

LIMELIGHT
ON THE
NORTH OF IRAQ

Nauman M. al-Kanaani

Publishers:
Dar al-Jumhuriya,
Baghdad, Iraq
1965

LP. REN. 39.

سکریپت

LIMELIGHT
ON THE
NORTH OF IRAQ



Nauman M. al-Kanaani

FONDS
M. REMZI BUCAK

Publishers:
Dar al-Jumhuriya,
Baghdad, Iraq
1965

The discussion contained in the following pages deals dispassionately with the question of Kurds in the north of Iraq. It is entirely free from legal and official jargon. It is based on an objective analysis for the benefit of the unbiassed layman who may want to get to the truth. It may therefore be read in the same spirit in which it is compiled and presented.

PREFACE

The first Arabic edition of this booklet having become exhausted soon after its appearance, it became necessary to produce the second edition with all possible speed.

The booklet has been greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm by the public at large, considering the value of the information contained in it and which was of equal interest to my Kurdish compatriots. This fact encouraged me to revise and enlarge it by the addition of fresh facts and additional figures.

In its present form, figures relating to Kurdish population have been analysed more thoroughly.

This edition also embodies the reproduction, or the substance, of the petitions which were addressed to the authorities in the North by the residents of that area. These bear witness to the feelings and reactions of our Kurdish brethren on the subject. They expose the hollowness of the claims advanced by the insurgents under Mulla Mustafa Barazani. These letters uncover the sense of shame and frustration felt by the Kurds at the depredations perpetrated in that area, by their own kinsmen.

The inclusion in this edition of the substance of two memoranda emanating from Mulla Mustafa Barazani is also of academic interest. I am indebted to al-Jamhuriyah newspaper, Baghdad, for the use of this material.

It has not been my intention to inflict upon the reader revolting details of suffering and misery. The purpose has been to tell the truth in the interest of justice.

Doubtless, the topic is of as much interest to those who are unable to benefit from the original work in Arabic. An English version was therefore urgently called for, to fill the void.

Baghdad,
1st April, 1965.

N.M. al-Kanaani.

CONTENTS

Preface	3.
Foreword by Ahmad Shakir Shallal, Ph. D.						5.
1. Introduction	12.
2. Facts & Figures	14.
3. The Analysis	19.
4. Inflated Leadership	25.
5. Deflated Leadership	31.
6. The Awakening	39.
7. Nationalist Ideals	45.
8. Memoranda of Demands	50.
9. Financial Statements	64.
10. Summing Up	66.
Bibliography	72.

FOREWORD

by

AHMAD SHAKIR SHALLAL, Ph. D.

This booklet summarises the problem of Kurds and their demand for autonomy within Iraq. It contains the elaboration of one set of arguments and explanations. It represents the stand taken by the authorities and by Iraqis of Arab origin. Granted that the treatment may not be exhaustive, it has to be admitted that it fulfils a long felt need. Three points emerge from it.

First, it provides to all concerned food for thought. In the absence of official version, the thinking on this subject in most quarters has been confused, being based on rumours and conjectures. The approach to the problem has therefore been emotional rather than objective.

For the first time perhaps, an attempt has been made to furnish facts and figures and to draw logical conclusions therefrom.

Secondly, this also seems to be the first serious attempt at putting forth the point of view of the Government of Iraq and Iraqis of Arab origin. While the beginnings of it can be traced as far back as 1940, the question has remained in the forefront since 1961 in consequence of violence having been resorted to repeatedly by a section of the Kurdish population in this country.

Their protagonists assert that the Iraqi Kurds being landlocked and lacking a government of their own, have not had the facilities and the occasions for publicity and propaganda. They forget that the present day world is simply teeming with people who are ever eager to take us cudgels on behalf of any real or supposed underdog. This explains why so much has been said and written in support of Iraqi Kurds the world over and so little, if at all, in favour of the Government and the other people of Iraq.

Lastly, nowadays far too many people, from the heads of states down to the man in the street, take uncommonly active interest in the affairs of other peoples and countries, to the unfortunate neglect of their own immediate business. That may be at the root of the pandemonium which has seized the world.

Whereas it is without the least doubt, a domestic problem for the Government and the people of Iraq to solve, the rest of the world is entitled to know something about it. In amplification of the analysis of the problem so ably undertaken by the author, it may be useful and interesting to refer to the complaints and connected demands of the Iraqi Kurds. These have been enumerated in detail by so many other authors elsewhere.

Perhaps the most enthusiastic exponent of the Kurdish cause has been Dana Adams Schmidt, an American journalist who represented the New York Times in the Middle-East. He is the author of "Journey Among Brave Men" published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston, U.S.A. Mr Schmidt has been unmistakably overzealous in pleading the cause of the Iraqi Kurds and for this he is not to blame.

He had no choice left after receiving the generous hospitality from his hosts. He has made it abundantly clear that his hunger for adventure was more than satisfied beside the material gain resulting from the sale of the book. In chapter 6, entitled 'The War for Autonomy' (pp. 72-92), Mr Schmidt enumerates the demands of the Kurds as follows:—

"A related complaint was that Kurdish newspapers and magazines have been suppressed... Special Kurdish language broadcasts on Baghdad radio have been cut down... The campaign against the Kurdish language had gone to such farfetched lengths as an order of the Ministry of Agriculture changing the name of the so-called Kurdish wheat to 'northern' wheat.

"Not only had the government refrained from appointing Kurdish officials in the Kurdish regions, or promoting those already in office to higher posts, particularly key posts, but hundreds of Kurdish officials had been dismissed or transferred to the south of Iraq.

"In another attempt to disperse the Kurds, the complaints went on, the training centre for Kurds called to military service had been moved to the southern part of the country.

"There was discrimination also on the economic level, the petitions charged... The Iraqi-Soviet technical assistance treaty included building radio and television stations all over Iraq, but very few in Kurdistan.

"The Kurdish Democratic Party had been persecuted, it was charged..."

Let us now go into those complaints one by one and see how much substance there is.

Iraq is undeniably the only country in the world which recognises and treats Kurdish as an official language in the north. There would surely be a good case for the wheat cultivated by them to be called Kurdish if its counterpart were referred to as Arab wheat!

Language has often led to bitterness and bloodshed, the more recent instance being that of neighbouring India. It is doubtful if it ever yields more tangible results, the language of the majority has to prevail. If somehow the language, culture, etc., of the minority were imposed on a majority, quite an amazing situation would result. How then would the latter react and to what end? Some of the states of Africa constitute a precedent in this context, which have been under white minority rule.

As a result of the political upheavals which this country has gone through lately, the fate of Iraqis of Arab descent with regard to postings, transfers, dismissals, etc., has been no better. Statistics on this subject, if available, would prove illuminating, no doubt.

In the face of disturbed conditions and the continuance of subversion in the north, the removal of training centre for army recruits to the south was by all standards a wise administrative step. No country would keep its budding soldiers exposed to propaganda and attempts aimed at creating disaffection and disloyalty. That the Kurds are still freely enrolled, reflects creditably on the Government's policy towards them.

Complaint of economic discrimination and the matter of radio and television centres also calls for statistical backing. Would ever a difference in the number, say, of radio stations for a particular area be a sufficient justification for starting civil war?

Now that the Kurdish Democratic Party openly defies law and order and advocates violence, it is not known how else its members expected to be treated by the Government, in this country or any other.

Volumes have been written on the historical origin of the Kurds. Regardless of where they first came from, they have lived in Central Asia for an unknown number of centuries. They have led a partly nomadic and partly pastoral existence, when not engaged in fighting inter-tribal feuds or conducting fratricidal warfare among themselves. ??

Salahuddin (Saladin) was the greatest Kurd of all times. His accomplishments and the resulting greatness rested on the foundation of Arab co-operation. Another Kurd, Karim Khan Zand, sat for a while on the throne of Iran. His successor, Lutf Ali Khan, was promptly deprived of his throne by his own fellow Kurds out of tribal enmity. In fact, it was easier for a Kurdish prince to be a vassal to a foreign overlord than give up his struggle with a rival Kurd. "When the Kurds did think in terms of a political horizon beyond the tribe, it was the supranational body of Islam", says Derk Kinnane in his 'Kurds and Kurdistan' (O.U.P.).

By virtue of the political fragmentation of Central Asia, the community lives in pockets belonging to Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the U. S. S. R. Within itself, the community is divided into tribes, clans and

sub-clans, etc. These would rather destroy each other fighting than unite, live and let live. Mustafa Barazani and his clan may well revive or continue hostilities against the Government of Iraq, just because certain tribes not friendly to him may have co-operated with the said government.

The map as well as the political geography of the world have undergone so many changes during the last two decades, that it would be difficult to keep an account of them. To refer to the Treaty of Sevres (1929) or even the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) is a waste of breath. So many more treaties have since been made and unmade, that alluding to them in support of one's demand for restoration of sovereignty, or even autonomy, is to ask for the moon.

Who would let the indigenous native of the Americas return to the throne of his forefathers, or allow the Arabs to regain control of Spain and the rest of southern Europe? The Great Mogul might well be turning in his grave at the prospect of his great-grand child being restored to his 'takht' in Delhi. For that matter, the Turks were masters of much of Europe, West Asia and North Africa till yesterday.

Minorities everywhere have to co-operate and co-exist with the majority communities. The latter are expected to manage their affairs in a manner so as not to practise fraud or oppression on the racial and religious groups living in their midst. Human conduct, it has to be realised, is never perfect and in actual practice lapses are bound to occur, on both sides. While the majority community must be understanding and tolerant, the minority on its part has to be patient and co-operative.

The Kurds are the nationals and the citizens of Iraq and would remain so. They may have suffered certain hardships. Their own rashness is as much to blame as the indifference of successive governments. The present rulers can hardly be expected to undo suddenly what the others did, some of them in the remote past.

In politics as in war, there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends. There are only permanent interests. It is equally debatable if fear of losing face is a good enough reason for continuing bloodshed. It can never be too late to sit back and do a bit of heart searching and to get together to work out ways and means of improving the lot of the common man, be he a Kurd or an Arab. Destruction of life and property debilitates both and weakens the administration. The only people to feel satisfied with a prolongation of this state of affairs are the enemies of the people and the country.

INTRODUCTION

For a free, frank and exhaustive discussion of the Kurdish question in the north of Iraq, we have to divide the subject into its ingredients, each with its own proper heading. Such an analysis has to be done dispassionately, without prejudice or favour. This is necessary in order to eliminate the possibility of bias, confusion and misconception creeping in.

