



KURDISTAN

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A CHANCE FOR PEACE

The negotiations between the Kurdish revolutionaries and the Iraqi Government ended on March 11, 1970 with the conclusion of a 15-point Agreement guaranteeing autonomy for Kurdistan (see actual text elsewhere). This agreement marked a notable victory for the Kurdish people after a decade of struggle and sacrifices in order to achieve the minimum national liberties. One does not have to attribute the agreement to pure reasons of altruism on the part of Iraqi Government. There were many factors which brought about the agreement.

The Kurdistan Revolutionary Army—Pesh Merga—have demonstrated their resolution to continue to fight for the aims of the armed struggle which began since September 11, 1961. The steadfastness of the Kurdish people has known no bounds in the face of awful conditions generated by the repression and onslaughts of the Iraqi Army. It became evident that all attempts at destroying the Kurdish movement were futile. The war against the Kurdish people, furthermore, met with courageous disapproval by the vast majority of the Arab people in Iraq which are of many political persuasions. The conflict has seriously retarded the economic development of Iraq which, with its considerable resources, should have been one of the most dynamic countries in the region. For the Government the cost of fighting had been very high. The war absorbed £100 million in 1969, nearly 30 per cent of the Iraqi budget. On the military side in the autumn and winter of that year the Iraqi forces sustained heavy casualties when they staged a major offensive in the areas of Sulaimani, Dukhan, Karadagh, Akra, and Shekhan. Finally, public opinion saw the war as a diversionary tactic by the Government in order to throw its full military weight against Israel.

The crux of the agreement is Article 14, which provides for unification of the areas, where Kurds form the majority, into one administrative unit to be run by Kurdish officials i.e. autonomy. Article 10 states that the provisional constitution would be amended to recognise the existence of two nationalities in Iraq—Arab and Kurdish. Article one says that Kurdish shall be an official language alongside Arabic in the areas where Kurds constitute the majority of the popu-

lation. The remaining articles deal with other aspects of the Kurdish problem such as the representation in the legislature, the government, and the public service; the compensation to the victims of the war and the procedure by which the principles are to be implemented. The terms of the agreement are by no means over-ambitious. The significant point about this agreement compared with previous ones, is the manner in which it was declared. It constitutes a formal recognition and declaration by the Iraqi Government of a basic principle, the denial of which plunged Iraq into civil strife for a decade, namely that Iraq as a state comprises two basic nationalities, with equal rights and duties. And the only guarantee for the progress of the country is the strict adherence by all political forces to this basic principle.

It would be premature to assume that the 11th March 1970 Agreement will bring an enduring peace in Kurdistan. There have been many cease fires and intermittent parleys in the last decade. But a formal agreement has been made for the first time and its provisions are such that the prospect of an enduring solution looks good—as long as the Baghdad Government fulfill the spirit, as well as the letter, of the agreement.

Political observers have become cynical about Baghdad's past declarations and may be tempted to dismiss them as "words without action". For instance, the 29th June 1966 12-point Programme remained a dead letter, yet the President of Iraq was claiming in January 1969 that all the provisions of that programme have been implemented and the only point outstanding was for Pesh Merga to lay down arms!! The Iraqi Government is duty-bound to demonstrate the difference of approach this time by carrying out the points of the 11th March Agreement in a manner such that the Kurdish people regain confidence in the sanctity of agreements reached with Baghdad regimes.

Naturally, there are many problems of implementation such as the delineation of the autonomous area and the form of representation the Kurdistan Democratic Party will have in Government. Then there is the crucial problem of defining the nature of future government in Iraq in general and the democratic rights of all political forces in Iraq. Since the declaration of the 11th March Agreement certain steps have been taken in order to pave the way towards implementing the basic 15-point principles. Iraqi troops have begun to withdraw from many areas of Kurdistan. All the mercenary forces have been disarmed and disbanded. Kurdistan again is breathing the air

of freedom from economic blockade and suppression of movement in the area. Five Kurdish ministers are included in the Iraqi Government. The Supreme Supervisory Committee, which is responsible for the implementation of the Agreement, has begun its deliberations.

But though there are no signs of deliberate attempts at repudiating the principles of the agreement, observers are not particularly struck with the pace at which the agreement is being implemented. The inclusion of the five ministers (who occupy relatively unimportant ministries) does not amount to more than a token gesture to the Kurdish movement. For there is no cabinet or council of ministers as such, but all executive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the secretive body of the Revolutionary Command Council, which comprises purely members of the Baath Party.

What the present Iraqi Government has to realize and absorb is that partnership of two nations in a state means effectively equal rights and opportunities, and respect for each other's national and political rights. Therefore, a policy which is based on pure rhetoric and paternalism is doomed right from the start. The Kurdish people are entitled to assert their inherent right to decide their own future; and just because they have chosen the path of joining forces with the Arab nation within the Iraqi Republic, it does not follow that they have to accept national rights on a "charitable" basis. This kind of policy, in the long run, is not in the interest of the Arab people either. For it is rare in history that a nation has built a genuine civilization at the expense of other nations. We, therefore, call upon the Iraqi Government to absorb the lessons of the last decade and put into practice the principles it has formally accepted on the 11th March 1970.

K.S.S.E. NEWS

THE 13th K.S.S.E. CONGRESS

The Kurdish Students Society in Europe held its 13th Annual Congress at West Berlin from 11th to 17th August, 1969. Student delegates representing 14 branches of the Society were present. Friendly student organisations had sent their representatives to attend this important gathering in Berlin. The Kurdish Revolution was represented by a delegation who were warmly welcomed by the 250 participants. Many Kurdish patriots from all parts of Kurdistan took an active part in the proceedings of the Congress.

The Congress discussed in detail the position of the Kurdish people in all parts of Kurdistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. In its deliberations and resolutions the Congress re-affirmed the belief that the Kurdish people's rights can only be permanently guaranteed under progressive and democratic regimes which uphold people's rights to self-determination.

At the time of the Congress, the Iraqi Army was waging a bitter war against the Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Iraq. The Congress expressed its solidarity with the Kurdish Revolution and the gallant struggle of Pesh Merga for autonomy in Kurdistan and a democratic Iraq. The delegates condemned the atrocities being committed against the civilian population of Kurdistan and urged world student and human organisations to highlight the plight of the Kurdish people in order to alleviate its miserable conditions. The Congress expressed its indignation at the treatment of all democrats in Iraq by assassination, imprisonment and torture.

The Congress condemned the other regimes suppress-

ing Kurdish national rights and all basic civil liberties in Iran, Syria and Turkey. In Iran the Kurdish people are deprived of even teaching and writing in their mother tongue plus the political subjugation of every Kurdish civil right. The Congress called for the establishment of a democratic regime in Iran which will safeguard the national rights of the peoples of Iran—Persians, Kurds and Azerbaijanis. It called for the release of all political prisoners in Iran.

The delegates considered the chauvinistic policies of the Turkish policies to be in violation of minimum human rights and called for the release of Kurdish political prisoners in Turkey. They also condemned the outrageous racist policies of the Syrian regime which is implementing the Arab Belt Policy aiming at depriving Kurds of citizenship from more than 100,000 Kurds.

The Congress expressed its solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for liberation against forces of reaction and imperialism; particularly the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against American Imperialism, and that of the Arab peoples against imperialism and Zionism.

The Congress, finally, sent its greetings to the International Union of Students (I.U.S.) and expressed its appreciation of their support for the defence of the just rights of the Kurdish people.

The Congress was concluded with the election of a new General Executive Committee of the K.S.S.E., amongst whom duties were allocated according to the procedure laid down by the Constitution of the Society.



K.S.S.E. NEWS

"11th September" Magazine:

The Kurdish Students Society in Europe—U.K. Branch has started the publication of a magazine in Arabic by the name of "11th September", which is the date in 1961 when the Kurdish Resistance began. The Branch has already published 2 issues of the magazine.

The 14th Congress:

Kurdish Students Society in Europe will be holding its 14th Annual Congress from 1–5 August 1970 in Stockholm—Sweden. The procedure for the congress is

First Day: Opening of the congress with a press conference

Second Day: Election of specialist committees and the presentation of the General Executive Report, followed by discussion.

Third Day: Discussion of specialist committees.

Fourth Day: Discussion, election of the new General Executive Committee, and resolutions.

Fifth Day: A tour of Stockholm, and a Kurdish night—singing, dancing etc., in the evening.

The Kurdish Students Union in Lebanon:

"Kurdistan" welcomes the formation of the Kurdish Students Union in Lebanon, from which we have received its inaugural statement and its constitution. The Union is centred in Beirut and it acts as the organisation for strengthening social and cultural ties among Kurdish students in Lebanon.

The Swedish Branch

The K.S.S.E. Branch in Sweden held its annual meeting on 11th January 1970 in which the organisation and future activities of the Branch were fully discussed. A number of resolutions were adopted concerning the situation in all parts of Kurdistan in particular and the liberation movements in the world in general.

TRIBUTE

BERTRAND RUSSELL May 18, 1872—February 2, 1970

"Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life; the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind." From the first volume of Bertrand Russell's autobiography.

The Kurdish Students Society in Europe expresses its appreciation of the services to the cause of peace, justice and survival of humanity rendered by Bertrand Russell throughout his long life.



The Role of K.D.P. in the Kurdish Revolution

by H.Z.

The Kurdish Revolution of September 1961 was the inevitable consequence of the aggressive and chauvinistic policies of the Iraqi Government. This revolution developed on a mass basis—it was not merely the work of a single party in Kurdistan. The participants are of various political and ideological groupings within the body politic of Kurdistan—Iraq. This fact notwithstanding, one particular political organisation can be singled out in the process of analysing the political elements organising and leading the Kurdish people's struggle: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K.D.P.).

The Origins of K.D.P.

The origins of K.D.P. date back from the events which led to the establishment of the Kurdish Republic in Kurdistan—Iraq in 1946, which was a year of great significance in Kurdish history. On 16th September 1942 a group of citizens held a meeting in the town of Mehabad with the specific aim of organising a Kurdish political party as an instrument for furthering their nation's cause. Of course, there were many political societies and political associations in existence in various parts of Kurdistan prior to this date, notably Hewa (Hope) in Iraqi Kurdistan. Those at the meeting decided to constitute themselves as a committee, in Kurdish, Komala. The Komala extended its membership and developed its organisation as a fully pledged political party. In November 1945 the Komala was changed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party with a clear programme for attaining self-government for the Kurdish people. Thus, the movement was formalising a trend that developed during the preceding year towards a more efficient and effective organisation.

The Mehabad Republic was declared on 22nd January 1946, by Qazi Muhammad, who had taken a leading role in the Kurdish movement and thus became the President of the Republic. The most influential persons in the formation of the new republic were members of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

After an eventful period of one year, the young republic sadly came to an end and its President Qazi Muhammad was hanged by Iranian authorities who had instigated a military onslaught on the Kurdish regime. The fall of the Republic was due to several factors, namely the power-political game played by the various states interfering in the region, plus the Iranian Army's military attacks.

Meanwhile, inspired by the political developments in Mehabad Iraqi Kurds were determined to organise them-




selves more efficiently for the achievement of the Kurdish national rights. Thus, the Kurdistan Democratic Party was formed in Iraqi Kurdistan and held its first party congress on 10th August 1946, and Mustufa Barzani was elected its chairman, although at the time he was serving in the Mehabad Army. In Syria a K.D.P. was also formed.

Since the fall of the Mehabad Republic the K.D.P. in Iraqi Kurdistan has been the main vehicle for organising the Kurdish political struggle for national rights. The K.D.P. had to operate underground before 1958, but it made an impressive impact upon the new generations in Kurdistan, drawing its support from a broad spectrum of Kurdish society—particularly active were students, teachers and peasants. The party built a massive following in the towns of Kurdistan. It had its regular party organ "Khabat" clandestinely published, in addition to pamphlets and policy statements regarding major political issues.

The K.D.P. fully supported the new regime which overthrew the monarchy on 14th July 1958, and its hopes for a better era were increased by the promulgation of the Iraqi Provisional constitution of 27th July 1958, which proclaimed in section 3 that "Arabs and Kurds are partners in this homeland", and by the freedom for political activities which culminated in the K.D.P. attaining legal existence in January 1960 and "Khabat" was published openly as a daily in Baghdad. This trend, however, came to a halt when the Iraqi Prime Minister Kassim saw dangers in the consolidated authority of the K.D.P. The fifth party congress on 5-10th, May 1960, was the occasion for the expression of disillusionment of many party members with the Government's performance over the implementation of the provisions for the exercise of Kurdish civil liberties. A provocative campaign, with tacit approval of Kassim, was started by the Government, denying the existence of Kurdish nationhood. This was followed by the suspension of the party organ on 22nd March 1961 and the dissolution order for the K.D.P. on 23rd September 1961, on flimsy legal grounds. On the 11th September 1961, an Iraqi Army onslaught had already begun, which met with an unorganised local resistance in Kurdistan. On 25th September 1961, the K.D.P. Central Committee formally decided to join the armed struggle against the Iraqi Government.

K.D.P. after the 11th September 1961 Revolution

The K.D.P. became the major organising force in the Kurdish armed struggle. Naturally, it had to adapt itself







PESH-MERGA HOSPITAL

A HEALTH OFFICER DISPENSES PRESCRIPTIONS
TO PATIENTS

THE VOICE OF IRAQI KURDISTAN RADIO STATION



from a party of peacetime to a political organisation capable of conducting guerrilla warfare. This transition was essential for the success of the revolutionary movement. The party had to devise practical methods of achieving the strategic objectives. It had to deal with specific problems related to raising the Kurdish Revolutionary Army—Pesh Merga—and developing it in order to defend the territory under its control and taking action against the Iraqi Army. The party had to deal with problems, such as the recruitment of suitable guerrillas; the acquisition of supplies; the training of military and political cadres; organising the lines of communication among the Pesh Merga and also the urban party network within Kurdish towns under Iraqi control.

