

KURDISTAN TIMES

A Quarterly Political Magazine

No. 1

FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY

FOR

KURDISH NATION

Winter 1990



Publisher

MUSTAFA AL KARADAGHI

Institut kurde de Paris

Cover picture represents
A Kurdish peasant family.
Saddam Hussein razed to the ground 4,000 villages
and displaced 1,500,000 Kurdish peasants.



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26/3-91

Dear prof. Blau,
I forgot to give you the
book when you were here.
Omar Sheikhmous' trip
was successful. Now the
parliamentarian support
group for Kurds is established
and the money for humani-
tarian aid is waiting to find
its way. We're in contact
with the Swedes. All the best!
Best regards from Wenche.

Institut kurde de Paris

**FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY
FOR
KURDISH NATION**

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Publisher's Note:

The words *Kurdistan News*
should read *Kurdistan Times*
on running heads throughout
the magazine.

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Kurdistan Times

Kurdistan Times is a quarterly political magazine devoted primarily to the study of different aspects of the Kurdish Nation, its history, language, culture, and the sad situation under which it now lives. It is determined to bring to the attention of the world the bloody struggle the Kurdish people are now going through in order to survive in their own homeland. Kurdistan Times carries the message of Kurdish hopes and dreams to be free and live free from oppression and persecution. The result of these studies and enquiries will be presented to the general public of the western world with the definite purpose of increasing their understanding of the Kurds and their country, Kurdistan.

Kurdistan Times is watching and looking out for any violation of Kurdish human rights whenever it takes place. It stands firm against those who violate Kurdish human rights. It publishes complaints against governments that abuse Kurdish rights with international organization, private individuals and organizations concerned with human rights violations. On the other hand, Kurdistan Times may advocate civil disobedience and civil protest against those who abuse Kurdish human rights.

The Kurdish nation of 25 million people, living in a vast and rich country, is divided into five parts among the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union. We describe the Kurdish nation as a "divided nation", "a homeless nation", "a persecuted nation". The Kurdish people have their distinct ethnic identity and language, unique culture, and a well-defined historical homeland. There is no moral or legal justification for this artificial and unnatural division of the Kurdish nation. None of the people among whom the Kurds are divided have any claim on the Kurds or their country, Kurdistan.

It is encouraging to know that most of the leaders of the world of today have frequently declared that "the winds of freedom are blowing everywhere", and that "in our era of freedom and democracy the control of one people by another is unacceptable". Kurdistan Times raises its voice loud and clear demanding full national rights for the Kurds. It raises its banner high for all to see as a declaration that "the Kurds have the divine right to self-determination and to live in freedom and democracy in their own homeland free from foreign domination."

The Kurdish nation is a part of the Middle East. Kurds share with Arabs, Turks and Iranians, a common historical experience of foreign domination

and exploitation. The Kurds have played an important part in the movements for freedom and democracy in the Middle East. The Kurdish people are greatly concerned about what happens in the Middle East. Any political events, positive or negative, in Baghdad, Damascus, Tehbran, Ankara, Cairo, or in Tel Aviv and Moscow may have a direct effect on the Kurds and their future, for better or worse.

Kurdistan Times stands against war and conflicts among the countries of the Middle East. It is wrong for Middle Eastern people to fight each other and spend their limited resources and energy on wars of destruction such as the 8-year bloody Iran-Iraq war, a strange and a phony war. It is a waste of resources to build huge armies and buy expensive weapon systems. Some of the Middle Eastern rulers find all kinds of pretexts for buying weapons from certain countries, for instance Italy. The definite purpose is to grant Italy petro-dollars or supply her with crude oil at a reduced price in order to strengthen her economy. The oil revenue of the Middle East is wasted on buying weapons or it is appropriated quietly by foreigners while Middle Eastern people are engaged in cock-fighting among themselves.

We wish to see a new order of economic cooperation and integration established for The Middle East in the form of a Common Market on the model of the European Common Market. We would like to see freedom and democracy prevail in the Middle East. We raise the banner of "Government by the people for the people", which would be accomplished by a system of free elections, free press, a multi-party system including an opposition to watch over the actions of the government in power. This democratic system is the best guarantee against the emergence of a little mad ruler like Saddam Hussein who drags his country into a war of destruction and drives his people into slavery.

When this new Middle Eastern order is established the Kurdish nation should participate not as a divided nation but as a united independent nation in order to play its part constructively.

Kurdistan Times is an independent magazine which is under no obligation to any political party or organization. However, in orientation Kurdistan Times follows the line of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement. As a free organ it is bound only by the rule of objectivity and truth in presenting its subject matter. It is our highest hope that Kurdistan Times succeeds in its mission of gaining the sympathy and support of the western world for the Kurdish people who are struggling to survive in their own historical homeland.

The Kurds and Their Country Kurdistan

The Kurdish nation is a divided nation cut up into five parts and distributed among the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The origin of the Kurdish division dates back to the end of the first world war when Turkey unconditionally surrendered and the allies divided among themselves the vast domain of the Ottoman Empire. It should be observed that that the Kurdish nation and the whole Middle Eastern region, except Iran, was under the Ottoman rule for more than three centuries, from 1636 until 1918.

In terms of ethnic origin, the Kurds belong to the Indo European family of Nations. The Kurdish Language is a branch of Indo-Eupear family of languages which includes Kurdish, Persian, Baluchi, Urdu, Afghani, and most of the European languages such as German, Russian, Italian, Spanish, French, Scandinavian languages, and English. Many scholars and linguists believe that the Kurdish language, because of its isolation and seclusion in the numerous closed valleys and mountain slopes of the Kurdistan highlands, has preserved many of its original characteristics; it is considered to be pure and to resemble closely the original primitive Aryan tongue.

The Kurdish population is estimated to be 25 million distributed as follows: In Turkey, 12 million; Iran, 7 million; Iraq, 4 million; Soviet Union, 1.15 million; and in Syria there are 1 million Kurds. Outside Kurdistan proper the Kurds live in Tehran, and other Iranian cities also, in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Istanbul, and Ankarra.

Tribes of Kurdish origin are settled in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Algiers. An estimated 170,000 Kurds live in different European countries, Canada, United States, and Australia.

Kurdistan- the homeland of the Kurds- is a vast mountainous highland which extends in the form of a crescent from the neighborhood of Persian Gulf in the south to the Mediterranean Sea in the northwest. The Kurdistan highlands is situated between the Iranian Plateau and the Mesopotamia steppe in the east and west, the Armenian tableland in the north, and the Anatolian lowlands in the west. The area of Kurdistan is estimated to be 550,000 sq. Kms. or equal in size to France. In ancient times, the Greek and Roman geographers and writers used to call The Kurdistan highlands "Zagros mountains", by which they meant the country of Karduchi, or the ancient Kurds.

The mountain system of Kurdistan is made up of parallel chains which

run in the general direction of northwest to southeast. Starting from Hamrin mountain, the first chain in the south overhangs the plain of Mesopotamia. Going north each chain is higher than the preceding one and the land is also elevated as you go northward. Among these parallel chains there are numerous isolated ridges and confused clusters of hills. The whole mountain system of Kurdistan is an elevated mass which rises high above its surroundings.

The climate of Kurdistan is a Mediterranean type having four distinct seasons: Autumn, Winter, Spring and Summer. The wind system brings sufficient and permanent rainfall. The rainy season begins in October and continues until the middle of June. The average rainfall for different parts of Kurdistan ranges between 20 and 40 inches. In winter snow falls frequently and temperatures fall in some places to 20 degrees below zero. Summer is dry and hot. Spring is mild. In the springtime the whole countryside becomes green and every living being bursts into life after a long and cold winter. Dashing rivers and streams run in the valley and on the mountain slopes. Natural fountains gush out from the ground almost everywhere. Kurdistan has a tremendous amount of water resources. The water sources of the important rivers of the Middle East, such as the Euphrates, Tigris, Khobour, Greater Zab, Lesser Zab, Diyala river, Alwand, Safid Rouge, Karkha and the head water of Dizful river are all located in Kurdistan highlands. Kurdistan resembles a heart pulsing out water to its surroundings in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

In terms of natural resources, Kurdistan is considered to be one of the richest countries in the Middle East. Nature has endowed the Kurdish homeland with good weather, sufficient amounts of rainfall, a network of perennial water supply, an excellent pastureland, and a fertile soil. Among the parallel chains of Kurdish highlands, there are many broad and fertile valleys and productive plains. Kurdistan is the natural habitat for the cultivation of grain and cereal. In Kurdistan there are two famous grain belts which depend on rain for cultivation and could produce millions of tons of grain and cereal annually. Before the present turmoil in the Middle East, Iraq exported 1 million tons of grain and cereal produced in Kurdish regions, which were sold to Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Agricultural products such as rice, corn, cotton, and tobacco are produced in abundance. Different kinds of fruits are grown in the valleys, on the hillside and on the slopes of the mountain chains. Huge quantities of grapes are produced annually. Flocks of goats, sheep and herds of cattle are raised on the undulating pastureland. Animal products such as wool, hide, cheese and fat are sold to the neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria. The agricultural products, animal husbandry and fruit production of Kurdistan could support a much larger population than the present one of 25 million.

The greatest wealth of Kurdistan lies in its mineral deposits. In 1955,

an Italian technical firm undertook a thorough geological survey of southern Kurdistan for the Iraqi government. In early 1960, a team of Soviet experts surveyed southern Kurdistan. Both teams reported the results of their studies. However, the two reports were classified by the Iraqi authority as secret and were not made available for further study. Information leaked out from these reports indicated that Kurdistan possesses many important mineral ores such as aluminum, copper, zinc, nickel, magnesium, and asbestos. Numerous iron ores and coal mines were located.

However, the greatest wealth of Kurdistan consists of its huge oil reserves. Southern Kurdistan is described as standing on an ocean of oil. At the present time oil is extracted in four oil fields of Ain Zala, Kirkuk, Khaniqin, and Zanboor. In addition, oil belts are known to exist in 14 other localities (see map). The oil belts of the two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali and the oil belts of the district of Kandinawa (in Dizayee Plain) are considered to contain the richest oil reserve in the world.

The Kurdish nation of 25 million are living in one of the richest countries in the Middle East. Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds, is a vast highland larger in size than 7 Arab countries combined.

The Kurdish people have their own language, culture, and unique historical development. The Kurds differ from Arabs, Turks, and Persians in language, way of life, and to a certain extent in physical appearance.

The right of the Kurdish nation to independence was acknowledged by articles 62-64 of the Sevres Peace Treaty with Turkey, signed on August 10, 1920. However, the allies changed their post war plan and signed a new Lausanne Peace Treaty with Turkey in 1923 in which no mention was made of the name of Kurds.

Although their rights to statehood was declared by the International Peace Treaty of Sevres in 1920. The Kurds found themselves after World War I divided into five parts between the states of Turkey, Syria (under French mandate), Iraq (under British mandate), Iran, and the Soviet Union.

Two main events were responsible for this division of the Kurdish nation: 1. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia. 2. The discovery of oil in southern Kurdistan.

The Bolsheviks succeeded in overthrowing Tsarist rule and establishing a Soviet socialist regime in Russia in 1918. The British and French governments at the time viewed this new development as a potential threat to their interest in the Middle East and Indian sub-continent. The two governments of Britain and France were forced to modify their war objectives and adopt a new plan to meet the new political circumstances. Accordingly, they abandoned their previous plan of dismantling Turkey and creating two independent states of Kurdistan and Armenia. They now favored the establishment of two dictatorial regimes in Turkey and Iran to maintain internal order and to prevent the

southward advance of Bolsheviks. Consequently, the idea of creating two independent states for Kurds and Armenians was abandoned by the allies.

The discovery of oil in great quantity having tremendous economic value in southern Kurdistan lured the British government to wrest Mosul wilayet from France and bring it under its own control. The British government adopted a plan to secure the oil exploitation for a long period of time.

The new British plan called for the creation of an Arab Kingdom of Iraq and annexation of Mosul wilayet to this proposed Arab Kingdom of Iraq under the British mandate. Furthermore, the plan called for the division of the Kurds as minorities among the states of Turkey, Syria (under French mandate), Iraq (under British mandate), and Iran, to set Kurds against these states and manipulate these states against Kurds when needs arise. Thus the flow of oil would be secure. Consequently, the Kurds became the victim of the discovery of oil in their own backyard and the wicked plan of "divide and rule" which is still at work in the Middle East up to this date in 1990.

The vitality and dynamism of the Kurdish people has expressed itself in a series of uprisings and revolutions in reaction to the allies betrayal of the Kurdish claim to independence and against the policy of repression, cultural and political, of the states among whom the Kurds are divided. In the span of 70 years (1919-1989), the Kurdish people have undertaken 10 major revolts, an average of one revolt every 7 years, a record seldom equaled in the history of other nations who had to undertake a long struggle before they attained their independence. These Kurdish national uprisings failed to realize their goal of establishing a Kurdistan state but succeeded in spreading the idea of nationalism among the Kurds. The Kurdish people have awakened. They have achieved a state of national consciousness. The Kurdish nation is ready and awaiting favorable circumstances to liberate themselves from foreign domination to live in freedom and democracy in their own homeland.



Sheikh Mahmood Hafid
King of Kurdistan 1923
The Shinning Star
of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement

Summary of the Kurdish History

By Mustafa Al Karadaghi

Part-I—Kurds in the Ancient Historical ERA

The modern Kurdish nation belongs to the Indo-European family of nations. The Kurdish language is a branch of the Indo-European (Aryan) family of languages which includes Kurdish, Baluchi, Persian, Afghan, Urdu, Russian, German, French, and English. All these Indo-European languages have a common root, they all are derived from the original primitive Aryan language which was spoken by actual people called nomadic Aryan tribes who began to migrate from their original home in Central Asia in about 2500 B.C. However, the Aryans' migration accelerated by 1500 B.C. and spread to Afghanistan, India, to the Zagros highlands, and Europe where they imposed their language and ethnic characteristics upon the people whom they brought under their control.

We are in possession of ancient historical records which establish beyond a doubt that the Kurds have been living continuously in the Kurdistan highlands since the beginning of history in 3000 B.C. What the historians mean by "the beginning of history" is the time when written records first became available as important sources for the study of historical events. Writing was discovered in the Sumerian city—state of Adab. The Earliest written records discovered so far in Mesopotamia date back to 3000 B.C.

In the Nile valley, writing was discovered about the same time as in Sumer in 3000 B.C. The long period of time before 3000 B.C. is what historians call "prehistory" for which no written records are available at all. For the study of pre-historical time historians depend on cultural remains such as tools, implements, remnants of foods and dwellings left behind by pre-historical men.

Around 3000 B.C., the third millenium B.C., the map of the ancient world, based on historical records, was drawn as follows: lower Iraq, or the "plain of Shinar" as it was called in biblical times, Mcsopotamia by Greeks and Romans, extended from the Persian Gulf northward to the modern town of Beled on the Tigris, where the flat river, deposited alluminum ends and the undulating pastureland of northern Iraq begins. Lower Iraq was called

Sumer and Akkad, Akkad being the northern half and Sumer its southern half.

Northern Iraq was called by the Sumerians Shubartu and Zagros highland by the Greeks and Romans. East of Sumer and across the Tigris river, the ancient Kingdom of Elam was located with its capital called Susa in the plain on Karkha river. The western desert was called Martu. The land between the end of the western desert and the Mediterranean shore was inhabited by the Hebrew people. In the early part of the third millenium B.C., the Semitic nomad tribes from the north-western desert settled in the tiny city of Ashur on the Tigris, which at a later date developed into the Assyrian city-state. Other semitic tribes, kinsmen of Assyrians, infiltrated into northern Sumer, and later became known as Akkadians who built their city Agade, on the Tigris in the vicinity of the modern city of Baghdad. Still more semitic tribes from the western desert built their city of Babylon on the Euphrates river and developed into the Babylonian city-state.

Further west in the Nile valley, another ancient civilization flourished with its important center at Memphis. The civilizations of the Nile valley and of the valley of the Twin Rivers (Mesopotamia) were contemporary. This was the limit of the ancient world as it was known in the third millenium B.C. However, what is relevant to our study is the history of Mesopotamia and Zagros.

In the ancient world, the plain of Mesopotamia was the scene of the rise and fall of four powerful ancient empires: the Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, and the Assyrians.

Sumerian City-States

The Sumerian city-states were the first to rise to the position of well-organized states between the years of 3000 B.C.-2600 B.C. The Sumerian people were highlanders who settled in the plain of Mesopotamia from pre-historic times. The Sumerian country was divided into a half-dozen or more small city-states, each with a capital city from which the state took its name. The following were the most important Sumerian city-states: Eridu, Umma, Adab, Erech, Kish, Ur, Lagash, and Warka.

Each one of those Sumerian city-states in turn rose to a position of power and would establish its control over the federation of the Sumerian city-states. In turn it would decline and some other city-state would take the leading role dominating the confederation. There was internal warfare between Sumerian city-states over distribution of irrigation water. There were also territorial disputes. However, against outside attack, the Sumerian National army fought as the united army of the whole confederation of the Sumerian

city-states.

Following the discovery of writing in Sumer we have written records which indicate that many of the famous ancient conquerors from Sumerian city-states carried out campaigns of war and conquest against the territories of the Zagros highland. Abundant information is available about their wars and the people they conquered. They were recorded on the clay tablets with Sumerian inscriptions. These Sumerian cuneiform inscriptions constitute an important source for the study of the ancient world in general and Zagros people in particular.

The Sumerian city-states occupied the center of power in the ancient world from 3000 B.C. to 2600 B.C. when Sargon of Agade defeated the Sumerian National army and the center of power shifted to Agade the capital city of the new Akkadian empire. (The Akkadian empire ruled from 2600 B.C.-2264 B.C.)

Cuneiform inscription in Sumerian language have definitely shown that the land of Gutium was one of the oldest independent kingdoms of the ancient civilised East, contemporary with Sumer, Akkad, Flam, and Armenia"¹

The name of the Kurds is mentioned in the earliest Sumerian record. "It is not unlikely that the earliest trace of the Kurds is to be found on a Sumerian clay-tablet, of the third millenium B.C., on which The Land of Karda or "Qar-da" is mentioned². This "Land of Karda" adjoined that of the people of Su, who dwelt on the south of Lake Wan, and seems in all probability to have been connected with the Qur-ti-e, who lived in the mountains to the west of the same lake and with whom Tiglath-Pile-ser I fought³. The author of Sherafname states that there is still a fortress in Bitles region which is called Suy. Deduced from the Assyrian documents Tigleth-Pileser I ruled in the period of 1098-1068 B.C. The Qurti people dwelt in the mountain ranges of Azu west of the lake Wan. According to the orientalist Drayon mount Azu is the same as the present mount Hazu which is also called Sason".⁴

In the second Sumerian tablet, the name of the land of Gutium appears in a tablet recorded by Lugal-Anni-Mundu, the king of the Sumerian city of Adab, which today bears the name Bismays, in southern Iraq in the Euphrates region. In a foundation memorial tablet discovered at Bismaya, Lugal-Anni-Mundu mentions the extensive land of Gutium, together with the land of

¹Safrastian, Arshak, Kurds and Kurdistan, — — —, pp. 16-17.

²Thureau Danguin, Die Sumerischen und Akkadischen Königsinschriften, 1,150 (No. 22, 52).

³Driver, G. R. The name Kurds in its philological connection, Jour of Royal Asiatic Society, 1923 (JRAS), p. 395.

⁴Zaki, A. Summary of The History of Kurds and Kurdistan, Arabic, edition, Rabita press Baghdad, 1936, p. 39 quotes Viladimir Minorisky, an essay titled opinion of Viladim Minorsky, regarding Kurds origin, Arabic version, included in pp. 38-47 of the First Volume of the Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan.

Subartu and Flam. The meaning of the tablet is not quite clear, but comparing its contents with later Akkadian information, scholars assume that the Sumerian king claimed a victory over the kingdoms mentioned which entitled him to proclaim himself "Lord of the four corners of the world"⁵

"According to the short chronology convincingly put forward by Sidney Smith, the date of this Sumerian King may be placed tentatively at about 2350 B.C."⁶.

In the third Sumerian document the expression of Gutebum, meaning GUTI, is recorded. "In an inscription of Adad-Nannor of Lagash we find the expression Ma-da-Gu-te-bu-um (ki)-me (Cf. Burton, Risa, p. 260, 16, line 20); the district in question is certainly to be sought in the Zagros, as is definitely certain from the context. It is very likely, therefore, that Gutebum represents GUTI with plural elements added, the same combination that we find in Lu-Lu-bu-um (Ki), ("Rawlison 50, obv. 4.27")⁷

". . . Thereafter the land of Gutium appears in dozens of Omen-texts, year-dates, astrological texts, and oracles, as always hostile to the small Sumerian city-states scattered in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq"⁸. However, from the time of GUTI occupation of Akkad and Summer, the historical information in the Cuneiform sources concerning GUTI increase considerably.

Akkadian Empire

The Akkadians were Semitic people from the north western desert who filtered into Mesopotamia in large numbers in the region around the modern city of Baghdad where they built their city called Agade. For a long period of time the Akkadian people were under domination of the Sumerians. However, in about 2600 the Akkadians became rivals to the Sumerians. Sargon of Agade, an Akkadian, who was a cupbearer to the governor of the Sumerian city of Kish became the champion of an independent Agade. He revolted against his Sumerian overlords, proclaimed himself King of Akkad, and established his capital at Agade as a rival to the Sumerian capital at Erech.

Sargon was one of the famous conquerors of the ancient world. He was called "the King of Battle". The new Akkadian King, however, did not yet

⁵Safrastian, Arshak, *ibid.* p. 17 quoting A. Ungnad, Subartu . . . (1936, pp. 36 et sqq).

⁶*Ibid.* Cites—Sidney Smith *Alalakh and chronology*: 1940, p. 29, from the list of Kings of the first Dynasty of Babylon, the date of the Sumerian King of Adab has to be calculated.

⁷Professor Speiser, *Ephraim, Mesopotamia origin*, Pennsylvania University Press, 1927, p. 106.

⁸Safrastian, Arshak, *ibid.* p. 17.

turn his attention to the south, since he would have exposed himself to being attacked by the northern tribes. His early campaigns were therefore conducted against Mari, Ashur, Kirkuk and Arbil, thereby assuaging the allegiance of Northern Iraq. Next, he marched against the Guti, tribesmen of the Zagros mountains, turned south into marshes east of the Tigris, and finally made his first raid into Sumer, capturing Lagash. He then easily defeated the Sumerian national army, and one by one the great cities of the south were compelled to submit to Akkadian rule. . . . After consolidating his power in the river valley, Sargon embarked on a succession of foreign wars. . . . Elam was overcome without apparent difficulty, while to the northwest his armies soon reached the Mediterranean.

“Sargon’s reign ended with general revolt of all the Sumerian provinces, and the great leader himself was treacherously murdered.” The reigns of Sargon’s two successors were occupied with the revolt in Sumer and Elam. The pacification of the Akkadian empire did not come about until Naram-Sin, Sargon’s son came to the throne.

Naram-Sin was the famous Akkadian conqueror. Soon after he came to the throne he embarked on the conquest of Zagros highland. He attacked the Lullu kingdom and defeated and captured the Lullu king called Satuni, who was contemporary with Naram-Sin. He commemorated his victory over Lullu by erecting his famous stela in one of the passes in the Karadagh range called Darband-i-Gawr meaning The Pagan Pass. The stela is located in a cave-like cavity on the left side of the gorge. It represents Naram-Sin as a powerful warrior at the head of the Akkadian army putting under his feet a wrecked figure representing King Satuni and his son; a row of other villains standing at attention and bowing their heads in allegiance to him. The detail of the battle and his victory over Satuni is recorded in Akkadian language on the stela.¹⁰ The trace of a ruined Lullu fortress is visible on the left side of the gorge. In another rock carving at Pir Hussein, near Diarbekir, Naram-Sin commemorated his conquest of that region. In the course of his campaign Naram-Sin himself suffered defeat at the hands of Gutium (See AFO V14100).

In one of the Akkadian texts related to Naram-Sin we find the following statement: “Naram-Sin, King of Agade, governor? . . . of the Land of Elam, all of it, as far as Barashhi, and the Land of Subartu as far as the Cedar Forest”¹¹ This passage indicates, then, that Subartu extended from Barashhi, on the north-eastern border of Elam, up to the Amanus (The Cedar-Mountain),

⁹Seton Lloyd, *Twin Rivers*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp. 31-33.

¹⁰The relief was discovered by C. J. Edmonds, British political officer in southern Kurdistan; C. F. his note in the geographical journal LXV 63-64 (with plate), entitled “Two Ancient Monuments in Kurdistan”.

¹¹Professor Speiser, *Ephram, Mesopotamia origin.*, pp. 97, 126.

in the Land Amurru-Ammorites.

The Akkadian empire did not last long after the death of Naram-Sin. Under the continual attack by the Gutian army, the Akkadian empire disintegrated. Sharkalisharri, the successor to Naram-Sin and the last king of Akkad fought against Gutu King Sharlak and defeated him. He boasts of having taken prisoner Sharlak, the King of Gutium¹² "Sharlak, King of Ku-Ti-Im (Ki), who was defeated by Sharkalisharri of Agade, is certainly a ruler of the Gutu and not of the city of Kute; (CF, Homel ethnologies 1018) The Akkadian King, Sharkalisharri ruled about 1900 B.C.¹³ Despite the temporary victory of Sharkalisharri, the Gutian army soon marched down from the hills, defeated the Akkadian army, and established Gutian control over Akkad and Sumer. In doing so they brought to an end the brilliant dynasty of Agade and the Akkadian empire. A dynasty of Gutium was established in Akkad and Sumer and lasted for 125 years.

The Gutian dynasty was overthrown by Utu-Khegal, the governor of the city-state of Erech. Following the victory of Utu-Khegal over Tirigan the center of power returned again to the Sumerian city-states and remained there for the next 200 remaining years of the third millennium B.C. but the Babylonian city-state rose to significant power to challenge both the remaining Sumerian city-state authority and the interference of Elam. In the reign of Hammurabi, 1852 B.C.-1800 B.C., the sixth ruler of Babylon, Sumer and Akkad became part of the Babylonian empire and the Sumerian nation disappeared completely from the historical scene.

Babylonian Empire (1900 B.C.-1600 B.C.)

The Babylonians were Semites from the west who migrated to Mesopotamia and built their city on the Euphrates river in the western Mesopotamia. The early part of Babylonian history resolves around their subjugation to Sumerian and Akkadian rulers. However, in around 1900 B.C. the tiny Babylonian city-state developed into a strong city-state and became a rival to Sumer. During the reign of Hammurabi (1800-1750 B.C.) Babylon became the center of the empire. "When Hammurabi became the sixth ruler to come to the throne he found himself in control of a prosperous federation of cities, corresponding in its boundaries approximately to the ancient Akkad.¹⁴

Hammurabi was one of the mighty rulers of the ancient world. He became

¹²Safrastian, Arshak, Kurds and Kurdistan, p. 18. cites the author of ancient history of Near East, p. 186, who confirms the defeat of Sharlak by Sharkalisharri.

¹³Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 98.

¹⁴*ibid*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁵Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia Origin, *ibid*, p. 87.

known to posterity as law giver and organizer. The code of Hammurabi or the ancient Babylonian law is a great monument to his fame. During Hammurabi's time there was a tremendous spread in the use of cuneiform writing, and in the use of the Semitic Akkadian language. This was the language the Babylonians, used as the normal medium for commercial agreements and communication all over the Middle Eastern region in ancient times.¹⁵

Hammurabi at once undertook campaigns of expansion. He began with Ashur, the birth place of the Assyrians Empire. He then succeeded in bringing under his control the whole of Sumer. He fought and defeated Elam. When the pressure of Gutium increased against Babylon Hammurabi was obliged to wage war against the GUTI kingdom. We are in possession of a text which indicates the authorship of Hammurabi in which the King records his campaign against Gutium and their ethnic affiliates. The document was discovered at Ur, and it has been published in a recent volume of inscriptions from that site (Ur). Among other facts we are told of the King's efforts against "the man of Elam, of Gutium, of Subartu, (and) of the Turkish, whose mountains are distant, whose languages are complicated."¹⁶

Hammurabi with his immense power was able to pacify and neutralize the danger of the Zagros people among whom GUTI was the strongest at the time of Babylonian first dynasty. When Hammurabi died after a reign of 42 years, he was succeeded by his son Sansu-Iluna during whose rule the struggle between Babylonia and Gutium intensified. The Babylonian army was eventually defeated by a combined force of Gutium and their kinsmen Kashshu (Kas-Pi-Or Kassite). Consequently, the whole of Mesopotamia was brought under Kassite rule which lasted for 600 Years, from 1630 B.C. to 1030 B.C. The power and influence of the Kassites seems to have eclipsed that of Gutium and other kinsmen in Zagros. During the six centuries of Kassite supremacy and rule over Mesopotamia and Zagros, we find scant materials in cuneiform inscription concerning GUTI. The GUTI and Lullu people came to prominence again during the Assyrian reign.

¹⁶This information paraphrased from Seton Lloyd, *Twin Rivers*, *ibid*, pp. 45-46.

The Assyrian Empire

The Assyrians were Semite Nomadic tribes from the northwest who migrated to northern Mesopotamia in the early part of the third millennium B.C. They built their city, Ashur on the Tigris, near the place of the modern town of Shirqat. The tiny city-state of Ashur passed under the successive domination of Sumerian city-states, Akkadians, the Babylonians, and the Kassites. Furthermore, the city-state of Ashur was surrounded by a hardy mountainous race. During most of early Assyrian history the city-state of Ashur was at the mercy of the Hurri-Mittani, Gutians, and Lullu. In the Assyrian annals we find numbers of Assyrian governors, bear names which are distinctively Hurian or Gutian. The Assyrians adopted the Sumerian culture and passed into obscurity until the last quarter of the second millennium B.C.

The sudden rise of the Assyrians to the position of great power was one of the most important events in the ancient world. The Assyrian emerged into possession of a powerful empire in the last quarter of the second millennium B.C. or about 1300 B.C. With the rise of Assyrian power the general situation in the ancient east, not only in the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates, underwent a radical change to the disadvantage of all neighboring countries. The gigantic and ruthless military power of the Assyrian empire had disrupted the social and political balance of the ancient world by occupying all the countries around them and subjugating their population. After the defeat of the Kassites in the year 1242 B.C. Sumer and Akad were brought under Assyrian domination. Elam was occupied and destroyed. The Hurri-Mittani empire was brought to an end. The Phoenicians and Ammorites became part of Assyrian empire. The Hebrews were taken three times into captivity during the reign of the Assyrians. The Kingdom of Gutium was ruined and its inhabitants either were massacred or escaped to the hills and mountains in the northeast. The Kingdom of Lullu was continually under attack. The ancient world became subjected to terror and brutality of the Assyrians terrible war machine for 700 years which brought to an end almost all ancient social systems.

The core of the Assyrian Kingdom lay in the small triangle formed by the old city of Ashur, Nineveh, and Erbil on the banks of Middle Tigris and in the open plain. The Assyrian monarchs were the ultimate authorities in the centralized system of administration and the commanders in chief of the Assyrian war machine.

The Assyrian army used new weapons such as a sharp piece of iron

at the head of the spear which terrorized the enemy. The Assyrians were the first people to exploit fully the use of horses which had been introduced to Mesopotamia by the Kassites. The war chariots played a decisive role on the battlefield. The Assyrian empire displayed a military might which lasted for seven centuries, from 1300 B.C. to 612 B.C.

Almost all powerful Assyrian kings waged war against ancient Kurds and their ethnic relations. In fact, the ancient Kurds fought against the mighty Assyrian empire for 700 years. It was the mountains of Kurdistan which came to the rescue of the ancient Kurds and saved them from total destruction by the Assyrians. In the Assyrian annals, we find sufficient written records which deal with Assyrian campaigns of war and conquest which throw much light on the lives and the geographical distribution of the ancient Kurds.

Adad-Niriri I (1310 B.C.-1281 B.C.) reports victory over the armies of the Kashshu, the Guti, the Lulu, and the Shubaru. . . . The King goes on to specify that his father Arikdenilu had been ruler over "the mountains and the hill country of the far spread Guti."¹⁷ Ashur-Uballit I (1362 B.C.-1327 B.C.) fought against and defeated the combined armies of Kassites and Gutium.

The King Shalmaneser I (1280 B.C.-1261 B.C.), "follows these victories with further success against Uruatri and Henigalbat. But the Guti are not to be ignored: "Thereupon the Guti who like the stars of heaven, know no number, (but) are expert in destruction, succeeded, rebelled against me, and instituted hostilities."¹⁸

In another document the same king declared: "Over the wide area extending from the boundaries of the land of Uruatri up to the land of Kumm, the blood of the Gutian troops is spilled like water."¹⁹

The Assyrian King Tukulti-Ninurta I (1242 B.C.-1206 B.C.) defeated the Kassites in the year 1242 B.C. and took their King Kashtiliashu II prisoners. He descended on Babylon and occupied all Sumer land. A passage from Text B which forms part of Tikulti-Minurta I inscriptions the king states that "On my accession to the royal throne 28,000, warriors Hittites from the other side of their Euphrates, carried off and in the mist of the Iaura mountain the Guti, Ugunani, (the people of) Elhunia and Sharnida, and the land or Mehri my hand conquered."²⁰

Tiglath-Pileser I (1115-1093 B.C.), the Assyrian King who extended the boundary of Ashur to lake Van claims to have defeated the Guti."²¹

In the remaining years of the second millennium B.C., the Assyrian army continued its war of conquest and destruction against Guti and Lullu kingdoms.

¹⁷Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, pp. 110-

¹⁸ibid.

¹⁹ibid.

²⁰ibid.

²¹ibid.

In the course of the first millennium B.C., the successive Assyrian kings continued to wage war against Guti, Lullu, and their related ethnic groups. King Ashurnasirpal III, (883 B.C.-859 B.C.) who revived Assyrian imperialism and moved his capital city to Nimrud, carried out three campaigns against the northern part of the kingdom of Lullu which was called Zamua. In his book "Southern Kurdistan—In the Annals of Ashurnasirpal," Professor Speiser gives detailed accounts of the three campaigns of the Assyrian king from which we quote:

"The account in the Annals."

The Annals of that ruthless conqueror give us a fairly detailed record of those wars. . . . The campaigns are described in the second column of the Annals and begin with line 23, as follows: "The immediate cause of the wars is the refusal of Nur-Adad, the prince of Dagara, to remain vassal of Assyria. Al Zamua follows suit. The pass of Babite is fortified and closed up with a wall. It is there that the initial battle must be fought. If the Assyrians fail to take the pass, Zamua is definitely lost to the empire. On the other hand, the loss of the principal gateway to his country need not worry Nur-Adad very much. His territory was full of natural fastnesses from which he could deter the invader."

The Formidable Pass did not long detain the invading troops. Fourteen hundred and sixty of the defending force were slain in the narrow passage; Babite and the fortress Uzi, Berutu, and Lagalage were taken by the Assyrians. This defeat must have somewhat shaken Nur-Adad's confidence. He sought refuge on an inaccessible mountain. Ashurnasirpal pursued him as far as Bara, which was also captured, yielding a large booty. . . . This concludes the first campaign. On his way home Ashurnasirpal probably left garrisons in the fortresses which he had occupied; at all events, the second campaign continued where the first left off.

"The position of Bara will be best discussed in connection with the second campaign. Ashurnasirpal starts from Kakzu early in the fall of 881 B.C. and, having passed Babite, directs his troops toward Nisir mountain. That mountain, "which the Lullu calls Kinipa" is the famous mount of the Deluge tablet (141) on which the flood-ship finds a resting place. The identification of Nisir with Pir Omar Gudrun may be considered as absolutely certain. I have tried to indicate above how impressive the peak appears at close range. But its remarkably-shaped top, especially when snow capped, also attracts the eye from a great distance. Often visible for more than a hundred miles; the hub of the universe has been placed at times in far less unusual spots." . . . The second expedition which had as its object "the cleaning of the northern territory around Mount Nasir Continued."

“The mountains that figure so largely in the battle of the third Zamuan campaign are generally situated in the region south of Shehrizor. . . . The richest and most spacious part of the valley, or Shehrizor proper, extends east of the bend of the Tanjero as far as Awraman, and from Gulambar to the south, beyond Halebja. Here the number of ancient mounds and modern villages is probably larger to the square mile than anywhere else in Iraq. To the Lullu inhabitants and the Assyrian conqueror or the Sassanian ruler, this section of the land was not less alluring than it is to the Kurds of today.

“The most stubborn and determined of the Zamuan battles were waged against Ameka, King of Zamri. After the defeat of Ameka, 150 towns, not counting fortresses, fell into Assyrian hands. No wonder that the defendants fought so desperately! But the prize at stake also removed all doubts concerning the position of the kingdom of Ameka. Shehrizor was the last populated province of Zamri. To occupy it Ashurnasirpal had first to capture the mountain fortresses in the northern part of the kingdom. The possession of those strongholds carried with it the ownership of the plain of Shehrizor. Given this information it will not be difficult to follow the third campaign to its conclusion.²²

King Shalmaneser III (858 B.C.-824 B.C.) reorganized and re-equipped the Assyrian army. Before descending to the northeast of Zamua, he attacked the Gutium territory around Mount Kollar, A mountain range east of lower Zab in the latitude of the modern city of Koi Sinjak. Scores of similar invasions of the ancient territories in the Zagros chain are reported by the Assyrian kings Shamsi-Adaad V (823 B.C.-810 B.C.), Tiglat-Pileser III (747 B.C.-728 B.C.), Sargon III (722 B.C.-705 B.C.), and Esarhaddon (680 B.C.-669 B.C.) who invaded Egypt.

The ancient Kurds resisted and fought the Assyrian empire until its downfall in the year 612 B.C. when Nineveh was occupied and destroyed by a coalition of ancient Kurds and Medes. “With the destruction of Nineveh and the fall of Babylon only seventy years later, the continuity of Iraqi history was broken. As a consequence the land had by now degenerated politically as well as geographically to a situation in which provinces were annexed to the domain of one foreign power or another.²³ The center of power shifted from its traditional centers in Mesopotamia, never to return, to the eastern edge of the Zagros highland where four powerful empires emerged: The Medes, Achaemenian, the Parthians, and the Sassanids.

²²Professor Speiser, Ephram, Southern Kurdistan in the Annals of Ashurnasirpal and today, Pennsylvania University Press, 1927, pp. 15-27.

²³Seton Lloyd, Twin Rivers, *ibid*, pp. 75-76.

Zagros Highlands

After surveying briefly the history of Mesopotamia, we now turn to the study of the history of Zagros highland which is the original home of the ancient Kurds. By natural barriers of great strength Zagros highland is divided into numerous enclosed geographical units. By mountain barriers of parallel chains, isolated ridges, rugged hills, and the water barriers of dashing rivers and streams, Zagros is cut up into dozens of broad valleys, closed narrow valleys, tablelands, and wide undulating plains.

The long severe winter season with its heavy snow and rain makes communication quite difficult between one district and another. By its physical nature Zagros is divided into numerous isolated districts. Because of years of isolation, these enclosed districts developed their own dialects and names. This process of localism develops in every mountainous country where there is no central authority, trade, and common education to work as unifying factor against the forces of isolation.

In the course of the long time of ancient history now and then one or another tribe or principality, living in any one of those numerous Zagros districts, became prominent and their names appeared in the historical records. At a later date another group of people or tribes might develop into a strong kingdom and become powerful enough to challenge the empires of the plain. Those names that appeared in the ancient historical records are called Zagros groups of people or Zagros nation who were ethnically and linguistically related and were branches of the ancient Kurds.

Who were those ancient Kurds? The ancient Kurds were mountaineer people who were the native inhabitants of the Zagros highlands at the time when Sumerians established themselves in the southern plain of Mesopotamia in about 3000 B.C. The historians call those mountaineer people of the Zagros highlands "Zagros people", "Zagros groups of people", or "Zagros nation".

In ancient times, Zagros was inhabited by mountaineer groups of people or tribes who were more or less homogenous in speech and ethnically related. Among these Zagros groups, the Elamites and Kurds were the most prominent. The Elamites were living in the southern part of Zagros in the territory of the ancient kingdom of Elam with its capital city in Susa. The territory of the ancient Kurds commenced just north of Elam and covered most parts of the Zagros highland.

The linguistic and ethnic affiliation of the Zagros people have been

identified. Professor Speiser in his book, "Mesopotamia Origin" describes, Zagros people as Elamite and their languages to belong to the Elamite family of languages. Professor Chaldie calls them, "the third factor in the ancient history of the Near East", the other two factors being Semites and the Aryans.

The concensus of opinions of the German historians is that Zagros groups of people were ethnically related and belonged to the ancient Caucasian race and spoke a common language which was a branch of the ancient Caucasian language. The Soviet scholar Marr identifies Zagros groups of people with the ancient Caucasian race and their language with the ancient Caucasian language.

The linguistic affiliation of the Zagros groups of people with the ancient Caucasian language have been established by historical records. Evidence of this connection is found in a wealth of proper and personal names of the Zagros people. The survival of the ancient Caucasian language is found in the abundant historical records left by the ancient kingdom of Elam. It is definitely proven that the Elamite language was a branch of the ancient Caucasian language. Additional conclusive evidence is found in the Venice records of the ancient kingdom of Urartu and in the Amarna letter written in the Hurrian language to Pharaoh of Egypt in the 18th century B.C. by the Mittani King Tushratta made up of all preserved 600 verses. The living survival of the ancient Caucasian language is found in the present day language of Georgians in the Soviet Union.

The conclusion follows that the ancient Kurds were the native inhabitants of the Zagros highlands and ethnically and linguistically belonged to the ancient Caucasian race and spoke the ancient Caucasian language the living survival of which still is in use among the Georgian people. The Zagros groups whose names appeared in the ancient historical records, such as Lullu, Guti, Kashshu (Kassite), Hurri-Mittani, and Urartu were identified as branches of the same ancient Kurds who appeared on the historical scene at different times and in different parts of the Zagros highland. In the ancient world the ancient Kurds were party to the two-way struggle which was going on between the plain dwellers of the south and the highlanders of the north. The famous conquerors from Sumerian city-states, Akkadian, Babylonian, and Assyrian empires carried on campaigns of war and conquest against the ancient Kurds in the Zagros highland. In the Sumerian, Akkadian and Babylonian, cuneiform inscriptions and in the Assyrian annals we find sufficient historical records dealing with these two-way struggles between the plain dwellers of Mesopotamia and the highlanders of Zagros which throw light on Kurdish ancient history.

Origin of the Name Kurd

The name of the ancient Kurds appears in diverse forms in the ancient historical records which were seemingly derived from the same common root and designated to mean the same people.

The Sumerian cuneiform inscriptions mentioned the land of Karda or Qarda and the people of Gutu and their country Gutium. The Babylonian, called Kurds Gardu and Qarda which signifies "valiant" or "brave". The Assyrians called Kurds: Quti, Qurti, and Guti. The Greeks called Kurds Karduch or Gorduch and their country Kurduch; The Armenians called them Gortukh or Gortai-kh. The Persians called Kurds Gurd or Kurd, which seems to have been derived from a common origin with the Babylonian Gardu or Qardū, "brave", "valiant", or "warlike", and bravery and the love of fighting are said to be the outstanding traits of the Kurdish character.

Syriac	Qardu, Kurdaye
Hebrew and Chaldean	Qurdaye-pronounced as Qarda a modified form of Syriac
Aramic and Nestorian	Qadu

The Arab writers of early Islamic rule in Iraq and Iran wrote the names of the Kurds as: Kurd, plural, Akrad.

The European sources from seventh century A.D. used the Patronymic name "Kurd" as an appellation for numerous Kurdish tribes with diversity of names inhabiting Kurdistan highlands.

In an admirable recent study called, "The name of the Kurds in its philological connection", G.R. Driver, Magdalen College, Oxford, sums up his conclusion as follows:

"It has now been shown that these diverse forms-Qarda (or Karda), Karduchi, Gortochi (and Gordi), Kardakes and Cyrtii, Gordyaei and Cordueni, Qardu and Qarda, Qardawaye, Qurdaye, Kartawaye and Kurdayya, etc.—in spite of their differences, have a common descent. The weakening both of the palatal and of the dental is a phenomenon common to the Semitic languages in their decay, hastened in this case by the foreign tongues through which

the original name has been transmitted, whereas the short vowel following the dental and prescending the termination has been preserved almost without exception and thus establishes beyond a doubt the case for their identity.”²⁴

Professor Speiser elaborate on Driver’s study by stating,

“The confidence with which most scholars have adopted the reading *Qurti* from the start is due to the occurrence in the same area of another name, which is practically identical in sound, and, in this case, well attested in writing. *Qurti* and *Kúptlol* correspond so closely that their equation is bound to satisfy even the most pedantic philologist. The comparison of the two names carries with it far-reaching implications. For it has been shown in an admirable recent study on “The name Kurd in its philological connexions”⁹⁵ that *Kúptlol* was one of the numerous designations for the basis population of Kurdistan. This is how Driver sums up his conclusions: “. . . the diverse forms—Qarda (or Karda), Kardūchi, Gortochi (and Gordi), Kardakes and Cyrtii, Gordyaei and Cordueni, Qardū and Qardā, Qardawāyê, Qurdāyê and Kurdayyâ, etc.—in spite of the differences have a common descent.” The above names have been ferreted out from cuneiform, classical, and late Syriac sources; the author believes to have thus established a continuous chain that would link the modern Kurds with the *Kapououxi* of Xenophon, and possibly even with a tribe mentioned in a Sumerian document dating from the time of the Third Dynasty of Ur. And it must indeed be admitted that all of the names listed by Driver contain the same element *k r d* (in several phonetic variants), while the endings are traceable to the various languages through which the name has been handed down.”

“It follows from the preceding that the connection between the modern Kurds and the ancient *Kúptlol* is certain, even though the philological relationship of these names may still be considered as doubtful. The confidence in the reading *Qurti* will now be easily understood. The geographical indications regarding the Cardūchi, Cordueni, and their philological congeners, tally so well with the cuneiform material concerning the *Qurti*, that a prominent historian has recently had no hesitancy in accepting the identification.⁹⁶ Furthermore, since we can no longer separate the *Qurti* from the Gutians, the survival of the latter in the population of modern Kurdistan can not very well be doubted”²⁵

²⁴G. R. Driver, Magdalen College, Oxford, *ibid*, pp. 393-403.

²⁵Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia Origin, *ibid*, pp. 116-117.

⁹⁵Driver, in JARS, 1923:393-403.

⁹⁶F. Bilabel, *Geschichte Vorderasiens and Ägyptens* (Heidelberg, 1927) I 184.

“When Pliny speaks of “the people formerly called Cardūchi, but now Cordueni,”¹⁰¹ adding that they bordered on the Adiabeni, he locates for us the tribes in question in the neighborhood of the Zab rivers, while indicating that the older gentilic termination was *-hi*. Strabo’s reference to “the lands of the Gordyaei, whom the men of old called the Kardūchi” corroborates the above information.¹⁰² It becomes clear that Xenophon’s famous *Kapoovxoi* takes us back to a time when the suffix under discussion was still in use, which is, incidentally, strong presumptive grounds that the language to which the suffix belonged had not yet been supplanted by the Iranian dialects spoken in later Kurdistan. What was, then, the older language? To associate the suffix *-hi* or *xoi* with the Armenian *-h*, as is generally done, is not going to the direct source. For that termination is at least as old as the middle of the second millennium. It is amply attested in the Hurrian dialects. Thus we find in the Hurrian records from Boghazkei the expression *Hattu-he ewirne*, “the Hittite princes.”¹⁰³ The Amarna Letters mention repeatedly the *Hurrū-he* or *Hurwū-he*, that is to say “the Hurrians,”¹⁰⁴ The suffix is even found in the district of Arrapba (Kirkuk), for the Kassites are called in the Kirkuk tablets *Kussu-hai*.¹⁰⁵ This makes it perfectly evident where the Cordueni had gotten their older gentilic form. We have seen that the Qurti used Hurrian names as early as Tiglath Pileser I. The later form *Cordu-eni* was apparently transmitted through Haldian (proto-Armenian) sources. In Haldian inscriptions we find *Babilū-nē* by the side of *Babilū*,¹⁰⁶ Akkad is translated as *Iului-na*,¹⁰⁷ which may conceivably hark back to the old Lullu, who dwelt north of Akkad. In Gordi and in *Kúptlol* the Zagros suffixes have completely disappeared.

“Thus we have obtained independent evidence that the original Kurds were one of the ethnic groups that belonged to the large Zagros family. At the same time we have found an important link for connecting the “Kurds” with the Qurti or Gutians, just as the modern inhabitants of Luristan have been linked with the ancient Lullu. That the pre-Iranian inhabitants of the entire area did not disappear without leaving a trace was never contested. It is also

¹⁰¹Cf. Driver, *l.c.*, 395.

¹⁰²*Ib.*

¹⁰³Cf. Forrer, *ZDMG* 1922: 227.

¹⁰⁴Cf. Knudtzon, *Index*, p. 1575.

¹⁰⁵*HHS* V 37.6.

¹⁰⁶Tseretheli, *Die haldischen Inschriften*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁷*Ib.*, p. 16, 17, and p. 54, note.

generally admitted that the Haldians became an important element in later Armenia, and this view is borne out by philological evidence. New dialects and new creeds may have been brought with the invasions to which the mountainous districts of Hither Asia were so often subjected. But the old population has clung tenaciously to their native hills, and the evidences of racial characteristics, coupled with scattered linguistic survivals, provide valuable means for at least a partial reconstruction of past conditions, which may have obtained there from earliest known times.²⁶

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
²⁶Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, pp. 116-120.

Part II

The Role that Kurds Played in The Ancient World

In the ancient world the Kurds played an important role in the history of Zagros and Mesopotamia. The ancient Kurds were one party to the two ways struggle which was going on between the plains dweller in the southern river country and the highlander of the north in the Zagros. In the ancient era the Kurds were able to establish four strong kingdoms and three powerful empires. As a matter of fact for the most part of the second millenium B.C. the ancient Kurds, represented by the Kassite empire in Mesopotamia and Zagros and the Hurri–Mitanni in the northwest, were occupying the center of power and influence in the Middle East. In the following we present a brief presentation of the Four Kingdoms of Lullu, Guti, Nairi, Urartu, and the three empires of Kassite, Hurri-Mitanni, and the median empires.

Kingdom of Lullu



tag: map no 1

Ancient Kurdish kingdoms and empires

Ethnically and linguistically, the Lullu people belonged to the Zagros group of nations. In terms of antiquity they were contemporary with the Sumerian city-states and Elam. In cuneiform inscriptions, we find the name Lullu mostly appearing in connection with kindred people such as Elam, Guti, Kashu (Kassite), Subaru, and Hurrian. In the Akkadian cuneiform inscriptions and the Assyrian annals, we find sufficient historical information resulted from the campaigns of war and conquest against Lullu and Guti to assist us in reconstructing the history of Lullu people and the extent of their kingdom.