It must be understood that the Kurdish question relating to Iraq has many facets to it. Nevertheless, the problem boils down in substance to that of individual Rights and corresponding Duties, in one's dealings with the State. In that context, we might as well pause to examine the performances of the Government of Iraq towards safeguarding the Rights accruing to the Kurds as a community. It would be equally fair to see, at the same time, how far and in what manner the Kurds have acquitted themselves of their Duties to their Government and the country at large.

Having accomplished that, we should be able to make a more objective study of the events, most of them sad and deplorable, which have besmeared the name of the Kurdish community in this country and which, regrettably enough, have made a habit of repeating themselves regularly and without warning.

It is notable that the Kurds are not a feature peculiar to Iraq. They are found in large numbers in the neighbouring countries as well. Nowhere, however, has this question posed itself with such violence, to the accompaniment of bloodshed, carnage and destruction of property.

Why has this movement not resulted in the emergence of a unified, independent and sovereign Kurdish state comprising tracts of land and populations which form part of the aforesaid countries wherein the community lives at present? This and related questions are dealt with at length in the pages that follow. Full note has been taken of the arguments that have been advanced from time to time in support of the demand for self-determination, through the medium of the spoken and the written word in different languages not excluding the Kurdish.

The prolongation of subversive activities and the continued loss of life and property can by no means bring prosperity, happiness or even good name to the Kurds or to the Arabs in whose neighbourhood the Kurds live throughout the Middle-East. The discussion is indispensable and somewhat overdue with a view to resolving this so-called 'problem'. The discussion restricts itself to an enumeration of facts, figures and bare essentials and in most cases it has been left to the reader to draw his own reasonable conclusions.

FACTS & FIGURES

The total population of the Kurds in the world, by countries, forms an important link in the general discussion of their condition and demands. The community is to be found scattered throughout the Central and West Asia, mainly in Turkey, Iran, Syria, the U.S.S.R. and Iraq. Their total world population has been variously quoted at 10 millions, 8 millions and 5 millions but the exact statistics are set out below:—

Turkey	2,640,000.
Iran	1,760,000.
Syria-U.S.S.R.	275,000.
Iraq	1,050,000.
*Total						<u>5,725,000.</u>

It would be seen that the Kurds of Iraq constitute but one-fifth of their total population in the world.

Obviously it does not help anyone to concoct imaginary statistics, for the saying still holds good that there are lies, there are damned lies and there are statistics. In spite of it, each country has its own official records and figures, not intended for dubious publicity and

* After the issue of the first edition in Arabic, more detailed and up-to-date information became available.

propagands but meant strictly for official use. Such facts and figures are accumulated through periodic census or else are collected through other government agencies.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, on page 2590, puts the total population of the Kurds of Iraq at 800,000, approximately. Opposed to this, the census figures available with the Government of Iraq disclose that the *total population* of the Sulaimaniyah and Arbil Liwas together with the *total population* of the *Qadhas* concerned in the *Liwas* of Mosul, Kirkuk and Diyali add up to 1,167, 558. It is well known that these localities, like any locality in the world, do not contain 100% Kurdish population and have domiciled therein members of other non-Kurdish communities such as Arabs, Turkomans and many others. It is also obvious that the compilation of census statistics would not distinguish a Kurd from an Arab or any other national of Iraq.

In this connection, the following points are noteworthy :-

1. In the Liwa of Arbil, Arabs predominate everywhere barring the town itself which is the headquarters of the Liwa.

2. In the countryside are to be found a large number of Arab tribes domiciled since times immemorial. Moreover, other communities like Turks, etc., are by no means extinct.

3. The percentage, viz. 15.5% or 16%, is based on the rash assumption that the entire population of the north and north-east of Iraq is Kurdish.

4. An analysis of the statistics officially compiled relating to June, 1964, and which put the total population of that area at 1,167,558, further provides a fairly

dependable estimate of the total number of persons of non-Kurdish origin inhabiting that area at 500,000.

5. From this emerges the conclusion that Kurds by themselves make a total population of a little over half a million.

6. The figure 1,167,558 is made up as follows, by localities :-

a. Liwa Arbil	286,342.
b. Liwa Sulaimaniyah	320,605.
c. Qadha Khaniqin	81,232.
d. Qadha Jam Jamal	34,969.
e. Qadha Toz Kharmatu	74,244.
f. Qadha Kufri	65,754.
g. Qadha Zakho	47,600.
h. Qadha Ammadiyah	55,538.
i. Qadha Dhok	41,510.
J. Qadha Aqra	47,630.
k. Qadha Sanjar	65,506.
l. Qadha Shekhan	46,628.

Total	1,167,558.
--------------	------------

Figures representing the Kurds can be misleading. No where else do the Kurds claim for themselves, or are accorded, a status separate from the rest of the population. For instance, in Turkey they are not acknowledged as Kurds but are officially alluded to as 'Turks of the highlands'. Any one, therefore, who is not physically present in the said highlands at the time of an official census, would not be included in the count. One might consequently infer that there may be many more persons of Kurdish origin in Turkey, for example, than the official statistics disclose. Similar treatment in Iraq

would atonce deprive that community of nearly half its alleged population, if the persons not habitually and physically resident in the north of Iraq were excluded from the total representing their population in this country.

For purposes of our discussion and argument, we shall throughout consider what the Kurds themselves look upon as their traditional home in the extreme north of Iraq.

The total area of Iraq is estimated at 452,264 sq. km., whereas the area traditionally inhabited by this community in the north makes a total of 52,500 sq. km., comprising in part or in whole, the following 'Liwas':—

(a) Sulaimaniyah...	the whole 'liwa'.
(b) Arbil	2/3rds 'liwa'.
(c) Kirkuk	1/3rd 'liwa'.
(d) Mosul	a few 'Qadhas' only.

That furnishes a ratio of 1:9, i.e., the Kurdish territory being a mere one-ninth of the total area of the country.

The produce of the north of Iraq is chiefly agricultural, eg., wheat cultivation, tobacco plantation, some fruit farming and a little forestry. Cattle breeding is also important in its economy. All these, however, do not add up to any impressive turnover in comparison with the rest of the country.

A comprehensive survey of Iraq's total agricultural output and cattle breeding would reveal that annual yield under these heads in the north constitutes a bare 1/20th of the national aggregate. We are not including other items in this calculation such as oil, minerals and light industries which have been extensively set up in

this country under Government supervision. Also not taken account of are miscellaneous incomes from tourists, pilgrims, inland water transport, Basrah port trust, etc. It is, however, self-evident that 15.5% of the total population occupying a sector being 1/9th of the total area, contributes but a 5% to the national wealth in the form of agricultural produce and cattle breeding, to take one instance only.

Shall we have a look at the other side of the medal? It would indeed be illuminating to find out what amounts are defrayed by the national exchequer for the maintenance and welfare of the northern sector of Iraq as opposed to the latter's contribution to it. Does the Arab compatriot of the Iraqi Kurd lose or gain in this family transaction?

We have so far touched upon the problem of economy only. The reader has to visualise for himself the feasibility of the demand for separation and the outcome of the efforts being made for its realisation. It seems that those who preach and practise violence in the name of self-determination and separation, either do not know the end to which they are leading these unsuspecting and innocent people or else deliberately ignore the consequences for reasons best known to themselves. Patently, the whole idea is as ruinous to the Iraqi Kurd as it is distasteful to his Arab neighbour.

The fire continues to smoulder and strife is kept alive by a handful of so-called leaders in total disregard of the consequences to the others and even to themselves. Some of them are fanatics, others are self-seekers while the rest are both rolled into one. It may be some consolation to realise that such leadership is not peculiar to the north of Iraq, it is fairly rampant in the world as a whole!

THE ANALYSIS

We have stated in the preceding chapter that the Kurds in this country number a little over one million out of a total population of about seven millions. We have also said that the sector in the extreme north traditionally inhabited by them is about one-ninth of the total area of the country. Likewise, we saw that their total contribution to the agricultural and livestock turnover constitutes but 5% of the national aggregate. ??

These three factors provide important working principles for assessing the privileges to which the Kurds can lay a claim in the financial and administrative set up of the country. In the formation of ministries in more recent times, we find that they had two to four ministers of their community, whereas the strength of the cabinet did not often exceed eight. Most of these, it may be emphasised, were Kurds not habitually resident in the north. Though Kurds by origin, the said ministers came from areas other than the north and their selections and appointments were influenced by merit and individual qualifications.

Consequently, included in more recent cabinet appointments were Sayids Nooruddin Mahmood, Ahmed Mukhtar Baban and others. Some of them even served as Deputy Prime Ministers, such as Mr Jamal Baban.

On the higher levels of the military and civil administrations too, the Kurds held a lion's share most of the time. Officers of the General rank were mostly out of that community. Senior commanders and staff officers of the Army were also Kurds, e.g., Generals Bakr Sidki, Amin Zeki Sulaiman, Nooruddin Mahmood, etc. Likewise, many of the brass hats in the civil services were Kurds. Of the fourteen Mutasarrifs in the country, the Kurds have held as many as ten appointments.

On the slightly lower level of Directorates-General and Directorates in the departments of Police, Education and other fields all over the country, their representation by far exceeds the share due to them by virtue of their population. Official records reveal that 23% of all such appointments have been in their hands.

No doubt, the Kurds domiciled in countries other than Iraq could hardly boast of such good fortune or such mutual trust. We have said nothing of the fact that in parts of the country where they predominate, Kurdish has been declared by the Government to be the official language. It is the medium of instruction in schools and is an indispensable qualification for appointment and promotion in the Courts of Justice. Arabic is elective and is taught in secondary schools for a start, to prepare the Kurdish children for admission to the University. There could be no objection to this procedure since they are naturally desirous of acquiring higher education at University level. Moreover, Arabic is the medium which not merely qualifies them for such education in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Arab world, which today has extensive facilities of its own for advanced education in every sphere. In any case,

University education in their own language would be impracticable since textbooks on various subjects are not available in Kurdish.

The question of dress is a matter for individual preference and taste, just as food is a matter for every person to decide for himself. The Iraqis may wear, according to their choice, traditional Arab garments or the traditional Kurdish outfit. The bulk of the population in the cities and bigger towns has taken to European form of dress, men, women and children, for the sake of practical convenience. Dress by itself could hardly alter one's obligations and privileges as the national of a country.