Che Guevaras' description in "Guerrilla Warfare" and "Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War", are vivid reminders that a guerrilla's life is a harsh one: the physical and mental demands placed upon him are immense. Thus many of the K.D.P. leaders who had previously had little experience of the rigours of country life, let alone guerrilla type of situation, had to adapt their method of political activity to suit the new environment. The positive outcome of this process astonished even some members themselves. Members of the Kurdish intelligentsia experience in peace time politics became adept in organising peasant life and acquired military techniques.

The Evolution of K.D.P.

Since its foundation in 1946, the K.D.P. has become a major political force not only in Iraqi Kurdistan but in Iraq as a whole. The path for its development has not always been smooth. Apart from the fact it had to face the suppression exercised by various Iraqi Governments, there were occasions when the internal party organisation was under serious stress. Without a doubt the greatest threat to its effectiveness occurred in 1964 when a number of its leaders broke away and assumed the party's name. They ended up in the Iraqi Government's pay as mercenaries—Jash. Although for a while it created uncertainty within the Kurdish Revolution, the K.D.P. managed effectively to recover from the setback.

The K.D.P. Today

The Pesh Merga is obviously the backbone of the Kurdish Revolution. The vast majority are peasants. There are between 18000-20000 mobilised members, with the possible figure of 40000 as reserves. The Pesh Merga is divided into 17 brigades (a brigade varying in numbers depending on its strategic position), which form three divisions.

The political and military leadership of the Revolution is conducted by the Command Council of the Revolution, comprising 46 members who elect an Executive Bureau of 9 members. The Command Council represents all political and social elements which subscribe to the idea of the Kurdish armed struggle.

The K.D.P. is represented on the Command Council and the Executive Bureau by the members of its political

bureau and Central Committee. The Command Council is headed by the K.D.P. Chairman.

The party makes its influence felt in many spheres. The leadership of Pesh Merga and that of the local party are often combined. The party emphasises political training within Pesh Merga through a special school for party cadres. In the educational field in general, the party has to cope with the immense problem of offering primary and secondary education in the liberated areas as the Government abandoned their maintenance. There are 3 teacher training courses to cope with the increasing need for teachers as new schools are opened. On the administration side, the party is in charge of collecting taxes, and the judiciary in the area. Health and medical affairs—facilities for which are negligible—are catered for by the party. The land reform scheme of the Revolution is administered by the party. Finally, the K.D.P. is in charge of publications and publicity for the Revolution. It publishes the organ of the party "Khabat" and "Dengi Pesh Merga" (Voice of Pesh Merga) plus local party's own publications. The political bureau of the party supervises broadcasting over "the Radio of Iraqi Kurdistan".

Looking back at the history of the K.D.P. since 1946 it has become obvious that the party has consolidated its position within the Kurdish society in Iraq due mainly to the popular basis for the presentation and advocacy of its policies. Furthermore, these policies, though marred by occasional setbacks have been pursued with vigour and consistency. The party did not flinch from the courageous decision of advocating armed struggle as a means of attaining the Kurdish national rights when all other means had failed. On the Iraqi level, the K.D.P. has enhanced its position as an important factor in deciding the future politics of Iraq.

This paper was presented in a seminar at the University of South Wales-Cardiff on 6th March 1970.

STATEMENT ON SYRIAN KURDISTAN

The half a million Kurds living in the northern regions of Syria have been for a long time experiencing all kinds of discrimination and personal and national oppression at the hands of the various Syrian governments. The policy of the so-called "Arab Belt" and the "Census", the mass deportation and withdrawal of citizenships from the Kurds do not seem to suffice. Neither does it satisfy the Syrian authorities. Chauvinistic attitudes and policies toward the Kurds, Arrest, detention, deportation, insults, denial access to education, to health services, and to work, and even prohibition on reconstructing ruined huts and homes are daily happenings which the Kurds suffer from. To all this the Syrian government has added new measures; e.g. preventing the Kurds from ploughing and sowing their land and harvesting their produce, despite the fact that these Kurds and their ancestors have been living in these areas from times immemorial. But when petroleum shows its head, and it has recently done, history, facts and human factors and considerations seem to sink to the bottom.

Not only does the Syrian authorities oppress the Kurds living in Syria, but they also encourage and demand the others to do the same. The Syrian authorities have denounced the Iraqi government because the latter seems to be trying to approach the Kurdish problem in Iraq from a different angle than the Syrian government wishes. In addition the Kurds in Syria have been banned from expressing their satisfaction because their brothers in Iraq have just recently been promised some human and national rights. The few Kurds who dared to express their real feelings about the event were arrested and detained. Tens of Kurdish students and other Kurds have been recently arrested in Damascus and other parts of Syria just because they peacefully

demonstrated their sympathies with their fellow – Kurds in Iraq.

The Kurdish Students Society in Europe strongly protest and denounces the latest oppressive and anti human rights measures of the Syrian government and at the same time demands that this government respect the human and national rights of the Kurds living within the Syrian borders. K.S.S.E. meanwhile reminds the Syrian government to learn from the lessons of history and asks the international public opinion and all those who are concerned with human rights and dignity to voice their protest against these oppressive measures and to help the peaceful Kurds in Syria by demanding the Syrian government to lift these measures and respect the rights of the Kurds in Syria.

K.S.S.E.
Secretariat
25th May 1970

KURDISTAN AND IRAQ OIL

by H. Saman

The Problem

The importance of Iraqi Kurdistan increased when the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) struck oil near Kirkuk in 1927. This has, ironically, increased the oppression exercised by the successive Iraqi governments over the Kurdish people in Iraq, and has resulted in the mass expulsion of Kurdish population from the Kirkuk area in recent years.

Considering the fact that oil revenues form the major part of Iraq's income, with Kirkuk providing a substantial proportion of it, it was not surprising to hear that the negotiations, between the Kurdish delegation and the Iraqi government which preceded the conclusion of the recent 11th March 1970 Agreement, encountered a serious obstacle when the future of Kirkuk provinces was discussed.

The Kurdish delegation have made it clear from the outset that any solution which excludes Kirkuk from the autonomous area will not be acceptable. The government, after a series of claims and counter-claims, have recognised eventually the Kurdish character of Kirkuk, but a census will be conducted to determine which parts of the province will join the autonomous Kurdistan.

Until such a census is conducted, and the manner in which it is conducted satisfies the Kurdish revolutionaries, no firm and final peace in Iraqi Kurdistan can be achieved.

History of Oil Agreements

Iraq's oil export production has always come from the concessions of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its associates the Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC). The IPC concession dates from 1925 and in 1928 the company's shareholding was established in its present form viz:—

Company	% shareholding
B.P.	23.75
Royal Dutch/Shell	23.75
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles	23.75
Near East Development Corporation (Joint Jersey Standard and Socony Mobil)	23.75
Participations and Explorations Corporation (Gulbenkian estate)	5.00
Total	<u>100</u>

The concessions of MPC and BPC were granted in

1932 and 1938 respectively. The shareholding in these two companies is the same as in IPC.

The territorial waters of the southern concession (granted to BPC) were released to the Iraqi Government in 1959. Iraq started to receive its substantially increased revenue in the early fifties when plans for development were drawn up and a Development Board was established in 1950, and a Ministry of Development created in 1953.

The 1952 Agreements of all three companies, in simplified terms, provide for the receipt by the State of half of the theoretical profit from their operations in Iraq; part of the government's share can be taken as oil in kind and there are certain guaranteed revenue and production minima.

Prolonged negotiations between the government (with General Kassim heading its delegation), and the oil companies, on government requests for a revision of the 50/50 formula, share participation, relinquishment of unexploited areas and a number of minor changes, were terminated in October 1961 without any accord. Kassim's weakness at the time, resulting from his oppression of almost all political parties and groups in the country, was the main reason for the failure of the negotiations. Nevertheless, on 11th December, 1961 the State enacted Law No. 80 of 1961 which restricted the Companies' area of operations to 1938 km (being about 0.5 per cent of their previous area), declaring the rest of their concessions withdrawn.

In 1970 the government formally revoked Article 3 of Law No. 80 of 1961, which permitted the re-allocation of a further small area to IPC. Active exploration has already been stopped by government order in April 1961. Iraq rejected a royalty expensing offer made by the oil companies in November 1964, accepted by most other OPEC members.

A clash between IPC and the Syrian government over transit royalties resulted in the closure of the pipelines by the Syrian authorities. The shut-down caused a considerable reduction in oil exports and consequently in revenues which has soured the relations between Iraq and Syria.

Oil exports from Iraq were again seriously disrupted in 1967 following the June War, when Iraq cut off all oil supplies in company with other Arab states.

On 1st March 1969, the Kurdish Revolutionary Army attacked the oil installations in Kirkuk. The attack was selective in that it was not aimed at destroying the entire complex of oil installations. The crude oil stabilisation

plant was attacked with mortar fire. Ten out of the twelve installations were destroyed. The Kurdish action was justified, from the Kurdish viewpoint, by the fact that the destructive capability of the Iraqi Army is financed by oil revenues accrued from Kurdistan region. The attack caused a fall in oil production in early 1969. In fact the fear of further attacks by the Kurdish Revolutionary Army, has contributed towards the conclusion of 11th March 1970 Agreement.

Kurdistan—the major producer

Iraq's exported oil is produced by IPC and its associates. IPC operates in the North, MPC in the north west and BPC in the south of the country. The north and north west form part of Kurdistan. Kurdistan produces most of Iraqi oil. IPC operates the major field in Kirkuk, and smaller fields at Bai Hassan and Jambur. MPC's fields are in Ain Zalah and Butmah. BPC's southern fields are in Rumailah and Zubair.


In 1969 IPC and its associates' production was as follows:—

	Mn tons	%
IPC ^(a)	56.4	75.7
MPC	1.3	1.7
BPC	16.8	22.6
	<u>74.5</u>	<u>100</u>

(a) IPC production was affected by the Kurdish attack in 1969, therefore production should be higher in normal times.

Source: Iraq Petroleum Company.

mn ton



IPC Group's Oil Production in Iraq (1969)

From the above figures one can see that 77.4 per cent



THE OIL PLANT AT KIRKUK:

of Iraqi oil is produced in Kurdistan, and the rest in other parts of the country.

Pressure has been put on the IPC group by the Iraqi government to increase its production, but these attempts have failed due to the politically weak position of the government.

Now that the 11th March Agreement with the Kurds has been concluded, it is hoped that the new strength acquired through the backing of the Kurdish people, will play a big role in future negotiations between the government and the IPC group.

Production in 1968 is set at 73.8 mn tons, 23 per cent up on the preceding year 1967. The table below shows increases achieved during the first nine months of 1969.

Country	Increase %
Kuwait	6
Iran	18.5
Iraq	0.8

The Iraqi figure has later been adjusted to 1.2 per cent and therefore is still the lowest.

The oil companies in Iran have agreed to Iran's demand for an increased production in 1970, amounting to 18 per cent over 1969. It is estimated that the international increase in demand for oil amounts to 8% annually.

Increased oil production and therefore oil export is the only way (other than nationalization or amending the 50/50 agreement which is resisted by the Companies) by which Iraq can get more revenues from the IPC group.

Kurdistan Democratic Party has always pursued an oil policy based on the national interests of Iraq.

Article 13 of its programme reads:—⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ The programme of the Kurdistan Democratic Party as approved by the Seventh Congress of the party in 1966.

"We strive to increase the royalties from oil; the appropriation of a particular share of these royalties for expenditure on industrial and agricultural projects in Kurdistan in proportion to the population ratio of the region, supervision of the execution stage—production, marketing, etc.; the activation of the Law 80 of 1961; strengthening the national oil company, and the prevention of the interference by the oil companies in the internal affairs of Iraq, the establishment of subsidiary industries from oil products by the government in the areas of extraction according to their particular locations, and the training and preparing of administrative and technical personnel for the eventual nationalisation of the oil industry".

Oil revenues are the main source of the Iraqi annual budget and of the five year Development Plan, sharing them 50-50 each.

Without this income the Iraqi balance of trade would show the following horrifying picture:—

ID mn	1963	1965	1967	1968
Exports fob (excluding oil)	16.73	18.12	20.66	23.03
Re-exports (excluding oil)	2.26	3.12	3.14	4.52
Imports	112.46	161.67	150.39	143.36
Deficit	93.47	140.43	126.59	115.81

Source: Central Bank of Iraq Monthly Bulletin.

In the revised Ordinary Budget estimates for 1968/69 oil revenues formed ID mn 81.4 out of the direct taxes amounting to ID mn 111.4, the total of all revenues being ID mn 222. The comparative figures for 1967/68 were: ID mn 70, 89.5, 214.1 respectively.

And as to the Development Plan the figures were as follows:—

Estimated^(a) and Actual Receipts and Expenditure of the Five-Year Development Plan 1966/67-1967/68 (ID mn)

	1966/67		1967/68	
	Estimates	Actual	Estimates	Actual
Receipts				
Oil Revenues	70	61.2	70	75.8
Profits of Government Departments	4.5	0.7	3.3	0.8
Foreign Loans	32.4	2.2	12.0	3.3
Domestic Loans	—	—	0.9	0.0
Other	29.0	0.6	14.2	0.9
Total	<u>135.9</u>	<u>64.7</u>	<u>100.4</u>	<u>80.8</u>

(a) as budgeted annually.

(b) provisional.

Source: Central Bank of Iraq.

In 1970, the broad outlines of the 5-year plan for the period 1970-74 were published. Total expenditure is estimated at ID 1144 mn of which ID 425 mn will be drawn from oil revenues and the balance found from government enterprises and departments and loans.

A review of the 1966/67 and 1967/68 estimated and actual receipts makes one to look at 1970 estimates with some reservation, if not doubt. But one thing may not change and that is oil revenues.