The heartland of Lullu country was located in the fertile valley of Shehrazor in the modern province of Sulaimania. Their capital city was called Arak-di, located in the place of the modern municipality of Arbat, some 30 kilometers west of the town of Halabja. However, the Lullu land extended until the border with Elam and further south to include Luristan region. "The Assyrian called the Lullu land, Zamwa, which was the later geographical term for the country of Lullu. At the end of the eighth century B.C., the Assyrians used a new geographical expression for the country of Zamwa and called it Lullum."²⁷ Thureau-Dangin, who studied ancient geographical place names in the Lulluland states that, "An often-mentioned range is that of Kull-ar, high mountains of the country of Lullu, also called the country of Zamwa."²⁸

The Lullu land was the source of grain and timber and the ancient trade routes were passing through Lullu territory and very often these routes were threatened by them. The Sumerian, the Akkadian, Babylonian, the Assyrian empires waged war against Lullu with the object of occupying their rich land and neutralize their threat on the trade routes.

The language of Lullu belongs to the larger group of languages spoken by Zagros nations which include Elamite, Lullu, Guti, Kashu, and Hurrian. According to Husing, the languages of Lullu belongs definitely to the Elamite group.²⁹ Professor Speiser, who studied Lullu proper names agrees with Husing and proves beyond doubt that the language of Lullu belongs to the Elamite group. He confirms his position with linguistic evidence by stating that, "as regards the languages of Lullu, Husing has shown in numerous minor publications that it belongs clearly to the Elamite group."³⁰

The Lullu people called themselves Lullubi, or Lullune. "The forms occurring in variety of spelling with the suffix the name might be translated

²⁷Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 90.

²⁸See Thureau-Dangin, *unrelation de la Huitieme Campaign de Sargon* (Paris, 19-2), *pi*, i, ii. For the Topography of Kuller see AASSOR VIII, 18F.

²⁹Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 96.

³⁰Husing, I.C., and OLZ, 1907, 234-5.

“the Lullu people” or the like. These variable forms of the name Lullu is listed in the *orientalia* (36-38 . 113f) to which should be added the forms with an initial nasal such as we have seen in Kirkuk tablets (Nullu)³¹ The name Lullu has survived in the modern name of Lur, the modern inhabitants, of Luristan, who are the direct descendent of ancient Lullu.

The history of the Lullu Kingdom reveals itself in an endless chain of wars of conquest and revolt against the invaders. The Lullu kings such as Laserab, Satuni, Annabanemi, Nur-Adad, Ameka, Arashta and many others fought against the invading armies of the mighty empires of Sumerian city-states, Akkadian, Babylonian and Assyrian. The warlike spirit of the Lullu people, the hills and mountain chains, together with severe winter were reasons behind Lullu survival.

Nūram-Sin undertook campaigns against the Lullu and celebrated his victory over Lullu King Satuni by erecting a stela on the left side of the pagan gorge (Darband-Gaur), “who had prided himself so much on the victory of the Lullu.”³² At a later date Nram-Sin suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the armies of Lullu and Gutu.³³

Annabanini, the Lullu king who ruled shortly after Naram-Sin's death liberated Lullu land from Akkadia. In a relief on the left side of the Darband-i-Belola (The gorge without a lock), written in Akkadian, he describes himself as the liberator of Lullu land. The relief is discussed by Husing in *Zagros* 16 FF. According to Husing, the name Annunbanini is connected with the Elamite god Humban, Umm (ib., 18). Another relief from the same district, recently copied by Horzfeld.

The Assyrian king, Ashurnaserpal beginning from 855 B.C.) undertook three campaigns against Zamwa. The war of Zamwa is considered one of the longest wars in human history. It lasted on and off for 700 years. (1300 B.C. to 612 B.C.) at the end of which time the Assyrian disappeared completely and none heard of them anymore. Generally speaking, Lullu people played a defensive role in the ancient world.

“The Lullu kingdom was considered to be rich and prosperous in the ancient world. Ashurnaserpal II reported that in the Shehrazor valley alone he captured 150 cities. Olmstead writes that, “the country of Lullu was in a considerable degree of architectural progress and civilization. The people had a good mastery of art and industry and were well prepared for them. This is indicated by Ashurnasirpal, the Assyrian king, who deliberately took numbers of artisans and technicians from Lullu land and transferred them

³¹Harvard Semitic Series (HSS) V.8.9.

³²Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 89.

³³*ibid*.

to Assyrian cities to strengthen the spirit of art, industry and culture among them.³⁴

The ruins and mounds of ancient cities and fortresses of Lullu are still visible scattered all over Lullu land from Shehrazor to Susa. No excavation has been carried out so far in Lullu land except a few by Professor Speiser in 1927.

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³⁴Zaki, Amin, History of Kurds and Kurdistan, Arabic Edition, *ibid*, p. 61, cites Olmstead.

Kingdom of Gutium

Ethnically and linguistically the GUTI (Quti or Qurti) people belong to the Zagros family of Nations. The GUTI spoke a branch of the Hurrian language which was also spoken by Lullu, Kassite, Khaldian, and Mittani. This is how professor Speiser sums up his study of GUTI language: "It follows from the preceding that the linguistic position of the Gutiums is distinctly within the larger Zagros group, which includes also Lullu and Elamite."³⁵

The territory and extent of the Gutium kingdom has been discussed by many historians. "The consensus of opinion is summed up by R. Campbell Thomson, who places the Gutium in the quadrilateral contained by the lower Zab, the Tigris, the hills of Sulaimania and the river, Diyala. Their capital city lay in or around the town of Kirkuk, named Arrapha in those days, about 80 miles north of Baghdad, a flourishing center of oil extraction today."³⁶

However, the Assyrian records show that the territory of Gutium extended further than that described by R. Campbell Thomson. In the east the land of GUTI and Lullu overlapped each other. In the north the two sub-divisions of GUTI named Kurruri and Kurhi were found in the district between Erbil and Rowanduz, where Naram-Sin marched his gigantic army against GUTI.³⁷ "A rock carving at Pir Hussein, near Diarbakir, commemorates his conquest of that region."³⁸ He then attacked GUTI heartland in Arrapha district. "In the course of his campaigns, Naram-Sin himself suffered defeat at the hands of the Gutium." (See AFOVI40)³⁹

The Assyrian King Shalmaneser I (1280-1260 B.C.) who fought the GUTI Kingdom, describes the land of Gutium when he reports that, "There upon the GUTI, who like the stars of heaven know no number—over the wide area extending from the boundaries of the land Uratri up to the land of Kummuhi, the blood of Gutium troops spilled like water".⁴⁰

The relationship of the Gutium Kingdom with the empires of the plain was one of constant conflicts and war. Historically, Gutian people played

³⁵Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 100.

³⁶Safrastian, Arshak, *ibid*, p. 18, cites: The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. III, pp. 218, 223, etc. (F. Sidney).

³⁷Smith, Early History of Assyria up to 1000 B.C., 1928. The word Gutium *indes*.

³⁸Seton, Lloyd, Twin Rivers, *ibid*, p. 3.

³⁹Professor Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 97.

⁴⁰*ibid*, pp. 110-111.

an offensive or rather aggressive role by attacking and raiding the Sumerian city-states, Akkadian, and Babylonian, whenever the opportunity presented itself. Eventually, Sumer and Akkad were occupied by Guti who ruled them for a century and a quarter.

We are in possession of a long list of Gutian Kings and their names. "The dynasty of Gutium ruled one hundred and twenty-four years and forty days in Akkad and Babylonia. Twenty-one Guti Kings succeeded each other during that century and a quarter." The date of this Gutian dynasty is set about 2264 B.C.-2137 B.C. "In the tables of the Kings" discovered at Nippur the names of the twenty-one Kings of the Gutian dynasty are listed and enumerated as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1) Imta | 13) |
| 2) Indishu | 14) Irarum |
| 3) Nikillagab | 15) Ibranum |
| 4) Shulme | 16) Hablum |
| 5) Elulumesh | 17) Pizur-Sin |
| 6) Inimabakesh | 18) Larlaganda |
| 7) Igeshaush | 19) |
| 8) Ianlagab | 20) |
| 9) Ibate | 21) _____ Tirigan-the last |
| 10) Iarlagash | Gutim King who was over- |
| 11) Kurum | thrown by the Sumerian King |
| 12) Utu-Khegal ⁴¹ | Utu-Khegal |

It appears that the Kings of Gutium had left their capital city in Arrapha and ruled the country of Sumer and Akkad as colonies. A king of Gutium, probably named Imbia (or Imta), established his authority in Babylonia as the legal sovereign, and ejected the dynasty of Akkad just as nearly two thousands years later Cyrus of Persia came down from the height of Anzan (Susa?) and with the help of Guti-Kurdish Cavalry Conquered Babylonia [538B.C.] without any fighting at all. . . . Another King of this dynasty, Eridapizir, proclaimed himself King of the "Four Corners of the World."⁴²

The Gutian dynasty in Sumer and Akkad came to an end when governor of the Sumerian city of Erech defeated Tirigan, the last King of Guti. "Utu-Khegal, the Erech Princeling, celebrated his triumph in the following words: "Gutium, the viper of the hills, he who was the enemy of the gods, who

⁴¹Safrastian, Arshak, *ibid*, p. 20.

⁴²Zaki, Anin, *Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, *ibid*, p. 61 *cites*: Cambridge Ancient History, vol. III, p. 425.

had taken away the kingship of Sumer to the mountain and filled Sumer with hostility, had carried away both husband and wife, had carried away with him both parent and child; had set hostility and wickedness in the land. Erhil, god of the countries, laid a charge upon Utu-Khegal, the mighty man, the King of Uruk, King of the four quarters, the King in whose words there is no deceit, to blot out the name of Utu-Khegal last Gutian King Tirigan and from that moment the barbarian domination (Gutian) of Sumer was at an end.⁴³

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⁴³Seton, Lloyd, Twin Rivers, *ibid*, p.35.

The Kassite Kingdom

The Kassites were a mountaier people who originally formed one of the subdivisions of the Lullu people. Their original homeland was located in the hill-country east of the Tigris River in an area corresponding to modern-day Kurmanshah. Ethnically, they were affiliated with the Lullu, Guti, and Hurrians. Kassites spoke a language which belonged to the Elamite or Zagros group and was similar to Lullu language as well as Guti. There were minor dialectical differences between the Kassite langauge and that of the Elamites and Hurrians.

During the first quarter of the 18th Century, B.C., the Kassites lived in political obscurity in their mountainous and hilly district. However, about 1750 B.C., they emerged as a great power. They were gradually establishing their control over Lulluland, Gutium and other related tribes of the Zagros highlands. They were thus enabled to expand westward to occupy the lands east of the Tigris River, which served as a border between the Kassite kingdom and the Babylonian Empire.

The Kassites soon came into direct conflict with the Babylonians, who were the dominant force at the time in what was then Mesopotamia. In the year 1746, B.C., the Kassites defeated the Babylonian army and took control of all Mesopotamia, including Sumer and Akkad. A Kassite Dynasty was established which ruled Mesopotamia for six hundred years, from 1746 B.C.-1146 B.C. their capital city was known as Dur Kurigalzu, presently called Agar Quf and located about 30 kilometers west of Baghdad city.

In the ancient historical documents, we find different forms of the name Kassite. In the cuneiform inscriptions the Sumerian registered the name as Kassite. The Akkadians and Babylonians pronounced it as Kassu. The Assyrians recorded the name in the form of Kassite, while the Bible has it as Kūs (Cush.) "Housing and his school suggested a change in the name of Kassites into Kas-pi, on the analogy of Lullu-bi and the like . . . when Husing aduces the name Caspian Sea and the ancient city of Kasbin (modern day Kazwin), as his proof of the original expansion of the Kassites. Even the original Akkadian word "kaspu" (which means silver) is said to be connected to the name of Kaspi. . . . Others, in their studies have discovered a Kassite element in the name Caucasus (Kuh-Kas?): the meaning would be "the Kas mountains." Kassu and Kussu are greatly attested names, derived evidently from the eponymous deity of the people. Note that the name of

the Nuzian *habanhu* (of Kassite origin), and known as Kussi-Harbes means "Kushshi is Lord" (Harbe-Bel).¹

"The name Khuzistan, a modern province in southwestern Iran, is said to be derived from Kassite or Kuss.² The name Khuzistan is a compound term made up of two words: Khuz and Stan. The suffix stan means the dwelling place of, or homeland. This term came into common usage at the time of Zoroaster in the 6th Century B.C. The prefix or stem of the name Khuz is a modified form of the Kuss. Therefore, Khuzistan, an Iranian designant for the region south of Sus is far easier to pronounce than would be Kussstan."

Based upon the studies and conclusions of Husing and his school, we can safely conclude that the native designant for the Kassite people was Kas-pi. The forms of Kussu, Kus, and Kassite are the foreign versions, and were used by the Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian and other peoples. The name Kus-Pi was derived from the name Kuh-Spi. Here, the stem Kuh means mountain and Spi is what is left from an adjective which in Kas-Pi language must have meant warrior. The compound Noun Kuh-Spi means "the warrior from the mountain", as we have seen in the case of Guti.

Ashur Uballit I (1370 B.C. – 1362 B.C.), who raised the battle cry against the Kassites tells us that the Kassites "have taken to themselves the name of hero", meaning the hero of the mountain.³

The Kassite people, bearing the name of Kassites, existed in Luristan highlands under the reign of the Roman Empire until about the time of the birth of Christ, or shortly thereafter. In the course of the first century A.D., the name Kus-Pi disappeared and was replaced by the name Lur. We have seen how the name Lur was derived from Lullu through adding the gentile (r) which creates the meaning or sense of affiliation with Lullu. The modern day Lurs are the offspring of the ancient Lullu people. Accordingly, the Kassites were originally a branch of the Lullus.

Ethnically, and linguistically, the Kassites were affiliated with the Zagros nation. "Opinions vary very little among scholars as to their identity. They appear to be the same people as the Kurdish tribes of Luristan, in southwestern Persia, in the Zagros chain."⁴ Originally, the Kassite people formed one of the southern flanks of the Lullu people inhabiting the hilly country of the Luristan highlands. They spoke the same language belonging to the Zagros group (including Lullu, Guti, Hurrian, and Khaldian languages.) Some scholars consider the language of the Kassite as belonging to the Aryan, or Indo-

¹Speiser, Epham, Mesopotamia origion *ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

²Safrastian, Arshak, Kurds and Kurdistan, *ibid.*, p. 28.

id., p. 22

³*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 22-34.

European family of languages. They forward their assumption on the basis of the names of the Kassite deities which are of Indo-European origin. However, the names of these deities are in fact borrowed from the advance group of Aryan warriors who appeared in Mesopotamia in the middle of the 2nd millenium B.C. Not considering a few other Aryan loanwords, the bulk of the Kassite language belongs to the Zagros group of languages. Speiser had established beyond doubt the connection between the Kassite language and the Zagros group. In his studies. Mr. Pinches and Mr. Deltschi, who published a book on Kassite language, conclude that the Kassite language is similar to that of the Elamite.⁵

Housing, who studied Elamite and Zagros languages for over 30 years and who published numerous books and articles on such languages, considers the Kassite language simply as a northern dialect of the Elamites.⁶

Professor Speiser sums up his study of the Kassite language, "At all events, from the little material that we now have available for the study of the Kassite language (first collected by Delitsch, and lately re-edited by Pinches), it is quite clear that the connections of that (Kassite) language are with the Zagros groups. Several divine names show, it is true, Indo-Iranian elements, just as the latter are also found in Hurrian; yet the bulk of the preserved Kassite words, as well as the majority of the personal names, allow of no mistake as to the original affiliations of the people. The Aryan elements are due to the appearance in Mesopotamia, towards the middle of the 2nd millenium B.C., of an apparently small group of Indo-European warriors."⁷

The original homeland of the Kassite was located in the hilly country of Luristan, as stated, east of the Tigris River. It roughly corresponds to the modern day Province of Kurmanshah and the two districts of Pusht-i-Kuh and Qasr-i-shereen in the western part of Iran. The original homeland of the Kassite was located, therefore, between the north of Elam and the district of Halwan. This entire area is overed with a confused and endless mass of hills intermixed with mountain ridges.

The expansion of the Kassites in the middle of the 18th Century, B.C. was one of the most significant events in the ancient world. From their hilly country they moved northward and established their sovereignty over Lulluland, Gutium, and almost all of the Zagros region. Moving westward, they defeated Babylonia in 1746 B.C., and in the year 1810 B.C., the Kassites were able to conquer the Sumerian sealand principalities, defying foreign invaders for the next 1,000 years. Consequently, they brought all of Mesopotamia under their control.

⁵cf. DeLitsch, O.C.; The Pinches "The Lang usage of Feukassite", Jras 1917, pp. 101-114 (Texts on pp. 103, and 105).

⁶See Husing, Memnon IV 24, and OLZ 1917:207.

⁷Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia Origion, p. 124.

In the north, the tiny city-state of Ashur was included in this domain . . . in the northeast they expanded to the Caucasian mountains and the shores of the Caspian sea. To the south, the entire highland between Halwan and Fars (modern Luristan), was included in the Kassite realm.⁸ In the days of the Roman Empire, some Kassite tribes inhabited the territories around Susa in the region of Khuzistan. The ancient archaeological discoveries in the area indicate that the southeastern part of the Kassite kingdom remained for some time under the rule of Elam.⁹

Major Rawlensen¹⁰ states that it appears that the Valley of Kashfanor or Kashwan is connected with the name Kashu. Hazfield, who undertook extensive studies in Luristan, states that the area of Kuh-Gale, located between Susu and Fars, seems to have been the birthplace of Cyrus the Great, which was called the country of Anshen or Anzan and was inhabited by Kassites. The Roman commander Ante Phonus, who passed through Kassite tribes, claimed their inhabited area extended as far as Puli-Tung-Gale . . . meaning in Kurdish "the bridge of the narrow gorge."¹¹ In short, the entire highlands between the Fars country and Kurmanshah, modern Luristan, was part of the Kassite homeland. This general framework indicates that the Kassites had established one of the most extensive and powerful empires in the ancient world.

The Kassites had taken an active role in ancient history. They formed one of the most powerful and long-lived empires of that time. From their hill-country, where they lived as a confederation of tribes, they burst forward in the first quarter of the 2nd millennium B.C. and brought the kindred people together under their leadership. The Tigris River had become the boundary between the Kassites and the Babylonians, but when conflicts broke out, the Kassites prevailed, occupying Babylonia and bringing about the downfall of the dynasty of Hammurabi.¹² They took over the rule of Mesopotamia themselves, continuing for another 600 years, from 1746-1149 B.C. No other historical dynasty maintained such power in Babylonia for nearly the same length of time.¹³ In spite of this, the Kassites did not prefer Babylon as a center for their government. They instead built a new capital city called Dur Kurigalzu in place of modern day Aqar Quf, located about 30 kilometers west of Baghdad city. The Ziggurats that they built to remind them of the mountain tops at home still stand high in the sky and are visible from afar.

⁸Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 11, p. 51

⁹Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia Origion, ibid, p. 124.

¹⁰Rawlensen, Major, from Zahaw to Tabriz, p. 124.

¹¹Zaki, Amin, Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan, p. 95.

¹²Ibid., p. 95.

¹³Lloyd, Seton, Twin Rivers, p. 46.

The Kassite capital, Dur Kurigalzu was excavated by the Iraqi government in 1943-1945. The temples and palaces of the Kassite kingdoms produced materials that were inscribed, and which, when fully studied, may shed much light on the contemporary history and character of the Kassites. This opinion was expressed by Mr. Lloyd in 1961, the date he published his book *The Twin Rivers*.¹⁴ It is interesting to note that up to this date in 1990, nothing has been made available from these Kassite writings due to the fact they may give crucial information about ancient Kurdish history.

A Kassite Dynasty was established in Dur Kurigalzu and the names of its members are given in the King-lists.¹⁵ The dynasty ruled over the whole Mesopotamian region and Zagros region for nearly six hundred years (1746 B.C.-1140 B.C.) The Kassite rule of Mesopotamia seems to have been effective; during the six centuries of their rule we hear of no revolt or uprising in Sumer and Akkad. In the Zagros highland there was peace until the rise of the Assyrian Empire in 1360 B.C. For more than a century (1362-1242 B.C.) five great Assyrian kings waged wars against the Kassite Kingdom. The mighty Assyrian King Tukulti-Ninurta I (1242-1206 B.C.) in his year of succession, conquered all of Gutium and Babylonia down to the Persian Gulf, and thus brought about the Kassite downfall. The Kassites were forced to leave Mesopotamia and retreat to their hilly country in Luristan to live in obscurity after ruling Mesopotamia for six hundred years.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁵See Thompson, R.C., CAIII, Ch. XV.

Hurri-Mittani Empire

Concerning Hurrian, we are in possession of enough written historical records to be able to establish beyond possibility of doubt their ethnic and linguistic affiliation, the extent of their country, and the role they played in the ancient history of the Middle East. As a matter of fact the two people, Kassite and Hurrian, dominated the Mesopotamian and Zagros most of the second millennium B.C.

Ethnically, the Hurrian belongs to the Zagros group of nations which included Lullu, Guti, Kassite, Elam, Hurrian, Haldian, and many other less important subdivisions.

The Hurrian spoke a language which was a branch of the Elamite family of languages. It is well established now that by the time of the second millennium B.C. the Hurrian and Elamite were opposed to one another geographically as the western and eastern linguistic families. However, in earlier times the two languages were united in one language. Husang and other scholars have established many points of similarities between the Hurrian language and Elamite on one hand and the modern Caucasian language on the other. In respect to the Hurrian language we possess accurate written historical documents to rely upon for the study of the language. We possess a connected text in the form of the letter of Mittani King Tushratta to be pharaoh of Egypt which is made up of 600 verses and is well-preserved. We also have a large fragment of inscriptions in the Hurrian section of the Boghaz-i-Koi archives. In addition, we possess thousands of various proper names. There are a wealth of documents in the Haldian language which was a younger branch of the Hurrian language and was the official language of communication in Haldian or Uratu Kingdoms. These documents are called Venice inscriptions.

The living survival of the Hurrian and Elamite languages is represented by the modern Caucasian language spoken in Georgia. The Soviet scholar, Marr, by his extensive study of the linguistic affiliation of the Zagros people, has proven the relationship between Hurrian and Elamite and the modern Caucasian language spoken in Georgia.

This is how Prof. Speiser sums up his extensive study of the languages of Kassites and Hurrians:

“We may now pass to a rapid review of the more characteristic philological elements that enable us to single out Hurrian material from among other

context. I have indicated previously that Bork has succeeded in establishing numerous points of similarity between Hurrian and some Caucasian languages.¹ Important is the fact that Hurrian observes the same distinction between animate and inanimate groups that is Noticable in Elamite, and is, among others, characteristic of "Caucasian" languages. Hurrian and Elamite share also notable peculiarities of phonology, and to a lesser degree of morphology; the etymological equipment of both languages is in several significant details also identical.² We must remember, however, that almost all the Hurrian material that is available at present belongs to the second millennium. At that time, Elamite and Hurrian were opposed to one another geographically as eastern and western linguistic families. . . . In short, there is nothing in the material that is available for comparative study of Hurrian and Elamite which would be inconsistent with the assumption that the two languages developed from a common source. . . . It may be added that Husing and Bork have succeeded, nevertheless, in establishing the identity of several pronominal elements of Hurrian and Elamite (CF. JRASI. C.). . . . All in all, we must be satisfied with sundry indications that are strongly in favor of an ultimate identity between Hurrian on the one hand, and Elamite with its relations, on the other."

"Hurrian has been so far compared with Elamite rather than with the other eastern languages, such as Lullu, Kassite, and Gutian, because we have no continuous texts of the three last named dialects; also because Elamite may be provisionally regarded as representative of the entire eastern group. In th case of Hurrian, we have not only the lengthy "Mitannian" letter of Tushratta, as well as Hurrian fragments from Boghazkoi, but also a very large number of proper names, which may be now counted in thousands. In the study of the Hurrian onomastic material, Bork, Ungnad, P. Scheil, Landsberger, Gadd, Contenau, and especially Gustav, have all rendered valuable service. The material which the present writer has collected would require a well-sized volume for a full treatment."³

The conclusion follows that Hurrian language was a branch of the Zagros family of languages and similar to Elamite, Kassite, Guti, and Lullu languages.⁴

¹CF. His Mitannis Prach 68 FF.

²CF. Bork, JRAS 1928. 58

³Prof. Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, pp. 137-138.

⁴For more recent view on the question of Hurrian dialects CF. Speiser, AASOR 16 (1936) 141F. in line with earlier opinions expressed by Thureau-Dangin, Syria 12 (1931) 264 FF., and others.

HURRIAN COUNTRY:

The heartland of the Hurrian country was located in the modern district of Sinjar and the headwaters of Khabour river. The geographical name for the country of the Hurrian empire was Hanigalbat which is also written as Haligalbat or Hani for short. It may be further connected with Hana on the middle Euphrates (CF. Meyer, OP. Cit. 454 for the nationality of those early conquerors of Babylon). This fact is of the greatest importance. We have seen that Hanigalbat was also the center of the Mitanni empire. It is also generally admitted that the foreign invasion in question was due to the same people who founded that empire (Winekler MVAG, 1913, 4.35). The ruins of the oval-shaped capital city of the Hurrians called Washshugani is still visible in the headwaters of Khabour river. The heartland of the Hanigalbat seems to have been closer to the Tigris than to the Euphrates river.

The geographical distribution of the Hurrian elements reveal one of the most amazing events in the history of the ancient east. Beyond the heartland of their country in the headwaters of Khabour the Hurrians were found to the east of the Tigris in the neighborhood of Arrapha. In the west, their territories extended to the middle of the Euphrates and even further west to the Mediteranean shore. In the north they occupied the whole territort presently called central and eastern Turkey, or rather Kurdistan in Turkey. One of the Hurrian sub-divisions called Haldi were inhabiting the Van region and Urmia basin in the Northwest of Iran. It is now widely accepted by scholars that in remote antiquity the Hurrians formed the original stock of southern Palestine, northern Syria, and the pre-Semitic stock of Akkad.

“The leading power in the north, which includes the young country of Assyria, were the Hurrians, the story of whose enormous expanse, from Armenia down to Southern Palestine, and from the shores of the Mediterranean up to the border of Persia, constitutes one of the most amazing chapters in the ancient history of the Near East.”⁵

THE RISE OF THE HURRI-MITANNI EMPIRE

In the middle of the second millennium (about 1500 B.C.), the Hurrians emerged to the status of world power and formed an empire known as Hurri-Mitanni empire with their capital city in Washshugani. In fact, the Hurrians in the north and their kinsmen, the Kassites in the south in Mesopotamia, were the two great powers who dominated the scene for the most part of the second millennium.

⁵Prof. Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, ibid, p. 77.

The Hurrian empire was known from contemporary records as Mitanni. However, the name Mitanni was a foreign designation of Indo-European origin used as a name for the ruling class and government of the Hurrians. The Mitanni people were a branch of the great Hurrian state who rose to the status of power and their name Mitanni became an appellation for the whole Hurrian people. Profs. Chiera and Speiser confirm this relationship and state that, "It has been indicated previously that there is also no demonstrated difference between the languages of the Mitanni and of the Hurri if we are to judge from the material now extant."⁶ Ungnad established absolute identity for the languages of Mitanni and Hurrian.

"The name Mitanni itself may be ultimately connected with the Medes (mentioned in the cuneiform inscriptions as Mat-ai and Ma-ta-ai) one could add that the change of A to I in closed syllable may be observed in such Iranian words as Mizda for Mazda, and Firna for Farna (Kultur Frager I, 12).⁷

The Hurri-Mitanni empire was one of the four important powers in the ancient world at par with the Hittite empire in the north, Kassite in Mesopotamia, and Egypt. As a power, the Hurrians came into conflict with Amorites and the powerful Hittite empire. They were able to confine the Amorites to their seashore cities and stop the Hittites' southward thrust. The Mittani kings had established friendly relationships with Pharaoh of Egypt to counterbalance the Hittite power and influence. One of the Mitanni Kings named Tushratta sent along a letter, written in the Hurrian language, made up of 600 verses, to Pharaoh of Egypt. Another Mitanni King called Astatama gave his daughter in marriage to the Pharaoh of Egypt to form an alliance with him against the Hittite Empire.

The rise of the powerful Assyrian empire in the midst of the Hurrian people brought about the eventual downfall of the Hurri-Mitanni empire. During the reign of the Assyrian King, Ashur-Nasir-Pal (883-859 B.C.), the Mitanni ruling group were crushed. Those who remained escaped westward and settled around Melete/modern Malatia, in southwest Turkey.

⁶Profs. Chiera and Speiser, *A New Factor in the History of the Ancient East*, Pennsylvania University Press, 1927, p. 83.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 83.

Kingdom of Nairi

Following the downfall and the disappearance of the Hurri-Mitanni empire upon the historical scene during the reign of Ashur-Nasir-Pal (883-859 B.C.), the two Hurrian subdivisions of Nairi and Khaldi became prominent during the course of the first millennium B.C. The kingdom of Nairi was located in the rugged mountainous region called central Kurdistan. The heartland of the Haldian kingdom covered the districts of Van, Armenia, and Urmia basin. The two ethnically related people of Nairi and Khaldi carried on the struggle against the mighty Assyrian empire until its downfall in 612 B.C.

Ethnically and linguistically, the Nairi people belonged to Hurrian. The name of Nairi began to appear in the historical records in the course of the first millenium B.C.. In the Assyrian annals the name is written in the form of Nairi. The bible referred to them as Aram-Naharam. The Egyptian record refers to Nairi as Nahari. The Nairis were warlike people who were made up of a loose confederation of independent nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes.

Customarily, the chief of one of the most powerful tribes was chosen by the tribal council as the nominal king for the whole Nairi. In case of war with outsiders, the whole Nairi would rise to arms on short notice. All the tribes, clans, men and women follow their chiefs to the battle field. The Nairi possessed a fantastic mobile force to strike the enemy.

The area covered by the Nairi kingdom is called Central Kurdistan. It covers the head of the Great Zab river and the valley of Bahtan Su, one of the tributaries of the Tigris. This region of Central Kurdistan is considered to be one of the most rugged and inaccessible of the whole Kurdistan. This region is cut off by dashing rivers and streams, rugged mountain ridges, deep canyons, and a confused mass of hills. Heavy rain and snow and severe cold weather in winter cuts off communication in winter and part of the spring seasons. The region by its physical nature is cut off into many independent small units, each inhabited by a certain tribe and its clans. In Central Kurdistan there is no room for large-scale farming and agriculture. Animal husbandry was the main source of living.

The Nairi people were known to be one of the best fighters in the ancient world. The Greek writers called The Nairi people Cordoye and described them as the best slingers in the world.

Thourou Dengin became interested in the warlike people of Nairi and

how they were able to challenge the mighty Assyrian state. In his article "Association of the eighth conquest of the King Sargon" he states that, "the territories of Nairi or Hobishka were the valley of Botan and this eastern part of Nairi had established an independent government."⁸

E. Soane, a British political officer in southern Kurdistan in 1918-1920, expresses his admiration for the military power of The Nairi by stating that, "the country of Nairi was not only made up of the northern part of the Great Zab, but indeed the King Tiglath-Pileser and his descendants were calling Nairi as a name for the people who were inhabiting the districts of Tigris and Euphrates head water and north of Nefatis, by which I mean the present provinces of Dyrbakir, Kharbor, and Dersem. Add to these the mountains of Bitles and Taurus. These districts are the same region where Kordoe people were found to be residing in the year 401 B.C.... Thus, the powerful Kordoe people was one of the ancestors of the Kurdish nation of the present and the offspring of the Median nation of the past"⁹

The Nairis were engaged in long struggle with the mighty Assyrian army. They were posing as a perpetual danger and threat to Assyria. They occasionally raided and attacked Assyria or engaged in a battle against the Assyrian army then withdrew themselves behind the mountain side or disappeared in the deep valleys and waited for an opportunity to attack again. The Nairis played the historical role of weakening the Assyrian empire and bringing about its final downfall.¹⁰

The Assyrian King Tiglath-Pileser I (1100 B.C.), during whose reign the Assyrian border extended to Lake Van, fought the combined armies of 23 of the Nairi kings. The two armies met in Malazgurd plateau. Many fierce and bloody battles were fought after which the Assyrian army was victorious. Tiglath-Pileser I celebrated his victory by erecting a great statue in the district of the Tigris headwaters inscribing on it the detail of the battle he fought and declaring his victory over Nairi.¹¹

In the year 910 B.C., the Assyrian army attacked the territory of Kotmakh northwest of Assyria. In a major battle between the Tigris river and Mount Judi, the Assyrian defeated the Nairi forces and brought the region temporarily under their control.¹²

The King Tukulti-Ninurta II was preoccupied with the campaign against the Nairi during most of his reign from 890-84 B.C.¹³

⁸Zaki, Amin, Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan, *ibid*, p. 71, cites thoroughly Dengin.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

The Assyrian Annal recorded that in the year 743 B.C., the Nairi forces had raided Assyria from northeast and advanced until they reached the heartland of Assyria. The King Tiglath-Pileser III (745-727 B.C.), in the period of great imperial revival, was obliged to meet the invaders. After a series of fierce battles, the Assyrian King was able to push the Nairi forces back behind Mount Judi with a great loss of life.¹⁴

The King Sennacherib (705-681 B.C.), the great statesman and conqueror who moved his capital to Nineveh, which he rebuilt, waged a long war against the Nairi in the year 699 B.C. The two armies fought on both sides of Mount Judi without decisive result. This long war was recorded in the Assyrian Annal under the name of "the fifth war of the Sennacherib Wars"¹⁵

The Kingdom of Nairi was overshadowed by the emergence in the north of one of their kinsmen, Haldi, who replaced them in challenging the power of the Assyrian. Another factor which contributed to the Nairis obscurity was the Median infiltration into their territory they settled in their land and eventually became the warrior class in Nairi territories.

The disappearance of the Nairi paved the way for the rise of yet another branch of the Hurri Kingdom known from the ancient records as Urartu.¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Zaki, Amin, *ibid*, p. 71.

Kingdom of Urartu

The Kingdom of Urartu was established in the beginning of the first millennium B.C. in the district of Van. The people who formed Urartu were called Haldi.

Ethnically and linguistically, the Haldians were a branch of the Hurrians. They spoke a language called Vennice which was identical with the Hurrian language.

"The heartland of the Urartu kingdom covered the districts of Van, Armenia, and Urmia. When Haldians rose to the position of power they established their control over their ethnic relations in the region and expanded as far as the Euphrates in the west and Alexander Paul in Caucasia. Their capital city was called Tospas located in the place of the modern city of Van. The Haldian King Sardores I built Tospas in the year 840 B.C."¹⁷

"Edward Meyer considers the middle basin of Aras or ancient Araxes river to be one of the heavily populated centers of the Haldians. He was, therefore, searching for their archaeological remains in that district and around Mount Ararat."¹⁸

Sidney Smith defines the country of the Haldians or Urartu to be the region located between Lake Urmia and Lake Van."¹⁹

The archaeological surveys so far undertaken have discovered two more Haldian cities. One is the ruin of the ancient city of Halat which is located on the northern shore of Lake Van. The other is the ruined city of Tibra Qala (The castle of Tibra) which is located in the district of Alshkurd in the modern Bayazid Province. No archaeological excavation has been undertaken in the ruins of the ancient cities of Haldian or the cities of Van, Halat, or Tabra Qala. The few archaeological tests or observations made on the ancient ruins of the Haldian cities were the work of German scholars in the 19th century. The ruins of the ancient city of Halat in particular are believed to contain a wealth of written documents.

The ethnic origin and linguistic affiliation of the Haldians are clearly related to the Hurrians. We are in possession of a fair number of inscriptions in the Vennice language. There are numerous royal inscriptions from Armenia

¹⁷Zaki, Amin, Summary of the History of Kures and Kurdistan, *ibid.*, pp. 66, 98, and 99.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

which are bilingual, one of them being Vennice. The language of these inscriptions appears to be a younger branch of the Hurrians. Concerning the linguistic affiliation of the Haldians, Prof. Speiser provides valuable detail of which we present the exact verbatim:

“With ancient inhabitants of Armenia, and of the adjoining districts to the east, we are on much safer ground. But the available material is of late date, belonging in its entirety to the first millennium B.C. It has little bearing on . . .”

According to the author of “Details of the General History”, the language of the Haldian Vennice resembles the modern language of Gurj and Laz in Caucasia. The region of Lazistan or the country of Laz is located to the west of Georgia (Gurjistan) and is called Lazeka.²⁰

The Kingdom of Uratu was established in the beginning of the 9th century B.C. The Haldian dynasty lasted for over 600 years, with a long line of hereditary kings. It appears that the first few kings of the dynasty were not well-known, probably because the Haldian kingdom had not yet risen to the position of power.

The first famous king of Haldian was called Sardores I who was contemporary with the Assyrian King Shalmaneser III (858-824 B.C.). His father was called King Ari, who was succeeded by his son Sardores. It was King Sardores I who built the city of Tospas (Van) and took it for his capital.

Following the death of Sardores I his son Ispones succeeded him to the throne. The most important achievement of King Ispones was using the Vennice language as the official language for communication and as the language of literature in Urartu in place of the Assyrian language which until that time had been used for official business and literary work. Consequently, there are abundant written historical records in the Vennice language.²¹

King Ispones and successive Urartu kings fought the Assyrian empire. King Ispones undertook a number of campaigns. To immortalize his deeds he erected a relief in the gorge of Kela Sheen, located north of Rayat principality in Erbil Province. On the relief the king inscribed in detail his conquests and victories. It is interesting to note that the language of the inscription is in Assyrian. In all probability, the king's intention was to make the highest publicity for himself by using a universal language such as Assyrian which could be understood by foes and friends alike.

During the reign of king Menoas the power and influence of the Uratu kingdom reached its climax. It seems that this powerful Urartu king was embarking on destroying the Assyrian empire and threatening to occupy the

²⁰Zaki, Amin, Summary of the Kurds and Kurdistan, *ibid*, p. 98, cites: Ahmed Rafiq Bey, Mofasul Tarekh Omomi, Details of General History, Turkish Edition, VI Volumes, 1929, Vol. I, p. 347.

²¹Zaki, Amin, *ibid*, pp. 99-102.

Assyrian hearland. King Menoas inscribed the details of his wars and conquests on two stone reliefs; the one on the stone wall of the Van fortress and the other near the city of Alexander Paul-Komri. The information on these reliefs indicates that King Menoas carried out 14 wars. The majority of those wars were waged against Shalmaneser II (781-772 B.C.). The reason behind all these wars was that the Urartu kingdom was competing with Assyria for power and influence in the region and even threatened the Assyrian existence itself.

The rule of King Sardones II, son of Menoas and his successor, was considered to be the golden age of the Urartu kingdom. The power of Urartu reached its summit of glory. King Sandores II waged a series of assaults on the Assyrian heartland which weakened and shook the foundation of Assyrian power. Subsequently, many disturbances and revolutions occurred within the Assyrian empire and lasted for some time until a certain Pul was able in a military coup to proclaim himself absolute ruler and King of Assyria and assumed the title of Tiglath-Pileser III (746-727 B.C.). The new Assyrian king reorganized the Assyrian empire and advanced against its enemies. He first attacked the warlike Nairi confederation of tribes residing between Assyria and Urartu "who were by no means easy to subdue especially when incited to rebellion by the irrepresible Urartu of Van."²² King Tiglath-Pileser III then moved against northern Syria and occupied it. "After securing both his flanks the Assyrian king attacked Urartu. In a fierce battle in the Hakkari territory, King Tiglath-Pileser III defeated the Urartu army and became master of the region and an absolute ruler in the Assyrian empire."²³

However, despite this defeat at the hands of Tiglath-Pileser III and his advance on the capital, Tospas, the Haldian army retreated and took a defensive position to defend the heartland of Urartu. In the succeeding years, the Haldians were able to defend their country against continual assault by the Assyrians, until the end of Sennacherib rule. (705-681 B.C.).

In the reign of King Rosas II (685), Haldian power revived again and they began to assault the Assyrian positions. The army of Rosas II marched westward and occupied Moshki, Hite, Halezon, Alzi-Palo. This was considered to be the last and the end of the Rosas II conquests.²⁴

The last king of Urartu, named Jurmia, came to the throne about 625 B.C. For a short time the king was able to preserve the independence of the Urartu kingdom and exercised his authority. However, King Jurmia was facing a very difficult political situation. The Median presence in his country was increasing and Median power and influence were too strong for him

²²Seton Lloyd, *Twin Rivers*, *ibid*, p. 62.

²³*Ibid*, p. 59.

²⁴Zaki, Amin, *History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, *ibid*, pp. 94-98.

to cope with. He was a king only in name and gradually the Haldians lost their independence and came under Median protection.

The rise of the Armenians to the status of nationhood was another factor that contributed to the decline and fall of the Haldians. The Armenians were one of those Indo-European tribes of the southern branch who migrated to the Zagros highland at the same time as the great Aryan migration. Eventually they appeared west of Urartu. At the beginning of the 8th century B.C., their power and influence began to be felt in the region. The Armenians advanced on the Haldian country from north-west and occupied its northern part. From that time on the northern part of Urartu became known as Armenia. And remained so until the middle of the 8th century B.C. As result of a long Armenian domination of their country, the mass of the Haldian population mixed with Armenians who were forming the ruling class and changed their Vennice language into the modern Armenian dialect. The author of "Details of General History" states that, "The Haldians did not migrate in mass or disperse but united with Armenia and mixed with them."²⁵

Prof. Speiser observes that, "Numerous Haldian linguistic elements have been incorporated in the Armenian language. The characteristic of physical type of a large number of the Armenians were evidently taken over from the Haldians"²⁶

As a result of Armenian and Median domination of the kingdom, northern Urartu mixed with the Armenians and southern Urartu coalesced with the Medes and changed their Vennice language into Median dialect.

The Haldian people attained a high degree of civilization. The Urartu kingdom lasted for 600 years with a long line of hereditary kings. Such an extended duration of rule is an indication of a stable society with an established order and security. The Urartu kingdom included the fertile plains of Erzurum, Van and Urmia basin which produced a great quantity of agricultural products. Add to this rich pastoral lands for raising flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. These two important sources of wealth, agricultural products, and animal husbandary ensured prosperity, growth and progress for the kingdom. The Haldians were skillful in the extraction and use of metal, especially iron and copper, which were easily accessible in some localities due to the factor of erosion. The famous Keban Maadam copper mine of present day Turkey was located in Urartu territory.

The Haldians were builders of big towns, impressive palaces and fortresses. The Haldian kings attempted to immortalize their names by erecting monuments and reliefs inscribing on them a record of their conquests and

²⁵ Ahmed Rafiq Beg, Mofasal Tarekh Omomi, Turkish edition, Details of General History, VI Volumes, 1929, Volume I, p. 347.

²⁶ Prof. Speiser, Ephram, Mesopotamia origin, *ibid*, p. 168.

deeds. Such is the relief near the city of Alexander Paul-Komri. The Haldians used the Vennice language as official and the language of literature an achievement that preserves the national entity and heritage.

The Haldians worshipped a god called Haldi, which was their national God. They worshipped another god called Teshup which played a very important part, being second only to national god Haldi (CF. Winekler, OP. Ct. 68).

The scholars, in particular German, Russian and American, were interested in studying such an ancient enlightened kingdom as Urartu. Unfortunately the successive Turkish governments from beginning of the first World War in 1914 to the present time in 1990, have blocked any attempt at excavation of the ancient sites of the ruined cities of Wan, Halat, and Tabra Qala, which might yield a wealth of written historical documents.

The final fall and disappearance of the enlightened kingdom of Urartu and, a decade later, of the mighty Assyrian empire, in 612 B.C., announced the end of the ancient world and the beginning of a new era which could safely be called the era of Indo-European supremacy.

PART III

The Kurds are the Direct Descendents of the Medes

Continued in the next edition.

CONCLUSION

From the preceding we can safely conclude that the four ancient kingdoms of Lullu, Gutu, Nairi, Urartu and the two empires of Kassite and Hurri-Mitanni were founded by the same people who were ethnically and linguistically related. Renowned historians such as Chiera, Speiser, Ungand, Meyer, Landesberger, Tensen, and Bork have established the ethnic and linguistic relations of Lullu, Gutu, Kassite on the one hand and the Elamite on the other.

The conclusion reached by Chiera-Speiser established that from earliest historical times Zagros highland was inhabited by an ethnic groups who were more or less ethnically and linguistically related.

A valuable study by Driver on "the name of Kurds in its Philological Connection" establishes that the Zagsos ancient groups of people who appeared in the ancient historical records under various names were in fact branches of the anciet Kurdish nation.

Regarding the importance of the ancient Zagros nation Chiera – Speiser stated the following:

"It has been indicated previously that there is also no demonstrable difference between the languages of the Mitanni and of the Hurri if we are to judge from the material now extant. The land of the Hurri is generally sought in Armenia. The language of the Vennice inscriptions appears to have been a younger branch of the same linguistic group although we must reserve final judgment on the subject until the entire material has been published. An important linguistic group is thus revealed to have covered the large area extending from Armenia down south to Mesopotamia, and from there to the lands east of the Tigris and what was until recently the isolated people of Mitanni. Confined mostly to northern Mesopotamia they now appear as but one member of the unexpectedly large family whose expansion would indicate a profound influence upon the ancient history and civilization of the Near East. Fortunately, we are not left here entirely to conjecture."²⁷

It is proven by historical evidence that the Zagros Nation belonged to Caucasian people and spoke the ancient Caucasian language. The ancient Kurds and Elam were ethnically and linguistically related and formed two important branches of the Zagros nation.

This ethnic and linguistic condition of Zagros lasted until the end of the first half of here sixth century B-C. (550 B.C.) when Zagros people were gradually aryanized during the counse of the first millennium B.C. In the course of one century and half of the median domination over Zagros highland, the ancient Kurds coalesced with medes and changed their ancient caucasian language into the median dialect.

²⁷Chiera and Speiser, a new factor in the History of the Ancient East, *ibid*, p. 78.

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Kurdish Language

By Mustafa Al Karadaghi

The modern Kurdish language is a branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Philologists today recognize eleven groups of languages having descended from the Aryan root, each group embracing a plurality of languages, with each language itself in actuality divided into a multiplicity of dialects.

The principle groups of the Indo-European family are as follows:

- (1) Cletic: surviving today only in Gaelic, Irish and Welsh, but once spoken over a vast area in Western and Central Europe.
- (2) Teutonic: includes Anglo-Saxon, Dutch, German and the Scandinavian languages.
- (3) Italian group: including Italian, French, Spanish, Romanian.
- (4) Albanian.
- (5) Greek: in classical times divided into four groups of dialects
- (6) Slavic tongues: Russian, Polish, Bulgarian, etc.
- (7) Baltic tongues: Lithuanian, Old Prussian, and Lettice, all known only from a comparatively late epoch.
- (8) Armenian, with literature beginning in the sixth century B.C.
- (9) Iranian: the oldest monuments of which were written in the Gathas and Zend Avesta, the sacred books composed by the Prophet Zoroaster, and Darius' inscriptions. The modern survivors in the Iranian group are Ossentian, Kurdish, Persian, etc.
- (10) Indic: primarily Sanskrit, then the ancient Prakrits, and the modern vernaculars.
- (11) Charian: an extinct language.

These eleven groups represent only a fraction of the total number of Aryan languages that have ever been in existence.¹

What is relevant to our subject is the Iranian group of the Indo-European family of languages. The name "Iran" means "the land of the Aryan", which is derived from the ancient Aryan genitive plural Aryanam, which meant

¹C.f. *Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Aryans*, Vol. II, p. 203.

the “land of the Aryans”. Following the Aryan migration, nomadic groups of the Aryan tribes moved from the steppe on the North-Eastern side of the Caspian Sea to the west, to the Fertile Plain and cultivated land in the northeastern district of the present state of Iran, near the border of northwestern Afghanistan. The Aryan nomads called this fertile region “Aryanam”, (the land of the Aryans), which later was modified to “Iran”, and the scope of its reference was extended to cover most of the Iranian plateau.

The record we have today is of twelve Aryan tribes by name and location who penetrated the Iranian plateau. This list of twelve Aryan tribes was provided in part by Zoroaster in the etymological part of Zend Avesta, which is thought to have been composed about 800 B.C.

A second source of information is Darius’ inscriptions from the 5th century, B.C., which corresponds to Herodotus’ compilation of the list of the Aryan Tribes in Iran in the 4th century, B.C.²

In the following text, we present the names and locations of the Iranian and Iranic group of Aryan tribes who entered the Iranian plateau and the Zagros highlands significantly at the time of Aryan migration.

- (1) The Medes: appeared in the historical texts and records as: Mada, Mata, Matai, etc. The Medes settled in the modern-day district of Hamadan, located on the eastern edge of the Zagros mountains. Their capital city was called Hagmatana, “the meeting place”, or Ecbatana. The Median inhabited the territory was called Media. The Medes settling in this Hamadan district were in the Stone Age of cultural advancement, and were comprised of six Nomadic tribes, each with its own clans and subdivisions.
- (2) Parsa: appeared in the Assyrian annals from 850 B.C. as Barsua, Parsua, Persis which was adapted to Persian by modern European writers.

Parsua was comprised of three small Nomadic tribes who followed the Medes in their migration route. Parsa, however, moved further south and settled in the territory of the ancient kingdom of Elam, in the region called Anshan, or Anzan, west of Susa. The territory occupied by Parsa was called Pars, meaning “the country of Parsa”. Later, Pars was modified to become Fars, and Faristan; the language became known as Faris. The Persians call themselves, and are known

²C.f. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 11, p. 203.

to their neighbors as Fars, their country as Faristan, and their language as Farisi.

- (3) The Hycanian (Varkana according to Darius, Zend Vehrkana) on the eastern corner of the Caspian Sea, in the fertile district of Astanabad.
- (4) The Parthians (Partyaeci; Parthaya) in Khorasan (see Parthia.)
- (5) The Arians (Persian Haraiva), in the vicinity of the river Arius (Heri-rud), which derives its name from them . . . this name survives in the modern Herat.
- (6) Drangians (Zaranka in Darius . . . Sarangians in Herod.) Situated south of the Aryans in the northwest of Afghanistan (Arachosia) by the Western affluent of Lake Hamun, and extending to the present Seistan.
- (7) Khorasmians (Khwakizmians, Pers, Mvarazmiya) in the great oasis of Khiva which still bears the name Khwarizm.³

The original twelve dialects of the Iranic branch were all derived from a parent language called "the primitive Aryan language". Those who spoke the original twelve dialects were Aryan Nomadic tribes who descended from a common origin—the Aryan nation. This fact of common origin explains the present day similarities between the modern representatives of those ancient dialects; e.g., similarities between Kurdish, Baluchi, Persian, and Pushtu.

The oldest written form of the primitive Aryan tongue is found in three ancient sources:

1. The Holy Book Veda, written in Sanskrit about 1300 B.C. in India. The Sanskrit dialect was spoken by one of the Aryan Nomadic tribes which migrated to India, and once the Veda was written, it became the language of literature and conversation in India.
2. Zend Avesta: The Sacred Book composed by the Prophet Zoroaster (Kurdish: Zardasht) c. 800 B.C. in Median dialect.
3. Darius' inscriptions written in the 5th century B.C. Darius was the third Achaemenian king who ruled from 521 B.C. to 486 B.C.; his inscriptions are found in the two rock carvings:

- (a) Located in western Iran near the town of Qasri Sheer is the inscription called *Bahston*, and it is written in three

³C.f. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. II, p. 20.

ancient languages: Persian, Elamite and Assyrian. Darius is known to us in the Judeo-Christian books as the King who ruled over Daniel, and in this inscription King Darius I speaks of his ethnic origin and the great deeds he performed.