Under Iraq's laws, every national, be he an Arab or a Kurd, enjoys perfect freedom of movement and domicile throughout the length and breadth of his country. As a result, a large number of Kurds forsook the region of the north and settled down elsewhere in the cities, the towns and even the countryside of Iraq. They have not only changed their domicile but also adopted other professions and callings. No one utters a word against such a choice on their part, officially or in private. Opposed to this, if an Arab likes to take up permanent residence among the Kurds in the north, he has to face a host of problems and prejudices. ?

These, in brief, are the Rights which the Kurds enjoy in Iraq and the privileges which the Government and the people extend to them. It is debatable if persons of Kurdish origin in other countries have even retained their racial identity. The laws and regulations which have been in force there, have all aimed at the assimilation of the Kurds into the national fabric. ??

Turkey encouraged the Kurds to scatter all over the country. This move by itself caused the separatist feeling, if it ever existed, to disappear together with all class-consciousness. The people are all Turks and their ancestral homelands are now a part of Turkey with no identity of their own left. The word 'Kurd' no longer adorns the Turkish language, the Kurds of Turkey being referred to as the 'Turks of the highlands'.

The Kurdish languages has, for the same reasons, fizzled out of existence in Turkey. No one teaches or studies it and nothing is ever printed or published in it openly. The old tribal laws and administration have become replaced by the national laws and administration of Turkey. And God help the man who takes it upon himself to countenance the said laws or the authority of the national government in that country!

In the sphere of public administration, no minister or official is ever referred to as a Kurd. All are Turks, first and last, that being the only admissible qualification. It is to the credit of Kurds in Turkey that they have willingly and cheerfully accepted these facts as unavoidable and to their advantage. They have moulded the pattern of their lives accordingly, not only to assist the national government in the implementation of its policies but also to accelerate the pace of their own progress and well being.

Generally speaking identical conditions obtain in Iran. That country too does not acknowledge the existence within its boundaries of a separate community of Kurds. All those who are resident in Iran and claim the nationality of that country, are Iranians of the Aryan stock. There is no distinction between the inhabitants of cities and the countryside, hill tracts and the coastal

plains. The term 'Kurd' is not of Iranian origin and is not recognised there as such officially.

The stand which Iran has always taken in regard to the problem of Kurds in its territories is well known. In 1946, when Jafar Peshwari, avowedly assisted by Mulla Mustafa Barazani from Iraq, defied the authority of the established government of his country, the uprising was promptly and ruthlessly put down by force of arms. That was the end of subversion and peace has reigned undisturbed ever since in the so-called Kurdish regions of Iran and also of Turkey.

All those who inhabit hilly areas come to possess certain distinctive physical features, regardless of where they live. They come to look different from those who live down the plains. The inhabitants of the extreme north of Iraq share, for that reason alone, certain physical characteristics with their neighbours in Iran and Turkey. These characteristics do not disqualify them from holding the nationalities of their respective countries but are essentially the product of climate and terrain.

And while all the people of Iran are Iranians and, similarly, all those who inhabit Turkey are Turks, it is ironical to observe that at least some of the nationals of Iraq are not Iraqis; they are Kurds first!

The foregoing gives us food for thought with regard to the attitude of the Government of Iraq and the Kurds of this country, towards each other. The one acknowledges ungrudgingly the latter's separate identity and measures are taken continuously to safeguard their individual and collective rights and privileges, more than seems due to them by virtue of their numbers

in the country. The Kurds, on the other hand, repay the Government and their fellow countrymen by indulging in acts of sabotage and violence resulting in loss of life and destruction of property, much of their own. In the bargain, it is once again the poor Kurd who, unwittingly and wholly unconnected with the dirty business, falls a victim to the depredations perpetrated by his own kinsmen.

INFLATED LEADERSHIP

Mustafa Barazani has scored some success in befogging the minds of the people of Iraq and also of a certain number of foreigners residing in and outside this country. He has, to some extent, created the impression that he is the sole and accredited representative as well as the acknowledged leader of the people of Kurdish origin in the world. He has, professedly, devoted his life and resources to the political emancipation of Kurds as also their material well being. According to his propaganda, he has made major sacrifices towards the attainment of that goal.

The hostile activities on the part of Mustafa Barazani directed against Iraq and the Arab world, strengthen the hands of those who have never been friendly to the latter. Such reaction emboldens countries like Israel, Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and some others who happen to be our nextdoor neighbours. *the shah* As a result, the domestic problems of those states that contain Kurdish elements, become much aggravated.

In the north of Iraq are to be found a host of distinguished men, belonging to large and respectable tribes of Kurds, who command spontaneous respect in all quarters by virtue of their status, learning and character. Their position in society eclipses that of

Barazani, if we disregard the notriety which he possesses. These elders have set an example to their people, which is worth emulating, by their devotion and loyalty to the lawful government of the country and by leading peaceful lives among their neighbours. They have enjoyed silent admiration of the masses and the patronage of the Government, even though their names have not become headlined in the Press.

Loyalty to the government and co-operation with the community are rewarded by peace and prosperity. Discord not only destroys peace and prosperity but also paves the way for colonial exploitation. It directly aids Israelis and their supporters, in their designs against the Arabs.

This Kurdish boil in the neck of Iraq creates other and more dangerous problems and exposes to grave perils the Kurds no less than the Arabs. The loyal clans in the north and their leaders appreciate this fact. They believe that to tolerate such a state of affairs would result in national disintegration and economic chaos. They know that Barazani and his associates as well as the clandestine Kurdish Democratic Party preach a hopeless cause. The outcome is murder, rapine, arson and devastation, carried out in the most barbarous manner imaginable.

The loyal tribes stand by with the Government and the latter extends to them protection and material assistance. Barazani and his accomplices have lost in the battle repeatedly and have had to surrender to the national forces time and again. This could only bring them into contempt with the loyal tribes.

A number of journalists, prompted by a latent hatred for the Arabs and Iraq, have endeavoured to im-

plicate falsely some of the loyal clans and their elders with subversion. This left the impression, *inter alia* that a majority of the people was in the movement.

For instance, nothing could be farther from the truth than to connect with reactionary movement, tribes such as Sourjiya, Zibareen, Harakia, Rekaneen, Yazidiya, Shurafa, Kakia, as also the Barazani, the Hoori and Zalka groups. Equally staunch in their devotion to the Government but also mistakenly confused with subversion are the tribes of Khoshna, Barad, Sittis and others.

Appended below is a list of eldemen, by tribes, clans and localities, whose loyalty for the country and the nation have remained unshaken and who have seized every opportunity to condemn and repair the breach created by Barazani and his group.

Some of those who are ranged against Mulla Mustafa Barazani are listed below:—

Mosul.

Abdullah Mohammed Amin Agha al-Barazani head of Rekan clan.

Ahmed Mir Khan of Rekani tribe (from Amadiyah).
Muawiyah al-Yazedi.

Tahsin al-Yazedi (leader of the Shekhan group).

Sh. Mahmud Agha al-Zebari and his sons Titar, Zubair and Umar.

Sh. Muhammad Faras Agha al-Zebari and his brothers Samko Faras and Abdul Qahhar Faras.

Sh. Latif al-Zebari.

Sh. Ahmad Soorji, religious leader of the entire tribe, with followers in Mosul and Arbil, himself being resident in village Kuwelan.

Sh. Taqiuddin al-Soorji, of Bejil town.

Sh. Kabir al-Soorji of village Kalati.

Sh. Sabir al-Soorji and his brother Sh. Fakhri al-Soorji.

Sh. Musleh al-Soorji.

Sh. Qutbuddin al-Soorji.

Sh. Sadruddin al-Soorji.

Sh. Muhiuddin Agha al-Hariki of Mosul and his two brothers Asad and Ezzeddin and latter's son, all resident in the tribal area of Sabaa and Soorjia.

Sh. Ahmad Siddi Khan of village Kardaseen.

Muhiuddin Yardosh, Abdullah Ismail Maaruf, Yasin Agha Aj'aj, Muhammad Qadir Agha Zankanan, Yunus Agha, Assim Amir and Muhammad Agha Kalkok.

Muhammad Salim Shosh, Abdul Sattar Khurshid and Sh. Taufiq al-Soorji.

Haj Faiq Mustafa Mulla Jibrail.

Sh. Ibrahim Sh. Baqir.

Abdullah Agha al-Sharfani.

Auni Mustafa.

Sabghatallah Mufti.

Nur Muhammad al-Bareefkani.

Mahdi Agha bin Haji Agha al-Sharfani.

Dewali Agha al-Doski.

Saied Mulla Toha.

Sh. Abied Al-Bareefkani.

Farid Haj Tahir al-Hamzani.

Arbil.

Reshad al-Mufti, Qadhi of Arbil.

Ahmed Jalbi al-Dabbagh and his sons.

Sh. Muhiddin.

Sh. Mustafa al-Naqshbandi.

As'ad Shetna and Rashid As'ad Shetna.

Kordu Noori Bawal Agha.

Mustafa Agha Ali Afendi.

Hawez Man Yehya.

Hadi Agha Kaka Khan.

Mahmud Beg Khalifa, head of clan of Baradosteen and his group.

Mahmud Saleh Beg, Audal Rashid Beg, Yahya Beg, Karim Khan, Haji Beg Khalifa and Usman Beg Khalifa.

Usman Beg Miran head of the Khosnawa clan.

Sabir Agha Ispandara, Anwar Rashid Beg, Mushir Ahmad Aghala, Wahid Beg, and Kamal Khurshid Beg.

Karim Agha Kori cousin of Usman Miran resident in Salahuddin.

Fattah Agha Harki leader of the tribe of Harki Sirhati.

Abdul Rahman Beg Sisawa (Hareer).

Bayaz Agha Kurdi leader of the tribe of Kurdia (Arbil).

Muhammad Sabir Agha of the tribe of Dazaie (Qoshatbah).

Khizr Ahmad Basha of the tribe of Dazaie.

Suleman Agha Deebka.

Yusuf Aziz Agha Zarari and Yusuf Agha.

Sh. Muhammad Rashid, Mushir Agha Kanej and Mam Rasul Agha Ashokan.

Hussain Khizr Agha al-Soorji and his brother Umar Khizr Agha al-Soorji of Sabeelak-Khalifan.

Laoka Agha Shekha Agha al-Soorji, Hareer.

Kirkuk.

Jamal Saiyid Khalil Kaki.

Mahmood al-Jaf, Sherwana, Kalar village.

Muhammad Rashid al-Jaf, Qaratabbah, Kokos village.

Ahmad Rustam leader of the Roghzaaie clan, Kufri.

