Mesopotamia 1917-1920

Mesopotamia 1917-1920
A CLASH OF LOYALTIES
IN CONTINUATION OF `LOYALTIES, MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1917’

`... You have been called hither to save a Nation,—Nations. You had the best People, indeed, of the Christian world put into your trust, when you came hither. You had the affairs of these Nations delivered over to you in peace and quiet; you were, and we all are, put into an undisturbed possession, nobody making title to us. Through the blessing of God, our enemies were hopeless and scattered... And now ? —To have our peace and interest, whereof those were our hopes the other day, thus shaken and put under such a confusion; and ourselves rendered hereby almost the scorn and contempt of those strangers who are amongst us to negotiate their masters' affairs ! ... If by such actings, . . these poor Nations shall be thrown into heaps and confusion, through blood, and ruin and trouble—all because we would not settle when we could, when God put it into our hands—to have all recoil upon us; and ourselves ... loosened from all known and public interests; ... who shall answer for these things to God?'

CROMWELL Speech,
12th September 1654.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA FROM THE DEATH OF GENERAL MAUDE TO THE ARMISTICE . page i
General Marshall succeeds General Maude. Military Policy. Question of Arab co-operation. Occupation of Middle Euphrates. Occupation of Kirkuk. Sir Percy Cox leaves for England. Question of advance on Mosul. Operations on the Tigris. The Armistice. Occupation of Mosul wilayat.

CHAPTER II. THE ADVANCE TO THE CASPIAN page 24
Events in Russia, General Dunsterville's Mission. Occupation of Enzeli. Eastern Committee of War Cabinet. Embarrassments in Mesopotamia consequent on military commitments in Persia. Famine in N.W. Persia. Persian misapprehen¬sions and resentment. Railway survey from Khanaqin to Hamadan. Christian refugees. Military virtues of Assyrian mountaineers. Attempted repatriation. Developments in Persia. Mr. Edwin Montagu and Lord Curzon.

CHAPTER III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL RESOURCES. THE GROWTH OF THE POLICE FORCE AND ARAB LEVIES page 45
Organization of man-power. Jail Corps. Labour Corps. Use of oil fuel and coal. Construction of gunboats. Compulsory service at Abadan and on oil-fields. Gallantry of Robert Lindsay and James Still at Tembi. Failure to substitute oil for coal on rivers and railways. Proposed oil refinery at Baghdad. Agricultural Development Scheme. Sir John Hewett. Cattle-breeding. Sheep and Wool. Dairies. Chicken-Farms. Department of Local Resources. Brig.-Gen. Dickson. Military Works Dept. Police Force. Lt.-Col. Prescott. Shabana and Levies. Bt.-Maj. Boyle. Loyalty of Levies and Police.

CHAPTER IV. THE GROWTH OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DUR-ING 1918 page 72
Trouble at Najaf. Captain Marshall murdered. Najaf blockaded. Conspirators hanged. Complicity of German officers. Captain Balfour presented with sword of honour. Civil Administration introduced. Land Tenure Systems. Position at Samawa and Ramadi. The Blockade. The Shammar Jarba`. Position on Diyala River and at Khanaqin. E. B. Soane. Abandonment and reoccupation of Kirkuk. Baghdad. Red Cross fetes. Municipal activities. The Oudh Bequest. Progress in Basra wilayat. Public Health. The Irrigation Dept. Qurna, Muntafiq, and `Amara Divisions. Deportation of Civilians. Justice and Education. Political uncertainties.

CHAPTER V. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS NOV. 1918 TO MAY 1919 page 1o1
General Marshall's announcement. Anglo-French Declaration of 8th November 1918. Proposed terms of peace. Proposals for an Arab Empire. Future governance of `Iraq. The Arab Bureau. Self-determination in `Iraq. Commendation of His Majesty's Government. Peace Conference at Paris. Discussion in London. Alternative and provisional schemes considered and approved.
 
CHAPTER VI. UNCERTAINTY IN `IRAQ AND DISTURBANCES IN KURDISTAN DEC. 1918 TO AUG. 1919 . page 122
Situation in April 1919. Inability of H.M's Government to make any statement of policy as regards Mosul. Proposals for constitutional organization. The question of Mosul. San Remo agreement. Captain Noel. Shaikh Mahmud. Sharif Pasha. Saiyid Taha. Rowandiz. E. B. Soane. Shaikh Mahmud revolts; is defeated, sentenced to death, and reprieved. Position in the Middle East. Ques¬tion of railway construction. Question of S. Kurdistan. Murders of Captain Pearson, Willey, and Macdonald. Punitive operations in Kurdistan. Fresh dis¬turbances. Murder of Bill and Scott. Further punitive operations. A period of quiescence.