INOC and government contracts

The Iraqi National Oil Company was established by the government, one of its main objects is to reduce the reliance by Iraq on revenues from foreign oil companies, i.e. IPC and its associates.

In August 1967 Law No. 97 was promulgated assigning exclusive rights to INOC for the development of hydrocarbon resources within Iraqi territory including offshore areas and the North Rumailah field. Under the new law INOC develops all areas directly or in association with others, as in the case of the INOC-ERAP agreement signed in November 1967, under which ERAP (France) is to explore certain concessionary areas of the dispossessed IPC group under a six-year contract, with exploited oil divided 50-50 between the two parties. The agreement is considered to be a setback for Iraqi oil policy.

Iraqi-Soviet agreement signed in July and effected through a series of contracts signed in December 1969, calling for the construction of oil production installations at the North Rumailah field; the construction of a pipeline between the field and the terminal at Fao, and the exploration and development of other potential oil bearing structures in southern Iraq, are being implemented.

Another contract valued at \$1 mn was signed with Hungarian Komobomplex for development drilling in the North Rumailah field in October 1969. It was followed by a co-operation agreement covering the grant of oil equipment and services over a 10-year period.

An agreement with Czechoslovakia was recently ratified providing for the construction of a refinery at Basrah. A proposed oil pipeline from North Rumailah to the Mediterranean coast is under study, and it has been suggested that a French company will soon begin the engineering and survey studies of the \$420 mn scheme. No further progress has yet been reported on the proposed Iraq-Turkey gasline.

Several other contracts concerning the exchange and sale of Iraqi oil were concluded with UAR, the Sudan, Hungary and other countries.

Refining and other government activities

Refining for general distribution is carried on by the

government Oil Refineries Administration, one of several directories under the Ministry of Oil. The principal state refinery, at Daura near Baghdad, with a capacity of 75,000 b/d (barrel per day), draws its crude from the main IPC lines.


Developments at Daura include the construction of a 36,000 b/d lub oil plant, a kerosene hydro-desulphurisation plant (12,000 b/d) and a catalytic reformer. The Alwand refinery (0.6 mn metric ton) of Khanaqin Oil Company was bought by the State in 1952, its crude is obtained from the Naft Khaneh field now state-operated.

There is another state-owned refinery (0.2 mn tons), it is situated at Muftiyah (Basrah), and draws its crude from BPC. The capacity of the Basrah refinery to be built by Czechoslovakia will be 70,000 b/d. A second refinery of 60,000 b/d will be constructed at Mosul. Total annual output of refined products is over 2 mn tons (77,900 b/d at the end of 1967).

The government also intends to develop a petrochemical industry, which may be INOC's responsibility. The construction of two 292-Km pipelines from Kirkuk to Baghdad, comprising a 16-inch gas line and an 8-inch line for LPG and natural gasoline (8,500 b/d), a gas distribution network serving industrial consumers in the Baghdad area, a 12,000 b/d LPG processing plant, and a 4½ inch, 30-km natural gasoline pipeline from Taji to Daura refinery have been completed.

Distribution and the sale of the gas will be handled by the new Gas Distribution Administration incorporated into the government Oil Refineries Administration in early 1968.

Iraq Oil Production (1965-1968)



Conclusion

Considering the above mentioned facts, certain conclusions are apparent:

Kurdistan is the major producer of oil in Iraq and consequently the major part of exported oil comes from this area. It is, therefore, the major earner of Iraq's foreign currency, and without this income the economy of the country would collapse within a short period of time.

Oil Production by Companies 1963-1969 (b/d '000)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Kurdistan					
IPC	910.3	891.5	781.6	1,136.0	— ^(a)
MPC	25.7	25.6	25.4	26.0	—
	<u>936.0</u>	<u>917.1</u>	<u>807.0</u>	<u>1,162.0</u>	—
Other parts of Iraq					
BPC	370.5	467.9	413.5	341.0	—
Government	6.1	7.2	—	—	—
	<u>1,312.6</u>	<u>1,392.2</u>	<u>1,220.5</u>	<u>1,503.0</u>	<u>1,518.4^(b)</u>
Metric tons mn	64.4	68.0	60.1	73.8 ^(b)	74.5 ^(b)

(a) not available

(b) Excluding Khanaqin production. Though Khanaqin is part of Iraqi Kurdistan, in this article Khanaqin production is ignored as no accurate information is available.

Applying the data to Iraq's receipts from IPC and its associates in proportion to each area's production, the result will show:—

Revenues Received by Government from IPC and Associates


Year	Total ^(a) £	Kurdistan £	Other parts of Iraq £
1965	131.3	93.6	37.7
1966	140.8	92.8	48.0
1967	131.7	88.0	43.7
1968	198.3	153.3	45.0
1969	225.9 ^(b)	174.6 ^(c)	51.3 ^(c)

(a) Original figures in US Dollars converted at \$2.80 = £1 for years 1964, 65, 66 & 67 \$2.40 = £1 for years 1968 & 69, due to November 1967 devaluation of the pound sterling.

(b) Provisional

(c) 1968 production figures were used.

Note: Total figures are actual receipts not entitlements, i.e. they include back payments.



Iraq's oil earnings in proportion to areas production.

This article is not intended to raise a claim for the proportion of receipts listed under (Kurdistan £) column. But it is an attempt to point out the injustice suffered by the Kurdish people in Iraq, especially in the sixties, when they had no choice but to revolt against the dictatorial and discriminatory policies of Iraqi governments.

It is particularly odious from the Kurdish viewpoint that the natural resources of Kurdistan, namely oil, are exploited in such a manner that the region itself does not derive any economic benefits from it. But, on the contrary the wealth is used as a source for sending lethal weapons to Kurdistan which have played havoc with both human and economic lives of the region.

It is also clear from the evidence available concerning the oil industry in Iraq, that there have not been any plans for establishing oil subsidiary industries in Kurdistan. In fact, all economic activity related to oil industry has been static—even new drilling—for the last 30 years.

And as far as the INOC is concerned one can see that most, if not all, of its activities are concentrated on the non-Kurdish areas of the country. All new pipelines, refineries, oil installations and exploration works are being constructed or done outside Kurdistan.

This policy of ignoring the northern areas of the country should be discontinued and a new policy with the aim of developing Kurdistan should be adopted.

The considerable concession made by the Kurdish leadership during the last peace negotiation with the government, by not insisting on a clear and just share of oil revenues, based on the proportion of Iraqi Kurdistan to the whole of Iraq's population, to be ploughed back into the Kurdish area, should not be considered to mean an acceptance by the Kurdish leadership of the unjust and disproportionate investment policies of the past Iraqi governments.

The Kurdish area which has been continuously bombed and destroyed during the last nine years, urgently needs the funds necessary to put it back on its feet. The Kurdish war has deprived Kurdistan from normal educational facilities with the withdrawal of funds by central government for the last decade.

It is vital that article seven of the 11th March 1970 agreement should be implemented in letter and spirit. The Committee which is to be created, supervising the rapid re-development of the Kurdish area, should have sufficient funds under its control to achieve its task otherwise it will be another grandiose body of little consequence. Funds should be set aside to compensate those who have been victims of the tragic war.

Finally, the economic future of Kurdistan and Iraq depends heavily on proper exploitation of the oil industry and a policy of fair regional investment between Kurdistan region and the South. The role of oil in Kurdistan so far has been negative and served as a "curse" rather than a "blessing". It requires swift and deliberate action to reverse this trend.

The Constitution of The Kurdish Students Society in Europe Founded 10th August 1956

Art. 1: The Name: The Kurdish Students Society in Europe.

Art. 2: **The Basic Aims:**

A – To strengthen the relationship of Kurdish students in Europe and to help to solve their academic problems.

B – Facilitate mutual aid between Kurdish students.

C – To promote the national Kurdish Culture and to work towards the good of the people and its national question.

D – To enlighten the world on the culture of Kurdistan, the condition of the Kurdish people, and its national problem.

E – To strengthen the spirit of co-operation and friendship between Kurdish students and students of other countries, to make contact with students and non-student organisations, both national and international, and co-operate with them within the scope of our mutual aims and interests.

F – To contribute towards the struggle of the divided Kurdish people, support all peoples in the struggle against imperialism, racial discrimination and dictatorial regimes for peace, democracy and liberty.

Art. 3: The Society's organ is the Magazine "Kurdistan".

Art. 4: **Membership:**

A – Membership is granted to every Kurdish student or students from Kurdistan studying in Europe if the following conditions are fulfilled:

1 – Accepts the constitution of the Society and endeavours to fulfill its basic aims.

2 – Pays the annual subscription of three pounds (sterling) or its equivalent.

B – The General Executive Committee or the Branch Committee accepts the application.

C – The member is liable to the following procedural methods if he violates the constitution or commits a harmful act towards the Society or the Kurdish people:

1 – Warning and then reprimand by the Branch Committee.

2 – Suspension by the General Executive Committee.

3 – Expulsion by the General Congress.

Art. 5: **The Organisation:**

A – **The General Congress:**

1 – It comprises all members present.

2 – It is the highest authority of the Society; it can amend the constitution by a simple majority.

3 – Is held once a year. An extraordinary Congress may be held on the request of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Society, or two-thirds of the members of the General Executive Committee. In both cases all the members of the Society must be notified about the date and place of the meeting a month in advance at the least.

4 – Only the General Executive Committee has the authority to appoint the place and

the date of the General Annual Congress.

5 – A Committee should be elected among the members present at the General Annual Congress to lead the meetings before the discussions on the Annual Report of the General Executive Committee (G.E.C.)

B – The General Executive Committee (G.E.C.)

1 – The G.E.C. is the highest authority of the Society between two General Annual Congresses.

2 – The G.E.C. has seven permanent members and two candidates. They are elected annually by the Congress.

3 – The G.E.C. meets before and after the Congress. During its first meeting after the Congress, it elects from among its members a Secretariat of three members, a treasurer and the editor of the Society's organ "Kurdistan" Magazine. The Secretariat executes the decisions of the General Executive Committee between two meetings and it meets once every three months at the least.

4 – The G.E.C. prepares the Agenda of the General Annual Congress and presents it to all the members of the Congress for discussion during its first meeting.

5 – The G.E.C. meets within six months after the Congress.

6 – The G.E.C. is responsible to the Congress.

C – The Branch

1 – The Branch is established by the members of the society in a country and by a decision of the G.E.C.

2 – The Branch meets annually.

3 – The Branch elects a committee in its annual meeting.

D – The Branch Committee

1 – The Branch Committee has from three to seven members.

2 – The Branch Committee organises the activities of the Branch and has a leading role in fulfilling the aims of the society in their country of residence in a manner that does not conflict with the G.E.C.'s policy.

Art. 6: The Finance

1 – The finances of the society are from:

A – The Annual subscription fees

B – Contributions from members and the friends of the Society

C – From the Society's activities

D – The Branch Committees should provide half their annual income to the G.E.C.
In case of aid The Branch Committee could demand support from the G.E.C.

As approved by the
13th Annual Congress
of K.S.S.E.
11/8/1969
Berlin

ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT

by A. Shakno

The Kurdish Movement as a popular movement is, in my opinion, irreversibly established by now. The dominant factor in bringing this about has been the military activity of the Armed forces led by Gen. M. Barzani. With this background in view, I shall attempt to discuss some non-military aspects of the Kurdish movement, which, as a popular movement, differs fundamentally from a rebellion, in that, we must look for its motivating power and sustaining power outside the realm of military activity, stressing at the same time that the military aspect must occupy the position of first priority for the foreseeable future, eventually however not as the only occupant of this position.

The success of a popular movement depends on the extent to which a mass of people identify themselves as a unit with a common objective both practically and spiritually. To attain fully this desirable state, the Kurdish people stand in front of two main obstacles. The policy of assimilation, implemented to various degrees of ruthlessness by the states controlling the different parts of Kurdistan, and, the social structure of most Kurdish communities, which can most briefly be described as not belonging to this century. These two obstacles are in fact not completely independent in that the success of the first leans heavily on the gravity of the second, which may thus be considered to be the more fundamental of the two. I shall now give a more detailed description of the nature of these obstacles, always keeping in mind that there is one Kurdish nation irrespective of the present political geographical situation.

The first, the assimilation policy against the Kurdish people is at its most intense in Turkey, to such an extent that this problem there, is of a different order of gravity compared with other parts of Kurdistan. But although this is only one part of Kurdistan, its importance is, however, difficult to exaggerate, as the overwhelming majority of the national population of Kurdistan is in this area. The solution of this problem should therefore attract maximum attention. At present, the reality of the national population of Kurdistan is refuted by the Turkish Government and Kurdish language, culture, and any other community activity is, apart from being 'not-recognised', also forbidden! Economically Kurdistan is the most neglected area of that country, which is perhaps objectively the recognition of Kurdistan as an alien entity by that Government. The national population which was once subjected to forcible dispersal from its native land still continues to disperse because of the extreme poverty conditions, young men leaving mainly to join the unemployed labour forces of expatriate Kurds carrying on a squalid and tragic existence in the larger towns of Turkey.

In this way, members of families are parted for years on end or forever, with the consequence that the only unforbidden part and the last thread of Kurdish life are broken by this breakdown of the family unit. The Kurdish intellectual on the other hand, faced with this tragic and apparently hopeless situation often finds the easiest refuge in turkification, neglecting his duty of leadership to his more common compatriots,

to whom even the luxury of turkification is not offered. What demoralises the intellectuals most, is probably the social structure of the Kurdish community which is the substance of the second obstacle mentioned above.

