

THE GULF WARS

**DOCUMENTS AND
ANALYSIS**

A G NOORANI



The war in the Gulf in January-February 1991 marks a watershed in the transition from a multi-polar to a uni-polar world. Whether it remains uni-polar for long remains to be seen, but the genesis of the war and its aftermath are of utmost importance. This collection of documents will assist all those who wish to study the Gulf War in detail. The editor has taken care to include documents representing all viewpoints, making the selection comprehensive and impartial. Comment is confined to a stimulating Introduction.

The views expressed here are refreshingly different from the stereotypes bred by ideological predilections. A.G. Noorani denounces both Iraq and the United States as aggressors. The impact of the war on the United Nations is also discussed along with the fallout of the ruinous decade-old war between Iraq and Iran. The editor has provided notes on the territorial disputes between Iraq on the one hand and Iran and Kuwait on the other to highlight the pointlessness of the conflicts brought about by the megalomania of a dictator.



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
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Documents and Analysis

A.G. NOORANI

Inv. 7681



KONARK PUBLISHERS PVT LTD

KONARK PUBLISHERS PVT LTD
A-149, Main Vikas Marg, Delhi 110 092

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Typeset at Excel Computer Services, New Delhi and printed at
Shiba Offset Printing Press, Delhi

Acknowledgements

The author is greatly indebted for the unstinted cooperation and generous assistance he has received from Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VC, VM, Director, Institute for Strategic Studies & Analyses, New Delhi; Dr. Bhaichand Patel, Director, United Nations Information Centre, New Delhi; the Directors of the United States Information Service, Delhi and Bombay; the Information Department, Embassy of the USSR, New Delhi, the Press section of the Embassy of Iraq, New Delhi and the Press Section of the Embassy of France, New Delhi.

—A.G. NOORANI

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Introduction

As the euphoria in the United States and in the coalition partners who followed its leadership evaporates with the passage of time, questions are sure to be raised as to the soundness of President George Bush's decision to prefer a quick, devastating war on Iraq to the slower processes of diplomacy backed by economic sanctions. All available evidence, which is confirmed by Bob Woodward's book *The Commanders*, suggests that the decision was his alone and, both, Secretary of State James Baker and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, had serious reservations. Victory stills doubts but only in the minds of victors. Dissent within the United States is unlikely to abandon its quest for the truth. The world outside should pursue it in its own way.

This collection of documents is a modest effort in that quest. The documents have been selected with every care to ensure that they represent the record faithfully and tell the story by themselves. Comment is confined to this Introduction. No attempt is made to conceal the view that the United States' recourse to war was worse than unwise and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. It was immoral and ruinous.

When Baker said on January 26, 1991, in the presence of the Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A. Bessmerthnykh, "It is not, of course, the purpose or goal of the multinational coalition to destroy Iraq", none believed him. Every one knew what Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney admitted, rather boasted, the next day. "In effect, what we're doing with our air campaign is very aggressively going after his (Saddam Hussein's) production facilities for chemical and biological weapons, his storage facilities, those places, for example, where he loads chemical weapons into warheads. We're going after the means by which he would deliver them, his artillery, his rocket launcher battalions, his aircraft capabilities."

Bush claimed, on January 28 "it is a just war. . . Our cause could not be more noble. . . we do not seek the destruction of Iraq. . . But

a just war must also be declared by legitimate authority. . . it is our gravest obligation to conduct a war in proportion to the threat. And that is why we must act reasonably humanely, and make every effort possible to keep casualties to a minimum. And we've done so''. Every one of these five claims was false.

After a visit to Iraq, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Martti Ahtissaari, said in his Report (S/22366) on March 21: "I and the members of my mission were fully conversant with media reports regarding the situation in Iraq and, of course, with the recent WHO/UNICEF report on water, sanitary and health conditions in the Greater Baghdad area. It should, however, be said at once that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanised and mechanised society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.

"My mandate was limited to assessing the need for urgent humanitarian assistance. It did not extend to the huge task of assessing the requirements for reconstructing Iraq's destroyed infrastructure, much less, to developmental matters. Accordingly, my report to you, in its several technical sections, seeks with as much exactitude as possible to convey the extent of needs in the primary areas of humanitarian concern: for safe water and sanitation, basic health and medical support; for food; for shelter; and for the logistical means to make such support actually available. Underlying each analysis is the inexorable reality that, as a result of war, virtually all previously viable sources of fuel and power (apart from a limited number of mobile generators) and modern means of communication are now, essentially, defunct. The far-reaching implications of this energy and communications' vacuum as regards urgent humanitarian support are of crucial significance for the nature and effectiveness of the international response."

Such a result cannot ensue from a war for the liberation of Kuwait, a war under a mandate of the United Nations. It can be—as, indeed, it was—the inescapable consequence only of a war that was aimed intentionally, primarily at the destruction of Iraq's military capability but which could not have failed to destroy Iraq itself. This was the fore-

seeable and foreseen consequence of Bush's decision.

This explains the attempts to conceal the enormity of the destruction that was wrought. Patrick E. Tyler of *New York Times* reported that three months after the Gulf war had ended, "A comprehensive assessment of the damage from the intense 43-day allied bombardment remains classified and the administration has been reluctant to divulge details", so much for the consequences of a "just war". (*International Herald Tribune*, June 4, 1991)

Tyler added: "The assessment indicates that Iraq's electrical power industry may have been damaged well beyond the intentions of allied war planners, who developed a still-secret weapon that dropped thousands of metallic filaments onto the electrical network at key points to create huge short-circuits and blackouts on the night of Jan. 17, when the war began. This was followed by raids on power plants. Even now, 80 per cent of the nation's power grid is out of service. Electricity shortages are aggravating a health care crisis. . .

"Overall, the American analysts say, the Iraqis are struggling precariously under a patchwork of short-term fixes and remedies that will probably deteriorate in the months ahead if the Bush administration maintains trade sanctions in an effort to force President Saddam Hussein from power.

"The Bush administration's internal findings parallel those reported by a special United Nations mission to Iraq in March. . . ." Predictably, the Ahtissaari Report was criticised by the United States when it was published. The former U.S. President Jimmy Carter said, on May 2, that negotiations would have brought a better result. He thought that the decision to use military force was reached by Bush "quite early in the process". Robert E. Hunter, Vice-President of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., who is no dove, had no hesitation in saying that it was "nonsense" to claim that the US' "Central goal" in the war was an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. (*Washington Post*; February 3). "In retrospect, it is clear that this was also true before the war. If George Bush only wanted to get Iraq out of Kuwait, he did little to help bring it about."

When, on August 2, 1990 Iraq marched into a defenceless Kuwait in an unprovoked act of brazen aggression, the United States' initial response was reflected in the Security Council's Resolution 660 adopted that day. The aggression was condemned and Iraq's withdrawal was demanded peremptorily and rightly so. But Para 3 called upon "Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations

for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States.”

On August 3, King Hussein of Jordan obtained President Saddam Hussein’s agreement to attend a mini-summit at Jeddah on August 4 or 5 in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen were to participate. He later claimed (January 19) that President Hussein had agreed to withdraw from Kuwait.

Even the US has acknowledged that on that day he had announced that he would meet the Emir of Kuwait two days later and pledged Iraq’s withdrawal, President Hosni Mubarak counters that the King could convey no *explicit* assurance in advance on August 3 and in its absence, he declined to attend. Significantly, that very day, the Arab League, while condemning Iraq, decided also “to categorically reject any foreign intervention or attempt to intervene in Arab affairs.”

On August 4, President Mubarak said “We will not ask for any foreign intervention” in reply to a question specifically on US intervention. The same day, even Kuwait’s Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Dr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Awadi said that a solution must be “within an Arab framework.” On August 4, Iraq began a highly publicised withdrawal of three elite divisions from Kuwait.

But, on August 6 President Bush decided to launch Operation “Desert Shield”. Defence Secretary Dick Cheney landed in Riyadh to press Saudi Arabia to invite US Military forces. They began arriving on August 7. On August 8, Iraq announced annexation of Kuwait.

It was this major policy switch that paved the way to war, a process in which President Saddam Hussein fully co-operated. In an authoritative expose of decision-making within the US administration, Thomas L. Friedman and Patrick E. Tyler of the *New York Times* reported that “the Bush administration began planning early last fall for an offensive campaign to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait, at a time when US officials were insisting in public that the only mission of US forces was to defend Saudi Arabia and enforce United Nations sanctions.

“According to a reconstruction of major internal deliberations and decisions by President George Bush and his senior advisers during the seven-month Gulf crisis, offensive military planning began in earnest in September, and on Oct. 30 *a week before congressional elections.* Mr. Bush secretly approved a timetable for launching an air war against Iraq in mid-January and a large-scale ground offensive in February that would strike deep into Iraqi territory to encircle President Saddam

Hussein's army."

This was, however, a logical sequel to the policy switch in August. Saudi Arabia was *not* willing to receive American troops on its soil and launch a policy of confrontation. The US pressed it to do both.

When the National Security Council reconvened on Friday, Aug. 3, General Scowcroft opened the meeting with a strong admonition that the discussion of options would be based on the recognition that Iraq's invasion was unacceptable and, if allowed to stand, would fundamentally alter the balance of power in a vital part of the world.

Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, initially annoyed by a reticence among uniformed officers to provide concrete choices, brought General Schwarzkopf to explain the Pentagon's updated plan to use troops in a crisis in the Gulf.

It called for more than two divisions of ground troops, about 700 combat aircraft and a big naval flotilla.

"I remember the body language when Norm talked about the 140,000 troops," a senior official said, "Good God, that's a lot of people" was the expression on some faces, he said.

Mr Bush, however, focussed on the principal obstacle to such a troop movement—the Saudis.

He had telephoned King Fahd and assured him that the United States would stand by Saudi Arabia, and he directed Secretary Cheney and General Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to brief the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, on the threat and on the troop plan.

Convinced that the sending of troops was the right course, Prince Bandar recommended that a high level envoy fly to Saudi Arabia to convince King Fahd who would have to make a quick decision.

The deliberations moved to Camp David on Saturday (August 4) General Schwarzkopf took Mr Bush and his aides through a series of charts depicting the full plan to move troops to the Gulf.

"This is what it will take to defend Saudi Arabia," the General said. Then, flipping to a final chart depicting an even larger use of troops, he added, "And if you want to liberate Kuwait, this is what it will take."

Although the group was focussed on the immediate problem of defense, General Schwarzkopf had introduced the concept of offence from the very beginning.

Mr Bush and his advisers debated who should go to Jidda, the royal capital, and whether a high level mission would run the risk of dis-

astrous recriminations if the Saudis could not make up their minds.

In the midst of the talks, Mr Bush received a telephone call from President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, who said he had an authoritative report that the Saudis had decided not to accept US forces.

Mr Bush telephoned King Fahd to sound him out, without mentioning the Mubarak call.

The king delayed in accepting a visit from Mr Cheney. He wondered whether a delegation of technical experts might not be better.

Mr Bush offered General Schwarzkopf, but continued to push Secretary Cheney as the head of the mission, because if the king decided to receive an envoy of his level, it would be more difficult for him to say no.

King Fahd delayed 14 hours before agreeing to see Mr Cheney. In the ornate Red Sea palace at Jidda, Mr Cheney delivered his brief and then watched as the king and his brother spoke in Arabic to express some of their ambivalent feelings about the Kuwaitis.

"We have to do this, what will happen to Kuwait?" King Fahd said to Crown Prince Abdullah, according to one of the Arabic-speaking Westerners present.

"There is still a Kuwait," responded Prince Abdullah, the king's brother.

"Yes, but the entire population is living in our hotel rooms!" the king shot back.

Saudi Arabia was on board, as long as the Americans agreed in writing to leave when the threat passed and to get Saudi approval before initiating any offensive military action.

The dimensions of the planned military build up were closely held by Mr Bush and his inner circle.

The motives were mixed. Just as the war on Iraq was unleashed in all its fury, the *New York Times* published an extract from a national security review, from the early days of the Bush Administration, dealing with "Third World Threats". It read: "In cases where the US confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly." Any other outcome, it explained, would be "embarrassing" and might "undercut political support."

After the war ended, Colonel Dimitriy Belskiy wrote an insightful article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on March 21 in which he recalled the US National Security Adviser General Brent Scowcroft's remark that the US troops had carried out a trial run of weapons on the "live testing

ground”.

Col. Belskiy posed a pertinent question: “Is this not the reason why, during the deployment of the anti-Iraq coalition and afterward, during the combat operations, the United States skillfully manoeuvred the Iraqi leadership into an ‘offside’ position, and the international community then found itself presented with the fait accompli of the need to enforce military solutions?” (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service*; Sov. March 27, 1991, p. 4).

One of the most perceptive American political commentators, William Pfaff, raised another pertinent question. “Are American intentions pure? No; the desire to maintain US national prestige obviously has played a large part in what has gone on.” This was written shortly before the war. (*International Herald Tribune*; January 12, 1991)

As it happened, eventually the war provided considerable financial gains to the US. Dr. Akmal Hussein, one of Pakistan’s foremost economists, succinctly summed up the economic imperatives in an article in the respected Lahore daily *The Nation* on April 6, 1991. “The US will be in a powerful position to pull the heart out of OPEC and calibrate oil prices according to US interests.” Its industrial firms had already begun to win highly lucrative contracts from Kuwait for reconstruction which was estimated to cost \$ 100 billion over the next five years. To add to the entire murky episode, the US will actually profit by the war. Its cost was estimated to be around 70 billion dollars of which the US contribution was to be 15 billion dollars, the allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, donating the rest. “But congressional experts reckon the bill could be as little as 40 billion dollars, leaving a tidy 15 billion profit on six weeks of conflict.” Mr. Rupert Cornwell reported in *The Independent* (London) (March 28): Thus the war “has not only offered a priceless battlefield testing ground for futuristic US technology. For once, Washington may even be in surplus as a result.”

These stark realities have overcast the sordidness of Saddam Hussein’s policies in the region for over a decade. Neither on the territorial dispute with Kuwait or on the one with Iran is Iraq’s case valid (vide *Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security* by A.G. Noorani; Jaico, Bombay, 1975, Ch. 12 on “Asian Territorial Questions” for a discussion of the Iran-iraq dispute. Vide also *The Gulf War* by Majid Khadduri, Oxford University Press, 1988).

The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents Vol. I published by Grotius

Publications Limited in the Cambridge International Documents covers the period up to November 1990 only but it contains a wealth of material on the historical background since the last century. A careful resume of the events preceding Iraq's aggression shows that any genuine grievances it had on oil prices were well on the way to being resolved. The stumbling block was the territorial question (vide *Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait* by Sreedhar; Strategic Analysis; October 1990; Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi). Iraq's case, documented in the letter by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Foreign Ministers the world over dated September 4, 1990 and in the White Paper entitled *Kuwait and its Historical and Legal Relations with Iraq* published by the Government of Iraq after it had annexed Kuwait, make pathetic reading. Britain's intrigues with the Sheikh of Kuwait against the Ottoman Empire cannot support Iraq's case.

Ms Tahira Mazhar, a Pakistani leftist of impeccable credentials, aptly remarked "It is amazing how Third World countries made Saddam a hero and his own people did not." (*Mainstream*, March 30, 1991) There is nothing heroic about a man who unleashes one war after another, without cause, on neighbouring countries, persists in his folly even when there is opportunity to change course and presides over the destruction and ruin of his *own* country.

The US and its allies encouraged Iraq in its war on Iran. The UN was stymied. This precedent was followed when, following Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the US decided to destroy Iraq as a power and ended up by destroying the country effectively. There is no cause for celebrating the "revival" of the UN. The US would, doubtless, have continued to condone Saddam Hussein's policies if only he had stopped short of imperilling US interests and acted to promote them along with his own.

The record on the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25 does not support her claim before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 1991 that he "felt stymied". According to Thomas L. Friedman "the State Department was uncertain on the basis of Ms Glaspie's own cable from Baghdad about the meeting that she delivered to Mr Hussein as forceful a message to keep his hands off Kuwait as she says she did" (*International Herald Tribune*; March 23, 1991).

Once it was decided to drive Saddam Hussein to the wall rather than negotiate with him, the UN Security Council was used to provide a fig leaf of legality. Resolutions flowed profusely in contrast to their

paucity on the Iran-Iraq war.

In such a situation a heavy duty rested on the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to make the correct position clear to all. He miserably failed to discharge it. Belatedly and then in a press interview to the Italian weekly *Panorama* published on January 28, he said that the war was not a UN war against Iraq but added that only the permission for the war had been issued by the Security Council. This interpretation was manifestly wrong. In a speech on January 28 Bush also claimed as "legitimate authority" the principle of "collective self-defence" and "12 Security Council Resolutions".

Article 51 of the UN Charter protects "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs" against a member of the UN "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary" to restore peace. Members are bound to report to the Council their exercise of the right. More, it "shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council". It was not even allowed to meet promptly in the instant case.

However, on November 8, 1990, Perez de Cuellar said that the US had no authority to wage war against Iraq unilaterally since the Council was seized of the matter. Any attempt to take military action against Iraq under Article 51 could, he added with exquisite delicacy, "face legal difficulties." Responding specifically to Bush's assertion a day before that the US could take action against Iraq under Article 51, in response to the appeal of the Emir of Kuwait, De Cuellar said that Article 51 was not available three months after Iraq's invasion.

This left Resolution 678 as the sole source of legitimacy. Its crucial para 2 reads thus "Authorises Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991 fully implements the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area".

Perez de Cuellar claimed on February 11 that the Security Council "has authorised all this" (the war) by its Resolution 678 and the view has been so readily accepted that the document has escaped scrutiny. It is totally opposed to the UN Charter which not only places on the Council (Article 24) the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" but lays down (Chapter VII) a precise scheme by which the responsibility should be discharged.

Briefly, it is by states assigning armed forces to the UN which will

be under "the strategic direction" of the Council's Military Staff Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of its five permanent members. The Committee has never functioned. In 1988 the USSR pleaded in vain for "reactivating" it.

Resolution 678 has no room for it but gives instead, a *carte blanche* ("authorises") to states "co-operating" with Kuwait "to use all necessary measures to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." However, the Council can act, as the Charter requires it to, only through the Committee. Failing that, the states retain the right of self-defence which, as de Cuellar said on November 8, has no application to the present case.

But the Council simply cannot abdicate its functions by giving the member states a "power of attorney" to act on its behalf under an open-ended resolution, free from the constraints of the Committee and, indeed, from the Council's own control as is evidenced by the way that body has been treated.

The British were very candid. The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs was informed that the coalition's aim was to remove Iraq's President. On January 27 Defence Secretary Tom King told the BBC that the coalition's aims went beyond the liberation of Kuwait. They covered the destruction of Iraq's military might and the coalition would not leave its task "half-finished".

He gave the game away by arguing that the Security Council's "ultimatum" Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorised Member States not only to implement earlier resolutions on Kuwait but also "to restore international peace and security in the area." So construed, the Resolution will be used as a *carte blanche* for imposing the West's schemes in the Gulf.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen sensed this early when he said on January 24 that the coalition was more interested in destroying Iraq than in liberating Kuwait. Three days later, even Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Boutros Ghali, told the BBC that UN resolution does not encompass either the destruction of Iraq's army or of its President but only the liberation of Kuwait.

Is it not strange that in a document of such momentous importance the use of armed force was not explicitly sanctioned? Resolution 665 (August 25) had explicitly referred to states "deploying maritime forces" in the Gulf and authorised them to enforce the embargo. The Security Council's resolutions in similar situation could not have been

unknown to the draftsmen of Resolution 678.

Its resolution of June 27, 1950 on Korea asked member states to assist the Republic of Korea "to repel the armed attack". Its resolution of July 13, 1960 on the Congo authorised the Secretary General "to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary." Its resolution of November 24, 1961 on Katanga's secession from the Congo empowered him "to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary" for defined ends.

The resolution of April 9, 1966 on Rhodesia is very apposite in that, like Resolution 678, it delegated the power to a state, the UK. It was authorised "to prevent by the use of force if necessary" breaking of the oil embargo.

The absence of such explicit language authorising use of force in Resolution 678 cannot be explained away as being implied in what is a formal document of grave consequence. Even the notorious Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed by the US Congress on August 10, 1964, authorised "all necessary steps, including the use of armed force". As Mr Henry Brandon said, it was used "to justify the escalation of the war (in Vietnam) and to handcuff Congress into sharing responsibility for it." Others alleged deceit.

In any case Resolution 678 even by its own terms cannot be stretched to justify the kind of war the US has unleashed on Iraq. Nor can the principle of collective self-defence. Two noted jurists, Dr Norman Bentwich and Dr Andrew Martin, aptly remarked in their commentary on the Charter that "Modern history is crowded with instances where aggression was committed under the cloak of self-defence."

A noted American jurist Dr Myres S. McDougal said that the right of self-defence was subject to the limitations "of necessity and of proportionality." According to a classic formulation by an American Secretary of State, the legendary Daniel Webster, "the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it." The attacks on Iraq cannot possibly fall within the ambit of self-defence.

However, all pretence of UN sanction stands exposed by the persistent obstruction in convening a meeting of the Security Council despite the fact that Para 4 of the Resolution 678 enjoins the States "to keep the Council regularly informed" and by Para 5 the Council "decides to remain seized of the matter." This nullifies the entire

resolution.

This is more than a procedural matter. It is the deliberate undermining of the authority of a vital organ of the UN which its Charter says (Article 8) "shall be so organised as to be able to function continuously." It bears "the primary responsibility" for keeping the peace. Rule 2 of its Rules of Procedure provide that "the President *shall* call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council."

Once, a President refused to follow this rule. On April 7, 1966, the US asked Ambassador Keita of Mali, President for the month, to convene a meeting urgently. More than 48 hours elapsed between the request and the meeting. The US rightly pointed out that Rule 2 is mandatory and that even if a majority of the Council members are opposed to a meeting, it must nevertheless be held. The President has a discretion "to set the time of a meeting" but he acts as a servant of the Council.

Mr Sidney D. Bailey opines in his authoritative work *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* that "the work of the Council would be brought to a halt if the President for the month were capriciously to flout the wishes of his colleagues." This has now come to pass.

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Jordan and India backed Yemen and Cuba in their request for a formal, open meeting of the Council only to be stalled by the US and UK with the cooperation of the Council's president Zaire. This happened for the first time in the UN's history.

On August 14 the Acting Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Valentin Lozinskiy, proposed the revival of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee (FBIS Sov; August 15, p. 13). Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had long been pressing for the Committee's revival even before the crisis. The plea was studiously ignored.

Resolution 674 of October 29 authorised the Secretary-General to "undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution". Resolution 678 was adopted on November 29 *before* he had made any such effort. He did so belatedly on January 13. The following exchange shows that even at that late hour there were bright prospects for an accord:

Perez de Cuellar: "Will you authorise me to notify the UN Security Council that you want negotiations to continue through the Secretary-General?"

President Hussein: Given the offer you have made, I believe this

a foregone conclusion. That is why I say that there are positive aspects to all the points you talked about. A continuation may lead to a deal.

Perez de Cuellar: Thank you for the trust you have shown in me as Secretary-General. I will consider these points *and present them in a report to be submitted to the UN Security Council.*" He did not.

Note that he asked Saddam Hussein for authority to say he wanted further talks and was given it on his request. De Cuellar suppressed this fact in his report. Instead he publicly cried failure knowing it would pave the way to war. No wonder he suppressed his report as well as the transcript of the talks from the public.

Saddam Hussein said that he knew that if the war erupted the people of Iraq "will pay dearly not because their adversaries are more courageous but simply because they have far more sophisticated weapons." He sinned against the light and the people of Iraq paid for his folly, dearly and instantly.

Perez de Cuellar was undoubtedly inept and supine. Yet, none can read the text of his public appeal to Saddam Hussein on January 15 without being struck by his sincerity *and* by the strongest possible hint of linkage which he offered to Saddam Hussein to save face.

The US Congress authorised the President to use force on January 12, 1991 only by a divided vote. The Senate vote was 52 to 47, the House of Representatives vote was 250 to 183. The resolution read thus:

"The President is authorised, subject to subsection (b) to use United Nations Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.

Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a) the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that:

(a) The United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsections (a); and

(b) That those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance."

However, unknown to Congress and to the UN, Bush signed orders authorizing the CIA "to aid rebel factions inside Iraq" to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the Associated Press reported quoting "several intelligence sources". Bush signed presidential "findings" about the same time that he ordered the air war against Iraq (*International Herald*

Tribune: April 4, 1991).

The record shows that even after Iraq accepted all the Security Council Resolutions, the US did not relent on its destructive course. "The world was horrified at the carnage and the brutality of the allied bombing on retreating defenceless forces in the last 12 days of the war", to quote Dr. Bernhelm Booss-Baunbeck of Roskilde University, Denmark (*Guardian Weekly*; March 31, 1991). The US persisted in imposing the most stringent terms possible on Iraq culminating in Resolution 686—a veritable Treaty of Versailles—which the Security Council adopted on March 2. The very next day Baker said that "the degree to which the coalition and other countries would actively prosecute their claims, I think might be affected to some degree by whether or not that regime is still in power" (*International Herald Tribune*; March 4, 1991). This was the principal American objective in the entire Gulf crisis.

Iran-Iraq Territorial Dispute

The major portion of the Iran-Iraqi frontier is a land boundary, but the southern-most 50 miles or so are on the river, Shatt-al-Arab. The boundary in this region runs along the low water mark of the left-east or the Iranian bank of the river subject to specific exceptions. Iraq succeeded to the frontier as defined in the Treaty of Erzerum, 1847 between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Under Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, "The Ottoman Government formally recognizes the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the City and Port of Muhammara, the island of Khizr, the anchorage and the land on the eastern bank—that is to say, the left bank—of the Shatt-al-Arab, which are in the possession of tribes recognised as belonging to Persia. Further, Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate freely without hindrance on the Shatt-al-Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of the two parties."

Britain and Russia, as mediating powers, gave explanations which were accepted by the Parties the import of which was that Turkey retained sovereignty over the whole of the river upto the eastern left bank subject to the exceptions relating to Muhammara and Khizr. Iran, however, asserted later that this sovereignty was in fact not exercised. It would seem that for some time, notwithstanding the Treaty, jurisdiction on the river boundary was jointly shared upto the point where both banks were in possession of Turkey, the *medium filum aquae* being regarded as the boundary. However, from 1918 onwards the Military Administration of Mesopotamia and later the Basrah Port Authorities assumed full jurisdiction over the Shatt-al-Arab water-way.

The Turco-Persian Protocol, signed on November 4, 1913 as a result of the British and Russian mediation, contained a comprehensive settlement of the boundary. The effect of the Treaties as Prof. Dr E. Lauterpacht sums up, "would appear to be to acknowledge Turkish sovereignty over whole river upto the normal low tide on the Persian Gulf subject to the recognition of 'certain specific rights of Persia' as set out in the Treaty."

A Boundary Delimitation Commission was set up under the Protocol and it delimited the frontier including that in the Shatt-al-Arab section in 1914. The Basrah Port Authorities had acquired jurisdiction over the water-way and this was strongly contested by Iran. On November 4,

1934 Iraq referred the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations which appointed Baron Alloisi of Italy as Rapporteur. As a result of his mediation, Iran and Iraq signed a boundary Treaty on July 4, 1937. The Treaty re-affirmed the Protocol and the frontier as defined by the 1914 Commission with an exception laid down in Article 2 which provides as follows: "The undersigned representatives further declare that Persia will not be entitled to any pretext whatsoever to put forward claims in regard to the regions situate on the right Bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, or to the territory on the left bank belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or parts of such tribes are established on the side bank or in the said territory."

Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty dealt with the right of navigation in the river Shatt-al-Arab. It provided that the river "shall remain open on equal terms to the trading vessels of all countries and to the vessels of war and other vessels of the two countries." It also stated that the "circumstances that the frontier. . . sometimes follows the low water mark and sometimes the *thalweg* or *medium filum aquae* shall not in any way affect the two High Contracting Parties' right of user along the whole length of the river." It will be observed that though the right of navigation accorded by the Treaty of Erzerum is limited to Persian vessels, the 1937 Treaty extends such rights to "trading vessels of all countries."

In sum, under the Treaty, the border between the two countries was the low water mark on the eastern side barring the short stretches near the Persian Ports of Khorramshah and Abbadan where it was fixed at the median line in mid channel. The Treaty envisaged that the Parties would conclude a comprehensive agreement on all matters concerning navigation, pilotage, etc. This was never done. A further provision of the Treaty that the ships using the river would have Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi flag, except in the vicinity of Khorramshah and Abbadan, led to much acrimony.

The result was that on April 19, 1969 Iran denounced the 1937 Treaty alleging Iraqi violations, to wit, Iraq's alleged collection of river tolls without giving Iran a share and the like. Iran declared that it would no longer pay toll to Iraq and that the Persian vessels would no longer fly the Iraqi flag. Iran further alleged that the 1937 Treaty was concluded for the convenience of British Naval Vessels using the high water way and that, in any event, the boundary as fixed by the Treaty meant a line that varied with the rise and fall of the tide, whereas the actual boundary in its view, should be a median line in mid sea as in

the case of Rhine, Danube, and other rivers which form international boundaries for part of the length.

In 1974 again there were clashes on the Shatt-al-Arab frontier which Iraq brought to the attention of the UN Security Council.

Iran and Iraq concluded a cease-fire agreement on March 7, 1974. On March 6, 1975, they arrived at an accord on the boundary dispute at Algiers as a result of Algerian mediation. This was followed by a formal Treaty settling the dispute finally which was signed at Baghdad on June 13, 1975 by the Foreign Ministers of both countries. Attached to it was a Protocol on the river frontier. In September 1980 Iraq tore up the Treaty and invaded Iran. A decade later Iraq agreed to abide by the Treaty a few days after it had invaded another neighbour, Kuwait.

Institut kurde de Paris

Iraq-Kuwait Territorial Dispute

There were disputes over oil, money, and borders between Iraq and Kuwait before Iraq attacked Kuwait on August 2, 1990 to settle them on its terms after the reconciliation talks at Jeddah broke down the day before.

Strictly speaking, there was no border dispute as such. It was something far graver—a territorial claim. Iraq claimed two Kuwaiti islands, Bubiyan and Warbah. It has two outlets to the Gulf but both are shared. One is the famous Shatt-al-Arab river which it shares with Iran and over which it went to war with it in 1980. The other waterway is Khawr Abd-Allah, which it shares with Kuwait. Right at its head lies the small Warbah island and just below it lies the large desolate sandbank, the Bubiyan island. These two mud flats would make access to the Iraq's Gulf port, Umm Qasr, more secure. The port is just above the border with Kuwait and was built only during the rule of the flamboyant Abd al-Karim Qasim who laid claim to the whole of Kuwait when it became independent in 1961 after the British relinquished their protectorate.

Iraq wanted to build a water terminal off the shore of Bubiyan. As it is, Umm Qasr has helped to reduce reliance on the ancient port of Basra which can be reached from the Gulf only after cruising up the Shatt-al-Arab. Umm Qasr offers direct berthing facilities on the Gulf itself. Iraq has no real dispute on the land border which is fairly well defined by agreements of 1923 and 1932 but is not demarcated on the ground despite repeated British, and later Kuwaiti, requests. Its demand is simple—give up the islands and the border demarcation will be done.

Behind this wrangle lay a chequered history. In 1716 a combination of Najdi tribes migrated to al-Qurain, as Kuwait was then known. In 1756 one of them, the Al-Sabah, consolidated their position as the hereditary rulers of Kuwait under their chief Sheikh Sabah. The dynasty has ruled since.

Kuwait was then a vassal of the Ottoman Empire which also ruled over Iraq. Its ruler was given the title of "Qaim-maqam" and he paid an annual tribute to the Ottoman Sultan. But this ended in 1896. The rest of the history followed the pattern with which we in India are familiar. On January 23, 1899, Britain signed a secret agreement with the Shaikh of Kuwait to exclude all other foreign presence. A month

earlier Britain had warned Turkey that if it sought to establish control over Kuwait, "a very inconvenient and disagreeable question would be raised."

Turkey acknowledged Kuwait's independence by a Convention in 1913 but it was not ratified because the next year Turkey was at war with Britain. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Kemalist Turkey renounced (Art. 16) all claims to territories other than those over which its sovereignty was recognised by the treaty. Thus was modern Turkey born.

Britain acquired from the League of Nations a mandate over the Ottoman territories of Palestine, Trans-Jordan and the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. These three became modern Iraq. A government was set up on June 20, 1920 and on July 11, 1921 King Faisal I was declared the Hashemite King of Iraq. The mandate over Iraq was surrendered on January 28, 1932 and Iraq became a member of the League of Nations later in the year.

Iraq recognised the border with Kuwait during this period. An exchange of letters between Sheikh Ahmad Al-Sabah and Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Iraq, in 1923 defined the border. By another exchange of letters of July 21 and August 10, 1932, between the Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri Pasha al-Said and the Ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Sabah, it was decided "to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait." It was clearly defined in the letters. And it was explicitly agreed that eight named islands "appertain to Kuwait". Warbah and Bubiyan were among them.

Kuwait gained full independence on June 19, 1961 when the Amir of Kuwait and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir William Luce, signed an Exchange of Notes whereby the Agreement of 1899 was terminated and Kuwait was recognised as a sovereign independent state. Britain undertook to help if Kuwait was attacked. Only six days later General Abd al-Karim Qasim, the President of Iraq declared that Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq". A formal statement was issued by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry on June 26 stating the legal grounds for the claim. They were typical of the arid legalism, the futile history and the shortsighted politics by which the Third World tears itself apart through border disputes and territorial claims—traditionally fertile sources of political confrontation and war. The Iraqi ground was as absurd as any—Kuwait was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire and its ruler was "a representative of the Governor of Basrah in Kuwait". And Iraq succeeded to the rights of the Province of Basrah.

As Iraq moved troops to the border, Kuwait invoked British aid under the agreement of 1961 and also appealed to the Security Council. On July 7, a British force, about 6,000 strong, was air-lifted to Kuwait and 'placed at the Ruler's disposal'. It was later replaced by an Arab League force to which Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) contributed. Kuwait was readily admitted as a full member of the Arab League but the Soviet Union vetoed its membership of the United Nations repeatedly in July and in November 1961.

Abd al-Karim Qasim was overthrown by a military coup on February 8, 1963 and the new Government of Iraq lost no time in initiating conciliation with Kuwait. Taking the cue, the Soviet Union changed its stand and Kuwait was duly accepted as the 111th member of the United Nations on May 7, 1963. There followed an event of crucial importance. On October 4, 1963, Iraq not only recognised Kuwait's independence but also its frontiers "in accordance with the definition of its boundaries contained in the letter dated July 21, 1932 of the Prime Minister of Iraq and the reply to the said letter dated August 10, 1932, of the ruler of Kuwait."

By these letters Iraq explicitly recognised Kuwaiti sovereignty over the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. The 1963 accord was embodied in Agreed Minutes signed at Baghdad on October 4, 1963 by the Prime Minister of Iraq, Major-General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakre, and his Kuwaiti counterpart, the heir apparent Shaikh Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah. Kuwait registered the Agreed Minutes as a Treaty with the United Nations.

Following its decision to withdraw from east of Suez, Britain concluded another exchange of Notes with Kuwait on May 13, 1968, terminating as from May 13, 1971 the defence accord of 1961. On March 20, 1973, Iraq, now under Saddam Hussein, attacked Kuwait and occupied a police post. However, the troops were withdrawn on April 6 when Iraq's Foreign Minister arrived for talks in Kuwait. The talks got nowhere. Kuwait was interested in the demarcation on the ground of the land border. Iraq was interested in Warbah and Bubiyan. It regarded the 1963 accord as a recognition of Kuwait's independence, not of its frontiers.

In 1990, Iraq challenged both by recourse to war.

Letters from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait Reaffirming the Kuwait-Iraq Boundary on 21 July 1932, and 10 August 1932, respectively

(a)

Nuri Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys
Office of the Council of Ministers,
Baghdad, 21 July 1932

I think Your Excellency will agree that the time has now come when it is desirable to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait.

I therefore request that the necessary action may be taken to obtain the agreement of the competent authority or authorities in Kuwait to the following description of the existing frontier between the two countries:

"From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdulla. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Kuwait."

(b)

Translation of a Letter from the Ruler of Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait, dated 10 August 1932.

With the hand of pleasure we have received your confidential letter dated the 7th instant (Rabi Thani 1351 (the 9th August, 1932), and have noted the contents of same, as well as the translation of the letter dated the 25th July, 1932, of His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Hon. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the translation of the letter dated the 21st July 1932, of His Excellency Nuri Pasha-as-Said, the Iraq Prime Minister, regarding the Iraq-Kuwait frontier. We also have noted from the Hon. The Political Resident's letter dated the 30th July, 1932, that the frontier proposed by the Iraq Prime Minister is approved of by His Majesty's Government. And,

therefore, we beg to inform you that we agree to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait as described in the Iraq Prime Minister's letter.

—Al Baharna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*

2

Agreed minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, recognition and related matters, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963

In response to the desire felt by both parties to eliminate all that blemishes the relations between both countries, the official Kuwaiti Delegation visiting the Republic of Iraq on an invitation from the Iraqi Prime Minister, held a meeting with the Iraqi Delegation in Baghdad on 4th October 1963.

The Kuwaiti Delegation was constituted as follows:

H.H. Shaikh Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah,

Heir Apparent and Prime Minister;

H.E. Shaikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Khalifa Khalid Al-Ghunaim, Minister of Commerce;

H.E. Ambassador Abdulrahman Ateeqi, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Iraqi Delegation was constituted as follows:

Major-General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakre, Prime Minister;

First General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, Minister of Defense and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Dr. Mahmoud Mohammad Al-Homsi, Minister of Commerce;

Mr. Mohammad Kayyara, Acting Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

The talks between the two delegations were conducted in an atmosphere rich in fraternal amity, tenacity to the Arab bond and consciousness of the close ties of neighbourliness and mutual interests.

Both sides affirming their deep-rooted desire in reinforcing their relations for the welfare of both countries, inspired by the high Arab

aims; and

Believing in the need to rectify all that blemished the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations as a result of the attitude of the past Kasim regime towards Kuwait before the dawn of the blessed revolution of the 14th of Ramadhan;

Convinced with the National duty dictating the inauguration of a new page consistent with the bonds and relations between the two Arab countries which are free from the artificial gap created by the past regime in Iraq;

Spurred by the belief of the two governments in the entity of the Arab Nation and the inevitability of its Unity:

And after the Iraqi side having seen the statement delivered by the Government of Kuwait at the Kuwaiti National Assembly on the 9th of April, 1963, embodying the desire of Kuwait to work for the termination, in due time, of the Agreement concluded with the United Kingdom:

The two delegations have agreed to the following:

1. The Republic of Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21.7.1932 and which was accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10.8.1932;

2. The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty, common interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity;

3. The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and economical co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical information.

In order to realize all the foregoing objectives, they shall immediately establish diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassadors.

In witness whereof the heads of the two delegations have appended their signatures unto these minutes.

Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah,
Head of Kuwaiti Delegation.

Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakre,
Head of Iraqi Delegation.

—Al Baharna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States.*

3

Treaty of friendship and co-operation between the USSR and the Republic of Iraq, 9 April 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic,

Firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-round co-operation between them accords with the national interests of both states and serves the cause of peace throughout the world and in the region of the Arab countries, the interests of the freedom of the peoples, their security and respect for sovereignty,

Believing that the strengthening of the solidarity of all the forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of the unity of the Arab states, on an anti-imperialist basis is an important means of struggle for a lasting peace and international security,

Inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and reaction, for the peoples' freedom, independence, and social progress,

Convinced that in the modern world international problems should be settled by means of co-operation and search for mutually acceptable solutions,

Reaffirming their peaceable foreign policy and loyalty to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Moved by a desire to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual trust, and striving to raise these relations to a new, still higher level, have decided to conclude the present Treaty and have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties declare that unbreakable friendship shall exist between the two countries and their peoples and all-round co-operation shall be developed in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic declare that they will co-operate closely and in all fields to ensure the con-

ditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each over all of its national resources.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties, consistently pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence of states with differing social systems, will, in conformity with their peaceable foreign policy, continue to work for world peace, relaxation of international tension, and general complete disarmament, embracing both nuclear and conventional types of armaments, under effective international control.

Article 4

Guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all peoples, the High Contracting Parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to wage a steadfast struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for the complete, final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, and to work for the full implementation without delay of the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The Parties will co-operate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 5

Attaching great importance to economic, technical and scientific co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen such co-operation and exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation, water conservation, development of oil and other natural resources, in the sphere of communications and in other sectors of the economy as well as in the training of national personnel. The Parties will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured-nation treatment.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties will further promote the development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, cinema, television, tour-

ism, sport and other fields.

The Parties will promote wider co-operation and direct ties between state bodies and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions of both states for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and accomplishments of the peoples of the two countries in various spheres.

Article 7

Attaching great importance to concerted action in the international arena in the interest of ensuring peace and security, as well as to the development of political co-operation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the High Contracting Parties will regularly consult each other at different levels on all important international issues affecting the interests of both states as well as on questions of the further development of bilateral relations.

Article 8

In the event of the development of situations endangering the peace of either Party or creating a threat to peace or a violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties shall contact each other without delay in order to agree their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or re-establishing peace.

Article 9

In the interests of the security of both countries, the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop co-operation in strengthening their defence capacity.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it will not enter into any alliance or take part in any groupings or states or in any actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges not to allow its territory to be used for the commission of any act that could militarily harm the other Party.

Article 11

The two High Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty and undertake not to enter into any

international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

The present Treaty is concluded for the term of fifteen years and shall be prolonged automatically for each subsequent five-year period, if neither of the High Contracting Parties declares its desire to terminate its operation, notifying the other High Contracting Party twelve months before the expiry of the term of operation of the Treaty.

Article 13

Any differences that may arise between the High Contracting Parties as regards interpretation of any provision of the present Treaty shall be settled bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow at the earliest possible date.

The present Treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the City of Baghdad on April 9, 1972, which corresponds to 25 Safar 1392, Hegira.

*For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics*
A. KOSYGIN

For the Iraqi Republic
A.H. AL BAKR

—*New Times* (Moscow), April 1972

4

The Algiers Accord on 6 March 1975

During the convocation of the OPEC summit conference in the Algerian capital and upon the initiative of President Houari Boumedienne, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein (Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council) met twice and conducted lengthy talks

on the relations between Iraq and Iran. These talks, attended by President Houari Boumedienne, were characterized by complete frankness and a sincere will from both parties to reach a final and permanent solution of all problems existing between their two countries in accordance with the principles of territorial integrity, border inviolability and noninterference in internal affairs.

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to:

First: Carry out a final delineation of their land boundaries in accordance with the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914.

Second: Demarcate their river boundaries according to the *thalweg* line.

Third: Accordingly, the two parties shall restore security and mutual confidence along their joint borders. They shall also commit themselves to carry out a strict and effective observation of their joint borders so as to put a final end to all infiltrations of a subversive nature wherever they may come from.

Fourth: The two parties have also agreed to consider the aforesaid arrangements as inseparable elements of a comprehensive solution. Consequently, any infringement of one of its components shall naturally contradict the spirit of the Algiers Accord. The two parties shall remain in constant contact with President Houari Boumedienne who shall provide, when necessary, Algeria's brotherly assistance whenever needed in order to apply these resolutions.

The two parties have decided to restore the traditional ties of good neighbourliness and friendship, in particular by eliminating all negative factors in their relations and through constant exchange of views on issues of mutual interest and promotion of mutual co-operation.

The two parties officially declare that the region ought to be secure from any foreign interference.

The Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Iran shall meet in the presence of Algeria's Foreign Minister on 15 March 1975 in Tehran in order to make working arrangements for the Iraqi-Iranian joint commission which was set up to apply the resolutions taken by mutual agreement as specified above. And in accordance with the desire of the two parties, Algeria shall be invited to the meetings of the Iraqi-Iranian joint commission. The commission shall determine its agenda and working procedures and hold meetings if necessary. The meetings shall be alternately held in Baghdad and Tehran.

His Majesty the Shah of Iran accepted with pleasure the invitation

extended to him by His Excellency President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to pay a state visit to Iraq. The date of the visit shall be fixed by mutual agreement.

On the other hand, Saddam Hussein agreed to visit Iran officially at a date to be fixed by the two parties.

H.M. the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein expressed their deep gratitude to President Houari Boumedienne, who, motivated by brotherly sentiments and a spirit of disinterestedness, worked for the establishment of a direct contact between the leaders of the two countries and consequently contributed to reviving a new era in the Iraqi-Iranian relations with a view to achieving the higher interest of the future of the region in question.

—*The Gulf War*, Majid Khadduri, OUP, 1988, pp. 199-222

5

Treaty concerning the frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq on 13 June 1975

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq,

Considering the sincere desire of the two Parties as expressed in the Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975, to achieve a final and lasting solution to all the problems pending between the two countries,

Considering that the two Parties have carried out the definitive redemarcation of their land frontier on the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the meetings of the Frontier Delimitation Commission of 1914 and have delimited their river frontier along the thalweg,

Considering their desire to restore security and mutual trust throughout the length of their common frontier,

Considering the ties of geographical proximity, history, religion, culture and civilization which bind the peoples of Iran and Iraq,

Desirous of strengthening their bonds of friendship and neighbourliness, expanding their economic and cultural relations and promoting exchange and human relations between their peoples on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity, the inviolability of

frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs,

Resolved to work towards the introduction of a new era in friendly relations between Iran and Iraq based on full respect for the national independence and sovereign equality of States.

Convinced that they are helping thereby to implement the principles and achieve the purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have decided to conclude this Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran:

His Excellency Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq:

His Excellency Saadoun Hamadi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State land frontier between Iraq and Iran shall be that which has been redemarcated on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning the redemarcation of the land frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this Treaty.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the state frontier in the Shatt Al Arab shall be that which has been delimited on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning the delimitation of the river frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this Treaty.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise strict and effective permanent control over the frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive nature from any source, on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning frontier security, and the annex thereto, attached to this Treaty.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the provisions of the three Protocols, and the annexes thereto, referred to in Articles 1, 2, and 3 above and attached to this Treaty as an integral part thereof shall be final and permanent. They shall not be infringed under any circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible elements of an over-all settlement. Accordingly, a breach of any of the components of this over-all settlement shall clearly be incompatible with the spirit of the Algiers Agreement.

Article 5

In keeping with the inviolability of the frontiers of the two States and strict respect for their territorial integrity, the High contracting Parties confirm that the course of their land and river frontiers shall be inviolable, permanent and final.

Article 6

1. In the event of a dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Treaty, the three Protocols or the annexes thereto, any solution to such a dispute shall strictly respect the course of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier referred to in Articles 1 and 2 above, and shall take into account the need to maintain security on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in accordance with Article 3 above.

2. Such disputes shall be resolved in the first instance by the High Contracting Parties, by means of direct bilateral negotiations to be held within two months after the date on which one of the Parties so requested.

3. If no agreement is reached, the High Contracting Parties shall have recourse, within a three-month period, to the good offices of a friendly third State.

4. Should one of the two Parties refuse to have recourse to good offices or should the good offices procedure fail, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration within a period of not more than one month after the date of such refusal or failure.

5. Should the High Contracting Parties disagree as to the arbitration procedure, one of the High Contracting Parties may have recourse, within 15 days after such disagreement was recorded, to a court of arbitration.

With a view to establish such a court of arbitration each of the High Contracting Parties shall, in respect of each dispute to be resolved, appoint one of its nationals as arbitrators and the two arbitrators shall choose an umpire. Should the High Contracting Parties fail to appoint their arbitrators within one month after the date on which one of the Parties received a request for arbitration from the other Party, or should the arbitrators fail to reach agreement on the choice of the umpire before that time-limit expires, the High Contracting Party which requested arbitration shall be entitled to request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the arbitrators or the umpire, in accordance with the procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

6. The decision of the court of arbitration shall be binding on and enforceable by the High Contracting Parties.

7. The High Contracting Parties shall each defray half the costs of arbitration.

Article 7

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 8

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its domestic law.

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Teheran.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty, the Three Protocols and the annexes thereto.

Done at Baghdad, on 13 June 1975.

(Signed)

Abbas Ali Khalatbary
*Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iran*

(Signed)

Saadoun Hamadi
*Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iraq*

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto were signed

in the presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council of the Revolution and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

(Signed)
—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

6

Protocol concerning the delimitation to the river frontier between Iran and Iraq

Pursuant to the decisions taken in the Algiers communique of 6 March 1975. The two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties hereby declare and recognize that the State river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt Al Arab has been delimited along the thalweg by the Mixed Iraqi-Iranian-Algerian Committee on the basis of the following:

1. The Teheran Protocol of 17 March 1975;
2. The record of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, signed at Baghdad on 20 April 1975, approving, *inter alia*, the record of the Committee to Delimit the River Frontier, signed on 16 April 1975 on board the Iraqi ship *El Thawra* in the Shatt Al Arab;
3. Common hydrographic charts, which have been verified on the spot and corrected and on which the geographical co-ordinates of the 1975 frontier crossing points have been indicated; these charts have been signed by the hydrographic experts of the Mixed Technical Commission and countersigned by the heads of the Iran, Iraq and Algerian delegations to the Committee. The said charts, listed hereinafter, are annexed to this Protocol and form an integral part thereof:

Chart No. 1: Entrance to the Shatt Al Arab, No. 3842, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No. 2: Inner Bar to Kabda Point, No. 3843, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No. 3: Kabda Point to Abadan, No. 3844, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No. 4: Abadan to Jazirat Ummat Tuwaylah, No. 3845,
published by the British Admiralty.

Article 2

1. The frontier line in the Shatt Al Arab shall follow the thalweg, i.e., the median line of the main navigable channel at the lowest navigable level, starting from the point at which the land frontier between Iran and Iraq enters the Shatt Al Arab and continuing to the sea.

2. The frontier line, as defined in paragraph 1 above, shall vary with changes brought about by natural causes in the main navigable channel. The frontier line shall not be affected by other changes unless the two Contracting Parties conclude a special agreement to that effect.

3. The occurrence of any of the changes referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be attested jointly by the competent technical authorities of the two Contracting Parties.

4. Any change in the bed of the Shatt Al Arab brought about by natural causes which would involve a change in the national character of the two States' respective territory or of landed property, constructions, or technical or other installations shall not change the course of the frontier line, which shall continue to follow the thalweg in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 above.

5. Unless an agreement is reached between the two Contracting Parties concerning the transfer of the frontier line to the new bed, the water shall be re-directed at the joint expense of both Parties to the bed existing in 1975—as marked on the four common charts listed in Article 1, paragraph 3, above—should one of the Parties so request within two years after the date on which the occurrence of the change was attested by either of the two Parties. Until such time, both Parties shall retain their previous rights of navigation and of use over the water of the new bed.

Article 3

1. The river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt Al Arab, as defined in Article 2 above, is represented by the relevant line drawn on the common charts referred to in Article 1, paragraph 3, above.

2. The two Contracting Parties have agreed to consider that the river frontier shall end at the straight line connecting the two banks of the Shatt Al Arab, at its mouth, at the astronomical lowest low-water mark. This straight line has been indicated on the common hydrographic charts referred to in Article 1, paragraph 3, above.

Article 4

The frontier line as defined in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Protocol shall also divide vertically the air space and the subsoil.

Article 5

With a view to eliminating any source of controversy, the two Contracting Parties shall establish a Mixed Iraqi-Iranian Commission to settle, within two months, any questions concerning the status of landed property, constructions, or technical or other installations, the national character of which may be affected by the delimitation of the Iranian-Iraqi river frontier, either through repurchase or compensation or any other suitable arrangement.

Article 6

Since the task of surveying the Shatt Al Arab has been completed and the common hydrographic chart referred to in Article 1, paragraph 3, above has been drawn up, the two Contracting Parties have agreed that a new survey of the Shatt Al Arab shall be carried out jointly, once every 10 years, with effect from the date of signature of this Protocol. However, each of the two Parties shall have the right to request new surveys, to be carried out jointly, before the expiry of the 10-year period.

The two Contracting Parties shall each defray half the cost of such surveys.

Article 7

1. Merchant vessels, State vessels and warships of the two Contracting Parties shall enjoy freedom of navigation in the Shatt Al Arab and in any part of the navigable channels in the territorial sea which lead to the mouth of the Shatt Al Arab, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial sea of each of the two countries.

2. Vessels of third countries used for purposes of trade shall enjoy freedom of navigation, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in the Shatt Al Arab and in any part of the navigable channels in the territorial sea which lead to the mouth of the Shatt Al Arab, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial sea of each of the two countries.

3. Either of the two Contracting Parties may authorize frontier warships visiting its ports to enter the Shatt Al Arab, provided such vessels do not belong to a country in a state of belligerency, armed conflict or war with either of the two Contracting Parties and provided

the other Party is so notified no less than 72 hours in advance.

4. The two Contracting Parties shall in every case refrain from authorizing the entry to the Shatt Al Arab of merchant vessels belonging to a country in a state of belligerency, armed conflict or war with either of the two Parties.

Article 8

1. Rules governing navigation in the Shatt Al Arab shall be drawn up by a mixed Iranian-Iraqi Commission, in accordance with the principle of equal rights of navigation for both States.

2. The two Contracting Parties shall establish a Commission to draw up rules governing the prevention and control of pollution in the Shatt Al Arab.

3. The two Contracting Parties undertake to conclude subsequent agreements on the questions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

Article 9

The two Contracting Parties recognize that the Shatt Al Arab is primarily an international waterway, and undertake to refrain from any operation that might hinder navigation in the Shatt Al Arab or in any part of those navigable channels in the territorial sea of either of the two countries that lead to the mouth of the Shatt Al Arab.

Done at Baghdad, on 13 June 1975.

(Signed)

ABBAS ALI KHALATBARY

*Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iran*

(Signed)

SAADOUN HAMADI

*Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq*

Signed in the presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council Revolution and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

(Signed)

—*The Gulf War, op.cit.*

7

UN Council Resolutions on Iran-Iraq War

On 23 September 1980, the President of the Council issued the following statement:

Members of the Security Council have today exchanged views in informal consultations on the extremely serious situation prevailing between Iran and Iraq. They have taken note of the sharp deterioration in relations and of the escalation in armed activity leading to loss of life and heavy material damage.

Members of the Council are deeply concerned that this conflict can prove increasingly serious and could pose a grave threat to international peace and security.

Members of the Council welcome and fully support the appeal of the Secretary-General, addressed to both parties on 22 September 1980, as well as the offer that he has made of his good offices to resolve the present conflict.

The members of the Council have asked me to appeal, on their behalf to the Governments of Iran and Iraq, as a first step towards a solution of the conflict, to desist from all armed activity and all acts that may worsen the present dangerous situation and to settle their dispute by peaceful means.

At its 2247th meeting, on 26 September 1980, the Council decided to invite the representative of Iraq to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "the situation between Iran and Iraq".

At its 2248th meeting on 28 September 1980, the Council decided to invite the representative of Japan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 479 of 28 September 1980

The Security Council

Having begun consideration of the item entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq",

Mindful that all Member States have undertaken, under the Charter of the United Nations, the obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all Member States are obliged to refrain their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq,

1. *Calls* upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means in conformity with principles of justice and international law;

2. *Urges* them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfillment of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Calls* upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;

4. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

Adopted unanimously at the 2248th meeting.

Resolution 514 (1982) adopted by the Security Council at its 2383rd meeting on 12 July 1982

The Security Council,

Having considered again the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq",

Deeply concerned about the prolongation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering peace and security,

Recalling the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the establishment of peace and security in the region requires strict adherence to these provisions,

Recalling that by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980, as well as the statement of its President of 5 November 1980 (S/14244),

Taking note of the efforts of mediation pursued notably by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his representative, as well as by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

1. *Calls* for a cease-fire and an immediate end to all military operations;

2. *Calls* further for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Decides* to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a report on the arrangement required for that purpose;

4. *Urges* that the mediation efforts be continued in a coordinated manner through the Secretary-General with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement acceptable to both sides of all the outstanding issues, on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

5. *Requests* all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution.

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

8

UN General Assembly Resolution of 22 October 1982

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled “Consequences of the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq”,

Noting the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, in which all States expressed their determination to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.

Reaffirming the principles that no State should acquire or occupy territories by the use of force, that whatever territories had been acquired in this way should be returned, that no act of aggression should be committed against any State, that the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of all States should be respected, that no State should try to interfere or intervene in the internal affairs of other States and that all differences or claims which may exist between States should be settled by peaceful means in order that peaceful relations should prevail among Member States,

Recalling resolutions 479 (1980) of 28 September 1980, 514 (1982) of 12 July 1982 and 522 (1982) of 4 October 1982 on the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq", unanimously adopted by the Security Council,

Further recalling the statements made by the President of the Security Council on 5 November 1980 and 15 July 1982,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 7 October 1982,

Considering that the Security Council has already called for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations,

Considering further that the prolongation of the conflict constitutes a violation of the obligations of Member States under the Charter,

1. *Considers* that the conflict between Iran and Iraq and its prolongation and recent escalation, resulting heavy losses in human lives and considerable material damage in a politically and economically strategic region, endanger international peace and security;

2. *Affirms* the necessity of achieving an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries as a preliminary step towards the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means in conformity with the principles of justice and international law;

3. *Calls upon* all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts, in consultation with the parties concerned, with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement;

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep Member States informed on the implementation of the present resolution.

—41st plenary meeting
22 October 1982

9

Resolution 522 (1982) adopted by the Security Council at its 2399th meeting on 4 October 1982

The Security Council,

Having considered again the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq",

Deploring the prolongation and the escalation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering peace and security,

Reaffirming that the restoration of peace and security in the region requires all Member States strictly to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980, as well as the statement of the President of the Council of 5 November 1980 (S/14244),

Further recalling its resolution 514 (1982), adopted unanimously on 12 July 1982 and the statement of the President of the Council of 15 July 1982 (S/15295),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/15293) of 15 July 1982,

1. *Urgently calls* again for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations;

2. *Reaffirms* its call for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Welcomes* the fact that one of the parties has already expressed its readiness to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 514 (1982) and calls upon the other to do likewise;

4. *Affirms* the necessity of implementing without further delay its decision to dispatch United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal;

5. *Reaffirms* the urgency of the continuation of the current mediation efforts;

6. *Reaffirms* its request to all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council

on the implementation of this resolution within 72 hours.

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

10

Resolution 540 (1983) adopted by the Security Council at its 2493rd meeting on 31 October 1983

The Security Council,

Having considered again the question “The situation between Iran and Iraq”,

Recalling its relevant resolutions and statements which, *inter alia*, call for a comprehensive cease-fire and an end to all military operations between the parties,

Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 20 June 1983 (S/15834) on the mission appointed by him to inspect civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to military attacks, and expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General for presenting a factual, balanced and objective account,

Also noting with appreciation and encouragement the assistance and co-operation given to the Secretary-General’s mission by the Governments of Iran and Iraq,

Deploring once again the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of civilian lives and extensive damage caused to cities, property and economic infrastructures,

Affirming the desirability of an objective examination of the causes of the war,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts with the parties concerned, with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement acceptable to both sides;

2. *Condemns* all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all their aspects, and calls for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas;

3. *Affirms* the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, calls on all States to respect this right and also calls upon the belligerents to cease immediately all hostilities in the region of the

Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other littoral States;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with the parties concerning ways to sustain and verify the cessation of hostilities, including the possible dispatch of United Nations observers, and to submit a report to Council on the results of these consultations;

5. *Calls* upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the Gulf;

6. *Calls* once more upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict and, thus, to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with the parties regarding immediate and effective implementation of this resolution.

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

11

Resolution 552 (1984) adopted by the Security Council at its 2546th meeting on 1 June 1984

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 21 May 1984 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S/16574) complaining against Iranian attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming the obligation of Member States to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace and security and its vital role to the stability of world economy,

Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security,

1. *Calls upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the right of free navigation;*

2. *Reaffirms the right of free navigation in international withdrawals and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities;*

3. *Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States that are not parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;*

4. *Condemns these attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;*

5. *Demands that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities;*

6. *Decides, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the situation in order to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area;*

7. *Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution;*

8. *Decides to remain seized of the matter.*

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

12

Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 582 (1986)

Deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a cease-fire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human life and material destruction,

Deploring the initiation and continuation of the conflict,

Deploring also the bombing of purely civilian population centers, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

Deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may take place.

Determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq,

Convinced that a comprehensive, just, honorable and durable settlement should be achieved between Iran and Iraq,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular the obligation of all member states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq,

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Demands* that, as a first step toward a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal and further requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in consultation with the parties and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council;

3. *Urges* that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

4. *Calls upon* Iran and Iraq to cooperate with the Secretary-General in implementing this resolution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations;

5. *Calls upon* all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;

7. *Recognizes* the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and the need for reconstruction efforts with appropriate international assistance once the conflict is ended and in this regard requests the Secretary-General to assign a team of experts to study the question of reconstruction and to report to the Security Council;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other states of the region measures to enhance the security and stability of the region;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of this resolution;

10. *Decides* to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to insure compliance with this resolution.

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

13

Iraq's reply to Security Council Resolution

Letter dated 23 July 1987 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 20 July 1987 and to inform you that the Iraqi Government has studied the text of Security Council resolution 598 (1987), adopted unanimously by the Council on 20 July 1987. The President of the Republic of Iraq has instructed me to transmit to you the position of the Iraqi Government, which is as follows:

1. The Iraqi Government welcomes the resolution and is ready to co-operate with you and with the Security Council so as to implement

it in good faith with a view to finding a comprehensive, just, lasting and honourable settlement of the conflict with Iran.

2. On the basis of the contents of the resolution and its binding character under Chapter VII of the Charter, it is, of course, obvious that Iran's clear approval of the resolution, confirmed to you, and its clear readiness to fulfil its obligations thereunder, without any terms or conditions, in good faith and with serious intent, are essential for the fulfilment of the corresponding obligations which rest upon us. In that regard, I have set forth in paragraph 1 above our complete readiness to cooperate with you in fulfilling those obligations in good faith with a view to finding a comprehensive, just, lasting and honourable settlement of the conflict.

3. In welcoming the resolution, the Iraqi Government proceeds from the premise that the text thereof is an integral and indivisible whole in respect of the contents, the time-limits and the measures for the implementation of all its paragraphs, and in particular from the premise of immediate and mutual advantage from its implementation to all the parties concerned.

4. The Iraqi Government takes the expression "without delay", which appears in paragraph 1 of the resolution to mean, that the withdrawal shall be completed within a period not exceeding 10 days from the date of the general cease-fire. The determination of this period derives from the precedent of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, which was effected within 10 days, between 10 and 20 June 1982, even though that withdrawal was unilateral and took place in the absence of a cease-fire from the other side.

5. The Iraqi Government takes the expression "without delay", which appears in paragraph 3 of the resolution and concerns the release and repatriation of prisoners-of-war, to mean that the prisoners shall be released and repatriated within a period not exceeding eight weeks from the date of the cease-fire. Furthermore, the Iraqi Government understands that this operation shall, in accordance with the third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, be effected in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and that this is a humanitarian and moral question having no connection in any way with the negotiations on other matters pending between the two countries.

6. The Iraqi Government is ready to co-operate with you sincerely in the mediation efforts entrusted to you in order to achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement in accordance with the

principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Iraqi Government will submit its proposals and define its position on other pending questions when negotiations commence concerning the comprehensive settlement, as called for in the resolution of the Security Council.

7. Iraq understands that, as soon as the cease-fire begins, it will be able to utilize its ports, its coasts and its internal and territorial waters and also that it will be able to enjoy, on a footing of equality with Iran, freedom of navigation in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf.

8. With regard to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Iraqi Government wishes to emphasize that it is ready to engage in consultations with you concerning the inquiry into responsibility for the conflict and its protraction and concerning the body to which this task should be entrusted.

9. The Iraqi Government welcomes the contents of paragraph 8 concerning measures to enhance the security and stability of the region, and proposes that, in the stage following the establishment of peace between Iraq and Iran, you convene a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States of the Arabian Gulf, under your auspices, to study ways and means of guaranteeing security, stability and the freedom of international navigation in the region of the Arabian Gulf, on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of the States concerned, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and observance of the provisions of international law.

10. Lastly, the Iraqi Government, in keeping with the nature of the resolution adopted by the Council and in the light of the strong desire of the international community to bring about peace as a matter of urgency, hopes that the period of time required for the submission of your report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution, in pursuance of paragraph 9, will be short so as to prevent any procrastination or delay from any quarter whatsoever.

(Signed) TARIQ AZIZ

*Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq*

—The Gulf War, op. cit.

14

Iran's reply to Security Council Resolution

The Islamic Republic of Iran on the Security Council resolution 598 (1987)

1. Resolution 598 (1987) has been formulated and adopted by the United States with the explicit intention of intervention in the Persian Gulf and the region, mustering support for Iraq and its supporters in the war, and the diversion of public opinion from the home front. None of these objectives correspond to the legitimate objective of seeking a just solution to the conflict.

2. Resolution 598 (1987) has been formulated without seeking consultation from the Islamic Republic of Iran. As it reflects the Iraqi formulae for the resolution of the conflict, it cannot therefore be considered a balanced, impartial, comprehensive and practical resolution.

3. If the United States and the countries supporting Iraq harbour the illusion that they can terminate the war in favour of Iraq through an unjust and partial resolution, they are well advised to review the experience of the Council over the past several years following the liberation of Khorramshahr and the expulsion of the Iraq forces of occupation from most of the occupied territory inside the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the victim of aggression, is the main party to determine how the war can be terminated, and no change can be effected in the course of the war as long as conditions of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not met.

4. The Security Council is obliged to explain why the Iran-Iraq war, exactly at the time when it is approaching its final stages, has turned into a breach of peace, thus necessitating recourse to Article 39 of the Charter. Ironically enough, the initiation of the war by Iraq on 22 September 1980 and occupation of a vast part of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a breach of world peace. The Security Council, however, chose to remain silent then. Little wonder, then, that the United States, in an outright show of support for Iraq even forced the Security Council to oppose the amendment of some permanent and non-permanent members of the Council as to considering the war from the very outset as a breach of peace.

5. The first Article of the United Nations Charter accords "suppres-

sion of aggression" priority over all other objectives. And yet, the Security Council in its first resolution regarding the conflict (resolution 479 dated 28 September 1980) called on Iran, a Member State of the United Nations, to practically submit to aggression. The Secretary-General, on the other hand, has, through his subtle initiatives, endeavoured to gradually compensate for the Council's "purposeful error". The recent hypocritical political manoeuvre of the United States forced the Security Council to support the aggressor once again and hence openly violate the first and foremost objective of the Charter.

6. The Security Council, by virtue of its submission to the resolution presented and actively pursued by the United States, has, in practical terms, turned itself into a party to the conflict. As such, the Security Council will not be able to play a positive and constructive role as regards the war, and it will find it expedient in the future to modify this position.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran had previously warned that the adoption of this resolution is a prelude to the expansion of tension and further exacerbation of the situation. What has transpired since its adoption points in the same direction. The United States immediately brought its armada into the Persian Gulf and intends to increase its military presence in the area. The incidents that took place in Saudi Arabia with American provocation and American military support for the export of Iraqi oil through Kuwait have soured the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and these countries. And military operations by Iraq are continuing unabated.

8. The United States increased presence and military provocations in the Persian Gulf which have led to further escalation of tension in the region constitute clear violations of paragraph 5 of resolution 598 (1987). As such, the United States is the first violator of the resolution whose formulation and adoption has been an American undertaking. If the Security Council is honestly committed to its own resolution, it follows that the Council must take a clearcut position on the violation of the resolution by United States.

9. The United States, through mounting pressure on the Security Council to adopt another resolution, seeks to take measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran and prepare the grounds for confrontation with Iran. Such efforts would only lead to the expansion of tension and further isolation of the Security Council from the political arena of the conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran would not hesitate to confront

any provocative measure on the part of the United States. However, the Security Council is well advised to realign its decisions with the principles enshrined in the Charter. Meanwhile, the best possible line of action lies in strengthening the positive aspects of the present resolution so that it would pave the way for future co-operation and adoption of constructive measures.

10. The crisis in the Persian Gulf is not unrelated to the question of the Iran-Iraq war. However, due to its significance and sensitivity, it calls for special attention. Failure in resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf will precipitate the expansion of the conflict to unpredictable dimensions. Therefore, any efforts to restore peace and security in the Persian Gulf must be accorded first priority. In this connection, paragraphs 5 and 8 constitute the critical parts of the resolution.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries in the region are, prior to and more than any other countries, interested in and committed to the stability and security in the Persian Gulf, freedom of navigation and the unimpeded flow of oil. The crisis in the Persian Gulf was initiated, perpetuated and expanded by Iraq and brought to a climax following the Kuwaiti invitation of superpowers and consequent military intervention by the United States. All these developments, and in particular the violation of paragraph 5 of the resolution due to the intensified United States military presence in the area, have adversely affected the possibility of action on the part of the Secretary-General, on the basis of paragraph 8 of the resolution, in connection with security and stability in the region.

12. Resolution of the crisis in the Persian Gulf lies in the commitment of both parties not to attack commercial ships, withdrawal of foreign forces from the area and strict observance of neutrality on the part of all littoral States, particularly Kuwait. Only the restoration of tranquillity in the Persian Gulf holds out any hope for positive political action regarding other aspects of the conflict.

13. Iraq has violated the terms of resolution 598 (1987) by launching several offensive operations immediately following its adoption. Some instances of these violations have been reported to the United Nations by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and are contained in documents S/18997 and S/19002. The Iraqi aerial attack against Tabriz is another clear and unequivocal example of Iraqi violation of resolution 598 (1987) and its hypocritical policy, which, ironically, was engineered by Iraq's supporters, and to its best satisfaction. While expectation of a minimum of consistency between

Iraq's words and deeds is most reasonable, it is not known for what reasons the Security Council has turned a blind eye in the face of such flagrant violations by Iraq of its resolution.

14. Pronouncement of Iraq as the aggressor and the party responsible for the conflict as well as determining damages and war reparations are essential for a thorough study of the conflict and formulation of a final solution. The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to co-operate with the Secretary-General in this field.

15. Resolution 598 (1987) has condemned once again the use of chemical weapons, bombardment of civilian quarters, attacks on ships and civilian aircraft and violation of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases. Yet, no practical measure has been foreseen to prevent the repetition of these crimes. The Islamic Republic of Iran is awaiting the response of the Secretary-General to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 10 August 1987 (S/19029) regarding the important issue of use of chemical weapons particularly after the Iraqi chemical attack on the city of Sardasht. The Islamic Republic of Iran is also prepared to consider any proposals on other aspects of the war related to international humanitarian law.

16. The Islamic Republic of Iran has submitted to the Secretary-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross various proposals for repatriation of different groups of POWs and, in some instances, has acted on unilateral basis. The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the ICRC for implementation of these proposals or any other proposals on the basis of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.

17. The eight-point plan of March 1985 of the Secretary-General has been the only practical plan thus far taking various aspects of the war into account which has not been in force due to Iraqi opposition. This plan is still a suitable ground for future efforts of the Secretary-General.

18. The Islamic Republic of Iran hereby renews its confidence in the Secretary-General and is prepared to continue co-operation with him within the framework of his independent efforts and initiatives.

19. Constructive and commendable endeavours of certain impartial members of the Security Council to arrive at a balanced and positive resolution did not reach the desired results. However, grounds have been laid so that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its co-

operation in a manner that would lead the Security Council to a just position. Undoubtedly, clearcut pronouncements on the responsibility of Iraq for the conflict, declared by some countries, constitute the most important element in the just resolution of the conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran takes note of all positive endeavours and expresses its appreciation.

—*The Gulf War, op. cit.*

15

*President Khamenei of Iran's letter to UN Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar on March 1988*

Excellency,

Please accept my warm greetings with best wishes for your Excellency's success in efforts to establish peace and justice.

As you are well aware, the fire of the war which was started by the Iraqi regime on 22 September, 1980 through an aggression against the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran has now gained unprecedented dimensions, bringing other countries into the war and even engulfing innocent civilians.

The killing of 290 innocent human beings, caused by the shooting down of an Airbus aircraft of the Islamic Republic of Iran by one of the American warships in the Persian Gulf, is a clear manifestation of this contention.

Under these circumstances, Your Excellency's efforts for the implementation of Resolution 598 is of particular importance.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always provided you with its assistance and support to achieve this objective.

In this context, we have decided to officially declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran—because of the importance it attaches to saving the lives of human beings and the establishment of justice and regional and international peace and security—accepts Security Council Resolution 598.

We hope that the official declaration of this position by the Islamic Republic of Iran would assist you in continuing your efforts, which have always received our support and appreciation.

—*Indian Express*

16

Agreement on non-interference in internal affairs and non-use of force between the Republic of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 27 March 1989

Out of their realization that protecting pan-Arab security from the dangers posed to the Arab states' sovereignty and security on the one hand and to world security and peace on the other requires prevalence of peaceful relations among the Arab states based on respecting sovereignty, preventing the use of force, resolving disputes by peaceful means, and not interfering in internal affairs; out of their belief in the principles of pan-Arab action grouping the Arab nation's sons and in the goals and principles of the Arab League Charter and also in the Collective Defense Pact and economic cooperation among the Arab League states; and also out of their recalling of the objectives and principles of the UN Charter and the bases of international law, the Republic of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have decided on the following:

Article 1: The two fraternal states pledge not to use force in the relations existing between them.

Article 2: The two fraternal states pledge to resolve any disputes that may emerge between them by the peaceful means approved in the Arab League Charter and the international law.

Article 3: Each of the two fraternal states will refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other state.

Article 4: This agreement will be subjected to endorsement in accordance with the procedures enacted in both fraternal states and will take effect as of the date of completing the exchange of the endorsement documents.

Signed in Baghdad on 20 Shaban 1409 Hegira, corresponding to 27 March 1989.

Signed for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, custodian of the two holy mosques and King of Saudi Arabia.

Signed for the Republic of Iraq by Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq. Baghdad, March 27, INA-President Saddam Hussein and King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz signed here today a second agreement on security coordination.

The agreement aims at enhancing security between the two countries and the Arab national security. The two sides agreed on setting up specialised committees to follow up implementation of articles of this agreement.

The two sides had before that signed an agreement on non-intervention in internal affairs, and prevention of the use of force between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

—FBIS-NES, 28 March 1989

17

*President Saddam Hussein's letter to Iranian leaders
on 21 April 1990*

Your Excellency Ali Khamenei;

Your Excellency Hashemi-Rafsanjani;

Peace be upon you;

I have on previous occasions during the war addressed you in an indirect manner through the Iraqi media, which were the only means available to us then to tell you what we wanted to say. In return, I heard what you said through your media. The most recent initiative we addressed to you, which stemmed from an undeniable intention to establish just and comprehensive peace, was the one we announced on 5 January 1990. However, so far we have not managed to achieve together the peace we wish to have between our two countries to move away together from the tragedies of war and the possibilities of it exploding again.

