

SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1928

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Research Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

ASSISTED BY

V. M. BOULTER

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PREFACE

IN this volume, as in previous volumes of the *Survey*, the first drafts upon the space at the writer's disposal have been given to transactions that came to a head in the year under review and to other transactions which were of such evident importance that, even if they did not come to a head, it seemed essential to keep the annual record of them up to date. Among the transactions of lesser importance, priority has been given to those which had some connexion with one or other of the salient points round which the volume has been constructed. In this way an attempt has been made to give greater unity of form to the volume than it would be easy to give if it were a strict chronicle of the whole facts and nothing but the facts of a particular calendar year.

The salient points of this Survey of International Affairs in the year 1928 are the negotiation of 'the Kellogg Pact', the development of the constitution of the League of Nations, the policy of Italy in South-Eastern Europe, the history of the Islamic World, and the changes in the foreign relations of China.

The signature of 'the Kellogg Pact' was a landmark in the history of the problem of Security, and the chapters dealing with it are followed by others bringing up to date the history of the closely related problem of Disarmament, including the work of the League of Nations and the abortive 'Anglo-French Naval Compromise' that was in some sense an incidental product of this work.

In dealing with the Constitution of the League of Nations, the opportunity has been taken to give a record, extending over several years, of certain controversies regarding the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. These controversies were important on account of their bearing upon the future of colonial administration.

The policy of Italy in South-Eastern Europe and the changes in the foreign relations of China are examples of subjects that seemed of sufficient current interest to demand that the full record given in the *Survey for 1927* should be carried on, in the same detail, in the present volume. The record of Italian policy is accompanied by a

record of other South-East European affairs. The narrative of the changes in the foreign relations of China, in this as in previous years, could not have been made intelligible without also giving some brief account of the internal history of the country.

The history of the Islamic World has been carried, in this volume, down to the end of the year 1928 after having been left untouched since it was dealt with (down to about the middle of the year 1926) in the first volume of the *Survey for 1925*. In 1928 Islamic affairs once more came to a head in such important transactions as the abortive Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, the abolition of the Capitulations in Persia, the culmination and collapse of King Amānu'llāh's 'Westernizing' policy in Afghanistan, and the substitution of the Latin for the Arabic alphabet in Turkey and in the Turkish States Members of the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand, the affairs of North-Eastern Europe and of the American Continent, which were dealt with fully in the *Survey for 1927*, have not been taken up again in the present volume.¹ Moreover, owing to lack of space, the record of international relations in Tropical Africa has been left over for the *Survey for 1929*.

In the present volume, the practice of documenting statements by references to the press in foot-notes has been given up, except where the reference is to the text of some document or to an article which is of interest in itself. It is hoped that this change will make the page more readable without really diminishing the value of the *Survey* as a book of reference. References to official publications and to books are given as before.

The *Survey for 1928* is at an advantage over preceding volumes in being accompanied by a supplementary volume of documents. Hitherto, lack of space has made it impossible to do more than publish a few documents in an appendix to each volume simply as a sample of the documentary sources. In the companion volume to the *Survey for 1928*, one of the original intentions of the Council, in arranging for the production of the *Survey*, has at last been fulfilled; for this companion volume contains a really representative and comprehensive collection of international documents dating from the year

¹ In the *Survey for 1927*, the Part dealing with the American Continent contains an account of the Pan-American Conference of February 1928.

under review, and it has been necessary to include in the *Survey* itself only two documents which belong to a previous year. Henceforth, the supplementary volume of documents will appear annually side by side with the *Survey*, from which the appendix of documents will be omitted. The launching of this companion volume is due to the initiative of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, the Honorary Information Officer of the Institute and Honorary Secretary of the Information Service on International Affairs. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett has undertaken the responsibility of compiling this volume, and he and Mr. Toynbee look forward to working in close collaboration in producing the pair of volumes annually. Mr. Milford is publishing the companion volume in the same format as the *Survey* itself.

G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY

*Honorary Secretary,
Royal Institute of
International Affairs.*

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PART I

WORLD AFFAIRS

A. DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

(i) **The General Treaty, signed in Paris on the 27th August, 1928, for the Renunciation of War.**¹

(a) **THE INSTITUTION OF WAR**

ON the principle that every organism has its specific diseases, and every soul its besetting sins, a historian might judge that the institution of War was the deadly disease and the sin against the Holy Ghost of human societies in process of civilization. By the year 1928, such experimental societies had been trying and failing to pass the level of Primitive Man, rising a little and then falling back again, coming into existence and passing away, for something like six thousand years; and it would appear from the records of the past that almost every defeat of these Sisyphean labours was traceable to the institution of War as its ultimate cause.

Why had this profoundly important fact attracted relatively little attention and stimulated relatively little effort to eradicate the fatal institution from the life of Mankind? In the first place, no doubt, because the conception of social life without War did not readily occur to the mind of societies in this stage of evolution. The popular imagination was apt to confound the species War with the genus violence and thence to assume that War was one of the essential expressions of human nature, if not of life itself. In contradiction to this popular view, sociological research, in the complementary fields of archaeology and anthropology, indicated that War was a specific and peculiar exercise of violence, in which that indefinite impulse was organized in a corporate form and subjected to rigid rules and conventions. Many of these 'laws of war' were the direct antitheses of customary social behaviour as practised in the same societies in peace-time; and there was also some ground for believing that this institutional form of violence, as distinct from the violence of anarchy, had not existed in the primitive condition of society in which Mankind had spent all but the last six thousand years of its inconceivably long duration since the first recognizably human beings had appeared on the face of the earth.² War was an activity of states, and the

¹ This treaty was also known as the Pact of Paris and, in popular usage, as 'the Kellogg-Briand Pact' or 'the Kellogg Pact'.

² It might be objected that, among primitive societies which still survived in the twentieth century after Christ, the institution of War seemed to be not

genesis of states was coeval and perhaps identical with the genesis of civilizations—an event which, in the year 1928 of the Christian era, was still probably less than six thousand years old. In the astronomer's or even the biologist's perspective, six thousand years was the twinkling of an eye compared with the previous ages during which Mankind had existed before the first attempts at civilization had been made, or with the future ages during which the evolution of life might be expected to continue after the experiment of civilization had either definitively failed or ultimately succeeded. On the other hand, in the popular perspective, in which the unit of measurement was the memory-span of an individual human being, these brief six millennia seemed so immense a period of time as to be subjectively indistinguishable from eternity; and in this perspective a peculiar institution of a passing phase of society might come to be regarded by its victims as one of the immutable 'laws of nature'.

Thus civilizations, with War as well as Law in their bosoms, were fields sown confusedly with wheat and tares, and again and again the tares had choked the wheat when the field had been ripe for harvest. This tragic compound of good and evil was apparent in the master-institution of civilizations, the State, which was a Janus-figure. States were contrivances for the local organization, control and direction of human violence, but they were in the habit of using their command of violence for diametrically opposite purposes inside and outside their arbitrary frontiers. Inside, they used organized corporate violence in order to suppress unorganized individual violence and so to reduce the total play of violence to a minimum. Outside, they used the self-same instrument of organized violence against one another for the purpose of War, with effects that were vastly more destructive than any that could flow from violence so long as it was merely a private and unorganized activity. Primitive societies were no more capable of begetting the destructiveness of War, as waged in civilized societies between one state and another, than they were capable of begetting the law and order which these war-making states maintained as a matter of course in their respective 'interiors'.

much less in evidence than it was in 'the civilized world'. The answer to this objection was that, at that date, no societies still remained in the pure primitive condition. One of the characteristics of civilizations was their power of radiation; and this social 'radio-activity' was so vigorous that the emergence of the phenomenon of civilization in less than twenty instances over a period of less than six thousand years had sufficed to 'infect' all the surviving primitive societies with many of the elements of civilization, first and foremost the institution of War. It was a well-known fact that the world-wide diffusion of new-fangled weapons was usually more rapid and thorough than that of other inventions.

Societies in process of civilization had usually begun by being articulated into a number of sovereign independent states in the unstable equilibrium of a 'balance of power'. Under this dispensation, the perpetually shifting balance was perpetually readjusted by War—only to shift and readjust itself by the same method again and again—and as each civilization went on from strength to strength, this strength was apt to be converted into the sinews of War as fast as it accumulated. The consequence was that the growth of civilization was accompanied by an increase in the violence of War which ultimately exhausted the vital energies on which it preyed.¹

When that lamentable stage had been reached in the history of certain civilizations, there had been rare moments in which Mankind became alive to the deadliness of War and revolted against an institution which it normally took for granted. There were historic occasions on which this feeling, dumbly astir in the hearts of the masses, had found expression in the words of poets or the actions of statesmen.

In the ancient Indian World there had been the monk-emperor Açoka, who, having made and witnessed one war, refused to countenance another and devoted the rest of his life to preaching and organizing peace. In the ancient Chinese World, there had been the revulsion against the destructive warfare of 'the Contending States'—a destructiveness which reached its culmination and its close in the career of Ts'in Shi Nwangti. Thereafter, in spite of recurring bouts of disorder, militarism and even the profession of arms itself remained under a cloud in Chinese society, until the pacific tradition which had set hard under the Dynasty of the Han was shattered by the impact of Western civilization two thousand years later. In the Graeco-Roman World, the two centuries of war and civil war which had brought forth horror on horror from Hannibal's passage of the Alps till Augustus's victory at Actium, were followed by a revulsion of which the exponents were the conqueror Augustus himself and the poet Vergil.

Hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
 ne prohibete. Satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
 Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae . . .
 Vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
 arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe;
 ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
 addunt in spatium, et frustra retinacula tendens
 fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.²

¹ On this point see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations*, p. 43.

² Vergil, *Georg.* I, ll. 500-2 and 510-14.

Thus the revulsion against War which, in the modern Western World, declared itself after the General War of 1914–18 and found expression ten years later in the General Treaty of Paris, was not the only recorded movement of the kind; and the question suggested itself: What light was thrown upon the prospects of this modern movement for the renunciation of War by the historical precedents? In answer to this question two facts emerged: first, those previous revulsions did lead to the 'Outlawry of War' among large sections of Mankind inhabiting wide territories, and this over long periods of time; second, these earlier 'Outlawries of War' were none of them world-wide and none of them permanent. Augustus, for instance, after his 'conversion', succeeded in so changing the order of society that, for more than two centuries following the closing of the Temple of Janus in 29 B.C., War was virtually banished from all the lands encircling the Mediterranean. During the course of these two centuries the Roman Empire endured not more than half-a-dozen years of internal warfare;¹ and where fortified inter-state frontiers had run before and were afterwards to run again, armaments were then reduced to vanishing point. In that peaceful age, one 'urban cohort' stationed at Lyons² were the only troops afoot on European soil between Rome and the Rhine. War seemed to have been banished from the centre of civilization to its periphery and to have been transformed into police-operations against barbarians beyond the pale; and even on the single frontier where, along the Euphrates, the Roman Empire marched with another organized state, the total number of war-years during those two centuries was hardly more than fifteen.³ A similar picture presents itself to the student of the Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' under the Dynasty of the Han. Yet in both these worlds War, thus effectively 'outlawed' for a time, eventually succeeded in forcing an entry into society again. The Pax Romana and the Pax Sinica were no more permanent than they were world-wide.

When Western society addressed itself to the 'Outlawry of War' in 1928, were its prospects of success more promising? The spiritual revulsion which had been evoked by the War of 1914–18 was unquestionably very strong, but so were the revulsions which had

¹ The bout of internal disorder during the years 66–70 post Christum was the only serious disturbance in the internal peace of the Roman Empire from the end of the civil war between Augustus and Antony in 30 B.C. down to the beginning of the disorders which followed the death of Commodus on the 31st December, 192 post Christum.

² The strength of this cohort was probably about 1,200 men. The 'urban cohorts' were a kind of municipal guards. The rest of them were permanently stationed in Rome itself.

³ The years 54–63, 115–16, and 161–5 post Christum.

declared themselves in the Chinese World after 'the knock-out blow' of 221 B.C. and in the Roman World after Actium; and if it was simply a question of the relative intensity of the moral force behind the movement, there was no ground for supposing that the movement in the Western World, which was making visible headway from 1918 to 1928, would have greater ultimate success than other movements of the kind. The strength of the revulsion, however, was only one of the factors governing the issue. The other factor was the material environment in which the moral force was operating; and here, in the Western World during the decade ending in 1928, there were certain favourable circumstances which had not been present in the cases under comparison.

The most important and most encouraging circumstance was that this time the movement appeared to have set in before it was too late, whereas in other cases it had not declared itself effectively until War had had time to do its worst and the War-ridden society had been stricken beyond hope of recovery. This vital difference in the timeliness of the movement for the 'Outlawry of War' was reflected in the difference between the forms of political organization through which it was sought to achieve an identical end. In other cases, the 'Outlawry of War' had been temporarily achieved through the reduction of a plurality of sovereign independent states to a single super-state or unitary state co-extensive with the whole of society; and on the principle that War is a relation between states and that it therefore takes more states than one to wage it, this might seem at first sight to be a radical cure for the disease. Yet to accept this conclusion would be to ignore the historical process by which these super-states were actually brought into existence. They were not established by the common consent of society, deliberately setting out to 'outlaw' War and acting on a reasoned view that War and the plurality of states were inseparable institutions which must stand or fall together. On the contrary, these super-states were the creatures of War itself. They were the automatic outcome of an unstable 'balance of power', perpetually readjusted by a succession of wars in an ascending scale of violence,¹ which had culminated in one Great Power overthrowing all its rivals and incidentally dealing the *coup de grâce* to the civilization which was the common mother of them all. Thus, in these cases, the very form in which the 'Outlawry of War' was carried out was evidence in itself that War had

1

Ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae
Addunt in spatio. . . .

Vergil, *loc. cit.*

not been 'outlawed' in time. The movement had been passive and not active; instead of dominating and determining events, it had waited upon them; and so it had failed to avert a catastrophe and had merely tried to make the best of it when the worst had already occurred. On the other hand the movement which expressed itself in the Pact of 1927 neither waited for a super-state to be thrown up by the very forces of destruction which the movement was seeking to subdue nor embarked on the chimerical enterprise of persuading a plurality of sovereign states to efface themselves in favour of a super-state while the life was still in them. It addressed itself to the more difficult but far more hopeful task of inducing a plurality of sovereign states to renounce, not their separate existences and not their sovereignty, but the single sovereign prerogative of employing War as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. The reason why this enterprise was more difficult and also more hopeful was one and the same. It was that these states had not yet carried their indulgence in War so far as to have exhausted their individual vitality or the general vitality of Western society. This fact made it more difficult to persuade them—still flushed, as they were, with the pride of life—that they could no longer continue to indulge in War with impunity. At the same time, it held out the hope that, if once the fifty-eight sovereign states of the contemporary world made up their minds to honour their engagement and renounced War in their hearts in all sincerity, the subsequent task of rendering the 'Outlawry of War' universal and perpetual might be successfully achieved. For this new Western Pax Oecumenica had just that impetus behind it for lack of which the Pax Sinica and the Pax Romana had been abortive. The Roman and the Chinese Peace had been abortive because, in this enterprise of eliminating War, a change of heart, however sincere and however deep, was not enough. The fruits of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil might bring more evil than good upon those who ate them, unless they could also stretch forth their hands to eat of the tree of life. A change of moral atmosphere must be followed up by the prosaic and laborious but indispensable work of organization; and that could only be carried through with the energy requisite for success by a society which had repented while it was still in its vigorous prime. It was because the repentance out of which the Pax Sinica and the Pax Romana had sprung had been a death-bed repentance that the peace-organization of the Chinese Empire and the Roman Empire, magnificent though it was, had ultimately proved unequal to the demands made upon it. Augustus and Lióu Ping had only begun to labour in their vineyards

at the eleventh hour, when the shades of night were already falling ; and the moral of their failures was 'Work while it is day, for soon the night cometh, when no man can work'. In contrast to this, the sun of Western civilization was still apparently high in the heavens, and the peoples of the Western World were still apparently in their prime, when the treaty for the renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy was signed in Paris on the 27th August, 1928. In proceeding to organize their peace, they might fail like their fellows or succeed for the first time in the history of civilization ; but at least they would not fail for lack of vitality or for lack of time.

The vitality of Western society found vent in the exercise of two aptitudes which were so characteristic of Western civilization that its peculiar essence could almost be defined in these terms: an aptitude for social organization in complex forms and on a grand scale, and an aptitude for the practical application of mechanical inventions. These aptitudes inter-acted with one another, and their interplay, which had made the General War of 1914-18 destructive beyond all precedent, had also, by the year 1928, produced certain other notable results which had a close bearing on the prospects of the new movement in the Western World for the 'Outlawry of War'. One result was that Western society had enlarged its borders until it had come to embrace all habitable lands and navigable seas and the whole living generation of Mankind. On the economic plane this unification was already substantially complete ; and on the political plane it was nearing completion. (There were only two¹ out of fifty-eight sovereign independent states in the world in 1928 which were regarded by the State Department at Washington as being so alien to the Western international comity that they were not invited to accede to the Peace Pact). Even on the cultural plane, on which the rate of radiation was least rapid, events in China, Turkey and many other non-Western countries indicated that the process of unification through 'Westernization' was well under way. A second result was that, through the rapidly advancing conquest of space and time, every community in this all-embracing society had come to be affected—with an intimacy for which there was no precedent in the histories of other civilizations, even within their narrower bounds—by the actions and experiences of every other community. A third result was that, owing to the extraordinary progress which Western inventors had made in harnessing the energies of physical Nature

¹ The Najd-Hijāz and the Yaman. The number of states invited to sign or adhere to the Pact was sixty-four, but this included the six self-governing British Dominions as well as Egypt and Iceland.

and organizing the concerted action of millions of human beings, everything that was done, for good or evil, in this society was done with a stupendous 'drive', which made the material consequences of individual acts far greater and the moral responsibility of the agents far heavier than these had been under other social dispensations.¹

From the standpoint of the movement for the 'Outlawry of War' the unification of Mankind into a single universal society was evidently a valuable advantage which previous movements of the kind had not enjoyed. Its value could be gauged by a study of how the lack of it had affected the fortunes of those non-universal peace organizations, such as the Pax Sinica or the Pax Romana, which had been established on other occasions. When the Chinese and the Roman Empires had been at their zeniths, the danger latent in this lack of universality had not been apparent. The Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' and the Roman 'Orbis Terrarum' had each constituted a complete world in itself in virtual isolation from other civilizations. Almost the only societies with which they were in contact without having embraced them within their frontiers were societies of barbarians; and the 'Outlawry of War' seemed sufficiently complete when War had been banished from the centre of civilization to its periphery and there transformed into police-operations against communities that were beyond the cultural as well as the political pale. Such complacency, however, was belied by the event; for these tolerated police-operations obeyed the same sinister rhythmic law of *crescendo* as the 'outlawed' Wars of the 'Balance of Power'. The clash of arms had died away almost out of hearing of Athens and Rome when Augustus had closed the Temple of Janus and had stationed the few undisbanded legions along the distant banks of the Euphrates and the Rhine and the Danube. Yet two centuries later the dreadful sound was heard in Athens and Rome again when semi-barbarized legions, with semi-civilized barbarians at their heels, ebbed back from the periphery to the centre in order to fight for the spoils of civilization, and shattered the Roman Peace in dismembering the Roman Empire. This was a danger which an all-embracing society, organizing the 'Outlawry of War' on an oecumenical scale, might hope to eliminate.

¹ To put the contrast in a homely way, we may compare the generation of 1928 to a man driving a motor-car, and other generations (e.g. that in which Edward Gibbon, a century and a half earlier, pronounced a dictum on War which is quoted below) to men driving ox-waggons. If the motorist is competent and sober, he has a range which puts the teamster out of the running. On the other hand, a fool in an ox-wagon is much less dangerous to the public and to himself than a fool in a motor-car.

What was the bearing of the other two unprecedented factors: the intimate interdependence of all communities and the stupendous material 'drive' behind all actions? It was evident that these factors, too, would work together for good for a society which, having renounced war sincerely, was embarking upon the organization of peace with all its soul and all its strength. It was equally evident that, if the sovereign states of the Westernized World were to reassert the ancient prerogative of sovereignty which they had renounced in 1928, and were once again to go to war, these unprecedented factors would make this next war incalculably potent for destruction. This danger could not be stated more forcibly than it was on the 8th January, 1926, by a statesman who was at that time responsible for the policy of one of the seven surviving Great Powers, to wit the Prime Minister of His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain, Mr. Stanley Baldwin:

Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the West and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome? ¹

This fearful warning, uttered by a responsible English statesman in time of peace, was strangely different—as different in tone of feeling as it was in statement of fact—from the complacent words which a great English humanist had written 145 years earlier, at a moment when Great Britain was in the last stages of a highly unsuccessful war against three European Powers as well as her thirteen American colonies:

In War, the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests. ²

¹ Mr. Baldwin was presumably referring to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. If he was, a historian might perhaps point out that the decay of the Roman Empire rather resembled the gradual collapse of an organism suffering from a mortal disease, and that the catastrophe which did cause civilization to fall with a shock, not only at Rome but throughout the Ancient Mediterranean World, was the Hannibalic War of 218–201 B.C. Similarly the fall of Athens was caused by the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C.

² Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West* (ed. J. B. Bury, editio minor, London, 1901, Methuen, vol. iv). This epilogue to the first of the three parts into which Gibbon himself divided 'The Decline and Fall' was presumably written shortly before the 1st March, 1781 (the date of the post-script to his preface, in which he announced the completion of the work down to this point). If this presumption is correct, then the passage here quoted was actually written just after Holland had become a belligerent in the American Revolutionary War on the side of the Thirteen Colonies, in addition to France and Spain, and just before the opening of that decisive campaign of the war which ended at Yorktown.

During the 145 years which had elapsed between Edward Gibbon's utterance and Mr. Baldwin's, Western society had increased its mastery over the forces of physical Nature to such a degree that, by its own act, it had deprived itself of the possibility of ever exercising itself by 'temperate contests' in future. 'La Guerre' had become 'la Guerre totale'—a war of 'unlimited liability' or, in plain words, a 'war of annihilation'.

Was Western society capable of grappling with this vast and fateful problem? The outcome lay on the knees of the gods; but at least the millions of men and women whose fate, and whose children's fate, was in the balance were becoming aware of the issue. The most remarkable, the most novel and the most encouraging circumstance in the genesis of the 'Peace Pact' of 1928 was the part that was played by public opinion.

(b) THE MOVEMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION

The General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928, was, of course, like other treaties, a contract between the Governments of sovereign states; the formal negotiations leading up to signature were conducted by Foreign Ministers with the technical assistance of their respective national departments of state; and in the course of these negotiations diplomatic ability of a high order was displayed, particularly at Washington by Mr. Secretary Kellogg. The novel feature, however, and therefore the distinctive feature in the genesis of this treaty was the part played by public opinion; for the initiative which set the negotiations in motion and the impetus which kept them moving until the conclusion of a treaty both came from outside 'official circles'. This feature, which was a noteworthy departure from the diplomatic tradition of Western international society, was an American contribution; and it was possible that, in retrospect, this American innovation in the methods of international intercourse on the political plane, which was now applied for the first time to a world-wide transaction, might eventually prove to have been scarcely less momentous than the particular principle established in this particular treaty (that is, the principle expressed in the American 'slogan' of 'the Outlawry of War').

The enterprise of 'outlawing War' captivated the American imagination during 1927 and 1928, and this was undoubtedly the most important international event of those two years.

It was an event that could hardly have happened in the Old World, where the towering mass of the established and reiterated past made

suggestions for really radical reforms seem either dangerously revolutionary or ridiculously utopian. Among the sophisticated 'governing classes' of states in Western Europe, the instinctive retort to such suggestions was 'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose'; and in the domain of international affairs this attitude persisted even in those West European countries where the general tone of society was otherwise on the whole democratic and progressive; for in the long and slow history of the extension of popular control over Government, the conduct of foreign relations had been the last fortress of monarchs, officials and privileged orders. The peoples had hesitated to interfere with a department of state which was hedged about with the prestige of mystery and fear because it was concerned with the formidable issues of Peace and War. Only when the catastrophe of 1914 had demonstrated that the old régime, in the long run, was capable of involving them in as great a disaster as any that they could bring upon themselves, had they conceived the idea of applying systematically to the conduct of foreign affairs those principles of popular control which in home affairs they had long taken for granted; and, acting thus under the influence of a great misfortune, they tended to act in a tentative way and in a somewhat faint-hearted and sceptical spirit. Thus, in the decade immediately following the General War of 1914-18, a faith capable of removing mountains from the international landscape could hardly be expected to spring from European soil.

On the other hand, the emergence of that temper at that time among the people of the United States was not surprising; for though the War had inflicted on individual American men and women the same losses and sufferings as on individual Europeans, it had not been for the American people as a whole what it had been for the European peoples: an overwhelming disaster. Even absolutely, and *a fortiori* relatively, it had made the United States a greater Power, in every sense, than she had been before; and its general psychological effect on the American people had been exhilarating. They had emerged from the War with their self-confidence not diminished but heightened; and this self-confidence expressed itself, in one way or another, in two reactions which were otherwise poles apart. The immediate reaction of the majority of the American people at the end of the War was to assume that they could return to the policy of the Monroe Doctrine in its traditional form; and this was the meaning of the non-ratification of the Versailles Treaty (including the Covenant of the League of Nations) in 1920. On the other hand, the movement of American public opinion which issued

in the General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928, was the work of a minority—a 'political intelligentsia'—whose experience of the War had suggested vividly to American minds—perhaps for the first time since the international recognition of American independence in 1783—a possibility which daily haunted the minds of continental European peoples: the possibility that foreign relations might in certain circumstances be more important than internal affairs.

During the 134 years which had elapsed between the signature of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and the American declaration of war on Germany in 1917, the American people—thanks to their own geographical situation and to the European balance of power—had been singularly immune from the normal dangers of international intercourse in societies where the institution of War exists; and they had been proportionately oblivious of this aspect of affairs of state; but this did not mean that, during these generations, they were leading sheltered or easy lives. On the contrary, these generations included 'the heroic age' of American history: the age of the pioneers and of the Civil War. For the energy which escaped consumption in foreign relations and foreign wars gave an almost daemonic impetus to the activities of the American people at home, and this impetus translated itself into a faith which did remove mountains: conquering the wilderness across the breadth of a continent and abolishing slavery (an institution which, like that of War, was coeval with civilization). In sequence to these previous adventures of faith, and with a self-confidence founded on the success with which they had been crowned, other American pioneers embarked, in 1927 and 1928, upon the new enterprise of 'outlawing War'. It was an enterprise comparable to the others in scale and difficulty and requiring the same spirit if it was to be carried through; but it had by no means been a foregone conclusion that the vitality of the American people should find its outlet, at this moment, along this particular channel. In fact, the re-entry of the American people into the international arena, which had been heralded by their participation in the General War, might conceivably have proceeded thereafter on warlike and not on peaceful lines.

The General War had signified that the unification of all Mankind and of the whole habitable earth had attained a degree at which it was no longer possible for any community—and certainly not for any great industrialized community—to hold aloof from international intercourse, whatever its geographical situation or its political traditions; and although the American people might at first rebel against this unfamiliar and unwelcome fact, the logic of the fact was

so potent that they were bound to yield to it rapidly by reacting to it in one way or another. The only open question was: which of various possible alternative reactions would take hold of a people whose country had just become potentially by far the greatest Power in the world? An Italian statesman familiar with Greek and Roman history, Baron Sidney Sonnino, had prophesied, before the General War of 1914-18 came to an end, that the American people would tread the Roman path; and an apprehension that this fatal idea might after all captivate the American imagination sometimes caused European observers to hold their breath when the 'big navy' question was being fought out in the United States almost *pari passu* with the question of the Peace Pact. If that view of their destiny had indeed obtained a hold over the American people during the months following the breakdown of the Three-Power Naval Conference of the 20th June-4th August, 1927, the outlook would have been gloomy for the world in general and indeed for the American people themselves. In the event, the vitality of the American people, now flowing for good or evil into international channels, was guided past the channel of 'naval supremacy' and was directed into the channel of 'the Outlawry of War'. The effects of this choice (if a mass-movement set in motion by a minority can properly be called a choice) seemed likely to be momentous.

It was this great current of American national energy, converted into public opinion, which supplied the impetus for the negotiation of the Peace Pact from beginning to end. In the internal politics of the United States, such evocations of public opinion were familiar; and private individuals or organizations that had mastered the art of mobilizing and directing opinion on the grand scale were recognized as being greater powers in the land than the politicians and departments of state that performed the comparatively humble task of putting privately and popularly framed national policies into effect. This was a logical corollary of democracy; but the negotiations of 1927 and 1928 for 'the Outlawry of War' were the first international transactions in Western history in which this method of political action played a conspicuous role.

After the idea of 'the Outlawry of War' had arisen in the United States, it was consciously and deliberately propagated abroad by private American enterprise, as is recorded below. There were also apparently spontaneous movements, in the same direction, in other parts of the world.

For example, at the last plenary session of the Sixth International Conference of American States which sat at Havana from the 16th

January to the 20th February, 1928,¹ the Mexican delegate introduced a resolution to the effect that

1. All aggression is considered illicit and as such is declared prohibited;
2. The American states will employ all pacific means to settle conflicts which may arise between them—

the resolution being grounded, in the preamble, on the postulate 'that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species'. This resolution was welcomed by the delegate of the United States, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, and was adopted by the Conference. On the other hand, the question of adopting some comprehensive and compulsory scheme of arbitration and conciliation as between American states was referred to a further conference which was to meet in Washington a year later.²

The phraseology of the Mexican resolution adopted at Havana on the 18th February, 1928, can be traced back to the following Polish resolution which had been adopted at Geneva on the 24th September, 1927, by the Assembly of the League of Nations during its Eighth Session:

The Assembly.

Recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of nations:

Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general peace;

Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international crime:

Considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence calculated to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken with a view to disarmament:

Declares:

(1) that all wars of aggression are, and shall always be, prohibited.

(2) That every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes, of every description, which may arise between States.

The Assembly declares that the States Members of the League are under an obligation to conform to these principles.

This resolution already contained two features which together constituted the essence both of Monsieur Briand's draft treaty of

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, Part IV A, Section (ii).

² The history of this conference will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1929*. The adoption of the first and postponement of the second of these resolutions at Havana in February 1928 anticipated, in an instructive way, the difference between the fortunes of the first and the second part of the Shotwell-Chamberlain model treaty (see p. 17 below). The first part, embodying 'the Outlawry of War', was realized in the General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928; the second part, embodying means, alternative to war, for settling disputes through processes of conciliation and arbitration, was left over for action in the future.

June 1927 and of the General Treaty eventually signed on the 27th August, 1928. These features were, first, a renunciation of a certain kind of war, and second an undertaking not to seek the settlement of international disputes by other than pacific means. The interesting fact emerges that in 1927 the peace movement in Europe, which had been divided over the Geneva Protocol of 1924, and the peace movement in the United States, which had been divided over the Covenant of the League, were feeling their way towards an almost identical standpoint in their separate efforts to overcome their respective difficulties. This convergence of ideas was striking because the two movements had originally started out on roads some distance apart. In the United States, the emphasis had been laid upon the renunciation of War itself; in Europe it had been laid upon the provision of alternative, i.e., pacific, methods of settling international disputes, such as arbitration and conciliation, and even more upon concerted measures for the coercion of peace-breakers. Even in the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations, a desire to make another attempt at progress on these latter lines was manifested. On the 6th September, 1927, the representative of the Netherlands in the Assembly put forward a draft resolution in favour of taking up the study of the fundamental principles of the Geneva Protocol again;¹ and although, on the 8th, one of the two original architects of the Protocol, Monsieur Politis, declared that, in his belief, it would not be wise or practicable to bring up the Protocol again in the existing state of affairs, he took pains to make it clear that his personal views had not altered. His belief, he added, was based on the fact that the obstacles which had wrecked the progress of the Protocol in 1924 were still, so far as he could judge, unchanged.

There is not the least ground for supposing—still less for hoping—that those obstacles have become less formidable or that they could be removed by a fresh effort on our part. On the contrary, I believe that the basic idea of the proposal, which is, if I am not mistaken, the extension of compulsory arbitration, would meet with the same opposition as before, and with the same results. My belief is based not only on the absence of any sign of real evolution in the attitude of the Governments concerned but also on the fact, of which there is abundant indication, that public opinion, as reflected in the responsible Governments, has not moved one step since 1924.

The leading opponents of the Geneva Protocol among the States Members of the League, whose opposition thus prevailed, were Great Britain² and the self-governing Dominions of the British Crown, in

¹ For this incident see also pp. 48–9 below.

² For Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech in the League Assembly on the 10th September, 1927, see the present volume, p. 49 below.

which, as in the United States, both official tradition and public opinion were hostile to the idea of entering into detailed commitments in advance as a means of providing against contingencies of which the details could not be foreseen. Thus the European and the American peace movements, in their separate efforts to find ways round the same obstacle, were being brought nearer to one another.

(c) THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY

The history of the negotiation of the General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928, between the French and American Governments in the first instance and eventually between all the fifteen Governments on whose behalf the treaty was signed, is implicit in the documents:¹ that is, in the official correspondence and interpretative statements which accompanied the earlier drafts of the instrument and preceded the general acceptance of the definitive text. Thus, to write a connected narrative of the negotiations would amount to little more than paraphrasing texts which must in any case be read in the original by serious students of these transactions, and in this place it therefore seems best to give, not a narrative of that kind, but a brief review of the principal phases through which the negotiations passed and the principal points on which they turned.

The first phase was initiated by Monsieur Briand; and it is significant that, although this overture came from the European and not from the American side, the popular note was struck from the outset. Wishing, as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the entry of the United States into the General War—a date which fell on the 6th April, 1927—Monsieur Briand conformed to the American method of action by dictating, not an official salutation to his own counterpart the Secretary of State at Washington, but a personal message to the American people.² He

¹ A practically complete set of texts will be found in (i) J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Information on the Renunciation of War, 1927-8* (London, 1928, Allen & Unwin); and (ii) James T. Shotwell, 'The Pact of Paris' (*International Conciliation*, No. 243 of October 1928). The text of the treaty, as it was signed, is reprinted in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume. A narrative in the form of a paraphrase will be found in David Hunter Miller, *The Peace Pact of Paris* (New York, 1928, Putnam). A penetrating study of the whole transaction has been made by Professor J. T. Shotwell in *War as an Instrument of National Policy* (London, 1929, Constable). See further C. C. Morrison, *The Outlawry of War* (Chicago, 1927, Willett, Clark & Colby).

² 'The inspiration of this message was undoubtedly a talk which M. Briand had with Professor James T. Shotwell a fortnight earlier [on the 22nd March]. Shotwell even formulated the idea of renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and, following the suggestion, Briand framed his message' (David Hunter Miller: *The Peace Pact of Paris* [New York, 1928, Putnam], p. 7).

transmitted this message in the form of a statement to the American 'Associated Press'. In this statement, he suggested that France and the United States might celebrate the occasion by subscribing publicly to some mutual engagement 'tending to outlaw war, to use an American expression', as between these two countries. He interpreted this American 'slogan' as meaning 'the renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy'; and this phrase, thus coined, survived the negotiations unchanged until it found its final place as the keystone of the General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928.

The suggestion thrown out by Monsieur Briand in this studiously informal manner was brought home to the American mind within the next few weeks by the exertions of a private American citizen, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler. Meanwhile, two other private American citizens, Professors James T. Shotwell and J. P. Chamberlain, had set themselves to give point and concreteness, in the eyes of the American public, to Monsieur Briand's original message, by working out and publishing an unofficial draft treaty which 'actually was built up out of the texts of existing treaties and drew them together into a single and consistent whole, adding the Briand renunciation of War to the Root treaties of arbitration and the Bryan treaties of conciliation, and re-stating them to fit in with the great declaration of Locarno'.¹

The second phase of the proceedings was a correspondence *à deux* between Monsieur Briand and Mr. Kellogg. In the first days of June 1927, Monsieur Briand opened this phase of the proceedings by transmitting—this time to the Secretary of State at Washington, through the ordinary diplomatic channels—a draft treaty of his own, consisting of a preamble and three articles. These three articles eventually reappeared as the three articles of the General Treaty signed on the 27th August, 1928, with little change of text apart from the alterations in drafting required for turning a bilateral instrument into a multilateral one. After more than six months' interval—during which the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva met and broke up without reaching agreement—Mr. Kellogg, on the 28th December,

¹ Shotwell, *op. cit.*, p. 55. Full text of the Shotwell-Chamberlain model treaty in *op. cit.*, Appendix I, pp. 271–8. This model was much more comprehensive than Monsieur Briand's draft of June 1927 or the instrument eventually signed on the 27th August, 1928, in both of which the arbitration and conciliation chapter was omitted altogether. The Shotwell-Chamberlain model already contained the legitimization of 'self-defence', which Mr. Kellogg afterwards conceded as an interpretation, as well as the provision that any party breaking the treaty should automatically lose the benefit of the treaty *vis-à-vis* the other parties—a provision which Mr. Kellogg afterwards included in his preamble.

1927, rejoined by addressing two simultaneous notes to Monsieur Briand. In one note he offered a formula for a bilateral arbitration treaty to replace the existing Franco-American arbitration treaty of 1908, which was due to expire on the 27th February, 1928; and the new arbitration treaty was duly signed on the 6th February, 1928.¹ This was a somewhat old-fashioned and imperfect instrument without much significance beyond that of filling a hiatus.² It did, however, contain in its preamble a declaration to the effect that the two parties were

Eager by their example not only to demonstrate their condemnation of war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, but also to hasten the time when the perfection of international arrangements for the pacific settlement of international disputes shall have eliminated forever the possibility of war among any of the Powers of the world.

Meanwhile Mr. Kellogg, in his second note of the 28th December, 1927, suggested that the treaty for the renunciation of War, which Monsieur Briand had proposed, should be not merely bilateral but multilateral. In this connexion it may be noted that the Shotwell-Chamberlain model treaty was conceived in general terms; and so were two resolutions, advocating 'the Outlawry of War', which were introduced into the Senate at Washington in December 1927, just before Mr. Kellogg replied to Monsieur Briand, by Senator Capper and by Senator Borah (the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).³ There followed a conflict of wills: the French Government insisting that, if the treaty was to be multilateral, the terms of Monsieur Briand's draft for a bilateral treaty must be qualified, while the American Government insisted both that the treaty should be multilateral and that the text should consist of Monsieur Briand's draft as it stood. An exposition of the American Government's point of view was given by Mr. Kellogg in an address which he delivered, on the 15th March, 1928, at New York, to a private society of American citizens, the Council on Foreign Relations.⁴ Eventually the French Government accepted a suggestion from the American Government that the two Governments should

¹ The hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the alliance concluded between France and the United States during the American Revolutionary War.

² For an analysis of this treaty see Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, Ch. XI, pp. 116-27; P. C. Jessup, 'The United States and Treaties for the Avoidance of War' (*International Conciliation*, No. 239 of April 1928), pp. 201-9. Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 210-12.

³ For a discussion of the Capper and Borah Resolutions, with their texts, see Shotwell, *op. cit.*, Chs. IX and X, pp. 93-115.

⁴ Extract from the text in Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-94.

jointly submit to the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan the correspondence exchanged between them since June.

In the third phase, the compass of the negotiations was wider; for this phase was opened by a circular note, dated the 13th April, 1928, from Mr. Kellogg to the German, British, Italian and Japanese Governments, in which he submitted to these Governments the draft for a multilateral treaty to be signed in the first instance by all the surviving Great Powers except the U.S.S.R. The two substantive articles in this draft were identical with those of Monsieur Briand's draft of the preceding June, except that they were cast in multilateral instead of bilateral form. The ratifications clause and the preamble were not only thus re-cast but were elaborated. On the 20th April, the French Government circulated to the same four Governments an alternative draft in which the two substantive articles were expanded to five and a number of qualifications and provisos were introduced in precise terms.¹ In the end, it was the American draft of the 13th April, 1928 (of which the kernel was Monsieur Briand's original draft), and not the French draft of the 20th April, that became the basis of the definitive text of the General Treaty as it was signed on the 27th August, 1928. The French draft, did, however, bring to a point the various provisos, interpretations and understandings that had been put forward on the French side in the course of the Franco-American correspondence; and on the 29th April Mr. Kellogg dealt with these French considerations in a speech delivered before the American International Law Association at Washington,² and sought, in a masterly series of interpretations of his own position, to demonstrate—not merely to his immediate audience of private American citizens but to the Governments and to the world at large—that the French desiderata could be satisfied within the framework of the draft which he himself had put forward. These interpretations were the turning point of the whole transaction and the masterpiece of Mr. Kellogg's diplomacy; and it was therefore significant that they were offered, not in any official note or diplomatic conversation, but once again in an address delivered by Mr. Kellogg to a private society of American citizens. The British, Italian and Japanese Governments had before them Mr. Kellogg's interpretative exposition of the 29th April, 1928, as well as his draft for the text of a multilateral treaty, before they

¹ See Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–6, for a synoptic view of the American draft of the 13th April, 1928, and the French draft of the 20th April in parallel columns.

² Text in Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–10.

despatched their replies to Mr. Kellogg's note of the 13th April, under cover of which that draft had been circulated. As for the German Government, they accepted Mr. Kellogg's proposal of the 13th April as early as the 27th April—two days before Mr. Kellogg's address to the American International Law Association was delivered—and thus incidentally secured the diplomatic success of being the first Power to fall in with the American plan.

The first reaction of the British Government was to suggest that the American and French drafts should be referred in the first instance to a conference of jurists;¹ but the State Department at Washington let it be known that it strongly disapproved of such a procedure (which would have tended to make the whole transaction esoteric instead of popular), and thereupon the British Government allowed the suggestion to drop. The Italian reply rode off on this question of procedure without directly answering—but, by implication, without rejecting—Mr. Kellogg's proposal of the 13th April.

Meanwhile, British public opinion declared itself in favour of the Peace Pact with a spontaneity, unanimity and vigour such as it had shown, two years before, upon the non-admission of Germany to membership in the League in March 1926, and was to show again a few months later over the Anglo-French 'naval compromise'.² There was a strong feeling in Great Britain that His Majesty's Government of the day were damning the proposed Peace Pact with faint praise and perhaps even prejudicing the chances of its achievement by undue delay in replying to Mr. Kellogg's circular note of the 13th April, 1928. One of the most remarkable manifestations of this feeling was the unanimous adoption in the House of Lords, on the 15th May, of a motion in favour of Mr. Kellogg's proposal which was introduced by Lord Reading. The Government protested that their critics were beating against an open door. Yet in their very protestations there could be detected certain overtones of emprossement and undertones of pique which seemed to indicate that the expression of public opinion had been not without influence upon the course of official policy.

Eventually, the British Government accepted Mr. Kellogg's proposal of the 13th April, as read together with his speech of the 29th, in a long and reasoned note dated the 19th May. Beyond this, the British Government suggested that Mr. Kellogg's invitation should be extended to the British self-governing Dominions and to India,

¹ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 10th May, 1928.

² See Section (ii) (b) of this part of the present volume.

and they also postulated an understanding which came to be nicknamed the 'British Monroe Doctrine', though it perhaps bore less resemblance to the American Monroe Doctrine than to the special American postulates relating to the Caribbean.

The language of Article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign Power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government.¹

Mr. Kellogg promptly acted upon Sir Austen Chamberlain's suggestion that invitations should be extended to the Governments of the Dominions and India; and favourable replies had been received from all five Governments by the middle of June. On the other hand, Mr. Kellogg ignored the British Government's postulate; and the British Government, on their part, did not either demand that it should be incorporated in the text of the treaty or formulate it in so many words as a British reservation. They did, however, reassert this postulate in a note of the 18th July, 1928, in the act of accepting the treaty as re-submitted by Mr. Kellogg in its definitive form;² and

¹ This postulate was taken to refer principally if not exclusively to Egypt (see Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, Ch. XVIII, pp. 200-8); but the British Government refrained from announcing what the geographical limits of the application of the postulate were. This silence exposed them to criticism, on the ground that such a postulate, put forward without explicit geographical limitation, virtually stultified the British acceptance of the Peace Pact. If Egypt was in fact the region principally in view, then the policy of the British Government in maintaining silence, at the price of leaving this criticism unanswered, may have been due to the fact that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were actually taking place at the time (see the present volume, Part III B, Section (i)). It may be noted that the 'British Monroe Doctrine' was the subject of parliamentary questions not only in the House of Commons at Westminster but in the Dail at Dublin and in the House of Commons at Ottawa. The Irish Minister for External Affairs and the Canadian Prime Minister both remarked, in reply to these questions, that the terms of Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 19th May, 1928, were only binding upon His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain (see Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-9).

² See below, p. 23.

on the 4th August they forwarded copies of the two notes of the 19th May and the 18th July to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations at Geneva with a request that they should be circulated to the Governments of other States Members.¹

Meanwhile, the tale of favourable replies to Mr. Kellogg's circular note of the 13th April had been completed on the 26th May by an acceptance of Mr. Kellogg's proposal on the part of the Japanese Government; and it was noteworthy that, while the Japanese note was dated a week later than the British, the Japanese Government did not follow the British Government's example by putting forward any postulate referring explicitly or implicitly to Manchuria.

Here again, the ground had been prepared for the American Secretary of State by a private American citizen, Professor Shotwell, who took advantage of an opportunity that was offered by a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (an unofficial international organization consisting of national groups of private citizens of various countries whose territories bordered on the Pacific Ocean). This conference was being held at Honolulu in July 1927—that is, at a date after Monsieur Briand's second *démarche* at the beginning of June, and before Mr. Kellogg's rejoinder in December—and here Dr. Shotwell took occasion to present the idea of a treaty for the renunciation of War to his colleagues of various nationalities, particularly to the Japanese. It was to be expected that Japan would prove stony ground for the reception of the idea, both for the general reason that the Japanese, like the West-European, 'governing class' was of a sceptical turn of mind, and also for the special reason that this particular idea was of American origin and therefore in danger of being suspect in Japan *a priori* ('Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes'). Accordingly those Japanese private individuals who had discussed the proposed treaty with Professor Shotwell at Honolulu found, on their return home, that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was somewhat suspicious of the project and the public either indifferent or antagonistic. Thereupon certain of them organized *ad hoc*,² for

¹ Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 53. The ground for circulation which was given in the British Government's covering note to the Secretary-General was that the two notes dealt with the question of the consistency of the Peace Pact with Article 20 of the Covenant of the League; but of course the circulation of the two notes also had the effect of bringing the so-called 'British Monroe Doctrine' to the attention of all States Members of the League.

² The study group thus formed *ad hoc* must be distinguished (i) from the Japanese National Group affiliated to the Institute of Pacific Relations and (ii) from the members of that group who had taken part in the conference at Honolulu. The procedure was that the *ad hoc* group was organized by some of those members, acting as individuals.

the study and discussion of the project, a group composed of several distinguished Japanese political scientists, international lawyers and historians, and the meetings of this group were attended by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This study group met once a fortnight during the autumn of 1927 and part of the winter, became convinced that the project was a good one, and then set themselves to interpret it to the Japanese public. Some of the leading daily papers published series of articles written by members of the study-group in which the implications of the plan and the bearing of these on Japanese interests were ventilated. The plan was also discussed in meetings open to the general public as well as in the sessions of various private societies, and essays on it were published both in journals concerned with political science and in popular magazines. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was kept in touch with the upshot of the discussions and with the movement of public opinion by its observer; and thereafter, when the Japanese Government had to take a decision upon receipt of the United States Government's circular note of the 13th April, 1928, they responded on the 26th May by accepting Mr. Kellogg's draft of a multilateral treaty without reservations.

The fourth phase of the negotiations was opened on the 23rd June, 1928, by the despatch of another circular note from Mr. Kellogg, this time to fourteen Governments—the five British Self-Governing Dominions and India and the three parties to the Locarno Pact which were not Great Powers (that is, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland) being added to France and to the four Great Powers to whom Mr. Kellogg had addressed his note of the 13th April. In this note of the 23rd June, Mr. Kellogg quoted the interpretative paragraphs from his speech of the 29th April and re-submitted the draft treaty with no change in the text of the articles but with a modification in the preamble postulating 'that any signatory Power which' should thereafter 'seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty'. He asked for acceptance of 'the form of treaty now suggested' 'without qualification or reservation'; and he suggested that, if and when the fifteen states concerned in the first instance were to conclude the treaty among themselves, the other states of the world might be expected to adhere to it. All fourteen Governments duly accepted the treaty as it now stood, the first notification of acceptance being made by the German Government on the 11th July and the second by the French Government on the 14th July, while His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain replied on the 18th and the Japanese Government

closed the tale on the 20th.¹ It was then arranged that the treaty should be signed in Paris on the 27th August, 1928, by representatives of the United States and of the fourteen states to whose Governments Mr. Kellogg had addressed his note of the 23rd June; that the treaty should be open for signature by all other states immediately after it had been signed by the representatives of the fifteen original contracting parties; and that the deposit of ratifications should be made in Washington. On the 27th August, 1928, at the Quai d'Orsay, the fifteen original signatures were duly subscribed.²

The fifth phase of the negotiations was opened on the 27th August itself by the despatch of a circular note from the Government of the United States to forty-eight Governments, communicating the text of the treaty and inviting each Government to notify its adherence. On the same date a similar invitation was addressed to the Government of the U.S.S.R. by the French Government—the Government of the United States not being in diplomatic relations with Moscow.³

¹ The acceptances were not made without further consideration: and, in particular, the legal advisers of the British, French and German Foreign Offices appear to have conferred at Berlin at some date between the 23rd June, 1928, and the 11th July. (Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.* pp. 45-7).

² Mr. Kellogg and also Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, both crossed the Atlantic in order to sign the treaty personally on behalf of their countries. His Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary for the Irish Free State was Mr. Cosgrave, the President of the Executive Council, and his plenipotentiary both for Great Britain and Northern Ireland and for India was the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Westminster, Lord Cushendun. In all, as many as ten out of the fifteen original signatures were subscribed either by Prime Ministers or by Foreign Ministers (including such distinguished continental European statesmen as Monsieur Briand, Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Beneš). Four out of the five countries that were represented by persons of less exalted position (that is, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) were particularly remote from Paris.

³ In both France and the U.S.S.R., official action in regard to the Peace Pact was undoubtedly influenced by public opinion, though in these two countries the opinion to which the Governments yielded was hardly that of the peoples in whose name they ruled. The peoples of the U.S.S.R. had no voice in such matters; and the people of France seem to have been at one with their Government in fearing that Mr. Kellogg's project might disorganize the treaty-system in which they had entrenched themselves since the General War, rather than hoping that it might add to their security. Yet undoubtedly there was a public opinion to which both the French and the Soviet Government were sensitive. It was this that had deterred the French Government from bringing the negotiations with Mr. Kellogg to an end, notwithstanding the discomfort which they displayed in the notes of the 21st January and the 30th March, 1928, and the dissatisfaction which they must have felt when on the 13th April Mr. Kellogg submitted the Franco-American correspondence to the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments off-hand, without further consultation with Monsieur Briand. Even more remarkable was the Soviet Government's consent to adhere to the General Treaty of the 27th August, 1928, which was

Thus, by midnight of the 27th–28th August, 1928, fifteen states had signed the General Treaty and forty-nine had been invited to adhere.

It may be noted that each of the fifteen original parties to the treaty except the United States was a state member of the League of Nations in its own right, but that only eight of the fifteen were sovereign states in severalty. The seven original parties which were states members of the British Commonwealth of Nations were possessed of sovereignty not severally but collectively—as was indicated by the fact that their representatives all received their full powers from the same sovereign authority. One of them, India, was not even ‘fully self-governing’. Of the forty-nine states invited to adhere, Egypt, though her independence had been recognized by Great Britain on the 28th February, 1922, could hardly be considered ‘fully self-governing’ until the four matters reserved by the British Government on that occasion had been disposed of by an agreed settlement.¹ Again, certain republics in Central America and the Antilles, while juridically sovereign and independent, could likewise hardly be considered ‘fully self-governing’ because they were in somewhat the same position *vis-à-vis* the United States as Egypt *vis-à-vis* Great Britain. On the other hand there were two undoubtedly conveyed in a note from Monsieur Litvinov dated the 31st August; for this consent signified a departure from the Soviet Government’s standing rejoinder to any fair-sounding proposal from ‘the Capitalist World’: ‘Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?’ On this occasion, Monsieur Litvinov duly underlined the omissions and shortcomings of the Peace Pact, compared it to its disadvantage with his own proposals for total disarmament (see Section (ii) (a) of this part of the present volume), and placed the most sinister interpretations on the so-called ‘British Monroe Doctrine’. Yet the gist of this long document was really contained in two short concluding paragraphs:

‘Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Pact of Paris objectively imposes certain obligations on the Powers before public opinion and gives the Soviet Government a new chance to put before all the participants of the compact a question most important for peace—that is the question of disarmament, the solution of which is the only guarantee of prevention of war—the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to sign the Pact of Paris.

In consequence of this assent I shall have the honour to hand over to you, Mr. Ambassador, the corresponding act of my Government in its joining in this compact as soon as the formalities connected with this are ended.’ More than this, the Soviet Government promptly took steps to bring the General Treaty into force locally, in advance of its general entry into force, as between the U.S.S.R. and the border-states of Europe. (These steps will be recorded in the *Survey for 1929*.)

It must be inferred that the Peace Pact had evoked something in the nature of an international public opinion which transcended frontiers and so pervaded the psychological atmosphere of the world that it was able to exercise a potent effect upon Governments even when it was not locally active in the territories under their rule.

¹ For the abortive Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1928, see the present volume, Part III B, Section (i).

sovereign, independent and 'fully self-governing' states which were not invited to adhere to the treaty, namely the Najd-Hijāz and the Yaman. Possibly these two Arabian states were omitted because very few other states had yet recognized them officially. Except, however, for the Najd-Hijāz and the Yaman, all sovereign, independent or 'fully self-governing' states existing on the 27th August, 1928, either signed the treaty on that date or were invited on that date to adhere to it. The list included all States Members of the League without exception, as well as seven states which had never become members (the United States, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Egypt, Iceland, Mexico and Turkey) and two former members that had seceded (Brazil and Costa Rica). Meanwhile, by the terms of Article III of the treaty, adherences that were notified by states that were not original parties could not take effect until the treaty had come into force as between the original signatories; and this would not take place until all their several instruments of ratification had been deposited in Washington. Thus the fifth phase of the negotiations could not be completed until the fifteen original parties had duly ratified the signatures subscribed by their plenipotentiaries on the 27th August: and, in the case of the United States, ratification was subject to the assent of the Senate at Washington. The history of the passage of the treaty through the Senate is recorded below.

(d) THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
CRUISERS THROUGH THE CONGRESS AT WASHINGTON

In the preceding sections of this part, some account has been given of the negotiation of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, down to its signature on the 27th August, 1928; and it has been suggested that this transaction, which was carried through on American initiative, represented one of the reactions of the United States Government to the failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference of the 20th June-4th August, 1927. Another reaction of the same Government to the same event was represented by the submission to Congress, on the 14th November, 1927, of a Bill for naval construction;¹ but there was an important difference in the circumstances in which these two new departures in policy were respectively taken. The Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, as has been recorded above, was consciously acting as the exponent of American public opinion when he addressed his note of the 28th December, 1927, to Monsieur Briand; the Secretary of

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 81-2.

the Navy, Mr. Wilbur, when he submitted his Naval Construction Bill to Congress six weeks earlier, was apparently acting in the expectation that this other response to the failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference would be at least as popular as Mr. Kellogg's. Mr. Wilbur, however, unlike his colleague at the State Department, ventured to act in anticipation rather than in execution of a popular mandate; his Bill, instead of following the expression of public opinion, evoked it; and the popular force which was then showing its power by carrying the Kellogg Pact through to a successful conclusion, gave a simultaneous and not less impressive manifestation of its strength by compelling the sponsors of the Wilbur Bill in the House of Representatives to make such drastic reductions in the draft as to change it almost out of recognition.

The Wilbur Bill, as originally submitted to Congress on the 14th November, 1927, had run as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives that for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United States, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of the following vessels:

Twenty-five light cruisers; nine destroyer leaders; thirty-two submarines, and five aircraft carriers;

Section 2. The construction of light cruisers and aircraft carriers herein authorized shall be subject to the limitations prescribed by the treaty limiting naval armaments ratified August 17, 1923.

Section 3. In the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armaments the President is hereby empowered, in his discretion, to suspend, in whole or in part, any construction authorized by this act.

In a covering letter, the Secretary of the Navy had estimated the aggregate cost of this construction programme at \$725,000,000 and had added that he was authorized to announce that the proposed legislation was not in conflict with the President's financial programme. On the 11th January, 1929, further explanatory statements were made by Mr. Wilbur himself and by his Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Charles F. Hughes, before the House Committee on Naval Affairs.¹ On the question of policy, the American, like the British, naval authorities laid down simultaneously two principles which, to the lay mind, were difficult to reconcile. While declaring that 'all naval armament is in a measure relative', that 'our needs for naval vessels are relative', and that 'in determining this need the General Board [of the Navy] at all times has taken into consideration

¹ Texts of statements in *The United States Daily*, 12th and 13th January, 1928.

the condition of other navies and their construction and replacement program so far as they are known to us', Mr. Wilbur also declared in the same statement that his programme was 'not based upon the strength of any prospective opposition', that the cruisers for which he was asking were needed 'as a defensive organization, without reference to the relative strength of other navies'; and that the programme did 'not cover all the foreign interests or trade routes of' the United States, but represented 'a conservative estimate of actual needs'.¹ In regard to the programme itself, Mr. Wilbur pointed out that 'the Bill . . . fixed no time for the beginning or completion of the ships therein named', and announced that this was 'in accordance with the desire of both the President and the Navy Department'. He added, however, that the intention was to carry out the provisions of the Bill within five years and that it was proposed to supplement them by 'a continuous building and replacement program' spread over twenty years²—at the end of which period, another twenty years' cycle would immediately begin.³ Mr. Wilbur affirmed and reiterated that, at the moment, the United States did not possess a first-class Navy.

Thereupon, on the 14th January, 1928, the House Committee proceeded to fortify the Bill by writing into it an explicit time-limit of five years for laying down and eight for completing the vessels projected, and by striking out the clause giving the President discretion to suspend construction in certain circumstances. On the 30th January, 1928, in a public speech, President Coolidge deprecated the introduction of a time-limit while declaring that he contemplated having the ships built as fast as possible; but by this time the storm had burst. On the 22nd January Mr. Borah, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, had opened the attack by denouncing the Bill as 'madness' which would lead to 'immediate and inevitable war'; and American public opinion declared itself rapidly and vehemently in this sense through the mouths of private individuals and private associations. On the 9th February, a deputation from the Society of Friends called upon Mr. Coolidge and published an open letter to him;⁴ and a hail of similar letters and tele-

¹ Compare Lord Jellicoe's observations, made on the 14th July, 1927, at Geneva during the Three-Power Conference, which are quoted in the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 58-9.

² i.e. twenty years including the five years which would be occupied by the construction programme provided for in the Bill itself.

³ For this last point, which was elicited by a question from a member of the House Committee, see *The United States Daily*, 13th January, 1928.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, 10th February, 1928.

grams began to descend upon both President and Congressmen. An attack on the Bill was published in the bulletin of the influential Federal Council of Churches; and on the 15th and 16th February the House Committee on Naval Affairs heard testimony from a deputation representing the World Alliance for International Friendship and the Church Peace Union. On the 27th February, the President received a deputation of churchmen which was introduced by the General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches and which presented a declaration¹ signed by a number of distinguished people. In this declaration the President and the members of Congress were asked to withhold their approval from the Bill on the ground that it would make the American nation 'appear insincere in its offer to negotiate treaties to renounce war as a measure of public policy' and would jeopardize 'the entire movement for world justice and peace based on mutual confidence, good will and international cooperation in constructive peace measures'. It was in vain for the sponsors of the Bill to secure the support of the Daughters of the American Revolution; for the hostility of the overwhelming majority of the people was unmistakable. Mr. Wilbur himself displayed an increasing recognition of this important political fact in a series of speeches delivered on the 14th February,² the 6th March³ and the 7th April;⁴ and the members of the House Committee were not slow to draw the moral. On the 14th February one of them, Representative Britten, called on the President 'to tell him of the thousands of letters being received on Capitol Hill from professional as well as misguided pacifists'. The upshot of this consultation was that Mr. Britten publicly rallied to Mr. Coolidge's view that a time-limit was undesirable, while Mr. Coolidge publicly declared that the most important feature in the programme was the cruisers. These announcements foreshadowed a change of policy.

On the 23rd February the Chairman of the House Committee, Mr. Butler, announced that, in place of the Wilbur Bill for the construction of seventy-one vessels at an aggregate cost of \$725,000,000, a new Bill was to be introduced for the construction of fifteen ten-thousand ton cruisers and one aircraft-carrier at an aggregate cost of \$274,000,000. In this Bill, as in the original version of the Wilbur Bill, the President was to have discretion to suspend construction; but he was now to have it only in the event of an international agreement for further limitation of naval armaments having actually been reached. Moreover, a time-limit was inserted after all, providing

¹ Text *ibid.*, 28th February, 1928.

² Text *ibid.*, 15th February, 1928.

³ Text *ibid.*, 7th March, 1928.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, 9th April, 1928.

that the fifteen cruisers must be laid down within three years and completed within six, and the aircraft-carrier laid down within two and completed within six.¹ On the 24th February the President let it be known that he would have preferred the original Wilbur Bill with its absence of time-limit for a larger ultimate programme. The decisive factor, however, was that the substitution of the new Bill for the old placated public opinion, which was reassured by the drastic reduction of the aggregate cost to little more than one-third of the original figure, and which evidently regarded the smaller programme as being no longer a provocative challenge to the rest of the world but a more or less reasonable retort to the British attitude on the question of parity in cruisers at the Three-Power Naval Conference of the preceding year. The deputation of churchmen, for instance, which waited upon the President on the 27th February, seems to have acquiesced in Mr. Coolidge's assurance that there was nothing in the reduced programme that could alarm any other country. Furthermore, on the 28th the House Committee, on the point of reporting the new Bill, reduced the aggregate cost to \$268,000,000 and left out that part of the time-limit clause which set dates for the completion of construction; and in this form² the Bill was duly introduced into the House that day.³ With three amendments,⁴ it was passed there by 287 votes to 58 on the 17th March, 1928, and so went up to the Senate.

On the 21st March, 1928, the House Committee on Appropriations presented an Appropriation Bill for the Department of the Navy for the financial year 1929, accompanied by a report⁵ drawing attention

¹ Details *The United States Daily*, 24th February, 1928.

² Text *ibid.*, 29th February, 1928.

³ The Committee's report on the Bill was presented to the House on the 3rd March (text of this report *ibid.*, 5th March, 1928). The new programme was declared to be 'in no sense a competitive programme, since the essence of competition is the effort to excel or out-distance another'. At the same time, the report contained the statement that 'the requirements of our fleet cannot, of course, be considered altogether apart from the naval developments of other countries'. It was perhaps significant that, whereas the Wilbur Bill had been expressly 'for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United States', the new Bill was simply 'to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels and for other purposes'.

⁴ One amendment dealt with the apportionment of the work between Navy Yards and private firms; a second dealt with a point of constitutional order; the third introduced a clause requesting the President to encourage that international agreement for further limitation, on the achievement of which his right to suspend construction was to come into force. For the text of the Bill as it passed the House of Representatives, see *The United States Daily* and *The Times*, 19th March, 1928.

⁵ Text in *The United States Daily*, 22nd March, 1928.

to the steady upward tendency of the Navy Budget. This Bill passed the House on the 27th March and the Senate on the 25th April.

On the 3rd May, 1928, the Naval Construction Bill, having been sent up to the Senate from the House, was reported to the Senate by its Committee on Naval Affairs with no substantial changes. The Committee did not accept an amendment from Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, advocating a restatement and recodification of the rules of law governing the conduct of belligerents and neutrals in war at sea before the meeting of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments which was due to meet in Washington in 1931. On the 10th May, however, when the Bill came up in the regular order of the Senate's business, it was left to stand over until the next session.

Meanwhile, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War was signed in Paris on the 27th August, 1928, and the Anglo-French 'Naval Compromise', embodied in the three notes of the 28th June, 20th and 28th July, 1928, was rejected by the United States on the 28th September, 1928.

This last incident was referred to by President Coolidge in an address delivered on the 11th November, 1928, the tenth anniversary of the Armistice which had terminated the General War of 1914-18.¹ After mentioning the failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927, the President observed:

Since that time no progress seems to have been made. In fact, the movements have been discouraging. During last summer France and England made a tentative offer which would limit the kind of cruisers and submarines adapted to the use of the United States, but left without limit the kind adapted to their use. The United States of course refused to accept this offer. Had we not done so, the French Army and the English Navy would be so near unlimited that the principle of limitations would be virtually abandoned.

In the same speech, *à propos* of the War of 1914-18, the President remarked:

If the European countries had neglected their defences, it is probable that war would have come much sooner. All human experience seems to demonstrate that a country which makes reasonable preparation for defense is less likely to be subject to a hostile attack and less likely to suffer a violation of its rights which might lead to war. This is the prevailing attitude of the United States and one which I believe should constantly determine its actions.

¹ Text of this speech, *ibid.*, 12th November, 1928. Part of the speech was devoted to the question of 'Inter-Ally Debts', probably in view of the fact that the question of Reparations had just been reopened at the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations. These passages will be dealt with elsewhere in that connexion.

The whole of the speech was not in this tone. For instance, in dealing with a criticism of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Mr. Coolidge declared:

So long as promises can be broken and treaties can be violated we can have no positive assurances, yet every one knows that they are additional safeguards. We can only say that this is the best that mortal man can do. It is beside the mark to argue that we should not put faith in it. The whole scheme of human society, the whole progress of civilization, requires that we should have faith in men and in nations. There is no other positive power on which we could rely. All the values that have ever been created, all the progress that has ever been made, declare that our faith is justified.

And the speech contained the following notable denunciation of War:

The whole essence of war is destruction. It is the negation and the antithesis of human progress. No good thing ever came out of war that could not better have been secured by reason and conscience.

The speech was double-edged; and, if it accurately represented the feeling of the American people,¹ it implied that at this moment they were simultaneously pursuing two divergent lines of foreign policy which were suggested respectively by different experiences in their recent intercourse with foreign nations. One of these lines was represented by the Naval Construction Bill, which was on the legislative calendar of the Senate for the session of Congress which was to open on the 3rd December, 1928. The other line was represented by the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, which had not yet been before the Senate because it had been signed during the summer recess, but which would naturally be dealt with by the Senate in executive session when Congress reassembled. Thus two momentous measures, each embodying one of these two different policies, were on the point of coming before the Senate simultaneously; and, on the eve of the re-assembly of Congress, the respective sponsors of the two measures in the Senate—perhaps responsive, like the President in his Armistice Day speech, to the national state of mind—took steps to prevent the Treaty and the Bill from coming into collision with each other. On the 22nd November, 1928, Mr. Hale, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, announced that he had come to an understanding on the matter with Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who *ex officio* would have the Treaty in his charge; and Senator Borah confirmed this statement on the same day.² On the 4th December the President,

¹ For the opinion that it did so, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th November, 1928.

² Both statements in *The United States Daily*, 23rd November, 1928.

in his Annual Message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the Naval Construction Bill ought to be passed without delay. On the same date he transmitted to the Senate the Treaty for the Renunciation of War with a request that this, likewise, should be passed by the Senate during the session that was then beginning.¹ Neither Bill nor Treaty had been dealt with before Christmas; but on the eve of the Christmas recess an agreement was reached whereby, when Congress reassembled on the 3rd January, 1929, the Bill and the Treaty should come before the Senate simultaneously, the one being the unfinished legislative business and the other the unfinished business in open executive session. On the 3rd January, by agreement, Senator Hale introduced the Bill in a speech in which he reviewed the history of the leading Navies of the world since 1916 and made detailed comparisons between the strengths of the American, British, Japanese, French and Italian fleets and the positions of American, British and Japanese naval stations. In the course of this speech, he intimated that he intended to vote for the ratification of the Treaty on the understanding that this would in no way change the existing position of the United States Navy. Thereafter, in accordance with the agreement, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the Treaty in open executive session, and this occupied its attention until it eventually passed the Treaty on the 15th January.²

On the 16th the debate on the Bill was re-opened by a speech from Senator Swanson; but the main outstanding points at issue were raised on the 24th by Senator Borah. On this occasion he reintroduced the amendment regarding the rules of law in war time at sea which had not been accepted by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs when the Bill had been in their hands.³ He also urged Senator Hale to strike out the time-limits for the commencement of construction, which still remained in the Bill, 'so as to give the negotiating power complete freedom to negotiate during the coming year or two with reference to disarmament and to the freedom of the seas'; and he added that, on that condition, he would cease his discussion and vote for the Bill. He based his two proposals on the following view of the international outlook:

I think we are on the eve of a naval race with Great Britain. The situation is not dissimilar to the situation existing between Germany and Great Britain from 1905 to 1914. . . . If we cannot have an agreement

¹ See sub-section (e) below.

² This debate on the Treaty in the Senate is dealt with in sub-section (e) below.

³ See p. 31 above.

with reference to the use of the sea, if our commerce depends for its protection entirely upon our navy, if England stays with the proposition that she proposes to dominate the sea, we will build a navy superior to England's undoubtedly . . . but I think, in the first place, before . . . we start on a naval race, we ought to make every effort possible, first, to bring about a complete understanding with the naval Powers with reference to naval building, and secondly a complete understanding with reference to the freedom of the seas.

In the course of the debate, Mr. Borah defined the term 'freedom of the seas' as follows:

My idea of freedom of the seas is that it is the right of neutral nations to carry their commerce as freely in time of war as in time of peace except when they carry actual munitions of war or when they actually seek to break a blockade. But the blockade must be a blockade sufficient to prevent the passage of ships and not merely a paper blockade. But as to all legitimate commerce, outside of the actual munitions of war and outside of speeding to a particular port where it is blockaded, there ought not to be any interference with the neutral powers. A minimum of belligerent rights and a maximum of neutral rights.

Senator Hale did not make objection to Mr. Borah's amendment regarding the rules of law, but on the 25th he announced that he would oppose the omission of the time-limit with all his might.

On the 29th January it was announced from the White House that the President was still opposed to the time-limit, but this on financial and not on diplomatic grounds, whereas Senator Borah had advocated its omission on both counts. At the same time, it was announced that, in the President's opinion, any action that could possibly be foreseen by a future Limitation of Arms Conference would have no bearing on the question of the adoption of the present Bill. It was added that, if the Bill should pass the Senate with the time-limit clause eliminated, the President would expect to transmit immediately to Congress a budget recommendation for the beginning of building operations.

On the 4th February the Senate rejected a motion to strike out the time-limit clause by 54 votes to 28. On the 5th it first adopted, by 81 votes to 1, an amendment which had been offered on the previous day by Senator Reed in substitution for Senator Borah's amendment and which had been subsequently modified by the two Senators in agreement. It also rejected one amendment for increasing and another for diminishing the number of vessels to be built, as well as a further amendment for requesting the President to ask the British Government to enter into an agreement for the limitation of 10,000-ton cruisers, and for providing that, during such negotiations, the

programme of construction laid down in the Bill should be suspended. Thereafter, on the same day, the 5th February, 1929, the Bill was passed by the Senate, by 68 votes to 12, in the following form:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to undertake prior to July 1, 1931, the construction of 15 light cruisers and one aircraft carrier according to the following program:

(a) Five light cruisers during each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1929, 1930 and 1931, to cost, including armor and armament, not to exceed \$17,000,000 each.

(b) One aircraft carrier prior to June 30, 1930, to cost, including armor and armament, not to exceed \$19,000,000: Provided, That if the construction of any vessel herein authorized to be undertaken in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, or 1930, is not undertaken in that fiscal year, such construction may be undertaken in the next succeeding fiscal year: And provided further, That the first and each succeeding alternate cruiser upon which work is undertaken, together with the main engines, armor, and armament for such light cruisers, the construction and manufacture of which is authorized by this act, shall be constructed or manufactured in the Government navy yards, naval gun factories, naval ordnance plants, or arsenals of the United States, except such material or parts as are not customarily manufactured in such Government plants.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to submit annually to the Bureau of the Budget estimates for the construction of the foregoing vessels.

Sec. 3. The construction of the light cruisers and of the aircraft carrier herein authorized shall be subject to the limitations prescribed by the treaty limiting naval armament, ratified August 17, 1923, so long as such treaty shall remain effective.

Sec. 4. In the event of an international agreement, which the President is requested to encourage, for the further limitation of naval armament, to which the United States is signatory, the President is hereby authorized and empowered to suspend in whole or in part any of the naval construction authorized under this Act.

Sec. 5. That the Congress favors a treaty or treaties with all of the principal maritime nations regulating the conduct of belligerents and neutrals in war at sea, including the inviolability of private property thereon.

That such treaties be negotiated, if practically possible, prior to the meeting of the conference on the limitation of armaments in 1931.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to present to Congress on or before December 10, 1929, preliminary plans, specifications, and estimates of cost for the construction of two salvage vessels for use in ship disasters.

The Senate's amendments to the Bill were agreed to by the House of Representatives on the 7th February; and the Bill was signed by

President Coolidge on the 13th. Financial provision for starting work on the new ships by the dates laid down in the new law was made forthwith.

(e) THE RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE
GENERAL TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR

In a previous section,¹ some account has been given of the negotiations which ended in the signature of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War on the 27th August, 1928, and of the steps which were taken forthwith to obtain the eventual adherence of forty-nine states in addition to the fifteen original parties. It has been noted that, by the terms of the treaty itself, these adherences could only take effect when the treaty came into force, and that in order to bring it into force the deposit of ratifications by all the fifteen original signatories was required. The most critical of these fifteen essential ratifications was that of the United States, and this for two reasons: first because, if the Government which had initiated the project of the treaty and had been chiefly instrumental in carrying it through to the point of signature, now failed to ratify their own handiwork, this would be the most severe blow that the cause of the treaty could well receive; secondly because there was a pronounced and widespread hesitation among the Latin-American states to commit themselves to eventual adherence before the question of ratification had been disposed of in the United States, for fear that the United States, while ratifying, might make some reservation or declaration regarding the Monroe Doctrine of which the Latin-Americans might disapprove. At the same time, the United States ratification was perhaps the most doubtful of the necessary fifteen owing to the constitutional arrangement in the United States under which the treaty-making power was divided between the Senate and the President. While the President could negotiate and sign a treaty, through his Secretary of State, without the Senate having power to interfere, he had to obtain the previous concurrence of the Senate before proceeding from signature to ratification; and, since there was no constitutional machinery for producing a decision if a deadlock should occur at this stage, there was always a possibility that treaties duly and even enthusiastically negotiated and signed by the Executive of the United States might fail to secure ratification.² The classic example of this had been the

¹ Sub-section (c) above.

² For a history of the treaty-making power in the United States since the inauguration of the Federal Constitution, see Charles P. Howland, *Survey of American Foreign Relations*, 1928 (published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York).

rejection by the Senate of the Versailles Treaty—for the reason that this treaty embodied the Covenant of the League of Nations—after President Wilson had taken as prominent a part in the negotiation and signature of that instrument as Mr. Kellogg's part in the negotiation and signature of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War nine years later. When the General Treaty came before the Senate, this precedent was in the minds of all observers; and on this analogy it seemed possible that the Senate, short of rejecting the treaty, might pass it subject to reservations of the kind that might dispose the Latin-American states to refrain from adhering; for it was recalled that the Versailles Treaty had had a fair prospect of being passed by the Senate with reservations if President Wilson had not announced in advance that he would not accept any reservations whatsoever.

On the 22nd November, 1928, it was rumoured that the three 'A. B. C.' states—Argentina, Brazil and Chile—had agreed to ignore the treaty altogether; and by the 4th December these three Latin-American Powers, together with Afghanistan and Iceland, were the only states, of those invited to adhere, which had not yet signified their intention to do so.¹ In the interval, President Coolidge had let it be known that, in his opinion, the treaty ought to be ratified without any reservations at all; and, in formally transmitting a copy of the treaty to the Senate on the 4th December (the day after the re-assembly of Congress) he was able to announce that an intention to adhere had been signified by forty-four out of forty-nine states invited, so that, counting in the fifteen original signatories, 'this new movement for world peace' had 'been endorsed by no fewer than fifty-nine of the sixty-four independent nations of the world entitled to participate in the present treaty'. In the same message, the President asked the Senate to 'take such action during the present session as to enable the United States to ratify the treaty before the expiration of' his 'term of office'.

The President's hands were strengthened by public opinion, which rose to the occasion. On the 7th December it was announced that private letters, dealing with the question of ratification and uniformly advocating it, were being received at the White House at the rate of two hundred a day and at the State Department at the rate of six hundred, and these figures were not surprising in view of the deep and widespread public interest which the question had been arousing. According to a report from one observer:

Nine leading organisations of women with an aggregate membership running into millions have been holding joint conferences in many of

¹ See the table on pp. 46-7 below.

the forty-eight States, primarily for the purpose of considering the Kellogg Treaty. Practically all these State conferences adopted resolutions asking for ratification without reservations. Among these organisations are such important bodies as the Young Women's Christian Association, the American Association of University Women, the National Federation of Women's Clubs, the National League of Women Voters, the National Council of Jewish Women, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Women's Council for Home and Foreign Missions. I attended two of these State conferences, in New York and New Jersey, and was astonished at the degree of enthusiasm and at the amount of accurate information displayed.¹

On the 17th December a petition asking for prompt ratification and bearing more than 180,000 signatures was brought to the White House by representatives of the Federal Council of Churches;² and throughout the time during which the treaty was before the Senate, this pressure of public opinion was maintained. During the last twenty-four hours before the Senate at length voted in favour of the treaty on the 15th January, 1929, petitions bearing some two million names were said to have been handed in; and the observer quoted above, writing on the day after the vote, recorded as follows:

The Senate's ratification of the Kellogg Pact coincided with, though it was not directly the result of, the greatest demonstration by peace forces in American history. About 1,000 women, leaders of peace activities in all parts of the United States, are now in Washington attending a conference on the cause and cure of war. Yesterday morning delegates from each State descended upon the senators from their own State and argued in favour of ratification. Thousands of resolutions and other endorsements of the treaty were laid before the senators by these visitors, and great bales of these documents were put into the official Senate record during the session which preceded the vote.³

This was the atmosphere in which the Senate conducted its deliberations.

These proceedings began with the appearance of Mr. Kellogg before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 7th and 11th December; and in the colloquies between the Secretary of State and individual members of the Committee at these two meetings⁴ most of the controversial points were brought out. On the question whether the terms of the treaty were affected by the previous correspondence between the eventual signatories, Mr. Kellogg expressed the opinion

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th December, 1928.

² Text of a public statement issued by the petitioners in *The United States Daily*, 18th December, 1928.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th January, 1929.

⁴ The transcript of these two hearings of Mr. Kellogg was made public by the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Borah, on the 28th December, 1928, and was published in *The United States Daily* on the 29th and 31st.

that there was nothing in any of these notes that was not contained, explicitly or implicitly, in the treaty itself; but he stated unequivocally that, if the previous correspondence did conflict with the treaty, the latter would prevail. On the question of self-defence, Mr. Kellogg declared that the right of self-defence was not limited to the defence of territory under the sovereignty of the state concerned, and that, under the treaty, each state would have the prerogative—or the responsibility—of judging for itself what action the right of self-defence covered and when it came into play, subject to the risk that this judgement might not be endorsed by the rest of the world.¹ On the question of the absence from the treaty of any specific mention of the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Kellogg submitted that to mention it specifically would have been superfluous, since the Monroe Doctrine itself was based specifically and exclusively upon the right of self-defence, and this right was covered already. On the question of the so-called 'British Monroe Doctrine' which had been postulated in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 19th May, 1928, Mr. Kellogg observed that 'the British Government put it solely on the ground of self-defense', that his own action in ignoring the British postulate had not committed him to acquiescing in it, and that 'if there was anything in that note contrary to the treaty they signed, it would not be a part of the treaty'. On the question of whether there was any obligation, legal or moral, upon the United States to go to war with a state that violated the treaty, Mr. Kellogg's answer was an emphatic negative.

On the 14th December, it was announced that the Committee had not yet agreed upon 'reporting out' the treaty to the Senate; and on

¹ This exceedingly important point in the interpretation of the treaty was brought out more clearly in these colloquies between Mr. Kellogg and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations than it had been before, as will appear from the following quotations:

'The United States must be judge . . . and it is answerable to the public opinion of the world if it is not an honest defense: that is all.' (Mr. Kellogg).