Whereas the danger of assimilation is grave in Turkey especially, the problems arising from the social structure of the Kurdish communities are more universal and have got common characteristics all over Kurdistan. Basically the trouble is that many parts of Kurdistan have not yet come out of their feudal systems, although it must be stressed that this statement does not hold generally. There are considerable areas of Kurdistan where the situation has progressed somewhat. One weakness that can and must be tackled immediately is the isolationist attitude of many communities. Another is the system of blood-feuds that reigns, which is undoubtedly one of the greatest social evils posing as a formidable barrier against co-operation within and between Kurdish communities — a fact which is recognised by some governments in control of Kurdistan who actively and sometimes even blatantly support the perpetuation of this system. We shall not discuss the economic and other more fundamental aspects of the existing social structure as that would go beyond the scope of this article.

It is, I hope, clear from the exposition of the obstacles considered above that their removal depends entirely on the cultural and social development of the national population of Kurdistan, with great urgency and as one people irrespective of the presently existing borders. This duty falls predominantly on the Kurdish intelligensia. It is therefore necessary to attract all intellectuals to this task which of course is in turn the duty of the leadership of the Kurdish movement which must also consider its task the preparation and training of more people capable of contributing to the collective effort made to tackle these problems, drawing its manpower from all levels of the national population of all regions of Kurdistan equally as far as possible. Needless to say, if this is to be a successful exercise, the area of activity must be the immediate environment of the people, that is inside Kurdistan, and the inefficient regime of having such manpower scattered in distant and exotic foreign metropoli must be kept at an absolute minimum. The effective implementation of such a plan is not easy but it is an indispensable element of the Kurdish Movement.

Finally, I shall give two examples of such activity, which in our opinion would serve in a positive way to the solution of the above mentioned problems — at least in the initial stages of development.

The first is the establishment of a Kurdish Academy, which would occupy itself with the standardisation of all cultural matters across state, regional, and tribal boundaries, and their efficient propagation. One obvious first task would be the creation and finalisation of a Kurdish Alphabet designed especially to suit the phonetics of the Kurdish language, which would also be easy to learn and hence be similar in structure to

the European alphabets and yet sufficiently different to have a complete character of its own.

The second is the establishment of a University of Kurdistan. It is true that the most urgent need of Kurdistan at present is teachers for schools and not high-powered specialists in any field. On the other hand, this supply of teachers simply does not exist at present and will not be catered for by any of the states controlling Kurdistan. The creation of a University on the other hand may attract the bulk of the Kurdish intelligentsia to join, who would then be in a good position to prepare teachers of the desired quality and other needed manpower.

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KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

Iraqi Government moves to end Kurdish problem

BY OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

FINANCIAL TIMES 30 DEC. 1969

BEIRUT, Dec. 29.

THE IRAQI Government has initiated contacts with the Kurdish insurgent leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani to end the Kurdish war in the northern part of the country, according to informed travellers from Baghdad.

They said Barzani is favourably disposed to negotiations which, if successful, would relieve Iraq of its most chronic and serious problem. It would also leave the Iraqi Army free to give greater attention to the confrontation with Israel.

On or about December 18 the Iraqi Government contacted a former Kurdish Minister, Fuad Arif, who is known to be a Barzani man, and asked him to mediate with the Kurdish leader at the latter's stronghold in Rawanduz, near the Iranian border.

Basic demand

Arif agreed and went with a representative of the ruling Baath Party. After meeting with Barzani the latter sent his own emissary to Michel Aflak, founder of the Baath Party and an important Baath figure. Apparently Barzani wanted assurance at the highest Baathist level because of deep mistrust between the Kurdish insurgents and the Baathist leaders.

According to the travellers Barzani also asked that if agreement were to be reached with the

Iraqi Government it must be registered with the UN to guarantee that it would be implemented.

Aflak was reported to have emphasised the Iraqi regime's desire to end the Kurdish problem on a basis of recognition by



Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader.

Baghdad of Kurdish nationalist rights. Barzani was reported to have made a basic demand that Kurds should enjoy the same rights as Arabs.

It is understood that the Iraqi

Government has formed a high-level delegation for full negotiations with Barzani once agreement is reached during initial contacts. The delegation is to be led by Sidam Hussein Takriti, Vice-President of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council—the country's highest executive authority. Mr. Takriti is the second in command in Iraq to-day, after President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr.

The Kurdish war has been dragging on since 1961. A truce was reached in 1961, but broke down over disagreement between the 66-year-old Barzani and the Baathist regime which came to power in July last year.

New Cabinet

Kurdish insurgents have been fighting for autonomy within a unified Iraq.

The present regime was reported to have stationed as many as two divisions in the North to keep insurgents under control. Because of this Iraq's contribution to the confrontation with Israel has been hindered. If agreement is reached with the Kurds, Barzani representatives could well enter a new Iraqi Cabinet now being formed in Baghdad. Agreement with the Kurds will be good news to foreign oil quarters because of the threat the Kurdish war posed to oil installations in the North.

THE GUARDIAN Thursday March 12 1970

Beirut, March 11

Overshadowed by the Arab-Israeli conflict, another war has been nagging at the Middle East for the past nine years—the civil war in Iraq between the rebellious Kurdish tribesmen in the North and the Government. Today it ended for the third time.

Saddam Hussein Takriti, who has been emerging in Iraq as the Ba'ath Party's strong man, made the announcement in a broadcast statement "Real

brotherhood between Kurds and Arabs has been established today and all disputed matters concerning North Iraq settled," he said. Then, hopefully, he added: "This solution is . . . a permanent solution that will last for ever."

He presumably had his fingers crossed. For the war has stopped at least twice before, only to burst into life later with mutual charges of ill faith.

President Al-Bakr later announced the terms of the agreement, disclosing a surprising generosity by the Government. The Kurds would get autonomy within the Iraqi

State, proportional representation in Parliament, a Kurdish National Vice-President, and recognition of Kurdish as an official language in areas with Kurdish majorities. The Kurds, in return would hand over their broadcasting station and heavy arms.

Persia is one country where the agreement may inspire concern. It could release some 20,000 troops to boost Iraq in its confrontation with Persia on the river border, and might start similar agitation among Persia's own Kurdish population.

Peace with Kurds

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

Kurdish "ready-to-dies" keep Iraqi Army at bay

Fighting between the Iraqi Army and Kurdish rebels under General Mustafa Barzani has stepped up sharply over the past weeks.

Many newspapers in the Arab world, generally quick to denounce the "lies" of the "imperialist press," have confirmed Kurdish reports of the Iraqi offensive.

The Kurdish military command has issued a report on the massacre of sixty-seven persons, including women and children, who were allegedly burned alive by government forces near the village of Dakan on August 16.

Intense bombing took place on August 22 around Zakho and Mount Saffin; the Aqrah area was struck on August 23; the following day, bombs fell on Bajan, Barbashi and Sandolona. The Iraqi Army's offensive against the Kurdish guerrillas was in full swing. At the same time, a wave of arrests hit the Kurdish communities in Baghdad and in the large northern towns.

We slipped across the border on the night of September 1-2 and walked six days to reach Nao-Perdam, headquarters of the Kurdish revolutionary forces.

During these first six days, we skirted along the Iranian border. It was high land grazing country and, in this season, livestock was moving down to the valleys. Iraqi planes flew over us on several occasions, but they dropped their bombs further north, near Amadiyah.

Iraqi planes were more frequent over Nao-Perdam. The Kurdish headquarters, buried in a deep valley, was protected by four anti-aircraft guns which twice forced the Migs to turn tail.

When the Kurd revolution marked its eighth anniversary on September 11, celebrations were kept to a minimum although the authorities did organize cultural gatherings. Dr. Mahmud Osman, a member of the revolution's ruling council and secretary of its executive branch, told us: "We do not want our children to be sacrificed as we have been. The Kurd uprising of September 11, 1961, lies far in the past. Today, more than ever, it is a revolution."

A few days later General Barzani termed the Kurd movement a "revolution that could stand for the entire Iraqi people."

Hopes for a peaceful solution to the conflict have been waning constantly since last January, and the latest clashes have dashed them altogether.

Survivors tell their story

Dakan was a tiny Kurdish village on the Khazir, in the Mosul area, situated practically on the line separating the belligerents after the cease-fire of June 29, 1966.

The massacre was the work of troops engaged in a general retreat. They entered the village about noon. After hunting in vain for guerrillas they began to search for the inhabitants of the village. The latter had taken refuge in a cavern and were quickly located by the invaders.

Soldiers stood guard outside while others gathered wood and straw to fill the entrance to the cavern. The pyre was doused with petrol and set ablaze. The troops left the village, believing that all the Kurds had died. But three persons, including a ninety-year-old villager, survived to tell Kurdish leaders of their ordeal. Altogether, sixty-seven men, women and children were burned alive.

The Iraqi drive against the guerrillas intensified in September. Several operations were led personally by Defence Minister General Hardan El Takriti and Interior Minister General Saleh Mahdi Ammache, who hold power jointly in Baghdad

Two Frenchmen who carried out separate fact-finding missions in the areas controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party have given a first-hand account of the situation. One of them, Michel Besson, said: "I was not more than a few hours' walking distance from Dakan. I have the names of the victims, and pictures. Baghdad has not dared to deny reports on the massacre broadcast on the Kurds' underground radio."

The second observer, Marc Alain, has given the following account of clashes between the Kurds and Iraqi troops.

with Iraqi President-General Hassan El Bakr. The attacks were repelled by the pesh-merga (In Kurdish: "ready to die"), an army of 20,000 men, at heavy cost to both sides.

In mid-September, the Iraqi Army set out to recapture Mount Saffin in a bid to gain control of the entire Arbil plain from the Kurds. An enormous war machine was set into motion: twenty-two regular army battalions and 6,000 Kurdish mercenaries, with air support, which amounted to roughly 23,000 men. General Barzani's strength in the region was no more than 3,500 pesh-merga but the Kurds managed to beat off the attack.


On September 16, we started out for the southern front in the Qala Diza district. Three days of travel enabled us to measure the full horror of the war: Migs and Hawker Hunters dived on villages where we stopped for rest; women and children ran for cover in makeshift shelters. In the small village of Sultan Ahmed, two Ilyushins dropped napalm bombs on a house. Fourteen persons were burned to death.

Organized insurgents

In each village we met the elected chief and also found a delegate from the party, a teacher sent by the revolutionary leaders, a nurse who had been trained at headquarters: we were in a Kurdistan that was fighting on all fronts.

A school to train party members has been functioning for the past six months in Nao-Perdam. A training centre for "soldiers of knowledge" was set up two years ago. Some 275 schools have been opened in "free territory."

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS



LE MONDE — Weekly Selection,

November 12, 1969

A new political awareness has been born. The dead are mourned but the struggle goes on. The Kurds have taken heart from ever-growing signs of fatigue and demoralization in the government ranks. Regular soldiers and Kurdish mercenaries have deserted to join the guerrillas. One of them, Laoka Surshi, with whom we were able to talk, went over to the guerrillas with 101 men from the 22nd Shaglawia Brigade. He claims that he was "sickened" by the spread of massacres and reprisals.

A mercenary in the government ranks earns ten dinars (roughly \$30) a month. A Kurdish guerrilla is paid only one dinar a month. But money no longer counts, he said.

Sporadic fighting continued around Mount Saffin but the victory of the *pesh-merga* seemed only a matter of time. A communiqué from the Kurdish headquarters announced that Abdel Wahab Karim, member of the Iraqi Baath Party's national executive, had been killed in an attack. The same day, Radio Baghdad announced that he had died in a car accident near Mount Saffin. He was given a state funeral.

We spent two days in the thick of fighting. The front moved along the top of a mountain range which separates the Qala Diza plain (liberated at the end of May following bloody fighting that lasted thirty-five days) and the Ranya flatlands. The *pesh-merga* harassed the government posts to prevent a counter-attack from developing.

Throughout the day, artillery fire kept us moving from one shelter to the next. The mountains were stripped and burned by incendiary bombs.

Mig fighters flew over us once or twice a day, diving, climbing, diving again and shooting at anything that moved. They left an eerie silence behind them.

The Dukan Dam, south of the Ranya plain, was prized by the government as a strategic stronghold. Although the dam's waters could cause great damage if released, Dukan's location at a main crossroad, in flat country, made it easy to defend by air and ground. Baghdad had long deemed the position to be invulnerable.

The *pesh-merga* struck at Dukan during the night of September 20-21. From our vantage point twenty miles away, we could hear the rumbles of battle until one o'clock, when the camp fell and the leader of the Kurdish attack, Colonel Azziz, sat down victoriously in the Iraqi commander's armchair. Fighting had been fierce, and the camp had been cleared of its last defenders by knife.

The *pesh-merga* controlled Dukan for three hours but pulled out at dawn in order to avoid massacres.

A hard blow, however, had been struck to Iraqi morale. Before abandoning the camp, the guerrillas destroyed thirty tanks, ten armoured cars, six trucks, ten heavy guns and six fortified positions. They carried off many weapons and considerable amounts of ammunition and equipment. Casualties were high: ten *pesh-merga* fighters were killed in the assault and forty-one seriously wounded. Government losses were reportedly higher.

Despite this setback, the Iraqi government did not halt its offensive. On September 24, Jalal Talabani, leader of the Kurdish minority that remains loyal to Baghdad, personally led Kurdish mercenaries into battle against guerrillas near Sulaymaniyah. They were quickly routed, with a loss of twenty-one dead.

For the moment, the Kurds still hold the terrain, but other battles lie in store for them. Their livestock has been slaughtered, their crops burned. The rebels must feed the Kurdish population and provide medical treatment to more than 1 million people... with only two doctors.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government continues to refer to the "Kurdish problem" and to "clashes" with the "Barzanist bandits." It reassures world opinion that "the Kurdish language will henceforth be taught in the senior classes of secondary schools, and in the universities."

MARC ALAIN

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

THE TIMES FRIDAY MARCH 13 1970

Kurds' leader backs pact with Iraq

From Our Correspondent

Beirut, March 12

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader known as the "Red Mullah", in a message read over Baghdad radio last night put his seal to the agreement between the Iraq Government and the Kurdish rebels which had earlier been announced in a broadcast by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

The Mullah said that the agreement granted the Kurds their just and equal rights and announced that he and his

Kurdish Democratic Party (K.D.P.) were bound by its terms and would cooperate with the revolutionary Government in Baghdad.

