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PREFACE
Arab Nationalism has been termed the principal force shaping the lives of the Arab people in the twentieth century. But Arab nationalism is not a stable, constant influence upon the Arab environment. Rather, it is a multidimensional dynamic process that interacts with the Arab environment- local, regional, and international. In the interaction, Arab nationalism has itself been transformed from the relatively conservative, tradition-based impulse to sovereignty and unity of the early twentieth-century Arab nationalists to the complex leftist ideologies of contemporary Arab nationalists. How is one to account for this markedly leftist orientation of contemporary Arab nationalists? In particular, what is the origin of the radical trend in Arab politics, known as the New Left?
These are the key questions that this book addresses.
Part of the answer, at least, is found in the impact of the Arab environment on Arab nationalism. Three issues in particular have catalyzed the nationalist orientation to the left: the problem of Arab unity, the Palestinian question, and the issue of social transformation. How these issues have affected Arab nationalism, and how the ideologies discussed here have responded to these issues are examined in this book.
The trends depicted in this study have not been uniform throughout the Arab political spectrum. Not all nationalist organizations are leftist, and vice versa. This book deals only with the nationalist leftits origin, development, and trajectory. The nationalist left is defined as those political organizations and/or movements in the Arab world that are Arab national in orientation, that adopt socialism (in any of its forms or schools) as their creed, that seek a radical change in the existing socio-political and economic structures and processes in Arab society in an engineered or planned manner, and that advocate neutrality in foreign policy. Thus, for example, the communist parties have been excluded because they are supra-national in orientation and not neutral in their foreign policies. Also, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been excluded because it does not represent an integrated leftist ideology; rather, it functions as an umbrella organization for several distinct ideologically based movements. Al-Fateh, a major component of the PLO, has similarly been excluded because it has not developed an integrated socialist world view. Although it has borrowed liberally from socialist thought and polemics, al-Fateh remains basically conservative and pragmatic in its definitions of problems and in its formulation of programs. This basic conservativism is most clearly reflected in the kind of government and economy al-Fateh advocates for a liberated Palestine.
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction by examining that transformation of Arab nationalism brought about by the interjection of socialist thought into nationalist ideology following World War II. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 examine the four principal leftist nationalist forces that emerged in the post- World War II era: the Ba’ath, the Progressive Socialists of Lebanon, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and Nasserism (written by Jacqueline Ismael). The Progressive Socialists of Lebanon was chosen because it is similar to a number of parties that have appeared and disappeared in the Arab World, such as al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (the National Democratic Party) in Iraq and the Wafd Party in Egypt. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the second major transformation of Arab nationalism—the interjection of Marxist-Leninist thought into Arab nationalist ideology—that occurred in the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war to give rise to the latest phenomenon in Arab politics—the New Left.
The Appendixes are translations of documents not readily available in English.
As this book is going to press, the sanguine civil war in Lebanon has again focused world attention on the Middle East. North American news media have portrayed the conflict as a purely sectarian civil war between Christians and Muslims. The problem of explaining the political issues in the strife has been easily resolved by dubbing the Muslims as leftists and the Christians as rightists. The prominent Palestinian role in the conflict has similarly been explained by placing them on the left side of the dichotomy. The entire formula reduces to a simple equation: Christians, rightists; Muslims, leftists; good guys, bad guys. The labels are half-truths that reveal the obvious and conceal the significant. This is demonstrated by the characterization of Kemal Jumblat as the sole leader of the Muslim-leftists—only half true and at any rate an incongruous conjugate that would be humorous in a less tragic situation.
While an examination of the Lebanese civil war is not within the frame-work of this book, the strife in Lebanon does emphasize the radicalization and polarization of ideologies in the Arab world. The Lebanese situation cannot be understood outside the larger context of the transformation of Arab nationalism. Lebanon, indeed, is a tragic manifestation of the transformation that is polarizing the ranks of Arab nationalism.
This book adheres to the Library of Congress system of transliteration. While the titles of books have been given in full transliteration and translation for reference purposes, only the translation has been given for the titles of journal articles in order to reduce the cumbersomeness of footnotes. After the initial transliteration of books, subsequent references present only the English translation.
I wish to express my appreciation to the Canada Council and The University of Calgary Grants Committee for providing funds to facilitate this research. Also, I am grateful to The University of Calgary for granting me a sabbatical leave for the purpose of carrying out the research.