CHAPTER VII. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DURING 1919 . page 156
Administrative difficulties. Temporary contracts. Government of India demands return of its officers. Delays in transit. Divided control in Whitehall. Parliamentary references to Mesopotamia. Departmental reductions. Irrigation Department. Sir John Hewett's Mission and Reports. Organization of Civil Administration. Judicial and Educational Organizations.

CHAPTER VIII. ARMY CHAPLAINS, Y.M.C.A., CHURCH ARMY, CAN¬TEENS, AND WAR GRAVES COMMISSION page 186
The supply of Chaplains. Episcopal Visitations. Ecclesiastical Reorganization. General Maude's attitude towards religious observance. His last hours. Christian refugees. The Church Army. Christian principles and the Civil Administration. The Y.M.C.A. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The British Red Cross. The Joint War Committees. Expeditionary Force Canteens. The Imperial War Graves Commission. The Basra War Memorial. The Maude Memorial

CHAPTER IX. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS 1919-20 . page 208
The Treaty of Versailles. The Covenant of the League of Nations. The Man-date. Municipal and Divisional Councils. Popular feeling in `Iraq. Peace tarries. Monsignor Martin. French Government officials. Sir John Cowans. Question of pre-war rights and concessions. Disposal of war stores. Disposal of river craft. Lord Inchcape. Transfer of I.W.T. and Railways to Civil Administration. Civil Budget of 1920. Civil Expenditure of 1920.

CHAPTER X. THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 192o page 227
Political atmospherics. The Syrian regime. Frontier between Syria and `Iraq. `Ana. Dair-ez-Zor seized by filibusters. Ramadhan-al-Shallash. The War Office bungle matters. We decline to reoccupy Dair-ez-Zor. Maulud Pasha. Faisal proclaimed King of Syria. 'Abdulla proclaimed Amir of `Iraq. References to `Iraq in Parliament. Proposal to maintain order in `Iraq through Royal Air Force. Mr. Winston Churchill's proposals. Mr. Asquith's views. Fresh con¬stitutional proposals. Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter's committee.
 
CHAPTER XI. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE MANDATE—AND AFTER page 248
Acceptance of Mandate at San Remo announced in `Iraq. Constitutional pro¬posals. Reception of Mandate by nationalists. Popular attitude. Disturbances during Ramadhan. The challenge of the nationalists. Their demands answered. Views of Basra and Hilla notables. Views of tribal leaders. Kurdish opinion. Return of Sir Percy Cox announced. Constitutional proposals accepted. Commendation of H.M's Government. Sir Percy Cox passes through Baghdad. Discussions in Parliament. Saiyid Talib Pasha al Naqib. Disorders on Diyala. Views of Sir Percy Cox.

CHAPTER XII. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN 192o page 270
Sir Aylmer Haldane replaces Sir George MacMunn. Military difficulties. Stores. Women and children. Prisoners of War. Refugees. Position in Persia. Tal `Afar attacked. Political officers killed. General Haldane leaves for Persia. Karbala. Diwaniya. Hilla. Kufa. Shatra. Qalat Sikar. Arbil. Sulaimani. Falluja. Kufa. Political Officers killed. Col. Leachman murdered. Samawa. H.M.S. Greenfly's crew killed. Officers of Royal Air Force killed. Karbala. Hilla. The Manchester Regiment. The rebellion quelled. Punitive measures.

CHAPTER XIII. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS JUNE—OCT. 192o page 3o3
J`afar Pasha. Foreign Office refuse to permit him to return to `Iraq. Events in Syria. Proposal to offer Emir Faisal throne of `Iraq. French action in Syria. Question of sovereignty. What is a rebel ? Staff difficulties. Sir Stanley Reed. Causes of rising. Criticism at home. Objections to mandatory system. Vale¬dictory messages. Sir Percy Cox returns.

APPENDICES • 327

NOTE

The bibliographical notes in this volume refer to the List of Authorities in Loyalties, Mesopotamia, 1914-17.