The agreement recognizes the right of nearly a million Kurds to autonomy within the Iraq Republic. The Districts inhabited by the Kurds in the north are to be unified administratively. Their boundaries will be defined by agreement between Kurdish leaders and a higher committee, presumably representing Arabs and Kurds, which will supervise the carrying out of the pact.

Until this area is unified there is to be coordination in governing it between the governors of the Kurdish districts and the Government in Baghdad.

The provisional constitution is being amended to recognize the Kurdish language as an official one, together with Arabic, in the Kurdish area. The Kurds will be represented in the legislature, in the Government and the Services in proportion to their strength among the population of Iraq, which is believed to be about 15 per cent.

There is to be a Kurdish Vice-President and the Kurdish holiday, the *Nawrouz*, is to become a national holiday as a sign of unity.

The cultural rights of the Kurds are recognized. They will have a weekly and a monthly publication in Kurdish. Kurds or other people with fluent Kurdish are to be employed in the Civil Service in the north. Kurdish students are to be given a proportion of seats in universities, colleges and military academies and the Kurds will have their own university in Suleimaniya.

The Financial Times Friday March 13 1970

Kurds get their own way

BY OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, March 12.

IRAQI troops in Northern Iraq have begun to withdraw following the agreement announced yesterday between Government and Kurdish insurgents under Mulla Mustafa Barzani, according to informed travellers from Baghdad to-day.

They said withdrawal is one of the secret provisions in the agreement that will not be announced. The Government was reported to have maintained two whole divisions in the north totalling about 35,000 men. Under the secret provision, the Government, travellers said, will keep a token force in Kurdish areas, and a special security force to guard the oil-fields and installations in Kirkuk. In future, movement of troops in Kurdish areas for national security reasons would be subject to Kurdish approval, they added.

Another secret provision provides that Kurds will retain their irregular army called Pesh Mergha, as a national guard to police Kurdish areas where Kurds now are to exercise autonomy. Pesh Mergha is said to total 12,000 men.

Furthermore, the Government is

to disband the "Saladdin Horsemen," the irregulars which the Iraqi Army had recruited from anti-Barzani Kurds to fight the insurgents. The Anti-Barzani Kurdish faction led by Jalal Talabi will also be dropped completely, travellers said, and claimed the Government used to pay Talabi and his followers about £50,000 each month to keep up the fight against Barzani.

The nine-year Kurdish war was said to have cost the Government £1,000m., plus thousands of casualties on both sides.

SELF RULE

According to informed sources the Iraqi Government has sent a letter to the United Nations asking for a statistics expert to supervise the forthcoming census of the Iraqi population in the north. The census will determine the areas where the Kurdish majority resides.

The agreement yesterday said these areas will be united in one district and become one administrative unit where Kurds will exercise self rule.

Travellers expect the Kurdish vice-president, who is to be appointed soon as provided in yesterday's agreement, to be one of the following three:

Idris Barzani, eldest son of Mulla Mustafa; Fuad Arif, a former Kurdish Minister, or Dr. Mahmoud Osman, secretary-general of Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party and who led the Kurdish negotiating team to Baghdad.

Reports said Barzani is reluctant to have any official office personally, and does not want his son to have one, either, Dr. Osman is believed to be his favourite. Dr. Osman to-day stood side by side with President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr on the balcony of the Presidential Palace in Baghdad waving to huge Arab and Kurdish crowds which demonstrated in support of the Kurdish-Government agreement. For the first time Barzani's name was cheered in Baghdad. This was when Dr. Osman declared in the name of the Kurdish leader that Kurds will stand by Arabs in the fight against Israel.

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

THE TIMES THURSDAY MARCH 12 1970

War with Kurds ends in Iraq

By NICHOLAS HERBERT

Peace was reported yesterday to have broken out in the long battle between the Iraq Government and the Kurdish rebels in the north who have been struggling for autonomy for more than a decade. The Iraq news agency said that all fighting had stopped.

Saddam Husain al-Takriti, the Deputy Chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council in Baghdad, was quoted as saying that the settlement was not a temporary truce as in the past, but "a complete, substantial, political and constitutional solution ensuring brotherhood for all time between Arabs and Kurds".

President Ahmed Hassan Al-bakr said in a broadcast on Baghdad radio last night that part of the agreement called for amendments to the Iraq constitution to create two nationalities.

He said the two nationalities would be designated Arab and Kurdish. The state would have a Kurdish vice-president, a new post, and Kurdish would be the official language with Arabic in those areas where Kurds are in the majority.

Given a certain tendency to hyperbole in the Baathist temperament and considering the past history of the Kurdish dispute, the announcement will be received with caution.

Yet encouraging noises had

been coming from Baghdad for several months and some kind of rapprochement was obviously being attempted with Mullah Mustapha Barzani, aged 69, the Kurdish nationalist leader.

Another member of Iraq's ruling council, perhaps more realistic than his colleague, was quoted recently as saying that a 10-year-old wound cannot be bandaged in one day.

Since 1958, when the monarchy was overthrown and fighting with the Kurds became perennial, there have been numerous truces and settlements which have all foundered.

The most notable was concluded on June 29, 1966 by Dr. Abdul Rahman al Bazzaz, the then Prime Minister, who is now in a Baghdad prison.

His 12-point peace agreement provided for a good deal of autonomy for the Kurds, the use of Kurdish in schools, Kurdish representation in the National Assembly under a permanent constitution, a general amnesty and resettlement of those displaced by the fighting.

With Dr. Bazzaz's fall hopes that this agreement could be implemented faded fast and for most of last year Mr. Barzani's supporters were complaining bitterly of Iraq atrocities in what they said was fierce fighting.

More recently, however, the Baghdad Government was reported to have given up its alliance with Jalal Talabani, a

collaborationist Kurd, in an effort to placate Barzani.

In February, the Baathist newspaper Al Thawra invited the Kurdish leadership to purge itself of secessionists, imperialist agents and feudalists. It also suggested that the Government's main objection was to demands for a specific geographic zone in which Kurds would be autonomous.

What was needed was to create in a democratic atmosphere a constitutional and administrative situation in which the Kurds could exercise their rights all over Iraq not just in the north, the newspaper added.

This may give a clue as to what has been done, although still later it was reported that the administrative future of Kirkuk, an oil producing area, was in dispute and was preventing agreement.

Iraq has every reason to want peace with the Kurds at present. Apart from the demands of the Arab-Israel situation, which has taken Iraq forces into Jordan and brought militant Palestinian guerrillas to Iraq, there is the simmering dispute with Iran over the Shatt-al-Arab at the head of the Gulf.

Nor has the regime's internal position shown any more stability than usual. No wonder that Mr. Takriti said settlement of the Kurdish problem was an achievement equal in historical importance to the July Revolution, which overthrew the monarchy.



KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

Iraq—peace in the North and a bloodbath in Baghdad

BEIRUT—The Iraqi government last weekend declared a general amnesty for Kurdish rebels and civilians in a move to end nearly nine years of guerrilla war in the north of the country.

In a Sunday broadcast the Baghdad government confirmed the amnesty proposals contained in a communiqué published on June 29, 1966, which also guarantees autonomy to the Kurds of Iraq and recognizes their language as the official tongue in provinces with a Kurdish majority.

Last weekend's announcement follows the visit to Baghdad earlier this month of three representatives of the Kurdish insurgents—Salah Yusefi, Dara Osman and Dara Tewfik.

Thus, the highly nationalist Baathist Party—whose own programme calls for the unity of the Arab nation from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic—has come to recognize the aspirations of General Mustapha Barzani's hard-fighting Kurds.

Over recent months the guerrillas have held out for exact application of the 1966 communiqué, and it is an indication of the Baghdad government's seriousness that it has promised to abide by just these terms, despite some internal opposition.

Certainly much of the army was committed to the principle of a "pacification by force," and negotiations with the rebels were carried on in the utmost secrecy while the military went on with its task.

The secrecy of negotiations was further ensured by the government's public refusal to recognize General Barzani as leader of the Kurds. They had established Baathist supporter Jalal Talabani as head of a faction aiming at a Kurdistan administered within the framework of the Iraqi state and the Arab nation.

"Kurdish nationalism is a legitimate sentiment, in no way suspect, whose goals have been distorted. Not being an imperialist creation it does not conflict with the Arab revolution," he wrote.

But recently, Mr. Talabani was exiled by the Iraqi regime, while the government may also have taken advantage of last week's abortive coup d'état to eliminate pockets of opposition in the army. More than forty persons were hanged on charges of complicity in the conspiracy.

Certainly, most of the victims of the post-plot repression were rightists or pro-Westerners. On the other hand, the government took the unprecedented step of denying rumours that General Barzani had been involved in the conspiracy.

Concurrently, President Ahmed Hassan el Bakr might have been clearing the way for his government's policy of an "opening to the Left and to the East."

This has been reflected in the incorporation of Communist Party members into his cabinet, and a variety of economic concessions to the Eastern European countries.

The 1966 communiqué which spelled out the details of Kurdish autonomy was elaborated under the government of former Prime Minister Abdel Rahman Bazzaz. It is exceptional in the guarantees that it offers for the implementation of the agreement.

Mr. Bazzaz has recently been under house arrest, but the latest announcement seems likely to be followed by his release and rehabilitation.

His release might prove a much needed trump card in the government's hand. The former prime minister still enjoys considerable popularity in the country—a fact the present regime cannot afford to ignore.

Despite its severity and hostile repercussions abroad, the repression that followed the plot undoubtedly strengthened the gov-

ernment's hand. It neutralized groups of officers who felt that there should be no compromise with the Kurds and that the insurrection should be put down by force whatever the cost.

The government seems to have emerged in a stronger position from this "trial of strength," and some even suggest that it was responsible for provoking—if not concocting—the coup attempt.

Whatever the truth of the matter, the regime is anxious to mobilize public opinion against the inevitable cries of "capitulation" which will be heard in some quarters. The release of Mr. Bazzaz should help to some extent to win goodwill and political support.

Twelve points

The talks which led to the present settlement began in June 1969, in Beirut, with the Kurds categorically refusing to accept any basis for negotiation other than the twelve points worked out with Mr. Bazzaz and his government.

They began in the apartment of influential Baathist leader and theorist Michel Aflak, a Syrian who has been living in the Lebanese capital since October 1968.

The talks continued throughout the summer, and by October the negotiators appeared to have reached a detailed agreement and an atmosphere of mutual confidence had been established.

Mr. Aflak took it upon himself to use his considerable prestige as Baathist founder to "condition" party militants to the idea of an accommodation with the rebel Kurds. For there were many who felt that any compromise represented something barely short of doctrinal heresy.

He discussed the matter in *El Ahrar*, organ of the Iraqi Baathist Party published in Beirut.

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS



LE MONDE Weekly Selection,

January 28, 1970

From our correspondent
EDOUARD SAAB

Mr. Aflak went on to say that Arabs and Kurds had lived as brothers for centuries and stressed the importance of "thwarting the designs of imperialists who seek to open a gulf of hatred between the two peoples."

There are some 8 to 10 million Kurds in an area extending over parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon.

An important provision of the communiqué, which seems likely to bring an end to hostilities, dispenses the insurgents from handing over their arms in order to profit from the amnesty.

After referring to the 1966 communiqué last Sunday's broadcast said the government had decided that "a general amnesty was to be granted to all civilians and soldiers who had participated in the events in the North.

"All... are released from the obligation to hand over their arms and ammunition. The authorities are invited to reinstate civil servants who were dismissed as a result of the events."

The 1966 communiqué also made provision for a special ministry responsible for the reconstruction of the northern provinces. Kurdish military and police personnel will be permitted to rejoin their units.

If the communiqué does bring peace, it will mean the first trouble-free period in the north of the country since early 1962.

The Financial Times Thursday March 12 1970

Iraq gives autonomy to 1½m. Kurds

BY OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, March 11.

THE IRAQI Government to-night announced that, with the aim of ending the nine-year-old Kurdish war, it was giving autonomy to 1½m. Kurds who live in the north of the country.

The news was given in a radio and television broadcast by President Ahmed Hassan al Bakr, who proclaimed to-morrow as a national holiday so that Kurds and Arabs might celebrate the occasion. "A new page in Iraq's life has been turned," the President announced. The radio announcer who introduced him said the Kurdish-Government agreement was "one of the greatest achievements in Iraq and the Arab world within the past ten years."

Earlier, Sidam Hussein, vice-chairman of the Revolution Command Council, who led the Iraqi team to the negotiations with the insurgent leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, emphasised: "This is not a mere truce or cease-fire but a permanent establishment of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood."

President Bakr said henceforth Arabs and Kurds in Iraq would devote their joint energies to fighting "the common enemy, Israel, and world imperialisms."

To-night's agreement releases the Iraqi Army from heavy commitments in fighting Kurds and leaves it free to turn to the current confrontation with neighbouring Persia, and to fighting Israel. The agreement deprived the Persian Government of a former ally in Barzani's person against the Iraqi régime. Persians had in the past provided Kurds with military assistance.

The agreement provides the Kurds with more rights and privileges than those they got under the arrangement they reached with the former Premier, Dr. Abdelrahman Bazzaz, in June, 1966.

For the first time in any Iraqi declaration on Kurds the word "autonomy" was used to refer to the self-government Kurds are to get now under the 15-article declaration issued in the name of the RG, the country's highest executive authority.

A Kurdish vice-president is to be appointed, and the declaration implied that a legislature is in the making. The RC currently exercises both legislative and executive powers.

The provisional constitution is to be revised to state that the Iraqi people "are formed of two nationalities, Arab and Kurdish."

