CONTENTS
Foreword / xi
Acknowledgments / xv
Prologue / xvii
PART ONE: THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts Regarding Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves and Their Legal Status Prior to Self-Governance / 3
I. Introduction / 3
II. Iraqi Oil and Gas Production / 9
III. Main Iraqi Pipelines / 12
IV. Iraqi Refineries / 17
V. Legal Status of Iraqi Oil and Gas Reserves Prior to Self-Governance / 19
VI. Conclusion / 26
2. The Provisions of the Iraqi Constitution Addressing Oil and Gas Activities: Of the Role of Subcentral Governing Entities, Handling of Revenues, and “Present” versus “Future” Fields / 27
I. Introduction / 27
II. Structure of the Iraqi Constitution / 31
III. Revenue Sharing: Articles 112 and 121 / 38
IV. Authority of Subcentral Units to Enter Oil and Gas Development Agreements: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Efforts by the KRG / 41
V. Constitutional Authority of Subcentral Units and the Matter of “Present” versus “Future” Fields / 46
VI. Conclusion / 52
PART TWO: THE COMPLICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAQI LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
3. Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law and Subcentral Government Responses / 59
I. Introduction / 59
II. Basics of the Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law / 60
III. Significant Legal Issues / 74
IV. The KRG’s Oil and Gas Law No. (22) of 2007 / 79
V. Problems Associated with Preexisting Oil and Gas Contracts / 90
VI. Conclusion / 95
4. A Primer on the Federal Model Exploration and Production Contracts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Model Production-Sharing Contract / 97
I. Introduction / 97
II. Federal Government Model Exploration and Production Contracts / 99
III. The KRG’s Model Form of PSC: The Principal Provisions Subgroup / 113
• Substance and Nature of the PSC / 114
• The Host Government’s Right of Participation / 118
• Work Duties Imposed on the Contract Holder / 119
• Financial Obligations Associated with the Contract / 122
IV. The KRG’s Model Form of PSC: The Adjectival Provisions Subgroup / 126
• The Making of Decisions / 126
• Handling of Land and Assets / 127
• The Matter of Contract Stabilization / 130
• Important Miscellaneous Adjectival Provisions / 131
V. Conclusion / 136
5. The Federal Oil and Gas Revenue-Sharing Law: Its Many Problems / 138
I. Introduction / 138
II. Context of Iraqi Revenue-Sharing Law / 141
III. Overview of the Revenue-Sharing Law / 144
IV. Difficulties Associated with the Collection of Revenues / 148
V. Difficulties Associated with Distribution of Oil and Gas Revenues / 159
VI. Conclusion / 168
6. Measures to Reconstitute the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) and Reorganize the Ministry of Oil / 171
I. Introduction / 171
II. The Relevant Terms of the Iraqi Constitution / 172
III. The Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Articles 6 and 7, as Well as 5D and 5E / 176
• Articles 6 and 7 / 177
• Articles 5D and 5E / 181
IV. Federal Oil and Gas Framework Approach: Scattered Articles / 186
V. Relevant Insights on the Restructuring of INOC and the Ministry of Oil from the KRG’s 2007 Oil and Gas Law / 192
VI. Basic Conditions and Current Thinking Associated with Reconstituting INOC and Reorganizing the Ministry of Oil / 197
VII.Conclusion / 207
PART THREE: CURRENT ISSUES AND POTENTIAL FUTURE PROBLEMS
7. The Matter of Creditor Claims: An Examination of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008), and Their Predecessors / 211
I. Introduction / 211
II. Primer on the Predecessors of Resolutions 1790 and 1859 / 213
III. Security Council Resolutions 1790 (18 Dec. 2007) and 1859 (22 Dec. 2008) / 221
IV. Analytical Significance of Protection from Legal Claims / 232
V. Conclusion / 241
8. Central Government Authority to Strike Oil and Gas Development Agreements in the Absence of a Federal Framework Law / 244
I. Introduction / 244
II. The Constitutional Context / 249
III. Evaluating the Article 110 Arguments / 251
IV. Article 114’s Shared Powers Arguments / 256
V. Article 112: Direct Reference to Oil and Gas / 258
VI. Power Carried Over from Saddam-Era Measures / 262
VII.Conclusion / 269
9. Distributing Profits in the Absence of a Federal Revenue-Sharing Law / 271
I. Introduction / 271
II. The Solidarity and Diversity Provisions: Articles 1, 3, and 14 of the Constitution / 273
III. Economic and Social Security Provisions: Articles 27, 30, and 34 of the Constitution / 275
IV. Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Provisions: Articles 111, 112, and 121 of the Constitution / 278
V. A Constitutional Sharing Obligation for Revenues Collected at the Subcentral Level? / 282
VI. Inadequacies of the Relevant Constitutional Provisions / 285
VII. Proposed Constitutional Amendments: How They Would Affect Revenue Distribution / 288
VIII. Other Sources of Law Suggestive of an Obligation to Distribute Revenues / 290
IX. Conclusion / 293
10. Changing the Mix: Transition Fails and the Face of Iraq Is Altered / 294
I. Introduction / 294
II. KRG and Central Government Apply Their Own Approaches / 298
• Kurdistan Regional Government / 299
• Central Government / 303
III. The Country Splits Apart / 305
• Kurdistan as a Separate Nation-State / 306
• Separate State(s) in the Balance of Iraq / 311
IV. Conclusion / 317
Epilogue / 321
Index / 327 | 