It is understandable that suspicions, doubts, and dubious explanations surround what is (good?) and what could be used to build hopes on. And now, without having to repeat our views, which we expressed earlier, you should express in return your views so that dialogue is not pushed further away from its rightful arena and constructive objectives, and so it does not start heading towards argument, in which differences might appear to overcome the agreements we wish to reach to realize actual, immediate, and comprehensive peace, not only between Iraq and Iran, but between the Arab nation and Iran, God willing.

I address you directly this time to propose in this blessed month,

during which the Muslims fast in hopes of gaining God's approval, to hold a direct meeting between us to be attended by God's servant, the sender of this message, and Mr. 'Izzat Ibrahim, as well as a team of our aides, in which you will be represented by 'Ali Khamenei and Hashemi-Rafsanjani and a team of your aides. I also suggest that the meeting be held in Holy Mecca, the Qiblah of the Muslims when praying to God and the ancient shelter where our lord Ibrahim established peace, or any other place we agree on. Let us work together to establish the peace expected by our people and the whole Islamic nation, thus sparing further bloodshed that might flow once again for one reason or another.

There is the potential for the forces that had a hand in stoking the sedition between Iran and Iraq to reignite war so as to keep peace out of our two countries.

You must, no doubt, be aware of the threats made by Zionism and certain super and major powers against Iraq and the Arab nation. Without a doubt, you must know that the idea is to give Zionism a free hand to spread corruption and bulldoze whoever stands in the way of injustice and thwarts its vicious designs in the region and works to remove its occupation of Arab Palestine and Jerusalem, which is cherished by every Muslim and all believers in God and his books and the hereafter.

These evil forces whose hopes we trust will, God willing, be frustrated and their arrows miss their targets, must—with the necessary means at their disposal—surely, want to reignite the bloody, armed conflict between Iran on the one hand and Iraq and the Arab nation on the other. Then the Muslims will not only have missed the opportunity to mobilize all their resources and capabilities to liberate their sanctities in Palestine, but will have forfeited a good deal of their assets.

We propose that what Iraq and Iran each aims to rightly attain is possible through face-to-face meetings between us. We will thus have forestalled our enemies who are out to spoil our desire for peace, if our peace intentions are sincere in accordance with what satisfies God and our peoples.

For our part, it is a deeply held desire, and we only wish that you and we each attain our respective, balanced inalienable rights.

I propose that you and I meet as soon as possible and that the meeting be held on the second day of 'id al-Fitr or on any other date that is agreed upon.

As for your visit to Mecca and the usual ceremonies set up by the host nation, in view of the bonds of brotherhood and mutual respect between us and our brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we will request our brother King Fahd Ibn-Abd-al-Aziz to order the necessary arrangements. The content of this letter has as yet to be communicated to him.

By way of facilitating this meeting, we suggest, and hope you will agree, that each of us have a representative in Tehran and Baghdad and that direct telephone communication be opened between the two capitals in the interest of the necessary contacts. May God be witness to this communication, and peace be upon you.

Signed Saddam Hussein, 26 Ramadan 1410 Hegira corresponding to 21 April 1990.

—*FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990*

18

President Saddam Hussein's letter to Iranian Islamic Revolution leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on 19 May 1990

Mr. Ali Khamenei,

Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,

I received your written letter dated 6 Shawwal 1410 Hegira (1 May 1990) in reply to our letter to you dated 26 Ramadan 1410 Hegira, corresponding to 21 April 1990. I and my brothers in the leadership read and re-read it several times. Although we understood from your letter that you agree to our proposal to hold a meeting between us at summit level in order to find a decisive and final solution to the outstanding problems between our countries which caused or resulted from the conflict, and we were pleased with that, the spirit of the letter itself was not as we had hoped. Because the letter contained cynical (mubattanah) terms at the beginning, and whenever there was an opportunity to use them, and harsh terms at the end.

Gentlemen, when we thought of writing directly to you, we considered all aspects of our special relationship and found that direct correspondence and the relationship it establishes is more effective in achieving direct contact and dialogue and that there isn't a better and

more beneficial and effective way to achieve the desired peace between Iraq and Iran, and in fact between the Arab nation and Iran. We know and assume that you also understand that peace between us cannot be achieved by one side only being convinced, while the other side is not equally convinced, or by one side only showing interest, while the other side does not show equal interest or share the same ideas, meanings, and methods.

Before writing our first letter, we recalled that we have used the strongest and perhaps the harshest terms against each other during the past 10 years. And despite the effect of that method on the conflict and war between us, it did not achieve peace. Your letter included such terms as "the imposed war" and "slow understanding". You also concluded your letter with the sentence "peace be upon those who heeded right guidance" (a term used by Prophet Muhammad in his messages to then Roman, Persian, and Abyssenian rulers asking them to convert to Islam) rather than the term "peace be upon you" which is normally used in such correspondence.

Because we want peace—only out of its great meanings to us and to our beliefs—our message contains conceptions and expressions in harmony with our human understanding and noble objectives. Thus, we have only used expressions which please God and the people. To start with, using these expressions does not mean a change in all our conceptions and views; rather, it means that we desire to open a new chapter which is closer to the other party and more capable of affecting it in the interest of the approach of peace, which we deem as a noble objective of benefit to our people and to humanity at large. And because this method is the proper and suitable method for such objectives and means, duty mandates that we should try and use a new way of addressing each other, which is different from the way used during the war and the time before. Moreover, using the expressions and vocabulary which were used during the war should not lead either of the two parties to believe that an extra capability has been added to what is known to be possessed by the two parties of the dispute. Neither does this help to bear out a matter as right. Furthermore, using appropriate expressions for such address, in case it does not add to his power and assist him—after depending on God—will not diminish any portion of its capability and will not diminish any established right, but would be a luminous path into the hearts which were burdened and gravely injured by war. This would help these hearts, in case they should opt for seeking the truth, and qualify them to do what is good

for the sake of establishing peace.

Therefore, we have found that what is appropriate for correspondence between us is that we should not confirm what we view as our right so that you might not rush to confirm what you view as your right, and thus there might not be an opportunity for the required psychological readiness so as we both might accept direct dialogue. By saying this, we do not mean to close the door to dialogue, which would open through the direct connection of what we both view as useful; so that each one of us would know the connection between the first step and the last step on the road of peace; so as to be able to view the peace process as a whole right from its very beginning; and to see the connection of what one deems his right to that which the other views as his right.

It is preferable that, as we pursue peace, neither of us should be preoccupied with the past at the expense of the future, because dwelling on the events of the past makes the one who does so in the eyes of our people—who are more capable of knowing the traits of each one of us—stand accused of being slow-witted. While saying this, we do not want to escape from the past, because you know, or can realize, that we are capable of presenting in the arena of debate about the inception of war and hostility and how it all began, sufficient documents which support our viewpoint in detail. You also know that documents are more effective in convincing the widest segment of our people and humanity at large than mere sayings and preconceptions of either of the two countries' leaderships.

You are fully aware that the questions on and preoccupation with this issue, if deemed to be a prelude for our discussions, considering that this would have chronological significance as you used to say before July 1990, requires time and effort to support the argument—a time period that will be as long as the war or longer than the war years. You are also well aware that each side to the conflict has its own story on when the conflict erupted. On this, each side bases its story on practical and legal facts different from the facts used by the other side. From this, it would become clear which party is entitled to describe the war as an imposed one and which party has the right to indicate that it sent messages rather than troops.

As for UN Security Council Resolution 598, we have viewed it, since our acceptance of this resolution when it was issued in July 1987, as a comprehensive and durable peace plan containing what the two countries can agree upon. We have noted that the principles and

provisions contained in it would help us reach an agreement. That is why we have adhered and continue to adhere to the need to implement the resolution on the basis of this understanding. While pursuing peace, we base our positions on the equal desire of both countries for peace and their awareness of the benefits that they stand to draw from such peace. We also believe that they have the same enthusiasm for attaining this peace. Therefore, neither of the two sides to the conflict is asked to pay an advance price for the direct meeting. The only prerequisites are a serious desire for peace and the use of significant practical terminology. When peace is achieved, it is taken for granted that the army of each country will be on its own territory and that it will not have a presence on any hilltop or inch of territory or in the territorial waters of the other country—the developments created by special circumstances and considerations relating to the cease-fire and the no war, no peace situation.

You have said in your message that you withdrew from Iraqi territory and here you are referring to your withdrawal from Halabjah under special and well-known circumstances, to the end of the sentence.

Our comment on this is that we withdrew from your lands which our armies entered under well-known circumstances at the outset of the armed conflict in 1980. This withdrawal took place on 20 June 1982 after we had announced the withdrawal decision in our news media on 10 June 1982. In this announcement, we said that we would withdraw within a maximum of 10 days. This was actually carried out. As for your troop withdrawal from Halabjah, it was carried out under special combat conditions which are different from the conditions under which our armies withdrew.

Hence, if you consider your withdrawal from Halabjah, which was implemented under special circumstances, evidence of good faith showing that you do not covet anybody's territory, it would be a more powerful argument for us to say that our withdrawal from your lands in 1982 and after the fourth Tawakkalna 'Al-allah battles in the southern and central sectors in July 1988 were further evidence, to be added to other pieces of evidence, showing our good faith and the lack of a desire on Iraq's part to keep any inch of Iranian territory.

Anyhow, we believe that peace means that no side should usurp any inalienable right of the other side. It also means that each side to the conflict should not keep any inch of the other side's territory or territorial waters. This is the policy which we have been reiterating and

adhering to in the most precarious and hostile circumstances. Therefore, it is only natural that we will adhere to this policy at a time when we are urging you to adhere to it while conducting peace negotiations and to help achieve peace, God willing.

From your reply to the inquiries our ambassador in Geneva presented to your ambassador there about what was cited in your letter to us on a preliminary meeting between representatives from both sides, we have learned that you prefer this method in preparing for a summit meeting. We agree to this arrangement and have authorized Barazan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, our ambassador in Geneva, to hold talks with Sirus Naseri, your ambassador there.

We are of the opinion that the task of our two representatives is to exchange views on the positions of both sides so that each side can familiarize itself with the other side's position vis-a-vis the issues that are of concern to us. The two representatives might be able to agree on some points in a manner that will clarify the picture for us when we meet on the summit level. This may also facilitate our mission, provided that the points of disagreement are left for the summit meeting.

As for the venue of the summit, we are still awaiting a definite answer from you because we did not find in your reply a decisive opinion about the venue we proposed, that is, holy Mecca. This might also be one of the topics to be discussed by the two representatives.

As for who will attend the summit, we still believe that a summit meeting should comprise all basic decision-makers in the two countries, provided that you really accept the idea of a meeting on the summit level and, depending on God, seek to attain this aim together with us because the attendance of both of us on the summit level is a test of the seriousness of this trend to settle matters by final solutions acceptable to the two sides. If this, with God's help, is achieved, a lasting and comprehensive peace will prevail. Keeping the basic decisionmakers, who can say no or yes, outside the summit will affect the implementation of what is agreed on and influence the degree of commitment to it. Excluding them will not serve the purpose nor adequately reassure them and this might lead to obstructing or amending any decisions reached during the summit.

Moreover, peace begins where its psychological beginning starts—inside those who weave its threads, so that it will remain constant in the heart. Therefore, the one who participates in making peace right from the beginning will find out that he is ethically and psychologically

responsible for implementing and abiding by it. Moreover, the presence of all decisionmakers will dismiss any excuse that might complicate or delay the peace process after agreeing to it. Therefore, we reaffirm our proposal that the summit meeting be attended on our side by the chairman of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and president of the republic and by the RCC vice chairman, and on the Iranian side by Mr. Ali Khamenei and Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. God stand witness to our good intention. Peace be upon you.

Signed Saddam Hussein, Baghdad 24 Shawwal 1410 Hegira, corresponding to 19 May 1990.

—FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990

19

President Saddam Hussein's cable to Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on 30 July 1990

Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Peace be upon you;

After an in-depth consideration of what should be considered, and after a detailed review of the development of relations and state of affairs between Iraq and Iran and of the dangers posed to the region, and in pursuance of our role of proposing initiatives that provide wider chances for the achievement of peace, we found ourselves—in accordance with our national responsibility and the human responsibility placed on our shoulders by our great principles—duty bound to propose a new initiative.

Since our initiative this time addresses within one framework and in detail all the substantive issues enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution No. 598, it is hoped it will be approached in this light and seriously enough not to deny our two peoples the opportunity to live in peace, the details of which we will have to work out so as to forestall enemy plans to push our two countries back to the pre-25 August 1988 state of affairs with the result that neither of us will have anything to gain.

The treacherous forces of darkness, given that the war between the two countries has not legally ended, may be tempted to reignite it. As

you know, just as a huge blaze may be started by a spark, the war between us may be reignited by what may initially seem to be a trivial affair, and the sinister forces who are lying in wait might be tempted by their powerlessness to embroil the two countries or one of them in a war. They might be alarmed by the two countries' stockpiles of weapons, and they might be interested to learn about the performance of all or some of these arms and so incite someone to spark war using their cunning, giving a land border 1,200 kms long and sea borders 800 kms long.

With the potential there for a major flare up, given the massive array of weapons, it need not be supposed that there must be one. However, the possibility remains that somehow or other and under this or that influence, someone may open fire and thus drag the whole army along with him. The result would thus be the greater loss to all of us and gain to the ill-intentioned, as we have already pointed out. -

Since such a development is the wish of neither Iraq nor Iran as has been made plain by their representatives, we are duty bound not just to attain peace but to do it as soon as possible, in order to foil the dreams of darkness and evildoers.

Accordingly, I propose the following:

1. I am relaunching the proposal of a prompt meeting between the heads of state of the two countries in a place to be agreed upon to work out the terms for a comprehensive and durable peace.

2. The discussions and agreement should address all outstanding issues. It will not be acceptable for either side to raise any issue without the approval of the other side once the comprehensive agreement is concluded. Otherwise it will count as a violation of the agreement. Whatever subsidiary details are subsequently worked out must be based on Resolution No. 598. It must be understood that the idea of the resolution is the establishment of comprehensive and durable peace only through dialogue and that the components of the agreement should be part of an indivisible whole and in the form of an integrated inter-related package and that the breach of any of its articles will count as a breach of all of its articles.

3. It should be immaterial which subjects are chosen to initiate the dialogue. But agreement on one or some of the points at issue will be subject to agreement on the other points and according to item 2 of this letter. Accordingly, each of the two interlocutors will have the right to respond to any unilateral announcement by the other as it deems fit, including the right to reject the partial agreement on any

of the items of the dialogue.

4. The withdrawal should take place within a maximum of two months from the date of the final ratification of the comprehensive agreement we work out, and the shorter the period the better. Every step taken by either of the two parties to the dispute should be coordinated with the other side and there should be reciprocal commitment to implementation.

5. We still look at the POW issue as being governed by the Geneva Conventions. We, therefore, assume that their release should have been completed in accordance with the articles of this agreement. Two years have passed since the ceasefire, during which time their release should have been completed under this agreement. Notwithstanding, and to facilitate the peace process, and according to the bases indicated, there is no reason why agreement should not be reached on a prisoner release timetable within the period specified in Article 4 (no later than two months) beginning with the final ratification date, and preferably sooner.

6. Dialogue on the Shatt al-Arab must be conducted under the following three headings:

(a) Iraq should have complete sovereignty as a legitimate historical right.

(b) Iraq should have sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab and the Thalweg line law should be applied regarding navigational rights between Iraq and Iran including the fishing rights, joint administration of navigation, and splitting profits thereof.

(c) The referral of the Shatt al-Arab issue to arbitration according to a formula to be worked out by the two sides, with each committing itself to prior abidance by its ruling. Pending the resolution of the issue through arbitration, the Shatt al-Arab is to be cleared so as to make it fit for navigation in accordance with a formula to be devised by the two sides.

Agreement will be on the understanding that the two sides will together decide on any of the three headings listed above, considering that the first heading represents Iraq's right and that the second and third headings represent Iran's wish.

7. We could agree to drop paragraph six of Resolution 598 from the discussion and even ignore this paragraph completely, because it is of no benefit to peace; indeed, it hinders peace, and its results may lead to rancor, hatred and revenge in the future, while peace between the Iraqi and Iranian people requires a different course. The UN

secretary-general should be informed officially and in writing of the agreement we may reach.

8. None of the above steps, which will be contained in the peace agreement between Iraq and Iran, should be implemented before all legislative procedures to approve it have been completed in accordance with the constitutions of both countries. This would make these steps legally and constitutionally final, valid, and irrevocable, in part or in total. Instruments of ratification should be deposited with the UN secretary general at a specific time agreed upon by the two parties.

9. The new peace agreement between Iraq and Iran should include everything we agreed upon. For a speedy achievement of the peace agreement, it may contain—together with the new topics and the issues of the land border and other rights—some points in earlier agreements between the two countries without this affecting the items mentioned in this letter. *

10. The agreements should include clear principles as to the establishment of relations of good neighborliness, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual respect of the options of both sides in terms of the political, economic, and social systems, and unequivocal recognition of the freedom of navigation in all its forms in international waters in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

11. It might be appropriate that an international party approved by the Security Council guarantee the best implementation of the agreement.

12. Although we know that the international situation does not warrant us attaching great hopes to receiving assistance for the reconstruction process, we are of the view that international assistance provided in accordance with paragraph seven be divided equally between Iraq and Iran.

13. To facilitate contacts between us, and in light of the positive developments in our relations, we believe that we should reopen our embassies in Tehran and Baghdad, especially since they remained open during the war and were closed only in September 1987.

This, Mr. President, is what appeared to us as something that can achieve lasting and comprehensive peace between Iraq and Iran. It is an integrated and indivisible proposal inspired by our experience and the talks between our representatives in Geneva, Naseri and Barazan.

With this, everything will have become clear, leaving no room for misinterpretation of the rapid, genuine, and comprehensive peace we are looking for.

God is great.

With best wishes to you, and through you to the Iranian leadership.

Signed Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq,

Dated 8 Muharram 1411 Hegira, corresponding to 30 July 1990, Baghdad.

—*FBIS-NES*, 23 August 1990

20

Assistant Secretary of State, John Kelly's remarks to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 31 July 1990

The Persian Gulf continues to be an area of tension and instability. It is also an area where we continue to have vital interests. Therefore we intend to do all we can to support our friends when they are threatened and to preserve stability. You are aware of the threats and intimidation which brought about the current rise in tension in the Gulf. The U.S. responded by speaking out publicly against these Iraqi tactics. We have consulted both with Arab governments and with friends and allies in Europe and Asia.

In the Gulf region we are conducting an air refueling exercise with the United Arab Emirates. This involves two KC-135 tankers and one C-141 cargo plane with maintenance equipment. This exercise grew out of discussions between our two governments and is designed to insure that we have the capability to work effectively with friends in the area. U.S. navy ships in the Gulf have increased their vigilance. We plan to maintain a naval presence in the Gulf for the foreseeable future as we have during every administration since that of President Truman.

In response to the rise in tensions, Arab leaders took the initiative to start a mediation effort. We have welcomed the efforts of President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussein of Jordan to defuse the crisis.

Meetings among Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi Arabian representatives were to have begun today in Jeddah with the aim of reducing the tension and resolving the differences. We strongly support these efforts.

Iraq is a major power in the region. This power carries responsibility with it. We would hope that Iraq could act in a manner that demonstrates it appreciates this point.

Historically, the U.S. has taken no position on the border disputes in the area, nor on matters pertaining to internal OPEC deliberations, but the U.S. has taken a strong position in support of the sovereignty of all States in the area.

The Administration, together with the Congress and this Committee, has been increasingly concerned about Iraqi conduct and activities. Human rights issues as well as Iraqi attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and long range missile delivery systems and Iraq's apparent readiness to use military force to achieve its aims are a cause for grave concern.

Peace Process: This Administration remains committed to the task of advancing the peace process in practical ways. As the president stated on June 20.

—USIS, New Delhi

21

President Bush's remarks on 2 August 1990

Let me make a brief statement here about recent events. The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. We call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Iraqi forces. There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world. And I have taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the events that have taken place.

Last night I instructed our ambassador at the United Nations, Tom Pickering, to work with Kuwait in convening an emergency meeting of the Security Council. It was convened, and I am grateful for that quick, overwhelming vote condemning the Iraqi action and calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Tom Pickering will be here in a bit, and we are contemplating with him further U.N. actions:

Second, consistent with my authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, I've signed an Executive Order early this morning freezing Iraqi assets in this country and prohibiting transactions with Iraq. I've also signed an Executive Order freezing

Kuwaiti assets. That's to ensure that those assets are not interfered with by the illegitimate authority that is now occupying Kuwait. We call upon other governments to take similar action.

Third, the Department of State has been in touch with governments around the world urging that they, too, condemn the Iraqi aggression and consult to determine what measures should be taken to bring an end to this totally unjustified act. It is important that the international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces depart Kuwait immediately.

Needless to say, we view the situation with the utmost gravity. We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our long-standing vital interests in the Gulf. And I'm meeting this morning with my senior advisors here to consider all possible options available to us. I've talked to Secretary Baker just now; General Scowcroft and I were on the phone with him. And we will—after this meeting, I will proceed to deliver a long-standing speech. I will have consultations—short ones—there in Aspen with Prime Minister Thatcher and I will be returning home this evening and I'll be here in Washington tomorrow.

I might say on a much more pleasant note, I just hung up from talking to Mr. and Mrs. Swanson, the parents of Tim Swanson, the Peace Corps volunteer who has been held against his will, held hostage or kidnapped there in the Philippines. And I want to thank everybody in the U.S. government that was so instrumental in working for his release. And, Bob, I hope you'll convey to the ambassador and to others in our Philippines country team.

Question: Do you contemplate intervention as one of your options?

Answer: We're not discussing intervention. I would not discuss any military options even if we'd agreed upon them. But one of the things I want to do at this meeting is hear from our secretary of defense, our chairman and others. But I'm not contemplating such actions . . .

Q: Are you planning to break relations?

A: You've heard me say over and over again, however, that we are dependent for close to 50 per cent of our energy requirements on the Middle East. And this is one of the reasons I felt that we have to not let our guard down around the world.

Q: Are you contemplating breaking diplomatic relations?

A: I'm discussing this matter with our top advisors here in just a minute.

Q: Is this action, in your view, limited to Kuwait?

A: I've seen—there's no evidence to the contrary. But what I want to do is have it limited back to Iraq and have this invasion be reversed and have them get out of Kuwait.

Q: Do you think Saudi Arabia's threatened or any of the other Emirates?

A: I think Saudi Arabia is very concerned and I want to hear from our top officials here, our director of intelligence and others as to the worldwide implications of this illegal action that has been condemned by the United Nations.

Q: And you were taken by surprise?

A: Not totally by surprise, because we have good intelligence and our intelligence has had me concerned for sometime here about what action might be taken. . .

—USIS, New Delhi

22

*Soviet statement on Iraq-Kuwait conflict on
2 August 1990*

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh read out the Soviet Government's statement regarding the invasion of the territory of neighbouring Kuwait by Iraqi troops.

"Relations between Iraq and Kuwait have sharply deteriorated in recent time. An Iraq-Kuwait summit was held to deal with the contentious issues between the two sides, but it ended without results. In the morning on August 2 Iraqi troops invaded the territory of neighbouring Kuwait.

"The Soviet Union believes that no contentious issues, no matter how complicated, justify the use of force. Such events totally contradict the interests of Arab states, create new, additional obstacles to the settlement of conflicts in the Middle East and run counter to the positive tendencies of improvement in international life.

"The Soviet Government is convinced that the elimination of dangerous tension in the Persian Gulf would promote the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory. The sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of

Kuwait must be fully restored and defended.”

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

23

Resolution 660 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting on 2 August 1990

The Security Council,

Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq,

Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;*
2. *Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the position in which they were located on 1st August 1990;*
3. *Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regards, and especially those of the League of Arab States;*
4. *Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.*

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

24

Statement by official spokesman of India on 3 August 1990

The Government of India regrets that it did not become possible for the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq to settle their differences in a peaceful manner. It is well-known that the Government of India is opposed to use of force in any form in relations between States. We sincerely hope that Iraq would soon withdraw its troops and have noted

the Iraqi statements in this regard. We also hope the various consultations that are going on in multilateral fora, including the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, would facilitate this process.

—External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi

25

The Arab League's resolution of 3 August 1990

1. To condemn the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, to reject any consequences resulting from such aggression, and not to recognize its repercussions;

2. To denounce bloodshed and the destruction of installations;

3. To ask Iraq for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces to their positions prior to 1 August 1990;

4. To raise this matter with their majesties, highnesses, and excellencies, heads of the Arab countries, to consider the convening of an emergency summit conference to discuss the aggression and to find ways to reach a permanent negotiated solution acceptable to the parties concerned in line with the Arab nation's heritage and the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity and with the existing Arab legal system;

5. To affirm the Council's firm commitment to preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, to reiterate its concern for the principles stipulated by the Arab League Charter on not resorting to the use of force to resolve disputes that may arise among the member states, to respect these states' current internal systems, and not to undertake any action aimed at introducing changes in these systems; and

6. To categorically reject any foreign intervention or attempt to intervene in Arab affairs, to entrust the secretary-general with following up on the implementation of this resolution and informing the Council of any developments, and to consider the Council's extraordinary meeting as in continuous session.

[Fourteen countries endorsed this resolution while six other countries abstained and rejected it. They are: Yemen, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Sudan and Mauritania.]

The resolution stated that the Arab League Council issued this resolution at its extraordinary session, which opened in Cairo yesterday.

Thursday, at Kuwait's request to discuss the Iraqi aggression, in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Arab League Charter, Article 2 of the joint defense pact and economic cooperation among the Arab League countries and Article 2 of the Arab solidarity covenant, which was endorsed by the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.

—FBIS-NES, 6 August 1991

26

Gulf Co-operation Council: Ministerial Council statement on 3 August 1990

The Ministerial Council of the Gulf Co-operation Council has condemned "the Iraqi aggression" against the fraternal State of Kuwait and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces to the positions they held before 1st August 1990.

In a statement it issued following its emergency meeting in Cairo today on the periphery of the Islamic conference, the GCC Ministerial Council declared its rejection of aggression and of any resulting effects and its non-recognition of its consequences. It called on the Arab League to take a united Arab stand on the basis of the principles and spirit of the Arab League Charter to end the aggression and remove its effects and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fraternal State of Kuwait.

In the statement, the GCC Ministerial Council expressed its utmost denunciation of and deep regret over this aggression by one fraternal Arab country against another, an aggression which shows disregard for all the bonds and ties that link the fraternal Arab countries and is contrary to all relations of fraternity and neighbourliness.

The statement noted that the Council held a meeting under its current chairman, Yusuf Bin Alawi, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and in the presence of UAE Foreign Minister Shaykh Rashid Abdullah al-Nu'aymi, Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad Bin Mubarak Al Khalifah, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, Qatari Foreign Minister Mubarak Bin Ali al-Khatir and Abdal-Rahman al-Awadi, Kuwaiti Minister for Cabinet Affairs, to examine the dangerous situation arising from the Iraqi aggression

against Kuwait and the consequences resulting from such aggression, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of a member of the GCC, the Arab League and UN as well as a blatant violation of all Arab, Islamic and international charters, norms and laws.

The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Co-operation Council member countries issued a statement this evening in which they emphasised their opinion that point six of the resolution issued by the Arab League Council's emergency meeting, stating the Council's absolute rejection of any intervention in Arab affairs, does not apply to collective international measures at the UN and Security Council.

The statement, which was read by Omani Foreign Minister, Yusuf Bin Alawi, said that, proceeding from the commitment to the UN and Arab League Charters, the UN is the international body charged with maintaining security and peace in the world.

The statement added that UN resolutions and measures cannot be considered foreign intervention because the Arab League Charter stipulates adherence to them.

—*The Gulf Crisis*, Edited by A.H.H.Abidi and K.R.Singh

27

*Mr. Tariq Aziz's letter to Arab League's Secretary General
Chedli Klibi*

His Excellency Chedli Klibi, Secretary General of the Arab League, Tunis.

I would like to refer to the resolution that the Arab League Council adopted in its extraordinary session in Cairo on 3 August 1990, and to note that the aforementioned resolution is based, among other things, on the provisions of Article Six of the Arab League Charter. In view of the fact that this article clearly stipulates the need for unanimity in adopting resolutions based on this article's provisions, and because the aforementioned decision was opposed by four of the member states, it will then be considered null and void with no effect whatsoever.

Please circulate this letter among the member states.

Please accept my respect.

Signed Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, Baghdad, 13 Muharram 1411 of the Hegira, corresponding to 4 August 1990.

—FBIS-NES, 6 August 1990

28

OIC statement on 4 August 1990

The text of the statement issued by the Islamic states Foreign Ministers' conference on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait:

The Conference received with deep regret the news of the tragic events which occurred between Iraq and Kuwait, two OIC members. These events coincided with the convening of this Conference and took place at a time when hopes were pinned on the imminent success of direct contacts which sincere brotherly Arab good offices have made to contain the crisis between two fraternal countries and achieve a peaceful settlement to resolve their differences.

The Conference expresses its support for the statement which His Excellency the OIC Secretary-General issued in this regard on 11th Muharram 1411, corresponding to 2nd August 1990.

The Conference condemns the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, rejects all its effects and does not recognise its consequences. The Conference calls for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory and the return of these forces to the positions they occupied before 10th Muharram 1411, corresponding to 1st August 1990. It also calls for abidance by the principles of the OIC Charter, particularly its provision regarding the need to settle conflicts between member states by peaceful means and non-interference in the internal affairs of any state. It also calls on the two countries to take into consideration the requirements of good-neighbourliness; not to try to change the internal regime in either of them by force; to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each state; and to refrain from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of either of them. •

—*The Gulf Crisis*, Edited by A.H.H.Abidi and K.R.Singh

29

Joint statement issued by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker at Moscow on 5 August 1990

"The Soviet Union and the United States as members of the United Nations Security Council consider it important that the Security Council immediately and resolutely condemn the flagrant, unlawful invasion of Kuwait by the armed forces of Iraq. The Soviet Union and the United States consider it fundamentally important that the Security Council resolution be fully and immediately complied with.

"Iraq's action runs counter to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law. In response to this obvious violation of the basic norms of civilised conduct, the United States and the Soviet Union independently made a number of moves. In particular, the Soviet Union suspended the supply of arms while the United States froze bank assets.

"The USSR and the USA reaffirm their call to Iraq to unconditionally withdraw troops from Kuwait. The sovereignty, national independence, lawful authority and territorial integrity of the state of Kuwait should be fully restored and ensured.

"The USSR and the USA believe that the international community should not only condemn the invasion but also take practical steps in response. The Soviet Union and the United States are now resorting to an unusual step—they are jointly urging the entire international community to join them and suspend all supplies of arms to Iraq on an international scale.

"The USSR and the USA are also calling on regional organisations, primarily the League of Arab states, all Arab countries as well as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to take all possible steps to secure the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution.

"Governments that resort to a glaring aggression should know that the international community cannot and will not reconcile itself to aggression or assist it."

Excerpts from the News Conference
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze described Iraqi troops'

invasion of Kuwait as a "tragic event". He spoke at a news conference he held together with the US Secretary of State James Baker at Moscow's Vnukovo-2 airport on August 3.

Shevardnadze said that the situation had been discussed during the recent meeting in Irkutsk. At that time, he said, Baker voiced serious misgivings in view of the concentration of Iraqi troop units at the border with Kuwait.

The Soviet Foreign Minister admitted that during the discussion of the issue in Irkutsk he "almost ruled out a further aggravation" of the situation.

"I did not think and did not expect that the Iraqis would resort to such an overt invasion, an undisguised aggression against the defenseless peace-loving country which did not and does not threaten anyone", he said.

"We did not and do not intend to discontinue direct contacts with the leadership of Iraq", Shevardnadze said.

The Soviet leadership on Thursday sent a special message to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and contacts are being maintained through the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow and the Soviet ambassador in Baghdad, Shevardnadze said.

Among other possible measures of political nature, he mentioned joint actions of the USSR and the USA within the framework of the UN Security Council.

If the UN Security Council's first resolution on the issue is not implemented, Shevardnadze said the question of passing a second resolution would naturally appear on the agenda in order to have an appropriate basis for taking practical measures to end the conflict, he added.

In the opinion of the Soviet and American sides, very much can be done in this respect by Arab countries themselves, by the Non-Aligned Movement, the League of Arab states and regional organisations.

The United States was making similar political and diplomatic moves, and is holding consultations with the governments of other countries, Baker said.

Besides, the USA is applying certain economic sanctions against Iraq, he added. In this connection, he pointed out the importance of the call, contained in the joint statement, to other states to give up supplying arms to Iraq. . .

As for the use of military measures, he said that it was inexpedient to guess what options could be taken.

For his part, Shevardnadze expressed the hope that the Iraqi leaders would have enough courage, determination and political wisdom to save their people and the international community from this conflict.

Noting that the Soviet leaders decided to suspend military deliveries to Iraq on Thursday, he stressed that the USSR would act in other areas, "taking into account further developments".

Shevardnadze said that there was no official reply from Baghdad to a message by the Soviet leadership.

But the Soviet Union is assured during contacts at various levels that "Iraq will withdraw its troops from Kuwait in the near future".

"As for military interference, the Soviet Union has no plans of this kind and, as far as I know, the United States has no such plans either", he continued.

Speaking of the fate of about 900 Soviet citizens in Kuwait and 7,000-8,000 Soviet citizens in Iraq, Shevardnadze said: "We hope that the safety of Soviet people will be ensured".

Otherwise the "consequences may be very serious", he noted. A similar statement concerning the safety of American citizens in Kuwait and Iraq were made by Baker.

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

30

Resolution 661 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,

Deeply concerned that the resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United

Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Determines* that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. *Decides*, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

3. *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

4. *Decides* that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies

within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs;

5. *Calls upon* all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;

9. *Decides* that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and *calls upon* all States;

(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;

(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

31

*News conference by President Husni Mubarak on
8 August 1990*

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Brothers: The Arab countries and, indeed, the Arab nation are passing through difficult and complicated circumstances. I have accustomed you in all situations to hearing me speak to you with total frankness about any domestic or external event that touches Egypt or affects pan-Arab security. In this I am motivated by the desire to safeguard the Arab nation's vital interests and to provide the necessary conditions to defend its rights and sanctities and enable it to confront the challenges that obstruct its progress in this era, which is replete with achievements and dangers at the same time.

Today I find myself bound to present to you my view about a situation that forebodes grave, perhaps destructive, dangers. These dangers will cause difficulties for all the peoples of the Arab nation without exception. These dangers have regional and international implications, the likes of which we have not seen before. For this reason we must all view them with the great attention and caution that they deserve. We must all together be aware of the terrible consequences that could result should they persist.

I am telling you the story of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute with total frankness, without being biased toward this or that side. It must not be understood that I am taking Kuwait's side against Iraq. It must also not be alleged that Kuwait is assisting Egypt and that for this reason Egypt is adopting a stand supporting Kuwait. I am saying this is absolutely untrue. There is no help from Kuwait. Nevertheless, it is a matter of principle. Egypt has principles and stands, and these stands can never be bought with money because history will record them for the coming generations.

The problem began as a border dispute. Iraq and Kuwait have had a border dispute for a long time. I believe most of you know this dispute's history from the days, or before the days, of Abd-al-Karim Qasim and the days of President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir, and you know the measures that were taken in that regard.

The present problem started as a border problem, particularly after the end of the Iraq-Iran war. During this period also, the question of

settling differences on debts that Iraq owed to Kuwait as a result of the Iraq-Iran war cropped up as well. Another problem that Iraq raised was of the theft of petroleum from a territory Iraq considers its own. I say that Kuwait should have acted to find a solution to the border problem. Kuwait admitted once to the theft of the petroleum.

On 18 July Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing petroleum and of establishing military bases in Iraqi territory. The Iraqis said that the Kuwaitis were causing a glut by exceeding their production quota and consequently producing a drop in prices. This, the Iraqis claimed, is undermining Iraqi national security and the like.

Egypt considered this issue to be very serious. We feared that the situation between two fraternal and neighboring Arab states might worsen. We issued a statement on 19th July. We first thought that this was one of the differences in which we could get involved and calm the situation. In our 19 July statement, we said: Please calm down. Let us settle the differences and disputes through a fraternal Arab dialogue. We are prepared to cooperate with all states to reach a result satisfactory to both parties.

After this, we heard news agencies reporting that the forces were moving from Iraq southward toward Kuwait. Naturally, Egypt has a pioneering and leading role whether we and others like it or not. Egypt has its history, culture, and the ability to act. The fact is that I acted.

Iraq is a friendly state. I am tied to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein by a strong brotherly bond. We have common views on many problems. By virtue of the relationship with them, I decided to go to Iraq, then to Kuwait, and then to meet our brother the custodian of the two holy mosques in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a state that carries weight in the region.

How did this problem arise? After long discussions with brother President Saddam Hussein, I posed a direct question. I asked him: Do you have troops heading southward toward Kuwait and do you have any troops on the Kuwaiti border? The truth is that he answered: No, these are the Presidential Guard forces, which are on a normal routine move with forces stationed there. I asked: Far from the border? He answered: They are 70 or 80 km away from the border. I then asked: Well, is there any intention to attack? He answered me: No, I am content. This is my stand and there is no intention to attack Kuwait. I said: Good, let us then think about a way to start a dialogue between the two parties. Let us, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and peace-loving

states participate in drawing views close and achieve a compromise between the two countries in order not to complicate the issue, which could reach bounds of which we do not approve or accept.

I went to Kuwait and told the officials there very frankly: The situation is difficult and you must act toward a solution. After long discussions I agreed with President Saddam Hussein that a session of discussions be held in Baghdad first and be followed by a second session in Kuwait. This is bearing in mind that President Hussein had refused a request from other heads of state that the dialogue should take place anywhere other than Baghdad. The fact is that the man agreed with me. We agreed on this. I then made another request. I asked him that the first session be held in a place other than Kuwait or Iraq to prepare the ground psychologically.

We agreed to hold a meeting between the two countries in Jeddah at the level of the Kuwaiti crown prince and of the vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council. After long discussions, President Saddam Hussein—and that was on Tuesday—told me: I hope that the meeting will be held as soon as possible, by Saturday or Sunday. I agreed with Kuwait. I told our brothers in Kuwait: It is a question of borders and you should have tried to solve it. It is a question of financial compensation, and you should sort it out. I am telling you very frankly—and Iraq has not said this to me quite frankly—but I am telling you and confronting you quite frankly with what I have felt from the entire events I have been observing, even during the stage that preceded the ultimatum.

On the same day I went to see the custodian of the two holy mosques. I agreed with him. I remember that I spent the whole night before traveling in Burj al-Arab. I left Burj al-Arab for Cairo at 0400, Monday. I met an envoy here in Cairo at 0600. Then I traveled to Baghdad, from there to Kuwait, and then to Saudi Arabia. Some of our brother writers and correspondents were with me on this tour. The custodian of the two holy mosques did not delay and said, I agree. I told him I want the meeting held in Jeddah and not in Cairo. He agreed and told me: I will start the contacts. The contacts took a long time. Wednesday and Thursday passed. I contacted the custodian of the two holy mosques two or three times.

A statement was issued in Baghdad saying that the meeting to be held would be one of protocol. Naturally, this angered the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. What protocol meeting? Are we holding a meeting to bring views closer or holding a protocol meeting where we sit, shake

each other's hands, and then leave? The custodian of the two holy mosques then sent his foreign minister, who spoke with President Saddam Hussein. They agreed that this meeting would discuss the issue.

During my trip from Baghdad to Kuwait, I saw in news agency reports that the Iraqi foreign minister had made a statement saying that during the Egyptian president's visit to Iraq the issue of Kuwait and Iraq was not discussed but that the talks concerned bilateral relations. I read this before arriving in Kuwait and said: Oh God; what is this—why? Am I doing anything or achieving anything? I am talking within an Arab framework of Arab brotherhood. This is our friend and our brother and the other is our friend and brother. I am bringing their views closer, with the cooperation of many Arab brothers.

The truth is that I was little annoyed but I said never mind. But then I sent a second envoy to Iraq on Thursday—and I was there on Tuesday and told them: Is this reasonable? We did not get the expected reply, but we said all right.

The meeting was held on Tuesday, 31st July, and lasted until the afternoon of Wednesday, 2 August—sorry, 1st August. I in fact heard about what went on the dialogue from both parties. What I heard from Iraq differed from what I heard from Kuwait and vice versa. Kuwait said the other party entered, said a few words, and did not want to sit with us. We said let us postpone it. They said: No. We are tired. Iraq said that the other party came with an inflexible stand. There were two versions that left one at a loss. But I knew about this later.

On 2 August, at around 0430 in the morning—while I was saying that God willing, let this August be a quiet month for once so that one can rest, if only for a week—I was told: There is an attack, the situation is grave, and they have occupied positions and entered Kuwait. My mind became paralyzed. I was originally a military man and know very well how these events develop. I can assess them because I participated in this sort of thing many times and had assessed many situations, some of which were much more difficult than this one.

I woke up. I could not believe what was happening. Iraq and Kuwait, two Arab countries, members of the Arab League, who suffered together in the war—one was attacked and the other helped with money. In fact I was stunned and could not believe myself.

At that time, (United Arab Emirates President) Shaikh Zayid was in Alexandria. On that particular day he was supposed to have lunch with me. At 0800, he telephoned me and said there were certain

circumstances. I told him that I would go over them with him. I went to him. We talked, and he decided to leave so that he could learn about the situation in his country and what was going on in the region.

On that same day, Shaikh Zayid left at about 1400. I was in Alexandria. I came to see him off. At around 1515, when I was getting ready to return to Alexandria, His Majesty King Hussein asked to visit me. The man always takes the initiative and makes contacts, and we have a dialogue together. He came to Alexandria. He arrived at around 1755. I had been waiting for him at the airport since 1730. That was on the afternoon of Thursday, the day of the invasion. We sat together talking in Ra's al-Tin place. I told him that the situation was grave and that we should find a solution. No one wanted an expanded Arab summit, because the Arabs, by nature, prefer to talk in small groups. At Arab summits, we trade accusations and curses without reaching any results. Therefore, you find that we do not want to meet at Arab summits. For how long have we been meeting at extraordinary summits? Every five months we hold an extraordinary summit, which gets together after much ado.

I told him: Your majesty, the situation has become very grave, and I fear the repercussions. If we do not tackle the problem it will be destructive and will put the entire Arab nation at stake. Our position will be as bad as could be expected. I believe that you should visit President Saddam Hussein and try to talk to him on two basic points that we can handle and use as a basis for an Arab summit, even a limited Arab summit, so that we can talk and help our brother in Iraq. Or else the situation will develop further. I told him that the first point should be the immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, which is an independent and sovereign state. The second point should be to stop trying to overthrow regimes by force, because it is not a man's responsibility to change a system in a neighboring country by force. This is the responsibility of the people. This is the right of the people. It is a very serious principle to let a foreign power come and destroy regimes or overthrow them. This is a very serious matter anywhere in the world, so what about the Arab world?

I told him we must achieve these two things. They must withdraw first and then we can begin negotiations over existing problems and help resolve them. If the situation requires Arab forces I will participate in them, to act as a buffer zone (preceding two words in English) between Iraq and Kuwait until the talks are concluded and the problem is solved.

Without agreeing on these, we would not be able to have a summit, albeit a limited one, in Riyadh or Jeddah. I talked to our brother President Saddam Hussein and told him that King Hussein was coming to see him the next day. The airspace was closed. We agreed on a way for him to reach Baghdad. He would take an aircraft to the Jordanian border, then take a car from there, and then an Iraqi aircraft would take him to Baghdad. If we agreed on these two points, there would be a basis for a summit, instead of insulting each other and achieving nothing.

This was on Thursday, 2 August 1990. The Arab League Council was in session and was planning to issue a resolution. I think that you have heard it. It contained a condemnation and other clauses. There is no reason for me to repeat it, because it has been published. We were ready to issue a statement, because Egypt cannot, in the face of such a momentous event, sit idle and not express its opinion. Our problem in the Arab nation is that if you express your opinion, and this opinion is different from someone else's, you are considered an enemy. In other words, if someone expresses an opinion that is different from mine, we become enemies. There are different opinions throughout the world. But the principle of difference of opinion is not a basis for enmity. Brother, I tell you my opinion, and you tell me yours. I tell you: Beware, you are an Arab state. Your affairs are of interest to me. I care that your country should not be overthrown. I care about your country's standard of living. I care about peace in the area. When I express my opinion, this should not provide a basis for you to say that Egypt is hostile.

I said that I have to issue a statement. Public opinion in Egypt was exerting pressure. Indeed, everyone was asking: Where is the president? What is Egypt's position? You all remember. Everyone was asking what Egypt's position was. I received calls from abroad. Finally, I stopped answering the telephone. What was the reason? King Hussein told me: If I go (to Baghdad), and this statement is issued—the Arab League and the foreign ministers, as you all know, wanted to issue the statement on that day—King Hussein told me that if this statement were issued, it would torpedo our efforts and nothing could be achieved with President Saddam Hussein.

I picked up the telephone. I spoke to our foreign minister, the Saudi foreign minister, the Kuwaiti representative, and several other foreign ministers and told them: Please, there are efforts being made to stop this deterioration. Please, can you, Arab League Council, postpone it

until tomorrow. They said: This is difficult. The entire world has condemned it; the UN Security Council has met; all the foreign countries have condemned it; how would we look before the world as Arabs? Everyone is asking what the Arab League's position is. Indeed, such things were said, and you all have heard them. I told them: Never mind, please, there is perhaps a glimmer of hope that we can achieve a solution instead of having to clash with each other. They postponed the conference until 1800 on Friday, 3 August 1990. I did not issue my statement. I was tense. If Egypt does not issue a statement, the entire world will criticize it—not only the world; the Egyptian public has its opinion. I cannot disregard it. No president could stand against the current, against public opinion in his country if there were unanimity over an Egyptian position against the invasion, irrespective of whether this one is our friend or not. No one accepts the invasion and occupation by force of one Arab country by another Arab country.

On Friday, 3 August, at approximately 1600, my brother King Hussein telephoned me and informed me that an agreement had been reached on convening a limited summit conference. This agreement was between ourselves. We had not yet spoken to other kings or heads of state. We were saying if we could accept these principles of withdrawal and so on—those three points (as heard), then we could speak of holding a summit conference so that we would not quarrel at the meeting. When this happens some countries do not like to attend. I asked the king what had happened, and he replied that he (not further identified—apparently Saddam Hussein) had accepted the summit. I then asked on what basis the summit should be held—on the basis of these few points? He told me he had not been able to discuss details, I answered that I could not accept that. Could I contact the custodian of the two holy mosques and invite him to attend a summit while we still did not know that we were going to achieve? Could we sit down and use invective against each other and then have the world say the summit had failed? The issue would worsen and deteriorate. Our image before the world would be very bad. We wanted a summit, but we would have to agree on the working paper—at least reach minimum agreement—before we met. We would then sit down and discuss things until, we hoped, we fully achieved at least an advanced step toward halting the deterioration and the conflict that had taken place.

Consequently, I found myself unable to issue a statement. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council were meeting and ready to issue a statement after me. The Arab League issued a statement at

about 2130. As you know, of course, neither Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, nor Mauritania accepted the statement. (murmurs) Yes, not the PLO either. Not the PLO. As for Libya, he (the Libyan delegate) did not attend. Regardless of who attended or did not attend, the world began looking at the Arab League and saying yes, it has actually done something. We were ridiculed by the whole world. Where is the Arab League? Is the Arab League asleep, is it a corpse? I heard terrible talk on the radios. There were really harmful accusations. This is because we are always late and slow in adopting a decision on such matters.

Our brother His Majesty King Fahd had said the same thing about withdrawal, the restoration of the legitimate government, and so on. The issue reached Baghdad, but he did not get any result in this regard. On the contrary, they were saying the al-Sabah family will not return. In one American's view, the issue was not that of a family being restored or not, but a matter of principle. It is an issue of its being wrong to remove a regime by foreign force. If the people remove their own regime—we recognize people's regimes (sentence as heard). But I cannot do that. Then anyone to whom it occurs could remove the regime in a neighboring country by force. I come and strike and seize one country, another comes and seizes another country, and then there will be no international or Arab community—nothing. For this reason I am making it clear that there was absolutely no agreed-upon summit. It was simply talk between me and our brother His Majesty King Hussain, but there was no summit. Some newspapers rumoured that Egypt had thwarted the summit. What summit? I was holding talks with a view to holding a summit. However, if a summit is to be held, there must be a basis for such a meeting, instead of coming and attending and—as it is our nature to do—having everyone hurling embarrassing invectives. Then all this would become known abroad, and our image would be shameful before the world, particularly because the issue had become international.

You know the Arab League's resolution—condemning the Iraqi invasion, rejecting all its effects, denouncing bloodshed and the destruction of installations, demanding an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, raising the issue of convening a summit to the Arab kings and presidents, emphasizing the principles of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab countries, adhering to the principle of not resorting to force to settle disputes, and rejecting any foreign intervention or attempted intervention.

The Islamic conference adopted a similar resolution, and the Gulf

Cooperation Council's foreign ministers conference adopted a decision before the Arab foreign ministers conference's resolution. The point is we were here differing among ourselves, when the UN Security Council, at its first meeting on Friday, 2 August, condemned the Iraqi invasion as a violation of world peace and security, demanded the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops, and asserted that the council's move was in accordance with Article 7 of the UN Charter, which deals with threats to and violation of peace. The UN Security Council beat us to a decision, as though the issue were not Arab and the Arabs were a motionless corpse who could not move, speak up, or react to an invasion of a state by another Arab state. They must have said that we were scared. The worst accusations were leveled at us, and you must have heard them.

The UN Security Council held its second meeting, the day before yesterday as far as I remember. It adopted a stricter resolution banning the import of any products from both Iraq and Kuwait or the export of any products to both countries, including weapons and other things. This is practically an economic blockade. No country is to import from or export to Iraq. No country is to buy Iraqi or Kuwaiti oil.

Article 41 of the UN Charter stipulates that if such a blockade does not produce results, Article 42, on the military blockade and use of military force, is to be applied. Are we Arabs just spectators? Is time so worthless to us that we postpone thinking until tomorrow or after tomorrow? Should we wait until there is a catastrophe and matters are out of our hands? The present reality in the international arena is. . . (Mubarak changes thought) I received telephone calls from the Canadian prime minister, the US President, Mitterrand of France, the British prime minister, and Turkey. Everybody expressed concern at the situation. They all said that a blockade is inevitable. I tried to persuade them to give us a chance. I asked the US President to give us a chance before making any decisions. He said he would impose the sanctions and give us the chance in the meantime. I have been trying to find hope. All the doors are closed. I meet some of them and say that the situation is very grave. I tell my brothers in Baghdad that there is nothing wrong between us. I keep telling them that the statement I made was useful to them, because Egypt cannot lose its credibility (preceding word in English) before the entire world and thus lose the ability to mediate with any world country in connection with any issue.

I can never accept this for our country. I tell them the situation is

grave, that European countries are moving, and that Arab countries no longer trust each other. You said you would not strike but you did. You are now marching on to Saudi Arabia. If you say that you would not strike, Saudi Arabia would not believe you. Should it wait until a catastrophe takes place there too? Moreover, each and every state is scared. There is no credibility for the words "we will not strike, or we will not attack" any more. They will say he promised not to attack and he attacked Kuwait.

According to the world news it is no secret that the US aircraft, British units, and the world are doing as they please in our area. I said this to our brothers in Iraq, and I will reiterate it, although it is no secret but an evaluation of a situation. However, I hope no one will talk to me later about imperialism, treason, and agency. I give my opinion as a solid military man who knows how to evaluate a situation and how to deal with our area. I fear that Iraq might receive a very strong blow from many directions. Do not believe that these fleets will remain idle. It is not like when the Americans entered Lebanon. No, no, no. The situation is completely different and has been well considered. I am stating a personal opinion here. I have not received a word about an aggression.

What is very clear to me, however, is that an aggression, which might be tragic or destructive, is imminent. Our standing as an Arab nation will be at its lowest. They (not further identified) refuse to let us use an Arab umbrella to contain the crisis. The states that are afraid and the states that deal with this incursion say: I will cooperate with the devil for the sake of my country. They are right. Do you then blame those who request US aid? As long as you do not accept the Arabs and the Arab umbrella, then I will give you the foreign umbrella—not only the American but the American, the British, and the French ones as well. I will provide it so that you may impose what you want. This is our position, O Arab nation. Is it not more honourable for us to solve our problem within the framework of the Arab umbrella? Is it not more honourable for us to let the voice of right judge between us? Is it not more honourable for us to meet, speak frankly, and lay our cards on the table in order to achieve a just and sound solution without any humiliation or harm?

Brothers, I consider the issue to be very grave. Interceptor defensive fighter planes went to an Arab country. The fleets are busy. The aircraft carriers are crossing. I might be asked to prevent the crossing of an aircraft carrier. I cannot prevent an aircraft carrier crossing. According

to the Constantinople agreement, I cannot prevent anyone crossing the Suez Canal unless I am in a state of war. I am not going to tell all the states: Do not cross, do not cross, do not cross. I cannot do so and have no right to do so. In order that you may not involve me, do not do what you like and then involve me and ask me to do the impossible. Do not put me in an embarrassing situation. You have your interests and I have mine. I safeguard Arab dignity as much as I can, but if you want to undermine and torpedo Arab dignity, then take the responsibility. Therefore, let us not blame those who request foreign forces. They have an excuse to do so because we do not want to respond to the Arab umbrella and to the voice of reason.

There is talk about Egyptian forces that are in charge of protection there. We have no Egyptian forces there. We have made no moves, and there is no talk about any moves. However, I say it frankly, if I am requested to participate with Arab troops of a certain country for security purposes, I do not believe that Egypt can refuse. I will participate with joint Arab forces but not with foreign forces. I do not believe that we will object to the participation in joint Arab forces because we are Arabs, and we desire to find an Arab solution and listen to the voice of reason, saying that all the forces should be Arab, if this is possible. (applause)

Frankly, I do indeed see a gloomy picture. Some analyses may say it is not gloomy. However, I am telling you that I have previous experience in this field. The picture is horrifying. If we do not tackle the issue and move swiftly, we will have no significance. We will be as good as dead bodies. We will be humiliated and dictated to. The military power will impose its will on us in spite of ourselves. It is through reason that we know God. We should not be obstinate. If someone knows that a certain action is bound to destroy him and insists on it, he will be done for. Will my destruction benefit anyone? To sacrifice myself for the sake of my people is acceptable and so it is to sacrifice a group for the sake of a nation. However, all this will be destroyed. Why, when we have good leaders? Why, when God endowed us with a mind to think with and with logic? I expect that they will take my words as a sign of enmity between us. I harbour no hostility toward anyone. I am prejudiced against no one. If I give advice to a certain state or friend, I give it sincerely for the sake of pan-Arab peace and security, and God is my witness. I have no private interests. We did not take financial assistance from any party to stand by it. Absolutely not.

From this rostrum I appeal to President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership to respond to the Arab umbrella, to withdraw their forces from Kuwait, and to restore the legitimate government to Kuwait. There is no objection to collective Arab forces acting as a buffer for the two sides, provided that negotiations begin to resolve the dispute. I am confident that through Arab cooperation we will reach a solution for the Iraqi-Kuwaiti problem. (applause)

In the meantime, time is passing very fast and events are moving faster than what we are doing. For this reason, I am calling for an urgent Arab summit conference in the next 24 hours—if possible within the next few hours. This will be more dignified for Egypt—for the Arab world—and it is better than having a solution imposed on us through foreign power. I am appealing to presidents and kings to respond to this appeal. I am willing in this circumstance to host the Arab summit in Egypt so that perhaps we may reach a solution before that which we do not like or accept for ourselves happens.

Pan-Arab security is at stake, and Iraq's safety is at stake. They will of course say that it is not at stake. This is my view. I am expressing my own point of view. There is no harm in that. The Arab nation's image and capability are at stake. The Arab nation is capable of finding a solution. However, there must be a response. Therefore, I am calling once again and appealing to President Saddam and the Arab nation to respond to the call for an Arab summit within 24 hours at the maximum. I hope we will find a solution and discuss the issue. It must not be an Arab summit at which we trade accusations and curses or tear each other apart. It must be a summit for resolving the problem within the Arab nation. I have delivered the message and may the Almighty be my witness. May God's peace and mercy be on you. (applause)

—FBIS-NES, 8 August 1990

32

Letter from Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to President Saddam Hussein

Letter from Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Saddam Hussein of Iraq who had sent him a letter on August 3, a day after the Iraqi military

occupation of Kuwait.

"In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

"Praise be to God, the Lord of all universe, benediction upon Prophet Muhammad and his holy household.

"His Excellency Mr. Saddam Hussein, the respectable president,

"Your letter dated August 3, 1990 was received. Although the text of the letter has apparently been prepared in order to proceed the peace talks, parts of the context are regrettable.

"Before anything else, I deem it necessary to reiterate once again the will and determination of the Islamic Republic of Iran for materialisation of a just and lasting peace. I hope you have come to the same conclusion. In the aftermath of the acceptance of the Resolution 598, being fully aware of our responsibilities before peace and its consequences, we initiated a sincere move and decided that other than the legitimate and indispensable rights of the Iranian nation, nothing could limit our progress in the path of peace, and did so. Our attitude both in the course of the negotiations held under the supervision of the United Nations secretary-general and in reply to your letter and talks which were held in Geneva between my and your representatives, should have clarified the issue for you.

"Accelerating the process of achieving peace and taking practical steps toward implementation of the Resolution 598 instead of resorting to correspondence and lengthy discussions, has been our main area of emphasis in the early stages of the talks between the representatives of the two countries in Geneva and now we believe that progress in the content of negotiations and not in its form, and efforts to clarify our stand vis-a-vis issues which are the key to the gate of peace would bring us close to our objective.

"The objective which will eliminate potential grounds for destroying the present situation or the artificial grounds created by the enemies of Islam, which could be created under the present special circumstances of the world and the region. It is in this way that peace will become available to the two neighbouring countries and forces engaged with each other could be put to the service of vital needs of the two nations and their main responsibilities towards construction, peace and security of the region.

"Taking into consideration the afore-mentioned issues, I deem it necessary to raise the following points concerning the contents of your letters of August 3, July 30 (unsigned), and July 16:

"1. To meet and hold negotiations at a level higher than what is currently underway in Geneva is acceptable only when we could achieve specific results out of the current Geneva talks which could lay the basis for the next stages. But, as you know, in Geneva we have made no substantial progress other than further familiarity with each other's views while your and our representatives had been commissioned to hold talks on the essence of the issues. Therefore, as we had notified before, a meeting between the two presidents could be effective only under the condition that important and key issues have been clarified and sorted out. Otherwise, failure of the talks of the two presidents could have more damaging impacts on the trend of peace and would take it out of the reach of the two countries.

"2. In your letter of July 30, 1990, proposals have been made concerning the Arvand River, which, although marks stepping back from your claims in your previous declarations, still it is clear to you that cannot be accepted by us. (sentence as received) Our specific proposal is that peace talks should be based on the 1975 accord because in the absence of any commitment to the previous agreements, especially the agreement which bears your own signature, one cannot be expected to trust on what is being said today.

"3. A two-month period which has been set as the deadline for withdrawal from the occupied Iranian territories cannot be justified because if this action is based on good-will it can be accomplished in a matter of one or two days. However, the United Nations secretary general in his plan had given this a two-week time period, and three months time for the release of POWs.

"4. It is amazing that by resorting to Arabism, our rightful stand vis-a-vis the occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi Army has been criticized while more obvious issues including paving the ground for the extensive presence of foreign forces in the region, disturbing peace and tranquillity, creating problems for Muslim people, Islamic responsibility, neighbourliness, and disturbing regional stability and security, conditioning changes in fronts and international undertakings, have all been ignored. How could it be justified that in a letter which begins with the name of Almighty God and ends with the inspiring slogan "God is the greatest", contrary to the strong and explicit teachings of Islam and Koran, the racial and ethnic doctrine has superseded the Islamic and ideological principle.

"The clear verses (of the Holy Koran): 'The believers are but brethren' (verse 10-sura hujurat), 'Verily this religion of yours is one

religion' (verse 92-sura anbiyaa), and 'O mankind, we created you from a single (pair of) male and a female, and made you nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you' (verse 13-sura hujurat), are sufficient Islamic principles for any Muslim to eclipse his racial, geographical and linguistic tendencies. (punctuation as received) You are better informed than others of the policies of the Kuwaiti Government in the course of the war and their unjust attitude towards the Islamic Revolution of Iran. But, our stands are not connected to individuals but emanate from our principles.

"5. No doubt, under the condition of peace talks between the two countries, unexpected aggression against a neighbour country without the slightest notice, and accompanied with all its extraordinary impacts and consequences in connection with us, could weaken our trust and create serious doubt in the motives of the past few months' talks especially that during this period we have not witnessed goodwill measures but rather witnessed insistence on the continuation of the occupation of our homeland and even opposition to a minor issue such as extinguishing the fire at oil wells which has no benefit for you other than wasting the wealth of our Islamic homeland.

"6. The tone of your last letter does not suit the required atmosphere in the peace talks process. A tone has been employed which had proven inefficient in connection with our Muslim revolutionary people in the past and an improper analysis had been made on the new stands of your former friends and supporters to convince us. Because, you know that we have experienced and passed all these stages in practice and have proved that more than anything else we rely on the faith, resistance and support of the people. We do not attach so much value to the wrath and grace of others to the extent that our daily life, stands and important decisions be placed on them. We are not intending to abuse the status quo, and we seek nothing but our own legitimate rights, something we have emphasised on during all stages of the talks.

"7. We fully accept the point which your letter put emphasis on—to speed the move towards peace—but what accelerates peace is not to set forth differing proposals and upgrading the talks without any practical progress. Rather we should abide by the internationally recognized agreements between the two countries and do not seek more than our legitimate rights because what had not been achieved in the course of the eight-year war cannot be expected to be materialised in

the talks. If we accept this, it would not be necessary to search for anything else than the 1975 treaty to delimit frontiers both on land and in the river. If we do not accept this, it would be better to pass on implementation of the resolution to the United Nations and the Security Council while keeping the Geneva link for exchange of views on common issues."

Peace be on you

Signed Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, 8 August 1990

—FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990

33

President Bush's announcement of despatch of US military units to Saudi Arabia on 8 August 1990

In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as president, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong—all in the cause of peace.

At my direction, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, as well as key units of the US Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland.

No one commits America's Armed Forces to a dangerous mission lightly. But after perhaps unparalleled international consultation and exhausting every alternative, it became necessary to take this action. Let me tell you why.

Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2, Iraqi armed forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours. With more than 100,000 troops, along with tanks, artillery and surface-to-surface missiles, Iraq now occupies Kuwait.

This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no invasion. There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression.

A puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace, and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression.

Four simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every president from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both froze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets. The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world.

Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.

We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remain stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less. We're beginning a new era. This new era can be full of promise. An age of freedom. A time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And four days ago he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean. His promises mean nothing.

In the last few days, I have spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas, and I have met with Prime Minister Thatcher, Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.

We agree that this is not an American problem or a European

problem or a Middle East problem. It is the world's problem. And that's why, soon after the Iraqi invasion, the United Nations Security Council, without dissent, condemned Iraq, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait.

The Arab world, through both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, courageously announced its opposition to Iraqi aggression.

Japan, the United Kingdom, and France, and other governments around the world have imposed severe sanctions. The Soviet Union and China ended all arms sales to Iraq.

And this past Monday (August 6), the United Nations Security Council approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These sanctions now enshrined in international law, have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression, while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value—especially oil.

I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait.

But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambitions. Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Given the Iraqi government's history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.

And therefore, after consulting with King Fahd, I sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we could take. Following those meetings the Saudi Government requested our help. And I responded to that request by ordering US air and ground forces to deploy to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Let me be clear, the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. US forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression.

Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom.

I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by her friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf.

We are working around the clock to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce UN sanctions. I'm continuing my conversations with world leaders. Secretary of Defense Cheney has just returned from valuable consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hassan of Morocco. Secretary of State Baker has consulted with his counterparts in many nations, including the Soviet Union. And today he heads for Europe to consult with President Ozal of Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States. And he'll then consult with the NATO foreign ministers.

I will ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production in order to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world economy. And I will explore whether we and our allies should draw down our strategic petroleum reserves. Conservation measures can also help. Americans everywhere must do their part. And one more thing. I'm asking the oil companies to do their fair share. They should show restraint and not abuse today's uncertainties to raise prices.

Standing up for our principles will not come easy. It may take time and possibly cost a great deal. But we are asking no more of anyone than of the brave young men and women of our armed forces and their families. And I ask that in the churches around the country prayers be said for those who are committed to protect and defend America's interests.

Standing up for our principles is an American tradition. As it has so many times before, it may take time and tremendous effort. But most of all, it will take unity of purpose.

As I have witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, America has never wavered when her purpose is driven by principle. And in this August day, at home and abroad, I know she will do no less.

Thank you and God bless the United States of America.

—USIS, New Delhi

34

The USSR Foreign Ministry statement on 9 August 1990

The situation in the Gulf is becoming more dramatic. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops on August 2, serious events took place in the area, including the so-called "merger" of Iraq and Kuwait, announced on Wednesday, and the deployment of US naval and air forces in Saudi Arabia, which Washington claims, are to protect Saudi Arabia's interests.

The tendency towards an escalation of confrontation and passions is unfortunately gathering strength.

The course of events generates concern and worry in Moscow, inasmuch as it takes place in a region where there is already a surfeit of "explosive material"—old conflicts, long-standing resentments and mutual territorial claims.

At the same time the region is a centre of important political and economic interests of many states, including the Soviet Union.

As a result, from the very beginning of the Gulf crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we firmly and clearly said that the spreading fire should be extinguished as soon as possible, the situation which existed before August 2 be restored, and the sides sit at the negotiating table to settle outstanding issues peacefully.

In addition to efforts within the Security Council, we were engaged in contacts with the Iraqi leadership, including the exchange of messages at the level of the Soviet and Iraqi Presidents to channel events in this direction.

This exchange of views with the Iraqi side prompted hopes that matters would move towards implementing Resolution 660 of the Security Council and thereby quickly defuse the crisis.

Unfortunately we are obliged to recognise that our hopes have not been justified. Iraq has not only failed to withdraw its forces from Kuwait, but yesterday declared what amounted to its annexation of the country.

Thus, it is difficult and painful to us to assess the latest actions by Iraq, a country with which we are linked by long-standing and friendly relations. We would like to preserve this friendship.

But in the present situation we cannot remain silent, let alone tell

lies. Our approach to this question of principle remains firm: Sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of the state of Kuwait should be fully restored and protected.

The relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council demand the same actions.

Current events in the Gulf graphically show how important it is to display wisdom and caution under such circumstances and to prevent actions that may pour oil on the flames:

We would like to note again that the Soviet Union opposes force and unilateral decisions. The experience of many years shows that the most correct and sensible way of acting in conflict situations is through collective efforts and the utmost use of UN mechanisms.

On a specific plane, we are for the Security Council to tackle this most urgent issue now, on a permanent basis. We are also prepared for immediate consultations within the framework of the UN Security Council's Military Staff Committee, which according to the UN Charter can perform very important functions.

Efforts by Arab countries themselves, as we see it, can play a special role to prevent the current situation in the Persian Gulf from developing into a larger-scale military conflict.

We are attentively studying reports on the Arab emergency summit meeting in Cairo. We hope that its results will become an important element of common action in view of the situation concerning Kuwait.

We would like to emphasise once again that the acuteness and the unpredictability of the current situation in the Persian Gulf area urgently require that all those directly involved in the dangerous confrontation unfolding there should show respect for the will of the international community and a sense of high responsibility for the destiny of peace.

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

35

Resolution issued by Emergency Arab Summit in Cairo on 10 August 1990

The extraordinary Arab summit conference which ended in Cairo this evening issued the following resolution:

Resolution issued by the Arab summit on 19th Muharram AH, corresponding to 10 August 1990:

After taking cognisance of the resolution adopted by the Arab League Council which convened in an extraordinary session on 2 and 3 August, 1990; after perusing the statement issued by the 19th conference of the Islamic states in Cairo on 2 August, 1990; proceeding from the provisions of the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty among the Arab League states; proceeding from the UN Charter, especially Clause Four of Articles 25 and 1; realising the grave historic responsibility that is dictated by the difficult circumstances resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its serious repercussions on the Arab homeland, Arab national security and the Arab nation's sublime interest, the extraordinary Arab summit that convened in Cairo on 19th Muharram AH, corresponding to 10 August 1990, decided the following:

(1) To confirm the Arab League Council resolution issued on 3 August 1990 and the Organisation of Islamic Conference statement issued on 4 August 1990.

(2) To confirm commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990, 661 of 6 August 1990 and 662 of 8 August 1990 which express international legitimacy.

(3) To denounce the Iraqi aggression against the fraternal state of Kuwait; not to recognise Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait or any other consequences resulting from the Iraqi forces' invasion of Kuwaiti territory; and to call on Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait immediately and return them to the positions they were in on 1 August 1990.

(4) To affirm Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity on the grounds that it is a member state of the Arab League and the United Nations, to emphasise the restoration of the legitimate system of government that existed in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion and to support it in all the measures it takes to liberate its territory and establish its sovereignty.

(5) To denounce the Iraqi threats to the Arab Gulf states and Iraq's concentration of its armed forces on the borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to emphasise complete Arab solidarity with Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states, to support the measures the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states take in implementation of the right of legitimate defence in accordance with the provisions of Article Two of the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty

among the Arab League states, Article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. These measures will cease immediately upon the Iraqi forces' complete withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti authority.

(6) To comply with the request of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states to dispatch Arab forces to support their armed forces in the defence of their territories and territorial integrity against any foreign aggression.

(7) The emergency Arab summit shall authorise the Arab League Secretary General to follow up the implementation of this resolution and to present a report on this to the Arab League Council within 15 days so that it may take what measures it deems fit in this regard.

—*The Gulf Crisis*, Edited by A.H.H. Abidi and K.R. Singh

36

Mr. Martin Fitzwater's statement on 12 August 1990

This morning the President received a letter from His Highness, Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, requesting on behalf of the Government of Kuwait, and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the right of individual and collective self-defense, that the United States Government take appropriate steps as necessary to ensure that the UN mandated economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait are immediately and effectively implemented.

In view of the Amir's request, the President has decided that the United States will do whatever is necessary to see that relevant UN sanctions are enforced. The President stressed that these efforts will complement not substitute for individual and collective compliance that has been highly successful thus far. The United States will coordinate its efforts with the governments of other nations to whom the Kuwaiti government has made similar requests.

Regarding Saddam Hussein's proposals announced today, the United States categorically rejects them. We join the rest of the UN Security Council in unanimously calling for an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. These latest conditions

and threats are another attempt at distracting from Iraq's isolation and at imposing a new status quo. Iraq continues to act in defiance of UN Resolutions 660, 661 and 662, the basis for resolving Iraq's occupation. The United States will continue to pursue the application of those resolutions in all their parts.

—USIS, New Delhi

37

President Saddam Hussein's proposal of 12 August 1990

As a contribution on our part to create an atmosphere of real peace in the region and to facilitate a state of stability, and to expose the falsity of America and its disfigured ally, Israel, as well as its small agents and their crimes against the nation, and affirming our right from a position of strength, we decided to present the following initiative:

The United States of America has tried to cover up its policies which are hostile to humanity and to the region's people under the pretext that economic boycott decisions against Iraq were in protest against the help Iraq rendered to the people of Kuwait who rid themselves of the rule of Al-Sabah family.

The United States of America lost its mind when Kuwaitis and Iraqis decided to restore what had been torn apart by the British colonialist, namely Kuwait which was part of Iraq until World War I. Iraq has never accepted the colonialist crime.

America started to mass military fleets and squadrons of aircraft and beat the drum of war against Iraq under the pretext of confronting the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia.

Because the spark of war, if started, will burn many and create great tragedies, to put the facts to world public opinion and the Western one in particular, and to unveil the falsity of America's allegations that it is championing the causes and rights of peoples and seeking to safeguard peace and the West's interests, I propose that all issues of occupation, or those projected as occupation, in the whole area should be resolved on the same basis and principles as set by the Security Council.

(1) Laying down arrangements for withdrawal in accordance with

one principle for an immediate and unconditional Israeli pull-out from the occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and withdrawal between Iraq and Iran, in addition to laying down arrangements for the case of Kuwait.

All military arrangements as far as timing and political implications should take place on a schedule that should apply to all cases and in accordance with the same basis and principles, taking into consideration Iraq's historical rights to its land and the choice of the Kuwaiti people.

An implementation of this withdrawal programme should begin with the occupation that took place first and subsequently a successive implementation of all resolutions issued by the Security Council and the United Nations related to all these cases, until we reach the last case.

The same measures adopted by the Security Council towards Iraq should also be applied to whoever does not abide by or respond positively to this arrangement.

(2) To put matters in front of the world public opinion to judge under objective conditions and away from American pressure, we call for the immediate withdrawal from Saudi Arabia of American and other forces that have responded to its conspiracy.

These should be replaced by Arab forces whose volume, nationality, duties and areas of presence between Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be defined by the Security Council, assisted by the United Nations Secretary General.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia should agree on the nationalities of these forces provided that they should not include any from Egypt whose government was used by America as crutch in its conspiracy against the Arab nation.

(3) An immediate freeze on all resolutions dealing with sanctions and blockade against Iraq, and economic, political and scientific dealings between Iraq and world countries be restored to normal. These resolutions should only be discussed or implemented against whoever violates the above mentioned points.

In all cases, and if America, its allies and small agents do not respond to our initiative, we will strongly resist, with the support of the good sons of the Arab nation and the great Iraqi people, its evil intentions and aggressive plots.

Victory is ours with God's help.

The evil men will regret their act after they are driven out from the

region with a curse and humiliation trailing behind them.

38

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ

Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff on 13 August 1990: "Saddam's Proposal Opens a Crack for Diplomats and Mediators"

Saddam Hussein's proposal to launch negotiations that would end all the territorial conflicts in the Middle East and lead to the withdrawal of occupying armies everywhere, including Israel from the territories, shows that any attempt to dissociate the Israeli-Arab conflict from the events between Iraq and Kuwait, the Arab world, and the United States is artificial. Israel will be unable to remain a mere spectator of events in the Persian Gulf, acting as if they had nothing to do with it; Israel will be drawn into the situation via a diplomatic, a political, or a military development.