Article 14 is the crux of the agreement. It provides for unification of the areas in Northern Iraq, where Kurds form the majority, into one administrative unity to be run by Kurdish civil servants. The article, however, made a condition that exploitation of the natural resources in the northern area will be the responsibility of the Baghdad Government. This is obviously a reference to the oil wealth centred in Kirkuk.

A "higher committee" has been formed to carry out these measures.

Richard Johns writes: Although there has been no confirmation of the agreement from Mullah Mustafa Barzani's headquarters at Rawanduz, Kurdish sources in London last night had no doubt that a settlement had been reached.

The continuance of the force of the irregulars which has defied the well equipped Iraqi army for nearly a decade is seen as a necessary guarantee of any settlement.

However, the Kurdish sources were reassured by the mention in the Baghdad announcement of the word "autonomy"—which they say has been used officially for the first time.

KURDISTAN AND THE PRESS

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 21, 1970

Two nations in one state

If the Kurdish peace sticks—and at least it looks more like doing so than the previous attempts at a settlement—it will make Iraq's constitution unique in the Middle East. Iraq will be virtually two nations, Arab and Kurd. But the Moslem faith links the two peoples of different language and race. And, as Sunni Moslems, the Kurds will bolster the Baathists' Sunni leadership, reasserting a Sunni majority over those Arabs who are Shia Moslems.

The Kurds—some 1.5 million people out of Iraq's total population of 9 million—will have administrative autonomy in all areas where they predominate; but Baghdad will deal with such matters as oil and development. Thus it should not be beyond human wit to apportion responsibility at Kirkuk, Iraq's major oilfield, should the Kurds prove their claim to outnumber other people living there. At present they do not do so, since so many Kurds were driven out of the district during their nine years in revolt. Nor has it ever been established that they did, in the past, outnumber the local Arabs and Assyrians. But the Kurds are to be repatriated before a census is taken.

The Kurds have won a great victory in obtaining their right to autonomy and also—by, reportedly, a secret treaty—to retain their own militia. What is openly

accepted is that their heavy arms and their radio station are not to be handed over until all 14 clauses of their agreement with Baghdad are in force. Their leader, Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who has warmly welcomed the agreement, needs to keep his military apparatus intact both as a guarantee for the settlement and to carry his soldiers with him along the unfamiliar road to peace.

It may still be a road full of obstacles. The test of an enduring settlement may well be in the Baghdad government's ability to associate Kurds in practice as well as theory in all policy-making decisions. Only so can the two nations coalesce. There remains the more distant question of whether the project, if successful, will give ideas to the other 5 million Kurds, in Turkey, Syria and Iran. In Syria they appear to be assimilated and in Turkey, where they are known as "Mountain Turks," have caused no concern for many years. But the Iranian Kurds have been helping their brothers in revolt in Iraq and some have bitter-sweet memories of their own brief period of Russian-aided autonomy in 1946.

FICTION

SAUVE QUI PEUT

by Lawrence Durrell

We dips (said Antrobus) are brought up to be resourceful, to play almost any part in life, to be equal to any emergency almost – how else could one face all those foreigners? But the only thing for which we are not prepared, old man, is blood.

Blood?

Blood!

Mind you, I am thinking of exceptional cases, out-of-the-way incidents; but they are not as rare as one might imagine. Old Gulliver, for example, was invited to an execution in Saigon to which he felt it was his duty to go. It affected him permanently, it damaged his concentration. His head is quite over on one side, he twitches, his ears move about. Unlucky man! I cannot claim an experience as radical as his, but I can speak of one which was almost as bad. Imagine, one fine day we are delivered a perfectly straightforward invitation card on which we read (with ever-widening eyes) the following text or something like it:

His Excellency Hacsmi Bey and Madame Hacsmi Bey joyfully invite you to the Joyful Circumcision of their son Hacsmi Hacsmi Abdul Hacsmi Bey. Morning dress and decorations. Refreshments will be served.

You can imagine the long slow wail that went up in the Chancery when first this intelligence was brought home to us. Circumcision! Joyfully! Refreshments! "By God, here is a strange lozenge-shaped affair!" cried De Mandeville, and he was right.

Of course, the Embassy in question was a young one, the country it represented still in the grip of mere folklore. But still I mean... The obvious thing was to plead indisposition, and this we did as one man. But before we could post off our polite, almost Joyful refusals to these amiable Kurds, Polk-Mowbray called a general meeting in Chancery. He was pensive, he was pale and grave, quite the Hamlet. "I suppose you have all received this" he said, holding up a pasteboard square on which the dullest eye could descry the sickle and minarets of the Kurdish Arms with the sort of crossed cruets underneath.

"Yes" we chorused.

"I suppose you have all refused" went on our Chief, "and in a way, I am glad. I don't want my Mission to develop a taste for blood... these things grow on one. But it does raise rather a problem, for the Kurds are a young, buoyant, up-and-coming little country with a rapidly declining economy, and they are fearfully touchy. It is inconceivable that HMG should not be represented at this affair by one of us. Besides, who

knows, it might be informal, touching, colourful, even instructive... what the devil? But *someone* should be there; we just can't ignore two-legged Kurds in the modern world. The next thing is they will vote against us in UNO. You take my point?

"Well, I have sat up all night worrying about the affair, and (having no taste for blood myself) have arrived at a perfectly democratic solution which I know you will approve and I hope you will respect."

From behind his back came his left hand holding a packet of straws.

"Whoever draws the shortest straw will represent us" he cried shrilly. We all paled to the gums but what could we do? It was a command. Closing our eyes, lips moving in prayer, we drew. Well and... yes, of course I did. I drew that short straw.

I let out – I could not help it – a rueful exclamation, almost a shout. "But surely, Sir..." I cried. But Polk-Mowbray, his face full of compassion, smote me on the shoulder. "Antrobus" he said, "I could not have wished for anyone more reliable, more circumspect, more jolly unflinching, anyone less likely to faint. I am glad – yes, glad with all my heart that fate should have chosen you. *Courage, mon vieux.*"

This was all very well. I wasn't a bit cockered up by all this praise. My lip trembled, voice faltered. "Is there no other way?" I cried out in my anguish, gazing from face to stony face. There wasn't it would seem. Polk-Mowbray shook his head with a kind of sweet sadness, like a Mother. Superior demobbing a novice. "It is *Kismet*, Antrobus" he said and I felt a sort of coffin-lid close on me. I squared my shoulders and let my chin fall with a thump onto my chest. I was a beaten man. I thought of my old widowed mother in St Abdomen in the Wold – what would she say if she knew? I thought of many things. "Well" I said at last. "So be it." I must say, everyone brightened up, looked awfully relieved. Moreover, for the next few days I received every mark of consideration from my colleagues. They spoke to me in Hushed Voices, Hushed Commiserating Voices, as if I were an invalid; they tiptoed about for fear of disturbing my reveries. I thought of a hundred ways out of the affair but none of them seemed practicable. I went so far as to sit in a draught hoping I would catch pneumonia; I hinted broadly that I would surrender my stalls for the Bolshoi to anyone kind enough to replace me – in vain.

At last the day dawned; there was nothing for it but to climb into sponge-bag and hoist gongs. At last I was ready. The whole Chancery was lined up to shake my

hand and see me off. Polk-Mowbray had put the Rolls at my disposal, pennant and all. "I've told the driver to take a First-Aid Kit with him" he said hoarsely. "One never knows in these matters." You would have thought that I was to be the sacrificial lamb from the way he went on. De Mandeville pressed his smelling-salts into my hand and said brokenly "Do give little Abdul all our sympathy." As for Dovebasket, he pressed his Leica upon me saying "Try and get a close-up. The Sunday Times colour sup is crying out for something new and they pay like fiends – I'll split with you. It's one chance in a million to scoop Tony." The little blackhead! But I was too broken to speak. I handed the thing back without a word and stepping into the car cried faintly "To the Kurdish Embassy, Tobias."

The Kurds had everything arranged most tastefully, I must say; lots of jolly decent-looking refreshments laid out in a huge marquee on the back lawn. Here we dips congregated. I noticed that most Missions had sent acting vice-consuls smelling for the most part of brandy and looking pale and strained. Now the Kurds may be a young nation but they look as crafty as some of the older. The Mission was dressed in spanking *tenue* but in one corner, presiding over a side-table covered in grisly-looking Stone Age instruments, stood a small group of sinister men clad in horse-blankets of various colours. They had shaven skulls and purple gums and they conversed in a series of dry clicks like Bushmen. Faces which suggested nothing so much as open-cast coal-mining. This, I took it, was the Medical Wing of the Kurdish Embassy – the executioners. But where was the little beardless youth in whose honour all this joyful frolic had been arranged? I went so far as to ask.

"Ah" cried the Ambassador, "he will be here in a minute. He is on his way from the airport. He arrived from London this afternoon." I was a bit puzzled by this, but... Kurds have their own way of doing things. "And think of it!" went on the Head of Mission, clasping his hands. "Abdul knows nothing of all this. It is a surprise for him, a little surprise. He will be very joyful when he sees..." He waved at the group of executioners. Well, I thought to myself, let joy be unconfined, and tried to draw strength from some rather good *rahat lokoum* – Turkish Delight – which I found in a corner. After all, one could close one's eyes, or turn the head; one needn't actually *look*, I told myself.

Luckily my fears were groundless. Imagine our collective surprise when Abdul bounded into the tent to embrace his mother and father: instead of some puling adolescent, we beheld a tough-looking youth of some twenty summers with a handsome moustache and a frank open countenance. This was to be the victim! I must say, his frank open countenance clouded as he took in the import of the business. He showed every sort of unwillingness to enter into the full joyfulness of the occasion. Wouldn't you? Moreover, he was just down from Oxford where he had not only taken a good degree, but had got his boxing blue. His mother and

father looked troubled and began to urge, to plead, in Kurdish.

But he respectfully declined, giving every mark of disapprobation. He shook his head violently and his eye flashed. At last his father lost patience and motioned to the thugs in the corner. He was going to force him to enter into the joyfulness of the occasion. But the young man had learned something at Oxford. With a right and left he sent two sprawling; the others climbed on his back. A terrible fracas broke out. Cartwheeling round like a top with the Kurds on his back, Abdul mowed half the Corps down and upset the trestle tables; then, reversing, knocked the tent-pole out and and the whole thing collapsed on us in a billowing cloud of coloured stuff. Shouts, yells.... I lost my topper, but managed to crawl out from under. I tottered to the gate yelling for Tobias. All I got out of the affair was the box of Turkish Delight which I shared round the Chancery. It met with approval and I was the hero of the hour. Compliments? They fairly forked them up to me. Polk-Mowbray was in two minds about the sort of figure I had cut, but after giving it thought he summed the matter up jolly sagely. "In diplomacy" he said, "it is so often a case of *saive qui peut*."

copyright Lawrence Durrell

TS DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS

THE TEXT OF THE 11th MARCH, 1970 AGREEMENT

“(1) Kurdish shall be an official language alongside Arabic in the areas where Kurds constitute the majority of the population. Kurdish shall be the language for teaching in these areas. Arabic shall be taught in all schools which use Kurdish as a teaching medium while Kurdish shall be taught as a second language in all other schools throughout Iraq in accordance with the limits prescribed by law.

“(2) The participation of our Kurdish brothers in the Government without discrimination between Kurds and non-Kurds in appointments to public posts, including important and key posts in the State such as Cabinet ministries, Army commands, and other such posts, had been and still is one of the important points which the Revolution Government aims to achieve. While approving of this principle the Revolution Government reiterates the need for work to apply it in just proportion, taking into consideration qualifications, population proportion and the deprivations which our Kurdish brothers have suffered in the past.

“(3) In view of the backwardness which afflicted the Kurds in the past, both culturally and educationally, a plan shall be drawn up to redress this backwardness by means of the following:

“(a) The speeding up of the implementation of the Revolution Command Council's resolutions concerning the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurdish people, and the control of the preparation and direction of the programmes relevant to Kurdish national affairs on radio and television at the General Directorate for the Kurdish Information and Culture.

“(b) The return of school students forced to abandon their studies because of the violence in the area, irrespective of their actions, or finding suitable solutions to their problem.

“(c) Increasing the number of schools in the Kurdish area, raising the Kurds' standard of education, and accepting Kurdish students in the universities and military academies and granting them scholarships in just proportion.

“(4) Officials in the administrative units inhabited

by a Kurdish majority shall be Kurds, or Kurdish-speaking persons should the required number of Kurdish officials already exist. Key officials – such as governors, district officers, police chiefs, and public security chiefs – shall be appointed and immediately begin developing the State machinery in the area after consultation with the Supreme Committee entrusted with the implementation of this statement, to ensure this implementation and to buttress national unity and stability in the area.

“(5) The Government accepts the Kurdish people's right to establish student, youth, women's and teachers' organisations of their own. These organisations shall become members of similar national Iraqi organisations.

“(6) (a) The operation of paragraphs one and two of Revolution Command Council Resolution No.59 of August 5, 1968, shall be extended until the date of issue of this statement, and shall be made to cover all those accused of committing acts of violence in the Kurdish area.

“(b) Workers, officials and employees, both civilian and military, shall be reinstated in the service, without taking into consideration questions of establishment. The civilians shall be employed in the Kurdish area in accordance with the needs of that area.

“(7) (a) A body of specialists shall be formed to raise the standard of the Kurdish area in all fields in the shortest possible time and to compensate it for the losses it suffered in recent years, and to allocate a sufficient budget for achieving this. The body shall be attached to the Northern Affairs Ministry.

“(b) An economic plan shall be drawn up to ensure the development and equality of all parts of Iraq after taking into consideration the conditions of backwardness in the Kurdish area.

“(c) Pensions shall be allocated for the families of those martyrs who fell during the regrettable fighting, be they members of the Kurdish armed movement or others. Pensions shall also be granted to those who have been disabled or disfigured because of the conditions in the North in accordance with special legislation

based on the laws in force.