Tareq Y. Ismael
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
July 1976
The Arab Left
The Transformation of Arab Nationalism
Geohge Antonius brought the phrase “Arab Awakening” to the attention of the world, but the awakening which occurred prior to 1939 was relatively unstable and incomplete. The form of Arab nationalism which arose in the early 1900s and swept the area before World War II led to the attainment of formal superficial political independence by the Arab states of the East (with the exception of the Arabian littoral states). But this formal liberation proved unsatisfactory in achieving the objectives of Arab nationalism—namely, emancipation from foreign domination, socio-economic development, and political unification1— and new leaders moved to the fore with popular bases and ideological views formerly of little consequence. New policies were evolved, both domestic and foreign institutions were challenged, and a disregard was shown for the niceties of law and custom. This marked the trans-formation of Arab nationalism to a new, more radical, orientation.
Such changes in acceptable or popular ideologies are of considerable significance but difficult to trace. To study the process, we must have some framework in which to place it for analysis. A starting place is the list Mary Matossian has constructed of critical decisions which underlie ideologies in developing nations. Implicitly or explicitly, each ideology must provide answers to these questions: “(1) What is to be borrowed from the West? (2) What is to be retained from the nation’s past? (3) What characteristics, habits, and products of the masses are to be encouraged?”2 The various nationalist and other ideologies current in the Middle East since 1900 have given radically different answers to these questions.
Early Variants of Arab Nationalism
We will deal only briefly with the earliest variants of Arab nationalism, which became dominant in the 1920s. There were two types of nationalism current in that era: dynastic and liberal. Dynastic nationalism, as in the Hejaz and Saudi Arabia, was hardly nationalism as the word is generally understood today, but was based upon primordial sentiments of personal loyalty and presumed kinship. There was an ingroup feeling and a desire for autonomy, but the primary character was traditional rather than innovative, indigenous rather than populist. Little was to be borrowed from the West, much was to be retained from the past, and little attention was paid to the characteristics of the masses beyond their piety, loyalty, and military prowess.
Liberal nationalism, which was most fully developed in Egypt, was quite frankly imitative of the West in its ideas, institutions, technology, and aims. Imitating Westernized elite groups, separated from the masses, and disenchanted with the national past, the liberal intellectuals sought to duplicate a West European state. However, though this was largely true on the explicit level, two qualifications which proved to be of some importance must be mentioned. The first is that certain Islamic leaders, in the tradition of Rashid Rida, while not attacking nationalism, turned to a re-examination of Islam.8 Also, and perhaps more important, because they were unconcerned with the masses, the elite did little about changing the existing conditions and, hence, provided no mass basis for their institutions and no major changes in the economic system. At the same time, the economic change initiated by the colonial connection continued. Thus, the attempt to imitate the West proceeded without (as is often emphasized) a proper understanding of the conditions in Western history which led to liberal nationalism and (what is more often neglected), without a deep.understanding of the realities of indigenous society.
The Transformation of Nationalism
Constantine Zurayk of Syria and Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz of Iraq were foremost exponents of what we have termed liberal Arab nationalism, and we shall consider their works as examples of the mainstream of liberal nationalist thought. These intellectuals, educated in the United States and Britain in the late twenties and thirties, respectively, were deeply influenced by classical Western liberal thought in the course of their studies; their political writings are characterized by their attempts to reconcile the past and present social, political, and economic conditions of Arab society with the political norms of the West and the West’s evident material and technical development. Broadly speaking, we can identify four sets of common concerns that set the liberal nationalists apart from both the earlier pan-Islamist or regional nationalists in the area and from the later radical Marxist nationalist interpretations: (1) the relationship between Islam and the Arab nation; (2) the relationship of the individual to the state in Arab society; (3) the modernization of the Arab world; and (4) the Pales¬tine defeat and the nature of the Zionist threat.
Constantine Zurayk
Constantine Zurayk may be considered the intellectual father of the liberal nationalist tradition/ Inspired by his studies in history at Chicago and Princeton in the late twenties, Zurayk soon distinguished himself in the literary circles of Beirut and Damascus as a promising intellectual. In his first volume of essays on national consciousness (al-Wa’y al-qawmi), which appeared in late 1939, Zurayk discussed the general concept of nationalism, the historical basis of the Arab nation, the function of religion in the state, and a political program for the practical realization of the aims of Arab nationalism (as he conceived it).
In dealing with the fundamental issue of the relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism, Zurayk argued that a basic problem of Arab society as it emerged from the Ottoman era was the lack of a …
1. Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Reality (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958), p. 5.
2. Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities,” in Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1967), p. 334.
3. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in the Modern World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).
4. Other works not specifically cited in the following discussion include Fi ma rakat al-hadarah [On the Battle of Civilization] (Beirut: Dar al-’Ilm lil-Malayin, 1964); Hadha al-’asr al-mutafajjir [This Explosive Age] (Beirut: Dar al-Thn lil-Malayin, 1963); Nahnu wa-al-ta’rikh [We and History] (Beirut: Dar al-’Ilm lil-Malayin, 1963); Ayyu Ghad? [What a Tomorrow?] (Beirut: Dar al-’Ilm lil- Malayin, 1956).
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