 111 Killings and Torture, 111 Prisons and the Legal System, 118 Freedom of Speech and Political Dissent, 120 Treatment of Minorities and Foreigners, 121 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 122
7 Sanctions and Economic Instability / 124 The Iraqi Economy Before the Gulf War, 127 The Iraqi Economy After the Gulf War, 136 UN Sanctions and the Policies of the Iraqi Government, 137 The Iraqi Government's Refusal of Relief from UN Sanctions, 147 Accepting UN Security Council Resolution 986,150 The Future Political Impact of Sanctions, 153 Debt and Reparations After the Gulf War, 156 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 158
8 Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities / 161 Iraq's Strategic Oil and Gas Potential, 161 Iraqi Oil Production Before the Gulf War, 163 Oil Production Efforts Since the Gulf War, 170 Iraqi Refining and Petrochemical Capability, 173 Production and Development Prospects Once Sanctions Are Lifted or Relaxed, 174 Natural Gas, 176 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 177
9 External Relations / 182 Iraq's Foreign Policy Since the Gulf War, 182 The Continuing Threat to Kuwait, 184 Relations with Iran, 189 Iraqi Support of the People's Mujahideen, 193 Relations with Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, 193 Iraq, Egypt, and Other Arab States, 200 Iraq and the Gulf States, 201 Iraq and the International Community, 204 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 209
10 Military Developments / 211 Iraqi Military Expenditures, 218 Iraqi Arms Imports, 224 Iraqi Efforts to Smuggle Arms and Parts and Rebuild Its Iraqi Military Industries Since the Gulf War, 226 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 232
11 The Threat from Iraqi Land Forces / 233 The Impact of the Gulf War on die Iraqi Army, 233 The Iraqi Army in 1996, 236 The Republican Guards, 237 Deployments Against the Kurds, 238 Deployments Against the Shi'ites, 239 Land Force Equipment Holdings, 240 Land Force Readiness and Warfighting Effectiveness, 258 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 262
12 The Threat from Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces / 263 The Cost of the Gulf War to the Iraqi Air Force, 263 Current Air Force Equipment Holdings, 265 Air Readiness and Warfighting Capabilities, 271 Land-Based Air Defenses, 274 Land-Based Air Defense Readiness and Warfighting Capability, 277 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 280
13 The Threat from Iraqi Naval Forces / 281 Surviving Combat Ships, 281 Naval Readiness and Warfighting Capability, 285 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 285
14 Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism / 286 Recent Iraqi Terrorist Activity, 286 Attempting to Assassinate President Bush, 287 Other Recent Iraqi Acts of Terrorism, 288 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 289
15 The Threat from Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction / 290 The Struggle to Eliminate Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 290 Iraq's Future Missile Capabilities, 306 Iraq's Future Chemical Weapons Capabilities, 314 Iraq's Future Biological Weapons Capabilities, 318 Iraq's Future Nuclear Capability, 333 Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 335
16 The Problem of Policy: Beyond Sanctions and "Dual Containment" / 344 The Case for Continuing Military Containment, 345 Prospects for Political Change, 350 Iran and Iraq: The Risk of a "Devil's Bargain," 356 The Problem of Sanctions, 357
Sources and Methods / 360
Notes / 363
About the Book and Authors / 394
INTRODUCTION
Iraq's current regime presents unambiguous security threats to the other states of the Gulf and to the West. While Iran's regime may offer some hope for constructive engagement, Iraq is virtually certain to be a revanchist and aggressive state as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Even if Saddam and his coterie should fall from power, their immediate successor will most likely consist of another Sunni authoritarian elite, made up of other members of the Ba'ath party, senior military officers, or a combination of both.
It may well be a decade before any political transformation occurs in Iraq that produces a stable, moderate government. In the interim, Iraq may go through several short-lived regimes and even civil war. Its politics are likely to remain the politics of violence, many of its future leaders are likely to seek revenge for the Gulf War and its after-math, and its political elites are likely to reassert Iraq's search for hegemony in the Gulf and seek to become the leading regional military power.
This does not mean that Iraq cannot change, and should not be encouraged to change. It does not mean that sanctions and isolation are the only way of dealing with Iraq, or that Iraq's people should be punished indefinitely for the actions of its leaders. It does mean, however, that the Gulf and the West must be realistic in shaping their policy towards Iraq, and must have a realistic understanding of its current regime and military potential.
The Policy Options for Dealing with Iraq
The West and the other states in the Gulf must find ways to live with Iraq, seek to moderate the conduct of its regime, and create a climate for positive political change. The basic issue for policy is how this can best be done. There are several major policy options that the West, other Gulf states, and other nations can pursue:
- Lifting political and economic sanctions under conditions that leave Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath elite in power, and which effectively recognize that Iraq will not fully comply with the terms of the UN cease-fire.
- Continuing the present UN sanctions that isolate Iraq politically and cripple its economy, in order to force Saddam Hussein from power and to create a successor regime that will be less aggressive and willing to trade changes in the regime's behavior for a lifting of sanctions;
- Lifting all or most political and economic sanctions in return for a large degree of Iraqi compliance with the terms of the UN cease-fire, requiring full Iraqi compliance in providing reparations and the recognition by Iraq of its new borders with a sovereign Kuwait, but leaving Saddam Hussein and the present regime in power;
- A step-by-step lifting of political and economic sanctions under conditions which trade specific changes in the conduct of Iraq's regime for each step in reducing the present sanctions, while leaving Saddam Hussein and the present Ba'ath and military elite in power;
- Seeking to create an alternative "centrist" regime that is still based on the Ba'ath, Sunni elites, and/or the military, but drives Saddam Hussein and his coterie from power by maintaining a mix of sanctions, using other economic and political pressures, using covert action, and persuading neighboring states like Turkey and Jordan to support such a "peripheral strategy";
- Adopting a "peripheral" strategy that combines sanctions with covert action, which attempts to mobilize the Kurds and Shi'ites against the central regime, and which seeks to persuade neighboring states like Turkey and Jordan to support such a "peripheral strategy" and; - Pursuing an individual national policy towards Iraq that seeks to maximize political and/or trade benefits in dealing with Iraq, regardless of the character of its regime and its conduct towards other states.
The UN is still committed to a policy of sanctions, but it is clear that there no longer is such a degree of international unity in pursuing this policy. - Some states—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain and the US—continue to favor a hard-line approach because they believe it is impossible to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime. Even Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, did not fully support the US during the Kurdish crisis of August-September, 1996.
- Other states, including major outside powers like France and Russia, believe that sanctions now harm Iraq's people without offering any …
Anthony H. Cordesman Ahmed S. Hashim
Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond WestviewPress
WestviewPress CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond Anthony H. Cordesman Ahmed S. Hashim
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Published in 1997 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford 0X2 9JJ
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Iraq : sanctions and beyond / Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-8133-3235-4 (he). — ISBN 0-8133-3236-2 (pbk.) 1. Iraq—Politics and government—1979- 2. Iraq—Foreign relations—1979- I. Hashim, Ahmed S. II. Title. DS79.7.C67 1997 956.704'3—dc20 / 96-46046 CIP
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