“(d) Immediate action will be taken to provide relief to the victims and the needy in housing and other projects, ensuring work for the unemployed, and providing suitable assistance in cash and in kind and reasonable compensation to the victims who need assistance. This will be done through the Supreme Committee. Persons affected by the previous paragraphs are exempted from this.

“(8) People of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be returned to their former places of residence. If the areas cannot be used as residential areas and are requisitioned by the Government for the public interest and in accordance with law, the people will be resettled in neighbouring areas and shall be compensated for resulting damages.

“(9) There will be immediate action to apply agrarian reform in the Kurdish area and to adjust it in such a way as to liquidate feudalistic relations. All peasants shall obtain suitable plots of land and shall be exempt from arrears in agricultural tax which have accumulated during the years of regrettable fighting.

“(10) It was agreed to amend the provisional Constitution as follows:

“(a) The Iraqi people consist of two main nationalities, the Arabs and Kurdish nationalities. The Constitution will acknowledge Kurdish national rights and the rights of all minorities within the Iraqi unity.

“(b) The following paragraph will be added to Article Four of the Constitution: The Kurdish language will be an official language in addition to the Arabic language in the Kurdish area.

“(c) The above shall be stated in the permanent Constitution.

“(11) The radio station and the heavy weapons will be returned to the Government. This will be connected with implementation of the final stages of the agreement.


“(12) One of the Vice-Presidents of the Republic will be a Kurd.

“(13) The Governorates Law will be amended in harmony with the contents of this statement.


“(14) After this statement is broadcast, the necessary measures will be taken by consultation with the Supreme Supervisory Committee to unify the provinces and the administrative units with majority Kurdish populations in accordance with an official census to be carried out. The State will strive to develop this administrative unit and deepen and expand the Kurdish people's exercise of their rights in this unit to ensure that they enjoy

self-government. Until this administrative unit is achieved, Kurdish national affairs will be co-ordinated in periodic meetings between the Supreme Committee and the Northern Region Governorate. Since self-government will take place within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the exploitation of the natural resources in this Region will of course be within the jurisdictions of the powers of this Republic.

“(15) The Kurdish people will take part in the legislative authority in accordance with the proportion of the Kurdish population.



A Pesh Merga camp somewhere in Kurdistan



Moment of relaxation for the hard pressed Pesh Mergas

DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS D

THE KURDS AS IN ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

KURDS, the name applied since the 7th century A.D. to western Iranians and neighbouring iranized peoples established astride the mountain systems of the Zagros and the eastern extension of the Taurus.

Their ethnic origins are uncertain. The Kurtioi or Cyrtii of Atropatian Media and Persis mentioned by Polybius (c. 200–120 B.C.) and later by Strabo and Livy were probably Kurds; also possibly the Kardouchoi who attacked Xenophon and the Ten Thousand (401 B.C.) near modern Zakho. The records of the early civilized empires of the plain (Sumer, Akkad, Babylonia and Assyria) contain frequent references to wars on their eastern and northern frontiers with mountain tribes that had names resembling Kurd. Personal names in contemporary documents indicate the presence of Indo-Aryan elements in Mesopotamia in the 16th century B.C. These were followed into the region of the western Persian plateau by the Iranians (*i.e.*, Medes and Persians). Names of Iranian type borne by Median princes are found in Assyrian texts of the 8th century B.C. Thereafter the Medes pushed on westward and southward until by 650 B.C. they dominated the Zagros and beyond. According to Herodotus (book i, 72 and 74) the western boundary of the Median empire was the Halys river, modern Kizil Irmak, having been fixed by a treaty with the Lydians (585 B.C.). The Medes, like the Persians, appear to have constituted an aristocracy controlling a mixed population on whom they imposed their language and their religion.

From about 550 B.C. the Median empire was replaced by the Persian, which was overthrown in 331 B.C. by Alexander the Great at the battle of Gaugamela between Mosul and Irbil. The region formed part of the empires that followed: the Seleucids (333-129 B.C.), the Parthians (247 B.C. to A.D. 226), the Persians Sasanians (226-636), the Arab caliphate (636-1258), the Mongols and the Turkmens (1258-1501). By the 16th century the frontier between the Ottoman-Turkish and the Safawid-Persian empires was more or less stabilized, leaving about three-quarters of the Kurds in Turkey and the rest in Iran. The Kurds thus never have enjoyed anything approaching political unity.

The Kurdish dialects, called Kirmanji, belong to the northwestern division of Iranian languages (*q.v.*) as distinct from the south-western Persian. Though showing minor differences, almost from valley to valley in the

higher altitudes, the dialects fall into two principal groups, northern and southern, the dividing line running approximately from the southern shore of Lake Urmia to the nearest point on the Greater Zab and thence down that river to the Tigris confluence. To the south-east, on a line running roughly from Kermanshah through Karand to Mandali, Kirmanji merges into the Lakki and Luri dialects of the southern Zagros. Within the Kirmanji area there are pockets of another group of dialects (belonging to the central division of Iranian) called Zaza in the northwest and Gorani in the south. Distinguishing characteristics in all the Kirmanji dialects suggest descent from an ancient and powerful basic language, perhaps the Median.

For 600 years after the Arab conquest (A.D. 636) and their conversion to Islam, the Kurds played a recognizable and considerable part in the troubled history of western Asia but as individuals or turbulent groups rather than as a nation. Among the petty Kurdish dynasties that arose during this period the most important were: the Shaddadids ruling a predominantly Armenian population in the Ani and Ganji districts of Transcaucasia (951-1174); the Marwanids of Diyarbakir (900-1096); and the Hasanwaihids of Dinavar in the Kermanshah region (959-1015). The most famous of all Kurds was Salah al-din (Saladin; *q.v.*), the chivalrous opponent of Richard I of England and founder of the Ayyubid dynasty of Egypt and Syria (1169-1250). Less is written of the Kurds under the Mongols and Turkmens, but they again became prominent in the wars between the Ottomans and the Safawids in circumstances favourable to the growth of a feudal system and a chain of semi-independent principalities. In spite of the later centralizing policies of both governments, several of these principalities survived into the first half of the 19th century, notably those of Bohtan, Hakari, Bahdinan, Soran and Baban in Turkey and of Mukri and Ardelan and Persia.

Kurdish nationalism is no recent growth. Before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were frequent risings against the central governments in which the leaders appealed to racial sentiment to rally their followers. A sturdy patriotism animates the work of the poet Ahmad-e Khani of Bayazid (1651-1706), who wrote in the northern dialect, as it does that of many of his successors, notably Haji Qadir of Koi (1815-96), who wrote in the southern dialect. In its modern form,

Kurdish nationalism developed along with similar movements of the other minorities of the Ottoman empire, the Arabs and the Armenians. The first Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, appeared in 1897 and was published at intervals until 1902 in Cairo, Geneva, London and Folkestone, Eng.; it was revived at Istanbul in 1908 (when the first Kurdish political club, with an affiliated cultural society, was also founded) and again in Cairo during World War I.

World War I marks an important turning point in the history of the Kurdish people. Their aspirations were encouraged by the defeat of Turkey and by point 12 of Pres. Woodrow Wilson's "program of the world's peace" (Jan. 1918), which stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman empire should be "assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." A delegation representing the Kurdish patriotic societies attended the peace conference. The treaty of Sèvres signed in Aug. 1920 by representatives of the Allies and of the sultan, provided for the recognition or creation not only of the three Arab states of Hejaz, Syria and Iraq but also of Armenia and, to the south of it, Kurdistan, which the Kurds of the Mosul vilayet, then in British occupation, would have the right to join. Owing to the military revival of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this treaty was never ratified. It was superseded in 1921 by the treaty of Lausanne, confirming the provision for the Arab states but omitting Armenia and Kurdistan. Mosul was excluded from the settlement, and the question of its future was referred to the League of Nations, which awarded (1925) in favour of Iraq. This was made effective by the treaty of Ankara signed in 1926 by Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain.

Although the treaty of Sèvres was stillborn, this project for an independent Kurdish state on record in an international document was not forgotten. Although not applicable to the Iranian Kurds it excited similar hopes among them; short-lived armed risings occurred. In Turkey the most serious was that of Sheikh Said in the Kharput region (1925), followed by such outbreaks as that near Ararat (1930). For some years after 1920 the Kurds south of the Greater Zab continued to resist incorporation in Iraq, and in 1922-23 Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaymaniyah proclaimed himself king of Kurdistan; in 1931-32 and again in 1944-45 serious risings in Barzan in the extreme north were suppressed with difficulty. In 1922 for several months, and again from 1941 to the end of World War II, Iranian administration virtually ceased to exist in parts of the frontier region, and in Jan. 1946 the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was set up under the presidency of Qazi Mohammed.

The liberal ideas that had inspired the treaty of Sèvres nevertheless continued to have important consequences, directly in Iran and indirectly in the other countries. In 1925 the League of Nations, endorsing for the whole of Kurdistan in Iraq the policy introduced for the southern part as early as 1918 by the British stipulated that Kurds or those proficient in the Kurdish language should be appointed for the administration of their country, dispensation of justice and teaching, and that Kurdish should be the official language. In 1932, when Iraq

applied for admission to the League of Nations, the council required from the Iraq government a declaration, which was to rank as part of the constitution and an obligation of international concern, reaffirming their rights, the Local Languages law was enacted to give it statutory effect. However, a sense of grievance was kept alive by what was considered, not entirely without justification, to be grudging and halfhearted implementation by the government. An article in the temporary constitution of Iraq promulgated immediately after the military *coup d'état* of July 1958, specifically mentioning the Kurds as partners with the Arabs in the state, was therefore warmly welcomed. But hopes of a measure of administrative devolution enhanced status for their language and a fairer share of social services and development projects were not fulfilled, and in 1961 there began a movement of organized resistance marked by alternating periods of open hostilities and uneasy armistice for fruitless negotiations.

Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i rite (*see* Islam). The mystical dervish orders, especially the Qadiri and the Naqshbandi, have numerous adherents. Heterodox sects of interest are the Beckettashi-Qizilbash, the Yezidis (*q.v.*) and the Ahl-i Haqq, popularly known as Kakai in Iraq and Ali-Ilahi in Iran.

On the basis of the census of 1965, the Kurdish population of Iraq is about 1,550,000. Reliable statistics for other countries are lacking, but 3,200,000 for Turkey, 1,800,000 for Iran, 320,000 for Syria and 80,000 for the U.S.S.R. are acceptable estimates, making a total of about 7,000,000, including Iraq. A figure of 10,000,000 often claimed by nationalists includes the Lakks and Lurs (Shi'i Muslims with some Ali-Ilahis), who are classed as Kurds in the *Sharafnama* (1596, in Persian), the earliest history of the Kurdish people, but are not covered by the term as generally understood. Islands of Kurds are found isolated from the main body: for instance, in Damascus, Syr., near Aleppo, Syr., and as far away as Ankara, Turk., and in the Iranian provinces of Kazvin, Khurasan and Kerman. Until 1914 the Kurds lived close to Christian communities with a similar mode of life: Armenians of the Anatolian plateau, Old Chaldeans of the Hakari highlands and the adjacent Urmia plain, and Uniate Chaldeans farther south. Relations were reasonably good, but the record was stained from time to time by bloody incidents generally attributable to provocation from outside. After World War I most of these Christians disappeared from Turkey, but several thousand Assyrians, including many from Turkey, remain compactly settled in the Amadiyah district in Iraq. Small colonies, probably dating back to the Babylonian exile, of Jewish weavers, dyers, tanners and peddlers survived in many towns and market villages until after World War II, when they emigrated to Israel.


Outside the towns the population consists chiefly of settled agriculturists. Nomads, who lived throughout the year in black goat-hair tents, driving their flocks between the Mesopotamian plains and the highlands of Turkey and Iran, were formerly numerous. But after World War I a combination of economic and government-

tal pressures obliged many to turn to agriculture or to assimilate themselves to semonadic villagers who move their flocks in summer to hillsides within their own frontiers. Improvements in communication, the consolidation of the administrations, the spread of education and the emergence of a new type of labour force, trained in the oil industry and on the great development projects financed by oil royalties, are tending to change the social structure. The traditional tribal or feudal society was based on groups of villages owing allegiance to a hereditary chief, a sheikh of one of the dervish orders, or a landlord, who, in return for certain fees and perquisites, was expected to protect the interests of his peasants vis-a-vis their neighbours or the government.


Kurdish peasant women are said to have enjoyed greater freedom than their Turkish, Persian and Arab neighbours. A number of women of the upper classes have been prominent in tribal administration, local politics, nationalist agitation or even war. The environment was thus favourable for female emancipation, and all classes have been eager to take advantage of any opportunities for modern education.

In Iraq since 1918, Kurdish has become widely used in private correspondence, and there has been continuous journalistic activity, there also has been a steady if not very prolific output of anthologies, collected works of classical poets, contemporary verse, histories, books on religion and morals, grammars and the like. In Iran, Kurdish newspapers and pamphlets appeared at Mahabad between 1943 and 1946, and in 1959 an official weekly, *Kurdistan*, was inaugurated at Teheran. In Syria for a few years from 1932 onward a monthly magazine and some books were published in both the Arabic and Roman scripts. Kurdish studies are encouraged in Soviet Armenia, where a modified Cyrillic alphabet is used. Programs in Kurdish have been broadcast in Iraq, Iran, Armenia and (for reception abroad) Egypt. In Turkey any manifestation of Kurdish political or cultural activity was firmly discountenanced in the late 1960s.

C.J.E.