Saddam's proposal indicates that he intends to gain time and to widen the conflict between him and Kuwait beyond the Persian Gulf. However, for the first time, the proposal offers a crack through which diplomats and mediators can operate. Saddam Hussein does not promise to withdraw from Kuwait, but for the first time he is willing to discuss arrangements in Kuwait—those discussions would take Iraq's historic rights into account. This may be a ploy designed to ease the increasing international and military pressure on Iraq, but it is also a possible opening for negotiations. In a war simulation held in Israel last week, the possibility that Saddam Hussein would raise the said proposal was considered.

The Americans will probably reply that the Iraqis must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait and allow its former government to resume power, but the way of US diplomacy has been always to take advantage of every conflict to suggest broader solutions. They did this during the Lebanon War, when they offered the Reagan plan, which included the Palestinian issue and Jordan in the solution. Under different conditions, they would have willingly bought the Iraqi proposal on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon; Israeli withdrawal from the territories, including

the Golan Heights; Iraqi and Iranian withdrawal from territories each of them had seized; and the opening for an arrangement in Kuwait. Even if the Americans reject the proposal at this time, they will give it a second thought, preferring it to an extensive war.

The Egyptians and the Saudis, who are not interested in an inter-Arab war or an American offensive against Iraq—which will be launched from Arab lands—will also ask Washington to give the Iraqi proposal some serious consideration.

As could be expected, the immediate Israeli response to the Iraqi proposal termed it a propaganda ploy, but if a similar proposal is forwarded tomorrow by a Western element, Israel will be unable to evade it in a similar fashion. Despite the numerous differences between the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait and the Israeli takeover of the territories in 1967, many Western countries will be ready to exploit the suggestion to conduct simultaneous negotiations for the solution of several territorial conflicts. Israel, which maintains that it wants peace negotiations with Arab countries, will find it difficult to reject such a possibility—even if it stands only a slim chance. Israel will naturally pose various conditions and security demands, but it will find that it cannot make peace with another Arab country without reaching a parallel arrangement with the Palestinians.

—FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990

39

*President Saddam Hussein's letter to Iranian President
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on 14 August 1990*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Esteemed Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After relying on God Almighty, with the objective of removing all obstacles before paving the way for brotherly relations with all Muslims, including those who opt for brotherly relations with Muslims of our neighbour Iran; to pave the way for a serious interaction with all the believers to confront the evildoers who seek to inflict evil on Muslims and the Arab nation; for the sake of distancing Iraq and Iran

from the blackmail and games of the evil international forces and their satellites in the region; in harmony with the spirit of our initiative that we announced on 12 August 1990, through which we meant to achieve a lasting and comprehensive peace in the region; so as not to give anyone an excuse not to interact and continue to harbour suspicions and apprehensions; so as not to keep any of Iraq's potentials disrupted outside the field of the great battle, and to mobilize these potentials in the direction of the objectives whose correctness honest Muslims and Arabs are unanimous; so as to avoid the mixing of trenches and to cast away suspicions and apprehensions so that the righteous will find their way to normal relations between Iraq and Iran; and as a fruit of our direct dialogue which has continued since our letter to you on 21 April 1990 and until your last letter to us on 8 August 1990; and as a final and clear solution that leaves no excuse for anyone, we have decided the following:

First, to approve your proposal as contained in your reply letter dated 8 August 1990, which our representative in Geneva Barazan Ibrahim al-Tikriti received from your representative (Cyrus Naseri), considering the 1975 agreement closely connected with the principles cited in our letter dated 30 July 1990, especially regarding the exchange of prisoners and Paragraphs 6 and 7 of UN Security Council Resolution No. 598.

Second, on the basis of the first paragraph of this letter and in our letter to you of 30 July 1990, we are ready to send a delegation to you in Tehran, or to receive your delegation in Baghdad, to prepare the agreements and sign them on the level to be agreed.

Third, as a goodwill gesture, our withdrawal will begin as of Friday, 17 August 1990, and we will withdraw our forces stationed on the border opposite you, leaving only a symbolic force together with border guards and police to carry out daily duties under normal circumstances.

Fourth, all prisoners of war held in Iraq and Iran should be exchanged immediately and comprehensively across land borders and via Khanaqin and Qasr-e-Shirin and other border points to be agreed upon. We will start this process as of Friday, 17 August 1990.

O President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, with our decision, everything has become clear, and everything you wanted and on which you have been concentrating has been achieved. It remains to exchange documents so that together we can start a new life of cooperation under the canopy of Islam's principles, respect each other's rights, and keep

away those who are fishing in murky waters off our coasts. We also may cooperate to keep the Gulf a lake of peace and safety free of foreign fleets and foreign forces that are lying in wait for us, and also to cooperate in other walks of life. God is great, and praised be God.

Signed Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq, on 23 Muharram 1411 Hegira, corresponding to 14 August 1990

—*FBIS-NES*, 15 August 1990

40

President Bush remarks on 15 August 1990

Over the past ten days you have launched what history will judge as one of the most important deployments of allied military power since the second world war. . .

I have just received a briefing from Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Our objectives remain clear: The immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. We will achieve these honorable goals. . . .

But Saddam Hussein would have us believe that his unprovoked invasion of a friendly Arab nation is a struggle between Arabs and Americans. That is clearly false. It is Saddam Hussein who lied to his Arab neighbors. It is he who invaded an Arab state. It is he who now threatens the Arab nation. We, by contrast, seek to assist our Arab friends in their hour of need.

Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against Infidel. This from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children of his own country—who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Muslims—and who now plunders Kuwait. Atrocities have been committed by Saddam's soldiers and henchmen. The reports out of Kuwait tell a sordid tale of brutality.

We are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources that are key—not just to the functioning of this country, but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the

freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein.

So, we have made our stand—not simply to protect resources or real estate, but to protect the freedom of nations. We are making good on longstanding assurances to protect and defend our friends, who have the courage to stand up to evil and are asking for our help. . .

—USIS, New Delhi

41

President Gorbachev on full-scale war in Gulf on 17 August 1990

President Mikhail Gorbachev said today that the Soviet Union intends to act “solely within the framework of collective efforts” to settle the Gulf conflict. He called for political methods to prevent it from escalating into a full-scale military confrontation.

Gorbachev, who is on vacation on the Black Sea coast, was speaking to participants in a military exercise in the Odessa military district.

“We count on the reason and responsibility of Arab States and their regional organisations. We rely on the powers and rights of the United Nations Organisation and Security Council,” he said.

“It is important not only to stop military activities and prevent them from spreading to other countries. It is important to restore respect for international law,” Gorbachev added.

He said that the Soviet attitude to Iraqi aggression should be viewed in the context of fundamental changes in the world and new Soviet foreign policies.

“We have witnessed an act of perfidy and a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter—in short, a violation of everything the world community now pins its hopes on as it seeks to put civilisation on the tracks of peaceful development,” Gorbachev said.

“In point of fact, we did not have any choice, just like most states. The use of force to redraw borders, especially in order to annex a sovereign country, threatens a perilous chain reaction endangering the

whole world community", Gorbachev said.

"For us to react in a different way would have been even more unacceptable as the act of aggression was committed with the help of our weapons, which we agreed to sell to Iraq only to maintain its defence capability rather than to seize foreign territories and whole countries," he said.

* * *

The situation in the Middle East is hard to predict and is a source of great concern to all countries, including the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told TASS on Friday before meeting his West German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Shevardnadze said "no one can guarantee against an explosion in the region—neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor Europe. I think in these conditions various options should be pursued".

The minister said Arab countries could do much "if they act in unity".

Shevardnadze said the "adoption of collective measures, above all through the United Nations Security Council, is an important condition for the settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict".

Later in the day, addressing a joint Press Conference with Hans-Dietrich Genscher upon completion of their talks, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, stressed the need for "active collective actions" in the Persian Gulf.

Shevardnadze expressed Soviet Union's "serious concern" about the explosive situation in the region.

He said he and Genscher were "unanimous in believing that all countries, including the Soviet Union and West Germany, should take all measures to see that UN Security Council resolutions are fulfilled".

He added that "this is not a simple task, and we are ready to cooperate on this issue".

The Soviet minister expressed support for the Security Council's actions, and called for using the possibilities of the UN Military Staff Committee. In this case, he noted, "I think the Security Council's resolutions would be weightier and yield other results".

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

42

*Resolution 664 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its
2937th meeting on 18 August 1990*

The Security Council,

Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661 and 662,

Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:

1. *Demands* that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals;

2. *Further demands* that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals;

3. *Reaffirms* its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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*"Open letter" from President Saddam Hussein to the families
of foreigners in Iraq on 19 August 1990*

Ladies and gentlemen, dear children: I know that you are pained because your relatives are not allowed to leave Iraq. I am just as pained as you are. I am fully convinced that the speaker and members of the Iraqi National Assembly are also pained just as are all the Iraqis and Arabs. This is because I know that the Iraqi National Assembly members are believers in God and in human rights, having fought many years to reach their present status for which they thank God. They know as well as I that their country taught humanity the first letter and thus taught them how to write and that their country taught the human race the first law to be developed on earth—the code of Hammurabi which set out human rights and obligations 4,500 years ago. They, therefore, know that there is no value to happiness in their country if the entire human race does not understand that any restriction of the freedom of any human being curtails the liberty of man in one of its aspects. They know that they care for human beings regardless of their nationality, color, or race, since they love God and God does not differentiate among his slaves except on the basis of the extent of their faith and its requirements.

Accordingly, the National Assembly members are just as pained as you are and all of us are sorry for what happened, which was not of our own making, but was the outcome of the will of certain people who acted arbitrarily and deviated from the will and teachings of God. The parties basically directly responsible for this are the US Administration and the British Government. How so? You know, ladies and gentlemen, that Iraq emerged from a war with Iran that lasted eight years and you know that this eight-year war was fought between two oil producers and in the environment of the Gulf oil and that in this war it happened that the Iraqi armies crossed into Iran and that the Iranian armies crossed into Iraq. Why did the United States, Britain, and others not interfere to end it, and why did they not threaten those who did not abide by the resolutions issued by the Security Council at that time?

They did not do that because they had contributed to its eruption and because they and their backward allies like the Croesus of Kuwait and his supporters had wanted it to continue and not to stop until God

wanted it to stop. When it stopped, they gave their agents in the region, foremost the Croesus of Kuwait and his clique, power over us to fight the Iraqi people in their livelihood and to deprive them, through economic war and aggression against our oil fields, of their simplest rights, although they are the people of civilizations and glories, until they reduced the value of the Iraqi dinar to one-twentieth of the Kuwaiti dinar, that is, 54 fils of a Kuwaiti dinar. The value of the Iraqi dinar was higher than the value of the Kuwaiti dinar in 1980, and now it has become difficult for us to provide milk for our children, although our country, the country of the two rivers, is a country of wealth and riches.

Gentlemen, you may not know that this country whose rulers concocted plots was part of Iraq until 1913 and that Iraq had not recognized it until the sixties in this century; that the Iraqi prime minister issued a decision in 1961 annexing Kuwait to Iraq, turning it once again into a district linked to al-Basrah and appointing its shaykh as governor as was the case until World War I broke out; that the Consultative Council in Kuwait decided twice in the thirties to unite with Iraq, a decision that was abrogated by the ruling family at that time; and that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id proposed unity with Kuwait to the Baghdad Pact in 1958 in the presence of the US representative.

Why do the US President and the British Prime Minister want to starve the Iraqi people to death? Cursed be what they are doing. What have the Iraqi people done other than unifying themselves and the families that were divided by circumstances in Iraq and Kuwait, defending themselves and helping to topple the backward Kuwaiti shaykh, whose only concern was collecting money and women. Why are they imposing a siege on Iraq to kill the babies and elderly as well as those who cannot get food and medicine, never mind that what the US and British administrations want may not be achieved? Why are they massing naval fleets, squadrons of planes, and ground forces with which they want to attack Iraq? They said they had come here and thus insulted the land of the Arabs and the sanctities of the Muslims by occupying the land of Hejaz and Najd [Saudi Arabia] in order to defend Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi danger. They are lying because they know that Iraq does not commit aggression but retaliates when it is attacked. Those who have not decided to deal a blow to Iraq can rest assured.

Ladies and gentlemen, O beloved children of God, O dear and

beloved children in Europe and the United States. As it is clear to you, our homeland is being threatened by the United States and Britain and those frustrated and humiliated ones involved with them. Our people are being exposed to a great harm. If the accursed ones mount an aggression, many heads of rulers will fall from their shoulders and tens of thousands of women, men, and children will perish from both sides. The National Assembly in our country knows this, and in accordance with its constitutional and humanitarian duties, it is searching for a way to prevent the disaster.

Among other things, it has reached the conclusion, together with other officials, that preventing the foreigners from traveling [safar] outside Iraq—particularly those whose governments have a hostile position and are taking part in the preparations for aggression and the economic embargo against Iraq—will constitute a means to open a deep dialogue with the peoples of those countries and those who represent them and with the administrations of those countries, to find a peaceful solution and avert the imminent catastrophe against the region and maybe the whole world that war would entail if it broke out.

At any rate, their presence with the Iraqi families working in the vital targets [ahdāf] may prevent military aggression.

Therefore, the National Assembly in Iraq, as well as we and the entire people of Iraq, are pained over what has happened. However, we understand the decision mentioned above because we know the reasons behind it and its objectives. This is because those who made that decision believe that man may have to, under special circumstances, deter major harm with lesser harm. They also believe that man is equal to his brother man in humanitarian value, regardless of his color, race, or nationality. Therefore, deterring the harm of death, murder, and starving to death resulting from the US policy which is directed against the people of Iraq, by banning a number of citizens from travelling, is a gain to humanity as a whole.

I add, ladies and gentlemen, that many of our children and yours will become orphans if war breaks out. Many of our women and yours will become widows if war breaks out. And, many of our men and yours will die if war breaks out. At any rate, many of the Iraqis, who are equal in human value to others, will starve and some of them, particularly children and old people, will die if the economic embargo, which the US Administration wants, is imposed according to its whim.

Therefore, and if any individual has to face such a scenario—which

is realistic and tangible, and the worst of it can happen at any minute—he will accept the consequences that will affect us all as a result of the foreigners involved not being able to travel for some time until the clouds disappear. To deprive an individual from seeing his homeland for some time is better for him and for humanity as a whole than depriving thousands of people of life.

You know that all the Americans and the others who belong to other nationalities in the armed forces were brought to the region and are massing to execute aggressive acts, not because they want this or because they are convinced about war and came here from their homelands and families by themselves, but because their governments have wanted this.

Therefore, let us all cooperate against those governments and stop them from committing their widespread crime and force them to withdraw their troops from the region, the presence of which may cause an intentional or unintentional spark that will set a huge fire or bring about the deluge from which no one can escape. To give everybody the opportunity to achieve peace, to disclose and expose those who want war and destruction, and to secure freedom for all, we put forward the following initiative:

1. The Security Council, with the approval of the United States, shall pledge that the United States will withdraw its forces from the region in accordance with a timetable not to exceed the time that these forces have been in the region. In addition, the Security Council shall pledge to Saudi Arabia that it will, collectively with the countries that abide by its resolution, stand against Iraq if it tries to attack Saudi Arabia. At the same time, both Iraq and Saudi Arabia shall pledge that neither of them will commit an act of aggression against the other or harm the interests of the other.

2. Alternatively, the Security Council shall pledge to secure peace and security in the entire region in accordance with the general basis contained in our initiative and the foreign forces shall withdraw from the sacred lands of Hijaz and Najd [Saudi Arabia]. This alternative, as we see it, is the option to achieve full and comprehensive peace and bring definite stability to the region and the world.

3. If either paragraph one or two above is accomplished, the foreigners shall be allowed to travel immediately as they choose.

4. If the above is not to be fulfilled on any excuse, then we will be content with the President of the United States making a clear, unequivocal commitment, in writing, to withdraw his forces and those

of his allies from the land of the Arabs and the sanctities of the Muslims in accordance with a declared timetable not to exceed the time it took for the buildup, that he pledge not to use force against Iraq, that he declare his respect for international law and refrain from violating it, that he break the blockade on Iraq by all sides immediately, and that he deal with Iraq on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocal refrain from harming the interests of either party.

For our part, and if the terms mentioned above are carried out, we will use our constitutional powers to allow the foreigners concerned to travel outside Iraq, each in accordance with his choice and decision.

5. The issue of Kuwait will be dealt with by the Arabs as an Arab issue, just as happened in all the other similar issues, such as the issue of the Sahara in the Arab Maghreb region between Morocco and the other parties concerned and the issue of Syria's occupation of Lebanon as well as other similar issues.

Brothers, sisters and dear children: This is our initiative. I ask you: Is there anything in it that contradicts international law, is against humanity, or is contrary to the West's legitimate interests? If the answer is that the initiative is fair, then let us all cooperate to realize it. With this, peace, freedom, and tranquil life can be achieved for all.

Will the deaf ones hear? This is a question directed to the US Administration in particular. With the correct answer to this question, many things can be achieved to serve humanity.

God's peace and blessings be upon you.

Signed Saddam Hussein on 19 August 1990

—FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990

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Statement issued by the PLO leadership following an "emergency session to discuss the serious developments in the Gulf and the entire region" in Tunis; date not given.

Since the outbreak of the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait in the Gulf region, the Palestinian leadership has been seeking to nip it in the bud, particularly because the prevailing circumstances point to a possible

escalation and explosion. The Palestinian leadership sought to contain and resolve this crisis through a fraternal dialogue, in continuation of the role it has been playing since 1973, when a similar dispute erupted between Iraq and Kuwait. At that time, that Palestinian leadership played a significant part in reaching a solution.

Upon the outbreak of the crisis, the Palestinian leadership embarked on efforts with Arab leaders to find an urgent solution within the Arab framework, which would preserve the higher pan-Arab interests and guarantee national rights, sovereignty, and security for all. Brother Abu-Ammar [Yasir Arafat] undertook intensified efforts with Arab leaders in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, the Libyan Jamahiriyah, and Tunisia in an effort to build a sound and balanced foundation for an Arab solution to the crisis which would be in accordance with pan-Arab interests and avert the danger of foreign intervention, which is bound to inflict great harm on the Arab nation, our people's struggle, and our central issue—that of Palestine.

Thanks to these efforts, it was possible to prepare Palestinian-Egyptian-Yemeni-Libyan-Tunisian draft plans which were presented to His Majesty King Fahd and President Saddam Hussein. The outcome of the talks, which all focused on an Arab solution, was discussed with His Excellency Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, His Excellency President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President Chedli Bendjedid, President Ali Abdallah Salih, and President Lieutenant General Umar al-Bashir.

Although the current circumstances do not allow us to present the details of these consultations the primary achievement of the Palestinian leadership was represented in Iraq's participation in the emergency Arab summit which was urgently called by Egypt and in which Kuwait took part. The second achievement was the proposal to pass a summit resolution establishing a committee embracing kings and heads of state to discuss the various issues with the Iraqi leadership, including the status of Kuwait.

During the Arab summit, brother Abu-Ammar suggested that the committee comprise Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia and make efforts during the summit. However, we were not able to put this proposal to a vote. We will not comment now on what happened during the Arab summit nor on the manner in which it was concluded. However, we will only note that three heads of state were deprived of the right to speak and their proposals were not put to a vote, although the Palestinian proposal had called on the proposed

committee to be guided in its work and in contacts with the Iraqi leadership by the speech which President Husni Mubarak delivered at the opening session of the Arab summit. In that speech, Mubarak emphasized that the solution must be within the Arab framework and warned against a possible explosive situation.

The Palestinian leadership had succeeded in winning the approval of all parties concerned, particularly Iraq, for that proposal and in making the committee's mission include a discussion of all issues without exception, including the status of Kuwait.

Before and during the summit meeting, the Palestinian stand was based on the need to reach an Arab solution and reject foreign intervention—something that was emphasized in Article 7 of the resolution issued by the Arab foreign ministers conference which was held in Cairo on 3 August.

After the sudden conclusion of the summit, the Palestinian leadership continued its efforts on the Arab and international levels, out of its conviction that the continuation of the crisis and intensive military intervention were bound to cause the outbreak of a destructive war. Such a war will harm the Arabs' economic, human, and military resources, undermine the Arab states, and open the door to Israeli expansionism and the imperialist forces which seek to control the area's wealth and its people's destinies, eradicate the Palestinian issue, and Balkanize the area.

The Iraqi initiative was the most important event that took place after the summit. The initiative contained positive elements, and was welcomed by the Palestinian leadership. The initiative stated Iraq's readiness to discuss the circumstances of a withdrawal from Kuwait and an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab and Palestinian lands, including Jerusalem, Golan Heights, and Lebanon, in implementation of the principles of international legitimacy and UN resolutions.

—*FBIS-NES*, 21 August 1990

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*Open letter from President Saddam Hussein to US President
George Bush on 21 August 1990*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Once again, President Bush stands in front of Americans to twist words, hide motives or part of those motives, and mix the causes with the results. In his statement yesterday, 20 August 1990, in front of the American war veterans, he dealt with the issue of the Americans who are in Iraq and called them hostages. This despite the fact that the Iraqi statements have explained beyond a doubt that the situation of the Americans here is the result of a real aggression committed against the Arab nation and Iraq and that President Bush himself and his ally, Thatcher, are the ones who are carrying out this aggression. Had the aggression not been committed and had President Bush made a real assessment of the interests of the American people and citizens, Americans and others would not have faced what they have.

Despite this, what they have had to face so far is the lightest treatment imposed by pressing circumstances even by American criteria themselves. And how is this? President Bush knows—or I suppose he knows—that America itself held tens of thousands of its own nationals just because they were of Japanese origin. It based this act on the rule of choosing the lesser of two evils. If this precedent exists and is proven on the US record, in addition to other precedents contained on the record of mankind, is it not a kind of racism to allow other states, including the American, that which is not allowed to Arabs, including Iraqis?

Despite all this, the Iraqis have clearly said that what took place is a kind of formula pressed upon us, not an option among many options. We are pained that this has happened.

Not allowing some foreigners to travel is not revenge, but deterrence of a crime of aggression President Bush intends to commit against the Iraqi people following his criminal occupation of the land of Kaaba and the tomb of the prophet, may God's prayers and blessings be upon him. If he commits such a crime, a big catastrophe will be inflicted not only on the region, but on the world.

President Bush went on to speak about outlaws; he makes a comparison—with a clear purpose—between Iraq and what it repre-

sents on one hand and Hitler on the other. He forgets that all these descriptions apply to him. This is because Iraq did not bring its fleets and aircraft to attack America and Europe. It was President Bush and those who were dragged with him to the abyss who boarded their ships and aircraft and came as invaders to our region. After desecrating the holy places and violating taboos, they want to kill the people and deprive them of their human nature. Is there any doubt of the application of these descriptions to Bush when he intends to ignite a war that would burn the entire world? Is there more evidence on his disregard of all initiatives and solutions which we presented, whether with regard to the origin of the problem or with regard to the issue of the foreigners who are the result of the original problem?

It is definitely misbehaviour, even poor insight and wisdom, for the White House to reject our initiative of 12 August 1990 a few hours after it was announced on the air and before President Bush took it upon himself to ask for the official text, out of fear that the translation was inaccurate or that the sentences were deficient for technical reasons.

Is this possible, President of the United States of America? Whoever does not want history to link him to the base characteristics of Hitler, must search thoroughly for peaceful means and not rush into preparations for war. What we presented in our initiative of 12 August 1990 and in our letter to the foreign families, who the National Assembly decided to host, is a clear way for anyone to distance himself from the base descriptions of Hitler.

We are among those who wish to be associated with all the characteristics of love and peace that are desired by the peoples of the world. At the same time, we defend, without fear from any arrogant and sinful tyrant or aggressor, the principles of our religion and holy shrines and the honour of the homeland and nation, even all the values of humanity combined.

It has become clear that claiming the US forces came here to defend Saudi Arabia is an argument that holds no water in the face of contrary facts. This is because the reality on the ground confirms that Iraq does not intend to attack anyone, including Saudi Arabia. However, to say that your forces came here to defend American interests, you know that the Arabs, including Iraq, are not opposed to legitimate interests, whether of the West in general or the United States. You also know that prosperity, scientific and technical progress, and the promotion and flourishing of growth cannot be achieved in the way the Arabs

hope without cooperation with the West. To achieve this, the Arabs have to sell oil; the major oil market is Europe and the United States, in addition to Japan.

I assume that President Bush knows that Iraq, for example, sold a third of its oil to the United States until 2 August 1990 and that Iraq was against the feverish price increases that took place in 1973. We have documents to prove it. At any rate, the Arabs, including Iraq, wish to sell their oil for all the purposes we have already mentioned, not to drink it or freeze it. The fact that Iraq owns, more or less, 20 per cent of the world's oil reserves does not annul the principles we have already referred to. If whoever owns oil is boycotted by the world, it would be all the more reason for the world to boycott America and the Saudi Arabian Government. After all, is not food more vital to the human being than oil? We answer by saying yes. By all human standards, it is more vital than oil. The human being cannot survive without food.

If President Bush's criteria for boycotts, hostility, war, and siege are applicable to Iraq merely because it will, or that it already does, own 20 per cent of the world's oil reserves, then it is all the more reason that these standards, in every sense, be applied to those who own the same percentage or more of food, primarily cereals.

Only then, the world must be against America and Australia primarily. If US interests have become so small and narrow in Bush's view that they are restricted only to the narrow corner of relations between Bush and Fahd, and to their mutual interests—which precede Bush's assumption of the Presidency and coincided with the elections; and if their interests have become so narrow that they do not consider them as they should in terms of good and positive relations with a large and great nation, but consider them only with Jabir al-Ahmad, the Croesus of Kuwait, and his clique, who is unable to construct a useful sentence and who, along with people like him, has been a source of shame to the Arabs and proof to the West of their backwardness—then, you will be cursed by what you are doing.

Before concluding my letter, I would like to say that the source of capability and power, Mr. Bush, does not lie in the size of armies and technological superiority, nor in your alliance with those who betrayed their nation and people. It lies in the inclination toward right. However, God is greater and more powerful than everyone and, as we have previously said, America would not have been a superpower if it had not been influential in the world. In order to remain influential, it must

respect the freedom of peoples and the freedom of nations to choose. It also must respect other people's sanctities and feeling. If you continue to ignore this, then I warn of the consequences, and I here record to history that your continuation in this policy will cause America to descend from its present status and it will lose many opportunities. In all circumstances, whether you choose war or boycott, you will lose and be defeated. And we will achieve victory, with God's help. God is great, and let the lowly be accursed.

*Signed Saddam Hussein, 30 Muharram 1411 Hegira,
corresponding to 21 August 1990*

—*FBIS-NES, 22 August 1990*

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*Statement by I.K. Gujral, Minister of External Affairs on his
visit to Moscow, Washington, Amman, Baghdad and Kuwait
in both Houses of Parliament on 23 August 1990*

1. As the august House is aware, I have been on a tour of some of the major countries concerned with the present Gulf crisis during the last seven days. I would like to take this first available opportunity to give a detailed report to the House regarding the highlights of this tour which took me first to Moscow, then to Washington followed by visits to Amman, Baghdad and Kuwait in that order. As Honourable Members are aware, my colleague, the Minister of Civil Aviation, Arif Mohammed Khan has also just recently visited several Gulf countries to see for himself the condition of Indians there, to make arrangements on the spot for the repatriation of distress cases, and to persuade the Governments of those countries to make available to us additional oil supplies. I am sure the House would like to express its appreciation of the effort that he has made and commend him for the success of that effort.

2. The primary reason of the tour was our deep concern for the welfare, security and well-being of the large Indian community that lives and works in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf. We have approximately 172,000 Indians in Kuwait, and in the Gulf as a whole

about 1.5 million altogether.

3. I spent nearly 2 days in Kuwait and used this opportunity to meet as wide a cross section of the Indian community as possible. I went to their school and to their residential areas, held two meetings at the Embassy which were attended by thousands of our people, and another two meetings at their residential areas, again attended by several thousands in each case. I spoke to individuals and groups where they lived and elsewhere. Their enthusiasm was tremendous. Several times during my address, slogans of *Bharat Mata ki jai* were shouted, and they greeted me with applause and warmth. There is naturally considerable anxiety about the future and a great deal of tension at present. However, visiting several places in Kuwait, I could see for myself that while the law and order situation is not normal, there is no cause for grave anxiety. There was looting in some cases including the property of a few Indian nationals, but severe punitive steps have been taken by the authorities and this problem has by and large been brought under control. Electricity, water and essential services are functioning normally. Medical services are available for emergencies. Closure of banks has been a problem, but one bank opened the day I arrived and other banks are expected to open in the next few days, so that people are able to draw cash for their needs. There is no doubt that in Kuwait, shortages of food have appeared, making rationing inevitable; almost all shops are closed, but some cooperative stores selling essential goods and food items are open. But the Indians I spoke to and the leaders of associations informed me that while a number of items are not available, and most shops are closed, basic rations are available for the time being. Common kitchens have been set up for those among the Indian community who are most needy and over 6,000 persons are being regularly fed at these kitchens. I conveyed to the leaders and all those whom I met that their families and friends were anxious to receive news about them—that they should write letters and give them to me to carry back to India. Thus I brought 15 large sacks full of letters back with me for posting.

4. I should mention the excellent work done by our Ambassador in Kuwait and the officers and staff of the Embassy who have undergone great hardship at this time of tension and daily difficulty and have nevertheless worked round the clock to ensure that the welfare and needs of the Indian community are met by whatever means are available during the period of shortages. I myself have seen the unprecedented crowds that gather daily at the Embassy, people who

are in need of travel or other documents, seek advice on what to do, or ask for arrangements for repatriation. The Embassy has, with limited staff in such an emergency, coped extremely well in handling the situation. Our Ambassador in Baghdad and the Embassy there are similarly to be highly commended; for, the current repatriation route is by land through which hundreds of Indian nationals arrive in Baghdad each day; they have to be fed and looked after and arrangements made for adequate transport. The Ambassador and his staff have devoted themselves entirely to this task on a round the clock basis despite several impediments regarding non-availability of accommodation and transport.

5. The future of our Embassy in Kuwait was discussed with the authorities. Iraq has decided that no Embassy will be allowed to continue after 24 August 1990. There is little option for the Missions located in Kuwait, but to comply with this decision. Both in order to look after the welfare of the Indian community more effectively and facilitate repatriation, for which Basrah is likely to be the most used route, we are taking measures to strengthen our Consulate General there. I am confident that this arrangement will work satisfactorily. We are also taking steps to improve our communications with the Consulate General in Basrah to facilitate this work.

6. The authorities in Kuwait have been courteous and considerate to Indian nationals, and there have been no serious complaints on this account. I have, however, with deepest regret, to inform the august House that in the crossfire on 2 August two Indian nationals lost their lives. I am sure that the House would join me in conveying to their families our deepest condolences and sympathy. We have also decided to pay Rs. 25,000 as grant to each family, and we are taking up the issue of their dues with the employers. There was a report of another Indian national who died, but this has not so far been confirmed. Apart from this, another Indian national was seriously injured; there are a few other reports of minor injuries. We had received reports regarding Indians missing or detained by the Iraqi authorities. I took all this up during my discussions and was assured that there were presently no detained Indian nationals. Nevertheless, on my request, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister agreed that specific instructions would be issued to the concerned Iraqi authorities to verify if any Indian national had been detained through mistaken identity, and that they would be released immediately. 507 Indians were detained on the first day, that is 2nd August. They have since been released and

have left Baghdad for Amman by air, for India. Some other specific cases were brought to my attention. The crew of an Air India flight had been stranded in Kuwait. I am glad to inform the House that they have since been repatriated. Indian nationals on board a British Airways flight transiting Kuwait were also stranded. Some of the ladies and children were brought back by me in the special aircraft in which I travelled. Arrangements are being made for the repatriation of the others.

7. Here, I must commend the Indian association leaders and other community volunteers in Kuwait who have put in a great deal of hard work and effort to ensure that during difficult times for the Indian community, they are looked after, their requirements of welfare met and they are fed. Many of the more prosperous Indians are feeding hundreds of the more needy at their homes daily; they are sharing what they have for the benefit of the community as a whole. I congratulate them; I assure them that the people and the Government of India appreciate the services they have rendered to such a large Indian community. I am confident that this House would agree that the contribution being made by them are in accordance with our highest traditions.

8. I informed the Indian community that while those who need to leave owing to genuine distress, medical assistance or other humanitarian grounds may do so, we do not see any reason for haste or panic in leaving Kuwait. Our people have done well there, they have contributed to the development of the nation, and the present circumstances though difficult, should not be a cause for panic or hasty departure. I advised the leaders and members of the Indian community to further strengthen the voluntary organizations that have so far done extremely well in keeping up the morale and rendering service to the community. They were asked to decide among themselves what should be the priority in regard to repatriation. At the same time, I assured them that we were closely watching the situation; we had made arrangements for repatriation of Indian nationals on a regular basis and we would gradually step up the numbers who could be repatriated. On these points I had detailed discussions with the local authorities in Kuwait who agreed to provide all facilities for the Indian community. In fact, they urged that the Indian community should stay on and continue to contribute to the economy. I myself brought back with me 200 of our nationals, including a few expectant mothers, other women, children and distress cases in the Air Force aircraft in which I returned.

The conditions of travel were exacting, but the demand was such that I felt obliged to help out to the extent possible. I would like to thank the Captain and crew of the aircraft for the great help they gave during the flight.

9. The present route for repatriation is very inconvenient. It is by road from Kuwait to Baghdad and then to Amman, from where Air India picks them up. In the present situation, the journey takes 48 hours or more; it is hazardous and exhausting; it is not suitable for women and children or the elderly. We have, therefore, arranged with the approval of the Iraqi Government that an Iraqi aircraft will be chartered from Basrah which is close to Kuwait to take Indian nationals to Amman from where Air India will pick them up. Presently it is planned to start with one flight per day, but this can be increased later according to the requirements. The Iraqi authorities are also processing our proposal for direct flights from Baghdad or Basrah to India and we hope this will be finalized in a short time. It has also been agreed that passenger ships might be used, but this is dependent on the present state of interdiction policies and we are seeking further clarification on this point. We are, in any case, setting up offices on both sides of the Iraq-Jordan border to facilitate passage by the land route. Two officials have already been posted on the Jordan side and two more are being posted on the Iraq side. Steps have also been taken for adequate reception at Bombay and Trivandrum and for facilitating onward journey for which the Minister of Railways has agreed to provide free tickets. One ship owned by non-resident Indians, *M V Safir* has been in Kuwait since the crisis began. During my discussion, it was agreed that the ship and its crew will be released. Efforts are also being made to see whether some members of the Indian community can be repatriated on board this vessel as well.

10. Another point discussed with the Government of Iraq was regarding the supply of food to the Indian community. I mentioned to President Saddam Hussein, the shortages and rationing faced by them and it has been agreed that whatever can be done within the existing circumstances will be done. What is needed is to improve the availability and I will come to that point presently.

11. During my discussions with President Saddam Hussein, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi leaders, I brought to their attention the numerous problems faced by the Indian community in Kuwait. I stated that they needed assistance by way of additional facilities for travel by road or air, provision of necessary documentation, enforce-

ment of law and order in the areas in which they live, medical aid etc. They promised to make every effort to solve these problems. I would like to express my gratitude particularly, to President Saddam Hussein and to the Iraqi authorities for all the help that is being rendered to the Indian community.

12. The question of interdiction was discussed with the Secretary of State, Baker in Washington, and I was informed that food supplies for humanitarian purposes as also medical supplies going by sea will not be stopped. We have, however, to see whether it is going to be really possible.

13. An important question discussed by me particularly in Moscow and Washington was the question of oil supplies at a reasonable price. As the House is aware over 40 per cent of our oil imports including supplies from the Soviet Union, originated in Iraq or Kuwait. The responses that I got during my discussions both in Moscow and Washington were generally encouraging. Mr. Baker told me that the US supported the proposal for an increase of production by Gulf producers and others so that the overall shortfall, and its adverse effects on prices and availability, could be minimized. The Soviet Government immediately agreed that they would seek alternative source for the supplies of oil which had hitherto originated in Iraq and said they would welcome a delegation from India to work out the details immediately; they also offered oil of Soviet origin, an offer which would be examined to see if this can be availed by us in India.

14. There is also the overall question of the adverse effects on the economies of countries like India, of the current developments in the Gulf, particularly of the application of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council. So far as the mandatory sanctions themselves are concerned, India would naturally keep step with the world community. However, in the present inter-dependent world, severe or draconian measures applied in any part of the world cannot but have adverse effects on the rest of the world. The UN Charter had visualized this problem, though not to the extent that it is present today, and had provided for recourse to the Security Council with regard to the solution of any special problems that may arise. In my discussions in Moscow, the Soviet Government agreed that this was a matter on which joint efforts are needed at the international level to ease the burden on countries like India which are severely affected. The subject was also discussed in Washington where I was told that the US also believed that there must be international cooperation to ease the burden

on countries like India which were most adversely affected. We have already commenced consultations in New York with several countries similarly affected, to explore the possibility of taking action through the UN.

15. I now come to the situation in the Gulf in general. This was discussed at length in all the capitals I visited. There are problems which must be of priority concern for Indian such as the future of the Indian community, oil supplies and prices and the burden of sanctions. At the same time, we have also to think of the possibility that exists for the de-escalation of the crisis before it engulfs the whole world. Any measure for de-escalation will be in keeping with the general trend of recent years towards global detente and strengthening of peace.

16. We in India are equally concerned about the destabilizing effect of this crisis for our region. The Gulf region is a neighbour of South Asia. Escalation of tension or conflict there will have serious repercussions on us. We have already seen that Pakistan and Bangladesh have decided to send troops to the area of tension in the Gulf. This could very well be used as an excuse for further militarization of these countries, thus posing a threat to the security of the whole region. This makes it incumbent upon all of us to look for openings for de-escalation and defusion of the situation.

17. Here, I am not proposing that we assume a mediatory or good offices role. I made this clear to all the leaders I met. Nevertheless, one of the objectives of the discussions was to find whether there was any chance of reversing the on-going escalation. This can only be explored tentatively at this stage. Though my discussions during the tour did not reveal much of a meeting ground, it is imperative that efforts to this end must continue.

18. Clearly, humanitarian considerations are uppermost in our mind because of the large Indian community in the whole region; there are, however, nationalities of other countries too, including Iraq and Kuwait who are adversely affected by the food shortages and other circumstances. As I already stated, there is agreement among all concerned that food supplies for humanitarian purposes can be sent. However in the context of the present 'interdiction' policy, we do not know whether it is really going to work. We are considering the possibility of sending a ship-load of food from India to alleviate the suffering of the people of all nationalities caught in the current crisis. It would also be a good idea to explore whether the Red Crescent or Red Cross Societies could play a role regarding the welfare of the foreign nationals in Iraq and

Kuwait.

19. Finally I would like to take advantage of this occasion to restate our position on some of the major aspects of Gulf crisis. Immediately after the onset of the crisis, we expressed our regret that the differences between Iraq and Kuwait could not be settled peacefully and stated our well-known position against the use of force in any form in inter-State relations and called for the soonest possible withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At the same time, we have expressed our disapproval of unilateral action outside the framework of United Nations by any country or group of countries to enforce the mandatory sanctions decided by the Security Council. We are also against the induction or presence of foreign military forces in this region.

20. It is our hope that the escalation that has taken place in the last three weeks in the Gulf will, in the coming days, be reversed and the international community will see the wisdom of making a determined effort to defuse the tension and restore peace and stability in the region. Both the Arab League and the Non-aligned Movement have an important role to play in this regard.

—*External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi*

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*US Secretary of State Baker's prepared testimony to House
Foreign Affairs Committee on 4 September 1990*

I have come here today to speak to you—and through you to the American people—about the conflict in the Persian Gulf and what it means for the United States.

I would like to use my statement today to place this crisis in a larger context. The entire world has mobilized to redress aggression against a small country in a very distant place. Already, of course, we're paying higher prices when we pull up to the local gas pump. And as you have pointed out as well, thousands of our finest young men and women now stand guard in the heat of the Persian Gulf.

The president has made it plain that we have a straightforward responsibility to the American people. Openly and clearly, we have a duty to state what is at stake as a result of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. We have indeed a duty to tell our people what our

immediate goals are in this conflict, and we have, as well, a duty to explain how we plan to achieve those goals in order to further our long-run interests in the Gulf and beyond.

So let me start, if I might, by discussing what's at stake. First, Iraq's unprovoked aggression is a political test of how the post Cold War world will work. Amidst the revolutions sweeping the globe and the transformation of East-West relations, I think we stand at a critical juncture in history. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is one of the defining moments of a new era, a new era full of promise but also one that is replete with new challenges.

While the rules of the road developed during the Cold War did, in the end, preserve East-West peace in Europe, the task now is to build an enduring peace that is global in its scope and not limited just to Europe and not rooted in confrontation and tension.

If we are to build a stable and more comprehensive peace we must respond to the defining moments of this new era, recognizing the emerging dangers that are lurking before us. We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and new conflict. It is an era in which new hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted.

Accordingly, we face a simple choice. Do we want to live in a world where aggression is made less likely because it is met with a powerful response from the international community, a world where civilized rules of conduct apply? Or are we willing to live in a world where aggression can go unchecked, where aggression succeeds because we somehow cannot muster the collective will to challenge it?

Sadly, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait will not be the last act of aggression that international society will face. So long as ruthless aggressors remain, the reality of international life is such—is that such predatory designs are going to emerge from time to time. But the current crisis is the first opportunity to limit such dangers, to reinforce the standards for civilized behaviour, found in the U.N. charter, and to help shape a more peaceful international order built on the promise of recent trends in Europe and elsewhere. So it's our view, that we must seize this opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order.

Second, from a strategic standpoint we must show that intimidation and force are not successful ways of doing business in the volatile Middle East or, for that matter, anywhere else. The combination of unresolved regional conflicts, turbulent social and political changes,

weapons of mass destruction, and much of the world's energy supplies, makes the Middle East particularly combustible. No one is immune from conflicts in the Middle East. And no one can feel safe when the danger of war escalating in the Middle East is so high.

If we want to encourage peaceful change, and to preserve the security of all of our friends in the area, we are going to have to remain a reliable partner for peace. We must help demonstrate that Saddam Hussein's violent way is an anachronism rather than the wave of the future.

Third, and perhaps most obviously, what is at stake economically is the dependence of the world on access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The effects on our economy and our people, as I mentioned, are already being felt. But, this is not about increases in the price of a gallon of gas at the local service station. It is not just a narrow question of the flow of oil from Kuwait and Iraq. It is, rather, about a dictator who, acting alone and unchallenged, could strangle the global economic order, determining by fiat whether we all enter a recession or even the darkness of a depression.

A sustained oil price spiral similar to what happened in 1973 and again in 1979 could easily cause higher inflation and interest rates worldwide, sending all of us into a sustained recessionary slide. The burden could become particularly great for the new democracies of Eastern Europe, threatening to undo the democratic revolutions of 1989. It would also be painfully felt in the poorer countries of Central America, South Asia and Africa, threatening those who are now embracing market oriented reforms and striving to improve living standards for their impoverished millions.

Simply put, these are the stakes raised by Iraq's invasion against Kuwait. So, the question is, I think, how have we and the international community responded to them?

For the United States, the president has identified four immediate objectives or goals.

First, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, as mandated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 660:

Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

Third, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and Kuwait.

Fourth, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.

Our strategy is to lead a global political alliance to isolate Iraq politically, economically and militarily. In this way, we aim to make Iraq pay such a high price for its aggression that it will be forced to withdraw from Kuwait and release Americans and others held hostage. This, in turn, of course, would allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. It will also improve the opportunities for long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf in a way that builds on the unprecedented international consensus that has already been formed.

Our strategy has moved on two mutually supporting tracks toward these aims. Let me summarize our efforts.

Diplomatically, we have worked from the beginning to foster a coordinated international response to Iraq's aggression. The results, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, have been extraordinary, and I think it's fair to say have as well been unprecedented. Five unanimous U.N. Security Council resolutions have been passed, and I think it's fair to say as well that Iraq is now isolated.

We are gratified by the responsible and productive work that we have been able to undertake with the other permanent members, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, as well as the support that the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement have provided.

In particular, as Mr. Broomfield pointed out, the Soviet Union has proved a responsible partner, suggesting new possibilities for active superpower cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. The president will work to further strengthen our ties of partnership when he meets President Gorbachev in Helsinki this Sunday, 9 September 1990.

In taking the long view, we should remember what this conflict would have looked like if old style zero-sum thinking was still driving Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf. NATO, the European community and the West European Union have pitched in magnificently. Our NATO ally, Turkey, should also be singled out for its fast, its effective and its very courageous cooperation.

Finally, a broad regional coalition including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf states and Syria have done much to foster international cohesion. In this regard, let me make a larger point. From the very early days of this administration, we have made a concerted effort, with our friends in Asia and Europe, with the Soviets, and with organizations like NATO and the European Community, to focus on the explosive dangers that are inherent in regional conflicts. In res-

ponse to Iraq's invasion, we've drawn upon the new international ties being shaped by this strategy.

The Kuwaitis themselves deserve our compassion and they deserve our respect. They have suffered a brutal invasion, their country pillaged, their lives traumatized. There has been a tragic loss of life, and thousands of Kuwaitis have fled to neighbouring states, escaping in many cases with only the clothes on their backs.

The Kuwaitis, however, are fighting back, and fighting back heroically. They are not collaborating with the Iraqis. All elements of Kuwaiti society, from religious conservatives to secular liberals, have voiced support for the restoration of the government. An indigenous Kuwaiti resistance has emerged. It carries on the struggle against Iraq aggression from inside Kuwait. Moreover, the government of Kuwait in exile is providing financial aid to support our military effort and to help alleviate economic disruptions that have occurred in states such as Egypt.

In short, Kuwait has been occupied—Kuwait has not been conquered.

The political coalition, bound by the principle that Saddam Hussein must be denied the fruits of aggression, has created an economic embargo under U.N. auspices that is solidly in place. Iraq's import-dependent economy is beginning to feel the strain, and international pressure will continue to grow over time as shortages mount. Sanction-busters may be tempted by the lure of financial profits, as they always are, but Security Council Resolution 665, which permits enforcement by all appropriate means, should ensure that Iraq's opportunities to export its oil and import key materials will be severely constrained over time.

Saddam Hussein's aggression has exacted a broad range of economic costs for countries across both the region and the globe. The destruction of the Kuwaiti economy by Iraqi invaders has caused major economic dislocations for our friends in the region, notably Egypt and Turkey. Other countries with fragile economies, especially in Eastern Europe, are bearing some very, very heavy costs. The need to offset the burden of our own military efforts must also be addressed. As the president announced last Thursday (August 30), we've initiated an action plan to meet these needs. Our friends around the world have been responding, and they continue to respond. Saudi Arabia is meeting a large share of the fuel costs for this effort, and other Gulf states are providing fuel and financial resources to the affected states.

The president has asked Secretary Brady and myself to go to key nations in the Gulf, in Europe, and in Asia to help mobilize and coordinate the international effort. We will attempt to ensure that the cost and responsibilities are shared equitably and that our various efforts complement one another. The aim is to address the vital needs of affected parties and to maintain the solidarity of the international coalition. Time can be on the side of the international community. Diplomacy can be made to work.

On the military track, over 25 countries are now supplying men and material in support of the Security Council resolutions. U.S. military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to ensure the effective implementation of the U.N. sanctions. Our military forces are also there to protect American lives and to provide an effective and decisive military response should Iraq escalate its aggression to active combat with the multinational force.

Once the present danger passes, however, we cannot let its lessons go unheeded. We have a responsibility to assure the American people that a decade from now their sons and daughters will not be put in jeopardy because we failed to work toward long-run solutions to the problems of the Gulf. The historic international consensus that we've built can become a solid foundation for successfully meeting our immediate objectives and for building a safer future. It can foster a future Gulf environment that will protect our interests and help us avoid having to make this kind of massive diplomatic and military effort again.

In the long run, we seek a stable Gulf in which the nations of that region and their peoples can live in peace and can live free of the fear of coercion. We seek a region in which change can occur and legitimate security concerns can be preserved and preserved peacefully. And we seek a region, in which energy supplies flow freely. We will need to work together with governments in the Gulf and outside of it to build a more durable order.

We will want to ensure that our friends in the area have the means to deter aggression and defend themselves, making it less necessary to send American men and women to help them. And we will work with the rest of the regional and international community to prevent further Iraqi expansionism as well as Iraqi efforts to acquire and produce weapons of mass destruction.

Resolution of today's threat should also become a springboard for a sustained international effort to curb the proliferation of chemical,

biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the region and elsewhere. It can become a springboard for revived efforts to resolve the conflicts which lie at the root of such proliferation, including the festering conflict between Israel and its Palestinian and Arab neighbors. It is not enough to demonstrate that aggression and intimidation don't pay; we must show that a pathway to reconciliation and peace does exist and that it can be found with good will and with good faith on all sides. Let me conclude by placing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in a historical perspective.

For over four decades, the central fact of international relations was the conflict between East and West. The Cold War reverberated across the globe affecting everyone, everywhere. Much of America's foreign policy was either driven by or it was derivative of, our efforts to contain Stalinist aggression.

Now, the central dispute of the post-war period, the East-West conflict over the future of Europe, has been transformed. Last year's people power revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe swept away the dictatorships of the past. In their place, the people are finding freedom. Europe is becoming whole and free and Germany will be united in peace and freedom. An enlightened Soviet leadership has encouraged peaceful, democratic change as the only legitimate road to progress.

This administration has actively engaged the new thinkers and reformers in the Soviet Union. Together we are finding common interest which will unite the East and the West. Partnership is replacing conflict in that relation.

As I have said many times before, America's role in this sea change in world politics is very straightforward. We must leave behind not only the Cold War, but the conflicts that preceded it.

And this is why, as the president has said from the outset, Iraq's aggression cannot stand.

The line in the sands of Arabia is also a line in time. By crossing into Kuwait, Saddam Hussein took a dangerous step back in History. Maybe he simply thought the world would consider Kuwait expendable, that we would think of it as just a small far-away country of which we knew and cared very little. Possibly, he remembered the 1930s when the League of Nations failed to respond effectively to Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia, what is today Ethiopia. Clearly, Saddam Hussein thought that his crime would pay, but the world has decided otherwise. He must not be allowed to hold on to what he stole.

The president has made our position very clear. The world must stand united to defend the principles enshrined in the United Nations charter. In this effort, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, America must lead and our people must understand that. We remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military, and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful collective response by the international community.

Geographically, we stand apart from much of the world, separated as we are by the Atlantic and the Pacific. But politically, economically, and strategically, there are no oceans, and in a world without oceans, a policy of isolationism is no option at all. Only American engagement can shape the peaceful world that our people so deeply desire.

We believe that this coordinated and comprehensive international isolation of Iraq is the only peaceful path to meeting the objectives set by the president. Our efforts, however, are going to take time, and that is what we ask most of the American people. Stand firm. Be patient. And remain united, so that together we can show that aggression does not pay.

Some US forces are likely to stay on in the Persian Gulf even after the present crisis is over, as part of a Middle East version of NATO, with major Arab participation.

That was Secretary of State James Baker's message when he addressed the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday. According to Mr. Baker, the US forces, which would more likely be Naval than ground troops, would be part of a new "security structure" that could contain runaway ambition on the part of President Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Baker also told the Committee "Even if you assume that the sanctions do work in moving Mr. Hussein out of Kuwait, there has to be a very clear overall examination of the security structure of the region, the balance of power in the region."

Several key US allies and others have been calling on Washington to topple the Iraqi President. Mr. Baker made it clear that was not one of President Bush's stated objectives. However, "President Bush has said it would not make us terribly unhappy if the people of Iraq wanted a new leader."

—USIS, New Delhi

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*Final Communiqué of GCC Foreign Ministers' Meeting
on 6 September 1990*

Their Highnesses and Excellencies the Foreign Ministers of the GCC member countries concluded this afternoon the proceedings of the 36th session of the Ministerial Council which has been held at the Conference Palace in Jeddah.

At the beginning of the final session held by Their Highnesses and Excellencies the Foreign Ministers, HE the Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdullah Bisharah, read out the final communiqué of the 36th session of the Ministerial Council, the text of which follows:

The Ministerial Council held its 36th session on Wednesday, 16th Safar 1411 AH, corresponding to 5th September 1990 AD, in Jeddah under the chairmanship of HE Yusuf Bin Alawi Bin Abdullah, the Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman, in the presence of Their Highnesses and Excellencies: HE Rashid Bin Abdullah al-Nu'aymi, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; HE Shaykh Muhammad Bin Mubarak Al Khalifah, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain, HRH Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; HE Mubarak Bin Ali al-Khatir, the Foreign Minister of Qatar; HE Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kuwait.

The Council reviewed the critical situation due to the continuation of the Iraqi forces' occupation of the State of Kuwait and its consequences, noting the Iraqi government's perseverance in its refusal to abide by the principles of the Arab League's Charter, the stipulations of the Arab summit resolutions No. 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665 of the year 1990. The Council condemns the Iraqi stance in refusing to adhere to these resolutions, which was exposed in the talks between the UN Secretary-General and the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Jordan between 1st and 2nd September 1990.

The Council stresses anew the necessity of the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from the Kuwaiti territories without any prior conditions, stresses anew that it recognises neither the Iraqi decision to annexe Kuwait nor any consequences of the Iraqi invasion of the Kuwaiti territories; and insists on the restoration of the legitimate regime which existed in Kuwait before the invasion.

The Council stresses that the origin of the problem is the Iraqi

occupation of Kuwait, annexing it and violating its national sovereignty which defied the international will, treaties and laws and pushed the international community to the edge of a precipice with complete disregard of the grave consequences which will be inflicted on the Arab peoples and the countries of the world.

As it recalls the resolutions of the emergency Arab Foreign Ministers' conference which was held in Cairo on 30th August 1990, the Council stresses the necessity of respecting the civilians in Kuwaiti territories under Iraqi occupation and securing the safety of their lives and property; and also preserving the private and public institutions and property according to the Islamic laws—which were the first in providing this protection—and according to the fourth treaty of the Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning the protection of civilians during time of war and international human rights treaties and traditions.

Therefore, the Council decides:

(1) to condemn the Iraqi authorities' violation of the stipulations of International Law and human values regarding the treatment of civilians in the Kuwaiti territories under Iraqi military occupation;

(2) to request the Iraqi authorities to provide the utmost level of protection to all civilians present in the regions under Iraqi occupation;

(3) [to affirm] the need for the commitment of the Iraqi authorities to provide protection to public and private premises and fixed and mobile properties in the State of Kuwait, and to consider measures contravening this commitment null and void;

(4) to request the Iraqi authorities not to tamper with the demographic structure of the Kuwaiti territories, for such tampering would constitute a fundamental violation of the stipulations of humanitarian International Law;

(5) to hold the Iraqi Republic responsible for compensating for the losses and damages resulting from the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which resulted, and is still resulting, in material losses and damages to Kuwaiti government interests, banks, public or private institutions and companies, and the confiscation of their properties, funds, deposits and the movement or transfer of these outside Kuwait;

(6) to hold the Iraqi Republic responsible for the damages resulting from the invasion of Kuwait and the practices of the Iraqi forces there, and to affirm the legitimate right of victims, Kuwaitis and citizens of various other states, to just compensation for their losses and damages.

Out of the Council's desire to spare the region and the Arab nation further destruction which would harm everybody if Iraq persists in its obstinacy, and out of its desire to reach a peaceful solution based on the UN Security Council resolutions, in accordance with the position of the international community and the resolutions of the Arab League, the Council calls on sisterly Arab States which have been unable to define their stances to re-examine their positions in order to safeguard the national and pan-Arab interests of the Arab nation and to protect Arab relations.

The Council praises the brotherly Kuwaiti people who have expressed, in an unambiguous way, their total loyalty to their legitimate government, as represented by HH the Amir Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, and their commitment to their independence and political regime which they have chosen for themselves in accordance with their Constitution and legislature, they have also expressed their rejection of occupation through their national resistance against the blatant invasion.

The Council also salutes all countries which supported international legitimacy. It stressed that such firm and principled positions are likely to thwart the ambitions of the aggressors.

Following the response of states to UN Security Council resolutions 661-665, the Council praises international co-operation for implementing these resolutions. It expresses its gratitude to them, particularly the countries which share borders with Iraq; the Arab Republic of Syria, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey.

The Council calls on other states which have not implemented the UN Security Council resolutions to do so in order to safeguard international stability and security.

The Ministerial Council, following with deep concern the development of events in the Artab Gulf crisis and the situation arising from the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait, which led to the detention of the nationals of other countries in Iraq and Kuwait, and recalling the international agreements and charters, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the Security Council resolution 664 issued in 1990, calls upon the Iraqi authorities not to hamper the legitimate right of the nationals of other countries in Iraq and Kuwait to leave whenever they wish.

It urges the Iraqi authorities to abide by their international commitments regarding nationals of other countries, to provide them with appropriate protection, secure the safety of their lives and possessions,

and spare them exposure to the dangers of military operations.

The Ministerial Council holds Iraq totally responsible for any harm that befalls the lives or the possessions of the nationals of other countries, should the Iraqi authorities fail to abide by their international commitments to this effect.

Issued in Jeddah on 17th Safar 1411 AH, corresponding to 6th September 1990 AD.

—*The Gulf Crisis*, Edited by A.H.H. Abidi and K.R. Singh

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Peace Plans

New York Times, August 14 and 26

The only peace plan so far to address the long-term problem of dealing with Iraq's potential for chemical and nuclear warfare.

— Iraq to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of all foreign nationals, including the right to leave Iraq and Kuwait, thus affirming President Saddam's willingness to conform to international law and traditional Arab hospitality.

— Iraq to withdraw to positions held before August 1. This would realistically take at least one week.

— A peacekeeping force to be placed in Kuwait for six months, perhaps all-Arab, but operating under a renewable UN mandate. Could be managed by the Gulf Cooperation Council or Arab League.

— The UN Security Council to assign a special representative to Kuwait, to report back to the council on implementation of the plan. The council would take this report into account when considering lifting the economic embargo.

— The special representative to report to the Security Council on progress made toward a referendum on the position of the monarchy in Kuwait. There is no legal reason why the Emir, whom the UN recognises as "the authority of legitimate government", should have to seek election, but it would renew his confidence and the US could avoid "unseemly commitment to the automatic return of an absolute monarch". Only those previously franchised in Kuwait would vote.

— Iraq and Kuwait would agree to submit all territorial, financial

or other disputes to binding arbitration after a full withdrawal. Iraq's claims for the strategic islands of Warbah and Bubiyan could be tested at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

— Once stability was restored, the main economic powers would consider contributing to the tranquillity and prosperity of the region.

— Iraq to destroy all its chemical weapons stockpiles and submit to international inspection of its industrial, chemical and nuclear facilities.

The international embargo on selling arms and military-related technology to Iraq to remain in place indefinitely.

PLO, August 27

The PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, announced that he was working on a three-stage initiative, which was almost immediately absorbed into the joint Jordanian-PLO initiative, announced the next day.

— Freezing of military build-up in the Gulf.

— Withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and international forces from Saudi Arabia, and replacement of both by UN or Arab peacekeeping forces.

— A committee, chosen by the Arab League, to be set up to discuss territorial aspects of the conflict.

Acceptability: Chances of success are slim, as Iraq's calls for talks without preconditions have been rejected by the US, which insists on prior Iraqi withdrawal.

PLO officials, however, hope that broad Arab support for the plan would make it acceptable to some European countries, at least, and perhaps to the Soviet Union, which has spoken favourably of an "Arab solution".

PLO/Jordan, August 28

According to the London-based Palestinian newspaper, *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, this plan aims to turn Kuwait into a Monaco of the Gulf—"a constitutional monarchy that would sign an agreement with Iraq giving it control of certain administrative aspects, on the understanding that the principality, mirroring the relationship between Monte Carlo and France, would have self-rule".

— Simultaneous withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and international forces from Saudi Arabia, followed by the deployment of Arab peace forces in Kuwait.

— Plebiscite in Kuwait on turning it into a "free zone" and on the

form of sovereignty.

Acceptability: Iraq has accepted the plan. (It formed a committee on August 19 to study the possibility of turning Kuwait into a free zone.) Iraq says it is confident of a positive result of any plebiscite, but this could involve bitter argument about voter eligibility.

The influential London-based Saudi newspaper, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, was scornful of the proposals, citing diplomatic sources as saying they were manoeuvres to buy time for Iraq and would produce a semi-autonomous Kuwait under Baghdad tutelage.

The same sources said that mere Iraqi withdrawal was not enough and a "strike that will close the page on Saddam Hussein's regime in its entirety" was needed.

Arab League, August 31

A still sketchy, five-point peace plan, decided at an extraordinary meeting of 13 Arab foreign ministers in Cairo.

The plan stresses that any solution to the crisis must have an Arab League mandate. The League also backed the right of Gulf states to defend themselves against aggression.

Iraq, the PLO, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Mauritania and Jordan boycotted the meeting. It includes the following points:

- Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

- Immediate release of hostages, unconditional on solutions to crisis; safety of Arab labourers in Kuwait to be guaranteed.

- Condemns Iraq's treatment of foreign embassies in Kuwait, and refuses to recognise Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

- Iraq should compensate Kuwait for damages at the time of invasion and any subsequent losses. The security of Kuwaiti assets inside Kuwait, like funds in the central bank, should be guaranteed. These last demands were put forward by Gulf Co-operation Council — Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain. The council has forces in Saudi Arabia as part of Peninsula Shield.

- Calls for the return of the Kuwaiti royal family.

Libya, September 1

The most detailed of any Arab plan, it aims at giving Iraq a face-saving way out of the impasse. It was drawn up after consultation with Iraq, Jordan and Sudan. The plan does not clearly endorse UN and Arab League resolutions on the crisis, which demand the unconditional

withdrawal of Iraqi troops and restoration of the Emir.

The plan would be carried out under supervision of UN and Arab League.

- Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait and be replaced by UN forces.

- US and other international forces to pull out of Saudi Arabia and be replaced by Arab or Muslim troops.

- UN embargo to be lifted.

- Kuwait's al-Rumeilah oilfield and Bubiyan Island, both in border areas claimed by President Saddam, to be given to Iraq.

- Political self-determination for Kuwait.

- Agreement on a "unified Arab oil policy" which would deter countries from violations.

- Negotiations over debt and compensation.

Acceptability: Would not be acceptable to Kuwait, not to most Arab and Western countries. It is not certain how Iraq would respond to the plan.

Abu Iyyad, September 4

Abu Iyyad, Yasser Arafat's deputy in the Fatah organisation of the PLO, gave an interview to the French newspaper *Liberation* in which he floated a proposal that was believed to reflect Baghdad's new negotiating position. It echoes the "back-channel deal" offered to the White House at the end of August by Iraqi intermediaries, and subsequently denied by President Saddam.

- A US guarantee that it would not attack Iraq, or stage an air strike against its chemical plants and nuclear laboratories.

- All hostages allowed to leave Iraq.

- Iraq to withdraw from all of Kuwait except the island of Bubiyan, which would give Iraq access to the sea, and a border strip containing the Al-Rumeilah oilfield.

- The people of Kuwait to be allowed to decide their future, but the Emir would be barred from returning to the throne.

Acceptability: This is the most realistic plan yet to have emerged from Iraq, but the Saudi monarchy would almost certainly stand by the Emir. The UN, the US and Britain would oppose this deal because it would leave President Saddam with at least some of the spoils of his aggression.

—*Guardian Weekly*, 16 September 1990

PRESIDENT QADHAFI	KING HUSSEIN	CHAIRMAN ARAFAT	ARAB MAGHREB UNION	JORDAN, ALGERIA, MOROCCO
1. UN forces to replace Iraqi forces in Kuwait. 2. Arab Islamic forces to replace US and Western forces in the Arab peninsula. 3. Economic embargo against Iraq to be lifted. 4. Bubiyan Island and the Rumeila oil field to be given to Iraq. 5. The future political setup in Kuwait to be decided by the Kuwaiti people. 6. Compensation to all Arab parties affected by the crisis.	Parallel withdrawals of Iraq from Kuwait and foreign forces from Saudi Arabia. Arab Peace Keeping forces to replace multinational forces in Saudi Arabia. UN forces in Kuwait to supervise a referendum within six months over future political setup. An unspecified privileged relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. A Middle East Peace Conference to discuss Israeli occupation of Arab lands including Lebanon, Golan Heights and the West Bank and Gaza strip along with the Gulf Crisis.	Resolution to present crisis within an Arab framework. Withdrawal of US and other foreign forces from the Gulf and their replacement by international forces under UN auspices. Lifting of sanctions imposed on Iraq and application of sanctions against any State which refuses to withdraw from occupied territory. A negotiated and comprehensive settlement taking into account the rights and interests of all parties and all pending regional problems—the Gulf, Palestine, Lebanon and Golan Heights.	Agreement on three principles: 1. Opposition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 2. Non-resort to use of force to settle current crisis; or 3. Other measures aimed at weakening or starving Iraq. These principles were subsequently not developed into an initiative possibly because of divergence of positions. (Libya had made pro-Iraqi pronouncements and voted against the Arab League Resolution, Mauritania had expressed reservation, Tunisia stayed away from the Arab League summit, Algeria abstained on the Resolution and Morocco took a forthright pro-Saudi position going to the extent of sending troops to Saudi Arabia.)	The meeting was secret and no details were announced. It is understood that there was agreement: 1. on the desirability of an Arab solution but recognition of lack of a major opening for undertaking an immediate initiative and 2. to continue contacts/soundings with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq by Morocco and Jordan so that further steps to work out a negotiated settlement can be considered. 3. There was no agreement on issues such as timing of withdrawal of foreign forces, start of the international peace process or settlement of Iraqi territorial and other claims over Kuwait.

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*Statement by I.K. Gujral, Minister of External Affairs in
Parliament on 8 September 1990 (Excerpts)*

In Kuwait and Iraq, the situation has deteriorated since my visit. The position regarding essential services including water and electricity and the telephones and medical supplies and treatment is not satisfactory. Continuing fuel shortage remains a cause of concern. While the Indian associations in Kuwait continue to run common kitchens, the availability of rations has seriously decreased. In fact, the Iraqi authorities have informed us and other Asian countries which have sizeable number of their nationals in Iraq and Kuwait that they will not be able to make arrangements for rations for members of their community and that this will have to be done through the import of food.

This general deterioration in condition has resulted in the lowering of the morale of Indian nationals. Hence the desire for repatriation has increased which has obliged us to take corresponding action to augment the facilities available for repatriation.

I have to report that there has been some delay and even departures from the assurance given by the Iraqi authorities in implementing the agreement reached during my visit to Baghdad, on which I had earlier reported to the House. Of course, the most disconcerting development has been the position taken by them that repatriation from Kuwait and Iraq itself, which is most convenient, will not be permitted until the aircrafts or ships deployed for repatriation brought food in the inward or outward journey as the case may be. For example, we had suggested aircrafts to bring repatriates directly from Kuwait, Basrah and Baghdad to India. But the Iraqi authorities have taken the view that unless the same aircrafts brought food from India to Iraq, this would not be permitted. The same condition has been applied to passenger ships that could go to Iraqi ports for evacuation purposes. Proposals for hiring Iraqi aircrafts from Iraq and deploying them for direct flight from there to India have also not materialized so far, precisely for the same reason and due to the same conditionality. I have addressed a detailed message to the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq conveying to him our concern at these developments which have immensely added to the stupendous problem that we are facing in repatriating our nationals from Iraq and to the suffering of the members of the Indian community who have now to undertake the arduous journey overland

to Amman before they can be repatriated.

I have to report with regret that the political and military situation in the Gulf has been fast deteriorating. Tension is mounting and the process of escalation continues unabated. The build-up of foreign military forces in the region is continuing uninterrupted. If no action is taken to halt this drift and find a negotiated settlement to the problem, the possibility of military conflagration cannot be ruled out. This will have disastrous consequences not only for our region, which is a neighbour of the Gulf area, but also for the whole world. Over the medium and long term, the continuing tension in the Gulf region is likely to lead to further militarization of South Asia, thus endangering peace and stability in this region.

It is imperative in the situation that diplomatic initiative should be taken to try to resolve the crisis. The importance of the Non-Aligned Movement taking an initiative in this regard is all too evident. Mainly at our suggestion, Yugoslavia, the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, has decided to establish a group of three countries consisting of Algeria, India and Yugoslavia and has convened a meeting of the Group at Belgrade on the 11th of this month. I will be going to Belgrade for this purpose.

At the same time, we are continuing our consultations with other Governments who are involved in or are playing a role in the context of the Gulf crisis. The Special Envoy of the Emir of Kuwait was in Delhi this week and had extensive discussions with us on the various aspects of the crisis. A Special Envoy of President of Egypt will be here in a couple of days, and we are looking forward to exchanging views with him also. Apart from this, we have continued exchanges at diplomatic levels both in New York and here with the representatives of the Permanent Members of the Security Council as well as with those of other Members. We are also in touch with the envoys both in New York and Delhi of other countries having large expatriate population in the area and facing similar problems.

In a complex situation like this, it is difficult to provide ready-made answers. But there seems to be consensus on at least some of the measures that must be taken. And these are: renunciation of a military solution to the problem and working for a political solution; withdrawal by Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of its sovereignty and independence; a reversal of the foreign military presence in the region; and above all, a commitment by the international community to mount a concerted international effort, without further delay, for solving the

humanitarian problem of ensuring safety, security, well being and repatriation of foreign nationals trapped in Kuwait and Iraq and arranging food supplies for them.”

—*PIB*, Government of India, New Delhi

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Joint Statement by Gorbachev and Bush in Helsinki on 9 September 1990

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our foreign ministers of 3 August 1990, and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

Today, we once again call upon the government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However,

we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.

—*The Associated Press*, 10 September 1990

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President Bush's address to Congress on 11 September 1990

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, fellow Americans, thank you.

We gather tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within three days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait, and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then I decided to check that aggression.

At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that distant desert and on distant seas, side-by-side with the forces of more than 20 other nations.

They are some of the finest men and women of the United States of America. And they're doing one terrific job.

These valiant Americans were ready at a moment's notice to leave their spouses, their children, to serve on the front-line half-way around the world. They remind us who keeps America strong. They do.

In the trying circumstances of the gulf, the morale of our servicemen and women is excellent. In the face of danger, they are brave, well-trained and dedicated.

A soldier, P.F.C. Wade Merritt of Knoxville, Tennessee, now stationed in Saudi Arabia, wrote his parents of his worries, his love of family and his hopes for peace. But Wade also wrote: "I am proud of my country and its firm stand against inhumane aggression. I am proud of my army and its men. . . I am proud to serve my country."

Let me just say, Wade, America is proud of you. And grateful to every soldier, sailor, marine and airman serving the cause of peace in the Persian Gulf.

I also want to thank the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, the chiefs, our commander in the Persian Gulf, General Schwartzkopf, and the men and women of the Department of Defense—what a magnificent job you are doing.

I wish I could say their work is done. But we all know it is not.

So if ever there was a time to put country before self and patriotism before party, that time is now. Let me thank all Americans, especially those in this chamber, for your support for our forces and their mission.

That support will be even more important in the days to come.

So tonight, I want to talk to you about what is at stake—what we must do together to defend civilized values around the world, and maintain our economic strength at home.

Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear, our goals defined and familiar:

- Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately—and without condition.
- Kuwait's legitimate government must-be-restored.
- The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must-be-assured.
- American citizens abroad must-be-protected.

These goals are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern for principle. And many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.

As you know, I've just returned from a very productive meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev. I am pleased that we are working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint statement affirmed to the world our shared resolve to counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote: "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression

must-not-be-tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.”

Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted U.N. action against aggression.

A new partnership of nations has begun.

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

This is the vision I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He, and other leaders from Europe, the gulf and around the world, understand that how we manage this crisis today, could shape the future for generations to come.

The test we face is great—and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose; if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination; it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.

America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will.

America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will.

America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will.

And one thing more—in pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth.

We do not exaggerate.

Nor do we exaggerate when we say: Saddam Hussein will fail.

Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some

10 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability.

Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends.

One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.

From the outset, acting hand-in-hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented.

Armed forces from countries spanning four continents, are there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deter and if need be, to defend against attack. Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations, stand shoulder-to-shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions.

We can now point to five U.N. Security Council regulations that condemn Iraq's aggression, they call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait.

Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will, and in contravention of international law. It is a mockery of human decency to call these people "guests". They are hostages, and the whole world knows it.

Prime Minister Thatcher, a dependable ally, said it all: "We do not bargain over hostages. We will not stoop to the level of using human beings as bargaining (chips). Ever."

Of course, our hearts go out to the hostages and their families. But our policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy.

We are now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding leadership of Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar. The United Nations is backing up its words with action. The Security Council has imposed mandatory

economic sanctions on Iraq, designed to force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The Security Council has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all means necessary to ensure compliance with these sanctions.

Together with our friends and allies, ships of the U.S. Navy are today patrolling Mideast waters. They have already intercepted more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. Three regional leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the heat.

We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just what their aggression has cost them. They are cut off from world trade. Unable to sell their oil. And only a tiny fraction of goods gets through. The communique with President Gorbachev made mention of what happens when the embargo is so effective that the children of Iraq literally need milk or the sick truly need medicine. Then, under strict international supervision that guarantees the proper destination, then food will be permitted.

At home, the material cost of our leadership can be steep. That's why Secretary of State Baker and Treasury Secretary Brady have met with many world leaders to underscore that the burden of this collective effort must be shared. We are prepared to do our share and more to help carry that load; we insist others do their share as well.

The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have pledged to provide our deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and Egypt.

I am also heartened to report that this international response extends to the neediest victims of this conflict—the refugees. For our part, we have contributed 28 million dollars for relief efforts. This is but a portion of what is needed. I commend, in particular Saudi Arabia, Japan, and several European nations who have joined us in this purely humanitarian effort.

There is an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil-producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output. More than half of what was lost has been made up. We are getting superb cooperation. If producers, including the United States, continue steps to expand oil and gas production, we can stabilize prices and guarantee against hardship. Additionally, we and several of our allies always have the option to extract oil from our strategic petroleum reserves, if

conditions warrant. As I have pointed out before, conservation efforts are essential to keep our energy needs as low as possible. We must then take advantage of our energy sources across the board: coal, natural gas, hydro and nuclear. Our failure to do these things has made us more dependent on foreign oil than ever before. Finally, let no one even contemplate profiteering from this crisis. We will not have it.

I cannot predict just how long it will take to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions will take time to have their full intended effect. We will continue to review all options with our allies, but let it be clear: We will not let this aggression stand.

Our interest, our involvement in the gulf, is not transitory. It predated Saddam Hussein's aggression, and will survive it. Long after all our troops come home, and we hope it will be very soon, there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role, with others, is to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense. And something else: to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and above all, nuclear technologies.

Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator, and with his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That's not a threat, or a boast, that's just the way it's going to be.

Our ability to function effectively as a great power abroad depends on how we conduct ourselves here at home. Our economy, our armed forces, our energy dependence, and our cohesion all determine whether we can help our friends and stand up to our foes.

For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a woven piece, as strongly bound as old glory.