- (b) The second inscription is called Naqsh-i-Rostum, which is located some 100 kilometers from the ruin of the ancient city of Persepolis, or Takht-i-Jamsheed, as it is called in Persian. In this inscription, King Darius I describes the countries and regions which were subjected to the rule of the Achaemenian Empire. These three sources, the Veda, Zend Avesta, and Darius' inscription are the oldest surviving records of the ancient primitive Aryan tongue.⁴


With the passage of time, the twelve original Iranian tongues grew into distinct and independent languages, each generating dialects of their own. Linguists divide the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages into four sub-branches:

- (1) The eastern branch, i.e., the Baluchi language
- (2) The northeastern branch, i.e., Mazandarani and Gilani
- (3) The Northwestern branch Kurdish language, i.e., The
- (4) The southwestern branch, i.e., the Persian language

The following table of the various branches of the Iranian languages will approximately illustrate the racial affinities of the Kurds⁵:

⁴Zaki, Amin, *Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 306.

⁵Hirt, *Die Indoyermanen*, Vol. 1, pp. 99-113, from whom this table is copied. See also E.B. Soane, "Notes on the Phonology of Southern Kurmanji" in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1922, pp. 191-226, and the opinions of Justi, Darmesteter, and Socin there cited. (Note: Southwestern-Persian is added by this author to the original table.) See also Driver, G.R., *Studies in Kurdish History*, p. 494.



The modern Kurdish language belongs to the northwestern Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages, and Kurdish was derived from the ancient Median dialect. The Medes were one of the ancient Aryan Nomadic tribes who migrated to the Zagros highlands at the time of the great Aryan migration. Eventually, the Medes settled in the territory of the modern district of Hamadan, where they built their city called Hagmatana, or Ecbatana, which was located in the place of the modern day city of Hamadan. At the time of their arrival, the Medes were comprised of six Nomadic tribes who spoke a dialect directly descendent from the primitive Aryan tongue.

In about 700 B.C., the confederation of Median tribes chose one of their chiefs as king to rule over all of the Medes, initiating the tradition of Kingship among the Medians.

The heartland of Media was divided into two parts: (1) the Media Magna (the great Media), which covered the modern provinces of Kurmanshah and Ardalan, and (2) Atrobateni (the small Media) which extended between west of the Caspian Sea and Lake Urmia.

From the time of 700 B.C. onward, the Medes emerged to a position of power and influence in the surrounding areas, and they were seen as a challenge to the authority of the Assyrian kings. The Medes became the leaders of the anti-Assyrian coalition, which moved on westward, threatening the Assyrian forces. The Kurds looked to the Medes as liberators from their oppression and tyranny by the Assyrians. This friendly attitude may have facilitated intermarriage and bonding between the ancient Kurds and the Medes.

In the year 612 B.C., a coalition of ancient Kurds and Medes, under Median banners, advanced on the Assyrian heartland and capital, Nineveh, completely destroying it. The Assyrian king SarnaPallos himself perished in the flames of his palace.

Following the destruction of Nineveh and the devastation of the Assyrian Empire once and for all, the Medes established an extensive empire extending from Halye River in the west to the Oxus in the east. Mesopotamia became a province of the larger Median Empire.

Median domination and supremacy in the Zagros region and its surroundings lasted for 150 years, from 700 B.C. to 550 B.C. Its decline came when the last Median king Astyages was overthrown by Cyrus the Great, who established the Achaemenian dynasty. In that 150 years under the Medes, the ancient Kurds coalesced with the Medians, and changed their ancient Caucasian language into the Median dialect. Following the collapse of the Median rule, the Medes, formerly a ruling and warrior class, were assimilated by the ancient Kurds.

One of the unique and amazing attributes of the Indo-European tribes was their capacity to assimilate the people they dominated. A few Aryan tribes moved to Indus, then on again to Ganges, and subsequently imposed their Sanskrit language upon the entire Indian sub-continent. The Nomadic tribe of Parsa-Parsua migrated to the ancient kingdom of Elam and in time imposed their language, Farisi, upon the whole Elamite kingdom. The wild Scythians controlled Russia and consequently changed the linguistic and ethnic characteristics of the native inhabitants of Russia. Still other Aryan tribes moved to Europe and their impact was made on the linguistic and ethnic composition of all of Europe. The Medes were by far the most successful of the Indo-European tribes in terms of their ability to assimilate other cultures, perhaps due to the fact that they were the leaders of the anti-Assyrian coalition, and were thus hailed as liberators by those under the Assyrian yoke.

During the period of a century and a half between 700 B.C. and 550 B.C., the Medes dominated the entire Zagros areas where Kurds lived, and

were witness to the complete change the Kurds made to the Median dialect, forsaking their ancient Caucasian language.

Median Dialect is Preserved in the Sacred Book Zend Avesta

Zoroaster was born into a simple country family in northwestern Media at the close of the 8th Century, B.C. He preached his fiery message in northeastern Media, living to be about 77 years of age, according to some sources.⁶ However, the Assyrian inscriptions that remain today indicate that Zoroaster's teachings were dominant in Media two centuries before Cyrus (550 B.C.) If the doctrines of Zoroaster were well-known in Media in 714 B.C., obviously, his appearance in the role of Prophet must have been much earlier.⁷

Zoroaster faced a hostile priesthood which began to conspire against him to prevent him from further influential preaching. He was forced to flee and he took refuge with the Governor of Bactria, Vistaspa, in eastern Iran. Here, the Prophet Zoroaster was able to convert the Governor and his minister, Jamas, to his teachings. Zoroaster then married the daughter of Jamas, and with the assistance and protection of the Governor Vistaspa, Zoroaster was successful in spreading his religious teachings in Iran, India and the Zagros areas. The Prophet was killed subsequently in one of the religious wars, preaching against the Huni people, a branch of the Huni nation.

In the language of the Sacred Book Zend Avesta, we retain the true speech of the ancient peoples of Media. While it is in the cuneiform inscriptions of the Acaemenian Kings, it is beyond controversy that we possess the ancient language of Persia.⁸ Likewise, in the Sacred Book of the Vedas, we have the original version of the Sanskrit language. These three sources for the ancient Aryan languages are the authoritative materials in their purest forms.

However, the original form of Zend Avesta which was composed by the Prophet Zoroaster underwent a radical change as it passed through the ages. The earliest part of the Sacred Book was composed in the native home in the eastern Urima district in which Zoroaster grew up. The dialect in the earliest part of the Book differs greatly from the language of the later parts of the Zend Avesta. Some scholars held that Zoroaster wrote this earliest portion of Gatha in a strange dialect. It is believed that this "strange dialect" was in all probability the Kurdish ancient Caucasian language which was

⁶Collins, Robert, *The Medes and Persians*, p. 74.

⁷C.f. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 11, p. 205.

⁸Rawlson, George, *The Seven Great nonanches of the ancient world*, Vol. 11, W. Lovell Co., New York, 1888, p. 67.

dominant in the region 800 B.C., the time which many writers assign to Zoroaster's period. It is more likely that he wrote the earliest part of Gathas in the Caucasian language and then he shifted to the Median dialect in Bactria. Median dialect was more widely known, was the language of the ruling class, and thus was more universal in its appeal.

The Sacred Iore of Zoroaster was handed down from generation to generation in its oral form; each generation contributing modifications, revisions and additions. Further difficulty is presented by the fact that Zend Avesta and other teachings of Zoroaster were translated into other Iranian dialects for different locales, and in different time periods, beginning with the Achaemenian Dynasty, the Parthians, the Sassanids, and again during Islamic rule, and throughout the Middle Ages. Most of the authors who translated the teachings of Zoroaster claimed their translations and collections were the True Version of the Zend Avesta. However, the original version was acquired by Greek in 320 B.C. scholars who accompanied Alexander the Great in his conquest of Persia, and thus it was brought back to Greece. A number of Kurdish historians, among them Zaki Amin, claim that the original version of Zend Avesta is now available from German sources.

The notion that Zend language was the idio of ancient Media originated with Anquetil du Perron. He looked upon Zoroaster as a native of Azerbaijan, and as a contemporary of Darius Hystaspis. His opinion was embraced by Kleuker, Herder, and Rask, and again, with certain modification, by Tychsen and Heeren. These later writers give a more completely Median character to the Zend Avesta by regarding it as having been composed in Media Magna, during the reign of the great Cyaxares.⁹ It is conclusive and well-proven that the Median dialect has survived in the Zend Avesta.

The modern Kurdish language is derived from the ancient Median dialect, a branch of the Indo-European family of languages. As we have previously stated, during a century and a half of Median domination of Zagros, the ancient Kurds coalesced with the Medes, and changed their ancient Caucasian language into the current Median dialect. The name of Medes became an appellation for the whole people of the Zagros and it eclipsed the name of the Kurds. But when the Median Empire was over-thrown, by Cyrus the Great in 550 R.C., the ruling/warrior class of Medes became assimilated among the vast agrarian settled communities of Kurds. In time, the name of the Medes was disappearing, being replaced by the name Kurds again as an appellation for those inhabiting the Zagros highlands. The Medes failed to retain their name as Medes, but they succeeded in imposing their language, and culture, and physical characteristics on the ancient Kurds.

Linguistic experts and historians have established that the modern day

⁹Ibid., p. 67.

Kurdish language is the same as the language of Zend Avesta, the ancient Median dialect. The historian Darmesteter, in his book, *Iranian Studies*, states that, "The Sacred Book Zend Avesta, composed by Zoroaster, is written in the Meidan language."¹⁰ Hassan Pernia considers the Median language to be the same as the present Kurdish language, or its basis, at least.¹¹ Zaki Amin, who has studied the Zend Avesta painstakingly, and is literate in both the Persian language and his own native Kurdish, undertook a comparative study of the Zend Avesta, Kurdish and Persian. He concludes his study by establishing a substantial oneness between the language of the Zend Avesta and the Kurdish dialect of Kurmanji. He concludes his study in his statement that "the language of Zend Avesta is the same as the ancient Median language, and that the Kurdish language of today is derived from the ancient Median language."¹² As a matter of fact, the Kurds read with ease and comprehension the language of the Zend Avesta with few difficulties, an indication that the two languages are nearly identical.

There exists a most interesting book which was written in the 3rd Century of Hijra (the Prophets of Islam's Flight in the year 622 A.D.) circa 622 A.D. The author is unknown, its title: *Danistani Denek*, meaning "the religious question". It is written in the Kurdish language of the time, as a defense of Zoroaster . . . (Zardasht, as he is known to Kurds.) The author concludes his defense of Zoroaster's religion saying that, "The language of Zend Avesta resembles exactly the present day Kurdish language."¹³

E. Soane, an authority on Persian and Kurdish languages, and the author of *Kurdish Grammar*, states the following regarding the origin of the Kurdish language: "It is becoming widely accepted fact that Zoroaster, who was speaking the Median language, was born in the northern part of the Median region, known as the Mukri District. The language of Zoroaster which we see in the Zend Avesta, is not only very closely related to the present day Mukri dialect, but as we mention later, is the Mukri language itself."¹⁴ The idea that Zoroaster was a Kurd, born in the Mukri District, west of Lake Urmia, is widely believed by Kurdish historians, and is commonly accepted by a number of international scholars as well.

The modern Kurdish nation is a direct descendant of the Medes. E. Soane describes the Kurds as "The Sons of the Medes."¹⁵ Arnold Wilson, in his book "Mesopotamia—Clashes of Loyalty 1918-1920", states that "The Kurdish nation is a direct descendant of the Medians, and their language is one

¹⁰Zaki, Amin, *Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 318.

¹¹Pernia, Hassan, *Ancient Iran*, Persian edition, Tehran, 1929, p. 57.

¹²Zaki, Amin, *Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, pp. 309-310.

¹³Ibid., p. 318.

¹⁴E. Soane, *Report on Sulemaniya*, Liwa, Calcutta, 1918, p. 85.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 85.

of the western Iranian languages.”¹⁶

Professor Cyes, in his book “The Historian’s History of the World” concludes his study of the Medes by stating that “The Medes were no other than Kurdish tribes whose linguistic affiliation was Aryan, Indo-European.”¹⁷

According to Rawlson, the modern Kurds best represent the ancient Medes in terms of physical characteristics. “The modern Persian is a very degenerate representative of his ancient Aryan stock. Slight and supple in person, with quick, glancing eyes, delicate features, and vivacious manner, he lacks the dignity and strength, the calm repose and simple grace of the race from which he has sprung. Fourteen centuries of subjugation under despots have left their stamp upon his countenance and his frame, which though still retaining some traces of the original type, has been sadly weakened and lowered by so long a term of subservience. Probably the wild Kurds, and Lurs of the present day, more clearly correspond in physique to the ancient Medes than do the softer inhabitants of the Great Plateau.”¹⁸

According to Vladimin Minorisky, who studied the Kurdish language and Kurdish history extensively, the two major Kurdish dialects of Kurmanji and Kurmanshahi bear the names and dialects of two Median tribes.¹⁹ With linguistic evidence, he establishes that Kurmanji is a complex noun made up of two names: Kur, which stands for the Kurds, and Manji, which was the name of Median tribe that was predominant in Northern Kurdistan. The name Kurmanshahi is a complex noun made up of two names: Kur, for the Kurds, and Manshahi, the name of a Median tribe that was predominant in southern Kurdistan, especially in the province of Kurmanshah, which still bears its name.¹⁹

From the preceding, we can safely conclude that the modern Kurdish nation is a direct descendant of the Medes. The Medes, who were one of the important tribes of the Aryan Nation, migrated to the Zagros highlands during the time of the great Aryan migration, as stated. The Medes spoke a dialect which was a branch of the primitive Aryan language. We further conclude that the original Median dialect has survived in the Sacred Book of the Zend Avesta dating about 800 B.C. Historians and linguistic experts have established the identity of the Kurdish language with the language of the Zend Avesta which was composed in Median language. In fact, the two major dialects of modern day Kurmanji and Kurmanshahi were the dialects of two major Median tribes: Kurmanji in the northern parts of Kurdistan, and Kurmanshahi in southern Kurdistan and in Luristan.

¹⁶Wilson, Arnold, *Mesopotamia: Clashes of Loyalty, 1918-1920*, Vol. 2, p. 127.

¹⁷Zaki, Amin, *Summary of the History of Kurds and Kurdistan*, pp. 316-320.

¹⁸Rawlson, George, *The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient East*, p. 37.

¹⁹Minorisky, Vladimir, *The Kurds, Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. 30, p. 51.

Major Kurdish Dialects

The modern Kurdish language, as stated, belongs to the northwestern Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Today, the Kurdish language is divided into three major dialects: Kurmanji, Sorani, and Kurmanshahi. Some linguists categorize Kurmanji into two sub-groups, Northern Kurmanji and Eastern Kurmanji. This classification may be correct in terms of philological connection and grammatical structure. However phonetically and in terms of actual native pronunciation, Southern Kurmanji is considered to be a distinct dialect, and is thus called Sorani.


The two minor dialects are Zaza and Hawrami. The Zaza dialect is in use in the Dersem District in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey). While Hawrami (or Hawramani) is spoken in Hawraman district, a mountainous border district between Sinna and Halabja town and in Pawa-Marewan Corridor. The artificial Iran-Iraq frontier line cuts through Hawraman and divides it into two parts: the eastern Hawraman is presently part of Iran and the western part of Hawraman which is part of Iraq.

Variations are not great among these dialects; upon careful study and with comparison, it can be established that these dialects belong to the same language. Furthermore, any one of these three major dialects could serve as a lingua Franca—a standard language for the entire Kurdish nation . . . Kurmanji, Sorani, or Kurmanshahi.

In the following, we are going to locate the primary areas of usage of these three major dialects of the Kurdish language. We also define the areas where the two minor dialects of Zaza and Hawrami are spoken.





- (1) *Kurmanji Dialect*: Spoken in Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey), by Kurds in Syria, and the Kurdish population of Transcaucasia (in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan Soviet Republics.) Those Kurds who were forcibly transferred from Caucasia to Central Asia by orders of Stalin also speak Kurmanji.

In southern Kurdistan (in Iraq), the Kurds of the two provinces of Duhok, Mosul, and Yezidis of the Sinjar District speak Kurmanji. As a matter of fact, one can draw a line dividing the two dialects as they are spoken in southern Kurdistan in Iraq, a line which runs along the Great Zab river until its confluence with its northern branch. The line then extends along this branch until Khana on the Iran-Iraq border. The areas north of the Great Zab and west of its northern



no 2

Distribution of the Kurdish dialects

-  Kurmanji
 -  Sorani
 -  Kurmanshahi
 -  Miner Dialects
- Zaza, Hawrami, Gorani

branch speak Kurmanji and thus south and east of the same line we find Sorani spoken.

- (2) *Sorani Dialect*: Sorani could be called a central dialect. It is spoken by Kurds in the provinces of Arbil, Sulaimaniya, and Kirkuk. Sorani is also spoken widely in the Kurdish areas of Iran: specifically the Urmia basin, the Mahabad District, among Mukri tribes, in the Ardalan region. It is spoken in Kurdistan Province, with its provincial capital Sinna, and further south until the border of Kurmanshah Province. In the southwest, Sorani is spoken north of a line drawn from Hamadan to Khanaqin Town, and west of a line drawn along the northern boundary of Diyala River, as it cuts through Bamorang in Darband-i-Khan Pom, down river until it cuts through Hamrin Mountain. This vast region, despite a slight change in pronunciation in some localities, all are Sorani-speaking Kurds.
- (3) *Kurmanshahi Dialect*: Kurmanshi is spoken in Kurmanshah Province, in the two districts of Khanaqin and Mandali (which administratively are part of Iraq), in the Pust-i-Kuh region where Faili dialect is very similar to Kurmanshahi.

In Luristan (in Iran), the Lurs speak two closely related dialects, Faili and Bakhtiari. The Faili dialect is identical in phonetics to the Kurmanshahi dialect. On the other hand, the Bakhtiari dialect has been continuing influence from the Persian language for over 2,000 years. Yet, despite close proximity to the Persians, and their common religious faith, the Bakhtiari dialect remains far closer to its original Kurdish language than to Persian.

The various dialects of southern Kurdistan, such as Laki, Kalhour, Faili, Bakhtiari, and Kurmanshahi are quite similar, and those speaking these southwestern Kurdish dialects communicate among each other with ease, and thus for all appearances we can say they belong to the same group under the Kurmanshahi dialect.

- (4) The two minor dialects of Kurdish are *Zaza*, and *Hawrami*, *Zaza* is spoken in the Dersim district in Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey) amidst Kurmanji-speaking Kurds. The cities of Mush, Kharbut (currently called Elazig), Erzincan, and Dersim (currently called Tunceli), are predominantly populated by *Zaza*-speaking Shiite Kurds. (Mehrad Izady, *Kurdish Times*.)

- (5) *Hawrami (or Hawramani) dialect* is spoken in the mountainous areas on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border between the towns of Penjwin and Halabja on the Iraqi side and Pawa-Marewan Corridor on the Iranian side. The artificial frontier between Iran and Iraq cuts through and thus divides Hawraman into its eastern and western component areas. The Hawrami dialect is most similar to Gurani (or Gorani) dialect, spoken in the mountain enclaves southeast of Hawraman and Zahaw district in Iran. The Gurani itself is close to Lakki dialect . . . approximately 100,000 inhabitants of Kurdish enclaves in Baluchistan speak primarily Gurani. This writer was very much impressed by the archaic form of the Gurani dialect. A letter is usually added to the beginning of a word or to the end of a word to enhance their musicality. It thus appears more archaic and it gives the impression that this language belongs to ancient times, is no longer in use. However, the only difference between Gurani and Sorani are those beginnings of the words, and endings, which occasionally make it difficult for the speaker of Sorani to comprehend with ease. One of the more famous Kurdish poets, Mawlawi, composed in Hawrami–Gurani dialect.

Kurdistan—The Homeland of the Kurds

By N. Simko

The meaning of the term Kurdistan

Kurdistan as a geographical expression means the homeland of the Kurds. It is a compound noun made up of two words, the ethnological Kurds, plus the territorial suffix, ISTAN. In Avesta, The Holy Book of Zoroaster, it signifies the place where people are bound to the soil from which they obtain their livelihood. Literally it means their dwelling place. By adding the suffix, ISTAN, to the collective name of any people, a compound noun was formed to denote the homeland of that particular people. It is likely that this geographical expression came into use through Zoroaster's teaching around B.C. 600 and consequently became a common geographical expression during the reigns of the four empires of the east, the Medes, the Achaemedes, the Parthians, and the Sassanids, who adhered to the teachings of Zoroaster. Almost all known countries of the ancient world were referred to in the same manner. The ethnic name of Balluchi plus istan formed Balluchistan which meant the Country of the Balluchi. Other similar examples could be cited such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Hindustan, Turkistan, Arabistan, and Kurdistan. It is interesting to note that most of these geographical names are still in use and included in modern maps.

Kurdistan is a mountainous country located in the north-west of Asia. In size Kurdistan is equal to France with an area of approximately 530,000 square kilometers. When we attempt to draw the general outline of Kurdistan or describe its physical features, we must always think of the Zagros highland because the two terms were regarded as synonymous corresponding to each other in terms of shape, size, and physical features.

Zagros is a Greek geographical term originally derived from the Kurdish word Zargiri, a compound noun made up of two words: Zar, meaning beyond and Giri, the mountains. The expression Zargiri means beyond the mountains. This is a common practice in the Kurdish language. By adding the prefix Zar, to the name of a place, an expression is formed to denote a location beyond that specific place. For instance Zargali is made up of two words, Zar, plus Gali, which means the gorge. The name Zargali means

a place or the area beyond the Gorge. Similarly the name Zarze is formed from Zar plus Ze which means the Zab River. Therefore Zarze means a place beyond the Zab river. When the Kurds use the term Zargiri they imply the mountain chain and the territories beyond or simply the mountaneous region.

In ancient times, the Greek communities inhabiting the eastern Mediterranean were in direct contact with the Kurds. The Greek writers and geographers seem to have taken the name Zargiri from the Kurds and assimilated it to Greek use by adding 'os' to form the geographical expression Zagros. Thereby they meant the mountainous highlands, which was the country of the Karduchi—a name the Greeks used for ancient Kurds.

This illustration regarding the origin of the term Zagros is confirmed by an article in the Encyclopedia Britanica, which we quote as follows: "The Guran are mentioned in the Masalik-El-Absar as the dominant tribe in Southern Kurdistan in the 14th century, occupying very much the same seats as at present, from the Hamadan Frontier to Shahrizor. Their name probably signifies merely "the mountaineers", being derived from gur of giri, "a mountain", which is also found in Zagros, i.e. Za-giri, translated "beyond the mountain" or "Pusht-i-Koh as the name is translated in Persian."¹

"This vast elevated highland was known to the ancient Greeks and Romans as Zagros, while in modern geography it bears the name of Kurdistan and Luristan".²

The Zagros region is made up of two tracts; one consisting of lofty mountain ranges and the other of high flat table-land which stretches out at the foot of the mountain chains. It should be noticed that both of these tracts constitute together one single compact land that rises above its surroundings. The mountain system of Zagros is made up of parallel chains that run in general direction from north-west to southwest. Numerous isolated ridges rise among these parallel chains. Hills of all sizes and shapes are found everywhere. These parallel chains join together and with the isolated ridges and foot hills they form the mountain system of Zagros that bends and extends in an arch south-eastward along Bakhtiari and Luristan mountains to the east of the Persian Gulf.

An accurate description of the Zagros Highland is provided by Rawlson whom we quote as follows:

"Description of the country";

"Along the eastern flank of the great Mesopotamian lowland, curving around it on the north, and stretching beyond it to the south and the south-east, lies a vast elevated region or highlands, no portion of which appears to be less than 3000 feet above the sea level. This region may be divided,

¹Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol. II, p. 950.

²Rawlson, George, The six great monarchy of the ancient East, W. Lovell Co., New York, London, 1873, p. 23.

broadly, into two tracts, one consisting of lofty mountainous ridges, which form its outskirts on the north and on the west; the other, in the main a higher flat tableland, extending from the foot of the mountain-chain, southward to the Indian ocean, and eastward to the country of the Afghans.

The western mountain-country consists, as has already been observed, of six or seven parallel ridges, having a direction nearly from the northwest to the southeast, enclosing between them valleys of great fertility, well watered by a large number of plentiful and refreshing streams. This district was known to the ancients as Zagros, while in modern geography it bears the name of Kurdistan ad Luristan. It has always been inhabited by a multitude of war like tribes, and has rarely formed for any long period the possession of any settled monarchy. Full of torrents, of deep ravines, or rocky summits, abrupt and almost inaccessible, containing but few passes, and those narrow and easily defensible. Moreover, owing to the rigor of its climate this region was secure from hostile invasion during more than half the year. It has defied all attempts at permanent subjugation, whether made by Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Parthians, or Turks, and remains to this day independent of the great powers in its neighborhood as it was when the Assyrian armies first penetrated its recesses. Nature seems to have constructed it to be a nursery of hardy and vigorous men, a stumbling block to conquerors a thorn in the side of every powerful empire which arises in this part of the great eastern continent.⁷³

General Outlines

Kurdistan is basically a mountainous highland which rises above its surroundings. In the north, Kurdistan is located between Iskanderon Gulf, anti-Taurus ranges, Ararat mountain, and the Caucasian plain, where the Kurdistan frontier crosses the Armenian border and enters Transcaucas. The western and northern mountain ranges of Kurdistan skirt the Anatolian lowland. In the west and east Kurdistan is confined between the eastern end of the Mesopotamian plain and the western edge of the arid high Iranian plateau. The eastern limit of Kurdistan is drawn by the Aras river which runs along its northeastern extremity and the eastern shore of Lake Urmia, and a line that runs like an arc in a southeasterly direction along the Bakhtiari and Luristan mountains to the northeast of the Persian Gulf.

In the west the Luristan mountain ranges curve around the eastern Khuzistan lowland to connect with the highland of Pust-i-Kuh mountain and

⁷³George Rawlinson, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

hills which overhang the eastern lowland of Mesopotamia. The Hamrin mountains encircle the eastern and northern alluvial plain of Mesopotamia.


In the Northwest the Sinjar range encloses the desert of the northwest of Iraq, which lies to its south. The hills of Jezirah, the Euphrates river, and the Kurdish mountain (Jabal Akrad), overhanging Aleppo, separate Kurdistans high tableland from the desert steppe of the east and northwest of Syria.

Due to its geological formation Kurdistan is a highland elevated from its surroundings. If you move toward Kurdistan highland from any of the neighboring countries in the south, west, north, and east, you will arrive at a naturally demarcated frontier and you can not fail to notice that the nature of the country and even the climate has changed.

Shape of Kurdistan:

The shape of Kurdistan has been described by a number of writers. To geographers its mountain system forms the backbone of the Middle East, with the old Zagros chain running from Ararat in the north along the present Iraq-Iran border southward to join the southern ranges near Khaniqin this forms its spine and the parallel ridges which are connected with it from the west and east, constitute its ribs. To some writers, Kurdistan resembles a crescent, the southern and northern ends of which touch the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean sea. To others the shape of Kurdistan resembles a sickle. More frequently, Kurdistan has been described as the heart of the region because almost all the water supply of the area comes from Kurdistan. In the hills, valleys, and mountain sides of Kurdistan almost all the rivers of the area have their origin. The Euphrates, Tigris, Khabour, Great Zab, Lesser Zab, Diyala, Alwand (Halwan), Aras, Kizil Uzan or Safid-Rud, Kerkha river, and Dizful headwaters, all have their sources in Kurdistan which churns out water, "a life-giving element in the dry region of the Middle East", like a heart through which these rivers resemble arteries. Other writers consider Kurdistan to be "the cradle of mankind"⁴ because here at the foot of some of its southern outer ranges the earliest farming villages developed around 7000 B.C.. Having certain degree of culture and social organization. These communities contrasted with southern Iraq. with its natural beauty, grand scenery, flowing plains, misty valleys, and fair weather Kurdistan is said to be like the Garden of Eden which was described in the Bible. Indeed to those who come from the bare desert steppe of Iraq, Syria, and arid bare plateau of Iran, Kurdistan looks like a perfect paradise.

⁴See Rev. W. A. Migram, *The Cradle of Mankind*, B.C. (Camb.), D.D. Lamberth, G. Bell and Sons, London, 1929, p.



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
General outline of
Kurdistan

THE ETHNIC BOUNDARIES OF THE KURDS

It is not difficult to draw the ethnographical map of Kurdistan as the country has the advantage of being separated from its neighbors by natural barriers of great strength. For the most part the Kurdish ethnic frontiers run along these barriers of mountain ranges, foothills, and rivers which both define and protect Kurdistans' boundaries. Furthermore, the traditional Kurdish homeland has been defined by the Zagros highland which is made up of one compact elevated landmass with distinct geological formations which could be distinguished without much difficulty from its surroundings. If you move toward Kurdistan from the Iranian plateau, the Mesopotamian alluvial plain, and the Syrian desert steppe, you will arrive at a natural demarcation where you do not fail to realize that the features of the land have changed and that you are in a new country.

The Kurdish ethnic boundary line runs continuously along Kurdistan circumference without a gap or separation from the mainland of any one of its five parts. The five parts into which Kurdistan is divided form the single geographical unit and together they constitute Kurdistans highland. However, the artificial boundaries of the states among whom the Kurds are divided run in a zig-zag manner over the map of Kurdistan and resemble a cross word puzzle. Many international frontiers touch Kurdish land including Turkey-Iran, Iran-Iraq, Syria-Turkey, and so on. In some localities along the Iraq-Iran border, this boundary line divides one single Kurdish village into two parts. Half belongs to Iraq and the other half is a part of Iran. In such a case one family are considered to be Iraqi citizens, while their next door neighbor, close relatives, are Iranian subjects. The Kurds describe the present map of the Middle East as "the cross word puzzle of the devil", an out-moded colonial map drawn after the first world war. Indeed, the Kurds are justified in demanding that the present map of the Middle East be changed.

Metal demarcation signs are numbered and affixed on the high places such as the top of the hills or on the crest of the mountain chains to indicate the dividing border line as shown on the map. Police posts are built at intervals along these borders at a cross road or in a high place to watch over the frontier. However, in case of a Kurdish uprising these security posts are easily overrun and are occupied by the Kurds and serve as good sources of arms. Each one of these four governments of the Middle East has a special force on duty called "Frontier Guards" to maintain order along the border. As a matter of fact, the four governments of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have an identical border policy; they all co-operate to preserve the status quo along their frontier to prevent any Kurdish movement across their respective



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Ethnographical boundaries
of Kurdistan

The map as drawn the
Kurdish study centre in
Paris in 1948

borders.

We are in possession of abundant materials and maps (old and new) to be able to draw the Kurdish ethnic demarcation line accurately. In the following, we present the point of view of about half a dozen authorities from different sources such as Russian, British, French and Arabic, who have drawn the Kurdish ethnic boundaries.

1. *British Sources:*

From British sources we present two authorities who have drawn the Kurdish ethnic boundaries. They are Colonel Carr and Colonel Elphinstone.

In an article "The Kurdistan Mountain Ranges' Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Carr describes the general features of Kurdistan as follows:

"The great mountain system, extending in almost unbroken continuity from Iskanderun on the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, has (hitherto) perhaps derived its chief interest in modern times from its bounding to the North, the rich plains of Mesopotamia, and from supplying the sources of that great river, the River Euphrates.


"It seems now destined, within the lifetime of the present generation, to attract the notice, both of the statesman and of the soldier, from its position between the tides of Russian advance and the waning power of Turkey.

"I trust that the reference here given may perhaps assist some of my readers to study for themselves the physical geography of a country likely to play an important part in the history of the East. It is one of the most favored districts of Asia, the reported cradle of the human race, unrivalled in fertility of soil and salubrity of climate by any part of the world."⁵

Colonel W. G. Elohineson, Chief of British Military Intelligence during the second world war, draws the ethnic boundaries of Kurdistan as follows:

"Kurdistan, the country of Kurds, may be described as resembling the arc stretching from Luristan in the south-east to Malatia in the west. This area is bounded in the north by a line which runs approximately through Erivan, Erzurum, Erzinjan, Malatia and Marash. On the south and west, the boundary is drawn along the southern fringe of the Turkish foothills to the Tigris and then through the Jebel Hamrin to the neighborhood of Khaniqin. The eastern limit lies in Persia and running in a south-easterly direction from Everan includes the districts of Urmia (Rezaiah), Sauj Bulaq, Saqqiz, Sinneh, and Kermanshah. South-east of the highroad from Khaniqin to Ker-

⁵Colonel Ralph Carr, *Kurdistan Mountain Ranges*, considered incurrence to Russian advance on the Tigras Valley, compiled in 1877, Journal Royal United Service Institute, Vol. 22, p. 166.



no 5

Ethnographical MAP DRAWN BY
Colonel Elphiniston, 1947

manshah, live the Lakks (Lakhs) and Lurs, who are sometimes classified as Kurds".⁶

2. *Russian Sources:*

From Russian sources, we present the view of a well known scholars Valadimir Minorsky who has made valuable contributions to the study of Kurdish history. Under the title "Homeland of the Kurds and Geography of the Country" he writes as follows:

"In order to define the geography of that part of Asia, or which we now make a study we must remember two familiar things. They are Mount Ararat and the Iskandarun Gulf.

"To the south of Ararat, at a distance of more than 2000 Farsakhs⁷, there extend mountain chains which unite one with the other in a straight line from north to south, and then form many chains that bend to the south-east until they reach the Persian Gulf.

"Thus we see the Kurds live at the present time in an extensive land along the borders of Turkey and Faris (Persia), from the city of Mandali (East of Baghdad) to Mount Ararat, where their land crosses our border and enters the transcaucasus. The Kurds live with Armenians in all parts of the Armenian mountain chains.

"Their northern border ends in Turkey alongside Erzurum. In the south the Kurds occupy extensive areas to the edge of the plain of Mesopotamia. In the west, their border is the Euphrates or to be more precise the (River) Qara Su. They extend to the depths of Asis Minor. They occupy areas not only south-east of Sivas but separate groups of them exist almost as far as Qonia in Klekia and in this way they reach the Mediterranean Sea".⁸

3. *French Sources:*

The information from French sources is illustrative and important. The French have no territorial ambition, economic and political interest in Kurdistan. Generally, the French authors are free, objective, and truthful. They do not twist their findings and facts to serve their national interest. In the following, we present the point of view of three French authors who have

⁶Colonel, W. G. Elphiniston, The Kundish Question, International Affair, p. 92.

⁷Farsakh is equal to one kilometer.

⁸Vladimir Minorsky, Homeland of the Kurds and Geography of their country, Arabic Language, p. 14.

drawn the geographical boundaries of Kurdisan: Madame Blau, Bois, and Rambout.

Madame Joyce Blau in her book "Le Probleme Kurde" states the following: "Kurdistan, the country of the Kurds, is a vast mountainous region located in the heart of Asia Minor. It has an area of 530,000 Km². It commences in the form of a crescent from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Persian Gulf.

In the north it is located between the mountain chain of Pontique and the plain of the Caucasus. It is bound by the Iranian Plateau, Tabriz, and Hamadan in the east and by Mesopotamia in the south and west."

Monseur Thomas Bois describes Kurdistan and draws its ethnic boundaries as follows:

"KURDISTAN"

"A land without frontiers, Kurdistan is, it goes without saying, that country inhabited by the Kurds. This name, in the course of centuries, has been given to those areas, more or less extensive, which have altered from epoch to epoch. Today, officially, it no longer figures on maps printed in Turkey, although it did appear during the time of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand the map indicates in Iran a Kurdish western province which is far from containing all the Kurds, even those of Iran.

"Kurdistan forms the backbone of the Middle East. Situated in the heart of Asia Minor, it occupies the greater part of that mountainous region which extends between the Black Sea and the steppes of Mesopotamia on one side, and the Anti-Taurus range and the Iranian plateau, on the other. Its territory, which has the shape of a sickle or crescent, according to one's imaginative taste, is nearly as large as France and forms large parts of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Despite this, its inhabitants are clearly distinguished by race, language and history from the Turks, Persians and Arabs."

"Geographical Kurdistan"

"The Taurus and Zagros mountain ranges form, so to speak, the spinal column of this country, which is situated at a considerable elevation above the surrounding countries. Some mountain peaks, however, tower over the regions which surround them. The great Mount Ararat, on which it is supposed Noah's Ark came to rest, is more than 16,200 feet high. Mount Judi, which claims the same honour, reaches a height of more than 6500 feet;

⁹Madamme Joyce Blau, *Le Probleme Kurde*, Buxell, 1963, p. 5.

Nemrud Dagh, a height of 10,400 feet and Sipan, frequently mentioned in song, rises to almost 11,330 feet, in Iraq, Pira Magrun has a height of 9,200 feet, The summits are snow-covered for a great part of the year. It is in mid-Kurdistan that the two Biblical rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, have their source. Their many tributaries, the Murad Su, the Khabur, the two Zabs, and the Diala follow difficult courses through the mountains over rocks and through precipitous gorges, thus contributing to the beauty of the landscape. But they also water some very fertile valleys. These are to be found mainly in the loops of the Euphrates, as, for example, the plain of Urfa and of Tigris, the regions of Diar and of Jezireh, the very rich and fertile valley of Mush, and the valleys of the two Zabs around Arbil and Kirkuk."¹⁰

Monseur Lucien Rambout draws the ethnic boundaries of Kurdistan, which he describes:

"Geography of Kurdistan"

"I have under my eyes the ethnographical map of Kurdistan which is based on more serious work, the newest of which states that the country extends from the Mediterranean Sea on one side to the Persian Gulf and Eastern Khuzistan on the other, with an area of 530,000 square kilometers.

"Kurdistan forms the backbone of the Middle East situated in the heart of Asia Minor. It occupies the greater part of that mountainous region which extends between the Black Sea and the steppe of Mesopotamia on one side, and the anti-Taurus range and the Iranian plateau on the other.

"In the west a line is drawn from Kurd Dagh (Syria) and runs in a northern direction passing by the north of the regions of Killis, March, Albistan, and Divirik and extends to the river Kilkit.

"In the north a line follows the river Kilkit and reaches Kars from where it passes east of the towns of Beybourt and Olty."

"In the east, a line is drawn from Kars and goes a south-eastern direction and passes along the western shore of Urmia and extends down to Luristan, Bakhtiari, Sinna, and Kirmanshah.

"In the south the Kurdistan frontier starts in Luristan and runs in a north-western direction to Khaniqin, close to Kifri, and along Hamrin mountain to reach the west and southwest of Jebal Sinjar, and then to the Euphrates, where near Jerabulus the line goes to south of Kurddagh from where it extends and comes quite close to the Mediterranean sea, north of Alexandretta."¹¹

¹⁰Thomas Bois, *The Kurds*, English edition, Khayat Press, Beirut, 1956, pp. 1-3.

¹¹Lucien Rambout, *Les Kurds Et Le Droit*, edit Le Cerf, Paris, 1947, pp. 11-13.

Arabic Sources:

The Kurds' ethnic boundaries with the Arabs can be accurately traced. There is a natural demarcation line separating Kurdish highlands from the semi-desert lowland inhabited by the Arabs. The Kurds share about 2,000 kilometers of border with the Arabs, commencing from the Persian Gulf and extending to the Mediterranean Sea. Along their long frontier the Arab tribes have in some places, crossed beyond the Kurdish ethnic line and have established enclaves and communities on the Kurdish land. To establish the ethnic demarcation line between Kurds and Arabs we are presenting the views of three Arab authorities who have drawn the Kurdish ethnic line. They are Abdul Razaq Al-Hassani, Faiq Al-Samarai, and Professor Shakir Khasbak.

The historian Abdul Razaq Al-Hassani, in his book "Iraq-Ancient and Modern", defines the ethnic line between Kurds and Arabs as follows:

"The Kurds inhabit cities and villages beginning from the Iran-Iraq border, then by a straight line along Jebal Hamrin to Jebal Sinjar, until it connects with the Iraq-Syrian border."¹²

Faiq Al-Samarai was the head of the Istiqlal party and a well known Arab nationalist leader in Iraq. When he was a political refugee in Cairo, during the Qasim regime (1958-1963), he was requested by the Arab nationalist movement to study the Kurdish problem and report his findings. In his report he defines the geographical boundaries of Kurdistan as follows:

"Kurdistan means in its broadest sense the country inhabited by the Kurds as a uniform homogeneous group of people. This country is divided between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, with some extension in the Soviet Union and Syria.

"In the north the border runs approximately through Erevan, Erzurum, Erzinjan in the form of an arc that embraces marash and overhang aleppo.

"In the south-west it runs alongside the slopes of the hills until the Tigris. After this, east of this river, downward and then it bends northward with the line of Jebal Hamrin until Mendali on the Iraqi-Iranian border."¹³

Professor Shakir Khasbak, an Arab from Baghdad, has written a number of books, two of which are directly related to our subject: Al-Akrad, (The Ethnogeographical Study and, The Kurds and The Kurdish Question. In his Ethnographical study, he discusses the meaning of the term Kurdistan and draws its general outline by stating:

" . . . According to Sharaf Khan Al-Bidlesi, who in his book, Sharaf Nama, states that Kurdistan begins at the shore of Hormuz (or the Persian Gulf that reaches the Indian Ocean), extending in a straight line until Malatia (a city

¹² Abdul Razaq Al-Hassani, IRAQ-ancient and modern, Sayda Press, 1948, pp. 33, 34.

¹³ Ahmed Fawzi, Qassim and the Kurds, Dager and the mountain, Press unknown, 1961, p. 21.

in the vilayet of Kharbout in the Kurdistan of Turkey), then to Marash (a city north of Aleppo), and extends north of this line to include the vilayets of Kars, Iraqi Ajami, Azerbaijan, Minor or Greater Armenia, the vilayet of Adana-Klekia and Erivan (Sharaf Nama p. 20-21).

“A fairly large number of Kurds are distributed outside of the Kurdistan borders, as we mentioned above, or outside of the border of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; especially in Syria and in the Soviet Union (in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and other provinces). There are Kurdish colonies located outside of the real Kurdistan of Turkey (especially near Qonia and Klekia), and also outside of Iranian Kurdistan (especially in Mazindaran, near Kilon Abdo, and around Kazvin). This phenomenon is explained by the exile policy which was followed by the Shahs of Fars with the Kurds (especially by Shah Abas Al-Safawi I and then by Nadir Shah). It is also explained by the policy of the Ottoman Sultans, especially Sulaiman Al-Qanoni.

“On the other hand, there are large minorities who live among Kurds in the real Kurdistan, especially Armenians who occupy that part which is located north of the 38th latitude, and the Assyrians who live in the Hakkari mountains (Hakkari) and in Urmia.”

“Therefore, we can say that the Kurds in Turkey at the present time represent the absolute majority in the wilayets of Erzurum, Sivas, Kars, Akri, Van, Mush, Sorat, Diarbakir, Mardin, Arafa, and Alaziz (Nikitine, pp. 38-39).

“In Iran they occupy completely the vilayets of Kermanshah and Ardalen and parts of the vilayet of Azerbaijan. And the Lurs occupy the region of Luristan. In Iraq the Kurds concentrate in the four northern provinces of Sulaimania, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (The new Province of Dihok), and also in the Khaniqin area of the Diyala province. The Sulaimania province is purely a Kurdish province as is Arbil province except for an Arab tribe of Tai which inhabits the district of *Kuer* or the Turkoman of Arbil. In the two provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul almost half of the population are Kurds. The Kurds of Lurs also spread in the provinces of Amara and Kuot. A large number of Kurds live in the cities of Baghdad, Basra, and other cities. The Kurds are also found outside the three countries mentioned within the borders of the Soviet Union, especially in Armenia (Erevan) in Ardahan, in Kaghisman, around Kars, in Zangezur, and Jifanher). In Syria, the Kurds especially concentrate in the vilayet of Aleppo (in the Kurd Dagh region), and in the province of Der Zur, in the region of Jarblus. There are other Kurdish tribes who are distributed in Afghanistan, Balujistan, and Pakistan.”¹⁴

In his book, “The Kurds and Kurdish question”, Professor Khasbak defines the geographical boundaries of Kurdistan as follows:

¹⁴Professor Shakir Khashak, *The Kurds-Ethnogeographical Study*, exact translation from Arabic, Shafiq Press, Baghdad, 1972, pp. 516-520.

"In the north, the border follows roughly the line which runs through Erivan, Erzurum, and Erzinjan.

In the southwest it runs along the foothills as far as the Tigris, then along Jebal Hamrin to a point on the Iraq-Persia frontier near Mendali.

In the east, in Persia, the limit of the Kurds runs in a south-easterly direction from Erivan so as to include the districts of Maku, part of Khoi, Rizaiya (Urmia), Mahabad (Sauj Bulaq), Saqiz and Sinna to Kermanshah.

"If we consider Lurs to be Kurds as is proven by much historical and linguistic evidence then the boundaries of Kurdistan extend alongside the Zagros mountains until the Persian Gulf."¹⁵

Institut kurde de Paris

¹⁵Professor Shakir Khasbak, *The Kurds and the Kurdish question*, first Arabic edition, Rabitta Press, Baghdad, 1959, p. 20.

Natural Resources of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is considered to be one of the richest countries in the Middle East. Nature has endowed the Kurdish homeland with all the elements necessary for prosperity and progress. Among the parallel chains of Kurdish highlands lie numerous broad and productive valleys. There are a number of undulating fertile plains which depend on rain for cultivation.

In Kurdistan, there are two vast grain belts for the production of grain and cereal which depend solely on rain for cultivation. The western grain belt alone is about twice the size of England. An excellent pastureland and grazing ground exists for raising flocks of goats, sheep and cattle.

In Kurdistan lie the water sources of the most important rivers of the Middle East, such as the Euphrates, Tigris, Lesser Zab, Greater Zab, Diyala river, Safid Rouge, Karkha, and the head waters of the dizful river.

In the Kurdish highlands lie many important mineral ores and huge reserves of oil. In addition, nature has endowed Kurdistan with a good climate and sufficient amounts of annual rainfall for agricultural production and permanent pasture.

Kurdistan has Medeterranian climate. It has four different seasons, summer, autumn, winter and spring. The rainy seasons begins in mid-October and continues until mid-June. The summer is dry and hot. The weather begins to cool off in the early part of November and the temperature gradually falls as days pass. The weather in the winter is severe and snow falls heavily which slows down communications during the winter season. The rain is heavy during the winter and spring seasons. beginning March 21st, which is the first day of spring, the whole highland becomes green and springs to life again after a long cold winter. Every district has its own watersheds—numerous dashing rivers and streams that run in the valleys parallel to the ridges and by the time they cut their way through mountain ridges they became formidable rivers gush out from the sides of the mountains and valleys. Everywhere natural springs are found. This fact explains why Kurdish villages are so scattered about because they are established near these widely spread fountains. In the dry region of the Middle East, Kurdistan has a tremendous quantity of water resources.

In terms of economic resources, nature has endowed Kurdistan with most of those economic resources which are essential for prosperity and progress.

Kurdish society is basically a grarian. Its economy is based mainly on agriculture and animal husbandary. It should be observed that the Kurdistan highland is the natural habitat for grain and cereal. They are still grown naturally on the hill sides and slopes of the mountains.

In Kurdistan, there are two important grain belts:

1. The western grain belt which starts from Mus in southwest Turkey and extends in a southeasterly direction until Mandali. This grain belt covers the provinces of Mus, Mardin, Diyarbakir in Turkey, Jazira region in Syria, Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and the provinces in Iraq. The famous valley of Shahrazoor in the Sulaimania Province, and the two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali in the province of Diyala.
2. The Eastern grain belt which extends from Aras river in the north to the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf in the south. This grain belt includes many fertile plains such as Urmia, Bana, Sina, Marywan, and Zahaw. Both of these two grain belts depend on rain for cultivation.

Prior to the present political turmoil in the Middle East Iraq was exporting large quantities of grain and cereal grown in Kurdistan. Iraq exported one million tons of barley annually to Europe. About two million tons of wheat and cereal were sold annually to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Central Europe.

Summer crops such as rice, corn, cotton, beets and sugar beets are produced in large quantities by means of irrigation. Kurdish tobacco, considered to be of a good quality, is sold throughout the Middle East or delivered to cigarette factories. There are one cigarette factory in Sulaimania, one in Mosul and two in Baghdad, which consume tabacco cultivated in Kurdistan in Iraq.

Animal husbandary is one of the important sources of income in Kurdistan. Thanks to suitable climate and sufficient amounts of rainfall, extensive pasture and excellent grazing ground exist throughout Kurdistan. The Kurdish nomads who formed 30% of the Kurdish population before they dispersed after 1921 were engaged solely in raising flocks of sheep, goats, cattle, horses and mules. Frederick Milligan speaks about tremendous Kurdish animal resources. He states that in the district of Wan, there were, in 1890, an estimated 3 million sheep and goats (Frederick Milligan, *Wild Life Among the Kurds*, p. 152).

The sedentary tribes and settled agrarian communities combine agriculture with animal husbandry. Every single village has a flock of sheep and goats and a herd of cattle which graze separately.

Every year in late October, when weather becomes cooler, flocks of sheep

and goats and herds of cattle were driven to Baghdad and Mosul where they were distributed to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Central Europe. Merchants used to roam Kurdistan buying wool, goat hair, hides, fat, and cheese. The Kurdish cheese was valued for its good quality.

Poultry such as chicken, Turkey, Goose and Duck are part of every household in the country and with eggs, they constitute articles of Internal trade. Fruit and vegetables are produced in large quantity as well. Traditionally, the Kurds are very fond of orchards. The Kurdish ideal house is one surrounded with orchards. All families who own land in the country built their own orchards. Good qualities of apples, pears, peaches, and grapes were produced in large quantities. The grapes are grown on the hillsides, mountain slopes and in the valleys. Kurdistan is considered to be the natural habitate for grapes.

Important economic vegetables such as melons, water, melons, cucumbers and pumpkins are produced in large quantities. Because of the close proximity of Kurdistan to the European market, fruits, vegetables, and grapes could bring a big revenue to the country. A special freight train could take fresh fruits and vegetables from Kurdistan to Berlin, Amsterdam, and London in a matter of days.

In the past, extensive areas in Kurdistan were covered with forest. The forest of Southern Kurdistan are filled with oak trees while the northern forests are a mixture of pine and oak. Because of years of ruthless cutting and waste, thick forest now exists on the rugged mountain slopes and inaccessible valleys. Woodland covers most of the mountainous and hilly countryside. Generally speaking, the Kurds have self-sufficiency in timber and the potentiality exists for expansion of forestry and the industry connected with forestry.

The conclusion that follows is Kurdisan even at its present state of underdevelopment, products a large quantity of surplus of grain and cereal, animal products such as meat, wool, cheese, and hide. The potentiality is great for improvement and expansion. With the application of modern technology, Kurdistan may become an important source of food-supply, animal poroducts, fruits, vegetables to Germany, England, and Sweden.

