Needless Deaths in the Gulf War
Middle East Watch
Human Rights Watch
Commanders of the allied bombing campaign of Iraq have sought to convey the impression that they took scrupulous care to avoid civilian casualties. While noting that some loss of civilian life is unavoidable in armed conflict, allied commanders have suggested that they took every feasible step to avoid civilian death and injury, as required by the laws of war. This report challenges that excessively rosy picture. Its conclusions are based on scores of interviews conducted during the war with those who fled the bombing, as well as substantial subsequent research and analysis. Middle East Watch concludes that while the allies avoided systematic violations of the laws of war, hundreds of Iraqi civilians died as a result of several allied decisions to take less than the maximum feasible precautions to avoid civilian casualties, as required by the laws of war.
"The report also examines the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Most of these attacks are found to have violated the laws of war by targeting civilians or by being fired into areas where the missiles were not technologically capable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. Some of these attacks also violated the laws of war because they were accompanied by rhetoric designed to terrorize the civilian population of those countries.
Middle East Watch hopes that the analysis presented in this report will spark a critical examination of both allied and Iraqi conduct of the air war with the aim of reducing avoidable civilian casualties in any future conflict.
Contents
Acknowledgments / ix
Preface / xi
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions / 1
Part I: The Legal Standards
Chapter One
The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of Air Warfare / 25
A International Humanitarian Law / 28
B. Military Necessity and the Principle of Humanity / 29
C. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2444 / 30
D. Customary Law and Protocol I: Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction / 31
E. General Restrictions on Air Warfare / 31
F. Restraints on Attacks: Prohibition of Disproportionate and other Indiscriminate Attacks / 41
G. Precautionary Measures / 49
H. Verification of Military Objectives / 53
I. Collateral Casualties and Damage / 54
J. The Rule of Proportionality / 55
K. Cancellation or Suspension of Attacks / 55
L. Warning Requirement / 56
M. Special Legal Protection / 57
N. Prohibition Against Starvation of the Civilian Population / 57
O. Special Protection for Civilian Defense Shelters / 62
Part II: The Air War Against Iraq
Background: Operation Desert Storm / 69
Chapter Two
U.S. Public Statements / 75
Chapter Three
The Means and Methods of Attack / 89
A U.S. Public Statements / 90
B. Daytime Bomb and Missile Attacks on Targets in Populated Areas / 95
1. One Hundred Killed in Daytime Attack on Bridge in Southern City / 96
2. Scores of Civilians Killed in Flawed Attack on Bridge in Western Iraq / 97
3. Denials and then Admissions by the Allies about the Attack / 100
4. Scores of Civilians Killed in Daytime Attack on Bridge near Market in Southern City / 102
5. Scores of Workers Killed in Market Area of Southeastern City / 104
6. Morning Bombing Near Crowded Market Area in Basra / 105
7. Daytime Bombing of Bridges in Basra / 107
8. Scores of Civilians, Waiting for Cooking Gas, Killed and Injured During Daytime Attack / 108
9. Civilian Factory in Southern City Bombed in Afternoon; Seven Killed / 109
10. Legal Standards, Conclusions and Unanswered Questions / 110
C. "Smart" Bombs, "Dumb" Bombs, and Inaccurate Attacks on
Targets in Civilian Population Centers / 113
D. The Lack of Warning Prior to Attack: The Ameriyya Air Raid Shelter / 128
Chapter Four
Objects Attacked: The Need for Full Disclosure and Accountability / 149