Muhammad Amin Muhammad Hassan leader of Khartania clan, Sherwana.

Haj Qadir leader of Shatri clan, Bebaz.

Muhammad Ali Muhammad Amin leader of Haroonia clan, Bebaz.

Haj Husain leader of Kamalia clan, Bebaz.

Hamah Jan al-Qaem Bamor, Roghazzai clan of al-Jaf tribe.

Khanaqin.

The Kakia clan.

Muhammad Rauf and Muhammad Saleh, Barazanjia party.

Abdullah and the Horeen party.

Noori Zalka and his party.

DEFLATED LEADERSHIP

On crossing the bounds of moderation, zeal may turn into dogma and dogma into fanaticism. We had some evidence of it in the time of the dictator Abdul Karim Kassim. His conduct was almost always influenced by a form of mental disequilibrium. He would not be satisfied, for instance, by pronouncing death penalty by itself; he would impose mutilation in addition. Imprisonment used to be supplemented by torture and ordinary interrogation was accompanied by humiliation, and so on. Such cannot indeed be the behaviour of a normal rational being.

Mulla Mustafa Barazani provides yet another example of similar deformed thinking. During the earliest stages of the Kurdish uprising, around 1936 and again in 1945, he could not state precisely what he was after. One is left to conclude that it must be his love for fighting for its own sake, intermingled with a craving for leadership and some worldly prestige, which induced him to embark on such an aimless course of death and destruction. He was certainly a very different man after his self-imposed exile in the U.S.S.R., where he enjoyed for some time at least the privilege of carrying a senior military rank.

The meetings and the exchanges of opinion which Mulla Mustafa had with Abdul Karim Kassim could

hardly bear fruit. What could be expected out of the coming together of two equally perverted minds? Nothing worthwhile emerged, consequently, apart from bellyaches on both sides.

Now, however, after the lapse of so much more time since his return from exile, his name has suddenly got into the healdines in the Press. The earlier confused thinking has now been christened into 'aims' and the bellychaces have at the same time become transformed into 'demands'. Above all, his depredations are now benig referred to politely as the 'national uprising of the Kurdish people', with possible reprecussions in the neighbouring countries, no less serious.

In actual practice, what does this so-called national uprising really consist of? Killing accompanied by banditry, aimed at depriving other Kurds of their property, honour and often life. It is all a sum total of mass murder, looting and arson in the service of nationalism.

A natural and understandable reluctance on the part of the local population to part with their money and goods unfailingly invites the vengeance of Mulla Mustafa and his accomplices. Quite often, personal enmity, tribal rivalry and clannish grudge may similarly culminate in bloodshed and robbery.

The emergence of such lawbreakers in the midst of otherwise peace loving Kurds has exposed the entire community to a charge of subversion, a charge which repeatedly makes its appearance in foreign Press, books, periodicals and journals. Few people have had the time and the diligence to go deeper into facts and to ascertain who are involved in such activities, to what extent, in what manner, and why.

For the benefit of the more skeptical of our readers, appended below is a short list of the "incidents" reported from the north of Iraq recently, during the half year ended January 1965.

(1) On the night 13/14th May, 1964, the rebels detained the headman of the village of Doshwan in the jurisdiction of Kandinawa, Abdul Aziz and his son Ibrahim, and deprived them of ID 30/-.

(2) Acting as the representative of Mulla Mustafa, in the area of Mosul, the insurgent Asaad Khoshwi assembled an illegal court-martial and passed cruel penalties against a number of innocent people of the locality.

(3) Ibrahim Ismail, a junior rebel commander, intercepted Hamid Aziz while the latter was driving in his car to the village of Banslaw. He was escorted to the rebel outpost and placed in custody. The outlaws demanded a ransom of of ID 100/- through the headman of village Saidawa. Finally, on 14th August, 1964, the insurgents raided the village of Saidawa which resulted in an exchange of fire whereupon the outlaws fled.

(4) On 21st November, 1964, seven rebels detained a car which was on a visit to Anwar Haj Wali, kidnapped its driver to village Sheikhan in the 'Nahiya' of Qaratabba and later decamped with the car as well.

(5) Three of the insurgents attempted to relieve a taxi driver of his wallet while the latter was plying his vehicle along road Mosul-Arbil. Station Officer at Arbil despatched an armed party to the scene which took one of the miscreants into custody and wounded another.

(6) The rebels detained Rahim and Mahami, two loyal Kurds of Khanaqin, along with their car and driver.

(7) A body of outlaws kidnapped Hussain Ali, Jihad Karim and Abdul Khaliq while they were travelling along road Sulaimaniya-Taslooja and carried them by force to the former's outpost in Shadla.

(8) Some of the miscreants raided the village of Hoorani and Salao and abducted a number of young persons and children.

(9) On 9th January, 1965, the insurgents kidnapped Hamah Saleh Faraj and his colleague Mohammad Saied in a car bearing registration number 176/A/Sulaimaniya. The same day, a fisherman was deprived of a sum of ID 101/- while on his way to Rania village.

(10) On 10th January, 1965, the outlaws waylaid Engineer Hanna, Inspector Yunus Seleh and Sami Haj Naji and deprived them of all their possessions such as cash, luggage and even wrist watches. The victims were proceeding from Kirkuk to Baghdad.

(11) The same day, the miscreants kidnapped a certain Qadir Agha Mintak of Arbil.

(12) On 11th January, 1965, a gang of kidnappers and robbers was formed in Arbil to conduct such activities in an organised manner.

(13) On 11th January, 1965, a certain Ismail Ahmed was kidnapped from Mohalla Sharshkan in Sarajnar town.

(14) On 16th January, 1965, the outlaws fired upon a private car and wounded one of its occupants who was later admitted to the local hospital. The miscreants likewise waylaid Dr. Sattar Hassan while he was on his way to Kirkuk and relieved him of his purse containing about ID 300/- as well as his watch. Similarly, one

Mustafa of Askat village was deprived of a sum of ID 10/-.

(15) The insurgents forced a certain Kurd jeweller of Qaisarya market in Sulaimaniya to part with ID. 400/-.

(16) Members of the outlawed Kurdish Democratic Party robbed the local destitute persons of the gift of wheat flour which the latter had received from the Government of Iraq. ? ?

(17) Seven of the outlaws kidnapped Ibrahim Hamah while he was travelling in a car, bearing registration number 125/2/Mosul from Arbil to Salahuddin. He was forcibly taken to an unknown destination.

(18) The insurgents fell upon Haseem Aziz, a school teacher, while he was somewhere between the villages Serwan and Wararni and took away his car by force.

(19) An armed gang on 26th January, 1965, committed robberies on the road Arbil-Mosul by relieving the occupants of six cars successively of their cash and wrist watches.

(20) On 27th January, 1965, seven armed highway men took away by force the car bearing registration number 884/2/Kirkuk, from the vicinity of the bridge, situated inside the State Forest, while the said car was proceeding to the Aski Kalak Project. It seems that January, 1965, yielded a big harvest of loot to the insurgents!

(21) The insurgent colonel Noori Maaruf and his group took away forcibly ID 1500/- from Saleh Qairwan and another ID 200/- from Noori, a chemist, both of Sulaimaniyah. The last named sum was intended as

monthly gratuity for the benefit of local officials and farmers, provided by the Government.

(22) About twenty armed insurgents raided the house of Naimat Rashid in Salahuddin and took away by force two guns with 150 rounds and one pistol with 14 rounds of ammunition beside ID. 300/— and some gold jewellery.

(23) Six armed outlaws similarly raided Sairwan village and kidnapped Jalal Abedin along with the latter's pistol .

(24) A clash occurred between armed insurgents and the local mounted levies which resulted in the death of three civilian bakers, another three of the mounted levies and one civilian wounded.

(25) Fifteen outlaws intercepted a car proceeding from Kufri to Altooz and kidnapped its occupant Abid Benzi, taking him to an unknown destination.

(26) Acting on the orders of the insurgent major Noori Ahmad Taha, a party of rebels abducted a girl from Sulaimaniyah, Amina daughter of Faraj Shun, and carried her off to the village of Mawat. She was forcibly detained for several weeks at a stretch within the premises of the local political office where she was regularly ravished by the members of the political gang. She was later sent back to her people where her brother, overcome by shame, killed her.

(27) Zubehi, a senior members of the Kurdish Militia (Pesh Murga), which is a select body of armed insurgents, committed an unnatural offence on the person of one of his own subordinates who complained about it to Mulla Mustafa. Mulla Mustafa declined to take notice since the offender happened also to be the

Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Party having since replaced Ibrahim Ahmad in that office. At one time the culprit was serving as a subordinate in the Ambassador Hotel in Baghdad!

(28) Majid Korkak, commander of the insurgents in Khalkan, started flirting with the wife of a certain member of the Kurdish Militia (Pesh Murga). Just as the husband of that unfortunate woman became aware of this fact, he got killed in a skirmish. This further encouraged Majid Korkak to molest her more often and freely but she resisted vigorously. One night the culprit broke into her house in a state of drunkenness and raped her. She visited Mulla Mustafa the following morning, threw into his face her besmeared undergarments and demanded to know if such conduct was in aid of nationalism. That was the end of it. ??

(29) Of all 28 cases of rape and unnatural offences, on women as well as men, that have been reported from the villages of Sulaimaniyah liwa, almost all were committed by Majid Korkak and other members of his Kurdish Militia (Pesh Murga).

(30) A certain youngman of the village of Kani Masi was assaulted by Mulla's militia men, Baker Halaw and his brother Uthman Halaw, who committed an unnatural offence on the former's person. The victim reported the offence to the local commander of the Kurdish Militia who reacted by committing on the unlucky man the same offence himself.

This is indeed a brief account relating to a brief period. And yet, how are we to explain the general conduct of the supporters of the movement? Are we to assume that these offences have been committed with the

knowledge and consent of the Kurds as a community?
Or, are they in aid of attaining autonomy and self-
government, or else for the achievement of other high
sounding and lofty ideals, much publicised lately? In
any event, do they or do they not expose a total absence
of discipline, organisation and control within the
body of the insurgents? Have the victims not been their
own fellow Kurds, their own neighbours, following the
same religion and being the nationals of the same
country? If history has the habit of repeating itself,
what could most likely be the end of a movement which
is sustained by such conduct on the part of its leaders
as well as rank and file?

THE AWAKENING

Earlier in this book, we have shown how only a small section of the population in the north is affected by the separatist movement. Large and influential tribes and personalities are solidly behind the Government.