'I made up my mind that the only safe thing for any country to do was to judge for itself within its sovereign rights whether it was unjustly attacked and had a right to defend itself, and it must answer to the opinion of the world.' (Mr. Kellogg).

'If we construe the treaty in the way that we construe to be self-defense, we have got then to make our defense before the world as to whether or not it was self-defense.' (Mr. Borah).

The implication was that the sanction against abuses of the right of self-defence was identical with the general sanction against any breaches of the treaty, namely, the uncertainty as to how the other parties would act in the circumstances and the risk that they might regard the state concerned as having broken the treaty and might so consider themselves automatically released from their treaty obligation not to go to war with that particular state.

the same date two members of the Committee, Senators Moses and Reed, made public statements deprecating the approval of the treaty by the Senate without some kind of safeguarding resolution being passed simultaneously. On the same date, Senator Borah issued a statement defending the treaty against certain indictments that had been made by a distinguished American Professor of international law, Dr. Philip M. Brown; and President Coolidge let it be known that he regarded the project of a safeguarding resolution by the Senate with disfavour. On the 17th December, the Senate Committee had before it the following resolution, introduced by Senator Moses on his own and Senator Reed's behalf:

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States declares that in advising and consenting to the multilateral treaty it does so with the understanding—

- (1) That the treaty imposes no obligation on the United States to resort to coercive or punitive measures against any offending nation.
- (2) That the treaty does not impose any limitations upon the Monroe Doctrine or the traditional policies of the United States.
- (3) That the treaty does not impair the right of the United States to defend its territory, possessions, trade, or interests.
- (4) That the treaty does not obligate the United States to the conditions of any treaty to which the United States is not a party.¹

On the 18th the Committee, by fourteen votes to two, ordered a report to the Senate recommending ratification of the treaty, and at the same time authorized a report without recommendations on Senator Moses's resolution as amended in the following form:

Resolved that the Senate of the United States declares that in advising and consenting to the multilateral treaty it does so with the understanding:

1. That the treaty does not impair or abridge the right of the United States to defend its territory or other vital interests in accordance with the traditional American policies:
2. That the treaty imposes no obligation on the United States to resort to coercive or punitive measures against any offending nation:
3. That the treaty does not obligate the United States to the conditions of any treaty to which the United States is not a party;
4. The Secretary of State is requested to forward a copy of this resolution to the representatives of the other powers.²

Senator Borah duly presented the two reports on the 19th; and on the 20th, as has been recorded elsewhere,³ the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to begin concurrent consideration of the treaty and the Naval Construction Bill when Congress reassembled on the

¹ *The United States Daily*, 18th December, 1928.

² *Ibid.*, 20th December, 1928.

³ See p. 33 above.

3rd January, 1929, after the Christmas recess. It has also been mentioned that on the 2nd January, 1929, on the eve of the re-assembly of Congress, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Borah, and the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Mr. Hale, agreed that consideration of the treaty should come first. Accordingly, on the 3rd January, 1929, after a further resolution on the treaty had been introduced by Senator Blaine,¹ and after Senator Hale had delivered a speech introducing the Naval Construction Bill, the latter Senator yielded the floor to Mr. Borah. It was noteworthy that, in pursuance of a unanimous consent agreement made just before the Christmas recess, the Senate departed from its usual custom when treaties were being considered and debated the Treaty for the Renunciation of War in open session.

The debate began with a speech by Senator Borah which lasted for two days (the 3rd and 4th January) and which was so frequently interrupted—with the speaker's own consent—that it almost turned from a speech into a series of colloquies. In this way, the Senate threshed out with Senator Borah the several points that its Committee had taken up with Mr. Kellogg on the 7th and 11th December; and Senator Borah answered the same questions and dealt with the same objections on substantially the same lines as the Secretary of State; but there was also a positive side to Senator Borah's speech which may be indicated by the following quotations:

If Senators will read this treaty, and take the treaty for what it says and not what it has been asserted that it says, they will come to the conclusion that there is just one fundamental principle in the treaty, and that is a solemn pledge upon the part of these nations, representing now practically all the inhabitants of the earth, that they will not seek other methods than peaceful methods for the settlement of their controversies.

It may be said that that is not much. I think it is a stupendous fact. I think the fact that sixty nations, representing the inhabitants of the earth, can be drawn together in a solemn pledge, backed by the conscience and the moral forces of their people, that henceforth they will pursue no course save that of peace, is a stupendous fact. We have been so thoroughly saturated, however, with the idea that there is nothing in international affairs save force, that we can give no credence to anything save that which is backed by an army and a navy.

I undertake to assert that the greatest factor in international affairs to-day is the moral forces of the masses of mankind; and this is an attempt to mobilize those forces. . . .

¹ To the effect that the Senate, in consenting to the treaty, should do so with the understanding that Paragraph 10 of the British note of the 19th May, 1928 (the so-called 'British Monroe Doctrine'), should not imply any admission of any reserve made in connexion therewith. (This resolution was brought up again, in a revised form, on the 8th January, 1929.)

Self-preservation has become the one powerful function for this treaty. The war system is undermining civilisation, bringing ruin and misery to millions, and the only hope is the policy embodied in this treaty. Here is the strength and the worth and the function for this treaty. Sink or swim, live or die, something like this treaty is the only way to escape from the impending doom.

Senator Borah's claim that the treaty was an expression of the opinion and the conscience of Mankind was reiterated on the 8th January by Senator Wagner in a speech advocating the passage of the treaty without reservations.¹ On the other hand, Senator Reed, one of the leaders of the opposition to the treaty, devoted a large part of his speech on the 11th January, 1929, to an argument that 'the general opinion of Mankind' was a myth and that the public opinion of individual nations was as often as not ineffective.

Meanwhile, those opponents of the treaty who were also supporters of the Naval Construction Bill began to fear that the latter might have to be postponed to a subsequent session if the debate on the treaty were to be prolonged by intransigence on their part; and they threw out a suggestion that the interpretations of the treaty which had already been made orally by Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Borah might be embodied in a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations. This suggestion, as far as it went, was not objected to either by Mr. Borah or by Mr. Kellogg; and on the 8th January Senator Moses put it forward in the Senate as one of four acceptable alternatives;² but he went on to demand that the report should not only be read into the Congressional Record, but should also be made known to the signa-

¹ Senator Wagner opened his speech on the 8th January, 1929, as follows:

'Mr. President, if the general treaty for the renunciation of war is an indication of what we may expect in the future, then we are on the threshold of a very interesting change in the conduct of international affairs. Apparently the treaty-making power, long the special prerogative of diplomats, is passing under popular control. The management of foreign relations was even in the United States clothed with secrecy and entrusted exclusively to the President and the Senate. But there is no doubt that the general treaty for the renunciation of war is a popular document and not a diplomatic arrangement. The idea of renunciation had its official origin in a public address. It was saved from discard by the public press. The negotiations have always responded to popular pressure and public desire. Here, at last, we have a treaty which may be said to have its birth in popular initiative and its approval in a popular referendum. The so-called diplomatic channels served in this instance their literal purpose as conduits of communication between the peace-loving peoples of the several nations.'

² His first alternative was the passage of formal reservations by the Senate which would require the assent of the other signatories upon exchange of ratifications; the second an interpretative resolution from the Senate which would be transmitted to the other signatories; the third an interpretative note to the other signatories from the Secretary of State.

tory Powers. It appears that this rider to the original suggestion was communicated on the same day by Mr. Borah to Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg, and was rejected by them forthwith.¹ Accordingly, the debate continued; but a rapidly growing desire for a compromise was now becoming apparent on both sides. On the 10th January Senator Borah, while refusing to consider anything that would change or modify the treaty or would have the effect of a reservation, again asseverated, and this time in public, his willingness that the Foreign Relations Committee should present a report, though always on the understanding that the Senate should not either adopt the report or recommend its transmission by the Secretary of State to foreign Governments. On the 11th Senator Moses was rumoured to have abandoned his insistence upon reservations, and Senator Reed to be weakening; but on the 12th January a 'round robin', affirming a belief in 'the purposes and objectives' of the treaty, but also a belief that, 'to avoid reservations, the Foreign Relations Committee should report its official interpretation',² obtained twenty signatures out of the thirty-two which would be sufficient to prevent Mr. Borah from obtaining the two-thirds majority required for ratification. On the 14th Mr. Reed moved formally for a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations in a resolution which was silent on the question of what was to be done with the report if and when it was presented; but it was agreed in advance that such report should neither be adopted by the Senate nor be communicated to foreign Governments nor have the effect of changing or modifying the treaty or making a reservation or reservations.³ On this understanding, Mr. Borah undertook to present the report, while in return Mr. Reed refrained from pressing his resolution to a vote and undertook, together with his associates, to vote for the treaty. This arrangement made it certain that the treaty would go through, and it did so next day.

¹ For the whole history of this transaction, see statements made by Mr. Borah and Mr. Reed in the Senate on the 14th January, 1929.

² The text of this 'round robin' was read out in the Senate by Senator Bingham on the 14th January. On this occasion Senator Bingham stated that the 'round robin' had been signed by twenty-five Senators and adhered to by others.

³ This last understanding was affirmed by Senator Reed in the Senate on the 14th January and was embodied in the concluding paragraph of the report as it was presented on the 15th January, 1929. On the same occasion, Senator Reed stated that he and Senator Moses had obtained pledges from all Senators, except a few absentees, not to move any resolution on a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations if such report were to be presented. According to Senator Reed, these pledges had been obtained 'a very few hours' after objection had been taken (by the Executive) to Senator Moses's suggestion of the 8th January.

The most important passages in the report, as presented, were the following:

Your Committee on Foreign Relations reports favorably the treaty signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, popularly called the multilateral or Kellogg-Briand treaty. . . .

The treaty in brief pledges the nations bound by the same not to resort to war in the settlement of their international controversies save in bona fide self-defense, and never to seek settlement of such controversies except through pacific means. It is hoped and believed that the treaty will serve to bring about a sincere effort upon the part of the nations to put aside war and to employ peaceful methods in their dealing with each other.

The committee reports the above treaty with the understanding that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same.

The United States regards the Monroe doctrine as a part of its national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe doctrine which is a part of our system of national defense. . . .¹

The committee further understands that the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty or any nation adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against the nation violating the treaty. The effect of the violation of the treaty is to relieve the other signers of the treaty from any obligation under it with the nation thus violating the same.

In other words, the treaty does not, either expressly or impliedly, contemplate the use of force or coercive measures for its enforcement as against any nation violating it. It is a voluntary pledge upon the part of each nation that it will not have recourse to war except in self-defense, and that it will not seek settlement of its international controversies except through pacific means. And if a nation sees proper to disregard the treaty and violate the same, the effect of such action is to take it from under the benefits of the treaty and to relieve the other nations from any treaty relationship with the said power.

This treaty in no respect changes or qualifies our present position or relation to any pact or treaty existing between other nations or governments.

¹ The passage omitted here contains quotations from President Monroe's message of the 2nd December, 1823; from President Cleveland's message of the 17th December, 1925; from a speech by Mr. Elihu Root in July 1914; and from a speech by Professor Theodore Woolsey in June 1914. These quotations were incorporated in the report in order to show 'the true interpretation of the Monroe doctrine as it has always been maintained and interpreted by the United States'.

This report is made solely for the purpose of putting upon record what your committee understands to be the true interpretation of the treaty, and not in any sense for the purpose or with the design of modifying or changing the treaty in any way or effectuating a reservation or reservations to the same.

When the Senate met on the 15th January, 1929, Senator Blaine's resolution was rejected, Senator Moses's resolution was withdrawn, the report from the Committee on Foreign Relations was duly presented, and in return the treaty was duly approved by the Senate by eighty-five votes to one, the solitary adverse vote being cast by Mr. Blaine. On behalf of eight out of nine Senators not voting, it was announced in the Senate, during the roll-call, that they would have voted in favour of the treaty if they had not been unavoidably absent.¹

Accordingly, on the 17th January, 1929, the instrument of ratification of the treaty was signed on behalf of the United States by President Coolidge and by Mr. Kellogg. On this occasion it was announced that the United States was the first of the fifteen signatories of the 27th August, 1928, to ratify the treaty; but that notifications of adherence had already been formally ratified by thirteen of the forty-nine other states that had been invited to adhere,² while no less than thirty-four of the remaining thirty-six had intimated their intention to adhere. Thus, by this date, only two out of sixty-four states which had been invited at some stage and in some form to become parties to the treaty had taken no action. These two states were Argentina and Brazil;³ and it was to be presumed that the uncertainty whether the United States would ratify with or without reservations—an uncertainty which had continued up to the 14th January—was one of the considerations that had prompted these two Governments to hold their hand.

¹ On the same date the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs rejected a resolution, which on the 21st December, 1928, it had agreed to consider, for advocating 'early ratification' of the treaty and for expressing the willingness of the House to participate in the formulation and enactment of legislation to that effect. The resolution was held to infringe the prerogatives of the Senate and to be obnoxious to the parliamentary practice of Congress.

² Only five of these thirteen states had completed their adherence by the formal act of deposit (see the table on pp. 46-7 below). Under the terms of the treaty itself, these adherences would not take effect until the treaty came into force as between the fifteen original signatories, that is, until ratifications had been deposited by the other fourteen parties in addition to the United States.

³ Chile's notification of her intention to adhere was announced by Mr. Kellogg on the 12th January, 1929.

*General Treaty for the Renunciation of War: Position on the 24th July, 1929,
regarding Ratifications and Adherences.*

<i>States which signed the Treaty on the 27th August, 1928.</i>	<i>Ratification.</i>	<i>Deposit of Ratifica- tion at Washington.</i>
Australia	(1) 7 Feb. 1929 ¹	2 Mar. 1929
Belgium	13 Mar. 1929	27 Mar. 1929
Canada	22 Feb. 1929	2 Mar. 1929
Czechoslovakia	before 13 Feb. 1929	2 Mar. 1929
France	1 Mar. 1929	22 Apr. 1929
Germany	6 Feb. 1929	2 Mar. 1929
Great Britain ²	—	2 Mar. 1929
India	—	2 Mar. 1929
Irish Free State	22 Feb. 1929	2 Mar. 1929
Italy	16 Feb. 1929	2 Mar. 1929
Japan	27 June, 1929	24 July, 1929
New Zealand	—	2 Mar. 1929
Poland	7 Feb. 1929	25 Mar. 1929
Union of S. Africa	28 Jan. 1929 ³	2 Mar. 1929
United States of America	17 Jan. 1929	[17 Jan. 1929]

<i>States invited on the 27th August, 1928, to adhere to the Treaty.</i>	<i>Notification of intention to adhere.</i>	<i>Ratification.</i>	<i>Deposit of adherence.</i>
Abyssinia	before 5 Sept. 1928	—	4 Dec. 1928 before 17 Jan. 1929
Afghanistan	?	—	—
Albania	before 10 Sept. 1928	17 Dec. 1928	13 Feb. 1929
Argentina	—	—	—
Austria	before 29 Aug. 1928	28 Nov. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929
Bolivia	27 Aug. 1928	—	—
Brazil	—	—	—
Bulgaria	before 6 Sept. 1928	?	before 24 July, 1929
Chile	5 Sept. 1928	—	—
China	12 Sept. 1928	before 28 Feb. 1929	8 May, 1929
Colombia	28 Aug. 1928	—	—
Costa Rica	before 29 Aug. 1928	—	—
Cuba	28 Aug. 1928	12 Dec. 1928	6 Mar. 1929
Denmark	before 29 Aug. 1928	? 2 Mar. 1929	27 Mar. 1929
Dominican Republic	before 29 Aug. 1928	—	12 Nov. 1928
Ecuador	8 Nov. 1928	—	—
Egypt	before 4 Sept. 1928	?	before 2 Mar. 1929
Estonia	before 4 Sept. 1928	8 Feb. 1929	before 24 July, 1929

¹ Date of issue of Order in Council asking the King to ratify the treaty in respect of the Australian Commonwealth.

² On the 28th January the Foreign Secretary informed the House of Commons at Westminster that the treaty would not be submitted to Parliament for ratification, but that the instrument of ratification would be deposited at Washington as soon as the approval of the Dominions had been received.

³ Date of approval of the treaty by the South African House of Assembly.

<i>States invited on the 27th August, 1928, to adhere to the Treaty.</i>	<i>Notification of intention to adhere.</i>	<i>Ratification.</i>	<i>Deposit of adherence.</i>
Finland	before 31 Aug. 1928	?	before 24 July, 1929
Greece	before 6 Sept. 1928	14 Feb. 1929	—
Guatemala	before 7 Sept. 1928	?	1 July, 1929
Haiti	26 Sept. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929	—
Honduras	before 5 Sept. 1928	before 24 July, 1929	—
Hungary	6 Oct. 1928	27 June, 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Iceland	before 17 Jan. 1929	before 16 May, 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Jugoslavia	before 31 Aug. 1928	28 Jan. 1929	20 Feb. 1929
Latvia	before 1 Sept. 1928	12 Feb. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Liberia	27 Aug. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929	before 2 Mar. 1929
Lithuania	before 8 Sept. 1928	22 Jan. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Luxembourg	before 31 Aug. 1928	—	—
Mexico	14 Sept. 1928	—	—
Netherlands	31 Aug. 1928	? before 26 Apr. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Nicaragua	before 7 Sept. 1928	?	17 April, 1929
Norway	before 17 Sept. 1928	15 Feb. 1929	26 Mar. 1929
Panama	before 1 Sept. 1928	14 Dec. 1928	18 Jan. 1929
Paraguay	12 Nov. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929	—
Persia	before 6 Oct. 1928	before 24 July, 1929	—
Peru	29 Aug. 1928	?	before 24 July, 1929
Portugal	before 4 Sept. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929	before 3 Mar. 1929
Rumania	4 Sept. 1928	? 1 Feb. 1929	23 Mar. 1929
Salvador	19 Sept. 1928	—	—
Siam	18 Sept. 1928	before 17 Jan. 1929	before 2 Mar. 1929
Spain	11 Sept. 1928	19 Feb. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Sweden	before 4 Sept. 1928	before 18 Mar. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Switzerland	before 1 Sept. 1928	before 24 July, 1929	—
Turkey	before 8 Sept. 1928	19 Jan. 1929	before 24 July, 1929
Uruguay	7 Sept. 1928	—	—
U.S.S.R.	31 Aug. 1928	—	1 Oct. 1928
Venezuela	before 4 Sept. 1928	?	before 24 July, 1929

(ii) The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.**(a) THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION FROM APRIL 1927
TO SEPTEMBER 1928.**

In the preceding volume of the *Survey*¹ the record of the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has been carried down to April 1927, when the third session of the Commission—having failed in its efforts to combine into a single text the two draft conventions for the limitation of armaments presented by the British and French delegations respectively—came to an inconclusive end.

The virtual breakdown of the Preparatory Commission in April 1927 marked the end of an attempt to find a solution for the problem of disarmament in isolation from the problems of arbitration and security. The Commission did not meet again before the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations opened on the 5th September, 1927; and it was significant that one of the most striking features of the discussions in the Assembly was the emphasis which was once more laid on the interdependence of arbitration, security and disarmament. A resolution suggesting that the time had come to resume a study of the principles expressed in the so-called 'Geneva Protocol' which had been adopted by the Fifth Assembly in 1924² was submitted to the Eighth Assembly by the Netherlands delegation and was referred by the Assembly to its Third Committee.³ The debates on this resolution in the Third Committee⁴ gave an opportunity to certain devoted supporters of the Geneva Protocol to express their belief that the Protocol and nothing but the Protocol would give sufficient guarantees of security to justify disarmament. Monsieur Paul-Boncour (France), the leading exponent of this point of view, put forward a proposal in which a revival of the Geneva Protocol was suggested as the most preferable of three possible methods of bringing the question of security within the province of the Preparatory Commission. This idea, however, of taking the Geneva Protocol as the

¹ *Survey for 1927*, Part I, Section (ii).

² See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I A, Section (v) for the negotiations which led up to the adoption by the Fifth Assembly of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in which, for the first time, disarmament was linked up with arbitration and security. For the rejection of the Protocol by the British Empire at the beginning of 1925, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Section (i).

³ For this incident see also the present volume, p. 15 above.

⁴ See the Minutes of the Third Committee of the Eighth Assembly (*League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 57).

basis of a fresh discussion seemed to some at least of Monsieur Paul-Boncour's fellow delegates not to take sufficient account of the developments in the European situation since the time when the Protocol had been drafted. Moreover, it was clear that an attempt to resuscitate the Protocol could only be successful if the representatives of the British Empire were prepared to withdraw their opposition; but before the Third Committee began work Sir Austen Chamberlain had made a declaration which left no possible doubt that the attitude of Mr. Baldwin's Government had not changed. In a notable speech before the Assembly on the 10th September Sir Austen Chamberlain had defended his Government against the charge of obstructing the movement for disarmament and security and had stated in unmistakable terms that the obligations accepted by Great Britain at the Locarno Conference represented a limit beyond which the British Government could not go.

The explicit refusal of the British Government to give any further guarantees of security meant, in practice, that any scheme on the lines of the Geneva Protocol was foredoomed to failure, and Monsieur Paul-Boncour therefore seemed to be leading a forlorn hope.¹ There remained, however, the widespread feeling that it was useless to expect states to disarm until they deemed themselves secure, and that it was therefore useless to discuss disarmament without exploring simultaneously all possible means of guaranteeing security. The debate turned less on the general question whether security must precede disarmament or *vice versa*, than on the practical point of whether or not a sufficient degree of security had already been attained to justify a first step towards disarmament. While Monsieur Paul-Boncour advocated the postponement of further discussion on disarmament until an ideal degree of security had been attained, the opposite point of view was forcibly put by the German delegate, Count Bernstorff. In urging the Third Committee to propose to the Assembly the convocation of the Disarmament Conference in the course of the next twelve months, Count Bernstorff was on strong ground. Germany was not only effectively disarmed; the German Government had also, on their own initiative, agreed to 'outlaw war' between Germany and her neighbours. Further they had signified their intention of adhering to the 'optional clause' of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and thus accepting

¹ Monsieur Paul-Boncour recognized, apparently, that it was useless to look for British acceptance of the Protocol but took the view that British support could be dispensed with, at any rate for a time. (See the report of an interview given by him to the Paris press at the end of November 1927, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 1st December, 1927).

compulsory arbitration for legal disputes with those states which had accepted the same obligation—an intention which was duly carried out on the 23rd September, 1927, before the Eighth Assembly dissolved. The German Government, therefore, felt that they had done all that lay in their power to contribute towards the security of Europe and that the time had come for other Powers to redeem the pledge, made at the time of the Peace Settlement, that the compulsory disarmament of Germany was to be merely the prelude to general disarmament.¹ The German argument carried the greater weight owing to general recognition of the certainty that Germany would eventually claim the right to re-arm herself if the Powers which had imposed disarmament upon her did not carry out their part of the bargain.²

The Third Committee of the Eighth Assembly succeeded ultimately in combining the proposals of the Dutch, French and German delegates into a single resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly on the 26th September, 1927.³ By this resolution the Assembly declared its conviction that the principal condition of success for the work of disarmament was that

every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments, but should be able to rely also on the organised collective action of the League of Nations ;

¹ The preamble to Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) of the Versailles Treaty ran as follows: 'In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.' The Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (16th June, 1919), contained the following comment on the military clauses of the Treaty: 'The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about. . . .'

² In certain quarters unfriendly to Germany, the persistence with which Count Bernstorff pleaded for an early convocation of the Disarmament Conference as a practical proof of the intention of the Powers to fulfil their pledge was interpreted as an indication that the German Government were anxious to force the pace less in the interests of disarmament than in the hope that a premature Disarmament Conference would fail to achieve its purpose and that its breakdown would set Germany free to re-arm (see for instance, an article by 'Pertinax' in the *Echo de Paris*, quoted by *Le Temps*, 25th March, 1928). Allegations of this kind were denied, with some heat, by Herr Stresemann in a speech at the end of March 1928.

³ For the declaration prohibiting wars of aggression adopted by the Eighth Assembly on the proposal of the Polish delegation, see the present volume, p. 14 above. The Assembly also adopted a number of other resolutions dealing with special aspects of the questions of arbitration, security and disarmament.

recommended

the progressive extension of arbitration by means of special or collective agreements, including agreements between States Members and non-Members of the League of Nations, so as to extend to all countries the mutual confidence essential to the complete success of the Conference on the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments;

and requested the Council

to urge the Preparatory Commission to hasten the completion of its technical work and to convene the Conference on the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments immediately this work has been completed.

The Council was also asked

to give the Preparatory Commission, whose task will not be confined to the preparation of an initial Conference on the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, and whose work must continue until the final goal has been achieved, the necessary instructions for the creation without delay of a Committee consisting of representatives of all the States which have seats on the Commission and are Members of the League of Nations, other States represented on the Commission being invited to sit on it if they so desire.

This Committee would be placed at the Commission's disposal and its duty would be to consider, on the lines indicated by the Commission, the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement.

The compromise represented by this resolution was generally welcomed, for it appeared to offer a way out of the deadlock which had arisen in April 1927. The request to the Preparatory Commission to 'hasten its technical work' with a view to the early convocation of the Disarmament Conference went some way to meet the German demand that disarmament should not be held up indefinitely pending the search for absolute security; and at the same time the recommendation for the appointment of a Committee on Arbitration and Security made it certain that the relation between disarmament and security would not be overlooked.

The Council took the necessary action on the Assembly resolution on the 27th and 28th September, 1927, and on the 30th November, 1927, the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission opened at Geneva.¹ The meeting was attended by delegates from twenty-three countries, including the United States and the U.S.S.R.² The Soviet

¹ The minutes of the fourth session are printed in League of Nations Document C. 667. M. 225. 1927. ix.

² When the Preparatory Commission was set up in December 1925 nineteen states had been invited to serve—the ten members of the Council (France,

Government had informed the Secretariat of the League of Nations, at the end of October, that they proposed to send a representative to the next meeting of the Commission, since a settlement had now been reached of the Soviet-Swiss dispute over the murder of Monsieur Vorovsky at the Lausanne Conference in 1923, and the reason which had hitherto prevented Russian delegates from attending meetings on Swiss soil had therefore ceased to exist.¹ On the agenda for the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission there figured only two items—the examination of the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council regarding arbitration, security and disarmament, and the consideration of the progress of the Commission's work. In France the hope was expressed that the Commission would confine itself to the purely formal tasks of appointing the Committee on Arbitration and Security and recording progress and would then adjourn and leave the new committee in possession of the field. The announcement that a Russian delegation would be present, however, made it appear likely that a general debate on disarmament would be initiated, and this impression was confirmed when the Russian press, about a week before the meeting was due to begin, made public the intention of the Russian delegation to submit proposals for universal complete disarmament. Moreover, on the 12th November the German delegate, Count Bernstorff, had written to Jonkheer Loudon, the President of the Commission, requesting him to give an opportunity for a general discussion. To French eyes there appeared to be a danger that the Russian and German delegations would co-operate to force the pace; and fears on this score were not allayed by the news that the Russian delegation had visited Berlin on the way to Geneva, and that Count Bernstorff had had an interview with Monsieur Litvinov, the principal Russian delegate, before the Commission met.

Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay), the three principal non-members of the League (the United States, Germany and the U.S.S.R.) and six states specially interested in disarmament (Bulgaria, Finland, Jugoslavia, the Netherlands, Poland and Rumania). In March 1926 the Council decided to send special invitations to Argentina and Chile to serve on the committee and both states accepted. The states which retired from the Council in September 1926 and September 1927 respectively were invited to continue to serve, and those which joined the Council also became members. Canada, China, Colombia and Cuba were added when they became members of the Council, and Greece was also invited to send a representative in 1927. Salvador, which served on the Council for the year 1926-7, declined the invitation to remain in the Commission, and neither Spain nor Brazil sent delegates after the Seventh Assembly of September 1926.

¹ For the settlement of the Russo-Swiss dispute see the *Survey for 1927*, Part II E, Section (vi).

At the first meeting on the 30th November, Jonkheer Loudon acceded to Count Bernstorff's request and gave an opening for a general discussion, but the only delegation which seemed anxious to avail itself of the opportunity was the Russian. Monsieur Litvinov read a long statement which opened with an attack on the 'capitalist' Powers and the League of Nations for having failed to advance disarmament by a single step, and went on to propose the immediate and total abolition of all armies, navies and air forces, the sinking of all warships, the scrapping of all war material and the demolition of all arms factories. In case these proposals should be rejected, Monsieur Litvinov explained, he had come prepared with a plan for complete disarmament by gradual stages during a period of four years, and he moved a resolution proposing that the Commission should proceed at once to work out a draft convention on the basis of his plan and should summon the Disarmament Conference to consider it in March 1928.¹

As was to be expected, Monsieur Litvinov's fellow-delegates did not welcome the idea of devoting themselves immediately to a detailed examination of his plan, and he was finally induced to agree to a postponement of the discussion until the next meeting. While some members of the Commission might be prepared to pay lip-service to the ideal of complete universal disarmament, the Russian plan was hardly likely to commend itself as a practical solution of the difficulties with which the League of Nations had been contending since its foundation. In point of fact, the general opinion both of the delegates at Geneva and of the public in the countries which they represented seems to have been that no one would have been more surprised than Monsieur Litvinov had his proposals been taken seriously, and that the Soviet Government's main object in putting forward their plan had been to discredit the League of Nations and the 'capitalist' Powers in the eyes of the 'proletariat'.²

On the afternoon of the 30th November the Preparatory Commis-

¹ Monsieur Litvinov supplemented his statement by a memorandum illustrating the losses caused by the War of 1914-18 and the growth of armaments since the War (the text is printed as an annex to the minutes of the Fourth Session of the Commission in League of Nations Document C. 667. M. 225. 1927. ix).

² *The Manchester Guardian* pointed out, however (see the issue of the 1st December, 1927), that even if the Soviet Government were acting mainly from ulterior motives, there was no reason to doubt the sincerity of their desire for disarmament. The Soviet Government's plan of action was to promote revolution, by means, not of armed force, but of propaganda, and since they professed constant alarm at the danger of attack from other Powers, they would appear to have little to lose and much to gain from general disarmament.

sion proceeded to constitute the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Monsieur Litvinov announced that the Soviet Government wished to be represented on the new committee only by an observer, and the American delegate also notified the Commission that his Government did not feel able to join in the discussions on security. With these two exceptions, the membership of the Security Committee—the activities of which are recorded elsewhere in the present volume¹—was identical with that of the Preparatory Commission itself. On the 1st and 2nd December, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission met as members of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, and on the 3rd December the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission was brought to an end.

At the third and last meeting on the 3rd December the underlying issue of priority as between security and disarmament came to the front for a moment, when the Commission had to fix the date of its next session. The Committee on Arbitration and Security had provisionally settled on the 20th February, 1928, as the date of its next meeting. Monsieur Litvinov proposed that the Preparatory Commission should assemble on the 10th January, and he made this proposal in the form of a resolution which declared that 'the uninterrupted continuance of direct work on the question of disarmament . . . can by no means be made dependent upon the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and its results'. Count Bernstorff supported the proposal for an early meeting of the Commission, though he dissociated himself from the actual terms of Monsieur Litvinov's resolution, on the ground that it was incompatible with the Eighth Assembly's resolution. The Swedish delegate also showed some anxiety lest disarmament work should be suspended indefinitely while the search for security was in progress. Monsieur Paul-Boncour made an eloquent speech in defence of the opposite point of view—that the Preparatory Commission must await the results of the Security Committee's labours before it could make any progress itself. It was finally decided that the Security Committee should assemble on the 20th February and the Preparatory Commission on the 15th March, 1928.²

The Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission duly opened on the 15th March and closed on the 24th March. Its members included, for the first time, a Turkish delegate, Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ, and thus the

¹ Section (iii) of this part.

² Monsieur Litvinov continued to protest against the postponement, but Count Bernstorff accepted it, after the President had assured him that the delay did not necessarily mean that the Disarmament Conference would not be able to meet before the end of 1928.

three principal states which were not members of the League—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Turkey—were all represented.¹

The Commission disposed rapidly of the first item on its agenda—consideration of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security—by adopting, with Monsieur Litvinov's as the only dissentient voice,² a resolution expressing satisfaction at the results obtained and approval of the general spirit in which the committee was carrying out its work.³ It then proceeded to discuss the Russian proposals for universal complete disarmament by stages, which had now been elaborated in the form of a draft convention of 63 articles.⁴ Monsieur Litvinov opened the debate by a long speech in support of his Government's proposals, at the conclusion of which he asked that the other members of the Commission should state, before proceeding to a detailed examination of the draft convention, whether they were or were not prepared to accept the principle of complete general disarmament and 'so to carry out the first stage of disarmament as to make the conduct of war, if not an absolute impossibility, of extreme difficulty in a year's time'. Thereupon, nineteen delegates rose one after the other and replied to Monsieur Litvinov's questions with a degree of unanimity which was not often attained at meetings of the Preparatory Commission. The speeches varied from cautious indications that certain points in the Russian draft might be worth consideration but that the scheme as a whole was too far-reaching to be practicable, to direct attacks upon the motives which were believed to have prompted the Soviet Government's action. One of the most outspoken of the delegates was Lord Cushendun (Great Britain) who drew the conclusion that the main object of the proposals was to wreck the League of Nations and remarked that the Soviet Government's own policy would be the greatest obstacle to the carrying out

¹ There was a difference of opinion between the Russian and Polish delegates as to which of them could claim credit for the suggestion that Turkey should be invited to send a delegate.

² Monsieur Litvinov objected to the regional treaties of security which the committee had drafted as resembling too closely the old system of treaties of alliance.

³ It may be noted that thirteen out of the twenty-three delegates who approved this resolution had also sat as members of the Security Committee. Eight states sent different representatives to the second session of the Security Committee and the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, and three states represented on the Preparatory Commission (the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Turkey) were not members of the Security Committee. Turkey, however, was invited to join the Security Committee and accepted the invitation.

⁴ The text is printed as an annex to the minutes of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission (League of Nations Document C. 165. M. 50. 1928. ix).

of their scheme. The debate lasted through several meetings of the Commission, and on the 22nd March Monsieur Litvinov replied to the criticisms which had been made in a conciliatory speech, declaring himself ready to accept amendments in detail if only the Commission would accept the principle of total disarmament. On the following day, however, he announced that, since it was clear that the underlying principles of his original proposals were unacceptable, he would withdraw them and substitute a plan (which he had ready in his pocket)¹ for the gradual reduction of armaments. This new plan proposed to divide states into categories according to the magnitude of their forces, and to reduce armaments, within a limited period, on scales varying with the categories. Monsieur Litvinov desired that the Commission should proceed at once to examine his new scheme, but on this point also opinion was overwhelmingly against him. In the resolution adopted (with the Russian and German delegates abstaining)² at the closing meeting on the 24th March, the Commission noted 'that the immense majority of its members are of opinion' that the draft convention for immediate, complete and general disarmament submitted by the U.S.S.R. 'cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out', and reserved for consideration at its next session the new draft convention submitted by the Russian delegation—commending it, in the meantime, to the attention of Governments.³

Apart from the Russian proposals, the main interest of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission centred round the question of a second reading of the document, somewhat euphemistically known as a draft convention for the limitation of armaments,⁴ which had been the outcome of the Commission's discussions in March and April 1927. In this document the Commission, far from presenting a single agreed text of a convention, 'had marked the points on which unanimity was obtained with or without reservations, placed side by

¹ This plan was also drawn up in the form of a draft convention. The text is printed as an annex to the minutes of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission.

² For the reason for Count Berustorff's opposition to the resolution see p. 58 below.

³ The Commission also reserved for consideration and commended to the attention of Governments a proposal, submitted by the German delegate at the beginning of the session, for elaborating methods of obtaining information regarding armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant.

⁴ The text is printed as an annex to the minutes of the third session of the Preparatory Commission (League of Nations Document C. 310. M. 109. 1927. ix).

side the texts on which agreement had not yet been established, and noted the statements and proposals on which unanimity was not reached but which the delegates who made them expressly wished to keep until the second reading.'¹ It was therefore less a draft agreement than a record of different points of view, and it was clear that to proceed with a second reading would merely be to reopen the controversy on such matters as the inclusion of trained reserves in calculations of military forces and the method of reckoning tonnage for the purpose of limiting naval armaments, unless some means had been found, in the interval, of bridging the gulf between the conflicting opinions held, especially by France and Great Britain, on these and other points.

In bringing the third session of the Commission to an end on the 26th April, 1927, the President, Jonkheer Loudon, had referred to the necessity for 'negotiations and exchange of views between the various Foreign Offices' in preparation for a fresh attempt to draw up a single text of a convention. During a meeting of the Third Committee of the Eighth Assembly in the following September he had again suggested that further progress would be impossible 'until an exchange of views between those Governments whose opinions were the most strongly opposed pointed to an agreement or a compromise'.

In opening the fifth session on the 15th March, 1928, Jonkheer Loudon complained that he did not know whether the Governments concerned had responded to his appeals to settle their differences out of court, and he asked for information on this point. The second reading of the draft convention could have been taken at this session in connexion with the consideration of the Commission's work which appeared as the third item on the agenda, but Jonkheer Loudon made it clear that he did not intend the draft convention to be discussed unless the private conversations which he had recommended had taken place and had produced satisfactory results. The German delegate, Count Bernstorff, however, followed his usual policy of pressing on every possible occasion for some definite step in advance, and he insisted that the Commission was under an obligation to give the draft convention a second reading at once, regardless of any private negotiations which might be in progress. In his view, the differences which had prevented the Commission from agreeing were mainly political, and it should be the function of the Disarmament Conference, not of the Preparatory Commission, to find a solution for them. Count Bernstorff's move led the French representative, Count Clauzel (who was replacing Monsieur Paul-Boncour at this session),

¹ Statement by Jonkheer Loudon at the closing meeting of the third session.

to respond to the invitation extended by Jonkheer Loudon at the opening meeting. On the 22nd March, Count Clauzel recommended the postponement of the second reading of the draft convention and supported his argument by a reference to certain 'useful conversations' on 'delicate questions' which had been proceeding between technical experts and which (he hoped) would soon lead to 'appreciable results'. The fact that such conversations were in progress was confirmed by Lord Cushendun on the following day.¹

Count Bernstorff continued to urge that the Commission should not yet again 'pass a resolution to do nothing and go home', and he proposed that the Commission should recommend the Council to convene the Disarmament Conference before the next session of the League Assembly. The majority of the members of the Commission, however, were clearly anxious to avoid discussing any draft conventions, whether their own or the Russian, at this session, nor were they disposed to commit themselves to a definite programme for the future. By the resolution finally adopted, by a majority vote, on the 24th March, the Commission decided 'to leave its President free to fix, according to circumstances, the date at which it would be practically useful to convene a new session of the Commission in order to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments'. As a concession to the German point of view, a sentence was added expressing 'the hope that the new session should begin at the earliest suitable date, if possible before the next session of the Assembly'.

The hope thus expressed was not fulfilled, and the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission was the last before the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations opened on the 3rd September, 1928. In the interval, however, the general situation had changed, as the result of certain important events which are recorded elsewhere in the present volume. The 'Kellogg Pact', providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, had been signed in Paris on the 27th August; and the German Foreign Minister, Herr Stresemann, had used the opportunity afforded by the ceremony of signature to raise the question of the evacuation of the Rhineland—a question which, in certain French minds at all events, was intimately bound up with security and therefore with disarmament. Moreover, the

¹ The progress and outcome of these conversations are dealt with separately below in sub-section (b). Neither Count Clauzel nor Lord Cushendun made it clear on this occasion that the negotiations in progress were purely Anglo-French, but rather implied that the conversations were general. It was the Italian delegation's denial of all knowledge of such private negotiations which elicited Lord Cushendun's confirmatory statement.

conversations to which Count Clauzel had referred at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission on the 22nd March, 1928, had resulted in an 'Anglo-French compromise' on certain naval questions; and although the terms of this compromise had not yet been published officially, its possible implications were beginning to cause widespread concern.

The influence of these developments on the general international situation was reflected in the debates which took place in the plenary sessions of the Ninth Assembly and in the meetings of the Third Committee. The speech of Herr Müller, the head of the German delegation, in the Assembly on the 7th September, on the theme of Germany's right to expect general disarmament, and the reply of Monsieur Briand on the 10th September, will be dealt with in a subsequent volume.¹ Monsieur Briand took the Assembly by surprise by departing from his usual conciliatory tone towards Germany, but Monsieur Paul-Boncour, when the question of fixing a date for the Disarmament Conference came up for discussion in the Third Committee, showed himself readier than usual to meet German views. Count Bernstorff proposed that the date of the Conference should be fixed definitely for some time in 1929. Monsieur Paul-Boncour was now prepared to admit that present conditions of security were such as to allow of a first step towards disarmament,² and he expressed the hope that it might be possible to convene the Disarmament Conference during 1929; but he differed from Count Bernstorff in still thinking it essential for the difficulties which had hampered the Commission's work to be settled before the Disarmament Conference assembled. He therefore proposed that an appeal should be made to Governments to seek agreed solutions which would enable the work of the Preparatory Commission to be resumed and brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The opposition to the German proposal for fixing the date of the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission and of the Disarmament Conference was led on this occasion, not by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, but by Lord Cushendun.³ After a long and

¹ The most important passages from these speeches are reprinted in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume.

² In addition to the signature of the 'Kellogg Pact' the Committee on Arbitration and Security had been continuing its labours and had produced certain practical results which were before the Assembly for consideration (see Section (iii) below).

³ See the present volume p. 80 below for Lord Cushendun's attitude to a proposal made by Jonkheer Loudon that he, as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, should invite representatives of the principal naval Powers to confer with him in order to find a basis on which the Preparatory Commission might continue its labours.

confused debate, the Third Committee finally agreed to submit to the Assembly a resolution which made the date of the Commission's next meeting dependent on the outcome of negotiations between the Powers, but contemplated that the meeting should take place not later than the beginning of 1929. Count Bernstorff opposed this resolution on the ground that it left the door open for further delays, and he was supported by the representative of another compulsorily disarmed state, Hungary. The German and Hungarian delegates abstained from voting on the resolution in the plenary session of the Assembly, on the 22nd September, and explained their reasons for abstention. With these two exceptions, the states represented in the Assembly accepted the resolution in the following form:

Whereas a close connection exists between international security and the reduction and limitation of armaments;

And whereas the present conditions of security set up by the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the Treaties of Peace, and in particular by the reductions in the armaments of certain countries under these Treaties, and also by the Locarno Agreements, would allow of the conclusion at the present time of a first General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments;

And whereas those Governments which consider that their security is not sufficiently assured are now, thanks to the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, in possession of fresh means for strengthening their security, of which it is to be hoped that they will make use at need, by having recourse to the good offices of the Council;

And whereas the Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments will increase international security;

And whereas it is desirable that the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and of the Committee on Arbitration and Security shall be pursued so that, by further steps, armaments may be progressively reduced as the increase of security allows;

The Assembly:

Urges the necessity of accomplishing the first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments with as little delay as possible;

Notes with satisfaction the efforts of certain Governments to prepare the ground for the future work of the Preparatory Commission;

Earnestly hopes that Governments among which differences of opinion still subsist as to the conditions for the reduction and limitation of armaments will seek, without delay, in the most liberal spirit of conciliation and international solidarity, agreed solutions which will enable the work of the Preparatory Commission to be brought to a successful issue;

Proposes to the Council that the President of the Preparatory Commission be instructed to keep in contact with the Governments concerned so that he may be apprised of the progress of their negotiations and may be able to convene the Commission at the end of the present year, or, in any case, at the beginning of 1929.

(b) THE ANGLO-FRENCH COMPROMISE ON THE LIMITATION
OF ARMAMENTS¹

The compromise on the limitation of armaments which was agreed upon between the French and the British Governments in the summer of 1928² originated in an attempt to find a way out of a deadlock in the proceedings of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. This deadlock had occurred during the third session of the Preparatory Commission (21st March–26th April, 1927);³ and in his closing speech the President, Jonkheer Loudon (Netherlands), had suggested that the next step should be 'negotiations and exchange of views between the various Foreign Offices' with a view to 'drawing up, at the second reading, a single text of a draft disarmament convention'.⁴ In making this suggestion, Jonkheer Loudon seems to have been expressing the general sense of the Commission; for on the 23rd March, 1928, during the fifth session, Mr. Gibson, the representative of the United States, reminded his colleagues that, 'at the conclusion of the first reading, there were so many points of disagreement that we felt that nothing further could be accomplished in public meetings until after an effort had been made by direct negotiation between the various Governments and between groups of Governments to find a way, through mutual concession, to eliminate existing divergences.' The unsuccessful Three-Power Naval Conference which sat at Geneva from the 20th June to the 4th August, 1927,⁵ was in effect, if not in form, an attempt to move forward on these lines. Another attempt was

¹ This compromise—which was embodied in a British note of the 28th June, 1928, a French note of the 20th July, 1928, and a British note of the 28th July, 1928—came to be known as 'the Anglo-French naval compromise'; but this popular description of it was inadequate, since the compromise covered the important question of trained reserves in land armies as well as certain naval questions. It should be noted that the terms of the compromise were not to come into force, as between France and Great Britain, in virtue of the compromise itself, but were to be submitted, by the two parties, to the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference—and this only in the event of their having received the previous approbation of the United States, Japan and Italy.

² The principal documents will be found in the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928 and in the French Blue Book 'Limitation des Armements Navals' of 1928. The texts of certain documents and speeches are also reprinted in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume.

³ For the work of the Preparatory Commission down to and including the third session, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part I, Section (ii); for its subsequent work down to the end of the fifth session (15th March–24th March, 1928) see the present volume, Section (ii) (a) of this part.

⁴ See p. 57 above and *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 16.

⁵ For the history of the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part I, Section (iv).

made—likewise without success—in the Anglo-French negotiations which resulted in the compromise of June and July 1928. These Anglo-French negotiations were in origin a direct response to Jonkheer Loudon's appeal, since the immediate cause of the deadlock on the Preparatory Commission had been a failure to reconcile the British and French theses on two questions of capital importance: first whether trained reserves as well as peace strengths were to be taken into account in reckoning the strengths of land armies; and, second, whether naval strengths were to be reckoned by total tonnage or by categories of vessels.¹ In the event, the French and British Governments succeeded in working out a compromise which bridged the gulf by which their representatives at the third session of the Preparatory Commission had found themselves divided; but this achievement, so far from facilitating progress towards the limitation of armaments, resulted in a serious set-back to the cause; for the terms of the compromise, when they were divulged, proved unacceptable not only to the Governments of two out of the three remaining naval Powers, that is, the United States and Italy, but also to public opinion in these two countries as well as in Germany and in Great Britain. This disapproval, which rendered the compromise abortive, was to be explained partly by the assumptions of principle which underlay the Anglo-French negotiations, and partly by the circumstances in which the Three-Power Naval Conference between Great Britain, the United States and Japan broke down in the interval between the close of the third session of the Preparatory Commission on the 26th April, 1927, and the achievement of the Anglo-French compromise in June and July 1928.

The underlying assumptions in the minds of French and British negotiators were set forth in retrospect, during a debate in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 29th March, 1928, by Lord Cecil, who, at the third session of the Preparatory Commission, had been the British representative.

Broadly speaking, the view I take—I may have been entirely wrong—and the view I took at the time was that in matters of the Army it was necessarily the big military nations that were principally concerned. In matters of the Navy it was necessarily the big naval and maritime nations that were principally concerned. And, whereas I thought it was reasonable that we should do our best to meet the views of the big military nations on military matters, I thought they also ought to do their best to meet our views on the naval questions. That was the broad line which seemed to me to be a reasonable line to take.

¹ For the history of the Anglo-French controversies over these two points on the Preparatory Commission, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part I, Section (ii).

It was undoubtedly true that, in the attempt to secure agreed limitation of armaments on land, the great military Powers were the parties whose concurrence was indispensable, and, similarly, the great naval Powers when it was a question of securing agreed limitation of armaments on sea. Their concurrence was more important than that of lesser Powers because they were able, far more effectively than lesser Powers, to obstruct the general progress towards limitation of armaments along any lines that did not happen to commend themselves to their statesmen or their experts; but this undoubted fact that the big naval and military Powers were the chief potential obstructors of the limitation of armaments was not tantamount to the proposition that they 'were principally concerned'. On the contrary, it might be argued that the countries principally concerned in the limitation of land armaments were countries like Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria which, after their forcible disarmament in the Peace Settlement of 1919-20, found themselves living virtually defenceless in the midst of heavily armed neighbours; and that those principally concerned in the limitation of naval armaments were countries like China, who at that time was unable to prevent foreign warships from proceeding, at will, many hundred miles up her chief navigable river. With still greater force, it might be argued that the limitation of armaments was the concern of all states equally, since all alike would suffer from the calamity of another war, though by *force majeure* it lay in the hands of the big naval and military Powers to determine whether and on what terms the limitation of armaments should be achieved. The assumption, however, that ability to obstruct a movement was the true measure of concern in that movement seems to have been implicit in these Anglo-French negotiations from the outset and to have been largely responsible for leading them to an outcome which other parties were unwilling to accept. For, on this assumption, the satisfaction of the military and naval Great Powers' desires became an end in itself instead of a mere means of removing an obstacle in the way of the general limitation of armaments; and Jonkheer Loudon's suggestion became (no doubt contrary to the intention of its author) an invitation to pairs or groups of Great Powers to strike mutually satisfactory bargains with one another which might open the way to a general limitation of armaments on the basis of an actual increase, instead of a reduction, in the general level. In other words, in these Anglo-French negotiations the ultimate purpose of an international limitation of armaments seems to have been obscured and even stultified by a misconception regarding certain of the means; and it was a sense

of this miscarriage that caused the Anglo-French compromise, when its terms became known, to be so ill-received by public opinion.

Nevertheless, public opinion might have been overridden, as had sometimes happened before, and the compromise might have been brought into effect, if the desires of all the Governments of all the military and naval Great Powers had been satisfied by it. In fact, however, it was a compromise between only two out of the five Powers which 'were principally concerned', even on the assumption above mentioned; and while one of the other three was apparently indifferent, the two remaining Powers, namely the United States and Italy, were decidedly opposed to the terms of this Anglo-French provisional agreement.

During the fifteen months which had elapsed between Jonkheer Loudon's suggestion of the 26th April, 1927, and the completion of the Anglo-French compromise in July 1928, the Three-Power Naval Conference of the 20th June-4th August, 1927, had tried and failed to reconcile the respective desires of Great Britain, Japan and the United States; and, on one of the principal points on which an Anglo-American compromise had proved impossible in 1927—namely, the classification of cruisers for purposes of limitation—the Anglo-French compromise of 1928 substantially reproduced the British desideratum. As the United States Government expressed it in a note of the 28th September, 1928, in which they informed the British Government that they found the Anglo-French compromise unacceptable, 'this same [British] proposal is now presented in a new and even more objectionable form. . . . This proposal is obviously incompatible with the American position at the Three-Power Conference. It is even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British delegation at that Conference.' The British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Cushendun, did indeed attempt in retrospect to demonstrate that 'the proposal in the [Anglo-French] compromise was not exactly what the United States had rejected';¹ but it required an expert as well as a benevolent eye to distinguish between these fine shades; and public opinion in the United States was impressed by the broad fact that a British desideratum which had been emphatically rejected by the United States reappeared within less than a year, substantially unchanged, as one of the terms of an understanding between Great Britain and France. On the British Government's part it might be pointed out

¹ See his speech in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 7th November, 1928. Compare Mr. Bridgeman's speech in the House of Commons on the 13th November, 1928.

that the Anglo-French compromise was the outcome of events which were anterior not only to the breakdown of the Three-Power Naval Conference, but to its inception; that no secret had been made of the fact that the Anglo-French negotiations out of which the compromise eventually arose were taking place; and that, as soon as the compromise had been completed, the terms of it had been communicated to the American, Italian and Japanese Governments. Notwithstanding these considerations, the substantial identity of one of the terms of the Anglo-French compromise of 1928 with one of the British proposals which had been rejected by the American delegation at Geneva in 1927 produced an impression in the United States that the British Government, having failed single-handed, and in direct negotiations, to induce the United States Government to fall in with their desires on this particular matter, had returned to the charge and attempted to secure their object in a roundabout way by enlisting, for a consideration, the support of the French Government and then confronting the United States Government with the *fait accompli* of an Anglo-French understanding. This feeling that the British Government had sought in some sense to obtain from the United States Government by diplomatic pressure a concession which they had previously failed to obtain by direct and free negotiation was sufficient to condemn the Anglo-French compromise in American eyes; and this American condemnation doomed it to sterility.

It remains to trace the process through which the Anglo-French compromise took shape, and to record the history of its subsequent rejection.

How soon after Jonkheer Loudon's suggestion of the 26th April, 1927, the Anglo-French negotiations began was not clear at the time of writing (March 1929). It was not clear, for example, whether any Anglo-French exchanges of views at all had taken place between April 1927 and the breakdown of the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva on the 4th August, 1927. The earliest exchange of views of which there was public knowledge was a conversation between the Chief of the French Naval Staff and the naval expert on the British delegation at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission, which was held at Geneva from the 30th November to the 3rd December, 1927.¹ The next publicly recorded step was a discussion into which Sir Austen Chamberlain, at Lord Cushendun's suggestion,

¹ This conversation is mentioned in a despatch of the 31st December, 1927, from Monsieur Briand to the French Ambassador at Washington, which is printed in the French Blue Book, pp. 33-5. The fourth session of the Preparatory Commission is dealt with in the present volume, Section (ii) (a) of this part.

entered with Monsieur Briand on the 9th March, 1928, with reference to the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, which was due to begin on the 15th.¹ By this time the question whether cruisers should be treated, for purposes of limitation, as a single category of vessel, or should be divided into two sub-categories, had already arisen, between Great Britain and the United States, in an acute form, had been the principal single factor in the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, and had presumably thereafter continued to be one of the chief preoccupations of the British Admiralty. This preoccupation was manifest in the following proposals, drawn up by the Admiralty, which were communicated, on the 9th March, 1928, by Sir Austen Chamberlain to Monsieur Briand:

Limitation to be effected by classes as follows:

1. Capital ships.
2. Aircraft carriers.
3. Cruisers between 10,000 and 7,000 tons.
4. Surface vessels under 7,000 tons.
5. Submarines.
6. Small vessels exempt from limitation.

States would be allowed to transfer tonnage from a higher into a lower category in all classes, excluding 1 and 2, subject to there being a limit to the proportion of total tonnage which might be utilised for submarines.

States with a total tonnage, including class 6, not exceeding 80,000 tons to be subject to no classification.²

In these proposals, the standpoint of the British delegation at the third session of the Preparatory Commission was certainly modified in the direction of the French suggestions of the 6th April, 1927;³ but an equally conspicuous feature was the reappearance, substantially without modification, of that British proposal for the division of cruisers into two sub-categories which had meanwhile proved unacceptable to the American delegation at the Three-Power Naval Conference of the 20th June–4th August, 1927. The other noteworthy feature in Sir Austen Chamberlain's representations to Monsieur Briand on this occasion, as summarized in the British official record, was the form of his proposals; for already, at this tentative stage, these proposals were cast in the form of a bargain between the two Powers concerned.

Public opinion realised that concessions were necessary from all parties for a general settlement to be reached, and if he could point to

¹ British official record of this conversation in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 17.

² Text in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 17, foot-note; French translation in French Blue Book, p. 36.

³ For this French 'compromise' or 'proposition transactionnelle' of the 6th April, 1927, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 15–16.

a concession by the French in naval matters it would probably acquiesce in his yielding a point on the military side. On the other hand, we could not abandon the British standpoint on the question of army reserves unless we could justify this concession by pointing to a similar concession made to us in the naval sphere.¹

‘Monsieur Briand asked for a personal copy of the revised Admiralty proposals . . . and said that he would put them before the French naval authorities’;² and in fact, during the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, which lasted from the 15th to the 24th March, 1928,³ these British naval proposals, in the setting of an Anglo-French naval and military bargain, were the subject of informal exchanges of views between the French and British naval and military experts.

In the opening speech which he delivered on the 15th March, the President of the Preparatory Commission, Jonkheer Loudon, renewed his former appeal in the following words:

In regard to the third point on our agenda—the progress of the work of the Preparatory Commission—I have no fresh information to give you. I deeply regret that it should be so, for I would have wished to be able to say that we are in a position to continue our work effectively. I am faced with this difficulty, that I do not know whether the Governments—which I fervently appealed to more than once at our previous meetings to seek to reconcile their different standpoints in regard to certain questions of primary importance to our draft Convention—have been engaged in conversations, or what may have been the result of such conversations. I shall be grateful if the representatives of those Governments are able to give us some information on the matter.

The exchanges of views between the experts which actually took place during this session were described by the British delegate, Lord Cushendun, a few days after the end of the session, in the following terms:

What did happen, not with ourselves alone but with other nationalities, was that the technical experts met, some of them in Paris, some at Geneva and some, I believe, actually between those two places in the train. These representatives, as my noble friend knows, are always meeting out at Geneva in a social way. They meet at the luncheon table and the dinner table and on the golf course, and there is constant conversation and talk going on between them. To use a very ordinary expression, they are always talking ‘shop’. ‘Shop’, to them, consists in the various points of agreement or disagreement that have arisen at the various Conferences they have attended, and in that sense the conversations which took place, I am told, although I have had nothing to do with them myself, at Paris and in the drawing-rooms elsewhere,

¹ Extract from the official record in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 17.

² *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

³ For this session see the present volume, Section (ii) (a) of this part.

were with a view to a better understanding of the particular points on which, as my noble friend knows very well, there has up to now been an unfortunate disagreement with regard to disarmament.

I do not want my noble friend to take the idea . . . that it was mainly, or entirely, with ourselves that this conversation took place, or that it was on matters dealing only with the Navy. I think quite as important a point, and one which was quite as much discussed, had nothing to do with the Navy at all, but was as to a reduction of land forces, a point with which my noble friend is very familiar.¹

At a meeting of the Commission on the 22nd March, a public reference to these discussions between the experts was made by the French delegate, Count Clauzel:

While we have been holding these very interesting political discussions, the technical experts of most of our delegations have had a certain amount of leisure which they have turned to good account. They have entered into or continued useful conversations dealing with the treatment of some of these delicate questions to which I have alluded and for which only partial solutions had been found; we hope that some final settlement will be reached as speedily as possible. One of the conditions of such settlement and one of the main conditions of success is an exchange of views not only between technical experts but between Governments. I am glad to say that we are far advanced along this path and that there is no occasion to anticipate any very long delay before we arrive at appreciable results.

Count Clauzel's announcement was publicly confirmed by Lord Cushendun next day, with the reservation that any conversations that might be going on in which Great Britain was concerned were not in his hands personally, and that therefore he was not in a position to give any definite information, and in fact did not possess any very definite information, as to the precise stage which these conversations had reached.

These conversations between experts in March 1928 did not result in an unqualified acceptance by the French experts of the British Admiralty proposals which Sir Austen Chamberlain had communicated to Monsieur Briand; but early in June 1928 the French naval expert, Commandant Deleuze, acting on his own initiative² in conversation with Vice-Admiral Kelly at Geneva, made a suggestion out of which a formula acceptable to both parties emerged.

The suggestion [was] that the only surface vessels subject to limitation should be those mounting a gun of greater calibre than 6-inch. This

¹ Statement by Lord Cushendun in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 29th March, 1928, in reply to Lord Cecil.

² The fact that Commandant Deleuze acted on his own initiative is explicitly stated in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 21, foot-note, as well as in the French Blue Book, p. 45, foot-note.

would produce a classification for the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament as follows:

- (a) Capital ships.
- (b) Aircraft carriers.
- (c) Surface vessels of 10,000 tons and under mounting a gun above 6-inch.
- (d) Submarines.¹

With the approval of the two Governments, this suggestion seems to have been examined in a meeting at Paris between a representative of the British Admiralty and the Chief of the French Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Violette, to their mutual satisfaction ;² and this understanding between the two Admiralties provided the basis for a provisional agreement between the two Governments which was embodied in three documents: a British note of the 28th June, 1928 ; a French note of the 20th July ;³ and a British note of the 28th July.

The elements of the compromise embodied in these notes were as follows:

First, the two Governments agreed provisionally, as between themselves, upon the following formula for the limitation of naval armaments:

Limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of warships:

- (1) Capital ships, i. e. ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than 8-inch calibre.
- (2) Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.
- (3) Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch calibre.
- (4) Ocean-going submarines, i. e. over 600 tons.

The Washington Treaty regulates limitations in classes (1) and (2), and the Disarmament Conference will only have to consider the method of extending these limitations to Powers non-signatory to this treaty.

As regards classes (3) and (4), the final Disarmament Conference will fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers which no Power will be allowed to exceed for the total of vessels in each of these respective

¹ Instructions of the 26th June, 1928, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to the British Ambassador in Paris (printed in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 20-1).

² See a statement by the French Minister of Marine, Monsieur Leygues, as reported in *The Times* of the 1st September, 1928. It is not clear whether the meeting referred to in this statement was identical with the meeting between Vice-Admiral Kelly and Vice-Admiral Violette referred to in Monsieur Briand's note of the 20th July, 1928 ; nor, again, is it clear from this note whether the meeting to which it refers took place before or after the presentation of the British note of the 28th June, 1928.

³ This note seems to have been based on instructions given by the Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale at a meeting held on the 13th July, 1928. (*Communiqué* from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in *Le Temps*, 2nd August, 1928).

categories during the period covered by the convention. Within this maximum limit each Power will at the final conference indicate for each of these categories the tonnage they propose to reach and which they undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the convention.¹

Secondly, the two Governments agreed, on Monsieur Briand's suggestion, that the text of this formula should be communicated to the Governments of the other three naval Great Powers: the United States, Japan and Italy.

Thirdly, the British Government, on their own initiative, declared that the adoption of Commandant Deleuze's formula, which they acknowledged to be a concession to their views on naval classification, would enable them to meet the French Government by withdrawing their opposition to the French standpoint in regard to army-trained reserves.

The last paragraph of the French note of the 20th July, 1928, amounted to a suggestion for including a fourth point in the compromise; for, after declaring his conviction that the concerted action of France and Great Britain would enable the two Governments to obtain, for the Anglo-French formula of naval limitation, the approval of 'the naval Powers concerned', Monsieur Briand declared that

Whatever the result, and even should this hope prove illusory, the two Governments would, none the less, be under the urgent obligation to concert either to ensure success by other means or to adopt a common policy so as to deal with the difficulties which would inevitably arise from a check to the work of the Preparatory Commission.

In regard to this paragraph in Monsieur Briand's note, Lord Cushendun stated in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 7th November, 1928, that it had been deliberately left unanswered by the British Government, for the reason that 'it might appear to suggest something in the nature of a closer political alliance, a formal political alliance, rather than a mere attitude of friendliness or entente which existed between the two countries'. On this occasion, Lord Cushendun added that 'His Majesty's Government thought that their silence would be perfectly understood in that matter and he did not doubt that it had been understood'.

On the 30th July, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain announced in the

¹ It should be noted that the formula, in this definitive form, embodied two supplementary proposals which were put forward by the French Government in their note of the 20th July, 1928, and were accepted by the British Government in their note of the 28th July, 1928, 'namely, that an equal maximum tonnage for submarines and cruisers should be fixed for the great naval Powers, and that submarines should be divided into two classes, the smaller class being exempt from all limitation.'

House of Commons at Westminster that conversations with the French, with a view to reducing the difference of view that had emerged in the Preparatory Commission, had been successful; that he was about to communicate the compromise to the other principal naval Powers; and that, until that had been done, he did not like to say more about the proposals which the compromise embodied. The text of the Anglo-French naval formula, but not the fact of the contingent British acquiescence in the French standpoint regarding army-trained reserves, was duly communicated to the American, Japanese and Italian Governments in an identical telegram of the 30th July, 1928, from the Foreign Office in Whitehall.¹ The same ground was covered in instructions sent from the Quai d'Orsay to the French Embassies in Washington, Tokio and Rome.² Pending the receipt of official replies from these three quarters the terms of the compromise were withheld from publication, so that the bare fact of its existence was the only thing about it that was public knowledge. Public opinion, however, not only in the United States and Italy, but also in Germany and Great Britain, was immediately thrown into a state of alarm by the 'far-reaching importance'³ which was promptly attributed to the compromise in the French Press; and the British Government found themselves quickly driven to make public apologies for a transaction of which the terms were still an official secret.

The alarm was sounded first in Germany. On the 4th August, 1928, the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed⁴ to Sir Austen Chamberlain that the German Government feared that the Franco-British naval compromise might 'imply some concession on the part of His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of the limitation of land forces'; and he asked whether he might assure the German Government that there was nothing in the compromise inconsistent with the Locarno Treaties. In authorizing Sir Horace Rumbold to give the proposed assurance, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that 'the text of the compromise itself' referred 'exclusively to naval limitation'; but he admitted the existence of 'an understanding with the French Government, made before the text of the compromise was

¹ Text in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 27-8.

² French Blue Book, Nos. 26-30 inclusive.

³ Phrase used by the British Ambassador in Berlin in a telegram of the 4th August, 1928, to Sir Austen Chamberlain (text in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 29). In the House of Lords at Westminster on the 7th November, 1928, Lord Cushendun declared, in retrospect, that, 'so far as he could trace it, the mischief began with perfectly unauthenticated statements made in certain French newspapers in August.'

⁴ Text of telegram in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 29.

actually drawn up'; and he communicated its terms, while hastening to add that 'no other engagement' had 'been assumed by either of the two Governments'.¹ In the same telegram, Sir Austen Chamberlain mentioned that this information had already been communicated to the United States *chargé d'affaires* in London; and five days later, on the 10th August, Lord Cushendun followed this communication up in a long explanatory telegram² to the British Embassy at Washington, emphasizing 'the fact that this Anglo-French agreement' was 'not a treaty or even a final binding agreement in regard to naval disarmament', and representing that a view expressed in the American press—to the effect 'that this naval agreement with the French represents a bargain, one part of which is that His Majesty's Government agree to support the contention of the French Government in the matter of trained reserves'—was founded on a misapprehension. These protestations were repeated by Lord Cushendun on the 30th August, 1928, during a session of the League of Nations Council at Geneva. Meanwhile, it had been assumed with some displeasure in the Italian press and with some gratification in the French press, but with equal conviction in both quarters, that an avowed Anglo-French agreement on naval limitation implied a tacit Anglo-French agreement for naval cooperation;³ and this point was also taken up by Lord Cushendun in his apologia to his colleagues on the Council.

Speculations as to secret clauses and so forth have no foundation whatever. I see it suggested, for instance, that we were going to arrange for pooling our navy with the French. There is absolutely nothing in any such suggestion nor is there anything at all in the shape of an agreed policy between ourselves and the French. It is not a question of policy. That has never been discussed. There are no secret clauses nor any arrangement as to an alliance or co-operation of navies. All that is absolutely beside the mark; nothing of the sort has ever been suggested.

From the British point of view, the reception given to the Anglo-French compromise—or rather to what was known or conjectured about the terms of the compromise—by French and Italian public opinion was chiefly important in consideration of its influence upon public opinion in the United States, where it was adding fuel to

¹ Text of Sir Austen Chamberlain's telegram of the 5th August, 1928, in *op. cit.*, pag. cit.

² Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 30–2.

³ See, for example, *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd August, 1928, for an extract from the *Giornale d'Italia* in which the Anglo-French 'naval compromise' was compared with the Anglo-French naval understanding *vis-à-vis* Germany before the War of 1914–18. See, again, *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th August, 1928, for a *résumé* of an article in *Les Débats* by a French authority on naval affairs, Monsieur R. la Bruyère.

flames that were already burning fiercely. In the United States, a strong and widespread hostility towards the Anglo-French compromise had rapidly declared itself, and this on several grounds.

In the first place it was suspected—though of course this was not ascertained beyond doubt until the texts of the principal documents became public—that the compromise involved the adherence of France (in return for value received in other coin) to the British desideratum regarding the division of cruisers into two sub-categories which had been rejected by the United States delegation at Geneva in 1927.

Secondly it was conjectured that, at any rate in French minds, this compromise with Great Britain was a first step towards a forthcoming attempt by France to get rid of the tonnage ratios for capital ships, established by the Washington Treaty of the 6th February, 1922,¹ when that treaty came up for revision in 1931. This conjecture had some justification in the actual terms of the compromise; for an eventual French demand for equality of maximum tonnage in capital ships with the three principal naval Powers would undoubtedly be strengthened by a previous understanding with one of those three Powers that there should be equality of maximum tonnage for all the naval Powers in 8-inch-gun cruisers and in submarines of over 600 tons. Moreover, the French press was chanting the death-knell of the Washington Treaty as one *motif* in its song of triumph over the compromise.²

Finally, American opinion was shocked by the unfortunate coincidence of dates between the negotiation of the Anglo-French compromise and the negotiation of the Kellogg Pact.³ Mr. Kellogg's suggestion, out of which the Pact arose, for giving Monsieur Briand's draft of a bilateral Franco-American treaty a multilateral application,⁴ had been made within a few weeks of the first publicly recorded conversations between the French and British naval experts—during the interval between the breakdown of the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva on the 4th August, 1927, and the end of the calendar year. Both of these approximately simultaneous steps might be regarded as attempts to make a fresh start in grappling with the problem which the Three-Power Naval Conference had failed to solve; and, to the American mind, the British Admiralty's endeavour to attain its old and rather narrow technical objective by

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part VI, Section (iv) (6).

² See for example a leading article, entitled 'Accord Naval', in *Le Temps*, 3rd August, 1928.

³ See the present volume, Section (i) of this part.

⁴ See p. 18 above.

new and apparently roundabout manœuvres presented a glaring contrast to Mr. Kellogg's endeavour to lift the whole problem of security and disarmament out of the technical rut by a large-minded and straightforward gesture. Again, all the time that Monsieur Briand was negotiating on Mr. Kellogg's suggestion with Mr. Kellogg in open court, he and the French naval experts proved to have been carrying on privately with Sir Austen Chamberlain and the British naval experts a series of technical negotiations which culminated in the Anglo-French naval compromise in June and July 1928—the very months that saw the successful conclusion of the Kellogg Pact. Monsieur Briand publicly issued his invitations for the signing of the Pact at Paris on the 27th July, 1928, one day before the signature of the note of the 28th July which completed the Anglo-French compromise; and Sir Austen Chamberlain announced the fact of the Anglo-French compromise on the 30th July in the same sitting of the House of Commons at Westminster in which he made his official statement on the Kellogg Pact after the acceptance of that instrument by His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain. These coincidences made a strong impression on the American mind, because they fitted in with the traditional American vision of a great gulf fixed between the Old World and the New—the Old World a 'City of Destruction' whose denizens were fast bound in the misery and iron of a Machiavellian 'Old Diplomacy', and the New World a 'City of God' where a Chosen People were assured of a happier dispensation so long as they kept clear of entanglements with their less fortunate European fellow-creatures. Mr. Kellogg's action in visiting the Irish Free State, but not Great Britain, on the occasion of his journey to Europe in order to sign the Peace Pact at Paris on the 27th August, 1928, was popularly interpreted as an intimation that in this matter American public opinion was in accord with the opinion of the Administration at Washington.

As for public opinion in Great Britain, it showed signs of increasing disquiet and dissatisfaction, and this on three grounds:¹ first on account of the unfavourable reception of the Anglo-French compromise by American public opinion at a time when Anglo-American relations were already a subject of considerable anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic; secondly, because it was feared that the effect, if not the intention, of the compromise might be to commit the British

¹ This unfavourable reaction of British public opinion towards the policy of the British Government in negotiating the Anglo-French compromise appears to have made an impression upon the minds of American observers, including Senator Borah.

Government to an appearance of acquiescence in the French system of continental military alliances for the forcible and perpetual maintenance of the dispensation of the four European Peace Treaties—a commitment from which British public opinion had consistently recoiled from the time of the Peace Settlement onwards; and thirdly because the texts of the documents in an admittedly important diplomatic transaction, to which His Majesty's Government in Great Britain were a party, remained unpublished.

Unfortunately, while these texts were still being withheld from publication officially on grounds of diplomatic propriety, they found their way, through irregular channels, into the public press. On the 22nd September, 1928, *The New York American*, an organ of the Hearst Press, published the text of a circular letter of the 3rd August, 1928, in which a *résumé* of the instructions regarding the Anglo-French compromise which the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given to the French Embassies at Washington, Tokio and Rome¹ had been subsequently communicated to other French diplomatic missions.² Thereafter, on the 26th September, the Foreign Office in Whitehall instructed the British Embassies at Washington, Tokio and Rome to communicate respectively to the American, Japanese and Italian Governments the texts of the three notes of the 28th June and the 20th and 28th July and to state that no other notes had been exchanged between the British and French Governments; but this communication was explicitly made in confidence and not for publication, and in the communication to Washington the word 'confidentially' was italicized.³ Thus these texts still remained unpublished when, on the 29th September, 1928, the American Ambassador made public the text of the reply to the British communication of the 30th July which he had delivered to the British Government on the preceding day. The French Government now pressed the British Government to consent to publish the three texts embodying the compromise forthwith, and further delay was deprecated in a leading article in *Le Temps* on the 30th September. According to a French semi-official statement issued on the 2nd October,⁴ the British Government on the 1st October were still objecting to publication until the Italian and Japanese Governments, which so far had only

¹ For these instructions see p. 71 above.

² The text of this circular letter is not reprinted in the French Blue Book, but the fact of its existence is recorded in a foot-note on page 50; and it was not denied that the version published in *The New York American* was a substantially complete and accurate English translation of a genuine French official document.

³ *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, p. 34.

⁴ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd October, 1928.

sent provisional replies, had made known their definitive points of view; but the French Government returned to the charge; and the question was settled by the publication (through channels unrevealed) of very full summaries of all three notes in the *Écho de Paris* of the 5th October, 1928. It was only after this that the principal documents relative to the whole course of the transaction were published officially in a British 'White Paper' and a French 'Blue Book'.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-French compromise had already been doomed to sterility by the official replies which the British and French Governments had received from the United States and Italy.

In the communication of the 28th September from the United States Embassy in London to the Foreign Office, which has been referred to above,¹ the discrepancy between the terms of the Anglo-French compromise and the American standpoint at the Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927 was pointed out; the reappearance of the British desideratum in regard to cruisers was commented upon in sentences which have been quoted at the beginning of this chapter; the Anglo-French proposals in regard to submarines were likewise rejected; the view was expressed that, 'if there' was 'to be further limitation upon the construction of war vessels so that competition in this regard between nations' might 'be stopped, it should include all classes of combatant vessels, submarines as well as surface vessels'. The crucial passage in the communication was the following:

The American Government seeks no special advantage on the sea, but clearly cannot permit itself to be placed in a position of manifest disadvantage. The American Government feels, furthermore, that the terms of the Anglo-French Draft Agreement, in leaving unlimited so large a tonnage and so many types of vessels, would actually tend to defeat the primary objective of any disarmament conference for the reduction or the limitation of armaments, in that it would not eliminate competition in naval armament and would not effect economy. For all these reasons the Government of the United States feels that no useful purpose would be served by accepting as a basis of discussion the Anglo-French proposal.

The American Government has no objection to any agreement between Great Britain and France which those countries think will be to their advantage and in the interest of limitation of armament, but naturally cannot consent that such an agreement should be applied to the United States.

This decision was supported by a reasoned *résumé* of American policy during and since the Washington Conference of 1921-2; but the

¹ The full text of this document is reprinted from *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 34-8, in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume of this *Survey*.

communication closed on a note, not of intransigence, but of exploration in search of some less unpromising line of advance.

The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval Powers, including those not represented at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva, and is willing to take into consideration in any conference the special needs of France, Italy or any other naval Power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defence. This could be accomplished by permitting any of the Powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes within the total tonnage, a certain percentage to be agreed upon. If there was an increase in one class of vessels it should be deducted from the tonnage to be used in other classes. A proposal along these lines made by Great Britain and discussed by the American and British representatives would be sympathetically considered by the United States. It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration for its own needs. Unfortunately, the Anglo-French Agreement appears to fulfil none of the conditions which to the American Government seem vital. It leaves unlimited a very large class of effective fighting ships, and this very fact would inevitably lead to a recrudescence of naval competition disastrous to national economy.

A note drafted in parallel terms was delivered on the same date by the American Embassy in Paris to Monsieur Briand.¹

The Italian Government replied to the French and British Governments—likewise in parallel terms—on the 6th October, 1928.² The reply began by referring to the passage in the British note of the 20th June, 1928, indicating 'that the adoption of the proposals in question [i. e. the 'Suggestion Deleuze'] would have permitted the British Government to give satisfaction to the French Government with regard to "trained reserves"'—a fact which had not been brought, or at any rate not officially, to the Italian Government's knowledge until the three notes embodying the Anglo-French compromise had been communicated to them by the British Embassy in Rome on the 27th September in accordance with the telegraphic instructions of the Foreign Office which have been mentioned above.³ The Italian

¹ Text in French Blue Book, pp. 62-5.

² The text of the Italian reply to the British Government is printed in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 39-43. The text of the Italian reply to the French Government will be found in the French Blue Book, pp. 66-8.

³ According to one Italian publicist, Signor Gayda, the French Ambassador in Rome was pressed by the Italian Government, on at least two occasions, between the original communication of the Anglo-French formula for naval limitation and the eventual communication of the texts of the three notes embodying the whole compromise, to declare whether other questions, concerning land armaments and of interest to Italy, had also been discussed; and on both occasions it was alleged that Monsieur de Beaumarchais had given a non-committal answer.

Government went on to declare that they could not concur in a separate discussion of the naval problem; that they could not consider the problem of disarmament as limited to certain states only; that as regarded land, naval and aerial disarmament, they were disposed *a priori* (as they had already declared elsewhere) to accept as the limits of their own armaments any figures, however low they might be, provided they were not exceeded by any other European continental Power; and that they considered that the most suitable means for the application of this principle, from the naval aspect, would be by the adoption of the formula of global limitation of tonnage, rather than the application of the formula of limitation by categories. The Italian reply also contained a geographical exposition of the special exigencies of Italy's national defence and a suggestion—not strictly relevant to the Anglo-French compromise—for delaying the several replacement programmes for capital ships which were authorized in the Washington Five-Power Treaty.¹

Of the three naval Powers to which the Anglo-French compromise was submitted by its authors, Japan alone 'accepted it in principle'² and expressed 'its concurrence to the purport of' it;³ but the tenour of the American and Italian replies was sufficient to render the labours of the French and British negotiators abortive.

The incident was closed by a final round of apologies, disclaimers and criticisms.

On the British Government's part, the Foreign Office in Whitehall on the 9th October addressed a recapitulatory and explanatory circular despatch to His Britannic Majesty's representatives in the capitals of all countries represented on the Preparatory Commission.⁴ On the 25th October, Lord Cushendun made a public speech in which he stated that 'there was no new entente with France, for the old one had never been dissolved'—a statement which was interpreted by his critics in Great Britain as a repudiation of the policy of Locarno. In answer to this criticism the Prime Minister made a statement of great importance in an address which he delivered on the 28th October in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the British League of Nations Union:

I must contradict the idea that has gained currency in some quarters, but for which there is no shadow of foundation, that we have to some

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part VI, Section (iv) (6).

² Note of the 7th September, 1928, handed by the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations to the French delegation (text in French Blue Book, p. 61).

³ Reply from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from the British Embassy at Tokio to the Foreign Office on the 29th September, 1928 (text in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 38-9).

⁴ Text in *Cmd.* 3211 of 1928, pp. 43-6.

extent abandoned our position of impartiality and conciliation which we assumed at the time of the Locarno Pact. That is not so. We have made no new engagements, there is no change in the orientation of our policy. Our interests and our inclinations alike prompt us to preserve and even strengthen the cordiality of our relations with Germany as well as with France. With Italy we have been on the most friendly terms for generations, and nothing has occurred or will occur to interrupt that friendship.

On the same occasion, the Prime Minister made the equally important declaration:

We have no intention of building in competition with the United States of America.

On the 31st October Lord Cushendun himself, in another speech, followed the Prime Minister's lead by declaring:

When I say we have still an entente with France, I should add that we also have an entente with Germany.