Mineral Resources and Oil

Kurdistan is considered to be rich in mineral resources. In the foot of numerous ridges and broad belt of hills, a number of important mineral resources are reported. Deposits of iron and coal exist over a fairly large area. Copeer is reported in Shamdinan, Hawraman, and Karadagh districts. Lead occur in the neighborhood of Akra, Amadia, and in the valley of Great Zab. Isbists and Magnisium are found in Barzinja district. Zinc and tin are

found along Karadagh range. Uranium ore is found in the hilly district of Khanaqin, in the Qasni shereen on the Iranian side of the border, and in Luristan.

Silver and gold ores have been reported in the headwater district of Khabour, in the Sinjar district, and in Zakho. Gypsum abounds in many localities.

Oil Resources of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is extremely rich in oil. The only oil field in Turkey is located in the district of Van. In Iran, oil is extracted near the Kurdish city of Kirmanshah. In Kurdistan, in Iraq, oil is extracted from four oil fields: Ain zala, Kirkuk, Zanboor, and Khaniqin. These four oil fields are only a small fraction of the extensive oil belts still not exploited.

Thorough geological examination and testing by modern methods indicates that Kurdistan is standing on an ocean of oil. In the following, we are going to locate the places where oil is known to exist but not extracted yet:

1. *Khaniqin*—Mandali district. This oil belt is located on the left bank of Diyala river and starts from where Diyala cut through Darbandi Khan Dam and extends in the form of a arc for 40 miles until the town of Mandali. This oil belt is considered one of the richest in the world. In early 1950, an unknown party dug two wells in the Qorato county, but no further exploitation was made.
2. *Sangaw Plain*—This undulating plain belongs to the Kirkuk Province and is located on the southern side of the Karadagh range. Around the village of Dalo, sulphate springs out from the ground. On the other side of the Karadagh range oil comes out mixed with water which dashes down through the deep gorge cut from the mountain.
3. *Chamchamal Town*—In the low depression west of Chamchamal—some 25 kilometers east of the famous Kirkuk oil field—there is a promising oil belt. In ancient time, this oil seems to have been active because bitumen were collected from it and was used to cover baskets and trays with it.
4. *Showan Districts*—About 20 kilometers north of Kirkuk city and 10 kilometers west of Aghjalar municipality, sulphat comes out of the ground and you can smell oil all around you.
5. *In the Arbil Province*—Taq Taq belt: An oil belt is located in the area around Taq Taq, which is on the lesser Zab, where


the Arbil-Kirkuk road crosses lesser Zab. North and South of Taq Taq oil mixes with lesser Zab water.

6. An oil belt is located a short distance west of the Koy Sinjaq town.
7. *Oil belt west of Erbil City.* In 332 B.C., when Alexander the Great defeated the Shah of Iran in a fierce battle west of Arbil city, people celebrated his victory by making torches from the oil coming out from the pits in the ground west of Erbil city.
8. *Kandinawa district in Dizayee Plain.* In 1986, an extensive oil belt was discovered in the Okinawa district. The Iraqi government forcibly evacuated all the villagers in the area as a preliminary measure for oil exploitation.
9. In the foot of the Shaqlaw chain, an oil belt exists.

Sulaimania Province:

10. *Nawti oil belt.* In the Karadagh district, there is a village called Nawti—which means in Kurdish language “the place of oil”. Until the early part of the 17th century, people used to collect oil from pits in the Nawti village and used it for light.
11. *Halabja oil belt.* In the vicinity of Halabja town there is an extensive oil belt. Just east of Halabja lies a rugged hilly area. Among these hills, few deep and narrow valleys are found where sulphat mixed with oil creeps down into the valley.

It must be remembered that on March 17, 1988, the Iraqi warplane bombarded the beautiful town of Halabja with chemical bombs, killing 5,000 innocent people on the spot. Since then, Halabjas inhabitants and the rural areas around it have been forcibly evacuated into an area called Arbat, some 25 kilometers west of Halabja, where they are refugees and are forbidden to go back to their villages.



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Oil Map—Of the Southern Kurdistan in Iraq.

Four operating oil fields of Ain Zala, Kirkuk, Khaniqin, and Zanboor. 1-14 Shows the location of known oil belts.

The Area of Kurdistan

No special survey for Kurdistan has ever taken place. Surveying and using statistical data in the Middle Eastern countries are recent innovations. Whatever surveyings were done for the Kurdish areas were carried out as parts of the states among whom Kurdistan is divided. Generally these states refrain from making estimates for their respective Kurdish areas. The figures they assign are the bare minimum with the obvious intention of showing that the Kurds inhabit a tiny portion of the country, a little areas, and that the Kurdish occupied territories are small and insignificant.

In the localities and sub-districts where a few non-Kurdish settlers and villages exist the whole region is considered to be mixed. In towns such as Mendeli, Khaniqin, Kifri, Sinjar and Talafar non-Kurdish quarters exist, while outside the towns the whole district is occupied by the Kurds. Despite this fact, the whole district is disputed. The city of Kirkuk has a mixed population of Kurds, Turkomans, and Arabs. The Arabs have also settled adjacent to Mesopotamia's desert steppe and were brought in to settle in the recently completed irrigation project of Hawija.

Thirty five years ago the percentage of Arabs in the Kirkuk province was four percent. Now it is ten percent, at the present time the whole province of Kirkuk, where Kurds form the majority and have been living for 45 centuries, is considered to be disputed area. The government of Iraq has changed the name of the Kirkuk province into TAAMEEN (Nationalisation) it has reshuffled and redistributed the districts with the intention of changing the province ethnically into Arab and thus to grab the vast oil fields and the grain lands of the province.

The city of Mosul is the administrative center of the Mosul province. It is located on the southern edge of the province. The inhabitants of the city are Arab-speaking people, half Christian and half is Moslem. The Kurds form an insignificant minority in the city. Throughout the province the Arab majority exists in the city of Mosul only. In the whole area outside the city the Kurds form 90% of the population and occupy 95% of the areas of the province.

Kurdistan is a vast country. It has an area of more than half of million square kilometers. Excluding the land-mass countries, such as Soviet Union, U.S.A., Canada, Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Australia, Indonesia, Iran and Arabian desert countries of Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Algeria,

Kurdistan is considered to be among the large countries of the world. The area of Kurdistan is larger than the total area of seven Arab countries, of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates combined their areas totals 409,107 square kilometers.¹⁶ "The area of Kurdistan is also larger than the total area of Great Britain, Ireland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland combined which is 446.116 square kilometers."¹⁷

The neutral European source put forward realistic assessments for the area of Kurdistan.

The minority rights group, in its report No. 33, first published in February, 1975, under the title "Where is Kurdistan?" estimates the area of Kurdistan to be 500,000 square Kilometers. In the following we quote from that report.

"There is no independent state known as Kurdistan. It is a "geographical expression", but even this is used in two different ways. On most maps of the Middle East Kurdistan is marked as a mountainous region stretching from south-east Turkey across the northern—most areas of Iraq into Iran's mid-western region. But this covers less than half the area which Kurdish sources claim as their Kurdistan. This land stretches from the Taurus mountains in the west to the Iranian plateau in the East, and from Mount Ararat in the north to the plain of Mesopotamia in the south. In addition it spills over into Soviet Armenia and Azarbiaijan. This area totals some 500,000 square kilometers—as large as France."¹⁸

Monsieur Thomas Bois describes the area of Kurdistan to be "nearly as large as France" or having the area of 547,026 sq. km.¹⁹

Monsieur Lucin Rambout estimates the area of Kurdistan to be 530,000 sq km.²⁰

Madame Joyce Blau states that the area of Kurdistan is 530,000 sq. km.²¹

Kurdish sources estimate the area of Kurdistan to be 550,000 square

¹⁶Syria is 185,175 square kilometers, Jordan 94,740 sq. km., Lebanon 10,170 sq. km., Palestine 20,700 sq. km., Kuwait, 17,920 sq. km., Bahrein 622 sq. km. and United Arab Emirates 80,150 sq. km.

¹⁷Dr. Abdul Rahmar Quasimlo, *ibid.*, p. 5. I have added to this list Ireland. The area of Great Britain is 244,000 sq. km., Ireland 70,287 sq. km. Holland 40,844 sq. km. Belgium 30,513 sq. km., Denmark 43,069 sq. km., and Switzerland 7,364 sq. km., the total is 446.116 sq. km.

¹⁸Minority Rights group, by Martin Short and Anthony McDermot, Report No. 23, printed in England by Expedite Multiprint Ltd., London, 1973, p. 5.

¹⁹Thomas Bois, *The Kurds*, translated from French by Professor M.W.M. Welland, Khayat Press, Beirut, 1956, p. 1.

²⁰Luoiien Rambout, *Les Kurdes et Le Droit*, Paris, 1947, p. 12.

²¹Madame Joyce Blau, *Le Problème Kurde—Essai sociologique et historique*. Publication du Centre pour l'étude des problèmes du monde Musulman contemporain, Bruxelles, 1963, p. 5.

kilometers. They state that their figure has been arrived at by adding the total areas of all localities, subdistricts, districts, and provinces that are inhabited by the Kurds and traditionally are parts of the Kurds' homeland within five states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union. They assert that this figure is distributed among these five states as follows: Turkey—225.000 sq. km; Iran 200.000 sq. km; Iraq 100.000 sq. km; Syria—20.000 sq. km; Soviet Union 5.000 sq. km. = total 550.000 sq. km.²²

TABLE 1

Shows the areas of the Kurdish land within each of the five states and their percentages to the total area of Kurdistan. (Compiled from Kurdish sources).

<i>COUNTRY</i>	<i>AREAS OF KURDISH LAND IN SQ. K</i>	<i>PERCENTAGE OF EACH PART TO THE TOTAL AREA OF KURDISTAN</i>	<i>POPULATION IN MILLIONS</i>
Turkey	225,000	41%	12
Iran	200,000	36.4%	-7
Iraq	100,000	18%	-4
Syria	20,000	3.6%	-1
Soviet Union	-5,000	1%	1,150,000
TOTAL	550,000	200%	25,150,000

²²Emir Ali Bedir Khan, Bulletin mensuel du Centre d'Etudes Kurdes, Paris, 1950, No. 13, p. 1.

Trends in the Dynamics of the Geopolitical Environment of Kurdistan after Worldwar II

By Omar Sheikmous, BA, MA

Any study concerned with this vital and important phase of Kurdish history, because of the radical social, economic, political, and cultural changes that have taken place, ever since, should concentrate its analysis on three different levels. Namely:

1. The role and position of the super-powers (USA & USSR);
2. The role and position of the states that embody parts of Kurdistan (and other important actors in the area);
3. The developments that have taken place inside Kurdish society (in all parts of Kurdistan) and the Kurdish liberation movement (organisational, political, ideological, and struggle methods).

This specific period of human history and societal development has been characterised as the age of decolonisation, comprehensive and speedy technological advances, an informational revolution, and implementation of the welfare state. No doubt, these universal developments have had an effect on Kurdish society (both direct and indirect).

A. Among the most salient changes that have occurred, in Kurdish society, one can mention:

1. A considerable degree of *mechanisation of agriculture*, since the 1950's, that has led to an unprecedented level of *urbanisation*, with all its characteristics of uprooting, weakening (if not Break-up) of family and kinship ties, decreasing the influence and power-base of the traditional leaders (tribal chief, Sheikh, and Agha), changes in gender roles (with more women becoming active in the labour and educational markets. Hence, gaining greater economic independence), slumming and proletarianisation, and other changes in the earlier traditional and patriarchal cultural patterns.
2. *The educational revolution* in Kurdistan. Particularly, in Ira-

nian, Iraqi, and Syrian Kurdistan. Where, even, the most remote mountain village might have a school (for girls and boys). Although, education might not be in the Kurdish language (except for Iraq). A development that has had wide-ranging consequences in reducing illiteracy. The same process has taken place in Turkish Kurdistan, too, but with less vigour and extent. One should not forget, here, the exceptional measures applied, by the central governments, in closure of schools and other learning institutions, in times of civil war (between the Kurdish resistance movement and the respective central government) and include its negative effects on this process. At the same time, one should not neglect the efforts (though rudimentary and on a modest scale) of the Kurdish resistance movements in Iran and Iraq, in balancing these negative effects, by opening their own schools and initiating their own literacy programmes, in the liberated areas.

The existence of universities, technical colleges and institutes (either in Kurdistan proper or in its immediate vicinity) e.g. Sulaimania, Arbil, Mosul (in Iraq); Diyarbekir and Erzerum (in Turkey); Urumieh, Sanandaj, and Kermanshah (in Iran); and Aleppo, Deir El-Zor, and Hasakah (in Syria) has given rise to a wide expansion of competent educated cadres (of both sexes) that can manage the many-faceted functions of Kurdish society, in the event of the establishment of a united independent Kurdish nation-state, a federal administration, or an autonomous and self-governing local administration.

This state of affairs contrasts sharply with earlier periods of Kurdish history. It might not be an exaggeration, even, to state: that, in the whole, in some parts of Kurdistan, they might own greater competence, in relation to the majority nation of their common states.

Another indication, of this educational explosion, is the large increase in the number of Kurdish academics studying overseas (Europe and the American continent). While, in the middle of the 1950's, their number could hardly exceed twenty students, they can be counted in tens of thousands, in 1986—this is excluding workers and non-academic refugees.

This academic exodus, overseas, has had profound effects on the Kurdish movement at-large. Through freedom of action, thought, organisation, and publication contact is established, among the Kurds, over the boundaries of the dividing states, and grounds are laid-down for current and future common action. Kurdish literary, political, cultural, and linguistic studies and works are carried-out, on a wide-scale, without fear of persecution and suppression. Various political and cultural activities mobilise the public opinion (mass, institutional, and media) of these countries, in favour of the Kurdish

cause. And, finally, contact is established with representatives of other liberation movements, in other parts of the world, that lead to a rich exchange of experiences.

One of the most important facets, of this educational revolution, is the impetus it gives to the Kurdish liberation movement, in increasing its capability, in mobilising larger numbers into its ranks, broaden its base of mass support, and achieve better standards of organisational forms.

Contrary to the expectations and plans, of the central governments, by opening schools (especially in Turkey) in their drive for assimilation and centrally-directed forced "integration", it led to greater Kurdish national consciousness and active politicization of Kurdish youth.

3. *The informational revolution* that has taken place, in the world at-large, since the 1960's, has had its clear effects on the most isolated corner of Kurdistan. Even a shepherd of a peasant, in the most rugged mountain areas can hardly do without his transistor radio and mini-cassette player. Any small town not only receives the television station of its national state, but also that of three (or at least two) of the neighbouring states. Various video cassettes can be purchased from the most isolated border markets. Radio broadcasts can be received from the most distant areas of the world (even in the Kurdish language. Especially from Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union. Apart from the 8-10 underground Kurdish radio broadcasts, by the different resistance movements in Iraq and Iran. In 1957, a Kurdish broadcast was established by Radio Cairo, but was terminated in the second half of the 1960's).

Newspapers, periodicals, booklets, and books are published, in the Kurdish language (apart from that of the majority nations) in thousands every year. A considerable amount of this flood of publications reaches even the smallest town of Kurdistan. Only, as in the 1950's, the number of Kurdish publications (newspapers, periodicals, and books) could hardly exceed ten per annum (in all parts of Kurdistan) but reach into thousands per annum, in 1986. This development has taken place despite the policies of cultural oppression practiced by the central governments of the states dividing Kurdistan. Here, the Kurdish resistance movements in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, as well as the Kurds of the diaspora (Europe, America, Australia and Lebanon) have played an important role. Curiously, Syrian Kurdistan lags behind in this development despite its high rate of literacy and sufficient intellectual cadres. This might be explained by the wide-scale political divisions in a small numerous population.

The overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, in 1958; the repeated peace agreements between the Kurdish resistance movement and the Iraqi government in 1963, 1964, 1966-1968, 1970-1974, 1984; the overthrow of the Shah regime in 1979, and the cease-fire agreement upto April-180 in Iran; as well as the relative democratic conditions in Turkey between 1975-1980, created favourable conditions for such a development.

It might be, in place, to mention two off-shots of this informational process. One is the extension of telephone lines to even the smaller towns in Kurdistan, where people keep in closer contact and exchange information about many spheres of life, to friends and relatives, in as far places as Sweden, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The other is the increase in the number of Kurdish plays, folklore, and music and theatre groups, who perform in many parts of Kurdistan, or through the dissemination of video and music cassettes.

4. *Land Reform* legislation, in the 1950's and 1960's, in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey although, sometimes, half-hearted and coloured by many derogations in the Kurdish areas, still led to radical changes, in the ownership relations of cultivated land. Large numbers of landless peasants received their own lots, got financial and administrative support (through agricultural and development banks and other financial institutions) received or were helped to acquire fertilizers, machinery, water-pumps, build irrigation systems, and guidance.

Despite some misconducts and deliberate government activity, in favour of some of their loyal landlords, these reforms had deep effects on the social structure in Kurdistan, in favour of the peasantry and to the dis-advantage of the traditional centres of authority and ownership in the Kurdish countryside.

These developments, together with the active intervention of the political organisations, gave rise to a more organised and better articulated peasant movement in Kurdistan, in the form of peasant associations and unions.

5. The *OIL Industries* in Kermanshah (Iranian Kurdistan); In Kirkuk, Khaneqin, Ain-Zaleh, and KOIYE (Iraqi Kurdistan); In Rumeilan and Qara Chokh (Syrian Kurdistan); and Batman (Turkish Kurdistan), together with the light industries for the production of sugar, tobacco, cement, carpets, leather, poultry, and construction works (roads, dams, housing, irrigation systems, and railway networks) and the mechanisation of agriculture, for whatever purposes, and though minimal

in comparison with the development projects and industrialisation plans carried-out in the areas of the majority nations, still have led to a not-so-little degree of proletarianisation in Kurdistan, with its apparent consequences of working class trade unions, marxist and socialist parties and organisation (though on a small scale, but still sufficiently felt and articulated).

6. Some of the effects of the *technological advances*, on Kurdish society, have been mentioned above (in communications, information, and mechanisation). Other technical advances have reached and influenced the daily life, in many areas of Kurdistan e.g. electrification, use of gas cookers and gas lights. Even, some of the negative aspects of advanced technological societies have made their entrance into Kurdistan, like: the plastic products, consumerism, waste, and ecological pollution. Thus, the Kurdish peasant, in his mountain, does not live, any longer, in his isolated world. He cannot help but to be infected by these changes.

It must be admitted, though, that the fruits of high technology and the computer age are still very distant from Kurdistan (except some universities. Though not unheard of or joked about) – and except for the transistor radio, the video tape, and the cassette band.

7. *The extensive process of decolonisation* that has taken place, since World War II, that led to the independence of most of the colonial and non-self-governing peoples in most parts of the world, some of whom hardly exceed few thousand people, by establishing their own states and gaining membership to the United Nations and other international organs, while a nation of twenty million people is denied its simple right of existence, has given the Kurds greater consciousness in realising the great injustices that are committed against them, by the countries ruling over Kurdistan, and therefore given them greater impetus to work for the elimination of these injustices, through political and armed resistance.

This process has, also, had a form of spin-off effect, in inciting the people of Kurdistan, in achieving their liberation, in the manner accomplished by other nations and small communities.

The establishment of the United Nations, and the hopes that were created,

with most nations, in the principles that were declared in its charter, together with numerous declarations and resolutions on human rights, the right of all peoples to self-determination, and other covenants on social and political rights as well as against all forms of racial discrimination, gave rise to great expectations, among many peoples like the Kurds. That, at least, some of these international measures will improve their lot and aid their struggle towards liberation. Although, these hopes proved to be misplaced, they still exercised a certain drive towards greater agitation in a more positive international atmosphere, for the achievement of their rights.

8. The period, after World War II, is internationally characterised by attempts, in most societies (with varying social systems), to *implement* some aspects of the *welfare state*. By providing their citizens with a better "quality of life" as far as employment, education, health-care, housing, social-security, leisure-time, and services are concerned. The dissemination of these ideas and its practical manifestations, even in Third World countries; with the majority of such developmental projects and activities concentrated in the areas of the majority nations; added to the information acquired by the Kurdish individual and collectivity about other societies; and the realisation of the primitive and backward conditions of his own society (through deliberate discriminatory policies of the central governments, despite the wealth extracted from Kurdistan in oil and other raw-materials); has given rise to a furious and rebellious sense of injustice among the Kurds. Hence, the continuous state of protest and resistance that has dominated the scene in Kurdistan, since the Second World War.

- B. It is quite apparent, therefore, that these important social, economic, and cultural changes, that have taken place in Kurdish society, since World War II, should have fundamental effects on the Kurdish liberation movement and its organisational, political, ideological, and struggle methods and structures.

1. *Organisational Changes*

In contrast with earlier periods, in Kurdish history, where the Kurdish individual's loyalties were primarily attached to his family, village, locality, tribe, tribe chief/or religious sheikh and sect, they lie, now, with his nation, political party/organisation, and political leaders (though his ties to family

and locality still may apply considerable cross-pressures). The recruitment patterns, into the armed Kurdish resistance movements and the political organisations in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan, give ample proofs to such a phenomenon. Where, a Pesh-Merga (Kurdish for guerilla soldier) and a political cadre voluntarily leaves his family and kinsfolk, without any means of subsistence, to serve in far away areas, and at times come into conflict and fight his own relatives, village, and "tribesmen" in the interests of a large community: the Kurdish nation. His family and local and tribal interests become totally subordinate to the interests of the movement, the cause, the nation. The directives and orders of his political leadership override any stimuli from his locality. Although, no process of social change is ever clear-cut and abrupt. One can witness, for example, that some traditional tribal and religious heads, who cooperate with the central governments, can still mobilise people to fight their own people, But the general tendency is very strong in moving towards such a change, as mentioned above.

This, in effect, has led to the ascendance of modernist organisational forms and party political leadership. Political parties and associations with newspapers, magazines, branches, and tight disciplin are more dominant, nowadays, with local and youth organisations that carry-out political educational and recruiting functions. At the same time, women, students, writers, teachers, peasants, and workers unions have become very common on the Kurdish political scene, and play significant roles in the Kurdish movement. This state of affairs contrasts considerably with the period before the Second World War, where the dominant organisational form was a loose tribal alliance that was local and centred around a tribal chief or a religious sheikh (despite the existence of some cultural, social, and political clubs and some form of parties, as early as 1890 in Istanbul, and later on, among the secularised and intellectual Kurds).

2. *Political Changes*

In earlier periods, except to a certain extent, for the Bedir-Khan (1846) and Ubeidullah Nahri (1880), the Kurdish uprisings tended to be local affairs, with limited demands for administrative reforms, exemption from taxes and conscription, some vague cultural demands, and local self-rule by Kurdish officials. They were led by religious or tribal leaders. Even if at times, a political party existed it played a very peripheral role. No attempts were made at contact or cooperation with other areas or parts of Kurdistan (though some half-hearted contacts were made at times).

But, with the ascendance of the political parties and the intellectual cadres, the whole character of the political message and leadership underwent drastic change, both in content and form, in the shape of well articulated programmes

or manifests. The demands were no longer local. They were either autonomy, federation, or self-determination. Continuous contact was maintained and developed, not only with other parts of Kurdistan but, also, with the democratic and progressive forces of the majority nations, that were willing to recognise the rights of the Kurdish nation.

The new leaders, of the movement, were urbanised professional intellectuals (though, at times, obliged to share power with some traditional leaders, like Barzani, in Iraqi Kurdistan. But that situation was not free from many-dimensional conflicts).

The character, of their political and diplomaic messages, abroad, have, also, become more refined and well-presented. They are, no longer, uniform, naiv, and emotional, but well-documented and factual. They reflect the interests of different groups and classes, in Kurdish society, that accounts for the relatively successful greater degree of mobilisation of support, among many sections, of the public opinion abroad.

3. *Ideological Changes*

The movement, here, has been towards a diversification of intrests. With urbanisation, the growth of peasant and workers organisations, and other intrest groups (women, students, artists, teachers, writers, etc.) the content of the political platforms, of the political parties, has become many-sided and with a very clear social element, in contrast with earlier periods that concentrated, solely, on the national and cultural rights.

It is inconceivable, now, for a political organisation, in Kurdistan, to survive without the inclusion of such issues, like: Land reform, nationalisation, women rights, industrialisation, social security, full-employment, and other social-welfare measures, in its programme.

At the same time, due to the division of Kurdistan and the total state of oppression, that was experienced by the Kurdish people, at the hands of the old colonial powers and the past-colonial majority-nation governments, the Kurdish movement, generally, has acquired a radical anti-traditional, anti-reactionary, anti-imperialist, and anti-dictorial progressive and democratic tendencies.

Similarly, it is moving towards building a common front, with the oppressed groups and classes of the majority nation, for achieving common liberation.

The Kurdish political organisations, after World War II, have rejected the notion that their struggle, for liberation, is directed against the majority nation, as a whole, but rather against the ruling classes and the dictatorial military or despotic regimes, i.e. they refuse to characterise their struggle as a national conflict. The central governments, however, continuously try

to convey the conflict as such, in order to broaden their mobilisation and support base. But, fortunately, they have so far failed.

4. *Changes in struggle methods*

The struggle methods, before World War II, were a reflection of the political structures that were dominant, then, as mentioned above. Except for the demonstration in front of Sulaimania municipality, on Sept. 6, 1930 (that led the killing of a number of demonstrators when police opened fire at them. Hence, called the "Black 6th of September" in Kurdish folklore) and the oil workers demonstration in "Gawerbaghi – Kirkuk" in 1946 (which also led to the killing of some workers by the police); and except for petitions, memorandums, and appeals to the League of Nations, the Allied Powers (during World War II) and the central governments; the only mode of struggle applied was taking-up arms and organising uprisings in the remote Kurdish countryside, that were generally (though not always) isolated local pockets of resistance, that were terminated after few years (sometimes less than a year).

In this period, the Kurdish countryside dominated the political movement, with all its characteristics and modes of function. The Second World War and its aftermath, together with the social changes that occurred in Kurdish society, shifted the leadership to the cities. Here, the political organisations and their modernist intellectual leadership concentrated their efforts on organising students, workers, peasants, women, shop-keepers, lower and higher level officials, soldiers and lower-grade officers, artisans in underground organisations that were well-discipline. They had secret publications and print shops, and a very effective distribution network. This state of secrecy was imposed, by the conditions of non-recognition and oppression practiced by the central governments. Negotiations, contact, and cooperation was established with other opposition parties and organisations, for coordination and joint action towards liberation and a democratic development, within the ranks of a National Front.

This situation continued, in Turkey and Iran, until the second half of the 1970's. While, in Iraq, after 1958, The Kurdistan Democratic Party-KDP gained official recognition, with public offices, newspapers, and magazines. Its membership swelled from few thousand to 50.000. Its mass meetings and demonstrations were among the largest in Iraq. The Kurdish movement, in Iraq, developed into an important actor on the Iraqi political scene. When the Iraqi government, in the spring of 1961, tried to curb its influence, because Kurdish demands were becoming too irritant and maximalised, the KDP initiated a well-organised armed-resistance movement that lasted until 1975. Other organisations (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-PUK, Kurdistan Socialist Party-KSP, and later-on a factor of KDP) continued with that struggle, from

1976 until now, because successive Iraqi governments continued with their policies of oppression and denial of Kurdish rights.

In Iran, the Kurdish movement, apart from an unsuccessful attempt at an armed uprising against the Shah regime, in 1967-68, by a radical wing of the Iranian KDP, the movement continued with its underground phase until the overthrow of the Shah, in February, 1979. This created extremely favourable and free conditions for the Kurdish movement to develop in all aspects. Unfortunately, the newly-established clergy regime of the ayatollahs did not allow this democratic experience to flourish, because they declared total war against Kurdistan, in August, 1979, which forced the different organisations in Iranian Kurdistan (KDP & Komala) to wage an armed resistance movement, that is continuing until now.

In Turkey, in the periods between 1967-1971, and 1975-1980, a semi-official and relatively democratic conditions allowed the flourishing of mass political work among the Kurds, after a harsh and suffocating taboo period, that extended as far back as the 1920's with the establishment of Kemalism. This, however, was interrupted, twice, by military takeovers, in 1971 and 1980, with extremely repressive consequences for anything Kurdish.

The situation in Syria has, more or less, been the same, except for 1954-1958 and after 1975, where a softer attitude is maintained without any official recognition. *Continued in the next edition.*

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN PARIS ON "THE KURDS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY"

An International Conference on "The Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity" was held in Paris at the Center of International Conferences on October 14-15, 1989. The conference was organized on the initiative of the Kurdish Institute in Paris and was sponsored by Madame Mitterand's human rights organization called "Foundation France—Liberties—Danielle Mitterand." The meeting was also sponsored by the French Minister of Culture and Humanitarian Affairs.

About two dozen speakers gave detailed accounts of the sad situation of the Kurdish Nation of 25 million, living in a rich and a vast country of the size of France, which is cut up into five pieces and divided among the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union. In their own homeland the Kurdish people are deprived of their basic human rights and are subjected to an inhuman program of political persecution, cultural repression, and the destruction of the Kurdish way of life and its ethnic identity.

In Turkey, since General Mustafa Kamal came to power in 1925, the Kurds are still living under military rule and subject to an official policy of assimilation. The Kurds are subjected to a systematic, cruel harassment,

insults and abuse by the cruel Turkish police and army. The use of the Kurdish language in Turkey is forbidden. The Kurds are not allowed even to call themselves Kurds. The Turkish Government denies the existence of 12 million Kurds in Turkey, living in ten Provinces in the south and east of Turkey, and refers to them as "Mountain Turks."

In Iraq, the Baathist regime is executing a "devilish scheme" to exterminate the Kurds by means of chemical weapons, forceful uprooting of the Kurdish peasants, and mass killing of Kurdish men, women, and children by the genocide campaigns of the Iraqi army.

In Syria, the political persecution of the Kurds has stopped since President Assad came to power. However, cultural activities of the Kurds in Syria are not allowed. In Iran, the cultural activities of the Kurds are still forbidden. In short, the Kurds are not allowed to live as Kurds in their own country.

One speaker after another raised concern about the plight of the Kurds and called for an end to the political oppression and cultural suppression of the Kurds. They called for the right of the Kurds to self-rule and their right to self-determination in future. Some of the speakers as Lord Avebury declared that "The Political control by one people over another is unacceptable in an era of equality."

The speakers called on all civilized nations to assist Kurds to live as Kurds in their own country. Indeed, some of the speeches addressed to the conference are considered to be important historical documents dealing with the tragic situation of the Kurdish Nation.

At the end of the conference, the following resolutions were adapted.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "THE KURDS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY"

RESOLUTIONS

The International Conference "The Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity, meeting in Paris on October 14-15, 1989 on the initiative of France-Libertees and the Kurdish Institute, in concluding:

and considering that the Kurds, a people divided among several countries, is enduring a tragic fate only because of their desire to preserve their cultural identity and defend their legitimate political and democratic rights in each of the countries in which they live,

expresses the desire:

—that its work be continued by the establishment of permanent missions responsible for defending human rights in the countries where the Kurdish people live, missions which are open to members of the parliaments of all democratic countries, and asks France-Libertés to act towards this goal;

—that representatives of the Kurdish people be invited to address the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and all major international institutions;

—that national governments prohibit the production of chemical weapons and also that the governments support an international agreement to impose economic and political sanctions against countries which use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law;

—recommends the immediate creation of a representative organization of the Kurdish people as a whole with the aim of obtaining observer status in the United Nations General Assembly;

—requests, on Professor Sakharov's initiative, that the UN, as guardian of international peace, convene a special session of the General Assembly, on the Kurdish issue;

—draws attention to the tragic condition of the Kurdish refugees and insists that talks with the High Commission on Refugees be held immediately, so that an active and effective support, which took into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the people particularly concerning humanitarian aid, could be brought to bear; a special meeting of the H.C.R. could be devoted to this problem;

denounces the fate reserved for the displaced Kurdish populations and asks the states involved to respect the relevant principles of International Law, including humanitarian aid, if the people request it;

—requests to this end that the right of free access to victims be granted to intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, acting in an impartial and neutral way in conformity with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/131 of December 8, 1988.

The Conference expresses its desire to meet again in Stockholm before July 1990 under the sponsorship of the Swedish Committee for Human Rights in Kurdistan.

Parliamentary Human Rights Group

Remarks by Lord Avebury, Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, UK, chairing the opening session of an international conference on

The Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity

held at the Centre des Conférences Internationales, 4 Avenue Kleber, 75016 Paris, and sponsored by Mme Danielle Mitterand.

The theme of this conference is human rights and cultural identity. But the cultural identity of any people is determined by their political status. And all other human rights presuppose the right of self-determination; without self-determination, not only is cultural freedom denied, but many of the other rights enshrined in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are flagrantly and persistently violated.

We see that truth exemplified today in the Baltic states annexed to the Soviet Union; in Eritrea, a former colonial territory which was handed over to the new imperialists in Addis Ababa by the UN; in Tibet, annexed by the People's Republic of China 30 years ago; in East Timor, still occupied by tens of thousands of Jakarta's troops; in Palestine, where Israeli repression fails to still the clamour for self-rule; in the Western Sahara and West Papua, both cases where the UN violated its own rules for decolonisation, and most tragically, in Kurdistan.

More than 70 years ago, President Woodrow Wilson set out his aims for the self-determination of nations in the celebrated Fourteen Points. Number twelve specifically mentioned the nationalities which living under Ottoman rule, and in the Treaty of Sevres, an independent Kurdish state was foreshadowed.

The western nations who devised these arrangements were really more concerned to dismember the Ottoman Empire than to promote the right of self-determination for the Kurds and the Armenians. But the fact remains that they pledged their word and then dishonoured it.

This places a huge moral responsibility on the present leaders of the United States, France and Great Britain. They fought two world wars ostensibly for the maintenance of the rule of law and the preservation of human rights including particularly the right of self-determination, and they gave detailed

and specific assurances to the Kurds. Today they can and do rely on the more limited formulations of the United Nations, which are concerned only with former colonies of the European powers. But is the right of a people to determine their own future to be confined to those former colonies, together with the states which had already achieved it?

We need an extension of the formulas in General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 of 1960, which set out the rules for self-determination. Surely it must be wrong that a people having distinct attributes of language, culture, ethnicity and religion should be denied that right merely because they had never been part of a separate political entity. In the case of the Kurds, the emirates of the 14th to early 19th century had all those attributes, but never developed into a nation state because of their feudal relationship with the Ottomans. This was neither better nor worse than European colonialism, or the Cho-Yon link between the Mongols and Tibet. All implied the political control of one people by another, and all ought to be just as unacceptable in an era of equality.

But the Kurdish people cannot wait for the slow process of international reforms. Throughout the whole of the middle East, the Kurdish people are facing an emergency.

In Iraq, the government has embarked on a massive programme of forced relocation. Under the pretence that Kurds have to be moved from their historic territory because they could be in the path of Iranian aggression, the regime has systematically uprooted tens of thousands from their towns and villages, and compelled them to move as much as 100 kilometres away.

This policy, which aims at the destruction of the Kurds as a separate community—what Leo Kuper has termed ‘ethnocide’—follows a programme of extra-judicial execution of Kurds, and the use of chemical weapons to exterminate Kurdish men, women and children. The notorious poison gas attack on Halabja, which the Iraqi government brazenly attempted to deny, was the most infamous crime in the long list of atrocities committed by the Saddam Hussain regime.

In Iran, the Kurds suffered terrible losses during the Iran-Iraq war. Many Kurdish towns such as Sanandaj were bombed heavily. It seemed until recently that following the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, there might have been an accommodation between Kurdish leaders and the new government in Tehran. However, the murder of the General Secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran in Vienna recently, by Iranian secret agents, shows that the Ayatollah’s policy of crushing the Kurds has continued after his death.

In Turkey, as in Iraq, the authorities are trying to eradicate the Kurdish identity. Already, hundreds of thousands have been moved from their homes in Kara Maras and neighbouring areas. The army, ostensibly searching for guerrillas, force the whole of the population of a village out of their house,

beat them up, subject them to all sorts of indignities, and take the young men away to army camps, where they are detained and invariably tortured.

Turkey has applied to join the EEC. It is, of course, absolutely unthinkable that we should admit a country which is inflicting such barbaric treatment on a defenceless minority whose only crime is to be different. In Britain last weekend a Kurdish refugee burned himself to death rather than be sent back to his Turkish persecutors, and another lies seriously ill in hospital.

I do hope that, as we consider the human rights and cultural identity of the Kurds over the next two days, we shall recognise that the very survival of the Kurds as a people is threatened. It is not a matter of just a few cases, to be carefully documented and perhaps made the subject of a presentation at the UN Human Rights Subcommission in Geneva. It is a wicked conspiracy by the leaders of several states to destroy a people, because that people aspires to the self-government we offered them and then snatched away.

Institut kurde de Paris

The Tragedy of Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruction of a People and Culture

Remarks to the International Conference on the Kurds Human Rights and Cultural Identity

*by Peter W. Galbraith
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate*

I will confine my remarks to the plight of the Iraqi Kurds. In connection with Senate Foreign Relations Committee assessments of the Iran-Iraq war, I twice had occasion to visit Iraqi Kurdistan, in 1984 and 1987. Between those visits I was able to witness the sharp deterioration in the treatment of the Kurdish population by the Iraqi government.

In 1988 the plight of the Iraqi Kurds burst onto the international consciousness, first with the graphic reports of a poison gas attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja and then with the massive outflow of refugees from northern Iraq in September, bringing with them tales of a broad chemical weapons offensive by the Iraqi army.

In connection with legislation that Senator Pell introduced to sanction Iraq for this use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked me to lead a mission to report on and document the use of chemical weapons. I shall summarize the findings of that mission, then discuss last year's sanctions legislation which was not enacted, and finally offer some thoughts on the future of chemical weapons legislation and what might be done to ameliorate the conditions of the Iraqi Kurds.

First, to restate the principal conclusions of our fact-finding mission, we found overwhelming evidence that Iraq did use chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq in a major offensive that began August 25, 1988. The offensive was intended to break the Kurdish insurgency and accomplished that objective.

These chemical weapons attacks were part of an Iraqi military policy

intended to depopulate large parts of Iraqi Kurdistan. Elements of the policy include:

- (1) the destruction of villages and towns throughout Kurdistan;
- (2) the relocation of the Kurdish population into concentrated new settlements where military control can be exercised;
- (3) the deportation of Kurds to areas outside of Kurdistan; and
- (4) the use of terror tactics, including lethal poison gas to drive civilians out of the areas to be depopulated.

The end result of this policy could be the destruction of the Kurdish identity, Kurdish culture, and a way of life that has endured for centuries.

The policy has been carried out with great brutality and with a cynical disregard for world opinion and international law. Our fact-finding mission documented chemical weapons attacks on 49 villages; we believe the actual total to be much higher. The chemical weapons attacks were followed by military operations in which many survivors who chose to remain in Iraq (or could not reach Turkish sanctuary) were massacred. Drawing on interviews, we estimated that the total cumulative civilian casualties from the chemical weapons attacks and the follow-on military operations were in the thousands. However, our information comes from only that part of Iraq where Kurds had access to refuge in Turkey. If the same kinds of military operations took place deeper in Iraqi Kurdistan as took place in the border areas, the Kurdish death toll could have been in the tens or hundreds of thousands.

We do not know the total casualties. We do not know with any degree of certainty what has happened in Iraqi Kurdistan over the last year. Ever since Iraqi soldiers sealed the border with Turkey at the beginning of September 1988, a deadly silence has descended on Iraqi Kurdistan.

Because the Iraqis questioned the evidence of poison gas use, let me also restate what the evidence was. In the last week of August and the first week of September, 1988, some 65 thousand people came unexpectedly across the Iraq-Turkey border. Although they came from many different villages spread over a very mountainous terrain, they reported essentially the same set of facts.

Beginning around dawn on August 25, Iraqi warplanes and helicopters dropped bombs containing chemical weapons on villages in the Dihok, Zakho and Amadiyah regions of Iraq. Generally, each aircraft dropped three or four bombs. These bombs made only a weak sound and then a cloud spread out from the center of the explosion. The air smelled of bad garlic, rotten onions, or bad apples. Many of those exposed to the gas dropped dead instantly or every quickly. The bodies, according to some, appeared frozen. The livestock died and birds fell out of the sky. These attacks continued until August 28.

Thereafter troops wearing protective clothes entered the villages. In some places, such as the village of Baze, Iraqi forces opened fire with machine-guns on the survivors and then bulldozed the bodies into mass graves.

This account is drawn on interviews conducted by my team with several hundred refugees from all the major Kurdish refugee camps and gathering areas. These interviews were conducted in the second week of September, just after the events described took place. We interviewed all kinds of people: Pesh Merga, civilian men, women, and children. And, we had no trouble finding witnesses; indeed, I would estimate that one-half to three-fourths of the refugee population were eye-witnesses to the events I described.

Some have argued that there was no "real" or physical evidence of the attacks. This is not entirely true, of course. A British television crew entered Iraq and unearthed bomb fragments that contained traces of chemical weapons. According to press reports, Secretary Shultz relied in part on technical evidence when he charged Iraq with the use of chemical weapons on September 8. However, in my judgement, the conclusive evidence came from the victims themselves. Under Anglo-Saxon law—and I think this is a pretty good standard—the greatest weight in a criminal trial is eye-witness evidence. The accounts of Iraq's use of chemical weapons were corroborated by thousands of eye-witnesses.

These eye-witnesses accounts also fit with known Iraqi behavior. Eight different United Nations investigative teams found and documented Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran in violation of international law. Iraq's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Ministry, Tariq Aziz, admitted to use of chemical weapons against Iran.

With regard to the Kurds, Iraq's brutality is equally undeniable and un denied. During my September 1987 trip, on the road from Baghdad to Jalawla to Darbandikhan to Sulamanyeh to Kirkuk, I counted more than forty Kurdish villages that had been destroyed recently. These villages were not in remote areas. They were on the principal roads of Iraqi Kurdistan. A regime that would callously destroy hundreds of villages that had been in place for centuries, that would make the first large-scale use of chemical weapons in international conflict since World War I, is certainly a regime capable of using chemical weapons against its own people.

Iraq's attacks on its Kurdish population began on August 25, 1988—that is to say, five days *after* a ceasefire went into effect in the Iran-Iraq war. In the case of the Kurds, chemical weapons were used against unarmed civilians and against insurgents without aircraft, without heavy artillery, and without any means of threatening the Arab-Iraqi homeland or the regime of President Saddam Hussein. While international law allows no defense of necessity so as to permit the use of chemical weapons, Iraq claims the use was justified by the life-or-death nature of the war with Iran. No such compulsion existed

in the case of the Kurds. Indeed, the destruction of the Kurdish insurgency could have been accomplished as effectively by Iraq's battle-tested troops without resorting to chemical weapons and without massacring innocent civilians.

Why then did Iraq choose to use chemical weapons on its Kurdish population? Because Saddam Hussein's government thought it could get away with it. They believed the world did not care about chemical weapons and that the world did not care about the Kurds.

Partly, they were wrong. The reports of chemical weapons use reached the United States over the Labor Day weekend, that is in early September. On September 7, the Senate came back into session. On September 8, Senator Pell introduced "The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988" which imposed stiff sanctions against Iraq for its use of chemical weapons and for its policy of destroying Iraq's Kurdish population. On September 9, the Senate unanimously adopted the sanctions legislation. Two further times the Senate approved sanctions and twice the House of Representatives passed a milder version of the sanctions. While the two houses did agree on a common version, parliamentary squabbles—and the firm opposition of the Reagan Administration—prevented the final enactment of the sanctions bill.

This was a tragedy. Iraq in the end paid no price for its use of chemical weapons. But I think our effort accomplished something. First, it caught Iraq's attention. Passage of sanctions produced the largest anti-American demonstration in Baghdad in 20 years. Some in the executive branch expressed concern about the damage done to U.S.-Iraq relations; I considered the demonstration a compliment to the Senate stand. Most important, however, Iraq stopped using chemical weapons.

Now the Foreign Relations Committee has approved a new sanctions bill. It will not reach back and punish Iraq for its past action. It will, however, impose a complete severance of economic relations between the U.S. and any country that uses chemical weapons in violation of international law or against its own citizens. I believe there is an excellent chance this measure will become law and, if so, this will be one positive product of last year's initiative.

A unilateral U.S. action will not of course be as effective as concerted action by the Western nations. I would therefore hope our sanctions approach might be considered by the major Western economic powers. A united front on our part will defeat any effort by an economically powerful state such as Iraq to circumvent the effectiveness of sanctions.

In our concern about the use of chemical weapons, we must not lose sight of the underlying human rights problem of the Iraqi Kurds. As I noted above, Iraq could have used conventional means to accomplish the same ends for which it used chemical weapons. For Iraq, the use of chemical weapons was merely a matter of speed and economy. From the point of view of the

Kurds, we will have accomplished little if we stop the use of poison gas but if villages continue to be destroyed, if people are moved to inhospitable environments, if children continue to be kidnapped and murdered.

The community of civilized nations should use every forum to raise concerns about the plight of the Iraqi Kurds. It is unrealistic to expect that the Kurds will become the sine qua non of Western relations with Iraq. But certainly we should expect democratic nations to take some action in support of values that are fundamental to our political systems.

No one can encounter a tragedy of the magnitude of that which occurred last September and remain unmoved. I have many images of the five days I spent along the Iraq-Turkey border; in a high mountain valley a woman seated atop a small bundle constituting all her possessions waiting for a very uncertain future; donkeys with gaily woven saddlebags wandering aimlessly after being abandoned by their refugee owners; an old man crying as he told of the deaths of his children and grandchildren. These are images that will remain with me as long as I live. I hope this conference, and what follows from it, might do something to make sure this tragedy is not repeated.

Institut kurde de Paris

Madame Mitterand Speaks Before the United States Congressional Human Rights Caucus

By Pary Al-Karadaghi, M.D.

On Monday, October 22, 1989, Madame Daniele Mitterand arrived in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus which was extended to her through the French Embassy in the United States.

At 2 P.M. on October 24, 1989, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a public meeting in the conference room of the Congress to hear Madame Mitterand's address "on Human Rights Abuses suffered by the Kurd."

Congressman Lantos, co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, welcomed Madame Mitterand and expressed his gratitude to the French Embassy for its efforts in arranging her visit.

Congressman Lantos described Madame Mitterand as a great campaigner and a champion of freedom in her own right. In her biographical introduction Congressman Lantos stated that Madame Mitterand joined her parents at the age of 18 and fought in the French resistance movement until the end of World War II. In 1944 she married Monsieur Francois Mitterand, who became the rising star of the French politics. Monsiur Mitterand became cabinet minister a number of times, head of Franc's socialist party, and elected twice as President of the French Republic. However, subsequent luxury, power, and family influence did not change Madame Mitterand's style of life or her humanitarian idealogical outlook. Instead of living in luxury, she lived a simple life and spent most of her time and energy in the cause of freedom and in defene of human rights everywhere.

Congressman Lantos ended his speech by declaring that "We are all your soldiers Madame Mitterand."

Congressman Porter, co-chairman, Congressman Bates, and two other congressmen spoke and condemned human rights violations anywhere in the world.

Senator Edward Kennedy gave an important speech and declared that human rights violations under any pretext are totally unacceptable. Senator Kennedy called for an end to human rights violations inflicted upon the Kurds.

Madame Mitterand gave a lengthy speech in French which was simultaneously translated into English. She stated that the aim of France—



Madame Daniele Mitterrand
Human Rights Campaigner and Champion
of Freedom
Addressed the United States Congressional
Human Rights Caucus on: "Human Rights
Abuse against The Kurdish People"
October 24, 1989

Liberties is to “contribute to the emergence and strengthening of individual and collective liberties all over the world”, and also to “help those who are working to that end.” She said that the same idea is reflected in Article I of our charter, and in our motto: “A free man is one who helps others to be free”. “This means that we are at the crossroad of two preoccupations; the one is traditional, to provide remedies in cases of individual distress, the other is less so, because it involves concrete action in denouncing oppression whenever it is exercised toward individuals, peoples, and communities.

“In these circumstances it is only natural that the Kurds should have their rightful place in our concern: they are all individuals in distress and their people are in danger of extinction.”

Madame Mitterand arrived in Turkey in May, 1989 and visited Kurdish refugee camps in Mus and Mardin. She said that, “I visited Turkey at the request of the Kurdish exiles around the world in my capacity as the President of the France—Liberties Foundations. There is a twin-sister organization in New York, of which I am also President. Clearly, the Kurds in the camps at Mus, Diyarbakir, and Mardin do not seem to believe all this. This is what they say”:

“Our villages have been bombed and gassed, our people, when they are not exterminated, are moved to the south of Iraq, which is a particularly inhospitable area that we can not adapt to. We are, in fact, deportees in our own country, Iraq, and under very difficult conditions. Right here, there is nothing we can do, nothing we can produce, nothing to trade, no profession we can practice. But back home, our very lives are threatened. Our province has been resettled by Arabs from Egypt as if our return had definitely been ruled out. From the bottom of our soul there is nothing we want more than to go back home. But how could we be protected if nobody watches over us.

“Do not forget us, Madame Mitterand. Silence is killing us.”

The result is that the Iraqi Kurds in Turkey are in totally desperate situation: They can neither go home—which is their deep wish—nor become integrated into the Kurdish population in Turkey. I am relaying their message to you. “Do not forget them, silence is killing them.”

Madame Mitterand's visit to the United States was not given much publicity by the media or the television. Her important speech before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus was not published in a single newspaper in the United States. Two television crews were present in the Conference room; a French television crew who were accompanying Madame Mitterand and a CBC television camera man, but no television coverage was given to Madame Mitterand or her activities. Madame Mitterand was received with reverence and admiration but no publicity was given to her activities. Before she left for France, Madame Mitterand gave a press conference in the Hilton Hotel where she was staying. However, very few people knew about the conference.

Consequently, only a small group of people attended. There were many complaints from the members of the Kurdish community because they were not told about the time and place of the press conference. However, it was evident that Madame Mitterand herself was not much interested in the publicity or about media coverage.

The Kurdish Human Rights Watch contacted the press attache in the French Embassy, the office of the chairman of the congressional Human Rights Caucus, a few television networks, and the Washington Post Daily and inquired about their failure to give due coverage to Madame Mitterand visit. They all expressed their regrets about this unfortunate negligence.

The Kurdish refugees in the United States and Canada had their day in Madame Mitterand's visit. From most of the states delegations of Kurdish refugee arrived to see and hear Madame Mitterand. A delegation from Canada came to Washington 2 days before her arrival. A huge crowd of men, women, and children waited for hours outside the Congress to greet her. When she arrived at 2 P.M. escorted by a heavy security, the crowd burst into emotional outburst screaming "La Vive Madame Mitterand, long live Madame Mitterand, God protect you Madame Mitterand." She came out of the car and walked toward the crowd and mixed with them freely. She carried few babies and kissed them and spoke to the people through a translator. When she headed toward the Congressional building, the whole crowd walked behind her and the Kurdish ladies formed a protective circle around her.

The conference room and the hallways were so packed, there was no place even to stand. It was readily a touchy scene, the Kurdish ladies in their National costume were sitting on the floor in a row facing Madame Mitterand and shedding tears in silence.

