Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East
Daniel Silverfarb
Oxford University Press
Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East is a penetrating account of Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1929, when Britain decided to grant independence to Iraq, to 1941, when military hostilities between the two countries came to an end. Showing how Britain tried to maintain its political influence, economic ascendancy, and strategic position in Iraq after independence, Dr. Silverfarb presents a suggestive analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the method of indirect rule by imperial powers in the Third World. Drawing on a wealth of British documents only recently opened to the public, the author also describes an important episode in the rapid disintegration of the dominant position that at great cost Britain established in the Middle East during the First World War. At the same time, he tells the fascinating story of how a newly independent Arab nation struggled to free itself from the lingering grip of a major European power.
Daniel Silverfarb received a Ph.D. in history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has published eight articles on Anglo-Saudi relations in the 20th century.
Contents
Foreword by Majid Khadduri / v
1. Introduction 3
2. The End of the Mandate / 11
3. The British Airbases / 23
4. The Assyrian Minority / 33
5. The Levies / 47
6. Arab Independence and Unity / 56
7. The Struggle for Kuwait / 65
8. The Supply of Arms / 74
9. The Supply of Credit / 87
10. The Problem of Oil / 94
11. The Deterioration of Anglo-Iraqi Relations:
Phase One—September 1939—October 1940 / 106
12. The Deterioration of Anglo-Iraqi Relations:
Phase Two—November 1940—May 1941 / 118
13. The Hostilities of May 1941 / 131
14. Conclusion / 142
Notes / 147
Bibliography / 185
Index / 193
FOREWORD
This book is a case study of Iraq's role in Britain's imperial history. After its occupation of Iraq during the First World War, Britain began to find that that country was not only important as a defense outpost but also vital for other purposes. These purposes were the product of the new conditions created by the First World War which prompted policy makers to design a new form of control that would link the country with the larger British imperial superstructure. Perhaps a little background about Iraq under British control and the new conditions that emerged after the First World War may be useful to explain the form of that unique relationship between Iraq and Britain.
Before Iraq was occupied during the First World War, Great Britain had already been the predominating power in the neighboring Gulf area. Earlier Britain had extended its control to East Africa and southern Arabia when Napoleon descended upon Egypt in 1798 and threatened to cut British overseas routes to India. Iraq —then geopolitically marked on the map as the three vilayets (provinces) of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra— had been under Ottoman domination since the sixteenth century and Britain seems to have been quite satisfied with Ottoman control as a barrier against rival powers. Nor were British commerical interests, though gradually expanding, in need of protection, since the Ottoman administration was on the whole well disposed toward British traders.
But the balance of power began to change early in the nineteenth century when the Ottoman Porte appeared too weak (otten referred to as the Sick Man) and rival powers —first Russia and then Germany— began to encroach on his dominions and exert an increasing influence in the internal affairs of his country, which were looked upon as detrimental to British interests and prestige in the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. So, concerned was Britain about the Russian threat during the Crimean War (1854—56) that she went to war with Russia to save the Ottoman Porte from collapse. She also opposed Russia when its forces again attacked Ottoman territory in 1877.
The danger, however, did not come only from Russia. After the fall of Bismarck from power, Germany became involved in full competition with Britain in colonial ventures and Kaiser William II began to cultivate the friendship of the Ottoman sultan. Not only did the sultan grant commercial and other economic concessions to German firms, but he also allowed them to construct a railroad across the hinterland from Istanbul to Baghdad —known in European diplomacy as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway— with an extension to Basra. Considering this a threat to its position in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, Britain strongly opposed the whole project. In time of hostilities, it argued, Germany could use Basra as a base for submarine activities in the Indian Ocean against British shipping. Had the First World War not broken out in 1914 and given Britain the opportunity first to occupy Basra in 1914 and Baghdad and Mosul in 1917 and 1918, it was simply a matter of time before Britain would have extended its control over the head of the Gulf—Basra and possibly beyond—to ensure the security of its imperial communications.