On the 5th November, the Anglo-French compromise was criticized in a public speech by Lord Grey of Fallodon with a studied moderation of language which did not detract from the severity of his strictures. He described the compromise as 'a very small thing' which had 'had the most tremendous consequences'; noted the impression created abroad that 'a new political entente so close as to be almost equivalent to an alliance' had 'been formed between Great Britain and France'; and, after accepting the account given by Lord Cushendun at Geneva on the 30th August¹ as the true one, he censured the British Government for having caused the truth to be obscured by their persistence in withholding the facts from publication.

We are still more concerned [he continued] to see the effect the Anglo-French Agreement has had in the United States. That really is the most disastrous consequence of all. The effect in the United States has really been to set back all further discussion of naval agreement, for a period, at any rate, to turn people's thoughts in the United States to the building of large cruisers, and to divert more attention to that than to the pact for the outlawry of war. That is a most disastrous consequence indeed. It has been produced by what seems to me the folly of the Anglo-French compromise.

Lord Cushendun replied to Lord Grey on the 7th November in a debate in the House of Lords at Westminster; and on the 13th November the policy of the Government was defended, in a debate in the House of Commons, by the Prime Minister in person as well as by the First Lord of the Admiralty. In these two debates,

¹ See p. 72 above.

certain interesting statements were made by Ministers with regard to the then existing situation. Mr. Bridgeman, for instance, stated explicitly that the Anglo-French compromise was 'dead'; and, in regard to the question of trained reserves, he no less explicitly endorsed Lord Cushendun's statement that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain 'were under no obligation on the matter and could, if they liked, alter their attitude and insist upon their own view'.

The official view in the United States, as held by President Coolidge, was announced by 'the White House Spokesman' in the following terms on the 23rd October:

It is not possible to say, now that the English and French naval correspondence has been published, whether any further naval limitation agreement can be reached before 1931. The President feels, however, that it would be fair to state that, so far as the United States is advised concerning the agreement made between France and England, it did not seem to advance the prospect of further agreements relative to naval armaments before 1931. The only advance that could be said to have been made was a certain change of attitude on the part of the French and British relative to limitations, but it was a change of attitude with which the United States was unable to agree.

Meanwhile this change of attitude on the part of the British and French Governments had definitely failed to effect its original purpose of enabling the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to extricate itself from the *impasse* into which it had fallen during its third session. On the 18th September, 1928, at Geneva, in the Third Committee of the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations,¹ Jonkheer Loudon suggested that, as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, he should invite the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States to appoint delegates to confer with him in Paris for the purpose of finding a basis on which the Preparatory Commission could continue its labours. Thereupon Monsieur Paul-Boncour submitted a draft resolution proposing that the Assembly should invite the Council to make an urgent appeal to the naval Powers to solve their difficulties, and expressing a desire that the final session of the Preparatory Commission should be held before the end of the calendar year or at latest at the beginning of 1929. At this point Lord Cushendun intervened in order to protest that the effect of Jonkheer Loudon's suggestion would be to anticipate the task of the Naval Conference which was due to meet at Washington in 1931; 'to express the opinion that the proposal was not at all likely to be accepted by any of the

¹ For the proceedings of this Committee, see also the present volume Section (ii) (a) of this part.

five Powers concerned'; and 'to state at once, anyhow, that one Power at least—he referred, of course, to the British Government—had grave doubts whether the proposal would be found acceptable'. Lord Cushendun's intervention led Jonkheer Loudon to waive his suggestion after explaining that he had been far from intending to produce the effect which Lord Cushendun prognosticated; and thus, paradoxically, the death-sentence upon the Anglo-French compromise was finally pronounced by a British statesman who had been one of its authors and its victims.

(iii) The Work of the League of Nations Security Commission (1927–8).

In the previous section of this part of the present volume,¹ it has been recorded that the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1927 suggested the appointment by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference of a sub-committee on Arbitration and Security, and that the Preparatory Commission took the action recommended on the 30th November, 1927, during its fourth session. The Assembly resolution had indicated that it would be the duty of the new committee 'to consider . . . the measures capable of giving all states the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement;' and it had suggested that these measures should be sought:

In action by the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalizing and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security;

In the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant;

In agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States;

And, further, in an invitation from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that, in a particular case, either all its forces, or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces, could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the Council's decisions or recommendations.

¹ See pp. 51 and 54 above.

The resolution also provided that the Committee should consist of representatives of the states 'which have seats on the [Preparatory] Commission and are members of the League of Nations, other states represented on the Commission being invited to sit on it if they so desire'. Of the two states which were not members of the League but were represented on the Preparatory Commission in November 1927, one—the United States of America—did not feel able to serve on a committee whose functions would include an examination and elaboration of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations; while the other—the U.S.S.R.—decided to follow the work of the committee by means of an observer, but not to send an official representative.

The first session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security,¹ which took place on the 1st and 2nd December, 1927, was attended by the delegates who were already assembled at Geneva for the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission. The proceedings were formal, and consisted of the election of a chairman—Monsieur Beneš (Czechoslovakia)—and two vice-chairmen—Monsieur Undén (Sweden) and Monsieur Urrutia (Colombia)—and of the adoption of a programme of work. Three rapporteurs were appointed to study different aspects of the problems which came within the committee's scope. Monsieur Holsti (Finland) undertook to report on arbitration, Monsieur Politis (Greece) on security and Monsieur Rutgers (Netherlands) on Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the League Covenant.

On the 26th January, 1928, the three rapporteurs and Monsieur Beneš met at Prague to prepare reports for the second session of the committee, which had been fixed for the 20th February. The rapporteurs had at their disposal observations by the Swedish, Norwegian, British and German Governments in reply to a questionnaire circulated by Monsieur Beneš to all states members of the League.² The Swedish and the Norwegian Governments both suggested that the committee should draw up a general treaty for arbitration and conciliation, on the model of the Locarno Agreements, and the Swedish Government submitted a draft agreement for consideration.³ The

¹ The minutes of the first session are printed (together with the minutes of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission) in League of Nations Document C. 667. M. 225. 1927. ix.

² The Belgian Government also replied to Monsieur Beneš's inquiry, but they merely stated that they had no fresh recommendations or suggestions to make. The texts of all the memoranda are printed as annexes to the minutes of the second session of the Committee, in League of Nations Document C. 165. M. 50. 1928. ix.

³ Dr. Nansen, on behalf of the Norwegian Government, had proposed the conclusion of a general arbitration convention at the Eighth Assembly in the previous September, but the Assembly had not taken a decision on his pro-

observations of the British and German Governments were of a more general nature; and while both Governments made certain concrete suggestions, the principal value of their memoranda lay in the exposition of their points of view in regard to the security problem as a whole. The British memorandum, in particular, was a document of more than passing importance; for it summed up, in a concise form, the views of the Government whose attitude was likely to prove the most important single factor in determining the success or failure of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

The British observations dealt in turn with arbitration agreements, security agreements, and the articles of the Covenant. In regard to arbitration, the British Government declared themselves opposed to guarantees for the enforcement of treaties—on the ground that these could have no sanction but public opinion—and in favour of a system of reservations. They considered that it might be possible to widen the scope of agreements for the settlement of non-justiciable disputes, and to pledge the parties in advance to accept arbitration. As other possible lines of progress, they suggested the inclusion in agreements of a non-technical character of a clause binding the signatories to submit to arbitration disputes over the interpretation of the agreement, and the reconsideration of the formula inserted in many arbitration treaties by which disputes touching 'vital interests, honour, independence, and the interests of third states' were excluded from the scope of the treaty. Under the heading of the 'optional clause' in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the well-known objections of the Conservative Government in Great Britain to signing any general undertaking were recapitulated, and a preference for bilateral agreements was expressed. The establishment of Conciliation Commissions was indicated as the most suitable method of dealing with non-justiciable disputes. The section on security agreements contained a eulogy of the Treaty of Locarno as the ideal form of security pact, and a strong recommendation that the system of local guarantees should be extended. On the subject of the provisions of the League Covenant, approval was expressed of the amendment to Article 10 which had been accepted by all the members of the Fourth Assembly save Persia¹ and of the interpretation of

posal, in view of the investigations into security and arbitration for which it made provision. Similar proposals had been made by Sweden at the Assembly of 1925, and had been repeated in subsequent years; but these suggestions had received little support except from the representatives of the smaller nations.

¹ This amendment had no binding force legally, since unanimity in the Assembly was necessary to amend the Covenant (see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations*, Section (iii) (c)).

Article 16 given to Germany by the other signatories of the Locarno Treaty¹—both of which provided that a state's geographical and military position should be taken into account in determining its obligations. In general, the British Government were opposed to the application of hard and fast rules in interpreting the Covenant, since they held that the strength of the Covenant lay in the discretion which it allowed to the Council and the Assembly in dealing with future contingencies. It was pointed out, for instance, that a rigid definition of 'the aggressor' might, in the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain,² prove to be 'a trap for the innocent and a sign-post for the guilty'.

On one or two points, the views expressed by the German Government in their memorandum resembled those of the British Government. The German Government, for instance, considered that guarantees were not necessary for the enforcement of treaties of arbitration, and that non-justiciable disputes could best be dealt with by conciliation procedure. If that procedure should prove unavailing, recourse could be had to the provisions of the Covenant, and the elaboration of methods of securing rapid action by the Council under Article 11 was recommended. The German Government also suggested that the League's machinery might be supplemented by voluntary undertakings to accept the Council's rulings, similar to those incorporated in the Locarno Agreements. The German Government differed from the British Government in thinking that the best method of dealing with justiciable disputes was to bring them before the Permanent Court, and they suggested that the Committee on Arbitration and Conciliation should consider in what way a greater number of states could be induced to adhere to the 'optional clause' of the Court's statute. While the German Government recognized that a system of pacific settlement of disputes might be embodied in either bilateral or multilateral treaties, they differed from the British Government, again, in expressing a certain preference for the more general type of agreement. With regard to security, the German memorandum pointed out that the core of the problem was 'the avoidance of armed conflict', and submitted that it was more important to remove the causes of war and to ensure that disputes should be settled peacefully than to elaborate means for stopping hostilities after they had begun. To remove the causes of war, how-

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part I A, Section (iii).

² The paragraph regarding the definition of the aggressor contained a quotation from a speech by Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 24th November, 1927.

ever, it would be necessary to reach a settlement which would 'guarantee permanent peace and provide for the removal of all international conditions endangering the peace of the world'.¹

With these memoranda before them, MM. Beneš, Holsti, Politis and Rutgers drew up a series of documents² at Prague at the end of January 1928. Each of the three rapporteurs presented a report, for which he took personal responsibility, on his special subject, and all three co-operated with Monsieur Beneš in drawing up a general introduction. The introduction emphasized the value of the Covenant of the League as a measure of security which was capable, in the majority of cases, of preventing war, and indicated that the only practicable method by which states could secure additional guarantees of security lay in the conclusion of special or collective treaties for the pacific settlement of disputes. Monsieur Holsti, in his report, traced the progress of arbitration and conciliation treaties and noted with approval a growing tendency to abandon reservations and restrictions on the scope of such treaties. He suggested that the Committee on Arbitration and Security, if it should see fit to draw up a general treaty on arbitration, should follow the Locarno model and provide for obligatory arbitration only in the case of justiciable disputes and for conciliation in other cases. If the committee should feel unable to draft a general arbitration treaty, it might, he considered, find less difficulty in preparing a general treaty for conciliation only; and it might also produce one or more models of special arbitration agreements.

Monsieur Holsti's recognition of the difficulties in the way of producing a general arbitration convention appeared to show that he had given due consideration to the point of view of the British Government; and the influence of the British memorandum could be traced still more clearly in Monsieur Politis's report on security. Monsieur Politis, who had been one of the principal architects of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, now went so far as to say that

There is only one possible way of endeavouring to increase the guarantees of security, and that way consists in the conclusion of separate agreements or regional pacts of non-aggression, of pacific settlement of disputes and mutual assistance, or of non-aggression only. The more logical and the speedier method—the conclusion of a general treaty binding on all States Members of the League—must, for the time being, be excluded. After the two unsuccessful attempts made in 1923 and

¹ The French press pointed out that this formula was presumably intended to leave the door open for the revision of the Peace Treaties.

² The texts are printed as annexes to the minutes of the second session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

1924 it would be not merely useless from the practical point of view, but dangerous to the prestige of the League, to make a third attempt; for the objections raised to the earlier attempts still exist.

As between separate agreements and regional pacts Monsieur Politis considered the latter in every respect preferable, and, in order to encourage the conclusion of as many such pacts as possible, he recommended that the committee should draft model treaties providing for the exclusion of aggressive war (but not of resort to arms in legitimate self-defence), for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for a system of mutual assistance. If regional pacts were to form part of a general system of security, Monsieur Politis considered that they ought to be linked up with one another as part of a comprehensive scheme in harmony with the Covenant.

The third of the rapporteurs, Monsieur Rutgers, also followed the British lead in certain respects. He expressed the opinion, for instance, that it would be inadvisable to draw up a rigid code of procedure to be followed by the Council in times of emergency and pointed out the dangers of a hard and fast definition of such terms as 'aggressor' and 'resort to war'. He attached importance to the improvement of means of communication and to the development of a scheme for giving financial assistance to a state which was the victim of aggression.¹

The preparatory work done by the Chairman and the three rapporteurs at Prague enabled the Committee on Arbitration and Security to make definite progress during its second session, which was held at Geneva from the 20th February to the 7th March, 1928. A general discussion, which lasted for three days, gave the various delegates an opportunity to define the attitudes of their respective Governments towards the questions at issue before they proceeded to a detailed examination of the Prague memoranda.² On one point,

¹ The Finnish Government had submitted a proposal for financial assistance to states which suffered from aggression to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at its first session in May 1926. The Preparatory Commission referred the proposal back to the Council, which arranged for it to be examined in connexion with a number of other questions relating to procedure in case of menace of war. During 1927 these questions, many of which were of a technical nature, had been under discussion by a special committee of the Council, by the Financial Organization and by the Organization for Communications and Transit; and these investigations, the result of which had been reported to and approved by the Council at intervals, had covered considerable ground by the time of the establishment of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

² The discussion showed that the delegates could be divided roughly into two groups: those who desired the principles underlying the Geneva Protocol to form the basis of their work and those who were opposed to any kind of

the delegates appeared to be of one mind; and that was on the necessity for producing practical proposals of some kind. It was therefore arranged that a drafting committee should draw up a series of model treaties of arbitration and security, which (it was hoped) would provide sufficient variety to meet the desires and conditions of different Governments. Six model treaties, three dealing with arbitration and conciliation and three with security, were produced by the drafting committee and passed their first reading before the second session of the committee ended on the 7th March.

Of the three model treaties for arbitration and conciliation, the first (Model A) was the most far-reaching. It provided that disputes of a legal nature should be submitted compulsorily to judicial or arbitral settlement, and optionally to a preliminary procedure of conciliation; and that disputes of a non-legal nature should be submitted compulsorily to conciliation procedure, and, if that should fail, to arbitration. Model B provided for the submission of legal disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the parties agreed to have recourse to an arbitral tribunal. Non-legal disputes were to be submitted to conciliation, but if no settlement could be reached they might be brought before the Council of the League under Article 15 of the Covenant. Model C provided simply for the submission of disputes of every kind to a Conciliation Commission. In drawing up these three types of general treaty, the drafting committee had deliberately refrained from introducing many innovations and where possible had followed existing models, such as the Locarno Agreements. An important feature of all three draft conventions was the provision that any state, on accession to the convention, might make reservations. It was contemplated that these reservations might be of four kinds. They might exclude from the provisions of the convention disputes which had their origin before the date of accession; or which concerned questions within a state's domestic jurisdiction; or which affected the principles of a state's constitution; or, finally, they might refer to specific subjects, such as territorial status. The last category of reservation would enable a state to withhold from arbitration disputes on any questions which, in its view, affected its vital interests, provided that such questions had been

general treaty and to a system of guarantees and were inclined to believe that the Covenant of the League afforded an adequate measure of security and did not need supplementing. France and her allies belonged to the first group; Great Britain, Italy and Japan to the second. Germany, as usual, showed anxiety lest the obligation to disarm should be overlooked in the search for security, and the Scandinavian states stood somewhat apart—desiring the widest possible extension of arbitration but disliking guarantees.

specifically mentioned in the reservation. This procedure was considered preferable to the old method of a general reservation covering any disputes affecting vital interests.

Of the three model security treaties, two were multilateral and one bilateral. Model D combined the three elements of non-aggression, peaceful settlement of disputes and mutual assistance. It was based to a large extent on the Rhineland Pact, but the provisions for peaceful settlement were taken from the Locarno Arbitration Agreements and resembled those in Model B. The draft differed from the Rhineland Pact in not providing either for mutual assistance prior to the decision of the Council in the event of flagrant aggression or for guarantees by third states. In Models E and F (which were similar except that one was multilateral and the other bilateral) the clauses relating to mutual assistance were omitted, but in other respects the provisions were identical with those of Model D.

All six of the draft treaties produced at the second session were read a second time by the committee during its third session,¹ from the 27th June to the 4th July, 1928, and were approved with certain modifications in detail. The third session also produced three new models of bilateral treaties for arbitration and conciliation, which followed the same lines as the three collective treaties described above.² The main interest of this session, however, centred round the discussion of certain proposals³ which had been submitted at the second session by the German delegation, and had been examined, in the interval between the second and third sessions, by the Belgian representative, Baron Rolin Jaequemyns. The German Government had proposed that, in order to strengthen the means at the disposal of the Council for preventing war, a protocol or agreement should be opened for signature by which states would bind themselves in advance to accept the Council's recommendations in cases where a dispute threatened to result in hostilities.⁴ The committee did not feel able to accept the suggestion for an agreement open to the signa-

¹ This session was attended by a Turkish representative, the Turkish Government having accepted an invitation to serve on the committee extended during the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission. See above p. 55.

² At the second session, Lord Cushendun had urged the committee to recognize the principle that bilateral treaties for pacific settlement of disputes were of equal value with multilateral treaties, and the decision to produce bilateral models was taken in deference to his views.

³ For a French interpretation of the motives which led the German Government to make these proposals for increasing security, see *Le Temps*, 2nd July, 1928.

⁴ In their memorandum of January 1928, the German Government had indicated that it would be desirable in their view to strengthen the League's machinery for preventing war in this manner. See p. 84 above.

ture of all states,¹ but it drafted a model multilateral treaty, by which the contracting parties would undertake, in the event of a dispute arising between them and coming before the Council, to refrain from any steps which might aggravate or extend the dispute and to carry out any provisional recommendation made by the Council with a view to the prevention of measures likely to prejudice a settlement. The signatories would also undertake to comply with the recommendations of the Council for the cessation of hostilities, in the event of war having actually broken out. The German proposals had also included provisions for the acceptance of the Council's recommendations for 'maintaining or re-establishing the military *status quo* normally existing in time of peace'; but on this point the committee could not reach agreement, in view of the objections raised by certain delegates to any attempt to define the 'military *status quo*'.²

By the close of its third session, the Committee on Arbitration and Conciliation had thus produced no less than ten draft treaties.³ Different members of the committee no doubt held different opinions as to the value of these model conventions for practical purposes; and doubts on this score had in fact been expressed, during the second session of the committee, by the British delegate. Lord Cushendun, however, had declared himself convinced by Monsieur Politis, who had pointed out the psychological value of the process on which the committee was engaged. Monsieur Politis believed that the movement for concluding treaties of arbitration and non-aggression would be stimulated if the League of Nations were to set the seal of its approval on specific types of treaty, and in support of his argument

¹ The opposition to this proposal was led by the British delegate, but he was supported by the delegates of France, Italy and Japan.

² Lord Cushendun, for instance, declared that, in the view of British experts, this part of the German proposals was impracticable, and might operate in favour of the aggressor. Lord Cushendun, supported by the Italian delegate, also opposed the thesis, presented by the French, Yugoslav and Polish representatives, that the German proposals would be useless and possibly dangerous unless provision were made for a system of control and sanctions. The model treaty provisionally approved by the committee did not contain any provision for guarantees.

³ These were: a General Convention for the Pacific Settlement of all International Disputes (Convention A); a General Convention for Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation (Convention B); a General Conciliation Convention (Convention C); a Bilateral Convention for the Pacific Settlement of all International Disputes (Convention a); a Bilateral Convention for Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation (Convention b); a Bilateral Conciliation Convention (Convention c); a Collective Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Treaty D); a Collective Treaty of Non-Aggression (Treaty E); a Bilateral Treaty of Non-Aggression (Treaty F); and a Model Treaty to strengthen the Means of preventing War.

he instanced the fact that the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which had considered the question of arbitration, had merely 'proclaimed certain principles' and 'sketched certain treaties' but that the result had nevertheless been 'the conclusion immediately afterwards of a certain number of treaties of this character'.¹ With these considerations in mind the Committee on Arbitration and Security submitted its model treaties, together with a number of resolutions, for the approval of the Ninth Assembly in September 1928.

The Ninth Assembly adopted the proposals of the Committee on Arbitration and Security with certain important modifications. The Third Committee of the Assembly succeeded² in combining the three multilateral conventions for arbitration and conciliation into one General Act of four chapters. The first three chapters provided respectively for the solution of disputes by conciliation (corresponding to Convention C); for the judicial settlement or arbitration of disputes of a legal character (corresponding to Convention B); and for arbitration of non-legal disputes (corresponding to Convention A). The fourth chapter contained the general provisions regarding reservations, &c., which had been common to the three conventions. It was hoped that this arrangement would facilitate the acceptance of an obligation to settle disputes peacefully by making it possible for states to adhere either to the General Act as a whole (in which case they would commit themselves to the peaceful settlement of disputes of every kind)³ or to the particular chapter or chapters which corresponded to their special needs. The document was put forward, not as a draft for the approval of states, but as a convention which would come into force between any two or more states as soon as they accepted it in whole or in part, and which would remain open indefinitely for the accession of all states.

¹ See the Minutes of the seventh meeting of the second session of the committee (League of Nations Document C. 165. M. 50. 1928. ix, p. 56).

² The proposal for a General Act was not carried through without a certain amount of opposition, especially from the British and Japanese delegations; but this opposition was withdrawn when it was made clear that the approval of the General Act by the Assembly would not oblige states to adhere to it. Lord Cushendun would apparently have preferred that the draft arbitration treaties should merely be recommended to states as models (as was done in the case of the security treaties), and not be opened for signature. He did secure recognition of the principle that bilateral treaties were of equal value to the General Act (see the Assembly Resolution quoted below).

³ The General Act would thus, if it were accepted as a whole, constitute the machinery necessary to implement Article 2 of the 'Kellogg Pact' which bound the signatories to settle all their disputes by peaceful means, without specifying what those means were to be. See this part of the present volume, Section (i) above.

The General Act¹ and the bilateral conventions for arbitration and conciliation were approved by the Assembly on the 26th September in the following resolution:

The Assembly:

Having considered the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security;

(1) Firmly convinced that effective machinery for ensuring the peaceful settlement of international disputes is an essential element in the cause of security and disarmament;

(2) Considering that the faithful observance, under the auspices of the League of Nations, of methods of pacific settlement renders possible the settlement of all disputes;

(3) Noting that respect for rights established by treaty or resulting from international law is obligatory upon international tribunals;

(4) Recognizing that the rights of the several States cannot be modified except with their consent;

(5) Taking note of the fact that a great number of particular international conventions provide for obligatory conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement;

(6) Being desirous of facilitating to the greatest possible degree the development of undertakings in regard to the said methods of procedure;

(7) Declaring that such undertakings are not to be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League of Nations to take at any time whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world; nor as impeding its intervention in virtue of Articles 15 and 17 of the Covenant, where a dispute cannot be submitted to arbitral or judicial procedure or cannot be settled by such procedure or where the conciliation proceedings have failed:

(8) Invites all States whether Members of the League or not, and in so far as their existing agreements do not already achieve this end, to accept obligations in pursuance of the above purpose either by becoming parties to the annexed General Act or by concluding particular conventions with individual States in accordance with the model bilateral conventions annexed hereto or in such terms as may be deemed appropriate;

(9) Resolves to communicate the annexed General Act and the annexed model bilateral conventions to all Members of the League of Nations and to such States not Members of the League as may be indicated by the Council.

(10) Requests the Council to give the Secretariat of the League of Nations instructions to keep a list of the engagements contracted in accordance with the terms of the present resolution either by acceptance of the provisions of the General Act or by the conclusion of particular conventions with the same object, so as to enable members of the League and States non-Members of the League to obtain information as soon as possible.

¹ The text of the General Act is printed in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume.

At the same time, the Assembly resolved that the Council should be invited:

to inform all States Members of the League that should States feel the need of reinforcing the general security conferred by the Covenant and of contracting for this purpose undertakings concerning the pacific settlement of any disputes which may arise between them, and should negotiations in connexion therewith meet with difficulties, the Council would, if requested to do so by one of the Parties—after it has examined the political situation and taken account of the general interests of peace—be prepared to place at the disposal of the States concerned its good offices, which, being voluntarily accepted by them, would be calculated to bring the negotiations to a happy issue.

No states acceded immediately to the General Act, nor had any accessions been notified by the end of the year 1928.¹ Nevertheless, the production of a general convention for arbitration and conciliation, open to the signature of all states, marked a definite step in advance. In the case of the model treaties for non-aggression and mutual assistance produced by the Committee on Arbitration and Security, a more tentative method of procedure was adopted. The Assembly, on the 26th September, declared its high appreciation of the value of these treaties, and its conviction that their 'adoption by the states concerned would contribute towards strengthening the guarantees of security'; and recommended them 'for consideration by States Members or non-members of the League of Nations', in the hope that they might 'serve as a basis for states desiring to conclude treaties of this sort'. A resolution concerning the good offices of the Council in the negotiation of such treaties, similar to that relating to arbitration and conciliation agreements, was also adopted. The Model Treaty to strengthen the Means of Preventing War was recommended in the same way for consideration.

A number of other resolutions, dealing with points which had been put forward by the Committee on Arbitration and Security, were also adopted by the Ninth Assembly. A resolution intended to promote the acceptance of the 'optional clause' of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was adopted on the 26th September. On the 20th September the Assembly noted 'the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security in regard to Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the Covenant' and recommended the studies in question to the Council 'as a useful piece of work which, without proposing a hard-and-fast procedure in time of emergency, and without adding to or detracting from the rights and duties of the Members

¹ Contrast the fifteen signatures which were affixed to the 'Geneva Protocol' within a few weeks of the close of the Fifth Assembly in 1924.

of the League, provides valuable indications as to the possibilities offered by the different articles of the Covenant, and as to the way in which they may be applied, without prejudice, to the different modes of procedure which the infinite variety of possible eventualities may render necessary in practice'. The Assembly also recommended 'that a study should be undertaken of the other articles of the Covenant, the conscientious and full application of which offers special guarantees of security'.

In regard to the scheme for financial assistance to states victims of aggression, the Assembly requested the Financial Committee to prepare a draft convention for submission to the tenth session of the Assembly in 1929.

Expenditure on Armaments of Various Countries.¹

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND [Figures include ordinary pensions and certain war charges, but not extraordinary pensions due to Great War.]	1927-8 (Estimates—net)	Army	£41,565,000		
		Navy	58,000,000		
		Air Force ²	15,550,000		
		Expenditure charged to other Budgets ³	2,039,000		
		Middle Eastern Services ⁴	3,541,000		
		Total	£120,695,000	120,695,000	14.75
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [Figures exclude pensions, debt service and war charges.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure ⁵	\$ 582,909,000	120,178,130	16.09

¹ The information in this table is taken from the *Armaments Year Book* of the League of Nations for the year 1927-8.

² Includes certain sums expended for civil air purposes.

³ I.e. services, such as postal services, rendered free by other Departments.

⁴ I.e. defence of 'Irāq and Palestine; grant in aid to 'Irāq army; maintenance of native levies in 'Irāq; garrison at Aden.

⁵ I.e. expenditure on the military activities of the War Department and on the naval and military activities of the Navy Department and special defence appropriations given directly to civil establishments. The estimates for the War and Navy Departments, including certain expenditure for civil purposes, were: War Department \$375,845,000; Navy Department \$326,740,000.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS [Figures include state expenditure on social insurance and health administration of Army and Navy.]	1925-6 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Roubles 635,500,000	67,427,055	16.01
FRANCE [Figures include various war charges and certain appropriations for non-military purposes, but exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War	Francs 5,074,900,000		
		Ministry of the Marine	1,792,200,000		
		Ministry of the Colonies ¹	369,600,000		
		Recoverable Expenditure ²	541,800,000		
		Total	7,778,500,000	63,368,635	19.75
JAPAN	1927-8 (Estimates)	Army	Yen 212,064,000		
		Navy	255,426,000		
		Total	467,490,000	47,235,969	26.57
ITALY [Figures include certain war charges and ordinary pensions, but not war pensions.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War	Lire 2,777,059,000		
		Ministry of the Marine	1,218,971,000		
		Ministry of the Interior (aviation) ³	625,710,000		
		Ministry of the Colonies ⁴	335,000,000		
		Total	4,956,740,000	45,895,740	23.46
INDIA [Figures include expenditure on non-effective services, but not debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Rupces 567,249,000	42,617,535	45.29

¹ I.e. cost of troops serving in the Colonies. Part of the expenditure is for civil administration. ² I.e. Army of Occupation.

³ Excluding expenditure on civil aviation.

⁴ I.e. military grants in aid to the Colonies.

EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS

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<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
GERMANY [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of Defence	Reichsmarks 1,041,000	35,137,384	7.16
		Army	479,263,000		
Navy	220,850,000				
War Charges	16,000,000				
Total	717,154,000				
SPAIN [Figures include war pensions and some expenditure for civil purposes, but not ordinary military pensions.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War	Pesetas 355,850,000	25,589,770	25.97
		Ministry of the Marine	161,851,000		
		Activities in Morocco	295,286,000		
Total	812,987,000				
ARGENTINA [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1926 (draft estimates—gross)	Dept. of War	Paper pesos 64,256,000	21,596,545	18.19
		Dept. of Marine	47,285,000		
		Total	111,541,000		
CHINA	?	Military Armaments	Chinese dollars 207,000,000	20,592,188	43.13 ¹
POLAND [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates)	Ministry of Military and Naval Affairs	Zloty 623,200,000	13,848,888	31.58
		Total	—	—	—
CZECHOSLOVAKIA [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927 (Estimates—net)	Ministry of Defence	Koruna 1,685,000,000	10,274,390	17.36
		Total	—	—	—
JUGOSLAVIA [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War	Dinars 2,160,566,000	8,742,753	19.29
		Navy	151,044,000		
		Frontier troops	101,390,000		
		Total	2,413,000,000		

¹ Percentage for 1925.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
NETHERLANDS [Figures include pensions and part cost of gendarmerie, but not debt service.]	1927 (Estimates voted—gross)	Ministry of War	Florins 59,000,000	7,848,309	13.06
		Ministry of the Marine	34,700,000		
		Ministry for the Colonies	1,500,000		
		Total	95,200,000		
BRAZIL [Figures include pensions, but not debt service.]	1927 (Estimates voted—gross)	Ministry of War	gold milreis 100,000 paper milreis 194,331,000	7,723,373	17.52
		Ministry of Marine	gold milreis 1,400,000 paper milreis 114,127,000		
		Total	gold milreis 1,500,000 paper milreis 308,458,000		
		Total (in paper milreis)	315,508,000		
SWEDEN [Figures include certain war charges.]	1927-8 (Estimates voted—net)	Army	Kroner 86,400,000	7,597,027	18.79
		Navy	44,400,000		
		Air Force	6,700,000		
		General Administration & common services	500,000		
		Total	138,000,000		
MEXICO [Figures exclude pensions.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Pesos 75,050,000	7,536,271	23.02
RUMANIA [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Army	Lei 6,259,805,000	7,463,978	18.00
		Navy	166,499,000		
		Aviation	477,876,000		
		Total	6,904,180,000		

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>	<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
AUSTRALIA [Figures exclude war charges, but include some expenditure on non-effective services and on civil aviation.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Normal Defence Expenditure £ 5,556,000	5,556,000	6.52
CHILE [Figures include pensions and some expenditure for civil purposes in respect of the Navy.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Army Navy Total Pesos 115,229,000 97,054,000 212,283,000	5,356,624	23.32
GREECE [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War Ministry of the Marine Total Drachmai 1,525,000,000 421,900,000 1,946,900,000	5,017,784	21.92
PORTUGAL [Figures include pensions and some expenditure for civil purposes.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War Ministry of the Marine Total Escudos 292,160,000 133,806,000 425,966,000	4,437,146	27.39
HUNGARY [Figures include ordinary military pensions, but not war pensions or debt service.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of National Defence Pengos 111,000,000	3,989,935	9.706
BELGIUM [Figures include war charges but not debt service, pension charges, expenditure on civil aviation or on gendarmerie or expenditure for accounts of other Departments.]	1927 (Estimates voted—net)	Ministry of National Defence Francs 607,100,000	3,480,080	7.67

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>	<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
CANADA [Figures exclude pensions and war charges, but include small sums spent for civil purposes in respect of Naval & Air Services.]	1927-9 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	\$ 16,668,400	3,436,208 4.705
SWITZERLAND [Figures include pensions and some expenditure for debt service.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Francs 85,000,000	3,383,758 25.83
FINLAND [Figures include war charges, but not pensions or debt service.]	1927 (Estimates voted—net)	Ministry of Defence Ministry of the Interior ¹ Total	Marks 574,100,000 27,300,000 601,400,000	3,118,082 15.91
CUBA [Figures exclude pensions.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Secretariat of War and the Navy	Pesos 12,325,000	2,537,052 15.05
IRISH FREE STATE [Figures include expenditure on pensions and on non-effective services, but not the cost of services rendered free by other Departments.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Army	£ 2,480,000	2,480,000 7.69
AUSTRIA [Figures exclude state contribution to pensions.]	1927 (Estimates voted—gross)	Army	Schillings 79,742,000	2,318,081 6.37

¹ Expenditure on guards on Russo-Finnish frontier.

EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS

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<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
DENMARK [Figures exclude pensions and debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates— net)	Ministry of War	Kroner 26,700,000	2,225,275	12.79
		Ministry of the Marine	12,500,000		
		Ministry of the Interior ¹	1,300,000		
		Total	40,500,000		
NORWAY [Figures include pensions and some expenditure on non-effective services and for civil purposes, but not debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates— gross)	Army	Kroner 30,600,000	2,214,137	10.31
		Navy	12,000,000		
		Total	42,600,000		
BULGARIA [Figures include expenditure on police and coast guards.]	1927-8 (Estimates— gross)	Ministry of War	Leva 1,244,400,000	1,830,000	17.79
LATVIA	1927-8 (Estimates— net)	Ministry of War	Lats 41,100,000	1,621,301	25.12
URUGUAY [Figures include some expenditure for civil purposes in respect of the Ministry of Marine, but exclude pensions.]	1925-6 (Estimates— gross)	Ministry of War and the Marine	Pesos 7,339,000	1,544,248	17.07
PERU [Figures include pensions.]	1927 (Estimates— gross)	Ministry of War	Peruvian £ 1,452,000	1,433,766	18.63
		Ministry of Marine	480,000		
		Total	1,932,000		

I.e. expenditure on recruiting, medical inspection and billeting.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>	<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA [Figures exclude war charges, pensions and debt service.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure £ 1,125,900	1,125,900	3.16
ESTONIA	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War Estonian Marks 1,882,100,000	1,022,880	23.46
NEW ZEALAND [Figures include expenditure on non-effective services, but not debt service or pensions.]	1927-8 (Estimates—net)	Naval Defence Dept. £ 493,326 464,995 Total 958,321	958,321	3.91
LITHUANIA	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure Litas 39,891,000	801,829	19.05
COLOMBIA [Figures include pensions.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of War Pesos 3,631,000	735,392	8.08
BOLIVIA [Figures include pensions.]	1925 (Estimates—gross)	Dept. of War Bolivianos 8,493,000	590,612	19.03
VENEZUELA [Figures include pensions and some expenditure on civil purposes in respect of the Ministry of Marine.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Dept. of War and the Marine Bolivars 13,816,000	540,743	14.87
SALVADOR [Figures include expenditure on National Guard and pensions.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure Colones 3,645,000	373,846	16.82

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
ECUADOR [Figures exclude pensions, but include some expenditure for civil purposes in respect of the Navy.]	1927 (Estimates)	Army and Air Service	Sucres 6,522,800	314,026 ²	15.88 ¹
		Navy	480,000		
		Total	7,002,800		
GUATEMALA [Figures exclude pensions.]	1927-8 (Estimates—gross)	Secretariat of War	Pesos 86,196,000	296,206 ²	13.02
PANAMA [Figures relate to military police.]	1925-7 (Estimates for two-yearly period)	Defence Expenditure	Balboas 1,291,440	265,391 ³	?
HAITI [Figures relate to constabulary, coast guards and President's general staff; they exclude pensions.]	1925-6 (Actual Expenditure—gross)	National Defence	Gourdes 6,116,217	251,376 ⁴	14.94
PARAGUAY [Figures exclude pensions.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Gold Pesos 1,108,000	214,386 ⁵	17.56
HONDURAS [Figures exclude pensions.]	1926-7 (Estimates—gross)	National Defence	Pesos 1,949,933	200,355 ⁵	17.17
COSTA RICA [Figures include expenditure on police and penitentiaries and on marine for civil purposes, but exclude pensions.]	1926 (Estimates—gross)	Ministry of Public Security	Colones 2,576,000	132,103 ⁶	11.37

¹ Percentage for year 1926.² Exchange at 23rd November, 1926.³ Exchange at par.⁴ Exchange at par.⁵ Exchange at par.⁶ Exchange as at 19th August, 1926.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Budget Figures in National Currency.</i>		<i>Equivalent of total in £ as at 31.12.26.</i>	<i>Percentage to total Expenditure.</i>
NICARAGUA [Figures include pensions.]	1925-6 (Actual Expenditure)	Army and Navy Police	Cordobas 132,571 194,704		
		Total	327,275	66,791	7.55
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC [Figures relate solely to expenditure on National Police.]	1927 (Estimates)	National Police	Pesos 1,472,642	60,525 ¹	2.52
LUXEMBOURG [Figures relate to gendarmerie and volunteers.]	1927 (Estimates—gross)	Defence Expenditure	Francs 5,499,000	31,521	2.55

¹ Exchange at par.

PART I

WORLD AFFAIRS

B. THE CONSTITUTION AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(i) Introductory Note.

THE League of Nations had been founded in consequence of a great war which had been fought in Europe; and, during the first years of the League's existence, a large part of its energies was inevitably devoted to the urgent though presumably transitory task of European reconstruction. There were European territorial and other political questions left over from the Peace Conference to be settled; there were financially disorganized European countries to be rehabilitated; and there were refugees to be re-established in new homes in a number of European countries. At the same time, the War of 1914-18, though fought in Europe, had not been a mere 'European War'; for, before this War had run its course, Europe had become the battlefield of the world. A majority of the non-European states had become belligerents; and even the passive belligerents and the neutrals were profoundly affected by the repercussions of the War on the economic plane—a plane on which the war-zone, far from being confined to Europe, was world-wide. More than ten years after the Armistice of 1918, this fact was recalled in forcible terms by a Latin-American statesman speaking in a European country.

The War had proved that, owing to modern means of communication and the interwoven economic interests of the civilised peoples of the world in each and every continent, no country, whether neutral or belligerent, could escape the ghastly consequences of an armed conflict. Suffering could no longer be circumscribed to the peoples engaged in fighting, and the whole fabric of modern civilisation was menaced from the moment the first shot was fired in a war. . . . Latin America did not suffer losses of life, but economic upheaval was such that after the War her Governments found themselves confronted with the most serious problems of social unrest, unemployment, curtailment of production, deficits, paralysation of all fruitful activities. The Latin American States realised in a different sphere, but with equal clearness, what a world war meant.¹

It meant indeed that, for weal or for woe, the whole of Mankind, in all habitable lands and on all navigable seas, was becoming one

¹ Don Agustín Edwards: 'Latin America and the League of Nations' (*Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, March 1929).

single society, knit together in a solidarity so close that no community could look forward any longer to remaining unaffected by the fortunes of its contemporaries even in the Antipodes.

The League of Nations, during the first nine years of its existence (1920–8), was visibly moulded by these salient facts of contemporary history; for, in its development during those years, two main tendencies could be discerned. There was a gradual but unmistakable transference of energy from tasks of European reconstruction to tasks of world organization; and there was a tendency for political activities to yield some ground to activities of an economic and cultural character. This did not mean, however, that the political aspect of international relations was yet becoming appreciably less prominent in the world as a whole; for though the local political situation in Europe began, after the years 1924–5, to show signs of becoming relatively quiet or quiescent, new political tensions were arising by that time in at least three other fields: first in the Pacific and the Far East, with the centre of disturbance in China; secondly on the American Continent, between the Latin-American countries and the United States, with the centre of disturbance in Mexico and Central America; and thirdly, all over the world between the British Empire, whose interests were already world-wide, and the United States, whose interests were rapidly expanding to the same dimensions. These new developments confronted the League of Nations with the possibility of having to take action in political fields which had previously lain almost outside its purview, and of having to deal with political issues in which the two non-member Great Powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., might be concerned as principles. The Government of one of these two Great Powers showed its appreciation of the increasing solidarity of Mankind on the political plane as well as on the economic by negotiating 'the Kellogg Pact' and inviting all the independent states of the world to adhere to it;¹ but the conclusion of the Pact produced a situation in which two systems of international relations—the virtually world-wide system of the Pact and the less widely extended though more closely compacted system of the Covenant—were in existence side by side without its yet being clear in what relation they stood to one another. Meanwhile, the question presented itself: would the system of the Covenant also become virtually world-wide in course of time, or was it likely to remain a predominantly European affair, with a certain number of loose and scattered adherents among non-European states?

Apart from the special question of the attitudes of the U.S. and the

¹ See the present volume, Part I A, Section (i).

U.S.S.R. towards the League, there were three non-European regions in which, at the close of the year 1928, the footing of the League was, in one way or another, distinctly less firm than it was in Europe. These regions were the Islamic World, the Far East and Latin America.

The Islamic World was the extreme case; for, notwithstanding its proximity to Europe, it still, at the end of the year 1928, contained only a single state member of the League¹ out of five Islamic states which were actually sovereign and independent both *de jure* and *de facto*² and four more³ whose independence was already provisionally recognized subject to the temporary exercise of certain measures of control by Western Powers. It was true that Great Britain was bound by treaty to extinguish her responsibilities for 'Irāq by seeking to secure her admission to membership in the League at the earliest opportunity;⁴ and again, in the abortive draft of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance which was negotiated in 1927, it was provided that Egypt should apply for admission to membership in the League and that Great Britain should support her candidature if and when the treaty came into force.⁵ The actually independent Islamic states, however, with the single exception of Persia, were still holding aloof from the League—Najd-Hijāz and the Yaman because of a 'Zealot' aversion from Western civilization; Afghanistan because the issue between 'Zealots' and 'Herodians'⁶ was not yet decided there; and Turkey partly, perhaps, because of a desire to consult the susceptibilities of her formidable neighbour the U.S.S.R., but probably more because she was still inclined to regard the League as an instrument in the hands of the Principal European Allied Powers, with whom she had remained formally in a state of war until the coming into force of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on the 6th August, 1924.

As for the Far East, it was well represented in the League on paper; for the one Far Eastern Great Power, Japan, and the two other Far Eastern independent states, China and Siam, were members of the League, as well as the two self-governing Dominions of the British Empire in the South Seas and the four European states with colonial possessions in this region, that is, Great Britain, the Nether-

¹ Persia. ² Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Najd-Hijāz, Yaman.

³ Egypt, 'Irāq, Syria-Lebanon, Palestine.

⁴ See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III C, Section (ix); the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (x); and the present volume, Part III B, Section (x).

⁵ See the present volume, Part III B, Section (i).

⁶ For this division of parties which had been produced in the Islamic World at that time by differences of reaction to the impact of Western civilization, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 6-7.

lands, France and Portugal. Nevertheless, the League did not find itself able to take effective action in that crisis in Far Eastern affairs which became acute in 1925 and only began to abate in the course of the year 1928. This virtual impotence of the League in the Far East at that time could not be explained simply by the fact that the two non-member Great Powers were here concerned; for the influence of the U.S.S.R., which was undoubtedly hostile to the League as a 'bourgeois' institution, suffered a severe set-back in the Far East in 1927,¹ while American activity in the Far East, which was great on the cultural plane and growing on the economic plane, had not displayed itself there in the role of an aggressive political force. The impotence of the League in this case was due rather to a conjunction of peculiar circumstances. In the first place, an overwhelming proportion of the territory, population and latent material resources of the Far East was comprised within the frontiers of a single state, China. Secondly, China had become subject to a number of legal 'servitudes', both public and private, by treaty with foreign Powers, who had thus acquired a juridical interest in what would otherwise have been Chinese internal affairs. Thirdly, the Chinese people had become imbued with the Western spirit of nationalism, which impelled them to throw these 'servitudes' off and to establish the sovereignty and independence of their country in the full Western sense of those terms. And fourthly, China had fallen into a bout of disorder which would almost certainly have produced incidental violations of foreign 'treaty rights' even if there had not been a deliberate and self-conscious movement in China for bringing the régime of 'the unequal treaties' to an end. It was the peculiar conjunction of these four circumstances, producing a situation with which the League had not been designed to deal, that debarred the League from taking action in the Far East during these years. This conjunction, however, was evidently unlikely to recur; and if, out of the disorders in China, a strong Central Government, unshackled by 'unequal treaties', were to emerge, the League might then begin to play in the Far East a part comparable to its role in Europe. At any rate, unless and until the situation in China became more or less stable, it would remain impossible to forecast what the ultimate role of the League in the Far East would be. Meanwhile, inevitably, the prestige of the League in the Far East suffered from the ineffectiveness of the role which, through no fault of its own, the League had actually been playing in that part of the world. The Japanese, for instance, were only remotely interested in the European activities of

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, Section (ii).

the League and were able to discount the existence of the League almost completely in affairs, nearer home, in which they were intimately concerned. Again, for the Chinese at this time the membership of their country in the League signified little more than a recognition of China's status in the Western comity of states; and Chinese interest in the League appreciably diminished after China's failure, at the Fourth Assembly in 1923, to secure re-election to a non-permanent seat on the Council.¹ Thereafter, China offered herself as a candidate for election year by year and when, at the Fifth Assembly, she only obtained fourteen votes, the Chinese delegation walked out of the hall and published a formal protest. The Chinese contention that the permanent representation of the principal regions of the world ought to be provided for in the constitutional arrangements for the composition of the Council, expressed the Chinese attitude towards the League at this time in a more general form.² Chinese sensitiveness in this matter was comprehensible. On the other hand it was noteworthy that the League Assembly, in spite of its predominantly European and Latin-American membership, showed a lively sense of China's potential importance in international affairs. China was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Council for the three successive years 1921 to 1923 inclusive,³ notwithstanding her condition at the time—a condition which incidentally caused her contributions to the Budget of the League to fall into arrears;⁴ she was elected again, at the seventh session of the Assembly, for a period of two years; and although she failed to secure election at the ninth session in September 1928,⁵ it was announced early in October 1928 that the Assistant Secretary-General of the League was to proceed on a special mission to Nanking by arrangement between the new Chinese Central Government there and Sir Eric Drummond. This decision showed that the progress towards normality and stability which China had been making during 1927 and 1928 had been appreciated at Geneva.

Thus the footing of the League, during the first nine years of its existence, in two out of the three non-European regions where that footing was relatively weak, had been largely determined by special

¹ *Survey for 1926*, p. 15.

² For this contention see *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 15 and 26.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, pp. 78–80.

⁵ A protest against the non-re-election of China on this occasion was made by the Chinese Minister at Brussels, who had been Chinese delegate at the ninth session of the Assembly, at a celebration of the Chinese *fête nationale* a few weeks later (extracts from the Minister's speech in *Le Temps*, 13th October, 1928).

local conditions. On the other hand the footing of the League in the third of these regions, namely Latin America, might fairly be taken as a test case of the League's prospects, outside Europe, in the world as a whole.

In this case, the issue between 'regionalism' and 'universalism' as alternative systems of international relations was raised in clear and concrete form. On the one hand, all the twenty Latin-American states were members of a Pan-American organization consisting of the Pan-American Union (a permanent Secretariat at Washington corresponding to the Secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva), a Governing Body (comparable in a general way to the Council of the League), and a periodic Conference of American states (which might be compared with the League Assembly). In this organization the Latin-American states were partners of the United States—one of the two Great Powers that were non-members of the League—and it was evident that the aloofness of the United States from the League would affect the policy of those of her Latin-American partners in the Pan-American organization who happened also to be League members, just as, in another partnership of self-governing peoples, the British Commonwealth, the policy of the overseas members was influenced in the opposite sense by the fact that the leading partner, Great Britain, was deeply concerned in all the League's activities. At the same time, those Latin-American states which were members of the League constituted, at the end of 1928, an appreciable part of the total membership—that is sixteen states members out of fifty-four¹—and, in the various organs of the League, they were by no means under-represented in proportion to their numbers. Thus the Latin-American states were involved simultaneously in two different inter-

¹ It should be noted that these figures, taken by themselves, might give an exaggerated impression of the extent of Latin-American participation in the League. In the first place, though sixteen Latin-American states were still nominally members of the League at the end of 1928, three of the sixteen (Argentina, Peru and Bolivia) had ceased for some years to collaborate actively in the League's work. The sixteen Latin-American states members represented 30 per cent. of the total membership, but they were only called upon to contribute 9 per cent. (that is 91 units out of 986) of the budget for 1929, and the proportion due from the thirteen active members was less than 5 per cent. (49 units). Moreover, the aggregate international importance of the thirteen active members of the League was much less than that of the seven Latin-American states which were non-members or passive members, as appears from the following figures (quoted from Don Agustín Edwards, *op. cit.*):

	Total Area in square miles.	Total Population.
Thirteen states collaborating in the League	1,506,073	27,178,286
Seven states not collaborating in the League	6,445,213	67,168,123

national systems—the ‘planetary’ or ‘oecumenical’ system of the League of Nations and the ‘regional’ system of the Pan-American organization—and it remained to be seen which of these two systems would ultimately secure the first claim on their allegiance or whether a conflict of allegiances would be avoided. In 1928, the Latin-American countries were still interested in their local relations with one another and with the United States more deeply than they were in affairs affecting the world as a whole; and, like other overseas countries (for example, the United States or the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire), they instinctively shrank from becoming implicated in the local affairs of Europe. So long as local European affairs, and especially the task of liquidating the European legacies of the General War of 1914–18, claimed the major part of the League of Nations’ attention, the Latin-American countries were naturally inclined to sit lightly to the League; but their interest in the League seemed likely to increase as local European political problems yielded ground, in the League’s field of activity, to economic and cultural affairs of world-wide scope.¹ On the economic and cultural planes, moreover, collisions between the League and the Pan-American organization were improbable. The crucial question remained: What would happen in an international crisis of a political character in which Latin-American states members of the League were involved? This question might have been difficult to solve *a priori* in juridical terms; but on the principle of *solvitur eundo* it received a reassuring practical answer when Bolivia and Paraguay came to the verge of war with one another in December 1928. In that emergency both the Council of the League and the Conference of American states took action in accordance with their respective constitutions, and their simultaneous activities resulted in the prevention of war without any friction arising between the two separate peace-making organizations.

(ii) The Composition of the Council.

The crisis over the composition of the Council of the League of Nations, which arose in 1926 in connexion with the admission of Germany to membership of the League, has been recorded in an earlier volume.² Under the new procedure adopted by the Seventh Assembly in September 1926, three of the nine non-permanent members of the Council were to be elected each year and were to serve for a period of three years. On retirement, a non-permanent

¹ For an illuminating exposition of this point, in concrete terms, see Don Agustín Edwards, *op. cit.*

² *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, Section (i).

member could not be elected during the next six years unless a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, by a special vote, declared it re-eligible. The number of re-elected members was to be restricted so that not more than three might serve on the Council at the same time.

The members of the League for whose benefit these re-eligibility provisions were primarily intended were states which did not fall within the category of the 'Great Powers' (whose claim to permanent representation on the Council was undisputed), but which felt themselves entitled, nevertheless, to more favourable treatment than that accorded to the small states composing the majority of the members of the League. The crisis of 1926 had arisen because three states of this intermediate class—Spain, Brazil and Poland¹—had demanded that, when the composition of the Council was modified by the admission of Germany to a permanent seat,² they should also be assured permanent representation. The rejection of their claims led Spain and Brazil to give notice of their resignation from the League; and Poland was therefore the only one of these three states that took advantage of the provision for 'semi-permanent' representation in September 1926. On the 16th September, 1926, Poland was duly elected a member of the Council for three years; and she was also, by a special vote, declared re-eligible when her term of office expired. Poland's success on this occasion, however, did not mean that the members of the Assembly were unanimous in approving of the creation of a 'semi-permanent' class of seat on the Council. On the contrary, a strong movement of opposition to any departure from a strict system of rotation in the election of non-permanent members had made itself felt, especially among the small states; and the result of the special ballot in 1926 seems to have been mainly due to a general belief that if Poland's claim was not accepted the admission of Germany into the League might again be rendered impossible.

In order to inaugurate the system by which three non-permanent members of the Council retired each year, it was necessary in 1926 to elect three states for three years, three for two years and three for one year. The three states which were due to retire in 1927 were Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Salvador. Belgium had been a member of the Council ever since its establishment; but she had not put forward a claim for a permanent seat in 1926, and she had refrained from asking the Seventh Assembly, when it elected her for a further

¹ Claims for permanent seats were also filed during 1926 by China and Persia, but only for the contingency that other states besides Germany received such seats.

² Germany made it one of the conditions of her entry into the League that she should receive a permanent seat on the Council.

period of one year, to declare her re-eligible in 1927. The announcement early in August 1927 that the Belgian Government had decided to apply for re-election at the forthcoming session of the Assembly therefore caused some surprise.

Monsieur Vandervelde, the principal Belgian delegate, went to Geneva at the beginning of September 1927 with instructions to explore the ground and make sure of a sufficient measure of support before putting forward a formal demand for a ballot on Belgium's re-eligibility. According to an alleged statement by a member of the Belgian delegation, Monsieur Vandervelde received promises of support from 38 states, and since the majority required was 32 he felt justified in making his formal application. When, however, the special ballot on Belgium's request took place, on the morning of the 15th September, only 29 votes were cast in her favour, and she therefore failed by three votes to be declared re-eligible. This adverse result, which appears to have caused general surprise, was the clearest possible manifestation of the strong feeling among the small states against the principle of 'semi-permanent' representation on the Council. The ballot was secret, but it was generally believed that all the Great Powers with permanent seats on the Council (with the possible exception of Italy) had voted for Belgium and that the opposition had included most of the Latin-American states as well as the Scandinavian group of European countries. Dr. Nansen, of Norway, was understood to have taken a prominent part in organizing the opposition. The disappearance of Belgium from the Council seems to have been widely regretted, and the fact that the sufferer from this movement of revolt among the small states was herself a small state (albeit one whose position was in some ways specially privileged) indicated that the delegates who cast adverse votes did so, for the most part, because they felt that an important principle was at stake.¹ Monsieur Vandervelde himself, in a speech delivered immediately after the ballot had been declared, expressed his conviction that the result had been determined by the question of principle and did not imply any hostility to Belgium. The applause which followed his speech showed that he had correctly interpreted the feelings of the Assembly.

The elimination of Belgium left in the field five states—Cuba, Finland, Canada, Greece and Portugal—which had presented themselves as candidates for the three non-permanent seats. The election on the 15th September resulted in 40 votes being cast for Cuba,

¹ See *Le Temps*, 17th September, 1927, for the suggestion that some delegates may have been actuated by more personal motives.

33 for Finland, 26 for Canada, 23 for Greece and 16 for Portugal. A few votes were also cast for other states. Uruguay received three votes, Denmark two, and Siam, Switzerland and Haiti one each. The absolute majority required was 25, and Cuba, Finland and Canada were therefore elected on the first count.

The result of the ballot in 1927 was of unusual interest owing to the special status of two of the new members, Canada and Cuba. Though Canada was not the first British Dominion to appear as a candidate for a seat on the Council,¹ she was the first to be elected. Her success in 1927 set the final seal on her autonomous nationhood, and signified that the new constitution of the British Empire had received the formal approval of the League of Nations.² As for Cuba, the 'Platt Amendment' of 1901 had placed her in a special relation to the United States by conferring upon the latter Power a right of intervention and a control over Cuba's foreign and financial policy.³ Thus the result of the ballot on the 15th September was that the Assembly, by the vote of 40 out of the 49 members present, conferred the coveted privilege of a seat on the Council upon a state which was virtually a dependency of one of the two remaining Great Powers which were not members of the League of Nations. It may be noted that the candidature of the third state elected in 1927—Finland—was known to be unwelcome to the other Great Power which held aloof from the League—the U.S.S.R.; and that Russia's attitude had led Germany, the latest of the Great Powers to enter the League, to withhold her support from Finland. Nevertheless, Finland was elected, in the face of Germany's opposition, by a margin of eight votes; and thus three

¹ The Irish Free State stood in 1926 but was not elected (see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, Section (iii) (d)).

² On the significance of Canada's candidature and election see *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* In that place, it is suggested that Canada and Cuba were in some sense in competition as alternative representatives of the American Continent. This appears to be doubtful; for it was afterwards asserted that the Latin-American states gave Canada little support, owing to their anxiety to make certain of the election of Cuba, and that Canada owed her election to the votes of the Scandinavian and other European states in conjunction with the votes of states members belonging to the British Empire. Apparently the regional group of states which the Latin Americans were concerned to see represented on the Council of the League was not an American group in the widest sense but an exclusively Latin-American group; and this narrower group was not, of course, represented by Canada (at any rate not in the geographical sense, since in point of nationality Canada had an indisputable claim to Latinity in virtue of the French element in her population).

³ In 1926 a controversy had arisen between Cuba and Uruguay because a Uruguayan delegate was alleged to have raised, on the occasion of the election of Council members by the Seventh Assembly, the question whether Cuba's sovereignty was restricted by the 'Platt Amendment' (see the *Survey for 1927*, Part IV B, Section (vi)).

out of the five European border states of the U.S.S.R. (the other two being Poland and Rumania) came to be represented on the Council simultaneously.

The failure of Belgium to secure re-election to the Council in 1927 did not deter two states—China and Spain—from asking the Ninth Assembly in 1928 to declare them re-eligible.

China had asserted her right to a permanent seat on the Council in 1926, but had withdrawn her claim on the adoption of the compromise which made it possible for Germany alone to enter the Council as a permanent member. The Seventh Assembly had elected China to one of the three two-year seats, and her term of office—together with those of Holland and Colombia—therefore expired in 1928. China's case for re-election was weakened by the fact that Persia was also a candidate for the seat which was expected to fall to an Asiatic state.¹ Although a good many delegates seem to have felt that it would be unfortunate if China suffered a rebuff at the hands of the League just at the moment when a new Chinese Government were making an effort to set their house in order,² this consideration did not avail to outweigh the small states' dislike of 'semi-permanent' seats. Accordingly, the special ballot on the 10th September resulted in only 27 votes being cast in China's favour, so that she failed by seven votes to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of 34.

In the case of Spain the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to induce the small states (a majority of whom, as Latin Americans, were specially friendly to Spain) to modify their attitude. Spain was one of the states whose special needs the re-eligibility provisions had been intended to meet; and although the rejection of her claim to a permanent seat in 1926 had led the Spanish Government to vindicate the national honour by giving notice of withdrawal from the League,³ the Government, before making that gesture, had shown a certain interest in the possibility of 'semi-permanent' tenure of office.⁴ In March 1928 the Spanish Government, in response to an appeal from

¹ Persia, like China, had abandoned her conditional claim to a permanent seat in 1926, but she had attempted (unsuccessfully) to persuade the First Committee of the Seventh Assembly that two non-permanent seats ought to be allocated to Asiatic states (see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 75). She had not stood for election in 1927, but on the conclusion of the ballot in that year she had reiterated her claim for another 'Asiatic' seat besides that occupied by China and had signified her intention of presenting herself next year. On the question of the geographical distribution of seats on the Council, see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 11, 15 and 61.

² For the situation in China at this time see the present volume, Part IV.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 74-5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 66-8.

the Council, had cancelled their resignation : and in so doing they had expressly declared that they left to the Assembly 'the duty of deciding the seat Spain shall occupy in order that her action shall be efficacious, useful, and corresponding to her special situation as a neutral Great Power during the last war and her rank as a creator of peoples and civilizations'. It would clearly have been difficult for the Assembly, which was of one mind in desiring to welcome Spain back to the fold, to deny her the benefit of those provisions for re-eligibility which had been introduced in 1926 largely in the hope of preventing her resignation. When the election of non-permanent members took place on the 10th September, Spain received 46 votes. Immediately after the ballot a separate vote was taken on the question of Spain's re-eligibility in three years' time, and she then received 37 favourable votes. Since the two-thirds majority required was 32, Spain's application was granted by a margin of five votes.¹

The other two states which were elected to the Council in 1928 were Persia (40 votes) and Venezuela (35 votes). Persia had benefited by the rejection of China's request to be declared re-eligible for the 'Asiatic' seat. Another Asiatic state, Siam, was also a candidate, but she received only six votes. It had been a foregone conclusion that the seat vacated by Colombia would fall to another Latin-American state, and Venezuela was the only member of that group whose claim had been seriously canvassed. Votes were also cast for a number of states which had not presented themselves as candidates ; and it was significant that Norway (the acknowledged leader of the small states in their stand on the question of the composition of the Council) should have received eleven unsolicited votes. Three votes were also given for Denmark, two for Paraguay, Uruguay and Greece, and one for Austria, Switzerland and Portugal.

The Council for the year 1928-9 was therefore composed of the five permanent members—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Germany—and of nine non-permanent members—Poland, Rumania and Chile (whose term of office would expire in 1929); Cuba, Finland and Canada (whose term of office would expire in 1930); and Spain, Persia and Venezuela (whose term of office would expire in 1931). Of these nine Poland, in 1929, and Spain, in 1931, would be able to stand again without a special ballot, since the Assembly had declared them re-eligible at the time of their election.

¹ In the ballot on China's re-eligibility 50 votes were cast and the two-thirds majority was therefore 34; but in the ballot on Spain the total number of votes was 47, making the two-thirds majority 32.

(iii) The Question of the Functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The inauguration of the mandatory system has been recorded in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*;¹ and, from the account there given, it will be seen that at least two problems of international law were latent in this new institution. The first problem was: Where did the sovereignty over the mandated territories reside? The second was: What was the form and the extent of the supervision which was to be exercised over the administration of the Mandates by the Council of the League of Nations—with the assistance of the Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant—in view of the fact that, according to another paragraph of the same article, the tutelage of the mandatory Powers over the mandated territories was to be exercised on behalf of the League?

By the end of the year 1927 the question of sovereignty had not yet been raised formally, though it had come under discussion with reference to the status of the mandated territory of South-West Africa.² On the other hand, the question of the form and extent of League of Nations supervision was raised on the 3rd September, 1926, during the forty-first session of the League Council, on two important points relating to the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The first point was the scope of the questionnaire which it was the practice of the Commission to circulate to the mandatory Powers as a guide in the preparation of their annual reports—reports which, in the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant, it was the duty of the Commission to receive and examine. The second point was whether the Commission, in rare cases when they could not otherwise come to a conclusion, might give audience to petitioners whose petitions had already been presented in writing and had been commented upon, in that form, by the mandatory Power concerned.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, whose functions were thus called in question in the autumn of 1926, had by that time been in existence for nearly six years. Its constitution, as approved by the Council of the League on the 1st December, 1920, has been printed in full in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*;³ and in this place it is only necessary to recall that the Commission consisted of nine members, 'appointed by the Council and selected for their personal merits and competence', and that—while the selection was

¹ Vol. vi, Part IV, pp. 500–23.

² This will be dealt with in a later volume of this *Survey*.

³ Vol. vi, pp. 512–13.

so arranged that four members were nationals of mandatory and five of non-mandatory Powers—the members of the Commission were not in any sense representatives of the Governments to which they happened respectively to owe personal allegiance.¹ It may be added, however, that both the original selection by the Council, and the subsequent appointments to fill vacancies, were admirably made, the persons appointed being distinguished people of wide diplomatic, administrative or technical experience²—with the result that the members of the Commission not only worked together harmoniously but displayed great tact and ability and insight as a body in the performance of their delicate task. This task, as the Commission pointed out in 1926 when they had to deal with a serious situation in the administration of the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon,³ was 'one of supervision and co-operation—functions which, though neither incompatible nor in conflict with one another, may yet be accompanied by genuine difficulties when they have to be carried out simultaneously'.⁴ Since that was the standing condition under which the Commission did their work, such difficulties inevitably arose; and on two occasions at least—when the Commission were confronted by the Bondelzwarts affair of 1922⁵ and by the Syrian rising of 1925⁶—the task became so delicate that it seemed almost impossible that it should be successfully performed. Yet, on these two critical occasions, the manner in which the members of the Commission acquitted themselves not only confirmed the esteem in which this eminent international body had come to be held by the public opinion of the world but drew spontaneous tributes of admiration from official representatives of the mandatory Powers concerned, and this after they had passed through the ordeal of discussing with the Commission

¹ They were not allowed to hold any office which put them in a position of direct dependence on their Governments while members of the Commission.

² In 1926 there were four members of the Commission who 'had spent their whole life in the colonial service of their respective countries; they had been Governors-General over territories larger than most European countries'. Statement by a Swedish member of the Commission, Mme Bugge-Wicksell, in the Sixth Committee of the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations on the 21st September, 1927.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 455–6.

⁴ According to an individual member of the Commission: 'the Commission had . . . realised that it must do nothing to embarrass the mandatory Powers in the execution of their task, and it laid stress on the fact that it regarded itself as a Commission whose duty it was to study reports and give opinions, and not to criticise but to co-operate.' (Statement by General Freire d'Andrade, a Portuguese member of the Commission, to the Sixth Committee of the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations on the 21st September, 1926.)

⁵ See the *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 405–16.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 422–57.

certain painful affairs, in which they personally, as well as the Governments which they represented, had been concerned.¹

It remains to trace the history of the two matters which caused the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission to be called in question in the autumn of 1926.

The 'questionnaire intended to facilitate the preparation of the annual reports of the mandatory Powers' had originally been drafted by the Permanent Mandates Commission during their first session (4th-8th October, 1921) and had been communicated forthwith to the Council and the states members of the League. The warrant for this step was the clause in the constitution of the Commission to the effect that the Commission should 'regulate its own procedure subject to the approval of the Council'. The purpose was to assist the mandatory Powers in showing, and the Council in ascertaining, whether and to what extent the Mandates were being administered in accordance, not only with the spirit of the Covenant, but with the specific 'safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population' which had been stipulated for in the Covenant in respect of Mandates of the 'B' and 'C' classes.²

The practical object of the questionnaire³ was to assist the Mandatories to present their reports in such a form as would reduce to a minimum the number of supplementary questions that the Commission would find it necessary to ask. At the same time, the Commission made no attempt to confine the Mandatories' reports rigidly within the framework thus provided by them. On the contrary, they were on the lookout from the beginning to see how the questionnaire might be modified, extended or otherwise made more apt to serve its purpose in the light of the reports actually presented and the practical experience gained in the performance of their work.

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 415-16; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 456.

² In respect of 'B' and 'C' Mandates, the mandatory Power was to be 'responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which' would 'guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory.'

'B' (like 'A' though not 'C') Mandates were further to be administered under conditions which would secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of members of the League other than the mandatory Power.

³ The questionnaire was drawn up in two versions referring to 'B' and 'C' Mandates respectively. In dealing with the class of 'A' Mandates, the Commission did not draw up a standard questionnaire, since conditions in the several territories differed widely.

On the 20th July, 1923, during their third session, they appointed a sub-committee for the revision of the questionnaire, consisting of Sir Frederick Lugard (a retired British colonial administrator of great distinction), Monsieur van Rees (the Dutch Vice-Chairman of the Commission), and Monsieur Orts (a Belgian member of the Commission). Alternative drafts of a revised questionnaire were considered by the Commission during their fourth and fifth sessions (24th June to 8th July and 23rd October to 6th November, 1924, respectively) and a final draft was eventually discussed on the 11th June, 1926, during the ninth session (8th–25th June, 1926).

The original questionnaire had contained 51 numbered questions in the 'B' version and 50 in the 'C' version, arranged under 13 heads. The revised version contained 118 arranged under 22 heads. Thus the number of questions was rather more than doubled: but, on a comparison of the printed texts, this increase struck the eye as being much greater than it actually was owing to the trivial fact that in the revised version the questions were numbered consecutively throughout, whereas in the original version they had been numbered in separate series under each heading. As a matter of fact (as Monsieur Orts observed to the Commission when it was considering the final draft) the mandatory Powers were already supplying information concerning each of the points raised in the questionnaire; and it was afterwards ascertained in regard to three British Empire mandatories that Australia had actually answered all the 118 questions in previous annual reports, Great Britain 117 and New Zealand 115.¹

When the draft was discussed by the Commission on the 11th June, 1926, a French member, Monsieur Merlin, criticized it on the ground that, 'when once replies had been given to the numerous questions contained in' it, 'there would not be any need to take up the questions again every year.' On this point the Chairman, the Marquis Theodoli, explained that 'it was intended to draw the attention of the Governments to the points on which the Commission desired to be informed, leaving them at liberty to develop their replies more or less as they thought fit'. In other words the new draft was intended to serve as an 'aide-mémoire' or a series of 'notes for guidance', and not as a questionnaire in the literal sense of a series of imperative questions demanding categorical answers. Eventually, the text of the draft was adopted with certain amendments, and was entitled: 'B and C Mandates: List of questions which the Permanent Mandates Commission desires should be dealt with in the annual reports of the

¹ Statement by Major J. W. Hills in a letter dated the 23rd November, 1926, and published in *The Times* on the 24th.

Mandatory Powers.' In a preamble it was explained that 'the document' indicated, 'in the form of questions, the principal points on which' the Commission desired 'that information should be given in the annual reports', and that, 'without asking that its questions should be necessarily reproduced in the reports, the Commission' considered 'it desirable that the reports should be drawn up in accordance with the general plan of the questionnaire.'¹

It was during this same ninth session that the Commission found themselves confronted with the problem whether petitions regarding the administration of mandated territories might, if necessary, be received by the Commission orally as well as in writing. Whereas the problem of the questionnaire had arisen over Mandates of the 'B' and 'C' classes, 'the greater part of the petitions' received by the Permanent Mandates Commission 'came from territories under "A" Mandates', since 'the inhabitants of those territories were in a far more advanced stage of civilization than the inhabitants of territories under "B" and "C" Mandates and were therefore in a better position to submit their views'.²

The position of the Permanent Mandates Commission with regard to petitions had not been provided for in the terms of its constitution, which determined the details of its competence;³ but 'the right of petitioners to submit a petition had never been questioned, and recently it had been decided that the term "petition" should include memorials from persons outside mandated territories'.⁴ 'In every . . . session of the Commission, from the first to the eighth, a discussion had arisen on this subject, in several instances occupying the whole or the greater part of a meeting.'⁵ On the 31st January, 1923, rules of procedure for dealing with petitions, which had been drafted by the Commission at the Council's request, were adopted by the Council, with certain small alterations. They were not included in the subsequent publication⁶ of the general rules of procedure of the Commission as amended by the Council on the 12th December, 1923;⁷

¹ For the history of the questionnaire down to this point see a statement made by Monsieur van Rees to the Sixth Committee of the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations on the 21st September, 1926.

² Statement by the Marquis Theodoli on the 10th June, 1926, during the ninth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

³ Statement by Monsieur van Rees on the same occasion.

⁴ Statement by Sir F. Lugard on the same occasion.

⁵ Note by Sir F. Lugard on procedure with regard to memorials or petitions (Annex 2 to the *Minutes* of the ninth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission).

⁶ In League of Nations Document *C.P.M.* 8.

⁷ The foregoing facts are taken from the note by Sir F. Lugard cited above.

but they were issued, as adopted by the Council, in a separate printed paper¹ and were followed by the Commission in practice thereafter. The essence of these rules was that petitions from inhabitants of (though not those from persons residing outside) a mandated territory should be transmitted through the mandatory Power concerned, that all petitions received should be subjected to a preliminary examination by the Chairman of the Commission and that the texts of those which he considered acceptable should then be communicated, for observations, to the mandatory Power concerned as well as to his fellow-members of the Commission.² On the question whether the Commission should in any circumstances give audience to petitioners, the rules gave no guidance. 'While' they did 'not rule out the possibility of petitioners being heard by the Commission, they' did 'not expressly provide for such a step.'³

This last question was one of extreme delicacy, since it involved three considerations which were not easy to reconcile with one another yet were all of fundamental importance: first, that the Permanent Mandates Commission should not be stopped from any procedure which experience might show to be necessary for the effective performance of their work as laid down in the Covenant of the League and in the Constitution of the 1st December, 1920: second, that nothing should be done by the Commission which might prevent the effective administration of a Mandate by a mandatory Power; and third that the inhabitants of mandated territories should not be denied the use of any means of action which it might be necessary to place in their hands in order to insure that the safeguards promised to them in the Covenant should be effective.

As regarded the first point, it was a commonplace that the Western administration of non-Western countries was not a matter which could be investigated intelligently and criticized constructively on the sole basis of documentary evidence studied at a distance from the spot. This commonplace was, in fact, regularly appealed to by Western colonial administrators as an *a priori* objection to strictures passed upon their work by 'arm-chair critics' at home. The Permanent Mandates Commission could not, of course, be dismissed as

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1923, Annex 457, reprinted separately as *C.P.M.* 38 (1).

² Note by the Secretariat of the League of Nations on a list of petitions relating to the administration of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon (Annex 2 to the *Minutes* of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission); note by Sir F. Lugard cited above.

³ Note by Monsieur Rappard on the hearing of petitioners (Annex 3 to the *Minutes* of the ninth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission).

a body of 'arm-chair critics', since a substantial number of the members of the Commission were themselves ex-colonial administrators with a long experience of practical work in countries contiguous to the mandated territories and similar to them in all relevant respects. Even so, it was a distinct handicap to the Commission, in the performance of their task, that in all circumstances they should have to depend exclusively upon the past experience of the members in dealing with other colonial areas; for it was evident that occasionally, though possibly not frequently, situations would arise in which personal contact with inhabitants of the mandated territories themselves, or with petitioners capable of speaking authoritatively on their behalf, would become virtually indispensable to the effective discharge of the Commission's duties.

As regarded the second point, there was a natural fear on the part of the mandatory Powers that any personal relations whatever between the inhabitants of the mandated territories and the Permanent Mandates Commission might prejudice their own position *vis-à-vis* both the inhabitants of the territories under their respective Mandates and the other states members of the League. They pointed out that one of the foundations of the mandatory system was the confidence placed in the mandatory Powers in the first instance by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, by whom they had been selected, and in the second instance by the League of Nations when it consented that the mandatory system, with these particular Powers as the Mandatories, should be placed under its auspices. They feared that the authorization of any procedure which permitted the inhabitants of the mandated territories to appeal direct to the Permanent Mandates Commission might be interpreted by international public opinion as being tantamount to a vote of want of confidence in the mandatory Powers; but they feared still more that it might be interpreted, by the inhabitants of the mandated territories themselves, as implying that the Permanent Mandates Commission rather than the several mandatory Powers was the depository of the supreme executive authority over them. It may be added that all members of the Commission who took part in the discussions concerning the possibility of receiving oral petitions seem to have shown a clear appreciation of the mandatory Powers' point of view in this matter and a sincere concern to propose nothing which might seriously increase the difficulties of the mandatory Powers' position.

The third point to be taken into consideration was the fair treatment of the inhabitants of the mandated territories, the safeguarding of whose interests was, according to the Covenant, the primary and

paramount object for which the mandatory system had been instituted. In this connexion it was pointed out that, in order to safeguard the interests of the mandatory Powers, the Council of the League, in drawing up the constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission, had laid down that the mandatory Powers should send their annual reports to the Commission 'through duly authorized representatives who would be prepared to offer any supplementary explanations or supplementary information which the Commission' might 'request'; that the Commission should 'examine each individual report in the presence of the duly authorized representative of the mandatory Power from which it' came, such representative being authorized to 'participate with absolute freedom in the discussion of this report'; and that although, after this discussion had ended, the representative of the mandatory Power was to withdraw while the Commission decided on the wording of the observations which were to be submitted to the Council of the League, these observations were to be 'communicated to the duly authorized representative of the mandatory Power from whom the report' came, and he was to be 'entitled to accompany it [i.e. the observations] with any comments which he' desired 'to make'. If, it was argued, this procedure of oral communication with the Commission through properly qualified representatives was considered by the Council to be necessary in order to ensure a fair hearing to the mandatory Powers, an unqualified denial of the same facilities to the inhabitants of the mandated territories, when petitioners claiming to represent them were found, upon investigation, to be genuinely representative, would be difficult to reconcile with an attitude of complete impartiality.¹

Before any ruling had yet been given on the delicate question in which these three different considerations were involved, that question was raised in a practical form during the eighth session of the Commission (16th February-6th March, 1926). A Syrian delegation came to Rome, where the Commission were sitting, in the hope of being personally received, and each of the members of the Commission did, in fact, hear this delegation privately;² but when the leader of the Syrian delegation—a well-known Druse publicist, the Amīr Shakīb Arslān—wrote a formal letter to the Commission requesting that the delegation should be received, the resulting discussion in the Commission brought to light two opposing views. Monsieur van Rees submitted that 'the Commission had no authority to accede to the

¹ This point was forcibly put by Sir F. Lugard in the note cited above.

² Statement by Monsieur van Rees in the *Minutes* of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, p. 158.

request of the Syrian delegation' and that, 'in hearing them officially,' they 'would be exceeding' their 'competence'; and in opposing the grant of their request he was supported—albeit 'with no feelings of joy'—by Monsieur Rappard. On the other hand Sir Frederick Lugard 'said he was not opposed in principle to hearing the petitioners orally, when they represented some particular and specific grievance. He did not indeed see how the Commission could claim to deal impartially with petitions unless it gave the complainants an opportunity of replying to the statements made by the other side. . . . In his opinion, the Commission had every right to adopt any measures which it might desire in order to carry out its task'. 'He added that he regarded the question of the right of appeal of the people of a mandated territory as a matter of the very greatest importance, and that he personally did not feel at all satisfied as to the manner in which it was being dealt with by the Commission.' As a result of this discussion, the Commission decided, first, that the Syrian delegates should not be received, but in the second place that the question of principle should be placed on the agenda of the next ordinary session.¹

At their ninth session, the Commission had before them not only two notes drawn up by Sir Frederick Lugard and by Monsieur Rappard respectively,² but 'a letter from the delegation of the *Waad Leumi* (National Council of the Jews of Palestine), asking to be heard by the Commission with regard to the different problems arising out of the establishment of the Jewish National Home'.³ In the view of Sir Frederick Lugard 'it followed . . . as a corollary to the right of petitioners to submit petitions, that the Commission should be able to hear those petitioners if it thought fit to do so'; and in his note he proposed that the right of petition should be made fully known, as also the method of procedure and the other conditions, and that petitions which had been judged worthy of acceptance and had been sent to the mandatory Power for observations should be referred to a sub-committee of three members for report as to whether an audience (in cases where that was asked for) should be granted. On the other hand, 'Monsieur Rappard had doubts about the competence of the

¹ Text of the reply eventually despatched to the Amīr Shakhīb Arslān (over the signature of the head of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations) in the *Minutes* of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, p. 168.

² Printed as Annexes 2 and 3 to the *Minutes* of the ninth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

³ Statement by the Chairman, the Marquis Theodoli, at the sitting of the 10th June, 1926. (*Minutes* of the ninth session, p. 47). The *Waad Leumi* was an unquestionably representative and authoritative body.

