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INTRODUCTION
On May 1, 1994, a land feud broke out between a disgruntled agha and farmers in Qaladiza, a town in the southeastern governorate of Suleymaniya, Iraqi Kurdistan.¹ Within two days, the quarrel spread to neighboring regions and spiralled into armed clashes between two main political parties, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since then, the region has become increasingly polarized along geographic, political, and ethnic lines. Intra-Kurdish fighting has also undermined the viability of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the first political institution of self rule in Iraqi Kurdish history. Clashes have officially ended the Kurds' two-year 'experiment in democracy' and seriously challenged the notion of self-rule in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although peace negotiations and ceasefires agreements continue, the Iraqi Kurdish autonomy movement has remained at a standstill for more than eighteen months.²
At first glance, unsuccessful autonomy movements are not surprising in Iraqi Kurdistan. For nearly seventy-five years, since the state-creation period in Iraq (1921), Kurds have clashed with central governments and each other in their attempts to attain political autonomy in the northern region. The image of 'unruly and tribal Kurds' naturally inclined toward internecine fighting is depicted in publications such as, Kurds and Kurdistan; an Unstable Element in the Persian Gulf (Pelletiere), and The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Ghareeb). Other authors explain intra Kurdish fighting as a consequence of regional and international politics. The view of Kurds as victims is portrayed in TheKurdish Tragedy (Chaliland), No Friends But the Mountains (Bulloch and Morris), The Kurds (McDowell), and Into Kurdistan: Frontiers Under Fire (Laizer).³ Both images emphasize an inchoate sense of Kurdish identity and describe Kurdish autonomy movements as 'failed nationalisms'.⁴ Yet, a deeper look into Kurdish politics after the Gulf war reveals continued efforts by Kurdish leaders to establish some form of self rule. Despite the presence of tribal groups and hostile regional neighbors, Iraqi Kurds have continued to pursue self determination and establish a sense of Kurdish identity. What accounts for this persistent stickiness in Kurdish nationalism and uneven pattern of behavior?
In this paper, I will examine the rise and fall of the Kurdish experiment in democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1992 to 1994 as a consequence of elite responses to material, political, and ideological circumstances. Specifically, I argue that the post Gulf war circumstances in Iraqi Kurdistan created conditions that fostered, but ultimately limited the development of a Kurdish government. These circumstances had unintended consequences on Kurdish politics, such as changes in the balance of power, uneven redistribution of resources, and realignment of party loyalties.
Additionally, domestic politics, and in particular the creation and maintenance of KRG, involved policies and actions by Kurdish officials that often competed with, or contradicted the political structure. A situation developed that seriously limited opportunities for Kurdish leaders to imbed institutions, ideology, and national identity into a viable political system. Consequently, what emerged was an institutionally weak Kurdish government that could not absorb the series of economic and political shocks sent to Iraqi Kurdistan during the course of the political experiment.⁵
As opposed to traditional center-periphery theories that view nationalist movements as reactions of peripheral groups to encroachments by the center, this paper treats Iraqi Kurdistan as a periphery and a political center from which privileged groups and subgroups collaborate with each other.⁶ Section one explains the political and economic context in which KRG emerged. These conditions include the creation of international humanitarian, security, and political organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan and the region. Section two examines the structural components of KRG, and in particular, power-sharing arrangements between Kurdish political groups after the May 1992 elections. This micropolitical analysis focuses on the '50-50' split and its impact on decision making processes within the KDP-PUK alliance. In addition to traditional political leaders, it examines the role of'second-tier' political entrepreneurs who assumed key decisionmaking roles and who influenced political processes and outcomes. Economic and external developments that altered the balance of power between KDP and PUK, and the unintended consequences these shifts had on political relationships will also be examined.
I. Hopeful Beginnings - Post Gulf War Circumstances
With the encouragement of the West and overestimation of their own political capabilities, Iraqi Kurds conducted a popular uprising against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in March 1991. The success of the uprising was short-lived, and after one month, the central government in Baghdad retaliated against the North⁷ militarily, forcing nearly two million Iraqi Kurds to flee to the mountains of Turkey and Iran. The refugee crisis that ensued brought world attention and assistance to displaced Kurds never before realized in Kurdish history. Repatriation of refugees to Iraqi Kurdistan created an environment immersed in humanitarian relief activities. United Nations (U.N.) organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and relief agencies soon established operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, where many remained for the next four years. U.N. supported projects were based on a three-month Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed with the government of Iraq in Baghdad. The MOU is part of the sanctions review process, which decides whether or not to maintain the U.N. embargo and allow humanitarian relief …
1 The feud commenced when Ali Hassan Mir Khan, a member of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and commander of a special bodyguard unit of KDP leader Massoud Barzani, attempted to reclaim his father's lands in Qaladiza, an area with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) support. Although Mir Khan possessed a deed of entitlement conferred by the Iraqi government before the 1990 Gulf war, local residents and officials had built shops on his property, and denied his legitimate ownership of the land. Several local residents including Mir Khan and local PUK officials were killed in the dispute. Interviews with KDP and PUK political bureaux representatives Jamal Aziz, Suleymaniya, Iraqi Kurdistan, 9- 10 May 1994, and Falah in Salahideen, 15 July, 1995. See also What Happened in Iraqi Kurdistan? May 1994; A Report on the Internal Conflict in May 1994, KDP Research Department, and Iraqi Kurdistan: A Situation Report on Recent Events, (PUK Foreign Relations Committee).
2 From May 1994 to October 1995, mediation efforts were made by Kurdish officials, regional delegations including Turkey and Iran, Iraqi National Congress (INC), U.N. officials, U.S. and Western political representatives. These attempts include creation of local conflict resolution committees, extensive dialogues and communiques, and signing of official Peace Accords.
3 According to this 'Kurds as victims' view, the governments of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria are mutually hostile to Iraqi Kurdish self rule, and pursue manipulative and destabilizing policies toward Iraqi Kurds. Bulloch and Morris note internal divisiveness among Kurds as consequence of centuries of exploitation by regional states and great powers. Vanley sees internal Kurdish divisions as a failure of Iraqi Kurdish leadership to forge a sense of Kurdish unity.
Consequently, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a symbol of 'poor people's colonialism', where ruling classes of adjoining states have imposed their will on Kurdish people.
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 1 -5. Anderson discusses this sense of community as a 'we feeling'
5 Another term used by statists to describe these shocks, is 'punctuated equilibrium', which gives particular emphasis to crisis as a fundamental institutional constraint to political development. Crises are seen as responses to pressures accumulating slowly over time by institutions that cannot respond in any rapid and fluid way to alterations in the domestic and international environment. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984), p. 233, IanLustick, "Israeli state-building in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; theory and practice", in International Organization 41, 1, Winter, 1987, Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B. Evens, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State back in (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 21.
6 Borhanadin A. Yassin, Vision or Reality? The Kurds in the Policy of the Great powers, 1941-1947, Sweden; Lund University Press, 1995, p. 19. See J. Galtung, "Structural Theory of Imperialism:, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, 1971, and S. Langholm, "On the Concept of Center and Periphery", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, 1971. On the issue of internal colonialism, see M.Hechter, Internal Colonialism, Berkeley; University of California Press, 1975. Concerning 'reactive collective actions' by peripheral groups, see C. Tilly, L. Tilly, and R. Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930 .and F.Young, "Reactive Subsystems", American Sociological Review, No. 35, 1970, pp. 297-307.
7 The 'North' refers to the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. It is used interchangeably with Iraqi Kurdistan.
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