The British occupation of the three Ottoman provinces, which were united and officially called Iraq after the First World War, raised the whole question whether Britain should withdraw from the country since the German threat had disappeared. The question was debated in London after a revolt suddenly erupted in Iraq (1920), demanding the withdrawal of British military forces. After a review of the situation at a conference held in Cairo (1921), the British cabinet decided that the new conditions created in the region after the war—the threat of the Bolshevik Revolution to the Gulf and India, the possible occupation of the Mosul province by the new nationalist regime in Turkey, and the prospect of oil potential in Iraq—necessitated the establishment of a national regime in Iraq to replace the military administration and reduce British expenditure, although some argued in favor of complete withdrawal while others urged administering the country as part of the Indian Empire. As a compromise, an Arab government headed by Faysal, son of the sharif of Mecca (ally of Britain in the war), was established in 1921, designed to satisfy Arab national aspirations and allow indirect British control to protect vital imperial interests. Moreover, this arrangement fu - filled British obligations toward the League of Nations whose covenant provided that countries (in the words of the covenant) “not yet able to stand by themselves” should be entrusted to a mandatory to provide administrative assistance “until such time as they are able to stand alone (article 22).
Britain thus found ample justification to perpetuate its control over Iraq but not without qualifications. The new national regime, often referred to as the “Arab fagade,” promised ultimate independence, as the country was deemed not yet ready for fu independence. Independence, however, under nationalist pressures, was finally achieved and the mandate came to an end in 1932. Moreover, Britain entered into treaty arrangements wit Iraq (1930) which regulated the new relationship between die two countries. By virtue of this arrangement Britain recognized Iraq s independence and retained full control over two airbases as weU as the use of all means of communication during war. As a quid pro quo, Britain promised to assist Iraq in case of foreign attack. This kind of rapport between Britain and her former ward is rightly described by Dr. Silverfarb as a form of an “informal empire,” since Iraq had not been fully freed from foreign control. For when Iraq tried to make an independent judgment on foreign policy in 1941, pressure was brought to bear culminating in a thirty-day war that forced Iraq to meet British imperial requirements. Even when the treaty of 1930 came to an end m 1954 Iraq was prevailed upon to enter into a new agreement (1955) pledging joint cooperation with Britain on the occasion of signing a regional security pact with Turkey and Iran called the Baghdad Pact. Both the special agreement with Britain and the Baghdad Pact were repudiated by an angry public when it rose in revolt against the monarchy in 1958 The monarchy was swept away because it was created by Britain m 1921 to protect British imperial interests. But the emotional outburst subsided after the fall of the monarchy, as the country under a new re¬gime committed to development and social reforms sough to achieve national aspirations.
The material used in the present study is drawn primarily from British official documents that have been made recently available to the public as well as from works by scholars and writers on subjects relating to British imperial policy. Dr. Silverfarb, however, has not used these sources uncritically, since he has verified his material with works by Iraqi leaders and writers who provided us with their version of the events and developments in the country that have bearing on British imperial policy. The product of his research may be taken as a balanced assessment of both British imperial interests and legitimate Iraqi national aspirations. He has also provided the reader with an interpretation of the movements and events which shaped the “informal empire” that may be taken to sum up Britain’s imperial experience in Iraq. Nor did he shrink from giving his own personal views on some of the important issues that arose between Britain and Iraq. In all these endeavors, Dr. Silverfarb did his utmost to maintain a high level of objectivity and impartiality.
Majid Khadduri
Preface
This work is an account of Anglo-Iraqi relations from Britain’s decision in 1929 to grant Iraq independence until the conclusion of hostilities between the two countries in 1941. In particular, it shows how Britain tried to maintain its political influence, economic ascendancy, and strategic position in Iraq after independence. It is thus a study in the possibilities and limitations of the method of indirect rule. It is also a description of an important episode in the fairly rapid disintegration of the dominant position that at great cost Britain established in the Middle East during the First World War. Finally, it is the story of how a recently independent Arab nation struggled to free itself from the lingering grip of a major European power.