Commission in the matter,' and thought that it might be unwise for them to 'exercise a doubtful right'; but he submitted that 'the Council could certainly decide the point'. In his note, Monsieur Rappard had proposed that the Commission might submit to the Council a suggestion for empowering the Commission to receive petitions orally, as the last stage in a lengthened procedure, in certain very carefully defined circumstances. A French member of the Commission, Monsieur Merlin, urged 'that in the present circumstances no change in the procedure should be made'. Monsieur van Rees pointed out that the special duty of dealing with petitions, 'which was not a consequence of the duties to be fulfilled by the Commission under the terms of the Covenant and of its own constitution, appeared . . . to be incapable of any other but a strict legal interpretation, and to interpret it legally meant that, since the Commission had not been authorized to convene the petitioners, it did not possess the right to grant itself such authority on its own initiative. In his view, therefore, such an authority should be obtained from the Council if the Commission thought it necessary.' As a result of this discussion the Commission decided not to accept the request of the delegation of the *Waad Leumi* for a hearing;¹ but the Chairman ascertained that the members of the Commission 'were unanimously agreed in thinking that it was essential in certain cases to hear petitioners and that it was necessary to submit a statement to the Council to this effect'.

Thus, during the ninth session of the Commission, their deliberations on the two problems of petitions and the questionnaire—deliberations which, like all the work of the Commission, had been conducted with great care as well as great ability—came to a head simultaneously, and their conclusions were embodied in the following passage of their report to the Council on this occasion.

The Commission has the honour to draw the Council's attention to certain questions of general interest mentioned below:

Petitions.

The Commission has again carefully considered the procedure in force with regard to petitions. Experience having shown that sometimes the Commission has been unable to form a definite opinion as to whether certain petitions are well founded or not, the Commission is of opinion that in these cases it might appear indispensable to allow the petitioners to be heard by it. The Commission, however, would not desire to formulate a definite recommendation on this subject before being informed of the views of the Council.

¹ *Minutes* of the ninth session, p. 54.

List of Questions which the Commission desires should be dealt with in the Annual Reports of the Mandatory Powers on Territories under B and C Mandates.

The Commission has the honour to submit to the Council for approval an annexed document (A. 14. 1926. VI) containing a list of questions which the Commission would like to have dealt with in the annual reports of the mandatory Powers on territories under B and C Mandates. This document, the drafting of which has been considered for several sessions, is intended to replace the questionnaires for these territories adopted at the Commission's first session and approved by the Council on October 10th, 1921 (documents C. 396 and C. 397, 1921).

The report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on their ninth session came before the Council of the League at its forty-first session (2nd to 7th September, 1926) and Monsieur Undén, the representative on the Council of Sweden (a non-mandatory and therefore unquestionably disinterested Power), was asked by his colleagues to act as *rapporteur*. In presenting his report to the Council on the 3rd September, Monsieur Undén dealt specifically with the passages in the Commission's report above cited. With regard to the questionnaire, he submitted the following draft resolution:

The Council instructs the Secretary-General to forward copies of the list of questions (Annex 899 b) to the mandatory Powers and commend to their consideration the request of the Commission that the annual reports should be drawn up in accordance with the general plan of this revised questionnaire.

As to the question of receiving petitions orally, he drew attention to the fact that 'with regard to the question of principle, the members of the Commission have expressed a certain hesitation as to the advisability of the proposed procedure. That it should be applied only in rare and exceptional cases seems to have been the general opinion. It has been thought that it would not in any way be compatible with the general character of the duties and work of the Commission that it should constitute itself as a kind of tribunal to deliver judgments on differences between petitioners and the mandatory Power'. 'In view of the fact that the Commission' had 'not put forward any proposal,' Monsieur Undén took occasion 'to submit the question whether the Commission ought to be asked to draw up rules for the hearing of petitioners, to be submitted to the Council at a later session'. At the same time he stated his personal view that the Commission should be authorized to make such a draft proposal, but on this point he refrained from presenting a formal resolution to the Council until he had heard the views of his colleagues.

This draft resolution and suggestion evoked opposition from the representatives on the Council of four states (Great Britain, France,

Japan and Belgium) which happened to be not only Council Members but mandatory Powers; and observations in the same sense were made by the representatives of two other mandatory Powers (New Zealand and South Africa) who had been called to the Council table in accordance with the established principle that representatives of states non-members of the Council should always be invited to be present at any proceedings of the Council at which matters of concern to their countries were on the agenda.¹

Sir Austen Chamberlain, who opened the discussion, submitted that the 'immense questionnaire' which the Permanent Mandates Commission had now prepared was 'infinitely more detailed, infinitely more inquisitorial than the questionnaire which had hitherto been in force with the sanction of the Council', and that 'it raised the question of the true relative position of the mandatory Governments in a mandated territory and the Mandates Commission which examined their reports and the Council which took action as guardian under the terms of the Covenant'. He expressed the view—'and he knew that this feeling was shared by other Members of the League and of the British Empire who exercised mandatory authority'—that 'there was a tendency on the part of the Commission to extend its authority to a point where the Government would no longer be vested in the mandatory Power but in the Mandates Commission'—a development which 'was not the intention of the Covenant'. He therefore begged that the new draft questionnaire should be submitted to the various mandatory Governments for their consideration and comment before the Council took any decision upon it. He made the same motion in regard to the question 'whether it was desirable that the Mandates Commission should hear petitioners in person under any circumstances whatever, and if so what steps should be taken to formulate the conditions under which audition might be given to such people. This appeared to him a very extreme proposal.'² Here, even more strongly than in the case of the questionnaire, he thought it would be unwise, imprudent and even dangerous for the Council to take any decision until it had before it the observations of the various

¹ At this time four out of seven mandatory Powers were members of the Council—Great Britain, France and Japan in virtue of their permanent seats, and Belgium by election. The representatives of New Zealand and South Africa attended this meeting by invitation. The representative of the remaining mandatory Power, Australia, had not yet arrived at Geneva.

² It should be noted that the Commission, in the passage of their report which has been quoted above, expressly refrained from making any proposal or recommendation to the Council on this point, but simply referred it to the Council for consideration as a problem with which the Commission had been confronted in the discharge of their duties under the existing rules.—A.J.T.

mandatory Governments upon the suggestion (it was not a recommendation) made by the Mandates Commission'.

Sir Austen Chamberlain was supported in a few sentences by the representatives of Japan, Belgium and New Zealand, and at greater length and with greater warmth by those of France and South Africa. It may be noted that, apart from Monsieur Undén, no representative of a non-mandatory member of the Council spoke on this occasion,¹ and also that Monsieur Briand and Mr. Smit, the two speakers who approached most nearly to Sir Austen Chamberlain in the vigour of their language, represented the two mandatory Powers whose administration happened to have been accompanied by painful incidents. A frank allusion to this latter fact was made by Monsieur Briand:

He represented a nation which, in a certain mandated country, had been confronted with serious responsibilities and which had taken up a civilizing mission which was very difficult to carry out. Under the pretext of petitions, certain circles were indulging in intrigues with the object of rendering still more difficult for the mandatory Power the carrying out of its work. It was important that this kind of petition should be very closely examined. When it was only a question of receiving a petition and forwarding it to the mandatory Power, which in turn gave information to the Council, such a procedure was perfectly legitimate.² When, however, it was proposed in serious circumstances, at times when the responsibilities of the mandatory Power were greatest, to institute against the mandatory Power within the League of Nations a kind of oral inquisition and to set up a sort of tribunal to which all the discontented elements, even the least respectable among them, might bring their grievances, he thought that the League of Nations must refuse to go so far.³

¹ On the 4th September, however, Signor Scialoja (Italy) reserved his right to make certain reservations regarding certain proposals that had been made, in case these should come up again for discussion, on the ground that a question had been raised 'which involved the general interpretation of Article 22 of the Covenant'. From his declaration on this occasion it appeared that, if he had intervened in the discussion on the preceding day, he would have 'put forward conclusions different from those of his colleagues'.

² It may be noted that the Permanent Mandates Commission, at their extraordinary session of the 16th February-6th March, 1926, had before them 108 written petitions relating to the French mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon, 'all' of which had been 'submitted to the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission in conformity with the rules of procedure applicable to petitions relating to mandated territories approved by the Council on January 31st, 1923.' (League of Nations Document C. 174. M. 65. 1926. vi, pp. 171-3). All these petitions were duly forwarded to the mandatory Power, but no information was given by the mandatory Power in regard to any of them.—A.J.T.

³ The Permanent Mandates Commission had not suggested, as Monsieur Briand appears to have implied, that they could not discharge their duties effectively without giving audience to petitioners as a general rule. They had only suggested that this situation arose occasionally.—A.J.T.

To these criticisms an equally vigorous reply was made by the Vice-Chairman of the Mandates Commission, Monsieur van Rees. He declared himself deeply moved by

the reproach . . . which he had heard addressed to the Mandates Commission after five years of hard and conscientious work. . . . From the outset [the Commission] had never lost sight of the necessity of associating itself with the efforts made by the mandatory Powers. From the Constitution of 1920, it would be seen that the Mandates Commission had the right to bring before the Council any questions regarding the whole of the administration of the mandated territories which might be of interest to the Council. . . . The Commission . . . had, of course, desired to collect as much information as possible in order to form an enlightened opinion, but this legitimate desire in no way justified the imputations made.

The impression that the Permanent Mandates Commission had been subjected by the Council to heavy censure was not removed by the rather formal expressions of appreciation of the Commission's work with which Sir Austen Chamberlain opened and Monsieur Briand closed the discussion ; and this impression was confirmed by Monsieur Undén's consent to re-submit his resolution—for which he had obtained no support in its original form—in modified terms. Modified resolutions, which this time provided for the reference of both the contentious questions to the mandatory Powers for observations, were duly presented and adopted next day.

In consequence of this discussion in the Council, the question of the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission was also discussed in the Sixth Committee of the Assembly on the 21st September, 1926, on a resolution moved by Dr. Nansen (Norway) to the effect that :

The Assembly

Recalling the opinion of the Council that full latitude should be left to the Commission as regards reports, and its decision that the Commission should examine the whole administration of the mandatory Powers with a view to determining whether that administration had conformed to the interests of the native population ;

Desires to record its high appreciation of the admirable work done by the Permanent Mandates Commission, and of the tact, devotion and complete impartiality which it has shown in carrying out its difficult and delicate task.

The Assembly decides to transmit to the Council the Minutes of the discussions of the Sixth Committee on the question of Mandates and to invite the Council to take this record into consideration when the draft list of questions relative to the annual reports on B and C Mandates comes up for final discussion.

The work of the Commission was warmly praised by Dr. Nansen in his opening speech ; and the Commission—which on this occasion was

represented by two of its members who happened to be serving as delegates to the Assembly for their respective countries,¹ as well as by its Vice-Chairman—had an opportunity of explaining its point of view in a less unsympathetic atmosphere than that in which Monsieur van Rees had found himself a few weeks before. In the debate, however, Dr. Nansen's motion was deprecated in conciliatory terms by Lord Cecil (British Empire)—on the ground that 'nothing could be less desirable or more unfortunate than any appearance of an attempt to bring the Council to judgment'—and by Mr. Latham (Australia); and in blunter language by Mr. Smit (South Africa) and Monsieur de Jouvenel (France). The latter expressed the opinion that 'a petition was too often a weapon used against the Mandate and the mandatory Power. To be perfectly frank, he thought that the Mandates Commission had somewhat contributed to the prolongation of the revolt in Syria'.² This debate in the Sixth Committee of the Assembly ended in the appointment of a drafting committee composed of Lord Cecil (British Empire), Monsieur de Jouvenel (France), Count Bonin-Longare (Italy), Dr. Nansen (Norway), Monsieur Louwers (Belgium) and Mr. Latham (Australia), who eventually proposed a resolution by which the Assembly thanked the Permanent Mandates Commission 'for the devotion and the zeal with which it has carried out its delicate task'; and expressed its confidence in the members of this Commission, as well as in the members of the Council, to ensure the application of the principles of Article 22 of the Covenant in a cordial spirit of co-operation with the mandatory Powers.

¹ General Freire d'Andrade was one of the delegates from Portugal and Mme Bugge-Wicksell was a delegate substitute from Sweden.

² It may be noted that Monsieur de Jouvenel—who had held the High Commissionership of the French Republic in the mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon from November 1925 to July 1926 without being able to accomplish the very difficult task of bringing the insurrection there to an end (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 439–57)—had made a statement on his administration to the Permanent Mandates Commission during their ninth session on the 17th June, 1926. On this occasion, Monsieur de Jouvenel had been much exercised over petitions. They were the first subject which he mentioned in his statement, which in fact took the form of a reply to the allegations which certain of these petitions contained. In the autumn of 1926 the insurrection in Syria was still continuing; and on the 20th September (only three days before the debate in the League Assembly on the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission) the French representative at the forty-second session of the League Council, Monsieur Paul-Boncœur, had found it necessary to ask the Council to grant a six months' delay in the depositing of the draft organic statute for this mandated territory. On the 12th March, 1927, a further delay was notified to the Council by Monsieur Briand. In the opinion of the writer of this *Survey*, there was no evidence to support Monsieur de Jouvenel's charge.

This resolution was adopted by the Sixth Committee on the 24th September, 1926, and by the Assembly itself on the 25th.

Meanwhile, on the 17th September, the Secretary-General of the League, in pursuance of the instructions given by the Council on the 4th September, had requested the mandatory Powers to inform the Council of their views on the two matters of the new draft list of questions and the oral reception of petitions by the Permanent Mandates Commission; and on the 21st October a committee to consider questions connected with the work of the Permanent Mandates Commission was appointed by the British Imperial Conference, then sitting in London,¹ in which four mandatory Powers were participants. This committee—which consisted of the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the chair—reported on the 29th October² that they found themselves agreed upon the observations and proposals of a memorandum³ which had been specially prepared for them by His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain and that they approved the draft of a reply,⁴ dated (in anticipation) the 8th November, 1926, which that Government proposed to send to Geneva. In this reply, which was duly despatched, the Foreign Office, after reviewing the history of the two questions at issue, declared that

the mandatory Governments of the British Empire feel that both the proposals now put forward by the Mandates Commission are based on a misconception of the duties and responsibilities of the Commission and the Council. The theory that petitioners should have a means of making their grievances known is perfectly correct; but the Commission's suggestion that a hearing should be given to the petitioners is, they submit, an incorrect and dangerous application of the theory. The implication, in the new list of questions, that the Commission should claim to check and investigate every activity of the mandatory Power, is unnecessary for the purpose for which the mandatory system was established and irreconcilable with the principles laid down by Monsieur Hymans and accepted by the Council for its execution.

The view of His Majesty's Government is that there are the gravest objections to the grant of any form of audience by an advisory Commission of the League to petitioners who either are themselves inhabitants of a territory administered by His Majesty's Government under mandate, or are petitioning on behalf of inhabitants of such territories.

The mandatory Governments of the British Empire and His Majesty's

¹ See *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*. ² Text of their report in *Cmd.* 2769 of 1926, pp. 221-2.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 222-7.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 239-43, and also in *Cmd.* 2767 of 1926.

Government among them have shown themselves anxious at all times to afford to the Commission all the information that is material to the discharge of its responsible duties, but they submit that this purpose would be amply secured for the future if the list of questions were limited to its subject headings and the extreme minutiae of the sub-headings were omitted.

The other mandatory Powers, in their several replies, all concurred in declaring against the oral reception of petitions by the Permanent Mandates Commission and in criticizing the new draft questionnaire. The New Zealand Government contented themselves with expressing entire concurrence with the British Government's reply. The replies from the Belgian and the Japanese Governments were distinguished by the restraint of their criticisms and the considerateness of their tone.¹

After the receipt of these replies the Council, on the 10th December, 1926, adopted a resolution requesting the Permanent Mandates Commission 'to consider afresh the list of questions for annual reports of territories under B and C Mandates'; and 'to postpone until its session in March next consideration of the question of the hearing of petitioners by the Permanent Mandates Commission in certain exceptional cases'.

At the March session, Monsieur Doude van Troostwijk (Netherlands), who acted as *rapporteur* for the Council on the postponed question of the oral reception of petitions, reported² against any change in the procedure of the Permanent Mandates Commission in this matter—principally on the ground that the Commission, as had 'been very justly observed in the replies from the mandatory Powers', did 'not and must not possess the character of a court of justice when dealing with disputes between private petitioners and the mandatory Powers'.³ On the 7th March, 1927, the Council adopted a resolution proposed by the *rapporteur*, which expressed the opinion that there was no occasion to modify the procedure which had hitherto been followed by the Commission in regard to the hearing of petitioners and directed the Secretary-General to transmit to the Commission copies of the present resolution, of the report of the Netherlands representative and of the replies of the mandatory Powers.⁴

¹ Texts of all the replies in *League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1926, pp. 1646-53, and March 1927, pp. 314-15.

² Text of his report in *ibid.*, April 1927, pp. 437-8.

³ The Permanent Mandates Commission appear already to have followed the practice of ruling out of consideration all petitions which were within the competence of courts of law. (See 'Summary of the procedure to be followed in the matter of petitions concerning mandated territories'.—League of Nations document *C.P.M.* 558 (1)).—A.J.T.

⁴ A similar question of principle had been considered by the Council, and

This resolution of the Council closed one of the two general issues which had been raised in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on their ninth session.¹

With regard to the questionnaire the Commission, after giving due consideration to the opinions expressed during the sessions of the Council and of the Assembly in September 1926, as well as in the communications from the mandatory Powers, made the following observations in their report on their eleventh session (20th June to 6th July, 1927):

As is apparent from the Minutes of the Ninth Session and the introduction to the document itself, the 'List of Questions' was drawn up for the use of the mandatory Powers solely with a view of facilitating the preparation of the annual reports which these Powers are bound to submit to the Council under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant.

Therefore it is entirely for the mandatory Powers to decide whether they desire to use or not to use the 'List of Questions', according to whether they share or do not share the Commission's opinion as to its usefulness.

The Commission must leave it to the Council to decide whether it still considers it desirable after these explanations to adopt any recommendation to the mandatory Powers regarding this document.

3. In order to reply to certain remarks to which its action has given rise, the Permanent Mandates Commission would observe that, in drawing up this list, it took special care to introduce only such questions as had already been dealt with either in the reports from the mandatory Powers or verbally by the accredited representatives of these Powers.

In preparing this list, therefore, the Commission did not depart from the methods of work which, with the approval of the Council and the active co-operation of the mandatory Powers, it has always followed since it entered upon its duties.

4. The discussions to which the Council has drawn the Commission's attention and the replies from certain mandatory Powers would seem to imply that some modifications might be introduced in the methods of work hitherto employed by the Commission in order to assist the Council in its supervisory duties.

5. The Permanent Mandates Commission has, however, had the had been disposed of in a similar way, when Monsieur Branting had proposed that the Council should not only summon to Geneva the Governing Council of the Saar Territory but should give audience to the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the territory. Monsieur Branting let his proposal drop in deference to the opposition of Monsieur Hanotaux (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 82).

¹ The procedure to be followed in the matter of petitions concerning mandated territories, as left unmodified in virtue of the above-quoted decision of the Council, was afterwards set out by the Secretariat of the League in a summary which was examined and modified in certain points by the Permanent Mandates Commission during their twelfth session (24th October-11th November, 1927). In the form approved by the Commission, this summary was then published as League of Nations document *C.P.M.* 558 (1).

satisfaction of noting that the annual reports of the mandatory Powers, as well as the statements of the accredited representatives during its present session, show, by the fullness and detailed nature of the information given with regard to every branch of the administrations' activities, that the readiness and good will of the mandatory Powers to facilitate the work of the Commission have in no way diminished. The Commission hopes, and has no doubt, that this will always be the case, for it is only on this essential condition that it can, in the future as in the past, fulfil its task.

Meanwhile, another general issue concerning the constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission had been raised by the admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations on the 8th September, 1926, namely, whether the membership of the Commission should be increased from ten to eleven in order to enable the Council to appoint an additional member of German nationality.¹ Briefly, the arguments in favour of such an addition to the membership of the Commission were first that, in as much as the territories under 'B' and 'C' Mandates were all former German possessions, there must exist in Germany a unique fund of knowledge and experience in regard to the administration of these territories and that if the Commission were enabled to draw upon this fund their power of effective action could not fail to be increased. The second argument was that a German member of the Commission would presumably be zealous for the strict execution of the Mandates for these former German possessions which had been conferred upon other Powers, seeing that Germany had been deprived of her dominion over these territories on the declared ground that she had shown herself unfit to govern backward peoples.² This last proposition was of course controversial to an extreme degree; but happily the issue was not determined by memories of old controversies—coloured, as these were, by the passions which had prevailed on both sides during the General War of 1914–18—but by the policy which Germany had pursued consistently, from the Locarno Conference of the 5th–16th October, 1925, onwards, in regard to the League of Nations. In spite of certain setbacks and discouragements,³ the successive German Governments in which Herr Stresemann had served as Foreign Minister had made

¹ The original membership of the Commission had already been increased from nine to ten by the addition of a Swiss citizen, Monsieur Rappard, who had been the first head of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

² See the letter, dated the 16th June, 1919, and signed by Monsieur Clémenceau, covering the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 258 of 1919, p. 7).

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A.

it clear—from the moment when the admission of Germany to membership in the League with a permanent seat on the Council had become an integral part of the policy of the other Locarno Powers—that they intended to exercise the rights and powers which would thus accrue to Germany in a broad-minded way. They had shown no disposition to take advantage of petty tactical opportunities in order to recover this or that fraction of the *terrain* which had been lost by Germany in the Peace Treaty, but had set themselves the more ambitious task of restoring the moral prestige of Germany in the world by demonstrating that she could play as effective a part as any other permanent member of the League Council in the reconstruction of international society.

In the matter of the reinforcement of the Permanent Mandates Commission by the appointment of an additional member of German nationality, the first step appears to have been taken by the Assembly of the League on the 25th September, 1926, in adopting the budget for the ninth financial period (1927). In the note to the schedule of figures relating to the Permanent Mandates Commission, it was put on record that one reason for an increase which had been made in the sum provided under this head was 'in order to allow for the possible appointment of a member of German nationality'.¹ The next step seems to have been taken by Herr Stresemann in May 1927, when he let it be known to his colleagues on the Council of the League that he would be glad to obtain their support for a German application for a seat on the Permanent Mandates Commission which he proposed to bring before the Council at its forthcoming session in June.² On the 16th June, 1927, the item above-mentioned in the budget of the League came before the Council; and the Council decided to refer the question first to the Permanent Mandates Commission itself, 'with the hope'—to quote the words employed by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Acting President of the Council, in making this proposal—'that it would welcome the contemplated addition and that in the month of September the Council would be able to make the appointment'. In consequence, the question came before the Permanent Mandates Commission at their eleventh session and was discussed by them in a private sitting on the 6th July, 1927. Although the Council, on the preceding 16th June, had publicly based its reference of the question to the Commission on grounds of courtesy towards that body, the Commission, in dealing with it, displayed a

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, January 1927, p. 26.

² See a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th May, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.

caution which was perhaps not unnatural in view of their experiences in their relations with the Council since September 1926. In their report they declared that they were 'unanimous in observing that the Council, in referring the matter' to them had 'only desired them to state whether there were any technical objections to the proposal'; that the majority of the members of the Commission 'concurred in the view that there was no technical objection to the appointment of a new member'; and that the minority were 'prepared to welcome whatever decision the Council might think fit to take', but considered that the Commission 'should abstain from expressing an opinion on account of the political character of the question'.¹

The Council, after considering this passage in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the 8th September, proceeded next day to the appointment of Dr. Ludwig Kastl, who duly took his seat at the twelfth session of the Commission (24th October–11th November, 1927). Dr. Kastl was a former German official who had been in South-West Africa from 1910 to 1920—first as a member of the German administrative service on the economic and financial side and afterwards as Commissioner accredited by the German Government to the Occupying Administration, in the interval between the conquest of the territory by the South African forces in 1915 and the inauguration of the Mandate in 1920. From Dr. Kastl's record, it would appear that the Commission stood to gain in authority and efficiency by this addition to their numbers.

(iv) The Personnel of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

The organization of the Secretariat of the League of Nations was dealt with in Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. They provided for a Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, who was named in the Annex to the Covenant. His successors were to be nominated by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly: the rest of the staff by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council. The Director of the International Labour Office was to be appointed by the Governing Body, and the staff by the Director.² The Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice were to appoint their Registrar and Deputy-Registrar, from the candidates nominated by the states adhering to the Statute of the Court, and the Registrar was to appoint his staff.³

¹ The majority view seems to have been supported by six votes, as against three abstentions.

² Treaty of Versailles, Articles 394 and 395.

³ Documents of the Court, Series D, No. 1, Statute of the Court; Rules of the Court, Articles 17 and 20.

At the first meeting of the Organization Committee of the League, which took place in May 1919 and consisted of representatives of the nine original states members of the Council, a resolution was passed authorizing the Secretary-General to engage a temporary staff and offices.¹ The Organization Committee also informed Sir Eric Drummond that he was to take as Under-Secretaries nationals of France, Italy and Japan.² The officials appointed under this instruction were Monsieur Jean Monnet, Deputy Secretary-General, and Dr. Inazo Nitobe and Commendatore Anzilotti, Under Secretaries-General. By 1928 the League Secretariat had a staff of 538 persons representing 47 different nationalities, the International Labour Office a staff of rather less than 400, and the Permanent Court a staff of 21, apart from the 11 Judges.

The principles underlying the staff organization were set forth on the 19th May, 1920, in a report to the Council from Mr. (afterwards Lord) Balfour,³ of which the most interesting passage ran as follows:

By the terms of the Treaty, the duty of selecting the staff falls upon the Secretary-General, just as the duty of approving it falls upon the Council. In making his appointments, he had primarily to secure the best available men and women for the particular duties which had to be performed: but, in doing so, it was necessary to have regard to the great importance of selecting the officials from various nations. Evidently, no one nation or group of nations ought to have a monopoly in providing the material for this international institution. I emphasize the word 'international' because the members of the Secretariat, once appointed, are no longer the servants of the country of which they are citizens, but become for the time being servants only of the League of Nations. Their duties are not national but international.

This was the root of the matter. Yet there were certain difficulties inherent in the situation and from time to time these difficulties caused the personnel of the several organs of the League to become a subject of public discussion. From the first, certain far-sighted Foreign Offices, notably that of France, had realized the value of the new international organization at Geneva for diplomatic purposes. During the years 1924 to 1926 this realization became general: and, instead of more or less 'unprofessional' delegates, Foreign Ministers became regular attendants at the Council and the Assembly. These diplomatic representatives did not fail to observe either the competence of the Secretariat, which was often praised at this time in Assembly speeches, or the influence exercised by officials who from

¹ Assembly Document 32, 20/48/32.

² Statement by Sir Eric Drummond to the Fourth Committee of the Ninth Assembly on the 14th September, 1928.

³ *League of Nations Official Journal*, June 1920, pp. 136-9.

time to time were meeting most of the statesmen responsible for international policy. The result was a virtual competition between the Powers to secure the highest posts for their own nominees, and the nomination of diplomatic candidates when vacancies occurred.

The nationality problem was complicated by the fact that in the early days the staff was preponderantly British and French. This was inevitable because of the two official languages of the League; the staff must know either English or French perfectly, and should know both. It was soon felt that efforts must be made to find room for representatives of other nations, especially in the administrative staff, and from 1922 onwards, except for interpreters, British and French nationals were not appointed. The question came to a head, however, in 1928 over the senior posts. There was a general feeling that the Secretariat was losing its early impartiality; and certain appointments were thought to show that certain states were inclined to claim a leading post as their right, and that this matter was governed by political considerations. Moreover, whereas the senior posts at the outset had been distributed between two diplomats and eight professors or journalists, by 1928 as many as seven of them were held by diplomats. Lastly, during 1928 several able members of the staff took up other careers, apparently because they felt that the system of appointing departmental heads from outside destroyed any reasonable prospect of promotion. To sum up: the growing realization of the importance of the Secretariat seemed to be resulting in political appointments being made to please certain Governments; in the importation of diplomats who were thought to act rather as ambassadors for their native countries than as members of an international service; and in a diminution of the attractions afforded to able young men and women by a career in the Secretariat.

In the summer of 1928 public interest in the subject was strong enough to evoke a resolution of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, and considerable publicity was given to the issue at stake by two articles on the League staff in *The Times*.¹ The writer, Professor S. de Madariaga, wrote with authority, as he had recently been Director of the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat. His view was that 'a national hierarchy has replaced the hierarchy of competence'; and he asked for a thorough enquiry in order 'to ensure the fair promotion of the staff on grounds of competence irrespective of nationality, and, as a corollary, to break the monopoly of the highest posts now held by the Great Powers, and to stipulate that, as a principle, members of diplomatic services must

¹ *The Times*, 4th and 5th September, 1928.

not be appointed to positions above the category of members of section'.

The Ninth Assembly, stimulated in part by these articles, reviewed the problem, which was ventilated in the Fourth (Budget) Committee. Monsieur Hambro of Norway alluded to the public uneasiness regarding the change in the professional antecedents of the higher staff. Diplomats, he suggested, were unsuitable because 'a diplomatic career was essentially, more than any other, a national career'. 'There had been an extension of the influence of Foreign Offices in the work of the League.' He maintained that no Government ought to try to influence appointments or to consider that it had a right to any single post, but he declared that, nevertheless, great numbers of positions were reserved for certain special members of the League. 'All the members of the Committee were aware of the high ideas with which the Secretary-General was inspired. Rightly or wrongly, however, there was an impression that not all in these high positions in the Secretariat had the same feeling, and that it had not been possible for the Secretariat to escape the pressure of certain Governments or nationalities which had not the same understanding of the relation between national and international ideas.' Monsieur Hambro suggested the appointment of a small committee of the Secretariat to make a preliminary report on staff regulations. Monsieur van Eysinga of Holland quoted the Balfour Report of 1920, and declared that its governing principle was 'no monopoly', whereas the five highest offices in the Secretariat were now held by nationals of the five Permanent Council Members, while three of these officials had staffs of their own compatriots. 'All these services appeared to be embassies of the Great Powers. Of the 18 officials of the first class drawing the maximum salary, 14 belonged to the 5 Powers and 4 to other States, of the total 66 members of the first class 34 were nationals of the Great Powers and 32 of other countries. The officials must be influenced by these conditions, especially as the Secretariat was organized on aristocratic lines.' He proposed a resolution, afterwards adopted by the Assembly.

Monsieur Reveillaud (France) said that 'no criticism had ever been made of the way in which the French officials of the Secretariat understood their international duties, and that no one had ever been able to say that the French Government had given them instructions, or had ever made any suggestion that they should depart for a single instant from the strict neutrality which should be observed by officials of the League of Nations'. He supported Monsieur Hambro's suggestion for a revision of staff regulations.

Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General, said that 'in no case had a Government forced one single appointment on him. It might be that a Government had suggested certain names for a given post, but he had never taken from amongst these names any one which he did not think was really fit for the position. . . . If a man was really the right man for the post, whether he was a University Professor or a diplomatist or politician, he ought to be appointed without taking into consideration the career which he followed. He was not responsible for the monopoly, which had been created at Paris before his own appointment. . . . He did not know how much longer he would be able to continue to hold his office. There were two factors which to him were perfectly decisive. The first was that he would immediately resign if there was any attempt (there never had been any: he wanted to make that clear) on the part of the British Government to influence his action as Secretary-General of the League. He would not hesitate a moment, not a second. The second was even more important: he did not wish to continue unless he was assured that he possessed the confidence of the Members of the League as a whole'.

A long debate was held upon the staff of the International Labour Office, the gravamen of the charge here being the preponderance of French and to a lesser degree of British officials in the higher ranks. The Director, Monsieur Albert Thomas, however, insisted that he would choose his experts where he found them regardless of their nationality, and refused to pledge himself to any attempt to redress the international balance.

Finally, the Assembly passed two resolutions. The first endorsed the principles concerning the staff of the Secretariat contained in the Balfour Report of 1920, and expressed the belief that

the observance of these principles constitutes an essential factor in the confidence which the Members of the League of Nations repose in the Secretariat. The Assembly [the resolution continued] relies on the Secretary-General and on the Council, which, in virtue of Article 6 of the Covenant, is responsible for approving the nominations made by the Secretary-General, to uphold in their entirety the principles stated above.

The Assembly requests the Council to submit to the Members of the League of Nations in good time before the tenth ordinary session of the Assembly a list of the appointments, promotions and resignations of officials of the rank of Members of Section and above that have taken place since the present session of the Assembly and of the salaries allotted in each case.

The second resolution referred to the staff regulations drawn up shortly after the organization of the Secretariat—'certain modifica-

tions' in which 'would appear desirable to remedy certain disadvantages to which attention had been drawn'—and instructed

the competent officials of the autonomous organizations, after examining the present situation and the improvements which might be made, to consider what steps—in particular, amendments to the Staff Regulations—could be taken to ensure, in the future as in the past, the best possible administrative results, and to submit the results of this enquiry to the Supervisory Commission, in order that a report on the question may be communicated to the Assembly at its next ordinary session.

(v) The Budget of the League of Nations.¹

For eight months before the official birthday of the League of Nations on the 10th January, 1920, the Secretary-General had been building up an organization and collecting an international Secretariat. The expenses of the League during this preliminary period—which was extended, for financial purposes, to the 30th June, 1920—were necessarily high. The budget of this first financial period was approved by the Council in May 1920. It was for a total of £250,000, of which £144,000 was for the direct expenses of the Secretariat and £106,000 for indirect expenses. The latter figure covered the cost of various technical organizations which had been established; and it also included the expenses of the International Labour Office (£58,000) and of the Permanent Court of International Justice (£3,100). The budget for the period 1st July to 31st December, 1920, which was approved by the Council at San Sebastian on the 5th August, 1920, was drawn up in gold francs.² It was for a total of 8,275,000 gold francs—3,275,000 for the direct expenses of the Secretariat; 1,750,000 for indirect expenses (including 150,000 for the Permanent Court); and 3,250,000 for the International Labour Organization. The budget for 1921, which was adopted by the Assembly on the 17th December, 1920, was for a total of 21,250,000 gold francs. Particulars of this budget, and of those adopted each year by subsequent sessions of the Assembly, are given in a table at the end of this section.

None of the various methods of financial administration in use in

¹ See *The League of Nations: Financial Administration and Apportionment of Expenses* (Information Section of the League of Nations Secretariat, Geneva, January 1928). See also the reports of the Fourth Committee to the successive sessions of the Assembly published in the Assembly Records and, from the Fourth Assembly onwards, reproduced in the *League of Nations Official Journal* (January 1924, January 1925, January 1926, January 1927, January 1928 and November 1928).

² The first budget had been drawn up in sterling, partly because the headquarters of the Secretariat during the preliminary period of organization had been in London. On the 19th May, 1920, the Council decided that the gold franc should be the monetary unit in future.

different countries was found to be entirely suitable for the needs of the League of Nations, and a system of control had to be evolved gradually during the first three or four years of the League's existence. In September 1924 the Fourth Committee of the Fifth Assembly was able to record, as a matter for congratulation, 'the fact that the finances of the League of Nations, both of the Secretariat and of the autonomous organizations, are now perfectly organized.'

Under the system thus gradually evolved, the provisional budgets of the Secretariat, the International Labour Office and the Permanent Court of International Justice were examined in the May of each year by the Supervisory Commission,¹ which rigidly scrutinized every item in order to ensure that expenditure was kept at the lowest possible level. After the draft budget had been revised in the light of the Supervisory Commission's recommendations, it was circulated to the Governments of states members, three months before the meeting of the Assembly, in order that they might be in a position to make any criticisms or suggestions during the session of the Assembly. The budget was not submitted to the plenary session of the Assembly for approval until it had been carefully examined by the Fourth Committee, which was responsible for all questions of finance and administration. Although the Fourth Committee generally found it necessary to sanction certain items of additional expenditure not included in the original budget, as the result of new work undertaken by the Assembly or other unexpected developments, it usually succeeded in effecting reductions which more than balanced the increases, and which on one occasion (in 1921) diminished the draft budget by more than 3,000,000 francs.²

As the table at the end of this section shows, the total expenditure estimated for in the budget tended to grow larger as the years went on; and although the increase in expenditure appeared to be relatively small in comparison with the increase in the work and responsibilities of the League (between 1922 and 1926 the staff increased by 27 per cent. and the budget by only 5 per cent.),³ the upward tendency aroused a certain amount of apprehension among the states members of the League. In September 1926 the Fourth Committee of the

¹ This Commission had been appointed by the Second Assembly, in September 1921, with the duty of supervising the financial working of the Secretariat of the League, the International Labour Office and the Permanent Court, and dealing with any special matters of administration which might be referred to it.

² The budget for 1922 was reduced by the Fourth Committee from 23,768,846 to 20,758,945 gold francs. In 1923, a net reduction of 1,636,934 gold francs was made on the budget for 1924.

³ See the report of the Fourth Committee to the Eighth Assembly (*League of Nations Official Journal*, January 1928).

Seventh Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by the representative of India which recommended that, in view of the existing financial condition of most countries, every effort should be made to resist the tendency of the budget to increase, and that, as a general guide to the consideration of the budget, it would be desirable to keep in view a maximum limit of expenditure which would ensure that the contributions of individual states members should not, in future, normally exceed their contributions for the current year. The Fourth Committee of the Seventh Assembly also suggested, as a possible measure of economy, that the attention of advisory committees and conferences convened by the League should be drawn to the heavy expense of publishing their minutes in full and that they should be asked to consider the alternative of publishing detailed reports of their work. It was also suggested that the minutes of sub-committees should only be published in cases where special reasons for publication could be shown to exist.

The question of publications was again discussed by the Fourth Committee of the Eighth Assembly in September 1927, but since the Secretary-General reported that the Publications Department had recently been reorganized and that receipts from publications were steadily increasing, the Committee did not think it necessary to make any further recommendations on this occasion. A year later, the Fourth Committee of the Ninth Assembly noted with satisfaction that receipts from the sale of publications had increased considerably, but at the same time the suggestion which had been made at the Seventh Assembly in 1926 was taken up again. On the proposal of the British delegate, the Fourth Committee decided to emphasize its desire to reduce the high cost of publishing the minutes of committees by submitting to the Assembly the following draft resolution:

The Assembly decides that excepting in the case of the Mandates Commission and committees of the Assembly where special considerations apply, the minutes of committees and sub-committees will in no case be published unless a formal request, containing a statement of the reasons for such a course, is submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General.

This resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly on the 26th September, 1928, affected about a dozen standing committees dealing with questions concerning disarmament, arbitration and security, with economic and financial matters, with communications and transit, with the codification of international law and with health, opium and other social questions. If the resolution were to be rigorously carried out, the public would be deprived of detailed information regarding some of the most important activities of the League

and would be forced to rely upon condensed and generalized reports. The Assembly's acceptance of the Fourth Committee's resolution therefore caused widespread concern. The Health Committee, which met shortly after the close of the Assembly, petitioned the Council on the 31st October, in the prescribed manner, for permission to continue the publication of its minutes, and by the end of November similar requests had been received from the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium, the Committee on Communications and Transit, the Special Commission for the Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and the Committee on Arbitration and Security. These petitions were considered by the Council during its fifty-third session in December 1928, and on the 11th December the Council decided to modify the Assembly's resolution to the extent of giving general permission for the printing of the minutes of all these committees.

Meanwhile, larger financial questions had been discussed in September 1928 during the ninth session of the League Assembly.

The total budget of the League for 1929, as it came before the Fourth Committee of the Ninth Assembly after having passed the scrutiny of the Supervisory Commission, amounted to 26,869,244 gold francs, involving an increase of approximately 7 per cent.¹ over the budget for the preceding year; and on this occasion an 'economy campaign' was opened by the British delegation, representing the state member to which the highest number of contribution units² had

¹ Or 6 per cent. according to the resolution of the Fourth Committee which is referred to below. (In this connexion the Committee were perhaps only referring to the budget of the Secretariat and special organizations, and not to the total budget of the League).

² The Covenant of the League (paragraph 5 of Article 6) had stipulated that 'the expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.' The Universal Postal Union's system of allocation of expenses provided for the classification of member states into a number of different categories, each of which was rated at a given number of units—the proportion of the expenses payable by each state being fixed by the ratio which its number of units bore to the total number of units. The original classification of the states members of the League based on that of the Universal Postal Union gave rise to general discontent and the system was gradually modified in order to make the assessment of each state correspond more closely with its capacity to pay. In the year 1928 the maximum at which a state could be rated was 105 units and the minimum one unit. Great Britain was the only state assessed at the highest rate, and her original assessment for the year 1929 amounted only to 2,878,052·10 gold francs or about £115,000. (The final contribution due from Great Britain for the year 1929 was only about £107,160.) The minimum contribution for 1929, payable by states rated at one unit, was 5,288·86 gold francs.

been allocated, with the active support of the Indian delegation, representing a state member which had always regarded itself as being assessed rather high, and which was also inclined to consider that an undue proportion of the League's energies had so far been devoted to European affairs.¹ On the 11th September, at a meeting of the Fourth Committee, the British delegate moved a reduction of the total by one million gold francs, while the Italian delegate moved that the total should be fixed at twenty-five million gold francs as a permanent maximum. The budget, in so far as it related to the Secretariat and special organizations, was defended by the Secretary-General, who pointed out that the proposed increase (with the exception of 50,000 francs proposed for the settlement of Armenian refugees in Erivan) was due entirely to provisions for expenditure arising out of decisions taken by the Assembly itself in the preceding year and was accounted for by four items, under the heads of the Economic and Financial Organization, the Transit Organization, the Central Opium Board, and a conference on the codification of international law. He also pointed out how small the total contributions of states members, and *a fortiori* the proposed increases in their contributions, were when measured by the scale of their respective national expenditures.² In the debate in the Fourth Committee, the British and Italian motions were opposed by the Netherlands delegate, who received support from the French delegate. Monsieur Colijn deprecated the idea of imposing a permanent maximum budget upon a young and growing organization like the League, and reminded his colleagues of the fine record of the League in those economic and financial activities which actually accounted for the proposed increases for the forthcoming year. The sense of the Committee seems to have been on Monsieur Colijn's side and the British and Italian motions were withdrawn in favour of a resolution recommending economy, particularly under the five heads above-mentioned, without suggesting specific reductions in figures. On the 17th September, 1928, the budget of the International Labour Organization for 1929, which likewise showed an increase on the budget of that body for the preceding year, was criticized, in its

¹ This point was made by Lord Lytton on the 26th September, 1928, at the plenary meeting of the Assembly in which the total budget for 1929, as modified by the Fourth Committee, was adopted.

² For example, the final total contribution of the United Kingdom to the League budget for 1929 was about £107,160 as compared with a contribution of about £98,600 towards the budget for 1928. On the other hand, the national budget of the United Kingdom for the British financial year 1928-9 amounted to over £800,000,000 without taking account of supplementary estimates. It was pointed out by Sir Eric Drummond that supplementary credits could not be obtained by the League, since the Assembly met only once a year.

turn, by the British delegate on the Fourth Committee, this time supported by his Norwegian colleague, and was vigorously defended by the Director of the International Labour Office, not only on its merits, but on constitutional grounds. The financial control over the International Labour Office, as provided for by the League Council during its session at San Sebastian in August 1920, was indeed somewhat anomalous. The budget had first to be approved by the Governing Body of the Office, on which the representatives of some Governments sat side by side with representatives of employers and of Labour; yet on this, as on the other parts of the total budget of the League, the final decision lay with the League Assembly, on which the same Governments were represented together with the Governments of all other states members of the League. On this occasion Monsieur Thomas objected that the items in his budget for 1929 which were being criticized by the British and Norwegian delegates on the Fourth Committee of the League Assembly in September 1929 had been expressly approved, on behalf of the British and Norwegian Governments, by their delegates on the Governing Body of the Office in the preceding April. Monsieur Thomas argued that the British and Norwegian Governments were bound in September by the approval which had been given in their names six months before; and their delegates on the Fourth Committee of the Assembly seem to have admitted the force of this contention, for the opposition was withdrawn. This withdrawal, however, did not dispose of the constitutional question in principle, since the Governments of the majority of states members of the League were not represented on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office and therefore could not be bound by that body's approval of the budget of the Office before the submission of the budget to the Assembly.

Meanwhile, the Labour Office budget for 1929 was accepted by the Fourth Committee of the Ninth Assembly as it stood; and the total budget of the League for 1929, so far from being reduced, eventually emerged from the Fourth Committee's hands with a net addition of 157,036 gold francs, making a total of 27,026,280. In this form, it was duly adopted, on the 26th September, 1928, by the Assembly in plenary session.

BUDGET OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

[Figures in gold Francs.]

	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Assembly and Council Meetings	750,000*	1,000,000	700,000	532,500	774,500	1,025,000	967,000	977,900	981,500
General Services of Secretariat	5,915,000	6,145,050	6,784,945	6,150,661	6,196,861	6,597,234	7,208,274	7,611,876	7,885,530
Special Organizations:									
Administrative Commissions and Minority Questions	—	200,000	413,157	333,394	330,481	329,107	352,739	356,817	339,438
Economic and Financial Mandates	760,000	1,574,000	1,339,318	1,208,020	1,171,127	1,300,594	1,491,746	1,391,031	1,750,385
Transit	100,000	222,500	205,100	206,328	224,857	203,878	250,038	260,884	252,589
Health	500,000	491,250	790,250	305,735	407,373	332,484	366,983	344,551	397,863
Social Questions ¹	400,000	392,125	700,500	641,120	809,764	988,165	996,700	992,638	1,019,957
Refugees and Repatriation of Prisoners of War ²	150,000	192,500	217,500	267,413	241,921	356,914	275,181	286,817	525,301
Limitation of Armaments	150,000	144,000	293,000	203,000	—	50,000*	15,100*	—	50,000*
Intellectual Co-operation and International Bureaux &c.	250,000	500,000	791,000	604,458	1,226,795	838,475	1,067,047	1,067,523	1,101,605
Other Organizations	100,000*	100,000	175,000	107,720	100,905	139,153	207,132	230,208	242,417
Unforeseen Expenditure	125,000	290,000	292,000	75,000	172,550	184,000	136,000	96,000	52,500
	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	—	—	—	—
Total Special Organizations	3,035,000	4,406,375	5,722,825	4,452,288	5,245,973	4,742,770	5,197,066	5,036,407	5,725,055
Permanent Equipment &c.	2,000,000	1,486,910	1,263,016	1,157,000	1,142,000	1,088,000	1,188,000	1,183,000	1,171,000
Refund of Expenses (Vilna Plebiscite)	—	—	422,260	—	—	—	—	—	—
Loss on Exchange	—	—	200,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
Working Capital Fund	1,890,000	—	500,000	2,077,774	50,000	—	—	—	—
International Labour Office	7,010,000	6,135,610	8,200,462	7,032,295	7,340,595	7,114,938	7,431,724	7,958,470	8,612,640
Permanent Court of International Justice	650,000	1,500,000	1,880,900	1,920,168	1,908,299	1,907,691	2,143,777	2,171,104	2,255,555
Buildings at Geneva	—	—	—	—	—	1,375,000	1,375,000	1,375,000	1,445,000
Total budget	21,250,000	20,873,945	25,673,508	23,328,686	22,658,138	22,930,633	24,512,341	25,393,817	27,026,280

¹ Estimated expenditure on Assembly only; included in direct expenditure of Secretariat. ² Includes Traffic in Women and Children and Opium.
³ Estimated expenditure on Repatriation of Prisoners of War is included only in the budgets for 1921 and 1922.
⁴ Estimated expenditure on International Bureaux and Commissions only.
⁵ From 1925 onwards the greater part of the estimated expenditure on refugees was included in the budget of the International Labour Office.
⁶ Estimated expenditure on Armenian Settlement Scheme.

PART II

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

(i) Italy and South-Eastern Europe

(a) THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ITALY.

IN the preceding volume, some account has been given¹ of the steps taken by Italy, during the years 1926 and 1927, to build up an Italian 'system' of alliances and ententes in South-Eastern Europe; and it has been mentioned that the pursuit of this policy at Rome had a disturbing effect, not only upon the local international situation in the region directly concerned, but also upon relations between Italy and France.

Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Franco-Italian relations had been strained by conflicts of interest in North Africa; and the tension had increased since the close of the General War of 1914-18 and since the establishment of the Fascist régime in Italy. These two latter events had the further effect of extending the area of Franco-Italian tension to South-Eastern Europe, where the break-up of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the eclipse of Russia had left the field open for other Powers to compete for political hegemony. France had begun to build up her 'system' in South-Eastern Europe on the morrow of the Armistice of 1918; and when Italy definitely followed her into this field in the spring of 1926, Franco-Italian relations took a fresh turn for the worse, with untoward effects upon the European situation as a whole. The most delicate moment came (as Signor Mussolini remarked, in retrospect, in the course of a speech delivered in the Senate at Rome on the 5th June, 1928)² in November 1927 when, on the 11th and 22nd of the same month, a Franco-Yugoslav treaty of amity and arbitration was signed at Paris and an Italo-Albanian treaty of defensive alliance at Tirana.³

During the year 1928 Italy not only kept alive the friendships which she had made during the previous two years—for example, with Hungary, with Rumania, and with Bulgaria⁴—but extended

¹ *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Sections (i), (ii) and (iv).

² A translation of this speech is printed in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume of this *Survey*.

³ *Survey for 1927*, p. 182.

⁴ On the 10th August, 1928, the French and British representatives at Sofia made a joint *démarche* to the Bulgarian Government, recommending that vigorous measures should be taken against the Macedonian Revolutionary

her 'system' farther afield by *rapprochements* towards Poland in one direction and towards Greece and Turkey in another. The activity with which she continued to conduct her foreign policy was indicated by a series of visits from foreign statesmen during the early months of the year. The Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Titulescu, stayed in Rome from the 24th January to the close of the month and conferred there with Signor Mussolini.¹ The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Bethlen, had an informal interview with Signor Mussolini at Milan on the 5th April;² and later in the same month a party of Italian senators, deputies, and other notables paid a state visit to Hungary and were received with demonstrations of enthusiasm, to which they replied with warm expressions of Italian regard for Hungary.³ During the same month, Signor Mussolini was visited by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rüşdi Beğ, by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Mikhalakópulos,⁴ and by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Zaleski. Signor Mussolini's conversations with Rüşdi Beğ were followed by the signature of an Italo-Turkish pact of neutrality and conciliation on the 30th May;⁵ and in his speech in the Senate on the 5th June, he expressed the hope that this would prove to be the first of three bipartite instruments to link together Italy, Turkey and Greece. On the same occasion, he denied that, in his conversations with Monsieur Zaleski, there had been any question of translating the friendship between Italy and Poland into a political treaty.

Organization while its ranks were divided as a consequence of the murder on the 7th July of General Protogerov, one of the leaders of the Organization. The Italian representative at Sofia, after consultation with his Government, refused to take part in this joint *démarche*. The Anglo-French representations were followed by a prolonged political crisis, which turned on the question whether General Volkov, the Minister for War, should remain in the Cabinet or not. General Volkov, who was accused by his opponents of reluctance to take any action against the Macedonians, had recently visited Rome, and the final decision to reappoint him to the Ministry for War when the Cabinet was reconstituted in the middle of September was represented in some quarters as a victory of Italian diplomacy over that of France, Great Britain and Jugoslavia.

¹ The purpose of Monsieur Titulescu's visit to Rome in January 1928 was avowedly political. On the other hand, it was denied that there was any political significance in a visit which another Rumanian statesman, Monsieur Duca, paid to Florence in April 1928.

² For Count Bethlen's state visit to Rome in April 1927, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 159-60.

³ The maintenance of the Italo-Hungarian entente was not confined to exchanges of courtesies. A definitive commercial treaty, to replace the provisional commercial treaty of the 20th July, 1925, was signed at Rome on the 4th July, 1928.

⁴ For Rüşdi Beğ's and Monsieur Mikhalakópulos's visits, see p. 159 below.

⁵ See p. 158 below.

On their part, Monsieur Zaleski and Monsieur Titulescu both took care to make it plain that their policy was not conducted on the principle that 'It is well to be off with the old love before you are on with the new'. In a statement given to the press on the 26th January, 1928, at Rome, Monsieur Titulescu declared that there was not 'any contradiction between loyal and active co-operation between Italy and Rumania and the interests of the Little Entente, which was created by post-war necessities and is a defensive alliance intended for the maintenance of peace within the boundary of existing treaties'. Again, Monsieur Zaleski, before leaving Warsaw for Rome, declared that Poland was linked to the Little Entente by the common ideal of maintaining peace on the basis of the integrity of the existing treaties; that, while the Treaty of Trianon did not touch Polish interests directly, it did constitute a factor in the general policy of Poland; and that it would be an absurdity on Poland's part to show herself indifferent to the integrity of the frontiers of the Little Entente states.

Meanwhile, in France, both the Government and the press continued to observe the activity of the Italian Government in foreign affairs with the same self-restraint and common sense that they had displayed in previous years; and in 1928 they had their reward.

Looking back on the 5th June, 1928, to the situation in November 1927, Signor Mussolini found himself able to declare that, during the intervening half-year, a long distance had been travelled on the road towards a clarification and stabilization of Franco-Italian relations on the political plane; and in this context he paid a tribute to a speech which Monsieur Briand had delivered in the French Chamber on the 30th November, 1927.¹ On this occasion, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that he had always been ready, at any time, to enter into conversations with the Italian Government; that he would gladly meet Signor Mussolini forthwith; that he was prepared to examine all suggestions for agreement on pacts of friendship and arbitration that would bring the two countries together; that the whole French Government were in favour of this policy; and that he himself was firmly convinced that, in spite of the friction of the moment, an agreement would be reached. On the 3rd December, on the eve of his departure from Paris to attend a meeting of the League of Nations Council at Geneva, Monsieur Briand followed up these conciliatory words by the positive act of signing, with the Italian Ambassador, a *modus vivendi* to regulate at once the position of individuals and corporate bodies of either nationality on the territory

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 184.

of the other country.¹ These two gestures of Monsieur Briand's were taken as an augury of an improvement in Franco-Italian relations by Signor Mussolini in a statement which he made to the Council of Ministers at Rome on the 15th December, 1927. He went on to express his belief that a broad, cordial and durable understanding with France was not only possible and desirable but even necessary for Italy. He added that such an understanding must be based upon the elimination of all concrete causes of friction between the two countries, and that a preliminary examination of these problems was shortly to be made through the regular diplomatic channels, with a view to an eventual meeting between responsible Ministers.

Monsieur Briand's overture and Signor Mussolini's response had an immediate effect upon public opinion in either country with regard to the other—thus producing the psychological conditions for a settlement which had hitherto been conspicuously lacking. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the preliminary diplomatic discussions which Signor Mussolini foreshadowed had been provided for when, on the 28th November, 1927, the French Government had appointed as their Ambassador in Rome Monsieur de Beaumarchais, a diplomatist of great experience, particularly in North-West African affairs.² Official conversations between Monsieur de Beaumarchais and representatives of the Italian Government were duly opened at Rome on the 19th March, 1928, and were carried on along two lines—the first aiming at the conclusion of a political pact of friendship and the second at a settlement of specific controversies in a series of protocols.³ The main points considered were the participation of Italy in the administration of the Tangier Zone of Morocco; the juridical status of Italians in Tunisia; and a rectification of the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania in Italy's favour.⁴ The conclusion of the new four-Power agreement regarding Tangier⁵ might be regarded as the first fruits of these Franco-Italian discussions at Rome. On the other points, which exclusively concerned France and Italy, definitive results had not been reached by the end of the year 1928. Before the

¹ For the tension which this question had created between France and Italy, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part II B, Sections (ii) and (iii).

² The French Ambassadorship at Rome was vacant owing to the retirement of Monsieur René Besnard, a distinguished politician and man of letters who had performed a difficult role with tact and credit during the previous three years.

³ This had been the method followed in negotiating the Italo-Yugoslav settlement of 1924. (See the *Survey for 1924*, Part II B, Sections (iii) and (vi).)

⁴ The foregoing information about these diplomatic discussions at Rome was given by Signor Mussolini in his speech of the 5th June, 1928.

⁵ This will be dealt with in a later volume.

end of the year, however, it was decided that a Franco-Italian Commission should be set up to continue the discussion of questions outstanding between the two countries, and this Commission began work in March 1929, with Monsieur de Beaumarchais as the principal French representative and Signor de Michelis, President of the International Institute of Agriculture, as the principal Italian representative.

In informing the Italian Senate in his speech of the 5th June, 1928, of the discussions at Rome in the spring of 1928, Signor Mussolini had remarked that questions relating to other regions were not on the agenda, for the obvious reason that they would involve an extension of the negotiations to include other parties—a complication which would render the position more delicate than it was. Presumably Signor Mussolini was referring here to South-Eastern Europe. Yet, even though South-East European problems were not being discussed directly between French and Italian diplomatists at Rome, it was noteworthy that the improvement in Franco-Italian relations, of which these discussions were a symptom, coincided in date with a distinct improvement in the South-East European situation. Italy did not cease to extend her 'system' up to the limits of this region and beyond it; but whereas, during the two years ending in the spring of 1928, Italian diplomatic activity in that quarter had tended to cause disturbance, from the spring of 1928 onwards it tended on the whole to have a reassuring effect. During 1926 and 1927 and the early months of 1928 its fruits had been an increase in the tension between Italy and France¹ and between Italy and Jugoslavia;² a check to the process of reconciliation between Jugoslavia and Hungary;³ and the threat of a rift in the Little Entente as between Rumania and her two partners.⁴ Its fruits during the following twelve months were a *détente* between Italy and Greece and between Italy and Turkey and the preparation of the ground for a *détente* between Turkey and Greece;⁵ and Italian policy was also one of the stimuli which induced Jugoslavia to drive a less hard bargain than before with Greece over the question of facilities at the port of Salonica.⁶

Whether or not this change in the general effect of Italian diplomatic activity in South-Eastern Europe was indirectly connected with the simultaneous improvement in the relations between Italy and France, the two changes, taken together, put a new complexion

¹ *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Section (i).

² *Op. cit.*, Part II C, Section (ii).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 201–2.

⁶ See Section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁵ See pp. 158–61 below.

upon a passage of Signor Mussolini's speech of the 5th June, 1928, in which he expounded the thesis that the four European Peace Treaties were not immutable.¹ This passage, if delivered a year or two earlier, might have been read as an appeal to the defeated and disappointed states of Europe to follow Italy's lead in a campaign to overthrow a French hegemony based upon the sacrosanctity of the European Peace Treaties and the solidarity of all states that had profited by them. Under the improved international conditions under which the speech was actually delivered, the purport of this passage was distinctly constructive and pacific. It was significant that Signor Mussolini supported his thesis by citing Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and by submitting that 'grave complications' would 'be avoided if Peace' were 'given new and wider room to breathe by a revision of the Peace Treaties on points on which revision' was 'required'. If Italy succeeded in combining the maintenance of this attitude on the general question of treaty revision with the cultivation of better relations with France on the specific matters at issue between the two Powers, the cause of peace might be well served by Italian statesmanship.

(b) RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND JUGOSLAVIA.

On the 27th January, 1924, a 'pact of friendship and cordial collaboration' between Italy and Jugoslavia had been signed at Rome, together with an agreement regarding the status of Fiume.² The duration of the pact of friendship was to be five years, but its terms provided that it might be either denounced or renewed one year before its expiration. By January 1928, therefore, the Governments at Rome and at Belgrade had to make up their minds whether they wished to denounce the pact or to prolong it. As the record given in previous volumes shows,³ the existence of the pact had by no means resulted in 'cordial collaboration' between the two countries throughout the four years that it had been in force; and in view of the strained relations which existed between Italy and Jugoslavia at the beginning of the year 1928, a decision to renew the 1924 pact as it stood would have seemed an empty and unprofitable gesture. At the

¹ This passage, which was perhaps the most important in the whole speech, ought to be read in its complete text, a translation of which will be found in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume. The Italian text was published in the *Corriere della Sera*, 6th June, 1928.

² See the *Survey for 1924*, Part II B, Sections (iii) and (vi); and for the text of the pact of friendship *op. cit.*, p. 506.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 161-5: the *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Sections (i) and (ii).

same time it was recognized both at Rome and at Belgrade that the formal denunciation of the pact might have an unfortunate effect on public opinion in the two countries concerned and might thus widen the breach between them to a dangerous extent. In these circumstances, a compromise was agreed on, and on the 25th January, 1928, a protocol was signed at Belgrade postponing for six months—that is until the 27th July, 1928,—the date on which the pact of friendship could be denounced or renewed.

The signature of this protocol was taken as an indication that the two Governments intended to make an attempt during the next six months to place their relations upon a more satisfactory footing.¹ Two series of conversations appear in fact to have been initiated—on technical questions in Belgrade and on political matters in Rome; but at the end of April, when half of the six months' period of grace had elapsed, it was admitted on the Yugoslav side that little progress was being made.

One difficulty in the way of a settlement lay in the fact that Italo-Yugoslav relations were in a sense subsidiary to Italo-French relations;² and the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations might perhaps have been facilitated had there been more rapid progress in the conversations, on questions outstanding between France and Italy, which followed the arrival in Rome in January 1928 of a new French Ambassador, Monsieur de Beaumarchais.³ In so far as Italo-Yugoslav relations could be isolated from the general field of South-East European politics, there appeared to be two principal obstacles in the way of a *rapprochement* between Rome and Belgrade: on the one hand, the desire of the Yugoslav Government to obtain some kind of guarantee that the growing influence of Italy in Albania did not constitute a danger to Jugoslavia;⁴ and on the other hand the desire of the Italian

¹ A day or two after the signature of the protocol the *Foglio d'Ordini* (the official order-sheet of the Italian Fascist Party) contained comments on the protocol which threw all the blame for the existing state of affairs on Jugoslavia and concluded by warning that country that she now had six months 'in which to give a new direction to her policy towards Italy, who is a great nation, and can afford to wait, and does not fear the unknown future'. (See the *Corriere della Sera*, 29th January, 1929, where the paragraphs in question were reproduced.)

² For this aspect of the matter, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Section (i), and the present volume, p. 148 above.

³ For these conversations, which opened on the 19th March, 1928, see p. 150 above.

⁴ In the early months of 1928, Italy's economic penetration of Albania appeared to be making rapid strides. In February, for instance, the Italian Senate passed a bill providing for the development with Italian capital of various public works in Albania, including the construction of roads, bridges, and ports. On the 28th February an agreement was signed between the

Government to obtain from Yugoslavia the ratification of the series of conventions dealing with technical questions connected with Fiume, Zara and Dalmatia which had been signed at Nettuno on the 20th July, 1925.¹ The principal argument which had been used in defence of the Yugoslav Government's failure to ratify the Nettuno Conventions was that their provisions threatened to lay Dalmatia open to economic domination by Italy and that they would not be accepted by the Croats and Slovenes without modification;² but the opinion seems also to have been generally held in Yugoslavia that the Nettuno Conventions represented the only remaining card which could be played against Signor Mussolini's refusal to discuss with Yugoslavia the question of Italy's relations with Albania.³ The anti-Italian demonstrations which followed the announcement in May 1928 of the Yugoslav Government's decision to ratify the Nettuno Conventions were no doubt partly accounted for by the feeling that the Government were throwing away this last card.

The motives which induced the Yugoslav Government to decide on the 23rd May that the conventions must be submitted to the Skupščina for ratification without further delay were the subject of considerable speculation. The general attitude of the Italian Government on the subject was of course well known; but Monsieur Marinković, the Foreign Minister, categorically denied rumours that direct pres-

Albanian Minister of Finance and the 'Società per lo sviluppo economico dell' Albania' providing for a moratorium in respect of a loan contracted by Albania with the 'Svea' in 1926. At the beginning of May, Monsieur Marinković, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, had to answer questions in the Skupščina regarding the alleged intention of Italy to declare a customs union with Albania as a first step towards a protectorate. Monsieur Marinković replied that he had no information which would lead him to suppose that Italy intended to follow the course indicated. In September 1928 Yugoslav suspicions were again aroused by Ahmed Beg Zogu's decision to assume the title of 'King of the Albanians' and by Italy's prompt recognition of the new monarchical régime. Yugoslav fears lest the new King intended to assert his sway over the considerable number of Albanians resident in Yugoslavia had subsided sufficiently by the middle of September to allow the Belgrade Government to grant formal recognition to the new régime in Albania.

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 164; the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 172 and 178. Another series of technical conventions (known as the Belgrade Conventions) which had been signed in August 1924 had been ratified in June 1926—though not without protests from the Opposition and from Croatia and Dalmatia (see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 164).

² Monsieur Ninčić, while he was Foreign Minister, was said to have suggested to the Italian Government, without success, that they should agree to the omission or modification of certain clauses specially obnoxious to the Croats. For the economic effects of the Nettuno Conventions see the *Belgrade Economic Review*, June 1928.

³ See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 178.

sure had been exercised either by Italy or by some other Power.¹ It seems likely that the negotiations for treaties of friendship which were known to be in progress between Italy, Greece and Turkey² helped to turn the scale and to persuade the Yugoslav Government that it was necessary to conciliate Italy at all costs. The Government's decision was accepted by the parties which supported the Vukičević Cabinet, but certain of the leaders of the Opposition were reported to have declared that they would proceed to extreme measures in order to prevent the ratification of the conventions. A storm of protest in the Opposition press was followed during the last week of May by anti-Italian demonstrations and riots in Dalmatian and Croatian towns and in Belgrade. The most serious disturbances took place at Sebenico and at Spalato, where the houses of the Italian Consuls were attacked and considerable damage was done to Italian property.³ Between the 27th and the 30th May the Italian Minister at Belgrade lodged four separate protests, which elicited from the Yugoslav Government on the 2nd June a conciliatory reply, promising full reparation for damage done to the persons or property of Italian nationals and giving an assurance that measures had been taken to prevent further disturbances. On the 4th June the Italian Minister informed the Yugoslav Government that their reply was accepted as satisfactory, and on the 5th June Signor Mussolini, in the course of a speech on foreign policy delivered before the Senate at Rome,⁴ not only referred to the recent incidents as closed from the diplomatic point of view but declared that he recognized in 'the rapid and loyal acceptance of Italian demands a mark of good will on Monsieur Marinković's part and a proof of his desire to give effect to the policy of friendship which Italy also sincerely desires to follow'.

In the meantime, the main force of the animosity against Italy in Jugoslavia had been diverted against the Yugoslav Government itself, largely on account of the severity with which the police had repressed student demonstrations at Belgrade during the last two or three days of May. It was evident that the Opposition parties were exploiting the public feeling against the Nettuno Conventions for political ends and that their main object was to overthrow the Vukičević Cabinet. Stormy scenes in the Skupsčina on the 31st May led

¹ There seems to have been some foundation for a report that indirect pressure had been exercised by the bankers with whom the terms of a loan were being negotiated in London.

² See sub-section (c) below.

³ The disturbances seem to have been aggravated by rumours (which were denied on the Italian side) that Italian demonstrators at Zara had attacked the Yugoslav Consulate and burned the Yugoslav flag.

⁴ See above, p. 147.

the Government to adjourn the session for a week, but the obstructive tactics adopted by the Opposition after the reassembly on the 8th June resulted in increasing tension, which culminated in bloodshed on the 20th June.¹ Therewith the feud between Serbs and Croats came to a head, and the Croat deputies withdrew from the Skupsčina. On the 4th July the Vukičević Cabinet resigned and it was not until the 27th July that a new Government was formed by Father Korošec, the leader of the Slovene Clerical Party.²

Monsieur Marinković (who continued to act as Foreign Minister in the Korošec Cabinet) had presented the Nettuno Conventions to the Skupsčina for ratification on the 16th June, but the political crisis made it impossible for any further steps to be taken immediately, and the position was recognized in Italy. The period of grace for the denunciation or renewal of the Pact of Friendship expired on the 27th July without any decision having been reached; but it seems to have been tacitly agreed that failure to prolong the treaty on the appointed date need not prevent the parties from maintaining it in force should they so desire. The Korošec Government gave proof of their good will by pressing on with the ratification of the Nettuno Conventions as soon as the Skupsčina reassembled on the 1st August. Since the Korošec Government were unacceptable to the Croats, the Croat deputies refrained from attending the session, and in their absence there was no effective opposition. The conventions were approved by a Parliamentary Committee on the 5th August with only one dissentient voice, and on the 13th they were ratified unanimously by the Skupsčina—the members of the remaining Opposition parties having left the hall before the division was taken. Ratifications were exchanged at Rome on the 14th November, together with those of the Belgrade Conventions of August 1924.

The absence of the Croats from the Skupsčina which passed the Nettuno Conventions meant that the ratification of these conventions provided no guarantee against continued opposition to the carrying out of their provisions, and recognition of this fact in Italy resulted

¹ The shots fired by Monsieur Račić at the Opposition benches wounded the Croat Peasant leader, Monsieur Stepan Radić, and caused his death, which occurred on the 8th August. Monsieur Paul Radić, his nephew, was mortally wounded and died a few hours later and another Croat deputy, Dr. Basariček, was killed outright. A fourth, Monsieur Pernar, was wounded but recovered.

² It is not possible in this place to give a detailed account of the internal position in Yugoslavia at this time. For the background and origins of the political crises of 1928 and the *coup d'état* of the 6th January, 1929, see the paper by Professor R. W. Seton-Watson on 'Yugoslavia and Croatia' in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, March 1929. See also the paper by Mr. C. D. Booth, *ibid.*, July 1929.

in a somewhat lukewarm reception of the announcement that ratification had been effected. The immediate consequence of ratification was that further anti-Italian demonstrations took place at Sebenico and Spalato on the 16th and 17th June. Fresh protests from the Italian Government once more elicited from the Yugoslav Government the promise that full reparation would be made and all possible precautions taken in future, and on the 25th June this incident, also, was closed by an Italian acceptance of the Yugoslav assurances as satisfactory.

Signor Mussolini, indeed, having gained his main point and obtained the unconditional ratification of the Nettuno Conventions (even though only by a 'Rump Parliament'), could afford to show consideration for the difficult position in which the Belgrade Government were placed; but at the same time he took advantage of the excuse afforded by Yugoslavia's internal troubles to postpone active negotiations regarding a pact of friendship until the situation had become more stable.¹ In December 1928 the Yugoslav Government were reported to have made proposals for the conclusion of a new treaty; but while the Italian Government agreed in principle that what was needed was not the renewal of the old pact of friendship but the negotiation of a new one on broader lines,² they showed no inclination for undue haste, and little or no progress had been made when the Korošec Government fell on the 30th December. After the *coup d'état* of the 6th January, 1929, and the establishment of a dictatorship in Yugoslavia, the new Government proposed the conclusion of a provisional agreement in order to avoid the expiration of the 1924 pact at the end of January, but this proposal did not meet with approval at Rome. On the 27th January, 1929, therefore, Italy and Yugoslavia ceased to be bound by a treaty of friendship. During the previous twelve months, however, circumstances had changed sufficiently for this fact to have but little significance; and it was noticeable that both the Italian and the Yugoslav press, in commenting on the lapse of the pact, took occasion to point out that friendship between two countries did not depend on the existence of a treaty and that there was no reason to believe that the absence of a treaty would adversely affect the improved relations between Italy and Yugoslavia.

¹ He was said to have replied to the Yugoslav Minister's suggestions that negotiations might be opened by asking to what extent the Korošec Government considered themselves in a position to negotiate a treaty binding on Yugoslavia as a whole.

² The Italian Government seem to have intimated that they still had no intention of discussing the Albanian question with Yugoslavia.

(c) RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY, TURKEY AND GREECE.

On the 30th May, 1928, an Italo-Turkish pact of friendship, neutrality and conciliation was signed in Rome. By the terms of the pact¹ either party undertook not to enter into any political or economic combinations directed against the other and to remain neutral in the event of the other becoming involved in a conflict. It was also provided that any disputes between the parties should be submitted to conciliation or judicial settlement, the procedure for which was laid down in an annexed protocol.

In its general lines the pact resembled other treaties which Italy had concluded during recent years, and it contained no provisions which might appear to justify alarm on the part of a third Power.

From the Turkish point of view, the signature of this treaty was important in several respects. It was the first political treaty which the Turkish Republic had concluded with a Western Great Power, and this a Power which had been suspected by the Turks of harbouring aggressive designs upon Anatolia in the recent past, particularly during the crisis over the Mosul question at the turn of the years 1925 and 1926.² At that time, when Turkey had been at issue with Great Britain and in fear of Italy, she had been drawn back into the orbit of the U.S.S.R. and had concluded with the Soviet Government the first treaty in Monsieur Chicherin's neutrality and non-aggression 'system'.³ For Turkey, as for Germany in the post-war period, good relations with so near and so formidable a neighbour as the U.S.S.R. were indispensable. Yet the prospect of finding herself in exclusive relations with the Soviet Government was no more palatable to the one country than to the other; and Turkey, having already recoiled from her first *rapprochement* towards the U.S.S.R. as soon as the termination of the Anatolian War of 1919-22 had relieved her from Western pressure, recoiled again from the second *rapprochement* of 1926 as soon as her relations with Great Britain and with Italy had sufficiently improved. In her treaty of the 30th May, 1928, with Italy she found an offset to her treaty of the 17th December, 1925, with the U.S.S.R., as Germany had found an offset to the Russo-German treaty of the 24th April, 1926, in her admission to membership of the League of Nations in the autumn of the same year. From the Italian point of view, the signature of the treaty marked an important advance towards the consolidation of Italian influence in the Eastern

¹ The full text is printed in the volume of documents issued as a supplement to the present volume.

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 526.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 525; *Survey for 1927*, pp. 251-2.

Mediterranean.¹ Apparently Signor Mussolini would have preferred a tripartite pact to which Greece also would have been a party, and it had seemed at one time as though his efforts to include Greece in the arrangement would prove successful. The negotiations between Italy and Turkey had opened at the beginning of April 1928, when the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ, had an interview with Signor Mussolini at Milan. This interview had been preceded by conversations at Geneva between Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ and the Greek Foreign Minister, Monsieur Mikhalakópulos, and it was followed almost immediately by a meeting between Monsieur Mikhalakópulos and Signor Mussolini. Between Greece and Turkey there were still certain questions outstanding in connexion with the exchange of populations² which had taken place as a sequel to the Anatolian War. Difficulty was experienced especially in connexion with the liquidation of the property of Greeks and Turks who had been exchanged, and the Greek Government took the line that a settlement of the points in dispute must precede the conclusion of a pact of friendship and neutrality between Greece and Turkey.³ The Mixed Commission which had been set up, in accordance with a convention of the 30th January, 1923, to supervise the exchange of populations had been unable to solve the difficulties that had arisen, but it was hoped that greater success might result from direct discussions between the two Governments concerned. The conversations between Monsieur Mikhalakópulos and Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ at the end of March 1928 were followed by diplomatic negotiations between Athens and Angora, and the Italian Government seem to have attempted to facilitate a settlement by offering their services as mediator. The drafting of a pact of neutrality proceeded concurrently with the Graeco-Turkish negotiations, and by the beginning of May the Italian and Turkish Governments were reported to have agreed on the terms. Signature was postponed for a few weeks in the hope that a Graeco-Turkish settlement might be achieved which would enable Greece to join in the pact, but by the end of May the Italian and Turkish Governments had come to the conclusion that the Graeco-Turkish negotiations were not making sufficient progress to justify further

¹ Italy does not appear to have obtained many of those advantages in the economic field which might have been expected to accrue to the first Western Power that concluded a treaty of friendship with Turkey. Past experience had taught the Turks to view with suspicion any economic activity on the part of a European Power, and this tendency was still strong enough to hamper the development of commercial relations between Italy and Turkey.

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II E, Section (i).

³ For the similar attitude adopted by Greece in regard to Jugoslavia, see Section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

delay, and the project of a tripartite pact was abandoned in favour of a series of bilateral agreements. As has been recorded, the Italo-Turkish treaty was signed on the 30th May. At the same time, the Italian Government made a definite offer to conclude a similar pact with Greece and expressed the hope that the conclusion of a Graeco-Turkish pact might prove possible in the near future. Greece seems to have agreed to the suggestion for a pact with Italy, but the negotiations were delayed by the change of Government which took place at Athens during the summer. Monsieur Venizelos, who became Prime Minister at the beginning of July, decided to carry on the policy of the preceding Government with regard to Italy, and by the middle of September agreement had been reached on the text of a treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement of disputes. The treaty was signed on the 23rd September by Signor Mussolini and Monsieur Venizelos, who paid a special visit to Rome for the purpose.¹ This treaty, again, followed familiar lines,² and Monsieur Venizelos was at pains to make it clear that it implied no hostility against any other country. Assurances of this kind were specially necessary in the case of Jugoslavia, since the uneasy relations existing between Italy and Jugoslavia³ had created a tendency at Belgrade to look upon any *rapprochement* between Italy and a South-East European state as a menace to Jugoslav security. The text of the Italo-Greek pact was communicated to the Jugoslav Government on the 23rd September by the Greek Minister at Belgrade, and its scope was explained by Monsieur Venizelos in person when he visited Belgrade early in October.⁴ Monsieur Venizelos seems also to have laid stress on the pacific nature of the Italo-Greek agreement in a conversation which he had with Monsieur Briand in Paris at the end of September.

In the meantime, the Graeco-Turkish negotiations had been suspended in June, but at the time of the signature of the Italo-Greek pact an exchange of correspondence was proceeding between Monsieur Venizelos and Ismet Paşa, the Turkish Prime Minister, and it was

¹ After the ceremony of signature, Monsieur Venizelos gave an interview to the Greek press in which he explained the significance of the pact. In reply to a journalist who inquired what he had done about the Dodecanese, Monsieur Venizelos declared that no Dodecanese question existed between Italy and Greece, and that the Italian administration of the islands could not and should not prevent the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries. This declaration was received with satisfaction in Italy. (For the Dodecanese question see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 470-1.)

² The full text is printed in the accompanying volume of documents.

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 161-5; the *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Sections (i) and (ii); and this part of the present volume, Section (i) (b).

⁴ For the negotiation, during this visit, of a settlement of the Graeco-Jugoslav dispute over Salonica, see Section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

hoped that if a meeting could be arranged between the two statesmen a basis for a settlement might be found. They were unable, however, to agree on a meeting-place, and negotiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels were resumed. Relations between the two countries were not improved by a dispute which arose out of a visit of the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations to Western Thrace in November; and although discussions took place at Angora in December between the Greek Minister, Monsieur Pappas, and Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ, they failed to provide a solution for the outstanding difficulties connected with the liquidation of the property of exchanged persons. Thus at the end of the year 1928 there seemed little immediate prospect that the special relationship between Italy, Greece and Turkey which Signor Mussolini desired to establish would be completed by the signature of a Græco-Turkish pact of friendship.

(ii) The Incident arising out of the Discovery on the 1st January, 1928, of a Consignment of Machine-Gun Parts at Szent Gotthard on the Austro-Hungarian Frontier.

On the 1st January, 1928, Austrian customs officials who were carrying out their duties at the railway station of Szent Gotthard, on the Hungarian side of the Austro-Hungarian frontier—the joint customs inspection having just been transferred to Szent Gotthard from a station on the Austrian side—discovered that five trucks, the contents of which were described as machinery, contained in fact a large consignment of machine-gun parts. As the goods had been falsely declared, and as they were not accompanied by the official permit which was required by Austrian law for armaments in transit, the Austrian officials demanded the return of the trucks to Austria, but the Hungarian railway officials refused to allow them to be shunted back across the frontier on the ground that they were on Hungarian territory and that the case must be submitted to the proper authorities in Hungary. The trucks therefore remained in the custody of the Hungarian railway officials at Szent Gotthard. The way-bill showed that the machine-gun parts had been despatched by a firm in Verona, and that their immediate destination was Slovenské Nové Mesto on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier. The Hungarian authorities, however, maintained that the ultimate destination of the trucks was Warsaw, and a joint inquiry held at Szent Gotthard on the 17th January by Austrian and Hungarian railway and customs officials apparently established the fact that the

waybill had contained instructions for the trucks to be forwarded from Nové Mesto to Warsaw.¹

In the meantime, Hungary's neighbours had been displaying considerable interest in the affair. The number of machine-guns which Hungary might possess was limited by the Treaty of Trianon, and the discovery at Szent Gotthard naturally aroused the suspicion that munitions were being smuggled into Hungary in defiance of the Treaty. It was pointed out that the direct route from Verona to Warsaw did not cross Hungarian territory, and that it was therefore improbable that the machine-guns were *en route* for Poland—which country, in any case, was not subject to restrictions on its armaments and had no reason to obtain supplies of munitions in a clandestine manner. Moreover, the Polish Government, on the 7th January, declared categorically to the representatives of the Little Entente states that the consignment was not intended for Poland. Inquiries made by the Czechoslovak authorities were also reported to have proved that the machine-guns were not destined for Czechoslovakia.²

During January 1928 discussions took place between the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania in order to decide what steps, if any, should be taken with regard to the Szent Gotthard incident, and representatives of the Little Entente Powers seem also to have consulted the Secretariat of the League of Nations as to the procedure which should be followed. Since the 31st March, 1927, when the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Hungary had ceased to function,³ the responsibility for seeing that Hungary did not evade the disarmament provisions of the Peace Treaty had rested upon the League of Nations. Rules for the exercise of the Council's right of investigation into the armaments of 'ex-enemy' countries had been drawn up in 1924⁴ and amended in December 1926, when agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Commission of Control from Germany;⁵ and under these rules every member of the League of Nations was entitled to communicate to the

¹ The *communiqué* issued by the Austrian authorities seems to have agreed with the Hungarian version on this point (see *Le Temps*, 21st January, 1928). The Hungarian railway officials were reported to have suggested to their Austrian *confrères* at this meeting on the 17th January that the machine-gun parts should be returned to the sender in Italy, via Austria, but the Austrian officials (who had originally attempted to secure the return of the trucks across the frontier) were now unwilling to agree to this course, on the ground that an impartial examination of the contents would be impossible after the trucks had been in Hungarian custody for a fortnight.