Every man has his own standard and sources of intelligence. Politics and religion have certain features in common. Both often command blind following and a man is frequently willing to kill or be killed in defence of certain beliefs of his own, without caring for the truth.

So many inhabitants of the north of Iraq have spent years allowing themselves to be misinformed and therefore misguided but some, at least, had the sense and good luck to discover the truth almost accidentally. Their response and reaction were both very human and natural. Bewilderment and remorse combined with a sense of embarrassment were noticeable in most cases. By nature an average Kurd is a God fearing honest man and is seldom unwilling to own his own faults and repent. We reproduce here a number of letters and telegrams which individuals and groups of Kurds belonging to the North have been addressing to the authorities, including His Excellency Field Marshell Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif, President of Iraq, the

Prime Minister and the civil and military authorities.
These speak for themselves.

To Colonel Saied Saleh al-Kattan, Commander 4th Division.

We, the undersigned Musheer and Arif, sons of Ismail Agha al-Roufi hereby declare our allegiance and devotion for our national government under the leadership of Field Marshall Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif. We beg pardon and forgiveness. We, our families as well as our fellow clansmen are ever ready to lay our lives for our country. We are willing to do our duty to it by providing to it our share of money and men for preserving the unity of our homeland.

God bear witness to what we have stated herein.

**Signed: Ismail Agha al-Roufi,
Arif Ismail Agha al-Roufi
and others.**

8th March, 1965.

This is but one and only a specimen of the numerous letters which are being regularly received from the inhabitants of the North of Iraq.

The reproduction of this latter is intended to give the reader an idea of the feeling in that sector of the country, in consequence of continued instability caused by a section of the population, resulting in a senseless loss of life and property.

Among the numerous letters and telegrams pouring in is a telegram from Saiyid Ahsan Saleh Agha and his group which runs as follows:—

To Field Marshall Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif, President of the Republic of Iraq; the Prime Minister; Mutasarrif of Mosul; the officiating Qaimmaqam of Ammadiya; Assistant Superintendent of Police; Iraq Radio; Minister of the Interior; 4th Army Division; Superintendent of Police, Mosul; and Al-Jamhuriya Newspaper.

We the residents of Ammadiya town disown and denounce strongly the disruptive activities which certain brigands have let loose and who are out to undermine peace and security by the use of force. We also denounce the circular issued by Barazani and re-affirm our loyalty to our country and are ever ready to sacrifice our property

and our very lives in the service of the homeland. Long live Kurdish-Arab brotherhood and down with subversion aimed at destroying unity.

Signatories: Ahsan Saleh Agha, Rashid Ahmad, Hamid Mustafa, Abdul Rahman Saied, Haj Tayyab Hussain, Ahmad Fattah Al-Haj Rashid, Majid Abdul Rahman Agha, Saleh Mustafa Mirza and Haju Sayyad Bakr.

Field Marshall Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif, President of the Republic of Iraq.

Sir, I, Hussain Zaweti, beg leave to relate here the story of my association with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan which has dedicated itself to subversion. My story is concerned with the gloomy activities of Mulla Mustafa Barazani and which also caused me the loss of my leg.

I was the representative in Mosul of the said Party, in addition to being the spokesman for Mulla Mustafa. I served him and his party to the best of my ability and carried on propaganda on their behalf. Allah had however willed otherwise and I and my colleagues were soon to become aware of the truth. This came about when I had the occasion to meet certain officials of the Government. I found them most courteous and human and understanding. We got round to discussing the burning topics of the day, particularly the problems facing the north of Iraq.

We went into the problem in detail and also examined dispassionately the ways and means of resolving it. We considered it our duty to lend them a helping hand in improving the lot of the people who had suffered so much and so long. We on our part felt that it was our duty to co-operate in all work connected with rehabilitation and reconstruction. This went against the grain of Mulla Mustafa and he connived at murdering me. Consequently a hand grenade was thrown at me which caused the loss of my leg. It is now there as a lasting evidence of what Mulla Mustafa and his gang have in their minds and what their character is. They are in brief a bunch of criminals bent on the destruction of life and property indiscriminately and without fear of man or God. They leave behind them bereaved families, widows and orphans. What could the others expect from him and his henchmen when that is how he treated me, one of his most trusted and loyal supporters.

It is barely possible for any self-respecting person to live in peace and to enjoy security of life and property.

All that has been going on in that sector of the country is the exclusive responsibility of Mulla Mustafa and his associates.

After that attempt on my life, I had to be admitted to the hospital. There I came under the supervision and treatment of the commandant

and officers of the military hospital. Despite my past history, they went out of their way to make me comfortable and did their very best to ensure my speedy recovery, disregarding the fact that not so long ago I was employed in destroying their own lives. They doubtless looked upon me as one of themselves, a fellow countryman and a Muslim and behaved accordingly. It disproved atonce the false propaganda that is being conducted on behalf of Mulla Mustafa to the effect that the Government has ordered the wantom destruction of Kurdish lives.

On the contrary, the conduct of the officers of the Government was perfectly in keeping with the teachings of Islam, as opposed to the behaviour of Mulla Mustafa. I could not resist the urge to forsake subversion, to become a servant of my country and to lay my life in its defence, under your command. May Allah give you victory over them, those who are working in aid of the enemies of Iraq. May you be pleased to look upon us as the humble and devoted soldiers of our beloved homeland, with the privilege of serving in the ranks of the national armed forces. May Allah help us all and may He preserve you and bless you all.

Long live the Arab-Kurdish brotherhood within the fold of Islam. Long live the brave army of Iraq. Long live the Republic of Iraq. Down with the dissentients and their supporters.

Hussain Zaweti.

The Prime Minister.

Sir,

I, Saadi Zaweti, am one of those who supported and co-operated with Mulla Mustafa Barazani in his disruptive and subversive activities aimed at the destruction of the army of our beloved country. All this resulted in peace and prosperity disappearing from our midst. Of course I was for a long time intimately associated with Mulla Mustafa and listened to all that he had to say. I had come to believe, therefore, that the Government of Iraq was in fact bent on killing the Kurds and scattering us, if it failed to take physical possession of our persons. During the cease fire, I found occasions to come in contact with the officials of the Government, both military and civil. They impressed me with their kindness and courtesy and their devotion to duty.

They were all directing their energies to the improvement of conditions in the north of Iraq, as gentlemen and Muslims. What really caused me to reflect on the conduct and the declarations of Mulla Mustafa was this. During the cease fire, detachments of the army of Iraq were sent out to our area to restore order and confidence. Officers and men of the 4th Division, which was in control of our area, were all persons of high calibre. They behaved with kindness and restraint and rendered all possible assistance to the local population. It made us feel among our own people and well-wishers. I thanked Allah for His blessings and cursed Mulla Mustafa and the like of him who spread

false propaganda against the Government, telling the people that if we did not surrender ourselves the authorities would apply force.

We seek your kind patronage and acceptance of our services in the armed forces; we also solicit forgiveness for our past conduct to be able to resume normal life, to till our lands and reap the harvest and to quit subversion. Long live Arab-Kurdish brotherhood, long live our national government and long live the brave Iraqi Army. May Allah bless you and may He preserve you.

Saadi Zaweti.

Field Marshall Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif, President of the Republic of Iraq.

Sir,

I, Mahmood bin Nauman Agha, am the head of the tribe of Barwari Jeri which is located within the Qadha of Ammadiyah. I and my people were connected with the insurrectionists. After the announcement of cease fire, I discovered the determined efforts that were being made by the Government of our country for the benefit of our countrymen. The detailed and costly planning that was undertaken for the rehabilitation and welfare of the country generally and of the northern sector of Iraq in particular, was impressive but not for the members of the forces of disruption and colonialism. The latter had only one purpose in life, i.e., to destroy peace and prosperity and to violate honour of individuals.

I declare, on my behalf and also on behalf of my people, our allegiance and devotion for the country and we, who number no less than 150 armed persons, seek amnesty and your patronage and we hope to serve you loyally and faithfully in bringing acts of sabotage and violence in the north of Iraq to an end, with the help of Allah.

**Mahmood bin Nauman Agha Jamanki,
for the Tribe of Barwari Jeri,
domiciled in the Qadha of
Ammadiyah in the Liwa of Mosul.**

The Prime Minister.

Sir,

We are addressing you this petition in the hope that the President of this country, your honour and all other authorities, would be pleased to review our cases with kindness and compassion, despite the fact that we were till recently involved in acts of sabotage and violence and thereby defied the law.

We are the inhabitants of the Nahiya of Ashaer Sabaa in the Qadha of Aqra and live there along with our cousins and other

members of the tribe. With the onset of insurrection in the north of the country, we were obliged to flee out of fear for our lives, leaving our lands and property behind. We remained fugitives for no less than three long years. Our sufferings and hardships opened our eyes to facts of life and we had no difficulty in appreciating that the real thing behind the movement was avarice on the part of the few so-called leaders, who were bent upon destruction of life and property, barring their own.

During the interval of cease fire we realised the difference in the two approaches, that of the insurrectionists and of the government of the country. No doubt, we had been compelled and misled into joining hands with the former.

The authorities, both military and civil, provided all possible assistance for our rehabilitation and welfare and made available the necessities of life, such as food and clothing. It was decided to return us to our lands and property, to make free use of both. The leaders of insurrection prevented us. It became obvious what their real purpose was and that they were not willing to accept even most reasonable offers of the authorities. We decided at long last to approach you with the request to forgive us and our families and children. We further offer our services as loyal soldiers of our homeland under the leadership of Field Marshall Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif.

We pray that Allah blesses you with success in the interest of the Republic and the Arab peoples. Long live the Arab-Kurdish brotherhood!

While seeking pardon and forgiveness for our past conduct, we as a tribe, assure you of our sincere desire to stand by the national government and to serve it loyally even with our blood and lives, God willing.

**Arif Ismail Agha Roni, Mushir Ismail Agha Roni,
Aziz Ismail Agha Roni and Ahmad Ismail Agha Roni.
On behalf of the Seven Tribes (Ashear Sabaa).**

NATIONALIST IDEALS

We may now go over once again what has been stated in this particular section and examine closely the letter addressed by Mulla Mustafa Barazani to the British authorities and the latter's reaction and reply to it. We may also review dispassionately Mulla's conduct during his sojourn in the U.S.S.R. and Iran as well as his sudden change of face and plans after the grievous failure of his mission abroad.