At the end of Madame Mitterand's speech all stood in a standing ovation and made way for her to pass. The crowd walked behind her slowly and with reverence. Before she entered her car the crowd thundered, "Auraveus Madame Mitterand, Thank you Madame Mitterand, God Bless You Madame Mitterand." The Kurdish ladies in the United States are still speaking about their hero, Madame Mitterand, who defends their loved ones who are left behind in the Iraqi prisons. This is the kind of publicity and reception which every popular leader like Madame Mitterand loves.

Testimony before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, Tuesday, October 24, 1989

*By David A. Korn, Consultant,
Middle East Watch, on the Kurds of Iraq*

I am a consultant to Middle East Watch, a component of Human Rights Watch, an organization I believe is well known to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus.

For the past five months I have been engaged in research and writing for a comprehensive report—the first of its kind by any human rights organization—on the human rights situation in Iraq. When published, the report will be a paperback book of some 200 pages and will cover all issues, those relating specifically to the Kurds as well as those that affect all Iraqis.

The government of Iraq is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in existence today. With the exception of freedom of worship, it denies its citizens all the fundamental rights and freedoms, and it brutally suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent. In this sense, Iraq treats all its citizens equally—members of all groups have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, murder, disappearance and deportation. The Kurds of Iraq have been the particular object of repression because they are the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority—numbering some three to four million out of Iraq's estimated population of sixteen million—and because they have persistently sought recognition of their distinct status. Most of the major human rights abuses perpetrated in Iraq over the past two years have been perpetrated against its Kurdish population.

The abuses suffered by the Kurds of Iraq are too numerous and the material on them too ample to make it possible to go into detail in the time available. Let me just mention the main ones:

Torture and Execution—The numbers of cases in these categories reported in recent years runs into the hundreds and possibly the thousands. Amnesty International's report of February of this year on the 300 some Kurdish children arrested and tortured—and some of them killed—is well known. What is less well known is that the Iraqi authorities have rounded up Kurdish civilians at random

and publicly executed them in retaliation for acts of sabotage and attacks on government officials in Kurdistan—a policy reminiscent of that practiced during the Nazi occupation in Europe. The report I am preparing will include testimony on instances of this during 1986 and 1987.

Disappearances—Many thousands of people have disappeared in Iraq in recent years. I will mention only one instance. In 1983 the Iraqi army rounded up some eight thousand Kurds of the Barzani tribe and took them away in truck, never to be heard from again. They were living peacefully with their families in relocation centers in government held territory and some of them were even members of the government's own Kurdish militia. They are believed to be in prison camps in the Iraqi desert.

Chemical Weapons—From April 1987 until September/October 1988 the Iraqi regime repeatedly bombed Kurdish rebel held territory with mustard and nerve gas, killing mainly civilians. Nobody knows the exact death toll, but it can safely be said that over ten thousand Kurds, men, women and children of all ages, were killed. Many thousands of others were irremediably sickened.

Forcible Relocation—Since 1987, on pretext of protecting the Kurdish population and providing them modern amenities, the Iraqi government has expelled several hundred thousand Kurds from their mountain villages and towns, has razed their dwellings, forbidden them to return on penalty of death and obliged them to resettle in "ne towns" in the hot, dry lowlands of Iraqi Kurdistan where they find little if any way to provide for themselves. Some seventy-five to eighty percent of Kurdish villages and towns—places where Kurds have lived for centuries or millennia—have been destroyed and large segments of Iraqi Kurdistan have been emptied of population.

In closing I would like briefly to mention two things. One is that the government of Iraq has launched a public relations campaign, targeted mainly at the US and advised and assisted by public relations and political counsel hired in this country, to try to cover up its abuses and give itself an appearance of respectability all the while it continues brutally to repress its citizens.

The second is that the response of Western governments to Iraq's crimes against its own population—Kurds and others—has been embarrassingly weak and timid. A few Western governments continue to sell arms to Iraq. Neither the current US Administration or its predecessor has made any public statement of objection to Iraq's brutal program of forced relocation of its Kurdish population. In 1989, the year after Secretary of State Shultz denounced Iraq's

use of poison gas against the Kurds, the US doubled its Commodity Credit Corporation Credits to Iraq to over a billion dollars. And Congress failed to pass any of the sanctions bills put before it last fall.

Congress now has the opportunity to remedy that earlier failure—and the failure of the Administration to take action clearly to disassociate this country from the Iraqi regime's crimes—by supporting the Senate Foreign Assistance bill currently before the House that calls for a cut-off of Export-Import Bank loans to Iraq. May I respectfully urge that the Congress approve this legislation.

Institut kurde de Paris

The Plight of the Kurds Congressional Human Rights Caucus

By Edward M. Kennedy, Senator

Let me first commend the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and especially Congressmen Tom Lantos and John Porter for hosting this important briefing on the plight of the Kurdish people. For too long, Congress has ignored this tragedy and today's briefing is an important first step in raising the consciousness of Congress and the American people about the crisis of the Kurds.

We are honored today by the presence of a tireless champion of the plights of the Kurdish people, Mrs. Daniels Mitterrand. Her persistence, commitment and dedication to preserving the Kurdish culture have greatly advanced this oft-forgotten goal. Friends of justice everywhere owe her a deep debt of gratitude and thanks for her efforts.

Mrs. Mitterrand has travelled to Iraqi Kurdish campus in Turkey and seen first hand the hardships of these innocent victims of persecution. She established a human rights foundation in Paris, the French Liberty Foundation, which has joined in the struggle of the Kurds and, together with the Kurdish Institute of Paris, she organized the first international conference ever devoted to the tragic history of the Kurds.

Last weekend's conference is a long-overdue recognition by the international community of the need for urgent protection of one of the proudest and oldest cultures. Attended by Kurds from 23 countries and distinguished guests from around the world, the conference was an important international recognition of one of the most flagrant examples of man's inhumanity to man. It brought home to all of us the need to take immediate steps to bring an end to the ongoing campaigns of persecution of these people.

Let us never forget that, even today, Iraq continues to destroy Kurdish villages, Turkey continues to prohibit Kurds from speaking their native language and Iran continues its war against the Kurds. Earlier this year, the Iraqi government began a massive campaign for the forcible relocation of tens of thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq to other parts of the country. Last year, thousands of Kurds died from the poison gas attacks by Iraq and thousands more had to flee to Turkey, Iran and Syria.

The brutal Iraqi campaign to eradicate the Kurdish culture must be universally condemned by the civilized world. The use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages last year was one of the most brutal and horrendous actions of modern times. Credible reports detailing the attack by Iraqi warplanes talk of the air smelling like bad garlic, of thousands of "frozen" bodies, of birds falling out of the sky, and of livestock dropping dead. Some villages reported Iraqi troops opening fire with machine guns on the survivors and bulldozing bodies into mass graves. 65,000 Kurds fled Turkey immediately following that attack. Their stories are bone chilling.

We may never know the extent of that tragedy but we must act now to ensure it never, never happens again.

Helsinki Watch summed up the plight of the Kurds as a "staggering list of human rights abuses: arrests, torture, murder, assassination, chemical warfare, mass deportations, expulsions, appalling conditions in refugee camps, refusal of political asylum by the West, denial of ethnic rights to language, literature and music, and destruction of villages, towns and cities."

The international community and the civilized world can no longer remain silent on the issue of the persecuted Kurdish people. Far too often throughout history, the Kurds have been persecuted and their culture repressed. The time to stop this crime against humanity has come.

The Kurdish conference last weekend in Paris proposed many worthwhile initiatives which I hope will be reviewed and implemented. I urge my colleagues, in particular, to follow the suggestion of the Soviet human rights activist, Andrei Sakharov, and press U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to organize a special General Assembly session on the Kurds. I also hope that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees will use his power and influence to ease the plight of these prohibiting the use of deadly chemical weapons—and in ensuring that anyone who dares use them suffers severe consequences from the international community.

For too long, powerful governments and individuals have persecuted this priceless culture with impunity. We must rededicate ourselves to combatting this tragedy and preserving the Kurdish way of life. Mrs. Mitterrand, I commend you for your leadership in this important struggle and believe you have brought us closer to the goals we all share. Together, we will triumph and ensure that the Kurds and their culture receive justice and honor they deserve.

Kurdish Population in the Soviet Union

Professor Nadir Nadrov, a Kurd from Alma Ata in Central Asia, a member of the Soviet Academy of Science, attended the International Conference in Paris "On the Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity" on October 14-15, 1989.

In his speech before the conference, Professor Nadrov spoke about the Kurds in the Soviet Union. He states that the number of Kurds in the Soviet Union is now 1,150,000 people. He based this figure on the 1989 Census which is not published yet. But information leaked out to him that the total number of the Kurds is 1,150,000 in the census register of 1989 to be published soon. Professor Nadrov added that this figure is an increase of nearly 1,000,000 on the previous census of 1979.

The number of Kurds at the time of The Bolshevik Revolution was registered at 500,000. However, in the 1969 census the number of the Kurds was recorded in the register to be 59,000. A decade later in 1979, the figure increased in the census record to 170,000. The figure given in the 1989 census is 1,150,000. This discrepancy in the population figure of the Kurds is the result of the policy of some of the Soviet republics who registered Kurds not as a Kurd but as an Azerbaijani or Turkoman and so on.

The disappearance of so many Soviet Kurds, Nadrov explains, was due to Josef Stalin's policy between 1937 and 1944. He deliberately dispersed most of the Kurds from their historical residence in the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian republics. By order of Stalin, the Kurds were forcibly transferred to Central Asia, 1600 miles away from their original homes. Stalin was concerned about possible Kurdish uprising so close to the sensitive southern Soviet border.

Professor Nadrov credited Soviet President Michael Gorbachev for the sudden rediscovery of so many Kurds. In the Central Asian republics mainly Kazakhstan and Turkmenia the Kurds were not registered as Kurds, but as Turkomans or Kirghiz, etc. The Kurds did not have cultural freedom. Kurdish children were not allowed to study in Kurdish in the schools in their villages and communities. However, the situation has changed. The Kurds in Central Asia now have cultural freedom. In school the Kurdish children are studying in the Kurdish language and using Kurdish textbooks.

The Kurds in the Transcaucasian Republics of Georgia and Armenia, now have full cultural freedom. In the Kurdish villages and communities classes are conducted in the Kurdish language at elementary, secondary, and college levels. Literary Periodicals are published in the Kurdish language. There is a Kurdish radio program. The Kurds even go to their work places and offices in their national customs.

Soviet Union to Grant Kurds Autonomy

By J. Arshak

In 1923 Lenin ordered the creation of the "autonomous republic of Kurdistan" within the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. The Autonomous Republic of Kurdistan was functioning until 1923, when Stalin abolished it. He ordered the transferring of 400,000 of its population to Central Asia. Those Kurds who remained behind in Azerbaijan were subject to an elaborate assimilation plan by the Azerbaijani authorities. They prohibited all Kurdish cultural activities with obvious purpose to melt the Kurdish ethnic entity. In the census registrar and the official documents, the Kurds were registered as Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani authority have frequently declared that the Kurdish population in Azerbaijan do not exist.

In the last three years, Kurdish intellectuals in the Soviet Union have been making efforts to re-establish the Kurdish autonomous region in Azerbaijan.

In October, 1989, the Kurdish newspaper, "Gel"—the people—, organ of the Kurdistan People's Democratic party, reported that the Soviet Union is considering giving autonomous status to its Kurdish population in Transcaucasia. In the following we present the exact quotation of what the "Gel" reported:

"Soviet Union to grant Kurds Autonomy":

"Preliminary decision to grant the Kurds autonomy taken by the Central Committee is expected to be endorsed by both The People's Congress of Deputies and The Soviet Presidium."

"In 1923, an independent Kurdish region was created within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan enabling the Kurds to preserve their ethnic identity and enjoy cultural rights. However, this did not last for long. At the beginning of the Stalin era, the independent Kurdish region was abolished and a large part of its population was deported to other Soviet Republics, mainly to Kazakstan and Turkmenia."¹

¹Kurdish information and educational project, English Edition, Published twice a year in March and October. London, October, 1989, Vol. I., p. 51.

The Armenian weekly published on Saturday, December 30, 1989, an article entitled "Kurdish question raised in USSR." The article contains interesting information about the efforts made by Kurdish intellectuals in the Soviet Union. For the re-establishment of the "Autonomous Kurdish region" we prefer to quote the whole article as it was originally published in the Armenian weekly.

"Kurdish Question Raised in USSR"

"YEREVAN—On Thursday, December 21, a group of Kurdish intellectuals with the deputy president of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia forwarded a telegram to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It made reference to the Babayev telegram circulated among the People's Deputies which discussed the situation of the Kurdish minority in the Soviet Union.

"In their telegram, the intellectuals expressed their complete agreement with the demand regarding the reestablishment of the autonomous Kurdish region in Azerbaijan and the importance of resetting the expelled Kurdish population. The telegram also outlined several distortions regarding the Kurdish situation which have outraged the Kurds in Armenia. It noted the size of the Kurdish population in Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1920s: the state of national and cultural life of the Kurds: the Forced of assimilation, as well as forced relocation of the Kurds in Azerbaijan, etc.

"The intellectuals expressed the wish that their telegram be made public at the Congress. The following is a translation of the text of the telegram sent by the group of Kurdish intellectuals.

"We ask you to announce our telegram in the Congress. It has become evident to us that the Babayev's telegram regarding the condition of Kurdish minorities in the Soviet Union has been circulated in Congress of People's Deputies. The telegram was a provocation. We are in complete agreement with the demands contained in the telegram, which ask for the re-establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region with the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the immediate return to that region of exiled Kurds. At the same time it is important that we note that the aforementioned telegram contains clear proof of premeditated distortions about Kurds in the Soviet Union. This has caused great distress to the Kurdish community living in Soviet Armenia. In the Soviet Union the Republic of Armenia has been one of the centers for the development of Kurdish culture, literature and other Kurdish studies, which all guarantee the normal national-cultural life of the Kurdish minority. The Kurdish national-cultural centers which were established in Armenia in the 1920's are still functioning today. And when one speaks of the national-cultural achievement of Soviet Kurds, they are due to good services of the Armenian

people and Soviet Armenia. On the other hand, the issue of respecting the violated rights of the Kurdish situation, which was inserted into the platform of the party, is conditioned by the overwhelming distortions of nationalities' policy taking place in Azerbaijan, where the Kurdish Autonomous Region has been dissolved, with part of the population in exile and the other part forcibly assimilated. It is clearly evident that, according to the official data in 1926, the Kurdish population of Azerbaijan was threefold that of Armenia, and according to the 1979 census, the Kurdish population in Armenia has quadrupled, while in Azerbaijan, in contrast, it was declared that a Kurdish population did not exist.

“As for the question of the forced emigration of the Kurds from Armenia, the numbers are highly exaggerated and the act itself is not the result of hostility on the part of the Armenian people. It is clearly evident that the suppression of the Kurdish Question is nothing but the neglect on the part of Azerbaijan to resolve the situation and refusal to accept the Kurds in the Kurdish region of Soviet Azerbaijan—thus forcing the problem into a dead-end while at the same time an attempt to complicate the solution of other national-ethnic problems.

“The appropriate documentation of this situation has been sent to the appropriate offices of the party and state.”²

²The Armenian weekly, saturday December 30, 1989, p. I.

How Southern Kurdistan Became Part of Iraq

By H. Mirkhan

In the sixteenth century Iraq became the bone of contention between the two rival powers of Turkey and Iran. Because holy shrines of both Suni and Shii sects of Islam were located in Baghdad, the possession of Baghdad became a matter of honor and religious duty for both the Sultan of Turkey, who was the protector of orthodox Islam (Suni sect) and the Shah of Iran who represented the Shii sect.

Iraq became part of the Ottoman empire in the year 1534 when Sultan Sulaiman occupied Baghdad and ended Persian rule in Iraq. However, the Persian Shah Abbas was able to occupy Baghdad in the year 1621 and to establish Persian sovereignty again.

The way Shah Abbas treated the orthodox Muslims and their holy shrines obliged Sultan Murad IV of the Ottoman empire to take revenge. In May, 1638, Sultan Murad IV advanced on Baghdad at the head of a powerful army. After a siege of 30 days Baghdad surrendered, thus ending the second period of Persian rule. After the year 1638 Iraq was part of the Ottoman empire without interruption until the end of the first world war on October 30, 1918.

During the three centuries of Ottoman rule, Iraq was divided administratively into three separate vilayets (provinces): Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The two Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra were inhabited by Arabs, while Mosul vilayet was predominantly inhabited by Kurd. Greek, Roman, and European sources continued to refer to Mosul vilayet as "The southern Kurdistan". It was called Mosul vilayet in reference to Mosul city which was its administrative center. Mosul vilayet was independent and directly connected with Istanbul. This administrative system for Iraq continued until the end of the first world war in 1918.

In the course of World War I the British army occupied Mesopotamia (Iraq). By the term of Mudres armistis, signed between the allies and Defeated Turkey on October 30, 1918, Turkey unconditionally surrendered to the allies. Consequently, the Turkish army disintegrated and vanished and the British army established its control over the whole of Iraq. The British established a centralized system of civil administration for Iraq. Accordingly, Iraq was divided into 14 provinces. The Mousl vilayet was divided into the four pro-

vinces of Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimania which were directly connected with the central government in Baghdad. This centralized system of administration, which was adopted by the British civil authority in 1919, lasted until 1974 when the second Baathist government changed the historical names of the provinces, reshuffled the old boundaries and created a few new provinces.

ALLIED SECRET AGREEMENT DURING WORLD WAR I

While the war with the "axes" was going on the allied powers signed a secret agreement on May 2, 1916, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement for the division among themselves of the vast domain of the Ottoman Empire. According to this agreement 5 spheres of influence were created. It was decided that the territory of the Mosul vilayet should be entrusted to France. "It was the British intention to "create a French buffer in the Middle East between Russian and British territory. After the Russian revolution broke out however, the allied scheme collapsed and was gradually replaced under French and British mandate." (The Mosul question, by Minorsky, Vladimr, pp. 9-10.).

SERVES PEACE TREATY WITH TURKEY

The allies signed the treaty with Turkey known as the Sevres Peace Treaty, Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920. The treaty laid down the policies of Britain, France, and in particular the policy of American President Wilson with his famous 14 point dismantling the ottoman empire and confining the turks to rule over Anatolia, the only region in the vast domain of the Empire that was inhabited by ethnic Turks. Accordingly, the allies made a decision to separate Kurdistan and Armenia from Turkey and make them two separate independant states.

According to articles 62-64 of the Sevres Peace Treaty the Kurds in Turkish Kurdistan were granted local autonomy and if within one year, they notified their desire to separate from Turkey, the Turkish authority must renounce its rights over all territories east of the Euphrates river. Moreover, adds the Treaty, "no objection would be raised by the principal allied powers to the voluntary adherence to such an independent Kurdish state of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has heitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet." (article 64)

The right of the Kurdish Nation to statehood was declared by the allied powers and was included in the International Sevres Peace Treaty. The Mosul

vilayet or southern Kurdistan was included in the proposed Kurdish state.

However, shortly after signing the Sevres Peace Treaty with Turkey on August 20, 1920, the governments of Britain and France changed their policies of dismantling Turkey and creating the two separate states of Kurdistan and Armenia and adopted new policy objectives for the whole Middle East. The British government, in particular, favored the establishment of a strong government for Turkey to rule over Anatolia and both Kurdistan and Armenia.

The reasons behind this shift of policy objectives are both political and economic. The discovery of oil in southern Kurdistan tempted the British government to bring Mosul vilayet under its control. The political reason lay in the success of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in establishing in Russia a socialist regime which was seen by the allies as a future threat to their interests in the Middle East and Indian subcontinent.

As a matter of fact, as early as 1920, a number of Soviet Groups, in Bolshevik style, were already formed among Christian communities in north-eastern Turkey and the northern part of Iran. These new political developments made it necessary for the military dictatorships of Turkey and Iran to maintain order and prevent the southward advance of the Bolsheviks. Consequently, General Mustafa Kamal was supported to become the sole ruler of Turkey and Colonel Mohamed Ridha Khan was chosen as the King of Persia. From that time on successive British governments adhered to the policy of ensuring the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran and the preservation of the status quo for the whole Middle East.

The discovery of oil in southern Kurdistan with its tremendous economic value inspired the British government to wrest Mosul vilayet from France to bring it under British Mandate. However, based on treaty rights, the French government insisted that Mosul vilayet should be included in the French sphere of influence. But the British government had already formulated "a new plan" for securing the oil interest. The British "new plan" was formulated by Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, and called for the following goals:

1. The idea of Kurdistan and Armenian independence to be abandoned
2. Mosul vilayet would be included in the proposed Arab Kingdom of Iraq to be formed from Baghdad and Basra wilayets and headed by an Arab King Amir Faisal
3. The Council of the League of Nations shall decide that Mosul Wilayet is to be included in the proposed Arab Kingdom of Iraq.
4. Kurds shall be distributed as minorities among the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq (under British mandate), and Syria (under French Mandate) to be used in check and balance manipula-

tion sometime known as "divide and rule"

Prime Minister Lloyd George personally interfered and used his influence with French President Clemenceau. He requested that France renounce its treaty rights at Mosul and agree to its inclusion in the British sphere of influence. Clemenceau accepted in principle Lloyd George's plans for removing Mosul from the French Zone in exchange for the promise to allow 25% French participation in Mesopotamian oil. This arrangement was finally concluded in the San Remo agreement of April 25, 1920, signed by Lloyd George on the British side and by Millerand Berthelot on the French side. On December 23, 1923, the decision taken by the Supreme Council in San Remo with regard to the division of the oriental mandate between Great Britain and France was completed by direct agreement of the two governments represented by Viscount Harding and M. Leyhues. (The proceedings of the meeting have never been published). A frontier line was established separating British mandates in Mesopotamia and Palestine from the French ones in Syria and Lebanon. In the North the line followed the Tigris from Jazira-ibn-Omar downwards to the frontier of the former vilayets of Diyarbakir and Mosul, and then inclined to the south following this latter frontier. In this way the vilayet of Mosul was left to the east outside of the French Mandate. (Minosky, Vladimir, *The Mosul Question*, p. 10)

The United States protected this secret wheeling and dealing between France and Britain on the oil of the Middle East. The United States was assured of a fair share of oil produced in the region. The secret negotiations between the allies for oil resulted in a formal treaty known as the San Remo agreement, signed at San Remo on April 24, 1920. According to this agreement the oil interests of the allies were distributed to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

France secured for herself 25% of the net output of the Mesopotamian oil or eventually a share of 25% in the company that might develop the Mesopotamian oilfield. That is the share that formerly belonged to the Germans. Later on it became known that, as an outcome of the negotiations between the United States and Great Britain the American group (The Standard Oil Co. of New York, The Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, The Mexican Petroleum Co., The Gulf Refining Co., and Sinclair Consolidated Oil (Company) and obtained 20-25% of total output. Under pressure from the British government, the Anglo-Persian company agreed to cede to these companies 25% out of its own share of 50%. (Minorsky, V. *The Mosul question* pp. 38-39).

As a result of the San Remo agreement of August 20, 1920, the policy objectives of France and Britain in the Middle East took a definite and permanent form. At a meeting of the British war cabinet in London, the new

British policy was reviewed and many important decisions were taken. A Foreign Office secret document refers in general terms to the meeting of the war cabinet but no details were disclosed about the discussion and the decisions that were taken.

However, following the meeting of the War Cabinet. The Foreign Office sent a telegram to the British High Commission in Iraq containing the following instructions, which are paraphrased:

1. Regarding the Kurdish and Armenian questions, we have decided to leave the fate of the Kurds and Armenians in the hands of the Turks. The consequences are known to us.
2. Mosul Vilayet shall be attached to the proposed Arab kingdom of Iraq under the sovereignty of King Faisal.
3. The Mosul question will be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, a formality the outcome of which is certain.
4. The Kurds in Iran remain within Iran. Any separatist movement shall not be encouraged.

The exact version of the telegram is available in the Foreign Office documents—secret section in the British museum.

TREATY OF LAUSANE

After the problem of sharing oil as settled to the satisfaction of all parties concerned and Greek forces were expelled from Western Anatolia, the stage was set for signing a new treaty with Turkey to replace the short-lived Sevres Treaty signed on August 20, 1920.

On July 24, 1923, the Lausanne Peace Treaty with Turkey was signed at Lausanne; in this treaty no mention was made of Kurds or Armenians. However, there was a stipulation in the treaty, stated in general terms, to safeguard and guarantee the rights of the minorities within Turkey. It should be observed that the provisions of the treaty of Lausanne conformed with or rather formalized, the policy objectives of France and Britain.

The final text of the Lausanne treaty (Art. 3) was as follows:

“The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

“In the event of no agreement being reached between the two governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred

to the Council of the League of Nations.”

The wording of the article 3 was ambiguous and this led to different interpretation by the representatives of Britain and Turkey. The Anglo-Turkish negotiation began in Istanbul on May 19, 1924 for the implementation of article 3 of the lausanne Peace Treaty and lasted until June 5, 1924. When Sir Percy Cot, British representative, presented a delination fronteier between Turkey and Iraq, Fethi Bey, Turkish representative, declared that he could not accept the frontier proposed by the British. Sir Percy concluded: “In these circumstances, I have already advised your excellency, I must, according to my instruction, put on end to the megorion and return to London” (Minorisky, V. The Mosul question, p. 13).

In a letter dated August 6, 1924 the British government demanded from the Council that, “the question regarding the frontier between Turkey and Iraq” be placed on the agenda of the 30th session of the Council of the League of Nations to be held in Brussel in October, 1924, that is in accordance with article 3 of the Lsuasanne Treaty. On November 17, 1924, the Council decided to appoint a special commission called “Commission of Enquirey of the league of Nations” to visit Mosul wilayet, enquire about the wishes of the population, and report to the council their suggestions and recommendations. The commissions visit to Mosul Wilayet lasted three months. On July 16, 1925, the Commission of Enquirey presented a lengthy and detailed report to the council of the league of nations. In the following we quote only the most relevant statements:

“It is well nigh impossible to summarize the mass of information contained in the report (XIII). Suffice it to quote the following characteristic statements:

1. “. . . As regards the period of Arab dominion . . . except for a few small districts the disputed area has never been included in “Iraq” (p. 26). As to later (European) sources these show “a fairly clear division into three areas according to which ‘Iraq Arabi does not extend further north than Hit-Tekrit or the Jebel-Hamrin district”¹
2. “The Kurds form the majority of the population. They are neither Turks nor Arabs. They speak an Aryan language . . . the only compact masses inhabiting large areas are the Kurds and the Arabs. These are the only two elements of the population of whose distribution advantage could be taken for the purpose of fixing a line which would separate different races. This line would follow the Tigris down to its confluence which the Lesser Zab – cutting off Mosul at its very gates from the

fertile and densely populated country. The necessary conclusion would be that an independent Kurdish State should be created, since the Kurds form five-eighths of the population" . . . (p. 57).

3. "There is no national 'Iraqi feeling in the disputed territory, except among a section of the Arabs who have some degree of education; and in their case it is rather an Arab feeling, with chauvinistic and often anti-alien tendencies. Among the Kurds we find a growing national consciousness, which is definitely Kurdish and not for 'Iraq;"
4. "1. The territory must remain under the effective mandate of the League of Nations for a period which may be put at 25 years.
"2. Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services."¹

¹Minorsky, v. The Mosul question, pp. 16, 17.

The Mockery of the Kurdish Autonomous Region*

*By Kak Homer**

It is a well established fact that the Iraqi regime is waging a war of genocide against the Kurdish people in Iraq. To cover up their horrible campaigns of destruction and extermination in southern Kurdistan the Baathist regime of Iraq is conducting a deceptive publicity campaign they try to show the world that the Kurds in Iraq are enjoying real autonomy in the Kurdish autonomous region, with two legislative and executive councils to direct Kurdish affairs.

In early September, 1989, the Iraqi press, radio, and television began to announce the coming election to the legislative council of the autonomous region. The date of the proposed election was set for September 9, 1989. As a matter of fact, a secret list of those who were supposed to be elected was secretly circulated among certain government officials who were ordered to secure enough votes for them. Officials of the government, the army, the police, and all who were on the government payroll were ordered to go out and vote for the secret list. However, things did not go the way the baathists wanted. All the Kurdish political parties and organizations ridiculed the phony election in this ostensible Kurdish autonomous region.

The Iraqi regime announced the results of the election and declared that President Saddam's party had won 30 out of 50 seats in the legislative council. The remaining 20 seats, it was announced, were won by two Kurdish parties which are carbon copies of the Arab Baathist party. Their members are on the payroll of the government. The Baathist regime had much to say via all the media about the election and the practice of democracy in southern Kurdistan.

Foreign journalists were invited by Iraq to attend the opening ceremony of the Legislative Council of the Kurdish autonomous region. The journalists were taken by a helicopter directly to Erbil city, the center of the autonomous region, by a special air route so that they would not see hundreds of black dots on the ground, the only traces left of what were once prosperous Kurdish villages and municipalities. They were taken back to Baghdad by the same route.

*Translated and condensed from the Kurdish Language.

However, the foreign journalists were not blinded by the phony show staged by Iraq about the Kurdish autonomous region. They were aware that the Iraqi regime has destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages in the rural area of southern Kurdistan. They knew too well that hundreds of thousands of Kurdish women and children are locked in prisons or in refugee concentration camps. A reliable source who was with them heard a foreign journalist saying: "This Baathist clique in Iraq is committing terrible crimes against their own citizens. Their accomplices in the west share responsibility for these terrible crimes."

When the foreign journalists were about to leave Baghdad airport, the Iraqi security arrested Mr. Bazoft, 31, who works for the liberal weekly Observer of London. Thus the journalists acquired first hand experience of how people in Iraq are arbitrary arrested and made to disappear without a trace. When the journalists were safely out of Iraqi reach, they openly and frequently commented that "Iraq is ruled by a bunch of thugs and hired killers".

On October, 18, 1989, the Baghdad daily Al-Jumhuriyah, commenting on the Kurdish autonomous region, presented speeches delivered by president and leader, Saddam Hussein, during his audience with the president and members of the executive council of the Kurdish autonomous region they made it seem as though serving our nation in Kurdistan was like serving Iraq from one end to the other.

In an article which covered two full pages of Al-Jumhuriyah President Saddam was shown watching the swearing ceremonies of the eight members of the executive council. In another enlarged picture in the middle of the second page, President Saddam was shown flanked by the eight members of the executive council dressed in "popular work uniforms".

The Baathist regime is staging this phony show in the Kurdish autonomous region at this time to pacify spokesmen of international media who are building up pressure against the Iraqi regime. The regime is accused not only of human rights violations but also of a campaign of genocide against its own citizens.

Looking back to the origin of the new plan for Kurdish autonomy we find that a plan for the Kurdish autonomous region was embodied in the peace agreement of March 11, 1970, signed by the Kurdish leadership and the present Baathist regime of Iraq. According to the provisions signed on March 11, 1970, an autonomous Kurdish region should be created from those areas, which are inhabited by the Kurdish majority. This was to be called the Kurdish autonomous region. With two main institutions, the legislative council to serve as the local parliament and the executive council to perform the function of a local cabinet to direct Kurdish affairs within the framework of the republic of Iraq.

In the areas of the Kurdish autonomous region, the duty and respon-

sibility of both the legislative and executive councils was to be defined by a law called "the law of the autonomous region" to be enacted at the end of the four years peace period beginning from March 11, 1970 and ending in March 11, 1974. The plan for creating "the Kurdish autonomous region", therefore, was agreed upon in the March 11, 1970 Peace agreement.

The four years peace period between March 11, 1970 and March 11, 1974 were devoted to negotiation and implementation of the March 11, 1970 peace agreement. The peace agreement included a condition that at the end of the fourth year, that is in March 11, 1974, the "law of the autonomous region shall be enacted and all the institutions of the autonomous region must be completed."

However, the negotiations dragged on without any positive results. The Baathist regime of Iraq was never serious in implementing the provisions of the March 11, 1970 agreement. When they came to power, for the second time, on July 30, 1968, they were weak and needed time to establish their control over Iraq and the army. They signed on March 11, 1970 to gain time to rearm the Iraqi army and prepare their wicked scheme of forming internal and external coalitions against the Kurds.

In the course of the negotiation, serious disagreements arose regarding the boundaries of the autonomous region and the sharing of oil revenue. The situation in southern Kurdistan became tense and frequent armed clashes took place between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Pesh Merga forces. By the time of the fourth anniversary of March 11, the negotiations were deadlocked. The Baathist regime, which had completed all necessary preparations to resume another war against the Kurds, decided to impose its own unilateral political solution. On March 11, 1974, President Ahmed Hassan Bakir of Iraq announced on Baghdad television what he called "the law of the Kurdish autonomous region". According to this law an autonomous Kurdish region would be created with two houses of legislative and executive councils to direct the Kurdish affairs within the framework of Iraq.

The provisions of the law, the areas to be included in the autonomous region, the duty and responsibilities of the legislative and executive councils were unilaterally decided by the Baathist regime without Kurdish participation or even consultation. The Kurdish leadership was asked to sign the law and co-operate with the Iraqi government in implementing its provisions. The Kurdish leadership rejected the Baathist autonomous law because it included only half of the area of southern Kurdistan.

In April 1974, the Baathist regime of Iraq resumed an all out war against the Kurds. However, Iraq's spring offensive ended in a complete disaster because the Kurdish Pesh Merga forces were equipped this time with some offensive weapons and the Iranian armed forces actively participated behind the scenes in fighting against the Iraqi army.

The Iraqi army was treacheriously ordered to advance in deep snow, under heavy bombardment from Iranian artillery, and lighting attack of the Kurdish Pesh Merga forces. In the course of one year's fighting, the Iraqi army lost an estimated 10,000 soldiers and 745 officers. The Iraqi army became completely demoralized and discontent against Saddam was openly expressed. Mr. Saddam had no choice but to submit.

Secret negotiation had been going on for some times through third party. Talks between Mr. Saddam and the Shah resulted in the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975. According to this Agreement The Shah promised to cut off his support for the Kurdish national movement and to close Iran's border in the face of the Pesh Merga. On his part Mr. Saddam signed at the Shah dictated to him.

However the Algiers Agreement had disastrous consequences for the Kurdish people. The Kurdish leadership in a major error of judgment or sheer betrayal of the Kurds, decided to abandon the fight against Iraq and unconditionally surrender with all Pesh Merga forces to Iran.

When the Kurdish Pesh Merga forces left the field and no longer existed in southern Kurdistan to resist the Iraqi army and defend the countryside the Iraqi army moved in. The Iraqi regime took control of the Kurdish Region for the first time since 1962. In the absence of the Kurdish resistance forces the Baathist regime had a free hand to dominate and delineate the autonomous region according to their wicked plan.

From 1918 until 1975 the boundaries of the old administrative units in southern Kurdistan was divided into 4 provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimanira, plus the two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali. The two provinces of Erbil and Sulaimanira are located deep inside southern Kurdistan. The Baathist regime, therefore, could not possibly detach any of their districts and allocate them for depopulation and Arabization. The two provinces of Erbil, with an area of 15,315 square kilometers and Sulaimanira with an area of 11,993 were included in the autonomous region.

The Baathist regime targeted the two provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk and the two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali for depopulation and Arabization. The following table I shows the districts of the two provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk and their areas in square kilometers. This is how the Baathist regime distributed those districts which belong to Mosul and Kirkuk provinces. On the 8 districts of Mosul province, only the four districts of Duhok, Akra, Amadia, and Zakho were included in the autonomous region. These four districts, with a total area of 9,926 sq. kilometers were formed into a new province by the name of Duhok which was included in the autonomous region. The remaining four districts of Mosul district centre, Sinjar, Shikhan, and Tel'afar with a total area of 15,642 sq. kilometers, were included within the Arab province of Mosul and were targeted for depopulation and

Arabization.

The districts of Kirkuk province. The district of Chamchamal was separated from Kirkuk province and added to Sulaimania province. A small county by the name of Kalar which belonged to Kifri district and was located in its northeastern part, was promoted to the district level and added to Sulaimanira province.

Of the five districts of the Kirkuk province, only one district, Chamchamal, with an area of 2,329 sq. kilometers, and a newly formed district of Kalahr, with an area of 2,474 sq kilometers, were added to Sulaimanira province and thus included in the autonomous region.

The four districts of Kirkuk centre, Hawija, Toozkhormato, and Kifri remained within the province of Kirkuk and were targeted for depopulation and Arabization.

The two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali with the total area of 9,937 sq. kilometers remained within the Arab province of Diyala and were targeted for Arabization.

In the following tables we present the names and the areas in sq. kilometers of those provinces and districts which were included in the autonomous region for comparison with those provinces and districts which were targeted for depopulation and Arabization.


TABLE 1

<i>PROVINCE</i>	<i>DISTRICTS</i>	<i>AREAS IN SQUARE KILOMETERS</i>
MOSUL	1. MOSUL DISTRICT CENTRE	5791
	2. SINJAR	3961
	3. SHIKHAN	1369
	4. TELAFAR	4648
	5. DUHOK	2094
	6. AQRA	2773
	7. AMADIA	2947
	8. ZAKHO	2085
		<hr/> 25,668 sq. kilometers
KIRKUK	1. KIRKUK DISTRICT CENTRE	4317
	2. KIFRI	4670
	3. HAWIJA	3242
	4. CHAMCHEMAL	2329
	5. TOOZKHORMATU	4985
		<hr/> 19,543 sq. kilometers
<i>THE TWO DISTRICTS OF KHANIQIN AND MANDALI</i>	1. KHANIQIN	3789
	2. MANDALI	6148
		<hr/> 9,937 sq. kilometers

TABLE 2

<i>AUTONOMOUS REGION PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS</i>	<i>AREAS IN SQ KLMTRS</i>	<i>DEPOPULATION AND ARABIZATION- PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS</i>	<i>AREAS IN SQ. KLMTRS</i>
Sulaimania Province	11,99	Mosul Province Mosul Centre District	5,791
Chamchamal District	2,329	Sinjar	3,961
Kalar District	2,474	Shikhan	1,369
Erbil Province	15,31	Tel'afar	4,648
			15,769
Duhok Province	9,92		
Duhok District		Kirkuk Province	
Aqra District		Kirkuk district centre	,317
Amadice District		Kifri	
Zakho District		Hawija	3,240
		Toozkhormatu	4,985
	—		
	—		
Total	42,02	Total	17,214
		<i>The two districts of:</i>	
		Khaniqin	3,789
		Mandali	6,148
		Total	40,466

The conclusion follows that about half of the areas of southern Kurdistan were included in the autonomous region. The other half were detached from the autonomous region and were targeted for depopulation and Arabization.




Phony Legislative Council Members
of the
Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq
September, 1989

In terms of vested authority and power, the legislative and executive councils of the Kurdish autonomous region have none. They are autonomous in name only. The two councils perform the function of rubber stamps to approve whatever the central authority in Baghdad dictates to them. Since their establishment on March 11, 1974, no Kurdish political parties, organizations, or individuals of exceptional personal integrity have participated in the two councils.

The members of both councils have been weak and suspicious elements who have had connections with the Baath one way or another. The Kurds look at them with scorn and contemps. They describe the members of the two councils as those who have "swallowed the Baathist green pills" to make them evil. They are called derogatory names such as "tail of the Baath", "lucky of the Baath" and "illegitimate Kurds" who can put people in jail but cannot take one single person out of prison.

An interesting description of the qualities of the members of the legislative and executive councils was given by Mr. Salim Fakhri, one of the most respected Iraqi leaders and a former colonel in the Iraqi army. In his address before the International Conference on: "The Kurds—Human Rights and Cultural Identity", held in Paris on October 15, 16, 1989, Mr. Fakhri stated that "the only solution for Iraq's problem is the establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq where the Kurds have their full true autonomy and all Iraqi people have their human and democratic rights. In speaking about the current members of the legislative and executive councils of the so called Kurdish autonomous region he stated that—"statistics show that 20% are illiterate, all of them are loyal to the Arab Baath Socialist Party, More than 90% have less than high school, and 30% have not finished elementary school . . . etc."



no 7

Areas of Kurdish Autonomous region and areas targeted for Arabization.

- +++ Traditional boundary between Kurds and Arabs
- Boundary of the former mosul wilayet.
- The areas of so called Kurdish autonomous region
- ▨ The areas targeted for Arabization.

Number and Distribution of the Kurdish Refugees

The mass exodus of the Kurdish refugees has resulted from Iraq's chemical bomb offensive and from the genocide campaign of the Iraqi army in the rural areas of southern Kurdistan in Iraq. The majority of the Kurdish refugees are located in Iraq itself, mainly in the desert of the southern part of Iraq. There are an estimated 1,500,000 Kurds (men, woman, and children) who are now confined in prison or detained in concentration camps in Iraq. The next largest number of Kurdish refugees are living in the two neighboring countries of Iran and Turkey.

Turkey

The Number of Kurdish refugees in Turkey was estimated to be 36,000 distributed in three refugee camps in southern turkey. The first refugee camp is in Kiziltepe near the town of mardin where 15,000 refugees live including 8,000 children. The second camp is near the town of mus where 8,000 refugees live. The third camp is near the city of Diyarbakin which has 12,975 refugees. Since June, 1990 a number of these refugees were forced to go back to Iraq. According to Kurdish sources the total number of Kurdish refugee in the three refergee camps in Turkey now is 27,000. In the three fefugee camps in Turkey there are about 2,000 Kurdish orphans whose parents were killed during Iraq's attack on Zakho triangle district in the period between August 25 to September 15, 1989.

The Kurdish refugees in Turkey are living under very rough and difficult conditions. The Turkish government has refused so far to give refugee status to these Kurdish refugees or allow the internatinal agencies to provide assistance to them. Both the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the International Red Cross have offered to help the Kurdish refugees but the Turkish government rfused to give them permission to do so. The United States Congress has allocated 10 million dollars financial assistance to Kurdish refugees in Turkey. However, despite continual efforts by the United States congress, the Turkish authorities have not given permission for this aid to reach the Kurdish refugees. Let us hope the Turkish government changes its policy, for humanitarian reasons and allows the international agencies to provide material and health assistance to these Kurdish refugees who are living under the most miserable conditions.

THE KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN

The total number of Kurdish refugees in Iran is estimated at 546,000 persons. The majority began to arrive in Iran in 1972. However, the main body arrived in three ways: The first wave started when the Iraqi regime commenced large scale expulsion of the Faili Kurds in Baghdad and Khaniqin in 1972. The second and the largest followed the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975 and the decision of the Kurdish leadership to abandon the fight and surrender to Iran with all the Kurdish fighting forces. The third and most recent wave resulted from the genocide campaign of the Iraqi army by means of chemical bombardment and extermination campaign following Iraq's cease fire with Iran on August 22, 1988.

REFUGEE CAMPS IN IRAN

All Kurdish refugee camps are located in the Kurdish-inhabited areas in the west and south-west of Iran. They are situated in the three provinces of west Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Bakhtiyaran (Kurmanshah). However, the majority of the refugees live in the province of west Azerbaijan in the following refugee camps: Zewa, Khoi, Dalmas, Ushnu, Naghada, Sardasht, and Urmia.

In the Kurdistan province the refugees live in camps in Saqiz, Bana, and Merywan.

In the Bakhtiyaran Kurmanshah Province the refugees live in the camp at Ramsar.

The Faili Kurds in Iran are in three main refugee camps: The first camp is called Azri, located in Luristan, which is devoted to families. The second camp is called Jahram, near Shiraz, which is also devoted to families. The camp Amar, near Khuramabad, is allocated to young males only. The bulk of faili refugees are scattered in Iranian cities where they work and in live.

DISTRIBUTION OF KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAQ

In Iraq, there are 1,500,000 Kurdish refugees who were forcibly evacuated from their homes and villages and thrown either into prison or confined to refugee concentration camps which the Iraqi regime deceptfully calls "residential complexes". Of this total, 1 million Kurdish refugees were transferred to prisons and refugee concentration camps in the southern part of Iraq. About 500,000 Kurdish refugees are detained in concentration camps in the northern part of Iraq.

In southern Iraq the Kurds are confined in two main prisons: 1-Nigrat Salman, 2-Arar. Nigrat Salman is the oldest and the biggest prison in Iraq. It used to be the detention center for Iraqi Communists. It is a maximum security prison located deep in the desert of south west Iraq. Arar is a vast prison which was established by the present Baathist regime. It is located in the desert in the southwestern corner of the country, near the borders of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

In the northwestern part of Iraq there are four prisons for the Kurds: 1-Faluja, 2-Al-Habaniya (Lake Habaniya), 3-Rumadi, 4-near Akashat where the second Iraqi chemical bomb factory is located.

Close to Baghdad city, a number of Kurds are imprisoned in Al-Haqil Al-Haywani (The animal farm), some 25 kilometers southwest of Baghdad city.

In northern Iraq, the Kurdish inhabited region, there are 7 refugee concentration camps. In Sulaimania province there is one refugee concentration camp near Arbat municipality, some 30 kilometers east of Sulaimania city. When the beautiful town of Halabja was attacked by chemical bomb on March 16, 17, 1988, most of its inhabitants escaped to Iran. About 35,000 of them returned to Iraq and were transferred by the Iraqi army to Arbat refugee concentration camp. And, when the Iraqi army razed the town of Halabja to the ground in mid June, 1989, all of its inhabitants were brought by the Iraqi army to Arbat refugee concentration camps. The population of the rural areas surrounding Halabja were also brought to Arbat after their villages were burned and destroyed by the Iraqi army.

Also in Sulaimania province there are about 80,000 refugees who are living in makeshift habitations along the 110 kilometer highway between Sulaimania and Kirkuk cities. These makeshift habitations are dug in the ground and covered with a piece of plastic and they serve as living quarters for a family. These "makeshift dwellers" are from the population of the prosperous Kurdish towns of Qala Diza and Rania, and their surrounding rural areas. They were forcibly evacuated by the Iraqi army in the late June, 1989.

However, the majority of the population of Qala Diza and Rania towns and their surrounding rural areas were transferred to Erbil city, where they were distributed along the highway between Erbil and Mosul cities.

In Kirkuk province there are three refugee concentration camps located in Haweja, Bainchan, and Dibis.

In Mosul province there is one main refugee concentration camp at Salamia, near Mosul city.

In Erbil province there are three main refugee concentration camps located in the following places:

- (1) Bahrka: located in the village of Bahrka in the Gardi

Tribesome 30 kilometers from Erbil city.

- (2) Gezhnikan: located some 25 kilometers south of Erbil city.
- (3) Qosh Tapa: located 15 kilometers south of Erbil city on the Erbil-Kirkuk highway.

In addition to these three main refugee concentration camps there are 5 more refugee concentration camps in Erbil province which the Iraqi regime calls "Residential Complexes". It must be observed that when the Iraqi army forcibly transferred the inhabitants of Qala Diza and Ramia towns and their surrounding rural areas, some 100,000 of them were taken to intern camps near Sulaimanira city and at a later date were dispersed in makeshift dwellings along Sultaimania-Kirkuk highway. However, the majority of the population of Qala Diza and Rania were brought by army convoys to Erbil city where they were distributed to the following refugee concentration camps along Erbil Mosul highway:

- (1) New Khabat—located in the county of Khabat in the Kalaki Yasin Agha some 2 kilometers from the Erbil-Mosul highway.
- (2) New Zab—located about 5 kilometers from Erbil-Mosul highway.
- (3) Kozik—located about 5 kilometers from Erbil-Mosul highway.
- (4) Tobizawa—located about 3 kilometers from Erbil-Mosul highway.
- (5) Danatosh—close to Erbil city itself it is devoted to those Kurds who have had connections with the Iraqi regime.

The following table shows the numbers and distribution of the Kurdish refugees in the Middle Eastern Countries and abroad.


COUNTRY

Iraq	1 Million	Kurdish refugees are in prisons in the southern Iraq. These are the names of the prisons where they are confined: 1) Nigrat Salman 2) Arar 3) Faluja 4) HabaNiya 5) Rumadi 6) Akashat 7) Haqil Al-Haywani (Southwest of Baghdad) 8) Rutba.
	500,000	Displaced persons confined to more than a dozen concentration camps which the Iraqi regime deceptively calls "Modern Residential complexes". Most of these concentration camps are located in the Northern part of Iraq.
Iran	546,000	Out of this total, 400,000 are Faili Kurds (see distribution of Kurdish refugees in Iran).
Turkey	35,000	Distributed on three refugee camps in Southern Turkey. They are: 1) Refugee camp near Diyarbakir city (12,000), In Mardin town (15,000), in Muss (8,000).

THE KURDISH REFUGEES ABROAD

West Germany	35,000	This figure indicates the total number of Kurds in West Germany. We do not know how many of these belong to the recent Kurdish refugee exodus.
France	10,000	Total number of Kurds in France. How many of these are classified as refugees is currently under the study.
Greece	60,000	
Sweden	14,000	
Norway	800	
Belgium	11,000	
Denmark	1,000	
England	3,000	
Canada	3,000	
U.S.A.	2,000	
Australia	11,000	
Total	150,000	

In Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, there are an estimated 2,081,000 Kurdish refugees and displaced persons. In Europe, Northern America, and Australia, there are about 150,800 Kurdish refugees.



no 8

Showing distribution of the Kurdish refugees in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

- Prison for the Kurds in Iraq
- Concentration camps in Iraq
- ▲ Refugee camps in Iran and Turkey

The Poisoning of the Kurdish Refugees in Kiziltepe Camp Near Mardin in Turkey

By A Western Reporter—Young Lady

Living in 2,200 tents in Kiziltepe camp are 15,000 Kurdish refugees from Iraq. Among them are 8,000 children.

I was in Kiziltepe camp the first weekend in June, 1989. I walked through the camp in the company of one policeman and several Kurdish leaders. I talked to and listened to many of the refugees, but the policeman stopped me when I wanted to take pictures of the people I was talking to. Later on it was possible for me to take pictures by the entrance to the camp and around the police station where thousands of Kurdish men and boys had gathered. Of all the people I met in this camp there was nobody who smiled. I had several hundred packages of chewing gum which I gave to the children. Nobody smiled. I got a frisbee out of my bag and threw it to some bigger boys. One of them threw it back to me. Nobody smiled. I spent hours talking to the Kurdish leaders of Kiziltepe camp and I learned why nobody in that camp ever smiled. These people lived in fear. They had fled from the chemical bombings and total destruction of their villages. They probably had imagined that they would be safe on the Turkish side of the border. But after one year in this huge tent camp they knew that none of them was safe. Four hundred of the refugees had died, mostly children. They were buried in the corner of the camp. Day by day more people would die.

And then among them were men from Iraq secret police, right in the camp. Traitors, pretending to be Kurds, listening and reporting. And official Iraqi envoys who tried to talk the refugees into returning to the country where they had suffered and lost so many relatives and friends. Fear was in every man's soul and their eyes mirrored their feelings of total hopelessness. One year had gone by and no country had offered a home and a job to a single one of the 40,000 refugees in Turkey.

I talked to the leaders of the camp and tried to encourage them. "You can not give up hope, you must be optimistic, because all the people in the camp are looking up to you, you are the leaders. Put a calm, confident expression on your face and don't let them know the despair in your heart," I said. I took some pictures around the police house but avoided getting the big bulldozer on my photos. "Why do you have the bulldozer here?" I asked

the chief of police. He didn't answer. A truck came to pick up the garbage and left, headed towards Mardin. A line of people had been standing outside the side door to the police station for four hours and the door to the medicine storage had not been opened. A young man among the refugees who was called "doctor" showed me the shelves of medication. I was impressed until I realized that there were price tags on the medicines. Of course none of the refugees had any money.