² See the memorandum attached to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav notes of the 1st February, 1928, to the Secretary-General of the League (text in *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1928).

³ See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 204.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 85-8.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 97-8.

Secretary-General of the League, for consideration by the Council, any reports or information which, in the opinion of that state, called for the exercise by the Council of the right of investigation. The decision of the Little Entente states to bring the Szent Gotthard incident to the notice of the Council as a matter calling for investigation was an event of more than local importance; for this was the first occasion on which the Council had been asked to use its power of supervision over the armaments of the four countries which had been compulsorily disarmed by the Peace Treaties. The action taken by the Council in the Szent Gotthard case might therefore form an important precedent, and it was this consideration which led the Governments of France and Germany in particular to follow the proceedings with special interest.

On the 1st February, 1928, notes from the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments, couched in similar, though not identical, terms, were presented to the Secretary-General of the League in order to draw the attention of the Council to the incident which had taken place on the 1st January at Szent Gotthard. All three notes referred to the rules adopted by the Council for the exercise of its right of investigation and appealed to the Council 'to intervene, in virtue of its rights and duties, so that more serious incidents or consequences may be avoided' and 'to take the measures which these rights and duties involve in accordance with the decisions mentioned above [i.e. the Council's decisions regarding the exercise of its right of investigation] and the provisions of the Treaty of Peace of Trianon concerning military control in Hungary'.¹ The Rumanian note expressly declared that the Government recognized 'that, for the moment, no real conflict has arisen . . . between the states directly interested' and that they did not wish 'to accuse or suspect anyone whatever in connection with this incident'.²

¹ Quoted from the Yugoslav note. The wording of this part of all three notes was practically identical. The texts of the notes will be found in the *League of Nations Official Journal* for April 1928.

² The explanation of this sentence in the Rumanian note (it did not appear in either of the other notes) seems to have lain in the fact that Italy was indirectly concerned in the incident, as the country from which the machine-gun parts were despatched. Rumania had no special reason to consider the susceptibilities of Hungary, with whom she had a long-standing dispute over the 'optants question' (see Section (iii) of this part); but she was in closer and more friendly relations with Italy than were Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. The Czechoslovak and Yugoslav notes were reported to be ready for delivery some days before they were presented, and the delay was attributed to the desire of the Rumanian Government to postpone presentation of their note until the conclusion of conversations which took place in Rome at the end of January between Signor Mussolini and Monsieur Titulescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister (see p. 148 above).

The appeal of the Little Entente Governments was placed on the agenda for the forty-ninth session of the Council, which was due to open early in March; but in the interval further developments took place which raised an important question of principle. In the third week of February it was announced in Hungary that, as the Austrian authorities had refused to take back the trucks containing machine-gun parts, and as the consignor had not come forward to claim the goods, the Hungarian authorities had decided to sell the machine-gun parts by auction, after they had been rendered useless for military purposes. The work of breaking down the parts had begun, under the supervision of Hungarian experts, on the 18th February, and the auction had been fixed for the 24th. On the 23rd February the Secretary-General of the League, at the request of the Acting President of the Council, Mr. Cheng Lo, sent a telegram to the Hungarian Government suggesting that the sale of the machine-gun parts should be postponed until the Council had considered the appeal from Czecho-slovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania. Mr. Cheng Lo's object, of course, was to prevent an alteration in the *status quo* which would make it impossible for any investigation on which the Council might decide to be carried out effectively. Count Bethlen, the Hungarian Prime Minister, replied on the same day that it was impossible to postpone the auction, which was to be held 'under the supervision of the competent judicial authorities at Szent Gotthard in accordance with the railway regulations'. Count Bethlen pointed out that 'the Regulations for the Exercise of the Right of Investigation contain no clause applicable to such case'; but he added that, as a matter of personal courtesy to the President of the Council, his Government would ask the purchasers not to remove their purchases. The sale by auction of the machine-gun parts took place on the 24th February, but the material remained after the sale in the custody of the authorities at Szent Gotthard.

Mr. Cheng Lo's action—which was taken after consultation with Monsieur Briand—raised the question of what powers the Acting President of the Council possessed when the Council was not in session. The only precedent for intervention by an Acting President in the intervals between Council sessions was Monsieur Briand's famous appeal to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments in October 1925 to remember their obligations under the Covenant not to resort to war—an appeal which succeeded in its purpose and averted the danger of hostilities on a serious scale.¹ It was pointed out, however, that Monsieur Briand's action was justifiable under Article 11 of the

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 303.

Covenant, because there was an acute danger of war and immediate steps had to be taken in advance of the special meeting of the Council which had been summoned to deal with the crisis, but that in the Szent Gotthard case there was no question of an appeal under Article 11 which might make it necessary for the Acting President to take urgent measures on his own initiative. Mr. Cheng Lo's action seems to have been criticized not only in Hungary and in Germany but also by certain of his fellow-members of the Council (who had not been consulted before he sent his telegram) during a private meeting on the 7th March. The Council was reported to have come to the conclusion that Mr. Cheng Lo had been placed in an embarrassing position owing to the lack of definite rules, and that it would be desirable to define in a general way the powers and duties of the Acting President in the intervals between Council sessions.

The discussion of the Szent Gotthard incident by the Council was preceded by numerous private and informal conversations at Geneva, and in the course of these conversations it was apparently agreed in principle that it would not be advisable to put into operation the full machinery provided by the rules for the exercise of the Council's right of investigation. During the public debate which took place in the Council on the 7th March Monsieur Titulescu, as the spokesman for the Little Entente, declared that he and his colleagues had acted in what they believed to be the general interest and were not inspired by any ill-will towards Hungary. The Hungarian delegate, nevertheless, made an emphatic reference to his country's sensitiveness regarding any interference in its internal affairs and to the unsatisfactory relations existing between Hungary and her neighbours. It was clear that insistence on a formal visit to Szent Gotthard by a Commission of Inquiry organized in accordance with the Council's rules for the exercise of its right of investigation would arouse strong opposition in Hungary, and to that extent would hinder rather than help the cause of peace. The Council therefore adopted the middle course of appointing a sub-committee of three of its members (the representatives of the Netherlands, Finland and Chile) to study the documents relating to the affair and submit a report. The sub-committee was also asked to examine the question of the powers of the Acting President of the Council in the intervals between sessions.

On the 10th March the Committee of Three reported that some of the necessary documents were not yet available and that it had not been able to form a final opinion on the Szent Gotthard incident. It therefore proposed to continue its investigations and it mentioned the possibility that it might prove desirable to send experts to Hungary

to make investigations on the spot. The Council approved of the course proposed by the committee, and the Hungarian representative, while he expressed the view that an expert inquiry was unnecessary, declared that his Government would be ready to give facilities to any experts whom the committee might decide to send to Szent Gotthard.

By the middle of April, the Committee of Three had decided that investigations on the spot were necessary, and between the 15th and the 19th April inquiries were conducted at Szent Gotthard by two armament experts and three members of the League Secretariat—one of whom was Monsieur Colban, the head of the Disarmament Section, and another a member of the Communications and Transit Organization. Towards the end of April the relevant documents were referred to two more experts on international railway traffic, and the results of the investigations of all the experts were available when the Committee of Three met at The Hague on the 3rd May.

Nevertheless, the information at the disposal of the committee did not enable it to form a decision on the most important point—namely, the ultimate destination of the machine-gun parts. By the middle of May the committee had completed two reports: the first on the Szent Gotthard incident itself; the second on measures to be taken in the intervals between Council sessions. The first report made it clear that, in the committee's view, the Szent Gotthard incident was 'an attempt to effect the clandestine transport of war material' and it laid stress on the special importance of the 'unlawful presence of war material' in Hungarian territory owing to Hungary's obligations under the Treaty of Trianon. It also pointed out that the Hungarian Government had considered the incident 'exclusively from the standpoint of railway and customs regulations' and did not appear 'ever to have thought it necessary to consider the question of the final destination of the war material'. 'The final destination,' the report added, 'is not apparent from the information which the Committee has been able to obtain, acting within the limits of its powers. On the other hand, the information furnishes no evidence that the material was intended to remain in Hungarian territory.' Thus on the main point at issue—whether or not the machine-guns were intended for the illegal arming of forces in Hungary—the Hungarian Government were neither convicted nor acquitted.

When this report came before the Council on the 7th June general dissatisfaction was expressed with its inconclusiveness and with the failure of the committee to get to the bottom of the incident. The most searching criticisms came, as was natural, from the representatives of the Little Entente states and of France, but the British and

German delegates also agreed that the results of the procedure which the Council had adopted in this case had not been satisfactory. Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that 'if another incident arose . . . we should have to seek means more efficacious than those which we chose on this occasion' and he added that it would be 'a great mistake to suppose that, because the particular procedure which we adopted in this case failed, the Council therefore exhausted its resources'. The general opinion of the Council clearly was that the method adopted for the investigation of this incident must not be allowed to form a precedent if another—and possibly more serious—incident should arise in future and call for action by the Council.

The Council finally adopted a series of resolutions expressing its regret that the final destination of the machine-guns had not been determined and that the Hungarian Government had considered the incident exclusively from the standpoint of railway and customs regulations; drawing attention to the right of every member of the Council to request an extraordinary meeting of that body, and to the Council's authority to order immediate investigation in virtue of the rules for the exercise of the right of investigation—'which rules the Council maintains intact'; and emphasizing the importance of an early ratification of the Convention on the Control of Trade in Arms concluded under the auspices of the League.¹

On the question of measures which might be taken when the Council was not in session, the Council adopted a resolution recommended in the second report of the Committee of Three. This resolution, while it left open the general question of the powers and duties of the Acting President of the Council, provided for a procedure which would have obviated the need for Mr. Cheng Lo's telegram if it had been followed in the Szent Gotthard case. The Council now decided that where a dispute had been referred to it and placed on its agenda the Secretary-General should communicate immediately to the interested parties the text of the following resolution.

The Council considers that, when a question has been submitted for its examination, it is extremely desirable that the Governments concerned should take whatever steps may appear to them necessary or useful to prevent anything occurring in their respective territories which might prejudice the examination of the question by the Council.

The parties would be requested to inform the Secretary-General, without delay, of the steps which they had taken to carry these recommendations into effect.

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 69-70.

(iii) The Controversy over the Optants in the ex-Hungarian Territories of Rumania.

Articles 61 and 63 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary which was signed at Trianon on the 4th June, 1920, provided that persons over eighteen years of age resident in former Hungarian territories which were transferred by the Peace Settlement to another state should automatically acquire the nationality of the state exercising sovereignty over the territory concerned, but that they should have the right to opt for Hungarian citizenship within a period of one year from the coming into force of the treaty. Persons who exercised the right to opt must transfer their residence to Hungarian territory within the succeeding twelve months, but they were to be 'entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other state where they had their place of residence before exercising their right to opt' (Article 63, paragraph 4).¹ Article 250 of the Trianon Treaty further provided that 'the property, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals . . . situated in the territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy' should 'not be subject to retention or liquidation' but should be 'restored to their owners freed from any measure of this kind [i.e. the measures applicable by the Allied Powers under Article 232 of the Treaty to Hungarian property, rights and interests within their territory] or from any other measure of transfer, compulsory administration or sequestration, taken since November 3, 1918, until the coming into force of the present Treaty, in the condition in which they were before the application of the measures in question'.² Claims made by Hungarian nationals under this Article were to be submitted to a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, the constitution of which was laid down in Article 239 of the Treaty.³

The Treaty of Trianon came into force on the 26th July, 1921. Four days later, on the 30th July, the Rumanian Government, in pursuance of the scheme of agrarian reform which they had undertaken

¹ Similar provisions were included in Article 3 of the Rumanian Minorities Treaty which came into force at the same time as the Treaty of Trianon.

² The corresponding French text ran as follows:

'Les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants hongrois . . . situés sur les territoires de l'ancienne monarchie austro-hongroise ne seront pas sujets à saisie ou liquidation en conformité de ces dispositions [les dispositions de l'article 232 et de l'Annexe de la Section iv]. Ces biens, droits et intérêts seront restitués aux ayants droit, libérés de toute mesure de ce genre ou de toute autre mesure de disposition, d'administration forcée ou de séquestre prises depuis le 3 novembre 1918 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. Ils seront restitués dans l'état où ils se trouvaient avant l'application des mesures en question.'

³ See below p. 174.

during the war to carry through,¹ promulgated an 'Agrarian Law applicable to Transylvania, the Banat, the districts of Crisana and the Maramuras' (the 'Garoffid Law'). Article 6, paragraph (c), of this law provided that: 'The whole of the rural estates of absentees shall be expropriated. For the purposes of this law, an absentee shall be any person who was absent from the country from the 1st December, 1918, until the date when this law was placed on the table of Parliament,² unless such person was discharging official duties abroad. Rural estates not exceeding fifty jugars³ shall be exempt from the operation of this law.'⁴ An executive decree, issued shortly after the promulgation of the law by the Government of which General Averescu was the head, laid it down that the term 'absentee' should not apply to a person who was a subject of a foreign state, and if this interpretation had remained in force the property of Hungarian optants in Transylvania would not have come within the scope of the law. In July and August 1922, however, a new Rumanian Government (that of Monsieur Bratianu) issued another executive decree and a series of ordinances, the effect of which was that foreigners were no longer exempted from the application of Article 6 of the 'Garoffid Law'.⁵

On the 16th August, 1922, the Hungarian Government appealed to

¹ The Liberal Party in Rumania had declared its adherence in 1913 to the principle of the expropriation of large estates. On the Rumanian agrarian reforms see I. L. Evans: *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge University Press, 1924) and Valeriu Berbaru: *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Paris, 1928, Librairie Universitaire J. Gamber). See also a letter from Professor R. W. Seton-Watson published in *The Times*, 12th March, 1928.

² i.e., the 23rd March, 1921 (see F. Déak: *The Hungarian-Rumanian Land Dispute*, published in 1928 by the Columbia University Press, New York, p. 18).

³ One jugar equals 1.473 acres.

⁴ The law provided for compensation to be paid to dispossessed landowners on the basis of the value of the estates in 1913, but owing to the depreciation of the currency it was alleged that the amount paid in any given case represented only a fraction of the real value of the property at the time of expropriation.

⁵ Déak, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–21. It was pointed out on the Rumanian side that the period of absence mentioned in the law was not identical with the period within which optants must transfer their domicile to Hungarian territory under the terms of the Trianon Treaty, since the former period ended on the 23rd March, 1921, and the latter could not begin until after the 26th July, 1921 (see above). It was therefore not impossible from the legal point of view for optants to have been in Transylvania during the period mentioned in the Agrarian Law and thus to have avoided being treated as absentees whose property could be confiscated. This argument was not refuted by the Hungarians—it was one of the points on which provisional agreement was reached at Brussels in May 1923 (see p. 172 below)—but it was pointed out that for reasons which were partly psychological a large number of optants had transferred their domicile before the period stipulated by the Treaty of Trianon began.

the Conference of Ambassadors on behalf of their nationals whose property in Transylvania had been seized by the Rumanian authorities under the Agrarian Law. The Conference of Ambassadors was asked 'to enjoin the Rumanian Government in order that she [*sic*] should conform her legislation and her attitude concerning the immovable property of persons who opted for Hungarian nationality to the explicit dispositions of Article 63 of the Treaty of Trianon'.¹ The Ambassadors replied on the 31st August that the matter appeared to relate entirely to the stipulations of the Rumanian Minorities Treaty² and that the Hungarian Government should address their representations to the League of Nations. In reply to a second communication from Hungary, the Conference of Ambassadors, on the 27th February, 1923, informed the Hungarian Government that the initiative in bringing the matter to the notice of the League of Nations must be taken by them or by some other member of the League.³ In the meantime, Hungary had also been making direct representations to the Rumanian Government on behalf of the optants whose estates had been confiscated. On the 28th February, 1923, the Rumanian Government, in reply to a series of Hungarian notes, declared themselves 'unable to give satisfaction' to the claims of the optants in view of the fact that the estates had been expropriated in conformity with the law, which provided that 'the absentees shall be expropriated entirely without making any distinction between Rumanians and aliens. There cannot therefore be any question of creating for the landholders of Hungarian origin in the recently annexed territories a privileged situation, not only as to other aliens, but also as to a whole class of Rumanian landowners'.⁴ The contention that it was impossible, in carrying out the agrarian reforms, to discriminate in favour of Hungarian nationals, provided one of the main arguments on the Rumanian side throughout the course of the dispute.

On the 15th March, 1923, the Hungarian Government appealed to the Council of the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant,⁵ on the ground that the expropriation of the optants constituted 'a

¹ Quoted by Déak, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

² This was not the case. As has been indicated above, the Treaty of Trianon also contained provisions relevant to the dispute.

³ Déak, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-2: statement by the Earl of Birkenhead in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 25th June, 1928.

⁴ Quoted by Déak, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-3.

⁵ For a summarized account of the League Council's discussions on the optants question between April 1923 and the end of 1927 see *The Hungaro-Rumanian Dispute: The Optants Case before the League*, by Mrs. Edgar Dugdale (issued by the Association for International Understanding, 10, St. James's Square, London, S.W. 1).

flagrant violation' of the Treaty of Trianon and the Minorities Treaty, and that the Agrarian Law was incompatible with the Treaties. They asked the Council to declare that 'the legislative and administrative enactments of Rumania are contrary to the Treaties'; to ensure that 'Rumania should act in conformity with the Treaties' in future; and to order 'that the immovable property of persons opting in favour of Hungary which has been affected by the confiscatory measures adopted in connection with the agrarian reform . . . should be restored to the parties entitled thereto in the condition in which it was before . . . the measures in question; also that it should be maintained in that condition free from all charges contrary to . . . the Treaties, and that full compensation for damage should be given to the injured parties'.

The dispute came before the Council during its session in April 1923, and representatives of both Hungary and Rumania were given a hearing. The Rumanian case, which was put by Monsieur Titulescu, was that the agrarian legislation had been applied with strict impartiality and that the provisions for the expropriation of absentees implied no hostility against Hungarians. In the Rumanian view, 'the Hungarian Government were not pleading for equality of rights but for a privilege in Transylvania to the profit of Hungarian nationals and to the detriment of Rumanian landowners. The Treaty of Trianon stipulated that persons opting for Hungary should retain their property. The Hungarian Government interpreted this to mean that the optant remained the owner of a special kind of property that could not be touched without international sanction. The Rumanian contention was that the optants' property was subject to the national laws of a sovereign state'. On the question of compensation, also, the Rumanian Government argued that there had been no discrimination against Hungarians, and that the Hungarian demands for payment in gold¹ and restoration of landed property could not possibly be granted.

The Council had appointed as rapporteur the Japanese delegate, Monsieur Adatci, and in the course of the discussions he suggested that the essential point at issue appeared to be the interpretation of the Treaties and that it would therefore be well to refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Hungary accepted this proposal, but Rumania rejected it, on the ground that the dispute raised important questions of principle affecting 'the political and social transformation of a nation' and that it was therefore not

¹ On this occasion Monsieur Titulescu said that payment in gold would have involved a sum of 15 milliard gold francs. At a later date, however, he spoke of 400,000,000 gold francs.

primarily a controversy over the interpretation of a text which could be settled by the Permanent Court. A further proposal that the dispute might be submitted to the Court merely for an advisory opinion, which would not limit the Council's freedom of decision in any way, was also accepted by the Hungarian and rejected by the Rumanian delegate—this time on the ground that the delay which the suggested procedure would involve might give rise to dangerous unrest among the Rumanian peasants whose title to the lands in question would remain open to doubt. In view of the Rumanian opposition, the Council had to abandon the idea of consulting the Permanent Court, and a resolution was finally adopted adjourning the question until the next session of the Council and expressing the hope that the two Governments might come to an agreement in the meantime.

Monsieur Adatci agreed to continue to serve as rapporteur,¹ and at the end of May 1923 a meeting took place at Brussels at which Monsieur Adatci endeavoured to bring representatives of the two Governments to an agreement. At the time it looked as if the rapporteur's efforts were to be crowned with success, for the *procès verbal* of the discussions, recording certain conclusions on which agreement had been reached, was initialled by Monsieur Adatci and by the Rumanian and Hungarian delegates, together with a draft resolution for submission to the Council. A few days later, however, the Hungarian Government repudiated the signature of their delegate, and the debate during the twenty-fifth session of the Council in July 1923 turned mainly on the question whether an agreement had or had not been reached at Brussels. Finally, on the 5th July, the Council adopted the resolution which had been initialled at Brussels, and which expressed the hope that both Governments would do their best 'to prevent the question of the Hungarian optants from becoming a disturbing influence' in their relations, and the conviction that the Hungarian Government would 'do its best to reassure its nationals' and that the Rumanian Government would 'remain faithful to the Treaty and to the principle of justice upon which it declares that its agrarian legislation is founded, by giving proof of its good will in regard to the interests of the

¹ Monsieur Adatci showed some reluctance to continue to act as rapporteur owing to the doubt which existed as to whether the Council, in dealing with a dispute referred to it under Article 11 of the Covenant, would have to take its decisions by a unanimous or a majority vote, and whether the votes of disputants would count in determining unanimity or a majority. Monsieur Adatci anticipated that difficulties might arise if and when recommendations for a settlement of the dispute were submitted to the Council unless all the members of that body were prepared to agree that the votes of the interested parties would not count in calculating a unanimous or a majority vote.

Hungarian optants'. The Hungarian delegate, Count Apponyi, refrained from voting on this resolution and reaffirmed his view that no agreement had been reached at Brussels, whereas Monsieur Titulescu declared that the resolution confirmed the Brussels agreement.¹

With the adoption of the Council's resolution of the 5th July, 1923, the first stage of the dispute came to an inconclusive end. During this stage the original question at issue—the rights of Hungarian optants in Transylvania—had been discussed in great detail and both sides had defined their points of view at length. So far as the original basis of the dispute was concerned, the cases of the respective parties remained unchanged at the beginning of 1927, when the League was again called upon to intervene, but at this point various new factors were introduced which raised general questions of great importance and thus gave a new character to the controversy.

From December 1923 onwards a number of applications from Hungarian optants owning lands in the territories which had been transferred to Rumania were submitted to the Secretariat of the Mixed Rumano-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal which had been constituted in accordance with Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon and which sat in Paris. The optants asked that the Tribunal should declare 'that the measures restricting their right of ownership, which had been applied to their movable and immovable property by the Rumanian State, were contrary to the provisions of Article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon, and that it should order the Rumanian State to make restitution'.²

In the course of the year 1925 the Rumanian Government raised objections to the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in cases of expropriation arising from the application of the agrarian laws. In December 1926 the Tribunal heard Counsel of the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments on the question of its competence and on the 10th January, 1927, it decided (by a majority vote)³ that agrarian

¹ During the debate the British delegate, Lord Robert Cecil, expressed the view that it would have been possible for the Council, independently of the parties to the dispute, to submit the question to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion, but it did not seem to him proper, 'particularly in view of what had taken place at Brussels', that the Council should exercise its power in this case. He added that, in his view, 'the Council could assume that an agreement had been entered into at Brussels by the representative of Hungary, and it was extremely undesirable that that agreement should not be considered by the Council as having great weight'. For a detailed account of the Brussels negotiations and an exposition of the Hungarian point of view, see Déak, *op. cit.* See also the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 220-1.

² Report of the Committee of Three to the Council (*League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1927).

³ Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon provided that 'the decision of the majority of the members of the Tribunal shall be the decision of the Tribunal'.

questions came within the scope of Article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon¹ and were therefore within its jurisdiction. It requested Rumania to submit a reply on the substance of the question within two months. On the 24th February, 1927, however, the Rumanian Government informed the Tribunal that they did not intend to submit a reply and that their judge would no longer sit on the Tribunal when claims by Hungarian nationals relating to the agrarian reforms were under consideration. At the same time, the Rumanian Government informed the League of Nations Secretariat of their decision and asked to be allowed to acquaint the Council with the reasons for their attitude. Like Hungary in 1923, Rumania invoked paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Covenant—that is, she brought the matter before the League as a circumstance which threatened 'to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations on which peace depends'.

The dispute came before the Council on the 7th March, 1927. Monsieur Titulescu, for Rumania, and Count Apponyi, for Hungary, argued the cases of their respective Governments at great length. The Rumanian representative explained that his Government still considered that the optants question had been settled by the Brussels Agreement of 1923 and insisted that the social and political aspect of the dispute, as opposed to the purely legal aspect, must determine the nature of the solution. Monsieur Titulescu's argument against the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was that the Treaty of Trianon restricted the Tribunal's jurisdiction to claims on account of liquidation, and that the expropriation of estates under the Agrarian Laws was not liquidation since it was not a war measure and was not applied to ex-enemy property as such.

The Hungarian representative argued that Rumania, in denying the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, desired 'to deal a mortal blow' at 'international arbitral decision'. He invited Rumania to agree to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice to give its judgment on the question whether the Tribunal, in declaring itself competent to decide claims arising out of the Rumanian agrarian reforms, had or had not exceeded its powers. He also appealed to the Council to appoint arbitrators to take the place of the judge whom the Rumanian Government had decided to withdraw when agrarian cases were in question. This appeal to the Council was based on Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon, which had made the following provisions for the constitution of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal:

Each such Tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the

¹ See p. 168 above.

Governments concerned shall appoint one of these members. The President shall be chosen by agreement between the two Governments concerned.

In case of failure to reach agreement,¹ the President of the Tribunal and two other persons, either of whom may in case of need take his place, shall be chosen by the Council of the League of Nations. . . . These persons shall be nationals of Powers that have remained neutral during the war.

If in case there is a vacancy a Government does not proceed within a period of one month to appoint as provided above a member of the Tribunal, such member shall be chosen by the other Government from the two persons mentioned above other than the President.²

Both the Hungarian suggestions—for a reference to the Permanent Court and for the appointment by the League of deputy arbitrators—were opposed by Monsieur Titulescu, and the Council finally adjourned the whole question. In summing up the discussion, the acting President of the Council (Herr Stresemann) pointed out that it was not 'just a dispute between two members of the League. The question is much more important than that. The point at issue is that of the competence of arbitral tribunals in relation to national and international laws on the same subject'. The Council finally decided to appoint a Committee of Three, consisting of the Japanese and Chilian representatives (Viscount Ishii and Señor Villegas), with the British representative, Sir Austen Chamberlain, as rapporteur, to study the question and prepare a report.

The Committee of Three summoned representatives of Hungary and Rumania to meet it in London on the 31st May and the 1st June, and further meetings took place in Geneva later in June. The committee's attempts at conciliation failed to bring about an agreement between the parties, and as its report was not ready in time for the June session of the Council, the question was postponed until

¹ The French text of this and the preceding sentence ran: 'Le Président sera choisi à la suite d'un accord entre les deux gouvernements intéressés. Au cas où cet accord ne pourrait intervenir, le Président. . . .' Some jurists interpreted this text to mean that 'the case for the intervention of the Council of the League under Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon only arises when there is a dispute as to the choice of a President for the Tribunal' (Professor J. E. G. de Montmorency in *Agrarian Reform in Roumania and the Case of the Hungarian Optants in Transylvania before the League of Nations* [Paris, 1927, Imprimerie du Palais]). According to this view the Council would not have been justified, under the terms of the Treaty, in taking the action suggested by the Hungarian Government.

² In May 1924 the Hungarian Government had asked the League Council to appoint a President of the Mixed Tribunal, since the original President had died and the two Governments had failed to agree on a successor. The Council decided in June to wait for a few months in the hope that a Chairman would be appointed by agreement, and at its next session in October 1924 it was informed that an appointment had been made.

September. The Committee of Three made further unsuccessful efforts at the beginning of September to bring about an agreed settlement of the dispute, and on the 17th September the committee's report¹ came before the Council for consideration.

The report emphasized the desire of the committee 'to find a solution that would allay discontent'. Since the matter had been referred to the Council, not under Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon, but under Article 11 of the Covenant, the Council could not, in the committee's view, 'evade the duty imposed upon it by the Covenant and confine itself simply to the election of two deputy members for the Arbitral Tribunal, which the Hungarian representative had demanded. If it did so it would have failed to discharge its political duties as a mediator and conciliator in a dispute which extended far beyond the actual terms in which it had been originally submitted by the two parties.'

The main problem which the committee had to consider was defined as follows:

Is the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal entitled to entertain claims arising out of the application of the Rumanian Agrarian Law to Hungarian optants and nationals?

On this question the committee consulted 'eminent legal authorities'² and its conclusions and recommendations were based on the advice it received from these experts. The report laid down the following three principles which, it declared, 'the acceptance of the Treaty of Trianon has made obligatory for Rumania and Hungary':

(1) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the War of

¹ The text is printed in the *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1927.

² The authorities concerned were the jurists attached to six of the delegations present at Geneva for the meeting of the Assembly. On this point, the committee's action was criticized on the ground that the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon in regard to the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was a matter for the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal itself in the first instance and for the Permanent Court of International Justice in the second instance, and not a matter for the committee itself to decide on the strength of legal opinions from authorities of its own choosing. (See, for instance, the opinions of a number of British jurists summarized in *The Manchester Guardian* on the 27th September, 1927, and a debate in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 17th November, 1927). For a collection of legal opinions in support of the Rumanian thesis and of the report of the Committee of Three, see *Agrarian Reform in Roumania and the Case of the Hungarian Optants in Transylvania before the League of Nations*, which contains the replies of a number of jurists of various nationalities to the two following questions: '(1) Under Article 11 of the Covenant and Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon, can the Council refuse to nominate an auxiliary judge? (2) Should the Council refer to the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the rulings which it has suggested to the litigants?'

1914–18 do not exclude the application to Hungarian nationals (including those who had opted for Hungarian nationality) of a general scheme of agrarian reform.

(2) There must be no inequality between Rumanians and Hungarians, either in the terms of the Agrarian Law or in the way in which it is enforced.

(3) The words 'retention and liquidation' mentioned in Article 250, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, apply solely to the measures taken against the property of a Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as such owner is a Hungarian national.

The committee recommended that the Council should request the two parties to conform to these three principles and should request Rumania to reinstate her judge on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. If either party should refuse to accept the three principles, certain 'sanctions' were proposed.

In the event of a refusal by Hungary . . . the Council would not be justified in appointing two deputy members in accordance with Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon. In the event of a refusal by Rumania . . . the Council would be justified in taking appropriate measures to ensure in any case the satisfactory working of the Tribunal. In the event of a refusal of the above recommendations by both parties . . . the Council will have discharged the duty laid upon it by Article 11 of the Covenant.

On the 17th September, 1927, Count Apponyi refused on behalf of Hungary to accept the principles laid down by the Committee of Three and defended his refusal in a long and eloquent speech. He argued that the report amounted to an interpretation of the treaties and that under the Covenant the duty of interpreting the treaties belonged not to the Council but to the International Court of Arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. He saw 'a tendency to ask the Council to assume the role of an arbitral tribunal, setting itself up above the Court constituted by the Treaty itself . . . a tendency to confusion between political power and the judicial work of a Court. . . .' He proposed once more that the question of the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to try agrarian cases should be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and he also suggested that the Court should be asked to give an advisory opinion on the question whether the three principles enunciated by the Committee of Three in its report had been 'rendered obligatory on Rumania and Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon'.

Monsieur Titulescu, on the other hand, intimated that his Government would accept the Committee's three principles, provided that they were also accepted by Hungary. He rejected once more the Hungarian proposal for arbitration—pointing out that 'for Hungary it is a question of money. Hungary has everything to gain and nothing

to lose. For Rumania it involves the whole of her social economy'—and insisted that a settlement must be reached on a political rather than a juridical basis.¹

The general discussion of the report of the Committee of Three revealed considerable differences of opinion among the members of the Council, especially in regard to the last part of the report, in which the committee suggested the course which might be followed in the event of either party refusing to accept the Council's recommendations.² The Council finally decided, on the 19th September, to adjourn the discussion until December in the hope that the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments, after examining the report at their leisure, would find themselves able to agree to the principles which it contained. The Council as a whole did not feel able to endorse that part of the committee's report which related to sanctions and the report as it was recommended to the two Governments for their consideration therefore did not include the final paragraphs.

On the 25th November the Rumanian Government notified the League of Nations Secretariat that they accepted the report of the Committee of Three, on the understanding that it was read in conjunction with the concluding paragraphs—that is, that the recommendations regarding sanctions were accepted. On the 29th November, the Hungarian Government informed the Secretariat that they were unable to accept the report, but that they had made direct proposals to Rumania for a settlement. These Hungarian proposals, which had been communicated to Rumania in the middle of November, drew a distinction between different kinds of property in Transylvania which had been confiscated under the Rumanian Agrarian Law. While the arable land which had been expropriated had been distributed among the peasants, the large areas of forest land had been retained by the state. The Hungarian Government now suggested that in the case of forest land the estates should either be returned to their owners or

¹ The Rumanian contention that the problem was essentially a political one was supported by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Monsieur Beneš, who submitted a memorandum to the Council during its forty-seventh session in which he pointed out that Czechoslovakia was directly interested in the Hungaro-Rumanian dispute by virtue of her own agrarian reforms, and declared that the Czechoslovak Government could not admit the competence of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to deal with claims arising out of the application of agrarian laws. In Monsieur Beneš's view, 'the fundamental political, economic and social conditions of several countries' were at stake.

² The Hungarian representative had indicated that he could not accept the committee's three principles, and if the Council adopted the report as a whole and took the sanction suggested by the committee, it would definitely refuse to grant Hungary's request for the appointment of two deputy members on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

compensation amounting to their full value should be paid ; but in the case of arable land restoration was not claimed and the Hungarian Government indicated that they would be prepared to consider a compromise with regard to the amount of compensation.

Monsieur Titulescu was unable to attend the December session of the Council, owing to ill-health, and with Count Apponyi's consent the question was adjourned until March 1928. By that time it was hoped that the direct negotiations which had been opened by Hungary might have progressed far enough for further intervention by the Council to be unnecessary. The Rumanian Government, however, did not reply to the Hungarian proposals until the end of February.¹ They then suggested that any compensation to the Hungarian optants which might be agreed upon should be paid by the Hungarian Government, which should be entitled to deduct the amount thus expended from the sum due to Rumania under the Peace Treaty on reparations account. This suggested arrangement was to be contingent on Hungary's accepting as the legal basis of the settlement the principles laid down by the Committee of Three in September 1927.

On the 8th March, the Council once more gave a hearing to the Hungarian and Rumanian delegates. Count Apponyi explained that his Government could not agree to the counter-proposals made by Rumania at the end of February, since they were, as they had already explained, unable to accept the report of the Committee of Three as the basis of settlement. Moreover, the Rumanian proposal that the sums paid as compensation should be deducted from reparation payments and the amount of compensation suggested were alike unacceptable. Monsieur Titulescu reiterated his Government's approval of the recommendations of the Committee of Three. Sir Austen Chamberlain, who continued to act as rapporteur, pointed out that the attempt to reach a solution by direct negotiation appeared to have broken down because Hungary refused to accept the principles enunciated in the report of the Committee of Three and Rumania made the acceptance of those principles by Hungary a condition of agreement to a direct settlement. The rapporteur therefore made a new proposal. He suggested that the Council might exercise its powers under Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon and appoint two neutral members of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, but these two members would be in addition to, and not in substitution for, the Rumanian member. The two parties might then be asked to agree

¹ The delay seems to have been largely due to the uncertainty of the internal political situation in Rumania as a consequence of the death of Monsieur Bratianu.

to the consideration by this tribunal of five members of claims arising out of the application of the Rumanian agrarian laws. Monsieur Titulescu said that he would accept this proposal on the understanding that the reconstituted tribunal would be bound by the three principles contained in the report submitted by the Committee of Three in September 1927. Count Apponyi was prepared to accept the proposal in its original form, but not with the rider suggested by Monsieur Titulescu, and Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that he 'could not make himself responsible for fathering the change' in his resolution which Monsieur Titulescu proposed.¹ The resolution which was finally adopted by the Council on the 9th March did not endorse the suggestion that the three principles of September 1927 should be made binding upon the tribunal, but it reaffirmed the value of the Council's resolution of the 19th September, 1927 (in which the report of the Committee of Three was recommended to the two Governments for consideration); expressed the view that the best method of settling the dispute was by friendly negotiation between the parties; and submitted for the acceptance of both Governments the proposal that the claims of the optants should be decided by a reconstituted tribunal of five members.²

On the 28th May the Rumanian Government informed the League Secretariat that they had examined the proposal contained in the Council's resolution and regretted that they could not accept it; and on the 6th June the Hungarian Government notified the Secretariat of their acceptance. The position of the two disputants, therefore, was now reversed. In the autumn of 1927 it had been the Rumanian Government who accepted the Council's recommendations and the Hungarian Government who rejected them. When the question

¹ The effect of Monsieur Titulescu's proposal, in practice, would have been to bind the tribunal to reject the optants' claims; since the third of the principles of September 1927 had laid it down that claims under Article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon on account of 'retention or liquidation' would only be valid where the measures complained of had been taken against property in so far as its owner was a Hungarian national. It was apparently not contested even by the Hungarians that the Agrarian Law had been applied without discrimination of nationality, and claims arising out of the application of the Agrarian Law would therefore have been inadmissible.

² For criticisms of the Council's attitude up to this point see the letters to *The Times* from Lord Buckmaster, Lord Newton, and others (issue of the 10th March, 1928); Lord Phillimore (23rd March, 1928); and Sir Frederick Pollock (9th April, 1928). For letters in support of the point of view that the problem was political rather than legal and ought to be settled in accordance with 'equity' see *The Times*, 12th March, 1928 (Professor R. W. Seton-Watson) and the same journal, 16th and 24th March and 11th April (Mr. Wickham Steed). For further expositions of both sides of the case see the debate in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 25th June, 1928.

came before the Council yet again on the 8th June, 1928, it was the Hungarian Government who were willing to comply with the Council's new proposals and the Rumanian Government who found them unacceptable.

In these circumstances, the Council seems to have come to the conclusion that it was useless for it to formulate further suggestions, and it contented itself with adopting the following resolution, proposed by the rapporteur:¹

The Council, whilst deeply regretting that the parties have failed to reach agreement on the lines of the Council's recommendations; without desiring to exclude any other friendly arrangement, remains of opinion that this dispute ought to be settled by the parties upon the basis of the solutions which the Council has recommended to their acceptance; maintains its resolutions of September 19th, 1927, and March 9th, 1928; and urges the Governments of Hungary and Rumania to bring this long dispute to a close by reciprocal concessions.

Sir Austen Chamberlain stated subsequently² that the adoption of this resolution had closed the question 'so far as concerns the appeals made to the Council of the League of Nations by Rumania and Hungary respectively in March 1927'.

Nevertheless, the Hungaro-Rumanian dispute appeared on the agenda for the fifty-first session of the Council in September 1928. At the close of the discussion on the 8th June Monsieur Titulescu had intimated that his Government intended to make new proposals to Hungary, according to which the Council would be asked to appoint one of its members to examine the whole question and decide what compensation, if any, should be paid to the optants. An exchange of views on the subject of this proposal took place between the two Governments in July and August, but although the Hungarian Government were willing to enter into negotiations with the assistance of a mediator, they were not prepared to accept certain principles formulated by the Rumanian Government. In particular, they rejected the proposal, which Rumania still maintained, that any compensation payable to the optants should be deducted from reparations dues. On the 25th August the Hungarian Government informed the League Secretariat that the negotiations had broken down and asked for the question to be placed on the agenda for the next Council meeting—repeating their requests for the appointment of two deputy members of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and for the submission of the dispute as to the Tribunal's competence to the Permanent Court of International Justice. After the Secretariat had received this request

¹ Count Apponyi abstained from voting on the resolution.

² In a written answer to a parliamentary question on the 13th July, 1928.

from Hungary, however, further communications were exchanged between the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments with regard to the possibility of direct negotiations on the question of compensation. The Council judged from these notes, which were placed at its disposal, that there was a possibility that the two parties might yet arrive at an amicable settlement, and on the 21st September it adopted a resolution adjourning the question once more and recommending that the two Governments, 'while reserving their points of view in regard to the principles involved and the legal situation . . . should take steps to enable their plenipotentiaries to meet as soon as possible, and to be furnished with the necessary powers to come to a practical settlement of the question.'

This resolution was accepted by both Monsieur Titulescu and Count Apponyi, and in the middle of October it was announced at Bucarest that arrangements had been made for plenipotentiaries of the two countries to meet at the beginning of November. The meeting had to be postponed several times, but a conference finally opened at Abbazia on the 15th December, 1928. The course of these direct negotiations and their outcome will be recorded in a future volume of this *Survey*.

From the foregoing narrative of the history of the question down to that date, it will have been evident that, as Dr. Stresemann pointed out in March 1927,¹ there was more at stake in this long-drawn-out, stubborn and intricate controversy than a local quarrel between two states over a particular concrete issue. As the controversy proceeded, at least two general questions of principle emerged: first, a conflict between treaty obligations on the one hand and national legislation on the other; second, a conflict between the juridical and the political method of handling an international dispute. A number of important points were raised, also, in connexion with the competence of the Council of the League of Nations. A considerable proportion of the time spent at Geneva in discussing the optants dispute was occupied by long debates on the powers and duties of the Council: whether unanimity was necessary in asking the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion; whether the Council could place a question on its agenda in opposition to the wishes of one of the parties to a dispute; how far it was entitled or empowered to interpret treaties; and to what extent it was justified in performing the functions of a committee of conciliation in preference to taking action under a treaty. The emergence of these and similar questions lent an interest to the optants controversy which it would scarcely have possessed if it had remained nothing more than a South-East European imbroglio.

¹ See p. 175 above.

(iv) Negotiations between Greece and Jugoslavia over Facilities at the Port of Salonica.

In the *Survey for 1926*¹ it was recorded that, on the 15th November, 1924, the Graeco-Serb treaty of alliance of 1913 was denounced by the Yugoslav Government, and an account was given of the negotiations for the renewal of that alliance which took place during 1925 and 1926 and which were accompanied by attempts to come to an arrangement whereby Jugoslavia would receive greater facilities for her trade at Salonica than had been granted to her under the convention of the 10th May, 1923, establishing a Yugoslav Free Zone at that port.² When, on the 17th August, 1926, the Greek Government of which General Pángalos was the head put their signature to a new treaty of friendship with Jugoslavia, they also signed a series of technical conventions dealing with the Yugoslav Free Zone at Salonica and with access to it by rail; but these conventions—which provided, *inter alia*, for joint Graeco-Yugoslav administration of the railway from Gevgeli on the Yugoslav frontier to Salonica and for the admission into the Free Zone of the goods of other countries besides Jugoslavia—went too far for Greek public opinion, and the overthrow of General Pángalos a few days after the signature of the instruments involved the lapse of the settlement which had been negotiated during his régime. On the 25th August, 1927, the Greek Chamber unanimously rejected the treaty and conventions of the 17th August, 1926, on the ground that they conferred privileges upon Jugoslavia which constituted a threat to Greek sovereignty in Macedonia.³

The new Government which had taken office in Greece in December 1926 declared repeatedly that they were ready to grant Jugoslavia all possible facilities at Salonica provided that the sovereign rights of Greece were fully safeguarded; and attempts to find a new basis for discussion appear to have been made in the summer of 1927, in connexion with the negotiations which were then in progress for a Graeco-Yugoslav commercial agreement.⁴ A treaty of commerce was signed on the 2nd November, 1927, together with a number of subsidiary conventions dealing with frontier traffic, railway tariffs, veterinary questions and other technical matters, but questions relating to Salonica were not included in the scope of these conventions. So long as Greece and Jugoslavia were unable to reconcile their differences over Salonica, the way was blocked for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship which would place their relations on a

¹ Part II B, Section (ii).

² For the terms of this convention, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, Section (iii) (9).

³ *Survey for 1926*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

satisfactory basis and which might ultimately serve as one of the foundation stones of a system of treaties of friendship and for the pacific settlement of disputes comprehending all the countries of South-Eastern Europe. Both the Greek and the Yugoslav Government expressed anxiety to come to an agreement, but an offer to open fresh negotiations on the Salonica question, which was made by Monsieur Marinković, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in September 1927,¹ does not seem to have been actively followed up for some months. In April 1928 Monsieur Marinković and Monsieur Mikhalakópulos, the Greek Foreign Minister, were reported to have had an interview at Geneva and to have agreed that negotiations on outstanding questions should begin without delay. In June further conversations seem to have taken place at Athens, but no definite result had been reached when, at the beginning of July, Monsieur Venizelos took office for the fifth time as the head of a Greek Government.

Since it was the declared policy of the new Government at Athens to establish cordial relations with neighbouring countries, and since Monsieur Venizelos himself was understood to entertain the friendliest feelings towards Yugoslavia, it was to be expected that the negotiations regarding Salonica would be pursued with fresh energy. On the Greek side, indeed, the prospects for a satisfactory settlement appeared to be improved by the advent to power of Monsieur Venizelos, if only because the special prestige which that statesman enjoyed would be likely to assist him both in negotiating with Yugoslavia and in securing the approval of his own countrymen for the terms of any agreement that might be concluded. The Yugoslav Government, for their part, were not likely to display an intransigent spirit towards Greece at this stage. For some time past, Yugoslavia had been making genuine efforts to conciliate her neighbours in the hope of counter-balancing the success of Italy's 'forward policy' in South-Eastern Europe—a policy which appeared to Yugoslav minds to be a direct threat against Yugoslavia.²

In view of the friendly relations established between Italy and Rumania in 1926,³ the signature on the 21st March, 1928, of a Graeco-Rumanian treaty of non-aggression, conciliation and arbitration⁴ had

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 209.

² See *op. cit.*, Part II C, Sections (i), (ii) and (iv).

³ *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (i).

⁴ The treaty was interesting mainly because it was the first agreement to be modelled on one of the draft treaties prepared by the Committee on Arbitration and Security of the League of Nations (see the present volume, Part I A, Section (iii)).

added to Yugoslav fears of isolation, and those fears were not diminished by the firstfruits of Monsieur Venizelos's foreign policy. His first steps towards the fulfilment of his design of establishing cordial relations with his neighbours led him not to Belgrade but to Rome, where, on the 23rd September, 1928, he and Signor Mussolini affixed their signatures to a pact of friendship and arbitration.¹ Monsieur Venizelos took pains to convince the Yugoslav Government that they need feel no apprehension on account of the Italo-Greek *rapprochement*, but, as he had no doubt calculated, the existence of the treaty of the 23rd September provided an additional inducement to Yugoslavia to settle the Salonica dispute without delay and on terms more favourable to Greece than those to which General Pángalos had agreed in 1926.

Early in September, before the signature of the Italo-Greek pact, discussions had taken place at Geneva between Monsieur Karapános, the Foreign Minister in Monsieur Venizelos's Government, and Monsieur Marinković, and at the end of September and the beginning of October Monsieur Venizelos himself had a series of conversations with Monsieur Marinković in Paris. In the course of these discussions the broad lines of an agreement appear to have been laid down. From the 9th to the 12th October, Monsieur Venizelos visited Belgrade, where he was accorded a warm welcome. The outcome of his negotiations with Monsieur Šumenković, the acting Foreign Minister, was the signature on the 11th October of a protocol specifying the procedure to be followed for the settlement, within a given time, of outstanding questions relating to Salonica.

The protocol² provided that the basis of the settlement should be the existing agreements regarding the Yugoslav Free Zone which had been signed in 1923.³ In order to clear up certain doubtful points in these agreements and to settle details which had been left for future consideration, the Greek Government had communicated to the Yugoslav Government in 1926 the drafts of five additional protocols. It was now arranged that the Yugoslav Government should inform the Greek Government, within twenty days, whether they could accept any or all of these drafts. Any suggested modifications were to be the subject of an immediate exchange of views between the Governments. If necessary, specific points would be examined by a

¹ See p. 160 above.

² The text was published by *Le Temps* and by the *Corriere della Sera* on the 16th October, 1928.

³ The main agreement had been signed on the 10th May, 1923, and various subsidiary protocols on the 6th October, 1923 (*Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, Section (iii) (9)).

mixed commission of experts, who would report within three weeks. On certain points, agreement was recorded in the protocol. It was decided, for instance, that the Yugoslav Free Zone could only be used for Yugoslav goods and that vessels carrying goods into the zone should be obliged to conform to the Greek sanitary regulations. Finally, MM. Venizelos and Šumenković recorded their belief that the value of the agreements concluded regarding Salonica must depend to a large extent on the degree of confidence and cordiality informing the relations between the two countries, and they therefore decided that as soon as the process of settling technical problems was completed (it was apparently contemplated that this process should not take more than six weeks), the two Governments should conclude a pact of friendship and peaceful settlement of disputes, conceived on the broadest possible lines and with a duration of five years.

The settlement foreshadowed by the protocol of the 11th October promised to give Yugoslavia the assurance of Greek friendship, but the Yugoslav Government did not apparently stand to gain many material advantages, and it was a sign of the times that they should be prepared, for fear of alienating Greece, to withdraw practically all their previous demands regarding Salonica. The adoption of the 1923 agreements as the basis for negotiation meant that the Belgrade Government had abandoned the hope of securing a share in the administration of the Gevgeli-Salonica Railway and the other privileges which Yugoslavia would have enjoyed if the 1926 agreements had come into force; and they seem also to have yielded on a point to which they were believed to attach special importance. Yugoslavia was interested in Salonica not only as an outlet for her trade in time of peace but also as the port through which munitions could most easily reach her in the event of war, and the Yugoslav negotiators were reported to have made attempts to obtain from Monsieur Venizelos a guarantee that Greece would adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality if Yugoslavia should find herself at war and would not interfere in any way with the transit of munitions through Salonica. Monsieur Venizelos was understood to have replied that an undertaking of the kind suggested would be incompatible with the spirit of the treaty which he had recently concluded with Italy.

On the 4th November, 1928, the Yugoslav Minister at Athens communicated to Monsieur Karapános his Government's acceptance of two of the protocols of 1926, but it was not found possible to settle certain technical points arising out of the other protocols within the period of six weeks contemplated by the agreement of the 11th October. The Greek Government agreed to a request from Belgrade

that the period of negotiation should be prolonged, and the protocols were still unsigned when the *coup d'état* of the 6th January, 1929, took place at Belgrade and a new régime which was virtually a dictatorship was established. The negotiations with Greece, however, were resumed by the new Yugoslav Government in the third week of January and were carried to a successful conclusion. On the 17th March six protocols were signed at Geneva, dealing with the conditions governing the use of the Yugoslav Zone at Salonica, with railway, customs, veterinary and postal services and with general matters. Ten days later the settlement was completed by the signature at Belgrade of a Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement with a duration of five years. This treaty of the 27th March, 1929, cannot be analysed in detail here;¹ but it may be noted that the provisions relating to the submission of disputes of a judicial character to the Permanent Court of International Justice and of other disputes to a procedure of conciliation or arbitration were modelled on the draft treaties prepared by the Committee on Arbitration and Security at Geneva and adopted by the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1928.² It was expressly stipulated, however, that the undertaking to submit to arbitration should not apply to disputes which had arisen before the conclusion of the agreement, or which related to questions falling, according to international law, within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or which were connected with the territorial status of the parties. Reservations of this kind were common in arbitration treaties, but the last one, in particular, had considerable potential importance in this case, in view of the special privileges which Yugoslavia enjoyed at Salonica and of the anxiety which had been expressed in Greece during the prolonged negotiations over the Salonica question lest Yugoslavia's status in Macedonia should constitute a threat to Greek sovereignty.³

¹ It will be printed in the volume of documents supplementary to the *Survey for 1929*.

² See the present volume, Part I A, Section (iii).

³ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part II B, Section (ii).

PART III

THE ISLAMIC WORLD

A. THE 'WESTERNIZATION MOVEMENT' (1926-8)

(i) Introductory Note.

DURING the years 1926-8 the term 'Islamic World' was still a convenient name for a region separating Europe and Russia on the one hand from Tropical Africa and India and the Far East on the other; but in this region, by that time, the process of 'Westernization' had reached a point at which it raised the question whether, except as a geographical expression, 'the Islamic World' any longer represented a reality. After the inconclusive issue of the Cairo Caliphate Conference in 1926,¹ could Islam still be said to exist as a way of life embracing every aspect of human activity or as a society uniting peoples of many races and languages by the bond of common obedience to its law? According to the Orthodox tradition, Islam was either nothing less than this or else it was nothing at all. What had it come to be in fact?

The prevailing ideals of the 'Westernization' movement in the old Islamic domain (*Dāru'l-Islām*)—as manifested *par excellence* in Turkey during the years in question—were secularism and nationalism; and these two ideals—the separation of church and state and the equation of the frontiers between different states with the boundaries between the domains of different languages—were both not merely alien to the Islamic tradition but were calculated to disrupt the old unity of Islam in so far as they prevailed. The Turks, for instance, by the time when they had not only declared a republic and abolished the Caliphate but had disendowed and disestablished Islamic religious institutions, abandoned the last vestiges of Islamic dress, and ceased to use the Arabic Alphabet, had deliberately and effectively cut themselves off from other members of Islamic society who had refrained from following their example or had moved in the opposite direction. To take an extreme case, it would have been difficult to point to many common Islamic traits which the Turks and the Wahnābīs still shared in 1928² in common contrast to the peoples of Western Europe or to

¹ For the history of this conference, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part I, Section (ii) (f).

² In Turkey, religious differentiation was not yet quite extinct in law (see, for example, pp. 195 and 199 below). The whole tendency, however, was

the Russians or to the Chinese. Indeed, a student of comparative sociology would have found more significant common traits between the Turks and the Chinese at this time than between the Turks and the majority of their former co-religionists; for, utterly different though the Islamic and Far Eastern social heritages were, the Turks and Chinese at this time were both reacting to the stimulus or virus of Western Civilization with a revolutionary violence; and the paroxysms through which they were severally passing revealed, under examination, remarkable similarities of detail. If the manner and degree of reaction to the impact of the West was at this time—as in fact it was—the most significant criterion for the sociological classification of non-Western peoples, then the Turks and the Chinese would most naturally be placed together in one class and the Wauhā-bīs and Tibetans in another.

If the process of Westernization were to be carried to completion in every part of the Islamic World, it was true that it would efface in the end those divisions which it had created between one Muslim people and another at the beginning; but it would only do so by effacing Islam itself (at least in its traditional shape as a way of life embracing every side of human activity) and absorbing the Islamic World into a Western World which was becoming co-extensive with the whole inhabited surface of the Earth. The homelands of Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe had been swallowed up by the expansion of the Western World already. On the other hand, Russia—the 'New World' of Orthodox Christendom—after having entered on the path of Westernization as early as the Greeks and Serbs and having achieved incomparably greater triumphs in the diverse fields of war and diplomacy and music and literature in the course of two centuries—had been seized by a revulsion which gradually gathered strength below the surface until it broke out in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917—a catastrophe that abruptly reversed in Russia the long process of 'Westernization' and, in the name of a Western revolutionary creed, impelled the peoples of the U.S.S.R. along a new course towards an unknown goal.¹ This startling revolt against 'Westernization' in one half of Orthodox Christendom might find its parallels in

towards secularization; and, as will appear from the facts cited in Section (vi) of this part of the present volume, the process had come very near to completion by the close of the year 1928. Of course it is easier to change laws than habits of feeling, thought and action; and in the Turkish, Chinese and Russian, as in most other known revolutions, there was a wide difference between the respective rates of change on the surface and below it. This difference, however, defied any attempt at measurement.

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, Section (i).

the Islamic World: and in fact, during the years 1926-8, the same 'Zealot' animus against the West was manifest, on a punier scale, among the Wahnābīs of Najd and among the fanatical tribesmen of north-eastern Afghanistan.

Were these 'Zealot' outbreaks mere rear-guard actions of defeated hosts which the *élan* of Western Civilization would overbear again and again, in successive onsets, until the rout was complete? Or were they rallies which portended the end of a long retreat and the return, on a new front, to stationary warfare? At the time of writing the answer to that pertinent question was utterly obscure even as regarded the prospects of Communism in Russia, and *a fortiori* as regarded the outbreaks of fanaticism in the Islamic World. Could any non-Western society oppose an effective resistance to the advance of Western Civilization without borrowing the invader's weapons? And would not that amount to borrowing the whole technical apparatus and organization of the West? And could that be done without becoming contaminated by the Western spirit and thus being exposed to the process of Westernization by the very exigencies of the tactics of defence? An observer who appraised the strength of the contemporary Western World—the impetus of Western Europe with the weight of America behind—might have been inclined to pronounce, at first glance, that the advance of Western Civilization was irresistible, and that not only the Najdīs and the Afghans but the Russians were bound to succumb to it. The victorious eastward progress of the Latin Alphabet, not only to Constantinople and Angora but to Baku and Tashkend and Qāzān,¹ might have been taken as a sign of the times. Yet such forecasts would have left out of account the possibility that the peoples of the West might spend their tremendous strength not in completing the cultural achievement of assimilating the rest of Mankind but in destroying one another and themselves by war and revolution. That fatal diversion of abounding energy and commanding ability from creative to suicidal channels had once brought the equally impressive advance of Hellenic Civilization to an abrupt halt when world dominion seemed to lie within its grasp. The Parthian raiders whom Antiochus the Great chastised, and the Jewish 'Zealots' who rose up against Antiochus Epiphanes's *protégé* Jason the High Priest for defiling the Holy City with felt hats and dramatic festivals and athletic competitions, must have appeared as insignificant to the Hellenistic statesmen of the second century before Christ as in 1929 Wahnābī raiders appeared to British High Commissioners in Palestine and 'Irāq or King Amānu'llāh's Macca-

¹ See Section (viii) below.

baean adversary the Water-Carrier's son to British political officers on the North-West Frontier of India. Yet because, in the second century before Christ, the Great Powers of the Hellenistic World indulged in wars which ruined all of them before they ended in the Pyrrhic victory of one, those rear-guard actions of a handful of wild nomads and highlanders came to stand out in history as portents, marking the turn of the tide when the flow of Hellenism ceased and the waters which had gone over the soul of the Oriental peoples began to ebb away from the Oriental World. In 1929 it was impossible to tell whether history might not repeat itself.

No doubt, it was virtually certain that, whatever general outcome the spiritual conflict between Western Civilization and Islam for dominion over human souls might have, there were at any rate some originally Islamic peoples who would be lost to Islam irrevocably and won by the West once for all. Such definitive 'Westernization' seemed to be the almost inevitable destiny of the Ottoman Turks and the probable destiny of the Persians.¹ Thus even if the followers of King 'Abdu'l-'Aziz in the Arabian Peninsula and the adversaries of King Amānu'llāh in Afghanistan were first to hold and then to enlarge their ground, the utmost degree of success within their reach would fall far short of reinstating Islam in full possession of its traditional domain up to its ancient frontiers. Yet that did not mean that an Islam thus recalled to life from the brink of the grave would necessarily be doomed to move in a narrower compass or to play a smaller part than before; for even if it had to resign itself to reduced limits on one front, it might find new worlds to conquer on others.

One of the determining features in the life of Mankind at this time was the fact that Western Civilization, with its talent for the application of physical science to practical affairs, had made a social unity of the habitable earth by its many inventions; for though the peoples of the West had spread this network of communications round the globe for the purposes of their own economic and political expansion, the network, once constructed, stood at the disposal of any Power strong enough to extort from its makers a right of user. Thus, for example, the opening-up of Tropical Africa by Western enterprise and the fever into which the blast of the Western spirit had thrown

¹ The Egyptians and the Syrians had travelled as far, or almost as far, along the path of Westernization as the Turks and considerably further than the Persians at this date; but the very stimulation of their national consciousness, which was one of the strongest effects of Western influence, was likely to reinforce their sense of solidarity with other speakers of the Arabic language and so to deter them from parting company with the 'Zealots' in the Arabian Peninsula.

the frail organisms of primitive African societies might open up, incidentally, for Islam, the possibility of incorporating a whole race and occupying a whole continent. The Black Race, face to face with the White intruders from the Western World, might well be attracted by an organized and ancient way of life which ignored the physiological differences between one true believer and another; and if Islam were to become the civilization of the Black Race in Africa, there seemed to be no reason, under the new conditions created by Western ingenuity, why the 'Islamization' of that race should be confined to the limits of a single continent.

Such speculations as these might serve to point the fact that, in 1929, it was hardly possible, after all, to answer the question whether there was still an Islamic World in the spiritual sense. In the eyes of certain Western observers, Islam was then *in articulo mortis*: in the eyes of certain Wahnabi fanatics, who recognized no true believers among contemporary Mankind outside the ranks of the Ikhwan,¹ Islam in 1929 stood again where it had stood in 633, when the tribes of Arabia, fused together by the Faith, were straining at the leash as they awaited the signal to go forth conquering and to conquer far and wide beyond the bounds of the Peninsula. Whether the observer's analysis or the fanatic's intuition came the nearer to the mark, the future would reveal. It was possible, again, that both might be equally blind to the future; for there was yet a third alternative, and this was that Islam might adapt itself to the environment of a Westernized World by accepting that place in the scheme of things which was occupied, in most Western countries, by the Christian Churches. It might be true that an Islam conceived on traditional lines would have no alternatives in a Westernized World, except to conquer or die; but an Islam which consented to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's' might look forward to the future with no less confidence than Roman Catholicism or Primitive Methodism. It remained to be seen whether the main body of Islamic Society might not take this turn.

(ii) The Situation of Foreigners.

During the period under review, the situation of foreigners was an open question only in those Islamic countries which were effectively free from foreign political control: that is, in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, the Najd-Hijaz and the Yaman. In these countries, official policy towards foreigners differed widely—partly owing to differences

¹ For the Wahnabi use of the word 'Muslims' as meaning Wahnabis and 'Islam' as meaning Wahhabism, see below, p. 294 n.

in the previous status of foreign residents and partly owing to differences in the present policy of the Governments concerned.¹

In Afghanistan no foreign Government had ever established more than a transitory ascendancy and no commercial community of Western residents with extra-territorial privileges had ever obtained a footing (though there was an important commercial community of Hindu residents of British nationality, or at any rate British-Indian origin). Accordingly, to Afghan minds at this time, the presence of foreigners did not suggest the same danger to national independence that it suggested to Turkish and Persian minds; and therefore, during years when the Persians were engaged in getting rid of the Capitulations² and the Turks in carrying to its logical conclusion the abolition of the Capitulations, which had been achieved for Turkey in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne,³ King Amānu'llāh was importing selected foreign experts and technicians, on his own terms, for service in Afghanistan, with an energy which recalled the importation of foreigners into Russia by Peter the Great. Among other foreigners, King Amānu'llāh imported Turks—partly, no doubt, because of the prestige which the Turks had acquired throughout the Islamic World by defeating the Greeks in Anatolia and negotiating peace on equal terms with the Principal Allied Powers at Lausanne in 1922-3, partly, perhaps, because of this Afghan ruler's personal sympathy with the radical 'Westernizing' course on which the Turkish revolutionaries had embarked. At the beginning of 1927 a Turkish medical mission was reported to have been sent to Afghanistan, and in the autumn of 1928 King Amānu'llāh was said to be contemplating the establishment at Kābul of a school for teaching the Turkish language, in order to equip Afghan boys for entering Turkish military colleges. It was noteworthy, however, that King Amānu'llāh did not confine his choice to Turks but also freely imported foreigners of all nationalities

¹ It may be noted that, apart from Turkey, the Islamic countries in which foreign residents were most numerous and foreign vested interests largest were all still under some form of foreign control or administration, e.g. Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, British India, Netherlands India. In North-West Africa the indigenous peoples had so little voice in the matter that the controversies over the situation of foreigners in that region at this time were controversies between one foreign community and another (e.g. between French and Spaniards in Tangier and between French and Italians in Tunisia). In Egypt, the liquidation of the Capitulations waited upon the settlement of relations between Egypt and Great Britain. In the territories under 'A' Mandates the Capitulations were suspended for the duration of the Mandates, and in 'Irāq for the duration of the Anglo-'Irāqī connexion as established by existing treaties and conventions with the approval of the League of Nations.

² See Part III B, Section (xii) below.

³ Art. 24.

except Englishmen and Russians—whom he hesitated to employ because they were the ruling races in the two great Empires which were Afghanistan's immediate neighbours.¹ Some of the foreign residents in or visitors to Afghanistan under King Amānu'llāh's régime had unfortunate experiences,² and a number of them were evacuated to British India by air during the insurrection which drove King Amānu'llāh out of Kābul at the beginning of 1929.³ The danger, however, to which foreigners in private stations and foreign legations were exposed in Afghanistan at that time seems to have been entirely incidental to the fighting between one Afghan faction and another: and the hostility towards the introduction of Western technique and institutions and ideas into Afghanistan, which was the mainspring of the insurrection, does not appear to have vented itself in personal attacks upon those foreign residents who had been brought into the country as the instruments and exponents of the 'Westernization' policy.

In the Najd-Hijāz, the Wahhābī régime stood for a return to Primitive Islam and a purification of Arabia from Western innovations. Yet it was noteworthy that although the King did not follow his royal confrère at Kābul in importing Western experts to Riyād, he did take into his employment a number of Westernized Muslims from Egypt, Syria, and other Arabic-speaking countries where the process of Westernization had hitherto made more headway than in the Arabian Peninsula.⁴

As for the Turks, they were still engaged, during the years in question, in drawing the consequences from the abolition of the Capitulations which they had secured, after so long a struggle, in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne; and their attitude towards foreign residents was still governed by the impulse to assert this new freedom from old juridical servitudes, rather than by the consideration that—under the conditions of ever closer international intercourse in that Westernized world in which Turkey's lot was now cast—the abolition of the Capitulations could not be an end in itself but had simply cleared the ground for the establishment, on a more satisfactory basis, of relations which, in some form or other, were bound to continue.⁵

¹ On this point see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 565.

² See *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* In this connexion, see 'Das Afghanische Strafgesetzbuch vom Jahre 1924' (*Die Welt des Islams*, vol. ii, Heft 1/2 (Berlin, 1928)).

³ This insurrection will be dealt with in a later volume.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 296, foot-note 5, and the present volume, Part III B, Section (iii) below.

⁵ For an interesting analysis of the Turkish state of mind on this matter at this time, see *The Times*, 11th October, 1926.

In March 1926, for example, the Constantinople branch of a British concern, the Ionian Bank, was threatened by the Turkish authorities with closure on the ground that it had not complied with a rule that 50 per cent. of the employees of foreign concerns in Turkey must be Turkish nationals of Muslim religion.¹ This incident was settled by concessions on the Turkish Government's side; but an incident which arose in the same month between the Turkish authorities and the Headmistress of the English High School for Girls at Constantinople was not settled until the school had been closed and the Headmistress prosecuted on the ground that she had disobeyed the orders of the Turkish Ministry of Public Instruction in declining to instal a Turkish teacher whom the Ministry had posted to the school in accordance with the law. When the case was examined, the Turkish authorities appear to have recognized that the teacher in question was unsuitable for the post, and before the end of the month the school had been allowed to reopen and the Headmistress had been acquitted by the Turkish Court. Again, in August 1926, the Turkish authorities threatened to close the five foreign Chambers of Commerce in Constantinople,² on the ground that they were issuing certificates of origin and that this function appertained to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce alone. This threat was afterwards reduced to a demand that the foreign Chambers should style themselves 'companies' instead, and eventually even this demand for a change of title seems to have been waived. Other incidents of the same kind were recorded by the Straits Commission, set up under Article 5 of the Straits Convention that had been signed on the 24th July, 1923,³ in the annual reports which, in pursuance of Article 15 of the convention, the Commission presented for the years 1925, 1926 and 1927.⁴ These incidents, though all trifling in themselves, were of some interest as indications of a state of mind which was a legacy from a dead past rather than an earnest of what the future permanent situation of foreign residents in Turkey was likely to be.

A more important matter in which foreign interests in Turkey were concerned was the provision in Article 9 of the commercial convention attached to the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, under which Turkey had

¹ For this rule see *The New York Times*, 18th April, 1926. The religious qualification was inserted because the Greek and Armenian minorities in Constantinople as well as the Jews and a majority of the Catholic Levantines were Turkish nationals.

² i.e. the American, British, French, and Italian, together with a Mixed Maritime Chamber.

³ Text in British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 1929 of 1923, pp. 109-29.

⁴ See the *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1926, July 1927 and July 1928.

established her right to reserve *cabotage*¹ between Turkish ports for Turkish ships. As a concession to the Principal European Allied Powers, whose shipping had previously taken a large share in this trade, the Turkish Government had consented² that nine foreign shipping lines (three British, three French, and three Italian) should provisionally carry on the trade, and had agreed to negotiate with them with a view to their continuing in the trade for a term of years, on the understanding that if an agreement were not reached by the 1st July, 1924, the provisional permit should terminate on the 1st July, 1926. The companies entered into negotiations with the Government during the period prescribed, but without inducing them to waive certain stipulations (e.g. for a minimum percentage of Turkish nationals in the crews of the ships employed) which they found unacceptable; and accordingly, in the absence of an agreement, the Turkish Government announced on the 1st July, 1924, that they intended to act on their right under the Lausanne Convention after the two years of grace had expired. During 1925 the companies appear to have made a second attempt to come to terms with the Government, but again without success; and on the 1st July, 1926, the Turkish Government's decision duly took effect. The first result of this reservation of *cabotage* between Turkish ports to Turkish bottoms seems to have been to cramp the coastwise trade of Turkey and to divert a certain amount of international maritime trade from Constantinople and Smyrna to Peiraeus—a port whose trade was on the increase at this time as markedly as the trade of Constantinople was on the decline. In this matter, as in the other restrictions placed upon the economic activities in Turkey of foreigners and non-Turkish native minorities, the Turks seem to have taken the view that the first necessity for the Turkish nation was to learn, at however great an immediate cost, to stand on its own feet.

The last vestiges of the capitulatory régime in Turkey were effaced by the law of the 28th May, 1928, on Turkish Nationality (*Türk Vatan-daşlığı Kanunu*),³ which provided among other things that, from the 1st January, 1929, onwards, children born in Turkey of foreigners born in Turkey would be Turkish citizens; and that, though they would be at liberty, upon coming of age, to opt for the

¹ Coastal traffic between two or more ports all belonging to the same country.

² By exchange of letters on the 24th July, 1923, between the Turkish delegation at Lausanne and the delegations of the three Powers concerned (for texts, see the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 1929 of 1923, pp. 233–5).

³ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, November 1928, pp. 572–4, from the Official Gazette (*Resmî Gazete*) of the 4th June, 1928. See further a note on the interpretation of this law in *Oriente Moderno*, February 1929, p. 60.

nationality of one of their parents, such option would involve their emigrating from Turkey and liquidating their property there within a year (Arts. 4 and 8). It was also provided that foreign women marrying Turks would become Turkish citizens but that Turkish women marrying foreigners would not lose their Turkish citizenship (Art. 13).

(iii) The Situation of Minorities.

In a previous volume¹ it has been recorded that between October 1925 and January 1926, in anticipation of the reception in Turkey of a Western Civil Code, the rights guaranteed to non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities under the Lausanne Treaty were renounced, at the instance of the Turkish Government, by the three principal minorities concerned: the Jews, the Gregorian Armenians and the Orthodox Greeks.² It has also been recorded that, in virtue of these renunciations, it was announced by the Turkish Minister of Justice, Mahmud Esad Beğ, some months after the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code by the Turkish Great National Assembly in February 1926, that the new code was to be applicable to all Turkish citizens without distinction of race or religion. Between the coming into force of the new code in August 1926 and the close of the year 1928 the remnant of the Gregorian Armenians and the Orthodox Greeks in Turkey were happy in having no history, whereas the Jews and the Catholic Armenians, who had formerly lived on happier terms with the Turks than the two minorities above mentioned, found it less easy to adapt themselves to the new situation—possibly just because they had been comparatively well off under the previous régime.³

The Catholic Armenians—a small community whose principal centre happened to be Angora, the capital of the Turkish Republic—waited until the new Civil Code had been introduced before they intimated to the Turkish Government their willingness to waive the Lausanne Treaty guarantee of their community organization; and even then the Mixed Lay Council of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate put forward a formula which envisaged simply the substitution of the Turkish Government's guarantee for the international guarantee which was being renounced, without proposing to reorganize the constitution of the community by effecting a separation of

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 71-2.

² It might be doubted whether these acts of renunciation by private communities in any way diminished the binding force of the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty as between Turkey and the other parties to that instrument.

³ The Catholic Armenians, for example, had been exempt from deportation and massacre in 1915-16.

temporal and spiritual functions in conformity with the secularization of the Turkish State. The Government at Angora did not show their hand at the time; but in the spring of 1927 an anti-clerical faction in the Catholic Armenian community took forcible possession of the Patriarchate with the connivance if not the encouragement of the Turkish police, and set up a new General Assembly, Administrative Council and lay *Locum Tenens*.¹ Thereafter, the Vicar-General and Apostolic Visitor of the Catholic Armenian community, Monsignore Hovhannes Nazlian, left Constantinople for Rome on the 25th April, 1927; the faction who had taken possession of the Patriarchate made a statement to the clergy setting forth the limits within which they proposed to confine the clergy's powers; and on the 26th May the clergy appear to have been informed by the Turkish authorities that the faction in possession would be regarded in future as the lawful representatives of the Catholic Armenian community.² The new lay *Locum Tenens* was duly recognized by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior on the 21st August, 1927.

The Jewish community in Turkey, after renouncing its rights under the Lausanne Treaty, appointed a Commission to draft a new constitution based on a separation of temporal and spiritual functions, and it also made arrangements for the gradual replacement of French by Turkish as the language of instruction³ in Jewish schools; but the prospects of a continuance of good relations between Jews and Turks which were opened up by these conciliatory steps on the Jewish community's part were temporarily clouded by an 'incident' which occurred in August 1927. In that month, a Jewish girl was murdered at Constantinople by a Turk. The murder was a *crime passionnel* in which the difference of nationality between the two parties was an accidental circumstance, and the murderer was duly arrested by the police; but some of the Jews who attended the girl's funeral on the 17th August were carried away by their feelings into making an anti-Turkish demonstration, for which they were arrested and prosecuted. On the 21st September, they were all acquitted by the Turkish Court except one, who was sentenced to thirty-five days' detention for having assaulted a policeman. Nevertheless, this

¹ This 'direct action' by the secularist faction in the Catholic Armenian community against the Catholic Armenian Patriarchate recalled Papa Eftim's 'direct action' against the Oecumenical Patriarchate several years before (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 266-72).

² The statements in this paragraph are taken from an anonymous but evidently authoritative communication published in *Oriente Moderno*, July 1927, pp. 316-18.

³ The vernacular language of the Ottoman Jews was neither French nor Turkish but Castilian conveyed in the Hebrew Alphabet.

'incident' caused friction between the Jewish and Turkish communities which lasted for some time; and the Government marked their displeasure by extending to the Jews a regulation, already in force against the Gregorian Armenians and the Orthodox Greeks, withholding liberty to travel in the interior of Anatolia without special permission. In March 1928 the application of this regulation to the Jews was rescinded. The other two communities, however, still remained subject to it, and in so far they remained in a position of juridical as well as practical disadvantage compared with their Turkish fellow-citizens.

This was, no doubt, an anomaly under the new régime, under which the minorities had been asked to renounce special rights guaranteed to them by treaty on the ground that equal rights would be guaranteed to all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without racial or religious discrimination, by the new Civil Code. Nevertheless, at the close of the year 1928 it might fairly be said that the minorities problem was nearer solution in Turkey, where it had once worked such havoc, than it was at that time in many East-European countries where it had never manifested itself in such ghastly forms; and it might be prophesied that the vestiges of discrimination would diminish in proportion as the national self-confidence of the Turkish community increased. During a century and a half of decline which reached its climax in the General War of 1914-18, the oppression of the non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire had been an index of the 'inferiority complex' of a ruling race which felt its imperial heritage slipping irrevocably out of its hands. Under the Angora régime, the Turkish people, inspired by a new consciousness of national vitality, had not only retrieved by force of arms, out of the dwindling residue of the Ottoman Dynasty's dominions, a Turkish Republic with stable frontiers, but they had also set themselves to compete with the non-Turkish minorities in their midst in the works of peace. As they succeeded in establishing an equality with the minorities on the economic plane, they might become less subject to the impulse to maintain the social balance of power by taking revenge on the political plane for humiliations suffered on the other.

At the same time it may be noted that the relation between majority and minorities in Turkey was not yet by any means so satisfactory as it had come to be in certain other Islamic countries which had not entered upon the path of Westernization with such daemonic fervour. In Egypt, for instance, the relation which existed at this time between the Muslims and the Copts was a happy example

of how the problem might be solved; and in Persia, where secularists had to feel their way cautiously in face of the still powerful Shī'ī divines, it was noteworthy that the Zoroastrian minority was taking an increasingly active share in public life, in an amicable understanding with the Shī'ī majority of the nation.

(iv) 'The Emancipation of Women.

In a previous volume,¹ mention has been made of the decisive stages in the emancipation of Muslim women in Turkey: the provisional recognition of their right to go about unveiled among men and to do men's work during the General War of 1914-18, when the dearth of 'man-power' led to the breaking down of social barriers which might otherwise have remained impregnable for generations longer; the definitive recognition of these rights under the impetus of the Angora Revolution (a profound social change which was symbolized outwardly by the discarding of the veil); the establishment of their claim to equality with men in the matter of educational opportunities; and finally the abolition of polygamy in virtue of the reception in Turkey of the Swiss Civil Code.² It remained for Turkish women to secure the logical consequences of emancipation by being admitted to the franchise and by asserting in practice their title to enter the higher professions for which they were now able to qualify educationally.

During the years in question the Turkish Women's Union started a vigorous campaign for the suffrage without finding much favour in the sight of the authorities. On the other hand, at the end of the year 1926 the Ministry of Public Instruction took a practical step for preparing the ground by arranging for compulsory universal educational courses for women in child-welfare, hygiene and social science; and on the question of entry into the higher professions the Government's attitude was positively favourable. In 1926, for example, all judicial posts were thrown open, without distinction of sex, to any graduates of the Turkish Law Schools who had passed the qualifying examinations; and a woman graduate of the Constantinople Law School was appointed clerk to the Municipal Court of Constantinople, as a first step towards the bench, in April 1926, while the first Turkish woman barrister pleaded in court on the 28th November, 1928. The medical profession in Turkey was open to women already, and other professions—for instance, dressmaking, banking and the stage—were

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 75-7.

² For the procedure of marriage under the new civil code see *The Times*, 9th October, 1926.

now entered by Turkish women as well as by Turkish men. At Constantinople, in the summer of 1928, there were reported to be six hundred Turkish women teachers, seven lawyers, seven doctors, two dentists, four chemists, about two hundred coiffeuses, and over a thousand trained midwives; and Turkish women were estimated to be supplying about 10 per cent. of the staffs of banks and about 30 per cent. of the working population. Observers in countries which had undergone the Industrial Revolution several generations earlier might question whether it was to the ultimate advantage of a nation to apply its 'woman-power' as freely as its 'man-power' to industrial and professional work; but the Turkish women might answer that they were going into business under less unfavourable conditions than their sisters in many other countries, because they were only a year or two behind the Turkish men. It was, indeed, true that in Turkey, before the revolution which came to the surface in 1908 and gathered momentum from 1920 onwards, the Turkish majority of the male population had devoted itself to public service and agriculture, leaving industry and the professions mainly in the hands of non-Turkish native minorities and of foreign residents. The simultaneous entry of the men and women of a community into the industrial and professional walks of life, which had previously been unfamiliar to both alike,¹ was an unusual phenomenon in social history. It might perhaps be taken as a sign of the times in Turkey that, in the spring of 1927, the newspaper *Aksam* of Constantinople was prosecuted and condemned for having insulted the women's emancipation movement in a caricature.