We shall have no difficulty in coming to certain conclusions. The good reader may permit us to point out that Mulla Mustafa's ideals, objectives and goals (if there were any) were at best flexible and volatile, which they continue to be to date. His ideals were never what he would have us believe, viz., purely nationalist and selfless, aimed solely at the amelioration of the condition of Kurds as a world community. On the contrary, his efforts have throughout been directed towards self-aggrandisement. Towards the attainment of his goal, he is ever prepared to make any sacrifice demanded. He is, as the world has already witnessed, ready to prolong strife till eternity and is equally willing to shed remorselessly any amount of blood, so long as that blood is not his own.

What is the real motive behind the endless series of disturbances which Mulla Mustafa Barazani has let

loose in the north of this country? Is there a purely patriotic feeling behind them or is he merely determined to see himself installed and worshipped as a leader and a hero, in total disregard of every other consideration?

There is no harm at this stage in reproducing here extracts from the correspondence exchanged by Mulla Mustafa with the British authorities. This happened around 1943 when the war was on. It becomes apparent at once that of the two parties, Mulla Mustafa was crawling on his knees whereas the other party, British government, was being as haughty and offensive in its attitude as it could possibly be.

Mulla Mustafa Barazani addressed to Mr. Edmonds a letter on 2nd January, 1943, the latter being at the time the British Counsellor at the Ministry of the Interior, Government of Iraq. Among other things, Mulla Mustafa had the following sentiments to convey to the addressee :-

"He (Mulla Mustafa) desires nothing from him (Mr. Edmonds) but his goodwill and patronage. If called upon, he (Mulla Mustafa) would build a fire and give himself up to the flames. He is ever at his (Mr. Edmonds') command. He (Mulla Mustafa) wishes him (Mr. Edmonds) greatness. To act on his (Mr. Edmonds') orders would be a matter of great honour".

Compared to this, the British attitude towards this unlucky man is worth noting. The British Embassy in one of its communications addressed to him during 1943, had the following to say :-

"On several occasions in your communications addressed to the British authorities, you have emphasised the affection and trust which you repose in the British Government. On their part, the said British authorities advised you to accept the terms prescribed by the Government. However, you did not accept that advice. In fact, your conduct materially jeopardises the war effort which the British Government is making. As such, the British Government considers your attitude towards itself as being hostile and takes the opportunity of warning you against the consequences".

It is hardly necessary to dwell at length upon the meaning of the wordings and the intention behind them. The attitudes and the divergent approaches of the two parties are apparent.

Much later on, when the subversive activities of Mulla Mustafa Barazani came to a sorry end in 1949, he fled Iraq, crossed into Iran and eventually found himself a fugitive in the U.S.S.R. First, he waited to ascertain the attitude of the Government of the U.S.S.R. towards himself. Later, he was invited to Baku in the autumn of that year (1946) in company with an officer of the Soviet army. He asked for, among other things, protection and material assistance. He was put in command of a body of troops and offered his services to Qazi Muhammad. The last named had for a time succeeded in carving a nominally independent sovereign state out of Azerbaijan, in the north of Iran, which was called Mahabad. This was supposed to be a Kurdish outfit and Qazi Muhammad styled himself as its head of state.

All along, Mulla Mustafa was aiding and abetting those, including the Soviet authorities, who were overtly or covertly for that unlucky and short-lived state.

At this stage, the Prime Minister of Iran visited Moscow and offered oil concessions to the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the north of Iran and, on his return, put the motion through the Parliament in Teheran. This move caused a **volte face** in official circles in the U.S.S.R. in so far as that ill-fated Republic of Mahabad was concerned, sealing its fate once and for all. The army of Iran occupied Mahabad. Its Head of State and his top level associates were soon afterwards found hanging by the trees in the main square of the capital city.

Having met with frustration, being in the jaws of death himself, as an enemy of the Government of Iran, and on being abandoned by the U.S.S.R., he had to look for other troubled waters where to fish.

The character of Mulla Mustafa Barazani, his ideals and objectives as well as the means and methods which he has from time to time adopted, can be ascertained with comparative ease if the reader would only refresh his mind with what has been stated in this chapter, viz., his petitions to the British authorities, the latter's replies and reactions to Mulla's feelers, his flight out of Iraq on the collapse of his earlier attempts at subverting peace in this country, his sojourn in the U.S.S.R. followed by his military and political activities in the still-born Republic of Mahabad (in course of which he almost gave up the cause of Kurdish au-

tonomy in Iraq) and the end of his dreams in that part of the world. It may be fair to recall that he once again chose the relatively safe ground of Iraq for reviving his demands and activities on behalf of the Kurds of the world. This is despite the fact that there are many more Kurds in Turkey and Iran and the Iraqi Kurds have always enjoyed certain substantial privileges which their kinsmen elsewhere are firmly denied.



MEMORANDA OF DEMANDS

The reader is now kindly requested to draw upon his knowledge of world history, particularly cases on record of minorities trying to break away from the majority rule through the use of force. History is full of such cases, and quite an outcrop of them in more recent times. We have however to distinguish cases of minorities living intermingled with the majority communities from the others where the so-called minority' was in fact a numerical 'majority' but weaker in organisation and physical force. The last-named definition applies by and large to colonial powers and their dependencies, the latter in almost all cases being numerically superior to their rulers if not in organisation and physical power.

Let us now take a hypothetical case of a minority which lives in the midst of the majority and enjoys privileges which members of the same racial or ethnical group domiciled elsewhere do not. Unprovoked, a small section of the said minority takes it into its heads to try and break away by force. It gets beaten time and again, has to flee the country and live abroad as fugitives, return with the consent of the national government, revive internecine strife and defy law and order continuously. In between, the said minority amu-

ses itself by placing before the lawful national government and the majority community a list of its 'demands' the acceptance and the fulfilment of which are required at the point of pistol.

How are the lawful national government and the majority community expected to react and behave under such a set of circumstances? Are the tolerance and restraint shown by the majority community and the constraint exercised by it on the national government in the latter's conduct towards the rebellious minority, to be construed as signs of weakness and acknowledgment of defeat? What would one say if the restive and beaten minority were to entertain the said majority by confronting it at intervals with successive demands, (none ever so much as formally acknowledged) but each 'demand' more ambitious than the preceding one?

The first memorandum was produced by the insurgents on 20th October, 1964, while the second came on or about 24th January, 1965, leaving a gap of some three months. The second memorandum obviously alters or modifies the first. The extent to which the ambitions and demands have mounted can be easily gauged from the following interpretive comments:—

(a) The original demand was for self-government for themselves, in areas where the Kurds formed a majority population. Opposed to this, the supplementary memorandum raised the demand and insisted on inserting a restrictive definition in the body of the constitution whereby the Arabs of Iraq are described as a part of the Arab nation (and Kurds of Iraq to be acknowledged as a separate nation). Let us refer to Clause 1 of

Memorandum No. 1 and Clause 7 of Memorandum No. 2. This was perhaps intended to pave the way for total separation from Iraq at a convenient date, after sufficient unrest and torment had been fermented in the adjoining countries where the Kurds similarly form sizable minorities.

(b) Vide Clauses 2 (vii) and 2 (vii), Memorandum No. 1 had made detailed provision in respect of the offices of the Vice President of the Republic of Iraq and of the Deputy Prime Minister in the Central Government, both being in the hands of the Kurds. The first memorandum has not only insisted on an adequate number of Kurdish ministers being appointed to the Central Cabinet but also on the admission in sufficient numbers of Kurdish students to the Baghdad University. Three months later, this was not thought enough and Clause 1 of Memorandum No. 2 made noticeable advances by asking for preference to be given to Kurds in appointments in the fields of Education and Local (Public) Administration through their appointments as Mutasarrifs, Qaimmaquams and Mudir Nahiyas, etc. Exactly what is intended by the Kurds having their 'due share in all such ministries of the Central Government as have functions to discharge carrying prestige with them', is for the authors of the two memoranda to explain.

(c) Clause 2 (iv) of Memorandum No. 1 has in detail safeguarded the linguistic rights of the Kurds. It said: 'Kurdish shall be the official language of the State or Province, with option to use Arabic. The minorities domiciled in the State or Province shall similarly enjoy the privilege to use their own languages'. Is this not a very comprehensive provision? Seemingly not; for

Clause 3 of Memorandum No. 2 asked for 'areas having a majority population of Kurds' to 'use Kurdish for purposes of public instruction in schools upto intermediate'. To a mind not initiated into the mysteries of the thinking in insurgent circles in the north of Iraq, this would look like coming down the ladder a bit!

(d) Clause 2 (ix) (a) had more than fully safeguarded the future welfare of the insurgents by ensuring their continued existence as a force as at present constituted, even after the emergence of the so-called State or Province of Kurdistan. Memorandum No. 2 vide Clause 4 extends special patronage to the Pesh Murga group, notwithstanding that this notorious body of outlaws has more murders and rapine to its credit than any other group of rebels. And the Arabs as well as the Government of Iraq were expected to bow down to them tearfully or cheerfully.

(e) Memorandum No. 1 vide Clause 2 (xiii) had stipulated that the Kurdish community is to develop along the same lines as the Arabs in the fields of politics, economics and culture. Memorandum No. 2 as per its Clause 6, prescribed the condition that before Iraq decides on any union or merger or federation of any kind with any other Arab partner or partners, the matter shall first be discussed with the Kurds.

It may be noted that even though the Kurdish memoranda do not so specify, from the picture that forms in one's mind it is only the territory of Kurdistan which is to have an autonomous status with a separate administration. The Arab majority areas in Iraq shall, it seems, continue to be administered by the Central Government. Moreover, the insurgents and outlaws are hopeful of being treated on par with the forces of the government

established by law. The proposed autonomous state is not only expecting to get compensated for its own acts of sabotage and despoilation (by payment of cash to the individual perpetrators of those acts, out of the pockets of the Arabs), it also wants to have a fully armed and wholly independent army of its own. This requirement is to be read with the further demand that the authority and the movements of the regular army of Iraq are to be severely restricted and subject to the sweet will of the Kurdistan Assembly, an arrangement which certainly has no parallel anywhere in world history.

We may now leave the reader to satisfy his own curiosity and to make valuable additions to his knowledge and logic by actually perusing the two memoranda in detail.

Memorandum No. 1
containing Kurdish proposals for autonomy
as submitted by representatives of the insurgents
on 10th October, 1964, to the Government of Iraq

1. Alteration of the last sentence in Clause 19 of the Provisional Constitution, which reads thus at present: "This Constitution specifies their national privileges within the body of Iraq." This shall be altered to read: "This Constitution specifies the privileges due to the Kurds in their relations with union of Iraq."