PREFACE

`... You have been called hither to save a Nation,—Nations. You had the best People, indeed, of the Christian world put into your trust, when you came hither. You had the affairs of these Nations delivered over to you in peace and quiet; you were, and we all are, put into an undisturbed possession, nobody making title to us. Through the blessing of God, our enemies were hopeless and scattered... And now ?—To have our peace and interest, whereof those were our hopes the other day, thus shaken and put under such a confusion; and ourselves rendered hereby almost the scorn and contempt of those strangers who are amongst us to negotiate their masters' affairs ! ... If by such actings , . . these poor Nations shall be thrown into heaps and confusion, through blood, and ruin and trouble—all because we would not settle when we could, when God put it into our hands—to have all recoil upon us; and ourselves ... loosened from all known and public interests; ... who shall answer for these things to God?'

CROMWELL Speech, 12th September 1654.

IN a previous volume entitled Loyalties Mesopotaria 1914-1917 I have endeavoured to place before the reader a comprehensive account of the salient events, both in the military and the political arena, which culminated in the capture of Baghdad and the occupation of the Baghdad wilayat. The present work is designed to record the successive victories of the armies under General Marshall, whereby, at or shortly after the Armistice, we found ourselves in possession of the Mosul wilayat, and burdened with great military responsibilities in Persia, on the Caspian, and in Russian Turkistan. The political developments and embarrassments which followed these achievements are also dealt with in some detail.

I have found it impossible to endow the record with the structural unity which an historical narrative of this critical period in the annals of `Iraq, and of Great Britain in the East, should possess. It has been difficult to maintain a strictly chronological sequence, or to offer to the reader a satisfactory analysis of the local reactions to events in other countries. Affairs in `Iraq during this period were influenced less by the wishes and actions of the inhabitants themselves, or of the representatives in `Iraq of the British Government, than by events in Europe, in Syria, in Persia, and in Turkey, which were often almost wholly beyond the control of governments.

The nationalist movement, which had its mainsprings in Syria, was many-sided. Patriotism is a plant which bears strangely diverse flowers in different soils and in successive ages, and its fruit is sometimes bitter. It was not an important element in `Iraq during this period. The conception of Arabia as an independent entity was not unfamiliar to the educated minority, but the idea of `Iraq as an independent nation had scarcely taken shape, for the country lacked homogeneity, whether geographical, economic, or racial. Separatist tendencies were strong in Basra; it was scarcely to be hoped that the wilayats of Basra and Baghdad could maintain their existence as an autonomous state without the revenue it was hoped might eventually be derived from the economic resources of the Mosul wilayat. Yet three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Mosul wilayat were non-Arab, five-eighths being Kurdish, and one-eighth Christians or Yazidis. The Kurdish problem proved insoluble. The tribesmen were disunited and intractable; their leaders had no common policy, and agreed only in their opposition to any form of govern¬ment which would bring them under Arab domination. The Christian communities, Chaldean and Assyrian, were smaller in numbers; to do them justice and to find an agreed place for them in the scheme of things presented great difficulties. The Assyrians, in particular, deserved special consideration. They had played a noble part on the side of the Allies during the war, had shown themselves to be first-class fighting-men, and were organized by the British military authorities into battalions as a Frontier Force to maintain order amongst the Kurds. Their homelands were in possession of the Turks, who proved implacable enemies, or of Kurdish tribes, who could not be ejected except by force. They were hill-men and could not even in favourable circumstances maintain their health and strength in the plains, but attempts to repatriate them failed. The Chaldeans and other Christian communities were less virile: their natural affiliations were rather with their compatriots in Syria, to whom the prospect of a French mandate made a strong appeal. The simpler Arabs of the Basra and Baghdad wilayats were under the influence of the priesthood of Najaf and Karbala—spiritual tyrants whose principal ambition was to stem the rising tide of emancipation.

In England the government of the day was distracted by financial and political problems of the utmost gravity at home and abroad; the press gave no useful guidance in any direction; publicists offered little but the broken lights of sentimentalism and pacificism. The British Empire had won the war, and in so doing seemed to have lost faith in its mission and belief in the obligation, imposed on it alike by self-interest and duty, to uphold the principles of authority and of good government for which it stood, until these principles had taken root and could safely be entrusted to an indigenous authority. I felt then, as now, deeply—even passionately—that the welfare of the people of the Middle East and India, no less than the existence of the British Empire, depended upon our facing our responsibilities. I was convinced that our economic difficulties would be surmounted in the measure that we rose to the height of our opportunities. My inner¬most beliefs were in all humility those expressed by Cromwell: `We are a people with the stamp of God upon us ... whose appearance and whose providences are not to be outmatched by any story.'