A. Target Selection: The Need for Public Disclosure / 154
B. Reports of Attacks on Food, Agricultural and Water-Treatment Facilities / 160
C. The Crippling of the Electrical System / 171
D. Civilian Vehicles on Highways / 193
1. U.S. Public Statements / 195
2. An Inquiry by Middle East Watch / 199
3. Eyewitness Accounts: Attacks on Civilian Vehicles Carrying Evacuees to Jordan / 201
a. Two cars directly hit by diving aircraft: in daytime attack, killing two families / 202
b. 30 killed in attack on bus / 204
c. Cluster bomb falls meters from two cars in dawn attack / 205
d. Strafing of Buses on Highways During
Daytime / 206
e. Southern Iraq: 31 Dead in Daytime Attack on Civilian Vehicles / 208
4. Legal Standards and Conclusions / 210
5. Attacks on Jordanian Civilian Oil Tankers / 213
6. Jordan’s Dilemma: Dependence on Imported Oil / 214
7. Civilian Trucker Casualties: Eyewitness Testimony / 219
a. Convoy of Four Tankers Attacked / 219
b. 28-truck convoy hit in nighttime attack / 220
c. One Driver Killed, Others Injured, when Aircraft Machine-gunned Five-truck Convoy / 220
d. Cluster Bomb Dropped at Truck Stop in Afternoon Attack / 221
e. Two Tankers Destroyed at Intersection / 221
f. Cluster Bomb Dropped in Daytime Attack, Two Injured / 222
g. Refrigerator Truck Attacked Near Border / 223
h. Other Accounts of Strafing of Trucks by Allied Aircraft / 224
8. Legal Standards and Conclusions / 224
E. Attacks on Bedouin Tents / 227
Chapter Five
The View from the Ground: Eyewitness Accounts of Civilian Casualties and Damage / 231
A. Summary of Findings / 232
B. Baghdad / 245
1. Bombing in the Bataween Quarter: What Were the Targets / 257
2. Cruise Missiles in the Karada and Masbah Quarters: What were the Targets? / 259
3. Destruction of the Central Bank / 262
4. Civilians Killed in Attack on Major Bus Station / 262
5. Five to Six Houses Totally Destroyed in the Working-class Quarter / 263
6. Six Houses in Residential Neighborhood Sustain Direct Hit / 264
7. Commercial Area in Residential Neighborhood bombed; Four Homes Damaged / 265
8. Five Homes Collapse, Killing Family of Six / 266
9. Five Residential Buildings in Vicinity of Doura Oil Refinery completely destroyed / 266
10. Reports of Damage Near Bridges / 268
a. Restaurant Destroyed, Civilians Killed, Near Sarafiya Bridge / 268
b. Five Houses Damaged, Civilians Injured and Killed, Near Sarafiya Bridge / 269
c. Shops and Two Cinemas Damaged near Jumhouriyya Bridge / 271
d. Restaurant Destroyed near Jumhouriyya Bridge / 272
C. Basra / 273
1. Two Missiles Crash into Crowded Market in Daytime Attack / 276
2. Ashshar Market Area in Downtown Basra Sustains Damage from Two Missiles / 276
3. 25 Houses Destroyed in Middle-class Neighborhood During Nighttime Attack;
at Least 11 Killed / 278
4. About 60 Homes Damaged in Several Attacks in al-Ma’qil Neighborhood / 279
5. Eight Adobe Houses Destroyed in al-Zubayr / 280
6. Only Hospital in al-Zubayr Destroyed / 281
7. Mosque Damaged / 282
8. Bombs Miss Small Bridge, Hit Hospital / 282
9. Small Bridge Missed Again / 285
10. 50 Homes Damaged, Ten Killed, as Bombs Miss
Telecommunications Tower in Daytime Attack / 285
11. Nighttime Bombing of Railroad Station / 286
12. Soda-bottling Plant Destroyed / 287
13. Reports of Attacks on Oil-industry Administrative Buildings / 288
D. Other Cities and Towns in Southern Iraq / 291
1. 20 Houses Destroyed in an Agricultural Village / 291
2. 36 Houses Destroyed or Damaged in Nighttime Attack / 293
3. Three Houses Destroyed in an Agricultural Village / 294
4. Two-story Medical Clinic Destroyed / 294
5. Three Residential Buildings Destroyed / 296
6. Two-story House Destroyed as Bomb Misses Bridge by 500 Meters / 296
7. Bomb Misses Bridge by 500 Meters, Falls in Residential Quarter, Six Killed / 297
8. Bridge Missed Again, One Killed / 298