2. The foregoing shall be implemented, in consequence of the alteration suggested, as under:—

(a) The administrative unit shall comprise the Liwas of Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimaniyah, together with the Qadhas of Zakho, Dhok, Agra, Ammadiyah, Shekhan, Sinjar, Tellafar, Khanaqin and such other Qadhas and Nahiyas which contain a majority population of Kurds, within the Liwas of Mosul and Diyali. This administrative unit shall be known as a State or Province under a Governor.

(b) The administration of the said State or Governor's Province shall be in the hands of an Executive Council which in turn shall be responsible to the Legislative Assembly to be known as the State or Provincial Assembly, as the case may be. Members of the Assembly shall be elected to it by the local population on the basis of one man one vote. The Executive Council shall be formed under the authority of the Central Government but shall be answerable for routine administration to the State or Provincial Assembly, which in its turn shall be vested with the power of censure over it.

(c) The State or Provincial Assembly shall enact laws and frame regulations for the day to day administration of Kurdistan provided that such laws and regulations do not contravene the provisions of the Constitution of Iraq.

(d) The following shall be the powers and functions of the Executive Council of Kurdistan:—

(i) Enforcement of the laws, orders and regulations, etc., as enacted or passed by the State or the Provincial Assembly, in respect of the following subjects:

Justice, Local Administration, Police, Education, Health, Agriculture, Forests, Communications, Municipa-

lities, Labour and Social Welfare, Development, Housing, Summer Resorts, as well as such other residual subjects as do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Central Government of Iraq.

(ii) Enforcement of such other general laws, orders and regulations, etc., as are from time to time enacted or issued by the Central Government of Iraq, so long as these do not impinge upon the powers of the State or Provincial authorities.

(iii) The selection and appointment, etc., of all officials and employees for the conduct of public administration within the territorial jurisdiction of the State or Province.

(iv) Kurdish shall be the official language in the State or Province with the option to use Arabic. The minorities domiciled within the State or Province shall similarly enjoy the privilege to use their own languages.

(v) The Finances of the State or Province shall comprise :—

(a) Local resources, taxes and dues levied inside Kurdistan.

(b) Kurdistan's share in the loans and grants as raised or received by the Central Government of Iraq, in the proportion of its population.

(c) Kurdistan's share in the revenues of customs, airports and ports, in proportion to its population.

(d) Kurdistan's share in the oil revenues, in proportion to its population.

(vi) The Constitution for Kurdistan shall guarantee cultural, social, and economic rights as also democratic and religious freedom to the minorities domiciled in

Kurdistan. It shall further guarantee their complete equality, in the matters of rights and duties, with members of the Arab and Kurdish nationalities. It shall also guarantee their representation, in a fair proportion, in the Executive Council, State or Provincial Assembly, etc.

(vii) The Vice President of Iraq shall be a Kurd elected by the State or Provincial Assembly.

(viii) Miscellaneous provisions:—

(a) The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq shall be a Kurd. There shall also be a number of Kurdish ministers in the Central Cabinet in proportion to the Kurdish population in the country.

(b) The number of Kurdish officials in the ministries of the Central-Government shall be in the same proportion.

(c) The number of Kurdish students admitted to Baghdad University and other institutes of higher education, as well as the number of Kurdish students sent for education on Government missions abroad, shall also be in the said proportion.

(ix) Military affairs:—

(a) The insurgent military establishment shall remain embodied in its present size and form till such time as a special Committee is convened to consider its re-organisation. In the latter event, Kurdistan shall have allotted as its share this body, thence forward to be known as Border Force or Corps, to comprise 2,000 all ranks.

(b) The Kurds shall render Colour service within Kurdistan.

(c) Officers and other ranks who were removed from service for political and allied reasons shall be accepted

back in their original appointments. Their service for promotion and pension, etc., shall count as actually rendered with the Colours.

(d) In time of peace, excepting emergencies, the Kurdish elements of the army shall ordinarily serve within the territory of Kurdistan.

(e) Kurdish students shall be admitted to the Military, Police, Staff and Air Force colleges and to other military establishments in proportion to their population.

(f) Martial Law may be declared in Kurdistan with the consent of the State or Provincial Assembly, in the event of actual war or in the face of a real threat of external aggression.

(g) The Central Government may despatch additional forces to Kurdistan in the face of a threat of foreign attack or in the event of actual aggression against the Republic of Iraq. In all other cases, the approval of the State or Provincial Assembly may be necessary, to be obtained through its Executive Council. This provision shall not hinder the Iraqi Army from carrying out normal exercises and routine functions.

(h) Military formations may engage in operational movements within Kurdistan at the request or with the permission of the State or Provincial Assembly, or its Executive Council.

(x) Any legislative provision, whatever its source, shall be considered null and void if its effect is to restrict national and democratic rights of the Kurds and or to limit their opportunities for exercising such rights.

(xi) (a) A mixed Commission containing an equal number of members representing both sides, i.e., Arabs

and Kurds, shall be constituted to draft a provisional Constitution and Rules of Procedure for the proposed State or Province as well as instructions relating to the first elections to the Assembly and the Executive Council. The Commission shall also be charged with the responsibility for the implementation of these.

(b) The said Commission shall discuss all necessary provisions and work out details in respect of the Constitution, Rules, etc., which have to be issued under the authority of the Government, complete with notes and explanations. Future co-operation and mutual trust shall largely depend on the work the said Commission puts into the framing of the aforesaid Constitution, Rules, etc. The successful implementation of the official policies and the co-ordination of the efforts of the Central and the State (or Provincial) governments, are both solely dependent on the outcome of the Commission's endeavours.

(c) Action on the provision of sub-clause (a) above shall be taken without delay and elections to the State (or Provincial) Assembly shall have to be completed with all possible speed, not later than four months from the date of the approval of these proposals.

(d) A certain amount of money is also to be earmarked for the benefit of those who took part in the nationalist uprising in Kurdistan and thereby suffered losses. The Commission is to assess and intimate reasonable amounts payable to individuals involved and to complete action on this provision with all possible speed.

(e) Another sum of money is to be set apart for payment of reasonable compensation to all those who became victims of disturbances and unsettled conditions

suffering loss of life or property, or both. This shall also be done under the supervision and direction of the Commission, as mentioned above.

(f) The safe return of all Arab tribes and clans to their original places of habitation or domicile and their rehabilitation there shall be organised with all possible speed. Their bonafide representatives shall be conducted safely to the localities concerned in the first instance.

(g) The re-instatement shall be taken up with all possible speed of such officials and Government employees as had become involved in the unsettled conditions and disturbances and had been compulsorily retired or removed from service. They shall, as far as possible, be reinstated in their original appointments and adequately compensated, if found deserving, for any losses actually suffered by them. For purposes of promotion and pension, etc., shall be counted the whole period during which they were compelled to remain out of employment.

(h) The levies shall be disbanded and returned to their homes.

(i) A general amnesty is to be granted to all those who became involved in political movements in Kurdistan and got detained or imprisoned for that reason. This shall include those actually convicted as well as those under trial.

(xii) The clause contained in the Provisional Constitution of Iraq which stands at present thus: "The Iraqi people are part of the Arab nation" is to be altered to read: "The Arabs in Iraq constitute a part of the Arab nation".

(xiii) The following additional clause is to be inserted in the Provisional Constitution of Iraq as it stands: "The Kurdish community is to develop along the same lines as the Arabs in the fields of politics, economics and culture."

(xiv) The interests of the Kurdish minority domiciled outside the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed Kurdish State shall be guaranteed and safeguarded on a footing of equality with the other nationals.

(xv) In the event of a merger (union) or federation with the United Arab Republic, or any other Arab country, the State or Province of Kurdistan shall have the same status as other individual constituents of the proposed union or federation. In return, Kurdistan shall have identical liabilities with the other constituents and shall be referred to as the State of Kurdistan.

Memorandum No. 2, submitted by a delegation on behalf of the Kurdish insurgents during its stay in Baghdad from 10th to 24th January, 1965.

1. (a) In the proposed State, preference shall be given to Kurds in appointments in the fields of Education and Local (Public) Administration, such as Mu-tasarraf, Qaimmaqam, Mudir Nahiya.

(b) The Kurds shall have their due share in all such ministries of the Central Government, as discharge functions carrying prestige with them.

2. The law applicable to the use of local languages shall continue to operate.

3. Areas having a majority population of Kurds shall use Kurdish for purposes of public instruction in schools upto intermediate level.

4. Members of the Kurdish Pesh Murga (a corps of insurgent forces) shall return to their original appointments or professions, as the case may be, e.g., soldier back to the army, policeman back to the police force, other government employees to their respective duties and the artisan and farmer, etc., to their own work.

The servicemen who are at present stationed in the south within the area of 2nd Division, as also members of the police force, shall all be transferred or posted to the north of Iraq, if they are of Kurdish origin.

5. Such inter-provincial or inter-state postings and transfers shall be obligatory unless otherwise an exception is warranted in the public interest.

6. The inclusion of the Kurdish State in any scheme for Arab union or federation in the future, shall first be discussed by the concerned parties, as a matter of course.

7. The Constitution shall state *inter alia* :—

“The Arabs in Iraq constitute a part of the Arab nation and the Constitution prescribes the national rights of the Kurds as originally specified at the time of the reconstitution of Iraq as a union.”

A closer scrutiny of the two memoranda reproduced above would disclose some marked inconsistencies and the existence of second thoughts in the minds of their authors. It is apparent that the demands are mounting and if the second memorandum had been

followed by a third one, it is by no means unlikely that a demand for the President of Iraq, or the Prime Minister, or both, to be of Kurdish origin would have been made. In all like cases, recorded in contemporary or remote history, it is not the recalcitrant and rebellious minority which makes demands on the majority and gets what it fancies. It is always the majority which, uncoerced and of its own free will concedes certain concessions and privileges which it feels the minority in all fairness merits. ??

It is not known if the second memorandum is supplementary to the first or else alters and modifies the contents thereof. It is doubtful if the authors themselves knew what its real purpose or intention was. Before concluding this final chapter, it may be interesting to recall that the compensation payable to the insurgents for having taken up arms against the lawful government of their country, is to be found out of the Arab pockets — an irresistible inducement and an attractive precedent for all refractory, rebellious and clandestine groups the world over to follow in the hope of reaping similar harvests regardless of whether they win or lose the battle.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

It has been alleged that the development of the northern sector of Iraq has remained neglected and the area habitually receives step-motherly treatment from the authorities. Appended below is a very brief and general statement of the projects floated and investments made in schemes formulated for the development and reconstruction of the north of Iraq.