The application in Arab countries of the mandatory principle seemed to me to be inconsistent with the interests of the inhabitants of the territories to which it was applied. If the system was merely a subterfuge to enable the supervising Power to exercise dominion (as in the case of Syria) in substance without the form, and so to pander to the misconceptions of President Wilson, it was unworthy and did not deserve to endure. If, on the other hand, it was intended to be a reality, it was unworkable, for it contained within itself the seeds of decay and dissolution. There was no `competent authority' to exercise ultimate power : it was the worst kind of diarchy. `Iraq would need capital for roads, railways, irrigation, and other public works; under the Mandate it would be impossible to obtain it, in the absence of a Treasury guarantee or of adequate sources of revenue available as security. `Iraq needed expert advisers: under the mandatory system it seemed unlikely that the best available men would be obtained—owing to lack of prospects or permanence—or that their advice would in the last resort be effective. The very foundations of such organized life as existed in `Iraq had been shaken by four years of war. The first principle to be re-established in men's minds was that of authority. It was difficult to envisage this under the mandatory system.

It was clear that the acceptance of the Mandate, as framed, would be followed almost immediately by a demand for complete and unfettered freedom from any form of tutelage, for which I believed `Iraq to be unfitted, owing not only to lack of competent administrators or to the absence of national feeling' but also on the broadest economic grounds. Its geographical situation, its long history of decay, the low repute of its principal products in the world's markets, all pointed to the benefits to be derived from close association with a larger and more advanced unit of government.

I did my best, nevertheless, to give effect to the decisions of His Majesty's Government and to be guided by the spirit of their instructions. How far the result fell short of the standards and ideals at which we all aimed I am painfully aware.
`In India', wrote Lord Curzon in 1921, `I was magnificently served. The whole spirit of service there was different. Every one there was out to do something.' In applying those words to the Civil Adminis¬tration of `Iraq during the period with which his work deals, I am speaking, I feel sure, for Sir Percy Cox as well as for myself, for at no time was there any substantial difference between us as to our local aims, and seldom as to means. The Civil Administration itself was, indeed, imbued with a unity of aim if not always of method, which would have done credit to a service of thirty instead of three years' standing.

More space has been devoted to a recital of departmental activities than is perhaps justified by their intrinsic historical importance, mainly because no complete account exists elsewhere in any accessible form. For the same reason I have recorded, in some detail, the correspondence that passed on the form of constitution to be set up under the Mandate, and have quoted freely from official correspondence on the subject, believing it to be in the public interest that the essential facts bearing upon the attitude and intentions of his Majesty's Government and of its local representatives should be available while the events to which they gave rise are still comparatively fresh in the minds of men. The study of interactions and interdependencies is but in its infancy and no one can foresee the end.

I have, moreover, written with the specific object of removing certain misunderstandings as to the aims and methods of the Civil Administration during and after the war. These misunderstandings gave rise to much criticism, in Parliament, in the Press, and elsewhere, on the part of many persons, some of whom were entitled by their experience in other fields to a respectful hearing.

In the course of the events here recorded, the attitude of some of those with whom I collaborated sometimes ran counter to my ideas and occasionally caused spectators to place an erroneous interpretation on my intentions; if only for this reason, the task of writing this volume has been neither easy nor agreeable. So far as my presentation of the facts is controversial, it is permissible to add that I have endeavoured to do justice to both sides of the case, and have made no statement the accuracy of which I have not been at pains to verify. Has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus.
 
With the inauguration in November 192o by Sir Percy Cox of an Arab Government which, in other circumstances, I might have assisted him to instal (though from the first I insisted that Sir Percy Cox himself should, if possible, preside over its destinies), the Civil Administration of `Iraq came to an end by absorption into the indigenous Government. Yet King Faisal, and his responsible ministers, are not wholly unaware of the debt which they owe to those British officers to whom it fell to wean the tribesmen and cultivators from old ways. The patient labours of political officers in deserts and marshes, their courage in face of difficulties and dangers, and their single-handed devotion to the welfare of `Iraq did more than anything else to make possible the foundation of a new State. Many who sought in 1920 only to kill and destroy cherish their memory to-day, and the tradition of the efforts of those gallant Englishmen will survive when their names have faded from human memory. In the words of Pericles :

`They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battlefield their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory.... The living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words.... Not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them; graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war.'