That day hundreds of questions were asked, by them and by me. Why doesn't UNHCR come to our rescue? Why doesn't the Red Cross help us? I was repeatedly embarrassed because I had no answers to their questions. They had, however, answers to all of mine. They informed me about how many families there were, how many children, how little the food rationing was, how bad the water, how difficult to live directly on the dirt in the tents. How the children had frozen to death last winter, how seldom the water was turned on. How difficult to live directly on the dirt in the tents. How the children had frozen to death last winter, how seldom the water was turned on. How difficult it was to get permission to leave the camp. After all the bus ride to town cost 5,000 lira and who could afford that? They told me about the schools they had started and been forced to close on the Governor's order. And they told me about their hopes that Western countries would offer them a place to live.

When at last I had to leave the Kiziltepe camp I cried for all the little sad children and all the desperately unhappy women and men who suffered in this Godforgotten place.

I did not realize it then, but I was told later that Gazi Atrochi was in the camp that day. Mr. Atrochi is a poison expert who works for the Iraqi Government.

Two days after I left Turkey a baker delivered poisoned bread to the camp.

On June 10th I got a telephone call from one of the people I knew in Kiziltepe. "We have been poisoned," he said, "we need physicians and medicine. On Thursday thousands of people got terrible pains and many fainted after eating. As we have only one ambulance here we carried the sick people to the road and begged passing private cars to take our children to the Mardin hospital—some of the police helped us. We asked for milk which we have not seen here in camp, thinking that the milk would neutralize the poison. But they didn't give us milk. I went to the hospital in Mardin and I was there when orders came to return all the sick people to the camp. Soldiers stamped into the hospital and pulled the IVs out of the people's hands so that they bled. They brought all the people back to the camp except some that were in a room with the door locked. They laid all the poisoned people out on the ground around the police house and physicians walked around and gave shots to people. Our own doctor tried to stop them from giving

shots, saying it would make the people worse. The police beat him to pulp. We had at least hundred people who were in a coma and some still are. We need help immediately." The fact is that the refugees in Kiziltepe were poisoned and did not get the help they needed until the news were out. Then some of the worst cases were brought to the clinic at the University of Diyarbakir.

I was shocked and almost unbelieving. It could not be true! These sad, unhappy little children could not have been exposed to poison, at least not deliberately poisoned?

The camp was closed off. Nobody could go out, nobody could go in. Policemen searched every tent and every person and removed pieces of bread which refugees had saved in order to get them tested for poison. It was brutal, thorough search.

The refugees themselves did not eat anything for three days. There could be poison in anything. How could they tell?

When I returned to Turkey and Kiziltepe I was not allowed into the camp. I was not even allowed to stand outside of the camp. And I was definitely forbidden to TALK to anybody in the camp.

Why did the authorities order that I should not be allowed to talk to the refugees? What were they afraid of?

In spite of their efforts to keep me away I was able to talk to a few people who work in the camp. And I visited the people who were still in the hospital in Diyarbakir A MONTH AFTER THE POISONING.

The Turkish Government informed the people from UN when they inquired about the poisoned in Kiziltepe that "it was only the yeast that was bad . . . and everybody was well the following day." Another Government source supposedly said that "the Kurds were hysterical, there was nothing wrong with them."

Remember that the Turkish Government stated that "no poison gas has been used against the Kurds in Iraq" when wounded refugees already were in Turkey.

Most people I have talked to in Turkey seem to think that it was a deliberate poisoning aimed at either killing or frightening the refugees. If the intention was killing, why didn't people die? Maybe there is a plausible explanation?

Blood and urine has been taken from people who were ill from the poisoning. In the samples which were brought to England a very potent poison was found.



Kurdish Refugees in Kiziltepe Camp
in Mardin South of Turkey

Among the people I met in Kiziltepe Refugee Camp in Turkey

I remember a Kurdish mother, Gulla

By A Western Reporter-Young Lady

She is so young and beautiful, Gulla. She shouldn't be a desolate place like this camp near the little Turkish town of Kiziltepe. But she is. She is standing in front of me with her head high and her back straight outside the dirty makeshift tent that has been her home since August 1988. It is now June 1989.

Gulla's dress is of thin, pink material, flowing in the light breeze. She has a pink scarf around her head and her shalvar are red. Her unbraided dark hair is falling down her back to her waist. She is holding a little girl on her arm and a small boy in torn pants is standing beside her. He has turned his face towards me and is looking at me with large, serious eyes.

Gulla is upset. She is talking very fast, knowing that she has only a few minutes to relate her message to me. She doesn't seem to be afraid of the Turkish policeman who is trying to get me to continue down the path among the 2,200 tents. I am ready with my camera, I want a picture of Gulla and her children. But the police grabs me by the arm, shakes his head: "Yok yok!" No, no!

Gulla wants me to understand, really understand, how it feels to live in a camp like this. In this dirt, in this stench, in this hell! Where there is no clean water and no suitable food for the small children. To live here and know that there is no hope of ever getting out alive!

"I wish that we all had been killed when they bombed our village," she screams, "It would have been better than THIS!" And her free arm makes a wide circle over the drab, dirty, stinking tent camp.

Again the policeman is trying to get me to move on, but my feet are securely planted in the brown dirt and I am surrounded by Kurdish men in brown overalls and black and white turbans. They stand there like human wall between me and the policeman.

I stand there, spell bound, listening to this young woman.

She tells me that when they fled from the chemical bombs in Iraq they were carrying her four small children. Gulla, her husband Azad, and his

parents and the children were already on their way up the hills when the bombs fell. They had left their village the day before and were able to witness the bombing from a fairly safe distance.

"There were no loud detonations," she says, "just muffled sounds when the bombs exploded. And then the mist covered our village. There was a cloud floating towards us and it smelled like apples. Some bombs let out a yellow mist, others an ash-gray mist."

In the village, all their relatives and friends, and the livestock just fell down, in a matter of minutes they were all dead. Gulla and her family could not return to bury them, they had a hurry away. They walked and walked until they had to stop because they all felt sick and vomited.

For many days they walked in the night and slept during the day, fleeing across the mountains, carrying the crying children.

It was a long hike before they reached safety and crossed over the Turkish border.

Now Gulla and Azad, his parents and the children, have been living in this tent for almost a year. After three months Gulla's youngest, a little baby boy, died. "I couldn't nurse him," she says, "I had no milk for him. He starved to death. He didn't cry. He never cried, he just lay there and looked at me. My baby!"

Gulla is sobbing and we stand around her in helpless anger.

But she has more to tell. Desperately fast she describes last winter when it was very cold for several months. They had to sleep directly on the ground, they had no mattress and no carpet. They would all lie down close together, holding the children in their arms to keep them warm.

Still they couldn't save their two-year-old son. He died eight months after their arrival in Kiziltepe camp. Both children were laid to rest in the northwestern corner of the camp where now 400 children are buried.

"They lost their hair," says Gulla and tears are streaming down her cheeks. "Their beautiful hair! My little boys were very, very ill."

I want to comfort her, to touch her hand, to say something, but the policeman pulls me away. He is angry now.

I will always remember Gulla. The way who stood there outside her tent with her daughter on her arm. The little girl was so malnourished, that she couldn't stand up by herself. Gulla had dared to talk and voice the feelings of the refugees in Kiziltepe.

Through her I learned more about the tragedy of the Kurdish people, about the inhuman suffering and the indestructible courage of the Kurdish woman. She taught me like nobody else before had been able to do. That day she gave me an incentive to keep working and never give up, until all the Kurdish refugees in all the camps are in a safe place.

A few days after my visit to Kiziltepe, I was informed that the refugees

had been poisoned, several thousand were ill. There had been poison put in their bread. I thought of all the people in Kiziltepe but worried specially about Gulla's two little thin and pale children.

I heard nothing about gulla and her family until last fall [when I met her aunt in a free western country. The woman had fled from Iraq and was now safe with her son. I was shocked when she told me that Gulla, Azad, his parents and the two children had been in the group of refugees who had returned to Iraq! "Why?" I asked.

Well, Gulla had wanted to go to her mother who lived in Erbil. Knowing that their own house was destroyed, she hoped that they all would be able to live with her mother. The Iraqi agents who came to Kiziltepe camp had promised the refugees that they would be welcome back to Iraq, and well taken care of, and that they had nothing to fear. Still, Gulla had said to one of her friends in Kiziltepe before she left:

"I know that we might be imprisoned or killed when we return to Iraq. **BUT THEY MIGHT SPARE THE CHILDREN!** Here in Kiziltepe my children don't have a chance. The two I have left will die from starvation, disease or poison. I want my children to live even if I have to die!"

So Gulla and her family left Kiziltepe to go back "home".

But as soon as they crossed over the border to Iraq, the men were separated from the women and children. Gulla's husband and his parents were put in prison. Nobody knows what happened to them.

Gulla, herself, never got to go home to her mother in Erbil. She and her two sickly little children were sent to a Farawat place in southern Iraq and there has been no word or message from her. When talking to Gulla's mother on the telephone, her aunt could not get any other information than: Gulla is far away. We don't know where they took her. We will never see her again." And the mother wept.

Gulla, I want you to know that you are in my thoughts. I believe that you have the strength that will carry you through. You are young and you are strong enough to fight for the two children you have left. You are one of the millions of Kurdish mothers who are ready to give their own live in order to save their children. Gulla, you know that your own mother brought up her children alone when your father was killed. You know that both your grandmothers did the same. Do you remember how your mother used to walk you to school with a gun over her shoulder?

You are strong, Gulla. Like so many Kurdish mothers who are as strong as the mountains in Kurdistan when it comes to defending their children.

A KURDISH REFUGEE IN LONDON PRISON BURNED HIMSELF TO DEATH RATHER THAN GO BACK TO TURKEY

On October 8, 1989, the London Observer and the London newspaper "The Independent" reported that two Kurdish refugees from Turkey in Hamondsworth detention center near Heathrow Airport attempted suicide by setting themselves on fire after "they were served with removal orders for their return to Turkey." The two Kurdish refugees were 26 years old. Sixo Lyiguven and, Dogan Arslan, two men from Kurdistan in Turkey who fled to England in June, 1989, when visas were not required for travelers from Turkey. But the requirement was introduced at a later date.

The two refugees suffered torture in a Turkish prison and are both wanted by the Turkish police. The Observer wrote: "Mr. Lyiguven who has been arrested on several occasions in Turkey was accused of association with left wing groups. In detention he was severely beaten on the head and systematically on the soles of his feet. Blows to his jaw had made it difficult for him to chew."

"The other burned man, Arslan, has also been detained and abused on many occasions, beginning when he was a 14-year old schoolboy. He was a target for semi-official right-wing paramilitary forces because his uncle was the founder of a banned communist youth organization. The uncle has been executed. Mr. Arslan had been in hiding since 1987."

"On Wednesday, October, 1989, the two refugees received an order of deportation to Turkey. Consequently, they became frightened and extremely depressed. Since their arrival in London, doctors and psychiatrists for the London-based Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture had twice examined Mr. Lyiguven and their reports were delivered to immigration officials. Both reports found that he suffered from the effects of severe beatings inflicted before he fled Turkey and the first medical reports, made on August 22, stated: "He has suicidal thoughts due to his deep fear of being returned to Turkey." "When interviewed by the immigration service he said that only his dead body would be sent back to Turkey."

Medical Foundation Psychiatrist, Dr. Caroline Grost-Unsworth, who examined him on September 13, said: "He was extremely depressed and had nightmares about going back. He found difficulty in remembering specific events and had little concentration. He was confused, agitated and preoccupied with deep mental depression over the prospects of his return to Turkey."

"I see many many refugees as distressed as him, and more so, even more fearful of being sent back, and it is only a matter of time before more of them do what he did. But I have to say that to him, suicide was not the manifestation of a mental illness, it was his decision that he would rather

die than be sent back.” (John Merritt, Scandal of the Forgotten Refugees)

When the two refugees were “served with removal orders for their return to Turkey” they both decided to die rather than face another torture in Turkish prison. Both was to have been sent back to Turkey on October 7, 1989.

“About 2 p.m. on Thursday, the men barricaded themselves into a room in Hamondsworth, piled four highly-flammable mattresses and bedding around themselves and set the pyre alight. The home office has refused to release details of the incident, saying that they are building an enquiry into the circumstances. But other Kurdish refugees, among the 25 who were being held in the detention center, have given the Observer detailed accounts of what happened.”

“Another of the refugees, Hassan, said: “They had been very depressed and had refused food. We saw the smoke coming from room 19 and the guard shouted at us to help them break down the door. It was locked and barricaded from inside. We rammed it with the extinguisher, again and again, and we made a hole through the thick wood.

“We saw them through the hole, they were burning, screaming, and one was like a bull, he threw himself against the window. It was very hard, strong glass, but we saw him break it with his body. It tore his arm, from there even, we could see his bone. The room was all in fire.”

Hammonds security guards got the men out through the window and, in panic, other detainees rushed outside. One refugee, Salman, said: We did not recognize our friends, they were like black men, their bodies were smoking. They were screaming in pain and it was half an hour before the ambulances came. We were in shock, we were screaming too. Refugees were shouting “Doctor, Doctor.”

Lyiguven was taken to Mount Vernon Hospital, North-West London, suffering from 60 percent burns. He is on life support and is not expected to live. Arslan, who suffered 30 percent burns, was taken to Stoke Mandeville Hospital where his condition was last night described as poor. Mr. Lyiguven died from his burns on Sunday, October 8, 1989. Mr. Anslan is still under treatment.

“Several hours after the two men set themselves on fire, 13 Kurdish refugees in Hammondsworth were suddenly released, without explanation, and allowed to stay with refugee agencies and friends while the home office decides whether to send them back. They described the mood of the 10 who remain in detention where another Kurdish man tried on overdose on Friday morning. Bringing to five, the number of suicide attempts by Kurdish refugees in custody during the last two weeks.”

One freed refugee said: “They are frightened so much I can’t describe. When we left they were crying, men as well. Everyone is in shock and in a terrible state. They don’t know what will heppen to them. The man who

tried to kill himself, the officers had tried to get him on a plane already, but he went mad and they couldn't control him. "If I am sent back I will face torture and depressions again and I would die. I am a wanted person in Turkey. We have been forced to leave our homes and villages. Since our childhood we hear that Great Britain is the cradle of democracy, decency and freedom; now we find the truth."

"Mrs. Helen Bamber, director of the Medical Foundation, said: "The Kurds are a dignified people but now what we are witnessing is terrible. The ones not held in detention are filling our offices. They are openly weeping and contemplating methods of suicide." (John Merritt)

The London newspaper "The Independent" provided the following details about the Kurdish refugees in England, which we paraphrase:

Following the incident the Home office released 25 Kurds seeking political asylum in Britain from the detention center. 70 other Kurds were released from Haslan Detention Center, near Gosport, Hampshire. 18 were released from Gloucester Prison, were given temporary admission, "For as long as it takes to assess their case." There are still 20 Kurds (as of October 10, 1989) detained at Haslan. Immigration officials will be conducting an interview over the next few days.

The Home Office spokesman stated that the total of 3,500 Kurds arrived in England in May and June, 1989, before Visa requirements were introduced. Most of them were living north of London, on income support and with help from Kurdish groups. About 200 have spent about 4 months in detention.

The Home Office says it has assessed only 560 of the total influx. 70 have been given refugee status. 240 have been allowed to stay for a year after which their cases will be reviewed. 150 have been refused asylum and 35 of these have already been deported. A further 45 cases are likely to go to Judicial review. A home office official pointed out that more than 230 have decided to return to Turkey voluntarily. They asked for refugee status on the ground that they have a well-founded fear of prosecution if they are deported. They had suffered torture and imprisonment in Turkey and were frightened to return. They had all left wives and children behind. They said they had come to Britain because they did not need Visas and because they thought it was a free country which could give them safe haven to save their lives." (The Independent, October 10, 1989)

Following the incident, the Kurdish community in England picketed the Home Office in protest at the continued detention and the deportation of the Kurdish refugees back to Turkey where they will be tortured and face certain death.

The deportation of the Kurdish refugees to Turkey is a clear violation of the United Nations Convention and Protocol which provide sanctuary for persons fleeing persecution. These Kurdish refugees arrived in England as

a result of an emergency situation in Turkey where their life was in danger. Their flight to England was, therefore, in search of "safe haven" to save their lives.

Almost all of these refugees have presented physical and documentary evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, torture, and danger to their lives upon their return to Turkey. Consequently, there was an emergency in their lives to justify a grant of asylum or a refugee status. If none of these alternatives were available to these refugees, the Home Office should have found them a third alternative country to go to, or give the refugees, themselves, the choice of a third country. But under no circumstances is the Home Office justified in sending these refugees back to Turkey where their lives are in imminent danger and the face certain death.

Institut kurde de Paris

Our Poetry is Written With Tears

By M. Emin Bozarslan

11 September 1971
Amed (Diarbekirs)
Military Prison

In the prisons
in the dark and crowded prisons
behind heavy iron gates and bars
that resemble strongholds and forts
among rats and roaches
the seeds of our literature grow
and our history matures

With tears
with the eyes' tears
with children's tears
that flow for the fathers
fathers who sit in prisons
our poetry is written
and our history matures

With longing
with young wives' longing
with young newlywed women's longing
that is felt deep in their hearts
for their men
those who sit in the prisons
our tales are woven
and our history matures

With blood
with young men's blood
with young women's blood
and our heroes the peshmergas¹ blood
that flows over the mountains
our songs are made
and our history matures

Our inspiration
doesn't come from rouged lips
and painted eyes
nor from powdered faces
It comes from flowing tears
the hear's deep longing
young men and women's blood
They are our sources of inspiration
small puffs of wind
that renew our love

¹Kurdish guerills soldiers.



President Rafsanjani Visits the Kurdish Areas in Iran

President Rafsanjani conducted a four day tour of the three Provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan and the Province of Kurdistan. During this tour, President Rafsanjani visited the cities of Sinna, Urmia and Tabriz. *Kayhan International* (English edition) published a report about this visit on October 28, 1989, entitled "The President's Kurdish Initiative" In the following we present exact quotes from it relevent passages:

"In line with his declared policy to be in regular contact with the various strata of society, President Rafsanjani last week conducted a four-day tour of three northwestern provinces. Rafsanjani and his entourage called on the people and officials of the two Azarbaijans (East and West) and Kurdistan Province. The trip was the president's first after he was elected as chief executive of the republic in July. On the first leg of the visit he told newsmen the purpose of his visit "is to visit the people, get acquainted with regional talents and study existing problems."

"The significance of Mr. Rafsanjani's visit lies more in the places he visited than its timing. As is expected of all popular leaders, the Iranian president too, as a matter of duty, will visit every area of the country in the months ahead. Any neutral observer will not have to tax his imagination as to why the president began with Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. Iranian history is full of facts which point towards the strategic importance of those provinces, especially West Azarbaijan and Kurdistan.

"Due to the geographical location and social and culture fabric of the two provinces, coupled with the path for enemies' greed and penetration, those areas have been subjected to diversified plots and offensive. Situated near the borders the regions visited by the president are of great value to the nation in that its people have always stood vigilant whenever hostile elements and traitors have embarked on missions supported and financed by the enemies of the Iranian people to destabilize the country.

"Seditions and instigations by our enemies have occurred at such short intervals in history that the peoples of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan have come into the category of neglected and dispossesses masses despite their huge natural and intellectual resources. Several anti-social, anti-nationalist and recently anti-revolutionary grouplets which can be best known as terror groups set up shops in the country's northwestern areas feigning concern for the general masses and ideals of a free state.

"The president's journey to Sanandaj, Urmia and Tabriz, etc., was enough to prove the region's geopolitical importance. The political and economic calculations made by Rafsanjani's administration with regard to a stable and

strong future for the Kurdish masses may not be visible at this juncture. But Rafsanjani's statement Saturday to the effect that "the Islamic Republic is the true patron of the Kurdish people," will gain practical meaning in the near future through the plans envisaged by the new government to rebuild war-affected zones."

"Iran's Kurdistan has a history of tragic problems which have remained unattended even after the 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the staunchly pro-Western Pahlavi dynasty. Again during the eight years of Iraqi-imposed war the brave and loyal Kurdish masses bore the brunt of inhuman military attacks on civilian areas by the Ba'athist regime and its mercenaries grouped in the so-called Mujahideen Khalq Organization outlawed in the early years of the victorious revolution. With salutations and praise for Kurdistan's loyalty and the unscathed devotion of the armed forces, Rafsanjani, who was the country's military chief during the war years, said that enemy conspiracies aided by imperialist mass media campaigns had failed in the Kurdistan region. He reiterated the strong belief of all Iranians that contrary to malicious foreign propaganda and calculated enemy plots, the noble Kurds had remained committed to Islam, revolution and republic."

"Lauding the valor, tolerance and faith of the long oppressed Kurdish population the chief executive forcefully declared that poverty and deprivation should end in this part of the country. "The time has come to pay attention to Kurdistan," President Rafsanjani told a large gathering of people in the Kurdish town of Sanandaj."

"The confidence and authority with which Iran's new president spoke at public gatherings and official meetings in the three provinces is indicative of the government's determination to implement its economic social and cultural programs in the post-war era. Almost all of Mr. Rafsanjani's public statements during the tour shed extra light on the fundamental problem he has pledged to solve—economic and social welfare of a nation that has begun the enormous task of reconstruction."


The Kurds in Iran are waiting to see president Rafsanjanis project to improve their economic condition and grant them cultural freedom. In the past, the Kurds have suffered greatly at the hand of the cruel dictatorial regimes in Iran. In the Kurdish areas even a petty official become a terrible dictator, exploiting people for his own self-interest. The army and police forces are driving people into slavery. The whole governmental machinery is a cruel heavy burden on the people.

In historical background and cultural identity, the Persians and Kurds are closely related, yet, all aspects of Kurdish cultural and political activities are prohibited. The immediate task of president Raosanjanis government is to take necessary measures to ensure that the Kurds live as Kurds in their own homeland in Iran. The Kurdish children should study in Kurdish and

use textbooks written in Kurdish. The Kurdish language should be an official language of official communication side by side with the Persian language which is a sister language to Kurdish. To prevent the local officials from terrorizing people and abusing their authority, the local councils and communities are to share in the decision-making of the officials. These measures are part of human rights which should be granted without delay.

At present, we hear encouraging news that President Rafsanjani is making dialogue with the democratic party of Kurdistan of Iran to solve the Kurdish problems. It is a wise and pragmatic polity to involve KDP in the administration and cultural activities of the Kurds in Iran. Granting Kurds full cultural and political freedom will strengthen the Kurdish sense of belonging and sharing in Iran's destiny and make them loyal citizens of Iran.

Institut kurde de Paris



Qazi Mohammed
President of The Kurdish Republic
of Mahabad 1946

Turkey's Basic Principles Face Serious Challenges

Country Could Undergo Identity Crisis

By Jonathan C. Randal

ANKARA, Turkey—Turkey shows signs of experiencing a major identity crisis as principles largely unquestioned since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modern republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after World War I face new challenges, according to diplomats and other analysts.

In rapid succession in recent months, Turkey's keystone relationship with the West have undergone wrenching change, provoking self-doubt unrivaled since Ataturk swore to turn his backward, Moslem country resolutely westward.

The end of the Cold War leaves Turkish officials wondering if their country's crucial role along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank facing the Soviet Union remains as great an asset to its allies as in the past four decades.

Officials also worry that East-West disarmament may compromise Turkey's hopes of modernizing its aging weaponry with F-16 aircraft and modern tanks. Senior American visitors have explained that a reduced U.S. global role eventually will involve cuts in military aid to Turkey, now scheduled to be \$545 million in fiscal 1991.

NATO's transformation into a more political oriented organization and the possible decline of its integrated structure raise fears that Turkey may no longer be able to take Western support for granted in dealing with its unstable neighbors: Christian Armenians in the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalist Iran and hostile governments in Arab Iraq and Syria.

The 12-nation European Community last December indefinitely postponed a decision on Turkey's application for full membership, and Turkish officials worry that the setback may prove permanent. The EC cited Turkey's near 3 percent annual population growth, human rights violations, the unresolved Cyprus question and a still comparatively underdeveloped economy.

But Turkish officials suspect that Western Europe really objected to absorbing 55 million Moslems into what amounts to a Christian club and say they fear the EC will give priority to integrating Moscow's former East European satellites.

Such shocks to basic tenets of Turkish policy, many diplomats and local commentators say, come as Turkey appears to be drifting dangerously, with the prospect of weak coalition government on the horizon.

The ruling Motherland Party scores in the low teens in opinion polls. Its leader, former prime minister and now President Turgut Ozal, is scarcely more popular.

After years of growth, Turkey's experiment with an export-driven market economy is beset by major problems such as 70 percent inflation and feather-bedded state enterprises.

Western-oriented bankers in Istanbul and businessmen in Adana and Izmir privately rail against what they call "two-speed Turkey," complaining that the prosperous, Europe-inclined west of the country is being held back by outdated notions of government in the east.

A civil war rages in the southeast again Kurdish rebels fighting for independence from sanctuaries in Iran, Syria and Iraq.

The army is thought to worry that granting Kurdish cultural demands inevitably will lead to the country's dismemberment, which Ataturk overcame by thwarting Greek, French and British designs against Turkey after World War I.

Current turmoil in neighboring Soviet Armenia has revived such fears. So, too, has President Bush, who in April fulfilled a campaign pledge by endorsing Armenian Americans' claims that Turkey massacred millions of its Armenian minority population during and after World War I.

Turkish officials fear the Bush statement will serve as a precedent for further Armenian claims, including demands for formal acknowledgement of Turkish responsibility for the massive loss of life, reparations and even revisions of Turkey's eastern border.

Despite sympathy for the estimated 70 million Turkic-speaking people in the Soviet Union's Moslem republics, the danger of contagious turmoil has dampened once strong longings for a greater Turkey, according to specialists.

Moslem fundamentalism is on the rise once again and has made inroads in government offices such as the Education and Culture ministries and reportedly also in some counterintelligence and police operations.

Although Iran and Saudi Arabia are often accused of paying for the rise of fundamentalism, diplomats are convinced that the gradual decline in Ataturk's anti-religious legacy is also a factor.

Even the army, Ataturk's vanguard for a lay society, has not proved immune. Recently, 150 non-commissioned officers suspected of fundamentalist leanings were forced out of the armed forces. Another 150 remain under investigation.

Although secular advocates insist the threat is more serious than a decade

ago, when Iran's revolution was at its most influential, some specialists are not convinced and cite the traditional antagonism between the mainstream Sunni Islam of Turkey and the Shiite Islam of Iran.

Nonetheless, pro-Iranian fundamentalists were widely thought to be responsible for the recent murders of a prominent constitutional law specialist and the editor of a major daily newspaper. These unsolved, professional-style assassinations have revived fears of a return to the lawlessness of the 1970s, which in 1980 triggered a military coup.

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Turkish Water Warfare Against Syria and Iraq

By N. Arsalan

Historically, the relationship between Turkey and Syria has been, most of the time, hostile. However, in the last three years, their relationship has continually deteriorated. In addition to the traditional enmity between the Turks and the Arabs of Syria, there are two current hotly disputed issues between the two countries: namely, the Askandarona Province and the distribution of Euphrates River water.

Askandarona is a province located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. This province was part of Syria under French mandate until the Turkish army occupied it and annexed it to Turkey in 1934. This military action of General Mustafa Kamal Pasha, the sole dictator of Turkey, had the consent and blessing of both the British and French governments. As a matter of fact, the British government at the time encouraged General Mustafa Kamal to occupy Askandarona in order to create a hotly disputed issue between Turks and the Arabs in Syria.

The population of Askandarona is predominantly Arab, and they continue to speak the Arabic language. Indeed, the Askandarona province had been inhabited by Arabs centuries before the arrival in Anatolia of three impoverished Turkish nomad tribes from Central Asia in the early 15th Century. The turks were escaping westward before advancing Mongol hordes in fear of their lives.

Immediately after the annexation of Askandarona, the Turkish government put into effect a Turkification plan for the province. The use of the Arabic language was forbidden, and all Arab cultural and political activities became punishable by law. The name of Askandarona Province was changed to Hatay Province in reference to the ancient Hittite people, who were of Indo-European origin and emerged into a powerful kingdom called "the ancient Hittite Kingdom" in the 17th Century, B.C. Their capital city called Hattusus was located in Southern Anatolia or Bagazkeui. The first Hittite King, who lived in Hattusas, was named Murshilish I. He captured and sacked Aleppo (called Halpa) and thereafter went to Babylon and destroyed it. He attacked also the Hurri, taking prisoners and Babylonian statues to Hattusas.

It was the destruction of Babylon by Murshilish which put an end to Hammurabi's dynasty.

The Hittites now overflowed southward out of Anatolia and formed powerful colonies in the Aleppo-Alexandretta area and in "hollow Syria" between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon.

The Turks claim that because the Hittite capital was in Anatolia, and it was from there that they spread to Askandarona Province, the Hittites are Turks. The Arabs therefore, they claim, are descendants of Hittites, thus originally Turks, who forgot the Turkish language during a long period of Arab domination. The Turks refer to Arabs of Askandarona as "seashore Turks." The Turkish government also officially claims 11 million Kurds who inhabit 10 provinces in the south and east of Turkey, "Mountain Turks." The government maintains that these Kurds were Turks but were lost in the mountains and forgot the Turkish language.

Since Syria became independent in 1946, the successive Syrian governments have demanded the return to Syria of the Arab province of Askandarona, which they consider to be an inseparable part of Syria and the Arab homeland.

The second disputed issue between Turkey and Syria is the distribution of the Euphrates river water. In the early 1980's, the Russians built for Syria the Asad Dam on the Euphrates, which greatly increased the cultivated land of Syria. When relations between Iraq and Syria became quite tense, the Syrian authorities decreased the flow of water into the Euphrates and thus threatened the whole northwest and southwest regions of Iraq with ruin from lack of water, as there is no other source of water besides the Euphrates. For some time, Syria was able to keep the Iraqi authorities on their toes and living by their nerves by playing games with the Euphrates river water's flow into Iraq.

The Turkish government saw the significance of this water game the Syrians were playing with Iraq. On the Turkish side of the border, they constructed on the Euphrates two dams by means of which they could completely cut the flow of water in to the river, leaving Syria and Iraq dry. On some occasions, the Turkish authorities decreased the flow of water to an alarming degree, thereby threatening the lives of millions in both Syria and Iraq. To the Syrian mind, it is most alarming to have your water resource, "the life-giving element in the Middle East", in the hands of the Turks.

Serious disputes between Turkey and Syria over Euphrates river water distribution, has brought the two countries to the brink of war. In 1987, a protocol was signed between Turkey and Syria in which they agreed on the minimum amount of water that should flow to Syria. However, the Turkish government did not always feel bound by the provisions of this agreement or played the game of decreasing the flow of water, which unnerved the Syrians.

As a matter of fact, both Syria and Iraq are today at the mercy of the Turks for their water supply.

On October 1, 1989, Turgut Ozal, then the Prime Minister of Turkey, hinted that his government might cut back the flow of the Euphrates if Damascus did not cease using the Kurdish Workers Party in anti-Turk activities.

On October 21, 1989, according to the Turkish foreign ministry, two Syrian MIG 21's shot down a civilian twin-propeller survey plane just 13 miles inside the disputed Turkish province of Hatay near the Mediterranean. The Foreign Minister stated that "The Syrian Ambassador was summoned and the incident was severely protested . . . a detailed explanation is expected without delay." Syrian-Turkish ties, long-burdened by Syrian claims on Hatay, have been strained ever since.

The following day, October 22, 1989, the Syrian government announced that a delegation of Turkish experts would soon arrive in Syria to survey and map the existing reserves of crude oil in Syria. However, on November 22, a month later, fighting broke out along the border between Turkish and Syrian security forces. Consequently, a Syrian delegation, headed by Nadhim Shakor, Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Ankara to settle their outstanding disputes.

Barely two months later, on January 22, 1990, Turkish President Turgut Ozal pushed a button at the new Ataturk Dam which lowered a huge block of cement, cutting the flow of Euphrates water by 75%. There was an immediate and angry reaction from both Syria and Iraq. The Syrians requested an emergency meeting of the Arab league to discuss this Severe Turkish action. Upon conclusion of their meeting, the Arab League delivered a very mild protest to the Turkish government. The Syrian and Iraqi governments were helpless, incapable of making any move against Turkey.

After cutting the flow of the river, Turkish authorities announced that, "In the long run, the Ataturk Dam will serve the interests of all people of the region." The Turks also recently offered to make electric power available to Syria and Iraq from the huge 22-Dam Anatolia Project, due for completion in 2005.

Water Conference in Ankara

On June 26, 1990, a meeting was held in Ankara between Turkish Iraqi, and Syrian representatives to discuss the possibility of finding a solution to the dispute over distribution of Euphrates river water. Both Syrian and Iraqi governments were represented by their respective Ministers of Irrigation. The Turkish government was represented by its Minister of Public Works.

At the outset of the meeting, the Turkish representative stated that the

Ataturk Dam may indeed influence the States of the region, but in the long term, the dam serves the interest of all parties concerned, such as its potential to supply electric power. He added the point stressing that the water distribution question is not a political matter but should be viewed as a technical problem. He included in the dispute the question of the Tigris river flow.

Syrian and Iraqi representatives raised alarm over Turkey's large scale use of chemical fertilizer, which can completely alter the quality of the water, making it unsuitable for drinking.

The proceedings of the meeting were kept secret, but from reliable sources inside Turkey, we learned that no agreement was signed, and that the Turkish government is embarking on a program to increase her influence Syria and Iraq through blocking their water supply.

As of today, the Turks have been carrying on an undeclared war against both Syria and Iraq. The water sources of the twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, are located in northern Kurdistan, presently part of Turkey, and are under Turkish control. The flow of the Euphrates river has already been brought under complete control of the Turks by the construction and current use of the Ataturk Dam.

In March, 1990, the Turkish authorities announced that they were planning to build five more dams, most probably on the Tigris and its tributaries. When these dams are completed, the fate of the entire Iraqi and Syrian populations will be in the hands of the Turks.

In the last week of December, 1989, the Turks announced that they would cut off the flow of the Euphrates River by 75% for the period of one month to fill Ataturk Reservoir and make it available for irrigation and hydroelectric power. Delegations from Syria and Iraq arrived in Ankara to convince the Turks not to cut off Euphrates water at this time of the year when cultivation of winter crops depends entirely on irrigation from that river. The Turks persisted in their position. New efforts were made with the Turkish government to shorten the period to 15 days, but to no avail.

The Turks seem to be planning to increase their influence and acquire oil concession from both Syria and Iraq by means of water warfare. By building 5 new dams on the Tigris River and its tributaries in Kurdistan in Turkey the Turks will be able to completely control the flow of water of both the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers they could cut off dry at will, turning both Syria and Iraq into uninhabited deserts. There are a number of governments who encourage Turkey in its secret and wicked design to turn Syria and Iraq into deserts. Furthermore, the Turks are planning to monopolize the sources of water in their hands and hoping to turn Turkey into a "fresh water producing country" having economic power equal to that of the other Arab oil-producing countries. The Turkish game plan is to exchange fresh water for oil and petrodollars.

Dream Pipe-Line Project

In late 1987, even before the completion of Ataturk Dam, the Turks formulated a grand pipe-line system that would carry water from Ataturk Dam to oil-rich countries. In early 1988, the blueprint of the pipe-line project was brought to the United States for further study and in order to find contractors to build the pipe-line system. The experts branded the Turkish project as a "dream pipe-line." The pipe-line was to carry water from Ataturk Dam to Syria, Jordan, Israel and across the desert to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. In economic terms the value of the project consisted of exchanging water for Arab oil. The total cost of the project was estimated to be \$22 billion, which was to be paid by the rich Arab countries for fresh drinking water.

However, the Arabs were not interested in the project because they could establish their own water supply system for one-tenth of the cost of the "dream pipe-line"; by means of sea water purification they would secure the sources of their drinking water under the Arabs' own control. However, in the years to come, Syria and Iraq will be subjected more often to increasing pressure from Turkey through water warfare. The two governments of Syria and Iraq stood helpless, unable to make any countermove, when Turkish President Turgut Ozal cut the flow of the Euphrates water by 75%, for the period of one month in January, 1990, in an official ceremony on Ataturk Dam. There were some angry pronouncements by the Syrian and Iraqi authorities, calling for the application of international rule governing the distribution of international water.

However, the Syrians have been playing the Kurdish card to press Turkey to come to terms with a fair distribution of the Euphrates water. The Syrian government has been supporting a Kurdish armed band called The Kurdish Workers' Party (KWP). In fact, the Syrians succeeded in gaining the co-operation of the dissatisfied Kurds for two reasons:

- (1) While the Turkish authorities have recently asserted goodwill toward the Kurds they have in the past persecuted them and suppressed all Kurdish activities. The Kurds have no right even to call themselves Kurds. They are officially called "mountain Turks." The Kurds have suffered greatly under Turkish authority, and their resentment is festering.
- (2) Since President Assad came to power in Syria the persecution and harassment of the Kurds in Syria has stopped. Consequently, President Assad is liked by the Kurds, who willingly co-operate with him against the hated Turkish authority.

The Kurdish Workers' Party has been carrying on guerilla warfare against

Turkish authority since August 1984. They often attack Turkish security posts, army convoys, and assassinate Turkish officials, then retreat inside Syria. In retaliation on many occasions, Kurdish villages are attacked, many of the inhabitants are killed, and the villages are burned. Peasants are forced to pay randoms and taxes.

In the year 1987 KWP attacked a number of Kurdish villages inside Turkey along the Syrian–Turkish border and massacred their entire population. The Kurdish Peasants in the region still recounts the horror of the massacre of 1987. (BBC–Arabic section, June 11, 1990)

More details about the current situation in Turkey have been provided by three Foreign Correspondents who have recently visited Turkey.

Sam Cohen is a special to the Christian Science Monitor, from Istanbul wrote the following from which we quote some relevant passages:

“Turks seek to limit the new phase of Kurdish Rebellion”.

“A surge of violence in Turkey’s southeastern provinces marks a new phase in what the Kurds call their “struggle for independence.” Turkish officials fear the campaign may spread.

“For the first time in the provinces of Mardin, Surt, and Elazig, teenagers are throwing stones at the security forces, erecting road, blocks, and burning tires. And people have closed shops, offices, and schools to protest the sometimes brutal action of the security forces.

“Government and military leaders meet tomorrow to discuss plans to combat the new wave of violence that Kurds call the “Kurdish *intifadah*,” after the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

“The biggest demonstration since the surge began last week was on Friday in Cizre, in Mardin Province, where thousands of people marched through the streets shouting “Down with Turkey” and “Long live free Kurdistan.”

“Analysis say the escalating violence highlights several new developments in the strategy of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the organization that directs the Kurdish struggle;

“PKK rebels have shifted their resistance activities from the countryside to urban areas.

“Until last week, the rebels raided villags, “executed” so-called village guards and their collaborators, and sometimes killed entire families, according to recent unpublished Turkish intelligence report.

“But now, the report says, the PKK operates in major cities, encouraging popular resistance to the authorities and security forces. It urges organized demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and seizure of public buildings.

“Villagers, who make up most of Turkey’s estimated 9 million Kurds, participate in the demonstrations.

In the past, even those sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism avoided involvement in PKK-organized activities, and some assisted the authorities in

arresting "terrorists."

"Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut and other senior government officials publicly play down the uprising. But privately, Cabinet ministers and top commanders say it is a serious matter.

"This is beginning to turn into a new and different situation," says a senior government official. "It is bad when you have local people and security forces turning against each other . . . We are sure most people still do not want to get involved, but they are either forced by the PKK or carried away by this new hysteria." (The Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 1990.

Suzanne Goldenberge, published an article in the Guardian of London on May 3, 1990 entitled. "Turkey's Kurds further their cause with a show of quiet defiance." From this important article we quote some of its passages which are related to own subject.

"For 10 million people, their music, language, and games are illegal. Suzanne Goldenberg in Istanbul reports on a struggle for identity."

"Crouching in the space behind a mountain of folded, brightly printed mattresses, the village mukhtar plays his cassette recorder at whisper level. "This is our music, Kurdish music," he says. "How do you like it?"

"His children play rhyming games and count slyly in the little Kurdish they can muster—*Yek, du, say, char, pench*—before collapsing into giggles.

"All along the border with Syria and Iraq there are small signs of defiance to an official policy that denies a distinct identity to Turkey's 10 million. Kurds, about half of whom are in the southeast. Their language, music, and even counting games are illegal.

"This spring brought a new dimension to the war against the government being waged by guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). In March, shopkeepers clanged down, their shutters in a strike and normally retiring women marched to protest against killings of guerrillas by the Turkish military and to demand the right to speak Kurdish, educate their children in Kurdish and take Kurdish names.

"It was the first popular show of support for the guerrillas, and accompanies the PKK's strongest Defensive since 1984. More than 100 people have been killed so far this year compared with 26 for the same period in 1989.

"The authorities responded by ringing the outside of towns with troops and injecting scores of secret police into the centre. The regional governor was elevated to an all-powerful position with the right to exile troublemakers to western Turkey, and to double the usual sentences for convicted Kurdish nationalists.

"Cizre, an hour's drive away, was at the heart of the uprising. There, eight protesters were shot dead by security forces and hundreds were felled. About 70 youths are still held in the prison at Diyarbakir, notorious for stories of torture.

“One young man of Cilzre says he was arrested after becoming entangled in the protest when he went out to buy bread. He was kept blindfolded and beaten during the three-hour journey to Diyarbakir prison. He was released after seven days.

“None of us wants to live under the flag of Turkey. Even our towns have become prisons. We don't want to live like that,” he says.

“The music-loving village mukhtar said “its not only about the PKK, it's about being hungry. It's about having our language. What we are protesting against is poverty and our own problems (The Guardian, May 3, 1990)

Jonathan C. Randel, Washington Post Foreign Service, published an article in the Washington Post on June 1, 1990 entitled: “Kurdish rebels appear to gain support-Turkish government's tactics of violence are creating some political backlash.” The source follows.

“DIYARBAKIR, Turkey—Kurdish rebels, in their sixth year of an increasingly bloody guerrilla war against the Turkish government, appear to be gaining grass-roots support, according to politicians, diplomats and other analysts.

“The last two months, during which 140 people on both sides have been killed, were the most violent since August 1984, when the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) started fighting in the southeast for independence for Turkey's 10 million Kurds.

“Using better intelligence-gathering and helicopters, the security forces have made some headway in the war, which has claimed nearly 2,000 lives.

But the government's tactics have sparked some political backlash.

This spring, for the first time, anti-government demonstrations for a separate Kurdish cultural identify erupted in more than a dozen towns and cities in this mountainous region the size of New England.

“The demonstratoins by thousands of Kurds—some spontaneous, others prompted by the guerrillas—followed warnings by Kurdish moderates that the security forces' widespread use of torture wholesale arrests, routine beating and other human rights abuse were alienating many Kurds. The government's harsh policy has drawn criticism from Amnesty International and others.

“Many ordinary Kurds, who initially were horrified by atrocities cried out by the Kurdish rebels, now express sympathy with the Guerrillas.

“The security forces mistakenly think they can stamp out all forms of Kurdish political life,” remarked a Turkish academic who recently visited the southeast and requested anonymity. “Government policy is a classic case of too little, too late. Kurds don't want independence. They want freedom to be Kurds.”

“Initially caught off guard by the demonstrations, the government struck back on April 9. Sweeping decree powers in 11 provinces were granted to regional Gov. Hayri Kozakciolgu, who critics claimed already ruled under

the civilian equivalent of martial law.

"Behind the scenes, according to informed sources, the Turkish military, with 60,000 troops in the region, is maneuvering to wrest overall responsibility for law and order from the governor, who controls 30,000 police, about 18,000 village guards and specially trained police commandos.

"Kozakcioglu indirectly criticized army tactics initiated last summer by insisting that only slow, patient efforts to separate the guerrillas from the civilian population can lead to lasting pacification.

"Even before the April decree, Kurdish moderates were depressed by signs of growing intolerance among Turkish officials, who in recent years had been moving gradually towards accepting a dialogue about Kurdish cultural rights.

"Prof. Ismail Besicki, who since 1971 has spent more than a decade in jail for writing that Kurds form a separate ethnic group, is again on trial for publishing another book on the taboo subject.

"Turkey's parliament is moving to strip five Kurdish members of their immunity. The opposition center-left Social Democratic People's Party expelled seven legislators for attending a conference on Kurdish issues organized last October in Paris by French President Francois Mitterrand's wife, Danielle.

"Much of the hardening of government thinking is ascribed to the PKK's comeback after the end of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1988, which deprived them of sanctuary in northern Iraq. Nearly two years later, the PKK has succeeded in reestablishing bases in Iraq, maintaining others in Syria and opening new ones inside Iran.

"Intelligence analysts estimate PKK strength inside Turkey at 1,500 to 2,000 armed men. Perhaps 1,500 others are either poised along Turkey's borders or training in camps run by PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.

"Although the guerrillas still use hit-and-run tactics in Turkey from bases across the borders, Western analysts are convinced that the PKK has sunk deep enough roots in Turkish villages to survive without dependence on foreign sanctuaries.

"Clashes have spread as far north and east as the region around Mt. Ararat near the Soviet border and west to Elazig. But 60 percent of the fighting remains centered on the so-called "devil's triangle" linking Mardin, Sirt and Hakkari close to Turkey's frontiers with Iraq and Syria. (The Washington Post, June 1990)

In recent months, the KWP has increased the scope of its activities along the border with Turkey. On Monday, April 9, 1990, BBC-Arabic section reported that the most fierce battle so far had taken place on the Turko-Syrian border. The battle lasted two days during which 22 persons from the KWP

were killed.

On April 10, 1990, the BBC again reported that the KWP attacked a Turkish patrol force on the Iraqi-Turkey border. It is evident that both Syria and Iraq are using KWP as a tool to force Turkey to come to terms for the fair distribution of Euphrates water.

The same station reported on June 11, 1990 that a band of KWP separatists attacked the village of safinly inside Turkey close to the Syrian border. They set the village on fire and killed its armed guards. They also massacred ten women and six children of the safinly inhabitants.

On July 30, 1990 the Washington Times reported the following brief news on the current fighting in Turkey.

“50 Kurds killed in Turkish offensive—DIYARBAKIR, Turkey— At least 50 suspected Kurdish guerrillas were killed in three days of stepped-up fighting against the separatists, the regional governor’s office announced yesterday.”

“It described the action as one of the largest anti-guerrilla operations in southeastern Turkey and said it was still being waged. Government troops and rebels clashed in the provinces of Siirt, Sirnak and Hakkari, said the announcement. From wiree dispatches and staff reports.”

Until recently, most of the Kurdish political parties and group knew little about KWP. The KWP leader is called Abochi—short for Abdulla Ocalan who lives in Damascus. KWP claims to be marxist, and working for the liberation of the Kurds in Turkey.

Foreign sources describe them as a secret terrorists group who kill both Kurds and Turks alike. According to a reliable Kurdish source Saddam Hussein has been discreetly supporting a group of Kurds who calls themselves KWP and carries out armed activities inside Turkey and retreats to certain secret locations inside Iraq. The same source has confirmed the report that KWP has a close connection with Jalal Talabani, the secretary General of the Kurdistan Patriotic Union.

“Ankara pins the responsibility for the escalation in violence on Damascus, where PKK leader exiled Abdullah Ocalan lives. Kurdish fighters—trained and equipped in camps in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon—are smuggled into Turkey across the Syrian border, Turkish officials say. Turkey has urged Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish militants, but Damascus says it has no control over them.”

“For the first time, senior officials and officers have talked publicly about the possibility of an Israeli-style assault against PKK headquarters in Damascus and its camps in the Bekaa Valley.

Gen. Necip Toruntay, Turkey's chief of staff, also hinted at the weekend that "a hot pursuit" of rebels crossing into neighboring countries, like Syria and Iraq, could not be ruled out."

"There is now an undeclared, unofficial war going on in that [southeastern] region, with some foreign powers involved," said a member of the Cabinet. "The terrorists [Kurdish militants] are being used as a weapon against us, . . . but this can backfire and cause more damage to them." (The Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 1990)

The activities of the KWP are not in line with the general strategy of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement with respect to the improvement of the Kurdish situation in Turkey. The Nationalist Movement seeks human rights and cultural identity for the Kurds by means of civil movement both inside Turkey and abroad. Under present political circumstances, armed struggle in Turkey is not considered to be advantageous to the Kurds. The Syrian and Iraqi governments support KWP only temporarily to press Turkey to come to terms on the distribution of the Euphrates water. But, if they reach a favorable agreement on the water dispute they would immediately cut off their support of the KWP. Time and time again Kurds have been used and then abandoned. There are indications that KWP leader is well aware of this time honored deception by the enemies of the Kurds.

Saddam Hussein Restores the Statue of King Faisal I

King Faisal I was the son of Sharif Hussein, Sharif of Mecca. At the outbreak of World War I he joined Lawrence of Arabia in fighting the Turkish army. He was the trustee of Lawrence of Arabia and influential in convincing the Arab tribes and Arab officers to join the Arab revolt, which began January 16, 1916. He was acting as the Commander of the Arab irregular forces under the direct supervision of Lawrence of Arabia. On October 3, 1918, Prince Faisal arrived in Damascus on horseback with some 1,200 horsemen at a full gallop. In the afternoon of the same day, the British forces, under the command of General Allenby, entered Damascus. Consequently, the Turkish army was cleared out of Arabia.

At the conclusion of the peace treaty with Turkey in 1920, Prince Faisal was assigned as King of Syria. However, the Syrians revolted against him and he was forced to leave to Iraq. On August 23, 1921, Prince Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq. He ruled Iraq from 1921 to 1936. He was a wise and gifted man, and was closely cooperating with the British authorities in Iraq.

After his natural death in 1936, his son Ghazi became King of Iraq. King Ghazi was a dashing, dynamic, young and ambitious king. He was anti-British and was planning to establish a close connection with Nazi Germany. King Ghazi was killed in the spring of 1938 in an automobile accident, when the car he was driving collided with an electric post. His infant son Faisal II was pronounced King under the Regent of his uncle, Prince Abdul Illah.

The short-lived kingdom of Iraq was overthrown in a military coup in the dawn of July 14, 1958, the coup was carried out by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim. In the early morning of July 14th, the Royal Palace of Rahab was surrounded by the army. The whole royal family was awakened, rounded up, and shot on the spot, thus ending the short-lived dynasty of King Faisal I.

On the right bank of the Tigris River, and in the Karkh section of Baghdad City, there were two well-known bronze statues located in the vicinity of the old British Embassy's chancery. There was a huge bronze statue of King Faisal I in Arabian costume riding a horse. The other was the statue of General Maude, the Commander of the British Forces in Iraq who occupied Baghdad in 1914. When the July 14, 1958 revolution succeeded, the populace of Baghdad tore down the two statues to symbolize the end of the British occupation of Iraq.