In Egypt, a 'Women's Union Society'² had been founded in 1923 and had taken up such questions as the marriageable age of women, the education of women, and the equalization of women's rights with men's under the law of inheritance.

In Afghanistan, since the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, King Amānu'llāh had been giving the emancipation of women a prominent place in his programme of 'Westernization'. Before he started on his journey to Europe at the end of 1927, he had founded one girls' school at Kābul³ and had made financial provision for opening three more; and in July 1928, after his return, he was reported to have decreed that in future any Government servant who took more than one wife would have to tender his resignation. His

¹ It should be noted that in agriculture—which had been the staple economic activity in Turkey and seemed likely so to remain—the Turkish women had always worked in the fields (and worked unveiled) by their brothers' and husbands' sides.

² *Jamīyatu'l-Ittihādī'l-Nisā'iyi'l-Misri*.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 565-6.

symbolic unveiling of Queen Surayyā on the 10th July, 1928—a portent of further steps which were cut short by the ‘Zealot’ insurrection of December—is recorded below in another connexion.

(v) Dress.

In a previous volume,¹ some account has been given of the compulsory imposition of Western head-gear upon men in Turkey and of the simultaneous liberation of the women from the former compulsion to wear the veil; and it has been suggested that these changes in dress were symbolic of social and psychological changes of greater import.

The general policy of the Angora régime in promoting the revolution in dress was to use compulsion with the men while simply setting the women free: and the wisdom of this policy was demonstrated when attempts were made to depart from it. For example, when, on the 5th December, 1926, the Vali of Trebizond in Council forbade the wearing of the veil in that vilayet on the ground that it endangered health, deprived women of the fundamental right of earning their own livings and assisted undesirable females to evade the scrutiny of the police, and when he went on to announce that, after a period of ten days’ grace, the contravention of this order would render offenders liable to arrest,² the women of Trebizond seem to have made up their minds that liberty for its own sake was an even greater good than being in the fashion. Accordingly, they showed as much determination in resisting compulsion to discard their veils as their sisters at Constantinople had shown in rebelling against compulsion to keep them on; and they were reported to have inflicted on the ever-victorious Ghazi one of the rare reverses which he had sustained in the course of six years. On the other hand, when, early in 1927, a similar resolution was thrown out by the Provincial Council of Nigde, the women of that vilayet were reported to have discarded their traditional costume forthwith in favour of the Western fashions of the moment as worn in Constantinople. Thereafter, the authorities, in dealing with the women, seem to have reverted from the method of coercion to that of persuasion. The President, for example, took occasion at official receptions to invite the ladies present to dance and also to take off their *çarşafs*; in August 1928 an eloquent plea for hats in place of *çarşafs*, for bobbed hair and for short skirts was made at Constantinople by the President of the Great National Assembly, Kazim Paşa; and the policy of persuasion was wise, for the *Zeitgeist*

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 73–5.

² Text of the order of the 5th December, 1926, in *Oriente Moderno*, December, 1926, pp. 582–3.

was working on the Government's side. In July 1928, the Constantinople correspondent of one Egyptian newspaper had already noticed that hats in place of *çarşafs*—a rare apparition on Turkish women's heads, even in Constantinople, in the summer of 1927—had now become the rule;¹ and in October it was reported from Constantinople that active propaganda for the abolition of the *çarşaf* had been started by the Union of Turkish Women. It was only after public opinion had declared itself in this unmistakable way that the Government, rendered cautious by its experience in the eastern vilayets, resorted to compulsion once again. Towards the end of the year the Ministry of Public Instruction issued an order that all female teachers must wear hats when off duty and teach bare-headed in school, and a few days later this measure was reported to have been made applicable to all women in public employment.

On the other hand, it was still found possible to impose the change of dress with a high hand upon the men. At the end of 1926, for instance, the picturesque costume of the Zeybeks was outlawed by the Provincial Council of Aydin—apparently without arousing in these once redoubtable fighting-men the spirit which a similar and simultaneous measure aroused in the ladies of Trebizond. It was a poor compensation that, two months later, the Ghazi decreed the modernization and nationalization of the Zeybek folk-dance.

In Persia, in this matter of dress as on other points of policy, Rizā Shāh followed in the footsteps of President Mustafa Kemal. In the autumn of 1928, he banned the traditional male headgear of the country, the sugar-loaf-shaped felt *kulah*²—but here he went one step further than his Turkish exemplar; for, instead of leaving his subjects free to adopt any alternative Western head-gear that they chose, he prescribed a compulsory substitute in the shape of the so-called *Kulah Paklawī*—a round cap with a peak, in the style of the contemporary headgear of officers in the French Army. There was sporadic opposition to this ordinance—the dissatisfaction being particularly strongly marked at Tabriz—and a lead was given to the malcontents by the Shī'ī divines. Nevertheless, the change was carried through. On the other hand, the year 1928 ran out without any motion having been made by Rizā Shāh to dictate changes of dress to the Persian women.

On Persia's northern flank, however, the unveiling movement had

¹ *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 29th July, 1928, as cited in *Oriente Moderno*, August 1928, p. 344.

² This had been the headgear of Persian men from time immemorial. It already appears on bas-reliefs of the Achaemenid Dynasty which date from the fifth century B.C.

spread to the Turkish states members of the U.S.S.R. by the spring of 1927, and in Uzbekistan the Communist Party members of Muslim religion appear to have been confronted with the hard choice of allowing their women to go unveiled in public or being expelled from the Party. In this predicament they were reported to have appealed to the *'ulamā* for mercy, but in vain, for the *'ulamā* insisted that to discard the veil was a sacrilege against Islam. At the end of 1928 it was still unknown in the West how these unfortunate Uzbek Muslim Communists had fared in the conflict between the two stiff-necked religions which were contending for their allegiance.¹

In Syria, the battle of the veil had started by the beginning of 1927, and in the autumn of that year some Damascene ladies announced their intention to appear unveiled in public and asked the Syrian Government for special protection. On a petition from the local *'ulamā*, the Government forbade this act and broke up a female meeting of protest, whereupon the Syrian ladies apparently decided to carry their case to the French High Commissioner at Bayrūt over the Syrian Government's head. In 1928, a learned Druse lady published a book entitled *As-Sufūr wa'l-Hijāb*² ('Unveiling and the Veil'), in which she sought to prove that the emancipation of women was in accordance with the *Qur'ān* and the Traditions.

The most romantic exponent of emancipation during these years was another lady with Syrian blood in her veins: the beautiful Queen Surayyā of Afghanistan. When she accompanied her husband King Amānu'llāh on his journey to Europe in December 1927, she first discarded the veil on the voyage from Karachi to Bombay; and though she resumed it during her sojourn in the latter city, she discarded it, for the rest of the journey, when she sailed from Bombay for Suez on the 17th of that month. The impression which she made in the West, where her unveiled beauty was set off by the taste with which she knew how to dress in the Western manner, was unwelcome news in Afghanistan, and the Queen was veiled again when the royal party re-entered Kābul on the 1st July, 1928. This was only done, however, in order to reserve her final unveiling in her own country for a greater occasion; and on the 10th July, 1928, at a state banquet and reception, the King himself ceremonially removed the veil from his consort's countenance in the presence of his court, as a symbol of the emancipation not only of the womanhood of Afghanistan but of the

¹ In the spring of 1928, the chief *'ālim* of the *'Ashqābād* district of Türkmenistan, a reactionary refugee from Persia, was reported to be in prison on the charge of having opposed the women's emancipation movement.

² Bayrūt, 1928, Qūzmā.

soul of the country. When the fanatical '*ulamā* from the countryside protested against this act as an outrage upon Islam, the King was reported to have asked them: 'Why is there no purdah in the villages?'—'The poor peasant-women have discarded the veil because they have to work.'—'Well then, when the villagers have learnt once more to appreciate the alleged blessings of purdah, come again, and I will re-establish purdah in the Palace.' The rustic '*ulamā* were reported to have retired somewhat out of countenance; but the unveiling of Queen Surayyā was one of the causes of the 'Zealot' insurrection which drove King Amānu'llāh from Kābul six months later.¹

Moreover, the male Afghan showed himself less tractable to compulsory changes of dress than the male Lāz or Zeybek. King Amānu'llāh had not visited the marts of Europe in vain; and when, in October 1928, he made his five days' speech to the *Loe Jirga* or Great National Assembly of Afghanistan—in faithful imitation of President Mustafa Kemal's five days' speech to the Great National Assembly at Angora just a year before—the 1,001 members of this Homeric assembly of Afghan chiefs and warriors saw one another, to their mutual amazement and indignation, arrayed (rank upon rank of their serried phalanx) in 1,001 soft felt hats, black tail coats and grey striped trousers which their sovereign's imperious bounty had provided. The cup was full, and it overflowed when, in November 1928, the King decreed that, as from the 31st March, 1929, all inhabitants of Kābul, and all tribesmen and provincials visiting the capital, must wear complete Western dress, including hats, when walking or riding on the main roads. Before the prescribed date arrived, King Amānu'llāh had been hurled from his throne—and he was not the first Oriental ruler who had courted disaster by commanding his subjects to wear Western clothes.

In this cause, a hundred and twenty years earlier, the Ottoman Sultan Selim III, the first 'Westernizing' statesman in the Islamic World, had lost not only his throne but his life; and in the next generation Mehmed 'Ali in Egypt and Sultan Mahmūd at Constantinople had found it necessary to wipe the Mamlūks and the Janissaries off the face of the earth before they could train new-model armies to bear the ignominy of wearing uniforms of a Western cut. On the same account, a century earlier, Peter the Great had been denounced as Anti-Christ by his Orthodox subjects; and the most dangerous insurrection of his reign had been evoked by a pious people's belief that his officers' wig-stands were idols. If these sagacious and enlightened

¹ This insurrection will be dealt with in a later volume.

statesmen deliberately faced such risks in order to carry through a revolution in dress, it may be surmised that they did not do this without good reason; and indeed there was a cogent reason of a psychological order. So great is the power of 'suggestion' that in a certain sense 'clothes make the man'; and a Zeybek in 'reach-me-downs' or a Pathan in a morning coat was like Samson shorn of his locks—a helpless victim in the Philistine's hands. The British Government, likewise, had been wise in its day with this tyrannical wisdom when it had stringently forbidden the wearing of the tartan in the Scottish Highlands after the suppression of 'The Forty-Five'.

(vi) Religion.

The principal steps in the secularization of the Turkish State were the transference of the political powers of the Ottoman Caliphate to the Great National Assembly at Angora (as from the 16th March, 1920) by a law which that body passed on the 1st November, 1922; the assignment of the former functions of the *Sheykhul-Islām* to a departmental head of religious affairs in the office of the Prime Minister, by the first of the three laws of the 3rd March, 1924; the unification of educational systems by the second law of that date; the total abolition of the office of Caliphate by the third of the three laws; the declaration that the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic belonged to the nation as represented by the Great National Assembly (Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution of the 20th April, 1924); the suppression of Islamic religious orders by three administrative decrees of the 2nd September, 1925; and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, virtually as it stood, on the 17th February, 1926,¹ and of the Italian Penal Code, with certain modifications, on the 1st March, 1926. Through the aggregate effect of these measures the process of secularization was virtually accomplished; and, since some account of all these measures has been given in a previous volume,² it only remains here to notice certain steps by which the process was carried to its logical conclusion.

One such step was to substitute Turkish for Arabic as the language for the delivery of the *Khutbah* (a Friday sermon constructed round a bidding prayer).³ In the summer of 1926 the linguistic issue was raised in a general way by the action of the *Imam* of the mosque at Göz Tepe (an Asiatic suburb of Constantinople), who recited in

¹ The new Civil Code actually came into force in Turkey on the 4th October, 1926. A new civil procedure for the operation of the new code was approved by the Assembly at Angora in June 1927.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part I, Section (ii) (c), (d) and (e).

³ See *op. cit.*, p. 52, note 2.

Turkish, not the *Khutbah*,¹ but verses from the *Qur'ān*, in leading the prayer during the first two weeks of Ramazan. The departmental head of religious affairs provisionally suspended the *Imam* from his functions, on the ground that this was a matter of public policy, and then appointed a commission of five experts to make proposals for reform. Before the end of the year, the departmental head's decision was announced. The *Khutbah* was to be recited in Turkish, and a printed collection of alternative *Khutbahs*, prepared by the commission and sanctioned by the departmental head, was to be distributed to all *Khatibs*—whose discretion was to be limited to choosing between the alternatives officially prescribed. These Turkish authorized versions of the *Khutbah* were still to open with the recital of the *Fātihah* in Arabic; and this was to be followed by the recital, likewise in Arabic, of the texts from the *Qur'ān* or the Traditions on which the different *Khutbahs* in the collection were strung; but the texts were then to be translated by the *Khatib* into Turkish, and the substance of the discourse was to be delivered in the latter tongue.² At the same time, the departmental head of religious affairs announced that a project for an authorized version of the entire *Qur'ān* and Traditions in a Turkish 'understood of the people' was already in course of execution, together with a commentary; and further information on the proceedings of the commission which had been entrusted with this task was given in the first days of the next year. The new regulations regarding the *Khutbah* were brought into force in December 1927.

The last vestiges of the 'establishment' of Islam as the state religion of the Turkish Republic were removed on the 9th April, 1928, by the passage through the Great National Assembly at Angora of a Bill amending the text of the relevant articles in the Constitution of the 20th April, 1924. This Bill had been drafted by the Minister of Justice, Mahmud Esad Beğ, endorsed by 109 deputies, adopted by the People's Party, and sponsored by İsmet Paşa as well as by the President himself. The main effects of the new Act were to omit the sentence 'The state religion of Turkey is the religion of Islam' from Article 2 of the Constitution; to omit the words 'sees to the execution of the precepts of the *Sheri'eh*' in the recital of the Great National

¹ As stated in *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd July, 1926. This *Imam* was reported to be a man of Western as well as Islamic education.

² It was reported that the ethical and theological subject-matter of these discourses was to be interpolated with exhortations to the congregation to support the Aviation Society, the Red Crescent, and other patriotic or philanthropic institutions (presumably on the analogy of similar exhortations which were customary in Christian churches in the West).

Assembly's functions in Article 26; and to substitute the formula 'I swear on my honour' for 'I swear by God' in the forms of oath prescribed for deputies in Article 16 and for the President in Article 38.

In June 1928 a report was published by a Commission on Religious Reform appointed by the Faculty of Theological Studies in the University of Constantinople—a Faculty which had been called into existence by the Ministry of Public Instruction in pursuance of Article 4 of the Law for the Unification of Educational Systems, passed on the 3rd March, 1924.¹ This report² contained a number of practical proposals: for example, that a liberal education should be provided for aspirants to the career of *Imam*; that new life should be put into the teaching of the *Qur'ān* by a re-interpretation of its meaning and a re-valuation of its precepts; that religious exercises in the mosques should be made more significant and more attractive to the congregations by the use of the Turkish language in a clear and simple form, by good chanting, and by the introduction of instrumental music; and that the congregations should be allowed to enter shod and to sit in pews. It will be seen that these proposals were of different orders of importance; but they were all inspired by certain consciously revolutionary postulates which were laid down in the opening paragraphs.

Religion is also a social institution, and is therefore obliged to conform to the exigencies of existence and the laws of progress. . . . In the Turkish democracy religion, like everything else, must enter into the new era of vitality of which it has need. . . . Religious life must be reformed, like moral and economic life, by means of scientific procedure and by the aid of reason.

The publication of this report was rumoured to have been regarded by President Mustafa Kemal as premature, pending an adequate preparation of the ground. A sign of the times, however, was a proposal, put forward in August 1928 by the Constantinople Chamber of Commerce, that in Turkey Sunday should be substituted for Friday as the day of rest of the Islamic community. In October 1928, a Government Bill to this effect, supported by the Constantinople deputies, was reported to be on the point of being laid before the Great National Assembly at Angora.

This sustained and deliberate secularist movement in Turkey had certain repercussions on international relations on the political plane. For example, a Papal delegate, while allowed to reside in the country,

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 99 and 574.

² An English translation of the report will be found in *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th June, 1928.

was denied official recognition—apparently for fear of creating a precedent favourable to Islamic religious institutions. Again, an American girls' school at Brusa was closed by order of the Turkish Ministry of Public Instruction on the 30th January, 1928,¹ and several American teachers were prosecuted and condemned to nominal fines and terms of imprisonment,² on the ground that, contrary to law, certain pupils in the school had been subjected to religious propaganda. Such public feeling as this incident aroused in Turkey seems to have been partly inspired by a secularist hostility to religion of whatever denomination, but perhaps still more by a nationalist suspicion that Turks who adopted the American religion were in effect adopting the American nationality into the bargain. This feeling, in so far as it existed, was of course a relic of the traditional Islamic outlook in which societies were not refracted into 'Church' and 'State' but appeared as indivisible wholes;³ and in so far as this outlook still prevailed, it was an illustration of the fact that institutions could be changed more easily and more quickly than points of view.⁴

On the other hand there seems to have been a distinct change of sentiment as well as of law in the matter of mixed marriages. The *Sheri'eh* sanctioned the marriage of a Muslim man with an unconverted Christian woman, but forbade the marriage of a Muslim woman with an unconverted Christian man. This veto was removed in Turkey by the disestablishment of Islam and the abrogation of the *Sheri'eh* in favour of the Swiss Civil Code; and, in accordance with the new law, the bans of marriage between a Muslim (Turkish) woman

¹ Text of the Minister's *communiqué* in *Oriente Moderno*, February 1928, p. 52.

² An appeal from the judgment of the court of first instance was lodged with a higher court, but the latter upheld the judgment in principle, though it appears to have reduced the sentence and limited its application to one teacher only.

³ On this point see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 26.

⁴ See an article by Köprülü-Zade Mehmet Fu'ād, a professor at the University of Constantinople, which was published in the Angora weekly *Hayat* and translated in *Oriente Moderno*, May 1928, pp. 218–20. In this article, which was entitled 'The Fact of the Conversions to Christianity and the Cultural Crisis,' the writer disputed the proposition that the incident signified 'the exit of certain persons from the Muslim community and their entry into the Christian community', and proceeded: 'According to me, it is simply a question of the exit of certain persons from the Turkish community and of their entry into the American community.' The point of interest is that the writer supposed that the proposition which he was disputing was an expression of the traditional Islamic view and that his own thesis was an expression of a modernist view. Actually, his own thesis was a product of Islamic tradition in as much as it assumed the identity of religion and politics or church and state, whereas the view that he was combating was the view which would have been taken of the incident if it had occurred in a Western country.

and a Christian (Italian) man were reported in March 1926 to have been published by the civil authorities in Pera. On the other hand, the liberty accorded to Muslim men by the *Sheri'eh* was denied by the new Turkish state to certain categories of its officials. At a date between the signatures of the Mudania Armistice and the Lausanne Treaty, the Angora Government forbade the officials in the Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and for Defence to marry women of non-Turkish nationality; and on the 11th February, 1929, the Great National Assembly passed a law providing that officials who married foreign women should automatically lose their posts and that those who already had foreign wives should be removed from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War (which included Marine). The nationalist spirit which inspired this law had, of course, its counterpart in contemporary Western countries.

The policy of carrying secularization to its logical conclusion was not followed, during the years in question, by the Governments of Islamic countries other than the Turkish Republic and does not seem to have been supported, outside Turkey, by any section of Islamic society or current of Islamic opinion. It was only to be expected that this policy should be repudiated by the Muslims of 'the scattered fringe'¹ as represented by the Indian Khilāfatists,² whose attitude was expressed in a pronouncement made by Mr. Muhammad 'Alī³ at Damascus in the autumn of 1928. It was more significant that an attitude of critical reserve should be maintained by the Egyptian modernist Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Rāziq, who represented the most liberal opinion on religious matters in one of the most highly cultivated communities in the Islamic World, and who had suffered personally for his views.⁴ In an important article⁵ published on the 13th May, 1928, in the Cairo journal *Al-Ahram*, the Shaykh declared roundly that priestcraft (*As-Sultat-u'l-kahanūtiyah*) was a disastrous evil when it interfered in public affairs, and that its elimination from that field was the first principle and the main requisite of reform, but at the same time he submitted that the complete separation of church and state was not the sole possible way of keeping the state free from ecclesiastical control, and that many Western states in fact succeeded in doing so by other methods than the French method of secularization which the Turks had imitated.⁶

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 4-5.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 47-8, 62-3.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 46, 48, 62.

⁴ For the case of Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Rāziq see *op. cit.* pp. 80-1. In that volume the Shaykh's name is wrongly spelt 'Abdu'r-Razzāq.

⁵ Translation in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1928, pp. 238-40.

⁶ An indication of the public interest that was being taken at this time in

In Egypt an important non-revolutionary reform was carried out in the year 1927.¹ Formerly the appointment of the heads of the indigenous ecclesiastical communities in Egypt,² as well as the control over the theological university of Al-Azhar—a seat of learning which was one of the oecumenical institutions of the Islamic World³—had been in the hands of the Sultan of Egypt as the local political heir of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph; and Article 153 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 had provisionally left the King's⁴ prerogative in this matter intact, while permitting future legislation for the regulation of the exercise of the King's power by law. In virtue of this enabling clause, the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in these matters was placed in the hands of the Prime Minister, acting under responsibility towards Parliament, by Law No. 15 of 1927,⁵ which was promulgated on the 31st May of that year. The reorganization of the School of Kādīs was provided for in Law No. 22 of 1927;⁶ and on the 27th November, 1927, Sarwat Pasha's Ministry approved and effected the appointment of a 'Commission for the Reform of Al-Azhar', with wide terms of reference which included 'the definition of the aims of the Establishments for Higher Theological Study . . . and their application to the needs of the present age'. This Commission started work on the 8th December, 1927; and on the 18th October, 1928, in the light of its report, Muhammad Pasha Mahmūd's Government set up⁷ a new Commission to prepare a draft law amending the existing law under which Al-Azhar was governed.⁸

On the 17th April, 1928, an incident occurred at Al-Azhar which offended Egyptian susceptibilities not on the religious but on the national side. On that date a learned but militant foreign Protestant missionary of American nationality, Dr. Samuel Zwemer, who held a visitor's pass, took advantage of this in order to enter Al-Azhar, where he proceeded to dispute with the teachers and students and to

Egypt in the problem of the relations between church and state was the attention that was given in Egypt to the debates in the Parliament at Westminster on the Church of England Prayer Book.

¹ See A. Sékaly: 'L'Université d'El-Azhar et ses Transformations' in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1927, Cahiers (i) and (iv); 1928, Cahiers (i) and (ii).

² i.e., the Sunni Muslim Grand Mufti, the Jewish Grand Rabbi, and the Coptic Monophysite and Greek Orthodox Patriarchs.

³ For the part played by Al-Azhar in the Caliphate crisis of 1924-6, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part I, Section (ii) (f).

⁴ For the change of title from 'Sultan' to 'King' see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 199.

⁵ Text in Sékaly, *op. cit.*, Annex xxi.

⁶ Text in Sékaly, *op. cit.*, Annex xxii.

⁷ Text of the ministerial decree in *Oriente Moderno*, November 1928, p. 539.

⁸ Text of the Règlement Intérieur of the 19th December, 1923, in Sékaly, *op. cit.*, Annex xxviii.

distribute Protestant propaganda literature. Happily a disturbance was averted, and on the 24th April the Prime Minister announced in the Chamber that Dr. Zwemer had surrendered his pass and presented a letter of apology, and that the United States *chargé d'affaires* in Egypt had spontaneously expressed his regret for what had occurred.

This incident at Al-Azhar would perhaps have aroused less attention if it had not followed immediately after the meeting of the International Missionary Council at Jerusalem on the 24th March–8th April, 1928.¹ This Council was an international Protestant organization which had been constituted officially in October 1921;² and the Jerusalem meeting was made as far as possible 'representative in approximately equal numbers of the missionary organizations of the 'sending' countries and of the Christian councils and missionary organizations on the mission field, not less than two-thirds of the delegates from the latter regions being nationals of the countries they represented'.³ The choice of Jerusalem as the meeting place evoked protests and demonstrations in Palestine and Transjordan and hostile comments in the Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian Press. Here, again, it was political rather than religious susceptibilities that were offended. It was objected that, though the meeting was held in the heart of the Arab world, there were no Arab Christians among the delegates;⁴ and it was resented that, under the mandate, a private international organization for religious propaganda which was mainly staffed and guided by Westerners should be able to hold a meeting in an Arab country without the people of that country being consulted.

The facts reviewed in this chapter indicate that at this time religious fanaticism was either extinct or in abeyance in the greater part of the Islamic World—at any rate in the leading countries of 'the solid core'. In Turkey, there was no overt opposition at all to a Westernizing movement which had committed itself unreservedly to the policy of secularism. In Egypt, Palestine, Syria and 'Irāq, there was a marked tendency for the old alignments of Christian against Muslim and Sunnī against Shī'ī to give place to new alignments on lines of nationality and for the pursuit of secular ends. It was only in

¹ See the *Report of the Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council* (London, 1928, Milford, 8 vols.).

² *Op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 8.

⁴ This was not quite accurate, for two of the three delegates for Syria were Syrians, one of the three delegates for Egypt was an Egyptian, and one of the coopted members was a Copt (see the List of Members in *op. cit.*, vol. viii, pp. 205–16). It was true, however, that Palestine was not represented at all, while 'Irāq and Turkey were represented exclusively by Americans.

Najd, Persia and Afghanistan that the '*ulamā*' continued to be a formidable social force; and the secular rulers of Najd and Persia contrived to pursue their secular aims at a rate, and in a manner, which afforded the '*ulamā*' no opportunity of denouncing them to the people as enemies of religion. On the other hand, in Afghanistan a Westernizing sovereign was openly challenged by the '*ulamā*' in conjunction with the tribesmen, during the last month of the period under review. This conflict between Afghan 'Zealots' and 'Herodians' which broke out in December 1928 will be dealt with in a later volume.

(vii) Literature and Art.¹

In the literature and art of the Islamic peoples during the years in question it was possible to discern several general tendencies—though these tendencies naturally varied very greatly in both relative and absolute strength in accordance with the respective local conditions of the different Islamic countries. There was a negative tendency towards a breach with the Islamic tradition; there was a positive tendency towards imitation of contemporary Western culture; and at the same time there was a tendency towards an accentuation of national individuality inspired by a new enthusiasm for the local national past. At first sight the two last-mentioned tendencies might appear antagonistic; but they were not really so, for an archaistic or 'romantic' nationalism was one of the characteristic features of contemporary Western society, in which it served as a psychological counter-weight to the rapid and bewildering changes in the material circumstances of life which were being brought about by the Western talent for the practical application of scientific discoveries. Thus it was no accident and no inconsistency that certain Islamic peoples, particularly the 'Osmānī Turks, who were in the full tide of the 'Westernisation' movement, were beginning to display a new interest in and care for the literary, artistic and architectural monuments of the Ottoman past, at the very moment when they were shaking themselves free from the dead hand of the Ottoman tradition. That hand had lain so heavily upon them and held them so close in its grip that they had been unable to turn and contemplate the spiritual presence behind it. It was only by breaking with their past in one sense that they were able to enter into relations with it in another.

¹ Space does not permit any systematic survey, here, of the educational developments that were taking place in a number of Islamic countries: e.g. the activities of the Universities of Constantinople and Cairo, and—still more important—the progress that was being made in the diffusion of primary education.

For example, from 1924 onwards the Stamboul Saray with its treasures—which had been allowed to fall into decay since Sultan 'Abdu'l-Mejid had moved to the new 'alla Franca' palace of Dolma Bagçe in 1853—was put into proper repair in 1924 and thrown open to the public. Steps were also taken to collect, arrange and catalogue the oriental manuscripts scattered through the libraries of the mosques and other public institutions of Constantinople and the provinces.¹ For the moment, however, this new pious interest in the national past was less to the fore than the revolutionary and the imitative tendencies; for the sudden fall of ancient religious *tabus* had opened up new fields of activity in which the Islamic peoples had to seek initiation by copying the West before they could hope to do original work of their own. One *tabu* which had fallen was the ban on graven images; and the erection of a statue of Mustafa Kemal Paşa at Constantinople in 1926 has been recorded in a previous volume.² On the 4th November, 1927, a second statue of the President was erected, this time at Angora; a third was ordered for Sivas; and on the 8th August, 1928, a monument of the Republic was erected in Pera. These monuments were all the work of foreigners; but already a Turkish national school of sculptors—no longer hampered by the ban upon using nude living models—was aspiring to render it unnecessary to resort to the foreign sculptor's services. Even in Persia the *tabu* no longer prevailed—to judge by an announcement made on the 31st January, 1928, in the Majlis at Tihrān, by a Zoroastrian deputy, that the Zoroastrians of India³ had presented the Persian Parliament with a statue of Firdawsī.⁴ The fall of another *tabu* was confirmed when, on the 5th November, 1928, the Council of Ministers at Angora approved a plan, prepared by the Ministry of Public Instruction, for a 'Scientific School of Dramatic Art' in which Turkish women as well as men were to be trained.

In the field of literature, the variety of local conditions was so great that generalizations applicable to the whole Islamic World were hardly possible. In relatively backward countries like Afghanistan or the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, the touchstone of progress on

¹ e.g., see *Oriente Moderno*, November–December 1926, pp. 583–4, for steps taken by the Ministry of Public Instruction at Angora for the conservation of books and works of art from the suppressed *tekkes*.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 70.

³ i.e., the 'Parsees'.

⁴ That the 'Parsees' should conceive of Firdawsī as a national hero whose poetry was a common spiritual heritage of Zoroastrians and Muslims of Persian race, was characteristic of the secularistic-nationalistic tendency of the age.

the literary plane was the emergence of a newspaper press¹—a step which had been achieved long before at Cairo and Damascus and Constantinople and Qāzān. In Turkey, the literary movement of the day was still chiefly concentrated on the ideal—a legacy from the Panturanian *furor* of 1914–18—of purging the Ottoman Turkish language of those Arabic and Persian vocabularies, locutions and conceits which had made the old Ottoman style so artificial, cumbrous and obscure.² The discarding of the Arabic Alphabet in favour of the Latin Alphabet, which is recorded below,³ was at once an external manifestation of this movement and a new weapon placed in its hands. For the Persians and the Arabs the situation was not the same;⁴ for though the Arabic vocabulary was no less alien to the Persian than it was to the Turkish language, its presence in Persian was consecrated by the existence of a great national literary heritage, in the arabized Persian style, from which the Persians could not contemplate cutting themselves off by a ‘comb-out’ of Arabic words which would have amounted to a linguistic revolution.⁵ As for the Arabs, the problem of an alien vocabulary, with which the Persians and Turks were confronted, did not exist for them, since the influence of Arabic on Persian and Turkish had no counterpart in the shape of counter-influences in the opposite direction. In the Arabic literature of the day, the only conflict conceivable was not between foreign and native elements in the language, but between classical Arabic and the numerous Arabic vernaculars which were current at this time from the Atlantic sea-board of Morocco to the western foot of the Iranian plateau, from Lake Chad to Maskat, and from the northern foot of the Abyssinian plateau to the southern spurs of the Taurus. Such a conflict had not yet arisen in fact; for though the literary use of the vernaculars had been suggested, there had been little attempt to put it into practice.⁶ In all Arabic countries, the classical language remained the vehicle of literature, and it had two strong points in its favour. In the first place, it could not be abandoned without a

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, March 1926, pp. 175–6, for a survey of the newspaper press in Afghanistan; and *Oriente Moderno*, April 1926, pp. 237–9, for a survey of the newspaper press in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

² See a study of the Turkish apostle of Panturanianism, Zia Gök Alp, by J. Deny in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1925 (Troisième Trimestre), volume lxi (Paris, 1925, Leroux), pp. 1–41.

³ See Section (viii) of this part.

⁴ See p. 221 below.

⁵ See extracts on this subject from the Persian Press under the heading ‘Le Nationalisme Linguistique ou “Pehlevisme”’, in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1925 (Troisième Trimestre), volume lxi, pp. 165–76.

⁶ See, however, D. Misconi: ‘Rénovation dialectale de la Poésie Arabe en Iraq et au Hedjaz’, in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1924 (Deuxième Section) volume lviii, pp. 253–66.

renunciation of a literary heritage which was still greater than the Persian. In the second place, the classical language was the bond of unity which held the Arabic-speaking peoples together. If the classical language were kept alive—or restored to life—the probable effect, in an age of increasingly rapid and frequent international intercourse, would be to cause the various current Arabic vernaculars to converge towards a single norm, bearing somewhat the same relation to the classical language as ‘Mandarin’ bore to Classical Chinese. On the other hand, if the Arabic vernaculars of Morocco, Egypt, Syria, ‘Irāq and Hijāz were to burst their classical bonds and become the vehicles of new vernacular literatures, the possible gain in naturalness, vitality and vigour might be offset by the break-up of Arabic into a number of languages almost as different from one another as the Romance languages of Europe. Owing to these considerations, Classical Arabic seemed likely to hold its own; but that did not mean that the language would be incapable of changing and growing in order to meet the demand for the expression of new moods and new ideas. The modernization of the classical language was being actively pursued;¹ and the very tendency towards a new solidarity of feeling among the Arabic-speaking peoples, which made for a certain linguistic conservatism, had also the makings in it of new schools of Arabic literature. For example, two of the most interesting books published in Arabic during the years in question were records of contemporary travel and research in the Arabian Peninsula—particularly in the dominions of Ibn Sa‘ūd—by a Lebanese observer, Mr. Ameen Rihani.² That a Lebanese Christian should regard the doings of Wahnābī Badu in the Najd, or of Zaydī highlanders in the remote Yaman, as his concern, and that he should find a cordial welcome awaiting him at Riyād and Sanā‘, were portents of a profound change of outlook in the Arabic-speaking world.

(viii) The Adoption of the Latin in place of the Arabic Alphabet in Turkey and in the Turkish States Members of the U.S.S.R. (1918–28).

The adoption of the Latin in place of the Arabic Alphabet in the course of the years 1918–28 by a majority of the Turkish-speaking nations of the world—from Thrace and the Crimea and Qāzān to the Pamirs and the Altai and the Lena—was an event of importance, not

¹ This adaptation of Classical Arabic was really less of a *tour de force* than the corresponding adaptation of Classical Hebrew which had already been achieved.

² See foot-note on p. 288, below.

only in the history of the Latin Alphabet but in that of Western Civilization, of which that script had become the instrument.

In the two and a half millennia of its history, the Latin Alphabet had risen from obscurity to a position of dominance over other scripts, partly, no doubt, owing to its intrinsic excellence, but perhaps still more owing to the accident that some of the communities which successively employed it happened to attain unusual degrees of political and economic power. Originating as one of several versions of the Greek Alphabet which were adopted for conveying the various vernaculars of Ancient Italy, it shared the fortunes of the Latin vernacular itself, which eventually became the official language first of the Roman Empire in the West, and then of the Roman Church. Having achieved this position as the vehicle of the Latin language, the Latin Alphabet afterwards came to be employed for conveying the various Romance, Teutonic, Slavonic, Letto-Lithuanian and Ugrian vernaculars of the European peoples that successively entered the fold of Western Christendom, until its domain came to include not merely Western but Central and Northern Europe up to the eastern frontiers of Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Finland; and then, by a second stroke of political fortune, its domain became extended to all quarters of the earth when the nations that spoke Spanish, Portuguese, French, English and Dutch, and that had learnt to use the Latin Alphabet for conveying their respective mother tongues, broke the maritime bounds of Europe and colonized or conquered the major part of the overseas world, as the Romans had colonized or conquered the major part of Europe. Therewith the Latin Alphabet became the universal script, not only of Western and Central Europe but of the entire continent of America and of the countries colonized by Western Europeans in the southern temperate zone of the Old World. Yet the Latin Alphabet, while it had thus extended its dominion into all quarters of the earth, had so far gained hardly any ground at the expense of other scripts. Its expansion from its original narrow domain in the Roman Campagna had come about in four different ways; first by the spread of the Latin language, and the Latin Alphabet with it, over Western Europe; then by the adoption of the Latin Alphabet for conveying the vernaculars of the illiterate barbarians of Western, Central, and Northern Europe; then by the expansion of the descendants of these barbarians into the overseas world; and finally by the activities of the Bible Society and other Protestant Missions, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were adapting the Latin Alphabet for conveying the languages of primitive peoples in many parts of the world, just as the

missionaries of the Roman Church had adapted it in the Middle Ages for conveying the languages of the then primitive peoples of Europe. Thus the Latin Alphabet had spread through the conversion (in earlier times to Latinity and in later times to Western Christianity) of successive tribes of barbarians; but it had only advanced *pari passu* with the enlargement of the borders of Western Christendom and had not made conquests among nations which had previously entered the fold of other civilizations and learnt to employ other scripts. For example, the Orthodox Christian nations had not adopted the Latin Alphabet in place of the Greek Alphabet or of its 'Cyrillic' version. Even so radical a revolutionary as Peter the Great had contented himself with reforming the 'Cyrillic' Alphabet, without discarding it in favour of the Latin Alphabet as the vehicle for the Russian language. Again, even after the political union of the Orthodox Christian Serbs with the Catholic Croats in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in 1918, the Serbs had continued to employ their 'Cyrillic' Alphabet and the Croats their Latin Alphabet for conveying the common language which was the basis and the *raison d'être* of the United Kingdom of Yugoslavia.¹ As for the Islamic peoples, they had not ceased to employ the Arabic Alphabet for conveying not only Arabic but also—in the case of non-Arabs—their vernacular languages: Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Malay, Swahili² and so on. Similarly, the Hindus had continued to use various forms of the Brahmi Alphabet for conveying a host of languages—Aryan and non-Aryan, classical and vernacular. Finally, the peoples of the Far East had continued to convey their several languages—Chinese, Korean, Japanese—in the Ancient Chinese Script, which had nothing in common with the Latin Alphabet, not even the distant relationship of common origin in the problematical 'Proto-Phoenician Alphabet' which the Latin Alphabet shared with all the other Alphabets above-mentioned.

Down to 1925, the only example of a literate nation, employing a non-Latin script, which had discarded that script and adopted the Latin Alphabet in place of it, were the Rumanians of the Orthodox Faith, who had discarded the 'Cyrillic' Alphabet for the Latin Alphabet in the nineteenth century. This, however, was an exception which proved the rule; for the liturgical language of the Orthodox Church in Rumania, with which the 'Cyrillic' Alphabet had originally

¹ For example, the names of railway stations were painted up in both Alphabets throughout 'post-war' Yugoslavia—the version in the Latin Alphabet occupying the upper place in Slovenia and Croatia and the lower place in Serbia.

² 'The language of the coasts' (Sawāhil) of East Africa.

been introduced into the country, was 'Old Slavonic'; the Rumanian vernacular itself had barely become a literary language at the time when the Latin Alphabet was substituted for the Slavonic Alphabet as its vehicle; and this Rumanian vernacular had a special claim to be conveyed in the Latin Alphabet, since it happened itself to be an offshoot of the Latin language.

Thus the adoption of the Latin Alphabet in place of the Arabic Alphabet, in the course of the years 1918-28, for conveying a number of Turkish languages was the first really significant conquest which the Latin Alphabet had made at the expense of any other script; and this historic event was a matter of practical importance for several reasons. In the first place, it instituted a precedent which might afterwards be followed by other nations using the Arabic Alphabet¹ or by nations using other scripts—for example, the particularly cumbrous and difficult Chinese characters.² In the second place, it opened up to the Turkish-speaking nations, for the first time, an opportunity of introducing general education, for the Arabic Alphabet was so difficult to master, by comparison with the Latin Alphabet, that a relatively high percentage of illiteracy in any population that employed it was almost inevitable, and it was no accident that nations employing the Latin Alphabet had been the first to conceive and approach the ideal of making literacy universal.³ In the third place, the adoption of the Latin Alphabet for the Turkish languages opened the door for an influx of the Latin, French, English and German vocabularies into these languages and of the Western ideas conveyed in those vocabularies into the minds of the Turkish-speaking

¹ There was already a movement for using the Latin instead of the Arabic Alphabet for conveying Swaheli—a Bantu dialect with an infusion of Arabic which is the *lingua franca* of East Africa. This movement was natural, considering that Islamic Civilization had yielded the ascendancy to Western Civilization in East Africa, and that other Bantu languages were being reduced to literate form in the Latin Alphabet by Western missionaries.

² Among the Chinese themselves at this time, there was a movement for reducing the number of characters in the Chinese script, which was as good (or bad) as infinite, to a select thousand. The Japanese had already picked out a small number of Chinese characters to form a syllabary for conveying the Japanese language; but the benefits of this syllabary were diminished by the concurrent use of a number of other Chinese characters, in the Chinese manner, not as phonograms but as ideograms.

³ It should be noted, however, that the easiness of the script was not the ultimate determining factor in this matter. In 1923, for example, the percentage of illiteracy in Japan was as low as 0.94 notwithstanding the use of a cumbrous script in which two incompatible principles were followed side by side. On the other hand, in 1911 the percentage of illiteracy was 68.9 in Portugal and in 1925 it was 62.0 in Mexico, though in both these countries the Latin Alphabet was employed.

peoples. So long as the Turkish-speaking peoples had used the Arabic Alphabet, the Turkish languages had tended to absorb the vocabularies of other languages, likewise written in the Arabic Alphabet, which had become the vehicles of great literatures—particularly the Arabic language itself and Persian.¹ Thus the change of Alphabet involved a simultaneous change in the sources from which the transliterated languages recruited their vocabularies and from which the speakers of these languages derived their culture.²

It may be observed that the same feature that made the Arabic Alphabet difficult to learn likewise made it awkward to print. The original 'Proto-Phoenician' Alphabet, having been devised for inscription on stone, had consisted of separate letters, and its earlier offshoots, such as the Greek Alphabet and the Latin version of the Greek Alphabet, had retained this characteristic so long as inscription on stone remained the ordinary means of record. When, however, the ordinary means of record came to be writing with pen and ink on papyrus, parchment, or paper, there was a tendency in all alphabetic scripts to sacrifice clearness to speed by joining the letters of the Alphabet with ligatures and running them together. In both the Greek and the Latin Alphabets, cursive hands came to be employed for ordinary purposes in place of the old 'block letters' from the eighth century after Christ onwards; but in these two Alphabets the use of the old 'block letters', for certain purposes, never died out, and their value revived with the invention of printing, in which a premium was put upon separate letters by the desirability of restricting to the smallest possible compass the variety of the fount of type. Accordingly, the early Western printers not only resorted to the old inscriptional 'block letters' but derived from them the happy idea of also breaking up the medieval cursive Latin and Greek hands into sets of separate letters—the 'small print' or 'lower case' letters in which most matter in the Latin and Greek Alphabets was printed thereafter. Meanwhile, during the long reign of the pen which had intervened between the decline of inscription on stone and the

¹ Even after the Turkish-speaking peoples had begun to come under the influence of Western Civilization and therefore to seek expression in their languages for Western ideas, they had usually resorted to the Arabic vocabulary for coining equivalents for Western technical, scientific, and philosophic terms, instead of taking over the Latin and Greek formations used for coining these terms in French or English.

² 'To a purist objector Kemal Pasha explained on the 25th August, 1928 [see p. 229 below] that the new spelling was strictly phonetic, following the Stamboul pronunciation, and must take no account of Arabic derivations. The Turkish language was freeing itself from the past.' (*The Manchester Guardian*, 27th August, 1928.)

invention of printing in the West, certain Oriental Alphabets had abandoned themselves so far to the cursive style, to which penmanship naturally tended, that in course of time they had lost their original 'block letters' altogether. Of these exclusively cursive Alphabets which arose during the reign of the pen, the Arabic Alphabet (derived from a version of the Aramaic Alphabet) was one; and as a cursive hand it was far superior to the cursive Latin and Greek hands that had been developed during the Middle Ages. Indeed, the Arabic Alphabet could be written at such high speed with the pen that nations which used it had no need ever to resort to 'shorthand'. The fact, however, that the Arabic Alphabet had developed into a kind of 'shorthand' itself gives the measure of its awkwardness for the printer; for many letters had come to have four different forms, according as they were joined to the previous letter or to the subsequent letter or to both or to neither; and, again, many letters were only distinguished from one another by dots which in print might easily be blurred. Hence, in a world in which the printing press had prevailed over the pen, as the pen had formerly prevailed over the chisel, the nations which had inherited the Arabic Alphabet found themselves as much at a disadvantage compared with those which had inherited the Latin as they had been at an advantage over them when penmanship was supreme.

It was no accident that, of all the nations employing the Arabic Alphabet, the Turkish-speaking nations were the first to discard it in favour of the Latin Alphabet. To begin with, they had not a great literary heritage, recorded in the Arabic Alphabet, to tie them to the past. The 'Osmānlis were the only one of these nations that had created a considerable literature; and even Ottoman literature was a feeble growth compared with Arabic and Persian. Thus the non-Ottoman Turks sacrificed hardly anything, and even the 'Osmānlis comparatively little, by making a change of Alphabet which cut them off from their own literary heritage. On the other hand, the Arabs and the Persians could not make that change without cutting themselves off from literary heritages which ranked among the great literatures of the world—a self-mutilation which would almost amount to cultural suicide. Moreover, the Arabic-speaking peoples, in giving up the Arabic Alphabet in favour of the Latin, would be actually giving up a more apt in favour of a less apt vehicle for the Arabic language, which the Arabic Alphabet had been expressly and skilfully adapted to convey. The Arabic Alphabet, like the 'Proto-Phoenician' Alphabet, from which it was ultimately derived through the Aramaic Alphabet, was an essentially consonantal script in which

the representation of vowels was partial and rudimentary; and the Arabic language, like the sister Semitic language for which the original Alphabet had been invented,¹ was an essentially consonantal language, which made its effects by ringing changes on tri-consonantal roots.² Evidently a language which made its effects by ringing changes on systems not of consonants but of vowels would be particularly ill served by the Arabic Alphabet and would stand to gain by adopting the Latin; for the Latin Alphabet had preserved the happy addition which its immediate parent, the Greek Alphabet, had made to the Phoenician Alphabet. The Latin Alphabet, like the Greek, always represented vowels, as well as consonants, by distinct letters and never by mere optional diacritical marks. This feature of the Latin Alphabet made it a more suitable instrument from the technical point of view for conveying an Indo-European language like Persian (apart from the obstacle, noted above, of the Persian literary heritage recorded in the Arabic Alphabet). *A fortiori* it commended the Latin Alphabet as an instrument for conveying the Turkish languages, which were distinguished by the fine and multiple differentiation of their vowels and by their systems of vowel harmonics.³ Historical accident had decreed that several languages⁴ belonging to the kindred Ugro-Finnish family, in which vowels played a similar and equally important part, should be written in the Latin Alphabet from the first moment when they were reduced to literate form at all. The Turkish languages had been less fortunate; for while the earliest monuments of Turkish, dating from the eighth century after Christ, were written in a special script of unknown provenance,⁵ the Turkish-speaking

¹ At the time of writing, the genesis of the original ancestor of all the Alphabets was still a mystery; and the question whether it was derived from the Ancient Egyptian script or from the Ancient Minoan script or from a combination of them or from some independent source was still a matter of controversy. It seemed probable, however, that the distinguishing feature of the original Alphabet and of all its progeny—that is, the graphic representation of simple sounds and not of syllables or of ideas—was invented in the course of providing a script for a Semitic language.

² Actually, one or more of the three components of an Arabic root might be a vowel, but these vowels behaved as consonants structurally.

³ For instance, the four actual and two hypothetical Turkish words which could be distinguished in the Latin Alphabet by the six different spellings *öl*, *ol*, [ül], [ul], *evl* and *evvel*, could only be conveyed in the Arabic Alphabet by the one identical group of three letters *اول*.

⁴ E.g., Magyar, Finnish, Estonian.

⁵ For the Orkhon Inscriptions see O. Donner: 'Sur l'Origine de l'Alphabet Turc du Nord de l'Asie,' in *Journal de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*, xiv, pp. 1 seqq. (Helsingfors, 1896); Finnish Archaeological Society: *Inscriptions de l'Jénissei* (Helsingfors, 1889), and *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon* (Helsingfors, 1892); J. Marquart: *Die Chronologie der Alt-türkischen Inschriften* (Leipzig, 1898); W. W. Radlov: *Alt-türkische Inschriften der Mongolei* (Petrograd: vol. i, 1895,

peoples afterwards succumbed to Alphabets of the non-vocalic order. The Manichæan and Nestorian Uighurs who had been a power in Central Asia during the Middle Ages learnt to write their Turkish language in a version of the Aramaic Alphabet; the pagan Turkish tribes who overran the provinces of the Arab Caliphate and were converted to Islam learnt to write their languages in the Arabic Alphabet. In order to express their languages in the well-adapted Latin Alphabet, which accident had thrust upon their kindred the Magyars and the Finns from the outset, the Turks had to wait a thousand years and then face all the difficulties of transliteration.

This radical step was taken at last when, in consequence of the General War of 1914–18, both Turkey and the Turkish States Members of the U.S.S.R. had come under régimes of a revolutionary temper.

The movement began in the U.S.S.R.,¹ in which there were no less than twenty-seven distinct Turkish-speaking nations or nationalities²

vol. ii, 1897, vol. iii, 1899, Imperial Academy of Sciences); V. Thomsen: 'Déchiffrement des Inscriptions de l'Orkhon et de l'Jénissei: Notice Préliminaire,' in *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale des Sciences et des Lettres de Danemark*, 1893, pp. 285–99 (Copenhagen, 1893), and 'Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées,' in *Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*, v, pp. 54 seqq. (Helsingfors, 1896); A. Vambéry: 'Noten zu den Alt-türkischen Inschriften der Mongolei und Sibiriens,' in *Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*, xii (Helsingfors, 1899).

The script of the Orkhon inscriptions bore a superficial resemblance to the Runic Script of the Baltic region, but evidence of a genetic relation between the two scripts was lacking.

¹ See J. Castagné: 'Le Congrès de Turkologie de Bakou' (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, lxiii, 1^o trimestre 1926, pp. 17–90), Paris, 1926, Leroux; 'Latinisation de l'alphabet turk dans les républiques turko-tatares de l'U.R.S.S.' (*Revue des Études Islamiques*, Année 1927, Cahier (iii)). Paris, 1927, Geuthner.

Th. Menzel: 'Der erste Türkologische Kongress in Baku' (*Der Islam*, xvi, pp. 1–76). 1927.

Midhat Sa'du'lläh: *Latin Harfleri-le Turçe Elifbe Tecribesi*. 1928 (June).

E. Rossi: 'La Questione dell' Alfabeto per le Lingue Turche' (*Oriente Moderno*, June 1927, pp. 295–310). Rome, 1927, Istituto per l'Oriente; 'Nuovo Alfabeto Latino introdotto in Turchia' (*Oriente Moderno*, January 1929, pp. 33–48). Rome, 1929, Istituto per l'Oriente.

Turkish Government—Dili Enjümeni: *Yeni Türk Alfabeti. İmla ve tasrif şekilleri*. (Türk dili encümeninin karar ve tensibi ile tertip edilmiş-tir). 1928, Government Press.

Turkish Government—Dili Enjümeni: *Muhtasar Türkçe Gramer*. Stamboul, 1928, Government Press.

A. Vissière: 'Les Musulmans chinois et la République: Littérature islamique chinoise' (*Revue des Études Islamiques*, Année 1927, Cahier (iii)). Paris, 1927, Geuthner.

N. Yakovlev: 'Le Développement d'une langue écrite nationale chez les peuples orientaux de l'Union Soviétique et la naissance de leurs alphabets nationaux' (*Revue des Études Islamiques*, Année 1928, Cahier (i)). Paris, 1928, Geuthner.

² List in Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

represented politically by fourteen distinct territorial constituents of the Union¹ after the reconstruction of the political map of Central Asia in 1925. The circumstances of these Turkish communities were extraordinarily diverse. Geographically, they were scattered from the Middle Volga to the Pamirs and from the Crimea to North-Eastern Siberia. Numerically they ranged from nations of six millions extending over half a continent, like the Qazāqs, to communities of twelve or fifteen thousand souls occupying a couple of isolated valleys in the Northern Caucasus or the Altai. Politically, two of the Turkish territorial constituents of the U.S.S.R. (the Republics of Türkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were direct members of the Union; one (the Republic of Azerbaijan) was a constituent of the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia, which was itself a direct member of the Union; seven were autonomous republics inside one or other of the direct members of the Union; and four were autonomous provinces. In culture the differences among these Turkish-speaking nations were greater still. They included nomads on the steppes, peasants in the forests and highlands, and urban and industrial populations in the oil-fields of Baku and in the commercial city of Qāzān. Again, some of them were completely or virtually illiterate, while others had developed national cultures which radiated beyond their own borders. In particular, the Qāzān Tatars had developed a literature, conveyed in the Arabic Alphabet, which had won for the Qāzān Turkish language the status of a *lingua franca* among the neighbouring Turkish peoples, for example, the Qazāqs, the Bāshqyrs, and the Nogays. The Qāzān Tatars had also built up a printing and publishing industry which produced editions not only of native works but of the great monuments of Arabic literature—and these Qāzān editions of Arabic works found a market far and wide in the Islamic World beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The first Turkish nation to adopt the Latin Alphabet were the Yakuts—a nominally Orthodox Christian Turkish people of North-Eastern Siberia who had lain beyond the horizon of Islam and whose language had never previously been reduced to literate form. The adoption of the Latin Alphabet by the Yakuts seems to have taken place as early as 1918; but the previous illiteracy of the Yakuts, which made the step easy for them to take, was also a mark of cultural backwardness which prevented their action from having much influence upon the other Turkish peoples—from whom, moreover, they were geographically as well as culturally remote. The movement only began to become important in 1922 when it was

¹ List in Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

taken up on private initiative at Baku, which was the capital of the Transcaucasian Turkish Republic of Azerbaijan and the centre of the oil production of the U.S.S.R.—a factor which, for several generations past, had brought the Azerbaijānī Turks into touch with the outer world and placed them *en rapport* with Western civilization. Previously, the Azerbaijānī Turks, being Muslims, had used the Arabic Alphabet to convey the Āzerī Turkish language; but in 1922, at Baku, a journal in Āzerī Turk, printed in Latin characters, started publication. At the beginning of the academic year 1925–6, the Latin Alphabet began to be taught in the Azerbaijan state schools; it was made the compulsory and exclusive medium of public instruction in Azerbaijan as from the beginning of the year 1927–8; and finally it was made the exclusive medium of all Government institutions and official publications as from the 1st January, 1929. After Azerbaijan had taken this lead, the question was vigorously canvassed at Qāzān, where the advocates of the Latin Alphabet were opposed by a party who feared that the abandonment of the Arabic Alphabet might cost the Qāzān Turkish language the currency which it had gained among other Turkish-speaking peoples. The opposition seems to have been still more violent in the small and isolated Republic of the Crimea. On the other hand, the Latin Alphabet was received with favour in Bāshqyrđistan, and in 1927 it was introduced into the secondary schools of the autonomous province of Khīngīzistan, in the Pamirs.

On the 26th February–6th March, 1926, an unofficial Turcological Congress was held at Baku¹ under the chairmanship of Āghām‘alī Ōghlū, the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijānī Republic, and was attended not only by representatives of the various Turkish-speaking nations of the U.S.S.R. but also by a delegate from Turkey and by a number of Russian and European *savants*. Before dispersing, this Congress passed (by 101 votes against 7, with 6 abstentions) a resolution declaring that the introduction and application of the Latin Alphabet were matters for each constituent unit of the U.S.S.R. to deal with at its own discretion, but at the same time emphasizing the importance of the movement in Azerbaijan and inviting the other Turkish-speaking nations to make themselves acquainted with what the Azerbaijānīs were doing, with a view to following their example. Indeed, at Baku, on this occasion, there was founded an official ‘All-Union Central Committee for the Reform of the Turkish Alphabet’, representing the various Turkish units of the U.S.S.R. and reinforced by twelve local branches. This Committee seems to have held a preliminary session at Baku in

¹ For this Congress see *opp. cit.* in foot-note on p. 223 above.

March 1927 and a plenary session at the same place on the 3rd–6th June of the same year—invitations being issued to the Kommissars for Education in all the constituent units of the U.S.S.R., as well as to individual Russian Orientalists. At this meeting it was announced that the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. had approved the constitution of the Committee and made a grant of 600,000 roubles for its work, in addition to 500,000 roubles previously granted for the same purpose to the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia. The Committee now organized itself definitively and appointed a permanent Presidium of its own; and the first act of this Presidium was a decision, voted unanimously, that a unitary version of the Latin Alphabet should be established, into which all the Turkish languages of the U.S.S.R. should be either transliterated or reduced for the first time to literate form, as the case might be.¹ This action was followed up by local and unofficial enterprise. For example, the Turkish-speaking peoples of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic—the greatest of the six constituent members of the U.S.S.R.²—held a cultural congress at Moscow on the 28th September–1st October, 1927, which expressed itself in favour of the Latin Alphabet. On the 17th January, 1928, the ‘All-Union Central Committee’ met for its second plenary session at Tashkend. By this time the Latin Alphabet had been adopted officially by four Turkish-speaking nations: the Azerbaijānis, the Yakuts, and two small North-Caucasian communities called the Balqars and the Qarachays.³ Its official adoption in Türkmenistan followed as from February and March 1928. Its spread among all the twenty million Turks of the U.S.S.R. seemed only a matter of time.

It was noteworthy that the Russian Communists, who were the ruling power in the U.S.S.R., not merely tolerated but encouraged and assisted this movement among their Turkish-speaking fellow citizens. In so doing they were applying their established policy of giving full play to the principle of nationality on the administrative,

¹ It should be noted that it was not proposed to unify these Turkish languages themselves by giving one of them, or an artificial amalgam of several of them, universal currency at the expense of the rest. The decision was that these different languages should all be conveyed in the same version of the Latin Alphabet with identical letters representing identical phonetic values in every case.

² The R.S.F.S.R. included the largest Turkish unit in the U.S.S.R. (the Autonomous Republic of Qazāqistan) and the most literate Turkish unit (the Autonomous Republic of Tataristan), as well as most of the smaller and more backward Turkish-speaking communities.

³ The Latin Alphabet had also been adopted by four Caucasic-speaking nations.

educational and cultural planes—in striking contrast to the defunct Imperial Russian Government's policy of 'Russification'. Presumably one object of this Russian Communist policy was to ensure that the propagation of the Communist Faith among the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. should not be compromised by becoming identified in their minds with the old Russian programme of 'denationalization'. A second object of the policy may have been to exert an influence upon neighbouring peoples, beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R., which happened to be akin to certain non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. in language, religion or civilization. At any rate, in the case under consideration, this result actually followed.

In this connexion it may be noted that one of the units represented on the 'All-Union Central Committee' was Tājikistan—an Autonomous Republic of the Uzbek Republic, the latter being one of the six direct members of the U.S.S.R. Tājikistan adjoined the Afghan frontier;¹ and the Tājiks, like the Afghans, spoke an Iranian vernacular which had not been reduced to literate form, while for literary purposes they made use of Persian. Under the influence of the movement among the neighbouring Turkish-speaking peoples of the U.S.S.R., the Tājiks now began to experiment in reducing their Iranian vernacular to literate form in the Latin Alphabet; and this experiment might eventually have an effect among more important Iranian-speaking peoples like the Afghans and the Persians.

Again, the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, in which the movement for conveying the Turkish languages in the Latin Alphabet was strongest, was only separated by an artificial frontier from the remainder of Azerbaijan, which lay within the frontiers of Persia—the provincial capital, Tabrīz, being the second city of the Persian Empire. The same Āzerī Turkish language was spoken by the Azerbaijānī Turks on both sides of the political boundary; but in Persian Azerbaijan the Āzerī language had never yet been reduced to literate form—the Persian Azerbaijānīs using the Persian language for literary purposes, like the Afghans and the Tājiks. It seemed possible that the new vitality which the Āzerī Turkish language promised to acquire in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan through the introduction of the Latin Alphabet might evoke a consciousness of linguistic nationality in the Persian Province of Azerbaijan, and that this might have important international consequences.

The first sequel, however, outside the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., was in Turkey, where the substitution of the Latin Alphabet for the

¹ There were also Tājiks in Afghanistan, and the water-carrier's son who made himself master of Kābul in January 1929 was reported to be one of them.

Arabic Alphabet was carried out suddenly and drastically in the year 1928. The version of the Latin Alphabet which was adopted in Turkey for conveying the 'Osmānli Turkish language as spoken at Constantinople was worked out quite independently of the unitary Latin Alphabet of the Turkish-speaking nations of the U.S.S.R. ; and the two results differed considerably.¹ Nevertheless, the events in the U.S.S.R. which have been recorded above must have been followed attentively at Angora ; and it is not inconceivable that they were partly instrumental in leading President Mustafa Kemal to take the same road ; for, down to 1928, the Angora Government had shown a reserve towards the idea of adopting the Latin Alphabet² which had contrasted rather noticeably with its radicalism in other fields.

The Government campaign for the adoption of the Latin Alphabet in Turkey was opened in October 1927, when the Prime Minister, General Ismet Paşa, announced at a conference of the Popular Party at Angora that the question was being considered. The Minister of Justice, Mahmud Esad Beğ, spoke in favour of the change on an official occasion in January 1928 ; and before the end of that month a committee for the study of the question, under the chairmanship of a former Minister of Public Instruction, Hamdullah Subhi Beğ, was appointed by the Council of Ministers. The first positive step was taken on the 20th May, 1928, when the Great National Assembly at Angora passed a Bill making the employment of the Western instead of the Islamic version of the Arabic numerals optional forthwith and compulsory as from the 1st June, 1929. On the 25th June, 1928, a Commission for working out a version of the Latin Alphabet suitable for the 'Osmānli Turkish language as spoken at Constantinople was appointed by the Ministry of Education. It started work at Angora next day and reported in the second week of July. Its specific proposals were approved on the 17th July, 1928, at a plenary session which the Prime Minister attended. On the 6th August the Commission reassembled at Constantinople, took its final decisions, and communicated the new Alphabet to the press.

At Constantinople on the same evening, at a gathering of the Popular Party, President Mustafa Kemal made a public declaration of faith in 'the new Turkish Alphabet',³ and within a week he started

¹ See the table on p. 231 of this volume.

² For the first step in this direction in Turkey, which had been taken in April 1926, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 70.

³ Stress was laid upon the new Alphabet being specifically Turkish, in the sense that it was a version of the Latin Alphabet specially adapted for conveying the Turkish language. On this point see a statement made by Ismet Paşa which was reported in *The Manchester Guardian*, 31st August, 1928.

a class in it at Dolma Bağçe Palace for his suite. Arrangements were put in hand for teaching Turkish in the Latin Alphabet in the schools of the Constantinople Vilayet from the beginning of the academic year 1928-29; and a lecture on its advantages was broadcast from Constantinople University on the 21st August, 1928. On the 23rd August the Ministry of Public Instruction took preparatory steps for teaching Turkish in the Latin Alphabet from the beginning of the academic year 1928-9 in all the schools throughout the country; and before the end of the month a beginning had been made with its use in the public services. In September the Ministry issued a circular, warning all Government officials, gendarmerie officers and employees of state banks and other semi-official institutions that they must learn to read and write Turkish in the Latin Alphabet by the end of October; and the Governors of the Provinces were instructed to report officials who omitted to comply with this order. The other Ministries issued corresponding orders a few days later. The Ministry of the Interior, for example, ordered the officials under its authority to make the change by the beginning of October and not the end. Again, the Government decided that all Turkish newspapers must be printed in the Latin Alphabet after the beginning of December—the financial strain imposed by this decision being somewhat mitigated by a special exemption of imported Latin type from customs duties.

Meanwhile, President Mustafa Kemal threw his energies into the campaign. On the 23rd August, 1928, he preached the virtues of the Latin Alphabet along the Thracian coast of the Sea of Marmora. Black-board lectures attended by some hundreds of Members of Parliament, officers, officials and Ministers of State, and lasting five hours each, were personally conducted by the President at Dolma Bağçe on the 25th August and on the 29th; and on the 14th September he started on a seven days' progress along the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, via Samsun and Trebizond, and thence overland to Angora via Tokat and Sivas, giving similar lectures all the way. He found that the only feature seriously criticized in the new Alphabet was an over-frequent employment of the hyphen, and he promptly gave instructions for this piece of elaboration to be simplified.¹ On the other hand, he refused to duplicate the letter K by adding Q to the Turkish version of the Latin Alphabet in order to reproduce, in loan words from Arabic, the distinction between the Arabic letters Kāf and Qāf, on the ground that in Turkish this distinction was

¹ Text of his letter of the 21st September, 1928, to Ismet Paşa in Rossi: 'Nuovo Alfabeto Latino.'

otiose¹ and that the 'Turkish Alphabet' ought not to be unnecessarily complicated for the sake of philological exactitude. On the 29th September certain further simplifications were published by the Commission. Meanwhile, on the 13th September, Ismet Paşa had commended the new Alphabet in a speech to his constituents at Malatiya. Thus the most eminent official sponsors of the change took pains to prepare the ground in the more backward north-eastern and eastern provinces before the change was enforced by law.

On the 1st November, 1928, at the first sitting of a new session, the Great National Assembly at Angora passed a law² giving the new Alphabet legal currency forthwith; providing that all newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, advertisements and public signs must be printed in the new Alphabet on and after the 1st December, 1928; that all business of public services, banks and companies must be conducted in it, and all books printed in it, on and after the 1st January, 1929; and that all administrative and legal forms, documents and records must be conceived in it on and after the 1st June, 1929. On and after the last-mentioned date the public was to correspond in the new Alphabet with Government Departments, banks and companies. The only exception was that bank notes, treasury bonds, share certificates, stamps and money orders printed in the Arabic Alphabet were to be tolerated until further notice. The employment of the Arabic Alphabet in education was forbidden categorically.

On the 11th November the Chamber voted an additional credit for the Ministry of Public Instruction in order to meet the expense of the change in the national system of education. Before the end of the month, arrangements had been made for the compulsory instruction in the new Alphabet of every Turkish citizen, male and female, above school age. The courses—to be conducted by itinerant parties of teachers—were to be four months long for illiterates and two months long for persons literate in the Arabic Alphabet. Men were to attend on four evenings a week, women on two afternoons. The regulation number of attendances was to be enforced and pupils were not to be discharged without having earned certificates of proficiency. This novel transference of the principle of universal compulsory service from the military to the educational field appeared, at the beginning of the year 1929, to be working smoothly on the whole; and such

¹ It was perhaps not entirely otiose, since, in the traditional spelling of Turkish in the Arabic Alphabet, Kāf had gone with vowel harmonies of the 'soft' series and Qāf with those of the 'hard' series. It should be noted that Q appeared, side by side with K, in both the Azerbaijānī Alphabet and the unitary Turkish Alphabet of the U.S.S.R. (See the table on page 232 below.)

² Text in Rossi, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-2.

symptoms of opposition as manifested themselves were severely repressed. For example, in October 1928 three officers of the Naval Reserve were arrested at Gemlik on the double charge of espionage and opposition to the 'Turkish Alphabet' and were put on their trial; and, while two of them were acquitted, the third was sentenced to a year's imprisonment. Again, within a week of the passage of the law at Angora, several persons were arrested on similar charges at Smyrna. On the whole, however, it was remarkable that, in face of such a sudden and sweeping change, so little recalcitrance should be shown.

TRANSLITERATION OF TURKISH LANGUAGES FROM THE ARABIC
INTO THE LATIN ALPHABET (1928)

Name of Original Arabic Character or Diacritical Mark.	Latin Alphabet of Azerbaijan [Azerbaijan] ¹	Unitary Latin Alphabet of the Turkish-speaking nations of the U.S.S.R. ²	Latin Alphabet of Turkey. ³	Latin Transliteration hitherto used in this Survey. ³
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I. Consonants.

Hamzah Elif medial	omitted	omitted	⁵ or omitted ⁶	'
Hamzah Elif initial	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Hamzah Elif final	omitted	omitted	omitted	'
Waslah Elif elided	omitted	omitted	omitted	'
Waslah Elif un-elided	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Bā	b	b	b or p	b
Pā	p	p	p	p
Tā	t	t	t	t
Thā	s	s	s	s
Jīm	c	c ⁷	c	j
Chīm	ç	c ⁷	ç	ch
Hā	h	h	h	h

¹ After Rossi in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1927, pp. 306-7.

² After Castagné in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Année 1928, Cahier (i), p. 33, and Rossi in *Oriente Moderno*, January 1929 (from the short-hand record of the session of the All-Union Central Committee held at Baku in March 1927).

³ After the official publication: 'Yeni Türk Alfabesi: İmlâ ve Tasrîf Şekilleri' (Türk dili encümeninin karar ve tensibi ile tertip edilmiştir) (Angora, 1928, Government Press), as amended by the Language Commission's Resolution of the 29th September, 1928 (*Oriente Moderno*, January 1929, pp. 40-1).

⁴ See *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. xi-xii and *passim*.

⁵ e.g. 'mes'ele'.

⁶ e.g. 'mesele'. (The sign ' being used only if the catch in the voice for which this Arabic consonant stands is actually preserved in the word as pronounced in contemporary spoken Turkish.)

⁷ Sic.

<i>Name of Original Arabic Character or Diacritical Mark.</i>	<i>Latin Alphabet of Azerbaijan¹</i>	<i>Unitary Latin¹ Alphabet of the Turkish-speaking nations of the U.S.S.R.²</i>	<i>Latin Alphabet of Turkey.³</i>	<i>Latin Transliteration hitherto used in this Survey.⁴</i>
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I. Consonants - continued

Khā	x ⁵	x ⁵	h	kh
Dāl	d	d	d or t	d
Dhāl	z	z	z	dh
Rā	r	r	r	r
Zāy	z	z	z	z
Zhey	[ʔ]	z	j	zh
Sīn	s	s	s	s
Shīn	ʃ ⁵	ʃ	ʃ	sh
Sād	s	s	s	s
Dād	z	z (ʔ)	z	d or z
Tā	t or d	t or d [ʔ]	t or d	t or d
Zā	z	z	z	z
'Ayn	¹⁶ or omitted	[ʔ]	¹⁷ or omitted ⁶	•
Ghayn	g	g	g ⁹ or ğ ¹⁰	gh
Fā	f	f	f	f
Qāf	k ¹¹	q	k	q
Kāf	q ¹¹	k	k	k
Gyaf	q ¹²	g	g or ğ ¹³	g
'Sāghyr Kāf' (Kāf-Nūn)	n	ŋ ¹²	n	ng or n
Lām	l	l	l	l
Mīm	m	m	m	m
Nūn	n	n	n	n
Wāw	v	v	v	v
Hā	h	h	h	h
Yā	j	j	y	y

II. Vowels.¹⁴

Elif initial (Maddah)	a	a	a	ā
Elif medial	a	a	a	ā
Elif final	a	a	a	ā
Yā final (= ā)	a [ʔ]	a [ʔ]	a ¹⁵	ā
Fat-hah [hard]	a	a	a	a

¹⁻⁴ See p. 231.⁵ After the Russian version of the 'Cyrillic' Alphabet.⁶ Insertion or omission optional.⁷ e.g. 'mes'ut' = mes'ūd.⁸ e.g. 'İbaret' = 'İbāret (the sign ' being used only if the catch in the voice for which this Arabic consonant stands is actually preserved in the word as pronounced in contemporary spoken Turkish).⁹ e.g. 'Gazi' = Ghāzī.¹⁰ e.g. 'doğru' = dōghrū.¹¹ Sic.¹² New invention.¹³ e.g., 'gördüğü' = gördügü; 'sevdiği' = sevdigi.¹⁴ For the use of the sign ' over vowels in the Latin Alphabet of Turkey, see the note on simplifications on p. 233 below.¹⁵ 'Mustafa' = Mustafā.

Name of Original Arabic Character or Diacritical Mark.	Latin Alphabet of Azerbaijan [Azerbaijan] ¹	Unitary Latin Alphabet of the Turkish-speaking nations of the U.S.S.R. ²	Latin Alphabet of Turkey. ³	Latin Transliteration hitherto used in this Survey. ⁴
II. Vowels—continued.				
Fat-lah [soft]	â	â	e	e
Ĥâ [hard]	a	a [ʔ]	a	a
Ĥâ [soft]	â	â	e	e
Yâ [-î] [hard]	Ĥ ⁵	Ĥ ⁶	ı ⁷	ÿ
Yâ [-î] [soft]	ı ⁸ or e ⁹	i or e	i	î
Kasrah [hard]	Ĥ ⁵	Ĥ ⁶	ı ⁷	y
Kasrah [soft]	i	i	i	î
Wâw [-û] [hard]	y ¹⁰	u ⁷	u	û
Wâw [-û] [soft]	u	y ⁷	ü	ü
Waw [-ô] [hard]	o	o	o	ô
Waw [-ô] [soft]	o ¹¹	o ¹¹	ö	ö
Dammah [-u] [hard]	y ¹⁰	u ⁷	u	u
Dammah [-u] [soft]	u	y ⁷	ü	ü
Dammah [-o] [hard]	o	o	o	o
Dammah [-o] [soft]	o ¹¹	o ¹¹	ö	ö
Total number of letters in each version of the Latin Alphabet	32 ¹²	33 ¹³	34	33

Note on Simplifications introduced into the Latin Alphabet of Turkey by the Resolution of the 29th September, 1928, as compared with the Alphabet published on the 10th August, 1928.

1. In the original version, Hamzah Elif final as well as medial, and also 'Ayn final, were conveyed by the character ' instead of being omitted (e.g. 'mebde' instead of 'mebde', and 'kat' instead of 'kat').

2. In the original version, Hamzah Elif medial, and also 'Ayn medial, were sometimes conveyed by the lengthening mark ^ over the preceding vowel instead of by '. (Apparently this was done in Arabic loan-words in which, in the Constantinople pronunciation of Ottoman Turkish, the effect of Hamzah Elif medial or 'Ayn medial was to lengthen the preceding vowel rather than to produce a catch or stop after the vocalization, e.g. 'têmîn = te'mîn; 'mêmûr = me'mûr). In the simplified version this seems to have been given up.

¹⁻⁴ See p. 231.

⁵ After the Gregorian Armenian Alphabet.

⁶ New invention.

⁷ Sic.

⁸ e.g., 'dâmir' = demîr.

⁹ e.g., 'demeq' = dimek.

¹⁰ After the Russian version of the 'Cyrillic' Alphabet.

¹¹ After the Danish version of the Latin Alphabet.

¹² Assuming the non-existence of a letter representing Zhey.

¹³ Assuming the non-existence of a letter representing 'Ayn.

3. In the original version, the mark $\hat{\text{}}$ was employed to distinguish the long vowels in all Arabic and Persian loan-words. In the simplified version, this use of $\hat{\text{}}$ was limited to two cases:

(a) to distinguish the Arabic adjectival 'i' from the various enclitic 'i's of the Turkish language (e.g. in 'watani' and 'dini' as contrasted with 'Türk dili encümeni').

(b) to distinguish words which, in the Latin Alphabet, would otherwise have had an identical orthography (e.g., 'Âli' (= 'Ālī) as contrasted with 'Ali' (= 'Alī)).

4. In the simplified version the sign $\hat{\text{}}$ was not only employed in Arabic and Persian loan-words as a distinguishing mark, but was also placed above long 'a' and 'u' following the consonants 'k', 'g' and 'l' in Arabic and Persian loan-words, when the effect of the juxtaposition, in the pronunciation of Ottoman Turkish, was to 'mouiller' the 'k', 'g' or 'l' before the long 'a' or 'u' (e.g. 'Kâzım' = K[y]āzym; 'ruzgâr' = rüzg[y]ār; 'lâzım' = l[y]āzym; 'hükûmet' = hük[y]ümet; 'mefkûre' = mefk[y]üreh). In the original version the modification of 'l' before long 'a' or 'u' had not been indicated at all, while the modification of 'k' or 'g' before long 'a' or 'u' had been conveyed by an arbitrary insertion of 'h' (e.g. 'hükhümet' instead of 'hükümet' for hük[y]ümet; 'khâzım' instead of 'kâzım' for k[y]āzym, &c.). N.B. In these cases, the $\hat{\text{}}$ in the original version was a lengthening mark, whereas in the simplified version it represented a modification of the consonant preceding the vowel marked $\hat{\text{}}$.

PART III

THE ISLAMIC WORLD

B. THE MIDDLE EAST

(i) Relations between Egypt and Great Britain (1926-8).

In a previous volume of this series¹ the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations in their several main fields has been carried down in one field to the reorganization of the Sudanese troops into a Sudan Defence Force separate from the Egyptian Army, a change which was completed in January 1925;² in another field to the presentation of the Report of the Nile Waters Commission on the 21st March, 1926;³ and in yet another field to the restoration of constitutional government in Egypt in June 1926 after nine months of what had been a 'Palace Government' in effect though not in form.⁴ In these circumstances the relations between Egypt and Great Britain were as far from a mutually satisfactory settlement, and therefore as far from stability, as ever. The four matters which the British Government had reserved for free discussion and friendly accommodation at some future date, when they made their unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence on the 28th February, 1922,⁵ had not yet been settled by an Anglo-Egyptian agreement; and meanwhile, as a result of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack,⁶ the British Government had been led once more to intervene in some measure in Egyptian internal politics, from which (as disentangled from the four reserved points) they had intended, in February 1922, to disengage themselves forthwith once for all. The British Government's action after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack had brought about the resignation of Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul, the leader of the *Wafd*, and the accession to office of a ministry, presided over by Ahmad Pasha Ziwar, which could not be sure of commanding a majority in the Chamber of Deputies; and the Ziwar régime, in the absence of the Prime Minister abroad, had ultimately degenerated into the thinly veiled 'Palace Government' above mentioned.⁷ Thereafter, British intervention contributed to the restoration of a constitutional régime;⁸ but, when the general election of May 1926 had returned a new Chamber in which the *Wafd* once again found itself

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Sections (i) to (iii).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 194-5.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 212 *et seqq.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 226-7.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

in a substantial majority over all other parties together, it was also British intervention that dissuaded Zaghāl Pasha from seeking to return to office, as the leader of the majority would normally have done.¹ The outcome was the formation of a *Wafd*-Liberal Coalition Government with an independent statesman, 'Adlī Pasha, as Prime Minister, but with a *Wafd* majority in both the Cabinet and the Chamber. Under these conditions the internal political situation in Egypt was as unstable as were the relations between the Egyptian Government and the Occupying Power; and the new Prime Minister—with a British High Commissioner to be considered on the one side and a *Wafd* majority of the Chamber on the other—had an unenviable task.

Nevertheless, for nearly a year after 'Adlī Pasha succeeded Zīwar Pasha in office on the 7th June, 1926, Anglo-Egyptian relations were undisturbed by any untoward incident; and meanwhile progress towards agreement was made in certain spheres.

In the matter of the allocation of the Nile Waters, for example, a departmental committee which had been appointed by the Egyptian Government to examine the Expert Commission's Report of the 21st March recommended in June 1926 that, in substance, the report should be accepted, and further that the maximum amount of land which might be irrigated in the Gazīrah (Jazīrah) district of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan should be raised from 300,000 *faddāns*² to 450,000—exclusive of 20,000 to be irrigated perennially by pumping. In November 1926 tenders for the construction of the Nag Hamadi barrage in Upper Egypt³ were invited by the Egyptian Government; and eventually the contract for the barrage itself was awarded to one British firm (Messrs. Sir John Jackson, Limited) and that for the sluice gates and operating machines to another (Messrs. Ransome and Rapier, Limited). The Nag Hamadi barrage was an exclusively Egyptian affair; but in the course of the year 1926 the Egyptian Government sent the Director-General of the Physical Department of the Ministry of Public Works, Dr. H. E. Hurst, on a mission to the catchment area of the Great Lakes, in order to investigate possibilities of conserving the waters of the White Nile⁴—an enterprise in which the Egyptian Government would have to secure the co-operation not only of the Sudan Government but of the Governments of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo. The founda-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

² For the history of the 300,000 *faddān* maximum, see *op. cit.*, pp. 256-8 and 261-2.

³ See *op. cit.*, pp. 258 and 266.