This book is based mainly on unpublished British documents located at the Public Record Office in London. The volumes on Iraq in the foreign office 371 series were the most valuable, although for the period before Iraqi independence in 1932 the files in the colonial office 730 series were important. I also used cabinet, air ministry, war office, and Baghdad embassy papers. For matters relating to Kuwait, India office and Kuwait political agency documents located at the India Office Library and Records in London were useful. For the Iraqi side of the story, I found published works by Majid Khadduri, Taha al-Hashimi, Mahmud al-Durra, Eliezer Beeri, Khaldun Husry, Ayad al-Qazzaz, Hanna Batatu, and Mohammad Tarbush very helpful.
All quotations from documents at the Public Record Office ap-pear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
The map entitled Syria and Iraq Mid 1941 was drawn specifi cally for this book and is based on a map in I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. II (London, 1956). It is printed with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
For the sketch map of Kuwait, I am indebted to Pat Kattenhorn of the India Office Library and Records.
I am grateful to Nur el-Deen Masalha for assisting me with Arabic translations.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. John B. Kelly, who first stimulated my interest in Middle Eastern history and who in numerous ways has assisted me ever since; and Professor Robert Koehl, my former adviser at the University of Wisconsin who has never ceased to be of great help to me. For reading all or part of my manuscript and offering useful suggestions, I would also like to thank Dr. James Piscatori of Australia National University, Dr. Joseph Kostiner of Tel Aviv University, Professor Eric Davis of Rutgers University, Dr. Peter Wetzler, Leonard Wetzler, Michael Van Vleck, Aviel Roshwald, Nur el-Deen Masalha, and Jeffrey Gunning. Needless to say, any errors or shortcomings in this work are solely my own responsibility.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents for their generous support and constant encouragement over a period of many years.
Madison, Wisconsin / D-S.
September 1985
Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East
Chapter 1
Introduction
During the First World War, after prolonged and costly fighting, Britain expelled the Ottoman empire from Iraq. By the end of the conflict all vestiges of Ottoman authority had been elimi¬nated, and British and Indian troops were in occupation of the entire country.1 Now the British government had to decide what to do with Iraq.
For various reasons, Britain did not simply withdraw from Iraq. To begin with, it viewed the country as a vital link in a chain of airfields that would eventually connect Egypt with India and extend onwards to Australia. Already in 1921 British aircraft were flying regularly from Egypt to Iraq with intermediary landings for refuelling in Palestine and Transjordan. By facilitating trade, travel, and mail deliveries, British leaders believed that the air route would help tie the widely separated parts of their empire together. They also believed that the air route had considerable military potential because in an emergency it would enable Brit¬ain rapidly to reinforce its garrisons in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Aden, the Sudan, or India with planes normally stationed in other locations.2
Aside from the need to develop and safeguard the air route, after the First World War the British government remained in Iraq because it wanted to have military forces near the large British owned oilfields in southwestern Iran and the important oil refinery at Abadan. During the war this oil had greatly facilitated Britain’s military operations, and British leaders believed that in a future conflict it might again become important. Even in peacetime, in the early 1920s it supplied more than half of the admiralty’s total requirements. However, British leaders feared …
Daniel Silverfarb
Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East
Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press
Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East
A Case Study of Iraq, 1929-1941
Daniel Silverfarb
Foreword by Majid Khadduri
New York - Oxford
Oxford University Press
1986
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Copyright © 1986 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Silverfarb, Daniel, 1943—
Britain’s informal empire in the Middle East.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Iraq.
2. Iraq—Foreign relations—Great Britain.
3. Iraq—History—Hashemite Kingdom, 1921-1958.
4. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1910-1936.
5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1936-1945.
I. Title.
DA47.9.I72S55 / 1986 / 327.410867 / 85-25830
ISBN 0-19-503997-1
Printing (last digit): 987654321
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