9. Health Clinic and Several Houses Destroyed in Bombing of Bridges / 299
10. Bomb Misses Telecommunications Tower; at least 20 Killed in Two-story House / 299
11. Telecommunications Tower Missed; 11 Killed When Hotel is Destroyed / 301
12. Civilian Casualties in Bombing of Bus Station in Hilla / 301
13. Civilian Casualties and Damage in Samawa from Cluster Bombs / 302
E. Cities and Towns in Western and Northern Iraq / 304
1. Bomb Hits House in Early Evening, Killing Five / 305
2. Airplane Opens Fire, Killing Members of Wedding Party / 305
3. Bomb Hits House in Midnight Attack, Injured Family of 14 Survives / 306
4. School Completely Destroyed, Hotel Damaged, at least Three Civilians Killed / 307
5. 23 Houses in Agricultural Area Hit with Bombs in Two Separate Attacks, No Survivors / 308
6. Reports from Northern Iraq / 309
Part III: Iraq’s Missile Attacks Against Israel and the Gulf States
Overview / 317
Chapter Six
Targets in Israel and the Gulf States: Iraq’s Public Statements / 327
Chapter Seven
Means and Methods of Attack and Defense / 335
Chapter Eight
Civilian Casualties and Damage: Israel / 347
A The First Attack: Early Morning Hours of January 18 / 352
B. The Second Attack: January 19 / 355
C. The Third and Most Damaging Attack: January 22 / 358
D. No Casualties in the Fourth Attack: January 23 / 361
E. Wide Collateral Damage in the Fifth Attack: January 25 / 362
F. The Sixth Attack on January 26: Varying Figures, Unknown Targets / 366
G. Two Missiles Land in Occupied West Bank: January 28 and January 31 / 368
H. No Casualties or Damage Reported: Attacks on Night of February 2-3 / 370
I. Iraq Claims Another Attack: February 6 / 371
J. Civilian Damage in the Eleventh Attack: February 9 / 372
K. Two Attacks in Rapid Succession: February 11 and February 12 / 373
L. An Apparently Harmless Attack: February 16 / 376
M. The Fifteenth Attack: February 19 / 378
N. Sixteenth Attack: February 23 / 378
O. The Last Missiles: Early Morning Hours of February 25 / 379
Chapter Nine
Civilian Casualties and Damage: Saudi Arabia / 385
A. The First Attacks: Dhahran Air Base / 387
B. First Missiles Fired at Riyadh on January 21, 12 Injured / 389
C. Conflicting Information About the Cause of Damage on the Ground / 389
D. The Second Attack on Riyadh, No Civilian Casualties / 392
E. Five Missiles Fired on January 23, No Civilian Casualties Reported / 393
F. First Civilian Killed as Missile Levels Wing of Interior Ministry
Building in Riyadh on January 25, 30 Injured / 394
G. The Next Two Attacks: No Reported Casualties or Damage / 396
H. 29 Injured in Riyadh: February 3 / 397
I. No Casualties in February 8 Attack / 397
J. Two Foreign Workers Injured in Riyadh: February 11 / 398
K Four Slightly Injured in Daytime Attack on Haff al-Batin: February 14 / 399
Maps
Western and Northern Iraq / 67
Southern Iraq / 68
Disposition of Military Forces at the Commencement of the Ground
War / 316
PREFACE
This report applies the rules of war governing international armed conflicts to examine civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects from bomb and missile attacks carried out by the allied forces against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, and from missile attacks by Iraq against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. The report does not address civilian deaths and injuries, or damage to civilian objects, during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the subject of previous and upcoming Middle East Watch (MEW) reports. Nor does it address possible violations of humanitarian law, or the laws of war, against combatants on either side in the conflict. Also beyond the scope of this report are the environmental damage and regional health hazards caused by the fires set in Kuwait’s oil wells and the massive release of oil into the Persian Gulf.