To revitalize our leadership capacity, we must address our budget deficit—not after election day, or next year, but now.

Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs would only make our fiscal deficit problems worse. That deficit was already greater than it should have been—a projected 232,000 million dollars for the coming year. it must—it will—be reduced.

To my friends in Congress, together we must act this very month—before the next fiscal year begins October first—to get America's economic house in order. The gulf situation helps us realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should be. Americans must never again enter any crisis—economic or military—with an excessive

dependence on foreign oil and an excessive burden of federal debt.

Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the Congress and between the branches over budget matters. It is high time we pulled together—and get the job done right. It is up to us to straighten this out.

This job has four basic parts.

First, the Congress should, this month, within a budget agreement, enact growth-oriented tax measures—to help avoid recession in the short term; and to increase savings, investment, productivity and competitiveness for the longer term. These measures include extending incentives for research and experimentation; expanding the use of IRAs for new homeowners; establishing tax-deferred family savings accounts; creating incentives for the creation of enterprise zones and initiatives to encourage more domestic drilling; and, yes, reducing the tax rate for capital gains.

Second, the Congress should, this month, enact a prudent multi-year defense program—one that reflects not only the improvement in East-West relations, but our broader responsibilities to deal with the continuing risks of outlaw action and regional conflict. Even with our obligations in the gulf, a sound defense budget can have some reduction in real terms, and we are prepared to accept that. But to go beyond such levels, where cutting defense would threaten our vital margin of safety, is something I will never accept.

The world is still dangerous. Surely that is now clear. Stability is not secure. American interests are far-reaching. Inter-dependence has increased. The consequences of regional instability can be global. This is no time to risk America's capacity to protect her vital interests.

Third, the Congress should, this month, enact measures to increase domestic energy production and energy conservation—in order to reduce dependence on foreign oil. These measures should include my proposals to increase incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration, fuel-switching, and to accelerate the development of Alaskan energy resources, without damage to wildlife.

As you know, when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970s, the United States imported almost six million barrels of oil per day. This year, before the Iraqi invasion, US imports had risen to nearly eight million barrels per day. We had moved in the wrong direction. Now we must act to correct that trend.

Fourth, the Congress should, this month, enact a five-year program to reduce the projected debt and deficits by 500,000 million

dollars—that is, by half a trillion dollars. If, with the Congress, we can develop a satisfactory program by the end of the month, we can avoid the axe of “sequester”—deep across-the-board cuts that would threaten our military capacity and risk substantial domestic disruption.

I want to be able to tell the American people, we have truly solved the deficit problem. For me to do that, a budget agreement must meet these tests:

- It must include the measures I’ve recommended to increase economic growth and reduce dependence on foreign oil.
- It must be fair. All should contribute, but the burden should not be excessive for any one group of programs or people.
- It must address the growth of government’s hidden liabilities.
- It must reform the budget process, and further; it must be real.

I urge Congress to provide a comprehensive five-year deficit reduction program to me as a complete legislative package—with measures to assure that it can be fully enforced. America is tired of phoney deficit reduction, or promise-now, save-later-plans. Enough is enough. It is time for a program that is credible and real.

Finally, to the extent that the deficit reduction program includes new revenue measures, it must avoid any measure that would threaten economic growth or turn us back toward the days of punishing income tax rates. That is one path we should not head down again.

I have been pleased with recent progress, although it has not always seemed so smooth.

But now it is time to produce.

I hope we can work out a responsible plan. But with or without agreement from the budget summit, I ask both Houses of the Congress to allow a straight up-or-down vote on a complete 500,000 million dollar deficit reduction package—not later than September 28.

If the Congress cannot get me a budget, then Americans will have to face a tough, mandated sequester.

I am hopeful, in fact I am confident, the Congress will do what it should. And we in the executive branch will do our part.

In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad depends upon political will and consensus at home. This is never easy in democracies—where we govern only with the consent of the governed. And although free people in a free society are bound to have their differences, Americans traditionally come together in times of adversity and challenge.

Once again, Americans have stepped forward to share a tearful

goodbye with their families before leaving for a strange and distant shore. At this very moment, they serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order. That is why they sweat and toil in the sand and the heat and the sun.

If they can come together under such adversity; if old adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in common cause; then surely we who are so fortunate to be in this great chamber—democrats, republicans, liberals, conservatives—can come together to fulfill our responsibilities here.

Thank you, good night, and God Bless America.

—USIS, New Delhi

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US refrained from warning off Saddam

Four days before President Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, the US ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie assured him that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait".

She added that the US Secretary of State, James Baker, "has directed our official spokesman to emphasise the instruction", first given in the 1960's, "that the issue is not associated with America".

The Guardian has the minutes of the meeting, in the version recorded by the Iraqis. US officials do not question their authenticity. A short extract has been shown on ABC television in the US.

The transcript shows that Ms Glaspie expressed considerable sympathy for President Saddam's quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of his confrontation with Kuwait.

"I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country," she said. "I know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country."

The US ambassador inquired gingerly why Iraqi troops were massed very close to Kuwait's borders. But she did not warn President Saddam against invading the emirate, even after he made it plain that he was

only prepared to give negotiations one more brief chance.

"We can see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your National Day [the ambassador quoted a series of other threats against Kuwait] then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship, not confrontation—regarding your intentions."

President Saddam replied with a tortuous description of his efforts to reach a settlement with Kuwait, and disclosed that there was to be one more meeting with Kuwait in Jeddah on July 31. "When we meet and when we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death."

At this first meeting, President Saddam also foreshadowed that he would give up the Shatt al-Arab, his strategic goal in the war with Iran, to defend Iraq's claims on Kuwait. "If we could keep the whole of Iraq [meaning Kuwait included] with Shatt al-Arab, we will make no concessions. But if forced to choose between half of Shatt al-Arab and the whole of Iraq, then we will give the Shatt al-Arab away to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be."

Four days *after* the invasion, the US charge d'affaires in Baghdad, Joseph Wilson, told President Saddam that "it is important that we keep a dialogue between us to avoid making mistakes. . . This is the only way in which we are going to be able to remove tension and cool emotions."

At this second meeting, President Saddam sent "assurances to the Saudis and to the world: We will not attack those who do not attack us. We will not harm those who do not harm us". As for attacking Saudi Arabia, "that question did not even occur in my mind".

But such benign attitudes would be swept aside if Saudi Arabia, encouraged by the United States, turned against Iraq. "If you are really worried about Saudi Arabia your worries are unrealistic. But if you are showing that worry to push Saudi Arabia to be worried, that is something else."

At both meetings, President Saddam blamed the US for turning on Iraq, after welcoming his help during the Iran-Iraq war. "You are talking about an aggressive Iraq". Yet, "if Iraq was aggressive during the Iran war, why then did you speak with them then?"

Even now, President Saddam was urging the US to understand that

it was in its interest to ally itself with Iraq, "a strong nationalistic and realistic regime in the area", instead of with Saudi Arabia.

Iraq had helped to protect the Gulf states and the West's oil supplies. "Without Iraq the future of the region would have been entirely different.

"You know that you are not the ones who protected your friends during the war with Iran" President Saddam told Ms Glaspie. "Had the Iranians overrun the region, the American troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons."

Iraq had come out of the war deeply indebted and was only claiming its just rewards.

President Saddam accused the US in league with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, of pursuing a deliberate policy to drive down oil prices, and deprive Iraq of its rights "to higher economic standards".

He could understand that the US "wants an easy flow of oil . . . but we cannot understand the attempt to harm Iraq's interests".

An avalanche of threats and warnings came next. "We don't want war, because we know what war means. But do not push us to consider war as the only solution to live proudly and to provide our people with a good living.

"We know that the US has nuclear weapons. But we are determined to live as proud men, or we all die."

Foreshadowing terrorist attacks, President Saddam declared: "We cannot come all the way to the United States [without armed forces]. But individual Arabs may reach you."

And although there was no specific mention of Iraq's chemical weapons arsenals, President Saddam told Ms Glaspie that "when we feel that you want to injure our pride and take the Iraqis' chance of a high standard of living, then we will cease to care and death will be the choice for us. Then we would not care if you fired 100 missiles for each missile we fired. Because without pride, life would have no value.

"We want stability and peace. But we will not be suppressed, and we hate famine and hunger. Our people were hungry for 1,000 years and we will not go back to that."

—Hella Pick, *The Guardian*, 12 September 1990

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*Resolution 666 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its
2939th meeting on 13 September 1990*

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990), paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs,

Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,

Noting that in this respect the Committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has received communications from several Member States,

Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the Committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,

Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of the safety and well-being of third State nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not for the purposes of paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph 4 of resolution 661 (1990) humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the Committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review;

2. *Expects* Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention;

3. *Requests*, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-General seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee regularly;

4. *Requests* further that in seeking and supplying such information

particular attention will be paid to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;

5. *Decides* that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be met;

6. *Directs* the Committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolutions;

8. *Recalls* that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Resolution 667 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2940th meeting on 16 September 1990

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990),

Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party,

Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the international Conventions

mentioned above and international law,

Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the Conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait,

Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,

Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel,

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation of its violations of international law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Strongly condemns* aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those premises;

2. *Demands* the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664 (1990);

3. *Further demands* that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and international law;

4. *Further demands* that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests;

5. *Reminds* all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990);

6. *Decides* to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as

soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of international law.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Resolution 669 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2942nd meeting on 24 September 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990,

Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have been received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Extracts from Statement by President Francois Mitterrand of the French Republic to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York, 24 September 1990)

In the conflict initiated by Iraq against Kuwait, the Security Council has shown its swiftness and its cohesiveness. My country, a permanent member of the Security Council, has voted and sometimes initiated the successive resolutions adopted by that body, from the beginning of the crisis to this day. And we continue to be fully united for the following reasons.

Kuwait is a sovereign State, a member of the international commu-

nity. In whose name can one decide that this State has ceased to exist? In the name of the law of planes and tanks and guns? I wish to specify that France has long maintained friendly relations with Iraq, which it supported in times of dire peril during the war against Iran, with a view to contributing to the preservation, on this millenia-old border, of the historic balance between the Persians and the Arabs, a balance whose upset would have triggered a chain reaction, with consequences on the entire Arab world and as far as the shores of the Atlantic.

Bonds of friendship were tied in these circumstances, between the Iraqi and the French peoples. I do not repudiate these: I do hope that, in spite of all, they will endure. But France is first and foremost a servant of the law as defined by the judge among nations, your institution. We are applying the embargo according to the resolution of the Security Council. We are participating in its implementation. We have dispatched naval and air forces to the Gulf region for that purpose, but in so doing we have not issued any threat nor acted in provocation.

Our policies are those of the United Nations. In fact, we have indicated to the Iraqi authorities that we would stand by the side of whoever might be the object of a new aggression in the region. Far from being of an offensive nature, our action is purely defensive. However, it will be neither biased nor marked by complicity. Once they have accomplished their mission, our forces will leave the area to return home.

How could we not feel repulsion at the sight of thousands of hostages among whom we find some 500 of our compatriots who had been welcomed as guests, according to Iraq's own statements, as friends who were assured of the hospitality of a noble people, among the oldest and most illustrious on earth.

How could we accept that some of them should, as is indeed the case, serve as shields of flesh and blood at certain locations of possible combat, a combat in which they have no part?

How could we accept that the residence of our Ambassador to Kuwait be violated, looted, robbed and its occupants arrested? If indeed it was a mistake why say so at such a late date, why increase in this way the number of hostages? Faced with these repeated acts, I have taken the decision which was required of me, both as a matter of honour and in a spirit of solidarity, to dispatch land reinforcements to the neighbouring countries which were threatened. My instructions remain as they were at the outset: to ensure the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, to contain aggression, to serve

peace in the context of the rights of each without surrendering to violence in any way. I should add that France is acting in close agreement with its 12 partners of the European Community and with those of the Western European Union, in close coordination with the military forces of the United States, of the Arab countries and of others which have been dispatched to the Middle East for the same purposes. In no way does this coordination affect our capacity for autonomous decision.

Thus, we remain available in the event of any peace opening which we are seeking for our own logic is one of peace as opposed to the logic of war which appears to prevail and which the policies of Iraq are forcing upon an anguished world.

Indeed, not the slightest word nor the slightest gesture on the part of the President of Iraq has given cause for a beginning of conciliation. He ignores or rejects the supreme authority, the United Nations, which was created following the second world war by the nations who understood the price of death and blood for not having been able, on two separate occasions, to avert the fatality of disaster.

What else can we say to Iraq but that the conditions have been made clear, that they are contained in the resolution of the Security Council, that they have been unanimously adopted and that they cannot be modified? Can hope be entertained no longer? Is there no longer any room for peace? We must not pronounce such a verdict.

A number of proposals forthcoming chiefly from certain Arab Heads of State and prominent individuals have offered new perspectives. This gratifies me. France has been hoping that the countries of the region could find a way of acting as the arbiters of the disputes which have arisen between two countries within their group. I wish I could say that this remains my hope. It would indeed be desirable to do away with the doubts and the suspicions which the armed intervention of western countries have generated, however unjustly this may be. But the Arab nation has yet to overcome its divisions and we cannot merely express pious hopes. In the absence of such a solution which, I must reiterate, remains the one which I would by far prefer, let us examine the context which would enable diplomacy to win, preventing an outbreak of war. First of all, this can be done by speaking clearly: I must state that there will be no compromise as long as Iraq refuses to accept the position adopted by the Security Council. Yes, let Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The sovereignty of that country is no more negotiable than that of any other. Let us remind ourselves of the men and women who are living

under foreign domination or who must face exile, of the neighbouring populations which, if we remained inactive, would be prey to the expansionist ambitions of one man or of one warrior State. Instead, let Iraq declare its intention to withdraw its forces, to free the hostages and everything becomes possible.

In a second stage, at least this is how I see the situation, the international community which has condemned aggression would be in a position to guarantee the implementation of the military withdrawal, the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait as well as the democratic expression of the Kuwaiti people. The third phase could then proceed, the one that the whole world is expecting albeit with faint hope since it appears to be so out of reach at this moment, or that it fears, because it will prove to be the moment of decision: it will be the moment when the confrontations which are wounding the Near East will have to give way to a momentum of good neighbourliness in a climate of peace and security for all.

I have in mind the Lebanon which has still failed to regain its full sovereignty throughout its territory which remains occupied by foreign troops and divided among divergent forces.

I have in mind the Palestinians who are in the throes of despair, tempted by dangerous courses of action, in order to satisfy their legitimate aspiration to the possession of a land which they could call their homeland where they could put in place the state structures of their choice.

I have in mind Israel which lives in a climate of permanent insecurity. In brief, I have in mind all these peoples which are crushed as a result of overarmament, which are terrified by a state of war which is either open or latent and which has become their daily lot. I wish to make myself clear: it is not my intention to assimilate conflicts which are different in their nature nor to claim to solve in one fell swoop, through some magic formula, all the problems which we are facing. A global approach would be unrealistic and therefore dangerous as it would offer a pretext to those who prefer not to act.

Our own approach implies dialogue, a direct dialogue between the parties concerned, an agreement with the neighbouring states or those who are close by, and finally the indispensable international guarantee which you represent. At the end of the road, one finds oneself with the idea of an international conference which would guarantee the implementation of the agreement and act as the catalyst of any suc-

cessful negotiation.

And even looking beyond, one can envisage a fourth phase which would deal with a mutually agreed reduction of armaments in the region, with the beginning of a cooperation which, from Iran to Morocco, from the Middle East to the Atlantic Ocean, would open the way to stability and prosperity in a region which, because of its history, its culture, its immemorial contribution to humanity, is destined to exert the influence which rightly belongs to it in the affairs of the world. But let us revert to ourselves, if we may.

For our part, we also have the obligation to respond to the questions which are being put from all sides: so many resolutions adopted by the Security Council which have never been applied. The reason for this state of affairs was due—at least I would like to think so—to the mutual neutralizing effect resulting from the antagonism between East and West and which has left the Near and Middle East in a warlike situation which is both ruinous and desperate. It is not without reason that this has caused some in the Arab world to question the sudden swiftness shown by the United Nations where Iraq is concerned. And it is true that there is in this failing a regrettable reference which affects the fair and just authority of our recent decisions. Truly, on this occasion which brings us together, I find it impossible not to say this loud and clear: the law must apply equally to all, both in regard to its principles and to its consequences.

And now I would like to emphasize a vital issue that I have raised constantly, among others, in international fora and to which present events have given glaring prominence. While the conflict in the Middle East is admittedly not a North-South conflict, because it is not a conflict between a rich country and a poor one, nevertheless the embargo, the oil shortage, and the increases in the price of oil, all contribute to making the already very difficult living conditions of the developing countries even worse. That help should be given to those who are close to the scene of the conflict and who are directly hit by the present crisis is obvious. But we must go further, and give new impetus to the unfinished debate on the North-South relations between rich and poor, between the heavily industrialized countries and those who lack the means to pay their debts or to revive their anaemic, or totally destroyed economy. The year 2000 is almost upon us, and yet 40,000 children die each day of hunger or of disease, although the treatment, or the vaccines exist. In a few days in this very place the

World Children's Summit will be considering problems of this kind, let us beware: there are injustices which are themselves a form of unbearable violence to which further violence will respond.

—*Press and Information Service, Embassy of France, New Delhi*

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Extracts from the speech of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the 45th UN General Assembly session on 25 September 1990

Mr. President,

Distinguished Delegates,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

From the vantage point of this 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly one might look back in amazement at how strikingly different is the terrain we have covered in just one year from the familiar landscape of the preceding four decades.

Politically, this was not just a calendar year but a light-year in the history of the world.

The cold war, with its accompanying stress, psychoses and anticipation of disaster, is no longer a part of our life. Gone is the strain of daily confrontation, propaganda bickering and reciprocal threats.

This was the year during which pieces of the Berlin wall were a popular souvenir. And now, an end has been put to the division of Europe and a final line drawn under the Second World War. The unification of the two German states is being completed. The "German question", this "great" and "classical" problem of world politics which only yesterday seemed intractable, has been resolved calmly and to mutual satisfaction.

Let me congratulate cordially and sincerely the German people on behalf of the Soviet people on this most important event in the history of this state, this nation and Europe.

Almost unnoticed, the military alliances have lost their enemies. They are beginning to build their relation on a new basis, moving away from confrontation which is being eroded by disarmament, lower defence spending, more wide-ranging confidence-building measures

and the emergence of collective and cooperative security structures.

Unprecedented progress has been made in the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts by political means. In Southern Africa the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia has been implemented. The situation around Nicaragua has been settled, and a dynamic search for peace is under way in Cambodia, Afghanistan and other hot-spots of the globe. We do not forget about Angola, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Korean Peninsula and Western Sahara. All this is being done with the most active participation of the United Nations.

These positive changes in the world have been propelled by a new relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is evolving from cooperation to partnership and interaction. The meetings of the Soviet and US Presidents on Malta, in Camp David and Helsinki are major events in world politics.

The political environment is clearly being defined by the global recognition of the supremacy of universal human values. Democratic forms are becoming established in running the affairs of states and in the conduct of international affairs.

The United Nations too is being reborn. We are pleased to note that President Mikhail Gorbachev's ideas concerning the role of the organisation in the changing world have been seen to reflect majority opinion and the real needs of the international community.

The central concepts of today's politics are cooperation, interaction and partnership in facing the global challenges of combating economic backwardness, poverty and social inequality and protecting the environment.

Had this session taken place before last August, we would have had every reason to say that mankind had cleared a narrow and dangerous passage and had wide and glowing horizons ahead of it.

But now our field of vision has been obscured by the dark cloud of aggression against Kuwait. On that black Thursday, Iraq flagrantly violated the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, the universally recognised norms of morality and the standards of civilized behaviour. Iraq has committed an unprovoked aggression, annexed a neighbouring sovereign state, seized thousands of hostages and resorted to unprecedented blackmail, threatening to use weapons of mass destruction.

There is also another dimension to Iraq's action. It has dealt a blow to all that mankind has recently achieved, all that we have been able to accomplish together, by adopting the new political thinking as our

guide to the future.

An act of terrorism has been perpetrated against the emerging new world order. This is a major affront to mankind. Unless we find a way to respond to it and cope with the situation, our civilisation will be thrown back by half-a-century.

The Security Council reacted rapidly and with determination, as required by the nature and dimensions of the threat. There is no doubt that it expressed the will of the international community.

Iraqi actions are having and will have the gravest consequences for the people of Iraq and for millions of men, women and children in many countries of the world, for their hopes and their future. War may break out in the Gulf region any day, any moment.

From this rostrum we would like to appeal once again to the leaders of Iraq. We are doing it as their old friends and as a country that found the courage to condemn its wrong-doings against certain states in the past. We call upon them to hear reason, to obey the demands of the law and also of plain common sense, to take a responsible and humane attitude, above all vis-a-vis the Iraqi people, who surely yearn for peace, tranquillity and good relations with their neighbours.

We also hope that at this time of grave trial, Arab states will live up to the expectations of mankind and help to find a way out of the Persian Gulf crisis. This would make it possible to deal with other hotbeds of conflict in the Middle East, and to find an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem.

If the world has survived to this day it is because at tragic moments in its history the forces of evil were always opposed by the forces of good, arbitrary power by the rule of law, treachery and meanness by honour and decency, and violence by the strength of the spirit and the belief in justice.

Today is no time for rejoicing, but one cannot help being satisfied at the unprecedented unity of the Security Council and the clear attitude of the international public opinion in the face of Iraq's behaviour. This gives us confidence in the ability of the United Nations to deal with this grave international crisis. The positions taken by members of this organisation give the Security Council the mandate to go as far as the interests of world peace will require.

Some may find that Iraq is being judged by a different higher standard than that applied to other countries even in quite recent past. My answer is this: it is good that we have reached this point. It is good that we have adopted a universal human yardstick of good and evil;

that we are calling aggression by its proper name and consider it necessary to condemn and punish its perpetrator and to help the victim of injustice.

These are a trying times, a test for our organisation. If it passes this test it will immeasurably enhance its prestige, gain new experience and new capabilities. There is no doubt that it will use them to restore peace and justice in other conflict situations and to ensure the implementation of its resolutions bearing on all regional problems.

An approach based on mankind's common interest does not permit any other kind of behaviour. From now on, the world community intends to act by a common set of standards.

International relations are being freed from the vestiges of the cold war which, for many years, had a negative effect on the international legal order. We are again becoming the United Nations and are returning to our own global constitution—the Charter of the United Nations, to those of its provisions that were forgotten for a while but have been proven to be indispensable for the most important of our tasks—the maintenance of international peace and security. The establishment of the principles of new thinking in world politics has enabled us to start implementing the effective measures of persuasion and enforcement provided in the Charter.

In the context of recent events we should remind those who regard aggression as an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power to "suppress acts of aggression". There is ample evidence that this right can be exercised. It will be, if the illegal occupation of Kuwait continues. There is enough unity in this regard in the Security Council, and there is also the will and a high degree of consensus in the world community.

Of course, before—and I reiterate—before this all political, peaceful, non-military forms of pressure must be applied to the aggressor, obviously in combination with economic and other enforcement measures.

We have drawn and continue to draw appropriate conclusions for ourselves. It is now common knowledge that militarisation is wasteful for any country and can be ruinous when taken to extremes.

In the longer term, the world community will need to monitor the military power of states, arms supplies and transfer of military technology. Such an approach will be in everyone's interests and will strengthen stability and trust. Otherwise, we will continue to be confronted with armed conflicts and attempts to intimidate and blackmail.

Above all it will be necessary to keep a close watch on those countries that make determined efforts to build up the offensive capabilities of their armed forces. Moreover, to have them explain why this is being done.

Of course, the United Nations itself will have to play the primary role in this. But the organisation will need effective support from regional security structures which are already becoming a reality in Europe and which we hope will emerge in Asia and the Pacific, in the Middle East, in Central America and elsewhere in the world.

We might consider the idea of introducing on a global and regional level the international registration of certain types of armaments that are produced or acquired. There is a need for transparency in this area.

We need to agree on principles governing the sale and supply of arms. Such attempts were made in the past, but unfortunately they were not carried through.

In our view, we must urgently request the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to address this issue and submit recommendations to the next session of the General Assembly.

Two years ago the Soviet delegation raised the issue of reactivating the work of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee. Recent developments have convinced us of the need to return to the original idea conceived by the founders of this organisation and of its Charter.

We know why the Military Staff Committee has never become a functioning body. During the cold war the committee could not and did not have a role to play. Now, however, we see that without substantive recommendations from this body the Security Council is unable to carry out its functions under the Charter.

The architects of our organisation proceeded from the harsh realities of the Second World War and were right in assuming that for the organisation to be effective in keeping peace and preventing war, it must have the means to enforce its decisions and, if necessary, to suppress aggression, and have a mechanism for preparing and coordinating such actions.

The Soviet delegation believes that the Security Council must take the necessary organisational steps to be able to act in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter.

It should begin by initiating steps to reactivate the work of the Military Staff Committee and study the practical aspects of assigning national military contingents to serve under the authority of the Council.

The Soviet Union is prepared to conclude an appropriate agreement with the Security Council. We are sure that the other Permanent Members of the Council and states that might be approached by it will do the same.

If the Military Staff Committee worked properly, if appropriate agreements had been concluded between the Council and its Permanent Members, and if other organisational aspects of countering threats to peace had been worked out, there would be no need now for individual states to act unilaterally. After all, however justified they might be, such actions provoke a mixed response, create problems for those same states and may not be acceptable to all.

By contrast, there is no reason to object to steps taken by legitimate international "law-enforcement bodies"—the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee.

We should not underestimate even the psychological effect of the Security Council acquiring structures and forces to counter aggression.

I would like to emphasise that the use of force is only possible as a last resort. We must rely on non-military, political means and pursue our objectives in a peaceful manner. Today more than ever before it is these methods that are becoming effective.

The latest crisis has dramatically illustrated the importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

To be frank, the situation is beginning to cause alarm. Let us face it: cracks have appeared in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the IAEA is having difficulty in expanding the zone of application of its safeguards. It is time to trigger off the emergency systems in order to save the situation. As matter of utmost urgency, nuclear tests must be stopped. If testing is stopped, we have a chance to survive; otherwise the world will perish. We need to tell people about it frankly, without taking refuge in all sorts of specious arguments. Should we perhaps invite the parliaments of all countries to express their attitude to nuclear explosions?

What else has to happen to set in motion the elimination of chemical weapons? The Soviet Union and the United States are setting an example by doing so on a bilateral basis. But what about the others? It is really odd that while there is no person, no politician who would publicly call for retaining toxic agents things are at a standstill.

Should we perhaps ask for a roll-call vote right in this room to see who votes against? If everyone is in favour, let us just work out a binding schedule for completing work on the convention and set a

time-frame for the destruction of chemical weapons. Similar problems, mostly concerning verification, arise with regard to biological weapons.

Swift action is needed on all these issues, yet the debate at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament proceeds in a quiet and leisurely manner. Should this be tolerated? Even as dangerous developments are gaining critical momentum in the world, the negotiations continue at a pace that was set at the time of the cold war.

I think negotiators at the Palais Des Nations in Geneva should pull up the blinds. Let them see what is going on outside and let people know what these disarmament pundits are reflecting upon.

I don't want to offend anyone. I know that eminent people work there. But what is to be done? The time has come to cry out.

I cannot fail to mention yet another aspect of security.

The world community should also consider the possibility of various "unconventional situations" arising from the mass taking of hostages and cases of blackmail involving particularly dangerous and destructive weapons.

These problems will have to be addressed at two levels—technical and legal. We could start out by setting up a group of experts for contingency planning under the Security Council.

The group could include experts on combating terrorism, psychologists, nuclear physicists, chemists, physicians, disaster relief workers, experts on physical protection of facilities, etc.

Recommendations regarding the management of "unconventional situations" should be made known to a limited number of people. The Security Council may find it necessary upon recommendation of the Military Staff Committee to establish a rapid response force to be formed on a contract basis from units specially designated by different countries, including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. This idea also deserves discussion.

But technical methods alone are not enough to deal with such things. In our view there is an urgent need to institute a new norm in international law which would declare the threat by any individual for purposes of blackmail of using weapons of mass destruction, hostage-taking or mass terror to be a crime against humanity. Such work is currently underway somewhere in the labyrinths of this organisation, but so far inconclusive.

What we need, however, is to create as soon as possible a moral and legal environment in which anyone guilty of grave crimes against

humanity, of participating in atrocities, in taking hostages, acts of terrorism or torture, and those guilty of particular ruthlessness in the use of force, could not escape punishment and would not be absolved from personal responsibility even if they acted under orders.

The principle of suppressing aggression and threats to peace should, in our view, be complemented with the principle of individual responsibility and commensurate punishment.

This is a difficult question from the legal standpoint. An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should be sought on this subject. Incidentally, we would be in favour of enhancing the role of that body and would welcome a more up-to-date interpretation of its competence.

The Gulf crisis is causing a major dislocation in the entire system of world economy. Its true magnitude is even difficult to assess now. It is clear that the consequences will be severe for the economies of the developing countries, particularly the poorest of them, those burdened by large foreign debt. Merely stating this is not enough. Action must be taken without delay. It is necessary to establish as soon as possible an international machinery, may be a temporary one for the time being, for example under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, to mitigate the negative consequences of this crisis for countries which are in a particularly vulnerable position.

We are of the view that finding out the economic repercussions of the crisis should be primarily the function of the United Nations. The organisation should be the centre of action in situations affecting the interests of many countries.

The Soviet Union as a major oil-producing and energy-exporting country will be prepared to cooperate in implementing measures under the auspices of the United Nations or of any other international body, aimed at stabilising the economic situation in the world. This should not be a matter of individual steps of a mostly charitable nature to assist individual countries. What is needed is a global policy of stabilisation and compensation.

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

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Resolution 670 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2943rd meeting on 25 September 1990

The Security Council

Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), and 667 (1990),

Condemning Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, its failure to rescind its actions and end its purported annexation and its holding of third State nationals against their will, in flagrant violation of resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990) and 667 (1990) and of international humanitarian law,

Condemning further the treatment by Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait in violation of international law,

Noting with grave concern the persistent attempts to evade the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),

Further noting that a number of States have limited the number of Iraqi diplomatic and consular officials in their countries and that others are planning to do so,

Determined to ensure by all necessary means the strict and complete application of the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions of Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Affirming that any acts of the Government of Iraq which are contrary to the above-mentioned resolutions or to Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as Decree No. 377 of the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 16 September 1990, are null and void,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's use of his good offices to advance a peaceful solution based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and noting with appreciation his continuing efforts to this end,

Underlining to the Government of Iraq that its continued failure to

comply with the terms of resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 666 (1990) and 667 (1990) could lead to further serious action by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations, including under Chapter VII,

Recalling the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* all states to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete compliance with resolution 661 (1990) and in particular paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 thereof;

2. *Confirms* that resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of transport, including aircraft;

3. *Decides* that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;

4. *Decides further* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless:

(a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that there is no cargo on board in violation of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be detained for as long as necessary; or

(b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990); or

(c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of UNIIMOG;

5. *Decides* that each State shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution;

6. *Decides further* that all States shall notify in a timely fashion the

Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of any flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for such a flight;

7. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate in taking such measures as may be necessary, consistent with international law, including the Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution;

8. *Calls upon* all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports and which are being or have been used in violation of resolution 661 (1990), or to deny such ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard human life;

9. *Reminds* all States of their obligations under resolutions 661 (1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) regarding those assets;

10. *Calls upon* all States to provide to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) information regarding the action taken by them to implement the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

11. *Affirms* that the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system are required to take such measures as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of resolution 661 (1990) and this resolution;

12. *Decides* to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or of the present resolution by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State in question to prevent such evasion;

13. *Reaffirms* that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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*New Yemeni initiative to solve Gulf Crisis on
26 September 1990*

1. Withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
 2. Considering the factors that led Iraq to invade Kuwait, and their settlement in reasonable and just way. This can be done in the framework of Arab body or the international body.
 3. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Arab peninsula and from the Gulf.
 4. Respect for right to sovereignty, independence and self-determination of Kuwaiti people.
 5. Termination of the economic blockade of Iraq.
 6. Establishment of a just and new economic condition in the region, which will remove the wide gap between rich and poor and secure for the region stability and peaceful co-existence among the people of the region.
 7. Work on bringing about lasting and just peace in the region and that is by solving the problems of the region, the utmost problem of Palestine.
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*President Saddam Hussein's views on President Francois
Mitterrand's Address in UN General Assembly
on 30 September 1990*

President Saddam Hussein on Sunday, 30 September 1990, said that Iraq is to contact France on President Francois Mitterrand's address last week in the United Nations containing France's view on a settlement to the Gulf crisis.

In an address marking the birth anniversary of Prophet Mohammed, the President said, "We are in the process of making a contact with the French Government so as to make clear our viewpoint in an

accurate manner, after getting acquainted through deliberations and dialogue, so that everything would be based on a clear foundation of idea and action. What we are most concerned about and what we are determined upon is that the state of affairs should not go back to the situation before August 2, on all levels, that Palestine be returned to its Palestinian people to establish on its territory their independent state, and that the forces of occupation should unconditionally leave the land of Najd and Hijaz and the Gulf."

President Hussein said, "In all cases we should encourage any behaviour by foreigners, including those who have become involved in the naval buildup, to push back while not bargaining over our aims and principles. We have to consider any retreat, based on an inaccurate and ambiguous vision in the start, as a virtue by anyone declaring the retreat."

He added "Upon this, we see the French President's speech as being different in its language from others, despite our objections (to some of its contents), we hope that our positive conclusion is correct."

President Hussein said: "We have said before and we still say that what annoys us and what we reject outrightly is not the difference in points of view but rather the dubious and hostile viewpoint which unleashes judgements without any readiness for dialogue on the concepts and methods spelled out. Even if they raise the slogan of dialogue they do so with preconditions."

"However, if dialogue were to replace threat and if the language of peace policy were to be used instead of the language of mobilisation of forces, threatening or use of force, it would not be important where we disagree or agree as regards this or that initiative, including the initiative of Mr. Mitterrand."

President Hussein stressed "It is important that dialogue should start to keenly search for a possible and just solution, and that such a solution should be comprehensive for us to enjoy peace and for all concerned in the region to build their future on a firm basis that cannot be shaken by changes of the circumstances."

"If the international community is to be involved, then the focus should be on (Iraq's) initiative of August 12, 1990. This initiative contains the factors that would ensure the necessary link, in a lively and interactive manner, with all issues of the solution without which peace cannot be achieved, including at the forefront the question of Palestine."

President Hussein stressed, "In all cases, the withdrawal of foreign

forces from the land of Najd and Hijaz and the Arab Gulf and ending blockage on Iraq should be the slogan of the believers without any compromise."

President Hussein said Iraq would also welcome an Arab solution to the Gulf crisis provided that US-led foreign invasion forces should withdraw from the Arab Gulf region.

—*Baghdad Observer*, 1 October 1990

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President Bush's remarks in the UN General Assembly on 3 October 1990

It is a great privilege to greet you today as we begin what marks a new and historic session of the General Assembly.

Forty-five years ago, while the fires of an epic war still raged across two oceans and two continents, a small group of men and women began a search for hope amid the ruins. They gathered in San Francisco, stepping back from the haze and the horror to try to shape a new structure that might support an ancient dream.

Intensely idealistic, and yet tempered by war, they sought to build a new kind of bridge, a bridge between nations, a bridge that might help carry humankind from its darkest hour to its brightest day.

The founding of the United Nations embodied our deepest hopes for a peaceful world. And during the past year, we have come closer than ever before to realizing those hopes. We've seen a century sundered by barbed threats and barbed wire give way to a new era of peace, cooperation, and freedom.

The Revolution of '89 swept the world almost with a life of its own, carried by a new breeze of freedom that transformed the political climate from Central Europe to Central America, and touched almost every corner of the globe.

That breeze has been sustained by a now almost universal recognition of a simple, fundamental truth: The human spirit can't be locked up forever. The truth is, people everywhere are motivated in much the same ways. And people everywhere want much the same things: The chance to live a life of purpose—the chance to choose a life—in which

they and their children can learn, grow healthy, worship freely, and prosper through the work of their hands, their hearts and their minds.

We're not talking about the power of nations, but the power of individuals. The power to choose, the power to risk, the power to succeed.

This is a new and different world. Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United Nations as it was designed—as a center for international collective security.

The changes in the Soviet Union have been critical to the emergence of a stronger United Nations. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is finally beyond containment and confrontation, and now we seek to fulfill the promise of mutually shared understanding.

The long twilight struggle that for 45 years has divided Europe, our two nations, and much of the world has to come to an end. Much has changed over the last two years. The Soviet Union has taken many dramatic and important steps to participate fully in the community of nations.

When the Soviet Union agreed with so many of us, here in the United Nations, to condemn the aggression of Iraq, there could be no doubt that we had indeed put four decades of history behind us.

We are hopeful that the machinery of the United Nations will no longer be frozen by the divisions that plagued us during the Cold War. That, at long last, we can build new bridges, and tear down old walls.

That, at long last, we will be able to build a new world based on an event for which we have all hoped—an end to the cold war.

Two days from now, the world will be watching when the Cold War is formally buried in Berlin. And in this time of testing, a fundamental question must be asked. A question not for any one nation—but for the United Nations. And the question is this: Can we work together in a new partnership of nations? Can the collective strength of the world community, expressed by the United Nations, unite to deter and defeat aggression?

Because the Cold War's battle of ideas is not the last epic battle of this century. Two months ago, in the waning weeks of one of history's most hopeful summers, the vast, still beauty of the peaceful Kuwaiti desert was fouled by the stench of diesel and the roar of steel tanks. Once again the sound of distant thunder echoed across a cloudless sky. And once again the world awoke to face the guns of August.

But this time, the world was ready. The U.N. Security Council's resolute response to Iraq's unprovoked aggression has been without

precedent. Since the invasion on August 2nd, the Council has passed eight major resolutions setting the terms for a solution of the crisis.

The Iraqi regime has yet to face the facts. But as I said last month: The annexation of Kuwait will not be permitted to stand. This is not simply the view of the United States. It is the view of every Kuwaiti, the Arab League, and the United Nations. Iraq's leaders should listen: It is Iraq against the world. Let me take this opportunity to make the policy of my government clear. The U.S. supports the use of sanctions to compel Iraq's leaders to withdraw immediately and without condition from Kuwait. We also support the provision of medicine, and of food for humanitarian purposes, so long as distribution can be properly monitored. Our quarrel is not with the people of Iraq. We do not wish for them to suffer. The world's quarrel is with the dictator who ordered the invasion.

Along with others, we have dispatched military forces to the region to enforce sanctions; to deter and if need be defend against further aggression. We seek no advantage for ourselves. Nor do we seek to maintain our military forces in Saudi Arabia for one day longer than is necessary. U.S. forces were sent at the request of the Saudi Government. The American people—and this president—want every single American soldier brought home as soon as the mission is completed.

Let me also emphasize that all of us here at the United Nations hope military forces will never have to be used. We seek a peaceful outcome—a diplomatic outcome. And one more thing—in the aftermath of Iraq's unconditional departure from Kuwait, I truly believe that there may be opportunities: For Iraq and Kuwait to settle their differences permanently; for the states of the Gulf themselves to build new arrangements for stability; and for all the states and peoples of the region to settle the conflict that divides the Arabs from Israel. But, the world's key task—now, first and always—must be to demonstrate that aggression will not be tolerated or rewarded.

Through the U.N. Security Council, Iraq has been judged by a jury of its peers—the very nations of the Earth. Today, the regime stands isolated and out of step with the times, separated from the civilized world not by space, but by centuries.

Iraq's unprovoked aggression is a throw-back to another era, a dark relic from a dark time. It has plundered Kuwait, terrorized innocent civilians, and held even diplomats hostage. Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and destruction. But this

outrageous disregard for basic human rights does not come as a total surprise. Thousands of Iraqis have been executed on political and religious grounds, and even more through a genocidal, poison gas war waged against Iraq's own Kurdish villagers.

As a world community, we must act—not only to deter the use of inhuman weapons like mustard and nerve gas—but to eliminate the weapons entirely. That is why, one year ago, I came to the General Assembly with new proposals to banish these terrible weapons from the face of the Earth.

I promised the United States would destroy over 98 per cent of its stockpile in the first eight years of a chemical weapons ban treaty, and 100 per cent—all of them—in 10 years, if all nations with chemical weapons capabilities sign the treaty.

We've stood by those promises. In June, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a landmark agreement to halt production, and to destroy the vast majority of our stockpiles. Today, U.S. chemical weapons are being destroyed.

But time is running out. This is not a merely bilateral concern. The Gulf crisis proves how important it is to act together—and to act now—to conclude an absolute, worldwide ban on these weapons. We must also redouble our efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles that can rain destruction upon distant peoples.

The United Nations can help bring about a new day, a day when these kinds of terrible weapons—and the terrible despots who would use them—are both a thing of the past. It is in our hands to leave these dark machines behind, in the dark ages where they belong, and to press forward to cap a historic movement towards a new world order and a long era of peace.

We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the Rule of Law, and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace and reduce arms.

And as we look to the future, the calendar offers up a convenient milestone, a signpost by which to measure our progress as a community of nations.

The year 2000 marks a turning point, beginning not only the turn

of the decade, not only the turn of the century, but also the turn of the millennium.

And ten years from now, as the 55th Session of the General Assembly begins, you will again find many of us in this Hall, our hair a bit more gray, perhaps a bit less spring in our walk. But you will not find us with any less hope or idealism, or any less confidence in the ultimate triumph of humankind.

I see a world of open borders, open trade, and—most importantly—open minds. A world that celebrates the common heritage that belongs to all the world's people, taking pride not just in hometown or homeland but in humanity itself.

I see a world touched by a spirit like that of the Olympics:

Based not on competition that's driven by fear, but sought out of joy and exhilaration and a true quest for excellence.

I see a world where democracy continues to win new friends and convert old foes, and where the Americas—North, Central and South—can provide a model for the future for all humankind—the world's first completely democratic hemisphere.

And I see a world building on the emerging new model of European unity. Not just Europe, but the whole world—"whole and free."

This is precisely why the present aggression in the Gulf is a menace not only to one region's security, but to the entire world's vision of our future. It threatens to turn the dream of a new international order into a grim nightmare of anarchy, in which the law of the jungle supplants the law of nations.

That is why the United Nations reacted with such historic unity and resolve. And that is why this challenge is a test we cannot afford to fail. I am confident we will prevail. Success, too, will have lasting consequences—reinforcing civilized standards of international conduct, setting a new precedent in International cooperation, brightening the prospects for our vision of the future.

There are ten more years until the century is out. Ten more years to put the struggles of the 20th century permanently behind us. Ten more years to help launch a new partnership of nations. And throughout those ten years—and beginning now—the United Nations has a new and vital role in building towards that partnership. Last year's General Assembly showed how we can make greater progress towards a more pragmatic and successful United Nations. And, for the first time, the U.N. Security Council is beginning to work as it was designed to work.

Now is the time to set aside old debates, old procedures, old controversies, and old resolutions. It's time to replace polemic attacks with pragmatic action.

We have shown that the United Nations can count on the collective strength of the international community. We have shown that the United Nations can rise to the challenge of aggression, as its founders hoped it would. And now in this time of testing, we must also show that the United Nations is the place to build international support and consensus for meeting the other challenges we face.

The world remains a dangerous place. And our security and well-being often depends, in part, on events occurring far away. We need serious international cooperative efforts to make headway on threats to the environment, on terrorism, on managing the debt burden, on fighting the scourge of international drug trafficking, and on refugee and peacekeeping efforts around the world.

But the world also remains a hopeful place. Calls for democracy and human rights are being reborn everywhere. These calls are an expression of support for the values enshrined in the U.N. Charter. They encourage our hopes for a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world.

Free elections are the foundation of democratic government, and can produce dramatic successes, as we have seen in Namibia and Nicaragua. And the time has come to structure the U.N. role in such efforts more formally. And so today, I propose that the United Nations establish a special coordinator for electoral assistance, to be assisted by a U.N. electoral commission comprised of distinguished experts from around the world.

As with free elections, we also believe that universal U.N. membership for all states is central to the future of this organization, and to the new partnership we've discussed. In support of this principle, and in conjunction with U.N. efforts to reduce regional tensions, the United States fully supports U.N. membership for the Republic of Korea. We do so without prejudice to the ultimate objective of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and without opposition to simultaneous membership for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Building on these and other initiatives, we must join together in a new compact—all of us—to bring the United Nations into the 21st century. And I call today for a major, long-term effort to do this. We should build on the success of our distinguished secretary general, my long-time friend and colleague, Javier Perez de Cuellar. We should

strive for greater effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations.

The United States is committed to playing its part, helping to maintain global security, promoting democracy and prosperity. My administration is fully committed to supporting the United Nations, and to paying what we are obliged to pay by our commitment to the Charter. International peace and security—and international freedom and prosperity—require no less.

The world must know and understand: From this hour, from this day, from this Hall—we step forth with a new sense of purpose, a new sense of possibilities. We stand together, prepared to swim upstream, to march uphill, to tackle the tough challenges as they come—not only as the United Nations—but as the nations of the world united.

Let it be said of the final decade of the 20th century: This was a time when humankind came into its own. When we emerged from the grit and the smoke of the industrial age to bring about a revolution of the spirit and of the mind, and began a journey into a new day, a new age, and a new partnership of nations.

The United Nations is now fulfilling its promise as the world's parliament of peace. I congratulate you, I support you. And I wish you Godspeed in the challenges ahead.

—USIS, New Delhi

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Extracts from the speech of Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq in UN General Assembly on 6th October 1990 (delivered on his behalf by Iraq's deputy representative at UN before the 45th regular session)

The events took place in the Arab region, which has had its own mechanisms and methods of addressing its problems for scores of years. The events started on 2 August 1990. On 3 August, His Majesty King Husayn sought to hold a mini-summit in Jeddah on 4 or 5 August among Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan to address the problem through the familiar mechanisms and methods. But the Arab

country that was supposed to hold the meeting—Saudi Arabia—avoided the meeting after it had accepted it.

Two days after the scheduled date of the meeting, the US forces landed in the Arabian Peninsula. This clearly shows that the United States was the side that put the Arab mechanisms out of action and decided to control the political situation on its own. One day after its troops landed in the Arabian Peninsula, it pushed its men in the region to hold a meeting in Cairo, not to discuss the issue and the ways by which Arab problems are usually solved, but to obtain support from its allies for the U.S. occupation and control of the political situation. This led to a sharp division among the Arab governments. Since then, some sincere Arab parties have been seeking a return to the Arab mechanisms and methods for solving the issue, but the United States is suppressing and defaming these attempts, threatening the leaders that make them, and using the Security Council as an instrument to thwart every earnest Arab endeavor.

This fact sheds light on what took place and what is taking place in the Security Council. Since the first day of the events, the United States called on the Security Council to hold an urgent session and placed before the Council a resolution based on chapter seven [of the UN Charter]. And, for the first time in the history of the Security Council, the Council did not give enough time for the participation of the foreign minister of the concerned country in the issue. Neither did the Council give an opportunity to Arab representatives who could have participated with responsibility to take part in the discussion. America called for the meeting at 0445 New York local time, on 2 August. It presented a draft resolution and insisted on adopting it within hours. It then went on to build the subsequent political activity on the basis of this draft resolution, although it knew that issuing a resolution of this kind and in this hasty manner would impede the possibilities for a serious and responsible search for appropriate solutions to the issue, particularly by the Arab side.

Why have the issues of Palestine, the Middle East, and Lebanon remained unresolved to date? What has happened to the 166 Security Council resolutions on those issues? And why does Israel continue its occupation of the Arab territories and impudently announce that these territories are part of Israel's land—calling the West Bank Judea and Samaria, and declaring occupied Jerusalem as its eternal capital before the eyes and ears of those who had not shown firmness regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions except after the

Council adopted its known resolutions after the events of 2 August 1990?

The record of the United Nations is full of condemnation of the U.S. policy, and we all know the position of the United States and its allies, especially Britain, toward the issues of independence, racial discrimination, equitable economic relations, and other issues that are brought up every year here at the General Assembly. The representatives of the United States and the West stand against these issues by all means, and they obstruct our sincere efforts to address them in line with international law, the UN Charter, and the standards of justice and equality.

The United States used its veto 81 times to block the adoption of resolutions by the Council, most of which concerned the rights of the Palestinian people, the Israeli acts of aggression against the Palestinian people and the neighboring Arab countries, and about South Africa. This year alone the United States used the veto seven times to oppose draft resolutions on the Palestine question.

The resolutions issued by the Security Council on the Palestine question, the Middle East, and Lebanon, which call for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Palestinian and Arab territories they are occupying, have not been implemented to date, nor have 44 other resolutions on Lebanon adopted since 1978 been implemented. Israel has been occupying Lebanon since 1982.

The UN General Assembly, for its part, has issued more than 400 resolutions on the Palestine question and the Middle East, with the United States opposing most of them. These resolutions, especially those calling for enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights, have not been implemented because the United States and Israel refuse to acknowledge the Palestinian people's right to self-determination—a right enjoyed by all world nations.

There are also many resolutions adopted by the UN specialized agencies on the rights of the Palestinian people and the Middle East issue. Because of the U.S. opposition of these resolutions, Israel ignored them as it did those of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We mention in particular the resolutions of UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

At this particular period of time we are witnessing a new campaign of settlement colonialism, represented by the Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and East European countries aimed at consecrating

the Zionist occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories and establishing the so-called Greater Israel.

The countries sponsoring this campaign under the pretext of defending human rights and the right to emigrate refuse to allow the Palestinian people to exercise these rights and the right to return to their homeland, although several UN resolutions recognizing the right to repatriation have been adopted since 1948 but remained unimplemented up to the present day. Now Zionist emigration is taking place at the expense of this Palestinian right and in order to force the remaining Palestinian people out of their land.

We the Arabs and world nations should not draw the wrong conclusions. The United States and its Western allies, which raised this clamor over the recent resolutions they imposed in the Security Council, are not now in a stage of an awakening of conscience, but are pushing the world, in the context of one of the most dangerous and malicious campaigns of delusion known in history, into a new imperialist era, taking advantage of the international balance brought about following the events in the Soviet Union and East Europe to entrench the pillars of this new imperialist system before the world nations wake up from the great shock and search for the methods with which they can restore balance in a manner that safeguards their independence and provides for world relations based on justice.

The rulers of the United States and its Western allies are not defending international law and charter; they, as U.S. President George Bush said, are defending the capitalist financial system, one of the main pillars of which was the former Kuwaiti regime's investments which amounted to more than \$200 billion. They are seeking to gain control over the oil reserves in the Gulf so as to have a free hand in manipulating the needs of the world, especially the needs of the people of the Third World, for this important commodity. The United States is seeking, in a dangerously coercive manner, to impose its leadership over the world, as was disclosed by President George Bush in his speech before the Congress on 11 September 1990 when he said: The American objectives in the Gulf are clear and known. . . America and the world must defend common vital interests. . . and in the pursuit of these goals, the United States should fear nothing. He emphasized that the United States antedated events and will survive them.

The United States is raising artificial fears about Iraqi control over 20 per cent of the oil reserves while it and its Western allies were quite happy when those reserves were under the control of a handful of

shaykhs. The true reason behind this fear-raising operation is that Iraq, although an oil-producing country, considers itself in reality and principle a member of the Third World, sharing its feelings, showing solidarity with it, and adhering to its causes.

In the seventies, before the war with Iran, Iraq provided more than 9 billion dollars in aid to some African, Asian, and Latin American countries.

This is the reason. They are fighting the principle of an independent country controlling its national resources that were stolen by force and conspiracy during the era of colonization. They are fighting against the use of these resources for true self-development and in order that this independent country may not effectively provide fair assistance to its brothers in the Arab countries and the Third World as it did until 1979. When Iraq announced on 10 September its readiness to provide free oil to the Third World countries, the United States and its allies put their political and military machine on a state of alert to terrorize those countries so that they cannot transport the oil. The Third World countries are now forced to pay twice as much for oil as they used to pay a few weeks ago.

The United States, which until a few weeks back had been resisting a natural increase in the price of oil in a manner that creates balance between supply and demand, is now eager to maintain the high price of oil because it is blackmailing its oil-producing allies into using the additional revenues to cover the heavy financial cost of its military campaign against Iraq.

We must thoroughly contemplate the generosity shown by the United States, the big capitalist countries, and the Arab capitalist countries in their spending on the military campaign against Iraq. Approximately 20 billion dollars have been collected within weeks to finance the campaign. We must ask: Were these countries really generous in collecting only a few million dollars to relieve those dying of famine in Africa, the millions of refugees in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and the Palestinian refugees that Israel expelled and is expelling from their lands?

—*FBIS-NES*, 9 October 1990

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Extract from the speech of the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Douglas Hurd, in UN General Assembly on 8 October 1990

"Iraq's aggression dominates our thoughts about the Middle East, but we must not lose sight of other issues in the region. . . of the need for a just solution, at last, to the Palestinian problem. We have no intention of forgetting that piece of unfinished business, but any solution to that problem will have to rest on respect for international law, respect for engagements entered into. That is why before that problem can be solved we must deal with the case of Iraq and Iraq's aggression. The chances of a more secure world order depend directly on the success of the international coalition which I have mentioned in reversing the occupation of Kuwait.

—BIS, British High Commission, New Delhi

66

Resolution 674 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2951st meeting on 29 October 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), and 670 (1990),

Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and of the authority of its legitimate government,

Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third-State nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and the other actions reported to the Security Council, such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, the relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait, including hospital supplies and equip-

ment, in violation of the decisions of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law,

Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such States,

Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches,

Recalling the efforts of the Security-General concerning the safety and well-being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Deeply concerned at the economic cost and at the loss and suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining international peace and security by seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means,

Recalling the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the Charter,

Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which directly threaten international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation,

Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular its resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990),

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,

A

1. *Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third-State nationals hostage, mis-*

treating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals and any other actions, such as those reported to the Security Council and described above, that violate the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions of Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law;

2. *Invites* States to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 above and to make this information available to the Security Council;

3. *Reaffirms* its demand that Iraq immediately fulfil its obligations to third-State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council;

4. *Also reaffirms* its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third-State nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to leave;

5. *Demands* that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well-being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait;

6. *Reaffirms* its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and well-being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above and in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third-State nationals;

8. *Reminds* Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their

nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;

9. *Invites* States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law;

10. *Requires* that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Security Council will need to take further measures under the Charter;

11. *Decides* to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

B

12. *Reposes* its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and to undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the basis of Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), and calls upon all States, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and stability;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

67

*Resolution 675 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its
2952nd meeting on 5 November 1990*

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 637 (1989) of 27 July 1989 and 644 (1989) of 7 November 1989, as well as the statement made by the President of the Security Council on its behalf on 7 November 1989,

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/21909;

2. *Decides* to extend, under its authority, the mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America, as defined in resolution 644 (1989), for a further period of six months, that is until 7 May 1991, bearing in mind the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/21909 and the need to continue to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of increasing demands on peace-keeping resources;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments and to report on all aspects of the operations of the Observer Group before the expiry of the new mandate period.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

68

US has no right to war: Cuellar

UN Secretary-General Cuellar has said the United States has no authority to wage war against Iraq unilaterally now that the Security Council is seized of the crisis.

He told a small group of reporters in New York on Thursday that any attempt to take military action against Iraq under Article 51 of the charter, as favoured by the US, "could face legal difficulties", according to the Washington Post:

He was responding to President Bush who reiterated yesterday that the US has authority under Article 51 to wage war against Iraq in response to the appeal of the Emir to end Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

But the Secretary-General says that this authority has now lapsed and the matter is under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council.

Cuellar told reporters that Article 51, which allows for collective self defence by permitting countries to go to the assistance of other nations, may not be applicable three months after Iraq invaded Kuwait.

He said that Article 51's validity has expired and that Iraq would have to launch another military attack before it could again apply.

Meanwhile, Iraq has said it will never pull out of Kuwait, following US announcement of plans to nearly double American fire-power in the Gulf by sending more than 150,000 new troops in a marked shift toward an offensive stance.

US Secretary of State James Baker, having extracted reluctant Soviet consent for possible military action in the Gulf, left Moscow today for talks on the crisis with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

In Moscow, a senior American official said Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab forces would fight alongside US troops in any action to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, but the extent of France's support is not known.

Baker will meet with French President Francois Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in Paris tomorrow.

—*Indian Express*, 10 November, 1990

69

Resolution 676 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2961st meeting on 28 November 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987, 619 (1988) of 9 August 1988, 631 (1989) of 8 February 1989, 642 (1989) of 29 September 1989, 651 (1990) of 29 March 1990 and 671 (1990) of 27 September 1990,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group of 23 November 1990 1/ and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group for a further period of two months, that is, until 31st January 1991, as recommended by the Secretary-General;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit, during January 1991, a report on his further consultations with the parties about the future of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, together with his recommendations on this matter.

—*UN Information Centre*, New Delhi

70

Resolution 677 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2962nd meeting on 28 November 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990 and 674(1990) of 29 October 1990,

Reiterating its concern for the suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. *Mandates* the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which has been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the registration of the population up to 1 August 1990;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, in co-operation with the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access to and use of the said copy of the population register.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

71

Resolution 678 (1990) adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting on 29 November 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling, and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990)

of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990,

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Demands* that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. *Authorizes* Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. *Requests* all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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President Bush's statement on Gulf Crisis on 30 November 1990

We are in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake.

And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein.

We are dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force, who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources—all at a time in history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.

Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies. And we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world.

We are not alone in these goals and objectives. The United Nations, invigorated with a new sense of purpose, is in full agreement. The United Nations Security Council has endorsed 12 resolutions to condemn Iraq's unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait, implement tough economic sanctions to stop all trade in and out of Iraq, and authorize the use of force to compel Saddam to comply.

Saddam Hussein has tried every way he knows how to make this a fight between Iraq and the United States and, clearly, he has failed. Forces of 26 other nations are standings shoulder-to-shoulder with our troops in the Gulf. The fact is that it is not the United States against Iraq, it is Iraq against the world, and there's never been a clearer demonstration of a world united against appeasement and aggression.

Yesterday's United Nations Security Council resolution was historic. Once again, the Security Council has enhanced the legitimate peacekeeping function of the United Nations. Until yesterday, Saddam may not have understood what he's up against in terms of world opinion, and I am hopeful that now he will realize that he must leave Kuwait immediately.

I'm continually asked how effective are the UN sanctions—those put into effect on August 6th—and I don't know the answer to that question. Clearly, the sanctions are having some effect but I can't tell you that the sanctions alone will get the job done.

And thus I welcome yesterday's United Nations action. The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe are being severely damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions. The developing countries of Africa and in our hemisphere are being victimized by this dictator's rape of his neighbor, Kuwait. Those who feel that there is no down side to waiting months and months must consider the devastating damage being done every day to the fragile economies of those

countries that can afford it the least.

And, as Chairman Alan Greenspan testified just the other day, the increase in oil prices resulting directly from Saddam's invasion is hurting our country, too. And our economy, as I said the other day, is at best in a serious slowdown. And if uncertainty remains in the energy markets, the slowdown will get worse.

I've spelled out once again our reasons for sending troops to the Gulf. Let me tell you the things that concern me most.

First, I put the immorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage and brutalize its neighbor. No nation should be able to wipe a member state of the United Nations and the Arab League off the face of the Earth. And I'm deeply concerned about all the hostages, innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law.

And then there's this cynical and brutal policy, forcing people to beg for their release, parceling out human lives to families and traveling emissaries like so much chattel.

I'm deeply concerned about our own embassy in Kuwait. The flag is still flying there; a handful of beleaguered Americans remain inside the embassy, unable to come and go. This treatment of our embassy violates every civilized principle of diplomacy. And it demeans our people, it demeans our country. And I am determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution 674, be fully replenished and our people free to come home.

What kind of precedent will these actions set for the future if Saddam's violation of international law goes unchallenged? I'm also deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself.

The tales of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting, are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of people must end and those who violated the Kuwaiti people must be brought to justice.

I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors, should he possess a nuclear device. We've seen him use chemical weapons on his own people. We've seen him take his own country, one that should be wealthy and prosperous, and turn it into a poor country, all because of insatiable appetite for military equipment and conquest.

I've been asked why I ordered more troops to the Gulf. I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if

force is required, we, and the other 26 countries who have troops in the area, will have enough power to get the job done.

In our country, I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted drawn-out war. The forces arrayed are different; the opposition is different; the re-supply of Saddam's military would be very different; the countries united against him in the United Nations are different, the topography of Kuwait is different, and the motivation of our all-volunteer force is superb.

I want peace. I want peace, not war, but if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs, and I pledge to you there will not be any murky ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible, as soon as the UN objectives have been achieved. I will never, ever agree to a half-way effort.

Let me repeat. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, we have only friendship for the people there. And, further, I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do, and, at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed.

And lastly, people now caution patience. The United States and the entire world have been patient. I will continue to be patient, but yesterday's UN resolution, the 13th by the Security Council, properly says to Saddam Hussein, "Time is running out. You must leave Kuwait, and we've given you time to do just exactly that."

Many people have talked directly to Saddam Hussein and to his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. All have been frustrated by Iraq's ironclad insistence that it will not leave Kuwait.

However, to go the extra mile for peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to come to Washington at a mutually convenient time during the latter part of the week of December 10th to meet with me. And I'll invite ambassadors of several of our coalition partners in the Gulf to join me at that meeting.

In addition, I am asking Secretary Jim Baker to go to Baghdad to

see Saddam Hussein, and I will suggest to Iraq's president that he receive the secretary of state at a mutually convenient time between December 15th and January 15th of next year.

Within the mandate—within the mandate of the United Nations resolutions, I will be prepared, and so will Secretary Baker, to discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis. However, to be very clear about these efforts to exhaust all means for achieving a political and diplomatic solution, I am not suggesting discussions that will result in anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all hostages.

—Associated Press, 30 November 1990

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'Doha Declaration' issued by the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council on 25 December 1990

Declaration issued under the name of the "Doha Declaration."

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful;

The Higher Council;

The Doha Declaration;

The events and developments that the region has witnessed and the repercussions resulting from Iraq's occupation of the State of Kuwait require the strengthening of cohesiveness and solidarity, the consolidation of the bases of cooperation, and the promotion of coordination among the GCC member states in all fields.

The Iraqi aggression has upset all assumptions in inter-Arab relations. It poses a threat to the security and stability of the countries in the region and the entire world, and places the very existence of our Arab nation and its common destiny in the most serious danger. This aggression and its subsequent results, in terms of the ensuing rift in Arab solidarity and the setback to joint Arab action, indicates the need to establish a clear-cut and an integrated strategy regarding the future policies that must be followed to prevent the recurrence of such

aggression and to lay down more solid rules for stronger relations among our Arab countries.

The Iraqi invasion of the sisterly State of Kuwait has revealed that the security arrangements that exist within the framework of the GCC are inadequate. Therefore, their majesties and highnesses declare the following:

1. To stress their commitment to the contents of the Muscat Declaration issued at the 10th session of the GCC Higher Council.
2. To demand the full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from the sisterly State of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government under its amir, His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, in accordance with the Arab, Islamic, and international resolutions.
3. To complete the establishment of security and defensive arrangements for the GCC member states to ensure that the individual national security of each member state and the collective regional security of all member states are safeguarded.
4. To reiterate the firm and principled position of the GCC member states in support of the heroic Palestinian intifadah and in support of the Palestinian issue, the Arabs' main cause, to which the international community must find a just solution that will restore the legitimate rights of its people, foremost being their rights to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent state on their national soil.
5. To increase political coordination among the GCC member states on the domestic, regional, Arab, and international levels.
6. To promote economic cooperation among the GCC member states, particularly in:
 - (a) Developing new concepts of common economic action to accelerate economic integration.
 - (b) Laying down a program for completing the establishment of a common market among the GCC member states and of an agreement for a unified trade policy.
 - (c) Reassessing the Unified Economic Agreement with a view toward achieving benefits that can bring about a balance of interests among the member states and overcome obstacles.
7. To increase coordination among the media agencies of the GCC member states in order to confront hostile media campaigns, and to establish a common information plan among the GCC member states

with a view to following up and analyzing the international media and advising the media agencies on how to deal with it.

8. To support the GCC general secretariat in forming committees of experts to study and develop proposals for integrated projects so that they can be submitted to the competent ministerial committees.

Following is the text of the final communique of the 11th session of the GCC Higher Council:

In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate.

The final communique of the 11th session of the GCC Higher Council, held in Doha in the State of Qatar 5-8 Jumada al-Akhirah 1411 Hegira, corresponding to 22-25 December 1990

In response to an invitation from His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Hamad Al Thani, amir of Qatar, and with God's help and providence, the 11th session of the GCC Higher Council was held in the city of Doha 5-8 Jumada al-Akhirah 1411 Hegira, corresponding to 22-25 December 1990. The session was attended by Their Majesties and Highnesses Shaykh Zayid Ibn-Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the United Arab Emirates; Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Salman Al Khalifah, Bahraini prime minister; King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia and custodian of the two holy mosques; Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id of Oman; Shaykh Khalifah Ibn-Hamad Al Thani of Qatar; and Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait.

The Iraqi Regime's Aggression against Kuwait

The Higher Council reviewed the serious situation created in the region as a result of the Iraqi regime's occupation of the sovereign state of Kuwait, which has posed a threat to the security and safety of the GCC member-states and resulted in the shedding of the blood of the innocent Kuwaiti people, the displacement of the Kuwaiti people and others residing in Kuwait, arrests and torture, looting of properties, and the violation of sanctities in an attempt to obliterate the Kuwaiti identity and entity.

The Higher Council also discussed the serious repercussions of this aggression on security and stability in the Gulf region and the Arab world, as well as on world peace and security.

The Higher Council reiterates its strong condemnation of the Iraqi regime for its arbitrary and oppressive aggression against the State of

Kuwait and its continued refusal to comply with the principles of the Arab League Charter, Arab Summit Resolution 195, the UN Charter, and the UN Security Council resolutions concerning the aggression against Kuwait. As it repeats its condemnation of these acts, the council reiterates that the GCC governments and peoples stand beside the State of Kuwait in its ordeal and extend their full support for and solidarity with the struggle of the Kuwaiti Government and people until full liberation is achieved.

The Higher Council commends the Kuwaiti people's steadfast rejection of the occupation and their adherence to their legitimate government under the leadership of His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah. The council also pays tribute to the sacrifices made by the Kuwaiti people in confronting terrorism, oppression, torture, and indiscriminate executions, and it honors their continued resistance and determination to defeat the forces of evil and aggression. The council expresses pride in the cohesion of the one Kuwaiti household, as demonstrated during the Kuwaiti popular conference in the city of Jeddah.

As it recalls the individual and collective efforts made by the GCC members before and after the tyrannical Iraqi aggression against Kuwait on 2 August to avert this tragedy, and their sincere and serious endeavors to find a peaceful solution, the council expresses gratitude for the good efforts of the leaders of sisterly and friendly states to persuade the Iraqi regime to comply with the principles of legitimacy and respect the resolutions of the Arab League Summit and the UN Security Council.

The council reiterates the GCC countries' firm stand in the face of the Iraqi aggression and their determination to resist it and nullify its negative consequences, proceeding from the premise that aggression against any member state is aggression against all GCC member states, and that the security of the GCC member states is indivisible.

Therefore, the council reiterates its demand that the Iraqi leadership respect international norms and charters as well as the agreements it concluded with the State of Kuwait, and calls on it to choose peace to preserve the Iraqi people's achievements and prevent the squandering of their resources, potential, and blood in a confrontation which will only result in losses and destruction. The council calls on the Iraqi regime to begin withdrawing its troops from all Kuwaiti territory immediately and unconditionally so that the legitimate authority can be restored to Kuwait before 15 January 1991. By doing so, the

brotherly Iraqi people as well as the people of the region and the entire world will be spared the horrors of a destructive war.

The council calls on the Iraqi regime to respect civilians, to safeguard their lives and property, and to protect public and private properties and establishments in accordance with the provisions of Islamic sharia, the fourth Geneva convention on the protection of civilians in time of war, and international charters and agreements.

The Higher Council holds Iraq responsible for paying compensation to Kuwait for the damage inflicted on Kuwaiti Government establishments, banks, and public and private institutions and for the seizure and transfer of their holdings, funds, and deposits outside Kuwait. The council also reiterates the lawful right of Kuwaiti and other nationals to obtain just compensation for damages and losses suffered as a result of the oppressive Iraqi aggression.

Within the framework of the political and diplomatic efforts to consolidate the Arab and international consensus rejecting the aggression, and to guarantee the implementation of the resolutions of international legitimacy, the GCC has decided to entrust a committee—comprised of the foreign ministers of its member states—with the task of visiting the permanent members of the Security Council, certain Arab countries, and other important countries.

Recalling the principles outlined in the Muscat Declaration released at the GCC's 10th session, principles which emphasize the basic rules and legitimacy to which the GCC member states are committed in their international relations, the GCC expresses its hope that the Iraqi regime will respond to the demands of Arab and international legitimacy. The principles enshrined in the Muscat Declaration call for good-neighborly relations; mutual respect for national sovereignty; noninterference in the domestic affairs of all countries; respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries; refraining from the use of force or threats to use force; and resorting to dialogue and negotiations as an effective means to settle disputes. At the same time, the GCC underlines the right and determination of its member states to resort to all means necessary to secure the restoration of sovereignty and legitimacy to Kuwait.

The GCC expresses its appreciation and gratitude to all the Arab, Islamic, and friendly countries that stood on the side of right and legitimacy, condemned the aggression, and sought to end it by responding to the resolutions of Arab and international legitimacy and to the GCC countries' request that they deploy their forces beside the Gulf

forces to support the latter in their defensive tasks. The GCC also asserts that the Arab, Islamic, and friendly forces that came to the region at the request of the GCC member states will return to their countries when the GCC member states request them to do so after the circumstances that required their presence—the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the threat to the GCC countries—are removed. The GCC asserts that these honorable stands will have positive effects on relations in all fields between the GCC countries and these Arab, Islamic, and friendly countries.

The GCC March

The GCC Higher Council reviewed the stages of the march of joint action in the political, security, military, economic, and social fields. It discussed ways to promote cooperation and integration among the member states in accordance with the principles and goals outlined in the GCC's statute, while taking into account the security developments in the region in light of the treacherous Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the developments and transformations affecting the essence of the order in the Arab world, and the current world developments that are transforming the international order.

The GCC emphasizes its concern to expedite steps and to make a qualitative leap in collective action among the member states in the forthcoming stage in order to achieve further coordination, integration, and cohesion out of its absolute conviction that its members share the same fate and goals. The GCC notes with satisfaction the development of security and military cooperation among the member states at this critical time in the region caused by Iraq's contempt for values and international charters and its defiance of the international will. The GCC takes pride in the unity of the GCC member states in the face of the Iraqi aggression and their determination to resist it. Out of their conviction of the importance of achieving further security and military cooperation among the member states, particularly in view of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the threat this poses to the security of other member states, the GCC has endorsed the defense ministers' recommendations on strengthening the intrinsic defensive capabilities of its member states.

The GCC Higher Council also reviewed the trend of economic action and expressed satisfaction with the achievements of joint action in this field. It stressed its determination to continue the work to fulfill the ambitions and aspirations of the GCC peoples in completing the

steps toward economic integration. To achieve this goal, the GCC Higher Council assigned the financial and economic cooperation committee the task of adopting the necessary measures to develop new concepts for joint economic action in order to expedite the achievement of economic integration and to draw up a program to complete the establishment of a common Gulf market, agree on a unified trade policy, evaluate economic cooperation, and examine the texts of the Unified Economic Agreement and methods of implementing it with the aim of securing new privileges that will enable the citizens of the GCC countries to enjoy new benefits in the march toward prosperity and development.

The Security Situation in the Region

The Higher Council notes with deep regret the deterioration of security conditions in the region as a result of the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait's territory. It also notes that although the entire region is on the verge of a destructive war, the Iraqi authorities have shown complete disregard for the consequences of such a war for the fraternal Iraqi people, the Arab nation, and the entire world.

Believing that establishing and safeguarding security in this vital part of the world serves the interests of the region's states, the Arab nation, and the entire world, the council reiterates its desire to adopt all measures necessary to protect the region's security and stability. It declares its determination to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation among the GCC members to strengthen their individual and joint defensive capabilities to serve the interests of the region, its security and prosperity, and to bolster world peace.

In this context, the council particularly appreciates the role being played by Arab states in support of Arab legitimacy. It looks forward to coordinating efforts with these states to find a way out of the tragedy triggered by the oppressive Iraqi aggression. It is also eager to work alongside these states to heal the rift, unite Arab stands, and establish a stronger and more cohesive Arab system.

In the meantime, and in view of international detente and the clear movement toward a new world order, the GCC countries will work with the region's countries, as well as the Arab and world household, to take the necessary measures to avoid the recurrence of such aggression and to lay the bases for stabilizing security in the region and serving the interests of world peace and security.

The Current Arab Situation

The Higher Council studied the current deterioration in Arab relations as a result of the Iraqi regime's disregard for Arab norms and charters, the schism created in Arab ranks by the Iraqi aggression, the collapse of Arab solidarity, and the lack of trust among the members of the Arab household. The council also noted that Arab energies are being wasted in fields far removed from Arab development and interests as a result of the oppressive aggression.

In this context, the council underscores the importance of working to reverse the current destructive trend in the Arab home and to heal the rift on the basis of a clear commitment in words and deeds to the principles of respect for Arab neighbours, noninterference in internal affairs, and refraining from the use of force or political threats and extortion. In this way, all human and material resources can be devoted to Arab and Muslim issues and a better future can be guaranteed for the Arab citizen in all corners of the Arab world.

The GCC states have made effective contributions to Arab development efforts at the bilateral, regional, and international levels. The council members desire to draw up new Arab development plans and believe in the importance of a joint Gulf development policy based on a new concept, which takes into account the contributions these efforts will make to political stability and regional security amid the economic difficulties resulting from the Iraqi aggression against the Arab world. Therefore, the council has decided to set up a program to subsidize development efforts in Arab and Muslim states. This program aims primarily at encouraging economic openness and market economies, improving Arab economic performance, and attracting world support for the Arab development process through encouraging international financing institutions and national development aid agencies to contribute to national development plans in Arab states.

The GCC countries express their determination to provide the necessary financing for such a program. Accordingly, the GCC foreign ministers will meet next week to work out the details and determine the funds required for the program from members' contributions and each country's share according to its resources.

The Higher Council reviewed developments in the Palestinian issue and voiced concern over the consequences of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and its negative repercussions on the Palestinian cause. The council recalls its previous resolutions and statements on the issue. It reiterates its commendation of the heroic struggle of the Palestinian

people and their daring intifadah in the face of the oppressive Israeli occupation and its suppressive and arbitrary practices.