In early 1989, President Saddam ordered the rebuilding of the statue of King Faisal. In August, 1989, the statue was erected in its old place. Three leading articles appeared in Al-Thawra, organ of the Baathist ruling clique, all designed to show King Faisal I's contribution to the Arab cause. The title of these three articles was "The Personality of King Faisal and its Effect

on Modern History.” The fourth article appeared, November 28, 1989, under the title “The Personality of King Faisal and its Influence on Modern History—Analytical Studies of His Life in View of the Historical Events of 1916.” The article explains how King Faisal I pursued the Arab cause, despite all the difficulties he faced in planning and executing the Arab revolt of June 10, 1916.

In Iraq, many eyebrows are raised regarding the resurrection of King Faisal and erecting his statue again. The Iraqis interpret this action of Saddam to be a preliminary step to proclaiming himself king of Iraq.

Institut kurde de Paris

Explosion in Iraq's Missile Factory

Iraq Claims

On August 18, 1989, a powerful blast occurred in the Iraqi Missile Factory at Mahaweel, a small town located in the Babil Province (Hilla), some 40 miles south of Baghdad City. The blast was so powerful that it was heard in Baghdad and many other cities in the area. This Iraq military industrial complex specializes in developing modern and strategic weapons such as long-range missiles and chemical bombs. The blast created a fire which lasted for a week and destroyed 30% of the buildings and facilities of the complex and inflicted extensive damage on the workers' quarters of the complex. The number of casualties is estimated to be 2,500 persons killed and wounded, most of them were Egyptians and foreign experts and workers. Regarding the cause of the blast, information from Iraq definitely establishes it to be the work of Israeli intelligence carried out via Egyptian experts and workers employed in the complex. According to unconfirmed report from Iraq there was a shooting on the site before the explosion and that the bodies of 125 Egyptians showed they were definitely killed by bullets.

Reporter for Weekly London Observer

Hanged in Baghdad

An Iranian-born reporter Farzad Bazoft, 31, who works for the weekly liberal Observer of London, was arrested in Baghdad on September 15, 1989, and charged with spying for Israel. A British nurse, Mrs. Daphne Parish, 52, who works in one of Baghdad's hospitals, was arrested and accused of helping Bazoft in the alleged spying. The two have been held in an unknown location since September 15, 1989, without having any contact with the outside world.

Mr. Bazoft has an Iranian passport with the right of residency in England. When he was arrested, he was traveling on a British document. He arrived in Baghdad with a group of journalists who were officially invited by the Iraqi authorities to attend the opening season of the so-called Legislative Council of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in early September, 1989. He was arrested in the airport when he was about to leave Iraq with the other journalists.

While in Iraq, Mr. Bazoft was trying to investigate the cause of the explosion which occurred in the secret missile center at the military industrial complex at Mahaweel, some 40 miles south of Baghdad City. BBC—Arabic Section reported on December 2, 1989, that "the Iraqi authorities claim that Bazoft was seen with Mrs. Parish taking pictures of the Missile Center and taking samples of soil at the ground of the site."

Bazoft was shown on Iraqi TV on November 2, 1989 being interviewed by the Iraqi reporter. In the interview, which lasted 25 minutes, he was shown to confess that he had been spying for Israel when arrested in Iraq. Bazoft said, "the British government knew he was an Israeli spy posing as a reporter."

On September 29, 1989, Amnesty International made an appeal to the Iraqi authorities on behalf of Bazoft and Parish. So far, Amnesty International has received no answer from the Iraqi authorities and is becoming very concerned about the safety of the two prisoners in view of what it call "Iraq's brutal human rights record." Amnesty International continued:

"What disturbs us is that political suspects in Iraq are consistently deprived of their basic human rights under international law, and that the security forces have a grim record of torturing or ill-treating political suspects in order to get 'confessions'.

On March 10, 1990 Farzad Bazoft was brought before the so-called

“Revolutionary Court” it found him guilty of having spied for Israel and Britain, and he was sentenced to death. The meeting and the record of the show Trial were held with greatest secrecy. The Observer of London demanded that Bazoft should be represented by an English lawyer. Instead, he was assigned an Iraqi lawyer who is affiliated with the Baath. The British Consul in Baghdad attended the Trial which lasted only one day. “Though he made a confession on Iraq television, he denied the charge in court.” (Reuter March, 16, 90).

Many heads of state appealed to president Saddam for clemency. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher personally appealed to president Saddam and asked him for clemency. The heads of European common market countries requested Saddam not to execute Bazoft. King Hussein of Jordan and Yasir Arafat interfered on Bazoft behalf. More than a dozen of Newsmen in London presented a petition to Saddam to reconsider the death sentence, but to no avail. On March 15, 1990 Bazoft was hanged in Baghdad. Iraqi information minister Latif Nassif Jassim delivered his corpse which was in a casket to the British Embassy in Baghdad. He then told the journalists, “Mrs. Thatcher wanted him alive. We gave her the body.”

In July, 1990 the Iraqi authority released Daphne Parish, the 53 years old British nurse who was sentenced to 15-year jail term for helping Bazoft by driving him in the official hospital car to Iskandaron a Military Installation where a powerful explosion occurred on August 18, 1989. She was transferred by a special plane from Baghdad to Zambia and arrived London on July 18, 1990.

The Iraqi deputy foreign secretary Nizar Hamdoun said in Baghdad, that “President Saddam Hussein decided to release Parish “in response to an overture from president Kaunda and for pure humanitarian reasons.” Another Iraqi spokesman stated that, “President Saddam responded to the pleas of President Kaunda because the two men have a good relationship, working together in the nonalignment movement. A spokesman for British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher expressed “gratitude to Iraqi Presidents Saddam Hussein and Kaunda.” (Washington Post, July 16, 1990)

The Iraqi Ambassador in London, Dr. Azmi Salihi, was asked by reporters in London: Why did Iraq not respond to so many pleas made on behalf of Bazoft and the Iraqi-born Swedish reporter for whom Swedish Prime Minister personally interfered with President Saddam Hussein. Yet you hanged both reporters. But Iraq responded to President Kaunda of Zambia’s request to release the British Nurse Parish and even transferred her by a special plane to Zambia? Is there a special relationship between Iraq and England?

The Iraqi Ambassador replied that, Iraq does not respond to force which was applied in the case of both reporters, while it responded to the Humanitarian Plea of President Kaunda on behalf of the British nurse Parish.”

Terrorized Egyptians Escape Iraq to Save Their Lives*

By Abu Mahdi

During the eight years of the Iraq-Iran war, most of the male workers of Iraq were taken to the front line to fight the Iranians. Consequently, there was a severe shortage of farmers, workers, and technicians in Iraq. The Iraq government made a formal agreement with the Egyptian authorities to provide Iraq with the workers and farmers it needed. The Egyptian authorities gladly agreed with what Iraq requested, in order to employ a huge number of idle workers, in addition to being a new source of income when the Egyptian workers transferred most of their earnings to Egypt. Furthermore, Iraq is a member of the so-called "Council of Quadruple Cooperation" for economic development, which includes Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and North Yemen. One of the important functions of the Council is the agreed transfer of workers between the signatory states.

In early 1980, Egyptian workers began to pour into Iraq to work in government offices, transportation, and on farms. As a matter of fact, waves of Egyptian workers began to arrive in June, 1975, after the Algiers Agreement was signed on March 6, 1975. The basic purpose of this agreement as I will explain, was to liquidate the Kurdish revolution of September 20, 1961. By June, 1989, there were two million Egyptian workers in Iraq. In addition to these two million civilian workers, there were 15,000 Egyptian military and technicians who were serving in Iraq's military machine. (*World Press Review*, June, 1989, p. 50)

Iraqi authorities have frequently voiced their praises for and their satisfaction with, the Egyptian workers. They have proudly announced that Iraq under the Baathist regime has become the fortress of Arab nationalism and the only Arab country where the ideal of Arab cooperation is put to actual practice. They bragged about how these Egyptian workers are working side by side with their Iraqi brethren to build the economy of Iraq. The senior officials of the Iraqi regime have often declared that they are planning to bring some 5 million Egyptian farmers to Iraq, and have implied that these Egyptian farmers would be settled on the fertile land of the Kurds who were going to be forcefully evacuated and transferred to the Arab sections of Iraq in

*Translated and Condensed from Arabic Language.

the south. As a matter of fact the Iraqi regime began, since 1975, forcefully evacuating the Kurds from their villages in the vicinity of four operating oil fields in southern Kurdistan, and bringing in Egyptian farmers and settling them around the oil fields with a definite purpose of neutralizing the Kurdish impact on the oil industry, thus securing the flow of crude oil.

However, the Egyptian motive for coming to Iraq was purely for financial gain. Generally, the Egyptians rarely interfere with local politics or undertake any action against the authorities of the host country. Their main concern seems to be their wages and their safe return to Egypt. Until recent months all seemed to be normal with the life of the Egyptian community in Iraq and their relationship with the Iraqi authorities seemed to be satisfactory.

The Egyptian calamity in Iraq surfaced early in 1989. During the first half of 1989, many Egyptians disappeared and no one knew their whereabouts. As a matter of fact, there has always been killing of Egyptians in Iraq, particularly since 1975. Information leaked out that those Egyptians who disappeared were in fact arrested by Iraqi security and taken to isolated maximum security camps where they were interrogated, tortured, and buried under the sand. The same information indicates that those who were arrested were suspected of having connections with foreign security organization, were identified as leftists, or were outspoken and somehow active in politics.

During the Iraq-Iran war numbers of Egyptian civilian workers were sent to the front line without having had much training. The Egyptians in Iraq and abroad still claim that the Iraqi authorities deliberately put those Egyptians on the hotline in front of the Iraqi soldiers to wipe them out. During the last three years of the Iraq-Iran war in 1985, '86, '87, large numbers of Egyptian corpses were taken back to Cairo and Egyptian authorities were told that these deceased Egyptians were the victims of the Iraq-Iran war. The arrival of such large numbers of corpses created an uproar in the Egyptian press, which demanded an immediate investigation and withdrawal of all Egyptians from Iraq. However, the Egyptian government did nothing to embarrass the Iraqi authorities and remained silent.

The mass killing of Egyptians became public in November, 1989. The BBC, Arabic section, was the first foreign source to expose the killing of the Egyptians in Iraq. On November 9, 1989, BBC reported that one Egyptian worker was shot and an Egyptian engineer was killed with a knife in the streets of Tikrit, the birthplace of President Saddam. BBC continued by saying that since October, 1989, three or more Egyptian corpses were returned daily to Cairo Airport. On November 15, 1989 the same station reported that a total of 1,000 Egyptian corpses had been returned to Cairo Airport. Furthermore, that the Iraqi government had assigned ten flights a day for a period of 3 months to transfer the Egyptian workers back to Cairo. On November 17, 1989, BBC broadcast a statement by President Saddam stating,

"Anyone who kills Egyptians is like killing Saddam."

The Iranian press, hostile to the Iraqi regime, dramatized the killing of the Egyptians in Iraq. On November 18, 1989, *Kayhan*, Weekly Arabic edition, presented an article on its front page entitled, "The Egyptians Uncover New Facts About the Massacre of the Egyptian workers who reside in Iraq—A Wave of Anger Sweeps Egypt and One Million Egyptian Workers Have Left Iraq." In this article *Kayhan* states the Egyptian press has begun since November 8, 1989, to publish articles about the assassination of the Egyptians in mysterious circumstances which have not been explained. It quotes *Al-Wafd*, the organ of the opposition, which published an article on November 8, 1989, describing how two Egyptian workers were killed by bullets and a knife on the street. *Al-Wafd* stated that "a mixed committee of Egyptians and Iraqis was set up to investigate numerous cases involving the Egyptian workers." *Kayhan* also quotes *Al-Ahram*, semi-official newspaper, which states that, "It has been learned from Egyptian official sources that one million workers have returned to Egypt since June, 1989, and that their total transferable wages amount to \$200 million, of which the Iraqi government did not pay a penny."

The ugly oppression of the Egyptian workers developed to a point of killing on the streets. Baghdad authorities admitted that an Iraqi driver, most likely security personnel, ran over and killed three Egyptians one after another on the streets of Baghdad.

In another incident an Iraqi drove his car inside a crowd of Egyptians celebrating the victory of their national football team against Algeria, killing one and injuring tens of them in the center of Baghdad city. When the Egyptian demanded the arrest of the driver, a number of Iraqis opened fire on the Egyptians and attacked them with knives, killing seven and seriously injuring 120 persons.

They area of Al-Narba along Al-Rashid street in Baghdad was turned into a battle field for four hours. The security police used tear gas and opened fire in the air to disperse Egyptian demonstrators who were protesting the killing of the Egyptians in Iraq. The incident was named by the Egyptian "The Friday Massacre" which occurred on November 24, 1989. The Egyptian demonstrators demanded the immediate expulsion of Cairo's Ambassador in Baghdad for his failure to defend them and called on Saddam Hussein and Hosni Mubarak to protect their lives from attacks by Iraqis and to guarantee their safe return back home to Egypt.

In the Provinces the killing of Egyptians at random continued. Now and then one Egyptian would be stabbed in the back or shot in the head on the streets in different parts of Iraq. These incidents terrorized the Egyptians and forced them to leave for Baghdad city to find means of transportation to take them out of Iraq.

Following the Friday massacre President Saddam Hussein asked to meet with the representatives of the Egyptian workers in Iraq to listen to them himself and learn of their problems and the wrongs inflicted on them. President Saddam explained to them that what is happened to Egyptian workers in Iraq is beyond his competence and that he does not like what is happening. This was an indication that Saddam put the responsibility for what is happening to Egyptian workers on the Iraqi people. He promised the Egyptians that he will severely punish those who are behind these crimes.

On November 25, 1989 the Iraqi information Minister had invited the international press to news conference on the situation of the Egyptian workers. But the news conference was attended by Jariq Aziz, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who refused to speak about the plight of the Egyptians. Instead the news conference was turned to the subject of peace dialogue between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi authorities cut all communications between the journalists and their media to prevent them from sending any news about the Friday massacre. When a Swiss Journalist took some photos of the Friday incident he was roughed up by the security, his camera was taken away from him, and the film was confiscated.

Meanwhile the Iraqi ambassador to Cairo, Nabil Najam, has confirmed that new remittance regulations have gone into operation since last month in Iraq permitting ordinary workers to transfer 10 dinars (\$33) per month from their savings. Skilled workers and employees engaged in government agencies are permitted to transfer back home between 30-40 dinars per month. He said that the new measures were not applied to Egyptian workers only, but to all foreign workers in Iraq. The halt of aid by Persian Gulf Arab states to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war and Iraqi Foreign debts were two reasons for the recent measures. Najim also confirmed that one of the Iraqi Soldiers who had killed one of the striking Egyptian workers would be imprisoned and compensation would be paid to the families of the dead Egyptians.

In the last week of November, 1989 the Egyptian were surprised to see in their homes on the television screen the meeting of President Saddam with the Egyptian workers in Iraq. The Egyptian saw President Saddam reassuring his brothers, the Egyptian worker, and their families in Egypt that their lives would be protected and their rights respected and that the individual cases would not be repeated again. He emphasized that the relation between Egypt and Iraq are stronger and deeper than these minor individual cases inside the same family.

On the same day when President Saddam's television film was presented to the Egyptian audience, President Mubarak was shown on television accusing the Egyptian media of having exaggerated the cases involving the Egyptians he said this did not serve the relations between Egypt and Iraq.

The Egyptian Ambassador in Baghdad returned to Cairo at the end of

November, 1989 and presented a lengthy report to President Mubarak. According to the information leaked to the Egyptian press the Ambassador put the responsibility for killing Egyptian on the Iraqi security who receive their orders from the highest authority in the Baathist leadership. Furthermore, the ambassador underlined clearly that the Iraqi motive for killing Egyptian workers was a plan by Iraqi leaders to terrorize Egyptians and force them to escape from Iraq without receiving the payments owing to them which Iraq cannot afford to pay. Those Egyptian workers who escaped Iraq and arrived in Cairo complained bitterly that they have not received a penny from their savings in Iraqi banks.

A high committee or Iraq-Egypt was formed to look into the subjected of Egyptian payments in Iraq. The high committee which was presided over by Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister, and attended by Latif Sidqi, Egyptian Prime Minister, met in Cairo on November 30, 1989. The committee formed a practical plan for transferring the assets of Egyptian workers in Iraq in a short period of time. It was also decided to pay installments due to some companies. First on the list, the Egyptian Airline. Prime Minister Sidqi stated that priority will be given to the families of the deceased.

The Egyptian worker have escaped Iraq to save their lives leaving behind all their savings in the Iraqi banks. Their accounts in the banks are in Iraqi dinners which, according to the signed agreement, Iraq should exchange to US dollar at the official rate of 1 Iraqi dinner to 3 dollars. According to a conservative estimation the two million Egyptian workers have total savings of 1 billion Iraqi dinner which is equal to 3 billion dollars. Even if the Iraqi government sincerely plans to pay them bank their savings, it will take years before the Egyptian workers receive their due savings.

According to information from the opposition groups inside Iraq, there were 4,000 Egyptians who continued working in Iraq until the end of July, 1990, a small fraction of the two million Egyptian workers. Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, the Egyptians were on the run both in Iraq and Kuwait. On August 8, 1990 BBC—Arabic section—reported that 3,000 Egyptians had arrived an Jordan, escaping from Iraq and Kuwait on their way back to Egypt. At the present time only a handful of Egyptian remain in Iraq and Kuwait.

Tikriti Ruling Clique* Are Killing Each Other

By Abu Mahdi

Until recently, Tikrit was a small municipality located on the right bank of the Tigris River some 150 kilometers north of Baghdad City. Administratively, Tikrit was the center of Nahia (County), the smallest administrative unit in Iraq, which belonged to Samarra District of the Baghdad Province. Geographically, Tikrit is located on the border line, which separates the Kurdistan highland from the lowland of Mesopotamia. Just on the northern outskirts of Tikrit, the physical features of the land change and the highland begins.

The inhabitants of Tikrit are descended from Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans. For some time, they have intermarried with the Turkoman of Kirkuk. The population of Tikrit look more like highlands than the plain dwellers of the South. However, all Tikritis speak Arabic, and in the last 30 years Tikrit and Sammara have become the centers of Arab nationalism in Iraq.

Since Iraq became independent in 1921, the Tikriti people have been very active and successful in Iraqi politics. This is because Tikriti people are clannish and are living in close contact with events in Baghdad. Numbers of prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and high ranking army officers have come from Tikrit. But, for the first time in 1968, the entire ruling clique of Iraq were from Tikrit.

On July 17, 1968, a group of army officers in the regimental palace guard, whose specific duty was to protect the President, carried out a peaceful military coup against President General Abdul Rahman Arif, the elder brother of President Colonel Abdul Salam Arif who was burnt in the air in May, 1966, when his helicopter was struck by a sand storm. It is interesting to note that the leading conspirators Col. Ibrahim Daud, Commander of the Infantry Battalion; Lt. Colonel Saadoon Ghaydan, Commander of the Tank Force; and Abdul Razaq Naef, Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, all were close relatives and trustees of President Arif and came from the Province of Ramadi, the birth place of President Arif.

*Translated and Condensed from Arabic Language.

At midnight on July 17, 1968, the conspirators' officers of the palace regiment awakened President Arif, put him in a special plane, kissed him goodbye, and sent him to exile to Istanbul in Turkey. The next day a new government was announced in which Major Abdul Razaq Naef became Prime Minister, Colonel Ghaydan became Minister of Interior, and Colonel Daud became Minister of Defense. What was most surprising and strange was that the conspirators assigned Colonel Ahmed Hassan Bakir as President. Because these officers in the presidential palace regiment were known to be Arab nationalist while Colonel Bakir was supposed to be the Baathist. They were criticized and warned of the consequences of their actions. They answered, "We have no experience of ruling, while Colonel Ahmed Hassan Bakir has. That is why we made him President."

President Bakir soon rewarded his benefactors. Colonel Bakir was known among army officers who know him well as the "yellow snake under the hay." Indeed, he bit them all. At noon time on July 30, 1968, he managed to capture Abdul Razaq Naef, the Prime Minister and Ibrahim Daud, Minister of Defense and put them on a plane to go to Spain and Switzerland as ambassadors. However, he kept Saadoon Ghaydan as Minister of Interior. Consequently, the Ramadi ruling clique was replaced by the Tikriti ruling clique.

The most important and influential members of the Tikriti Ruling Clique were the following: President Ahmed Hassan Bakir, who was President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Baath Regional Command. He was called by the Baath crowd "Our Father's Leader." The second most important person was Air Force General Hardan Al-Tikriti, who was Minister of Defense and later Vice President. He had great influence in the army and was known to be a person who embodied the highest values of Arab culture. Next to him was General Hammad Shahab, Minister of Defense, who was well liked and trusted by the army. General Adnan Khayrullah, son-in-law of President Bakr and cousin and brother-in-law of Saddam. Since the Iran-Iraq war he was Minister of Defense, and the army urged him to become President in place of Saddam. Saddam Hussein was Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Baath Party. At the time he did not have much influence because he was young and inexperienced was looked down upon by those Tikriti dinosaurs.

As soon as the Tikriti Ruling Clique was established they began to fight among themselves for a position of power and influence. President Bakir, because of his seniority in the army, was able to keep some balance between the army and the Baath crowd. However, the army stood behind General Hardan Tikriti and considered him to be their protector. The Baath crowd found him to be dangerous and planned to get rid of him. He escaped to Saudi Arabia. Later, he was assassinated in the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait when the Ambassador, who knew him personally, asked him to come to Kuwait

to settle the differences with the high authorities in Baghdad. In the meantime, three killers were sent from Baghdad, and the minute he arrived at the door of the Embassy they opened fire at him and killed him. His body was taken back and was buried in Tikrit.

General Hamad Shahab, Minister of Defense and the Protector of the Army, was assassinated in Baghdad when Nadhim Kizar, the head of the notorious security of Iraq, planned to assassinate President Bakir and Mr. Saddam. Before starting his coup, Nadhim Kizar phoned Saadoon Ghaydan, Minister of the Interior who was his boss, and Hamad Shahab, Secretary of Defense, to come to visit his newly established modern laboratory for torture and extracting confessions. When they arrived, he arrested them both. When his coup failed he retreated with his forces and headed toward the Iranian border. He put Gen. Hamad Shahab in a wooden box and put it in a truck and carried it with him. But Nadhim Kizar was captured before arriving at the Iranian border and brought back to Baghdad. When they took out the wooden box, Gen. Hamad Shahab was alive, crying and shedding tears. However, he was killed inside the box and his body was taken back to Tikrit where he was buried.

In the meantime, President Bakir, our Father Leader, became disgusted with the Baathist crowd because many members of his family were killed in mysterious circumstances. His son-in-law, active in Tikrit's rumor mongering, was drowned when his car slipped and fell into the Tigris River. His elder son, an outspoken young man who opposed to Saddam, died in an automobile crash near Tikrit. His wife was burnt to death while cooking in the kitchen. President Bakir himself was tired and sick. One day he was given his favorite yellow soft drink, which he so often gave to friends and foes, and passed away. He was buried in a fantastic official ceremony in Tikrit.

General Adnan Khayrullah, Minister of Defense, was burned in the air over the Kurdish area when his helicopter was stuck by a sand storm. During the course of Iraq-Iran War General Adnan was the army's choice to replace Saddam as President. Since the case fire with Iran on August 22, 1988, the high command of the Iraqi army had been planning to assign General Adnan as President of Iraq. In May, 1988, General Adnan, with three officers, and President Saddam, travelled to the North for inspection of the troops. When they were about to return, Saddam told them he had some urgent business to attend to, and told them to continue the trip back to Baghdad while he stayed behind. On their way back, their helicopter got stuck in a sand storm and burst in the air. All three officers and General Adnan were burnt in the air.

Saddam is the only senior member of the Tikriti Ruling Clan who is alive today. However, the relatives and clans of General Hardan Al-Tikriti, General Hamad Shahab and President Ahmed Hassan Bakir are accusing him of complicity in their death and are actively seeking vengeance. Mr.

Khayrullah Tulfah, the father of General Adnan Khayrullah, who was burnt in the air in May, 1989, is publicly accusing Saddam of being behind his death. It is worthwhile to note that Khayrullah is the uncle of Saddam from his mother's side. When his father died, he was a little boy, his mother remarried, and his uncle took the orphaned boy to his house and raised him with his son, General Adnan. After he had grown up and reached manhood, he married Mr. Khayrullah's daughter, Majidah, and has a grown son from her by the name of Oday. Before the death of General Adnan, another family problem happened which further complicated Saddam's family life. About two years ago, he was infatuated with the wife of an Iraqi Air Force officer. He forced the officer to divorce his wife and he married her. He has a son by this new wife, about the year and half old. His first wife, Majidah, began to agitate against Saddam, and his son, Oday, took his mother's side in the quarrel. One day Oday struck the captain of Saddam's bodyguard with a stick and killed him because Saddam knew his second wife through him. His son, Oday, now is living with his deceased uncle's family in his grandfather's house.

In a later date President Saddam assigned his son Oday to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Swiss government refused to accept him and asked him to leave the country.

The Journal of "The Kurdistan Front" in its September 2, 1989 edition, p. 9, published a short article entitled "Short News" about how Saddam's guard shot to death the widow of General Adnan Khayrullah in her own house. In the following we quote the exact translation of the article as it was written in Arabic:

"There is news which indicates that Saddam recently visited the family of Khayrullah Tulfah to explain how Adnan's helicopter fell down, which provoked Adnan's wife, the daughter of former President Ahmed Hassan Bakir, to accuse Saddam of killing her husband. The heated argument between the two became so tense that one of the members of Saddam's bodyguards shot the widow in the presence of her family and killed her."

News from Baghdad indicates that during the visit General Adnan's wife attacked Saddam calling him "Murderer, you killed my father, you killed my husband. "She pulled a gun to shoot him but was shot by Saddam's body guard.

Reliable information from Baghdad indicates that Khayrunah Tulfah, an old man of 75 years old, now is carrying guerrilla warfare against his nephew, Saddam, and his followers. About two years ago, both of Tulfah's legs were amputated below the knee to save his life from bone cancer. However, a number of specialists whom he consulted reponse that Mr. Tulfah was only suffering from Arthorite Pain in his legs. Until his death in late 1988, he was sitting in his wheel chair and directing gueirilla warfare against Saddam in Baghdad city and in the Tikrit district. He was pursuing Saddam in person to average

the death of his children and relatives. He used to pray and say "may" the curse of God be upon an that cursed orphan who brought calamity to this family and to all poor Iraqi people". How long Saddam can hold on when he is pursued by the entire Tikritclan is uncertain.

In defiance of the rumors that he is afraid to visit Tikrit, Prsident Saddam held his 53rd birthday party in Tikrit. The lavish party was conducted with style of the Arabian Nights befitting the Caliph of Baghdad. Time magazine on May 21, 1990 published a brief commentary on this spectacular entertainment which we quote it in the following:

"Happy Birthday To Me . . . When you're fifty something, you're entitled to a little extravagance. But few birthday parties could match the spectacle staged by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for his 53rd last month. Saddam invited Cabinet members, prominent government officials and diplomats to his home village of Tikrit for lavish festivities that included a two-hour parade and banners proclaiming your candles, Saddam, are the torches for all the Arabs.

"At the climax of the parade, the residents of Tikrit wheeled out a simple cabin, and people dressed in the robes of ancient Babylon and Assyria prostrated themselves before it. When the cabin split open to reveal a palm tree from which 53 white doves were released, Saddam appeared to a ware of applause.

"The President sat and watched the remainder of the show, including a tableau—Moses redux?—of a baby Saddam rocking in a cradle in the marshes. Remarkd a Western diplomat: "Even to veteran Saddam watchers, this spectacle reached new heights."

The Iraqi people ridiculed this Juvenile show entertainment. They were hard lamenting their sad situation under the reign of Terror of the Butcher of Baghdad by saying: "People are starving to death! This is the way they spend the oil money-either buying weapons to kill people or spend it in these madneses." Following the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 The Iraqi people believe that Saddam's end is comming soon.

Why The Baathist Regime of Iraq is Killing Kurds— Reason Behind Genocide Against the Kurds in Iraq

It is a well-known fact that the present Baathist regime of Iraq is carrying out a campaign of genocide against the Kurdish people with the purpose of exterminating and uprooting the Kurds as an ethnic entity in their own historical homeland of Kurdistan in Iraq. This genocide has been carried out by the following methods:

Mass arrest, imprisonment, disappearance of people, and summary execution of civilians. The deadly Iraqi security, police force, and a large part of the Iraqi army are engaged in the so called liquidation process." The Kurds are dragged out of their homes, arrested on the streets, in their work places, or captured on the roadside. In what passes for military operations the Iraqi soldiers chase the peasants and their children to capture or kill them. Those Kurds who are arrested or captured by the Iraqi army are transferred to an unknown destination to disappear and no one ever hears from them any more.

The arrest and the disappearance includes those Kurds who work for the Baathist regime. In 1983 Dara Tawfiq Salihi, engineer and president of Iraq's Maritime Transportation Co., disappeared and no one has heard from him to this date.

Mr. Obaedulla Barzani, son of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and a cabinet minister, disappeared in 1985. At a later date Salih Yousifi, another cabinet minister, disappeared. The Iraqi authorities claimed that he was killed by a letter bomb someone mailed to him.

Mr. Shahr Fattah, a well-known Kurdish writer and a member of the Baathist-created legislative council, disappeared in 1985. Sheikh Mohamed Karadaghi, Imam of the mosque and a member of the legislative council, disappeared in 1986. The Kurds have a list of all those people who have disappeared.

Amnesty International in a 71 page document called Iraq-Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression (AI Index MDE 14.04.89), issued in February 1989, condemned Iraq for arresting and killing innocent children. The document reported that in 1985 300 children were arrested in the Sulaimania Province and have disappeared. Further it noted that the European Parliament in its joint resolution of April 9, 1987, passed resolution No. C125/132 dated 11/5/87 condemning Iraq for detention and torture of children and murdering at least 29 of them.

Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, the general secretary of Rada Barhen (Swedish Childrens Society) wrote as follows in MITT expression on April 5, 1990,

an essay entitled "The Hangman of our Time": "Saddam Hussein engages in total lawlessness today in Iraq. His regime represents Terror like nowhere else in the world today."

"Last year, Amnesty International reported that even children were exposed to such terror. Even children have been arrested, tortured and executed. Parents have had to pay a fee to get their childrens' bodies back. In other cases the children just "disappeared."

In 1972, 1979, and 1980, the Baathist government of Iraq conducted a campaign of mass arrest of the Faili Kurds in Baghdad, Khaniqin, and other cities in southern Iraq where Faili Kurds worked and lived. A total of 500,000 Faili Kurds were arrested and taken by military convoys to the Iranian border and forced at the point of bayonets to run and enter Iran. Of this total, about 50,000 young Faili Kurds were separated and taken to the Nigrat Salman Prison in the western desert. Those young Failis were highly educated people; doctors, engineers, and technicians, students in medical school, engineering and pharmacy school. Since 1985 the where about of those 50,000 young Failis is not known.

In 1984, the Baathist regime arrested a large number of Shiah Arabs, Turkomans, and Kurds. The total of 3,000 Shiah arrested at that time came mostly from the southern part of Iraq but some were Turkomans from Teleaftar, a town in the Mosul Province in the north. The 3000 Shiah disappeared. Terrible news leaked out in 1987 that they were massacred in the desert west of Mosul city. They were buried by a bulldozer under the sand. Even the drivers who drove them there were massacred and buried with them as a precaution against the news of the massacre becoming known.

After the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, Mull Mustafa Barzani and those men who surrounded him decided to abandon the fight with the Iraqi government and enter Iran. Barzani issued an order to Kurdish Peshmarga forces to leave the front line and enter Iran where they were disarmed by the Iranian forces and put in refugee camps guarded by Iranian security. When Kurdish fighting forces left the front, the Iraqi army began to arrest Kurds and put them in concentration camps. A large number of Barzani tribes men, kin of Mulla Mustafa himself, were arrested in Barzan district and were confined in a concentration camp in Qosh Tapa, a village some 35 kilometers south of Arbil city.

In 1984, a huge Iraqi army force surrounded Qosh Tapa camp and arrested all males except very old men. They arrested boys 12 years old and up. They left only women and children in the camp. The total of 8,000 Barzani men and young boys from age 12 and up were arrested and transferred by military convoy to prisons in southern Iraq. All news about them was cut off until 1987 when an editor of Kurdistan Times learned the following shocking news:

The Barzani prisoners were told they would be transferred to Jordan to settle down there. They were taken by military convoys to Rutba, near the Syrian border, where they were massacred and buried in mass graves under the sand. A company from Denmark which was digging wells for the Iraqs' government found mass graves in the region. When they informed the Iraqi authority about their findings they were told that those bodies belonged to ancient times. The Iraqi authority cancelled the contract of the Denmark Co. and expelled them from Iraq.

The Kurdish nationalist organizations have compiled a list of the names of those who have disappeared. The figure is in the tens of thousands. There is also a list of those Arabs who have disappeared, or burnt in the air when their helicopter was stuck by a sand storm, or those who died in an automobile accident and others who died in heart attack or poisoning. These are the four most common causes of death nowadays in Iraq for opponment of the regime.

The second stage of the Iraq's wicked scheme of genocide the destruction and depopulation of rural Kurdistan. This depopulation of the Kurdish rural areas was achieved by means of chemical bomb attacks and deployment of massive forces of Iraqi army, supported by air cover, tanks and helicopter gunships. After an extensive bombing the soldiers entered the villages and caputre all whom they could lay their hands on. They burnt the houses, dynamited them or flattended them to the ground by bulldozer. In every Kurdish village there is a mosque. The Iraqi soldiers were ordered by their commander to raze the mosque to the ground. They were ordered to kill animals, burn harvests, destroy orchards and dynamite the fountains to change the course of the underground water. All those peasants who could not escape were shot. The soldiers chased unarmed peasants, women and children who tried to escape and shot at them to kill. Those villagers who were captured were packed in army convoys and transferred to southern Iraq.

On March 28, 29, and 30, 1988, the Iraqi planes attacked the districts of Karadagh, Garmian and Mawat with chemical bombs. The extensive bombing of the villages was followed by the advance of 100,000 soldiers and irregular forces on the two districts of Qaradagh and Garmian. They burnt and flattened to the ground all villages in the two districts. They captured 40,000 peasants and members of their families and transferred them to the southern desert of Iraq. About 400 people who were too ill to escape were massacred by the Iraqi soldiers.

At 6:30 p.m. on April 30, 1988, 40 Iraqi planes attacked with chemical bombs the two districts of Shown and Sheik Bizayni North of Kirkuk oil field. The following morning before dawn, the attack resumed. Every single village in these two districts was attacked more than twice. A huge force of the Iraq army, 200,000 soldiers or 10 divisions, surrounded the two districts.

Some 400,000 peasants including members of their families were captured and were transferred to concentration camps in Arar in the south, Rutba and Rumadi concentration camps in the northwest of Iraq. No one knows for sure how many of these victims are alive today. 400,000 peasants are not accounted for to this date.

After the cease-fire with Iraq on August 20, 1988 Saddam Hussein turned loose the Iraqi army of one million men against the Kurds. In the period of August 25 to September 15, 1988 Iraqi planes attacked by chemical bomb the Zakho triangle district on the Turko-Iraqi border. The two districts of Zakho and Amadiya of the Duhok Province were extensively bombed by nerve gas and cyanide. The entire Iraqi army then advanced on the two districts. The minister of defense Adnan Khayrullah (who in May 1989 was burnt in the air in a helicopter disaster), and the high command of the Iraqi army took their headquarters to Mosul city so as to be near the center of military operations. The Iraqi soldiers laid waste to the two districts. Some 120,000 peasants crossed the border and escaped to Turkey. The Iraqi army captured 50,000 peasants, men, women, and children and transferred them to southern Iraq. However, the exact number of the villagers who were massacred by the Iraqi army is not known.

Amnesty International issued urgent appeals to the Iraqi authorities in September to put an end to the killing. On September 8, the organization issued an unprecedented public appeal to the UN Security Council "to act immediately and stop the massacre of Kurdish civilians by Iraqi forces", stating that the "systematic violations" taking place in Iraq "call out for immediate action by the Security Council". On September 16, the Iraqi government refused a request made by the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to allow a UN team to travel to Iraq to investigate the reported killings. (Amnesty International Report, February, 1989-Iraq, Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression).

The third stage of genocide is to destroy the Kurdish towns and transfer their entire population to the Arab part of Iraq in the south. It should be observed that the Kurdish towns are located in the strategic positions in the valleys and plains and serve as economic nerve centers for the districts around them. To destroy these towns is to paralyze the economic life of rural Kurdistan. The Iraqi regime calls the destruction of the Kurdish towns and uprooting of their inhabitants "planned resettlement".

On March 16, 17, 1988, the Beautiful town of Halabja was attacked by chemical bombs which killed more than 5,000 persons. Some 40,000 of its inhabitants escaped to Iran where they became refugees. Of this figure 30,000 persons returned to Halabja after Iraqi authorities promised them that they would be allowed to live a normal life there. But few weeks after their return they were transferred by the Iraqi army to Arbat, a small municipality some

30 kilometers west of Halabja on the Halabja-Sulaimania road.

In mid June, 1989, the Iraqi army destroyed the beautiful town of Halabja and razed it to the ground. In response to the outrage of world opinion, the Iraqi regime announced it would build a new town of Halabja near Arbat.

In May, 1989, the Iraqi government notified the inhabitants of the two prosperous towns of Qala Diza and Rania that they would be transferred and resettled in different places.

Manchester Guardian reported that "the Kurdish population of the town of Qala Diza have been told to leave behind everything except personal belongings that can fit into a Jeep.

"Telephone reports from the area said Iraqi officials have warned against resistance to the eviction."

"According to the Washington Post of May 25, 1989. Deportation forms distributed to the Kurds gave them the choice of three camps in northern Sulaimania and Arbil provinces, to which they are expected to be taken temporarily before being permanently resettled in southern Iraq."

In mid-June, 1989, two huge forces of the Iraqi army surrounded and blockaded the towns of Qala Diza and Rania and cut their connections with the outside world. Foot soldiers in military formations, followed by columns of tanks, were spread in the towns. They dragged the inhabitants out of their homes and brought them to an open space outside the towns where they were packed in military trucks and taken away. Loud speakers on open military trucks were bombarding the people and calling on them not to resist and to come out of their homes, because their homes would be demolished and they would be buried alive under the Rubblar. A large number of bulldozers were moving behind the tank columns and were ready to start demolishing the houses. Helicopter gunships were circling over the towns, warning people to obey the order of else they would be wiped out by chemical bombs.

A midst the screaming of women and children and prayers of the men, the entire population of the two towns of Qala Diza and Rania were evacuated. A total of 200,000 people from Qala Diza and its surrounding rural area were evacuated. Some 120,000 people from the town of Rania and the rural area around it were also evacuated.

The majority of the population of the two towns of Qala Diza and Rania and their surrounding rural areas were transferred to a concentration camp near the city of Arbil where they were distributed among refugee concentration camps located along the highway between Erbil and Mosul. The largest of these concentration camps are located at: 1) New Khabat, 2) New Zab, 3) Kozik, 4) Tobizawa, 5) Danatosh.

About 100,000 of the population of the two towns were transferred to a concentration camp near Sulaimania city. At a later date these refugees were dispersed in makeshift dwellings along the Sulaimania-Kirkuk road.

These makeshift dwellings consisted of a hole in the ground covered with a piece of plastic and were assigned as living quarters for a family of five persons. Their food supplies consisted of loaves of bread distributed once a day by the Iraqi army. The supply of drinking water was a serious problem. How could you supply drinking water to such a crowd of people by means of water trucks and water barrels? A large number of children died from lack of water.

This is how the Iraqi regime uprooted the population of the two prosperous towns of Qala Diza and Rania which were surrounded by productive fertile plains and extensive pastureland. All are now in ruin and deserted.

Iraq's genocide has brought tragic consequences to the Kurdish people in Iraq. At this stage of the investigation we are unable to state a figure for the number of Kurds who were killed in cold blood. More than 12,000 Kurds have disappeared and their whereabouts are not known.

There are an estimated 1,500,000 displaced Kurds in Iraq. About one million Kurds are now in prisons in the southern and northwestern parts of Iraq. Some 500,000 Kurds are confined in refugee concentration camps which the Iraqi regime deceptfully calls "Modern residential complexes", but which the Kurds call "Goristan" meaning the graveyard. The following table shows the destructive result of the genocide against Kurds in Iraq.

No. of persons assassinated and executed	6,000 persons
No. of people who disappeared	12,000 persons
No. of Villages and towns destroyed in Iraqi Kurdistan	4,000 persons
No. of schools destroyed	1,757
No. of Mosques destroyed	2,457
No. of churches destroyed	15
No. of hospitals and clinics destroyed	271
No. of families deported	219,828

The table is compiled by the Kurdish Human Rights Organization. Details about each one of these items in the table can be provided upon request.

Why Iraqi Baath are Killing Kurds

The question which is most frequently asked by the foreign observers is why the Baathist regime of Iraq is killing the Kurds? Why all this depopulation of rural Kurdistan and destruction of Kurdish towns? Why did the previous regimes of Iraq did not kill the Kurds while the Baath were embarking on the extermination of the Kurds in their own historical homeland?

The answer to these questions becomes clear when the true identity of the Baath becomes known. The Baathist group which rules Iraq now and call themselves by the name of the Arab Baath socialist party is not a grass-root political party. The name of the Arab Baath socialist party is only a cover. In reality, Baath is a paramilitary organization and its members are selected and trained like any other police force or foreign legion. The leaders of the Baath come to positions of leadership not as a result of elections by the party organization, but are assigned like any other commanders of police forces for a specific duty to be performed. Michel Aflaq, the first Baath leader, was chosen to invent a deceptive, ambiguous, and double edged abstract ideological principle to show that Baath is a political party. Colonel Ahmed Hassan Bakir who became the leader of the Baath in 1968 was chosen for a specific purpose to liquidate Arab nationalist elements in the Iraqi army and throughout Iraq.

Saddam Hyssein was selected to become the leader of the Baath in 1979 to carry out bloody wars of ruin and destruction in Iran and Iraq, and in southern Kurdistan. It should be noticed that in 1973 he was given a military rank of field marshall, an indication that the present genocide scheme was formulated as early as 1973 and that Saddam Hussein was chosen to execute it in future. Saddam Hussein was chosen because of his bestiality and his blood-thirsty criminal tendencies which had been developed since he was a street gang youngster most of his early life.

We have no doubt that the Baath is a paramilitary force organized, supported, and directed by the international oil cartel. The Shah of Iran was called "policeman of the Gulf", his duty was to maintain peace and order in the Gulf region. Saddam Hussein is called a hired killer of the international oil cartel and his duty is to guard the flow of oil.

President Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt knew the identity of the Baath. He branded them as "the Baath, the Agents". Once President Nasser was asked by a foreign leader "whose agents are these Baathists?" The Arab nationalists still refer to the Baath by the same name as President Nasser called them.

Quite often we read from foreign sources and from some Kurdish sources

description of Saddam and his rule as: Dictatorship, Autocracy, Absolute and Despotic rule, Arbitrary, Individualistic rule, a Facist, and Racist. The Iranian rulling Mullah described Saddam's rule as "authoritative." Branding Saddam Hussein with such common political labels is like giving him respectability and raising him to a much higher level. Saddam's rule should be described as a rule by proxy, indirect rule, and a rule by agents as some Arabs describe it. Saddam himself is a hired killer of International oil cartels.

The intelligence agencies of France, the Soviet Union and East and West Germany know the identity of the Baath and treat them accordingly. The British Intelligence Service knows the identity of the Baath. However, strange as it sounds the C.I.A. and Israili Intelligence, Masoud, have not been or perhaps unwilling to identify the identify of the Baath and its leader Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein and his Baathist clique are killing Kurds to achieve two specific objectives:

1. To Neutralize the impact of the Kurds on the oil extraction in southern Kurdistan.
2. Depopulation of the Kurdish region is a preparatory measure to clear the ground for the development of many more new oil fields in southern Kurdistan.

In the last thirty years the Kurds in Iraq have risen to the status of National Consciousness demanding autonomy for the Kurds within the framework of the Iraqi republic. The population of the Kurds in Iraq has increased to become four million. Many important urban centers have developed. A powerful educated elite has come into existence which replaced the traditional tribal chiefs and feudal lords in terms of power and influence. Well-organized grass-root political parties have carried on the role of opposition and challenge to the corrupt and useless Iraqs' government. On September 11, 1961 the Kurdish revolution in Iraq broke out, directed by the Kurdistan Democratic party, a grass-roots political party supported by the mass of the Kurdish population. Under its pressure, successive Iraqi governments collapsed and failed to put down the Kurdish revolt of 1961. In the course of 16 years of revolution (1961-1975, until Algiers Agreement), there were a few occasions when Kurdish forces blew up oil pipe-lines as a warning only to the oil companies to be fair and to spend a fraction of their huge earnings in the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish leadership had frequently demanded that a fair share of the oil revenue be spent in Kurdistan.

The rise of the Kurds in Iraq to the position of power, having a strong Pesh Merga force, did not suit the international oil cartels. A wicked conspiracy was formulated in 1972 to liquidate the Kurdish revolution of 1961 and to neutralize the Kurdish impact on oil production. The Algiers agree-

ment of March 6, 1975, was the first stage in the stage-by-stage plan of this wicked conspiracy against the Kurdish people in Iraq.

The Kurdish leadership at the time was one party to this conspiracy who treacherously abandoned the fight with Iraq and surrender to Iran with 20,000 well armed Pesh Maerga forces.

The rest of the wicked plan of conspiracy was assigned to Saddam Hussein to be carried out. Saddam Hussein is only the executioner of this wicked plan of conspiracy to depopulate and neutralize the Kurds in Iraq.

Kurdistan in Iraq is described as standing on an ocean of oil. At the present time oil is extracted in four oil fields of Ainzala, Kirkuk, Khaniqin, and Zanboor. In addition to these four oil fields, rich oil belts are known to exist in 14 other places. Saddam Hussein is forcibly transferring the inhabitants of those districts where oil is known to exist to clear the way for oil extraction.

The two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali contains the richest oil reserve in the Middle East. After the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, Saddam ordered the destruction of all the villages in the two districts and forcibly transferred all their inhabitants to southern Iraq. The two districts of Khaniqin and Mandali are now deserted.

Rich oil belts exist in the plain of Garmian, near the village of Dalo, on the Southern side of Karadagh mountain. On the northern side of Karadagh mountain near the village of Nawti, meaning the place of oil, another extensive oil known to exist. On March 28, 29, 30, 1988, the Iraqi warplanes bombed the two districts of Garmian and Karadagh by chemical bomb which was followed by the attack of Iraqi army. All the villages and towns in the two districts were destroyed. A special irregular Iraqi force is now guarding the two districts to make sure that no peasants come back and resettle in their villages.

The two districts of Showan and Sheikh Sizayni, some 15 kilometers north of the oil field of Kirkuk, contain a very rich oil belt. Sulphate mixed with oil gushes out from the ground in many different places in the two districts. In April, 1988, 40 Iraqi planes bombed the two districts with chemical bombs for two days after which 10 Iraqi divisions advanced on the two districts and captured 400,000 peasants and members of their families and transferred them to prison in southern Iraq and the northwest of Iraq. The Iraqi army regularly patrols The districts of an Showan and Sheikh Bizayne Any human being or animal found in these two districts would be shot on the spot.

The ruined towns of Halabja, Qala Diza, and Rania are known to be standing on the centers of three rich oil belts. Saddam Hussein leveled all three towns to the ground and forcibly transferred their population to refugee concentration camps. One of the richest oil reserves is known to exist in Kandinanwa district in the plain of Dizayee which belongs to Arbil province.

In early 1988 the Iraqi army moved on the Kandinawa district and forcibly transferred all its inhabitants to southern Iraq. The district of Kandinawa now is a prohibited area guarded regularly by army patrols.

In the period between August 25 and September 15, 1989, the Iraqi war planes bombed the Zakho triangle district extensively with chemical bombs. The Iraq army of 200,000 soldiers, supported by tanks, air cover, and helicopter gunship, followed the attack on the two districts of Zakho and Amadia. All the villages in the two rich districts were destroyed. About 120,000 of their inhabitants escaped to Turkey to save their lives from the Iraqi army. Those peasants who were captured, some 50,000 persons and members of their families were immediately transferred to southern Iraq.

The main purpose behind the attack on Zakho Triangle district was to neutralize Kurdish pressure on the oil pipeline which runs across Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea.

Once again the Kurds became the victims of the existence of an extensive oil reserve in their homeland. The discovery of oil in great quantity in southern Kurdistan had tremendous economic value but brought tragic consequences to the Kurdish people. According to a new Allies scheme for long-term oil exploitation, adopted after the San Remo oil agreement of 1920, the plans for independent Kurdish and Armenian states were abandoned altogether, the fates of the Kurds and Armenians were put in the hand of General Mustafa Kamal, pro-western dictator. The Armenian people were targeted for total annihilation, while the Kurds were targeted for forced assimilation. Consequently, instead of creating an independent Kurdistan the Kurds became divided into four parts among the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran to be manipulated or used as an instrument for the policy of "divide and rule" which operates by setting the Kurds against those States among whom they are divided and setting those states against Kurds when the need arises. It could all be a method of checks and balances to secure the flow of oil.

A recent discovery of an ocean of oil in southern Kurdistan in Iraq brought a new calamity to the Kurds. The international oil cartel has formulated a wicked scheme to wipe out the Kurds in southern Kurdistan in order to clear the ground for oil exploitation. The assessment of the opposition to the Baathist regime in Iraq is that Saddam Hussein has been appointed by the International oil cartel to execute the blue print of this "wicked scheme" to depopulate southern Kurdistan. It is well known public secret in Iraq that Saddam Hussein is only an executioner who kills Kurds to clear the ground for large scale oil extraction in southern Kurdistan in Iraq. Following the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 the prices of oil soared from \$16 a barrel to \$40 a barrel by the end of September, 1990. This rapid increase in the oil price brought hundreds of billion dollars profits to the international oil cartels and has saved the economy of a number of European countries from total collapse.



Hasso—An Eight Years Baby Boy Was
Inflicted with Iraq's Chemical
Bomb Attack in September 1988
6) month

Amnesty International Condemns Iraq for Killing and Executing Children and Minors.

The report of Amnesty International is entitled: "Iraq-Children-Innocent Victims of Political Repression" In the following we present exact quotation of some of its passages:

"Children have frequently been the victims of human rights violations in Iraq. Information received by Amnesty International over a number of years indicates that children have been the victims of arbitrary arrest and detention without charge or trial. They have been imprisoned as 'hostages' in lieu of their parents or relatives who were being sought by the authorities. They have sometimes "disappeared" following their arrest, and their fate and whereabouts have remained unknown for years. They have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces; some were reported to have died in custody as a result of such treatment. Children have been the victims of the wide-ranging application of the death penalty in Iraq. In some instances such executions have been carried out without prior legal proceedings or following summary trials by military or special courts. Children have also been the victims of deliberate killings by government forces, in some instances on a massive scale. School children have been apprehended, lined up and summarily shot in public. They have been shot dead in demonstrations. Whole families, including children and infants, have been killed in large-scale military attacks by Iraqi troops on civilian targets. . . .