The purpose of this report is to contribute to the public debate about the conduct of the Persian Gulf War and to draw attention to violations and possible violations of humanitarian law. In some cases it draws conclusions, and in others it requests from the U.S. Department of Defense and other allied military commands, additional information that is important in assessing the allies’ compliance with the laws of war governing aerial bombardment. Further, the report raises questions that Middle East Watch believes should be addressed to the Pentagon and publicly discussed.
Middle East Watch hopes that this report will be useful to members of the U.S. Congress in evaluating the two Department of Defense reports on the conduct of the Persian Gulf conflict. These documents -- the first preliminary report was released on July 16, 1991*, and the second and final report is due no later than January 15, 1992 — are to be submitted by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command, to the congressional defense committees, pursuant to legislation enacted in March 1991.** These reports — which will include classified and unclassified versions — are required to address a range of issues. The issues related to subjects in this report are:
- the use and performance of United States military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions;
- the role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by U.S. and coalition forces, including collateral damage and civilian casualties;
- the rules of engagement for the coalition forces; and
- estimates of military and civilian casualties sustained by Iraq and by nations not directly participating in the hostilities in the conflict.
Middle East Watch has included material from the Pentagon’s July 1991 preliminary report in this report. While we acknowledge the Pentagon’s prominent caveat that the interim report contains preliminary information subject to change as additional information is received by the Defense Department, nevertheless we find — regrettably — that numerous questions related to the issues noted above remain unanswered.
Civilian Casualties and Damage In Iraq: Methodology
This report uses the same methodological framework as other Human Rights Watch investigative reports on violations of the rules of war in Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan. As has been the case with many of these reports, Middle East Watch was obliged to rely on testimony from those who had fled the country where the violations of the rules of war were committed. Despite repeated requests beginning February 7, 1991, MEW did not receive permission from the Iraqi government to visit the country and conduct on-site investigations of the sites of allied bomb and missile attacks. However, as this report was going to press in October, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society extended an invitation for a delegation to visit Iraq, a mission we hope to undertake in the near future.
The interviews with former residents of Iraq and other eyewitnesses to allied bomb damage cited in this report were conducted by Middle East Watch representatives during the war in Jordan, and after the war in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Most of the interviews cited in this report were conducted in Jordan during the war by Jemera Rone, counsel to Human Rights Watch. Ms. Rone has undertaken similar field work in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America over a six-year period.
Ms. Rone visited Jordan from February 11 to March 2, and conducted interviews with randomly selected persons who had arrived in Jordan from Iraq during the air war. Most of those interviewed were "evacuees" — foreign workers, typically males from Africa and South Asia, who had fled Iraq after living there for at least one year and in some cases over 10 years. Pakistanis and Indians typically were employed by large construction or other companies and lived in compounds provided by their employers; others had lived among Iraqis, often in poor neighborhoods.
The Jordanian government and international humanitarian organizations were well prepared for an exodus of refugees and evacuees far greater than what actually materialized during the war. By the time the air war started, they had readied tents, supplies and transport systems that were more than adequate for the needs of the 22,000-plus evacuees who crossed into Jordan from Iraq between January 17 and February 27***. The system of repatriation of the evacuees had become so efficient that evacuees, after spending the night at the Ruwayshid facility near the Jordan-Iraq border, typically stayed only a few days in Azraq before being repatriated or only overnight in Aqaba before being taken by ferry to Egypt. The evacuees in many cases left Jordan within a few days and the incoming evacuees thus had no opportunity to talk to them about the contents of the interviews — conditions which are superior for fact-finding purposes, compared to situations that usually exist in camps where refugees spend months together.
