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INTRODUCTION
Though an ancient land, Iraq as a country is an invention dating from the end of the First World War: Britain created it from three Ottoman provinces, established its constitutional monarchy, and maintained an influential presence there until the military putsch of 1958. Indeed British influence was so closely intertwined with Iraq’s parliamentary monarchy, sustaining and relying upon it, that after the revolution Britain virtually ceased to have a role in Iraq. The customary division of Iraq’s pre-revolutionary history into two periods, the Mandate (1920-32) and Independence (1932—58), itself serves chiefly to mark a shift in the relationship between British influence and the Iraqi regime: whereas under the mandate, Britain held a position of power and legal authority in the country over and above Iraq’s independent political institutions, after independence these political institutions assumed legal sovereignty though Britain continued to enjoy certain political, administrative and military privileges based on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Preferential Alliance.1
The chronological span of this book is premised on a further distinction between the pre-war and post-war periods of independence, with British intervention in 1941 seen as the turning-point. During the first decade of independence, Iraq lapsed into political instability: divisions inside the regime gave rise to a series of tribal insurrections, assassinations and coups d'état which weakened the country’s constitutional system and rendered British influence less effective.
Rashid Ali’s coup of April 1941, however, marked a definite break between Rashid Ali’s faction and the regent, Abdul Illah, Nuri al-Said and their followers. This split roughly corresponded with that between the pro-German and pro-British factions within the regime and therefore provoked a strong British reaction. In the ensuing military confrontation, Britain overthrew Rashid Ali’s government and restored Abdulillah and Nuri al-Said. Moreover, the British encouraged them to purge Rashid Ali’s supporters, promoted changes in the constitutional structure, and re-established their own influence in Iraq.2 Thus revived, the regime demonstrated a much greater degree of internal cohesion and peaceful political competition than during the inter-war years. The British also behaved differently, abandoning their relatively passive and defensive earlier posture in order to advance political, social and economic reforms in Iraq and to shift the focus of British influence there. Yet the impetus for much of this activity derived from a recognition by Britain, and to some extent by the regime, that a more fundamental difference separated post-war Iraq from the thirties: change in Iraqi society and attitudes, in particular the spread of education, which now posed an increasing threat to the existence of the regime and of British influence in Iraq. That was the chief incentive for reform.
By comparison with the period up to the Second World War and that after 1958, the post-war Iraqi monarchy has received little attention. Majid Khadduri’s Independent Iraq, 1932—1958, which emphasises the constitutional history of Iraqi politics, covers the post-war monarchy in a cursory manner.3 Michael Ionides combined analyses of Iraq’s development programme and foreign policy between 1955 and 1958 in order to reach a balanced view of why the monarchy collapsed.4 Later, in the Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Hanna Batatu presented an outstanding account of the Iraq’s pre-revolutionary social structure but a narrow opposition view of monarchical politics. The prominence given to the Iraqi Communist Party in that work gives a misleading impression of its importance under the monarchy.5 Edith Penrose and E. F. Penrose’s well-written Iraq: International Relations and National Development and Phebe Mart’s more detailed Modern History of Iraq include the only continuous conventional political accounts of the post-war regime.6 However, a collection of essays on the 1958 coup d’état provide a pointer to recent academic thinking about the monarchical regime (the contribution of Wm Roger Louis stands out for its interpretation of British Foreign Office documents) and Daniel Silverfarb has recently produced a work on Iraq 1941—50.7
Official documents, though not without their pitfalls, make it possible to form a more rounded view as well as a more accurate record of the Iraqi monarchy. The quality and range of sources from which the American and especially the British embassies drew their information, together with the analytical capacity of these institutions and their home departments, make such documents an authority of unrivalled significance; yet many of them were unavailable to earlier writers on post-war Iraq.8 Moreover, because of Britain’s responsibility for the political institutions of Iraq and its interest in the peaceful evolution of the existing regime, British records provide a sympathetic appreciation of the monarchical government. This is important, not so much in order to balance the hostility of a few writers as to counteract a more widespread indifference towards the regime.9 For example, despite Khadduri’s work (referred to above), little interest has been shown in either the Iraqi electoral process or the functioning of parliament. British documents, and indeed American ones as well, demonstrate that an appreciation of these, particularly of parliament, is necessary to a proper understanding of the regime. They also show how much the abilities and actions of individuals within the regime determined the outcome of events in Iraqi politics.
The present book, though based partly on secondary sources in Arabic as well as English, relies principally on the releases of official documents at the Public Record Office at Kew. While the first chapter examines the origins and operation of Iraq’s political system and issues of political, social and economic reform under the monarchy, the core chapters describe the history of its cabinets in three sections: 1941—48, 1948-52 and 1953—58, with the Portsmouth Riots of January 1948 and the November 1952 Intifada serving to mark them off. Batatu, Marr and Iraqi writers have regarded these events as important examples of popular opposition to the regime, but British official documents provide significantly different factual details and interpretation of both crises.10 The final chapter analyses British influence on the government and administration of Iraq, and full details of each government and its ministers are given in Appendix One.
Chapter I
Government and Politics in Iraq, 1941—1958
The first section of this chapter, an introduction to the politics of Iraq’s constitutional monarchy, describes the origins, political characteristics, state structure and history of Iraq until 1941. It argues that after the mandate ended and Iraq became an independent member of the League of Nations in 1932, internal rivalries and weaknesses within the Iraqi regime gave rise to a series of political crises which devalued the country’s constitutional system and distracted attention from such important tasks as economic development and national integration. During that period, threats to the regime stemmed from established politicians and high-ranking officers rather than from junior officers and effendis, which was reflected in the fact that although several coups d’etat occurred, no revolution took place. A transitional section, covering the period 1941—45, continues by arguing that the defeat of Rashid Ali and the colonels, accompanied by the strong revival of British military and political influence in Iraq, removed a major schism from within the Iraqi regime and made it possible to restore and revise the old political system. However, the British and increasingly members of the Iraqi regime (most importantly, the regent Abdulillah) began to realise that the balance of power in Iraqi society was shifting downwards; and observing the rising expectations and growing dissatisfactions of ordinary Iraqis, they concluded that the regime, in order to survive, must broaden its political base and adopt a more conscientious and constructive attitude. In a key speech at the end of 1945, the regent called for a change in the way Iraqi politics operated and for social and economic reforms. This speech provided the initial impetus and a reference-point for much of Iraq’s post-war reform effort. The remaining sections of the chapter examine the workings of the Iraqi constitution and the attempts made to reform or make effective use of it, the regime’s difficulties and achievements in the field of ...
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