As it reiterates its members' full and absolute support for the historic Palestinian intifadah, the council appeals to the international community to provide the necessary support for the intifadah and for the sons of the occupied territories in their ordeal. It also appeals to the international community to work to expose the Israeli terrorist methods, put an end to the occupation troops' arbitrary and oppressive measures, and stop the deportation of the Palestinian people from and the demolition of their homes, as such practices violate human rights and international laws and charters.

The council welcomes UN Security Council Resolution 681 on providing international protection to Palestinians in the occupied territories. It also welcomes the UN Security Council's call for holding an international peace conference on the Palestinian issue. In this regard, the council reaffirms its support for the convocation of an international peace conference in which all parties concerned, including the state of Palestine, will participate. It also calls for taking all measures necessary to hold the conference.

Regarding the situation in Lebanon, the GCC Higher Council notes with deep satisfaction the recent positive developments and the legitimate Lebanese Government's achievements in extending its authority over Greater Beirut and other areas. The GCC Higher Council expresses its desire that Lebanon achieve its full unity and territorial integrity. In this respect, the GCC Higher Council expresses its appreciation for the efforts exerted by the custodian of the two holy mosques, His Majesty King Hassan II, His Excellency President Chadli Bendjedid, and for the constructive role played by His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad in assisting the legitimate Lebanese Government. The GCC Higher Council exhorts the international community to continue to support the al-Ta'if Accord. The GCC Higher Council reasserts its support for His Excellency President Ilyas al-Hirawi and its desire for the restoration of security and stability throughout Lebanon. Recalling Resolution No.185 of the emergency Arab summit conference, which provides for the establishment of an international fund for reconstruction and development in Lebanon, the GCC Higher Council emphasizes its support for this fund to enable Lebanon to begin reconstruction and exercise its cultural role in the Arab and international arenas.

Relations with Iran

The GCC Higher Council welcomes the desire of the Islamic Republic of Iran to improve and promote its relations with all GCC countries. The GCC Higher Council underlines the importance of serious and realistic action to settle the outstanding differences between Iran and the GCC member states so that the countries of the region can proceed to achieve their cherished goals and exploit their resources for comprehensive economic development. The GCC Higher Council stresses its desire to establish distinguished relations with Iran on the basis of good-neighborliness; noninterference in domestic affairs, and respect for sovereignty, independence, and peaceful coexistence deriving from the bonds of religion and heritage that link the countries of the region.

International Developments

The GCC Higher Council examined the report prepared by the tripartite ministerial committee charged with studying international developments and evaluating their effects on the GCC countries. Out of its conviction of the importance of dealing with the requirements of international developments in a way that will safeguard the interests of the GCC member states and peoples, the GCC Higher Council ratified the recommendations submitted to it. The GCC Higher Council welcomes the new spirit of concord between East and West. It expresses its satisfaction with the political and economic openness being witnessed in East Europe in view of its effective role and the contribution this makes to enhancing peace and allowing human resources to be used for development instead of squandering funds in an exhausting and futile arms race. It praises the rational spirit prevailing in international relations based on mutual respect for sovereignty; balance of interests; and rejection of aggression, treachery, and occupation. The GCC Higher Council welcomes unified Germany as a factor for stability and as an effective member of the international community in support of development and international progress in a world permeated with the spirit of peace, understanding, reason, wisdom, and prosperity.

The GCC Higher Council wishes to express its solidarity with developing countries and its continued support for them in their efforts to achieve economic growth and improve the standard of living of their peoples. It asserts that its preoccupation with the repercussions of the sinful Iraqi aggression will not divert the attention of its member states

from continuing their cooperation and solidarity with the developing countries in their efforts to establish a more equitable international economic order. The GCC Higher Council decided to ask GCC Secretary General 'Abdallah Ya'qub Bisharah to remain in his post. It expresses its utmost appreciation and gratitude to His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Hamad Al Thani and to his government and people for the hospitality and reception extended to the GCC leaders and members of their delegations. It praises the excellent preparations and accurate arrangements for the convenience of the delegations and the success of the summit. The GCC Higher Council looks forward to its 12th session in Kuwait next December, God willing, in response to the invitation of the amir of Kuwait, His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah.

Issued in Doha on 8 Jumada al-Akhirah, 1411 of the Hegira, corresponding to 25 December 1990.

—FBIS-NES, 26 December 1990

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*The French Seven-Point Plan presented in Luxembourg
on 6 January 1991*

1. Iraq must respect the UN resolutions "by announcing its decision to evacuate Kuwait" before the 15th of January.
2. Baghdad must be notified that once this decision has been taken and announced, no attack will be made against Iraq.
3. Once Kuwait has been evacuated, the ground will be free for the examining of all the issues affecting the problems in the Middle East, "withing the framework of one, or two international conferences".
4. The Twelve must invite Mr. Tariq Aziz to meet Mr. Jacques Poos "on the first possible date, if possibly much before the 15th of January".
5. The EEC should welcome the initiative of Mr. George Bush.
6. The European "troika", made up of the present President of the EEC (Luxembourg), the last President (Italy) and the coming one (Netherlands), should make contact before the 15th of January with Yugoslavia (which at present holds the Chairmanship of the Non-

Aligned countries and which has launched a separate initiative), the Arab countries concerned and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

7. "Later on", a solution for the security of the region must be examined, taking inspiration from what the Europeans have achieved within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which gathers together all the European countries.

—*Le Monde, Reuter*, 6 January 1991

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Excerpts from President Bush's news conference on 9 January 1991

I have a brief opening statement, and then I will take a few questions.

I have spoken with the secretary of State, Jim Baker, who reported to me on his nearly seven hours of conversation with the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the United Nations resolutions.

Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi foreign minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein, refused to carry this letter and give it to the president of Iraq. The Iraqi ambassador here in Washington did the same thing. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation. The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League, or the European Community, the results are the same. Unfortunately. The conclusion is clear. Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution.

I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva not to negotiate, but to communicate. And I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its full compliance with the 12 relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. And he also made

clear how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply.

Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful outcome. It's not too late. I've just been on the phone, subsequent to the Baker press conference, with King Fahd, with President Mitterrand, to whom I've talked twice today, Prime Minister Mulroney and others are contacting other coalition partners to keep the matter under lively discussion.

It isn't too late. But now, as it's been before, the choice of peace or war is really Saddam Hussein's to make.

—USIS, New Delhi

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Tariq Aziz's News Conference in Geneva on 9 January 1991

President Bush intends to have a press conference, I preferred to listen to him, then I was told that the press conference of the president, President Bush, has been postponed for a while, so I wanted to use the time to talk to you.

When I arrived last night in Geneva, I said that I have come with open-mindedness, and that was my intention, and I also came in good faith. The most important fact about these talks I would like to draw your attention to is that they are taking place after five months of the occurrence of the latest events in the Gulf, and I drew the attention of Secretary Baker to that important fact; also, that this meeting took place after the last resolution that was taken under American pressure by the Security Council which gives. . . [pauses] makes limits to diplomacy. If we had an earlier opportunity several months ago, I told the secretary that we might have been able to remove a lot of misunderstandings between us—if there was a chance—or there is a chance for that, because he spoke at length about his government's assumptions of miscalculations by Iraq.

And when I came to that point, I made it clear to him that we have never—we have not made miscalculations. We are very well aware of the situation; we have been very well aware of the situation from the very beginning. And, I told him that we have heard a lot of talk on

his side and on the side of President Bush, that the Iraqis have not got the message—they don't know what is going around them, etc. You know what they have been saying in this regard. I told him, if we had met several months ago, I would have told you that we do know everything. We know what the deployment of your forces in the region means; we know what the resolutions you imposed on the Security Council mean; and we know all the facts about the situation—the political facts, the military facts, and the other facts. So, talking about miscalculation is incorrect. We have to convey to each other our view about the situation and that removes the misunderstandings on either side.

I heard Secretary Baker describing our meeting in form, and I say also that from the professional point of view it was a serious meeting.

We both listened to each other very carefully. We both gave each other enough time to explain the views we wanted to explain, to convey the information we wanted to convey. From this aspect, about this aspect in the talks, I am satisfied. But we had grave, or big, differences about the issues we addressed. Mr. Baker reiterated the very well-known American position. He is interested in one question only, that is the situation in the Gulf and the Security Council resolutions about that situation. I told him very clearly, and I repeated my idea and explained it at length—that what is at stake in our region is peace, security, and stability. What is at stake is the fate of the whole region—that region that has been suffering from wars, instabilities, hardships for several decades. If you are ready to bring about peace to the region, comprehensive, lasting, just peace to the whole region of the Middle East, we are ready to cooperate. I told him I have no problem with the international legality. I have no problem with the principles of justice and fairness. On the contrary, those principles are in the best interest of the people of Iraq and they are in the best interest of the Arab nation.

We had been seeking for decades to have those principles respected and implemented in our region. But, they have not been respected and implemented by the Israelis, in that they have got a continuous, strong American support. If the American Administration changes its position and it works with us and with the other parties concerned in the region to bring about peace—comprehensive, lasting, just peace—we will be very glad and very enthusiastic to participate in that effort.

Concerning the new world order, or the international world order, I said I have no problem with that order and we would love to be

partners in that order, but that order has to be implemented justly and in all cases, not using that order in a single manner, in a selective manner, impose it on a certain case with the view of the United States of America and neglect the other issues and not show sincerity and seriousness about implementing in other issues.

He said that he does not believe that what happened on the 2nd of August and later was for the cause of the Palestinian question, or to help the Palestinians. I explained to him the history of Iraq's interest in the Palestinian question. I explained to him that the Palestinian question is a matter of national security to Iraq. If the Palestinian question is not resolved, we do not feel secure in our country, because there have been wars in the past. Iraq participated in those wars. Israel attacked Iraq in 1981, and we were expecting Israeli attack on Iraq this year, last year. In March and April last year, we were expecting such an attack; and that was the main theme in the Arab summit that was held in Baghdad in late May. Therefore, it is a matter of Iraqi security as well as Arab security to see that the Palestinian question is solved in a just manner, according to international legality, according to the principles of justice and fairness.

He said that he does not believe that. I told him: Okay; test us. You can test us and see whether we are sincere in that or not. I spoke at length about the linkage between the issues in the region, and I told him that when we speak about the linkage, we are serious and sincere, because what was happening before the 2nd of August has a strong relationship with what happened later. And I told him that the United States actually implemented an embargo on Iraq before the 2nd of August. We had dealings with the United States in the field of food-stuffs. We used to buy more than a billion dollars of American products. And we were faithful and accurate in our dealing with the American relative institutions. Early in 1990, the American Administration suspended that deal, which was profitable to both sides. And we were denied food from the United States. Then, the United States Government decided to deny Iraq the purchase of a very large list of items. That was done also by the British Government and other Western governments. So, the boycott was there before the 2nd of August. The threat to the security of Iraq was there before the 2nd of August. The threat to the Palestinians was there before that date. The threat to the security of Jordan was there before that date; and that was, as I said, the main themes in the Baghdad summit which took place in late May.

So, if you want to bring about the situation in the region to that period prior to the second of August, that means that we would be threatened; we will be boycotted and the political and psychological and media campaign against us would continue. So, what is the difference; what is the difference? If we have to change the course of events, if we have to bring about peace, let us address all the issues. If the matter is the implementation or the respect of the international organization, the respect of Security Council resolutions, we have a number of resolutions about the Palestinian question. They have been neglected for decades. The last two important resolutions, 242 and 338, the first was adopted in 1967, the other in 1973, and they are not yet implemented. And the United States and the members of the coalition, as Mr. Baker calls it, have not sent troops to impose the implementation of those resolutions; they have not taken measures against Israel because Israel was intransigent. On the contrary, the United States government has covered the Israeli position, protected it politically at the Security Council, and that is very well known to everybody; and the United States government still supplies Israel with the military and financial means to stick to its intransigence. So, if the matter is respect of international law, Security Council resolutions, we would like you to show the same attention to all Security Council resolutions, and if you do that, a lot of differences between us will be removed.

Concerning the threats or no threats which the secretary referred to in his address to you, the tone of his language was diplomatic and polite; I reciprocated, but the substance was full of threats, and I told him all in substance that we will not yield to threats. We would like to have genuine, constructive dialogue between us, between our two nations, in order to make peace in the region and between our two nations. When we discussed the question of the mass destruction weapons, I told him in 1990 when this question was raised very, very strongly by the American Administration, we made it public—my president made it public—and he also informed a number of prominent American senators led by Senator Bob Dole, who came to see my president in April 1990—he told them and he made it public also that Iraq is ready to join an agreement to eliminate all mass-destruction weapons in the whole region, including the nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and chemical weapons.

And I told the secretary that you only concentrate on what Iraq has and you do not show any concern about what Israel has. Israel does have nuclear weapons, and you cannot give me any assurances that

Israel is not going to use them against us or against other Arabs. The only assurance, credible assurance, is that we reach an agreement on the elimination of all mass destruction weapons. And I told him you have got a pledge from me to that. And my guess that you cannot get such a pledge from the foreign minister of Israel, or from his prime minister. And in spite of that, you do not show concern.

This raises, as well as the attitude towards the Security Council resolutions, the question of double standards. I told him we in Iraq and the Arab world, we feel against, strongly against, the double standards you use in addressing the questions in the region. When it comes to Israel, you are calm, you are not worried, you can wait for months and years to try to persuade. If they are not persuaded and if they continue their positions, you do not do anything, you continue your support. But when it comes to the Arabs, there you raise the stick. And we are fed up with this policy of double standards. We shall not accept to be treated as a nation as underdogs. We are a proud nation. We have our history. We had our contribution to human civilization, and we would like to be treated in a dignified and just manner.

You heard that I declined to receive the letter from President Bush to my president. At the beginning of the meeting, Secretary Baker told me that he carries a letter from his president to my president, and he handed over a copy to me. I told him I want to read this letter first. And I read it, as he said, carefully and slowly, and I knew what it was about. I told him, I am sorry, I cannot receive this letter. And the reason is that the language in this letter is not compatible to the language that should be used in correspondence between heads of state. I have no objection that Mr. Bush would state his position very clearly. A serious exchange of letters between leaders and politicians can, or should contain the position of each party, but when a head of state writes to another head of state a letter, and if he really intends to make peace with that head of state or reach genuine understanding, he should use a polite language. And politeness does not contradict with substance. Therefore, because the language of that letter was contrary to the traditions of correspondence between heads of state, I declined to receive it.

Reporter: Could you give us an example of the language?

Aziz: Well, I read it only once, and I have not rehearsed that letter. But the contents of that letter were paraphrased in one way or another in the different statements the secretary made during the talks. This is the introduction I wanted to make about the meeting and I am ready

to answer your questions [motions to reporter] Yes?

Reporter: Would Iraq leave Kuwait if promised an international conference on the question of Palestine?

Aziz: I did not put it that way. I heard such a question during Mr. Baker's meeting with you. I told the secretary that if you are ready to respect and implement international legality, the principles of justice and fairness, as far as all the issues in the region are concerned, you will find us very cooperative.

Reporter: Mr. Secretary, did you speak with your president after your meeting with Secretary Baker, and is it your conclusion after this meeting that war with the United States is inevitable?

Aziz: I beg your pardon, I did not get the first part of your question?

Reporter: After your meeting with Secretary Baker, did you have a conversation with your president about the results of the meeting?

Aziz: No. I think the officials in this hotel know that I have not made any phone calls or overseas phone calls.

Reporter: Could you answer the second part of the question? Do you believe that war with the United States is inevitable?

Aziz: Well that is up to the American Administration to decide. I told Mr. Baker that we are prepared for all expectations. We have been prepared from the very beginning. If they decide to attack Iraq, we will not be surprised. We have our experience in war, and I told him that if the American Administration decides to attack Iraq militarily, Iraq will defend itself in a very bold manner. We are a courageous nation and we deeply feel that we have been treated unjustly. The Iraqi people, the Arab nation, and the nation which feels that it has been treated unjustly for decades, and a nation as courageous as the Arab nation—the Iraqis are part of that nation—and the nation which has the great determination to tell the others that it does not accept to be treated as it was treated, such a nation has the determination and the capability to fight as long as need be to prove and to achieve its rights.

Reporter: Mr. Foreign Minister: In your opening statement, in fact [words indistinct], you haven't mentioned the Iraqi invasion. [reporters and media persons complain because they cannot hear the question and ask the reporter to use the microphone] One, two, three, four, five. One, two, three. Mr. Foreign Minister: Sorry about that. In your opening statement, and in fact up to this very moment, you have not mentioned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. I am curious to know whether you actually ever discussed the question of withdrawal from Kuwait during the course of the six or so hours of talks with Secretary Baker. Did

the Iraqi side in any way, shape, or form even discuss the question of withdrawal?

Aziz: Well, the secretary spoke a lot about the situation in the...
[Reporter interrupting] [words indistinct]

Aziz: Yes. Mr. Baker spoke a lot about the situation in the Gulf, and I made our position very clear. I told him that this situation is part and parcel of a general situation in the region. If you are ready to address on the same principles, on the same criterion, I am ready to do the same.

Reporter: Do you deny that Iraq was stripped of all its possessions, its wealth, its people, its humanity?

Aziz: Well, you can put your question the way you like. But, I am not going to respond to allegations. The Iraqi people and the Iraqi Government have their own historical rights. And when they deal with those rights, they have their own view about it and they have their own standards about it. You might have a different view; that is up to you.

Reporter: Mr. Foreign Minister: If the war starts in the Middle East, in the Gulf, will you attack Israel?

Aziz: Yes. Absolutely yes.

Reporter: Mr. Minister: Are there circumstances under which Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait? And if so, can you tell us what they would be?

Aziz: I am not going to answer hypothetical questions. I have a line which I made very clear in my talks with the secretary. If the United States is ready to address all the issues in the region on the same principles, on the same criterion, Iraq will do its contribution to that effort in a serious and sincere manner.

Reporter: Mr. Foreign Minister, there have been quotes from Baghdad in the past, Mr. Minister, questioning America's will and its resolve, particularly given its Vietnam experience. I wonder if you would give us your reading of America's will. Do you think that. . . ?
[question incomplete as heard] You said Mr. Baker has miscalculated discussing Iraq's miscalculations. Could you tell us how you calculate America's resolve at this point? Do you think that they are indeed ready to fight you in a prolonged manner?

Aziz: I dealt with this question at length in the talks. I told Mr. Baker: You have mentioned that in your statements. And I told him that we follow what is being said in the United States, in the Congress, what is being published in the American newspapers; and that is part of our duty to follow the events in the United States and the world

vis-a-vis the situation in our region. But I told him: The decision of the United States is your problem or that is your business, you see. It is up to the Americans in the government, in the Congress, in the public opinion to make their own decision. We have prepared ourselves for the worst from the very beginning; therefore, we are not making miscalculations about that. But, at the same time, I am telling you now that any support in the United States or elsewhere for the cause of peace is a noble phenomenon; and such a noble phenomenon has to be appreciated.

We do appreciate the reasonable statements made by American individuals, by American politicians about the situation in the region, even if they differ with our point of view. We do appreciate them. And in this world, in this world, with the development of communications and means of information, people listen to each other, and there is nothing wrong about that. But it does not mean that we are calculating on that, or making our calculations on that—that the Americans do not have the resolve to do this or that—that is up to the American people and the American Government to decide. As far as the Iraqi people are concerned, as far as the Iraqi leadership are concerned, we are preparing ourselves, and we have been preparing ourselves from the very beginning to the worst kind of expectations.

Reporter: Mr. Minister, during your stay here, and we do not know how long it will last, are you intending to meet with other European officials?

Aziz: No, I do not have any plans of meeting foreign officials. I might meet Arab colleagues who happen to be here in Geneva. The Europeans made a proposal to receive me in Rome when Italy was the president of the group, I accepted that invitation immediately and appreciated that invitation. When there was a problem between us and the United States about the dates of my meeting with President Bush and Mr. Baker's visit to Baghdad, they withdrew that invitation. And when they invited to Luxembourg once again after we agreed to make this meeting here in Geneva, I said sorry, I cannot accept your invitation because your treatment, your position in withdrawing the previous invitation was humiliating, and if you want to talk with the Iraqi leadership you are welcome in Baghdad. This is still my position about that.

Reporter: Mr. Minister, did today's talks change your mind in any way about the. . .

[Aziz, interrupting] The talks with Secretary Baker?

Reporter: Yes, and did you get any new information that you feel obligated to [words indistinct] President Saddam Hussein?

Aziz: No, honestly, honestly, I happen to know some English, and I can listen to statements made by American officials without translation—sometimes, many times, without translation. And we listen to the American radio, and I have the advantage of seeing the CNN, which is very active in covering the political activities [laughs with some members of the press corps], especially the statements of the American officials; I have heard Secretary Baker talking several times. And the last few months I have heard almost all the statements of President Bush. I did not find anything new in what Mr. Baker said in our meetings. But as I said at the beginning the tone here in Geneva was different. It was a diplomatic tone, not the harsh tone which we are familiar with listening to the previous statements.

Reporter: Mr. Secretary: Do you rule out any attack on Israel before a U.S. attack on Iraq, number one? Two, . . .

[Aziz, interrupting] That is not going [word indistinct] . . .

[Reporter, interrupting] Excuse me, sir, just to finish, would you give us any more details, you said that you had information that Israel was going to attack Iraq last March or April; I was wondering if you could elaborate on that? And finally, why not have face-to-face talks with Israel yourself, or the head of state, either in Jerusalem or Baghdad? You've talked about peace in the Middle East for decades; why hasn't that happened? Why aren't you for it?

Aziz: About the first half of the question, Iraq is not going to attack anybody, any party, before it is attacked. So, our action in this regard would be a retaliation to attacks, and a defensive action. As far as the talks you mentioned are concerned, there is no bilateral dispute between Iraq and the Israelis. There is the Palestinian question; the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian land; the Israeli subjugation of the Palestinian people—if they are ready to resort to the principles of justice and fairness and to the principles of international law, they have to talk to the Palestinians and when the Palestinians want the help or the support of the Arab brothers and they want any kind of support on the side of Iraq, we will be always at their disposal.

Reporter: [Words indistinct] Israeli attack last year?

Aziz: The Israelis were planning to attack Iraq last year, yes.

Reporter: Did you also foresee the possibility of the good offices of the secretary-general of the United Nations within the next six days?

Aziz: Well, several days ago, our representative in New York met

with Mr. Perez de Cuellar, and he informed him that he would be welcome in Baghdad if he wishes to come. This position is still there. I heard on the news that he might decide to come to Baghdad, but I haven't yet received a formal letter or a formal suggestion in this regard.

Reporter: Mr. Foreign Minister: You stressed twice now during this press conference that you were satisfied with the professional style, as you put it, and the tone and the language of today's talks with Secretary Baker, but then you explained to us that you rejected the letter because of the language President Bush used supposedly in this letter. Are you implying that Secretary Baker and President Bush use different language on the same issue?

Aziz: The tone of our talks was different from the language that was used in the letter although the substance doesn't change very much. I am not, as I said, against the substance. Every head of state can convey to his counterpart whatever he wants to convey, but the question is a question of language, of politeness, and resort to diplomatic means of correspondence. I came to see Mr. Baker. He wanted to see me, and I wanted to see him, and we wanted to talk about all questions of common interest, all of the interest of this side and of the other, and we had long discussions as I said, from the professional point of view they were good discussions.

Reporter: Mr. Minister, before leaving Baghdad, you said you will have new proposals and ideas. What you've just said this evening, you said many many times before. Why did you have no new proposals or ideas?

Aziz: I raised a lot of ideas with Mr. Baker. I told him: Why don't you work with us together, and with the other parties, to bring about peaceful, comprehensive peaceful settlement to the whole region? This is a very constructive idea. I raised with the secretary the question of the Arab solution. I told him: Why are you against the Arab solution? And he said that the majority of the Arab countries are against the so-called Arab solution. I told him: Wait a minute. I will count one country after the other who has shown interest in an Arab solution. And when I counted the states which showed interest in an Arab solution the number was 11. And this shows that there is a majority among the Arab world to try an Arab solution. But, he strongly refused that path, and he even denied that there is an Arab solution, the idea of an Arab solution. I told him: There is an Arab solution. Why not? This is an Arab problem between Arabs, and what's wrong if a number of leaders

in the Arab world meet and try to find solutions to this problem? What's wrong with that? And there is no contradiction in taking that solution to the international organisation and seek some sort of an endorsement to it.

And there is a precedent in that, a very recent precedent. We have the situation in Lebanon; and that situation was a very critical situation. And it has been dealt with several times by the Security Council and by other international bodies. Then the Arabs met in Casablanca in 1988, and they created a commission of three leaders. And those three leaders with the help of their foreign ministers reached some sort of a solution which was called the al-Ta'if solution. And that solution was endorsed by the Security Council, was supported by the United States. Why not in this case? He strongly refused. Which means, as I told him clearly, he says that this is the international community versus Iraq, this is the coalition versus Iraq. I told him: But the meeting is between you and me. The meeting is not between myself and Mr. de Cuellar. The meeting is not between me and the foreign minister of the Soviet Union. The meeting is not between me and the foreign minister of the Ivory Coast, who participated in the adoption of those resolutions. The meeting is not between me and the foreign minister of Ethiopia who participated in the adoption of the Security Council resolutions. The fact that the foreign minister of Iraq and the secretary of the United States are meeting here in Geneva discussing the situation shows that this is a confrontation between Iraq and the United States.

You have your allies on your side and we do have our allies on our side. You can count a great, a bigger number. You have the capabilities. And we all know how that number of the coalition was increased. A lot of money, billions of dollars were spent, to create that coalition. We don't have such money to make a parallel coalition, but those who are supporting Iraq, they are supporting it genuinely. They are not mercenaries who are being paid every month, and who are competing with each other about the amount of payment and making their complaints once to the Americans and other times to the Saudis and to the others that the money is not enough, you've got to pay more and more. We don't hear such things from those who support us.

And I told him: Who are the staunchest supporters of Iraq now? The people of Palestine in the occupied territories. Those people were the most affected financially by the events in the Gulf. And in spite of their financial and economic hardships, they support Iraq. Why? Because they find in this conflict a golden chance for themselves that their

country, their land, they themselves, might be liberated.

Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen. Good night.

—FBIS-NES, 10 January 1991

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*President Bush's letter to President Saddam Hussein
on 12 January 1991*

At their meeting in Geneva on Wednesday, Secretary of State James A. Baker gave the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, a letter from President George Bush to be passed on to President Saddam Hussein. Mr. Aziz read the letter and then refused to accept it, saying its tone was inappropriate.

Here is the text of the letter, as released by the White House on January 12.

Dear Mr. President:

We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678.

I am writing you now, directly, because what is at stake demands that no opportunity be lost to avoid what would be a certain calamity for the people of Iraq. I am writing as well because it is said by some that you do not understand just how isolated Iraq is and what Iraq faces as a result. I am not in a position to judge whether this impression is correct; what I can do, though, is try in this letter to reinforce what Secretary of State Baker told your foreign minister and eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in your mind about where we stand and what we are prepared to do.

The international community is united in its call for Iraq to leave all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay. This is not simply the policy of the United States; it is the position of the world community, as expressed in no less than 12 Security Council resolutions.

We prefer a peaceful outcome. However, anything less than full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its predecessors is unacceptable. There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised.

However, by its full compliance, Iraq will gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. More immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will escape destruction. But unless you withdraw from Kuwait completely and without condition, you will lose more than Kuwait. What is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait—it will be free, its government will be restored—but rather the future of Iraq. This choice is yours to make.

The United States will not be separated from its coalition partners. Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries providing military units to enforce them, more than 100 governments complying with sanctions—all highlight the fact that it is not Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the world. That most Arab and Muslim countries are arrayed against you as well should reinforce what I am saying. Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving.

You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of opinion that is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation. Diversity ought not to be confused with division. Nor should you underestimate, as others have before you, America's will.

Iraq is already feeling the effects of the sanctions mandated by the United Nations. Should war come, it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons, support of any kind of terrorist actions, or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort.

I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with no sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Mr. President, UN Security Council Resolution 678 establishes the period before Jan. 15 of this year as a 'pause of good will' so that this crisis may end without further violence. Whether this pause is used as intended, or merely becomes a prelude to further violence, is in your hands, and yours alone. I hope you weigh your choice carefully and choose wisely, for much will depend upon it.

—*International Herald Tribune*, 14 January 1991

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Meeting held between President Saddam Hussein and Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary-General on 13 January 1991

After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. de Cuellar said: I am happy to see you again. I have seen H.E. President Saddam Hussein three times, all of them in difficult circumstances. One day I shall come to Iraq to enjoy your hospitality in a different way, as a tourist, and to acquaint myself with the cultural heritage of your country.

H.E. the President-Leader said: There were circumstances in which there were no problems, but you didn't come.

The Secretary-General: It is my hope to come as a tourist, and I shall avail myself of my friendship with Mr. Tariq Aziz to see all the important archaeological sites in this country. All civilized peoples acknowledge that this country is the cradle of civilization.

The President-Leader: Except Bush.

The Secretary-General: In any case, Mr. President, I should like to say that I have come to Iraq without being charged with any mandate, I am entrusted with no specific task either by the Security Council or the United Nations. I have, however, been encouraged to make this trip not only by heads of States and governments, but also by the Pope and by humble citizens who have asked me to take advantage of our position, particularly its moral aspect, to work for the establishment of peace in this region. It may surprise you, Mr. President, that among those who have wished success for my mission is the President of the United States with whom I have met and talked four times since last Saturday. But I wish to assure you that I do not carry any message and I am no one's messenger. I represent only myself. I have had the honour to meet with you twice, and I think President Saddam Hussein will remember the neutral, impartial way we tried to use in mediating between you and Iran. Today, I meet with Your Excellency in the same spirit. I should like you to know that I wish to leave tonight, since I must be in Europe tomorrow. Although I am charged with no mandate by the Security Council, my duty requires that I should be there. Your Excellency, as a military man, will know what it means to abide by one's duty.

The President-Leader: For the information of the Secretary-General, I haven't had even a single day of military studies. I am a lawyer, in

terms of the conventional accounting of specializations.

The Secretary-General: We are colleagues. I, too, have studied law. You, however, are the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and so we say you are a military man. It is my duty to submit a report to the Security Council on the discussions I am to have with Your Excellency today. Since Your Excellency is a lawyer, there is competition with my friend, Mr. Tariq Aziz.

The President-Leader: You would cooperate.

The Secretary-General: Your Excellency will be aware that you are a Member of the United Nations, and this Organization acts by resolutions. Now resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are recommendations, but those adopted by the Security Council are mandatory on Member-States.

Unfortunately, the history of the United Nations makes it clear that some resolutions of the Security Council have not been implemented. I am fully aware of your feelings on the matter, however, as a friend of your country, I should like to say that bad examples should not be followed.

It is not within my duty to reiterate or read out all the resolutions which the Security Council has adopted, for I know that you are a very well-informed statesman. The only matter on which I should like to offer assistance is how to avoid any confrontation or war as a result of this crisis.

I know that there have been many visits by important prominent personalities who might have reflected their own concerns or the concerns of their countries and peoples. I have, however, grown old as a Secretary-General, in a few days I shall be 71 years old; and I should like to make use of the independence I enjoy for peace.

My colleague Tariq Aziz has given me a clear explanation of the position of your government. I respect that, and I agree with him in many areas. I believe I am not going to enter into arguments with Your Excellency, but I should like to know in what reasonable way can one achieve peace.

Before coming to Iraq, I had met a week ago with President Bush and informed him of my decision to meet with you. . . , I wanted, before doing so, to listen to him and to ascertain his wish with regard to finding a peaceful solution to the crisis.

I cannot guarantee intentions, but all he said to me, knowing I was going to meet with you, was that he wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis, desperately. That was before the Geneva meeting between your

Minister of Foreign Affairs and . . . private telephonic link between us to say that he had approved of all that was between the two Ministers. Later on, and after my discussions with him, that is to say, on the day I left for Baghdad, I had a discussion with him by telephone and I said to him, 'I am going to meet . . . I say that you want a peaceful solution?' He said, in spite of the impression given by the information media in considering me responsible for finding a peaceful international solution: 'I prefer the peaceful solution of the crisis'.

While it is not part of my task to convey this message, I consider it a necessary background. There are some ideas which can be used to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

I know that you are a lawyer and that you respect legality. I can say that in this world of ours we need not only peace but peace and justice, since peace is not enough to realize the aspirations of our peoples.

Of course there are many resolutions which have been adopted by the Security Council. And you know that I am not responsible for these resolutions. I am only a witness, since I do not vote on them. But I am convinced that it is possible to read the Security Council resolutions in a positive manner.

You have taken certain initiatives, an important and constructive one of which was your decision to release the foreigners, by which you removed an obstacle in the way of the relaxation of tension in the area.

The 12 August initiative has not been well understood, but it figures in one form or another in the first of the Security Council resolutions, which specifically referred to the Arab League and its participation in any solution. I believe that to be a positive thing. On that basis something can be done.

And you have done something, as I have told your Minister of Foreign Affairs. I consider that you have done a great deal for the question of Palestine; you have put the fate of the Palestinian people on the agenda. Being of Spanish descent, I feel close to the Arab world and the Palestinian people. Afterwards, I did not hesitate to call the attention of the United Nations to the Palestinian problem, working for convening an international conference in keeping with six or seven resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Only yesterday, I announced that I was going to appoint a Special Representative to be responsible for this question and to deal with it in accordance with resolution 242. I am happy that my friend Yassir Arafat has found that to be a positive decision, considering it to give

a new push to the solution of the problem.

Your Excellency, before coming here I had a meeting with the twelve Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community. What gave me great satisfaction was that all the Ministers, although in varying degrees, were inclined to have this problem settled. Even your colleague Mr. Bush, when I saw him on Saturday, acknowledged the pressing need to settle the Palestine crisis. He said he hadn't forgotten the statement he made before the General Assembly on the first of October in which he said there might be an opportunity for all States to find a solution to the problem which had divided the Arabs and Israelis. I don't want to argue, Mr. President, but you deserve all the credit for this achievement for the question of Palestine.

Now, Mr. President, I am eager to build on what has been achieved so far, modest though it might be. What is important is not to lose the opportunity of helping our Palestinian brothers. I said to your Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday that the fate of the question of Palestine depended on peace in the region. Apart from that, on 20 December a statement by the President of the Security Council was finalized and approved by the United States, the only country besides Israel which has a problem with holding an international conference. That statement says an international conference on peace will be arranged at an appropriate time and should facilitate the efforts aiming at achieving a peaceful settlement and a comprehensive and lasting solution in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Again, this was brought about as a result of efforts made by you, and it is only natural, to achieve such a result, that we should have your help in finding a solution to the problem.

I know your courage and your generosity, and you know how I have followed up the Iraqi-Iranian war and the unilateral initiatives you offered to put an end to that war. I hope that you will, in the same spirit, offer something to put an end to this conflict.

Of course, in order to do so, we must see our way through to compliance with the United Nations resolutions, especially resolutions 660 and 678. At the same time, there should be an indication as to how the future role of the United Nations is to be perceived with regard to what will happen after this crisis in the area of security in the region and security for your country. This was emphasised by President Bush. They realize that you want guarantees and that your country needs such guarantees not only from the Permanent Members of the Security Council but also from others. This matter can be discussed.

Should it be your wish, I can develop some ideas relating to the post-crisis period. I have in this paper certain ideas which I would sum up as follows:

You will remember what was said by President Mitterrand of France . . . he said: "If we are able to implement the Security Council resolutions, everything will be possible".

The important matter or the important concern is that if a decision is taken to that effect then it is the duty of the United Nations to ensure that there will be no threat to your country. There is something else said by Mr. Bush which I put down on a small piece of paper. It is this: "The United States will not attack Iraq or its armed forces if withdrawal from Kuwait has been achieved and the situation has returned to what it was prior to 2 August. The United States does not want to keep ground forces in the region; it will support negotiations between the parties concerned, and I shall accept any decision taken by those parties."

[The same passage re-translated]

"The United States will not attack Iraq or its armed forces if withdrawal from Kuwait has taken place and the situation has been restored to what it was prior to 2 August. The United States has no intention to keep its ground forces in the region; it will support negotiations between Iraq and the parties concerned, and will work for the relaxation of the sanctions imposed on Iraq if it complies with the Security Council resolutions".

This was what was said to me by President Bush before I left for Baghdad. I am in a position to urge [the adoption of measures ensuring] that there will be no threat to the security of your country, such as the creation of United Nations forces which will be recruited from acceptable countries and will come to the region to help in restoring the situation existing before 2 August and to ensure the safety of Iraq's boundaries. I can also work for further guarantees to be offered by the Security Council.

We believe that the important thing is to work for setting up special arrangements for the region with a view to consolidating regional security and cooperation. Your Excellency will recall that resolution 598 which you were kind enough to accept referred in its paragraphs 7 and 8, currently under implementation, to the need for ensuring security and stability in the region.

The President-Leader: And we got nothing from it.

The Secretary-General: We shall work for its implementation, while the possibilities of action available to the United Nations have expanded a great deal. Also, by profiting from Your Excellency's initiative, we should work for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the region. Finally, as I have said, we should work for setting up such arrangements between the countries of the region as are necessary for promoting their development and improving the general atmosphere and conditions there. In referring to that, I am referring to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Israel.

Mr. President, these are our modest aspirations by which we hope to contribute to finding a solution to the crisis. Now I am not so naive as to imagine that we shall resolve this problem tonight. But I wish to be in a position to go back with something we can build up on to reduce tension and deprive the warmongers of their opportunity. These are the ideas which I wish to share with you. Thank you very much.

Here, H.E. the President-Leader asked Mr. de Cuellar. "Do you take unsweetened coffee? This kind of coffee doesn't help you sleep through the night." Mr. de Cuellar answered: "I travel a great deal, and I am used to what is called jet lag. I am old, but I am quite strong for my age. The head is in control of everything." The President-Leader said: "The head is the organizer".

The President-Leader (continuing): I wouldn't conceal from you, I wanted you to come and not to come to Baghdad. You are the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We are all one family in the United Nations. We are part of this world family, and it is only natural that we should be concerned that the United Nations should assume its role in the life of States.

Now I wanted you to come because you know us. You have dealt with us in the past, and would remember our characteristic ways of thinking. On the other hand, I was apprehensive about your coming because you would be coming in the circumstances of a situation in which recourse to arms at the earliest possible moment is being advocated by the powerful who, when you are unable to offer them what they want, may thus find in your visit an excuse for reinforcing the argument for going to war. In listening to you, however, I found many positive elements in your discourse. I agree with you that with regard to such a complex issue, it is not to be expected to find solutions in a single meeting, but it is necessary to discuss matters in depth and comprehensively.

I should like to say that we are not about to give up our membership in this international family of the United Nations, by which I mean our responsible role in it. Such a statement could be made by President Bush or the Soviet Union or France just as it was made by me; but a statement has as much merit as its corroborating evidence. When we state that we want to be a part of the family of the United Nations, and to be a responsible part in circumstances such as these, we must provide evidence that this is the case, and here is the evidence.

You have followed up the war between Iran and Iraq at a certain stage. We met you twice. Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs conducted talks with you, and not with Iran, on the agreement of 8 August 1988. Later, there came our letter to the Iranians in April 1990, in which we invited them to a dialogue at the Summit level and assured them of our desire for peace. You will remember the military state of Iran in 1988 and you know our military state then and now in 1990. Why so?

It is that we always take peace initiatives with regard to Iran because we want peace, and because we know that we can build our country in the right way only under the banner of peace. All this building activity which you see around you, including the thriving city of Baghdad, is the product of our own and no one else's efforts; and he who knows how to build and has a passion for building does not want war. But when our security, the opportunities for building and the free choice of our beliefs were threatened by Iran, we fought. When the Iranians were threatening Basrah, when all countries thought that they were on the verge of occupying Basrah in 1987 (they had already occupied Fao), and we were presented with a draft sponsored by the French or the Soviets for a ceasefire, they were told by the Minister of Foreign Affairs: "We do not want a ceasefire". They said to him: "But Basrah will fall". He said: "No, it will not *fall*; and even if it should fall, we shall fight on. What we want is comprehensive peace, not a ceasefire". Thus we fought in East Basrah to repel some of the most ferocious attacks that have ever been known, but we never asked for a ceasefire.

When, on 8 August 1988, the opportunity arose for a ceasefire as a gateway to a comprehensive peace, you and the Minister of Foreign Affairs reached agreement thereon by telephone . . . and that agreement, as I think, has thus been the most easily arranged agreement to have ever been concluded in connection with a case like this within

the framework of the United Nations. Why did that agreement take place? The answer is because Iraq wanted it and because Iraq cooperated with you. This, then, is evidence from recent history that we are a constructive not a destructive or troublesome member of the United Nations family.

Can any other, particularly the United States, offer similar evidence taken from the history of their relations with the United Nations? So, the latest evidence in the United Nations shows that it is the Iraqis who have pioneered the way in a major issue involving eight years of hostilities. We are proud and pleased that this.

As to the issue of Kuwait: it would have been possible to live with the situation existing prior to 2 August as we had always done before. We did not just all of a sudden remember that Kuwait had been part of Iraq severed by Britain to be made a protectorate, then to be converted into a state in 1961. We know this, and we also know that none of the Kings or Presidents who have ruled the Iraqi State since 1921 has ever said that Kuwait is not part of Iraq. You, Secretary-General, will know that, up to 2 August 1990, you have no document signed by the two parties that designates boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait.

What has brought matters to the point reached after 2 August? It is the threat we feel as a result of the fact that Kuwait has been converted into an American base for hatching plots against us. It is only natural in such circumstances that we should call to mind the historical background with all its underlying premises. Even so, we continued to proceed with caution in deference to the legal aspects of the matter. Kuwait was not immediately annexed to or unified with Iraq although, as you know, its former rulers fled and control over it was achieved on the very first day, and a government was formed by a number of Kuwaiti army officers of whom the most senior had the rank of major. We sought thereby to defer to the legal aspects in consideration of the fact that we are members of the United Nations family. We agreed to a summit conference to be held in Saudi Arabia by five countries, namely, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, out of a wish to have all the complexities discussed and resolved within the Arab environment.

Then what happened? The five-State committee was not held; instead, it was cancelled by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and it was agreed with the United States to have its forces land in Saudi Arabia. The

opportunity for finding an Arab solution was thus lost. The Americans so acted without a resolution by the Security Council. When the Americans came to Saudi Arabia they did so on the basis of an American decision. The forces then began to increase.

It was unreasonable to expect lower-ranking army officers with little experience to be able to administer Kuwait and confront the American forces in order to defend Kuwait. The unification measures were therefore accelerated and did not take the due form that would satisfy the legal concerns of the West. Although the decision to rush the American forces to Saudi Arabia had already been announced, we dealt positively with Security Council Resolution 660. While it is true that we did not recognise that resolution, we did deal with its contents. We clearly announced that we would withdraw our forces on 4 August, and we did not stop at a mere announcement but actually withdrew some of our forces. I think we withdrew a whole brigade although our force at the time was not as big as it is today.

Arriving American forces kept increasing, we stopped the withdrawal. As I have previously stated, we then announced the unification to say to the Iraqis and to the Iraqi Army: "Kuwait is now part of your country. Fight to the death to defend it." Iraqis would not fight to defend Kuwait with a provisional government at its head as hard as they would when they are told that Kuwait is now part of their country. Had there been no such development in the actions taken by the United States, the unification would perhaps have taken a longer time, thus allowing all to acquaint themselves with the legal steps involved in the unification process.

Who is responsible for all this? It is the United States, which has introduced many complexities into the matter: of course when Kuwait has been unified with Iraq, we have had to discuss all the background as to how Kuwait was part of Iraq; how it was separated; how King Ghazi was killed, and all the other matters which the Minister of Foreign Affairs must have talked with you about.

Meanwhile, more and more forces were arriving to the Moslem's sacred lands, and, as they arrived, there was more and more provocation to the sensibilities of Moslem Arabs. Along with this, the Security Council was passing resolutions at an increasingly quicker pace, to the point that no one in the region had an opportunity to give thought to resolving the impasse into which matters have been allowed to fall. This is unprecedented in the history of the Security Council,

as you are well aware as a veteran diplomat.

We find nothing unusual when we are disagreed with on legal aspects relating to the subject of Kuwait's unification with Iraq or on the use of the army in Kuwait. But we want to be heard by all so that they may acquaint themselves with the background of these developments and ask us for the documentation in support of every word we say to be able to ascertain our position. We know that we will not receive the applause of the international community for the disappearance of a Member State or the United Nations, but that community ought to acquaint itself with the facts.

Let us go back to the matter of law. How can a Member of this family be converted into an accused party without it being given a chance to be heard in self-defence? You are the Secretary-General of the United Nations, yet you have not been able to ensure the arrival of the plane carrying the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to arrive at the United States for him to be able to attend and defend the point of view of Iraq.

The Secretary-General: I tried, I said that was not in keeping with the Headquarters Agreement with the United States.

Voice reminding them of legality in a most elementary matter, namely, the Minister's attendance to exercise his right to defence. You know there is no case in the whole world said to have been conducted in accordance with the law in which the accused has not been granted the right to self-defence. In cases involving accusations the whole membership of a court would visit the scene of the alleged offence to have the help of eyesight as well as sound reasoning to reach a fair decision. How could one then prevent an accused who himself would want to attend to defend himself from doing so? We have ample evidence indicating that international law has become American law rather than the law of the United Nations or that America has taken to putting the law to in the service of political aims rather than to exercise it objectively which is the most important condition for its impartial application.

We respect peace with justice and not peace without justice, because this is to our interest both as Iraq and as an Arab nation which has been wronged under international law. Palestine is occupied. Al-Jawlan is occupied. Both Al-Quds [Jerusalem] and Al-Jawlan have been annexed to Israel by an official decision of the Israeli government, but no armies have been marshalled against Israel, nor has it been placed

under an economic embargo or boycott.

It may be said that all this belongs to the past. Very well. Let us cite other evidence that this conduct continues and is not part of the past. The idea of protecting the Palestinians from suppression by the occupiers has recently been put forward. You are aware that it took 84 days for this idea to become a resolution, and you know how that idea was squeezed and squeezed until it lost all its flavour and all strength. Who has done this? It is the United States. What has it had to say on the subject? It declared openly that it "opposes the idea of holding an international conference to prevent Saddam Hussein from scoring a political victory". The United States, then has made justice contingent upon political tactics, and it does not seek peace with justice; otherwise, and had it had any respect for justice with peace, it would have seen to it that the Palestinian people are granted its rights regardless of the Gulf crisis or the way the crisis develops.

What are they saying now?—Let Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, then we shall convene an international conference to discuss the issues involved. This is not a categorical promise; it is only a possibility.

We want peace with justice, but not all Members of the United Nations want peace with justice. On 12 August, we offered an initiative. We did not imagine that it would be accepted in its entirety; but we did not imagine, either, that it would be left without being examined. The President of the United States rejected that initiative while aboard his plane only two hours after it was announced and before learning anything about its contents. Is this right? As to the Soviet Union, after issuing comments to the effect that the initiative contained positive elements, backed out from any further involvement in the matter when faced with the strong reaction on the part of the United States.

We then submitted the initiative of 16 August, based on the initiative of 12 August. We stated, in terms of the new initiative, that if the international community was unprepared to deal with the subject as whole, then it should leave the Arabs to solve their own problems and provide the proper environment for that. This initiative was also rejected.

The meaning of all this is that there is an insistence on a particular course through which it is intended to achieve certain political and military goals. Accordingly, there is no point in discussing or thinking of initiatives. We know that the United Nations cannot, *prima facie*, approve anything illegal. The United Nations, however, is a political

Organization and not the International Court of Justice in the sense that the United Nations takes for a basis for its actions to achieve security with justice. Should it find that this objective can be achieved by this means rather than by that it should change its means and ways. Even law gives the judge ample latitude to adapt his decisions in the light of the circumstances of the accused and the implications of the law. The United Nations has always dealt with complex issues on the basis of this ABC of politics and international law. While its resolutions might provide for withdrawal, this principle would always be set within a framework of negotiations and dialogue, rather than of pre-conditions, to facilitate cooperation among the parties to an issue.

We have stated and continue to emphasize that we desire peace and are prepared to bear our responsibility as part of the international family of the United Nations. But are the others equally prepared to bear their responsibility on the same basis? Are they prepared to apply international legality and international law to the issues of the Middle East and with regard to each and every issue, taking into account the background of these issues and the questions of justice and equity they involve.

Just look at the American President: see how he talks about matters of form and fails to touch on substantive issues of concern to us as a wronged nation; how he talks about the possible withdrawal of land forces and fails to mention a thing about the withdrawal of the air and naval forces; and how he talks about the possible relaxation of some economic measures and fails to talk with any sincere conviction about cumulative measures.

The Secretary-General: These are not my resolutions but the Security Council's resolutions.

The President-Leader: These are American resolutions. This is an American era. What America wants today goes, not what the Security Council wants.

The Secretary-General: I am on your side, as far as I am concerned.

The President-Leader: Let us see now. You, Secretary-General, have no aircraft and no tanks. You act in accordance with the requirements of law and morality and the responsibility devolving on the Secretary-General in relation to the international community. We want a true United Nations. We want to have international law and international legality truly applied.

The Secretary-General: Allow me, Mr. President. There is an International Court of Justice. Perhaps it can work for a settlement of

such a problem.

The President-Leader: In any case, let us give dialogue its due; let us give it all the room needed to identify all the complexities involved in the various issues so as not to say that the human mind is incapable of finding solution to these and other issues. The important thing is willingness. All that we have been told so far is implement this and that and that. This is not the same as talks or dialogue; this is an imposition of will.

What was there in Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein? We are being surprised daily that the Americans do not know us. How could have Bush imagined that there is a possibility of even one per cent that Saddam Hussein fears threats? Was he tempted by the notion that his capture of the President of Panama to put him on trial in the United States would make all Heads of State fear his threats?

Such tactics on his part do not have the effect of making us willing to enter into dialogue with him, because our Iraqi people will not allow us to stay in power one more day if they should discover that we fear threats. It is the human duty of our people to know that those in charge of administering their affairs are acting responsibly in their behalf with regard to international law and peace and security in the world. Our people know their legal responsibilities: they are inculcated in them by their history upon reading the laws of Hammurabi which, enacted over four thousand years ago, represent the first code to prescribe human rights and duties.

I am glad you have come to Baghdad because of what I have heard about you. If the others have opened opportunities for you to assume your role in this issue, you know we are the kind of people who would facilitate your task. You have had your experience with us. You made peace by telephone, a matter which has never happened in the world before.

In the present instance, matters are not in our hands. In August 1988, we used to tell you "yes, we agree with Iran", and that "yes" meant we agreed on peace, not on war. Now look at the latest resolution which Bush insisted on forcing out of the Senate and the House of Representatives. He had tried similar pressures to force out resolution 678. We know that he had told a number of Security Council Members that what was intended by that resolution was to put pressure on Iraq, not to have it used. He has now played the same game with the American Senate and House of Representatives, and has got his resolution by hinting that the resolution is not necessarily for use but to face the

Iraqis with a threat which will make them withdraw.

The Iraqis, however, will never withdraw in the face of threats. Bush will therefore be pushed day by day into a corner, and he will be obliged to resort to arms because he who is busy preparing the requirements for the use of arms could not occupy his mind fully with thinking about how to find alternatives to avoid the use of arms.

We are not responsible for this. America has brought matters to this level. Had American leaders been patient, had they sought other means than those into which they have pushed matters, the state of affairs would not have come to such a point either before or after 2 August 1990.

At present, we have good relations with Iran, and we praise God for this. It is our hope, and our determination, to improve these relations in all fields. All our people know that we have given half of Shatt-al-Arab to Iran and have released all prisoners of war without waiting for the release of ours. When Iraqis asked me: "Why all this?", I answered: "For the sake of peace. Now that Kuwait is part of Iraq, you have all that long cost of your own, and there is no longer a need for us to shove one another for Shatt-al-Arab". Then we withdrew our army from this front to Kuwait.

Do you see these complexities created by the United States? It has entangled one thing with another. Even those who call for the withdrawal of Iraq do not explain where to, leaving aside Iraq's views on the subject.

[At this point, the President-Leader turns to explaining on a map certain matters relating to the absence of boundaries between Kuwait and Iraq, and how has Kuwait expanded at the expense of Iraq.

[Pointing to the map, he says: here were Kuwait's lines when it was a protectorate. It then expanded to this point, then to this point, where the lines were at a place called Al-Mitlaa (which I suggest you take down). This was the state of affairs until 1963. Mr. Yassir Arafat's passport is stamped at Al-Mitlaa. For our part, we have corroborating documents and thousands of passports.

[In the years 1963-1968, Iraq was ruled by two weak brothers during whose rule the Shaikhs of Kuwait marched again in the land from Al-Mitlaa to this point. During the period of the war with Iran they further advanced in the land to exploit oil fields known from the beginning to be within pre-2 August 1990 Iraq.

[When Kuwait city was within the wall here (pointing at the map), a British subject was killed within the wall, and the British government

asked the Shaikh of Kuwait to investigate the incident. The Shaikhs of Kuwait had the victim's corpse thrown outside the wall, and the Shaikh of Kuwait wrote to the British government that since the offence had taken place outside the wall, it fell within the responsibility of the government of Baghdad, and the Baghdad government did actually undertake an investigation.

[Furthermore, the Mab'outhan (the Ottoman Turkish Parliament) approved the status of Kuwait as a protectorate only within the wall. The relevant documents are all there.]

In the light of this complexity, when it is suggested that Iraq should withdraw, where is it supposed to withdraw to?

The Secretary-General: If you have such a good case, you may have recourse to the International Court of Justice.

The President-Leader: I wanted to explain these matters to help you. I am sure that had the Americans heard from us after resolution 660, they wouldn't have hurried to have all the heap of resolutions which have placed them in an impasse. The British know all these facts which they have in their files. Mr. Heath knows them, too.

The Secretary-General: My colleague here confirms what you have said. (Mr. de Cuellar is referring to a side exchange he had with one of his aides during the President's latter discourse). You stated at the outset that you had doubts about my visit. . .

The President-Leader: They weren't doubts.

The Secretary-General: This mission may have a character which runs counter to the course of peace. As you have stated, those who want war and not peace will take advantage of the fact that I shall return with nothing. What I am asking for is not in the name of the United Nations but in the name of the international community which wants you to give me something which could relax tensions and be a way out not only for the region but also for the world.

The President-Leader: Every point we have discussed involves giving you something.

The Secretary-General: I shall give thought to all that you have discussed, in all sincerity, and shall include it in my report. I am afraid, however, that what I shall take with me will not be considered concrete enough to relax the threat dangling, like a sword, not over my head but over the "head of the world", so to speak.

You will be aware of the many expectations and hopes attached on my visit. You have been visited by a large and significant number

of personalities, but none of them had the global mission I have. I remember at the press conference he held following the Geneva meeting, Mr. Tariq Aziz was asked: Is this the last chance for peace? So I should like to ask if this is the last chance for peace. I should also like to say I am afraid if I should return with nothing along with the important matters you stated, that would not be enough to stop the slide towards confrontation not only in the region but in the world at large. This is my fate; wherever I go they think I carry the solution.

The President-Leader: You said you came without being charged with a mandate by anyone. You came having nothing in your hands except a wish to have peace prevail and the spectre of war banished. This is the first meeting we have with you after the events and the first time you yourself hear from us. Consequently, you ought to discuss the publicly stated point to the effect that Iraq announce withdrawal after which "everything will be possible", to quote Mitterrand and not Bush who has come to make war. It is obvious that even this cruel matter involves no guarantee, whether from Bush, Mitterrand, or the United Nations, that would have for its basis some part of the Arab or Iraqi issues.

I should like to say something of vital importance to Mr. de Cuellar. Iraqis know Kuwait to be the nineteenth province. If you ask anyone in the street from elementary school children to university professors, they will all say to you that they want peace and a dialogue leading to a just peace; that they are willing to assume their responsibilities with regard to peace and to offer their share of sacrifices for peace if the others are willing to do the same, but that they are at the same time willing to fight if attacked, confidently relying on the depth of a fighting experience extending over a period of 8 years. They also know that if matters were to the point of the breakout of hostilities, they will suffer huge losses not because the opponent has more courage or has a just and legitimate but because he has more sophisticated weapons than ours. They are, however, as sure as though they have the outcome in the grip of their hands that, in the end, the aggressor will be defeated.

Hence, even if we were to be granted all the privileges, any privileges, in the world. I should say when the two armies, the Iraqi and the American (the likelihood of war is now a matter of hours), no one will ever utter the word withdrawal, because to utter the word withdrawal, when war is likely is to prepare the psychological ground for

the victory of the enemy. Now isn't this what the Americans want? They know what it means, but this will never happen, never.

What will happen is to be the outcome of our willingness to discuss a whole package. You are aware of our insistence on the principle of the whole package in the Iraqi-Iranian war, and you know that this insistence led in the end to the achievement of peace. Since we want peace and not partial or provisional solutions, we insist on the principle of the whole package in which no one can deceive anyone and all know their duties as well as their rights and know what sacrifices and gains they are making. The fragmented treatment of issues without comprehensive linkage between them will in the end have for an outcome deceivers and deceived and winners and losers. We do not believe this will serve peace.

The Secretary-General: If I understood you well, your position on Kuwait is irreversible, in which case the principle of package cannot be applied.

The President-Leader: I didn't say this, you said it. If you find the Americans in a position wherein they are looking for a way out of their impasse without losing or necessarily realizing all that they have in mind, it is possible to set down certain principles then charge the Arabs to look for a solution in keeping with those principles. Or you as a capable, experienced diplomat might sound other parties for their points of view.

The Secretary-General: You are a party, too.

The President-Leader: Then you might submit proposals which you will discuss with the principal parties, including us, in the hope of reaching an agreed solution.

The Secretary-General: Do you authorize me to tell the Security Council that you want continuous discussions to be conducted through the Secretary-General?

The President-Leader: I regard this as given on the basis of your offer. That is why I have said there is a positive aspect to all the points you discussed, there may emerge a package as result of continuity.

The Secretary-General: Thank you for the trust you have given me as a Secretary-General. I must reflect on the points and include them in my report to the Security Council. I shall try to do that in the best possible way. I shall maintain contact with the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs and keep him informed of the reactions to what you have offered. I shall communicate that to all those concerned in this

crisis, especially in view of the fact that yours is a defensive and not an offensive position.

The President-Leader: Hence can be achieved only when both parties want it.

The Secretary-General: Thank you for your hospitality and for the time you have allocated for me. I also thank you for your attitude of understanding concerning my coming here on an independent visit in order to achieve peace together.

The President-Leader: I wish you success.

The Secretary-General: We must think of our Palestinian brothers.

The President-Leader: They are slaughtering the children and women of Palestine every day.

The Secretary-General: I know that very well.

The President-Leader: It is necessary that you should discharge your responsibility with regard to food and medicine for Iraq.

The Secretary-General: I told your Minister of Foreign Affairs that the World Health Organization intends to come here to evaluate the situation with regard to providing Iraq with medicine and food. My colleague will come here to ascertain the situation. Another concerned person in WHO will come over. The Sanctions Committee has now a new president, the Austrian Ambassador, and I will tell him of the problem.

The President-Leader: Welcome to all.

—*Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in India, New Delhi*

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UN Secretary-General's Press Meets on his arrival from Iraq on 14 January 1991

The Secretary-General told the press upon his arrival at Kennedy Airport today that he had not been offered anything from the Iraqi authorities which could be considered as a step towards peace. When asked if there was any hope left for peace, he said it was "A little late for embarking on any other efforts". Asked if he had lost hope, the Secretary-General replied, "In some ways, yes". He also said that President Hussein had not expressed any desire to withdraw from

Kuwait, nor had the question of an international conference on the Palestinian question been specifically raised during the talks.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Statement by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on 14 January 1991

1. You will recall that on Thursday, 10 January, I informed you, Mr. President, that I had decided to accept a standing invitation from the Government of Iraq to visit Baghdad in order to have discussions with the authorities, in particular with President Saddam Hussein. I took this decision following the outcome of the meetings that were held in Geneva on 9 January between US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 678. Prior to my departure, I received messages of strong support from a great number of world leaders, including those of many Members of the Security Council. All of them expressed the profound hope, that a way be found to obtain the Implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions by peaceful means.

3. I travelled to Baghdad in the afternoon of 12 January where, upon arrival, I had a three-hour meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. On 13 January, prior to my meeting with the Iraqi President, I met with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Yasser Arafat, at his request. It should be noted in this connection that, like King Hussein, Mr. Arafat was extremely disturbed by the prospects of a military confrontation, the consequences of which would be devastating for the region, not least for the Palestinians.

4. In the evening of 13 January, I was received by President Saddam Hussein for some two-and-a-half hours. At the outset of our meeting, I underlined to him that I had come to Baghdad at my own initiative, but with the widest possible support from the membership of the United Nations. I added that, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, I had responsibilities under the Charter to strive for peace and, accord-

ingly, I urged him to comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, starting with resolution 660.

I pointed out that I intended to report to the Council upon my return to New York and that, if I were to do so without serious progress having been made, I was duty-bound to reflect this in my report. In emphasizing the importance of the implementation of the resolutions, I stated that progress in this direction would facilitate the undertaking of measures with respect to stability and security in the region. I touched upon possible steps that could be taken in the post-withdrawal phase (such as those relating to peace-keeping, assurances of non-attack and the present sanctions). I also referred to possible regional security arrangements. In connection with the broader Middle East peace process, I referred to the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly, my own efforts, and the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 20 December, 1990 which clearly implied that a major effort could soon be made.

5. In his opening comments, President Saddam Hussein said that he did not wish to conceal from me his ambivalence about our meeting. On the one hand, he had wanted me to come to Baghdad to discuss the present crisis because I had, through contacts developed during the Iran-Iraq conflict, dealt with his country and knew its "traits". On the other hand, he expressed concern that, if our meeting were to produce insufficient results, it could be used by those who wished to wage war against Iraq. Underlining a theme that had been emphasized during my meeting the previous evening with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the President said that it would not be possible, in a single meeting, to find "ready solutions to such a complicated situation". He noted that whereas resolution 598, which Iraq had accepted, set out a comprehensive approach to the issues addressed therein, the Security Council had not, regrettably, adopted a comprehensive approach in dealing with the present crisis.

6. The President dwelt at length on Iraq's claim to Kuwait, and underlined that in the period prior to 2 August 1990, it had become "a base for conspiracy" against Iraq. He pointed out that although Iraq had never accepted resolution 660, it had agreed, in the early days of the crisis, to attend a mini-summit in Jeddah and had begun to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. But those efforts, which he stated were aimed at achieving "an Arab solution", were undermined by the introduction of foreign forces into the region, which heightened the

threat posed to Iraq. Criticizing what he called "precipitous" actions by the Security Council, he stated that Iraq had been tried *in absentia* and his Foreign Minister had been denied the facilities he needed to be able to present his case. Further, he stated that on earlier occasions when the Council has called for the withdrawal of troops, this had been accompanied by a call for negotiations between the parties; withdrawal had not been set as a precondition for such negotiations. Moreover, he cited examples of Israeli occupation and annexation, noting that Israel had never been subjected to sanctions or outside military intervention as a means of ensuring compliance with Security Council resolutions. This, he stated, was indicative of a double standard that persisted until the present. It was unfortunate, he said, that his initiatives of 12 and 19 August, which had advocated the application of a single standard and a set of principles in addressing comprehensively the issues of the region, had never been seriously considered.

7. On the question of withdrawal, the President stated that the Iraqi people today regarded Kuwait as Iraq's "19th Province", and "would not even whisper the word withdrawal", as war was looming and such an utterance would give a psychological advantage to Iraq's adversaries. At the same time, Iraq was prepared for an in-depth dialogue. In this connection, I should add that in my meeting with the Foreign Minister the previous evening, Mr. Tariq Aziz repeatedly stressed Iraq's desire for dialogue with the United States, the European Community and the Arab states, in particular, Saudi Arabia. The President stated that his Government was prepared to discuss a "package deal" because, in such an arrangement, each party knew exactly what it would have to give and what it would receive. The Iraqi people were, he said, "ready to sacrifice for the cause of (sic) would do the same."

8. On two separate occasions during our meeting, the President called on me to use my good offices, saying that if the other parties were to permit me to play a role in search of a solution, Iraq would facilitate my task and cooperate with me. In response to my comment that this idea would be a non-starter if the position of Iraq was irreversible on the subject of withdrawal from Kuwait, the President reacted by saying that that was not what he meant. He reiterated that I should try to engage the views of the parties, including Iraq, in order to make proposals that could lead to a solution. I explained to the President that, while I would reflect this suggestion in my report to the Security Council, I felt that any effort of mine would naturally

need to be in furtherance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

9. Mr. President, from the foregoing, it must sadly be concluded that a most ominous situation exists at present. Despite the near universal yearning for peace and the intense efforts of many, including myself, to secure compliance by Iraq, the relevant resolutions of the Security Council remain unimplemented. At this solemn hour, with 15 January upon us, members of the Council must once again consider whether there are any diplomatic measures that can still be taken by the Organization, or by its members individually or collectively, to secure full implementation of the Council's resolutions by peaceful means. All of us are aware of the extreme gravity of the decisions to be made, for no one and no nation can—except with a heavy heart—resort to the other “necessary means” implied by Resolution 678, knowing in advance that tragic and unpredictable consequences can follow.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar's statement on 15 January 1991

As 15 January advances, the world stands poised between peace and war, I most sincerely appeal to President Saddam Hussein to turn the course of events away from catastrophe and towards a new era of justice and harmony based on the principles of the United Nations Charter.

All of our efforts in this direction will fail unless Iraq can signify its readiness to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, beginning with resolution 660.

If this commitment is made, and clear and substantial steps taken to implement these resolutions, a just peace, with all of its benefits, will follow. I therefore urge President Saddam Hussein to commence, without delay, the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Once this process is well under way, I wish to assure him, on the basis of understandings that I have received from Governments at the

highest level, that neither Iraq nor its forces will be attacked by those arrayed in the international coalition against his country.

Further, with the commencement of withdrawal, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, I would, with the consent of the parties concerned, and the agreement of the Security Council, be prepared immediately to deploy United Nations observers and, if necessary, United Nations forces to certify the withdrawal and to ensure that hostilities do not erupt on the ground.

In addition, with compliance of the resolutions, I would urge the Security Council to review its decisions imposing sanctions against Iraq. I would also encourage a process whereby foreign forces deployed in the area would be phased out.

Peace in the region requires that all of its problems be resolved justly and equitably, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. I have every assurance, once again from the highest levels of government, that with the resolution of the present crisis, every effort will be made to address, in a comprehensive manner, the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian question. I pledge my every effort to this end.

As I stated to the Council last night, all of us are aware of the extreme gravity of the decisions to be made in the period ahead. No one and no nation can—except with a heavy heart—resort to the other “necessary means” implied by resolution 678, knowing in advance that tragic and unpredictable consequences can follow.

I trust, in the circumstances, that wisdom and statesmanship will prevail in all quarters in order to move decisively away from conflict. In appealing to President Saddam Hussein today, I wish him to know that I will readily devote my every capacity to working with him, and with all others concerned to this end.

In the tenth and final year of my tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations, no cause would give me greater satisfaction than to set the Middle East as a whole on the road to just and lasting peace. And no disappointment would be greater and more tragic than to find the nations of the world engaging in a conflict that none of their peoples want.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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French Launch 11th-hour bid for Gulf crisis

Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister, was ready last night to travel to Iraq with a new peace offer if the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to a Middle East peace conference.

The move came after Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, despondently concluded his mission to Baghdad and Iraq dealt a crushing blow to peace hopes as its parliament voted for war.

Diplomatic sources said M Dumas would go to the Iraqi capital if the Security Council adopted a presidential statement endorsing an international conference on the region at a meeting due to take place in the early hours of today. But America, opposed to any linkage between Kuwait and the Arab-Israeli conflict, was said to be "very unhappy" with the French move. The UN deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait is 5 a.m. London time tomorrow.

Senor Perez de Cuellar said in New York that his trip had failed. "I have done what I had to do", he said. When asked if he had lost hope, he admitted: "In some ways, yes. You need two for tango. I wanted to dance but I didn't find any nice lady for dancing with", he said, adding that President Saddam Hussein "did not express any desire" to withdraw from Kuwait.

Downing Street matched his gloomy assessment as it emerged that John Major and President Bush were about to allow military commanders to choose the moment to launch a strike against Iraqi forces after an early political decision to go to war against Baghdad.

Meanwhile, Saddam issued a warning to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, broadcast by Baghdad radio, that hundreds of thousands of Saudis would die in a war. Earlier, after a two-hour debate in the Iraqi national assembly, the 250 deputies unanimously approved a motion granting authority to the president to exercise full powers for the defence of Iraq and the Arab nation.

The American State Department said that the Iraqi ambassador to Washington, Muhammad al-Mashat, had decided to leave the United States before the deadline.

One Western European source said the French initiative had a "one-in-a-hundred" chance of success. Diplomatic sources said the six-point French plan:

- Sought a final appeal to Iraq to comply with security council reso-

lutions calling for withdrawal from Kuwait;

- Called on Baghdad to announce immediately its time-table for pulling out, and to begin immediately a rapid and massive withdrawal of troops;

- Guaranteed UN verification of the withdrawal with Senor Perez de Cuellar arranging for the dispatch of a multinational observer force and the deployment of an Arab peacekeeping force when Saddam's commitment was received;

- Called for non-aggression guarantees for Iraq;

- Sought necessary measures, in consultation with Arab nations, to promote talks to consolidate the peace process;

- Guaranteed active support of council members for the resolution of other regional problems, particularly the Israeli-Arab conflict and more specifically of the Palestinian grievances, and the convening, when appropriate, of an international conference, once the security council resolutions had been complied with.

France was trying to convince the Americans that the statement would not imply linkage because efforts to convene a peace conference would begin only when Iraq was out of Kuwait. The council has already endorsed the principle of a Middle East peace conference in a statement on December 20.

But the American ambassador, Thomas Pickering, said: "We do not believe in linkage or attempts to shelve the security council resolutions. We do not agree with any attempts to offer to an intransigent Saddam Hussein any concession."

—James Bone in New York and Richard Beeston in Baghdad,
The Times (London), 15 January 1991

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President George Bush's news conference on 16 January 1991

Just two hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.

This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait, a member of the Arab League,

and a member of the United Nations, was crushed, its people brutalized.

Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight the battle has been joined.

This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States, and many, many other countries.

Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others travelled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice.

Our Secretary of State James Baker held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed.

This past weekend, in a last ditch effort, the Secretary-General of the United Nations went to the Middle East with peace in his heart—his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Now, the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail.

As I report to you, air attacks are under way against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed. Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal.

Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan. Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait, the legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again be free.

Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, and then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf.

Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanc-

tions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities, and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.

While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait. While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the third world, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy. The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces arrayed against him. While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.

I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nations resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side. Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations, leave Kuwait or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America. Well, he failed.

Tonight 28 nations, countries from five continents—Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League—have forces in the gulf area, standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force would be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.

Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied servicemen and women.

I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight

with one hand tied behind their back.

I'm hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long, and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum. This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

When we are successful—and we will be—we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envisioned of the UN's founders. We have no argument with the people of Iraq, indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq; it is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can even now convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

Thomas Paine wrote many years ago "These are the times that try men's souls". Those well-known words are so very true today, but even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail, but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.

No president can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the nation's finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they're there, and listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any president or prime minister ever could. Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says: Let's free these people so we can go home and be free again.

He's right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.

Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said: There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in.

Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82nd Airborne. We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing

is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years. It's better to deal with this guy now than five years from now.

And finally we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an army lieutenant, when she says: If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next.

I have called upon Hollywood and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades in arms to do what must be done.

Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the gulf, and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.

—USIS, New Delhi

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*Letter from President Saddam Hussein to Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev in reply to his letter of
18 January 1991*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Mr. President Gorbachev, peace be upon you.

Having read your letter and reviewed the situation and the background of relations between our two countries and two peoples, I had a feeling that I should be angry with you, or at least blame you for the method with which you tackled the issues that you described as serious and dramatic, and the means you proposed for protecting Iraq from destruction.

After remembering that the international community today is living under, or rather falling in one way or another under the mercy of the US law of hegemony and domination, with a few exceptions here and there, my anger abated and I desisted from leveling any blame here in my letter.

We, Mr. President, would like to state a fact that cannot be overemphasized; namely, that we are as free as our mothers gave birth to us and as God created us from the earth. Because we are free men and we insist on retaining our freedom, we reject the US law of hegemony and domination. We are not the ones who have committed aggression

against the United States and waged war against it. So we should not be asked to make statements that would make the United States appear to be twisting our steadfast will and that would tempt it to continue its blackmail and arrogance in our region and the world, based on the notion that everyone must submit to its law of hegemony over the world.

From the very beginning, we have been drawing the attention of people who care for freedom and sovereignty and those who care about implementing the law of the only living God in relations among peoples. We have always emphasized the importance of dialogue among nations because it is important among people. Then and only then, and when the method of equitable dialogue is used, the human mind would be able to find a solution to all the region's problems, which are linked together like cause and effect. This is especially so if the dialogue is given a healthy atmosphere and mankind is provided with reassurance.

You might remember, Mr. President, that as we recall the requirements of our responsibility, which we do not forget—as Bush and the failures who encouraged him to commit his aggression and to hold man and mankind in contempt have forgotten—we say that because of our human responsibility toward security and stability in the world, we submitted our initiative on 12 August 1990, which your government said was positive in the beginning. You did not pursue your efforts to put it within the framework of serious discussion. You remember how Bush rejected it only two hours after we broadcast it on the air without even bothering to ask for an official copy of the initiative. He might not have even read it as disseminated by world news agencies.

You also remember, Mr. President, how the United States and its media urged the destruction of our military and scientific power even before 2 August, and how it had been denying our people bread as of March 1990 by a decision of the US Congress and Administration. You remember how Bush instigated his treasonous rulers, such as Jabir al-Ahmad, the former shaykh of Kuwait, to plot against Iraq.

This is part of what we wanted to remind you of in this letter. It is only part of what should be recalled about the treacherous plot and the unjust aggression. We say this so you can remember that the US President is conspiratorial and treacherous, that he has a grudge against the Arabs, and that he is working to stifle any noble voice that may demand the liberation of Palestine and an end to the suffering of the Arab people of Palestine.

Bush has committed aggression and must pay the price of his aggression if he continues to indulge in it. The punishment of God, the one and only God the Almighty, the powerful, and the great, will be his punishment.

Therefore, your letter should have been addressed to the tyrant Bush and not to Saddam Hussein and his aggrieved people.

God is Great, God is great, God is great. Accursed be Bush and his henchmen.

[Dated] 20 January, 1991.