Ms. Rone interviewed the evacuees in private, without the presence of government officials. The Jordanian authorities granted permission for Ms. Rone to travel to four sites where the evacuees were housed while awaiting transport to their countries of origin: the Ruwayshid evacuee facility, the sole Jordanian crossing point on the Iraqi border; the Azraq evacuee facility near Azraq, Jordan, 60 km east of Amman; the Andalus transit facility outside of Amman; and the Rabia evacuee facility in Aqaba. The evacuees usually remained only overnight at Ruwayshid and then moved to Azraq or, in the case of Egyptians, to Aqaba, to await transport to their countries of origin. The evening before they departed by plane, they were moved to the Andalus facility.
Ms. Rone also interviewed Jordanians and Palestinians who had returned from Iraq. A few had been in Kuwait before or during the war: some had lived in Kuwait; some went to help other Jordanians in Kuwait and Iraq pack up and move to Jordan; and others went to Iraq to provide medical assistance during the war. As it did during the 1980-88 Gulf War, Iraq barred its citizens from leaving during this conflict. With the exception of one Bedouin — whose tent in western Iraq was bombed — interviewed by Ms. Rone at a hospital in Jordan, she met no Iraqis who had entered Jordan since the bombing began. Ms. Rone also did not encounter in her random selection any evacuees who had come from Kuwait after the air war started.
Ms. Rone questioned all interviewees about the day, time and place of bombing incidents that caused civilian casualties or damage; the physical details of the damage inflicted, including bomb craters; the wounded or dead persons actually seen; and the distance of the site of the damage from military or possible military targets. Distances, where they are noted in this report, were roughly calculated by the interviewees. Judging by the way the interviewees answered, they considered the questioning process to be serious and made efforts to recall the precise information that was sought. They did not have prepared stories — much of the information had to be elicited by questioning; they also were patient with repeated requests for details, such as their meaning if they described a house as "completely destroyed." Ms. Rone asked some but not all the interviewees to provide their names, with the understanding that the names would not be published, and some volunteered their names.
Civilian Casualties and Damage in Israel and the Gulf States: Methodology
The information gathered by Middle East Watch on civilian casualties and damage in Israel from Iraq’s missile attacks came from a variety of private and public sources. Andrew Whitley, the executive director of Middle East Watch and a former Israel bureau chief for the London Financial Times, conducted a fact-finding mission to Israel from June 2 to 4, 1991. He spoke with dozens of Israeli citizens who lived in the affected areas and others, such as journalists, who gathered information about Iraq’s missile attacks as they occurred but have been prevented by Israeli censorship from speaking publicly.
Mr. Whitley concentrated his field research on the greater Tel Aviv metropolitan area, where the majority of missiles landed and where most civilian casualties and damage occurred. Mr. Whitley visited sites where damage had taken place, and interviewed bystanders, local residents and, where appropriate, shopkeepers and other workers. It was explained to them why Middle East Watch was conducting this research. Most interviewees were cooperative, volunteering information about such matters as the extent of warning they had received from air raid sirens, how much damage had been caused and whether there had been any casualties. However, it should be emphasized that the sampling was not scientific and the picture obtained from these eyewitnesses was not necessarily complete. Some respondents were suspicious about the inquiries, preferring not to talk to a foreign human rights worker without official permission.
Official sources of information were releases from the Government of Israel Press Office, Ricochet, a published compilation of statements issued during the war by the Israel Defense Forces Spokesman, data from the Press Communications Center set up temporarily during the war, and news broadcasts on the government-controlled Israel Radio and Television networks. Maariv, a mass circulation daily newspaper, also published a useful, detailed chart of those missile attacks about which official information was disclosed.
Middle East Watch did not undertake fact-finding in Saudi Arabia to document civilian casualties and damage there from Iraq’s missile attacks during the war. The information presented on this subject has been drawn from official Saudi Press Agency reports, independent press accounts and other sources indicated in Chapter Nine.
