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Crisis of the Ottoman Empire


Auteur :
Éditeur : Franz Steiner Verlag Date & Lieu : 2000, Stuttgart
Préface : Pages : 524
Traduction : ISBN : 3-515-07687-5
Langue : AnglaisFormat : 160x235 mm
Code FIKP : Liv. Ang. 1949Thème : Histoire

Présentation
Table des Matières Introduction Identité PDF
Crisis of the Ottoman Empire

Crisis of the Ottoman Empire

James J. Reid

Franz Steiner Verlag


Comparative investigation of 19th-century wars, combined with a knowledge of Ottoman, Balkan, and Middle Eastern historical developments can afford some understanding of the wars that transpired in the Ottoman Empire from 1853 to 1878. Certain fields lend themselves to comparative study, and one such field is military history. Generals and military establishments have dwelt in a constant need to learn about the progress of other armies, especially their enemies. When an army has failed to keep abreast of developments, the results are not only obvious, but devastating for the laggard. In the 19th century, the Ottoman army had begun to make efforts at change, but ambitions exceeded results. Change occurred, but not the sort that the reformers had planned. Most Ottomanists and Turcologists seek to portray “reform” as a unilateral proposition undertaken by the Ottoman elite with a definable purpose, and a sense of discipline. Even if the reformers failed, their vision for the future prevailed in new emanations during future reform efforts. Comparative studies enable a more realistic picture to emerge.

Comparative investigation has particular benefits for the Ottoman army in the 19th century in that British, Hungarian, Polish, French, German, Austrian, and even Austrian Croatian officers held rank in the Ottoman


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to give special thanks to Dr. Dittmar Dahlmann of the Seminar für Osteuropäische Geschichte at Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, for the great pains he took to read through my manuscript. The ideas represented within the text are the author’s own, and Professor Dahlmann should not be held responsible. I also wish to thank Mr. Vincent Sieveking of Franz Steiner Verlag for his useful suggestions in editing, and his patient coordination of the publication.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism for its generous support in the writing of this book. The Center sponsored research trips to Crete, Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, and to Getty Museum Los Angeles. The faculty and staff of the Vryonis Center also proved invaluable in their support of this project. The author gives a special thanks to Mr. Angelo Tsakopoulos whose support of the Vryonis Center has proven invaluable. Thanks are also extended to Dr. Speros Vryonis, Jr., Dr. Christos Ioannides, Dr. Stelios Vasilakis, Mr. Constantinos Pouhtos, Ms. Janet Coles, Mr. Michal Roche, Mr. William Riddle, Ms. Sabrina Guidi, Mr. David Lindstrom, and Ms. Stacey Leitner among others for their assistance and support in this endeavor. In addition to the Vryonis Center, the author wishes to thank Ms. Janey Morris and the staff of the special collections department at Duke University Library for their help and cheerful assistance in unearthing the Crimean War material held by their library. Also of assistance was Dr. Peter Boyden of the National Army Museum, rich in materials relating to the Crimean War. The staff of the Photographic Department in the J. Paul Getty Museum, including Julian Cox and Jaclyn Bums proved quite accommodating in the assistance they gave me with some of the photographs reproduced in this volume. The ideas in this writing are the author’s own, and they must not be held responsible for any conclusions made in this book.



Chapter 1: Introduction

I. Introduction

Comparative investigation of 19th-century wars, combined with a knowledge of Ottoman, Balkan, and Middle Eastern historical developments can afford some understanding of the wars that transpired in the Ottoman Empire from 1853 to 1878. Certain fields lend themselves to comparative study, and one such field is military history. Generals and military establishments have dwelt in a constant need to learn about the progress of other armies, especially their enemies. When an army has failed to keep abreast of developments, the results are not only obvious, but devastating for the laggard. In the 19th century, the Ottoman army had begun to make efforts at change, but ambitions exceeded results. Change occurred, but not the sort that the reformers had planned. Most Ottomanists and Turcologists seek to portray “reform” as a unilateral proposition undertaken by the Ottoman elite with a definable purpose, and a sense of discipline. Even if the reformers failed, their vision for the future prevailed in new emanations during future reform efforts. Comparative studies enable a more realistic picture to emerge.

Comparative investigation has particular benefits for the Ottoman army in the 19th century in that British, Hungarian, Polish, French, German, Austrian, and even Austrian Croatian officers held rank in the Ottoman army. Until the present, those who have written about Ottoman military reform in the 19th century have spoken only of “European” influences without reference to individual officers. The reason for this hesitance to peer more deeply into the personal and official documents left by these European officers becomes apparent upon perusal of the documents. One could speak of change without reform. Corrupt Ottoman officers abused their offices for their personal benefit, and at the expense of their soldiers’ lives, killing many before musket or cannon fired one shot. In addition to military inadequacies, these “European” officers presented a picture of bloody local conflicts, “uncontrollable” bands of aggressive soldiery [whom the Ottoman state supplied with Winchester repeating rifles in the 1870s], and the ruthlessness of certain Ottoman generals that many would prefer to see disappear.

II. Forms of Internal Conflict

The author originally had the intention of including an entire section of the book considering forms of internal conflict. Since these issues have received coverage elsewhere, the book will begin with a summary of these issues. The problem of violence in Ottoman society owed its origin to the fact that the Ottoman legal system had ceased to function actively in the management of social interactions between the 17th and 19th centuries. The idea of a civil society came into the Ottoman Empire only very late despite the fact that Tanzimat reformers had earlier sought to reintroduce the idea of law during the course of reforms. This inability to regulate social conflicts through legal means resulted in two problems. First, society itself fell into factions that engaged in the vendetta with its customs and practices that sometimes imposed limitations ...

 




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