—FBIS-NES, 22 January 1991

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President Chadli Bendjedid's speech to the National People's Assembly on 23 January 1991

President Chadli Bendjedid is still delivering his speech at this very moment. He has presented a comprehensive review of all the efforts made by Algeria since the conflict started in the region. His excellency the president stressed how these efforts would have succeeded had it not been for the decision of some parties, especially the United States, to change their mind. Starting with the Cairo summit, President Chadli Bendjedid indicated that Algeria had reservations because the climate had not been prepared for an Arab role and the summit was held too quickly. The same summit adopted resolutions which divided Arab public opinion and Algeria did not sign those resolutions because they conflicted with its viewpoint. Despite all this, Algeria made intensive efforts and the president made several trips which enabled Algeria to gather all the facts and, with the Europeans, it arrived at a formula for a solution which was not made public; but when that formula was submitted to the Security Council and to the United States, an agreement was reached on all the proposed points apart from the one point about the international conference.

President Chadli Bendjedid said that this point was unfortunately rejected not only by the United States but by some Arab parties who decided to refuse to link the conflicts in the region with all the other problems of the Middle East conflict.

So, the president of the republic said that a few days ago we wondered what the solution could be, and that was before 15 January. Should we content ourselves with what we have already done or should we continue? He added that our dignity urged us to move before the deadline of 15 January; therefore, we decided to return to Baghdad. We also decided, he went on to say, to travel to the United States. He said in this regard: I intended to travel to the United States not out of material interest nor to ask for political influence. The US refusal is considered as a humiliation to Algeria and the excuse given was that the UN Secretary-General had not presented his report yet.

After the report was presented, they said that since the Secretary-General did not obtain anything, we cannot respond favorably to any request which is outside the UN resolutions.

The president of the republic also indicated that he tried to obtain a secret agreement between himself and US President George Bush on a personal basis, providing for holding an international peace conference which would enable him to convince the brothers, especially Iraq; but we were unsuccessful. Naturally we had to cancel our trip to Baghdad as a result.

In conclusion, the president said that Algeria is satisfied because it tried to make endeavours and it fully carried out its duty. The president of the republic also pointed out that the allied forces had gone beyond their original mission and they exploited the issue of Kuwait to destroy Iraq. This is a pretext and nothing else. It is a trap set for the Arab states since the years of the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraq-Iran war was also a trap, and they destroyed the Iranian forces which began to threaten Western interests.

The president of the republic said: I told Saddam Hussein that the United States will not let you threaten their interests and also threaten Israel, especially now that the arena is emptier [as heard] than it was before, since there were two blocs, and the Nonaligned Movement was active, and we used to maneuver via these bodies. But the vacuum was seen by the United States as the chance of a lifetime to break Iraq's capabilities.

At the end of his address, the president of the republic stated that the West is endeavouring to alter the map of the world to establish a new international order. He added that the Arab Maghreb region is under threat because of its huge resources and energies; therefore, we are not safe, and Maghreb citizens must be aware of this.

In this speech, the president of the republic insisted on highlighting

the fact that Algeria's efforts were intensive and he said, I quote: I defy any party, be it in Algeria or abroad, to show that they have made more efforts than Algeria throughout this misfortune and since the start of the conflict in the region and since 2 August.

So, President Chadli Bendjedid concluded by saying that Algeria stands by the fraternal people of Iraq; but he warned against the veiled speeches and warned against the manipulation of the masses' emotions. He added that our strength lies in our unity as well as in serious work.

—*FBIS-NES*, 24 January 1991

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*It is not UN war says Perez de Cuellar on
27 January 1991*

The Persian Gulf War is not the United Nations war against Iraq, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said.

Only the permission for the war has been issued by the Security Council, he said in an interview with the Milan-based weekly *Panorama*, to be printed on Monday.

Mr. De Cuellar said Israel has the right to defend itself but should not retaliate.

If the Persian Gulf war was a UN business, as was the Korea war in 1950, all troops should have gone under the UN flag with blue uniforms, and under a joint military command whose headquarters is the United Nations.

Mr. De Cuellar said if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, the Security Council should approve a new resolution in order that the countries involved in defending Kuwait withdraw their troops.

In that case, the Secretary-General is also about to follow up his diplomatic functions, which he started in two messages to the Iraqi President on Jan. 15 and 22, Mr. Cuellar said.

However, he said he was not optimistic if his messages would be effective because, he said, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's important proposals had also been rejected by the Iraqi President.

On his talks with the Iraqi President before the outbreak of war, he said he had put forth proposals in the establishment of a peace force,

and efforts for nullification of the economic sanctions against Iraq, as well as holding of peace conference on the Middle East.

According to PTI report from United Nations, ambassadors and diplomats at the United Nations will resume bilateral and multilateral consultations on Monday on the Gulf war which looks at present almost impossible task of bringing it to an early end.

During the intensive consultations last week in which the non-aligned States led by India played a major role, it became clear that the Security Council has little control over the war authorised by it.

At the insistence of some members including India, the Council agreed on Friday to hold a formal meeting on the Gulf war, perhaps sometime next week, but what it would exactly do is unclear.

The meeting has been requested by Yemen, the only Arab member of the Council, and it was agreed during consultation that a meeting should be held even if one member asks for it.

Suggestions are being made that the meeting is held behind the closed doors, thereby restricting its coverage by the media to the briefing by the ambassadors and diplomats.

In any case, the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain have ruled out consideration of any proposal for cease-fire or peace of pause by the Council. Their stand is very clear: Saddam Hussein must withdraw from Kuwait before the Council takes up such a proposal. Diplomats said they have enough support to block any such move.

—*The Hindustan Times*, 28 January 1991

87

Extracts from the State of the Union address by President Bush on 29 January 1991

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the United States Congress. I come to this House of the people, to speak to you and all Americans, certain that we stand at a defining hour.

Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. We know why we're there. We are Americans: part of something larger than ourselves.

For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And to-

night we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity.

What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order—where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future.

The community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression. Saddam Hussein's unprovoked invasion—his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor—violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand—and it will not stand.

Together, we have resisted the trap of appeasement, cynicism, and isolation that gives temptation to tyrants. The world has answered Saddam's invasion with 12 UN resolutions, starting with a demand for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal—and backed up by forces from 28 countries of six continents. With few exceptions, the world now stands as one.

The end of the Cold War has been a victory for all humanity. A year and a half ago, in Germany, I said our goal was a Europe whole and free. Tonight, Germany is united. Europe has become whole and free—and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is important, not only to us, but to the world. That relationship has helped to shape these and other historic changes. But like many other nations, we have been deeply concerned by the violence in the Baltics, and we have communicated that concern to the Soviet leadership.

The principle that has guided us is simple: our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union. In our recent discussions with the Soviet leadership, we have been given representations, which, if fulfilled, would result in the withdrawal of some Soviet forces, a reopening of dialogue with the Republics, and a move away from violence.

We will watch carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and reform.

If it is possible, I want to continue to build a lasting basis for US-Soviet cooperation, for a more peaceful future for all mankind.

The triumph of democratic ideas in Eastern Europe and Latin America—and the continuing struggle for freedom elsewhere around

the world—all confirm the wisdom of our nation's founders.

Tonight, we work to achieve another victory—a victory over tyranny, and savage aggression.

We in this union enter the last decade of the 20th century thankful for our blessings, steadfast in our purpose, aware of our difficulties, and responsive to our duties at home and around the world.

For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and requires sacrifice.

But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us.

We are Americans: We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do—freedom works.

The conviction and courage we see in the Persian Gulf today is simply the American character in action. The indomitable spirit that is contributing to this victory for world peace and justice is the same spirit that gives us the power and the potential to meet our toughest challenges at home.

We are resolute and resourceful. If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be.

If anyone tells you America's best days are behind her, they're looking the wrong way. . . .

The war in the Gulf is not a war we wanted. We worked hard to avoid war. For more than five months we, along with the Arab League, the European Community, and the United Nations, tried every diplomatic avenue. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar; Presidents Gorbachev, Mitterrand, Ozal, Mubarak, and Bendjedid; Kings Fahd and Hassan; Prime Ministers Major and Andreotti—just to name a few—all worked for a solution. But time and again, Saddam Hussein flatly rejected the path of diplomacy and peace.

The world well knows how this conflict began and when: It began on August 2, when Saddam invaded and sacked a small, defenseless neighbor. And I am certain of how it will end. So that peace can prevail, we will prevail.

Tonight, I'm pleased to report that we are on course. Iraq's capacity to sustain war is being destroyed. Our investment, our training, our planning—all are paying off. Time will not be Saddam's salvation.

Our purpose in the Persian Gulf remains constant: to drive Iraq out

of Kuwait, to restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region.

Let me make clear what I mean by the region's stability and security. We do not seek the destruction of Iraq, its culture, or its people. Rather, we seek an Iraq that uses its great resources, not to destroy, not to serve the ambitions of a tyrant, but to build a better life for itself and its neighbors. We seek a Persian Gulf where conflict is no longer the rule, where the strong are neither tempted nor able to intimidate the weak.

Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam now, not later. They know this brutal dictator will do anything; will use any weapon; will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents must suffer.

They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace—based not on arms races and confrontation, but on shared principles and the rule of law.

And we all realize that our responsibility to be the catalyst for peace in the region does not end with the successful conclusion of this war.

Democracy brings the undeniable value of thoughtful dissent—and we have heard some dissenting voices here at home—some reckless, most responsible. But the fact that all voices have the right to speak out is one of the reasons we've been united in purpose and principle for 200 years.

Our progress in this great struggle is the result of years of vigilance, and a steadfast commitment to a strong defense. Now, with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians.

Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes—whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.

The quality of American technology, thanks to the American worker, has enabled us to successfully deal with difficult military conditions and help minimize loss of life. We have given our men and women the very best. And they deserve it.

We all have a special place in our hearts for the families of our men and women serving in the Gulf. They are represented here tonight by Mrs. Norman Schwarzkopf. We are very grateful to General Schwarzkopf and to all those serving with him. And to the families, let me say our forces in the Gulf will not stay there one day longer than is necessary to complete their mission.

The courage and success of the RAF pilots—of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, French, the Canadians, Italians, the pilots of Qatar and Bahrain—all are proof that for the first time since World War II, the international community is united. The leadership of the United Nations, once only a hoped-for ideal, is now confirming its founders' vision.

I am heartened that we are not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of this struggle. Last year, our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic costs of Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over 40,000 million dollars for the first three months of 1991, I am confident they will do no less as we move through Desert Storm.

But the world has to wonder what the dictator of Iraq is thinking. If he thinks that by targeting innocent civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia, that he will gain advantage—he is dead wrong. If he thinks that he will advance his cause through tragic and despicable environmental terrorism—he is dead wrong. And if he thinks that by abusing the coalition POWs, he will benefit—he is dead wrong.

We will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression.

The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order—where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.

Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace.

This is the burden of leadership—and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world. . . .

—*USIS*, New Delhi

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*Joint Soviet-US statement on Gulf adopted in Washington on
30 January 1991*

During the last round of talks on Tuesday, US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh adopted a Soviet-US Statement on the Gulf. Follows is the full text of this Statement:

In the course of the discussions held in Washington on January 26–29, 1991, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Bessmertnykh and US Secretary of State James Baker devoted considerable attention to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

The Ministers reiterated the commitment of their countries to the UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

They expressed regret that numerous efforts of the United Nations, other international organizations, individual countries, and envoys were all rebuffed by Iraq.

The military actions authorised by the United Nations have been provoked by the refusal of the Iraqi leadership to comply with the clear and lawful demands of the international community for withdrawal from Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker emphasised that the United States and its coalition partners are seeking the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq.

He stressed that the United States has no quarrel with the people of Iraq, and poses no threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. Secretary Baker reiterated that the United States is doing its utmost to avoid casualties among the civilian population, and is not interested in expanding the conflict.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh took note of the American position and agreed that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait must remain the goal of the international community. Both sides believe that everything possible should be done to avoid further escalation of the war and expansion of its scale.

The Ministers continue to believe that a cessation of hostilities would be possible if Iraq made an unequivocal commitment to withdraw from Kuwait. They also believe that such a commitment must be

backed by immediate, concrete steps leading to full compliance with the Security Council Resolutions.

The Iraqi leadership has to respect the will of the international community. By doing so, it has it within its powers to stop the violence and bloodshed.

The Ministers agreed that establishing enduring stability and peace in the region after the conflict, on the basis of effective security arrangements, will be a high priority of our two governments.

Working to reduce the risk of war and miscalculation will be essential, particularly because a spiralling arms race in this volatile region can only generate greater violence and extremism.

In addition, dealing with the causes of instability and the sources of conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, will be especially important. Indeed, both Ministers agreed that without a meaningful peace process—one which promotes a just peace, security, and real reconciliation for Israel, Arab States, and Palestinians—it will not be possible to deal with the sources of conflict and instability in the region.

Both Ministers, therefore, agreed that in the aftermath of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, mutual US-Soviet efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace and regional stability, in consultation with other parties in the region, will be greatly facilitated and enhanced.

The two Ministers are confident that the United States and the Soviet Union, as demonstrated in various other regional conflicts, can make a substantial contribution to the achievement of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

—TASS, Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

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UN Secretary-General's letter to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on 30 January 1991

Mr. Minister,

I have read your letter of 24 January with regret and cannot but reject its connotations.

When we met in Amman on 31 August 1990 and in Baghdad on 12 January 1991, I stated that our efforts to avert the unfolding tragedy

would fail unless Iraq could signify its readiness to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, beginning with Resolution 660. On each occasion, after returning to New York, I reported the views of your government to the Security Council.

As you know, on 15 January 1991, I appealed again to President Saddam Hussein to indicate his readiness to proceed in the manner I had suggested to him, so that the course of events could be turned away from catastrophe and towards a new era of justice and harmony, based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. I pledged, in such circumstances, to work with him, and with all others concerned, to bring just and lasting peace to the Middle East as a whole.

Today, I reiterate my 15 January appeal, as I did on 22 January 1991, when I also expressed my profound grief and anxiety at the increasing severity of the war, the widening of the area of hostilities, and my fear that the toll in death and destruction would escalate unless my appeal received a positive response. I continue to believe that such a response is needed in order to find a peaceful solution to this grave and tragic conflict and to save human lives. In the meantime, in order to alleviate the present suffering which is causing me deep anguish, I have already asked the main humanitarian agencies of the United Nations system to coordinate their efforts with a view to ensuring that help is provided to those afflicted by the conflict as soon as circumstances permit.

You will recall, Mr. Minister, that when speaking in the formal meeting of the Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 678, I stressed that, in requiring compliance with the resolutions of the council, the United Nations sought, not surrender, but the most honorable way of resolving a crisis in a manner that respected all legitimate interests and was conducive to the wider peace and the rule of law. I also underlined that the actions of the United Nations in the present crisis must be perceived as part of the larger endeavour of the organization to establish peace through justice, whenever the one was imperiled and the other denied.

That remains my view today and I would therefore urge your government to make a serious effort to put this tragic situation on the road to a peaceful solution.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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*UN has no control over war, says De Cuellar
on 5 February 1991*

The UN Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, today said the war in the Gulf was not a UN war and that the world body had no control over it although it had its sanction.

In an exclusive interview to PTI-TV, he said a careful distinction would have to be made between a war fought under UN control and the war that has UN authorisation.

He, however, added: "I do not mean that this is an illegitimate war. It is a legal war because it has the support of the UN." "But we cannot consider it as a UN war in the sense that there is no UN Flag. There is no UN control over military operations. We are informed through the Security Council about military operations, but after they have taken place."

Speaking of the efforts to avert the crisis, Mr. De Cuellar said he had continuously tried to see what he could do, but "unfortunately the very position of Iraq did not allow me many possibilities of moving ahead". He was disappointed by the two trips he made to the Gulf region and added, that after the resolution 678 was passed (on November 22) neither the Americans nor the Iraqis were prepared to "meet each other in a very substantive manner."

During his visit to Baghdad shortly before the January 15 deadline he tried to explain to the Iraqi President Mr. Saddam Hussein, the position of the international community over three hours." But he did not indicate at any moment that he was prepared to withdraw from Kuwait, which I have to concede is a real pre-condition to a peaceful settlement." About the linkage of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with the Palestinian question, Mr. De Cuellar said: "I was honest enough to tell the President of Iraq that one mistake does not justify another. One sin does not justify another sin."

He said he felt that it was necessary to implement all resolutions of the UN and expressed regret that "decisions taken by the Security Council on other issues have not been implemented".

He said efforts were continuing to bring to end the war it would be wrong to think that no efforts were being made just because the UN was not publicising them.

Asked about the effect of the war on the world, Mr. De Cuellar said the US had spoken of the emergence of a new world order after the war. "I do not exactly know what they have in mind," he said adding "I have not had any definition of this new world order."

"For me, as a man of the Third World, it has to be a genuine democratic world which excludes hegemonists. I cannot conceive of a new world order which does not include these concepts—democracy, non-hegemonist, and the general well-being of the countries of the world," he added.

—*The Hindu*, 6 February 1991

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The US Secretary of State, James Baker's statement before the US House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 February 1991

It is a privilege to appear before this Committee to testify on behalf of our foreign affairs funding proposal for FY 1992. With your permission, I would have my detailed written statement entered into the record. This year, even more so than most years, the funds requested should be seen as an investment in a better future—a world of secure nations, free peoples, and peaceful change.

I realise that as armies fight in the Persian Gulf such a world seems far distant. Yet I believe that it is vitally important to see the challenges we face also as opportunities to build a more secure and just world order. And so, today I would like to make a few comments concerning our ideas about post-crisis challenges and arrangements.

The international coalition has been waging war against Iraq for three weeks now with very clear objectives: to expel Iraq from Kuwait; to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait; and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. I want to make several observations about the course of the conflict so far.

First, the international coalition has held steadily to its purpose and its course. An outstanding achievement of the current crisis has been the ability of the United Nations to act as its founders intended. Before

January 15, a dozen Security Council resolutions guided the United States and other nations as together we waged a concerted diplomatic, political, and economic struggle against Iraqi aggression. We did so because we all share a conviction that this brutal and dangerous dictator must be stopped and stopped now. Since January 16, in actions authorised by Security Council Resolution 678, we have been able to wage war because we are equally convinced that all peaceful opportunities to end Saddam's aggression had been explored and exhausted.

Let me give you some idea of those exhaustive efforts, both by the United States and other nations. In the 166 days between the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the expiration of the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal on 15 January 1991, I personally held over 200 meetings with Foreign dignitaries, conducted 10 diplomatic missions, and travelled over 100,000 miles. For over six and one-half hours, I met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister—six and one-half hours in which the Iraqi leadership rejected the very concept of withdrawal from Kuwait, even the mention of withdrawal. As you know, many others also tried—the Arab League, the European Community, the UN Secretary-General, Kings, Presidents, and Prime Ministers.

None succeeded because Saddam Hussein rejected each and every one.

Second, the coalition is sharing responsibility for the economic burdens of conflict. Support for US military outlays covers both 1990 commitments for Desert Shield and 1991 commitments for the period of January through March for Desert Shield/Storm. In addition, funds have also been forthcoming to offset the economic costs confronting the frontline states in the region.

To date, we have pledged of over \$50,000 million to support our military efforts and over \$14,000 million to assist the frontline states and others with their economic needs.

Third, our unfolding military strategy fully reflects our political purposes. This is the place to restate, as the President has done so often, that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our goal is the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq or changes in its borders. A thoroughly professional and effective military campaign is underway. Our young men and women and the forces of our coalition partners are writing new annals of bravery and skill. But the task is formidable, and no one should underestimate Saddam's military capabilities. Iraq is not a third rate military power. Billions (thousands of millions) have been diverted from peaceful uses to give this small country the fourth largest

army in the world. Iraq has more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom and France combined. It has more combat aircraft than either Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Ejecting Iraq from Kuwait will not be easy, but, as the President said, "So that peace can prevail, we will prevail."

We are also trying our best to wage a just war in a just way. Our targets are military, and we are doing all we can to minimise civilian casualties and avoid damage to religious and cultural sites. And as General Schwarzkopf has pointed out, the coalition forces are even putting themselves in danger to minimise the risk to innocent lives.

In shocking contrast, Saddam Hussein's conduct of the war has been not unlike his conduct before the war: a relentless assault of the values of civilisation. He has launched missiles against Israeli cities and Saudi cities, missiles aimed not at targets of military value but fully intended to massacre civilians. He has abused and paraded prisoners of war and he says he is using them as "human shields"—actions totally in violation of the Geneva Convention. And he has even attacked nature itself, attempting to poison the waters of the Persian Gulf with the petroleum that is the patrimony of the region's economic future.

We have heard, and we take at face value, Saddam's threats to use chemical and biological weapons. We have warned him—and he would be well advised to heed our warning—that we will not tolerate the use of such weapons. Any use of chemical or biological weapons will have the most severe consequences. And we will continue to insist that Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention with respect to coalition POWs.

I think that our conduct of the war is in itself a great strength, the strength that comes from doing the right thing in the right way. And Saddam's continuing brutality redoubles our resolve and the entire coalition's conviction about the rightness of our course. Ending Saddam's aggression will also be a blow to state-sponsored terrorism.

This is also the place to note our deep appreciation and great admiration for the extraordinary restraint of the Government of Israel.

Israeli cities have been attacked by Saddam Hussein because part of his strategy has been to consolidate his aggression by turning the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite its clear right to respond, the Israeli Government has acted with restraint and responsibility. The United States has been and will continue to be in close contact at the highest levels with Israel. We have offered and Israel has accepted batteries of Patriot missiles—some with American crews—to defend

against Scud attacks. We continue to devote special military efforts to destroying the Scuds and their launchers.

Everyone should know: when we speak about our unshakable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it.

The fourth observation I would make is this: the great international coalition that is now winning the war must also be strong enough to secure the peace. Winston Churchill once observed that "We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices now being made by the brave men and women who defend our freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace worthy of their struggle. And that can be done if we can hold together in peace the coalition tempered by war.

I believe that when Congress voted the President authority to use force in support of the UN resolutions, it voted also for peace—a peace that might prevent such wars in the future. I believe that the American people support our role in the coalition not only to defeat an aggressor but to secure a measure of justice and security for the future.

Mr. Chairman, we and every nation involved in this conflict are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so. At the same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to lay out a detailed blueprint for the post-war Gulf or, for that matter, the region as a whole.

The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence both the security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now underway necessarily involve many casualties, great hardships, and growing fears for the future. Tough times lie ahead.

We should therefore approach the post-war problems with a due sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and Middle East must be uppermost. In any event, modern history has shown that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein.

Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a way, working in consultation with all of the affected nations, to set a course that brings greater

security for all and enduring peace. We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region which needs it so badly.

So I would like to discuss several challenges that I believe we must address in the post-war period.

One challenge will be greater security for the Persian Gulf. After two wars in 10 years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements. In our view, there are three basic issues to be resolved: the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; the role of the local states, regional organisations, and the international community; and in the aftermath of the war, the military requirements until local stability is achieved, and thereafter.

I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include:

Deterrence of aggression from any quarter.

Territorial integrity. There must be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders.

Peaceful resolution of disputes. Border problems and other disputes that have long histories—and there are many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example—should be resolved by peaceful means, as prescribed by the UN Charter.

These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented and aggression deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties. No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Post-war Iraq could have an important contribution to play. And so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf.

There is a role, too, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them.

As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman Administration in 1949. We had and continue to have very strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with and provided military equipment for our friends in the region. The President has said we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes.

Before security is assured, however, important questions must be answered. We will be going through an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of the war as we try to establish stability. Let me list just a few of the questions that need to be answered.

Should there be a permanent, locally stationed ground force made up of local troops under UN auspices or under regional auspices, such as the GCC?

How can the international community reinforce deterrence in the Gulf, whether by contributing forces or through other political arrangements, such as resolutions or security commitments?

No one has the answers yet to these and other questions. Some may never be answered. But however we eventually proceed, we will conduct extensive consultations among all of the concerned parties to such arrangements.

A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern countries have more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom or France. The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flows into an area that is already overmilitarised. That suggests that we and others inside and outside the region must consult on how best to address several dimensions of the problem:

How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's post-war ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and most destabilising conventional weapons?

How can we work with others to encourage steps towards broader regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction? What role might the kinds of confidence building measures that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and the Middle East?

Finally, what global actions would reinforce steps towards arms control in the Gulf and the Middle East? These could include rapid completion of pending international agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and dual-use technology into the region. And what implications does that have for arms transfer and sales policies?

A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with

it. Kuwait has been looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost jobs and fled. Trade flows and markets have been disrupted.

I am confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery.

And no one should forget that for the second time in a decade, the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf must include Iraq.

Of necessity, most of the resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf. Yet, should we not be thinking also of more than reconstruction? It might be possible for a coalition of countries using both local and external resources to transform the outlook for the region—in expanding free trade and investment in assisting development, and in promoting growth-oriented economic policies which have taken root across the globe.

Any economic effort must have a special place for water development. Well over half the people living in the Middle East draw water from rivers that cross international boundaries or depend on desalination plants. We have all been incensed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate poisoning of the Gulf waters, which could affect a large portion of Saudi Arabia's desalinated drinking water.

Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objective: reducing one by one the sources of conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.

A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect, tolerance, and mutual trust. As you know, I personally had devoted considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians—an essential part of an overall peace process. Let's not fool ourselves. The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet in the aftermath of this war, as in

earlier wars, there may be opportunities for peace—if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we are committed to working closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process.

The issues to be addressed are of course familiar and more challenging than ever.

How do you go about reconciling Israelis and Palestinians?

What concrete actions can be taken by each side?

What will be the role of the Arab states in facilitating this process and their own negotiations for peace with Israel?

How will regional arms control arrangements affect this process?

What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the process underway?

Again, we will be consulting and working very closely with our friends and all parties who have a constructive role to play in settling this conflict.

A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States: we simply must do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the President has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination we are now bringing to the war itself.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, some of these elements are political, some are economic, and some of necessity are related to security. That suggests that we should view security not just in military terms but as part and parcel of the broader outlook for the region. We're not going to have lasting peace and well-being without sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded—or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And surely finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to work with each other will be crucial if we are to lift our eyes to a better future.

Before closing, I would like to say a few words on another challenge we face: our relations with the Soviet Union.

The President has spoken often of a new world order in which freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears of the Cold War. We have been hopeful about such an order partly because of the growing cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as a search for

points of mutual advantage. And this search has yielded good results.

Three examples will suffice. First, over the past year, a democratic Germany, fully a member of NATO, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has vanished and with it the Cold War. Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue democracy and economic liberty. Third, the Soviet Union has joined the international coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues to completely support the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.

While we both have worked at finding these and other points of mutual advantage, it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation or even partnership between our countries would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reform. That is why when last fall I called for pathways of mutual advantage, not just discrete points, I also announced our desire to see a broader democratic dialogue with Soviet reformers. Not just economic reform but essential political reform could transform the Soviet Union into a very different society.

Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of *perestroika*, the enormous and daunting difficulty of changing after 70 years a society's basic direction and many of its values.

In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the Baltics; an apparent turn toward economic recentralisation; a less free media; extension of army and KGB authority; and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates.

These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real economic reform. There is simply no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic states who have acted throughout with dignity and restraint.

The President and I have had extensive discussions with President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these developments. We and our European allies have pointed out the inevitable consequences if the Soviet Government continues on this path. And we have stated our belief that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own objectives if it should abandon *perestroika*, democratisation, and

glasnost.

On the Baltics, I could do no better here than to quote the President's words from the State of the Union address: "... our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union."

We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue with the Baltics, and to creating a society ruled by law, not force. We're going to watch this situation closely to see whether these representations become enduring realities.

I hope that the Soviet Union will relearn quickly the lesson from its own hard experience: the old ways are not the right ways. *Perestroika* cannot succeed at gunpoint. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters may still turn more for the worse. But at the same time, we must be careful not to jump to premature conclusions.

The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear that their last several steps have taken them down a path of no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they resume the march that has given the entire world hope of a better future.

I want to sum up my comments today with this observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review our overall foreign policy, we were well on the way to a whole and free Europe, secured by expanding US-Soviet cooperation in resolving the continent's outstanding political and military problems. The possibility, even the idea, of this terrible conflict in the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination. Yet now we face the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty about the course of Soviet reform.

There can be different views of how to handle these situations. I look forward to your counsel and good words on both issues. Yet on one point I believe we are in very basic agreement: the need for American leadership. If we do not do our part, then Churchill's broad path pursued by many states in common will not be possible. And as Churchill warned, "the middle path adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bull's eye of disaster." More clearly than we could have ever imagined a year or even six months ago, the world emerging from the end of the post-war era will be shaped by the United States and its international allies. Our constant purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for free peoples to live.

Let me turn to our foreign affairs funding request. For FY 1992, we seek \$21,900 million in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs Budget Function 150, an increase of \$1800 million over levels appropriated for FY 1991. In addition, we are requesting a one-time appropriation of \$12,200 million as the US share of global quota increase for the International Monetary Fund.

In accordance with the terms of the Budget Enforcement Act, our request provides for specific, stringent limits on our spending levels, in spite of unprecedented demands for US leadership across the globe.

In order to achieve our worldwide objectives within these resource constraints, additional flexibility is needed. Last year, I appealed to this Committee to make constructive consultation—not earmarking—the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on programme objectives. I am pleased to note that we made some progress towards that goal last session.

Earmarking in our Economic Support Fund (ESF) declined from 82 per cent in FY 1990 to just over 68 per cent in FY 1991. In our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account, the decline was less dramatic but still significant, from 92 per cent to 87 per cent. This is a welcome trend, one that we want to encourage promote.

But we still have a long way to go. To support our request this year, let me express the Administration's willingness to work in partnership with Congress to develop greater flexibility in our state operations and foreign assistance legislation. To guide this effort, let me suggest five broad objectives for our international cooperation programmes, built around the five foreign policy challenges which I presented in my testimony before this Committee last year.

First, promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the President noted in his State of the Union address, this fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples across the globe for more than two centuries.

Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential ingredients of democracy—respect for human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and political and economic opportunity—are also the basic building blocks of the new world order.

Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening US competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies; together,

these can promote US economic interests abroad. By fostering market forces through deregulation, privatisation, and promotion of free trade and investment, reform-minded countries can establish an appropriate complement to building and securing democracy. They also can develop into thriving markets for US exports and the jobs they represent. Indeed, US exports to four aid graduates—Colombia, Chile, Taiwan, and Korea—total more than twice the value of our entire worldwide foreign assistance budget. Our long-run goal should be to graduate more countries from foreign assistance toward mutually beneficial trade and investment relationships with the United States.

Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts, strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

As the crisis in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated, there is no substitute for strong US leadership. We continue to play a vital role in bolstering the security of regional allies around the world. Egypt and Turkey—two long-standing beneficiaries of US security assistance—are bulwarks of the coalition against Saddam Hussein.

National and regional security are preconditions for democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's aggression is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect the security of regional states of vital interest to the United States and our allies. The proliferation of missile system and chemical and biological weapons further sharpens our interest in promoting regional stability.

Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism.

As I noted in my first statement to Congress two years ago, "The future of our civilisation demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature." This includes curbing proliferation, protecting the environment, and countering terrorism and narcotics.

We have made progress in all of these areas. We have led the international effort to tighten nonproliferation export controls on a global basis. We continue to work to advance our environmental agenda.

We are actively pressing state sponsors of terrorism in an effort to thwart terrorism around the globe. And our international narcotics efforts to counter supply are complemented by reports of declining demand at home.

But progress is sometimes slow, unheralded, and hard won. Iraq's

conduct following its invasion of Kuwait is a brutal reminder of the danger posed by the interaction of these transnational threats. Saddam Hussein's most recent actions illustrate how traditional concepts of threats to national security need to be extended. Indeed, Iraq has combined:

A credible threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons.

A contemptible use of missile technology as a weapon of terror against innocent civilian populations.

Perhaps the world's first deliberate use of an environmental disaster as a wartime weapon, with unknown consequences for the entire region for years to come; and

A worldwide call for terrorist actions, sometimes supported by embassies abroad in flagrant violation of the basic principles of diplomacy.

These challenges to international order can all be defeated by a committed world community, supported by firm US leadership and appropriate resources as needed.

Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs will continue to reflect deep and abiding concerns of the American people. America's record for responding quickly and substantially to alleviate severe suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters is unequalled. We salute the role played by American private voluntary agencies and private American citizens in this regard. Meeting the most pressing humanitarian needs with food aid, disaster relief, and refugee assistance will always be an essential component of US assistance policies.

We are prepared to work with Congress on legislation that builds on these basic objectives to provide more flexibility and simplicity to our economic cooperation efforts. Working with our global partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to advance this agenda worldwide:

One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities. We seek more flexible account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs. We hope to move toward an assistance programme unified around a single set of core objectives, along the lines of those outlined above.

As a first step toward this goal, we have proposed a modest \$20 million Presidential Contingency Fund in our FY 1992 budget request.

The need for flexibility is especially urgent at a moment when developments in the world are moving so quickly and unpredictably,

while our ability to respond with additional resources is severely constrained by budgetary realities. The Gulf crisis, the restoration of democratic rule in Nicaragua and Panama, and the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa over the past year illustrate that when unprecedented demands for American leadership are combined with limited resources, our need for flexibility becomes all the more urgent.

Two, we see scope for more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to advance our objectives, through both the international financial institutions and the UN system.

The Bretton Woods institutions have now admitted all the Eastern European countries, and are playing a central role in structuring sound, adequately financed programmes to ease their transition to market economies based on private initiative. Should the Soviet Union move further along the path of structural economic and political reform, we would expect the IMF and the World Bank to play a role in facilitating its transformation as well. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will promote the development of infrastructure, environmental programmes, and private sector development in the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, through our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank is expected to play a major role in promoting sound investment policy in our own hemisphere.

To support the efforts of these institutions, we are again proposing full funding for the multilateral development banks—including all arrears—plus a periodic quota increase for the IMF. This funding will allow these institutions to leverage other contributions in support of our objective of promoting sound, growth-oriented economic policies in the developing world.

As President Bush noted in his State of the Union address, the United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security Council's 12 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis, symbolised the unity of the international community against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era. At the same time, the humanitarian organisations of the UN system have assisted the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Iraqi aggression. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this view, revitalised United Nations as a full partner in the building of a post-Cold War world where peace, stability and pros-

perity prevail.

Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships with the European Community members and Japan in particular. As many in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common agenda with partners who share our values and interests.

No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to enlist worldwide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and for the frontline states whose economies have been set back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression.

In 1990, our coalition partners pledged \$9700 million to meet Desert Shield costs, representing 88 per cent of the roughly \$11,000 million in total incremental expenses we incurred. As soon as hostilities broke out, our allies again responded promptly and generously to shoulder their fair share of coalition military expenses under Operation Desert Storm. Over the past three weeks, we have received unprecedented pledges totalling in excess of \$40,000 million from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Japan, Germany, and Korea, to offset Desert Shield/Storm expenses expected to be incurred during the first three months of 1991.

The world community has also responded swiftly and generously to the needs of the frontline states, especially Egypt and Turkey, as they incurred substantial costs in standing up to Saddam Hussein's aggression. Through the US-chaired Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, over \$14,000 million has been pledged by the Gulf states, Europe, Japan and Korea to ensure that the economies of affected regional states are stabilised and that their commitment to stay the course is reinforced. The United States has played its part in this effort, supported by Congress, by cancelling Egypt's \$6700 million military debt, thereby relieving a heavy burden on a critical regional ally. Other countries have followed suit and cancelled an additional \$8000 million in Egyptian debt.

Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the successful G-24 process chaired by the European Commission has mobilised more than \$18,000 million in pledges for Poland and Hungary, to ease their transition to market economies. And in the Philippines, the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) has been responsible for nearly doubling the level of international assistance to this struggling democracy. We are also looking to

our worldwide partners to assist us in clearing arrearages of Panama and Nicaragua to the international financial institutions and to assist in the financing of the enhanced debt strategy. Finally, we are encouraging Europe and Japan to join us in pledging \$100 million a year over five years to create a Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean. This fund is a key part of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and will play a crucial role in enabling countries to move from aid to trade and private investment as the principal engines of economic growth.

In each case, both strong US leadership and a community of interests are essential to catalyze a broad worldwide response.

Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment policies as vehicles to promote US interests in world economic growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength.

Central to these efforts over the past four years has been our determination to pursue a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. We continue to believe that the Uruguay Round has profound political as well as economic implications for the shape of the world in the next century. Successful conclusion of the round is essential for the economic growth and stability of the emerging Eastern European democracies, as well as the wide range of developing countries who will ultimately rely on expansion of world trade—not aid—as the primary vehicle to generate employment opportunities and sustainable economic growth.

In our own hemisphere, the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative represents a comprehensive effort to promote economic growth and stability in the region, combining free trade and investment—the primary vehicles for growth—with debt relief and environmental initiatives.

As an important step toward the eventual goal of hemispheric free trade, the Administration intends to seek a North America Free Trade Area with Mexico and Canada, which we are convinced promises important economic benefits for all three countries. Since the President's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free trade agreement with Mexico, we have engaged in extensive consultations with Congress and the private sector. Canada's participation in these talks will establish a free trade zone throughout the world's largest market, worth over \$6,000,000 and including more than 350 million consumers. The resulting stimulus to exports and the creation of new business opportunities would act as a significant engine of growth and employ-

ment generation.

Meanwhile, the United States has worked actively with our Asian partners in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to advance market-oriented cooperation among member-states.

Our Bilateral Investment Treaty programme has been an important vehicle in ensuring an open and liberal investment climate for US investors and exporters. Over the past year, we completed negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and are actively negotiating with nine other countries which are in the process of undertaking economic restructuring programmes.

Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous US diplomacy, in the context of a State Operations budget that reflects an activist approach to the diplomatic challenges of a changing world stage. I would again reiterate our need for funding flexibility, especially as it relates to our ability to transfer funds among accounts within our very tight State Department Operations budget.

Bilateral military and economic assistance will remain an essential tool in advancing US interests through the 1990s, assuming the necessary flexibility can be provided to meet emerging needs. No other vehicle at our disposal is as well suited to provide timely support to our allies and friends around the world. Our interests in political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peace-making, and strengthening alliances—all can be advanced by prudent use of bilateral assistance resources.

For FY 1992, our request for discretionary budget authority for bilateral assistance programmes totals \$13,100 million. That marks a 6.5 per cent increase over the \$12,300 million appropriated by Congress for FY 1991. Highlights of this request by category are as follows:

\$46,500 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), supporting a programme level of \$4920 million.

\$3240 million in Economic Support Funding, up from \$3,140 million.

\$1300 million in development assistance, the same as the prior year.

\$800 million for the Development Fund for Africa.

\$400 million for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase in the FY '91 appropriation.

\$160 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiatives for the Philippines.

\$1300 million for bilateral PL-480 food aid, supporting the export of 5.9 million metric tonnes of US commodities.

\$171 million for anti-narcotics assistance, plus additional security and development assistance resources to support these efforts.

For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting \$1700 million in FY 1992 budget authority, up from \$1600 million in FY 1991.

This includes \$1100 million in funding for the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which provides concessionary financing to the world's poorest countries, as well as full funding for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other regional development banks.

Our FY 1992 budget request also contains \$12,200 million in budget authority for the proposed increase in the US quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. This is to ensure that the Fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. In the Third World, IMF arrangements support market-oriented adjustment and underpin debt reduction operations in support of the Brady Plan. The Fund has also spearheaded economic reform in Eastern Europe, and responded vigorously to assist countries seriously affected by the Persian Gulf crisis.

In addition, we are seeking \$250 million for voluntary contributions to international organisations including the UN Development Programme (\$115 million) and UNICEF (\$55 million).

The United States continues to play a preeminent role in addressing the plight of the world's refugees—through our international assistance and domestic resettlement programmes, as well as our diplomatic efforts in support of permanent solutions to refugee situations.

For FY 1992, we are requesting \$491 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance, up from \$486 million in FY 1991.

For our refugee assistance programmes overseas, we seek \$233 million in FY 1992 funding, a \$20 million increase over the FY 1991 level. These programmes will continue to focus on basic life-sustaining activities for the most vulnerable groups and support lasting solutions through opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration.

To finance refugee admission and resettlement, we seek \$192 million in FY 1992 funding. This will cover the expenses of an estimated 120,000 refugees—about the same number as last year. Most refugee admissions will be from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, but there will

also be admissions from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. Family reunification will continue to be a priority, as will the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities and former political prisoners.

In addition, we request \$20 million to replenish the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, to enable us to respond to unforeseen refugee and migration needs worldwide.

Another important component of our international development assistance request is our \$200 million request for Peace Corps operating expenses.

The Gulf crisis provides a vivid demonstration of the "frontline" role played by the State Department in protecting American citizens and defending American interests abroad. This is an increasingly expensive responsibility, exacerbated by the demands on the Department to expand operations to meet new political and economic opportunities around the globe. Fluctuations in exchange rates, higher rates of overseas inflation, and the continuing need to enhance the security of our posts and personnel abroad further magnify the problem. Today we face a potential and worrisome weakening of our foreign affairs infrastructure at a time when we are being called upon to meet extraordinary and new challenges.

Since January 1989, we have placed a high priority on strengthening our ability to manage scarce resources:

To better match national interests to available resources, we are taking steps to better integrate policy planning with the budget process.

To strengthen foreign service personnel management, we have begun to implement key proposals made by the Bremer and Thomas Commissions.

To conserve personnel and financial resources, we have set up a new centre in Rosslyn, Virginia, to process hundreds of thousands of refugee and asylum applications from the Soviet Union, which can serve as a model to meet future consular and immigration demands.

To strengthen our physical plant abroad, we have put into place a professional property management system and begun implementation of a five year integrated plan which addresses new construction, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance.

To enhance the cost-effectiveness of our security efforts, we have begun to implement reforms to link our wide-ranging efforts at over

250 posts abroad to country-specific threat profiles.

For State Department salaries and expenses, we are requesting \$2050 million in budget authority for FY 1992, an increase of \$179 million over the current year. This is the minimal level of resources we need to fund our overseas and domestic operations: over two-thirds of the increase compensates for price increases and exchange rate changes. The remainder will be used to support several specific funding requirements: Expanding our diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (\$25 million).

Responding to increased immigration processing requirements necessitated by passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 (\$24 million).

Strengthening our information and financial systems by improving our infrastructure (\$13.5 million).

In the Foreign Building account, we have requested \$570 million in FY 1992 funding. Of this total, \$440 million represents the first instalment of a five-year, \$2350 million programme to address the Department of State's most urgent facility replacement priorities, including embassies in Bangkok and Bogota. Our goal is to restore the safety, security and workability of our aging but valuable inventory of overseas facilities.

We are also seeking \$130 million in funding for the Moscow Embassy project. It is imperative that we make a decision now on a new building so we can begin to operate as soon as possible in appropriate, secure space.

The President has emphasised the urgency of restoring financial viability to the United Nations and other international organisations. After several years of effort on the part of Congress and the Administration, we are pleased to report significant movement toward budgetary and administrative reform with the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. No one who has witnessed the response of the UN Security Council to recent events in the Persian Gulf could deny the importance to US interests of a financially healthy UN system.

We remain absolutely committed to full funding for US assessed contributions, to the extent permitted by law, and to paying our prior year arrearages over the next four years. We appreciate the full funding we received for FY 1991, which included initial funding toward the necessary process of arrears clearance. For FY 1992, we are requesting \$750 million in budget authority to meet our current assessments to international organisations, plus an additional \$371 million for arrears clearance, to be paid out over the following four years. For interna-

tional peacekeeping activities, we are requesting \$69 million to meet our full funding obligations, plus \$132 million for arrearages.

Public diplomacy will be one of our most valuable tools as we seek to encourage the worldwide tide of democracy and political pluralism. For the valuable work of the US Information Agency and the Board for International Broadcasting, we are requesting \$1300 million in FY 1992 funding, up slightly from the prior year. Within this level, a new emphasis will be placed on information and cultural programmes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Islamic world.

Thanking you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to working with you and the members of this Committee in the coming months to mobilise the resources needed to carry out our ambitious foreign affairs agenda.

—*Mainstream*, 16 February 1991

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President Gorbachev's statement on 9 February 1991

The developments in the Gulf Zone are taking an ever more alarming and dramatic turn. The war, the largest during the past several decades, is gaining in scope. The number of casualties, including among the civilian population is growing. Combat operations have already inflicted enormous material damage. Whole countries—first Kuwait, now Iraq—are facing the threat of catastrophic destruction. The discharge of an enormous amount of oil into the Gulf can develop into an extremely grave ecological disaster.

The Soviet leadership reiterates its commitment, in principle to the U.N. Security Council resolutions, which reflect the will of the majority of countries and the hopes of nations for New World Order that would rule out aggression and infringement on other countries' territory and natural resources.

However, the logic of the military operations and the character of the military actions are creating a threat of going beyond the mandate, defined by those resolutions.

Provocative attempts to expand the scope of the war, to draw Israel and other countries into it, thus giving the conflict another destructive

dimension. The Arab-Israeli one are also extremely dangerous.

Judging by some statements on a political level and those made by influential mass media organs, attempts are being made to condition people by both sides of the conflict to the idea of a possibility and permissibility of the use of mass destruction weapons. If this happened, the whole of the world politics, the world community in general would be shaken to the foundation.

The development of events connected with this war evokes great concern in Soviet society and among the country's leadership. The more so that it is taking place close to the Soviet Union's borders.

The only conclusion comes from historic responsibility, common sense and humaneness—to put to use all levers of a political settlement on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

At this critical moment I appeal publicly to the Iraqi President urging him to analyse again what is at stake for his country, to display realism which would make it possible to take the path of reliable and just peaceful settlement. I shall immediately send my personal representative to Baghdad to meet President Hussein.

By taking these steps, we want acting jointly with Arab and other Moslem countries, with European and Asian countries, with the United States in the first place, with all permanent members of the Security Council, not only to help overcome the state of war as soon as possible, but also to begin preparing a solid and equitable security system in that region, which is so important for the whole world. The security system should include of course the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. The countries of the region should play a decisive role in this process. Iraq should hold a worthy place in the post-war settlement. Its people cannot bear responsibility for the past developments. They deserve sympathy, compassion and support.

I repeat that in order to make a breakthrough to peace in the Near and Middle East, it is necessary to put the flame of war in the Gulf as soon as possible. This is the most important thing now.

—*Pravda*, 11 February 1991

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Iraq's apprehensions on NAM

Iraq on Tuesday cast doubt on the ability of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) foreign ministers meeting in Belgrade to help end the Gulf war.

"The ideas being debated will fall in line with United States interests and not those of Iraq, which represents the Third World", an Iraqi official told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE. He said Iraq did not expect any positive results from the meeting which opened Tuesday in the Yugoslav capital.

—FBIS-NES, 13 February 1991

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*Ramsey Clark's Report on US bombing of Iraq
on 12 February 1991*

Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
The Secretariat
United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

During the period February 2 to February 8, 1991 I travelled in Iraq to assess the damage to civilian life there resulting from the bombing and the embargo, including civilian deaths, injuries, illness and destruction and damage to civilian property. I was accompanied by an experienced camera team that has filmed war and its destructiveness in many countries including Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Vietnam. Their film documents most of the damage I mention in this letter and some I do not. In our party was an Iraqi-American guide and translator who has family in Baghdad and Basra and is personally familiar with those cities and many other areas of Iraq. He had last visited Baghdad, Basra and Kuwait City in December 1990.

We travelled over 200 miles in seven days to view damage, learn of casualties, discuss the effects of the bombing with government officials, public health and safety agency staffs and private families and individuals. We had cooperation from the Government of Iraq including Ministers, Governors, health and medical officials and civil defense personnel. The bombing in all parts of Iraq made travel difficult, requiring caution for bomb craters and damage to highways and roads and making night driving especially hazardous.

The damage to residential areas and civilian structures, facilities and utilities was extensive everywhere we went. Every city and town we visited or that was reported to us had no municipal water, electricity or telephone service. Parts of Baghdad had limited delivery of impure water for an hour a day.

The effect of damage to municipal water systems on health and safety is tremendous. The Minister of Health considered potable water for human consumption the single greatest health need in the country. Tens of thousands are known to suffer diarrhoea and stomach disorders. There are believed to be hundreds of thousands of unreported cases. Several thousands are believed to have died.

There is no electric lighting in the cities, towns and countryside in daytime or the long winter nights, except for a few interior spaces like hospital emergency rooms where gasoline generators are available. The meaning of this is brought home most painfully in the hospitals at night.

In the hospitals, there is no heat, no clean water except limited quantities for drinking supplied in bottles, no electric light in wards and hospital rooms, and inadequate medicine, even for pain alleviation, in the face of a great increase in critically and severely injured persons. Doctors we talked with in four hospitals are deeply concerned over the absence or shortage of needed medicines and sanitary supplies. Surgeons and medics treating wounds cannot keep their hands clean or gloved and work in the cold, in poor light with greatly increased number of patients in unrelieved pain. Seven hospitals are reported closed by bomb damage. Many if not most have had windows shattered.

Schools are closed. Homes are cold. Candles are the principal lighting. Telephone communication does not exist. Transportation is extremely limited. Gasoline is scarce. Roads and bridges are bombing targets. There is no television. Radio reception is limited to battery

powered radios which can receive short wave signals, a few transmissions from Iraq stations or nearby foreign stations. According to the Ministry of Health, hospital officials and the Red Crescent, there is a substantial increase in falls, home accidents, stress, nervous disorders, shock, heart attack, miscarriage and premature births and infant mortality. Nightly air raids, the sounds of sirens, anti-aircraft fire and the explosion of bombs have placed a great strain on the society as a whole, but particularly on children and individuals with nervous system or heart disorders.

Dr. Ibrahim Al Noore has been head of the Red Crescent and Red Cross of Iraq for ten years. He is a pediatrician by training who interned at Children's Hospital in London, later headed Children Hospital in Baghdad and served in the Ministry of Health for some years rising to Deputy Minister. Dr. Noore estimates that there have been 3000 infant deaths since November 1, 1990 in excess of the normal rate attributable solely to the shortage of infant milk formula and medicines. Only 14 tons of baby formula have been received during that period. Prior monthly national consumption was approximately 2500 tons.

One of the early targets of US bombing was the infant and baby milk processing facility in Baghdad. No Iraqi with whom we talked assumed this was a coincidence. The US claim that the plant manufactured chemical warfare material is false. A French company built it. The twenty or more people who we interviewed, who operated it, who visited it before its destruction and who have examined it since without ill-effect all say it was a plant processing infant and baby milk formula. In a lengthy and unrestricted examination of the plant, we saw no evidence to the contrary.

In all areas we visited and all other areas reported to us, municipal water processing plants, pumping stations and even reservoirs have been bombed. Electric generators have been destroyed. Refineries and oil and gasoline storage facilities and filling stations have been attacked. Telephone exchange buildings, TV and radio stations, and some radio telephone relay stations and towers, damaged or destroyed. Many highways, roads, bridges, bus stations, schools, mosques and churches, cultural sites, and hospitals have been damaged. Government buildings including Executive Offices of the President, the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, Ministry for Industry and Justice Ministry have been destroyed or damaged.

Ambassadors of Member-States should ask themselves if their capi-

tals, major cities and towns were similarly destroyed and damaged by such bombing, they would consider the targets to be permissible under the International Laws of Armed Conflict. Imagine the reaction if water, electricity, telephones, gasoline, heating and air-conditioning, TV and radio were denied to Lima and Marseilles, New Delhi and Calcutta, to Canberra and Sydney while civilians were bombed in their homes, business, shops, markets, schools, churches, hospitals, public places and roadways.

How can destruction of municipal electricity for Mosul, the telephone system for the people of Baghdad, the municipal water supplies for Basra, or shooting defenseless public buses and private cars on the road to Jordan and elsewhere possibly be justified as necessary to drive Iraq from Kuwait? If it can be so justified, then the United Nations has authorized the destruction of all civilian life of a whole nation.

The effect of the bombing, if continued, will be the destruction of much of the physical and economic basis for life in Iraq. The purpose of the bombing can only be explained rationally as the destruction of Iraq as a viable state for a generation or more. Will the United Nations be a party to this lawless violence?

I will briefly describe destruction to residential areas in some of the cities and towns we visited. In Basra Governor Abdullah Adjram described the bombing as of February 6 as worse than during the Iran-Iraq war. We carefully probed five residential areas that had been bombed:

1. A middle class residential area was heavily damaged at 9.30 PM on January 31. Twentyeight persons were reported killed, 56 were injured, 20 homes and six shops were destroyed.

2. On January 22, an upper middle class residential neighbourhood was shattered by three bombs destroying or extensively damaging more than 15 homes reportedly injuring 40 persons, but without any deaths.

3. On January 24, an upper middle class neighbourhood was bombed, killing eight, injuring 26 and destroying three homes and damaging many others.

4. On February 4, described by officials as the heaviest bombing of Basra to February 6, at 2.35 AM 14 persons were killed, 46 injured and 128 apartments and homes destroyed or damaged together with an adjacent Pepsi Cola bottling plant and offices across a wide avenue. The area devastated was three blocks deep on both sides of streets. At least fifteen cars were visible, crushed in garages. Small anti personnel bombs were alleged to have fallen here and we saw what appeared to be one that did not explode imbedded in rubble. We were shown the shell

of a "mother" bomb which carries the small fragmentation bombs.

5. On January 28, about eighteen units in a very large low cost public housing project were destroyed or severely damaged, killing 46 and injuring 70. The nearby high school was damaged by a direct hit on a corner. The elementary school across the street was damaged.

On the evening of February 5 at 8.30 PM while our small group was dining alone by candlelight in the Sheraton Basrah, three large bomb blasts broke glass in the room. We went upstairs to the roof. From there I saw one bomb fall into the Shatt-Al-Arab beyond the Teaching Hospital to the south throwing a column of water high into the air, another bomb hit near the Shatt. As agreed upon earlier, civil defense officials came to take us to the blast sites. They were 1.2 km down the street near the Shatt-Al-Arab. I had walked by the area about 6.30 PM.

We found two buildings destroyed. It is an apartment and residential home area. One was a family club, the other a night club. If either had been open scores of people would have been killed. Palm trees were sheared off and shrapnel, rocks, dirt and glass covered the street for several hundred feet. We were unable to enter the buildings that night.

We returned the next morning and were told both buildings were empty at the time by the owners who were looking at the damage. The Teaching Hospital, about 150 yards distant, which had been closed for a week following earlier bombing was without windows. It apparently received no new damage. As with all the other civilian damage we saw we could find no evidence of any military presence in the area. Here there was no utility, or facility that are frequent, if illegal, targets either. There were only homes, apartments and a few shops, grocery stores and other businesses found in residential area, plus two small bridges connecting the hospital to the mainland.

We were informed by a variety of sources including visual observation during extensive driving in Basra, that many other residential properties had been hit and that the five areas we filmed were a minor fraction of the civilian damage that had occurred.

At the central market where more than 1000 shops and vendors sell fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, foodstuffs and other items, a bomb leaving a huge crater had demolished a building with a grocery store and other shops and damaged an entry area to the market at about 4.00 PM. It reportedly killed eight persons and injured 40.

We examined the rubble of a Sunni Moslem Mosque, Al Makal, where a family of 12 had taken sanctuary. The minaret remained

standing. Ten bodies were found under the rubble and identified by a family member who had returned from his military post when informed of the tragedy. The dead included his wife and four young children.

In Diwaniya, a smaller town, we examined the same types of civilian damage we witnessed elsewhere and that was reported everywhere. In the town center, apparently seeking to destroy the radio telephone relay equipment in the post office, bombing had damaged the tower and the office. We saw many similar, or identical, relay towers in the region that had not been attacked. Adjacent to the Post Office on the central circle of the city, three small hotels of 30 to 50 rooms were destroyed together with a host of shops, cafes, and offices including those of doctors and lawyers. We were told 12 people were killed and 35 injured. More damage could be seen across the circle among business and apartment buildings from one or more bombs that fell there.

Near the outskirts of the town four more or less contiguous residential areas had been bombed. Twentythree persons were reported killed and 15 injured. Two schools were badly damaged. There was no water, electricity or telephone service. A water irrigation station was destroyed. Extensive damage was witnessed while driving around the town. On the outskirts an oil tank was on fire, one of more than a dozen we saw burning during our travels.

Baghdad has been more accessible to foreign observation than Basra and other places in Iraq. It will only be highlighted. We examined extensive damage on a main street in the blocks next to and across the street from the Ministry of Justice which had all its windows on one side blasted out. I know that area as a busy poor commercial residential area from walking through it on the way to the National Museum and visiting the Justice Ministry. A large supermarket, eight other stores and six or eight houses were destroyed or badly damaged. Across the street, one bomb hit on the sidewalk and another was a direct hit on housing behind the street front properties. Six shops, a restaurant and several other stores plus nine or ten homes were destroyed, or badly damaged. We could not get an agreed account of casualties from the forty or fifty people standing around the damage. Some said as many as thirty died and many more were injured.

We visited a residential area where several homes were destroyed on February 7. Six persons in one family were killed in an expensive home and several others in adjacent properties. One 500 lb. bomb had failed

to explode and the tail was seen above the thick concrete roof when a member of our team first drove by. When we returned, the bomb had been removed. Our camera team visited the hospital where the injured were taken later that afternoon. The critically injured father from the home where the bomb failed to explode was there. This was one of four hospitals treating persons injured in bombings that we visited.

A bus station was hit by a bomb and the stained glass in a nearby mosque shattered. We were unable to learn if anyone was killed though 40-50 people were at the station near midnight when we drove by on our arrival.

We saw five different damaged telephone exchanges while driving around Baghdad and many destroyed and damaged government and private buildings. Bridges in Baghdad were a frequent target though damage to them was minimal when we left. The bridges are not a legitimate military target. Even Defense Ministry buildings are occupied by non-combatants. The telephone exchanges run by civilians are overwhelmingly processing non-military calls. The military has the most extensive independent communications capacity in the country. These are not legitimate targets and the effort to bomb them necessarily takes civilian lives.

Damage in Basra appeared to be considerably more extensive than in Baghdad and the actual bombing there was much more intensive than at any time we were in Baghdad. There were civilian deaths every night we were in Baghdad.

Visits to the towns of Hilla, Najaf and Nasseriya by press corps representatives and our crew found civilian casualties in residential areas of each, damages to a medical clinic, 12 deaths in one family, and 46 deaths in one night of bombing in one town. A small town was bombed a few minutes before we passed through on our drive back from Basra. We saw no military presence there. Smoke could be seen from three fires.

Over the 2000 miles of highways, roads and streets we travelled, we saw scores, probably several hundred, destroyed vehicles. There were oil tank trucks, tractor trailers, lorries, pickup trucks, a public bus, a minibus, a taxicab and many private cars destroyed by aerial bombardment and strafing. Some were damaged when they ran into bomb craters in the highways, or road damage caused by bombs and strafing. We found no evidence of military equipment or supplies in the vehicles. Along the roads we saw several oil refinery fires and numerous gasoline stations destroyed. One road repair camp had been bombed on

the road to Amman.

As with the city streets in residential, industrial and commercial areas where we witnessed damage, we did not see a single damaged or destroyed military vehicle, tank, armoured car, personnel carrier or other military equipment, or evidence of any having been removed. We saw scores of oil tank cars driving between Iraq and Jordan and parked in Jordan, as well as five or six that were destroyed by planes on the highway. We saw no evidence of any arms or military material on or around the destroyed and burned out tank trucks, or those not hit.

No one in the press corps or among the civilians we encountered reported to us that they had seen any evidence of the presence of military vehicles having been hit on the highways or having been in the vicinity of civilian property or private vehicles hit before, during or after an aerial strike. We saw no evidence of any military presence in the areas of damage described in this letter.

It is preposterous to claim that military equipment is being placed in residential areas to escape attack. Residential areas are regularly attacked. The claim reveals a policy of striking residential areas, because it purports to establish a justification for doing so. If there had been military vehicles in the civilian areas we examined, or on the roads and highways we travelled when bombing occurred it is inconceivable that among all that debris we would not find some fragments of military vehicles, material, equipment or clothing. Not only did pinpoint precision fail to hit military targets in civilian areas, they were not collaterally damaged in the attacks on civilian life. Had they been present they would have been hit.

The Government of Iraq has vastly understated civilian casualties in Iraq. This is not an uncommon phenomenon for governments in wartime.

The inescapable and tragic fact is thousands of civilians have been killed in the bombings. The bombings are conducted with this knowledge.

Dr. Noore with more than four decades in medical service and ten years as head of Red Crescent estimates 6000 to 7000 civilian deaths, and many thousands of injuries from bombings. Red Crescent vehicles transport medicine and medical supplies into Iraq from Jordan and Iran. They make deliveries as often as two to three times a week to some cities and hospitals but regularly to hospitals throughout the country. These contacts and hospital requests for medicines and supplies along with the relationships established over the years provide a solid base for

his opinion. He adds to the toll thousands of deaths from failure to obtain adequate supplies of infant formula and medicine, contaminated water and from increased death rates from stress, heart attacks and similar causes.

While I applaud your recent initiative in designating a UN mission to Baghdad to carry medical supplies and ascertain the health needs of the Iraqi people, I urge you to seek major funding now or release of Iraqi funds for supplying 2500 tons of infant and baby milk formula, greatly needed medicines and supplies, equipment for desalination and water purification.

The bombing constitutes the most grievous violation of international law. It is intended to destroy the civilian life and economy of Iraq. It is not necessary, meaningful or permissible as a means of driving Iraq from Kuwait.

No UN resolution authorizes any military assault on Iraq, except as is necessary to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The bombing that has occurred throughout Iraq is the clearest violation of international law and norms for armed conflict, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Nuremberg Charter. It is uncivilized, brutal and racist by any moral standard. With few if any exceptions we witnessed, the destruction is not conceivably within the language or contemplation of Security Council Resolution 678/44.

I urge you to immediately notify the Member-States of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the information herein provided. I urge you to ask for the creation of an investigative body to examine the effect of US bombing of Iraq on the civilian life of the country. Most urgent, I ask you to do everything within your power to stop the bombing of cities, civilian population, public utilities, public highways, bridges and all other civilian areas and facilities in Iraq, and elsewhere. If there is no cease-fire, bombing must be limited to military targets in Kuwait, concentrations of military forces in Iraq near the border of Kuwait, operational military air fields or identified Scud launching sites or mobile missile launchers in Iraq. If a cease-fire is not achieved, the immediate cessation of this lawless bombing of civilian and non-combatants is essential.

The use of highly sophisticated military technology with mass destructive capacity by rich nations against an essentially defenceless civilian population of a poor country is one of the great tragedies of our time. The United States annual military expenditures alone are four

times the gross national product of Iraq. The scourge of war will never end if the United Nations tolerates this assault on life. The United Nations must not be an accessory to war crimes.

We have six to seven hours of video tapes of much of the damage to civilian life and property described above. It includes painful hospital interviews with children, women and men injured in these assaults. The tape was not reviewed or in any way examined by anyone in Iraq before we left, and the actual filming was largely unobserved by any Iraqi official. This footage is being edited. I will send you a copy as soon as it is ready within the next few days. If you wish to have the entire tapes reviewed, let me know and I will arrange a screening.

Copies of this letter are being sent to President Bush and President Hussein and the United Nations Ambassadors for the United States and Iraq.

Sincerely,

Ramsey Clark

—*Mainstream*, 2 March 1991

95

*Indian proposal for Non-Aligned Peace Initiative
on 12 February 1991*

The Ministers expressed their deep distress and anguish at the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf despite all efforts made till the last moment by the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as individual member countries to avert war and to promote a peaceful solution.

They noted with concern that the destruction unleashed by the hostilities in the Gulf has not been confined to military targets. Many innocent lives have been lost. Civilian properties, including thousands of dwelling homes, have been destroyed. Millions of civilians have been caught up in the violence without shelter or protection against bombing. Their plight is compounded by the health hazard faced by them owing to the absence of electricity and increasing shortage of clean water. The Minister urged that internationally accepted methods of warfare be scrupulously adhered to and every possible precaution taken to protect the civilian population against the devastations and

risks of the military operations.

The Ministers recalled that the UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorises member-states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution 660. Even those who are participating in the war in pursuance of this resolution, have recognised that the objective is to liberate Kuwait and not to subdue Iraq or to dismantle its technological and physical infrastructure or to cripple its social and economic life. The Ministers were of the view that the UN Security Council must at all times ensure that the conduct of military operations is in strict conformity with the objective of the Security Council Resolution 678. They urged that for this purpose, the Security Council should meet urgently to review the present situation and thereafter from time to time, to keep the situation under constant review.

The Ministers expressed their deep concern over statements made recently by the parties to the conflict regarding the possible use of chemical and nuclear weapons. The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and reprehensible and prohibited by international law. Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war but instruments of mass annihilation. Their use can unleash death and devastations beyond the theatre of war, affecting both belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The Security Council, while prescribing the use of 'all necessary means' in its Resolution 678, could not have conceived the use of nuclear weapons as falling within these means. The Ministers, therefore, call upon all parties engaged in the conflict strictly to abjure the use of nuclear or chemical weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction.

The Ministers are gravely concerned about the incalculable human suffering caused by the war, its adverse implications for the environment, the danger it poses to international peace and security and to the prospect of growth, particularly of the developing countries.

They, therefore, regard it as imperative that the war must be stopped and peace restored in the Gulf. Consistent with its historical contribution to the promotion of international peace and stability, the Non-Aligned Movement has an important role to play in bringing this about.

II

The Ministers, therefore, call for

1. An immediate cessation of hostilities simultaneous with the an-

nouncement by Iraq of an unequivocal commitment to withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait as well as an announcement of a timeframe of complete withdrawal.

2. Commencement without delay of the process of withdrawal as part of the time-frame of complete withdrawal.

3. Simultaneous arrangement to be made by the Security Council for verification of compliance with both the cessation of hostilities and implementation of the withdrawal schedule.

4. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region simultaneously with the commencement of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and the replacement of these forces by the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force.

5. A guarantee of non-aggression against Iraq to be given by the Security Council.

6. The commencement of the withdrawal of sanctions against Iraq and complete withdrawal of these sanctions simultaneously with the completion of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

III

The Ministers further urge that

1. Agreement should be reached in the Security Council on the modalities for commencing negotiations, after the completion of the process of withdrawal, for resolving Iraq-Kuwait disputes in order to strengthen peace and security in the region.

2. Agreement should also be reached in the Security Council to address, in a comprehensive manner, after the completion of the process of withdrawal, the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian question, through the convening of an international conference, on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on this subject and with the participation of the PLO.

3. Bilateral and multilateral consultations should be promoted among the countries of the region to take further steps to consolidate peace and security, including mutual non-aggression pacts and arms reduction agreements. These pacts and arrangements should be guaranteed by the Security Council, if so requested by the parties concerned.

4. Urgent steps should be taken for the rapid conclusion of the ongoing global disarmament negotiations, such as the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the banning of the develop-

ment, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of weapons of mass destruction.

IV

The Ministers decided

1. To send a small team consisting of the Foreign Ministers of a select group of NAM countries to Baghdad and Washington to seek the agreement of the two parties on the recommendations in points 1 and 2 of Section II of this Initiative.

2. To take formal action, as soon as an agreement of the two parties is obtained, to convene an emergency session of the Security Council to consider and take action on the other points indicated in Sections II and III.

Belgrade

12 February 1991

—*Mainstream*, 2 March 1991

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UN Security Council to hold closed formal session on 13 February 1991

The Council will allow publication of the verbatim transcript of the closed meeting to be held February 14. The vote was 9 to 2 (Cuba and Yemen opposed) with China, Ecuador, India, and Zimbabwe abstaining.

The United States supported the Council's decision, Ambassador Thomas Pickering said, so that countries would have the opportunity to express their views "without providing Iraq an opportunity to exploit our debate or twist the truth."

Pickering said that "it is clear in recent days that Iraq is fighting a major campaign to discredit this council, its resolutions, the UN, and the person and institution of the Secretary-General. Its disregard for the truth is as obvious as its disregard for its neighbors."

Questioning the purpose of a public debate on the gulf war, the

ambassador pointed out that Iraq has made clear it is not interested in a cease-fire accompanied by a withdrawal.

"We must not do anything which will prolong the conflict, and that most particularly includes sending signals, which Iraq will misperceive and misuse, that the council is not firm in its decisions and is not intent on seeing them implemented," he said.

"The signal we must send instead, and keep on sending, is that this body and the international community are resolute, as they have been since August 2," Pickering said. "We refuse to tolerate the unprovoked seizure and attempted obliteration of a member state of the UN. We will not tolerate the outrageous behavior of Iraqi occupying forces in Kuwait, in contravention of international law."

Pickering made it plain that "We have no wish or intent to stifle debate", noting that the private meeting "will encourage genuine and effective give and take".

The five countries who are members of the Arab Maghreb Union, along with Yemen, Jordan, the Sudan, and Cuba, have been pressing for an open council session to discuss the allied coalition's conduct of the gulf war since it began in January. However, the majority of the council members felt that a public debate would not help convince Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait and instead, might send the wrong signal to Baghdad.

The compromise—first suggested by Austria—was to hold a formal, but private meeting of the council. Thus other UN member states, who are barred from the council's regular private consultations, could participate; only the news media and general public were not allowed to take part.

British Ambassador Sir David Hannay formally proposed that the council continue in private when the meeting began February 13.

Sir David pointed out that the council's rules provide for private meetings "in exceptional circumstances". He said "this occasion calls for serious and careful consideration of all developments away from the glare of immediate publicity."

"First the council has adopted a series of resolutions in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, culminating in Resolution 678, authorizing the use of all necessary means to uphold and implement the previous resolutions," he said. "At the same time diplomacy is actively underway as it has been since the 2nd of August to see if there is any way to bring about the peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of the

council's resolutions."

"We should do nothing which would detract from the council's unity of purpose or blur the signal that is sent to the outside world," Sir David said. "In our view we cannot afford to send mixed signals when that might only delay the realization that a peaceful solution of this crisis has to begin with the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait."

The council used the closed session format in 1974 for discussions on the Middle East and Cyprus, and in November 1975 on the Western Sahara. The council otherwise regularly meets in private to consider the appointment of a secretary-general and adopt its annual report.

Proponents of the closed meeting say that to use an open meeting to deliver set speeches will not help the peace process. Instead, in the closed session, council members can discuss openly with the countries that still have channels to Baghdad how the Iraqi leadership can be persuaded to withdraw.

Yemen and Cuba strenuously objected to the closed meeting and used their position as members of the council to publicly air their objections to the situation in the gulf.

Yemeni Ambassador Abdalla Al-Ashtal said the closed meeting would "destroy the democratic methods and transparency of the United Nations."

Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov also pointed out that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz is expected in Moscow in a few days and that the council meeting should be a collective influence on Baghdad.

He added that "public debates in the Security Council may be incorrectly interpreted in Baghdad and make more difficult the Soviet Union's and other countries efforts for a peaceful settlement."

Private discussions may help those countries to "refine peace efforts and to ask personal questions and discuss how to promote intensive search (for peace) in a businesslike atmosphere", the Soviet envoy said.

"The Soviet Union firmly stands by the resolutions and insists on their full and unreserved implementation", Vorontsov said.

Kuwaiti Ambassador Mohammad Abulhasan told journalists before the session that while it is up to the 15 council members to determine what type of meeting to hold, "We don't want that meeting to deliver a wrong signal to the Iraqi regime that there is a split or tendency to move away from Security Council resolutions."

"I would like that the meeting produce a reaffirmation of Security Council resolutions concerning Kuwait that whatever military force is

used, (that) it is used strictly to liberate Kuwait and to implement Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662", Abulhasan said.

—USIS, New Delhi

97

Council must send firm message to Iraq, US says on 13 February 1991

United Nations—The United States supports a Security Council's decision to hold a formal, but private meeting on the Persian Gulf crisis February 14, because it will allow nations to share their views, "without providing Iraq an opportunity to exploit our debate or twist the truth," says US Ambassador Thomas Pickering.

Pickering added February 13 that "it is clear in recent days that Iraq is fighting a major campaign to discredit this council, its resolutions, the UN, and the person and institution of the Secretary-General. Its disregard for the truth is as obvious as its disregard for its neighbors."

Questioning the purpose of public debate on the gulf war, the ambassador pointed out that Iraq has made clear it is not interested in a cease-fire accompanied by withdrawal.

"We must not do anything which will prolong the conflict, and that most particularly includes sending signals, which Iraq will misperceive and misuse, that the council is not firm in its decisions and is not intent on seeing them implemented," he said.

"The signal we must send instead, and keep on sending, is that this body and the international community are resolute, as they have been since August 2", Pickering said. "We refuse to tolerate the unprovoked seizure and attempted obliteration of a member state of the UN. We will not tolerate the outrageous behavior of Iraqi occupying forces in Kuwait, in contravention of international law."

Nine nations, including the members of the Arab Maghreb Union asked for a council meeting to air their concerns about the situation in the gulf. The council decided—by a vote of 9 to 2 with 4 abstentions—that to accommodate the desire of non-members to express their

views and yet not send mixed signals to Baghdad the meeting will be held in private. The verbatim of the private meeting will be released.

"No one likes the fact that we have been compelled by Saddam Hussein to respond to force with force," Pickering said. "There are no greater advocates of peace than those who are called upon to pay the price for defending the principles of international law and conduct contained in the UN Charter."

Following is the text of Pickering's remarks:

We are discussing today an important procedural question about how this Council deals seriously with one of the most important issues it has ever had before it. We have been grappling with the question of what next steps the Council should take regarding the Gulf crisis. A wide variety of concerns have been expressed about the need to maintain the integrity of the Council's decisions, the impact of the war, the failure of Iraq to respond to diplomatic overtures, and the need for the Council to remain engaged. We have listened carefully, for my government shares many of the concerns which have been expressed, even if we do not always agree with all of the conclusions.

After having weighed the pros and cons of a variety of options, we have concluded that the interests of all the members of the Council, and of the members of the UN, can be best served now by a proposal advanced by the Austrian delegation some days ago: The holding of a formal but private meeting of the Security Council. We believe this will enable all who wish to do so to express their views and to exchange ideas in an appropriate setting. At the same time, this proposal will enable delegations to get statements on the record if they believe it desirable. But most of all, I hope that it will offer the opportunity for a serious and constructive discussion, free from the glare of instantaneous publicity and the misinterpretation and misuse to which this meeting might be subject. We have no wish or intent to stifle debate. Indeed, we support this proposal because it will encourage genuine and effective give and take.

We meet at a time of considerable gravity. The Security Council has acted to ensure full Iraqi compliance with its resolutions. It has taken the most difficult of decisions for member states of the United Nations: To authorize the use of force to confront unprovoked aggression and to achieve a return to international legitimacy and legality. It was compelled to make this decision. A few nations still find it all too easy to turn to violence and aggression to achieve their ends, counting on the acquiescence of others. Unfortunately, Iraq has given

the world no reason to believe that it ever intended to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the will of the international community.

No one likes the fact that we have been compelled by Saddam Hussein to respond to force with force. There are greater advocates of peace than those who are called upon to pay the price for defending the principles of international law and conduct contained in the UN Charter. Again we call upon Iraq to withdraw immediately from Kuwait, and to comply with the 12 relevant Security Council Resolutions. By doing so—and only by doing so—Iraq could end the bloodshed right now, today.