"In sum, children and young people have become the innocent victims of a policy of political repression. Opponents and critics of the government have frequently had to pay a price for their activities in terms of the welfare—and sometimes the lives—of their children. . . .

"In January 1986 Amnesty International called on the government to investigate reports that some of the 300 children and youths arrested in Sulaimaniya in September/October 1985 had been tortured, and that three of them died in custody as a result. The bodies of the three children were reported to have been found in the streets on the outskirts of Sulaimaniya, their clothes bloodstained and their bodies bearing the marks of torture. Others were allegedly beaten while in detention. The government denied these reports in its letter to the organization received in April 1986. There was no indication that the torture allegations had ever been investigated. Amnesty International subsequently received the testimony of a former detainee released from

Fudailiyya Security Headquarters in Baghdad in late 1985. Suspected of having contacts with members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, he was detained for seven months and allegedly tortured in order to reveal the names of PUK members. He stated following his release that some of the 300 Sulaimaniya children had been detained at Fudailiyya with him and subjected to torture. The following are extracts from his testimony. . .”

“The government also denied in April 1986 the arrest of some 300 Kurdish children and youths in Sulaimaniya in September/October 1985. However, in September 1987 it confirmed the execution in January of that year of seven of them, and added that one other had been brought to trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. The fate and whereabouts of over 250 children and youths remain unknown; they have effectively “disappeared” in detention. . . .

“Below are the details of six Kurdish children arrested in July and August 1985, and whose parents or relatives were said to be members of the KDP’s Pesh Merga forces (armed Kurdish units). One of the children was arrested with his father; the others were arrested as hostages in lieu of relatives being sought by the authorities. Their ages at the time of arrest ranged between six and thirteen. As far as Amnesty International is aware, none have since been released. . . .

“Reports of the “disappearance” of detainees following their arrest continue to be received by Amnesty International. Some were reported to have been arrested on suspicion of membership of support of opposition groups. ‘Ismat Najman ‘Abdallah, a secondary school student from Duhok, was 17 at the time of his arrest in October 1986. Mustafa Ahmad Mustafa, also a secondary school student from Duhok, was 17 when arrested. . . .

“Appendix: A”

“List of Names of 315 “Disappeared” Children of the Barzani Clan”

“Children and young people have also been subjected to torture while in custody. Allegations received have included the following: the extraction of fingernails, beatings, whipping, sexual abuse, electric shock treatment, and deprivation of food and of the use of toilet facilities. According to the testimony of a former prisoner released in 1988, female prisoners, including young girls, have been hung upside down from the feet during menstruation. Objects have also been inserted into the vaginas of young women, causing the hymen to break. . . .

“Amnesty International has received details of other cases where trials by such courts have resulted in the passing of heavy sentences on minors for alleged political offences, but whose names the organization will not publish

for fear of reprisals by the Iraqi authorities against them or their families. They include three minors arrested in 1982 whose ages ranged between 15 and 16 at the time. They were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging between 15 and 20 years' imprisonment and life. . . .

"In many other cases known to Amnesty International, minors have been detained indefinitely without charge or trial. Having committed no crime themselves, their fate is dependent on that of their parents or relatives for whom they are held as hostages. Alternatively, they are used as tools to induce their parents to "confess" to alleged offences.

"In other cases the government had initially denied that arrests had taken place, or that the victims were in detention, but subsequently confirmed that some of them had been executed. In February 1985, the government confirmed to Amnesty International that six members of the al-Hakim family were executed in 1983 but denied that some 90 other family members (believed to be still in detention at that time) had been arrested. However, in July 1985 the government confirmed that ten other family members were executed in March of that year, and reiterated: "As regards the imprisonment of 90 members of the Hakim family, there is no truth in these allegations". At the time of writing, over 50 members of the al-Hakim family were believed to be still in detention, but their fate and whereabouts are unknown. Among them are twelve children and young people aged between nine and 17 at the time of their arrest in 1983. . . .

"Baghdad. These executions were also later confirmed by the government. The fate and whereabouts of twelve members of the al-Hakin family, whose ages at the time of arrest ranged between nine and 17, remain unknown. Among them is Sayyid 'Ali Sayyid 'Abd al-Hadi al-Hakim, fifteen years old when arrested in May 1983. His father, Hojatoleslam Sayyid 'Abd al-Hadi al-Hakim and his two brothers, Hussain and Hassan (aged 18 and 22 respectively) were executed in March 1985. The fate of the adult members of the family leads Amnesty International to fear for the safety of the children. (See Appendix C for the names of the twelve children, and Appendix F2 for photographs). . . .

"Among the hundreds of others who are reported as having "disappeared" over the years are male members of Feyli Kurds deported to Iran by the Iraqi authorities. Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq conflict in September 1980, thousands of Feylis were forced to leave their homes by the authorities. Their properties and possessions were confiscated. They were forcibly taken to border areas such as Mandali and forced to cross the border into Iran, where the majority have since lived in refugee camps. In some cases whole families were deported, while in others only the women, younger children and old people were deported (see Appendix F3 for photographs). The male members of such families—both adults and minor were arrested, often in

the presence of their relatives as eye-witnesses. They have since been detained, indefinitely without any legal proceedings. Amnesty International is not aware of any such cases where the detainees were charged with any offences. In most cases brought to the organization's attention, the families have remained ignorant of the fate and whereabouts of detained relatives. They have been prevented from making enquiries in this regard by virtue of being forcibly expelled from their country. . . .

"The majority of those arrested under these circumstances have been male members of Arab Shi'i Muslim families from regions such as Najaf, Karbala' and al-Hilla, who were declared by the authorities to be of Iranian descent (*taba'iyya*). Also detained are male members of Feyli Kurdish families (Shi'i Muslims) who have also been deported to Iran over many years. In these latter cases, however, such punitive measures were taken for overtly political reasons, since Feyli Kurds have historically been associated with opposition movements in Iraq (see Footnote 5 for brief background detail). . . .

"The following are examples of such cases where minors have been detained and whose families were deported to Iran: Amnesty International had submitted the names of 46 of the 150 victims reported executed in Abu Ghraib. The government confirmed the execution of nine of them.

"Two of the nine victims whose executions were confirmed by the government were, according to Amnesty International's information, aged 16 at the time of their execution. They were Lugman Haji 'Ali and Ribwar Muhammad Karim 'Aziz. The government stated that Luqman Haji 'Ali was in fact 23 years of age, not 16, when executed. However, despite denying in its letter that minors have been executed, the government confirmed that 16-year-old Ribwar Muhammad Karim 'Aziz had been executed and did not contest his age. . . .

"A more recent case was that of Ribwar Muhammad Karim 'Aziz, a Kurdish youth from Sulaimaniya arrested at the age of 13. He was sentenced to death by a special court and executed in Abu Ghraib Prison in December 1987 at the age of 16.

"Report reaching organization indicate that minors as young as 14 have been executed. In cases raised by Amnesty International, the government has either denied the allegations or questioned the ages of the victims concerned, stating that they were over 18 years of age at the time of their execution. . . ."

The European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Iraq for arrestig, torturing, and killing children.

Swedish childcare society warns Saddam Hussein to stop killing children. Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, Secretary General of Rada Barna, Swedish Childcare Society, writes under the headline "The Hangman of our time", that Saddam Hussein has been guilty of total lawlessness in Iraq. His regime

uses terror the likes of which can be found nowhere else in this world today. There is a new law in Iraq that gives a man the right to kill women in his family if he suspects that they have been unfaithful. The total lack of safety is like a law in Saddam Hussein's regime. That this way: Total contempt for the rule of human rights. . . ."

"The person who dares to protest or is suspected of being critical will be thrown into prison, or worse. Amnesty International has shown that the torture of people arrested in Iraq is systematic and frightfully brutal. Death sentences are made after secret court proceedings and people have been executed in mass right after they have been arrested without any kind of judicial proceedings. . . ."

"Last year Amnesty International reported that children have been arrested, tortured, and executed. Parents have had to pay a fee to get their children's body back. In other cases the children have just disappeared. . . ."¹

¹Translated from Swedish, selected passages from "The Hangman of our Time", published in Swedish "Mitt-i-Expression."

DOCUMENT (Translated from Arabic)

From Iraqi Secret File, Proving Genocide Against the Kurdish People in Iraq

Arab Baath Socialist Party One Arab Nation, having
Command of Zakho Branch its Eternal Message
Committee for Organizing Battalions No. S-Sh-664
For National Defense Date: June 14, 1987

Extremely secret and Personal
To all party organizations
Subject: The Decision

Comradely Greetings:

With reference to the letter of the Committee for the Organization of the Battalions for National Defense No. S-S-Sh-1175 dated June 9, 1987 which in turn is based on the letter of the Bureau for the Organization of the North, classed as extremely secret and personal, No. 28-2650, dated June 3, 1987, which includes the following instructions:

- 1) The delivery of food, machinery, and any human presence is absolutely and totally forbidden to reach the prohibited villages, i.e., those villages which are included in the second stage of the village collectivisation. Those villagers who wish to join with the National Front should be allowed to do so. However, their families and relatives are prohibited from contacting them without prior approval from the Security Organization.
- 2) Human presence is totally forbidden in those areas and villages included in Stage One of the Prohibited Villages. Human presence is also forbidden, after June, 1987, in those areas which are included in the Second Stage.
- 3) Following the completion of harvest season, which must end before July 15, no further cultivation of either summer or winter crops will be permitted.
- 4) The grazing of cattle and other herds is prohibited in these areas.

- 5) The military forces, each within its own area of jurisdiction must kill any human or animal seen in those designated areas under their jurisdiction.
- 6) Those villages which are included in the Deportation Plan should be informed about the resettlement, and they will be held responsible for any violation of this order.

This directive is for your enforcement, that you shall act accordingly, each within your own jurisdiction.

With our regard, and may you live long to struggle for the cause.

Signed

Comrade Ali Moashu Kadhum

Trustee of the secretes of the branch¹

Institut kurde de Paris

¹The Kurdish observer, London, December, 1988, p. 12.

Make No Mistake—This is Genocide Iraq's Final Solution for Its Kurds

Jim Hoagland

PARIS—Iraq is committing step-by-step genocide against the Kurdish people in the remote Zagros Mountains. The evidence is now so clear that the world cannot shrink from branding Iraq's actions with that horrible word and demanding an end to this calculated massacre.

The Iraqi version of genocide is being conducted in military operations stretched out over years and launched against the Kurds as opportunities permit. It does not have the maniacal pace or organization of Hitler's Germany or Pol Pot's Cambodia. But this must not lessen the horror, condemnation and forceful opposition the world community and especially the Reagan administration must demonstrate if a similar tragedy is to be avoided.

Washington and the United Nations have responded with surprisingly mild rebukes as Iraq has taken advantage of the U.N.-sponsored cease-fire with Iran to intensify poison-gas attacks against Kurdish civilians, on a scale not known since World War I. More distressingly, the United States and other nations have taken no effective action to stop the slaughter of Kurdish civilians and the mass eviction of these Aryan tribal people from their mountain homes.

Such inactivity from an administration that has supposedly been building up American influence and leverage in the Persian Gulf is inexcusable. The United States spent \$200 million to place a naval shield for the past year around the shipping of Iraq's Arab allies in the war against Iran. The White House also accepted with indecent haste an Iraqi apology for the attack on the USS Stark, which killed 37 American servicemen. In its grudge match with Iran, the Reagan administration visibly tilted to Iraq's side—and at a high price.

But now Washington appears either unable or unwilling to use the leverage it said it was obtaining to help the Kurds or push the Iraqis to drop the hard-line positions that have driven the negotiations on ending the Iran-Iraq war into deadlock.

Secretary of State George Shultz has given several recent speeches mixing eloquence with hand-wringing about the horrors of chemical weapons. When confronted with their open use by the brutal Iraqi regime that he has chosen to cultivate rather than confront, Shultz folds his cards. As it stands now, other countries that would be tempted to use the "poor man's atomic

bomb" against their enemies can conclude from the Iraqi example that they will have to pay no price internationally for doing so.

An estimated 120,000 Kurds have fled into neighboring Turkey in the past week. One measure of the atrocities being committed against the Kurds is the public outrage voiced by the leaders of Turkey, a Moslem country that places high value on its relations with Iraq and has a reputation for suppressing its own Kurds. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was quoted by the BBC as saying that "a massacre of innocent people" is occurring in Iraq.

Where are equivalent U.S. statements that might signal a serious international action to halt the Iraqis? In the midst of the election campaign, the Reagan White House and the State Department appear to have other things on their agenda. State Department officials speak instead of making "an expression of concern" to the Baghdad government.

History shows that such meekness will provide no comfort or protection for the Kurds—Moslems who are racially distinct from the Arab majority of Iraq. While their periodic rebellions against Baghdad in this century have been suppressed with brutality, it was only 13 years ago that "a final solution" seems to have been adopted as the option of choice for the troublesome Kurds.

In 1975, it was the shah of Iran who signed a border agreement with Iraq and gave Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein a free hand in Kurdistan rather than continue a costly frontier war. The United States went along with the decision of the shah, who had been funneling American supplied weapons to the rebel Kurdish army led by the legendary warrior Mullah Mustafa Barzani.

I was with Barzani in the Zagros when the end came that March. Anger and sorrow consumed him as he told me that he had risked everything because he had trusted the United States. He had expected betrayal by the shah; that was why he had insisted that the United States be deeply involved in supporting the rebellion from the beginning. In defeat, he asked for American humanitarian help to prevent the destruction of his people.

But over the next year, the Iraqis faced no international opposition as they destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages and resettled as many of the Kurds in Arab-dominated regions as they could. After the Iran-Iraq war erupted in 1980, the surviving Kurdish fighters threw in their lot with Tehran.

This time it is a truce with the ayatollahs that has enabled Iraq to have another go at removing the Kurds from their homeland, with the new wrinkle of poison gas thrown in. This time Hussein's intention of depopulating Kurdistan may be within his grasp.

It is unthinkable that he will benefit once again from official American indifference and/or impotence that will be justified in the name of maintaining influence in the Arab world."

(The Washington Post September 1988)

Getting Away With Genocide

Richard Cohen

“Occasionally something happens that brings to mind a Broadway show of some years back. Last week, it happened again. Meeting in Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Commission voted not to investigate Iraq. “Stop The World—I Want To Get Off,” was the show. It’s also how I feel.

The case against Iraq is impressive. It has used poison gas against Iran in a war it started but could not finish. It has used poison gas against its own people, the Kurdish minority. Torture, although outlawed by its own constitution (naturally), is commonplace. A recent State Department report on Iraq is just plain sickening: beatings, whippings, the extraction of fingernails.

The State Department says that “disappearances” are commonplace. It says Iraqi children are occasionally executed, and cites instances in which their bodies were returned bearing unmistakable evidence of torture. The State Department also says what should be obvious: “Torture could not be practiced without the authorization of senior officials.”

Of course, these are allegations. But the evidence for them is compelling. The Baghdad regime said it had not used poison gas against the Kurds. Some 60,000 Kurds who fled into Turkey say otherwise. So does U.S. intelligence, which reportedly monitored radio transmissions from Iraqi planes as poison gas was dropped.

The State Department says Iraq is involved in a massive relocation program. An estimated 500,000 Kurds have been taken from their villages and resettled elsewhere. This effort to destroy an entire culture by dispersing its people is what Turkey attempted with its Armenians during World War I. The Turks also had their explanations, but 60 years later a term has been applied to what they did: genocide.

Iraq, too, has embarked on genocide. So what does the United Nations do? Nothing. Seventeen mostly Third World countries, including such American allies as the Philippines and Pakistan, voted against investigating Iraq. Four Communist governments, including the Soviet Union and the fictitious Ukrainian Republic, either voted “no position” or abstained. Of the Third World nations on the commission, only Peru and Togo voted with the United States, Japan, Canada and Western Europe.

The consequences of this indifference are hard to predict. Maybe there will be none. But history suggests otherwise. It teaches that thugs like Iraq’s

Saddam Hussein must be called to terms. The lack of reproof, the absence of indignation—these only encourage despots. How many times must the world relive the lessons of Hitler? How many times must we exhume the victims of Pol Pot before we get the point? How many times do we have to be told that silence is complicity.

Wars accelerate history, and two recent ones have done just that. The first was the Iran-Iraq war, in which both sides, but Iraq in particular, used poison gas. The second is the recently concluded war in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was licked, partly because the United States supplied the mujaheddin with Stinger ground-to-air missiles. The effectiveness of these weapons remains disputed, but what matters is that Third World guerrillas learned to use them. The nature of warfare was changed: both a highly trained soldier and a poorly trained guerrilla can press a button. Silicon chips will do the rest.

Iraq came out of the war with Iran with an immense army. It learned how to effectively drop poison gas from airplanes and helicopters. It might know how to arm missiles with poison gas—missiles that can reach Jerusalem or, for that matter, Amman, Jordan. Iraq violated international law with impunity—and benefited from it. The world noticed. Libya and now Egypt reportedly are developing chemical warfare capabilities. The next Middle East war could be a doozie.

Third World countries wonder why they should abjure chemical weapons when the United States and other Western countries retain them. There can be only one answer: the West must practice what it preaches. These nations also ask why they should abide by international law, considering how the Reagan administration thumbed its nose at the World Court in 1984 when the United States was sued by Nicaragua. Again, there can be only one answer: the United States must play by the rules.

Short of war or economic sanctions, only condemnation will give Iraq's Saddam Hussein pause—condemnation not only by the West but by other Arab governments and Third World nations as well. But even a slap on the wrist was too much for these nations, some of which, like India, usually don't hesitate to offer the United States moral instruction. In Geneva, they turned in a squalid performance. Back in 1962, Anthony Newley said it best: "Stop the world—I want to get off."

(The Washington Post, March 14, 1989)

Hitler-Style Genocide Threatens the Kurds

By Helga Graham

“THE ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war has left in power in Baghdad one of the most ruthless dictatorships in the world—that of Saddam Hussein. It has left the Iraqi President’s hands free, behind a carefully crafted camouflage of apparent political openness, to pursue a ruthless extermination of his opposition, in particular its Kurdish component. With Western arms, credits and, incomprehensibly, our tacit consent, one of the most resilient democratic movements in the Middle East is currently under threat of something close to annihilation.

The West, and in particular the UK, one of Iraq’s largest aid donors, has one final chance to control a situation that threatens at any moment to spin out of control into mass killing and unbridled genocide.

Saddam Hussein’s methods of dealing with his political opponents, Arabs and Kurds, have been movingly described in Amnesty International’s February report. Torturers have gouged out the eyes of their victims, cut off their noses, ears, breasts and penises, and axed limbs. Children are tortured wholesale—whipped, sexually abused and given electric shocks. Babies of five months are starved in front of their parents.

However pitiful such cases, the internal problem in Iraq has moved on beyond them. Saddam Hussein has evidently decided to deal with the Kurds—at four million, a quarter of the Iraqi population—*en masse*, as a people.

The process of settling with the Kurds is well under way: its main instrument that horrific form of collective torture, chemical weapons. Chemical bombardments have caused thousands to die—20,000, maybe 30,000, no one knows how many—and have driven over a million people, mainly poor Kurdish peasants, out of their villages.

Rural Kurdistan is being destroyed both demographically and ecologically; a way of life thousands of year old casually sprayed with chemicals like a garden weed. Imagine the West of England or the South of France with *no villages*. A peasant culture with a peasantry uprooted, landless, idle, living off government handouts.

A quarter of a million Iraqi Kurdish refugees shiver in miserable camps over the Turkish and Iranian borders, largely forgotten by the world. Others have crowded into the Kurdish cities. Up to half a million more are held incommunicado in camps in the southern desert, in Ar Ar, Nukrat Salman,

Rutba. A few old men, released to die, have told terrible stories, but we have no real means of knowing the facts.

The next targets are the smaller and medium-sized Kurdish towns. A month ago the entire citizenry of Quala Diza (120,000) and Rania (30,000) were given notice to quit—leaving all but their most intimate possessions behind. In the face of international protest the regime backed off. Yet we know that its displacement programme, including 22 new towns, away from the mountains and border, remains. The Government has apparently now set this Friday as the new deadline for mass evacuations.

Saddam Hussein is intent on becoming overlord of the area, untrammelled by democratic opposition. The Kurds are the backbone of that Iraqi democratic movement. Besides, they have a natural geographical stronghold in their northern mountains. For three decades Kurdish guerrillas have fought for themselves and for the Iraqi middle classes and for three decades they have constituted a thorn in the side of a military dictatorship.

This is what is at stake. For all its nationalist dimension, it is not some kind of esoteric Kurdo-Arab conflict. The Kurds are likely to continue to be the regime's most visible victims. But equally, young Arab pilots are victims, who, their lives under threat, are forced to drop chemical weapons. Twenty-two of them were executed in January for planning to shoot Saddam Hussein—the latest in a long line of attempted military coups.

The Government's objective is clear: the Kurdish population is to be confined to a handful of large cities or penned into army-supervised, regimented new towns. An apparently 'controlled', but in fact totally combustible situation.

At some point the Kurds will revolt. This revolt may be the act of clear-eyed citizens who have understood that once herded together they are especially vulnerable to chemical and biological weapons. Or a riot may break out in the cities among disoriented peasants who believe—perhaps quite mistakenly—that biological agents, typhoid or some killer disease, has been unleashed. Such a scare has already happened in the Kurdish nationalist centre of Sulemaniya, a city bloated by refugees to half a million.

The truth is that the real peril now lies less in Saddam himself than in our supine appeasement of him, 'The plain and hideous fact', said the Archbishop of Canterbury, 'is that Iraq has used these weapons without adverse consequences.' So why should Saddam stop when his goal is within reach?

This, after all, is a regime with a record.

Consider Appendix A of the Staff Report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It lists 22 occasions from 1984 to 1988 on which the US Administration made public statements denouncing Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Yet no action was taken, not even when 7,000 civilians in the Kurdish town of Helabja died under chemical attack.

Saddam then moved the nightmare to fast forward. One hundred thousand

Kurds in August 1988 fled across the border under renewed chemical onslaught. The UN Security Council voted to take 'effective' measures against such action in the future, but neither stopped nor punished Baghdad. The Iraq Foreign Minister pledged a halt, but there were further chemical attacks in October. The Kurds named the villages. No international reaction. In March the UN Human Rights Commission voted not to consider the Kurdish question. Western powers displayed 'outrage and disbelief' at Third World connivance with Baghdad.

The ultimate hypocrisy is that Western powers are providing the massive new credits on which this semi-bankrupt regime is so vitally dependent. Where else would it find loans—from the USSR?

The EC last week, at British instigation, finally called for an ambassador's report. This is too little, too late. Having created our Frankenstein monster, do we believe we can halt it now by shaking a feather duster in its face?

How about stalled credits, military equipment, agricultural exports? Pure panic gripped Baghdad's presidential palace when the US Congress came within a whisker of such action last winter.

How about making it clear to Saddam (as it was not made clear to Hitler after his pogroms of November 1938) that any further move against the Kurds in the north, or the Shia Arabs in the south (who have also had a taste of chemical weapons) will meet with relentless retaliation? How about taking a stand on the unspeakable camps? The massive displacement programme must be halted immediately.

Western powers managed to act decisively and in concert when it came to collecting their debts in January. Let them do so now.

Genocide is *not* an internal affair."

Sadistic Beast of Baghdad

By Smith Hempstone

“Having live din this world for 60 years, traveled to more than 100 lands and covered a dozen wars, I have seen my share of death, destruction and suffering.

Man’s inhumanity to man is such that after a time one’s capacity for indignation becomes blunted. If it did not, one’s heart would break.

But, as God is my witness, I am here to tell you that the horror being perpetrated by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein exceeds the bounds of anything a society that calls itself civilized can tolerate in silence.

This man, this sadistic monster, is systematically torturing, sexually abusing and executing Kurdish children, frequently in front of their parents, solely because their loyalty to his repressive rule is suspect.

The reports, despite the official Iraqi denials—Sadam Hussein is a liar as well as a sadist—are too numerous and well-documented to be doubted.

According to Amnesty International, the London-based human rights organization, Sadam Hussein in the past four years has tortured and killed hundreds of Kurdish children, perhaps thousands, to silence and punish their rebellious parents. To reclaim the broken bodies of their executed children for burial, their parents are charged an “execution fee.”

In 1985, according to Amnesty, about 300 children were arrested in the town of Sulaimaniya because their parents were suspected of supporting an independent Kurdish state.

Fellow prisoners who have since escaped and made their way to the West report that the children were beaten, whipped, sodomized, deprived of food and water and subjected to electrical shocks. Some had their fingernails extracted. Three of the children died under torture, another 29 were executed without trial in 1987 and the rest have simply disappeared.

The 70-page report tells of a screaming, 5-month-old baby being starved to force her parents, in an adjoining cell, to confess to political offenses. Another former political prisoner describes how 12 of his relatives, aged from 5 to 73 (is grandmother) were tortured in front of him.

The relatives of Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish revolt, are said to have been single out for special attention, with scores tortured and executed. Mr. Barzani’s father, the late Mulla Mustapha Barzani, led four earlier rebellions against Baghdad’s rule.

The Kurds, like Iraq’s ruling clique, are Sunni Moslems. But they have

their own language, and are Aryans rather than Semites (and hence not Arabs).

Some 20 million Kurds inhabit the mountainous regions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union. They were promised a separate nation in the 1922 Treaty of Sevres, but this was conveniently forgotten by the nations concerned, if not by the Kurds.

There have been reports that Saddam Hussein began using poison gas—mustard gas and cyanide—against the Kurds as early as 1985. In March of last year, his air force blanketed the Kurdish town of Halabja with chemical warfare agents, killing 5,000 civilians (many of them women and children) and driving tens of thousands of others across the frontier into Turkey and Iran.

Because they dared to dream of freedom, Saddam Hussein has and waste the Kurdish homeland. An estimated 4,000 of the 5,000 Kurdish villages have been bulldozed and burned. Wells have been poisoned, orchards uprooted and crops left to rot in the field.

The inhabitants of these villages, perhaps a third of Iraq's 3 million Kurds, have been dispersed and forcibly relocated in unhealthy, lowlying areas of the country; far from their beloved mountains. Many have sickened and died in these concentration camps.

If this is not genocide, what is it? The United States helped the Kurds in the 1974-75 conflict because they were supported by the shah of Iran. But in the recent war between Iraq and the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran, of which the Kurdish rebellion was a sideshow, Washington tilted toward Saddam Hussein. Thus we bear a measure of responsibility for the holocaust that is consuming the Kurdish people.

One can rationalize the tilt by saying that by 1980 Saddam Hussein was no longer a threat to the Persian Gulf emirates, that there was a compelling need to contain revolutionary Iran, that secular Iraq provided a bulwark against the surge of Islamic fundamentalism, that the spread of the Kurdish revolt to Turkey would have been a disaster for NATO, that the West had need to Iraq's oil.

All of this is true. But it cannot justify the torture and execution of children. Nothing can.

The United States, to its credit, has protested against Saddam Hussein's more bestial acts. But there comes a time when word are no longer an adequate substitute for deeds. That time has come.

Saddam Hussein, the Pol Pot of the Arabs, should be ostracized by all nations. The United States should impose total sanctions on this child-killer, neither buying Iraqi products nor selling American goods to Baghdad. All nations should be urged to sever diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Saddam Hussein's cruelty to innocent children is an affront to every religion (including his own), an assault on every system of values. There can be no place for such a monster in a world that calls itself civilized."

The Gulf Crisis—What It Is All About

It is generally believed that Saddam Hussein, the butcher of Baghdad, is the cause of the present crisis which he has created by invading and annexing Kuwait. On July 17, 1990, Mr. Hussein presented to the world one more of his many erratic surprises when he publicly accused the government of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of stabbing Iraq from the back with a poisonous dagger by increasing the production of oil above their agreed quotas, thus bringing down the price of oil and causing the loss of billions of dollars to the Iraqi budget. He particularly accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from Romaila oil field worth billions of dollars. Saddam Hussein demanded from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to pay due compensation for Iraq's loss. He asked (OPEC) to raise the price of oil from \$18 to \$25 a barrel. Saddam warned the oil producing countries not to exceed and strictly adhere to the quotas assigned to them by OPEC. He strongly warned the Arabs and foreign governments not to interfere in the disputes between Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. By these announcements and warnings Saddam, with his army of one million men declared himself to be the strongest military power in the Middle East and the guardian of oil production and the arbiter of the oil prices.

Following these pronouncements Saddam massed 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 500 tanks on the Kuwait border with Iraq. On August 2, 1990 Iraq attacked and annexed Kuwait, changed its name to Fatimia, and officially became the 19th province of Iraq. Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmed Sabah and the whole royal family fled to Saudi Arabia. The exodus of foreigners and Kuwait nationals followed escapes in mass caused by Iraq's reign of terror. Two-thirds of an estimated 700,000 Kuwait population fled the country. Some 1,500,000 foreign nationals who were working in Kuwait escaped leaving behind all their belongings. There are fewer than 1,000 foreigners remaining in Kuwait who are in hiding. Saddam brought 350,000 Palistenians to Kuwait and granted them citizenship to replace those Kuwaites who escaped. An estimated 350,000 Egyptians have escaped Kuwait and Iraq since the invasion in August 2, 1990. According to reliable Iraqi sources 2,500 Egyptians were killed in Kuwait by the Iraqi security on the pretext they belonged to Kuwait's resistance forces.

The Iraqi troops looted banks, food storage and warehouses taking away foods, machines, spare parts, oil equipment and transferred them back to Iraq. People were indiscriminately arrested on the street, beaten, tortured,

and killed. Innocent people were shot on the street to strike terror in the mind of the people and force them to submit to Iraq's rule. Horrified stories are still told about rapes and killing children. Arab house wives were dragged out of their homes and locked up in the animal cages in the zoo. It should be noticed that the Iraqi troops slaughtered most of the animals in Kuwait's zoo and ate them.

In a public statement on October 17, 1990, President Bush decried Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait and stated that "children were shot by the Iraqi troops in front of their parents."

It must be recalled that Saddam Hussein followed exactly the same method of destruction and depopulation in the Arab province of Khuzistan, the center of the Iranian oil extraction in Iran, and in the rural areas of Kurdistan in Iraq where four major Iraqi oilfields are located and more than a dozen new rich oil belts have been discovered.

During eight years of Iran-Iraqi war the Iraqi army in its offensive and retreats indiscriminately bombed Arab towns, cities, and villages. The whole Khuzistan province became ruined and deserted. The three million Arab inhabitants of Khuzistan were displaced and became refugees in the Iranian cities.

Southern Kurdistan in Iraq was targeted for the same destruction and depopulation. In 1988 and 1989 Saddam ordered the destruction of rural Kurdistan. By means of chemical bomb attacks followed by the army campaigns of destruction more than 4,000 villages and small towns were razed to the ground. Their entire populations were transferred to the desert in the southern part of Iraq or escaped to the big cities where they became homeless.

The destruction and depopulation of both of the Arab province of Khuzistan and rural Kurdistan in Iraq were premeditated actions by Saddam aimed at neutralizing the impacts of Arabs in Khuzistan and Kurds in Kurdistan in Iraq on the oil industry.

Saddam Hussein has been planning to invade Kuwait since the cease-fire with Iran in August 20, 1988. Los Angeles time reports that, "Iraq planned invasion for two years." The Washington Times published this News on October 4, 1990 as follow: "Los Angeles-Iraq staged secret military exercise for at least two years in preparation for Kuwait, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday.

"The newspaper quoted unidentified U.S. officials as saying the August 2 invasion was part of a war plan drafted as many as five years ago by President Saddam Hussein with an eye to seizing eastern Saudi Arabia oil fields, the newspaper added."

In mid-October, 1990, Washington Post reported that the Soviet military advisers in the Iraqi army have informed their high command in Moscow that Saddam was planning to invade Kuwait and that this news was withheld

from Soviet president Gorbachev.

There were many other signals coming out of Iraq indicating that Saddam was about to wage another war. Iraq's massive buildup, of weapons of mass destruction such as long-range missiles, huge stockpiles of chemical weapons and germ bombs were an indication that Saddam was planning to attack another country. In an outburst in April, 1990, Saddam threatened to burn a third of Israel if Israel attacked Iraq. In June he repeated the same threat and in a more comprehensive terms by saying that he will burn a third of Israel if Israel attacked Iraq or any other Arab country or Arab organization. By these threats Saddam meant to warn Israel to keep its hand off Iraq's adventures.

Since January, 1990, Saddam made an all out effort to improve relations with Iran and sign a peace treaty with President Rafsanjani. In the last week of April, 1990, Saddam sent a letter to present Rafsanjani suggesting direct negotiation between the two countries on the basis of Algiers agreement of March 6, 1975, which set the boundary between Iran and Iraq along the middle of Shat-al-Arab river. It must be recalled that Saddams declared objectives and justification for attacking Iran in September, 1980 Arab was to abrogate Algiers agreement and bring the whole Shat-al-river under Iraqi control.

On July 17, 1990 Saddam Hussein gave a speech on the occasions of the 22nd anniversary of the coup which brought Baath to power, in which he publicly announced that Iraq is ready to sign a peace treaty with Iran on the Iranian terms and proposed a summit with president Rafsanjani to resolve all the remaining issue. At the same day he wrote a letter to Rafsanjani specifying the kind of concession Iraq was ready to make. Saddam concluded his letter by stating that "these are all that the Iranian wanted to which Iraq agrees."

The underlying reasons behind this unexpected concession to Iran, meant to be temporary, was to sign a peace treaty with Iran for two obvious reasons: 1—To pacify Iran in order not to enter any anti-Iraq coalition. 2—To withdraw Iraqi troops from the Iranian border and deploy them in Kuwait. According to the Iraqi opposition sources, the Iranians were aware that Saddam was about to attack Kuwait and in their subtle ways were encouraging him to do so in order to bring about his downfall.

During the course of negotiation with Kuwait to settle the Iraqi debts, Iraq demanded from Kuwait to cancel the 10 billion debt granted during Iraq-Iran war and extend another 10 billions for Iraq's sacrifices defending Kuwait and other Gulf emirates from the Iranian army. When Kuwait refused, Iraq treated Kuwait with invasion and annexation. Information leaked out about Saddam's list of countries to be attacked. The first on the list to be destroyed was Iran, the second was the Kurds in Iraq marked out for ex-

termination, and the third were Kuwait and Israel to be attacked simultaneously in order to draw Israel into the conflict and turn it to an Arab Israel war.

Saddam's motives we are told, for attacking Kuwait was to control its huge oil reserve and its oil production of 1.5 million barrel a day. By adding Kuwait's oil production to Iraq's own 1=3.1 million barrels a day, Saddam will control 4.6 million barrel a day which amounts to 25% of the total (Opec) production. Controlling such huge oil resources gives Saddam an economic power which combined with his military power of one million men makes him the strongest power in the Middle East capable of achieving his goals of wars and conquests. Saddams own justification for invading Kuwait was based on the historical claim that Kuwait was part of Iraq during the Ottoman rule and that Iraq is simply reclaiming it.

The reaction of the United States and British governments was swift. They demanded Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and return Kuwait's legitimate ruler. The United States dispatched a military force to defend Saudi Arabia from attack. Under the direct influence of President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher and international coalition has been formed against Iraq. A multi-national force has been assembled in Saudi Arabia and is growing with passing of time. The United Nation has passed 10 resolutions condemning Iraq and imposing an economic sanction against Iraq. All Iraqi assets were frozen throughout the world. The economic sanction is aimed at bringing down Saddams rule by means of economic strangulation. The leading world powers such as Soviet Union, France, Germany, Japan are joining this anti-Iraq coalition. China demands Iraq's immediate withdrawal but favors a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Turkish government is fully co-operating with the United States government, opening its air bases, transportation facilities, and massing about 100,000 troops on the Iraq border. Iran playing a subtle game of demanding Iraq's withdrawal at the same time improving relations with Iraq and opening its borders to interrupt the working of the economic blockade. What is more interesting to watch is the Arab participation in the coalition against Iraq. Egypt and Syria have sent troops to the Gulf and are standing side by side with the United States troops in the frontline. The actions of the Egyptian and the Syrian government are explained partly by their hatred of Saddam and by the reward of financial assistance, in particular from Saudi Arabia.

The Western Media has created an evil man out of Saddam and he is shown as enemy no 1 of mankind. As a matter of fact Saddam is completely isolated from the world in this Gulf crisis. Saddam is against the whole world.

The question which is most frequently asked is what is this Gulf crisis all about? Is there going to be a war? What are the most unexpected events which might happen is? To answer these questions we should first present what the Iraqi are really thinking about this Gulf crisis. The United States

government has been leading the multi-national forces in the Gulf. By stating Bush administrations declared objectives in the Gulf it enables us to comprehend what is publicly declared to be the U.S. reason for this Gulf crisis.

The average Iraqi believes that this Gulf crisis is about oil and that the allies are fighting among themselves for oil. The Iraqi people are hard-hit by the economic sanctions and very concerned about the war. The intellectual and the middle class people of Iraq condemn Saddam for attacking Kuwait saying that Iraq does not need Kuwait's oil. Instead of attacking Kuwait for its oil, Saddam should have developed one or two of Iraq's many existing oil belts which could have produced more than Kuwait's 1.5 millions barrels a day. Furthermore, in 1963 the Baath party of Saddam signed a treaty with Kuwait donouncing all Iraqis rights in Kuwait in return for a \$30 millions loan to Iraq.

The opposition groups to Saddams rule inside Iraq consider Saddam to be a man who is working for the West. The oil interest in Iraq picked Saddam on the street, built him up, supported him to become a terrible dictator to look after their interest. They raise a question whether Saddam has rebelled against his masters in the West and is really threatening their interest? The opposition believe that Saddam still is taking orders from his masters and acting according to their direction. The opposition in Iraq considers the whole Gulf crisis to be what they call it "The Hellish Plan" by the West in which Saddam is playing the role of the "bad man". To them this powerful force assembled in Saudi Arabi has other undeclared objectives than just forcing Saddam out of Kuwait.

The United States administration claims that the Gulf crisis came about as a result of Saddam occupation and annexation of Kuwait. The United States and the British leaders demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of Kuwait's legitimate ruler. Since then the declared goals of the United States in the Gulf crisis have developed gradually and taken a definite form. The initial deployment of the United States forces in the Gulf was to defend Saudi Arabia. The purpose of the international forces assembled in Saudi Arabia was to put pressure on Saddam and force him to withdraw from Kuwait by peaceful means, if not by use of military force. The idea behind economic sanctions was to bring down Saddam' rule with economic strangulation of Iraq. President Bush mastered an international coalition to isolate Saddam, internationalize the Gulf crisis, and help the economic sanctions work effectively.

The other objects of the United States for envolving in the Gulf crisis were stated as following:

1. To step the aggression, Saddam's aggression should not be rewarded because it would set a bad example.

2. Hitler revisited. Saddam should not be appeased like Hitler was in Munich in 1938 some say this resulted in the second world war.
3. Oil—The oil resources of the western world are all coming from the Gulf region. If Saddam controls the oil supply of the Western countries, it would lead to the fluctuation in the oil supply and the oil price and bring about inflation, recession, and unemployment which mean losing jobs.
4. American Security—The Gulf region it was claimed is essential to the United States national interest not for its oil alone but for its strategic location. On November 22, 1990 when President Bush visited American troops in Saudi Arabia, he announced that, “we are here to defend freedom.” On 21st of November when President Bush met King Fahd at Jiddah, both ruled out any “partial solution to the Kuwaiti crisis that stops short of Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal.” King Fahd said in a statement, “we both agree that aggression must not be rewarded and that these (United Nations) resolutions and the entire world’s will must be implemented without precondition” (The Washington Times, November, 22, 1990).

President Bush has been criticized by the opposition in the United States for having other undeclared objectives such as:

1. Oil—The United States, they claim is in Gulf for oil, that is to control the supply of oil. The demonstrators around Capital Hill frequently shouted “read my lips—it is O-I-L” Even Senator Dole, Republican and Senate minority leader stated that, “we are in Gulf for oil”.
2. The Gulf crisis is basically to help oil companies and oil cartels to make profits. Before the Gulf crisis there was a plenitude of oil in the market and a barrel of crude oil was sold for \$16 a barrel. Following the invasion of Kuwait the price of oil soared into a \$41 a barrel and now declined to \$34 a barrel. The profit of the oil companies rose 700%. Net income for refineries increased by 130% in the third quarter of 1990 from the quarter of 1989. Exxon made 3 billion dollars in the first three months of the Gulf crisis, the other oil companies even made more profits. Before the Gulf crisis most of the oil companies were facing bankruptcy but now they are accumulating a huge profit.
3. The Gulf crisis is aimed at keeping the United States economy

at a semi-war basis to save it from collapse as happened in the eastern bloc. The end of the cold war era necessitates cuts in the military spending, reducing personnel, and reducing the purchase of weapons. These austerity measures in military spending would bring about the collapse of the military-industrial complex and infect the rest of the economy, it would lead to a serious depression with its resulting social unrest and the demand for political change. The opposition claims that it is necessary to keep the United States economy on semi-war basis and that the Gulf crisis perform just that function.

4. Help the Republican party avoid catastrophic defeat in the mid-term election on November 6, 1990.
5. Help re-elect President Bush in 1992, if the Gulf crisis is brought to a successful conclusion.

Is there going to be a war? What are the most unexpected events that might happen during the course of the war or at the conclusion of the Gulf Crisis?

By reviewing the present political and military alignments one has no alternative but to conclude that war is inevitable between the multi-national forces, led by the United States, and Iraq. That the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of military force to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and setting a deadline of January 15 for Saddam to withdraw his forces from Kuwait. Accordingly, the massive U.S. dominated coalition of forces in the Persian Gulf have a mandate from the United Nations to start war at any time after that deadline.

The war with Iraq is expected to be short and very intense. Because the theater of operation is an extensive flat desert, the superiority of the air power will decide the outcome of the war. The Washington Post in its edition of November 27, 1990 writes about the Allie strategy in the war as follows: "The most favored emerging strategy is a massive bombing campaign against Iraq's entire infrastructure and scattered armory, including chemical and nuclear facilities. A tank-led encirclement of Kuwait and then a breakthrough into the Iraqi-occupied emirate would follow. The analysts are confident that the Allie air superiority will prove overwhelming within a few days. But few American generals are eager to take the political and military risk of trying to take Baghdad or of occupying the whole of Iraq . . .

"Desert wars, run, according to the conventional wisdom, are fast and furious. If no speedy result is achieved, the alliance could be in deep trouble."

"The more prolonged the fight, the more likely such a resentment will spread throughout Gulf monarchies and other Arab autocracies."

“An even bigger worry is the morale of American troops, echoed by political ambiguity and back biting at home.”

The most unexpected events that might happen would be a military coup inside Iraq itself, in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. If an anti-Western regime comes to power in any one of these countries it might seriously affect the course of the war. The change in the regime in Turkey and Iran would strengthen the resistance of the Iraqi army.

Replacement of President Gorbachev by a conservative in the Soviet Union might create a serious challenge to the multi-national forces during the course of the war or in the post-Gulf war period. It is interesting to watch the development in the Gulf crisis and it remains to be seen what would be this “New Order” President Bush is speaking about.

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
MUSTAFA AL KARADAGHI

Mustafa Al Karadaghi was born in August of 1921 in the village of Karadagh in Kurdistan in Iraq. He is a descendant of an ancient agrarian family which had lived for centuries in the mountainous district of Karadagh. In the past, his family was involved in tribal warfare, and in modern times it has been active in the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Mr. Al Karadaghi completed elementary school in Karadagh and intermediate school in the city of Sulaimania, Iraq. He graduated from agricultural secondary school in 1944 and passed the baccalauriate examination for secondary school in June of 1946. Enrolled in the law college of Baghdad University in September, 1947, he was forced to leave law school due to fear of persecution for his connection with the Kurdish Nationalist movement in Iraq and Iran. He arrived in the United States in December, 1947 and enrolled at Denver University in January, 1948. He acquired a B.A. in political science at San Francisco State University in June, 1951, and an M.A. degree in political science at the University of California, Berkeley in December, 1954.

He returned to Iraq in March, 1955 and was appointed instructor of economics in the Commerce School in Baghdad. In June, 1959 he passed the foreign service examination and was assigned Second Secretary in the Iraqi diplomatic service. In 1960 he was appointed consul in the Iraqi embassy in Prague, and was in charge of the Iraqi consular affairs in East Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria. He served as first secretary in the Iraqi embassy in Lagos, Nigeria in 1962 and as a Counsellor in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1970. In 1973 Mr. Karadaghi was promoted to the rank of minister in the Iraqi diplomatic service. While awaiting his next assignment as Ambassador to France, the Baathist regime of Iraq commenced its genocide against the Kurds. In protest, he left the service, escaped to France where he became a political refugee.

Mr. Karadaghi has been involved in the Kurdish Nationalist movement since his student days. At the age of 18, he was directing an underground student movement in Sulaimania city. In summer of 1942, he became a soldier in the Kurdish secret army working under the command of Lt. Mohammed Qudsi, his friend since his elementary school days. Lt. Mohammed Qudsi



was under the command of captain Mustafa Khoshnaw. After the collapse of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran in 1946, both of these two gallant officers were executed in Baghdad in the summer of 1947. In the period 1943-1946 Mustafa Al Karadaghi served as a covert intelligence officer for the Kurdish Nationalist movement in Iraq, and after that, in Iran. From 1955 to 1957 he was covert director of the underground Kurdistan Youth Organization. From 1958 until June 1959, he was covert president of the underground Kurdistan Teacher's Association. In August, 1962, while serving in the Iraqi Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, he escaped to Kurdistan and joined the Kurdish revolution in Iraq. In 1965, he became a member of the central committee and the political bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic party in charge of the Pesh Marga forces, and served as the Commander of the southern front.



In early 1966, the leadership of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq established a close relationship with the Shah of Iran. The Shah provided corrupting financial support, and moderate offensive weapons to the Kurds in order to steer the Kurds to put pressure on the Iraqi Government to force concession. At the same time the Shah was secretly conspiring with his collaborators to liquidate the true Kurdish revolution.

Mr. Karadaghi correctly assessed and predicted the consequences of this new alignment of the Kurdish leadership. His assessment and prediction was ultimately proven by the Algiers agreement of March 6, 1975 which formalized what was secretly agreed upon between the Shah, Henry Kissinger, and Saddam Hussein. Their Scheme called for the liquidation of the Kurdish national revolt and a step-by-step plan to break up and neutralize Kurdish military and political power by means of genocide. The Kurdish leadership at the time was one party to this conspiracy against the Kurdish people in Iraq.

For Mr. Karadaghi's opposition and uncompromising stand against subversion of the Kurdish revolt, he was targeted for liquidation. In August, 1966 a band of armed men, sent by The Kurdish leadership itself, attempted to assassinate him. In this attempt he was seriously wounded.

Despite an imminent danger to his life Mr. Al Karadaghi remained defiant and outspoken against enemies designed to liquidate the Kurdish revolution. In his last meeting with Barzani in April, 1967 in a village near Penjwin on the Iranian border he laid before Barzani in detail the consequences of coming under the direct influence of the Shah of Iran who in fact was con-

spiring behind the scenes to liquidate the Kurdish revolt. Mr. Al Karadaghi warned Barzani of the wicked conspiracy of the Shah, Kissinger, and Saddam. After all night discussions Barzani concluded by saying that his policy of close relations with the Shah is correct and is a very important tactical and strategical necessity. Barzani emphasized the point that those who oppose this policy are not working for the best interest of the Kurds, Following this meeting with Barzani Al Karadaghi withdrew to his native District of Karadagh where he set up a camp on the mountain slope of Karadagh protected by his loyal Pesh Marga guards and his relatives.

While staying in Karadagh two important events occurred which forced him to leave for Baghdad. Shortly after his arrival in the Karadagh district he realized that the district has become the center of the opposition to Barzani's leadership. In May, 1967 the powerful Pesh Marga forces of Karadagh and Garmian districts rebelled against Barzani leadership and accused it of selling out the Kurds. The "yes" men around Barzani claimed that Mr. Al Karadaghi had a hand in the rebellion. However, it was a well-known fact about Mr. Al Karadaghi that he has been always against the split in the Kurdish movement and any kinds of internal conflict. When fighting broke out between the rebelling Pesh Marga forces and the Barzani forces Mr. Al Karadaghi was caught in the cross-fire and unable to stop the fight, He left Karadagh.

The second event was the announcement of a peace agreement between Barzani and the government of Iraq, known as the June Agreement of 1967. The Declaration of this peace agreement on June 30th by the Iraqi government was a tactical victory for the Kurds by which the Kurdish right for autonomy was declared and a general amnesty for all the participants in the Kurdish revolt was granted. Iraqi president, general Abdul Rahman Arief was a good man who had the interest of the Kurds in mind. An atmosphere of peace and trust prevailed in Kurdistan and throughout Iraq.

Despite the Shah's opposition to the June peace Agreement of 1967, Barzani whole heartedly supported the peace and co-operation with president Arief's government. The Kurdish nationalist forces urged support and co-operation with the government of president Arief. In September, 1967 Mustafa Al Karadaghi and Jalal Talabani left together for Baghdad to speed up the project of the autonomy for the Kurds within the framework of the republic of Iraq. While in Baghdad Mr. Al Karadaghi refused to be under any obligation to the authority in Baghdad. He worked at a center for cigarette distribution to support himself and his family.

In accordance with the provisions of June agreement 1967, a presidential decree was issued entitled "The return of the participants in the Northern event

to their previous jobs." Under the terms of this presidential decree, Mr. Al Karadaghi was reassigned to the ministry of Foreign Affairs as a first secretary, his rank from five years before. As it was agreed upon in June agreement 1967 and in the March 11 agreement of 1970, five Kurds at Barzanis request were assigned as ambassadors in the ministry of foreign Affairs. Mr. Al Karadaghi's long service among the Kurds was overlooked and his diplomatic experience was ignored in this restructuring. He was instead transferred to the distant Iraqi embassy in Jakarta to prevent him from any future contact with the Kurds.

Four years later, in 1974, the Baathist regime of Iraq commenced its genocide against the Kurds. Mr. Karadaghi fled from Jakarta to Tehran, to join the current fight against the Baathist regime. It is worth noting that he went to Teheran at the invitation of the Shah himself. Yet, upon his arrival, he was placed under house arrest. He was faced with surrendering to the Iraqi government as a sign of the Shah's good will. He was saved only by the efforts of the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tehran and his personal friends in Iran. He was allowed to travel to France, where he became a political refugee.

In search for safe haven he moved from France to England, And then to the United States where he applied for political asylum in June 1980. Since then he has been living in the United States working in all kinds of odd jobs to support himself and his family.

In 1987 when the Baathist regime of Iraq resumed its genocide of the Kurds through chemical weapons and the army's campaign of exterminations, Mr. Al Karadaghi sprang into great activity in defense of the Kurdish people. He began to publicize the crimes of Saddam against the Kurds and his imminent danger in the Middle East and Western interests in the region. He founded the Kurdish Human Rights Watch and has produced scholarly literary work, Given radio and television interviews, distributing circulars on Saddams crimes and human rights abuse. Mr. Karadaghi is considered to be an expert in Guerilla Warfare and in political strategy.

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