⁴ Dr. Hurst had already visited part of the area two years earlier.

tion stone of the Nag Hamadi barrage was laid in February 1928; and in the same month the Ministry of Public Works was reported to be studying schemes for heightening the Aswān barrage. In August 1928 the general question of the conservation of the Nile Waters for irrigation was discussed in London between the Egyptian Minister of Public Works, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, the Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Governor of Uganda. Progress towards a solution of the Nile Waters problem was important, not only for the material well-being of all the riverain countries, but because it tended to lift out of the plane of political controversy between the Egyptian and the British Governments a matter on which Egyptian feeling was particularly sensitive.

The question of foreign officials in Egyptian service had been the subject of discussions between the Egyptian and British Governments during the first three months of 1926 in view of the approaching expiry, in April, of most of the contracts that had been concluded between the remaining permanent officials of British nationality and the Egyptian Government under the Egyptian law of 1923.¹ As a result, the services of about eighty per cent. of these officials were retained for a further term. This arrangement, which was made on the British Government's demand, was criticized by Egyptians as an instance of somewhat high-handed inconsistency in the conduct of British policy, for it was pointed out that the law of 1923, the operation of which was thus suspended, had itself been introduced on the British Government's demand, on the ground that, under the régime inaugurated by the British declaration of February 1922, it was inequitable to hold foreign officials in the Egyptian service to their original contractual terms. At the time when the law of 1923 had been introduced, the British Government had exacted from the Egyptian Government an assurance that they would maintain the arrangement of 1923 in force until it should have produced all of its effects,² and between that date and the spring of 1926 it had duly been in operation at a heavy cost to the Egyptian Treasury. Egyptians resented the fact that, after this cost had been incurred under pressure from the British Government, the same Government should suspend the arrangement on the ground that the retention of British officials in Egypt under the existing régime was a necessity—a contention contradictory to that on which the British Government had grounded the arrangement of 1923.

On the 18th April, 1926, 'Adli Pasha resigned office—technically

¹ For this Law No. 28 of 1923, see *op. cit.*, pp. 204-5.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

on the ground of a vote in the Chamber which he interpreted as a withdrawal of confidence in his administration. The substantial ground seems to have been a feeling that the *Wafī* majority in the Chamber was making his task too difficult. Zaghāl Pasha failed to persuade 'Adlī Pasha to reconsider his decision, and only succeeded with difficulty in persuading Sarwat Pasha to take his place. Sarwat Pasha's reluctance was overcome, however, on the 23rd April and he completed the formation of a new Coalition Cabinet on the 26th. When he met the Chamber next day he was coldly received; and as early as the 18th May he had a passage of arms over a local question (with a deputation headed by a prominent Liberal politician) which might have led to his resignation then if Zaghāl Pasha had not interposed personally.

The origins of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis with which 'Abdu'l-Khālīq Pasha Sarwat was confronted within a month of taking office were ultimately traceable to the evacuation from the Sudan, at the end of 1924, of Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army, Egyptian officers previously serving in the Sudanese units which, till then, had formed part of the Egyptian Army, and Egyptian officers who had been seconded to the Sudan civil administration. The history of this evacuation, and of the mutiny in a Sudanese unit which occurred in connexion with it, has been recorded in a previous volume,¹ and in the same place it has been mentioned that the Sudanese units were reorganized forthwith into a separate Sudan Defence Force.² These changes in the military situation in the Sudan, which had been prescribed in the British Government's ultimatum of the 22nd November, 1924,³ were followed by corresponding changes in the strength and organization of the Egyptian Army in Egypt. Between 1922 and 1926 the strength of the Egyptian Army in Egypt rose from 4,800 all ranks to 10,580 all ranks, partly owing to the addition of the Egyptian units evacuated from the Sudan at the end of 1924 (whereafter, the whole of the Egyptian Army, now shorn of its Sudanese units, was stationed in Egypt itself) and partly owing to the raising of two new infantry battalions and one new squadron of cavalry in 1925 with a view to providing employment at home for those Egyptian officers who had lost their positions in the Sudanese units (now reorganized as the Sudan Defence Force) and in the Sudan civil administration. Again, the organization of the Egyptian Army was changed inasmuch as Sir Lee Stack's successors in the office of Governor-General of the Sudan were not appointed simultaneously, as Sir Lee Stack

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 250-1.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 216-17 and 251.

and his predecessors had been, to the office of Commander-in-Chief (Sirdar) of the Egyptian Army. The *raison d'être* for the previous personal union between the two offices had, in fact, disappeared now that no portion of the Sirdar's command was stationed any longer in the territory subject to the Governor-General's administration. At the same time the Sirdarate, unlike the Governor-Generalship, had not been filled, after Sir Lee Stack's death, by a fresh appointment; and thereafter the Sirdar's functions had devolved, first, upon the late Sirdar's assistant, Huddleston Pasha, and then upon the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Forces, Spinks Pasha, in the capacity of acting Sirdar. It will be observed that this divorce of the Egyptian Sirdarate from the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan and the devolution of the functions of the office upon an acting Sirdar had been effected without the supreme control of the Egyptian Army passing out of British hands. The total number of British officers attached to the Egyptian Army, however, fell from 172 in 1922 to 9 in 1926. This fall was due partly to the detachment from the Egyptian Army of the Sudanese units, including their complement of British officers, and partly to the operation of the law of 1923 regarding the retirement of foreign officials in the Egyptian service. It should be noted that both these measures, of which the fall in the number of British officers attached to the Egyptian Army was the common effect, had been the work of the British Government and not of the Egyptian.

The Egyptian Government, on their part, had not recognized *de jure* the new *de facto* situation which the British Government had established by *force majeure*, and they had protested against the formation of the Sudan Defence Force.¹ On the other hand, in order to avoid a fresh crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations, the credit for the Sirdarate had been retained in the Egyptian Budget; and, in addition, a sum of £E750,000 had been allotted for the Sudan Defence Force in the Budgets of 1925-6 and 1926-7. In voting the Budget for 1926-7, however, the Chamber had expressly stipulated, not only that its approval of the Sudan Defence Force credit should not be taken as constituting an abandonment of Egyptian rights in the Sudan or the acceptance of the changes that had been made there since 1924, but also that it should not be taken as giving the Sudan Government any claim to receive the same contribution annually.²

In the spring of 1927, when the Chamber was dealing with the Budget for 1927-8, it referred the Ministry of War Chapter of the Budget to the relevant committee of the House in the ordinary course of business; and during the deliberations of the committee one of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

members, 'Abdu'rahmān 'Azzām Bey, placed certain suggestions before his colleagues on his own private initiative and not as part of the committee's official proceedings. He appears to have recommended that the contribution to the Sudan Defence Force should not be repeated and that the credit for the Sirdarate should be cancelled. The latter suggestion seems to have been the financial implication of one among a number of suggestions regarding the technical organization of the Egyptian Army and Ministry of War which were derived from a study of the organization existing in Great Britain. The idea was that, in order to avoid an overlapping of powers and functions between the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of War, the office of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished and that executive unity should be reconciled with technical efficiency by giving the Minister—thus left with undivided executive authority—an Army Council to advise him. This reform had been carried out in Great Britain in 1904; and one of the two features in it, namely the establishment of an Army Council, had been in existence in Egypt *de facto* since 1925, though parliamentary sanction still remained to be given. 'Azzām Bey also seems to have suggested certain concrete increases in the establishment of the Egyptian Army and improvements in its equipment.¹ This private and personal memorandum, which had not been endorsed or even officially considered by the Committee of the Chamber, and *ex abundantia* not by the Chamber itself, became public property by some channel which remained obscure; and on the 23rd May, 1927, the correspondent of *The Times* at Cairo telegraphed a summary of it as the 'published' report of the Parliamentary War Committee on the War Budget'.²

The publication of this document was followed by representations from the British High Commissioner in Egypt to King Fu'ād and to Sarwat Pasha; and, upon receipt of an urgent despatch from Lord Lloyd, the British Government, on the 30th May, addressed a note to the Egyptian Government which reached Sarwat Pasha's hands on the evening of the same day. On the same evening, under orders from the Admiralty at Whitehall, three British battleships left Malta for Egyptian ports—two for Alexandria and one for Port Said. These

¹ See the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 1st June, 1927, which is referred to below.

² See *The Times*, 25th May, 1927, especially the last paragraph of the telegram, which begins: 'The Committee recommends unanimously the cancellation of the credit for the Sirdarate'. This error was repeated in *The Times* of the 31st May, 1927, in which 'the decision of the Committee of the Egyptian Parliament to recommend the suppression of credits for the Sirdar' was referred to. A correction of the error does not seem to have been published in any subsequent issue.

steps caused some perturbation in Egypt; and King Fu'ād, who had been on the point of proceeding to Alexandria *en route* for Europe, changed his plans and remained in Cairo.

The text of the British note was not made public,¹ but it is to be presumed that the note was drafted and despatched and the warships ordered to Egypt by the Government at Westminster under the same misapprehension as that which had been entertained by the correspondent of *The Times* at Cairo; for in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 1st June, 1927, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that 'some days ago, the War Committee of the Egyptian Parliament published its recommendations to the Chamber of Deputies', and, as the purport of this non-existent publication, he proceeded to give a summary of 'Azzām Bey's memorandum aforementioned. 'After consultation with His Majesty's Government,' the Secretary of State continued, 'the High Commissioner addressed a note to the Egyptian Government,' and 'in the note was set forth our view that the whole question was one in which Egypt and Great Britain were both interested and which should properly form the subject of an agreed settlement'. He added that in the British Government's opinion a settlement could be so framed as to meet the best interests of both countries, and that the British Government were ready at once to begin negotiations for the purpose. He defended the despatch of the warships as a precaution, pending an agreed settlement, which was recommended by past experience—as an example of which he cited the outbreak at Alexandria in 1921.²

In opening his statement, Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that 'for some time past the Egyptian Army' had 'attracted the attention of a section of Egyptian politicians'; and he averred that 'the aims of this section' were 'firstly, to increase the existing numbers of the Army and strengthen its armament, and ultimately to convert it into

¹ 'I felt it was more courteous to the Egyptian Government to leave them time to consider it before any publication.' (Statement, referred to below, by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster, on the 1st June, 1927).

² For this outbreak see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, p. 202. It may be observed that the violent popular upheavals which had occurred several times in Egypt between the Armistice of 1918 and the British Declaration of 1922, and of which the Alexandria outbreak of 1921 was an instance, had not recurred under the new conditions inaugurated rather more than five years before Sir Austen Chamberlain made this statement, so that the allusion might seem somewhat far-fetched. (On this point see p. 272 below). According to Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 1st June, 1927, 'reports indicated that efforts were being made to foment political excitement'; yet no specific evidence seems to have been adduced to show that, at this time, an outbreak, whether serious or trivial, was really imminent.

a weapon at the disposal of one political party, the *Wafd*'. He declared that 'these projects' were 'a matter of direct concern to His Majesty's Government' and that 'we cannot permit our task to be complicated by the presence of a potentially hostile force, such as there is good reason to fear the Egyptian Army might become if subversive influences were to be allowed full play'.

On the 3rd June the Egyptian Government delivered its reply to the British note of the 30th May; but this reply was apparently regarded by the British Government as insufficiently precise in its terms. Thereafter, Sarwat Pasha had an interview with Lord Lloyd on the 12th and another with King Fu'ād on the 13th. On the latter date he received a note from the British Residency suggesting an interpretation of certain passages in his note of the 3rd and asking for his confirmation of this;¹ and the reply which he returned on the 14th to this second note was accepted by Lord Lloyd as 'satisfactorily' explaining 'the intentions of the Egyptian Government and' disposing 'of the cause of the recent tension'.²

What this cause had been was made clear by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the opening passage of the statement cited above. The British Government had made up their mind to insist that everything appertaining to the control and organization of the Egyptian Army should be treated, in effect, as being covered by the four reservations to the British Declaration of February 1922; and the tension which this determination had caused subsided so soon as a declaration of conformity with the British Government's point of view had been obtained from the Egyptian Government. Whether the British Government's standpoint in this matter was or was not justified was evidently a matter for argument, in which the interested parties might take different views; but there was no doubt that the British authorities had raised and forced the issue on the strength of an erroneous assumption. The document which they had taken as their text turned out not to bear the official character which they had assumed it to possess; and the knowledge of this fact aggravated the soreness which the incident left behind it in Egyptian minds.

After this incident had been formally disposed of in the manner described above, King Fu'ād made his intended journey to Europe, visiting London in July, Rome in August, and Paris in October; and Sarwat Pasha and Lord Lloyd both came to Europe at the same time.

¹ Statement in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in answer to a parliamentary question on the 16th June, 1927.

² Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson, cited in the preceding note.

In London, on the 13th July, Sarwat Pasha called on Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office by appointment; and the conversation which took place between the two statesmen on this occasion was the starting-point of yet another attempt to reach an agreed settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian problem.¹ The attitude of the protagonists in these negotiations indicated that they were both personally in favour of making considerable concessions in order to secure a settlement which would terminate the series of incidents—some tragic, and all humiliating to both countries in different ways—that had punctuated Anglo-Egyptian relations during the past eight years. Had they been plenipotentiaries, it seems possible, though perhaps not probable, that their joint endeavours would have been crowned with success; but, as it was, Sarwat Pasha had to convince the leader of the *Wafd* and the *Wafd* majority in the Egyptian Chamber, and Sir Austen Chamberlain his colleagues in the British Cabinet and the Conservative majority in the House of Commons, if an agreement between the two statesmen was to be converted into a settlement between the two countries; and Sarwat Pasha's failure to convince the *Wafd* was the rock on which the attempt actually suffered shipwreck.

From the records which Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha made of their conversation on the 13th July, 1927,² it would appear that both of them were so conscious of not being free agents that they met without any thought, on either side, of entering into formal negotiations at this stage.

I did not suggest [Sir Austen Chamberlain wrote in recording his conversation with Sarwat Pasha] that we should carry on any negotiations during his visit in London, but might we not perhaps prepare the way for conversations between himself and Lord Lloyd when they had both returned to Egypt?

I made it clear to His Excellency [Sarwat Pasha wrote of the same conversation] that I had not been commissioned to open negotiations of any kind and that my visit to London was more modest in its purpose. . . . All that I could do . . . was to learn his opinion and the nature of the guarantees which, from the British standpoint, appeared to him to be necessary. If I judged them to be acceptable, I would communicate them to the Leader of the Majority (Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha). We should see then if it would be possible to open official negotiations; if the answer

¹ For the course of these Anglo-Egyptian negotiations from the 13th July, 1927, down to Sarwat Pasha's resignation on the 4th March, 1928, see the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928 and the Egyptian Green Book No. 1 of 1928 (Cairo, 1928, Imprimerie Nationale).

² Sir Austen Chamberlain's memorandum of the 13th July, 1927, in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928; Sarwat Pasha's *Exposé Liminaire* to the Egyptian Green Book No. 1 of 1928.

were in the affirmative, the result of the agreement would be subject to ratification by Parliament: if it were in the negative, that would be the end of it, and we should avoid the inconveniences of an official rupture.

These passages imply that neither statesman contemplated opening formal negotiations in London at this stage. Yet, out of this conversation on the 13th July, 1927, there did arise an immediate attempt not merely to open negotiations but to draft the text for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance. Presumably this new departure must have been made on the initiative of one or other of the two statesmen; but on the question which of them was actually responsible for it, their records do not tally.

It should be noted that Sir Austen Chamberlain's memorandum on the conversation of the 13th July, 1927, was written down on the day on which the conversation took place, while Sarwat Pasha's *Exposé Liminaire* bears the date of the 14th March, 1928. This record of Sarwat Pasha's was presumably compiled from notes taken nearer to the time of the various transactions recorded in it, and no suggestion was made in any quarter that, in drawing up his final account of these transactions, he had any intention of misrepresenting what had occurred. At the same time, at the date at which he was writing, there must obviously have been in his mind, in addition to his desire to state the facts, a second consideration which cannot have been in Sir Austen Chamberlain's mind on the 13th July, 1927. Between that date and the following March, the attempt to negotiate a treaty had failed; and in retrospect it had already become evident that the 'speeding-up' of the procedure after the 13th July had had an adverse effect upon the course of events at a later stage.¹ It would be no imputation upon Sarwat Pasha's character to suggest that, in March 1928, this then present consideration may have coloured his memory of events then eight months old.

Sarwat Pasha's record proceeds:

Agreeing with me completely on this basis, Sir Austen Chamberlain asked me to present him with a draft of a treaty. I made it clear that

¹ More than this cannot be said, for there is no warrant for assuming that, if the more cautious and dilatory procedure originally contemplated had actually been followed, an Anglo-Egyptian settlement would have been certainly achieved. On the contrary, it would appear that the concrete issue on which the negotiations came to grief was the question of the British military occupation; and on this matter the gulf between the views of the British Government and of the *Wafd* was at this time far too wide to be bridged, even if it had been approached by the most skilful diplomatic method. It seems probable that if the procedure originally contemplated had been followed, the Chamberlain-Sarwat conversations of 1927, like the MacDonald-Zaghlul conversations of 1924 (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 208-9), would never have developed into negotiations at all. On this point see further p. 266 below.

he was taking me a little by surprise; that I was hardly equipped for that; that I had neither the necessary documents nor the necessary collaborators; and that the Foreign Office was more naturally indicated as the party that should undertake this task. However, he insisted; and I promised him to try to prepare a draft.

From Sir Austen Chamberlain's record, it would appear that it was certainly he and not Sarwat Pasha who gave the conversation its first turn in this direction. After Sarwat Pasha had dwelt upon recent incidents, Sir Austen remarked that he 'was much more interested in the future than in the past'; and he went on to suggest that 'if we had an agreement—or an alliance, if he pleased¹—the whole situation would be changed'; that there were concessions which, 'with proper safeguards,' the British Government 'could afford to make'; and that 'it would be much easier to make them, and they might be on a more generous scale, if they were part of a larger arrangement which placed the relations of the two Governments on a permanently satisfactory footing.' But so far from indicating that he asked Sarwat Pasha to present him with the draft of a treaty, Sir Austen Chamberlain's record of what he went on to say to Sarwat Pasha proceeds at this point:

I would beg His Excellency to think over what I had said, and, if he felt during his stay in this country that we could usefully go further into the matter, I should be most happy to resume the conversation with him. Possibly he would be in a position to give me some indication of the lines on which he thought we might proceed. I repeated that I had no idea of entering into a negotiation with him during this visit, but it might be useful if, before Lord Lloyd left, I could give him rather more precise indications of the lines on which we might proceed than were contained in what I had just said to His Excellency. Sarwat Pasha, in reply, expressed his sincere pleasure at the sympathy I had shown and repeated his agreement with all that I had said as to the conditions which necessarily governed the relations of Egypt and Great Britain. He would consider whether there was anything more that he could say to me before he left London. In any case he earnestly hoped that some such agreement as I had foreshadowed might be reached.

¹ This was probably an allusion to an interview which had been given by Sarwat Pasha to *The Daily Mail* of London on the 7th July, 1927, and which had been published in that journal next day. This interview contained the words 'I hope that an alliance between the two countries will augment and fortify this friendship.' This passage, of course, showed that a treaty of alliance was already the objective in Sarwat Pasha's mind; and it might be conjectured that he would not have committed himself to a public pronouncement in favour of it unless he had reason to know that it also found favour with Zaghlul Pasha. This would not prove, however, that, in coming to England, he had originally intended, or had been authorized by Zaghlul Pasha, to do more than reconnoitre the ground with a view to negotiations on some future occasion.

On the 10th May, 1928, speaking in retrospect in the course of a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated categorically: 'I did not propose a treaty. Sarwat Pasha proposed a treaty to me.' And after recapitulating the passage that has just been quoted from his memorandum of the 13th July, 1927, he added: 'What was the result? In three days' time Sarwat Pasha came back to the Foreign Office with the draft of a treaty which he had to offer.' That the first draft for a treaty was drawn by, and put forward by, Sarwat Pasha was an undisputed fact; and from this point onwards the records again agree.

The undisputed facts, the probabilities and the disputed questions in this transaction might perhaps be stated as follows. It was undisputed that Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain had each deliberately allowed the other to see that he desired a comprehensive Anglo-Egyptian settlement in the form of a treaty. It was probable that either statesman desired that, if and when formal negotiations were opened, the first concrete proposals should come from the other side. It was undisputed, again, that, in the event, the first draft for a treaty was drawn by, and put forward by, Sarwat Pasha. The question which came into dispute was whether Sarwat Pasha took this step on his own initiative or on the suggestion of Sir Austen Chamberlain. On this question the records contradict one another categorically; they cannot be reconciled; and the reader must choose between them. Attention has already been drawn to two considerations which, without impugning Sarwat's Pasha's good faith, tell in favour of Sir Austen Chamberlain's record *a priori*.¹ In any case, it is certain that Sarwat Pasha communicated the text of a draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty to the Foreign Office on the 18th July.² A counter-draft, approved by the British Government,³ was communicated by Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sarwat Pasha at a second personal meeting on the 29th;⁴ and on the 31st August detailed observations on this counter-draft were transmitted by Sarwat Pasha to the Foreign Office.⁵ These exchanges of ideas brought out clearly the nature of the obstacles to agreement, without bringing the negotiations (as they had now virtually become) to an impasse at this stage.

The points on which there was substantial agreement were that the two Governments should enter into an alliance (Art. 1 of both drafts); that if Egypt were attacked, Great Britain should come to her aid

¹ See p. 244 above.

² Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928 and in Egyptian Green Book, No. 1 of 1928.

³ Text in *opp. cit.*

⁴ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Luminair*e, p. xii.

⁵ Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928 and Egyptian Green Book, No. 1 of 1928.

immediately in the capacity of a belligerent (Art. 2 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 3 of the British draft); that the instruction and training of the Egyptian Army should be in accordance with the methods of the British Army, and that the Egyptian Government should employ no foreigners who were not British subjects as officers or instructors (Art. 2 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 6 of the British draft); that Great Britain should use all her influence with foreign Powers having capitulatory rights in Egypt in order to obtain some new arrangement in place of the capitulatory régime as it then existed (Art. 3 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 7 of the British draft); that, under such new arrangement, the British Government should retain certain rights of intervention on behalf of foreign residents in Egypt (Art. 3 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 8 of the British draft—the two articles being mutually compatible, though the British draft was framed in markedly wider terms); that Great Britain should sponsor an application by Egypt for admission to membership in the League of Nations (Art. 4 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 9 of the British draft); that, in the event of Great Britain being involved in war, 'even if that war should in no way affect the rights and interests of Egypt,' the Egyptian Government should place the facilities for communication in Egyptian territory at the British Government's disposal (Art. 5 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 4 of the British draft); that the Egyptian Government should authorize the British Government to maintain a military force upon Egyptian territory—provided that the presence of this force was not to constitute an occupation and was not to prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt (Art. 6 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 5 of the British draft); that the Egyptian Government's foreign policy should not be conducted in a manner incompatible with the alliance or prejudicial to Great Britain (Art. 7 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 10 of the British draft); that the existing position and functions of the Financial Adviser and the Judicial Adviser should be maintained (Arts. 8 and 9 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 12 (2) of the British draft); and that any disagreement regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty should be settled by the procedure of the League of Nations (Art. 12 of the Egyptian draft, Art. 16 of the British draft).

In addition, the British draft explicitly reserved the rights and obligations arising under the Covenant of the League of Nations (Art. 14 of the British draft, as well as a clause in Art. 3).

It will be seen that, as between the original draft and counter-draft for the projected treaty, there was a large extent of common ground, and that this covered some of the most important matters involved. At the same time, there were inevitable differences between

the general attitudes of the two parties, and there were also wide divergences of view on several matters not less important than those on which there was substantial agreement.

In general, the British Foreign Secretary desired a text which would reassure his colleagues in the Cabinet and their supporters in Parliament that fundamental British interests in Egypt which were felt to be safe under the *status quo* would be safeguarded by sufficient sanctions under the proposed new régime,¹ while the Egyptian Prime Minister desired a text which would convince his countrymen that on the whole a new relation based on mutual trust was being substituted for the existing relation of tutelage and control.² The specific matters on which divergences of view were brought to light by the exchange of draft and counter-draft were the territorial limits within which the British force on Egyptian soil was eventually to be confined (Egyptian draft Art. 6, British draft Art. 5); the régime in the Sudan and the regulation and the distribution of the Nile Waters (Egyptian draft Art. 11, British draft Art. 13); the question whether the Egyptian Government should be under an obligation to consult the British Government in case of any tension in their relations with a third Power (British draft Art. 2); and the question whether appointments of foreign officials by the Egyptian Government should be controlled by the British Government and normally conferred on British subjects as far as senior posts were concerned (British draft Art. 11). There was also a clause in the alternative preambles which raised the question of the compatibility or incompatibility of foreign interference in the internal administration of Egypt with the Egyptian Constitution of 1923. Of these five matters, the first and second were more serious than the third, fourth and fifth.

On the first point, the Egyptian draft (Art. 6) proposed the formula: 'This military force, after a period of years from the coming into force of the present treaty, will be quartered in '. On the other hand, the text proposed in the British counter-draft (Art. 5) was: 'After a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties will reconsider the question of the localities in which the said forces are to be stationed in the

¹ In this spirit, the British counter-draft was supplemented by an Annex prescribing the peace strength of the Egyptian Army and providing for strict British control over its instruction and equipment, maintaining the existing privileges and immunities of the British forces in Egypt, prohibiting the passage of any but British military aircraft over the Suez Canal Zone, and stipulating for the retention of the European Department of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.

² On this point, see the opening paragraphs of Sarwat Pasha's observations of the 31st August, 1927, in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

light of the experience of the operation of the provisions of the treaty and of the military conditions then existing.'

In regard to the Sudan, the Egyptian draft (Art. 11) proposed that the settlement of the Sudan question should be deferred to future negotiations in which each of the two contracting parties should have complete freedom to maintain its rights, whereas the British counter-draft (Art. 13) simply proposed the continuance of the condominium. Further, the Egyptian draft proposed a return forthwith to the *status quo* of before 1924, whereas the British counter-draft, by passing over this point in silence, implied that the changes, to Egypt's disadvantage, which had been introduced into the situation in the Sudan after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack were to stand, while on the other hand it provided that Egypt's current contribution (of £E750,000) 'to the cost of the administration of the Sudan' should be continued, pending agreement between the two parties that this arrangement should be revised. In regard to the regulation and distribution of Nile Waters, both parties accepted the recommendations in the Expert Commission's Report of the 21st March, 1926, and both also agreed that the Egyptian Government should be free to carry out, both in Sudanese and in British territory, at their own expense, those conservancy works for the benefit of Egypt which the Report recommended. Beyond this, however, they disagreed on a question of principle; for the Egyptian draft proposed that the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works should retain the superior executive powers which it had formerly exercised over the regulation and distribution of Nile Waters in Sudanese as well as in Egyptian territory, whereas the British counter-draft merely proposed that the Irrigation Department of the Egyptian Ministry should be free to verify, in Sudanese territory, whether the Sannar (i.e. Makwār) barrage¹ was being operated in accordance with the rules which the Expert Commission's Report laid down. For the rest, the British draft proposed that the working arrangements agreed between the representatives of the Egyptian and Sudan Irrigation Departments respectively on the 1st May, 1926, should stand, with the implication that the Sudan Irrigation Department was to be regarded as an authority exempt from Egyptian control and vested with the same executive powers in Sudanese territory as were exercised in Egypt by the Egyptian Department.

These divergences of view in regard to the Sudan and to the eventual location of the British force in Egypt were brought out in the memorandum which Sarwat Pasha transmitted to the British

¹ For the construction of this barrage, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 257.

Foreign Office on the 31st August; but in a conversation which he had on this occasion with a British official, the Egyptian Prime Minister expressed the hope and the expectation that these obstacles might be circumvented. According to this British official's report, 'On the question of the troops he said that, while he had made his comments, he wished that matter set aside for the time being, and made it clear to me that in spite of our proposals not having come up to his hopes, he was not unsanguine of being able to find a solution if the other matters were disposed of. Similarly, in the matter of the Sudan, while he did not hold out any hope of being able to carry an agreement of the kind we had submitted to him in Egypt, he could see no reason why mention of the Sudan should not be omitted altogether and reserved for settlement for a more favourable occasion in the future.'¹

Meanwhile, Sarwat Pasha had had to take into consideration not only the desiderata of the British Government but the probable attitude of Zagh'lul Pasha and of the *Wafd* majority in the Egyptian Chamber, both on the matters on which he personally had arrived at a substantial agreement with Sir Austen Chamberlain and on those in which the two drafts for the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty were in conflict. From the passage, quoted above, in the interview which Sarwat Pasha had given to the *Daily Mail* on the 7th July, 1927, and from his reference to Zagh'lul Pasha in his interview with Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 13th, it would seem probable that Sarwat Pasha had reason to know that Zagh'lul Pasha approved, in principle, the idea of attempting to arrive at an Anglo-Egyptian settlement on the basis of a treaty—whether or not Zagh'lul Pasha was prepared for Sarwat Pasha to go so far, during his visit to London in July 1927, as he had actually done. In Sarwat Pasha's opinion,² his draft of the 18th July proposed no commitments on the Egyptian side which had not already been proposed by the *Wafd* during the abortive Milner-Zagh'lul negotiations of 1920;³ but on the 8th August he sought to make sure of this by despatching to Zagh'lul Pasha an account of his conversations up to date and enclosing a copy of his draft—with an offer to forward a copy of the British counter-draft as well, either before or after his (Sarwat Pasha's) own observations on this counter-draft had been completed.⁴ Unhappily, Zagh'lul Pasha, when this communication reached him, was already too ill to give it his atten-

¹ Memorandum by the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, covering Observations by Sarwat Pasha on proposed Treaty with Egypt. (Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928).

² *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xii.

³ For these negotiations see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 201-2.

⁴ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xiv.

tion,¹ and on the 23rd August he died. How he would have received the draft and the counter-draft—particularly the crucial clauses relating to the British army of occupation—can only be inferred from his attitude during the London conversations of 1924 and from the attitude afterwards displayed by Egyptians of almost all parties, and not merely by the *Wafd*, when Sarwat Pasha eventually divulged the terms of the final draft treaty in February 1928. Yet though it seemed unlikely, on the face of it, that Zaghlül Pasha would have approved the lines along which the current Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were proceeding, his death at this critical moment distinctly clouded the prospects of the negotiations in two ways. In the first place, it removed the one Egyptian statesman who, if he had happened to approve of Sarwat Pasha's action in London and its results, would have been able to give a decisive lead to a majority of the Chamber and of the politically conscious part of the nation in favour of accepting a definitive Anglo-Egyptian settlement on the basis established in the Sarwat-Chamberlain negotiations. Secondly, Zaghlül Pasha's death inevitably deflected the attention of his followers from the larger question of Anglo-Egyptian relations to the smaller but for them more pressing question of electing one of their number to be leader of the *Wafd* in Zaghlül Pasha's stead. On the 19th September, 1927, the Party Organization issued a manifesto announcing that the *Wafd* would continue to work for the principles for which their late leader had stood; and this manifesto was approved on the 26th by a party meeting which elected Mustafä Pasha Nahhäs to fill the vacancy. It was evident that whereas Zaghlül Pasha would have been free to consider Sarwat Pasha's results on their merits and would almost certainly have been able to carry his countrymen with him if he had come to the conclusion that a settlement on these terms was in Egypt's best interests, the first official successor of the national hero would be compelled—and this most stringently on the morrow of Zaghlül Pasha's death—to consider first and foremost, in his capacity of executor of his master's political testament, whether the new proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement were consonant with Zaghlül Pasha's statements of principle and policy, even though those statements had been made, not in reference to these actual proposals, which he had been unable to consider, but in reference to distinctly different situations at earlier dates.

Nevertheless, Zaghlül Pasha's death did not deter Sarwat Pasha from proceeding on the course upon which he had embarked. He had returned to Egypt from Europe on the 10th September, 1927, and on

¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

the 1st and 8th October he had conversations with Nabhās Pasha as the new leader of the majority party. On the 9th he left Egypt again for Europe; and on the 30th he arrived once more in London and immediately placed himself in touch with the Secretary of State and the competent authorities at the Foreign Office. He does not appear to have given them any indication that he regarded the death of Zaghlūl Pasha as a serious blow to his prospects of securing the necessary support in Egypt for carrying the negotiations through to completion. On the contrary, he appears, in all good faith, to have given the impression that, if he succeeded in arriving at an agreement with Sir Austen Chamberlain in London, he had no fear of failing afterwards to obtain endorsement for such an agreement in Cairo. In these circumstances, fresh, and this time arduous, discussions between Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain, on the basis of the three documents of the 18th and 28th July¹ and the 31st August, took place in London between the 31st October and Sarwat Pasha's departure on the 8th November.

As a result of these negotiations, agreement was reached, between Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain, not only on the terms of a treaty but on a draft text; and, up to the last moment before Sarwat Pasha's departure from London for Paris on the 8th November, there was no doubt, in Sarwat Pasha's mind, that their joint efforts would be completely successful.² On the 7th November however some hitch occurred which threatened to render the negotiations abortive;³ and next day, on the platform at the railway station, Sarwat Pasha handed to Sir Austen Chamberlain a personal note⁴ urging that a further attempt should be made to prevent the negotiations from falling through when agreement was so nearly in sight. In response to this, an official of the Foreign Office, Mr. Selby, was sent to Paris with a view to reaching agreement with Sarwat Pasha on the points outstanding;⁵ and eventually only one point remained

¹ The British counter-draft was dated the 28th July, though the date of its communication by Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sarwat Pasha was the 29th.

² Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xvii; Sarwat Pasha's personal note, delivered to Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 8th November (Egyptian Green Book, Document No 4.)

³ The nature of this hitch at the eleventh hour is not stated in either the Egyptian Green Book or the British White Paper; but the historian who compares the citations just made from Sarwat Pasha with Sir Austen Chamberlain's first despatch of the 24th November, might read between the lines that, before the 7th November, Sir Austen Chamberlain had already submitted the draft text, on which he had agreed with Sarwat Pasha, to his own colleagues in the Cabinet at Westminster and had failed to obtain their complete concurrence.

⁴ Text printed as Document No. 4 of the Egyptian Green Book.

⁵ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xvii.

on which textual agreement had not been reached before Sarwat Pasha sailed. In consequence, Sir Austen Chamberlain was able to inform Lord Lloyd, before the latter sailed from Marseilles for Egypt in the same ship as Sarwat Pasha, that His Britannic Majesty's Government were prepared to accept the treaty as then proposed—'subject only to the settlement of a suitable text for the expression of the agreement on a minor point which Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain 'had agreed in principle and to the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and India'.¹

The draft treaty of alliance between the heads of the British and Egyptian states,² which had thus taken shape,³ was supplemented by two other drafts—a draft note from the British to the Egyptian Government regarding the utilization of the Nile Waters,⁴ and another draft note from the British to the Egyptian Government regarding Capitulations in Egypt.⁵ The draft note regarding the utilization of the Nile Waters had been communicated unofficially to Sarwat Pasha in London on the 4th November and had been favourably received by him in principle, though he was not in a position to accept it definitively until he had discussed its technical aspect, after his return to Egypt, with the Egyptian Minister of Public Works.⁶ The draft note regarding Capitulations in Egypt, which had been prepared after discussion between Sarwat Pasha and the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Sir Cecil Hurst, had also been communicated to Sarwat Pasha in London before his departure. The three texts are printed in full in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume and therefore need not be recapitulated here.

In the draft treaty, the five specific points of divergence between the original Egyptian draft and British counter-draft of July 1927 were disposed of partly by omission, partly by concession and partly by the discovery of fresh common ground.⁷ The expedient of omission

¹ Statement in a despatch dated the 24th November, 1927, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd (text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928).

² For the reasons why the British Government found it convenient that treaties should be drawn as between heads of states see *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, Section (v) (c).

³ Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book (Document No. 8).

⁴ Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

⁵ Text in *op. cit.*, and in the Egyptian Green Book (Document No. 6). An earlier version of this draft, differing from the final version in the text of Paragraph 12, is also printed in the Egyptian Green Book (Document No. 5).

⁶ Despatch from the Foreign Office to the British Residency at Cairo, dated the 9th November, 1927 (text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928).

⁷ In addition to the five points of difference in the bodies of the Egyptian and the British drafts, there had been certain points in the annex to the British draft which Sarwat Pasha had criticized in his observations of the 31st

was applied to the elimination of the controversies over the preamble and over the Sudan—the question of the Nile Waters being separated from that of the political régime in the Sudan and dealt with, outside the framework of the draft treaty, in the first of the two draft notes. The two remaining matters of secondary importance were disposed of by concessions on Sarwat Pasha's part to the British desiderata that the Egyptian Government should consult the British Government in case of any tension in their relations with a third Power (draft of November, Art. 4,¹ as compared with the British draft of July, Art. 2) and that the Egyptian Government should as a rule give preference to British subjects in engaging the services of foreign officials—with the omission of the proviso that, in the making of such appointments, the British Government should exercise a control (draft of November, Art. 8, as compared with the British draft of July, Art. 11).² Finally, the crucial question of the territorial limits within which the British force on Egyptian soil was eventually to be confined was disposed of by an agreement that it should come up for reconsideration after a period of ten years from the coming into force of the treaty; that, if the two parties then failed to agree, the question might be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations; and that, if the decision of the League were adverse to the Egyptian Government's claims, the question might be reinvestigated—at the Egyptian Government's request and under the same conditions—at intervals of five years from the date of the League's decision. In addition to this new draft of the second paragraph of the relevant article, a new clause was added to the text of the first paragraph in order to take note of the possibility that at some future date another Anglo-Egyptian agreement might be concluded by which the British Government would entrust the Egyptian Government with the task of ensuring, in Egyptian territory, the protection of the lines of communication of the British Empire (draft of November, Art. 7, as compared with the Egyptian draft of July, Art. 6, and the British draft of July, Art. 5).

August. These criticisms were met by modifications in the annex to the new agreed draft. The provisions relating to the Financial and Judicial Advisers and to British officials employed in the public security and police services of the Egyptian State were also placed in the annex in the new draft, instead of being placed in the body of the treaty.

¹ In this text, the obligation upon the Egyptian Government to consult the British Government was extended to 'circumstances likely . . . to threaten the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt'.

² In the new version of this article, the British gained in substance while the Egyptians gained in form; for the proviso that British subjects should have preference in Egyptian appointments of foreign officials was not limited to senior posts in the draft of November as it had been in the draft of July.

In the discussions between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha in which the new draft of this article had been agreed, it had been explicitly stipulated and admitted that the new clause in the first paragraph did not commit the British Government to any engagement, 'express or implied.'¹ Nevertheless, this Article 7 of the agreed draft treaty of November 1927 represented a remarkable concession on the British Government's part in the matter of British Empire communications by sea—a matter on which British opinion was as sensitive as Egyptian opinion was in regard to the regulation and distribution of the waters of the Nile. The British Government had, in fact, agreed that, after ten years, the territorial limits within which the British force on Egyptian soil was to be confined should be decided, in the last resort, by the League of Nations; and they had also consented to put on record the possibility that some day the British force might be withdrawn altogether. Sarwat Pasha was not without justification in claiming that on this crucial question, on which the conversations between Zaghāl Pasha and Mr. MacDonald had broken down in 1924,² and on which his own conversations with Sir Austen Chamberlain had almost broken down before the draft was eventually agreed, he had obtained more favourable terms for Egypt than Zaghāl Pasha himself had obtained in his conversations with Lord Milner in 1920.³

In the draft British note regarding the utilization of the Nile Waters, the controversial question whether the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works was to retain its former superior executive powers over the regulation and distribution of Nile Waters in Sudanese as well as in Egyptian territory was disposed of by omission, like the political question of the Sudan régime. In compensation to the Egyptians, explicit recognition was given to the principles which they had at heart and which were, in fact, the fundamental interests which they were seeking to secure when they demanded that the former powers of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works should be preserved undiminished. In the draft note, it was accepted that 'the combined flow of the White and Blue Niles and their tributaries must be considered as a single unit'; it was recognized that Egypt had 'a prior right to the maintenance of her present supplies of water for the areas' then 'under cultivation, and to an equitable proportion of

¹ This explicit agreed interpretation was put on record in a despatch of the 24th November, 1927, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, in which the agreed draft treaty was enclosed (text of this despatch in *Omd.* 3050 of 1928).

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 208-9.

³ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xvi.

any additional supplies which engineering works' might 'render available in the future'; and it was agreed that since Egypt, 'as a result of her physical configuration, must rely to a greater extent than the Sudan on irrigation works, . . . she must exercise a preponderating influence on the general development of works designed to store the waters of the Nile.' The principles thus explicitly set forth, which represented the fundamental Egyptian desiderata in this matter of vital import to Egypt, had already governed the Expert Commission's Report of the 21st March, 1926, which the British as well as the Egyptian Government had accepted as the basis for a settlement. In the draft note, the acceptance of the Report was endorsed, and in two annexes draft technical agreements were attached in order to establish respectively the practical measures which were to be taken immediately and the principles which were to govern possible future developments.

The specific matter dealt with in the draft note regarding Capitulations in Egypt was the question of extending the existing jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals over the fields in which jurisdiction was still exercised, in Egypt, by foreign consular courts. Draft laws for effecting this change had been prepared as far back as 1920, at the time of the Milner-Zaghlül conversations of that year;¹ the question had been raised again by the Egyptian Government, *auprès* the British Government, early in 1927; and Sarwat Pasha, in his interview with Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 29th July, 1927, had pressed for a settlement of this question as between Great Britain and Egypt, as a preliminary to negotiations with the other Powers concerned.² In consequence, the question had been taken up before Sarwat Pasha's return to Egypt in September,³ and the draft note of November embodied the result.

It remains to record the fate of these drafts which were the monument of so much labour, ingenuity and goodwill.

The texts of the draft treaty and of the draft note regarding Capitulations in Egypt were enclosed respectively in two separate despatches, both dated the 24th November, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to the British High Commissioner in Egypt.⁴ The despatch enclosing the draft treaty was to be communicated by Lord Lloyd to Sarwat Pasha, and this was done at Cairo on the 3rd December.⁵ In this

¹ For the Milner-Zaghlül conversations see the *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, Part IV, section 10. ² Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xiii.

³ Sarwat Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

⁴ Texts of both despatches in *Cmd. 3050 of 1928*.

⁵ Statement in a despatch dated the 5th February, 1928, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd (text in *Cmd. 3050 of 1928*).

despatch the British High Commissioner was informed that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, after communication with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and India, accepted the draft treaty,¹ and that he was authorized to sign the treaty on behalf of His Britannic Majesty as soon as Sarwat Pasha was in a position to sign for the Egyptian Government.

In the second despatch of the 24th November, 1927, from the Foreign Office to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, enclosing the draft note regarding Capitulations in Egypt, Sir Austen Chamberlain declared his expectation that he would be able to adopt both this note and that regarding the utilization of the Nile Waters (which had been communicated to the British Residency at Cairo previously under cover of a despatch of the 9th November)² 'as part of the settlement which the coming into force of the treaty of alliance' would 'bring about'. 'Both notes,' he added, 'are conditional upon the conclusion of the treaty, and I propose that they should be exchanged with the corresponding notes from the Egyptian Government on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.'

On the 3rd December, 1927, when the despatch enclosing the draft treaty was communicated to Sarwat Pasha by Lord Lloyd, the position was as follows. First, the process of drafting the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty had been definitively completed—at any rate in the view of Sir Austen Chamberlain, as expressed in the despatch itself:

In its present form the draft treaty must be regarded as expressing on the one side and the other the limit to which each party can advance in his wish to meet the other. It was so understood between us, and it was on this condition only that Sarwat Pasha no less than I could go thus far. It was common ground to us both that no further changes could be made and that the treaty must now be accepted or rejected as it stands.

On the British side, the text of the draft, as it then stood, had been accepted not only by the Foreign Secretary but by his colleagues in His Majesty's Government in Great Britain—who, by accepting certain points in the draft which Sir Austen Chamberlain had referred to them, had 'shown their earnest desire to make the treaty such as Sarwat Pasha could recommend confidently and without reserve to the Egyptian Government and nation.'³ On the British side, the text had also been accepted by the Governments of the Dominions and

¹ For the correspondence on this matter between His Britannic Majesty's respective Governments in Great Britain and in the Dominions, see pp. 279–83 below.

² Text of this despatch in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

³ Sir Austen Chamberlain's first despatch of the 24th November, 1927.

India.¹ Accordingly, on the British side, there was no obstacle to immediate signature. On the Egyptian side, however, Sarwat Pasha had still to secure the acceptance of the treaty by his colleagues before signature was possible; and, even if the signature of the treaty were achieved, both Governments would have to secure the acceptance of it by the respective parliaments, since it had been 'understood' between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha 'that on each side ratification would be subject to parliamentary approval'.² This was easy for the British Government, which commanded a majority in the House of Commons, but difficult for Sarwat Pasha, whose position *vis-à-vis* the Chamber was dependent on his securing the support of the leader of the majority, Mustafā Pasha Nahhās. Meanwhile, the text had not been communicated by Sarwat Pasha to his colleagues, and no official public statement of the scope of the proposed treaty—or even of the fact that a treaty had been drafted—had been made in either country.³ Indeed, on the 20th July, 1927, Sir Austen Chamberlain had stated in reply to a parliamentary question in the House of Commons at Westminster that, while he had taken advantage of Sarwat Pasha's presence in Great Britain to discuss Anglo-Egyptian relations with him, it was not the intention of either of them to conclude any new agreement during that visit. Again, on the 17th November, in reply to another parliamentary question from the same member regarding the outcome of the second series of conversations which had just taken place that month, he had simply stated that 'no decisions were taken or sought'. When, however, some days after the text of the draft treaty had been communicated to Sarwat Pasha by Lord Lloyd on the 3rd December, yet another parliamentary question was put down in the House of Commons at Westminster for the 12th December, Sir Austen Chamberlain conveyed to Sarwat Pasha, on the 7th December,⁴ the suggestion that the treaty should be signed in the course of the follow-

¹ For the constitutional import of this acceptance see pp. 279–83 below.

² Sir Austen Chamberlain's first despatch of the 24th November, 1927.

³ On the 9th November, 1927, at the Guildhall, Mr. Baldwin, in his review of foreign relations, merely said that His Majesty's Government had availed themselves of Sarwat Pasha's two visits to London 'to discuss fully with His Excellency the relations of our two countries. Both have reason to be satisfied with the course of those conversations. We hope they have laid the foundations on which we may presently build a firm structure of Anglo-Egyptian friendship, so as to ensure to this country and the British Empire the defence of their essential interests and to discharge all their international obligations, and to Egypt her freedom and independence and proper position in the comity of nations'.

⁴ In a telegram of that date to Lord Lloyd (Text in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 10).

ing week and published simultaneously in Great Britain and in Egypt on about the 20th December, that is, just before the British parliamentary recess.¹

The Egyptian parliamentary session had opened on the 17th November, and at the first sitting Nahhās Pasha, the new leader of the *Wafd*, had been elected President of the Chamber. In the speech from the throne, which Sarwat Pasha read on this occasion, he referred to his conversations with Sir Austen Chamberlain and intimated that an Anglo-Egyptian alliance was the goal in view. Between that date, however, and the receipt of Sir Austen Chamberlain's message of the 7th December, Sarwat Pasha—having re-entered the atmosphere of Egyptian politics—appears to have discovered that, in all good faith, he had placed himself in a false position. In inducing Sir Austen Chamberlain to advance so far towards his point of view as to have made it possible to produce a draft treaty which he personally could accept, he himself had been led so far towards Sir Austen Chamberlain's point of view that he had passed the line beyond which he could hope to induce his countrymen to follow him.

In this situation, Sarwat Pasha evidently found the British Government's message of the 7th December embarrassing; and his best course would probably have been to inform Sir Austen Chamberlain at once that he had made a miscalculation and that his expectation of securing acceptance in Egypt for the draft treaty as agreed between Sir Austen and himself was no longer tenable. Instead, he informed Lord Lloyd that he felt unable to lay the documents before his colleagues until he had discussed certain issues which (he submitted) had not been cleared up in London; and, at the end of a consequent exchange of views, his new queries crystallized into a request, which he made on the 31st December, for written assurances regarding the interpretation of the text of the draft treaty in Articles 2, 4, 6, 8, and Annex II (c). He also suggested two interpretations, on his own part, of Annex II (c) and Annex I (a). At the same time, in connexion with the two draft notes, he raised certain points relating to the allocation of the Nile Waters and asked for written assurances on certain points relating to the reform of the Capitulations.² The

¹ For the history of events from the 3rd December, 1927, onwards see two despatches, dated respectively the 5th February and the 1st March, 1928, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928, as well as Sarwat Pasha's *Exposé Liminaire*, Part VI (pp. xvii-xviii). Sarwat Pasha's narrative is much briefer than Sir Austen Chamberlain's. On the other hand, it is supplemented in the Green Book by the texts of the correspondence exchanged between London and Cairo during this stage—a correspondence of which only the more important documents are quoted in full in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatches.

² It should be noted that in opening this discussion on the two draft notes

British authorities, on their side, were aware that Sarwat Pasha's 'difficulties were very real and that undue haste on' their 'part might not only drive him to take a false step, for which the blame might fall upon His Majesty's Government, but might also be interpreted as excessive anxiety to secure a treaty in' their 'own interests'.¹ They were therefore disposed to assist him—within the limits of the previous understanding that the text of the draft treaty, as it then stood, was definitive—in his difficult task of commending the draft treaty to his colleagues in the Egyptian Government and to the majority in the Egyptian Chamber. When, however, the exchange of views dragged on and was repeatedly extended in scope by Sarwat Pasha, Sir Austen Chamberlain reminded him of his contention, during the original conversations out of which the draft had emerged, that one effect of the treaty ought to be the substitution of a new relation of mutual trust for formal safeguards, and he suggested that the force of this contention ought to be felt both ways.² Nevertheless, in a message³ which was received by Sarwat Pasha on the 10th January, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain gave written assurances on the points on which Sarwat Pasha asked for them; and he also dealt with the two interpretations of Annex I (a) and Annex II (c) which Sarwat Pasha himself had suggested. After a discussion of this message between Lord Lloyd and Sarwat Pasha on the 10th and 11th January, 1928, the outstanding points of difference were reduced to Sarwat Pasha's interpretations of Annex I (a) and Annex II (c) which Sir Austen Chamberlain had not found himself able to accept, but in regard to which he had made certain constructive suggestions. On the first point, which concerned the British personnel to be attached to the Egyptian Army, Sir Austen Chamberlain had suggested the conversion of the existing personnel into a military mission; and on the 1st February the Cabinet at Westminster gave authorization for

Sarwat Pasha was unquestionably acting not only legitimately but reasonably, for he had expressly reserved his acceptance of the note on Nile Waters and had not signified acceptance of the note on Capitulations, whereas he had expressly agreed the text of the draft treaty, article by article, except for the one small point outstanding which has been mentioned. Thus his action in opening a discussion on the two notes was not on all fours with his action in reopening the discussion on the treaty.

¹ Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928, to Lord Lloyd, referring to Lord Lloyd's own observations to the Secretary of State in reporting Sarwat Pasha's attitude.

² Text of this message, which was received by Sarwat Pasha on the 28th December, 1927, in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 11.

³ Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 12.

an attempt to arrange this by negotiating an agreement to be embodied in a separate exchange of notes. Thus the new differences of view which had been brought out since the 7th December were in turn reduced, to all appearance, to a single issue, namely Annex II (c), which concerned the British personnel in the Egyptian public security and police services. On this issue the British Government sought to meet Sarwat Pasha by offering him, in lieu of the first version of their written assurance on this clause, an alternative formula¹ according to which the question of the number, status and functions of the British officials in the Egyptian public security and police services should be referred in the last resort to the Council of the League of Nations, 'in default of the conclusion, within five years of the coming into force of the treaty, of agreements with the Powers concerned for the reform of the capitulatory system as contemplated in Annex II (c), and in default of agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government for the modification of the provisions of that clause'. This message was conveyed to Sarwat Pasha on the 6th February, together with a personal message² from Sir Austen Chamberlain, in which the British Secretary of State impressed upon the Egyptian Prime Minister 'that so far as His Majesty's Government' were 'concerned, the last word' had 'now been said'; that they could not 'contemplate further discussion'; that, if Egypt now refused this settlement, the British Government would 'be obliged to insist upon a strict observance of the rights which they' had 'reserved to themselves by' the Declaration of February 1922; and that, with the re-assembly of the Parliament at Westminster, the Secretary of State could not, consistently with his obligations, avoid giving a full account of their negotiations, which would necessitate the publication of the whole correspondence in the near future. Sir Austen Chamberlain therefore urged Sarwat Pasha to place the treaty before his colleagues without delay and to proceed at the earliest possible moment to its signature. In reply, Sarwat Pasha declared to Lord Lloyd, in the course of the interview on the 6th February, 1928, in which the messages were conveyed, 'that the last word of His Majesty's Government would not satisfy Egyptian public opinion and that he could, in consequence, see no prospect of the treaty's acceptance either by his colleagues or Parliament. The discussions in London showed that the whole difficulty lay in the maintenance of

¹ Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 14.

² Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 17.

the British Army on Egyptian soil. Egypt could only be convinced of the necessity for this if it could be shown that the advantages of the treaty were such as to outweigh this disadvantage.¹ By this test, he condemned, as still unsatisfactory, the British Government's alternative formula for the assurance regarding Annex II (c); while, as regarded the military mission, he 'said that he was quite prepared to make proposals for its establishment, but that he would never persuade his colleagues to sign the treaty before the matter was settled'.² He declared himself willing to lay the treaty before his colleagues as it stood, if Lord Lloyd insisted, but he protested that 'this would mean failure'.³

By this time Sarwat Pasha was being pressed to communicate to his colleagues the text of the draft treaty and the result of the exchanges of views since his return to Cairo not only by the British Government but by his colleagues themselves; and he was under perhaps greater pressure from Nabhās Pasha—the newly elected leader of the party to which a majority of his colleagues owed allegiance and by which a majority of votes in the Chamber was commanded. Under this attack on two fronts, his resistance broke down. He first communicated the whole *dossier* of the negotiations to Nabhās Pasha on the 8th February;⁴ and, between that date and the 25th, he also communicated it to his own colleagues in the Cabinet and discussed the proposed terms of settlement with some of them and with Nabhās Pasha likewise.⁵ In the meantime, he did not cease to carry on his negotiations with the British Government. On the 18th February, for instance, he presented a reply⁶ to the two messages which he had received from Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 10th January and the 6th February respectively; on the 21st he presented two notes⁷ dealing further with the questions of British personnel to be attached to the Egyptian Army and to the Egyptian public security and police services; and on the 25th he received, through Lord Lloyd, a further personal message from Sir Austen Chamberlain.⁸ From the moment, however, when he communicated the *dossier* to Nabhās Pasha on the

¹ Sarwat Pasha's observations as reported in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 5th February, 1928.

² Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928. ³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928.

⁵ Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928; Sarwat Pasha's *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xviii.

⁶ Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 18.

⁷ Texts in the Egyptian Green Book, Documents Nos. 19 and 20.

⁸ Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928, and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 21.

8th February, Sarwat Pasha had really ceased to be the protagonist on the Egyptian side ; and his actions after that date would not appear to have had any influence on the further course of events. As soon as Sir Austen Chamberlain was informed that the *dossier* had been placed in Nahhās Pasha's hands, he began to communicate with Nahhās Pasha direct;¹ and this step corresponded with the realities of the situation in Egypt; since, from the 8th March onwards, Sarwat Pasha's role was reduced to the position of passively awaiting the decision of the *Wafd* under Nahhās Pasha's leadership, with the foreknowledge that this would determine the decision of his own Cabinet, in which the *Wafd* commanded a majority as well as in the Chamber. The dealings between the British Government and Nahhās Pasha, which now began, are recorded below ; but it seems convenient, before passing to this subject, to conclude the history of Sarwat Pasha's draft treaty, with which Sarwat Pasha's own political fortunes were bound up.

From the message to Sir Austen Chamberlain which Sarwat Pasha presented on the 18th February, 1928, he would appear, on that date, still to have taken the view that his success or failure in commending the draft treaty to Nahhās Pasha and to his own colleagues in the Cabinet would turn on the two points relating to Annexes I (a) and II (c) which still remained at issue ; and that if the treaty fell through, the responsibility would therefore lie with the British Government, in as much as they had pressed him to communicate the text to his colleagues before the exchange of views on these points had been concluded. The sequel showed, however, that the opposition to the treaty went much deeper ; that in fact, as Sarwat Pasha himself had declared to Lord Lloyd on the 6th February, the whole difficulty lay in the maintenance of the British Army on Egyptian soil ; and that Sarwat Pasha had deceived himself in supposing that he could secure from the British Government any interpretation of the treaty which would be such as to outweigh this disadvantage in the judgement of those Egyptians on whose action the fate of the treaty depended. When Nahhās Pasha communicated to Sarwat Pasha his opinion on the draft, 'he declared that, "by reason both of its basic principles and of its actual provisions", it "was incompatible with the independence and the sovereignty of Egypt", and that, moreover, "it legalized the occupation of the country by British forces." Consequently he held that it was useless to enter into a discussion which might have resulted in explaining or clearing up the draft or which might even

¹ See the first paragraph of Sir Austen Chamberlain's second despatch of the 1st March, 1928, to Lord Lloyd in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

conceivably have opened the way for an attempt to ameliorate it with a view to rendering it acceptable.¹ Again, in an interview with Lord Lloyd on the 26th February, 1928, Nahhās Pasha 'stated that he felt it useless to discuss what advantages might or might not be afforded to Egypt in various clauses of the treaty, in as much as the treaty clearly failed to provide for the complete evacuation of Egypt by the British Army,' and 'on the question of the British Army in Egypt he was entirely uncompromising and repeated himself on this point again and again.'² The attitude of the leader of the *Wafd* was reflected in that of the Cabinet, (though not all the Ministers were *Wafd* members), and the Cabinet insisted³ that the British Government should be informed of their view. Accordingly, on the 1st March, Sarwat Pasha informed Lord Lloyd that his Government were unable to sign the treaty;⁴ and on the 4th he handed to him the written text of their decision. In this document⁵ the grounds for the rejection of the treaty were stated in the very words which Nahhās Pasha had used to Sarwat Pasha some days before,⁶ as follows:

My colleagues have reached the conclusion that draft, by reason both of its basic principles and of its actual provisions, is incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt and, moreover, that it legalises occupation of the country by British forces. My colleagues have accordingly charged me to inform His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they cannot accept this draft.

That afternoon, Sarwat Pasha had resigned office.⁷ On the 22nd September, 1928, he died.⁸ He had been the victim of a vain attempt to serve his country by entering upon a great transaction in circumstances that did not allow him to succeed. His failure, which was a personal tragedy for him, was also a grave misfortune both for Egypt and for Great Britain.

¹ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xviii. It is not clear whether this exchange of views between Sarwat Pasha and Nahhās Pasha was identical with that reported by Sarwat Pasha to Lord Lloyd on the 25th February. According to this report, as reproduced in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 1st March, 1928, Nahhās Pasha, in conversation with Sarwat Pasha, 'had objected to the right of the British Army to remain in Egypt being recognized, but otherwise had been non-committal, arguing that he must first discuss the treaty at a party meeting which had been summoned for the following day.'

² Sir Austen Chamberlain's second despatch to Lord Lloyd of the 1st March, 1928, quoting Lord Lloyd's report to him.

³ Sarwat Pasha, *Exposé Liminaire*, p. xviii.

⁴ Lord Lloyd's telegram of the 1st March, 1928, in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

⁵ Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928 and in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 22.

⁶ See p. 263 above.

⁷ Lord Lloyd's telegram of the 4th March, 1928, in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

⁸ He died in Paris. For an account of his career see the obituary notice in *The Times*, 24th September, 1928.

In a reply, dated the 5th March, 1928,¹ to the message which he had received from Sir Austen Chamberlain on the 25th February, Sarwat Pasha again suggested that the cause of the failure was the fact that he had been compelled to communicate the text of the draft treaty to his colleagues in the Cabinet and to Nahhās Pasha before he had settled with the British Government the interpretation of certain points in the Annex relating to British personnel in the Egyptian Army and the Egyptian Police. He further suggested the deeper reason that, in the course of negotiations, the procedure had been changed. The original idea, he submitted, in both his own and Sir Austen Chamberlain's mind, had been that the conversations in London should not be pursued further than the establishment of an agreement in principle, and that such agreement should be endorsed by the leader of the *Wafd*, as well as by Sarwat Pasha himself, before the real negotiations—which were to take place in Egypt—were started. An examination of the British as well as the Egyptian record of Sarwat Pasha's transactions with the British Government, down to his final return to Egypt in November 1927, indicates that Sarwat Pasha's statement on this point was correct to the extent that the embodiment of a provisional agreement in the texts of draft diplomatic instruments was something more than either party had originally expected or intended to accomplish at this stage.² It also appears³ that, after the conversations had developed into negotiations over texts, the British Foreign Secretary, in order to secure the consent of his own colleagues to certain concessions to the Egyptian point of view which were contained in the text of the draft treaty as agreed between him and Sarwat Pasha, found himself obliged to inform Sarwat Pasha that the limit of British concessions had been reached and to insist that this text in its existing form must be regarded as definitive, before any opportunity to consider it had been given to those Egyptian statesmen with whom the ultimate decision on the Egyptian side would rest. On the other hand, the change from exploratory conversations to negotiations over texts, which undoubtedly occurred between the 13th and the 18th July, 1927, and of which Sarwat Pasha complained on the 5th March, seems actually to have been made on Sarwat Pasha's own initiative.⁴ And it also appears that, after this change of procedure had resulted in the almost

¹ Text in the Egyptian Green Book, Document No. 23.

² For the 'speeding-up' of the transactions between the 13th and the 18th July, 1927, see pp. 243-6 above.

³ See the passage in Sir Austen Chamberlain's first despatch of the 24th November, 1927, which is quoted on p. 257 above.

⁴ See the examination of this disputed point on pp. 244-6 above.

complete agreement of the text of a draft treaty, Sarwat Pasha had explicitly acquiesced in Sir Austen Chamberlain's condition that this text must be taken or left as it stood.

There remains the prior question whether Sarwat Pasha, being the representative of only a minority in the Egyptian Cabinet and the Egyptian Chamber, was well advised to initiate the negotiations at all; and whether the British Government, on their part, were well advised to enter into negotiations with an Egyptian Prime Minister who could not command a majority. On this point, both Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain might have replied that they were so convinced of the need for arriving promptly at a definitive settlement in the interest of both countries, that they felt themselves justified in making the venture, even when it had to be made on such uncertain ground.¹ In that case, the failure would be traceable in the last resort to the anomalous position in the internal politics of Egypt since the assassination of Sir Lee Stack—a position in which the leader of the majority in the Chamber was unable to serve as Prime Minister—and for this position the British Government were responsible in as much as, since the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, they had interfered in the internal politics of Egypt to the extent of placing a veto upon Zaghlūl's return to office. Even, however, if Zaghlūl Pasha had been in office in the summer of 1927, and if negotiations with the British Government had been opened by him at the time and carried on by his successor Nahhās Pasha, it does not seem probable that a definitive settlement would have been attained. On the contrary it seems far more likely that such negotiations would have broken down at once over the question of the British military occupation, as the Zaghlūl-MacDonald conversations had done in 1924² and as the Sarwat-Chamberlain negotiations actually did as soon as the draft treaty resulting from them was communicated to Nahhās Pasha. More than that, it seems likely that negotiations would have broken down over this crucial question sooner or later whatever Government had been in office in Egypt; and that Nahhās Pasha, in taking the stand which he took in this matter when it eventually came before him, was speaking not only for the *Wafd* but for the majority of politically conscious Egyptians of all parties.

¹ In the course of a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 10th May, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain argued very forcibly that, when once Sarwat Pasha had presented him with the draft of a treaty, he had really no choice except to go forward and attempt to arrive at an agreed draft. (On the question how the idea of preparing a draft forthwith arose between the 13th and 18th July, 1928, see pp. 243-6 above).

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 208-9.

The British military occupation of Egypt seems, in fact, to have been the ultimate stumbling-block in 1927-8 as in 1924; but this occupation, again, was merely the most conspicuous symbol of the fact that Anglo-Egyptian relations rested on a basis of force; and this was a part of a vicious circle which had hitherto defied all efforts to break it. On both sides it was recognized as the objective of diplomacy that the relations between the two countries should be lifted from this basis of force and placed on a new basis of mutual consent founded on a common recognition of mutual advantage. This change of basis, however, could only be effected by the creation of a new atmosphere of mutual confidence and goodwill; and this new atmosphere was stifled by the old atmosphere of mutual suspicion which the existing basis of force continued to engender.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the negotiations had been the persistence with which this atmosphere of suspicion reasserted itself. On the British side it had manifested itself first, on the eve of the negotiations, in the drastic steps taken during May 1927 on the strength of an unofficial document of Egyptian authorship in which changes were suggested in the control and organization of the Egyptian Army;¹ and then again, during the first stage of the negotiations themselves, in an anxiety to safeguard British interests and responsibilities in Egypt as far as possible by formal stipulations in the text of the draft treaty and to rely as little as possible on the psychological effect which the treaty might have in the way of evoking Egyptian goodwill. It may be noted that the signal successes which Great Britain had achieved in arriving at definitive settlements, on a voluntary basis of mutual consent, first with the Dutch in South Africa and then with the Catholics in Southern Ireland, had been achieved by taking the very risk which His Majesty's Government in Great Britain hesitated to take, with regard to Egypt, both in 1924 and in 1927-8. The essence of the grant of 'Dominion Status' had been that Great Britain had deliberately surrendered her existing 'material guarantees' in South Africa and Southern Ireland—guarantees consisting, there also, in military force—in exchange for 'psychological guarantees' which *ex hypothesi* did not yet exist, since nothing but the surrender of the 'material guarantees' could call them into being. There was a striking contrast between this spirit in which British statesmen had dealt so successfully with the South African and the Irish problems and the spirit of suspicion which continued to be prevalent in British dealings with the Egyptians—for example, in the transactions of 1927. On the Egyptian side, precisely the same

¹ See pp. 239-42 above.

atmosphere prevailed during the second stage of the negotiations, when Sarwat Pasha, in his turn, felt himself unable to recommend to his countrymen, with any hope of success, a draft treaty which left any detail of Egyptian interests dependent on British goodwill. At this stage, it was Sarwat Pasha who sought the safeguard of the written bond—not, indeed, by introducing new stipulations into the text of the draft treaty, which Sir Austen Chamberlain had vetoed in advance, but by obtaining the British Government's endorsement of written interpretations. Thereupon, Sir Austen Chamberlain justly pointed out¹ that Sarwat Pasha was showing at Cairo the very spirit of suspicion which he had complained of in the British Government when he had been in London. To a certain extent, no doubt, misgivings were inevitable in the mind of a representative of a small country when he was negotiating with the Government of a Great Power a treaty which would virtually determine his own country's destiny if once it were concluded. It may be noted, for instance, that the two Italo-Albanian treaties of the 27th November, 1926, and the 22nd November, 1927, which were successfully signed and ratified, were supplemented by unilateral declarations, interpreting certain points, which the Italian Government made public at the Albanian Government's request.² At the same time it is probable that, in the Egyptian mind, misgivings which would have obtruded themselves in any case were strengthened by the contagion of the corresponding misgivings which existed on the British side. Here, again, there was a vicious circle of suspicion breeding suspicion which the joint efforts of British and Egyptian diplomacy failed to break.

As soon as it was evident that Sarwat Pasha's draft treaty was doomed to be rejected by the *Wafd*, the atmosphere of suspicion reasserted itself on the British side. In the spring of 1928, as in the spring of the preceding year, this was evoked by certain suggestions and proposals for legislation by the Egyptian Parliament—the subject, this time, being not the Egyptian Army but the provisions in Egypt for the maintenance of public security. In 1928, once again, the proposals were quashed by a repetition of the drastic steps which had been taken the year before.

As early as the 2nd January, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain instructed Lord Lloyd to warn Sarwat Pasha confidentially that the British Government regarded 'the *Wafd's* reckless legislative programme with grave concern';³ and as soon as he was informed that,

¹ See p. 260 above.

² See the *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, Section (ii).

³ Text of the instructions, as quoted by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the course of a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 10th May, 1928.

on the 8th February, 1928, the *dossier* of his negotiations with Sarwat Pasha had been communicated by the latter to Nahhās Pasha, he 'thought it essential that Nahhās Pasha should be left under no illusion as to the serious nature of the decision which Egypt was called upon to make and which he, as leader of the numerically strongest group in the present Egyptian Parliament, would largely influence'.¹ He accordingly authorized Lord Lloyd 'to inform His Excellency that in the event of a rejection of the treaty His Majesty's Government would have to consider how the enactment of certain projected legislation in the Egyptian Parliament would accord with their responsibilities under the Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, and to add that the wording of recent manifestos by students, and the reported association with them of undesirable characters, raised the question of the obligations imposed on His Majesty's Government by that instrument for the protection of foreigners'.² Thereafter, when he was informed that Nahhās Pasha, in his interview with Lord Lloyd on the 26th February, had shown himself intransigent as far as the draft treaty was concerned,³ Sir Austen Chamberlain instructed Lord Lloyd—'unless . . . the final decision of the Egyptian Government differed widely from the attitude adopted by the leader of the *Wafd*'—to address an official note to the Egyptian Government in the following terms:

His Majesty's Government have for some time past viewed with misgiving certain legislative proposals introduced in the Egyptian Parliament which, if they were to become law, would be likely seriously to weaken the hands of the administrative authorities responsible for the maintenance of order and for the protection of life and property in Egypt.

So long as there was any prospect of the early conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Egypt which would define anew the responsibilities and rights of the two parties, His Majesty's Government were content to refrain from all comment in the expectation that they might rely with confidence on the Egyptian Government to avoid legislation which might make it impossible for the Egyptian Administration to discharge successfully the increased responsibilities inherent in the treaty régime.

But now that conversations with the Egyptian Government have failed to achieve their object, His Majesty's Government cannot permit the discharge of any of their responsibilities under the Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, to be endangered whether by Egyptian legislation of the nature indicated above, or by administrative action, and they reserve the right to take such steps as in their view the situation may demand.⁴

¹ Sir Austen Chamberlain's second despatch of the 1st March, 1928, to Lord Lloyd, printed in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928. ² *Op. cit.* ³ See p. 264 above.

⁴ Text in Sir Austen Chamberlain's second despatch of the 1st March, 1928, to Lord Lloyd.

This note was duly handed by Lord Lloyd to Sarwat Pasha on the 4th March,¹ and was considered by his Cabinet on the 6th March, 1928; but, in view of the fact that Sarwat Pasha had resigned office on the 4th before receiving the note from Lord Lloyd, they decided that they could not deal with the matter. It therefore remained in suspense until after the formation of a new ministry on the 16th March. This ministry was a coalition, like its two predecessors—seven portfolios being assigned this time to members of the *Wafd*, two to Liberals, and one to an Independent.² This time, however, the ministry was formed and the post of Prime Minister taken by the leader of the majority, that is, by Nahhās Pasha;³ and it therefore fell to Nahhās Pasha to deal, on the Egyptian side, with the new crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations that was then impending.

The occasion of this crisis was a bill regarding public meetings and demonstrations which, in compliance with a decision taken by the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies on the 22nd November, 1927, had been submitted to the Egyptian Parliament in December. This bill was designed to replace the Egyptian Law No. 14 of 1923, and it was the difference between the bill and the existing law which gave ground for the concern expressed in the note presented by the British High Commissioner on the 4th March, 1928. It may be observed that all Egyptian legislation dating from the pre-constitutional era was due to come up, piece by piece, for consideration by the Egyptian Parliament with a view to confirmation, amendment, repeal or replacement, as the case might be, so that the proposal to replace Law No. 13 of 1923 by a new law was not an exceptional measure. It may also be observed that the bill would probably⁴ have become law before the draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty had been rejected by the Egyptian Government, and while the head of that Government was still Sarwat Pasha, but for the accident of a drafter's or printer's error in the text as first submitted to and passed by the Senate—a technical defect which had made it necessary to pass the bill, as a pure formality, through the Senate again, with the result that it was still pending at the moment when the treaty was rejected and Sarwat

¹ Lord Lloyd's telegram of the 4th March, 1928, printed in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

² For the composition of the new ministry see *The Times*, 17th March, 1928.

³ It is to be presumed that the veto which the British Government had imposed, since the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, upon the formation of a ministry by Zaghfīl Pasha had been regarded as applying to him personally and not *ex officio* and as therefore not applicable *a priori* to his successor in the leadership of the *Wafd*.

⁴ The uncertain factor was the date on which the bill, after unimpeded passage through the Chamber and the Senate, would have received the Royal Assent.

Pasha fell. As this accident could not have been foreseen by the British Government, it is difficult to understand how they could have expected (as stated in the note presented after the rejection of the treaty) that the passage of the bill into law would be avoided by Sarwat Pasha's Administration. If, however, before the rejection of the treaty, the British Government were content to allow the bill to take its chance, it must have been not so much a change of expectation regarding the prospects of the bill as a change of attitude towards the Egyptian Government owing, to the rejection of the treaty and the fall of the Egyptian statesmen who had sponsored treaty and bill alike, that led to the new departure in British policy announced on the 4th March.

On the 30th March, a reply¹ to the British note of the 4th was presented to Lord Lloyd by Nahhās Pasha, to the effect that the note did not correspond with the Egyptian Government's 'frank willingness to develop and fortify the bonds of friendship which should govern the relations between Great Britain and Egypt'; that it was 'an evident departure from the rules admitted in matters of diplomatic intervention'; and that the Egyptian Government could not 'admit the principle of an intervention which would be tantamount to its veritable abdication'. To this reply Sir Austen Chamberlain rejoined, in a message transmitted on the 4th April,² by declaring that the British Government could not accept the reply 'as a correct exposition of the relations existing between Great Britain and Egypt or of their respective obligations'. He then set forth the British Government's view of the situation created by the British Declaration of February 1922; and declared that, the Egyptian Government having refused the draft treaty which he had negotiated with Sarwat Pasha, the *status quo ante* continued.

The position to-day is therefore the same as when the Ramsay MacDonald-Zaghālū negotiations broke down, except in so far as it has been modified by the Notes exchanged in November 1924. The reserved points remain reserved to the absolute discretion of His Majesty's Government, the Egyptian Government exercising its independent authority subject to satisfying His Majesty's Government on these matters.

In reply to this rejoinder, Nahhās Pasha made a statement³ in the Egyptian Chamber in which he announced that the Egyptian Government held to their point of view.

On the 7th April, the text of the bill was transmitted to Sir Austen

¹ Text in *The Times*, 5th April, 1928.

² Text in *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

³ Text in *The Times*, 7th April, 1928.

Chamberlain by Lord Lloyd.¹ (It has been explained above that by this time the bill, having been passed by the Chamber and approved without any substantial modification by the Senate, would probably have been law already, but for a drafter's or printer's error on account of which it was awaiting the purely technical formality of re-passage through the Senate with the error removed.) In his covering despatch, Lord Lloyd submitted that the bill was 'obviously aimed at weakening the Executive and at facilitating political agitation and demonstrations in the frequently recurring periods of tension between Great Britain and Nationalist Egypt'; and after comparing the text of the bill with that of the existing law, Sir Austen Chamberlain formed the opinion that certain features of the bill, to which Lord Lloyd had drawn attention,² presented 'a very real threat to foreign lives and property in Egypt when interpreted in the light of the general conditions obtaining there'.³

This allusion may have been prompted by events in Egypt which had occurred as recently as the 7th and 8th March, when the news of the rejection of the treaty had been followed by demonstrations of schoolboys at Asiyūt, Cairo and Tantah. At Asiyūt the boys of an Egyptian school attacked an American school, because their fellows there would not join them in coming out on strike; at Cairo, they made disturbances in the centre of the city and also demonstrated at the Baytu'l-Ummah—the late Zagh'lūl Pasha's house, which had become the headquarters of the *Wafd*; at Tantah, they wrecked several shops belonging to Cypriots and other foreigners. At all these places they came into collision with the police, and casualties were inflicted and suffered.⁴ Yet perhaps the most significant thing about this outbreak was its triviality, compared with the violent popular upheavals which had occurred several times between the Armistice of 1918 and the British Declaration of 1922; and it could hardly have been taken seriously as a threat to lives and property except through being interpreted in the light of general conditions which had really ceased to obtain for several years past.⁵ A neutral student of Anglo-Egyptian relations might have noted this as another instance of a

¹ The text of the bill as it stood at this stage is printed in parallel columns with the Egyptian Law No. 14 of 1923, and with indications of the changes contemplated in the bill, in an enclosure to a despatch of the 7th April, 1928, from Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain, which is included in the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928.

² For details, see Lord Lloyd's despatch of the 7th April, 1928.

³ Despatch of the 16th April, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd, printed in *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928.

⁴ For details of these disturbances see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th March, 1928.

⁵ On this point see p. 241 above.

vicious circle, in which the failure of an attempt to arrive at a settlement by mutual agreement once again evoked an outbreak (though this time not a formidable one) on the Egyptian side; and this outbreak inclined the British Government, in default of a settlement and under the persistent impression of events in the past, once again to impose their will on the Egyptian Government by a show of force, in a matter in which the powers of the Egyptian police were in question—with the consequence of stimulating hostility in Egypt towards Great Britain and thereby making a settlement by mutual agreement more difficult than ever. In any case, Sir Austen Chamberlain, after perusal of the text of the new bill, informed Lord Lloyd, in a despatch of the 16th April, 1928, that 'His Majesty's Government in Great Britain' found 'their responsibility under the Declaration of February engaged'.

Thereafter, when it had become apparent that the Egyptian Government had resolved to proceed with the bill, the British Government sent instructions to Lord Lloyd under which the latter, at 7 p.m. on the 29th April,¹ delivered a 'final warning' to Nahhās Pasha in the following terms:

I am now instructed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to request your Excellency, as head of the Egyptian Government, immediately to take the necessary steps to prevent the bill regulating public meetings and demonstrations from becoming law. I am instructed to request your Excellency to give me a categorical assurance in writing that the above-mentioned measure will not be proceeded with. Should this assurance not reach me before 7 p.m. on the 2nd May, His Britannic Majesty's Government will consider themselves free to take such action as the situation may seem to them to require.²

This 'final warning' of the 29th April, 1928, like the note of the 30th May, 1927, was supported by a show of force. On the 30th May, 1927, three British warships had sailed from Malta for Egyptian ports. On the 30th April, 1928, five British warships sailed from the same naval base for the same destination.

Meanwhile, on the 27th April, at the eleventh hour, Nahhās Pasha had sought to meet the British Government's desires without amendment of the bill by delivering a speech³—at a reception held in his

¹ The date and hour are given in a statement made on the 30th April, 1928, in the House of Commons at Westminster, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in reply to a private notice question by the Leader of the Opposition.

² The full text of this 'final warning' is quoted in Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement of the 30th April, 1928.

³ The text of the relevant part of this speech will be found in *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928, pp. 17–20.

honour by the Egyptian Bar—in which he interpreted the bill in reassuring terms; and on the 30th April—the day after that on which the British Government's 'final warning' had been delivered to Nabhās Pasha by Lord Lloyd—the Egyptian *chargé d'affaires* in London communicated to the Foreign Office, on instructions from his Government, the relevant portions of the text of this speech; 'pointed out that a declaration in this sense would be made in the Senate if the bill came up for discussion; and maintained that it would be accepted by the courts as the correct interpretation of the new law'.¹ The British Secretary of State, however, was 'advised that such a declaration would only be accepted by the courts if it did not (a) conflict with the law itself, or (b) conflict with previous declarations in Parliament'. He therefore held that 'amendments to the bill in the sense of the declaration would . . . be essential'; and he also considered that, irrespective of the legal force which these interpretations might or might not possess, 'they could have no permanent value, since they would always be liable to be suspended or reversed by similar declarations made by future Governments'.² Accordingly, this communication from the Egyptian *chargé d'affaires* in London did not lead Sir Austen Chamberlain to modify the terms of his 'final warning' which had been conveyed to Nabhās Pasha by Lord Lloyd on the previous evening; and on the afternoon of the 1st May Sir Austen Chamberlain read the text of this 'final warning' in the course of a statement in the House of Commons at Westminster in reply to a private notice question by the Leader of the Opposition. Meanwhile, at Cairo, on the 30th April, in secret sittings of both Houses of Parliament, it was agreed that the bill should be withdrawn for the current session; and at 10 p.m. on the 1st May a reply to the British Government's 'final warning' was received from Nabhās Pasha by Lord Lloyd.³ The crucial paragraphs were the following:

Faced with duty that is incumbent upon them of upholding the rights of country and of respecting its Constitution Egyptian Government cannot recognise Great Britain's right implied in note of the 29th April and based upon Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, to intervene in Egyptian legislation. . . .