I have sought to tell in this volume in what manner Great Britain played her part in `Iraq during and immediately after the Great War. Those on the spot laboured blindly, not knowing the event, but always aware that the people of `Iraq, be they Arabs, Kurds, or Assyrians, could not for an indefinite period look to Great Britain to keep internal peace. To attempt to do so, for even a brief period, whilst entrusting to others responsibility for the administration of law, the execution of justice, and the collection of taxes, is a policy that can only bring discredit on both sides and must eventually fail. In `Iraq as elsewhere a kingdom to be stable must in the ultimate resort be based on the character of rulers, the strength of social bonds, and the assent of the subjects. The path on which we have set the feet of the peoples of `Iraq is steep and stony; the journey has been made more difficult by the pace at which their leaders have tried to traverse the first stages.

As Sir Henry Maine remarked with reference to India: `the British Nation cannot evade the duty of rebuilding upon its own principles that which it unwittingly destroys.' The idea that an Arab government can be reconstituted to-day on an improved native model is a delusion not less dangerous because it is widely believed. A country which has for any length of time been exposed to Western ideas and has come into touch with Western thought can never be the same as before. The new foundations must be of the Western, not the Eastern, type, unless indeed, so much blood be spilt and such anarchy reign that the tradition of the West be obliterated.

But we must, with George Meredith, `look at the good future of man with some faith in it, and capacity to regard current phases of history without letting our sensations blind and bewilder us,' knowing that though for us all, the wise and the foolish, the slave and the free, for empires and anarchies, there is one end, yet do our works live after us, and by their fruits we shall be judged at the bar of history. If we have worked faithfully, then it is well. It is God who gives and takes
away kingdoms. Potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia.

St. George's Day, 1931.

________________
1 A very competent observer, with fourteen years responsible administrative experience in `Iraq, wrote as follows in October 1930:

`There are difficulties common to all branches of the administration in `Iraq. These arise from more or less permanent factors, and are not at all appreciated by those who do not know the country, nor sufficiently by those who do.
`One of the chief of these factors seems to me the smallness of the governing class. I do not suppose there is in the whole of history another example of a state with a representative government of a modern type, in which the only people who count are two or three hundred at the most. It is in fact a close oligarchy, but without the administrative experience, the education and the tradition of public service, without which as far as I can remember no oligarchies have governed successfully.

`Another factor is the complete absence of any true patriotism. This is not surprising considering the past history of the country. But it means that the foundation of all repre¬sentative government—the recognition by the individual that the good of the community as a whole is identical with his own private good—does not exist here even in the most rudimentary form.'

GALS WORTHY
'The unhappy King (Theodosius) now learnt by experience
that not even the wisest or most humane of Princes,
if he be an alien in race, in customs, and religion, can ever win the hearts of the people.'

(GREGOROVIUS, Rome in the Middle Ages, i. 327.)
 
By the same Author
THE PERSIAN GULF An historical sketch from the earliest
times to the beginning of the twentieth century. 1928
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERSIA. 193o LOYALTIES, MESOPO

TAMIA 1914-1917. 1930
 
MESOPOTAMIA
1917-1920
A CLASH OF L0YAL TIES A Personal and Historical Record
BY
Lt.-Col. Sir Arnauld T. Wilson
K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Formerly Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, Political
Resident in Me Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul
General for Fars, Khuzistan, & c.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD
1931
 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN MOUSE, E.C. 4
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
LEIPZIG NEW YORK TORONTO
MELBOURNE CAPETOWN BOMBAY
CALCUTTA MADRAS SHANGHAI
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE
UNIVERSITY
 
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,
OXFORD BY JOHN JOHNSON, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
 
GENERAL SIR
EDMUND BARROW
G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
Military Secretary, India Office
1904-17

SIR
ARTHUR HIRTZEL
K.C.B.
Assistant Under-Secretary of State
India Office, 1917-21

TO WHOSE UNSELFISH LABOURS AND
WISE JUDGEMENT THE MESOPOTAMIA
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AND CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION, AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS, OWED FAR MORE
THAN THEY KNEW