Media Accounts
This report also draws in part on reports filed by journalists who were based in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel during the war. Despite the control of movement by the authorities on both sides, and the clearance of dispatches by Iraqi government or U.S. military censors, Middle East Watch found the reporting of journalists in the region to be valuable to our ongoing work. We salute their efforts and persistence under extremely difficult conditions.
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, the 43-day U.S.-led international military campaign to oust Iraq from Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm, was spearheaded by "the most successful air-campaign in die history of die world." In some respects, this claim seems justified. The allies assembled a gigantic airborne armada that quickly and easily established air superiority over Iraqi military forces. Allied aircraft bombed whenever and wherever they wanted. Their arsenals were equipped with technologically sophisticated weapons that proved capable of astonishing precision. By means of die bombing campaign, the allies overwhelmed die foe to die point where — once the long-dreaded ground war got underway — it quickly became a rout and coalition forces suffered mercifully few casualdes.
Yet Secretary Cheney's assertion of unequalled success went even further. Implicitly it included die contention — made explicit by President Bush and other Pentagon officials — that never before had such care been taken to avoid harm to the opposing side’s civilian population. Further, U.S. and other allied spokespersons claimed at every turn that the effort to minimize damage to civilians had succeeded. Though occasionally acknowledging that some civilian casualties were inevitable, die impression was created by statement after statement and television image after image that, so far as the allied performance was concerned, it was a near-perfect war, with as little harm to civilian life and property as humanly possible.
This impression was reinforced by a deliberate policy on the part of die United States and its allies to manage die news of die war in a manner designed to suggest that all feasible precautions in fact had been taken to avoid harm to civilians. Restrictions placed on journalists attempting to cover die war and die selective presentation of information about the conduct of die war, in part through elaborately rehearsed military briefings, left die press unable to probe the extent of the precautions actually adopted. Parallel curbs on the foreign press imposed by Iraq exacerbated the difficulty of penetrating die veils that blocked the view of the actual conduct of the war.
…..
* U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict / An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991 [hereinafter Pentagon Interim Report].
** Title Five (Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict) of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, March 21, 1991.
*** In the early weeks of the air war, some 5,000 to 10,000 evacuees and Jordanians were blocked by the Iraqi authorities from crossing into Jordan on the grounds that they did not have exit permits. For the most part, the evacuees could not return to Baghdad to secure the permits because they lacked gasoline and money. Moreover, the highway was very dangerous because of frequent allied air attacks. As a result of international pressure, the Iraqis relented and those stranded at the frontier without proper food or shelter and in sub-zero nighttime temperatures finally were permitted to cross into Jordan. (See David Hirst and Walk Amr, "Refugees cross into Jordan as Baghdad reopens border," The Guardian, January 29, 1991.) The only exceptions to this apparently were Egyptians, who massed on the border until mid-February when their crossing was allowed, also without exit permits.
Middle East Watch
Needless Deaths in the Gulf War
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch
Needless Deaths in the Gulf War
Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign
and Violations of the Laws of War
A Middle East Watch Report
Human Rights Watch
New York - Washington - Los Angeles – London
Copyright ® November 1991 by Human Rights Watch.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
Cover design by Patti Lacobee Watch Committee
Middle East Watch was established in 1989 to establish and promote observance of internationally recognized human rights in the Middle East. The chair of Middle East Watch is Gary Sick and the vice chairs are Lisa Anderson and Bruce Rabb. Andrew Whitley is the executive director; Eric Goldstein is the research director; Virginia N. Sherry is the associate director; Aziz Abu Hamad is the senior researcher; John V. White is an Orville Schell Fellow; and Christina Derry is the associate.
Needless deaths in the Gulf War: civilian casualties during the air campaign and violations of the laws of war.
p. cm — (A Middle East Watch report)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-56432-029-4
1. Persian Gulf War, 1991-United States. 2. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Atrocities. 3. War victims-Iraq. 4. War—Protection of civilians.
I. Human Rights Watch (Organization) II. Series.
DS79.72.N44 1991
956.704’3—dc20 / 91-37902
CIP