The objectives of the United States and the coalition effort are clear and limited, and set out in the Security Council Resolutions: The withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Our aims are no broader than to compel Iraq's compliance with the resolutions.

President Bush stated at the outset of coalition operations that we seek neither the destruction of Iraq, nor its dismemberment, nor to punish its people for the policies of their leaders. And, despite the propaganda charges to the contrary, never in history have military forces been engaged in battle with so much concern for the limitation of damage to the civilian population. Warfare is indeed a terrible thing. All coalition members are making the maximum effort to avoid civilian casualties. This often means increased risk to our own forces, a cost we are willing to bear. I cannot help but note that this is in stark contrast to Iran's own policy of deliberately targeting civilian populations for uncertain missile terror attacks. It has also deliberately increased the exposure of its own population by moving military equipment and facilities into civilian areas, with the purpose of using innocent Iraqi civilians and their homes as shields against attack.

As President Bush somberly observed several weeks ago, Americans fight in anger only because we have to fight at all. We did everything we could to avoid this conflict. And we will do our best to bring it to the earliest possible conclusion. Despite the invective to the contrary, some of which we have been subjected to today, this is not a war of hegemony, not a grab for the control of oil reserves, and not an attempt to impose an American "order" on the Arab world. Such foolishness ignores the realities of both Iraqi behavior and the overwhelming rejection by the members of the United Nations of that

behavior. We are in the Gulf, as are the other 30 members of the coalition, to ensure that naked aggression does not succeed. We want to give meaning to the only principles on which a peaceful and prosperous world community can be based. We will stay not one day longer than necessary.

Looking ahead, Secretary Baker outlined on February 7 the expectation of the US leadership that, following hostilities, the states of the Gulf themselves, and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council will take the lead in rebuilding the war-ravaged region and in building a network of new and stronger security ties. No regional state should be excluded from such arrangements.

But what we must discuss today is how the Council will conduct further serious and important discussions on the Gulf crisis. My government brings one fundamental criterion to this debate: How can we promote the earliest possible withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, and how can we strengthen the Council's role in achieving this objective?

My mathematics may be deficient but I would like to remind the distinguished representative of Cuba that this is approximately the 195th day of the war which began with Iraqi aggression on August 2 and not the 28th as he claims. All of us in this room, and literally thousands of people throughout the world, in dozens of ministries and institutions, have exerted every effort to avoid this conflict. All want it ended as soon as possible. And all agree on one thing: Iraq must leave Kuwait. Iraq's refusal to accept this, and its many deeds in contravention of international law, make it in a literal sense an "out-law" state.

Iraq continues to reject every proposal from every envoy seeking peace, including most recently Iran and Pakistan. It had spurned before the efforts the UN Secretary-General, the Arab League, the GCC, the OAU, and innumerable bilateral initiatives at the highest levels. Iraq's reaction to the latest Soviet envoy regrettably contains nothing new, and still refuses to consider or countenance withdrawal. Although efforts will continue, Radio Baghdad on February 10 declared that Iraq rejects the idea of a cease-fire, and still insists that the independent nation of Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq. With this as prologue, what then is the purpose of this meeting?

With only a few exceptions, no member of this Council is suggesting that it back away from Resolution 678. No one is suggesting that there be a cease-fire without concrete evidence that Iraq will withdraw and comply fully with the Council's resolutions. And all of us, I

believe, sincerely seek for peace. President Bush has made clear he welcomes any mediation effort to convince Iraq to comply fully with the UNSC resolutions and to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.

But there are some states, including Iraq, which are trying to call into question the clear, legal obligations the Council has imposed upon it, and the clear, legal authority granted to the coalition military effort, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678. The Council has acted, and the coalition effort has been undertaken in keeping with the UN Charter. The Council continues to monitor the situation. The United States has submitted frequent and full reports to the Council as required under UNSC Resolution 678. My country holds that the Council should meet when it is in a position to advance its objectives, and to take action. That is what the international community looks to us for. And given the continuing refusal of Iraq to acknowledge the validity of the Council's demands, that does not seem to be the case.

We have yet to have defined for us the purpose of a public debate this afternoon. Is it to explore a cease-fire? Iraq has just made clear it is not interested in a cease-fire accompanied by withdrawal. And a cease-fire without withdrawal is unacceptable: We have no intention of offering Saddam Hussein breathing space in which to regroup. Nor does he have any need of a pause in the fighting to make the decision which he needs to make.

Is the purpose of this meeting to exchange information on the military effort? Open scrutiny of coalition efforts occurs every day, with thousands of journalists in the Middle East. The exposure to scrutiny of military operations in the Gulf is indeed unprecedented in history.

At the present juncture, when Iraq remains intransigent and it is not clear what additional steps the Council might take to ensure compliance with its resolutions, our concern is that a meeting will be subject either to misinterpretation or exploitation. Above all else, we must not do anything which will prolong the conflict, and that most particularly includes sending signals, which Iraq will misuse and misperceive that the Council is not firm in its decisions and is not intent on seeing them implemented.

The signal we must send instead, and keep on sending, is that this body and the international community are resolute and united, as they have been since August 2. We will not tolerate the unprovoked seizure and attempted obliteration of a member state of the United Nations. We will not tolerate the outrageous behavior of Iraqi occupying forces

in Kuwait, in contravention of international law. We will not accept the obliteration of Kuwait or the terrorizing and torturing of its people. We will not tolerate indiscriminate terror attacks against civilians in Saudi Arabia and Israel. We will not tolerate flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. And we will not tolerate mindless attacks on the environment. The Council must make clear that the international community is prepared to do what is necessary to make sure that this aggression, and this lawlessness, is not rewarded.

Given the evident and earnest desire on the part of a number of nations for the Council to meet to discuss the Gulf crisis, and notwithstanding our reservations about the genuine usefulness of such a meeting, we will join with a majority in the Council. We believe that the form of such a meeting should be in keeping with the purpose, which in this case I take to be a serious discussion and exchange of views, commensurate with the importance and sensitivity of the subject. This will also respond to the appeal of a member of the Council that we do nothing now which would endanger its continuing diplomatic efforts to get Iraq to implement the Council resolutions.

For the reasons I have indicated, we support the Austrian suggestion that we move to a formal private session. This will allow non-Council members to share their views, while permitting the exchange and circulation of prepared statements which nations may wish to deliver and make public.

It has become clear in recent days that Iraq is fighting a major campaign to discredit this Council, its resolutions, the United Nations, and the person and institution of the Secretary-General. Its disregard for its neighbors. It is our earnest belief that this formula will meet the concerns which have been expressed in this room, without providing Iraq an opportunity to exploit our debate or twist the truth.

We urge Iraq's leadership again to turn away from its destructive course and to bring an end to the needless suffering it has inflicted on the people of Kuwait, the people of the international community, and now on its own population. We hope that all states will join us in affirming support for enforcement of the resolutions of the Security Council, in confirming their support for the Secretary-General, and in renewing the call on Iraq to bring an end to the conflict in the Gulf.

—USIS, New Delhi

*China's statement in UN Security Council
on 14 February 1991*

The statement concerning a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis, made by Ambassador Li Daoyu, China's permanent representative to the United Nations, at a UN Security Council's meeting on 14 February.

We regret that despite the greatest efforts by the international community for a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis, it is unfortunately [as received] that all these efforts had failed and the war finally broke out. The war has been going on for nearly a month, inflicting disastrous losses of lives and properties. Many innocent civilians have been killed and many non-military installations demolished. We express our deep grief and sympathy about it. We are deeply anxious and worried that there exists a serious danger of the expansion and escalation of the war and the situation is extremely grave.

From the very start of the Gulf crisis, the Chinese Government has adopted a principled and responsible position. We have opposed Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally, and restore and respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the legitimate Government of Kuwait. At the same time, the Chinese Government has consistently held that the Gulf crisis should be settled through peaceful means within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We believe a peaceful solution through negotiations may take a longer time, but with a lower cost, whereas, the use of force will not provide a solution in a short time and there exists the possibility of a protracted and expanded war. All the parties concerned will pay a high price for it. Consideration should be given to the fact that war has its own logic, independent of man's will, and that war will lead to many serious consequences, difficult to estimate at present. Modern war is cruel. The longer the war lasts, the more serious the consequences will be. Therefore, we once again call upon the belligerent parties to exercise the greatest restraint and prevent the spread and expansion of the flames of war so that the people of the Middle East and the Gulf region and the countries concerned will be saved from greater disasters, thus creating favourable conditions and

providing opportunities for the international community to continue its search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

The Gulf War has caused universal concern and anxiety of the international community. Some states' leaders have put forward many peace proposals for an early end to the war. We appreciate their efforts. We are of the view that in order to give peace efforts a chance for progress, there should exist the following elements: First, Iraq should signify that it will withdraw its troops from Kuwait immediately; second, the parties concerned agree to seek a peaceful solution; third, the belligerent parties will exercise restraint so as to reduce hostilities and prevent the expansion and escalation of the war; fourth, the settlement of the Middle East question should be scheduled; fifth, the arrangements after the Gulf War should be made mainly by the countries in the region, and foreign military forces should withdraw from the Gulf region.

The Chinese Government has always supported the positive role played by the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the relevant member states of the United Nations in seeking a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis. Together with the international community, we are willing to continue to make our own contributions to achieving an early solution to this crisis and restoring peace and stability in the Gulf region.

—*FBIS-NES*, 15 February 1991

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Summary of UN Security Council's debate on 15 February 1991

The Security Council began holding its first closed, formal session in 15 years after the five nations of the Arab Maghreb Union—Jordan, Yemen, the Sudan, and Cuba—pressed for a council meeting to discuss the conduct of the hostilities by the allied coalition. The nine countries that asked for the meeting also hoped to push for a cease-fire.

Ambassador Abulhasan of Kuwait asked "those countries that speak out loudly in defense of the stubborn Iraqi regime" to strongly condemn the inhumane Iraqi practices and asked how could Iraq be

rewarded for its aggression and atrocities with a cease-fire.

"Should not these countries instead turn first to Iraq to maintain international peace and security," the ambassador said. "Should not they direct to that regime their appeals and calls for withdrawal."

Abulhasan pointed out that the use of brute force or the waging of war started on 2 August last year "When legions of the treacherous and usurping Iraqi army assaulted Kuwait. . . trampling its people underfoot, displacing its families, raping and defiling its sanctities, wreaking unprecedented havoc. . . and plundering and destroying all the enormous economic potential."

He said that in the current military operations "the Kuwaiti armed forces had the honor of firing the first shots in the battle to liberate the blessed land of Kuwait. . . the fighting has not been expanded, nor is its target the destruction of Iraq. The only aim is to set Kuwait free from the machine of aggression."

"We cannot fail to note here that it was the Iraqi regime that brought this devastation upon itself and upon its people because of its insistence on aggression, its rejection of the international will, its refusal to comply with the international will, its defiance of the world community's resolutions and the sentiments of world public opinion, its violation of all laws, norms, covenants and principles," he said.

With the exception of the Iraqi delegate, all who addressed the council stressed that the first step in ending the conflict still lies with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the form of an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

Iraq's crimes against Kuwait, the many failed peace missions to Baghdad, Iraq's disregard of the Geneva Conventions, and the responsibilities of the international community were recalled. There was no mention of a cease-fire in the first day's debate.

Ambassador Samir Shihabi of Saudi Arabia said "We would be deceiving ourselves, we would be hypocrites condoning injustice and rejecting reality, if we failed to acknowledge that the Iraqi regime was given every opportunity to return to the path of wisdom, or if we maintained that it would have agreed to leave Kuwait voluntarily."

"To Iraq's apologists and those who maintain that we were duty bound to give Iraq another chance, we say that no usurper in all of history was ever given the opportunity and time that the Iraqi regime was given to desist from its adventures and to evacuate Kuwait," Shihabi said.

"How many emissaries marched to that regime's leader, advising

and guiding him, enlightening and promising, warning and threatening," he said. "... Has the game of the guest hostages been forgotten, the game in which each leader or mediator who arrived in Baghdad was given a number of persons to take back to his country, satisfying the purpose of his visit?"

Asking Iraq's supporters why they are sacrificing the state of Kuwait and its people, Shihabi said "Is Kuwaiti blood cheap to you?"

"What would be your attitude today if your people and country were in the position of Kuwait and its people, invaded by one who does not fear the Creator and does not value human being?" the Saudi ambassador said.

Qatar Ambassador Hassan Al-Ni'mah, who also represented the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), appealed to the council "to insist on and remain committed to the resolutions it has adopted and to resort to all means to secure their implementation."

"We are convinced that any slackening in the council would constitute a set-back to international legitimacy," Al-Ni'mah said. Commitment to council resolutions "will help bring about peace in our area and will enable the Arab region to engage once again in the march towards development, inspired by the heritage of our heavenly messengers and Islam, the religion of tolerance."

He said that the GCC is "convinced that the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government, headed by Sheikh Al-Sabah, is in keeping with international legitimacy and respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter. If these resolutions remain unimplemented, the council will have failed in its responsibility and duty with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security."

The people of Iraq, Al-Ni'mah said, "have become victims of the aggression launched against Kuwait and victims of those who obstinately refuse to reverse this aggression against Kuwait."

Ambassador Li Daoyu of China, a permanent member of the Security Council, said that from the start of the crisis China opposed the Iraqi invasion.

However, he pointed out that "modern war is cruel. The longer the war lasts, the more serious the consequences will be" and he called upon the warring parties "to exercise the greatest restraint and prevent the spread and expansion of the flames of war so that the people of the Middle East and the gulf region and the countries concerned will be saved from greater disasters."

Li Daoyu said that first Iraq should signify that it will withdraw its troops from Kuwait immediately.

Romanian Ambassador Aurel Munteanu said that the failure of peace efforts has created increasing destruction and suffering in Iraq "but no one should forget who bears the full responsibility for the invasion of Kuwait, for the outbreak of war and for its tragic consequences."

"It is only through the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions that an end can be put to this tragic situation", Munteanu said. "That is why Iraq should clearly and unequivocally declare that it will fully comply."

He also expressed sympathy for the suffering of the people in Saudi Arabia and Israel who are being attacked by Iraq and all the countries having severe economic problems because they are complying with the UN sanctions against Iraq.

Austria's Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner, a new member of the Security Council, also said that the hostilities started on August 2 when Iraq invaded Kuwait not mid-January.

"We, who have ourselves once been the victim of military aggression, have good reason to support the action undertaken by the international community against an aggressor," he said. He urged, nevertheless, that while the hostilities continued diplomatic efforts to find peace should go on.

"While it is understandable that attention is being focused on dealing with the immediate situation, we must not lose sight of its long-term implications. It has been said that the Gulf conflict is a defining moment in history. The way in which we deal with, and finally resolve, this conflict will be a paradigmatic importance not only for the future of the region but also for the concept of collective security and the role of the United Nations as a whole," he said.

"For Austria, the goal is clear. We seek full implementation of all Security Council resolutions beginning with resolution 660—no more, no less," Hohenfellner said.

Ecuadoran Ambassador Jose Ayala-Lasso, another new member of the council, said that even though military action is underway diplomatic and political actions to resolve the problem should be redoubled.

On a humanitarian level, the Ecuadoran ambassador appealed to Iraq to "reflect on and comply" with the council's resolutions. And he asked the coalition "to promote peace in the region by showing the kind of flexibility that only the defender of justice and reason can

show."

"Despite the aggressor's obduracy, we must remain persistent in searching for a way out, which, by restoring the rule of law, will make possible a peace that will be more easily accepted and therefore more lasting," Ayala-Lasso said.

"We believe that any solution must be based on strict compliance with the principles the Charter embodies in the resolutions adopted by the Security Council," he said. "The fundamental aim of the Security Council resolutions is the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of international security in the region."

Another speaker was Belgium's Ambassador Paul Noterdaeme, another new council member.

"All of this suffering and destruction is rooted in Iraq's refusal to respect the most fundamental provisions of international law," Noterdaeme said. "If a small peaceful state can be wiped off the map by a powerful neighbor with no reaction from the international community, few members of the United Nations will feel safe.

"For my country—which twice in this century has been invaded, which endured the burden of two lengthy occupations and was twice liberated by an international coalition against totalitarianism and dictatorship—the principle of the defense of Kuwait and of the need to liberate it is crucial and basic", he said.

Saying he understood the concerns of those countries that asked for the meeting after seeing the daily sights of combat and its aftermath, Belgium's ambassador said "unfortunately, one must immediately remember that the sole cause of the present war in the Gulf was the universally-condemned expansionism of the Iraqi regime and of the country's stubborn refusal to respect the will of the international community."

Any truce, he said, would ultimately prolong hostilities rather than cut them short.

"A cessation of military operations would be interpreted by the Government of Iraq as a sign of weakness on the part of the international community, and that government would use it to bolster new arguments to justify its contempt for the council's resolutions and take it as evidence of an illusory tactical advantage in the field", Noterdaeme said.

Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov was the final speaker. He said the attacks on Israel, the dumping of oil in the gulf are further escalating the conflict that "may create a danger exceeding the mandate

of the council's resolutions."

"We believe that the entire international community and all states must actively exert their influence on the Iraqi leadership to force it to change its mind," Vorontsov said. "That is precisely the aim of the continuation of the Soviet-Iraqi contacts now taking place in Moscow."

"In our view the present discussion in the Security Council must serve as a clear reaffirmation of the need for the speedy implementation of the resolutions adopted so far by the Security Council resolutions", he said. "Our meeting here is a clear signal to the Iraqi leadership that it must comply with these just and well-founded decisions of the Security Council and in the interests of its people and of the peace in the region declare an immediate, full, and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait."

Vorontsov ended the meeting with a question for Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Al-Anbari: "When shall we hear such a statement from the Iraqi leadership?"

—USIS, New Delhi

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Excerpts from statement by former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega from Amman on 15 February 1991

I want to tell the people of Nicaragua that the International Movement for Peace was formed a few hours ago in Amman, the capital of Jordan, by 15 political and religious personalities. We have made known a peace plan. It is a comprehensive peace plan for attaining a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. This plan was read by US Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, President of Pax Christi for the entire United States. The Bishop of Amman also read a message from the Vatican expressing support for the International Movement for Peace, which fully parallels our proposal and that of Iraq in stating that the solution to the problems of the region must be all-encompassing. This means that the law must be equally applied to everyone and not selectively as the United States has attempted in this case. There are a number of UN resolutions that have not been fulfilled. Territories are occupied by Israel and the Palestinian problem remains—these resolutions have

not been fulfilled. The United States is determined to impose implementation of a UN resolution by force on Iraq, yet it ignores other UN resolutions. There has already been massive bombing that has resulted in thousands of casualties. Therefore, the proposals by the Vatican and Iraq and the proposal we presented in Amman this morning fully share the view that the problem must be resolved as a whole. There is also full agreement in support of peace.

We must stress that an hour after the peace plan was disclosed, Iraq responded over Radio Baghdad through a Revolution Command [Council] statement; in other words, the Iraqi political and government leadership, indicating that in response to the request for Iraq to take the first step. . . [changes thought] Our proposal states that as a contribution towards peace, Iraq should announce acceptance of this proposal for a just, lasting and overall peace in the Middle East.

This implies that Iraq, as a first step, would be willing to begin a process to resolve the situation in Kuwait. The proposal continues. This is the first of seven points. Iraq has said that, in keeping with requests for this first step, it is willing to withdraw from Kuwait as long all UN resolutions are complied with. In other words, it is thus ratifying the position maintained in the peace proposal that we are revealing this morning. This, I repeat, fully agrees with the Vatican's position.

I wish to take advantage of this moment to unveil the peace plan to the Nicaraguan people. It reads as follows:

International Peace Movement [Movimiento Internacional por la Paz] proposal for the achievement of a just, lasting and overall peace in the Middle East:

We, the undersigned members of the International Peace Movement believe that the preservation or restoration of peace based on justice is the supreme objective of humanity. We are firmly convinced that the achievement and preservation of peace require a firm commitment to defend the rule of law in international relations at all times, without exception.

We also believe that peace requires recognition of the basic equality of all people and their right to live in an uncontaminated environment in conditions that are compatible with human dignity and world scientific development.

We are profoundly worried about the war in the Middle East. The use of massive bombing and, in general, excessive measures that are not in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter and humanitarian law, has resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and incalculable

destruction of the region's economic and social infrastructure.

The entire planet is being threatened by an irreversible ecological catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions. The war must be stopped. With this in mind, we have created the International Peace Movement, which we hope will grow and expand sufficiently to stop the dementia of war, suffering and destruction, and give peace and life a chance in the Middle East and around the world.

We are completely committed to the preservation of the UN Security Council as a vital instrument in maintaining international peace and security. However, we believe that this will only be achieved by guaranteeing that all its resolutions and decisions, without exception, are equally respected and complied with.

In keeping with provisions contained in the UN Charter, the Security Council must enforce compliance with all its resolutions with the same firmness, while refraining from being selective in this regard. In the Middle East, there is an ever increasing number of situations that stem from failure to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, on the illegal annexation and occupation of territories, as is the case with Palestine, and which include Jerusalem, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Cyprus and, most recently, Kuwait.

Peace in the region demands prompt resolution of all these situations. It is increasingly evident that the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East requires a stronger commitment than shown so far to declare the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Concerning the Persian Gulf, we have taken note of observations from Iraq, as well as from the United States, which enable us to harbour the hope that the possibility still exists of reaching a diplomatic agreement, despite the intensity of the armed conflict. We believe that for the sake of mankind we are duty bound to provide an opportunity for peace by appealing to the noblest sentiments of all who, in some way, are involved in these problems. In this spirit, we, the International Movement for Peace, are submitting the following proposal for a just, lasting and overall peace in the Middle East.

We are proposing that, to contribute towards peace, Iraq should announce acceptance of this proposal for a just, lasting and overall peace in the Middle East. This would entail, as a first step, that Iraq be prepared to begin the process to find a solution to the situation in Kuwait the moment the UN Secretary-General announces, with the authorisation of the UN Security Council and in coordination and co-

operation with the Iraqi government, the arrival of UN personnel to observe implementation of this process.

Unresolved territorial disputes must be settled according to the norms of international law and through mutually agreed upon means to resolve controversies. Although it is true that Iraq's announcement accepting this overall process marks the start of the peace process in the Middle East, the nature of the problems in the region is such that total implementation of this proposal, as well as the establishment of a just, lasting and overall peace in the region, require that:

(1) All US forces and all other foreign forces deployed to the Persian Gulf since 2nd August 1990 should be withdrawn as soon as the peace process begins, within a time no greater than it took for them to be deployed.

(2) All sanctions and punitive measures against Iraq should be suspended as soon as the peace process begins, and unilateral as well as UN Security Council guarantees should be given that force will not be used against Iraq during or after implementation of this proposal for a peaceful solution, based on the terms contained herein.

(3) All UN Security Council members, particularly its permanent members, pledge to support the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution demanding respect and the immediate implementation of all resolutions related to Israel's withdrawal from all Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and all other occupied Arab territories in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and the dismantling of Israeli settlements in all those territories.

This entails the adoption, based on Chapter Seven [not further specified], of the same measures implemented in the Persian Gulf against those who choose to maintain their stances of systematic defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.

Progress in implementing these measures will be indispensable towards making progress in achieving substantial solutions to the situation in Kuwait.

(4) The UN Security Council immediately assume its obligation of taking all necessary practical measures to guarantee the protection and safety of the Palestinian population and all Islamic and Christian holy sites that are currently under Israeli occupation.

(5) In practice, the implementation of points three and four require that as soon as peace begins, an international conference on peace in the Middle East be convened, in line with the appropriate UN resolutions, to establish overall peace and the security of the region that

will allow the Palestinian people to exercise their rights as a nation, including the right to regain their self-determination and independence and return to their national and ancestral homeland.

(6) Regional and international agreements should be reached to resolve the region's underlying economic, social, political and security problems, including the need to declare the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, to defend the principle of the rule of law in international relations, and to develop measures that strengthen mutual trust, so that the road can be paved for total disarmament.

Signatories to this statement are: Daniel Ortega; Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, President of the US Pax Christi group; the Algerian Assembly President; the Jordanian Assembly President; the Cypriot Assembly President; the Vice-President of the Yemeni Assembly; two representatives of the PLO Executive Committee and officials of the Palestinian state government, the Libyan government and the Jordanian House of Notables and House of Representatives; British Labour Party parliamentarian Tony Benn and the Zambian Foreign Minister.

This statement was signed in the presence of the Catholic Church representatives Bishops Salim Sayegh and Mgr Rayet Bayard [phonetic], who read out a message from the Vatican at today's meeting. The document was also signed by the conference [not further specified] secretary Father Miguel d'Escoto.

—SWB, ME/0999, A/19, 18 February 1991

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Statement by the Iraqi Revolution Command Council on 15 February 1991

Honourable Arabs, true Muslim believers, freedom-loving people around the world: Ever since the United States, Zionism and the United States' imperialist Western allies came to realise that an Arab Muslim country—Iraq—was developing a force of its own, capable of being a counterweight to the imperialist-backed Zionism—a free, honourable force, resolved selflessly to tackle Zionist aggression and greed, and to reject imperialist hegemony over the region, the United States, Zionism and all colonial powers who entertained hatred against Arabs

and Muslims—[ever since then, they] set about taking measures, making decisions and waging campaigns of falsehood and incitement against Iraq, with the object of thwarting the creation and development of this force, and isolating and punishing Iraq, because it has faithfully, determinedly and efficiently gone beyond the limits set by the United States, imperialism and imperialist forces, for the states of the region.

1988 and 1989 saw sustained campaigns in the press and other media and by officials in the USA and other imperialist nations to pave the way for the fulfilment of vicious aims. 1990 saw these campaigns escalate feverishly and mount day by day. The aim was clear to us and to all conscious Arabs and true Muslims, as well as to all the free people who believe in freedom and justice in the world. The aim was to pave the way for destroying this nascent force and tip the regional balance back in favour of the USA, Zionism and the imperialists—the balance that has been in place for many decades and prevented the Arabs from recovering their rights and usurped and occupied lands in Palestine, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. It has also stood in the way of the Arab nation realising its aspirations for revival, progress and justice in the interest of occupying its deserved place in the world by virtue of its glorious history and its great contribution to human civilisation.

In the early months of 1990, these campaigns intensified, expanded and assumed a hysterical dimension, with daily incitements to hit Iraq, liquidate its leadership and deprive it of the means to achieve a revival and progress. Along with other imperialist nations, the USA took a string of measures and made unfair decisions banning the export of whatever may contribute to Iraq's development and its scientific and industrial revival. These decisions called for an effective economic blockade, including the cancellation of food contracts in March 1990. It was also clear that in concert with the Zionist entity, the USA was preparing to hit Iraq's scientific and industrial facilities and liquidate its patriotic, believing leadership. When the USA discovered that its plan, which largely rests on the Zionist military capability, fell short of achieving its civil aims, it brought into the conspiracy its hireling, corrupt agent and conspiratorial rulers in the region—the enemies of God. The role of these was to undermine Iraq's economy and then push Iraq to the brink of economic collapse.

In the meantime, the USA set about tightening the network of the imperialist alliance in the interests of forging a political and military US-Atlantic alliance with the aim of dealing a blow to Iraq and

controlling the region when the opportunity to achieve this aim presented itself with the lopsided balance represented in the USSR becoming preoccupied with internal developments.

O Iraqis, O Arabs, O Muslims, O free men of the world: The events of 2nd August 1990, in substance and goal, were not as portrayed by the US and colonialist propaganda, or as were described by the treacherous rulers, followers of America. They were a national, pan-Arab and Islamic uprising against the conspiracy and conspirators—an uprising against injustice, immorality, corruption and imperialist-Zionist colonialist hegemony of the region, and against the plotters whose role in the US-Zionist conspiracy became exposed. Thus, the imperialist-Zionist-Atlantic alliance revealed its true goals and intentions from the very first hours of those events. The alliance massed armies and forces and organised the biggest and most malicious campaigns of misinformation, lies and deception witnessed by the world in the modern age.

This oppressive and sly imperialist-Zionist-Atlantic alliance manipulated the UN to issue with unparalleled swiftness a series of unjust and unprecedented resolutions, although this body had failed, throughout several decades, to fulfil the simplest demands of the Arab nation and preserve the simplest rights of the Arabs in Palestine, despite the obviousness of the Arab right and the severity of the tragedy of the struggling Palestinian people, from which other Arabs, including the oppressed Lebanese people, have suffered.

This tyrannical alliance has forced its will on the world. It has pursued terrorist and extortionist tactics, as well as bribery, not to mention the malicious means of lying and deception found in the pouch of imperialism, Zionism and colonial powers, to pave the way for the aggression against Iraq.

O glorious Iraqis, O dear Arabs, O faithful Muslims, O freemen and honourable people throughout the world, the aggression that has been launched on Iraq, the courageous, proud, mujahid, faithful and patient country, is unprecedented in history. The entire history of mankind (?will) never record such an alliance in which the USA as well as two big powers participated, not to mention several other countries numbering 30, against the mujahid, courageous and patient Iraq, whose population does not exceed 18 million people. It is an evil, (?rancorous), malicious and atheistic alliance against the bastion of faith and principles, against the centre of freedom where the call for justice and fairness is made.

Over the past month, the USA, its allies, along with the Zionist

entity, which has taken part in the aggression from the beginning, have launched savage and destructive raids on the Iraqi people; on their economic, scientific, cultural and service property; and also on their religious centres and the sites of ancient civilisations in Iraq. These raids are unprecedented in history in terms of the gigantic firepower used and in terms of the means of killing and destruction used in a manner that contravenes the UN Charter, the false international legitimacy and the new world order, which they wanted to use as an order for US-Atlantic hegemony over the world.

The United States and the partners in the evil alliance, the planes that fire their missiles from a distance and the long-range missiles, have dropped huge quantities of bombs and explosives on women, children and old people in all Iraq's cities and villages and even on the nomad bedouin in the desert. They hit in a premeditated manner mosques, churches, schools, hospitals, civilian factories, bridges, main roads, telephone, electricity and water centres, irrigation dams, cultural centres and sites in the country. They hit targets that have no connection in any way whatsoever with the military effort or the military duel arena of which they have spoken.

Their latest crime was the ugly and dirty crime of the premeditated bombardment of a civilian shelter. They killed and burned hundreds of women, children and old people. The aim of this unjust aggression was very clear, namely to proceed with the process of destruction which they want and to punish the proud, free and struggling Iraqi people, because it has chosen the road of freedom, independence and glory and has rejected humiliation, disgrace and submission to the will of imperialism and Zionism.

The United States and its allies have waged a dirty and cowardly war against a courageous and faithful people. The history of peoples and nations and their fate are not decided by the material possessions of states and ruling regimes. How many strong and rich empires throughout history had fallen because they pursued the road of evil, cowardice, injustice and decadence! This is the fate of tyrannical America and its decayed systems. It is the fate of Zionism and all the imperialist forces by the will of God.

Iraq has triumphed in this duel. It has triumphed because it has remained steadfast, courageous, faithful, proud and strong-willed. It has triumphed, because it has maintained principles and the spiritual values inspired by the true religion of Islam and its noble heritage. Its material losses in this battle, despite their enormity, are small com-

pared to its spirit of determination, its firm belief in principles and strong determination to continue the course of renaissance and progress.

O dear Iraqis, O honest Arabs, O Muslims who truly believe in Islam, O honest and free men of the world: Proceeding from this firm and right feeling and this assessment of the nature of the showdown, and in order to rob the evil US-Zionist-Atlantic alliance of the opportunity to achieve their premeditated goals; and in appreciation of the Soviet initiative conveyed by the envoy of the Soviet leadership; and in compliance with the principles outlined in leader President Saddam Hussein's initiative on 12 August, 1990, the Revolution Command Council has decided to declare the following:

First: Iraq's readiness to deal with [Arabic: yuta'amal] Security Council Resolution No. 660 of 1990 with the aim of reaching an honourable and acceptable political solution including withdrawal. The first step that is required to be implemented as a pledge by Iraq regarding withdrawal will be linked to the following:

(a) A total and comprehensive cease-fire on land, air, and sea.

(b) For the Security Council to decide to abolish from the outset Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677 and 678, and all the effects resulting from all of them, and to abolish all resolutions and measures of boycott and embargo, as well as the other negative resolutions and measures that were adopted by certain countries against Iraq unilaterally or collectively before 2nd August, 1990—which were the real reasons for the Gulf crisis—so that things may return to normal as if nothing had happened. Iraq should have to suffer any negative effects for any reason.

(c) For the United States and the other countries participating in the aggression, and all the countries that sent their forces to the region, to withdraw all the forces, weapons and equipment which they brought to the Middle East region before and after 2nd August, 1990—whether on land, seas, oceans of gulfs—including the weapons and equipment that certain countries provided to Israel under the pretext of the crisis in the Gulf, provided that these forces, weapons and equipment are withdrawn during a period not exceeding one month from the date of the cease-fire.

(d) Israel must withdraw from Palestine and the Arab territories it is occupying in the Golan and southern Lebanon, in implementation of UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions. In the case that Israel fails to do this, the UN Security Council should then

enforce against Israel the same resolutions it passed against Iraq.

(e) Iraq's historical rights on land and at sea should be guaranteed in full in any peaceful solution.

(f) The political arrangement to be agreed upon should proceed from the people's will and in accordance with genuine democratic practice and not on the basis of the rights acquired by the Al Sabah family. Accordingly, the nationalist and Islamic forces should primarily participate in the political arrangement to be agreed upon.

Second : The countries which have participated in the aggression and in financing the aggression should undertake to reconstruct what the aggression has destroyed in Iraq in accordance with the optimum specifications regarding all the enterprises and installations targeted by the aggression, and at their expense. Iraq should not incur any financial expenses in this regard.

Third: All the debts owed by Iraq and the countries of the region which had been harmed by the aggression and which did not take part in the aggression, either directly or indirectly, to the Gulf countries and to the foreign countries which took part in the aggression should be written off. Besides, relations between the rich nations and poor nations in the region and the world should be based on justice and fairness in such a way that puts the rich nations before clear commitments regarding the realisation of development in poor nations, thus removing their economic suffering. This should be based on the saying that the poor must share a claim to the wealth of the rich. Moreover, the duplicitous approach pursued in handling the issues of peoples and nations should be halted, whether this approach is being pursued by the UN Security Council or by this or that country.

Fourth: The Gulf states, including Iran, should be given the task of freely drawing up security arrangements in the region, and of organising relations among them without any foreign interference.

Fifth: To declare the Arabian Gulf region a zone free of foreign military bases and from any form of foreign military presence. Everybody must undertake to observe this.

This is our argument, which we declare before the world, clear and shining against the traitors and their imperialist masters.

Our basic source of confidence, in addition to our reliance on the one and only God, remains our great Iraqi people, our valiant and struggling armed forces, and those who believe in the path which we have chosen in fighting oppression and the oppressors. Victory will certainly be realised against the oppressors in the coming days, as it

had been certain in past times. God is with us. May the despicable be damned.

[Signed] The Revolution Command Council.

[Dated] 29th Rejab 1411 AH, corresponding to 15 February 1991

—SWB, ME/0998, A/3, 16 February 1991

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The Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s statement on 16 February 1991

Within the framework of their national affiliation and their firm adherence to the documents governing joint Arab action, foremost among which are the Arab League Charter, the Joint Defense Pact, and the Economic Cooperation Agreement among the Arab League states, as well as the Arab Solidarity Charter of 15 September 1965;

As a result of the realization of their pan-Arab responsibility at this critical time for the Arab world and of their desire to make every effort possible to mend the rift in the Arab world resulting from the Iraqi occupation of fraternal Kuwait;

The foreign ministers of the GCC members states, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Egypt met in Cairo on 15 and 16 February 1991. The ministers reviewed all aspects of the operation to liberate fraternal Kuwait. They reiterated their adherence to the implementation of the resolutions adopted by international, Islamic, and Arab legitimacy for the sake of restoring security and stability to the region. These resolutions stipulate:

1. Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from all territory of fraternal Kuwait.
2. Restoration of legitimacy to Kuwait.
3. Commitment to the full implementation of the related Security Council resolutions.
4. Commitment to the principles of resolving disputes between countries through peaceful means.

The ministers expressed their deep sorrow and pain at the sufferings of the sons of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi peoples as a result of the continued

Iraqi occupation of the State of Kuwait and as a result of the Iraqi leadership's intransigence and refusal to comply with the resolutions of Arab, Islamic, and international legitimacy.

The ministers also discussed their countries' coordination and cooperation in all fields, especially the security, political, and economic ones, in the stage following the liberation of Kuwait and their efforts to create a new spirit of solidarity among Arab countries.

In this regard, they emphasized the following principles:

1. To adhere to the principles and objectives of the Arab League Charter, the joint defense pact, and the economic cooperation agreement among the Arab League member states;

2. To examine the concept of pan-Arab security from a comprehensive and multidimensional perspective and to consider the region's security and stability as an integral part of the Arab world's security and stability.

3. Cooperation and coordination among the participating parties, and any concept formulated regarding this shall be open to all Arab countries that wish to join, on condition that they abide by the principles and objectives governing such a concept.

4. To revive the role of the Arab League and all institutions promoting joint Arab action.

5. It is important to make a new tangible start in the efforts to promote Arab economic and social development. In this regard, the ministers highly praised the pan-Arab role played by existing and newly created funds and programs for Arab development, such as the Gulf Fund for Supporting Development Efforts in the Arab World.

6. To respect the principle of every Arab country's sovereignty over its natural and economic resources.

The ministers also discussed the Palestine question and the magnitude of the negative impact the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has had on this main cause of the Arab countries. They recalled the heavy burdens borne by their countries and the martyrs, funds, and unremitting moral, political and diplomatic support they offered despite all challenges and obstacles. In this regard, they stressed the following:

1. Their countries' continued adherence to their pan-Arab and historical commitment to guarantee the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of their state on their national soil.

2. Their continued commitment to work to find a just, comprehensive, and lasting peaceful settlement to the Palestine question.

3. The ministers reaffirmed their countries' commitment to work to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the Israeli troops' withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Holy Jerusalem and the Syrian Arab Golan.

4. They also stressed the need for Israel to implement UN Security Council Resolution 425 calling for its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. They expressed their satisfaction with the deployment of Lebanese Army troops in southern Lebanon and affirmed their countries' determination to enable the Lebanese legitimacy to implement all clauses of the al-Ta'if national reconciliation document.

5. The ministers also voiced their countries' interest in efforts to remove all weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the possession of all states in the region without exception.

The ministers agreed to hold their next meeting, God willing, in Damascus at a date to be agreed upon.

The ministers expressed their deep gratitude to the Arab Republic of Egypt—its president, its government, and its people—for the warm welcome and hospitality they were accorded and the excellent arrangements that were made to ensure the success of their meetings.

—FBIS-NES, 19 February 1991

103

AMU Foreign Ministers' Statement on 20 February 1991

The emergency meeting of the Arab Maghreb Union foreign ministers ended in Benghazi today. At the end of the meeting the following statement was issued:

The Council of the AMU foreign ministers convened in an emergency session in Benghazi, the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, on 20 February, after reviewing the grave situation that has resulted from the devastating war now raging in the Gulf area, and in continuation of its efforts, including its call on the UN Security Council to meet to secure a cease-fire and provide an opportunity for finding a political solution to the Gulf crisis. While it expresses its deep regret at the UN Security Council's refusal to hold a public session

for achieving a cease-fire, it has decided the following:

1. It considers the Iraqi proposal agreeing to deal with UN Security Council Resolution 660 as a positive step toward finding a political solution to the Gulf crisis within the framework of international legitimacy, and it calls on all sides to respond to this proposal, which underlines Iraq's acceptance of the aforementioned resolution which annuls any justification for the continuation of the war.

2. While the council recalls the position it adopted on 2 September 1990 in Algiers, which contained a categorical rejection of the use of force for solving disputes and rejected the move to starve the Iraqi people to undermine their potentials, it condemns the savage bombing of innocent civilians in Iraq and Kuwait and the complete and deliberate destruction of Iraq's capabilities, including its cultural, and contemporary heritage—a matter that constitutes a blatant overstepping of the UN Security Council resolutions.

3. It warns against the real dangers arising from the flow of material, political, and military support for the Zionist state, which exploited the Gulf war in order to benefit from it by consolidating its military and economic capabilities.

4. It underlines continuing support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people under its sole legitimate representative, the PLO, and supports the Palestinians' popular and tumultuous uprising against Zionist occupation and their opposition to the various methods of Zionist suppression.

5. In view of the grave developments through which the Arab nation is passing, the Council addresses a call for convening an urgent meeting of the Arab foreign ministers in one of the Maghreb capitals to discuss Arab conditions to safeguard the higher interests of the Arab nation and its ability and restore unity of Arab ranks.

6. The Council took notice of the invitation extended to it from the EEC and in this connection the Council of Ministers will contact the European presidency in this respect.

[Dated] 5 Sha'ban 1411 AH, corresponding to 20 February 1991

—FBIS-NES, 21 February 1991

104

*Statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of Islamic Summit
Conference on 21 February 1991*

"Final statement issued by the joint meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states of the bureaus of the fifth Islamic summit conference and the 19th Islamic conference of the foreign ministers and states chairing the standing committees of the Islamic Conference Organization, held in Cairo on 21 February 1991" read by "Dr. Munir Zahran"—live or recorded]

1. The joint meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states of the bureaus of the fifth Islamic summit conference and the 19th Islamic conference of the foreign ministers and states chairing the standing committees of the Islamic Conference Organization was held in Cairo, the Arab Republic of Egypt, on 6 Sha'ban, corresponding to 21 February 1991, to discuss the situation in the Gulf region and the ICO's role in settling the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict that resulted from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

2. [number as heard] The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers and the heads of the delegations of the following member states: Egypt, Gabon, Kuwait, the Maldives, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey. The Kingdom of Morocco was absent from this meeting.

3. The meeting took note of the report—Document No. JMBMINSG-REP1—submitted by His Excellency ICO Secretary-General Hamid al-Ghabid, regarding the follow-up and implementation of the resolutions contained in the declaration regarding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, issued by the 19th conference of the Islamic foreign ministers held in Cairo, the Arab Republic of Egypt, from 9 to 14 Muharram 1411 Hegira, corresponding to 31 July to 5 August 1991.

4. Following a detailed study of the current conditions in the Gulf, especially in light of the current events, the meeting agreed that the Republic of Iraq's invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait has dragged the region and the Muslim nation, and the world in general, into a serious crisis, the repercussions of which are countless.

5. The meeting noted in bitterness that the crisis resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi troops has led to a

large-scale armed conflict, which has devastating and major repercussions against mankind and his environment.

The exile and harsh sufferings imposed on the Kuwaiti people, the massive departure of hundreds of thousands of workers from Iraq and Kuwait, the losses in human life, and the destruction of socio-economic facilities in Iraq and Kuwait constitute the great magnitude of the catastrophe resulting from the presence of the Iraqi Armed Forces in Kuwait.

6. The meeting strongly condemned the invasion of the State of Kuwait and its continued occupation by the Armed Forces of the Iraqi Republic as an action incompatible with ICO principles, human values, and rules of international law. It underlined the contents of the special statement on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait that was approved by the 19th Islamic conference of foreign ministers, the final statement issued by the annual coordination meeting of the ICO member states held at the United Nations in New York on 1 October 1990, and the statement issued by the joint meeting of the high commissioners of the member states in the fifth Islamic summit bureau and the 19th Islamic conference of the foreign ministers held in Jeddah on 8 January 1991.

7. The meeting praised the numerous efforts of the international community on the individual and collective levels to contain the crisis—from the time it appeared—and to help find a peaceful solution to it. It expressed its profound regret at Iraq's lack of response to the appeals made to it by the Islamic nation and the world in general, and for its choosing to challenge them through its intransigent refusal to comply with Islamic and international legitimacy and to withdraw its forces from the State of Kuwait so as to restore this country's legitimate government.

8. Regarding the statement issued by the Iraqi Government on 15 February 1991, the meeting repeated that, with the principle of good-neighborliness, the basic and necessary condition for a political solution to the crisis consists of the following: the Iraqi forces' immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the Kuwaiti territories, restoration of the legitimate government under His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, the amir of Kuwait and the chairman of the current fifth ICO summit, and Iraq's full commitment to comply with the relevant Security Council and ICO resolutions.

9. The meeting reaffirms the resolutions issued by all Islamic summit conferences and Islamic foreign ministers conferences relating to Palestine. It also reaffirms the following facts:

Their countries have made great sacrifices and provided constant moral, political, and diplomatic support—despite all challenges and obstacles. They reaffirm their continued support for the valiant *intifadah* of the Palestinian people under occupation. The member states adhere to their Islamic and historical commitment to the Palestinian people's national legitimate rights, including their genuine right to self-determination and the establishment of their state on their national soil.

Their commitment to the effort to find a peaceful, just, and comprehensive settlement to the Palestine question comes before any other consideration, within the framework of an international peace conference.

10. The meeting denounced Iraq's intransigent refusal to submit to Islamic and international legitimacy. The meeting also denounced Iraqi attempts to link the resolution of the crisis resulting from the occupation of Kuwait with other issues. The meeting emphasized that the Palestine question is a pan-Arab responsibility that concerns all Arabs and Muslims. Consequently, the meeting condemned the Iraqi regime's attempts to take advantage of the Palestine question to justify its invasion of Kuwait and the expulsion of its people and hundreds of thousands of people working there, including Palestinians themselves. In view of the Iraqi practices, the meeting stressed that this regime is incapable of carrying out any act that would resolve the regional crisis. The meeting went on to emphasize the falsity of the Iraqi regime's allegations about playing the role of the defender of Arab and Islamic causes.

11. The meeting voiced appreciation for the sacrifices made by the states and peoples of the region to face the aggression and resist its effects. In this regard, the meeting underlined the ICO member states' solidarity with the governments and peoples of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as with other states and peoples of the region, in this hard and unfair ordeal that has befallen them. The meeting stressed the member states' commitment to the liberation of Kuwait, to the return of its legitimate government, and to supporting the Gulf states' efforts to preserve and defend the region's security and stability.

The meeting says that stability in the Gulf region requires respect for and nonviolation of all regional states' internationally recognized borders as they were before the start of the crisis.

13. [no number 12 as heard] The meeting noted the fears expressed by the international community. It urged the prohibition of the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The meeting also stressed

the need to respect absolutely the rules of Islamic shariah [law] and/or the rules of the Geneva Conventions and other rules of international humanitarian laws. It called on the entire international community to continue its contribution to achieve these objectives in line with the requirements of Islamic and international shariah.

15. [no number 14 as heard] In addition to resolving the current crisis in the Gulf, the meeting called on the member states to start to think deeply about ways and means to back security and cooperation in the Islamic world, within the framework of joint Islamic action. This process should include political, economic, social, cultural, and other aspects; the establishment of peace and security in the Islamic world on firm bases and making a tangible reality of the objectives of this cooperation and solidarity—which have been clearly set out in the historic communique of holy Mecca. In this respect, the meeting welcomed the efforts already under way by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Islamic countries.

16. The meeting shared with millions of Muslims in the world the real pain they are feeling over the severe tribulation imposed on the peoples of the Gulf region, including their most holy places, because of Iraq's unjustifiable refusal to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory and to respect the independence, sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other countries in the region. The meeting expressed hope that the day will come when Iraq returns to the ranks of the Islamic nation to work in harmony with the peoples of the Gulf region and all Islamic peoples so as to achieve the Muslims' legitimate aspirations of justice, freedom, peace, and progress.

Final paragraph: The meeting expressed its profound thanks to the Arab Republic of Egypt for hosting this meeting and for the meeting President Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, had with the ministers and heads of delegation and for his strengthening of the spirit of Islamic solidarity at this fateful point in the Islamic world's history.

—FBIS-NES, 22 February 1991

105

*Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's briefing
on 21 February 1991*

Fitzwater: President Gorbachev called President Bush at 6:47 p.m. this evening to discuss his conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. President Gorbachev outlined all of the major points of a Soviet initiative developed by himself and the foreign minister.

President Bush thanked President Gorbachev for his intensive and useful efforts, but raised serious concerns about several points in the plan. President Bush said the United States will consult with its coalition partners on a proposal. We are in the process of examining the Soviet initiative tonight (February 21). The United States and its coalition partners continue to prosecute the war.

That is the sum and substance of the situation that we have at this point. I'll try to answer a few questions.

Question: Did President Gorbachev give any indication that once President Bush gave him these concerns that he was going to take those back to Aziz? And did he leave any hope that there may be some give on the part of Iraqis on those points the president raised?

Answer: They didn't discuss follow-on procedures. President Bush did say that we should be examining these points tonight, and we will be considering then how we intend to respond. I would not expect anything—any response tonight—anything before tomorrow. But in terms, of what happens then, that really is contingent upon how we view the various points in this plan and what action needs to be taken at that time.

Q: What are the concerns? What are the chief drawbacks as the administration would see it?

A: Well, we don't want to go into the individual points. Of course, this plan was just announced by the Soviets a very short time ago. The telephone conversation lasted approximately 33 minutes. And although they did get a chance to go through the major points, we obviously have a considerable analysis to do.

But I would emphasize again that as they went through the various points, President Bush did state the concerns that he felt the coalition would have on this matter, both in terms of points that are in the plan that we have problems with as well as issues that are not included. So

there are a number of issues to resolve.

Q: But this does hold up the ground war, doesn't it?

A: The ground war is a matter that is still under consideration. The war itself continues. We will continue to seek compliance with the UN resolutions, and the president will make decisions concerning the ground war as appropriate. This process—that it was initiated by the Soviets—is continuing at a rather intensive pace, but there's no change at this point in our schedule for prosecution of the war.

Q: During the meeting itself, was Aziz in communication with the president? Was there any two way on that?

A: No. There was no one else on the phone call and no other communications.

Q: Does President Bush see now... a chance for the first time since August 2 to reverse the invasion of Kuwait and actually come about this without launching a ground war?

A: Well, there have been enumerable chances since August 2 in the sense that Saddam Hussein could have pulled out at any time. That still is the fastest and most efficient way to end this war. In terms of this initiative, it's just too soon to characterize it. We need to take a look at it. But I would say again that we have had our hopes raised before; after a serious examination there have been significant problems. And certainly, the president has indicated there could well be some difficulties here. But we are taking a look at it.

Q: How could he prosecute a ground war if indeed the talks are proceeding in Moscow?

A: Well, that's not an issue at the moment. We are proceeding the war, the air war continues. There's been no decision on the ground war at this time. And we continue to pursue the matter in the Persian Gulf in the most effective and efficient military way possible.

Q: The president has said all along that the 12 UN resolutions are what Saddam Hussein must live up to. In the points that the president raised that he doesn't like, the possibility sounds like there may be a negotiation underway to drop one or more of those points. Can the president live with anything less than full acceptance of all 12 as long as Iraq pulls out of Kuwait?

A: There is no negotiation underway with regard to the United States. I remind you again that this is a matter between the Soviet Union and Iraq. That we are commenting on their proposal, and we are not directly involved in that sense. I would repeat once again as well that full compliance with the 12 UN resolutions is the goal we

seek. And those are the guide-posts that we would use in judging any consideration of withdrawal.

Q: Are you willing to go beyond those 12 though—to scale back any of those 12?

A: We have said repeatedly that we must have full compliance with the 12 U.N. resolutions. There's no change in that situation.

Q: Aside from raising serious considerations here, you said that we've had our hopes raised before. In the process of reviewing this, do you at least see that there is some hope here that this peace proposal could work if some of these problems that the president sees are worked out?

A: I just don't want to give it any characterization until we've had a chance to give it the full analysis of the U.S. government.

Q: How can you say there are no negotiations going on when Gorbachev tells you his points and you tell him which ones are objectionable and basically ask him to go back to Tariq Aziz and say about these points. Are those not negotiations? Is he not negotiating on your behalf?

A: We haven't asked him to do anything. He's asked our views on these matters; we will provide them as we have in the last few days. But I reiterate again, that this is a matter between the Soviets and Iraq. And we are appreciative of the communication that told us of these discussions, but we are not a part of the negotiations.

—USIS, New Delhi

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President Bush's statement on 22 February 1991

The United States and its coalition allies are committed to enforcing the UN resolutions that call for Saddam Hussein to immediately and unconditionally leave Kuwait. In view of the Soviet initiative, which, very frankly, we appreciate, we want to set forth this morning the specific criteria that will ensure Saddam Hussein complies with the UN mandate.

Within the last 24 hours alone, we have heard a defiant, uncompromising address by Saddam Hussein, followed less than 10 hours

later by a statement in Moscow that on the face of it appears more reasonable. I say on the face of it because the statement promised unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait only to set forth a number of conditions. And needless to say, any conditions would be unacceptable to the international coalition and would not be in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 660's demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

More importantly and more urgently, we learned this morning that Saddam has now launched a scorched-earth policy against Kuwait, anticipating perhaps that he will now be forced to leave. He is wantonly setting fires to and destroying the oil wells, the oil tanks, the export terminals and other installations of that small country. Indeed, they are destroying the entire oil production system of Kuwait. At the same time that that Moscow press conference was going on and Iraq's foreign minister was talking peace, Saddam Hussein was launching Scud missiles.

After examining the Moscow statement and discussing it with my senior advisers here late last evening and this morning, and after extensive consultation with our coalition partners, I have decided that the time has come to make public with specificity just exactly what is required of Iraq if a ground war is to be avoided.

Most important, the coalition will give Saddam Hussein until noon Saturday (February 23) to do what he must do—begin his immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We must hear publicly and authoritatively his acceptance of these terms. The statement to be released, as you will see, does just this and informs Saddam Hussein that he risks subjecting the Iraqi people to further hardship unless the Iraqi government complies fully with the terms of the statement.

We will put that statement out soon. It will be in considerable detail. And that's all I'll have to say about it right now.

—USIS, New Delhi

107

Moscow Peace Plan of 22 February 1991

President Mikhail Gorbachev's spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko outlined

eight points which he said Iraq and the Soviet Union had agreed as a possible basis for resolution of the Gulf war.

1. Iraq announces a complete and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait.
2. Withdrawal begins on the day after cessation of hostilities.
3. The withdrawal of forces takes place in a fixed timeframe.
4. After withdrawal of two-thirds of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations are lifted.
5. At the end of the withdrawal all UN resolutions against Iraq become invalid.
6. Directly after a cease-fire all prisoners of war should be released.
7. The withdrawal of forces should be monitored by countries not involved in the conflict and under the auspices of the UN Security Council.
8. Work on finalising details continues. The Security Council will be informed of the outcome on Friday.

—*Indian Express*, 23 February 1991

108

Latest Soviet Peace Plan of 22 February 1991

The six points of the Soviet plan as listed by the Soviet presidential spokesman, Mr. Ignatenko, were:

1. Iraq agrees to carry out resolution 660 of the United Nations security council calling on it to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait to positions they occupied before invading the emirate on August 2 last year.
2. The troops withdrawal would begin the day after a cease-fire in all military operations in the area, on land, sea and in the air.
3. The troop withdrawal will be completed within 21 days, including a pull-out from Kuwait city within four days.
4. Once the withdrawal has been completed, all UN security council resolutions on the crisis will lose their force because the reasons for them will have been removed.
5. All war prisoners will be freed and repatriated within three days after a cease-fire and the end of military operations.

6. Monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal will be carried out by observers or peace-keeping forces as determined by the security council.

—*Times of India*, 23 February 1991

109

Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's briefing on 22 February 1991

The Soviet announcement yesterday represents a serious and useful effort which is appreciated. But major obstacles remain. The coalition for many months has sought a peaceful resolution to this crisis in keeping with the UN resolutions. As President Bush pointed out to President Gorbachev, the steps the Iraqis are considering would constitute a conditional withdrawal and would also prevent the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Also there is no indication that Iraq is prepared to withdraw immediately.

Full compliance with the Security Council resolutions has been a consistent and necessary demand of the international community. The world must make sure that Iraq has, in fact, renounced its claim to Kuwait and accepted all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Indeed, only the Security Council can agree to lift sanctions against Iraq, and the world needs to be assured in concrete terms of Iraq's peaceful intentions before such action can be taken. In a situation where sanctions have been lifted, Saddam Hussein could simply revert to using his oil resources once again, not to provide for the well-being of his people, but instead to rearm.

So in a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community, the United States, after consulting with the government of Kuwait and her other coalition partners, declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against Iraqi forces if, prior to noon, Saturday, February 23, New York time, Iraq publicly accepts the following terms and authoritatively communicates that acceptance to the United Nations:

First, Iraq must begin large-scale withdrawal from Kuwait by noon, New York time, Saturday, February 23. Iraq must complete military

withdrawal from Kuwait in one week. Given the fact that Iraq invaded an occupied Kuwait in a matter of hours, anything longer than this from the initiation of the withdrawal would not meet Resolution 660's requirement of immediacy.

Within the first 48 hours, Iraq must remove all its forces from Kuwait City and allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait. It must withdraw from all prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq borders, from Bubiyan and Warbah Islands, and from Kuwait's Rumaylah oil field within the one week specified above. Iraq must return all its forces to their positions of August 1, in accordance with Resolution 660.

In cooperation with the International Red Cross, Iraq must release all prisoners of war and third country civilians being held against their will, and return the remains of killed and deceased servicemen. This action must commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and must be completed within 48 hours.

Iraq must remove all explosives or booby traps, including those on Kuwaiti oil installations, and designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti and other coalition forces on the operational details related to Iraq's withdrawal, to include the provision of all data on the location and nature of any land or sea mines.

Iraq must cease combat aircraft flights over Iraq and Kuwait, except for transport aircraft carrying troops out of Kuwait, and allow coalition aircraft exclusive control over and use of all Kuwaiti air space.

It must cease all destructive actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and release all Kuwaiti detainees.

The United States and its coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not attack retreating Iraqi forces; and further, will exercise restraint so long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.

Any breach of these terms will ring an instant and sharp response from coalition forces in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 678.

That's the conclusion of our prepared statement. Let me just add a couple of points. First of all, that a copy of this document was provided to Iraqi diplomats here in Washington about noon today. President Bush and Secretary Baker spoke with President Gorbachev for over an hour and 15 minutes this morning to discuss this situation.

Secretary Baker spoke with Soviet foreign ministry officials both yesterday and today. And we have consulted with all of our allies and

coalition partners last night or this morning. The coalition remains strong and united.

Q: Are these ultimatums being made after consultation with the allies, or on behalf of the allies?

A: After consultation with the allies. We've had extensive discussion all through the night last night and this morning.

Q: What is in this, if anything, for Saddam Hussein?

A: A chance to save his country and to do the thing he should have done the day after he went in on August 2.

Q: This is a change of signals. In the past, you've talked about Saddam leaving unconditionally. You've now said—I count seven conditions here. In the past, you would halt the fighting if a massive withdrawal is underway. Now you say if any of these—any breach if these seven are violated that you would continue fighting.

A: This is the criteria to be used in judging unconditional withdrawal. The UN resolutions are very clear that Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait unconditionally. We want to be equally clear in saying that these are the minimum kinds of actions that he needs to take to comply with those resolutions, to indeed get out of Kuwait unconditionally.

—USIS, New Delhi

110

*Vitaliy Ignatenko, Chief of the Press Service of Soviet
President's brief on 22 February 1991*

The document worked out today during the Soviet-Iraqi talks has been "substantially tightened up in the direction of Iraq's responsibility" by comparison with yesterday's according to a statement made at a briefing by Vitaliy Ignatenko, chief of the press service of the USSR President.

He declared that the document contains the following conditions:

1. Iraq agrees to fulfill Resolution 660 of the UN Security Council, that is, immediately and unconditionally to withdraw its troops from Kuwait to the positions they occupied on 1 August 1990;
2. The withdrawal of troops will begin on the day after the cease-

fire in all the hostilities on land, sea and in the air has taken place.

3. The withdrawal of troops will be completed in 21 days, including the withdrawal of troops from the City of Kuwait during the first four days.

4. As soon as the troops have been withdrawn from Kuwait the reasons for adopting other resolutions by the UN Security Council would be exhausted and, hence the above-mentioned resolutions will cease to exist.

5. All prisoners of war will be released and repatriated within three days after the cease-fire and cessation of military actions;

6. The confirmation of monitoring and supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops will be implemented by observers or peace-keeping forces, to be determined by the United Nations Security Council.

—FBIS-SOV, 25 February 1991

111

Statement by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Moscow accepting the Soviet Peace Plan on 23 February 1991

Ladies and gentleman, good morning. I have a short statement to make this morning. Last evening, the Soviet government declared a proposal about the situation in the Gulf region and in order to achieve a peaceful settlement to that situation in accordance with the UN resolutions.

You are familiar with the points in that declaration, but anyhow, I am going to reiterate those points in English.

First, Iraq agrees to comply with resolution 660 and therefore to withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from Kuwait to the positions in which they were located on the first of August 1990.

Second, the withdrawal of the forces shall begin on the day following the cease-fire and the cessation of all military operations on land, at sea and in the air.

Third, the withdrawal shall be completed within a period of 21 days, including the withdrawal from the city of Kuwait within the first four days of the said period.

Four, immediately upon the completion of the withdrawal of the

troops from Kuwait, the grounds for which all the other resolutions of the Security Council were adopted will have been removed and thereby, those resolutions will cease to operate.

Five, all prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated within three days of the cease-fire and the cessation of all military operations.

The last point, the sixth, the cease-fire and withdrawal shall be confirmed, verified and supervised by observers and/or a peacekeeping force as determined by the Security Council.

These are the points of the plan, or the initiative that was declared by the Soviet government last evening. I am here to tell you that the Iraqi government fully endorses this plan and fully supports it.

Last night the Revolution Command Council issued a statement saying that Iraq supports the Soviet initiative and it appreciates the Soviets' efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to the situation. And we particularly appreciate the efforts of His Excellency President Mikhail Gorbachev and his government in this regard.

The second point I would like to address is the allegations made by the American government yesterday that Iraq has created a new ecological situation in Kuwait and you are aware of those allegations.

My government has strongly denied those allegations in the statement made last night. And the Iraqi government asks the Security Council to establish immediately a committee to investigate the situation in Kuwait. If the American authorities would like to use this pretext to justify their aggressive position, such a pretext has no grounds.

This is the short statement I wanted to make this morning and thank you very much and goodbye.

—USIS, New Delhi

112

News conference in Moscow by Vitaliy Ignatenko, spokesman for Soviet President Gorbachev on 23 February 1991.

I believe that all of you understand that the main topic of today's conversations of the leader of the Soviet state is the Persian Gulf and those few hours that separate us from the last and tragic phase of the war, which could be a result of the whole of the tragic situation in the Gulf. It is no surprise, too, that the ultimatum is now riding out and

in some time this tragic state could come into effect in the Persian Gulf.

The telephone conversation which lasted for more than one hour and a half with US President Bush, as far as that conversation is concerned, I would like to emphasize that in that conversation was emphasized the importance of the attitude taken as regards the aggression against Kuwait that made it possible to adopt all those UN resolutions, and everything that happened could not have been possible if there had been improvement in the US-Soviet relations.

President Gorbachev said and expressed deep understanding on the fact that the American people had put on themselves a heavy burden of implementing the will of the international community in overcoming a serious obstacle to international peace which the aggression against Kuwait by Iraq constituted. Naturally, in all those talks and during the conversation, telephone conversation with President Bush, it was—President Gorbachev expressed his readiness to continue working towards ensuring peace. It was emphasized that of primary importance for both of our countries are such relations of trust—of personal trust.

And the President of the Soviet Union—(inaudible). He emphasized that could undermine this choice taken by the leaders of the two countries. All those talks and conversations that took place, which were characterized by profound philosophical content, I believe that we have, on the basis of all those talks, we have a vision of a new world, of a new policy, to which we will someday arrive at, and I believe that this day is not far away. And if we are talking today about the almost—the chance that has almost—and I would like to use this word “almost”—been not used or not—which has almost passed by—it is of a special importance, that trust which exists now between the leaders of our two countries. And in the basis of these is the realization that we all have to understand that the fate of the peoples depends on how developments will be—will be that continuing and developing.

Now, questions. Canadian Television, please.

Q: Question from Canadian Broadcasting. You told us yesterday that the six-point plan was the maximum that you could achieve under the circumstances. Is that, in Moscow's view—the maximum position—is that as far as Iraq is prepared to go? Do you have any indication that Iraq intends to move any further in order to fulfill the conditions of the US ultimatum? And also, is there any negotiation underway, or as far as Moscow is concerned, is that the end of the negotiating process?

Ignatenko: I believe that Iraq still has some time to act, but unfortunately it is not days, not months, but hours and minutes. Tariq Aziz,

just before boarding his plane, he got into contact with our president, and he heard from our president the last words of advice, that is to weigh everything and to think over what could—this last stage of the war could bring. And I—as far as the authority, I don't believe that the foreign minister had all the authority in order to resolve all those issues in the spirit in which they were—President Bush's—

Q: (Through interpreter.) What was the attitude to the—to the statement made today that no one has a right to present an ultimatum save the United Nations?

Ignatenko: Well, it seems to me that President Bush, in all his activities, especially in trying to find a peaceful way to resolve this conflict, shows that in such difficult matters an ultimatum is indeed a means of last resort, because up to the last moment one has to find ways to save the world from bloodshed. And all the actions that our president has taken testify to that. It seems to me that today if there was an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council where the international community having before it on the table all those proposals that have been put forward, either by the Soviet Union or the United States, if the international community could integrate, if it could choose the best from those proposals, we could have arrived at a better turn of events. I hope that the remaining hours would not be lost in vain and that something will be done.

Q: (Through interpreter.) You just said that Tariq Aziz—you said he had the authority to resolve those issues included into the ultimatum. The Soviet Union suggested further, harsher measures, but Iraq wanted to reject them.

Ignatenko: Well, what you have in these six points is the maximum which was possible to achieve.

Q: A question from the *Chicago Tribune*. As the negotiations have proceeded, it seems that the important vote, the important veto in these talks, was not the Soviet or the Iraqis, but the Americans, since President Bush, speaking for the coalition, said your plan was not enough. Do you now wish that you had been working closer with the American side all along so that the proposal put forth in Moscow would have been acceptable to the American side and to the coalition instead of only to the Soviets and the Iraqis? Thank you.

Ignatenko: Yes, we've been working very closely with the Americans and we are maintaining a constant communications link, not only with President Bush. And this is indeed with—Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh also has a constant contact with his counter-

part, his American counterpart. I believe that this is a matter-of-fact and businesslike and very (?) contact. And what I am telling to you right now is what has been done in attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution. And it seems to me that in that process, not only mutual interests were taken into account, but also the interests of the entire world.

Q: Question from CBS News. If you are in such close contact with the United States, and if you keep talking about—(inaudible)—why is it that the White House came out today and said that the Iraqi acceptance of the six points was absolutely meaningless? Are you doing one thing in private and another in public?

Ignatenko: No, I don't want you to understand the situation in these terms, because we are doing everything in public, and nothing was done, as you said, through private channels, so to say, because all of our actions have been made public. They are known to the United States, to a number of other countries, and primarily to those who are prominent members of the Security Council. But the other thing is to accept them or not to accept them. But as to openness—and it's indeed in this way. Steve, your question, please.

Q: A question from CNN. I wanted to make sure that in your list of people Mr. Gorbachev had contacted today that President Bush was not among them. And if that is the case, are there any plans for Mr. Gorbachev to talk again with Washington with some sort of last-minute appeal to putt off this deadline and the ultimatum?

Ignatenko: I don't exclude such a possibility.

Q: Polish Newspaper *Express*. What was the reaction of Gorbachev to the American ultimatum? And the second question: Will there be an opportunity to—for Hussein to get an asylum in the Soviet Union if he asks for it?

Ignatenko: The second question is indeed a wonderful one. The first one is simply a good one. Well, I believe that I've given the response a number of times to your first question. Indeed, the proposal made by President Bush has been under very careful study on our side. And following the conversation with George Bush, we learned about that proposal and we understand fully the proposal. So I believe you understand that. Another thing is how to integrate them into that program which could lead our world, today or tomorrow, to a peaceful solution in the Persian Gulf. That is a very important problem. We don't yet have such a possibility of integration. But if you study carefully the two programs, you don't find much difference because

the difference is as regards the timing and the—the strict character. But we have to take into account the entire situation in the Persian Gulf.

Q: (Through interpreter.) ABC question. What is the theoretical basis we are talking about? President Bush has declared an ultimatum in his own name, on behalf of the United States, or of the United Nations? That is my first question. Now, the second question is, will the Soviet Union continue to support the present policies of the United States as regards the conflict in the Persian Gulf?

Ignatenko: First, of course—well, I forgot about the previous answer. Yes, the—(End of available audio/satellite feed interrupted.)

—USIS, New Delhi

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White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's statement on 23 February 1991

Centcom reports that they have detected no military activity which would indicate any withdrawal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Similarly, there has been no communication between Iraq and the United Nations that would suggest a willingness to withdraw under the conditions of the coalition plan. Iraq continues its scorched-earth policy in Kuwait, setting fire to oil facilities. It's a continuing outrage that Saddam Hussein is still intent upon destroying Kuwait and its people, still intent upon destroying the environment of the Gulf, and still intent upon inflicting the most brutal kind of rule of his own population; yet appears to have no intention of complying with the UN resolutions. Indeed, his only response at noon was to launch another Scud missile attack on Israel.

The coalition forces have no alternative but to continue to prosecute the war.

As we indicated last night, the withdrawal proposal the Soviets discussed with Tariq Aziz in Moscow was unacceptable because it did not constitute an unequivocal commitment to an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Thus, the Iraqi approval of the Soviet proposal is without effect.

President Bush today spoke with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan, President Ozal of Turkey, and President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. The phone call from President Gorbachev occurred at 11:15 a.m. and lasted for approximately 28 minutes. President Gorbachev informed the president that he asked for a UN review of his proposal and said that he had talked to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand about his plan. Both of the allied leaders indicated full support for the coalition withdrawal plan. President Bush thanked President Gorbachev for his extensive efforts and reflected our general disappointment that Saddam Hussein has chosen not to respond positively.

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Statement by President Bush on 23 February 1991

Good evening. Yesterday, after conferring with my senior national security advisors, and following extensive consultations with our coalition partners, Saddam Hussein was given one last chance, set forth in very explicit terms, to do what he should have done more than six months ago—withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay and comply fully with the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council.

Regrettably, the noon deadline passed without the agreement of the government of Iraq to meet demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, as set forth in the specific terms spelled out by the coalition to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. To the contrary, what we have seen is a redoubling of Saddam Hussein's efforts to destroy completely Kuwait and its people.

I have therefore directed General Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Once again, this was a decision made only after extensive consultation within our coalition partnership.

The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase. I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly and

decisively to accomplish their mission.

Tonight, as this coalition of countries seeks to do that which is right and just, I ask only that all of you stop what you are doing and say a prayer for all the coalition forces, and especially for our men and women in uniform who this very moment are risking their lives for their country and for all of us.

May God bless and protect each and every one of them. And may God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much.

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Soviet Government statement on 24 February 1991

“United States President George Bush announced at dawn on February 24 that he had ordered the start of ground operations against Iraq.

“The instinct to rely on a military solution prevailed, despite the fact that Iraq’s agreement to withdraw its forces from Kuwait in keeping with United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 660 had created a basically new situation, clearing the way to transferring the Gulf conflict to the footing of a political settlement.

“As is known, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told a news conference in Moscow on February 23 that the Iraqi leadership was prepared to pull all its forces out of Kuwait immediately and unconditionally to positions they occupied on August 1, 1990.

“The Soviet Union, which had done much to impel Iraq to take that step, urged the international community to take advantage of the opportunity in order to prevent the conflict from escalating into a still sharper and bloodier phase.

“The Soviet president during February 23 had telephone conversations with the leaders of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Syria, Egypt and Iran.

“Before that, the Soviet president had sent personal messages to the heads of state and government of all countries that are Security Council members, as well as to the UN secretary-general, briefing them on the results of the latest round of talks with Tariq Aziz in Moscow, which produced qualitative shifts in Iraq’s position.

“The governments of Arab countries were advised of steps being undertaken by us. The Soviet ambassador to the United Nations took

steps towards convening an emergency Security Council meeting to examine the obtaining situation as a top priority, set the date for the start of the Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait, and resolve the issue of confirming, verifying and monitoring the cease-fire and troop withdrawal.

"The Soviet Union expresses regret that a most realistic chance to secure a peaceful outcome of the conflict and achieve the goals set by United Nations Security Council resolutions without further casualties and destruction has been passed up.

"The differences between the formulas accepted by Iraq and proposals by a number of other countries were not too wide and lent themselves to resolution within the UN Security Council framework within a day or two.

"It is still not too late to do this. The Security Council, which is now in session, should get down to examining the situation that has taken shape without delay."

—FBIS-SOV, 25 February 1991

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Iraqi President's Broadcast on withdrawal

Following is the text of address on Iraqi radio by President Saddam Hussein, on Feb. 26 for Iraqi troops' complete withdrawal from Kuwait:

In the name of God, the merciful, the Compassionate. O great people: O stalwart men in the forces of *Jihad* and faith, glorious men of the mother of battles: O zealous, faithful, and sincere people in our glorious nations, and among all Muslim and all virtuous people in the world: O glorious Iraqi women.

In such circumstances and times, it is difficult to talk about all that which should be talked about and it is difficult to recall all that which has to be recalled. Despite this we have to remind of what has to be reminded of, and say part a principal part of what should be said.

We start by saying that on this day our valiant armed forces will complete their withdrawal from Kuwait.

It was an epic duel which lasted for two months, which came to clearly confirm a lesson that God has wanted as a prelude of faith,

impregnability and capability for the faithful, and a prelude of an (abyss), weakness and humiliation which God Almighty has wanted for the infidels, the criminals, the traitors, the corrupt, and the deviators to be added to this time, is the time of the military and non-military duel, including the military and the economic blockade.

On Iraq and which lasted throughout 1990 until today and until the time God Almighty wishes it to last before that, the duel lasted, in other forms, for years before this period of time. It was an epic struggle between right and wrong: we have talked about this in detail on previous occasions.

It gave depth to the age of the showdown for the year 1990 and the already elapsed part of the year 1991.

Hence, we do not forget, because we will not forget this great struggling spirit, by which men of great faith stormed the fortification and the weapons of deception and the croesus treachery on the honourable day of the call. They did what they did within the context of legitimate deterrence and great principled action.

GOD'S WILL: All that we have gone through or decided within its circumstances obeying God's will and choosing a position of faith and chivalry is a record of honour, the significance of which will not be missed by the people and nation and the values of Islam and humanity. Their days will continue to be glorious and their past and future will continue to relate the story of a faithful, zealous, and patient people who believed in the will of God and in the values and stands accepted by the Almighty for the Arab nation in its leading role and for the Islamic nation in the essentials of its true faith and how they should be.