Development and Welfare Projects undertaken by Economic Planning Board, Local Administration, and Reconstruction in the North.

Sulaimaniyah Liwa :

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (a) Economic Planning Board: | Educational establishments (7) |
| (b) Local Administration: | Public works, hospitals, etc., (43) |
| (c) Reconstruction in the North | New schools and clinics (50) |

Arbil Liwa :

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| (a) Economic Planning Board: | Schools and clinics (12) |
| (b) Local Administration: | New schemes and extensions to clinics, public baths and poor houses (20) |
| (c) Reconstruction in the North | Educational establishments and other miscellaneous Public Works (105) |

Sundry expenditure :

- | | | |
|---|--------|-----------------|
| (a) Cash grants made to victims of devastated villages in the vicinity of Arbil | | ID 146,756,350. |
|---|--------|-----------------|

- (b) Expenditure sanctioned for repairs and minor works under the Public Works Department ID 29,788,403.
- (c) Grants for instructional equipment and stores to be provided to existing schools and educational establishments: ID 7,444,000.

Kirkuk Liwa :

- (a) Economic Planning Board (new schemes):
- (i) Local Administration: Public works for community halls, health centres, etc. (18).
- (ii) Reconstruction in the North Clinics, schools and mosques (17)
Repairs and alterations to hospitals and clinics, community hall and schools (26).

Diyali Liwa :

- (a) Economic Planning Board: Extensions to existing buildings, clinics, community halls and road repairs (20).
- (b) Local Administration: Extensions to existing buildings, clinics, community halls, fencing and road repairs (146).
- (c) Reconstruction in the North New constructions; repairs and modifications to existing buildings, schools and road repairs (29).

Sundry Expenditure :

Grants to victims of disturbances ID 4,050,000.

Mosul Liwa :

Local Administration Clinic in Dhok, a new bridge on the road Al-Qoosh-Skekhan, and fencing and road repairs in the area of the health clinic in Al-Qoosh.

These facts and figures have been summarised. Fuller details are available with the concerned departments and authorities to any one interested in them.

SUMMING UP

We saw how Mulla began as a free booter. Circumstances imposed on him a role that came to be looked upon as nationalist. That is how some others have come to view him but his own early career and conduct show no signs and no trace of nationalist thinking.

On 2nd December 1933, accompanied by another member of his gang, he demanded from the Administrator of the Nahiya of Barazan a sum of ID 200/- or, in lieu, ID 20/- p.m. Compliance with this demand was required to be completed within five days. Of course, such a ridiculous demand could only be turned down but the Government offered him employment at ID 5/- p.m.

Likewise, on 12th July, 1943, Mulla Mustafa broke loose from detention in Sulaimaniyah and betook himself to his native Barazan, only to be rounded up again soon afterwards. For this dramatic performance too, the reasons were identical. The allowance which he received during his detention in Sulaimaniyah had been increased progressively on three successive occasions but the point of satiation in this man had always been difficult to reach.

On another occasion, he successfully chased and was in turn chased, among others, by a cabinet minister

(Majid Mustafa), a British military officer, the Mutasarrif of Mosul and some others. That his demands on this occasion were equally unreasonable caused a breakdown in the parleys that followed. He asked for a cash grant of ID 1500/- along with all the barley which the Government had set apart for the relief of destitutes in the north. He further demanded an advance of ID 134,000/-, as agricultural subsidy.

He can be both flexible as well as pliable, in his principles and conduct. In his relations with the British, he went out of his way to be agreeable in order to placate them, often touching the point of servility. Once he offered to "place in British hands all Kurdish lives and property".

On yet another occasion, he assured Col. Mead that the Kurds desired "nothing more than the patronage of Great Britain and the benefit of British sense of justice and solicited the treatment which a child receives from its parent". Nevertheless, it was his friend Col. Mead who expressed the opinion that Mulla Mustafa was a wileful as well as a crafty character and yet "he was a firm friend of the British".

At the outset of his otherwise colourful career, Mulla Mustafa always tried, with partial success at times, to fork out of the Government whatever he could in cash or kind, or both. Alternatively, he would sally forth and harrass those Kurdish tribes that were not traditionally towing the Barazani line. His oldest enemies were the Rekani Kurds whom he drove out of their lands. The Zebari Kurds were next on his list.

The entire history of unrest unleashed by him in the north comprises a chain of events culminating in death and destruction for other Kurdish tribes. Such

fratricidal warfare is by no means an innovation for which he could claim all the credit for himself. It has been the darkest spot in Kurdish history, every where and in all ages.

It is still not known for certain, if Mulla Mustafa is heading a world movement or a local uprising. The term Kurdistan applies to a much wider tract of land, embracing parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the U.S.S.R. The loose and indiscriminate use of this term, as such, creates serious problems for such of our neighbours as have thus far looked on the happenings in Iraq with callous indifference.

Iraq's position is third in the world in regard to the population of Kurds. In spite of it, Iraq is the only country that acknowledges their separate identity ungrudgingly. This country does not frown upon the use by them of their own dress or language. We know how Iraq has been rewarded for this fond indulgence!

The concessions which the Kurds of Iraq under Mulla Mustafa's leadership demand are out of proportion with their numbers in this country, the area of land inhabited by them or the contribution made by them as a community to the national output. The expenditure relative to the north of Iraq by far exceeds the income.

The pronouncements made by or on behalf of Mulla Mustafa that the Kurds of Iraq neither demand nor expect a break from the rest of the country, is a mere smoke screen. The insurgents have an eye fixed on the distant future and more ambitious objectives. Jalal Talabani, to cite one instance, has openly challenged the right of Iraq to receive oil revenues for the output of the fields situated in the north. He has time and again warned the foreign companies operating those

fields against dealing with the lawful government of the country in the matter of oil.

The demand for the creation of a separate armed force under the sole control of the proposed State, simultaneously curtailing the freedom of the so-called federal army in its relations with that State, are both unmistakable pointers to something deeper, sinister and yet quite an obvious design which the separatists have so far refrained from proclaiming openly. Such a demand for a separate and independent army of a constituent state or province, has absolutely no parallel in world history.

Why did the Unionist and the Confederate armies wage a prolonged and bloody struggle in the United States and to what end? Here is a precedent from which we may all draw useful conclusions and a lesson. On a point of principle, the Confederates were firmly and successfully denied the right to secede. Notwithstanding these historic facts, the insurgents in Iraq seek active sympathy and material support for themselves from the U.S.A. ✓

The sudden discovery and subsequent exploitation of rich minerals, etc., cannot be the exclusive privilege of the local inhabitants. The nation as a whole has to benefit from them, just as in adversity the whole country has to stand up to it as one man. A country is invariably made up of sectors some of which may be barren the others fertile, some rich and the others poor. The country and the people have to share the fate together.

No doubt that internationally there is no moral justification for any anti-national or separatist movement in Iraq as the Kurds of this country come third on the list, Turkey and Iran being much higher on it. ✓

Internally also, the Kurds of Iraq have no grounds to feel dissatisfied with the national government. They are exposed to no discrimination and enjoy privileges which their opposite numbers elsewhere are denied. Their share in the administration has always been greater than their numbers merit. Oil and other natural resources are no where in the world considered the private property of the small section of population inhabiting the site of their discovery or exploitation. They belong to the country and the nation as a whole. No constituent province or state can ever lay a claim to the possession of a fully armed independent army, at the same time restricting the operational movements of the national forces.

The removal of army training centres to the south and the number of radio stations, etc., allocated to a particular area can hardly be grounds for waging civil wars.

We have yet to know the name of a country other than Iraq, where in a like manner a numerical minority regularly serves on the national government and the majority community warlike ultimatum containing "demands" and threats of war, in the same breath denying any intention to break away.

That the country is getting impoverished daily, is an undisputed fact. Responsibility for this rests with those who cause millions of dinars to be sunk into this thankless, ungodly and wholly destructive enterprise, resulting in endless shedding of blood and loss of property, mainly Kurdish.

The draining of Iraqi blood on its own soil, Arab or Kurdish, is most certainly a source of profound happiness and satisfaction to Israel and other enemies.

of the Arab world and Islam. It indefinitely postpones the latter's efforts to redeem what they have been deprived of in Palestine.

Truly speaking, the whole problem centres round one man. It is the prolongation of what he let loose in the early 30's. Later, he deserted to Iran and then to the U.S.S.R., staying there so long as he was surrounded by some success and affluence. He felt no shame in returning home on coming to know that adversity and death awaited him if he extended his stay abroad. Meanwhile strife continues unabated. There is but one man who feels happy about it. He is firmly established in his saddle of leadership. He survives in his leadership only as long as the killing continues. The end of unsettled conditions would mark his own end—a most disagreeable thought for Mulla Mustafa Barazani to entertain.

Bibliography

In English :

1. "Journey Among Brave Men" by Dana Adams Schmidt (an Atlantic Monthly Press book). Little, Brown and Company, Boston, U.S.A.
2. "The Kurdish War" by David Adamson. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, Museum Street, London.
3. "Kurds and Kurdistan" by Derk Kinnane. Oxford University Press.

In Arabic :

1. The Barazanis and Insurrection in Barazan (1943) by Brig. Hassan Mustafa. Darul Taleea, Beirut.
2. The Kurdish Problem by Mahmood Darra. Darul Taleea, Beirut.
3. "Al-Arabi" magazine, serial number 60 for the month of November, 1963.
4. "Al-Jamhuriyah" newspaper, Baghdad.





THE AUTHOR

Nauman Mahir al-Kanaani was born in Samarra, Iraq, in 1919, and completed his early education there. Later, he graduated from a secondary school in Baghdad and subsequently passed out of the Military College, being commissioned into the Army in 1938. After attaining the rank of Lieut. Col., he resigned from the Army in protest against the policies of the then Government of Iraq.

In the wake of the first Revolution in the country, he was recalled to Colours and promoted a Colonel with effect from the forenoon of 14th July, 1958.

Again, he was compulsorily retired from military service and convicted in absentia in 1960 on a charge of disloyalty to Abdul Karim Kassim. Evading arrest, he escaped to the U.A.R.

After the Revolution of 14th Ramadhan, in 1963, he returned to his country and was appointed a Director-General in the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, Government of Iraq, in 1964.

Colonel Nauman Mahir al-Kanaani is the author of several works, literary, poetic and military. He is a happily married man with a wife and children.