NEWROZ
CELEBRATIONS
LONDON
1970



KURDISTAN



لسان حال اللجنة
للبيانات الديمقراطي الكردى في سورية
وأخرت ٢ / ١٩٦٩ / العدد / ٤١٦ / أثنين ٢٥ قس

خهبات

النضال

لسان حال الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني

خهبات
لسان حال الحزب
الديمقراطي الكردستاني
العدد : ٥١٤
تشرين الاول ١٩٦٩
العدد ١٠٠ فلان
للبيشمركة ٥٠ فلان
طبعت بمطبعة خهبات

الاشيورا

دانه نى پينج قرانه به ده و ده و ده

ده ننگى

Kurdish Affairs Bulletin

Published by The Kurdish Journal

خزمهتی پیشمه‌رگه
به گهل و پشتیوانی
گهل بو پیشمه‌رگه
که وره‌ترین ده‌سته‌به‌ری
سه‌رکه و تنمانه .

ده‌نگی

پیشمه‌رگه

هیزی پیشمه‌رگه
قه‌لغانه بزو
پاراستتی بونو
مافی نه‌ته‌واپه‌تی
کورد .

لیژنه‌ی ناراسته‌و به‌خشی شورشی کوردستان ده‌ری نه‌کا

کوردستان

NEWS FROM KURDISTAN

The K.D.P.'s Eighth Congress

At 9 a.m. on 1st July 1970, at Naw Pirdan, Mustafa Barzani, Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K.D.P.), officially opened the important eighth Congress of the party with a speech in which he called for national unity and peace for the Iraqi people as a whole for a better and democratic future for the Arab and Kurdish peoples.

The Congress was being held at an important juncture in Kurdish history when the citizens of Kurdistan—Iraq have formally secured recognition by the government of their right for autonomy. But the struggle for the realization of this right is by no means over. Hence, the 400 delegates discussed in great detail what should be the role of the K.D.P. in the process of achieving Kurdish national rights and K.D.P.'s views concerning securing a democratic and popular regime in Iraq as a whole. Indeed, the General-Secretary of the party Haval Habeeb Kareem delivered a comprehensive report to the Congress, analysing the present state of affairs in Kurdistan and Iraq. In it he pointed the significance of the 11th March 1970 Agreement as an achievement after the considerable sacrifices given by the Kurdish people. He also emphasised the need for a government which enjoys the confidence and support of the people as the only guarantee against the repetition of all the misfortunes suffered by the people of Iraq throughout its turbulent history.

The Congress attracted a great deal of attention, both at home and abroad. All major Iraqi political parties were represented at the Congress and addressed the delegates. There were also numerous foreign press representatives covering the event. The Kurdish Students Society in Europe had sent a group of representatives to Naw Pirdan.

The general atmosphere at the Congress, according to observers, was remarkable for its freedom of discussion and genuine spirit of constructive analysis by the delegates. Representatives of other parties were truly impressed by this strange phenomenon of political democracy at work at a time when repression and authoritarian methods have become common practice. Details of the new revised K.D.P. Programme and the resolutions of the 8th Party Congress are expected to be published soon.



MUSTAFA BARZANI, Chairman of K.D.P.

MARTYRS' DAY : 9th JUNE

June the ninth has been designated as the Martyrs' Day in Kurdistan in commemoration of all those who have sacrificed their lives in the pursuit of the aims of the Kurdish movement. The month of June carries special memories for the people of Kurdistan: history shows that June has been the favourite month for launching attacks against the Kurdish people. The Kurdish Resistance has lost many courageous men and women fighting for freedom, democracy and social equality and against aggression in the month of June.

The following are some of these events:

June 17, 1919: British troops attack the Kurdish forces led by Shaikh Mahmud in Dervendy Bazuan—Sulaimani.

June 24, 1923: The Treaty of Lausanne (replacing the Treaty of Sevres between the Allies and Turkey—excluding the Kurdish Question and the fate of the Mosul region).

June 28, 1925: The Turkish Government executes 45 persons, among them the Kurdish leader Shaikh Said Piran.

June 19, 1947: Major Izzet Aziz, Captain Mustafa Khoshnaw, Lieutenant Mohammed Kudsi and Lieutenant Kheyrolla Karim, four former officers in the Iraqi Army serving the Kurdish cause in Mehabad, executed by the Iraqi Government.

June 9th, 1963: The Iraqi Army attacks Kurdistan. Kurdish representatives arrested in Baghdad. A savage massacre in Sulaimani. 167 civilians, mostly young, killed in Sulaimani. 70 buried alive by bulldozers. This day is known as The Great Black Day in Kurdistan.

June 20–25, 1963: The town of Koy Sanjak is attacked by the Iraqi Army. Numerous arrests of civilians subjected to torture.

This year the Pesh-Merga officially observed the occasion of the Martyrs' Day by holding a mass rally in Galala at which Dr. Mahmud Osman gave a speech on behalf of the Kurdish leadership. The pupils of Galala Primary School sang various national songs remembering the Martyrs of Kurdistan.

Al-Taakhi Reappears

The newspaper Al-Taakhi has started to appear again. Al-Taakhi has had a chequered life so far: since its first appearance in 1966, it has been suspended twice on charges of violating rules of censorship. The paper is the voice of the Kurdish movement and it has not hesitated in discussing general issues critically and in the light of professional standards of government officials. Currently, it is being edited by Ali Abdullah. We wish Al-Taakhi a longer period of uninterrupted publication this time.

Open Organisations

After the 11th March 1970 Agreement, various organisations in Kurdistan have come into the open and are readjusting themselves to the new situation. Among those are the Kurdistan Student Union; the Kurdistan Union of Democratic Youth; the Kurdistan Women's Association and others. Also a Kurdish Union of Writers has been formed headed by the famous poet Hajar to promote Kurdish literature.

BOOK REVIEWS

REPUBLICAN IRAQ, by Majid Khadduri
318 pp. (Oxford University Press
for Chatham House) 60s.

This is the second book by Professor Khadduri, about modern history of Iraq. The first "Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics", covered the period of Iraqi Politics prior to the 14th July 1958 Revolution. This second study, deals with the period immediately preceding the 1958 Revolution to just before the overthrow of Abdul Rahman Aref ten years later.

The book discusses the causes that led to the downfall of the monarchy and gives an account of the new forces and ideologies which are engaged in reshaping the political system—including an outline of the social background of the new leaders, their ideas and aspirations and the new social forces at work. The analysis clearly disposes of the mythical existence of the notion of Iraqi "nation", and the artificial attempts at moulding such a nation. Three fundamental forces are identified which precipitated the Revolution of 1958. First, after World War II nationalism tended to become a revolutionary movement under the impact of radical ideologies. Secondly, the growing disenchantment of the new generation with the public policy and the method of rule of the old representing vested interests. Thirdly, the pan-Arab movement which undermined the Old Regime and caused its final collapse.

Professor Khadduri purports to give an account of the Kurdish Question in Iraq, but, surprisingly his approach, in general, to the Kurdish movement is very sketchy and contains many inaccuracies. For example, his statement that, "The Kurdish Democratic Party (K.D.P.), organised shortly before the Revolution was affiliated with the Iraqi Communist Party." First of all he has the actual name wrong: it is "Kurdistan" Democratic Party and not "Kurdish". Second, the party was not formed "shortly before the Revolution" but dates back from 1946. Finally, the claim that K.D.P. was "affiliated" with the Iraqi Communist Party is also inaccurate. This is not to deny that there was a dialogue between the two parties, as indeed there was between the Communist Party on the one hand and the National Democratic Party, Istiglal Party, Baath etc. on the other. If one studies the history of K.D.P. in Kurdistan-Iraq the divergencies between its policies and that of the Communist Party become obvious. Included in the chapter titled "Arab Socialism Reconsidered"(!) is an account of the development of the Kurdish question after the fall of Kassim, discussing the abortive negotiations after February 1963, the Koisinjak Meeting of Kurdish representatives (18 to 22 March 1963), where proposals were prepared and a Committee elected to negotiate with the government and the subsequent resumption of the War on 10th June 1963. Next was a brief cease-fire followed by heavy

fighting until 29 June 1966, when a 12-point programme was announced by Premier Bazzaz as a basis for a settlement of the Kurdish problem.

In spite of its defects this book is a useful addition to the study of modern Iraqi politics, especially the sections discussing and analysing the social realities behind a political development, the political principles and the actors on the Iraqi political stage since 1958.

KURDISTAN and the KURDS

by Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
304 pp. Collet's, London. 27s.6d.

Though Mr. Ghassemlou's book was published some time ago (1965) it still retains a special position amongst Kurdish studies. The book is a piece of pioneering research into Kurdish politics and society throughout all parts of divided Kurdistan. The author avoids the traditional approach to the study of Kurdish politics, i.e. looking at the Kurdish problem as a romantic endeavour on the part of some colourful type of human beings somewhere in remote mountains of West Asia. This traditional approach was prevalent even up to the late 1950's, mainly because many of the works written about Kurdistan were undertaken as travelogue exercises by individuals not well acquainted with all the facets of the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish Revolution of 11th September 1961 transformed the style of writing about Kurds and Kurdistan radically: the traditional approach was superseded by attempts at studying and presenting the Kurdish movement in its modern context, with particular emphasis on ideological and organisational elements shaping the movement. Prominent among those were Schmidt, Adamson, Kinnane and others.

Ghassemlou not only adopts a "modern" and "scientific" approach but also tackles every aspect of the Kurdish issue thoroughly.

The first part of the book deals with the geographical setting of Kurdistan, the religion, language, literature and history of the Kurdish nation. It also gives an account of the Kurdish struggle for freedom and national rights through numerous uprisings in the 19th and 20th centuries. The economic factor is underlined as constituting a major motive for the arbitrary division of Kurdistan. The origins of the vicious policies of the Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi Governments can be traced to this factor.

The second part is an economic survey of Kurdistan, with special reference to the agricultural system prevailing in Kurdistan: the forms of land tenure and land rent; the irrigation system, and the position of the


peasant and the structure of the Kurdish Society. This is followed by an economic analysis of industry and commerce. The role of the oil industry, as a significant factor in economic development is emphasised.

The third part deals with the Kurdish question in its modern environment as a struggle of a national-liberation movement. The author discusses the theoretical and practical problems connected with the materialisation of the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. Furthermore, he discusses factors affecting economic progress of economically less developed countries in general and of Kurdistan in particular.

The book was translated into Arabic in 1968, with an additional chapter titled, "The Struggle for the Right of Self-Determination in Iraqi Kurdistan", which covers the events leading to the outbreaks of the 11th September 1961 Revolution, and the perceptible development of the armed struggle, its aims and organisation up to 1966. The Kurdistan Democratic Party's Seventh Congress is briefly discussed.

It is unlikely that every reader agrees with the author's views and interpretation of issues and events, as the author does not disguise his Marxist commitment. But Mr. Ghassemlou has dealt with his subject painstakingly, and provides valuable information—hitherto not available—concerning Kurdish society, particularly the chapters on "Forms of Land-Holding", "Forms of Ground-Rent", and "The Social Structure and Living Standard of the Rural Population".

M. Bapeer



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
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Kurdistan and Kurds



HELP THE KURDISH PEOPLE!

These kurdish children live in constant tear. They have no hope for the future. Must they hear the some appalling privations as their fathers? Your contribution may help kurdish children to hope for a less deprived existence and a future of peace and freedom.

HELFEN SIE DEM KURDISCHEN VOLK!

Diese kurdischen Kinder leben in ständiger Angst. Sie bangen um ihre Zukunft. Vielleicht müssen sie das harte Schicksal ihrer Väter und Vorfäter teilen. Sie können durch Ihre Spenden mithelfen, daß die kurdischen Kinder zukünftig in Frieden und Freiheit ein menschenwürdiges Dasein führen.

AIDEZ LE PEUPLE KURDE!

Ces enfants kurdes vivent dans la peur permanente. Ils craignent pour leur avenir. Peut-être ils doivent partager la dure destinée de leur pères et grand-pères. Par votre contribution vous pouvez aider les enfants kurdes à mener à l'avenir une vie plus digne de l'homme, en paix et en liberté.

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Some Facts about the Kurdish People

The Kurds are the fourth most numerous people in the Near East. They are the offspring of the ancient Medes and of indoeuropean stock. The present national division (see map) was enforced upon the kurdish people in 1923. Since then, the Kurds have continually fought for their national rights in all parts of Kurdistan. The armed struggle in iraqi Kurdistan from 1961 onward represents only one phase of their fight for autonomy and freedom, both political and cultural. Even today kurdish schools, a kurdish press, books about the kurds and books in the kurdish language are forbidden in all parts of Kurdistan.

Ein kleiner Auszug der Geschichte des kurdischen Volkes

Die Kurden bilden das viertgrößte Volk im Vorderen Orient. Sie sind die Nachkommen der Meder, und indoeuropäischen Ursprungs. Die jetzige staatspolitische Verteilung Kurdistans wurde 1923 gegen den Willen des kurdischen Volkes vollzogen. Seither kämpfen die Kurden in allen Teilen Kurdistans um ihre nationalen Rechte. Die bewaffnete Auseinandersetzung in Irakisich-Kurdistans seit 1961 ist nur ein Teil dieses Freiheitskampfes. Bis heute gibt es in keinem Teil Kurdistans kurdische Schulen, Kurdische Presse, Bücher über die Kurden und in kurdischer Sprache sind verboten.

Un petit Abrégé de l'Histoire de Peuple Kurde

Les Kurdes sont a la quatrieme place dans le Proche Orient en ce qui concerne leur nombre. Leurs ancêtres sont les Médes, ils sont d'origine indoeuropeenne. La division nationale existant actuellement fut executée en 1923 contre la volonté du peuple Kurde. Depuis ce temps les Kurdes luttent pour leurs droits nationaux dans toutes les parties du Kurdistan. Le combat dans le Kurdistan irakien, datant de 1961, n'est qu'une partie de cette lutte pour la liberté. Jusqu'aujourd'hui il n'y a pas d'écoles kurdes dans aucune partie du Kurdistan. La presse kurde, les livres sur les Kurdes et ceux en langue kurde sont interdits.

Kurdish Students' Society in Europe (KSSE)
Vereinigung Kurdischer Studenten in Europa (VKSE)