These values which had their effect in all those situations offered the sacrifices they had offered in the struggle, and symbolised the depth of the faithful character in Iraq will continue to leave their effects on the souls.

They will continue to reap their harvest, not only in terms of the direct targets represented in the slogans of their age whether in the conflict between the oppressed poor and the unjust and opportunist rich, or between faith and blasphemy, or between injustice, deception and treachery on the one hand and fairness, justice, honesty and loyalty on the other but also the indirect targets as well.

This will shake the opposite ranks and cause them to collapse after everything has become clear. This will also add faith to the faithful now that the minds and eyes have been opened and the hearts are

longing for what the principles, values and stances should long for and belong to.

The stage that preceded the great day of the call on 2nd August 1990 had its own standards, including dealing with what is familiar and inherited during the bad times, whether on the level of relations between the ruler and the ruled or between the leader and the people he leads.

The relations between the foreigners among the ranks and infidelity and oppression and among the region's states and the world had their own standards, effects and privileges that were created by the Arab homeland's circumstances, and which were facilitated by propaganda which no one could expose more than it has now been exposed.

The conflict was exacerbated by the vacuum that was created by the weakness of one of the two poles that used to represent the two opposite lines in the world.

However, after the 2nd August 1990, new concepts and standards were created. This was preceded by a new outlook in all walks of life in relations among peoples, relations among states, and the relations between the ruler and the ruled, and by standards of faith and positions: patriotism = pan Arabism, and humanitarianism: *Jihad*, faith, Islam, fear and non-fear' restlessness and tranquility; manhood and its opposite; struggle, *Jihad*, and sacrifice: and readiness to do good things and their opposite.

O valiant Iraqi men, O glorious Iraqi women, Kuwait is part of your country and was carved from it in the past. Circumstances today have willed that it remain in the state in which it will remain after the withdrawal of our struggling forces from it. It hurts you that this should happen.

We rejoiced on the day of the call when it was decided that Kuwait should be one of the main gates for deterring the plot and for defending all Iraq from the plotters. We say that we will remember Kuwait on the great day of the call on the days that followed it and in documents and events some of which date back 70 years.

The Iraqis will remember and will not forget that on 8th August, 1990 Kuwait became part of Iraq legally, constitutionally, and actually. They will remember and will not forget that it remained throughout this period from 8 August 1990 and until last night when withdrawal began and today we will complete withdrawal of our forces, God willing.

Today certain circumstances made the Iraqi army withdraw as a

result of the ramifications, which we mentioned, including the combined aggression by 30 countries. Their repugnant siege has been led in evil and aggression by the machine and the criminal entity of America and its major allies.

These malicious ranks look the depth and effectiveness of their aggressiveness not only from their aggressive premediated intentions against Iraq, the Arab nation and Islam but also from the position of those who were deceived by the claim of international legitimacy. Everyone will remember that the gates of Constantinople were not opened before the Muslims in the first struggling attempt, and that the international community (places) dear Palestine's freedom and independence in oblivion.

When new measures spring forth and the familiar, traitorous, subservient, and corrupt (people) and tyrants are rejected then the opportunity for the cultivation of the pure soil will increase in its scope, and the seeds of this plant will take root deep in the good land.

—*Radiance*, 10--16 March 1991

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*White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's statement
on 26 February 1991*

"Saddam Hussein's radio statement last night contained the same diatribe as previous comments, with no commitment to complying with the 12 United Nations resolutions. His speech changes nothing. It does not annul the annexation of Kuwait or meet any of the coalition's other terms. The war goes on."

United Nations—Iraq formally told the UN Security Council early February 26 that it was willing to withdraw from Kuwait, but the majority of the 15 council members found the offer lacking the basic requirements to end the hostilities.

At a closed formal council meeting, US Ambassador Thomas Pickering outlined the points made late February 25 by the White House, stressing the need for Iraq to accept all 12 council resolutions.

The White House also announced that it wanted Iraq's response to come from President Saddam Hussein himself publicly.

Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Al-Anbari, just returned from the Moscow talks between Soviet officials and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, said that he informed the council "of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwaiti territories" on instruction from the foreign minister, not President Saddam Hussein.

Asked by journalists if Iraq was ready to accept all 12 council resolutions, Al-Anbari said "right now we are addressing ourselves to the basic fundamental of withdrawal and that's Resolution 660."

"All the resolutions were passed one after the other simply because 660 at the time was not implemented by Iraq," al-Anbari said. "Now we are saying that we are fully committed and we are ready to implement that resolution."

But council members and other nations cooperating with the government of Kuwait indicated it is critical that Iraq accept all 12 council resolutions. Those resolutions, beginning with Resolution 660, constitute a body of international requirements.

After Resolution 660—which demands that Iraq "withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990" and calls on Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate negotiations to resolve their differences—the council passed 11 more resolutions that declared Iraq must rescind its annexation of Kuwait, established economic and military sanctions and an air embargo, required Iraqi compliance with the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, and set the stage for Iraq to be held responsible for reparations for material damage and for war crimes.

Saudi Ambassador Samir Shihabi said, "the invasion of Kuwait has created issues—local, bilateral and regional—and all this should be solved. You can't just simplistically say: 'thank you: I came in, I pillaged, I destroyed, I put on fire, I killed, I did everything, but now, thank you very much, I am going back home.'"

The council also held private consultations into the early morning hours, discussing how to best proceed to get Iraq to comply fully and respond to a request from the Iraqi leader for a cease-fire.

British Ambassador Sir David Hannay said Iraq's willingness to withdraw unconditionally and quickly was "the good news".

"The less good news was the representative of Iraq in his statement to council which made it extremely clear that the only resolution he was accepting was 660 and that cast some doubt on how best to proceed," Sir David said. "Most of the council believe that all 12

resolutions which are referred to in Resolution 678 must be accepted."

Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov reported on a message President Gorbachev received from Saddam Hussein.

Vorontsov characterized it as "rather short, rather terse," indicating that the Iraqi leader had already given the withdrawal order and asking the Soviet Union "to convey to the Security Council his request for a cease-fire."

The Soviet Union, he said, "is in favour of all the resolutions being implemented, but 660 is the one we started with in trying to push Iraq from Kuwait and I think it is important that 660 should be a starting point."

Kuwaiti Ambassador Mohammad Abulhasan said that the Iraqi response "is not enough at all, because it ignored totally other Security Council resolutions."

Abulhasan used as an example the fact that the Iraqi ambassador told the council that "Kuwait geographically is undisputed but constitutionally that is something else. Here he meant they are only withdrawing their troops from territory which belongs to them and constitutionally Kuwait is still part of Iraq."

"He wants to . . . give the impression that the withdrawal is taking place from Iraqi territory instead of a sovereign state which has been occupied by force," he said. "My reply was unless all Security Council resolutions are clearly mentioned then we are nowhere."

"Without a formal letter from the government of Iraq to the Secretary-General accepting all Security Council resolutions, the mere statement here is not valid particularly because Iraq is not trustworthy in its international dealings," Abulhasan said.

—*USIS*, New Delhi

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President Bush's address to nation on 26 February 1991

I have a brief statement to make today. Saddam's most recent speech is an outrage. He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout, and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait. He is trying to save the remnants of

power and control in the Middle East by every means possible. And here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail.

Saddam is not interested in peace, but only to regroup and fight another day, and he does not renounce Iraq's claim to Kuwait. To the contrary—he makes clear that Iraq continues to claim Kuwait. Nor is there any evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression or any indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for the awful consequences of that aggression.

He still does not accept UN Security Council resolutions or the coalition terms of February 22, including the release of our POWs—all POWs—third-country detainees, and an end to the pathological destruction of Kuwait. The coalition will therefore continue to prosecute the war with undiminished intensity.

As we announced last night, we will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat. We have no choice but to consider retreating combat units as a threat and respond accordingly. Anything else would risk additional US and coalition casualties.

The best way to avoid further casualties on both sides is for the Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms, as nearly 30,000 Iraqis already have. It is time for all Iraqi forces in the theater of operation, those occupying Kuwait, those supporting the occupation of Kuwait, to lay down their arms. And that will stop the bloodshed.

From the beginning of the air operation nearly six weeks ago, I have said that our efforts are on course and on schedule. This morning, I am very pleased to say that coalition efforts are ahead of schedule. The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand.

And let me just add that I share the pride of all of the American people in the magnificent, heroic performance of our armed forces. May God bless them and keep them.

We continue to prosecute the war. We have heard no reason to change that. And because there is a war on, our first concern must be the safety

and security of United States and coalition forces.

We don't know whether this most recent claim about Iraqi withdrawal is genuine. We have no evidence to suggest the Iraqi army is withdrawing. In fact, Iraqi units are continuing to fight. Moreover, we remember when Saddam Hussein's tanks pretended to surrender at Khafji only to turn and fire. We remember the Scud attacks today, and Saddam's many broken promises of the past. There are at least an additional 22 dead Americans tonight who offer silent testimony to the intentions of Saddam Hussein.

The statement out of Baghdad today says that Saddam Hussein's forces will fight their way out while retreating. We will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat. But we will consider retreating combat units as a movement of war.

The only way Saddam Hussein can persuade the coalition of the seriousness of his intentions would be for him personally and publicly to agree to the terms of the proposal we issued on February 22. And because the announcement from Baghdad referred to the Soviet initiative, he must personally and publicly accept explicitly all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including especially UN Security Council Resolution 662 which calls for Iraqi recision of its purported annexation of Kuwait, and UN Security Council Resolution 674 which calls for Iraqi compensation to Kuwait and others.

That's the end of the statement. I might just add that the President met with his national security advisors for approximately an hour and 15 minutes this evening to consider this matter, and the President has returned to his residence.

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Letter from Iraqi Foreign Minister to UN Secretary-General on 27 February 1991

The letter from the Iraqi foreign minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Javier Perez De Cuellar, as broadcast on Iraqi radio at 8.41 p.m. IST on Feb. 27.

Your excellency: I have the honour to notify you that the Iraqi government, as it once again reiterates its consent to fully abide by United Nations security council resolution 660 for the year 1990, the Iraqi armed forces have embarked upon pulling out to the positions they occupied prior to 1st August 1990. Hopefully, full withdrawal will be fully completed within the next few hours, although the American and other forces are continuing their attacks against the Iraqi armed forces in the course of their withdrawal process.

I would also like to inform you that the Iraqi government agrees to abide by resolutions No.662 for the year 1990 and resolution 674 for the year 1990, if the UN security council orders an immediate cease-fire and an end to all land, sea and air military operations, and considers as nonexistent, and consequently null and void, all the bases on which council resolutions 661 for the year 1990, 665 for the year 1990, and 670 for the year 1990 were adopted.

The Iraqi government asserts its full willingness, immediately after a cease-fire takes effect, to release the prisoners of war and return them to their homelands within a very short time in accordance with the third Geneva convention for the year 1949, and under the supervision of the international committee of the Red Cross.

Please convey this message to the UN security council at once and guarantee its distribution as a council document.

—*Times of India*, 28 February 1991

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President Bush announces suspension of war with Iraq on 28 February 1991

Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny.

We share in their joy—a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal. Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American flag flies above our embassy.

Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight, America and the world have kept their word.

This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride—pride in our troops, pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis, pride in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces.

No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait, but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.

After consulting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, and our coalition partners I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight—Eastern Standard Time—exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and six weeks since the start of Desert Storm, all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.

Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements. Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait. And acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage and injury its aggression has caused.

The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate military commanders to meet, within 48 hours, with their coalition counterparts at a place in the theater of operations, to be specified, to arrange for military aspects of the cease-fire. Further, I have asked Secretary of State Baker to request that the United Nations Security Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war to be ended.

This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces, and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coa-

lition forces will be free to resume military operations.

At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your POWs with kindness. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and looked forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.

We must now begin to look beyond victory and war. We must meet the challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before, we will consult with our coalition partners.

We've already done a good deal of thinking and planning for the post-war period, and Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition partners on the region's challenges.

There can be, and will be, no solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace. In this spirit, Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to begin a new round of consultations.

This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace.

Tonight, though, let us be proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those who risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families. And let us all remember them in our prayers.

Good night, and may God bless the United States of America.

—USIS, New Delhi

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Letter from Iraqi Foreign Minister to UN Security Council on 28 February 1991

I have the honour to inform you officially that the Government of Iraq agrees to comply fully with Security Council resolution 660(1990) and all the other Security Council resolutions.

You are kindly requested to transmit this letter to the members of the Security Council and to have it circulated as an official document

of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tariq Aziz
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs
—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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UN Security Council's Cuba, Ecuador, India, Yemen and Zimbabwe: draft resolution on 2 March 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its relevant resolutions, particularly resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990) and 670 (1990),

Welcoming Kuwait's liberation following total withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait in compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990),

Noting the urgent humanitarian circumstances in both Iraq and Kuwait,

1. *Determines* that humanitarian circumstances have arisen in Iraq and Kuwait, including for the purposes of paragraphs 3(c) and 4 of resolution 661(1990);

2. *Decides* that none of the provisions of resolution 661(1990) and other relevant provisions of subsequent resolutions, in regard to supplies for medical purposes, foodstuffs, water, fuel and electricity, shall have any further force and effect;

3. *Requests* the United Nations specialized agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies to extend assistance in implementing this resolution, particularly for supplies and distribution of foodstuffs.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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*UN Security Council resolution number 686 which was
approved on 2 March 1991*

The sponsors of the resolution were the United States, Belgium, France, Romania, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and Zaire.

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990) and 678 (1990),

Recalling the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter,

Recalling paragraph 9 of resolution 661(1990) regarding assistance to the Government of Kuwait and paragraph 3(c) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,

Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all of the resolutions noted above (s/22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of war immediately (s/22273),

Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990),

Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in resolution 678 (1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region,

Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 578(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,

Acting under Chapter VII of the charter,

1. *Affirms* that all 12 resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect;

2. *Demands* that Iraq implement its acceptance of all 12 resolutions noted above and in particular that Iraq;

(a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;

(b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;

(c) Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained; and

(d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period;

3. *Further demands* that Iraq;

(a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft;

(b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time;

(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990); and

(d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678(1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent waters;.

4. *Recognizes* that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remain valid;

5. *Welcomes* the decision of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to provide access and to commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross;

6. *Requests* all Member States, as well as the United Nations, the

specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to cooperate with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country;

7. *Decides* that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken the actions set out above;

8. *Decides* that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the Security Council remains actively seized of the matter.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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US Commander of Operation Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf's briefing on March 3 in Safwan, Iraq

Let me just say that we have just completed what I think were very frank, very candid and very constructive discussion with the Iraqi military. The purpose of this meeting, as stated previously by the President of the United States, was so that we could agree on certain conditions that were necessary to continue with a cessation of hostilities and the cessation of coalition offensive operations.

I am very happy to tell you that we agreed on all matters. Some of the subjects that were discussed were control measures to ensure that units—armed units—of the coalition do not come in contact with armed units of the Iraqi military that result in any more deaths.

We have received information on the location of mine fields in Kuwait and mine fields in international waters so that we can begin operations immediately to make those areas safe.

We have also made it very clear that upon the signing of a cease-fire, but not before, all coalition forces will be drawn back from Iraqi territory that we currently occupy.

The most important point that we discussed was the immediate release of all prisoners of war. We have agreed that this release should be immediate. We have agreed that the details of this release must be worked out by the International Red Cross. But, both sides have agreed that we will do everything we can to work with the Red Cross to, as

rapidly as possible, determine locations and times. We have also asked that as a token of good faith on both sides that we have a symbolic release immediately. And, I feel sure, based upon our discussions, that such a symbolic release should take place.

We have provided the Iraqis with the names of all of the missing in action and we have asked for as much information as we could get concerning those missing in action. We have also asked them to provide us with the names of anyone who may have died while they're in their—in their custody. And we have also asked for the return of the remains.

I would just say that I think we have made a major step forward in the cause of peace. And, I have every expectation that if we continue the open and frank and cooperative dialogue that we had today, and I would say very candidly that the Iraqis came to discuss and to cooperate with a positive attitude, that we are well on our way to a lasting peace.

I will take three questions.

Q: Were you able to learn the whereabouts or circumstances of the Kuwaiti detainees?

Gen. Schwarzkopf: We mutually agreed that anyone who was detained against their will would be treated in the same category as a POW, be they a journalist, be they a civilian, or anything else. They would be treated as a POW and handled by the Red Cross.

Q: Sir, when do you think that the US forces will be out of the Middle East for good? When do you think the final soldiers would be out?

A: That's an impossible question to answer. There's some other things that need to be done in the international arena, of course, according to the United Nations resolutions (which) have to be accepted by Iraq. We have to have a cease-fire. As soon as we have a cease-fire, we will start withdrawing forces from Iraq. And, I'm sure the President of the United States that he is going to try and get the forces—US forces home as rapidly as possible.

Q: Sir, how many did he say died in captivity—how many POWs?

Q: What's the next step toward a formal cease-fire agreement with the Iraqis?

A: I think that the next step, of course, at the present time has to be full acceptance of the United Nations' resolution that was passed last night. And, also, we want to get on as quickly as possible with

the return of POWs. And I think that's the next two things you could see.

Q: (Off mike)—a second meeting?

A: At the present time, if there is a second meeting it will probably be between—We have established a mutual meeting point in the event it is a necessity to have a further meeting between the military where military commanders can get together to work out any difficulties or any problems that might arise, or any minor details. But, we both made it very clear to each other that we are prepared to meet again if required, however, at the present time, based upon the very positive nature of the meeting we had today, I would (not?) anticipate that that would happen.

And that's five questions instead of three. So, I'm going to turn it over to General Khalid now.

Gen. Khalid: Thank you very much.

I think we should consider today as a memorable, historic day. And I hope that peace will last in the Middle East and the whole world. The attitude today—I concur with General Schwarzkopf that it was excellent. We have all the answers for all our questions. The delegation—the Iraqi delegations—were willing to; not only to answer, but to satisfy us in every request we had.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Statement of the President of the Security Council on March 3 1991

The Council welcomes the decisions taken to date relating to food and medical needs by the Committee established under resolution 661 including those just taken to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance including infant formula and water purification material.

It calls upon the Committee to continue to act promptly on requests submitted to it for humanitarian assistance.

It urges the Committee to pay particular attention to the findings and recommendations on critical medical/public health and nutritional

conditions in Iraq which have been and will continue to be submitted to it by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant organizations, consistent with the relevant resolutions, and urges these humanitarian agencies to play an active role in this process and co-operate closely with the Committee in its work.

The Council welcomes the Secretary-General's announcement that he plans to send urgently a mission led by Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari comprising representatives of the appropriate United Nations agencies to Iraq and Kuwait to assess the humanitarian needs arising in the immediate post crisis environment. The Council invites the Secretary-General to keep it informed in the shortest possible time on the progress of his mission on which it pledges to take immediate action.

—UN Information Centre, New Delhi

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Letter of Iraq to the United Nations on 3 March 1991

Sir,

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, dated 3 March 1991.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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*Letter from Tariq Aziz to UN Security Council on
3 March 1991*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Iraqi Government has taken note of the text of Security Council resolution 686 (1991) and that it has agreed to fulfil its obligations under the said resolution. We hope that the Council, in its turn, will interact in an objective and honourable manner, pursuant to the provisions of international law and the principles of equity and justice, with our faithful and—to the extent that we are able—speedy fulfilment of those obligations.

You and the members of the Security Council are well aware of the manner in which the American forces and their partners in the military operations against Iraq have implemented Security Council resolution 678 (1990), and of the major losses which Iraq has suffered to its infrastructure, economic, civilian, cultural and religious property, basic public services such as electricity, water, telephones, transport, fuel and other essential requirements of everyday life.

Despite these facts, resolution 686 (1991) has ignored the Iraqi people's suffering and the imposition on Iraq alone of a long series of obligations. A number of members of the Security Council referred to this fact, leading one of them (Cuba) to vote against the resolution, while three States—India, Yemen and China, the latter being a permanent member of the Council—abstained.

We record these facts for history and for the attention of those members of the Security Council and the international Organization—and those elements of international public opinion—who have a conscience. Our agreement to fulfil our obligations under this resolution stems from our determination to refute the pretexts which some may employ in order to persist in their aggression against Iraq and to inflict further harm on its people.

Iraq hopes that the Security Council will ensure the adoption of a resolution proclaiming an official cease-fire and the cessation of all military operations on land, at sea and in the air, as well as the immediate withdrawal of the foreign military forces stationed without any justification in various regions of Iraq. Iraq also hopes that the Security Council will proceed to declare, with all possible speed, the

bases for its adoption of Security Council resolutions 661 (1990), 665 (1990) and 670 (1990) as having elapsed, with the result that the resolutions become null and void.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Tariq Aziz

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister for Foreign Affairs

The President of the Security Council; and

The Secretary-General of the United Nations

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Revolution Command Council's decision on 5 March 1991

In accordance with the acceptance by the Iraqi Government of Security Council resolution 686 (1991) and with its previous declarations regarding acceptance of the other Security Council resolutions, and pursuant to the provisions of article 42, paragraph (a) of the Constitution,

The Revolution Command Council has decided as follows:

1. All Revolution Command Council decisions subsequent to 2 August 1990 regarding Kuwait are null and void.
2. All laws, decisions, regulations, instructions, directives and measures issued by virtue of the decisions of the Council referred to in paragraph 1 above are abrogated and all the effects arising therefrom are nullified.
3. No text which is contradictory to the provisions of this decision shall have any effect.
4. This decision shall be published in the Official Gazettee and shall take effect from 3 March 1991.
5. The competent ministries and authorities shall undertake the implementation of this decision.

SADDAM HUSSEIN

President of the

Revolution Command Council

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*Speech by President Bush to US Congress
on 6 March 1991*

Mr. President. Mr. Speaker. Members of Congress: Five short weeks ago, I came to this House to speak to you about the State of the Union. We met then in time of war. Tonight, we meet in a world blessed by the promise of peace.

From the moment Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 16, until the time the guns fell silent at midnight one week ago, this nation has watched its sons and daughters with pride—watched over them with prayer. As commander-in-chief, I can report to you: Our Armed Forces fought with honor and valor. As president, I can report to the nation—aggression is defeated. The war is over.

This is a victory for every country in the coalition, and for the United Nations. A victory for unprecedented international cooperation and diplomacy, so well led by our Secretary of State James Baker. It is a victory for the rule of law and for what is right.

Desert Storm's success belongs to the team that so ably leads our Armed Forces—our secretary of defense and our chairman of the joint chiefs: Dick Cheney and Colin Powell.

And of course, this military victory also belongs to the one the British call the "Man of the Match"—the tower of calm at the eye of Desert Storm—General Norman Schwarzkopf.

And let us not forget Saudi General Khalid, or Britain's General de la Billiere, or General Roquejoffre of France, and all the others whose leadership played such a vital role. And most importantly, all those who served in the field.

I thank the members of this Congress—support here for our troops in battle was overwhelming. And above all, I thank those whose unfailing love and support sustained our courageous men and women: I thank the American people.

Tonight, I come to this House to speak about the world—the world after the war.

The recent challenge could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain; Kuwait the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world—all united against aggres-

sion.

Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature.

Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to—denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world—Saddam and those around him are accountable.

All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait and the suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for all our fallen soldiers and their families, for all the innocents caught up in this conflict. And yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq—a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that one day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations.

Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait. So tonight, let me outline four key challenges to be met:

First, we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for regional security. But we want them to know that just as we stood with them to repel aggression so now America stands ready to work with them to secure the peace.

This does not mean stationing US ground forces on the Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces. And it means maintaining a capable US naval presence in the region, just as we have for over 40 years. Let it be clear: Our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf.

Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq requires special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful intentions—that its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and rebuild its menacing war machine—Iraq must not have access to the instruments of war.

Third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. On the night I announced Operation Desert Storm, I expressed my hope that out of the horrors of war might come new momentum for peace. We have learned in the modern age, geography cannot guarantee security and security does not come from military power alone.

All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab states have for the first time found themselves confronting the same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states—and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead nowhere—there can be no substitute for diplomacy.

A comprehensive peace must be grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.

The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problems in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go forward with new vigor and determination. I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will.

Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources with a wealth of untapped human potential. Resources once squandered on military might must be redirected to more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now, the challenge is to reach higher—to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all people of the region.

By meeting these four challenges we can build a framework for peace. I have asked Secretary of State Baker to go to the Middle East to begin this process. He will go to listen, to probe, to offer suggestions, and to advance the search for peace and stability. I have also asked him to raise the plight of the hostages held in Lebanon. We have not forgotten them. We will not forget them.

To all the challenges that confront this region of the world, there

is no single solution, no solely American answer. But we can make a difference. America will work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change.

But we cannot lead a new world abroad if, at home, it's politics as usual on American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away from the temptation to protect unneeded weapons systems and obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to micro-management of foreign and security assistance programs, micro-management that humiliates our friends and allies and hamstringing our diplomacy. It's time to rise above the parochial and the pork barrel—to do what is necessary, what's right, and what will enable this nation to play the leadership role required of us.

The consequences of the conflict in the Gulf reach far beyond the confines of the Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire world was convulsed by war. Twice this century, out of the horrors of war hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, those hopes proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man.

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and Cold War.

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the strong . . ." A world where the United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.

The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans: We passed that test.

For the sake of our principles—for the sake of the Kuwaiti people—we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador Al-Sabah, tonight, Kuwait is free.

Tonight, as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission.

Our success in the Gulf will shape not only the new world order we seek but our mission here at home.

In the war just ended, there were clear-cut objectives, timetables and, above all, an overriding imperative to achieve results. We must

bring that same sense of self-discipline, that same sense of urgency, to the way we meet challenges here at home.

In my State of the Union address and in my budget, I defined a comprehensive agenda to prepare for the next American century.

Our first priority is to get this economy rolling again. The fear and uncertainty caused by the crisis in the Gulf were understandable. But now that the war is over, oil prices are down, interest rates are down, and confidence is rightly coming back. Americans can move forward to lend, spend and invest in this, the strongest economy on Earth.

We must also enact the legislation that is key to building a better America. For example: In 1990, we enacted an historic Clean Air Act. Now we've proposed a National Energy Strategy. We passed a Child Care Bill that put power in the hands of parents. Today, we're ready to do the same thing with our schools, and expand choice in education. We passed a Crime Bill that made a useful start in fighting crime and drugs. This year we're sending to Congress our comprehensive crime package to finish the job. We passed the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act. Now we've sent forward our Civil Rights Bill. We also passed the Aviation Bill. This year we've sent up our new Highway Bill.

And those are just a few of our pending proposals for reform and renewal.

Tonight, I call on Congress to move forward aggressively on our domestic front. Let's begin with two initiatives we should be able to agree on quickly: transportation and crime. And then, let's build on success with those and enact the rest of our agenda. If our forces could win the ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days. Let that be a promise we make tonight to the American people.

When I spoke in this House about the state of our nation, I asked all of you: If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be. In the time since then, the brave men and women of Desert Storm accomplished more than even they may realize. They set out to confront an enemy abroad, and in the process, they transformed a nation at home.

Think of the way they went about their mission—with confidence and quiet pride. Think about their sense of duty, about all they taught us, about our values, about ourselves.

We hear so often about our young people in turmoil; how our

children fall short; how our schools fail us; how American products and American workers are second class. Well, don't you believe it. The America we saw in Desert Storm was first-class talent.

And they did it using America's state-of-the-art technology. We saw the excellence embodied in the Patriot missile and the patriots who made it work.

And we saw soldiers who know about honor and bravery and duty and country and the world-shaking power of these simple words.

There is something noble and majestic about the pride, about the patriotism, that we feel tonight.

So, to everyone here, and everyone watching at home, think about the men and women of Desert Storm. Let us honor them with our gratitude. Let us comfort the families of the fallen and remember each precious life lost.

Let us learn from them as well. Let us honor those who have served us by serving others.

Let us honor them as individuals—man and women of every race, all creeds and colors—by setting the face of this nation against discrimination, bigotry and hate.

I'm sure many of you saw on television the unforgettable scene of four terrified Iraqi soldiers surrendering. They emerged from their bunker—broken, tears streaming from their eyes, fearing the worst. And then there was the American soldier. Remember what he said? He said: "It's okay. You're all right now. You're all right now."

That scene says a lot about America, a lot about who we are. Americans are a caring people. We are a good people, a generous people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do.

Soon, our troops will begin the march we've all been waiting for—their march home. I have directed Secretary Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat units from the Gulf.

Less than two hours from now, the first planeload of American soldiers will lift off from Saudi Arabia headed for the USA. It will carry men and women of 24th Mechanized Infantry Division bound for Fort Stewart, Georgia. This is just the beginning of a steady flow of American troops coming home.

Let their return remind us that all those who have gone before are linked with us in the long line of freedom's march. Americans have always tried to serve, to sacrifice nobly for what we believe to be right.

Tonight, I ask every community in this country to make this coming Fourth of July a day of special celebration for our returning troops.

They may have missed Thanksgiving and Christmas, but I can tell you this: For them and for their families, we can make this a holiday they'll never forget.

In a very real sense, this victory belongs to them—to the privates and the pilots, to the sergeants and the supply officers, to the men and women in the machines, and the men and women who made them work. It belongs to the regulars, to the reserves, to the Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known.

We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. We fought hard, and—with others—we won the war. We lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in return.

We're coming home now—proud. Confident—heads high. There is much that we must do at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are Americans.

May God bless this great nation—the United States of America.

—USIS, New Delhi

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The Damascus Declaration, on Coordination and Cooperation among Arab Countries of 6 March 1991

The member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, who participated in the meeting held in Damascus on March 5-6, 1991:

Proceeding from the sentiments of fraternity and solidarity which bind them together and which have been crystallised by the age-old legacy of support and cohesion and a joint struggle, the unity of aspirations, challenges, goals and destiny;

Enhancing their abilities to shoulder their national responsibilities to exalt the status of the Arab nation, serve its aspirations and sovereignty, maintain its security and realise its common interests; in the framework of a firm adherence to the goals and principles that are consecrated by the Charters and Resolutions of the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the United Nations, recognising the on-going profound changes in the international arena, that provide major challenges to the Arab nation, require an optimum level

of coordination and cooperation among the Arab states to face them;

Reiterating their rejection of the policy of aggression and a bias towards it, as had occurred during the aggression against and occupation of the State of Kuwait by the forces of the Iraqi regime. It was a flagrant violation of all established Arab, Islamic and international principles and customs and flouted a number of concepts and achievements of joint Arab action at a time when the Arab nation needed more than ever to unify and mobilise its potentials to foil numerous unprecedented threats;

As they welcome the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimacy and express their deep anguish and regret at what the Kuwaiti people underwent on account of the Iraqi regime's aggression, and also express their profound distress at the worst kind of sufferings that the Iraqi people have been experiencing due to the indifference of the Iraqi leadership towards their interests. They emphasise in this regard their support for the Iraqi people in their hour of crisis and their total commitment to the territorial integrity and safety of Iraq;

Emphasise their determination to provide a fresh spirit to the joint Arab action and to the establishment of fraternal cooperation among members of the Arab family on concrete bases relying on the following principles:

First: Principles of Coordination and Cooperation

The coordination and cooperation are based on the following:

1. Working in accordance with the Arab League Charter, the United Nations Charter and other Arab and international Charters; respecting and upholding the historical and fraternal ties and good neighbourly relations; obligation to respect the territorial integrity, regional security, sovereignty, non-acquisition of land by force, non-intervention in internal affairs; obligation to settle disputes peacefully.

2. Working for setting up a new Arab order to strengthen joint Arab action; considering the arrangement agreed upon by the participating parties as the basis for achieving this goal; keeping the door open for other Arab countries to join in this declaration in the light of common interests and objectives;

3. Working for enabling Arab states to direct their full resources to face the challenges which confront the stability and security of the region and to achieve a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestine cause on the basis of the United Nations Charter and relevant UN Resolutions.

4. Strengthening the economic cooperation among the participating parties to form an economic grouping for the achievement of economic and social development.

5. Respecting the principle of the sovereignty of each country regarding its natural and economic resources.

Second: Objectives of Coordination and Cooperation

1. In the Political and Security Spheres

A. The participating parties consider the current stage, that followed Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation, provides the optimum conditions for facing other challenges and threats that the region is subject to. On top of them are the challenges emanating from the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and the settling of Jews in them. The participating parties consider the holding of an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations is a suitable framework for terminating the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and is a guarantee for the national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the relevant UN Resolutions.

B. The participating parties emphasised their respect for the principles of the Arab League Charter and their commitment to the Joint Defence Pact and economic cooperation among member-states of the Arab League and their determination to work together to guarantee the security and safety of the Arab countries. Referring to Article Nine of the Arab League Charter in particular, the participating parties consider the presence of Egyptian and Syrian troops in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Gulf region—upon the request of their governments to defend their territories—represents the nucleus of the Arab Peace Force that guarantees the security and safety of the Arab countries in the Gulf region and is a specimen that serves to guarantee the effectiveness of a comprehensive Arab security and defence system.

The participating parties also emphasise that the coordination and cooperation among them is not directed against any party. On the other hand, it could be an initiation for a dialogue with Islamic and international parties that respect the supreme interests of the Arab states and abide by the established principles of international law, especially those that are relevant to the respect for the sovereignty of nations, the non-intervention in internal affairs, and settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

C. The participating parties seek the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East region, especially nuclear weapons, and will work to achieve this through the concerned international organisations.

II. In Economic and Cultural Spheres

In accordance with the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defence Pact and the economic cooperation among member-states of the Arab League and other agreements of joint Arab action, the participating parties seek to:

A. Strengthen the basis of economic cooperation among founding parties as a first step to be built upon with other Arab nations so as to widen the scope and range of cooperation.

B. Adopt economic policies that will achieve a balanced economic and social development paving the way for the formation of an Arab economic grouping to face the challenges and to keep pace with the developments emanating from the establishment of large economic groupings in the world.

C. Encourage the private sector in the Arab countries to participate in the process of economic and social development, including strengthening the ties among Arab chambers of trade, industry and agriculture and providing an opportunity to small and medium sectors to benefit from the fruits of joint action in an easy and tangible way.

D. Promote the role of scientific research centres and facilitate communication among them in order to enable them to undertake common researches that achieve integration in different fields.

E. Make use of the experts and human resources in the fields of culture and information exchange, maintaining the values and traditions of participating states and non-intervention in their internal affairs.

III. In the Sphere of Joint Arab Action Organisations

Supporting the Arab League and foiling all attempts aimed at weakening or dismembering it; reiterating the obligation and adherence to the objectives and principles of the Arab League Charter with the possibility of improving it by incorporating in it the outcome of the Charter Revision Committee as appendices, including the establishment of a system for settling disputes.

Third : The Organisational Framework for Coordination and Co-operation

The coordination and cooperation among founding parties will take place to achieve the indicated objectives through meetings hosted in rotation by all participating states at the level of foreign ministers and with the possibility of inviting experts and specialists to study the aspects of cooperation to reach new contracting formulae for Arab cooperation among them and to be open to all Arab countries.

Fourth: General Provisions

Eight original copies of this Declaration are signed in Damascus on March 6, 1991. Each has equal authenticity. This Declaration will be put into effect after ratification and the documents of this Declaration will be deposited in the Foreign Ministry of Syria.

Rashid bin Abdallah El Naseem	Foreign Minister, United Arab Emirates
Prince Saud Al Faisal	Foreign Minister, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Mubarak bin Ali Khater	Foreign Minister, State of Qatar
Dr Esmat Abdel Meguid	Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Arab Republic of Egypt
Sheikh Mohamed bin Mubarak al Khalifa	Foreign Minister, State of Bahrain
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah	Foreign Minister, Sultanate of Oman
Sheikh Sabah al Ahmed Al Sabah	Foreign Minister, State of Kuwait
Farouq Al Shara	Foreign Minister, Syrian Arab Republic

—Press Bureau, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt,
New Delhi

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*Soviet Views on post-crisis set-up in Gulf area
on 19 March 1991*

The Kuwait crisis and the process of its overcoming have become a test of strength for the new thinking. By withstanding this test the world community has shown that the distance already covered in the passage from the "Cold War" to a new system of international relations is in no way a short one.

To consolidate the success achieved, it is necessary to preserve the high degree of interaction and cooperation in the post-crisis period while solving the problems brought about by the conflict in the Persian Gulf area.

A stable normalisation in the Persian Gulf could influence in a positive way the process of improving the atmosphere in the entire region of the Middle East and promote the settlement of the problems brought about by the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the Soviet Union we are noting with attention the ideas put forward now as regards the post-crisis set-up in the Gulf. Many of the known initiatives in this regard contain the approaches which either coincide with or run parallel to our own approaches.

We envisage the promotion of security in the post-crisis period on the ways of implementing practical steps in the following main directions.

1. The key role in defining the parameters of the post-crisis set-up in the Persian Gulf area, no doubt, belongs primarily to the countries situated in this region. It is for them to define where the balance of their rights and interests lies which can provide on a long-term basis broad political and other kind of cooperation among them. Yet, one should not think in terms of the creation of isolated block-type groupings fencing themselves off other states, which could become a factor in the creation of new and in the fanning up of old antagonisms. The post-crisis settlement should not be directed against anybody. On the contrary, it should promote the interaction of all the regional countries concerned, as well as of the states which are not directly linked with this area but which make important contribution to maintain peace and stability there.

It is important to lay in the foundation of future agreements among

the parties concerned the basic principles of international law, in particular such as non-interference in each other's affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, recognition of the right of all the states of the region for sovereignty and territorial integrity within the existing and internationally recognised borders.

The optimum variant should envisage a multilateral comprehensive agreement or bilateral agreements which would meet the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and would be backed up by appropriate international guarantees by the Security Council and its five permanent members.

2. The lessons of Kuwait crisis call for the implementation of consequent steps to cut the arms race in the region. Despite all the complexities of this process it is justifiable even now to put forward the task of maintaining the balance of forces at ever decreasing levels of armaments, to the extent of attaining the level of defence sufficiency.

—The most acute problem is to effectively block the avenues for the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other types of mass destruction weapons in the region.

The proposals to create in the Middle East a zone free from these types of weapons merit earnest consideration. It is important that all the Middle East countries accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as to the Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

—The question of a balance reduction of arms supplies to the region ought to be seriously considered. This matter requires a responsible approach both by the principal arms suppliers and of their buyers. Primarily it means that restraint should be observed as far as the supplies and acquisition of offensive types of weapons, especially of missiles and missile technologies, are concerned. It would be necessary to reach appropriate collective agreements, including those on the control mechanisms, so that the optimum solutions to the problem could be found.

—It would be useful to utilise the experience accumulated by other regions in implementing the confidence-building measures such as prior announcement of military exercises, invitation of observers to these exercises, creation of demilitarised zones and low weapon-density zones.

3. Foreign military presence should not exceed the levels which

existed in the region as on August 1, 1990. If military support from outside becomes necessary for a certain period, in that case either the UN Peace Keeping Forces could play their role in this, or UN observers, or both of them, with appropriate contingents of Arab, Muslim or other countries joining them.

4. The task of initiating comprehensive economic cooperation among the states of the region arises, primarily for the restoration of their war-torn economies.

It is necessary to unfold international interaction in the cause of elimination of the damage inflicted on the environment by the hostilities.

Without casting any doubt on the inviolability of the principle of sovereignty of states over their natural resources, it is important to look in a new light at the task of adding more social and economic stability to the region by gradually equalising and harmonising the levels of economic development of the states situated there.

5. A broad consensus is forming, as well as among the states of the region, as regards the fact that important functions should belong to the UN as far as external support to the post-crisis settlement in the Persian Gulf area is concerned. This logically proceeds both from the role played by the Security Council in the mobilisation of collection rebuff to the Iraqi aggression and from Resolution 598 of the Council.

First of all, the UN can act as a reliable guarantor of implementation of the agreements.

Our proposal for the establishment of naval forces under the UN flag, in case any kind of threat to shipping emerges in the area of the Persian Gulf, remains valid. The new degree of trust among the permanent members of the Security Council justifies renewed and detailed discussion on the matter of engaging the services of the UN Military Staff Committee in crisis situations.

6. The task of lessening military tensions in the subregion of the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East as a whole requires purposeful efforts aimed at removing political causes of instability and conflicts here.

The unanimous mood of the international community in favour of a speedy and radical improvement in the situation in the region where interests of a great number of states are closely interwoven, is creating more favourable conditions for tackling, without delay, the problem of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of efforts in this direction will enable to incorporate the security which is being created

presently in the Persian Gulf area, into broader regional structures. And, for sure, the security of the peoples of the Middle East and West Asia will only benefit from this.

We are well aware of the fact that the creation of a comprehensive regional security system is not a one-act play but a process which needs time to be initiated. Even more so, at least some initial steps are essential to attain progress in those fields where they can be expected to be really successful.

While expressing these views, we, in no way, pretend to possess the ultimate truth. The working out of a new quality in inter-state relations in the region will require intensive political and diplomatic efforts with the participation of the widest possible range of the countries concerned. The Soviet Union is ready to make its contribution with the aim of speediest advancement towards the settlement of the problems of the post-crisis set-up in the Persian Gulf area, to discuss any constructive ideas, to actively cooperate with all parties concerned—the Persian Gulf countries, other Arab and Muslim states, permanent members of the Security Council, West European and non-aligned nations.

—Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi

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Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management dated 20 March 1991

INTRODUCTION

1. You asked me to travel, as a matter of urgency, to Kuwait and Iraq to assess humanitarian needs there in the immediate post-crisis environment, and to bring with me a team comprising representatives of the appropriate United Nations agencies and programmes. Your decision was announced in a press statement of 1 March 1991.

2. On 3 March 1991, the President of the Security Council made

a statement on behalf of the Council, in which it welcomed your announcement and invited you to keep it informed in the shortest possible time of the progress of this mission, in respect of which it pledged to take immediate action (S/22322).

3. In the days immediately preceding my departure, I consulted with all concerned parties, and met on 4 and 5 March 1991 with the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, H.E. Dr. Abdul Amir A. Al-Anbari, and with the Charge d'affaires of Kuwait to the United Nations, Ambassador Mohammad Saad Al-Sallal. Each pledged the full cooperation of his Government but mentioned logistical difficulties and communication problems with his capital. In my meeting with the representative of Kuwait I expressed a preference to travel there first. He, however, responded that his Government anticipated receiving a mission led by Mr. Abdulrahim Farah to assess losses and damages during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. His authorities preferred to receive that mission first. Thus, he believed that it would be more practical for my mission to travel first to Iraq before proceeding to Kuwait. He appreciated my desire to go first to his country and hoped that the mission could be received there in the near future.

4. I departed from New York on 7 March. The mission assembled at Geneva the following day. It comprised representatives not only of the Secretariat, but also of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). On my way to the Middle East, I consulted at Geneva with Mr. Claudio Caratsch, Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The mission travelled to Amman on 9 March and arrived at Baghdad on 10 March. At Amman, I was received by His Highness Crown Prince Hassan and by His Excellency Mr. Taher Al-Masri, Foreign Minister of Jordan. The mission remained in Iraq until 17 March. On that date I travelled to Bahrain while awaiting the outcome of consultations in New York and your further instructions. In Bahrain I met with the Foreign Minister, His Excellency Sheikh Mohamed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa. On 19 March you instructed me to return to New York. Leaving the remainder of the mission in Bahrain whilst awaiting the decision of the Kuwaiti Government, I departed that day and arrived in New York on 20 March. The Kuwaiti authorities have now

informed you that the mission is expected to depart Bahrain for Kuwait on or about 22 March.

1. Modus Operandi in Iraq

5. The mission began its work immediately upon arrival at Baghdad on 10 March, first linking up with local UNDP and UNICEF representative and, later that day, meeting with His Excellency Mr. Mohamed Sa'eed Al-Sahaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and senior officials of the relevant government departments and of local authorities. Joint working groups were established with the various United Nations specialist members of the mission. These held their first meeting that same evening to establish work programmes. Field work was undertaken from 11 to 16 March at various locations in and around Baghdad. A longer field trip was made by a group from the mission, led by myself, to Mosul, 400 kilometres north-west of Baghdad, and I myself also inspected numerous locations in Greater Baghdad. I and members of the mission held meetings with representatives of foreign diplomatic missions at Baghdad and with senior representatives of ICRC. Members of the mission also met with representatives of several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who had made their way to Iraq to see the situation for themselves. I held final meetings in respect of the specialist teams' work with the Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Tariq Aziz, and with the Minister of State and the participating senior officials, on the evening of 16 March.

6. The Iraqi authorities were fully cooperative in regard to the activities of the five specialist working groups. These dealt with: food and agriculture; water, sanitation and health; transportation and communications; energy; and refugees and other vulnerable groups. Members were able to inspect all locations and facilities that they had requested to see in the Baghdad area and in several other governorates, and could also engage in independent field research in wholesale and retail markets and undertake household surveys. However, the Government was unable to accede to my request that we visit Souera, Moussayeb, Basrah, Masiriyah and Kiruk. In respect of some, the problems were said to be logistical; in regard to others, concern for security was conveyed. I expressed regret at our inability to cover the whole country, because it was important that the United Nations should be able to assess the humanitarian needs of the entire population of Iraq in all regions. The authorities also expressed their regret on this subject, and we agreed that locally based United Nations staff would

travel to these areas as soon as conditions permitted. It has, however, been possible to infer from information available from various other sources that needs are unlikely to vary greatly from what we ourselves observed, but it is reported that conditions may be substantially worse in certain locations.

II. Summary of Findings and Recommendations in regard to Iraq

7. A summary of the mission's findings and conclusions is set out below. It is based upon a number of internal working papers, technical annexes, visits to sites and oral reports by mission specialists.

A. General remarks

8. I and the members of my mission were fully conversant with media reports regarding the situation in Iraq and, of course, with the recent WHO/UNICEF report on water, sanitary and health conditions in the Greater Baghdad area. It should, however, be said at once that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanised and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.

9. My mandate was limited to assessing the need for urgent humanitarian assistance. It did not extend to the huge task of assessing the requirements for reconstructing Iraq's destroyed infrastructure, much less, to developmental matters. Accordingly, my report to you, in its several technical sections, seeks with as much exactitude as possible to convey the extent of needs in the primary areas of humanitarian concern; for safe water and sanitation, basic health and medical support; for food; for shelter; and for the logistical means to make such support actually available. Underlying each analysis is the inexorable reality that, as a result of war, virtually all previously viable sources of fuel and power (apart from a limited number of mobile generators) and modern means of communication are now, essentially, defunct. The far-reaching implications of this energy and communications' vacuum as regards urgent humanitarian support are of crucial significance for the nature and effectiveness of the international response.

10. These conditions, together with recent civil unrest in some parts of the country, mean that the authorities are as yet scarcely able even to measure the dimensions of the calamity, much less respond to its consequences, because they cannot obtain full and accurate data. Additionally, there is much less than the minimum fuel required to provide the energy needed for movement or transportation, irrigation or generators for power to pump water and sewage. For instance, emergency medical supplies can be moved to health centres only with extreme difficulty and, usually, major delay. Information regarding local needs is slow and sparse. Most employees are simply unable to come to work. Both the authorities and the trade unions estimate that approximately 90 per cent of industrial workers have been reduced to inactivity and will be deprived of income as of the end of March. Government departments have at present only marginal attendance. Prior to recent events, Iraq was importing about 70 per cent of its food needs. Now, owing to the fuel shortage, the inability to import and the virtual breakdown of the distribution system, the flow of food through the private sector has been reduced to a trickle, with costs accelerating upwards. Many food prices are already beyond the purchasing reach of most Iraqi families. Agricultural production is highly mechanised, and much land depends on pumped-water irrigation. Should the main harvest in June 1991 be seriously affected by a lack of energy to drive machines and pump water, then an already grave situation will be further aggravated. As shown below, prospects for the 1992 harvest could, for combined reasons, be in at least as much jeopardy. Having regard to the nature of Iraq's society and economy, the energy vacuum is an omnipresent obstacle to the success of even a short-term, massive effort to maintain life-sustaining conditions in each area of humanitarian need.

B. Food and agriculture

11. Mission members held working sessions with counterparts from the relevant ministries, visited social centres where various vulnerable groups are cared for, agricultural production areas, a seed production centre, a veterinary health centre and a dairy production unit. The mission noted that Iraq has been heavily dependent on food imports which have amounted to at least 70 per cent of consumption needs. Seed was also imported. Sanctions decided upon by the Security Council had already adversely affected the country's ability to feed its people. New measures relating to rationing and enhanced production

were introduced in September 1990. These were, however, in turn, negatively affected by the hostilities which impacted upon most areas of agricultural production and distribution.

12. Food is currently made available to the population both through government allocation and rations, and through the market. The Ministry of Trade's monthly allocation to the population of staple food items fell from 343,000 tons in September 1990 to 182,000 tons, when rationing was introduced, and was further reduced to 135,000 tons in January 1991 (39 per cent of the pre-sanctions level). While the mission was unable to gauge the precise quantities still held in government warehouses, all evidence indicates that flour is now at a critically low level, and that supplies of sugar, rice, tea, vegetable oil, powdered milk and pulses are currently at critically low levels or have been exhausted. Distribution of powdered milk, for instance, is now reserved exclusively for sick children on medical prescription.

13. Livestock farming has been seriously affected by sanctions because many feed products were imported. The sole laboratory producing veterinary vaccines was destroyed during the conflict, as inspected by the mission. The authorities are no longer able to support livestock farmers in the combat of disease, as all stocks of vaccine were stated to have been destroyed in the same sequence of bombardments on this centre, which was an FAO regional project.

14. The country has had a particular dependence upon foreign vegetable seeds, and the mission was able to inspect destroyed seed warehouses. The relevant agricultural authorities informed the mission that all stocks of potatoes and vegetable seeds had been exhausted. Next season's planting will be jeopardised if seeds are not provided before October 1991.

15. This year's grain harvest in June is seriously compromised for a number of reasons, including failure of irrigation/drainage (no power for pumps, lack of spare parts); lack of pesticides and fertilizers (previously imported); and lack of fuel and spare parts for the highly-mechanised and fuel-dependent harvesting machines. Should this harvest fail, or be far below average, as is very likely barring a rapid change in the situation, widespread starvation conditions become a real possibility.

16. The official programme for the support of socially dependent groups of the population (the elderly, disabled, mothers and children, hospital patients, orphans, refugees, etc.) is affected by the overall grave deficiencies in the food situation.

17. The mission had the opportunity to conduct independent research relating to household costs and living standards in Baghdad. Such standards have declined rapidly in the last months, while food and fuel prices have climbed dramatically. Price increases in the August to January period reflected shortages of supply, but since January there has been a further acceleration of price increases reflecting both supply shortages and the breakdown of the transport system. Interviews with private wholesale food distributors revealed that their stocks are near depletion and they no longer have an organised private transport capacity, owing to fuel shortages. The government-initiated rationing system was designed to provide families with a fraction of their basic necessities at prices comparable to those (sic) person, per month, of flour or 3 loaves of baked bread; 10 kilograms per family, per month, of liquid cooking gas; 1 bar of soap per person, per month, etc. However, independent surveys conducted by the mission in several diverse areas of Baghdad showed that many families cannot draw their full rations, since the distribution centres are often depleted and they have great difficulty in travelling to other centres. The quality of food distributed has itself deteriorated to the point of causing health problems. Most families also reported that they could not meet their needs through the private markets. Despite official price controls, the independent market surveys conducted by the mission showed hyperinflation since August. The price of most basic necessities has increased by 1,000 per cent or more. For example, flour is now 5-6 dinars per kilogram (and seemingly still rising); rice has risen to 6 dinars per kilogram; sugar to 5 dinars per kilogram; lentils to 4 dinars per kilogram; and whole milk to 10 dinars. In contrast to this hyperinflation, many incomes have collapsed. Many employees cannot draw salaries, the banking system has in large measure closed down and withdrawals are limited to 100 dinars per month. The minimum monthly wage was 54 dinars and the average monthly salary of a civil servant was 70 dinars. In short, most families lack access to adequate rations or the purchasing power to meet normal minimal standards.

18. The mission recommends that, in these circumstances of present severe hardship and in view of the bleak prognosis, sanctions in respect of food supplies should be immediately removed, as should those relating to the import of agricultural equipment and supplies. The urgent supply of basic commodities to safeguard vulnerable groups is strongly recommended, and the provision of major quantities of the following staples for the general population: milk, wheat flour, rice,

sugar, vegetable oil and tea. These are required to meet minimum general requirements until the next harvest. Safeguarding the harvest means the urgent importation of fertilizers, pesticides, spare parts, veterinary drugs, agricultural machinery and equipment, etc. The mission was able to quantify many of these needs. The disappearance of vegetables from the country's markets also appears likely by the summer, and seed importation is crucial.

19. The mission observes that, without a restoration of energy supplies to the agricultural production and distribution sectors, implementation of many of the above recommendations would be to little effect. Drastic international measures across the whole agricultural spectrum are most urgent.

C. Water, sanitation and health

20. As regards water, prior to the crisis Baghdad received about 450 litres per person supplied by seven treatment stations purifying water from the Tigris river. The rest of the country had about 200-250 litres per person per day, purified and supplied by 238 central water-treatment stations and 1,134 smaller water projects. All stations operated on electric power; about 75 per cent had standby diesel-powered generators. Sewage was treated to an acceptable standard before being returned to the rivers.

21. With the destruction of power plants, oil refineries, main oil storage facilities and water-related chemical plants, all electrically operated installations have ceased to function. Diesel-operated generators were reduced to operating on a limited basis, their functioning affected by lack of fuel, lack of maintenance, lack of spare parts and non-attendance of workers. The supply of water in Baghdad dropped to less than 10 litres per day but has now recovered to approximately 30-40 litres in about 70 per cent of the area (less than 10 per cent of the overall previous use). Standby generating capacity is out of order in several pumping stations and cessation of supplies will therefore ensue if current machinery goes out of order for any reason (spare parts are not available owing to sanctions). As regards the quality of water in Baghdad, untreated sewage has now to be dumped directly into the river—which is the source of the water supply—and all drinking-water plants there and throughout the rest of the country are using river water with high sewage contamination. Recently, the water authority has begun to be able to improve the quality of drinking water by adding more of the remaining stock of alum and chlorine after assurances from

UNICEF and ICRC that emergency aid would be provided. Chemical tests are now being conducted at the stations but no bacteriological testing and control is possible because of the lack of electricity necessary for the functioning of laboratories, the shortage of necessary chemicals and reagents and the lack of fuel for the collection of samples. No chlorine tests are being conducted because of the lack of fuel for sampling. While the water authority has warned that water must be boiled, there is little fuel to do this and what exists is diminishing. Cool winter conditions have prevailed until recently.

22. Only limited information is available to authorities regarding the situation in the remainder of the country because all modern communications systems have been destroyed and information is now transmitted and received (in this sector as in all others) by person-to-person contact. In those areas where there are no generators or generators have broken down, or the fuel supply is exhausted, the population draws its water directly from polluted rivers and trenches. This is widely apparent in rural areas, where women and children can be seen washing and filling water receptacles. The quantity and quality of water produced is very variable and in many locations there are no chemicals available for purification. No quality control—chlorine testing, chemical testing or bacteriological testing—is being conducted.

23. The mission identified the various problems mentioned above: heavy sewage-pollution of water intakes; absence or acute shortage of water-treatment chemicals; especially aluminium sulphate (alum) and chlorine; lack of power to operate equipment; lack or shortage of diesel to run generators; inability to repair generators because of lack of spare parts; in some instances a total absence of generators; the destruction of some stations; absence of water-testing; lack of a health surveillance system in respect of communicable, and, especially, water-borne diseases. A further major problem, now imminent, is the climate. Iraq has long and extremely hot summers, the temperature often reaching 50 degrees Celsius. This has two main implications: (a) the quantity of water must be increased, and a minimum target of 50 litres per person per day has to be attained (this entails a gross output of 65 litres per person at the source); and (b) the heat will accelerate the incubation of bacteria, and thus the health risks ascribable to the water quality (already at an unacceptable level) will be further exacerbated—especially viewed in the overall sanitary circumstances which have already led to a fourfold increase in diarrhoeal disease incidence among children under five years of age, and the impact of this on their

precarious nutritional status.

24. As regards sanitation, the two main concerns relate to garbage disposal and sewage treatment. In both cases, rapidly rising temperatures will soon accentuate an existing crisis. Heaps of garbage are spread in the urban areas and collection is poor to non-existent. The work of collection vehicles is hampered by lack of fuel, lack of maintenance and spare parts and lack of labour, because workers are unable to come to work. Incinerators are in general not working, for these same reasons, and for lack of electric power. Insecticides, much needed as the weather becomes more torrid, are virtually out of stock because of sanctions and a lack of chemical supplies. As previously stated, Iraqi rivers are heavily polluted by raw sewage, and water levels are unusually low. All sewage treatment and pumping plants have been brought to a virtual standstill by the lack of power supply and the lack of spare parts. Pools of sewage lie in the streets and villages. Health hazards will build in the weeks to come.

25. As regards health conditions, the mission reviewed the situation since the special joint WHO-UNICEF mission in February 1991. It found that the recommendations made in their report (S/22239) subsequently approved by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, were well-founded. The mission also identified any further immediate health problems that needed to be addressed over the next three to six months. It also identified constraints that hamper the implementation of the already agreed recommendations of the joint mission. It found that health conditions in Baghdad and throughout the country remain precarious. A major factor is the water and sanitation situation described above. Additionally, the total lack of telephone communication and drastically reduced transport capability pose other problems to the health system since basic information on communicable diseases cannot be collected and disseminated, and essential drugs, vaccines and medical supplies cannot be distributed efficiently to the country. Mission health experts therefore focused especially on control and prevention of communicable diseases; water quality control; and logistics support for an effective distribution system from Baghdad to outlying regions of vaccines, drugs and medical supplies, as well as infant formula.

26. There is an urgent need to establish a national surveillance and reporting capacity for communicable diseases. This would require the establishment of sentinel sites that can test for the major communicable

diseases, as well as the capacity to collate and analyse resulting data on a national scale in a timely manner. Communications, functional laboratories, including necessary chemicals and reagents, and transport and power resources are essential to provide for this emergency humanitarian need. The question of water quality control has already been described. The fourfold increase in incidence of diarrhoeal diseases amongst young children reported by the WHO/UNICEF mission has been reconfirmed by findings recently obtained in 11 sentinel sites in Baghdad. The water and sanitation situation contributes to this problem which must be expected to increase as the summer approaches. The mission concluded that a catastrophe could be faced at any time if conditions do not change. It assessed the detailed requirements for water quality control. As for logistics, this sector is at present especially affected by the same problems that exist in the rest of society.

27. The mission's recommendations regarding water, sanitation and health, on an urgent humanitarian basis, are as follows:

(a) For water, needs have to be calculated in such a way as to permit a minimum quantity of safe water through the hot season from April to September. Assistance, similar to that approved earlier, should be provided to cities outside Baghdad, including the necessary quantities of fuel for generators and transport; lubricants for engines; aluminium sulphate; chlorine; generators for water stations; skid-mounted river water treatment units; chemical dosing pumps; gas chlorinators; pump sets; spare parts; collars for water pipes; and reagents for chemical tests;

(b) For sanitation needs, these include: fuel and spare parts for garbage collection trucks, as well as insecticides; fuel and spare parts for the sewage disposal system (all of which is mechanical and imported); and hoses for drawing water with tanker-trucks;

(c) As regards medical needs, the mission concluded that a number of items (sic) requirements. They include the provision of essential drugs and vaccines, as approved earlier, on a more extended scale, chemicals and reagents, generators, battery-operated incubators, means of alternative communication, requirements for the reinstitution of the cold chain for vaccines, and some vehicles;

(d) Without fuel, power and communications, the needed measures indicated above could, however, prove more or less ineffectual. Estimates of related fuel requirements have been made by the mission.

D. Refugees and other vulnerable groups

28. Conditions described above affect the whole population of Iraq and, most especially, low-income groups. The mission paid particular attention to the plight of especially vulnerable groups, whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi. Thus, it found that care for orphans, the elderly and the handicapped had been in many instances disrupted, with residents of institutions having had to be moved and regrouped at various locations. It recommends the urgent implementation of a humanitarian programme aimed at enabling some 25 orphanages and 71 other social welfare centres to resume their normal activities and at providing their beneficiaries with essential relief supplies, and specifies essential inputs for this purpose.

29. As regards the displaced and the homeless, the authorities themselves have not yet been able fully to assess the impact of the recent hostilities. They have, however, calculated that approximately 9,000 homes were destroyed or damaged beyond repair during the hostilities, of which 2,500 were in Baghdad and 1,900 were in Basrah. This has created a new homeless potential total of 72,000 persons. Official help is now hampered by the conditions described throughout this report and, especially, a virtual halt in the production of local building materials and the impossibility to import. The input of essential materials should be permitted.

30. The mission was unable, in the time available and having regard to the incomplete data in the hands of the authorities, to ascertain the number of foreign workers of Arab and other nationalities still resident in Iraq. It has been estimated that approximately 750,000 were still present in January 1991. It can at this stage be no more than a matter of surmise whether a number of those remaining may be in need of support to return to their countries of origin.

31. Some 54,000 Iranian nationals, (sic) Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 14 August 1949, or the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, had previously resided in three camps in Iraq. There has been substantial dislocation of some of these persons. Others have indicated their desire for repatriation. Limited relief assistance is urgently needed for some of those who have been obliged to leave one of the camps. Additionally, some 80,000 Palestinians are resident in Iraq, including a group of 35,000 considered as refugees benefiting from the protection of the Iraqi Government. It has been reported that several hundred Palestinians have recently come to Baghdad from Kuwait and are now in need

of emergency assistance. Certain measures have been developed to provide urgent assistance to those most in need.

E. Logistics: transportation, communications and energy

32. The mission examined transportation, communications and energy facilities, as it increasingly emerged that adequate logistics and energy would be essential to support and make effective emergency humanitarian assistance.

33. As regards transportation, the fact that the country has been on a war footing almost continuously since 1980 has undermined its capacity. At present, Iraq's sole available surface transport link with the outside world is via Amman to Aqaba. (It has been reported that a bridge has recently been destroyed on the Iskenderun/Mersin road to Iraq from Turkey; and the ports of Basrah and Umm Qasr are currently out of use; nor has there for some years been any direct cargo traffic to Iraq via the Syrian Arab Republic.) Internal transportation by road is now severely affected by a lack of spare parts and tyres and, above all, by a lack of fuel. Some internal railway capability still exists on the Baghdad-Mosul line. The mission was informed that a total of 83 road bridges had been destroyed and a number were inspected.

34. As regards communications, the mission was informed that all internal and external telephone systems had been destroyed, with the exception of a limited local exchange in one town. It had the opportunity to inspect a number of war-damaged or destroyed facilities and experienced for itself the situation in the Greater Baghdad and other urban areas. Communication in Iraq is now on a person-to-person basis, as mail services have also disintegrated.

35. The role of energy in Iraq is especially important because of the level of its urbanisation (approximately 77 per cent of the population lives in towns), its industrialization, and its prolonged, very hot, summers. Pre-war energy consumption consisted of oil and refined products (85 per cent), electricity (14.8 per cent) and other sources (0.2 per cent). About 30 per cent of electric power generation was hydro-power. Bombardment has paralysed oil and electricity sectors almost entirely. Power output and refineries' production is negligible and will not be resumed until the first repair phase is complete. The limited and sporadic power supply in some residential areas and for health facilities is provided by mobile generators. There have, officially, been virtually no sales of gasoline to private users since February. The mission was told that the only petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) products now

available are heating oil (rationed to 60 litres per month, per family) and liquified petroleum gas (LPG), which is rationed to one cylinder per month, per family. The authorities stated that stocks of these two products are close to exhaustion and that their distribution is expected to cease within the next 2-4 weeks. While work is under way to clear sites and assess damages, lack of communications and transport is retarding this activity. Initial inspections are said to show that necessary repairs to begin power generation and oil refining at minimal levels may take anywhere from 4 to 13 months. Minimal survival level to undertake humanitarian activities would require approximately 25 per cent of pre-war civilian domestic fuel consumption. Its absence, given the proximate onset of hot weather conditions, may have calamitous consequences for food, water supply and for sanitation; and therefore for health conditions. It seems inescapable that these fuel imports must take place urgently, and units and spare parts will also be required to enable Iraq to meet its own humanitarian needs as soon as possible. Under optimal circumstances it would be difficult or impossible for such needs to be provided from other sources given all the circumstances of that country's economy and social conditions, and bearing also in mind the limited bulk transportation possibilities that are likely to exist for the foreseeable future.

36. During my final meetings in Baghdad on 16 March I made reference to the need to be able to assess the effective utilisation of all inputs that might in future be established under the responsibility of the United Nations. The Government assured the mission that it would accept a system of monitoring of imports and their utilisation.

F. Observations

37. The account given above describes as accurately as the mission has been able, using all sources, including much independent observation, to ascertain the situation, which, within the time available and the travel limitations referred to earlier, was perceived to exist in regard to urgent humanitarian needs in Iraq during the week of 10-17 March. I, together with all my colleagues, am convinced that there needs to be a major mobilisation and movement of resources to deal with aspects of this deep crisis in the fields of agriculture and food, water, sanitation and health. Yet the situation raises, in acute form, other questions. For it will be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy these immediate humanitarian needs without dealing with the under-

lying need for energy, on an equally urgent basis. The need for energy means, initially, emergency oil imports and the rapid patching up of a limited refining and electricity production capacity, with essential supplies from other countries. Otherwise, food that is imported cannot be preserved and distributed; water cannot be purified; sewage cannot be pumped away and cleansed; crops cannot be irrigated; medicaments cannot be conveyed where they are required; needs cannot even be effectively assessed. It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met. The long summer, with its often 45 or even 50 degree temperatures (113-122 degrees Fahrenheit), is only weeks away. Time is short.

—Mission of India, UN

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Letter from Nasser Al-Kidwa to President, UN Security Council on 21 March 1991

Excellency,

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of the State of Palestine to bring the following to your immediate attention:

Violent and criminal actions are being continuously committed against the Palestinians, still living in Kuwait, which number around 150,000.

Examples of such actions are: beating, torturing until death, detaining and kidnapping of thousands, imposing siege on areas where Palestinians live and excluding them from getting available essentials of life, including food. Thus, creating unbearable situation of suffering and fear. Here, I would like to draw your attention to the wide coverage by the media of such situation.

The Palestine Liberation Organization did make unlimited efforts and contacts with Arab and Friendly governments in order to bring this tragedy to an immediate end. It, once more, calls upon all to do

everything they can in this respect.

While I recall my letter of March 6, 1991 on the very same situation, I reiterate the responsibility of the International Community, particularly the United Nations Security Council for the safety and well being of Palestinian civilians in Kuwait under the present prevailing circumstances.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr.Nasser Al-Kidwa
Alternate Permanent Observer
of Palestine to the UN
Charge d'Affaires

H.E. The President of the Security Council of the
United Nations
The United Nations
New York

—Mission of the PLO, UN

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*Letter from Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari to President, Security
Council on 21 March 1991*

Sir,

I wish to refer to my letter dated 8 March 1991 transmitting to you a copy of Revolution Command Council decision No. 55 of 5 March 1991 concerning the implementation of paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 686 (1991).

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of issue No.3345 of *Al-Waqa'i' al-Iragiyah*, the official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, issued on 18 March 1991, in which is published Revolution Command Council decision No. 55 of 5 March 1991 concerning the implementation of paragraph 2(a) of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution.

I request that this letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency
The President of the
Security Council

(Signed) Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

—Mission of Iraq, UN

136

Security Council adopts Gulf Cease-Fire Resolution on 3 April 1991

The United Nations Security Council April 3 approved a formal cease-fire resolution on the Persian Gulf War.

The comprehensive measure, adopted by a vote of 12 (US, UK, USSR, France, China, Belgium, Zaire, Romania, India, Cote d'Ivoire, Austria and Zimbabwe) to 1 (Cuba) with 2 abstentions (Yemen and Ecuador), declared that, upon Iraq's official notification to the Security Council of its acceptance of the resolution's provisions, a formal cease-fire would be effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the coalition of nations that cooperated in the military action to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The resolution requested that the UN Secretary-General, after consultations with Iraq and Kuwait, submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor a demilitarized zone extending into Iraq and into Kuwait.

The Security Council demanded that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all its chemical and biological weapons and all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

Following is the text of resolution 687:

Belgium, Zaire, France, Romania, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution,
The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990),

674 (1990), 677 (1990), 678 (1990) and 686 (1991),

Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate government,

Affirming the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the member states cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Taking note of the letter sent by the foreign minister of Iraq on 27 February 1991 (S/22275) and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991) (S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and S/22330),

Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign states, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters," thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the charter and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the state of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the prime minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the declaration adopted by all states participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held at Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

Recalling further that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio-

logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this convention,

Noting moreover the importance of all states adhering to this convention and encouraging its forthcoming review conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

Concerned by the reports in the hands of member states that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons program contrary to its obligations under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the states of the region,

Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

Deploing threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-

General of 20 March 1991 (S/22366) and 28 March 1991 (S/22409), and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent council resolutions,

Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the charter,

1. Affirms all 13 resolutions noted above, except as expressly, changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

A

2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters," signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, UN Treaty Series, 1964;

3. Calls on the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the charter;

B

5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any

hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one state to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the council of the completion of the deployment of the UN observer unit, the conditions will be established for the member states cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

C

7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) the Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate governments and, where appropriate, with the director general of the World Health Organization (WHO), within 45 days of the passage of this resolution, shall develop, and submit to the council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within 45 days of such approval:

(i) the forming of a special commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the des-

ignation of any additional locations by the special commission itself;

- (ii) the yielding by Iraq of possession to the special commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b)
- (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under supervision of special commission, of all its missile capabilities including launchers as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
- (iii) the provision by the special commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the special commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this resolution;

11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968;

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the special commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. Requests the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the special commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the special commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within 45 days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the agency's verification and inspections to confirm that IAEA safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this resolution;

14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

D

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property which Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

E

16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990, repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq

scrupulously adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

18. Decides to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a commission that will administer the fund;

19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the council for decision, no later than 30 days following the adoption of this resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a program to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the commission designated above;

F

20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto, contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the committee established by resolution 661 (1990) or, with the approval of that committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March, 1991 (S/22366), and in any further finding of humanitarian need by the committee;

21. Decides that the council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every 60 days in light of the policies and practices of the government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining

whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

22. Decides that upon the approval by the council of the program called for in paragraph 19 above and upon council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;

23. Decides that, pending action by the council under paragraph 22 above, the committee established under resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the council, all states shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of;

(a) arms and related material of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;

(b) items specified and defined in paragraph 8 and paragraph 12 above not otherwise covered above;

(c) technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

(d) personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

25. Calls upon all states and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses, or any other arrangements;

26. Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with appropriate governments, to develop within 60 days, for approval of the council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them

available to all states and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

27. Calls upon all states to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case 120 days following passage of this resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with this resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

29. Decides that all states, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;

31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

H

32. Requires Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism;

I

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the member states cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

—USIS, New Delhi

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*Resolution 688 (1991) adopted by the Security Council
on 5 April 1991*

The Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations,

Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved,

Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the United Nations dated 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442),

Taking note also of the letters sent by the permanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447),

Reaffirming the commitment of all member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area,

Bearing in mind the Secretary-General's report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366),

1. *Condemns* the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many

parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region;

2. *Demands* that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;

3. *Insists* that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;

5. *Requests* further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;

6. *Appeals* to all member states and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts;

7. *Demands* that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

—USIS, New Delhi

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Letter by the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication dated 6 April 1991 (S/22456).

You thereby transmit to me the letter addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, the penultimate paragraph of which contains official notification of the acceptance, irrevocable and without qualifying conditions, by Iraq of resolution 687 (1991), in accordance with paragraph 33 of that resolution.

You have subsequently confirmed to me on behalf of your government, during our meeting on 8 April 1991, that the above-mentioned letter constitutes Iraq's irrevocable and unqualified acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with paragraph 33 of that resolution. You have also transmitted to me the acceptance by Iraq's National Assembly on 6 April 1991 of the aforesaid resolution (S/22480), and confirmed to me, in the name of your government, that the Revolution Command Council has used its constitutional powers to make this decision legally binding in the Republic of Iraq.

The members of the Security Council have, accordingly, asked me to note that the conditions established in paragraph 33 of resolution 687 (1991) have been met and that the formal cease-fire referred to in paragraph 33 of that resolution is therefore effective.

The members of the Council welcome this development as a positive step towards the full implementation of resolution 687 (1991).

—USIS, New Delhi

139

Exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council concerning the composition of UNIKOM on 11 April 1991

Mr. President,

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991, in which the council decided to set up the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

I intend to proceed without delay with the deployment of UNIKOM.

Having consulted the parties, I propose that UNIKOM be composed of contingents from the following member states, all of whom have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. The government of Switzerland has also informed me of

its readiness to contribute to UNIKOM.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

Javier Perez de Cuellar

—USIS, New Delhi

12 April 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 April 1991 concerning the proposed composition of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter on 12 April 1991 and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter.

Accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Paul Noterdaeme

President of the Security Council

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Resolution 692 of 20 May 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 674 (1990), 686 (1991) and 687 (1991), concerning the liability of Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Noting the Secretary-General's report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559), submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559);

2. *Welcomes* the fact that the Secretary-General will now undertake the appropriate consultations requested by paragraph 19 of 687 so that he will be in a position to recommend to the Security Council for decision as soon as possible the figure which the level of Iraq's

contribution to the Fund will not exceed;

3. *Decides* to establish the Fund and Commission referred to in paragraph 18 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with Part I of the Secretary-General's report and that the Governing Council shall be located at the offices of the United Nations in Geneva and that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the activities of the Commission should be carried out elsewhere;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to implement paragraphs 2 and 3 above in consultation with the members of the Governing Council;

5. *Directs* the Governing Council to proceed in an expeditious manner to implement the provisions of Section E of resolution 687 (1991), taking into account the recommendations in Part II of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Decides* that the requirement for Iraqi contributions shall apply in the manner to be prescribed by the Governing Council with respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq after 3 April 1991 as well as such petroleum and petroleum products exported earlier but not delivered or not paid for as a specific result of the prohibitions contained in resolution 661 (1990);

7. *Requests* the Governing Council to report as soon as possible on the actions it has taken with regard to the mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund and the arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Fund, so that the Security Council can give its approval in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991);

8. *Requests* that all states and international organizations cooperate with the decisions of the Governing Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution and further requests that the Governing Council keep the Security Council informed on this matter;

9. *Decides* that if the Governing Council notifies the Security Council that Iraq has failed to carry out decisions of the Governing Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution, the Security Council intends to retain or to take action to reimpose the prohibition against the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq and financial transactions related thereto;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter and that the Governing Council will submit periodic reports to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

—USIS, New Delhi

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Cover design: Dushyant Parasher

ISBN 81-220-0250-1

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IKPLIV107681

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