In conformity with their ardent desire to reach an understanding and conciliatory sentiments which have never ceased to animate them, the Egyptian Government, within limits of their constitutional right,

¹ Despatch of the 30th April, 1928, from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd, printed in *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928.

² The foregoing quotations are all taken from Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch of the 30th April, 1928.

³ Text of Nabhās Pasha's note of the 1st May, 1928, in *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928, pp. 22-3.

yesterday requested Senate, who agreed, to postpone examination of Bill in question until next session. They hope that this step will be appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

On the 2nd May, the British Government telegraphed to Lord Lloyd for transmission to the Egyptian Government, a rejoinder¹ to this reply in which they declared themselves 'entitled to assume that the Egyptian Government' would 'be careful to avoid any revival of the controversy which' had 'led to the present crisis'; reiterated their objections to the bill; informed the Egyptian Government that 'if . . . the measure in question were to be revived or if other measures were introduced which in their view presented similarly dangerous features', they 'would again be obliged to intervene, as in the present instance, to prevent their enactment'; and laid it down that 'His Majesty's Government can enter into no discussion respecting the Declaration of February 1922'.

At the same time, the British warships *en route* for Alexandria were instructed to take a new course.

The postponement of the examination of the Public Meetings and Demonstrations Bill by the Egyptian Senate was accompanied by the postponement of two other projects of legislation, one (which had never reached the stage of being introduced as a bill into the Chamber) for altering the status of village headmen and elders, and the other a bill to replace the existing law on the carrying of firearms.² The existing law on the latter subject had been passed in 1917; and dating, as it did, from the pre-constitutional era, it had, in the ordinary course of public business, to be either confirmed or modified by Parliament. It was criticized in Egypt as having been framed in order to suit British military requirements during the General War of 1914-18; but, if it was excessively severe, the new bill—which had been drafted, in a mood of reaction against it, in 1924—tended to err in the other direction, and it had therefore been 'pigeon-holed' for four years under successive régimes. As for the other project, it envisaged that village headmen and elders, instead of being appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, should be elected by the villagers possessing the parliamentary franchise; and that the disciplinary powers over the headmen, which had hitherto pertained to the provincial governors, should be vested instead in local committees on which the Bar, the Bench, the Senate and the Chamber, as well as the official hierarchy, should be represented. Critics of these two projects

¹ Text in *Cmd.* 3097 of 1928, p. 24.

² For these projects, see *The Times*, 27th August, 1926, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th May, 1928.

deprecatcd them on the same general ground on which the British Government objected to the bill regarding Public Meetings and Demonstrations, namely, that the effect of their passage would be to weaken the forces of law and order in Egypt to an extent which might endanger the lives and property of foreign residents in the country.

The postponement of these three bills resolved the Anglo-Egyptian crisis of 1928, and during the last seven months of that year there was no further development in Anglo-Egyptian relations worth recording. This chapter cannot be closed, however, without a brief mention of certain subsequent events in the internal history of Egypt which, however they may have stood to Anglo-Egyptian relations immediately precedent to them, were of serious import for Anglo-Egyptian relations in the future, since their effect was to establish in Egypt a dictatorial régime with which it would be even more difficult for the British Government to negotiate a definitive Anglo-Egyptian settlement than it had been under the previous parliamentary régime when the Egyptian Government had been represented by a Prime Minister who did not command a majority.

The first sign of a coming storm in the internal political life of Egypt was the resignation of the two Liberal Ministers in Nabhās Pasha's Coalition Cabinet. One of them, Muhammad Pasha Mahmūd, resigned first on the 3rd May, on the morrow of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis, and then again definitively—after having withdrawn his first resignation at the request of King Fu'ād—on the 17th June. The other, Ga'far (Ja'far) Pasha Wali, resigned on the 19th. It was at first assumed that the coalition thus dissolved would be replaced by an all-*Wafd* ministry, in as much as the *Wafd* commanded a majority in the Chamber and the coalition with the Liberals had been dictated by the exigencies of dealing with Great Britain and not by those of Egyptian party politics. On the 20th, the *Wafd* held a party meeting and passed a vote of confidence in Nabhās Pasha; but on the 24th a new and unexpected situation was created by the publication—in the Liberal and Nationalist Press—of alleged facsimiles of ostensibly compromising documents, bearing the signatures of Nabhās Pasha and two other advocates who were likewise deputies—one of these being the President of the Chamber, Wisā Bey Wāsif (a Copt). As interpreted by opponents of the *Wafd*, the documents convicted the three signatories of having made a contract with a client which was not merely a breach of legal etiquette but which entailed disciplinary measures, and further of having proposed to abuse their political position in order to promote legislation for abolishing the court which had jurisdiction over the case and so causing the case to be transferred

to another court in which their client's prospects of success would be more favourable. The court in question was 'The Court of the Crown', which had jurisdiction over all cases affecting the personal statute of members of the Egyptian Royal Family; the client was the mother of an Egyptian prince who had escaped from a lunatic asylum in Great Britain; and the incident on account of which the prince had been certified insane was a murderous assault which he had made in Cairo, thirty years before, on no other person than King Fu'ād, who had been severely wounded. The suit was for the recovery of control over the prince's estate.¹ It is beyond the province of this survey to examine the question of what the documents proved.² It is perhaps sufficient to state that all the three gentlemen concerned—Mustafā Pasha Nabhās, Wisā Bey Wāsif and Ga'far Bey Fakhri—were acquitted of the charges against them by the disciplinary council of the Egyptian Bar on the 7th February, 1929. This ultimate verdict upon the purport of the documents could not, however, undo the immediate political effects of their publication.

On the day of publication, the 24th June, the rumour was confirmed that there had been two more resignations from the Cabinet—this time on the part of the Independent and of one Minister belonging to the *Wafd* itself. That evening, the Executive Committee of the *Wafd* expelled the Wafdist who had resigned his portfolio from the Party, reaffirmed its confidence in Nabhās Pasha, and decided that the King should be asked to fill the four vacancies and thus enable Nabhās Pasha to remain in office. The King's reply was to dismiss Nabhās Pasha from office next day, the 25th June, 1928. On the same day, the King offered the task of carrying on the government to Muhammad Pasha Mahmūd, who accepted it that evening and duly formed his Cabinet on the 27th. On the 28th Parliament was prorogued by the King for a month at the new Prime Minister's request; and this step was followed up on the 19th July, 1928, by the publication of a Royal Decree dissolving Parliament (both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and suspending the parliamentary régime for three years.

¹ On the history of the affair of Prince Ahmad Sayfu'd-Din see *The Times*, 25th and 26th June, 1928.

² The crucial document seems to have been a letter from Ga'far Bey Fakhri to the Agent (Wakil) of Prince Sayfu'd-Din's mother. On Nabhās Pasha's behalf it was asserted (i) that, granting that Ga'far Pasha had felt and expressed hostility to 'The Court of the Crown', this hostility was neither expressed nor felt by Nabhās Pasha; (ii) that the passage in Ga'far Pasha's letter which was taken to prove intention to promote legislation for abolishing 'The Court of the Crown' could not bear this interpretation in the Turkish original but only in the Arabic translation, which did not properly convey the sense of the original Turkish.

Simultaneously there was issued the text¹ of a note addressed to the King by Mahmūd Pasha, in which the *Wafd* régime was arraigned.

This *coup d'état*, which was admitted by its authors to have been a violation of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923, was carried through without any effective opposition. On the 20th July, a meeting of the *Wafd* at Tantah passed off with little disturbance of the peace; an attempt at a three days' strike of lawyers was abortive; and a meeting of *Wafd* Senators and Deputies on the 28th passed resolutions² denouncing, as unconstitutional, the suspension of the parliamentary régime without attempting to execute their original plan of marching to the Parliament House. It would appear that, in this phase of the struggle between the *Wafd* and the Crown, the *Wafd* found itself unable to arouse popular feeling and mobilize public support as it had done on so many occasions when it had stood for Egyptian national aspirations in the struggle between Egypt and Great Britain. The truth seems to be that the members of the *Wafd* had rendered themselves unpopular, not only among their opponents but among wider circles of their countrymen who otherwise took little interest in politics, by their somewhat high-handed methods of asserting themselves personally during their tenure of power; and this unpopularity brought its nemesis at a moment when they could not appeal for support on patriotic grounds as being effective champions of the Egyptian cause against foreign domination. King Fu'ād saw and took his opportunity, and the successful *coups* of the 25th June and the 19th July, 1928, were the reward of his political acumen. Yet there was no reason to suppose that, in the long struggle between the Egyptian Crown and the Egyptian champions of parliamentarism, who included members of other parties besides the *Wafd*, this vicissitude was to be the last, or that the quiescence which had descended upon Anglo-Egyptian relations after Nakhās Pasha's capitulation at the beginning of May was not to be followed by further crises which might give the *Wafd*, as the champions of Egyptian nationalism, another opportunity to play a *beau rôle*. Thus the superficial tranquillity which reigned in both the home affairs and the foreign relations of Egypt during the second half of the year 1928 was a precarious condition that could not be expected to endure. For the moment, the British Government might congratulate themselves on the fact that there had been one crisis in Egypt in which they had not been implicated. On the 23rd July, 1928, in the House of Commons at Westminster, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated, in answer to parliamentary questions, that,

¹ Printed in *The Times*, 20th July, 1928.

² Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th July, 1928.

although he had had some indication of what was going to happen, he had carefully refrained, and Lord Lloyd had carefully refrained, from expressing any opinion or tendering any advice before the Egyptian Royal Decree of the 19th July, 1928, had been issued. He added that it had been the consistent policy of the British Government to refrain, as far as possible, from interfering in purely Egyptian affairs and to safeguard only those interests which they had to maintain and those obligations which it was their duty to fulfil. In Egypt, on the other hand, there was a widespread feeling that the *coup d'état* would not have been attempted unless its authors had had reason to expect that their action would be countenanced by the British authorities; and there was an equally widespread belief that the unconstitutional régime could not endure if the light of the British Government's countenance were withdrawn from it. While, in the absence of positive evidence, this could only be a matter of opinion, there was no disputing the fact that, nearly seven years after the declaration of February 1922, at least one of the four matters then reserved for future discussion between the British and Egyptian Governments was still a controversial issue; that, in consequence, a comprehensive and definitive settlement by agreement had not yet been reached; and that in the meantime, after a period of parliamentary government, Egypt had reverted to the former autocratic régime. When recent experience had shown how difficult it was for the British Government to negotiate a definitive Anglo-Egyptian settlement with the parliamentary Coalition Government of 'Abdu'l-Khāliq Pasha Sarwat, it was evident, *a fortiori*, that it would be still more difficult to do so with the unconstitutional Government of Muhammad Pasha Mahmūd.

Note on the Attitude of the Canadian Government towards the abortive Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance between His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Egyptian Government in 1927-8.

The abortive negotiations between His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Prime Minister of Egypt, Sarwat Pasha, incidentally raised a question regarding the conduct of British Empire foreign relations.

In the Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference in 1926¹—a report which was unanimously adopted by the Conference²—it had been recommended 'that all treaties . . . should be made in the name of heads of states, and that, if the treaty were signed on behalf of any or all of the Governments of the Empire, the treaty should be made in the name of the King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire'. In view of the fact that the treaty-making power had now been recognised to reside

¹ Text in *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, pp. 106-9.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

separately in His Majesty's Governments in each of the several self-governing states members of the British Commonwealth, it had been added, in this section of the report, that 'in the case of a treaty applying to only one part of the Empire it should be stated to be made by the King on behalf of that part'.

The Foreign Office counter-draft¹ to Sarwat Pasha's original draft for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty was duly drawn in the name of His Britannic Majesty of the one part and His Majesty the King of Egypt of the other;² but it contained no statement that it was to apply to one part of His Britannic Majesty's dominions only; and apparently no such statement was contained in the text of the agreed draft which resulted from the second series of discussions between the Foreign Office and Sarwat Pasha in November.³ 'There was no limitation to the parts of the Empire to which the treaty was to apply. The application of the treaty was not stated to be limited to Great Britain and Northern Ireland.'⁴ Presumably, therefore, if the Canadian Government had expressed concurrence in the draft treaty as it then stood, and if thereafter the treaty had been signed, Canada would have found herself a party to it. The draft text, thus drawn, was received by the Canadian Government on the 11th November, 1927, as an enclosure in a despatch from His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, in which it was announced that the draft treaty was acceptable to that Government and that they were prepared to offer it to Egypt if they received the concurrence of the Governments of the Dominions.⁵ According to a statement made in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 29th March, 1928, by Lord Salisbury, 'it never entered into the heads of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain to ask the Dominion Governments to be parties to the treaty, and what was asked for was 'their concurrence in the general policy embodied in the treaty', which was 'a very different thing'.—'There was no question at any time', he declared in the same statement, 'of asking the Dominions to take part in being responsible for the treaty or the results of the treaty.' With reference to this, Mr. Mackenzie King declared in the House of Commons at Ottawa on the 30th March: 'I accept unreservedly Lord Salisbury's statement . . . that the Government of Great Britain had not any intention of obliging the Dominions to become a party to the treaty, or even of inviting them to do so'; but when a member interjected: 'They made a very delicate suggestion', Mr. Mackenzie King observed: 'I think it is a very delicate suggestion; and I submit that, as presented to us, the documents are not capable of any other interpretation in the light of the rules laid down in the Imperial Conference with respect to the negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties.'

Accordingly, the Government at Ottawa replied, on the 22nd November, to the despatch which they had received from the Government at Westminster on the 11th, by 'stating that they would raise no objection to His Majesty's Government in Great Britain entering into an agreement em-

¹ See the text in *Omd.* 3050 of 1928, pp. 9-14.

² See pp. 246-9 above.

³ See pp. 252-3 above.

⁴ Statement on the 30th March, 1928, in the House of Commons at Ottawa, by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King.

⁵ Statement by Mr. Mackenzie King on the 30th March, 1928.

bodying the substance of the draft treaty, in appropriate form, with the Government of Egypt; however, that they could not contemplate recommending to Parliament that the treaty should be made applicable to Canada, nor could they undertake to participate in its signature and ratification'. The considerations which actuated this reply were set forth by Mr. Mackenzie King in an earlier statement in the House of Commons at Ottawa, made on the 26th March, 1928, as follows: 'The terms of the treaty . . . involved military sanctions, and they contemplated military alliances. What was the reply of the Government to that question? It was that we did not believe that so far as Canada was concerned the Parliament of Canada would approve such a course; that if Britain and Egypt would work out a treaty as between themselves along the lines proposed, well and good: but so far as Canada was concerned, we did not feel that it was in the interests of the British Empire itself or in the interests of the larger peace which it was hoped the treaty would serve, that this country should be asked to become a party to it.'¹ Mr Mackenzie King added, in his statement of the 26th March: 'The British Government immediately accepted our view': and in his statement of the 30th March he recorded that 'On the 2nd December they received a despatch, saying that the British Government had decided to sign the proposed Treaty, in view of the replies received from the various Dominions; that it was being made clear that, as regarded the form, the treaty should be concluded in the manner contemplated in the Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, in case of a treaty made on behalf of one part of the British Empire, that was, that in the Preamble it should be confined to Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and should be signed by a plenipotentiary holding a full power limited correspondingly.'

The effect of the Canadian Government's reply of the 22nd November, 1927, which was sent by cable, is indeed apparent in the despatch addressed on the 24th November by Sir Austen Chamberlain from the Foreign Office to Lord Lloyd at the British Residency in Cairo.² 'I have now the pleasure to inform your Lordship', the Foreign Secretary wrote, 'that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, after communication with His Majesty's

¹ The passage, here referred to, in the Canadian Government's reply of the 22nd November, 1927, ran as follows:

'It is observed in this connection that it is His Majesty's Government in Great Britain which has directed the policy in the past as to its relations with Egypt, which has negotiated the present draft agreement and which is to administer the provisions and annexes set forth in the treaty. We consider that, were an issue to be raised as to the assumption by Canada of military obligations in Europe or the Near East, as would be inevitable were the Canadian Government to recommend entering into a military alliance with Egypt, that it would be prejudicial to the relations between Canada and the other parts of the British Empire as well as to the interests of Canada itself.

'The Canadian Government as a Member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the League of Nations will be prepared if occasion arises in connection with the proposed treaty, as in the case of Locarno and other regional agreements, to consider the policy to be adopted and if need be to be recommended to Parliament in the light of the situation then existing both at home and abroad.'

² See pp. 256-7 above.

Governments in the Dominions and India, accept the draft agreed upon between us, of which a copy is attached to this despatch, and that you are authorised to sign the treaty on behalf of His Majesty as soon as His Excellency is in a position to sign for the Egyptian Government.¹ In the text of the preamble to the draft treaty, as enclosed in this despatch, it was set out that 'His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India', had appointed Lord Lloyd as his plenipotentiary 'for Great Britain and Northern Ireland'.²

This express limitation, which had not appeared either in the original British counter-draft of the 28th July, 1927, nor, it would seem, in the text of the subsequent agreed draft as enclosed in the despatch received at Ottawa on the 11th November, would have had the constitutional effect, which the Canadian Government desired, of making the treaty between His Majesty the King of Egypt and His Britannic Majesty apply, as far as the latter was concerned, to Great Britain and Northern Ireland alone of his Dominions.

There appears to be no public record of any discussion of the draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty between His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain and His Governments in any of the self-governing Dominions, other than Canada, on the constitutional issue. For example, no mention of the constitutional issue was made in the House of Representatives of the Australian Commonwealth by the Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Bruce, when, on the 8th March, 1928, he laid papers relating to the recent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. From the statement which he made on this occasion, as well as from a statement by the Leader of the Opposition, it would appear that the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were regarded in Australia, first and foremost, not from the constitutional but from the strategic angle, that is, in their bearing upon the security of the maritime communications of the British Empire through the Suez Canal. This difference of attitude was a striking illustration of the way in which the difference in the geographical situation of the several self-governing Dominions affected their participation in the conduct of British Empire foreign relations. The very military sanctions which rendered the draft treaty unpalatable in Canada were designed to safeguard a British Imperial interest which, for Australians, was their essential interest in the relations between the British Empire and Egypt. In view of the fact that the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations really broke down over the question of the British military occupation of Egyptian territory,³ it will be seen that, although the Australian Government apparently raised no objection, constitutional or other, to Sir Austen Chamberlain's conduct of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations at any stage, the Australian point of view (as that of a Dominion which was vitally concerned in the Egyptian question) may have had a greater influence on the course of events than the Canadian point of view (as that of a Dominion which had so little direct concern in the Egyptian question that its interest in the draft treaty was confined to its incidental bearing upon a constitutional matter).

It may be added that on the 2nd May, 1928, in the House of Representa-

¹ Text in *Cmd.* 3050 of 1928.

² Text in *op. cit.*

³ On this point see pp. 263-4 and 266-7 above.

tives at Canberra, Mr. Bruce stated, in reply to a parliamentary question, that the Commonwealth Government 'accepted and endorsed' the note which had been delivered, on the 29th April, to Nahnās Pasha at Cairo by Lord Lloyd. Were that not so, he added, the Commonwealth would have indicated its view to the British Government, pointing out where it was not prepared to accept any line of action.

(ii) The Delimitation of the Frontier between Italian Libya and Egypt.

In a previous volume,¹ the history of the negotiations over the Liby-Egyptian frontier has been recorded down to the signature of an Italo-Egyptian agreement at Cairo on the 6th December, 1925. As there noted, one of the provisions of this agreement was that a Mixed Delimitation Commission should be appointed and that differences over the interpretation of the agreement should be settled by arbitration.

The Mixed Commission, which was duly constituted, did not find it easy to agree upon all heads of the rather wide range of questions which had been referred to it. By the beginning of July 1926 the two questions which were causing greatest difficulty on the Commission were, first, whether the Sanūsī inhabitants of the oasis of Jaghbūb should be free to opt for Egyptian nationality or whether they should be obliged to become Italian subjects; and, second, whether Italian subjects, natives of Libya, other than nomads in search of pasture, who crossed to the Egyptian side of the frontier should be subject to the special tribunal of the Egyptian frontier administration or should come, under the capitulations, before the Italian consular court at Sallum. For a time it seemed as though these two questions might have to go to arbitration, as the agreement had provided; and in August the work of the Commission was temporarily suspended. On the 28th October and the 9th November, 1926, however, there were signed at Cairo certain protocols to the agreement of the 6th December, 1925, in which the two Governments settled the question of jurisdiction over Italian subjects, natives of Libya, on Egyptian territory, as well as a topographical question regarding access to a well, but agreed to deal with the question of the Sanūsī in special diplomatic conversations and to leave over certain matters relating to the customs régime on the frontier until the existing Italo-Egyptian commercial treaty came up for renewal or revision in 1930.

On the 26th and 27th April, 1927, there were signed, on the frontier,

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 184-8.

the maps and the *procès verbal* embodying the results of the delimitation of the frontier on the ground, which had been the Mixed Commission's principal task.

(iii) Relations of the Kingdom of Najd-Hijāz with Great Britain and with the Arab Countries under British Mandate or Aegis (1926-8).

In a previous volume,¹ the personal union of the Hijāz with the Najd under the King-Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd and the relations of this rising Arabian Power with Great Britain and with the Arab countries under British mandate or aegis have been recorded down to the signature at Bahrah and Haddā, on the 1st and 2nd November, 1925, respectively, of two agreements between Ibn Sa'ūd and His Britannic Majesty. The first-named of these agreements dealt with relations between Najd and 'Irāq and the second with relations between Najd and Transjordan; and, when read together with the treaty signed at Muḥammarah and the protocols and the agreement signed at 'Uqayr in 1922,² they completed the regulation of the frontier régime between Najd-Hijāz and its northern neighbours and also defined a frontier line from the coast of the Persian Gulf westwards to the intersection of meridian 38° E. with parallel 29° 35' N. Certain questions, however, remained outstanding. In the first place, between the point just specified and the coast of the Gulf of 'Aqabah there was a stretch of nearly 200 miles as the crow flies, where Hijāz marched with Transjordan, across which even an imaginary frontier-line had not been agreed upon. In the second place, it remained to be seen whether, along the very much longer stretch where an imaginary line had been laid down by agreement, the proposed frontier régime would work satisfactorily in practice. In the third place, all the instruments negotiated between His Britannic Majesty and Ibn Sa'ūd in 1922 and 1925 were concerned solely with relations between the latter and the Arab countries under British mandate or aegis, and not with relations between Ibn Sa'ūd and Great Britain herself, which continued to be governed by the treaty of the 26th December, 1915.³

This treaty, which had been concluded after Ibn Sa'ūd had asserted his independence of the Ottoman Empire *de facto* and had come into

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Sections (v) and (vi).

² For the treaty, the two protocols and the agreement of 1922, see *op. cit.*, pp. 333-7.

³ For the terms of this treaty, the text of which was not published officially, see *op. cit.*, pp. 282-3. This treaty contained no reference to the subsidy which the British Government had started to pay to Ibn Sa'ūd during the General War of 1914-18 and had continued to pay until the 31st March, 1924 (*op. cit.*, p. 294).

direct contact with the British sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf by conquering the Ottoman province of Hasā, had been framed more or less on the pattern of earlier British treaties with lesser 'Gulf Chiefs'; and it had therefore become an anachronism in the course of ten years during which Ibn Sa'ūd, by his successive conquests of Jabal Shammar and Hijāz, had built up his Wahhābī principality into a state stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and embracing the Holy Cities of Islam. His change in status had been marked first by his acceptance, on the 8th January, 1926, of the title of King in respect of the Hijāz;¹ and the logical sequel to this step occurred in January 1927,² when an assembly of Najdī notables at Riyād passed a resolution in favour of raising the senior dominion of Ibn Sa'ūd's dual monarchy, hitherto styled the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies, to the same rank as the conquered Hijāz by styling it a kingdom likewise and proclaiming 'Abdu'l-'Aziz b. Sa'ūd King in respect of this realm also. Ibn Sa'ūd gave effect to this resolution forthwith in a decree.³

Meanwhile, Ibn Sa'ūd had prepared the way for strengthening his relations with the four Powers which had so far recognized him—namely, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and the U.S.S.R.—by sending his second surviving son, the Amīr Faysal, Viceroy of Mecca, on a visit to London, the Hague and Paris in the autumn of 1926;⁴ and in December 1926 it was reported that the British Agent and Consul-General in the Hijāz had gone to Ibn Sa'ūd's headquarters in order to discuss treaty questions. The treaty of 1915 had in fact contained a provision for the conclusion of a detailed treaty at some future date unspecified; and in May 1927 Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had negotiated the Bahrah and Haddā Agreements as the British Government's representative in 1925, entered into new negotiations⁵ with Ibn Sa'ūd at Jiddah, with the result that there was signed in that place, on the 20th May, 1927, a fresh treaty between the King of the Hijāz and of Najd and its Dependencies and His Britannic

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 310. The Hijāz had been erected into a Kingdom by a tacit compromise between the Sharif Husaynu'l-Hāshimī and his Western allies in 1916 (*op. cit.*, p. 287).

² The Islamic date was the 25th Rajab, A.H. 1345.

³ Text of a royal proclamation, rehearsing the resolution and embodying the text of the decree, in *The Times*, 21st April, 1927.

⁴ The Amīr Faysal was prevented by indisposition (clinical or diplomatic) from visiting Moscow. In August 1926, Ibn Sa'ūd's eldest surviving son, the Amīr Sa'ūd, Governor of Riyād, had visited Egypt.

⁵ The negotiations would appear, from their rapidity, to have gone smoothly. On the 16th May it was reported in Cairo that they had begun at Jiddah, and on the 24th Sir Gilbert Clayton arrived in Cairo on his return journey.

Majesty,¹ in substitution for the treaty of 1915.² The ratifications of the new treaty were duly exchanged, likewise at Jiddah, on the 17th September of the same year.

The treaty of 1927 naturally reaffirmed (Art. 1) the British recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd's independence which had been accorded in the treaty of 1915; but it took account of the enlargement of his dominions by styling him 'the King of the Hijāz and of Najd and its Dependencies' and it described his independence as 'complete and absolute'—in contrast to the treaty of 1915, which had hedged it about with conditions (customary in treaties between the British or the British Indian Government and 'Gulf Chiefs') that gave the word a narrowly restricted and indeed almost technical meaning.³ In fact the new treaty differed principally from the old in being drawn as between parties on an equal footing, in terms of reciprocity. Either party undertook, not only to maintain good relations with the other, but 'by all the means at its disposal to prevent his [*sic*] territories being used as a base for unlawful activities directed against peace and tranquillity in the territories of the other party' (Art. 2); and either sovereign recognized the national status of the other sovereign's subjects if and when they happened to be in his (the former sovereign's) dominions (Art. 5)—'it being understood that the principles of international law in force between independent Governments shall be respected' (a proviso which presumably ruled out anything in the nature of 'capitulations'). For the rest, Ibn Sa'ūd undertook, as in 1915, 'to maintain friendly and peaceful relations' with the territories of Kuwayt and Bahrayn and with the Shaykhs of Qatar and

¹ The text of this treaty is reprinted in the appendix to the present volume from British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2951 of 1927, which also contains the texts of four pairs of notes exchanged between Sir Gilbert Clayton and King 'Abdu'l-'Aziz on the 19th–21st May, 1927.

² It was expressly laid down in Article 9 of the treaty of the 20th May, 1927, that the treaty of 1915 should cease to have effect as from the date on which the new treaty was ratified.

³ For example, in the treaty of 1915, Ibn Sa'ūd had agreed that the individual whom he selected as his successor should not be antagonistic to the British Government in any respect; that he would not enter into relations with any foreign Power other than Great Britain and would not alienate or lease territories or grant concessions to any other foreign Power or its nationals; and that he would follow Great Britain's advice unreservedly—provided that it were not damaging to his own interests (a proviso which placed Ibn Sa'ūd, from the outset, in a freer position *vis-à-vis* the British Government than any ordinary 'Gulf Chief' could have hoped to secure for himself). In return the British Government had pledged itself to aid Ibn Sa'ūd—at its discretion and if it had not had a previous opportunity to intervene diplomatically—in the event of aggression by any foreign Power against his territories. (For the terms of the 1915 treaty see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 282.)

the 'Umān coast¹ (Art. 6), and to give facilities and protection to British Muslim pilgrims to the Islamic Holy Land.² There was also a new provision (Art. 7) for co-operation between the two parties in the suppression of the slave trade.

The treaty was accompanied by four pairs of notes, all exchanged between Sir Gilbert Clayton and King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz in the course of the 19th to the 21st May, 1927.

In the first pair of notes, Sir Gilbert Clayton set out the British Government's view that the frontier between the Hijāz and Transjordan started at the intersection of meridian 38° E. and parallel 29°35' N., which marked the termination of the already agreed frontier between the Najd and Transjordan, and followed a line which brought Mudawwarah, on the Hijāz Railway, and the town of 'Aqabah, on the coast of the gulf of the same name, just inside Transjordan territory. King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz recorded his dissent from this view, but signified his willingness 'to maintain the *status quo* in the Ma'ān-'Aqabah district' and promised 'not to interfere in its administration until favourable circumstances' should 'permit a final settlement of this question.'

In the second pair of notes Sir Gilbert Clayton announced, and King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz acquiesced in, the British Government's intention 'to abstain at present from renouncing the right of manumitting slaves, which' had 'long been practised by His [Britannic] Majesty's consular officers', until it should have become clear to both parties that the co-operation provided for in Article 8 [*sic*]³ of the treaty would secure the same ends effectively.

In the third pair of notes it was put on record that the British embargo on the export of war materials to Arabia had been removed and that the Government of the Hijāz and Najd would be free to

¹ This enumeration exhausted the list of 'Gulf Chiefs' now that the Shaykh of Muḥammarah had been eliminated by the Persian Government (see *op. cit.*, pp. 539-42) and that Ibn Sa'ūd himself had definitely passed out of the category.

² Arts. 5 and 6, corresponding to Art. 5 of the 1915 treaty. The provision in Art. 6 for the recovery of the property of British Muslim pilgrims who died in Ibn Sa'ūd's territory was new. On the other hand, the 1915 treaty (in consideration of the control which it gave Great Britain over Ibn Sa'ūd's relations with other foreign Powers) had stipulated for facilities and protection for all pilgrims crossing Najdī territory (the British Government regarding itself as being responsible towards all other foreign Governments for the treatment of all pilgrims in Najdī territory), whereas the 1927 treaty referred to British pilgrims only and assured these no more than 'most-favoured-nation' treatment.

³ In the text of the treaty as published in *Cmd.* 2951 of 1927, the article dealing with the slave trade is numbered not 8 but 7.

place orders in Great Britain for war materials for its own use, in accordance with the conditions set forth in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925.

The fourth pair of notes elucidated Article 4 of the treaty, relating to the recovery of the property of British Muslim pilgrims who died while in King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz's dominions.

The conclusion of this new treaty between His Britannic Majesty and King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, with the accompanying exchanges of notes, was opportune. It placed the formal relations between the two parties on a basis no less friendly than that of 1915 and at the same time more stable, inasmuch as it was more in consonance with present realities; and it accomplished this at a time when the internal situation in Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions was on the point of producing a fresh outbreak of disturbance along the border where these dominions marched with three Arab states under British mandate or aegis, namely Kuwayt, 'Irāq and Transjordan.

A brief notice of the religious mission and theocratic organization of Ibn Sa'ūd's ancestral principality of Najd has been given in a previous volume;¹ and it has been explained there that these were the driving force and the building material with which 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd had fashioned his Arabian empire during the quarter of a century ending in the year 1925. Now that the dual monarchy of Najd-Hijāz was united in his person and a new treaty concluded on equal terms with the principal Great Power in contact with his dominions, Ibn Sa'ūd's achievement might have seemed complete and his personal position secure. The empire which he had created was, indeed, the product of his personal genius in the sense that the forces and materials which he had brought into play would not have produced the same result automatically if they had not been handled by Ibn Sa'ūd himself or some other statesman. At the same time, in the very act of employing these forces and materials with such success, Ibn Sa'ūd had increased their strength as well as his own; and when the time seemed to have arrived for stabilizing the empire that he had already conquered rather than continuing to extend his conquests further, he had to reckon with the momentum which, under his

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 276-8, especially the quotation, there given, from H. St. J. B. Philby, *The Heart of Arabia* (London, 1922, Constable, 2 vols.). The reader may now be referred further to another volume by the same author entitled *Arabia of the Wakkabis* (London, 1928, Constable) and to three books by a Lebanese Christian Arab publicist and traveller, Mr. Ameen Rihani. One of Mr. Rihani's books has been published in English under the title *Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia* (London, 1928, Constable), the other two in Arabic under the titles: *Mulūkū'l-'Arab* (Bayrūt, 1928, Sādir, 2 volumes) and *Ta'rikh Najdi'l-Hadith* (Bayrūt, 1928, Sādir).

leadership, the Wahhābī movement had once more acquired after more than a century of adversity and quiescence.

The history of Arabian empires, from Muhammad's downwards, appeared to show that they could only be generated by religious enthusiasm; but it also indicated no less clearly that they could only be maintained by statesmanship and extended by the exercise of religious toleration; and Ibn Sa'ūd had acted on this principle when he extended his own dominions from his patrimony of Najd, in which the Wahhābī form of Islam was the prevalent and virtually exclusive religion of the people, to embrace other parts of Arabia in which Wahhabism was not indigenous. While on the one hand he had prepared the way for his fighting men by sending out his missionaries among the tribes that paid allegiance to his rivals, and had thus gained a following in the enemy's camp before going to war with him, he had hitherto refrained, when the victory was won, from imposing Wahhabism by force upon the unconverted inhabitants of the conquered countries. For example, when he had conquered the Gulf coast province of Hasā in 1913, he had taken under his personal protection the important Shī'ī community there¹ and had secured them liberty of law and worship; and again, when he had conquered the Red Sea coast province of Hijāz in 1924-5, he had contented himself with prohibiting certain religious practices which were flagrantly idolatrous in Wahhābī eyes and with insisting on the substantial observance of the Hanbalite *madhhab* or rite, without requiring that the Hijāzīs or the foreign pilgrims should go to the extremes of rigour with which that rite was observed by the Wahhābīs themselves. Otherwise, he had been careful to preserve the separate constitutional existence of the Hijāz as a kingdom connected with the Najd solely through a personal union. In January 1926, after assuming the crown of the Hijāz, he had given the Hijāzīs a majority over the Najdīs in the Consultative Council which he then attached to the Viceroy of his new kingdom, and an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly.² In August 1926,³ he had approved a new organic law for the Hijāz⁴ which, while avowing and sanctioning the plain fact that the Government was an absolute monarchy, at the same time marked a definite constitutional advance by providing for the essentials of

¹ Shi'ism in Hasā was strong by virtue of the neighbourhood of the partly Shi'ī country of 'Irāq and the almost wholly Shi'ī country of Persia.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 310.

³ That is, on the 21st Safar, A.H. 1345.

⁴ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, October 1926, pp. 530-3, translated from a text reprinted in *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 14th September, 1926, from the Hijāz official journal *Ummu'l-Qurā*.

orderly administration;¹ and by the autumn of the same year, with the King's encouragement, the new Government of the Hijāz had made some progress in the promotion of education. In this connexion, it is noteworthy that the King appointed a Damascene Arab as Director-General of Education for the Kingdom of the Hijāz, and that the Hijāzī Government applied for the services of forty Syrian teachers who had obtained their normal-school diplomas.² This was one instance of a policy which Ibn Sa'ūd had followed in Najd itself from an early stage in his career: the policy of taking into his service men from Arab countries which had been in longer and closer contact than the Arabian Peninsula itself with Western civilization.³ Again, after completing the conquest of the Hijāz, Ibn Sa'ūd had shown himself anxious to stimulate a revival of the Pilgrimage by ensuring law and order, improving means of communication, and making some provision for public health.⁴ This had been a leading point in the agenda of the Islamic Congress which had been held at Mecca, on his initiative, in June and July 1926;⁵ and towards the end of the year it was reported that Mecca was to be endowed with sanitary regulations and with a chamber of commerce. This promotion of social and economic development, likewise, was simply an application, to the rather more advanced conditions in the Hijāz, of a policy which Ibn Sa'ūd had been pursuing, since 1912, in face of greater material difficulties in the more primitive Najd. His policy in Najd had been to grapple with the crux of the social and economic problem there by converting a considerable proportion of the nomadic cattle-breeders into agriculturists concentrated in permanent settlements; and this movement had made remarkable progress in fifteen years.⁶

There was, however, an unresolved contradiction between the objective of religious toleration and material development, towards

¹ The Hijāzī Fundamental Law of 1926 was not unlike the Afghan Constitution of 1923 (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 566).

² For an interesting notice of Syrian officials employed in the Hijāz, see *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 23rd July, 1927, as quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, August 1927, pp. 375-6.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 296, foot-note 5.

⁴ For the mortality (amounting to about 10 per cent.) among the Javanese pilgrims during the pilgrimage of 1927, see a statement by the Netherlands Consul at Jiddah which is reproduced in *Oriente Moderno*, November 1927, pp. 559-60.

⁵ For the proceedings of this Congress see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (v) (d).

⁶ See Rihani, *Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia*, pp. 191-9, for an account of the movement, with a list of settlements and their quotas of fighting men. These settlements were called *hijrahs* and the settlers *muhājirīn*, with an evident allusion to the history of Primitive Islam.

which Ibn Sa'ūd was feeling his way, and those forces of fanaticism and theocracy through which he had to work ; and this contradiction became acute when the Hijāz came under his rule ; for the Hijāz, unlike the Najd, was in constant communication with the outside world and, as the Holy Land of Islam, was of interest to all Muslims and also to all non-Muslim Powers which had any considerable number of Muslim subjects. Ibn Sa'ūd's problem in the Hijāz was to work out a régime which would seem sufficiently liberal to satisfy public opinion abroad and at the same time sufficiently strict to avoid exciting the religious indignation of his own puritanical Najdīs, on whose support his military power depended. The difficulty which he found in conciliating Muslims abroad—especially those of Egypt and India—has been touched upon in a previous volume.¹ To these foreign Muslims his puritanical measures in the Hijāz were stumbling-blocks ; and they threatened to win him that reputation for impious fanaticism which had proved fatal to his ancestors when they had conquered the Hijāz a century and a quarter before him. Yet this perilous odium which Ibn Sa'ūd's régime in the Hijāz was exciting outside Arabia did not save Ibn Sa'ūd from incurring the suspicion and resentment of his own Najdīs, who took these self-same measures as indications that their leader was becoming almost impiously lukewarm.

The Najdīs, in fact, were prone to regard toleration as irreligion and material progress as corruption ; and they were especially prone to take this view when the country concerned was the Hijāz—a neighbour whom they despised as unwarlike and feared as versed in arts unknown to them—and when the responsibility for the régime which excited their indignation lay with their own prince who had now ascended the Meccan throne. Well versed as the Wahhābī 'ulamā were in Holy Writ, they were cognizant of the irresistible attraction which Mecca had exercised upon the Prophet Muhammad himself ; and they knew that when once Mecca had capitulated to the military power which he had built up at Medina with the assistance of Medinese arms, it had availed these 'Helpers' nothing that they had borne the heat and burden of the day. The Meccans, not the Medinese, had reaped the fruits of the mighty empire into which the modest theocratic state of Medina rapidly grew ; and the *tour de force* which a conquered Mecca had once achieved at Medina's expense, the same Mecca—holy as ever and now just conquered once again—might achieve a second time, and this time at the expense of Riyād. It would be safe to assume that from 1925 onwards this striking and

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Section (v) (c) and (d).

ominous parallel was constantly in the Najdī 'ulamā's minds; and it may also be assumed that the Najdī tribal chiefs who, as swords of the Wahhābī God and lieutenants of the Wahhābī *Imām*, had executed the conquests through which Ibn Sa'ūd's new Arabian empire had been built up, now chafed to see their leader turning more and more from the familiar pursuit of war to the new-fangled arts of peace and inviting into the country a host of unwarlike strangers whose only claim to power and honour was their skill in these very arts which Najd could well dispense with in the chiefs' opinion. At any rate, it would seem to be something more than a mere coincidence that the reactionary opposition to Ibn Sa'ūd in the Najd became active in 1926 and 1927, which was the very time when he was seeking to consolidate his position in the Hijāz and abroad. In the summer of 1926 an indication of this reactionary pressure upon Ibn Sa'ūd was given in a report that he had issued a public notice declaring that thenceforth there was to be no division between Shī'ī and Sunnī in his dominions, that the mosques of either community were to be open to adherents of the other, and that the prayers were to be conducted by new prayer-leaders (*imāms*) who were to be sent from Mecca. This seemed tantamount to an unavowed withdrawal of the toleration which Ibn Sa'ūd had extended to the Shī'īs since his conquest of Hasā thirteen years before; and a reversal of policy in this sense was so contrary to his usual practice that, if the report were correct, it seemed reasonable to infer that he was acting under virtual compulsion.¹

Again, in the autumn of 1926 it was reported that the most redoubtable of Ibn Sa'ūd's captains—Shaykh Faysalu'd-Dawīsh,² chief of the Mutayr tribe and governor of the first of Ibn Sa'ūd's settlements, Artāwīyah—had joined with another captain who was chief of the 'Utaybah in presenting certain demands to their ruler. The first of these reported demands was for permission to wage the Holy War (*Jihād*) against all non-Wahhābis; the rest were for the abolition

¹ In some quarters this report was interpreted in the directly opposite sense of a roundabout concession to the Shī'īs of Hasā with an eye to conciliating their co-religionists in Persia; but it is difficult to see how this ordinance can be interpreted in that sense if the account of it, here cited, is correct.

² For the part which this captain played in the war against Ibn Rashīd and in the raids on 'Irāq and Kuwayt during the years 1921–5, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 284. It was alleged against Faysalu'd-Dawīsh that his show of importunate religious zeal was a cloak for personal animosity against his master. He was said to have been aggrieved, first, because Ibn Sa'ūd had not appointed him governor of Hā'il after the fall of Ibn Rashīd in 1921, and secondly because, after the surrender of Mecca in 1924, he had forbidden him to enter the city with his Mutayrīs for fear that they might sack it.

or prohibition of a number of Western innovations: custom-houses, hospitals, telephones, post-offices, motor-cars. Ibn Sa'ūd was reported to have replied by making the suggestion that the chiefs should consult the Wahhābī 'ulamā at Buraydah in the district of Qasīm, which seems to have been under his immediate control, to which the captains retorted by making the counter-suggestion that the consultation should be held at Artāwīyah—the settlement in which Dawīsh himself was master and which was the natural base for military operations in the direction of Kuwayt and 'Irāq. These demands do not appear to have been pressed at the assembly of Najdī notables which met at Riyād in January 1927 in order to raise their country to the rank of a kingdom;¹ but the notables were reported to have complained on this occasion of Ibn Sa'ūd's laxness in having allowed the idolatrous Egyptian *Mahmal* to enter the Hijāz during the last Pilgrimage;² and, though the main purpose of their meeting was to confer an honour on Ibn Sa'ūd, it may be conjectured that this act was inspired by Najdī nationalism as well as by personal regard for their ruler who thus became twice over a king. Meanwhile, Ibn Sa'ūd himself, during his sojourn at Riyād, requested the 'ulamā of Najd for a legal opinion (*fatwā*) on a number of points which had been submitted to him by members of the Wahhābī Brotherhood (the *Ikhwān*); and in February 1927³ the opinion was duly rendered—on the whole, on reactionary lines.⁴ In regard to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the telegraph, the 'ulamā suspended judgement on the plea of insufficient knowledge. In regard to two shrines in the Hijāz which savoured of idolatry, they advised that these ought to be destroyed. With regard to secular laws (*qawānīn*), they advised that, if any such existed in the Hijāz, they ought to be abolished immediately and that the country ought to be governed by the Religious Law (*Shar'*) alone. With regard to the entry of the Egyptian pilgrim-caravan into the territory of the Holy Land under arms, they advised that this ought to be forbidden. With regard to the *Mahmal*,⁵ they advised that its entry into the Great Mosque at Mecca ought to be prohibited, that no one ought to be allowed to kiss it, and that its escort ought to be forbidden to play music. As a counsel of perfection they advised that,

¹ See p. 285 above.

² For the 'incident' which occurred over the *Mahmal* during the Pilgrimage of 1926, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 290–2.

³ i.e., on the 8th Sha'bān, A.H. 1345.

⁴ Text of this *fatwā* in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1927, pp. 276–7, translated from *As-Siyāsah* of Cairo, weekly edition, issue of the 21st May, 1927.

⁵ For the previous history of this controversy over the *Mahmal* see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 290–2.

if this could be done without causing a disturbance, the *Mahmal* ought to be prevented from entering Mecca at all. With regard to the Shī'īs of Hasā, including the port of Hafif, the 'ulamā advised that they ought to be compelled to abandon all their peculiar rites and doctrines, that Sunnī prayer-leaders (*imāms*) should be imposed on them, that their special places of worship should be destroyed, and that the penalty for contumacy should be exile. As for the Shī'īs of 'Irāq who had mingled with the Wahnābī nomads, they advised that they ought to be denied residence in Wahnābī territory. With regard to taxes not authorized by the Religious Law, they advised that these were evidently unlawful and that it was Ibn Sa'ūd's duty to give them up; but they diplomatically added that, if he refrained from giving them up, it was not lawful for Wahnābīs to rebel against him on that account. With regard to the steppes and villages under the government of the Wahnābīs, they advised that Ibn Sa'ūd ought to send among them missionaries (*du'āt*) and teachers and to compel his lieutenants in every district to assist these missionaries in enforcing the observance of the Religious Law. With regard to the Holy War, they advised that the decision lay with Ibn Sa'ūd in his capacity of *Imām*¹ of the Wahnābī commonwealth, and that the *Imām* was required by the Religious Law to take into consideration what would be most to the interest of Islam and of the Muslims.

It will be seen that, while this *fatwā* was reactionary in spirit² and categorical in its injunctions on certain secondary matters, it gave Ibn Sa'ūd sanction for exercising the powers which he needed if he was to hold his own against his captains on two points in which his authority as a ruler was at stake. It left him a free hand for imposing taxation and a free hand for declining to proclaim the Holy War. In fact, in this *fatwā*, the Wahnābī 'ulamā proved, not for the first time in history, that it was possible to combine diplomacy with the role of a Puritan divine.

At the beginning of April 1927, however, Faysalu'd-Dawīsh re-

¹ For the nature and history of the Islamic Imamate or Caliphate, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part I, Section (ii) (a).

² It may be noted that, throughout, Ibn Sa'ūd was referred to, not by the secular titles of 'Sultan' or 'King', but by the theocratic title of *Imām*, and that the Wahnābīs were referred to as 'the Muslims' without qualification. The inference was that the non-Wahnābī majority of the Islamic World were destined to become Wahnābīs, by conversion or compulsion, so that, by anticipation, the generic term 'Muslims' could properly be employed there and then to designate the existing Wahnābī nucleus of a future reformed Islamic Church Universal. In the same spirit, a contemporary Protestant Sect in Kentucky styled themselves 'Christians' pure and simple, in the expectation that the laxer majority of Christendom would presently be gathered into their fold.

turned to the attack by coming again to Riyād at the head of a representative deputation of captains and chiefs—who constituted, with their followers, a body of about 3,000 fighting men—and waiting upon Ibn Sa'ūd in order to ascertain whether their Prince 'were allowing himself to be tempted by wordly interests into neglecting the interests of God.'¹ Ibn Sa'ūd reassured them in a speech with which they professed to be satisfied, and the deputation dispersed peacefully; but the incident was an omen of trouble to come.

Ibn Sa'ūd's policy, in this situation, seems to have been to give way on secondary matters in order to insist on points which were vital to his authority. His sacrifice of his Shī'ī subjects has been mentioned above;² and he also risked the sacrifice of friendly relations with Egypt in order to comply with the 'ulamā's injunctions regarding the Egyptian pilgrim-caravan and the *Mahmal*. Upon receipt of information from the Egyptian Consul at Jiddah that King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz had laid down conditions, in these matters, in conformity with the 'ulamā's requirements, the Egyptian Government, on the 12th May, 1927, decided to refrain from sending the *Mahmal* that year and to inform Egyptian pilgrims that the Government would take no responsibility for them.³ Later, the Egyptian Government further decided not to send the Sacred Carpet (*Kiswah*) apart from the *Mahmal*, as they had originally intended to do, and also not to send the customary alms for the poor at Mecca. In spite of the Egyptian Government's warning, not less than 8,030 Egyptian pilgrims were reported to have left for the Hijāz by the 18th May. It also appears that several hundred Persian pilgrims succeeded in making their way to Mecca, though in Persia the pilgrimage to the Hijāz was not only discouraged but officially prohibited. Next year, Ibn Sa'ūd took the precaution to order a *Kiswah* in India:⁴ and this was duly conveyed to Jiddah from Bombay and was exhibited at Mecca ceremoniously on the 25th May, 1928, in the presence of representative pilgrims from many countries. The number of pilgrims in 1928 was reported to be not so large as it had been in 1927. but, without counting those from Ibn Sa'ūd's own dominions, it was estimated to have approached the figure of 100,000. A feature of the Pilgrimage of 1928 was the busy

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, June 1927, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 17th May, 1927.

² Compare King Amānu'llāh's sacrifice of the Ahmadīyah Sect in Afghanistan in 1924 (*Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 568).

³ Text of an official *communiqué* from the Egyptian Government, translated from *As-Siyāsah* of Cairo, 13th May, 1927, in *Oriente Moderno*, May 1927, p. 213.

⁴ See an interview given at Cairo by Ibn Sa'ūd's counsellor Shaykh Hāfiq Wahbah (*Oriente Moderno*, March 1928, p. 125).

motor traffic between Jiddah, Mecca and Medina, which was said to have been supervised by a Scottish engineer.

Meanwhile, Ibn Sa'ūd's most serious preoccupation was given him by the conduct of his captains on the northern frontier, where, before the end of the year 1927, they began on their own account to take that aggressive action against the neighbours of the Wahnābī commonwealth for which they had failed to obtain sanction from the Wahnābī *Imām*. It will be convenient to deal with events on the Transjordan border separately from events on the borders of 'Irāq and Kuwayt. Notwithstanding the fact that, as between Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions and Transjordan, it had not yet been found possible to agree upon a frontier line, the disturbances along this sector of the border in the years 1927 and 1928 were less serious than those along the sector where Najd marched with 'Irāq and Kuwayt—a sector in which agreed lines had been laid down.

In the Transjordan sector, it was rumoured that the Wahnābīs had seized the station of Mudawwarah, on the Hijāz Railway, from the Huwaytāt (a tribe paying allegiance to the Transjordan Government) in the autumn of 1926. In the course of the year 1927, 'the tribunal, set up under the Haddā Agreement, to settle raiding claims,¹ sat at Ma'ān, Jericho and Jerusalem; but the difficulty of securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses rendered it abortive;² and in this connexion there were rumours of Wahnābī concentrations near the Transjordan border in April. On this occasion, no raid followed; but by the beginning of 1928 the Wahnābīs had apparently succeeded in 'peacefully penetrating' the principal Badu tribes which had hitherto paid allegiance to the Transjordan Government—for example, the Huwaytāt, the Sharārāt, and even the comparatively remote Banu Sakhr, as they had penetrated the tribes of the Hijāz before making war on King Husayn in 1924–5. Partly, perhaps, under the influence of Wahnābī missionaries and partly on the calculation that the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh would not be capable of affording them protection against a serious attack from the followers of Ibn Sa'ūd, certain sections of all the three Transjordanian tribes above mentioned seem to have transferred their allegiance from the weaker to the stronger Power. In February 1928 Fayṣalu'd-Dawīsh, encamped at Jawf, was reported to have written to the people of Ma'ān and 'Aqabah, demanding the payment of the traditional Islamic tax

¹ For this tribunal see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 344–5.

² Report by H.B.M. Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1927 (*Colonial No. 31 of 1928*), p. 75. See also *Oriente Moderno*, February 1927, p. 93; March 1927, p. 137.

(*zakāt*) to the Government of the Hijāz; and on the 11th February his men attacked two sub-tribes of the Banu Sakhr who had already seceded from 'Abdu'llāh to Ibn Sa'ūd, had embraced Wahhabism, had begun to pay *zakāt* to their new sovereign, and had crossed to the Najdī side of the frontier laid down in the Agreement of Haddā.¹ This curious incident, in which a tribe that had sought security by coming into Ibn Sa'ūd's fold found itself attacked by Ibn Sa'ūd's most distinguished captain, was another indication that the Wahhābī *Imām* was at that time finding it difficult to control the forces which he had set in motion in the Arabian Peninsula. There were still plainer symptoms of this difficulty along the borders of 'Irāq and Kuwayt during these years.

Along the 'Irāq border, the reciprocal pledge, given in the Bahrah Agreement of the 1st November, 1925, to prevent tribal raiding as far as possible, was faithfully observed on both sides for nearly two years. During the whole of the year 1926 and the first nine months of 1927 'Irāq was completely immune from raids on the part of Najdī tribes;² and though the 'Irāq Government did not succeed so quickly in putting an end to raids on Najd by 'Irāqī tribes—particularly the refugee Shammar who had found new grazing-grounds in the Mesopotamian Jazīrah since the Wahhābī conquest of their homelands in 1921³—it seems to have achieved this in the course of 1926, partly through the co-operation of the British Royal Air Force and partly through the establishment of a chain of military posts along the inner edge of the Shāmīyah steppe, on the south-west of 'Irāq, with an alignment roughly parallel to the Najd-'Irāq frontier as laid down, far out in the Shāmīyah, in 1922.⁴ Moreover, early in April 1926 the 'Irāq Government requested the British High Commissioner at Baghdad to communicate with Ibn Sa'ūd with a view to obtaining his agreement to the prompt constitution of the special tribunal for inquiring into the particulars of any aggression committed across the frontiers of the two states, for assessing damages and losses and for fixing responsibility, which the Bahrah Agreement had prescribed. Ibn Sa'ūd twice asked for postponement of this on account of his being detained in the Hijāz by the necessity of superintending the arrangements for the Pilgrimage of the year; but he agreed that his

¹ For this frontier see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 343.

² See *Colonial No. 29* of 1927 (Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1926), p. 21, and *Colonial No. 35* of 1928 (Report for the year 1927), p. 56.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 330-1. For a vivid account of the mobility of the Shammar and of the consequent difficulty of keeping them under effective control, see *Colonial No. 29* of 1927, p. 22.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 334.

frontier governors at Hā'il and in Hasā should be authorized to correspond direct with certain 'Irāq frontier officials over matters touching the peace of the border; and this arrangement yielded good results. The claims outstanding from a number of previous raids were liquidated to the satisfaction of both sides; and no incidents occurred in 1926 during the seasonal migrations of the nomads across the frontier or during the visits to 'Irāq of Najdī caravans.¹ Further, in April 1927, the 'Irāq Parliament passed a law² imposing severe penalties on persons guilty of raiding or plundering in the territory of a foreign state at peace with 'Irāq; and this law was duly enacted on the 4th May and promulgated on the 11th. Yet, though these measures on both sides were effective in maintaining peace on the Najd-'Irāq border for nearly two years dating from the signature of the Bahrah Agreement, this peace did not carry with it the maintenance of the political *status quo*; for the Wahhābīs, while refraining from raids, were carrying on their policy of 'peaceful penetration' at the expense of 'Irāq as well as Transjordan. For example, before the end of these two years, the chiefs of the two 'Irāqī tribes, the Dhafir³ and the Dahāmshāh,⁴ had passed over from the orbit of 'Irāq into the orbit of Najd, visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyād, been received by him with honour, and been sent back to their tribes accompanied by Wahhābī 'ulamā to instruct them in the true faith. Under the influence of these missionaries, Ibn Sa'ūd's new clients, who had originally inclined towards him from mundane motives of fear or calculation, acquired the zeal of the convert and themselves became apostles of Wahhabism among the other tribesmen of 'Irāq; and this religious merit received an immediate secular reward, for the converts from the other 'Irāqī tribes abandoned their own brethren and clave to the Dhafir and the Dahāmshāh, with the result that these two tribes increased while the 'Irāqī tribes which remained loyal to King Faysal, like the 'Amārāt 'Anazah, decreased in proportion. There could hardly have been a more striking demonstration of the advantages of adherence to the rising Arabian Power; and thus, during the two years of peace along the Najd-'Irāq border which ended in the autumn of 1927, the Wahhābīs had prepared the ground for an overt advance at 'Irāq's expense.

¹ The foregoing facts are taken from *Colonial No. 29* of 1927, p. 22.

² The Raïding and Plunder (Forbiddance of) Law No. 47 of 1927. (Text in *Colonial No. 35* of 1928, pp. 186-7).

³ For the part played by the Dhafir in the frontier relations between Najd and 'Irāq from 1919 to 1925, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 330-5.

⁴ Whereas the Dhafir had been expressly recognized by Ibn Sa'ūd as being an 'Irāqī tribe (*Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 334-5), the allegiance of the Dahāmshāh had remained in dispute between the Governments of 'Irāq and Najd.

'The first warnings of a renewed trouble came in October 1927, when letters were received from the Najd Government protesting against the building of fortifications and barracks at Būsayyah, a spot in the desert seventy-five miles from the Najd frontier, and against other military measures which it was rumoured in Najd that the 'Irāq Government were contemplating in the frontier districts, such as the construction of a railway line to Būsayyah. The Najd Government based their protest on Article 3 of the 'Uqayr Protocol, which reads as follows:

The two Governments mutually agree not to use the watering places and wells in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose such as building forts on them and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity.

'They requested the removal of the posts which the 'Irāq Government had constructed at Abu'l-Ghār¹ and Būsayyah. These posts, they said, had created great excitement among the Najd tribes on the border, who regarded their construction as an act of hostility. It was evident that very distorted accounts had been sent to Riyād about the scope and purpose of the arrangements which the 'Irāq Government had made for the control of the frontier. No barracks or fortifications had, in fact, been built, and the idea of constructing a railway in the remote deserts on the Najd border had never for a moment been entertained. The posts of Abu'l-Ghār and Būsayyah had been established as a part of the general scheme for keeping order on the border and were intended to serve as centres of intelligence from which early news could be obtained of any movements of raiders either from 'Irāq into Najd or from Najd into 'Irāq.² In Abu'l-Ghār there was a small garrison of a platoon of the 'Irāq Army, and in Būsayyah fifteen men of the Nāsiriyyah camel police. Neither could reasonably be regarded as coming within the meaning of Article 3 of the 'Uqayr Protocol, Būsayyah being situated approximately 75 miles and Abu'l-Ghār 90 miles from the nearest point on the Najd frontier. The 'Irāq Government were unable therefore to agree to the demand that the posts should be dismantled, and a reply was sent to the Najd Government's protest pointing out how exaggerated were the accounts which they had evidently received and explaining the exact position and strength of the posts. Meanwhile the Mutayr tribe of Najd took the matter into their own hands. On the night of the 5th November, 1927, a party of about a hundred men under

¹ For the Wahnābi raids on Abu'l-Ghār in 1922, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 332 and 341.—A.J.T.

² On this point see further a statement made by the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq to the correspondent of *The Times* at Baghdad which was published in *The Times* of the 13th March, 1928.—A.J.T.

Faysalu'd-Dawīsh, chief of the 'Ilwah Mutayr, attacked and overwhelmed the Būsayyah post, killing six policemen, one overseer of the Public Works Department, twelve Arab labourers, and one woman. The building of the post [a very simple and inexpensive erection of mud and brick] had not been finished, and the policemen and the labourers working there were unable to defend themselves against the sudden attack of the tribesmen. A protest and a demand for reparation and the punishment of the raiders was sent to the Najd Government, and about the same time a dispatch was received from Riyād, dated the same day as the attack on Būsayyah, again protesting against the construction of the Būsayyah post and stating that, much as an outbreak of raiding would be deplored, the Najd border tribes were so excited that no guarantee could be given that regrettable incidents would not occur, unless the post was immediately evacuated. A warning was also given to the Political Agent, Kuwayt, by the Najd Representative¹ who had arrived there for the meeting of the Frontier Tribunal,² that serious trouble had broken out in Najd, and that, contrary to the express order of the King, a tribal force was moving northwards against the 'Irāq frontier. A few days later reports came from Kuwayt that men from the same Mutayr tribe under a relative of Faysalu'd-Dawīsh had on the 4th December raided Kuwayt territory near Jahrah and had carried off a number of camels,³ and on the 9th December the Mutayr committed a raid on the Ghalidh section of the Banu Hachaym, an 'Irāq shepherd tribe, while they were grazing their sheep in the neutral zone between Najd and 'Irāq. These raiders also fired on an air patrol, which by chance was passing over that area, and wounded a British wireless operator.

'As it seemed clear that the Mutayr were at least temporarily out of control, it was decided that, as a temporary expedient, aeroplanes should be authorized to pursue raiders across the frontier.⁴ The Najd Government were informed of this decision and at the same time

¹ In regard to this warning, see further a statement by Mr. Amery in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 14th December, 1927.—A.J.T.

² On the eve of Faysalu'd-Dawīsh's raid, Shaykh Hāfiz Wahbah, one of Ibn Sa'ūd's non-Najdī civilian advisers, had arrived at Kuwayt from the Hijāz by air for a conference on outstanding questions relating to the Najd-'Irāq frontier. In view of the raid on Būsayyah this conference was postponed by the British Acting High Commissioner in 'Irāq.—A.J.T.

³ For details of this Wahnābī raid on Kuwayt territory see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th November, 1927; *The Times*, 6th and 7th December, 1927.—A.J.T.

⁴ It was reported in *The Times* of the 15th and the 22nd December, 1927, that the British Royal Air Force counter-attacked certain Wahnābī raiders who fell upon two 'Irāqī tribes in the Nāsiriyyah district on the 13th December, 1927.—A.J.T.

thanked for the warning given by the Najd Representative to the Political Agent in Kuwait.

‘On the 17th December, 1927, a party of about 250 of the Mutayr again led by Faysalu’d-Dawīsh once more crossed the border into ‘Irāq and attacked an encampment of ‘Irāq shepherd tribesmen near Jumaymah. The raiders killed all males who fell into their hands; even babies were not spared. The situation then became extremely critical. The ‘Irāq tribes were very uneasy, and since they dared not move southwards to their accustomed grazing-grounds they were in danger of serious loss from lack of grass for their flocks and herds, the northern grazing-grounds being completely dried up and exhausted. The great ‘Anazah tribe, which stretches north across the desert motor-route from Baghdad to Damascus, was particularly affected, and their paramount chief came in to see the High Commissioner at Baghdad and declared that, unless urgent measures against the raiders were taken, the loyalty of his tribe could no longer be relied upon; they would sever their connexion with ‘Irāq and depart either to Syria or elsewhere.’¹

The first step which the British Government took—before the end of December 1927—for dealing with this new and dangerous situation was to suggest a meeting between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to discuss any matter in dispute, and this suggestion was repeated several times before the 12th March, 1928, when the Colonial Secretary of His Britannic Majesty’s Government in Great Britain, Mr. Amery, stated in the House of Commons at Westminster that Ibn Sa‘ūd had ‘not so far seen fit to avail himself of the opportunity offered him for a full discussion of outstanding questions’. On the other hand, Mr. Amery had already stated in the same place, on the 27th February, 1928, that Ibn Sa‘ūd had ‘entirely disavowed these raids and some time ago announced his intention of dealing with the raiders’, but that he had not dealt with them by that date. When these facts are read in connexion with the warning of Faysalu’d-Dawīsh’s intentions which Ibn Sa‘ūd had conveyed to the British authorities at an early date,² it may be inferred that the raids represented an outbreak of the elemental force of Wahhabism when temporarily unamenable to the Wahhābī *Imām’s* control. In these circumstances the ‘Irāqī and the British Government took measures for meeting force by force in operations not only on the ground but in the air; and they felt themselves justified in allowing their aircraft, when counter-attacking Wahhābī raiding parties which had

¹ Quoted from *Colonial No. 35* of 1928, pp. 56–8.

² See p. 300 above.

crossed the frontier into 'Irāq, to cross the frontier in the opposite direction in their turn.

Before the middle of January 1928 the arrangements for these air operations appear to have been made and an air reconnaissance appears to have been carried out as far as Faysalu'd-Dawish's headquarters at Artāwīyah. The next Wahhābī raid was delivered on the 22nd January against an 'Irāqī tribe some ten miles within the 'Irāq frontier; and this time casualties estimated at seventy-five killed were inflicted.¹ On the 27th January, another party raided in Kuwayt territory but were there engaged by the forces of the Shaykh of Kuwayt, who recovered their loot from them,² and were then located—on the 29th and 30th January—by British aircraft, which inflicted a number of casualties on them. In February, however, a message was received at Kuwayt from Faysalu'd-Dawish in which the chief of the Mutayr and Governor of Artāwīyah demanded with threats that the port should be opened to his people;³ and thereafter a British cruiser was stationed off Kuwayt as a measure of precaution. On the 19th February 'Irāqī and Kuwaytī tribesmen were attacked at Jarishan, south-west of Basrah, some sixty-five miles within the frontier; but this time, again, the raiders were located by British aircraft and were effectually counter-attacked from the air on the 19th, 20th and 21st. The casualties inflicted on the raiders were believed to be severe, but the aircraft were also heavily fired upon and one machine was shot down, the pilot losing his life.⁴ On the 24th February British aeroplanes, having passed over the frontier, located the raiders again—this time in Najdī territory at As-Sāfah, on the route from Kuwayt to Artāwīyah—took them by surprise when they were concentrated (apparently for the distribution of loot), and inflicted casualties again.⁵ A new British air base was now established at Kuwayt, and the border zone traversed by the Wahhābī raiders was intensively patrolled.

The British Government had 'been most careful to furnish Ibn Sa'ūd with prior information as to the action to repel raiders in

¹ See a statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to a parliamentary question, by Mr. Amery on the 27th February, 1928.

² For details of this battle see *The Times*, 31st January, 1928, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd February, 1928. The Kuwaytīs brought motor-cars into the field as well as cameleers.

³ Faysalu'd-Dawish was said to have made this demand on the Shaykh of Kuwayt because his suzerain Ibn Sa'ūd had recently closed against him the ports of Hasā.

⁴ For details see *The Times*, 22nd and 23rd February, 1928, as well as the official *communiqué* published in *The Times* of the 28th February, 1928.

⁵ Official *communiqué* cited above.

'Irāq'.¹ Nevertheless, Ibn Sa'ūd—in deference, no doubt, to Wahnābī feeling—appears to have made a formal protest against the air raid on As-Sāfah on the ground that it was a breach of treaty,² while he charged certain envoys who had been sent to Riyād by the Shaykh of Kuwayt to carry back the message that he could not answer for the Mutayr or the 'Utaybah and that the Shaykh of Kuwayt had better rely on self-help. At this point, the gravity of the situation seemed to be increasing; for the chief of the Ajmān was reported to have accompanied Faysalu'd-Dawīsh and his Mutayr tribes in the raid of the 19th February; and the chief of the 'Utaybah (who had joined Faysalu'd-Dawīsh in presenting certain reactionary demands upon Ibn Sa'ūd in the autumn of 1926)³ was also reported to be bringing up his followers, to join in the raids, from their distant grazing-grounds on the border between Najd and Hijāz. In these circumstances alarming rumours (not afterwards substantiated) began to arise. On the one hand it was rumoured that Ibn Sa'ūd had received Faysalu'd-Dawīsh, together with his confrères the chiefs of the Ajmān and the 'Utaybah, at Riyād in order to inform them of his conversion to their view that the non-Wahnābīs of 'Irāq, Kuwayt and Transjordan were only amenable to the argument of the sword; that he had given the militants arms and munitions, as well as his blessing; and that he had even gone so far as to proclaim the Holy War (*Jihād*). On the other hand it was rumoured that a Gurkha battalion was being sent by the British Indian Government to Kuwayt. Both these rumours, however, were denied;⁴ and on the 8th March, 1928, Mr. Amery was able to state in the House of Commons at Westminster that there had been no further Wahnābī raids since that of the 19th February. In the same place, on the 6th April, it was stated on behalf of the Colonial Office that the raiders on the borders of 'Irāq and Transjordan had so far been engaged only with aeroplanes and armoured cars; that no ground forces had been in

¹ Statement by Mr. Amery in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 5th March, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question. It must be remembered that the means of communication with Ibn Sa'ūd were slow and difficult and that messages were often long delayed in transmission.

² See *Oriente Moderno*, April 1928, pp. 178-9, for a *résumé* of an article in *Ummu'l-Qurā* of Mecca, 10th March, 1928, formulating six points in which the Bahrah and Haddā Agreements had been infringed by the 'Irāqī and Transjordanian Governments according to the Najdī point of view.

³ See p. 292 above.

⁴ The rumour regarding the Gurkhas was denied by the Colonial Office in Whitehall and later by the India Office. The rumour regarding the Holy War was denied by the Secretariat of the Palestine Government as well as by Ibn Sa'ūd's Counsellor Shaykh Hāfiz Wahbah. Shaykh Hāfiz Wahbah also denied that Ibn Sa'ūd had supplied the raiders with arms and munitions.

action; and that the British casualties had been one pilot killed and one wireless operator wounded. In fact, after the 19th February, 1928, the situation steadily improved. At first, it is true, there was still some reason for anxiety. It was rumoured, for instance, that Wahnābī forces were encamped at three points not far from the northern frontiers of Najd and the Hijāz; and, while the Mutayr were believed to have lost their appetite for raiding after the reprisals taken on them at As-Sāfah from the air on the 24th February, the 'Utaybah tribe, 'which had had no experience of the devastating effects of aerial warfare', might still be tempted to try its fortune in the hope of plunder.¹ However, it was afterwards reported that their chief had been overtaken on the march by an emissary from Ibn Sa'ūd and had been persuaded to turn back. Early in April, it was rumoured that the Mutayr and the Ajmān were once more on the move—this time supported by another tribe from the interior, namely the 'Utaybah's neighbours the Harb—but by the middle of April it was reported that the tribal concentration on the frontier had dispersed and that the tribes had severally repaired to their respective summer ranges. It was added that Ibn Sa'ūd had summoned a conference of tribal chiefs to meet him at Buraydah. By May, according to report, Faysalū'd-Dawīsh had so far changed his behaviour that he caused certain Mutayrī sheep-stealers to restore their plunder to its 'Irāqī owners; and again in August he caused Mutayrī camel-thieves to make restitution to the Dhafirīs to whom the stolen camels belonged.

This second restitution was the more notable inasmuch as it occurred after the breakdown of a conference which had been held at Jiddah in May and August 1928 between Ibn Sa'ūd of the one part and representatives of the British and 'Irāqī Governments of the other, to discuss the matter which had been the occasion (or pretext) of the Wahnābī raids, namely, the establishment by the 'Irāqī Government of military posts along the inner edge of the Shāmīyah steppe.

The British representative, Sir Gilbert Clayton, left London on the 19th April, was joined at Cairo by the two representatives of the 'Irāqī Government,² and by one representative of the Transjordanian Government,³ and arrived at Jiddah with his colleagues on the

¹ Statement by the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq.

² Both these representatives of the 'Irāqī Government were Englishmen, one of them being Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior and the other an administrative inspector in the 'Irāq Government service. The Counsellor at the British Residency at Baghdad also came to Cairo to meet Sir Gilbert Clayton *en route*, but did not accompany him to Jiddah. This caused some dissatisfaction in 'Irāq.

³ Mr. G. Antonius, a member of the staff of the secretariat of the British High Commissioner for Transjordan.

2nd May. The conference opened on the 8th; but on the 22nd it was announced in London by the Colonial Office that it had been suspended owing to the approach of the Pilgrimage season. On the 20th July Sir Gilbert Clayton left London again and resumed negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd at Jiddah on the 1st August, the Government of 'Irāq being represented this time by its Minister of Education, Tawfiq Beg Suwaydī; but, within a week of resumption, the conference broke down—this time definitively—over the crux of the question under discussion.¹ The Najdīs continued to insist that the construction of the military posts in 'Irāq along the inner edge of the Shāmīyah was an infringement of the 'Uqayr Protocol of 1922, while the 'Irāqīs and the British held to their view that the posts at Salmān, Būsayyah and Abu'l-Ghār, being respectively 60, 75 and 90 miles distant from the frontier, could not reasonably be regarded as having been built in its 'vicinity', and that the construction of these posts was therefore covered by the general principle that, apart from the stipulations of treaties and the customs of international law, every Government was entitled to liberty of administration on its own territory.

About a week later, on the 15th August, 1928, at Haifa, there was a breakdown in another conference in which Ibn Sa'ūd and the British were participants, together with the French. This Haifa Conference had been 'convened to meet the expressed wish of the King of the Hijāz that the whole question of reconditioning the Hijāz Railway should be examined from the practical point of view';² and the British and the French had participated in their capacity as mandatories for Palestine and Syria, since the track of the Hijāz Railway, which had originally lain wholly within the Ottoman Empire, had been partitioned, as a result of the Peace Settlement, between the three states of the Hijāz, Palestine (including Transjordan), and Syria. At the Haifa Conference, 'the Palestine Government was represented by three senior officers of the Palestine Railway Administration, which also' operated 'the section of the Hijāz Railway in Transjordan'.³ According to the British Government, the conference proved abortive because, at the opening of it, on the 26th July, 1928, 'the Hijāz representative declined to proceed with the discussions unless the

¹ For the 'Irāqī Government's report of the breakdown see *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th August, 1928; for Ibn Sa'ūd's version see a statement issued by the Hijāz Government Agency at Cairo and reproduced in *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th August, 1928. In these reports there was no disagreement regarding the reason why the conference broke down.

² Statement by Mr. Amery in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 12th November, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question.

³ Amery, *loc. cit.*

general question of the status of the railway was first considered,¹ whereas 'the invitation to the Hijāz Government' had 'made it clear that the discussions would be confined to technical questions only'.² On the 12th November, 1928, when a statement on the subject was made in the House of Commons at Westminster by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Amery declared that there was no prospect of the conference being resumed at an early date.

Nevertheless, the breakdown of the Jiddah and Haifa Conferences in August 1928 does not appear to have undone or even checked that improvement in the situation along the northern borders of Najd-Hijāz which had been in progress since the latter part of February; and the outlook was further improved by the announcement, early in October, that the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq, Sir Henry Dobbs, whose term of office was approaching its end, was to have for his successor Sir Gilbert Clayton, who in a series of negotiations—some fruitful and some abortive—during the previous three years had established with Ibn Sa'ūd a personal relation of a friendly character. Thus the immediate situation along the border gave no ground for serious anxiety; and the prospect of a great and permanent change for the better was opened up by certain important events which now followed in the interior of Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions.

On the 5th November, 1928, there assembled at Riyād a great congress in which almost all the 'ulamā, tribes, *hijrahs* of *Ikhvān* and towns of Najd and its Dependencies were represented.³ The chief aim of King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz in convening this congress evidently was to dispose of the criticisms which had been evoked by certain features in his policy and to obtain affirmations of loyalty. These he duly received; but the moral effect of the congress was diminished by the fact that Faysalu'd-Dawish and Ibn Humayd (the chief of the 'Utaybah) had absented themselves. This overt gesture of defiance probably convinced Ibn Sa'ūd that a trial of strength with his recalcitrant captains was no longer avoidable. At any rate, during the winter of 1928-9 both sides prepared for war, and in the spring Ibn Sa'ūd took the offensive. The campaign was short, for when the King and the rebels met in battle near Artāwiyah in March 1929

¹ For the previous history of this question see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 316-17 and 342. For further details see *The Times*, 30th July and 17th August, 1928; *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th August, 1928.

² Amery, *loc. cit.*

³ A report of this congress is given in an extra edition of *Ummu'l-Qurā* of Mecca, dated the 18th December, 1928. (See two articles on the subject by Professor C. Snouck Hurgronje in *De Telegraaf* of Amsterdam, 7th and 9th February, 1929.)

the result was decisive. The rebel forces were scattered, and the two leaders fled from the field and sent humble messages to their sovereign, throwing themselves on his mercy. Ibn Humayd was punished by the loss of his chieftainship. Faysalu'd-Dawīsh died of wounds at Artāwiyah.

At the time of writing it seemed as though this signal victory of Ibn Sa'ūd over his enemies within his own household in A.D. 1929 might have the same effect in consolidating his Arabian Empire as Abū Bakr's triumph over the *Riddah* of 632-3 had had in consolidating the commonwealth of Primitive Islam. In Arabia, it had always been less difficult to build an empire than to maintain it in being; and it might well prove, in retrospect, that the defeat of Faysalu'd-Dawīsh, rather than that of Ibn Rashīd or that of King Husayn, had been the decisive event in Ibn Sa'ūd's career. Be that as it might, it seemed probable that this 'crowning mercy' of 1929 would give him time at any rate to consummate his policy of solving the Malthusian problem in the Arabian Peninsula by turning a certain proportion of the Badu into fallāhīn. So far as he succeeded in doing this, he would incidentally be solving the problem of his relations with his neighbours; since the Najdī tribesman's incentive to raid Transjordan and 'Irāq would be diminished in proportion to the increase in his opportunities for securing a livelihood at home by the arts of peace.

(iv) The Relations of the Zaydī Imām of San'ā with Great Britain and with Italy (1926-8).

In a previous volume¹ it has been recorded that, as a result of the General War of 1914-18, the Zaydī Imām Yahyā of San'ā became the independent ruler of those districts in the Yaman highlands, inhabited by a Zaydī population, in which he had previously exercised a measure of religious and judicial authority, under Ottoman sovereignty, by the terms of an agreement negotiated with him by 'Izzet Pasha in 1911 and confirmed by a *firman* from the Sultan in 1913. It has also been recorded in the same place that the Imām Yahyā afterwards extended his rule over certain non-Zaydī territories in South-Western Arabia, first by occupying Dāla' and other places in the British Aden Protectorate at the close of the year 1919, and then by conquering from the Idrisī Sayyid of Sabyā the two Red Sea ports of Luhayyah and Hudaydah, together with the whole southern section of the coastal plain (*Tihāmah*) between the highlands and the Red Sea. In another section of the present volume,² an account is given of his

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 276 and 320-1.

² Section (vi) of this part.

subsequent dealings with the Idrīsī Sayyid Hasan, which resulted in one portion of the Idrīsī's former holdings, from Midī southwards, becoming incorporated in the Imām's dominions, while the remnant of the Idrīsīyah principality placed itself under the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ūd by an agreement signed on the 21st October, 1926. It remains to record the history of the Imām's relations during the years 1926 to 1928 with his south-eastern neighbour Great Britain and with Italy, whose colony of Eritrea faced the Imām's newly acquired ports of Hudaydah and Luhayyah on the opposite coast of the Red Sea.

Direct political relations between the Zaydī Imām and Great Britain may be said to have begun with the Imām's encroachment upon the British Aden Protectorate in 1919: for, before that, the British Government's political dealings in South-Western Arabia had been partly with the local Arab rulers and tribes in the immediate hinterland of the Aden Settlement and partly with the Ottoman Government as the sovereign Power in other parts of the Yaman, but never with the Zaydī Imām, since the Imām had not been an independent ruler, either *de jure* or *de facto*, at any time between the establishment of British influence in the hinterland of Aden and the extinction of Ottoman authority in Arabia by the execution of the Armistice of October 1918.¹ It was, indeed, in effect the British themselves who had rendered the Imām independent by evacuating the Turkish forces from South-Western Arabia after the Armistice had been concluded. In so doing, they had removed an *état limitrophe* which had previously recognized the British Aden Protectorate within a certain agreed boundary, and had left its place vacant to be occupied by a new *état limitrophe* which had never been in relations with Great Britain and had not recognized her position in South-Western Arabia at all.

The Anglo-Turkish frontier in South-Western Arabia had been laid down because the British, who had made themselves masters of the port and town of Aden in 1839, and the Turks, who had reoccupied the Southern Tihāmah in 1849 and the central highlands of the Yaman, including San'ā, in 1872, had gradually extended their authority or influence into the interior of South-Western Arabia, starting respectively from the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, until they had come into collision with one another in 1873. From that year until the beginning of 1902, the boundary between

¹ Thus, though the Imām had previously invaded the British Aden Protectorate, in the wake of the Turkish forces which invested the Aden Settlement during the General War of 1914-18, he had taken this action as an Ottoman subject and not as a belligerent in his own right.

the British and the Turkish sphere in the Yaman had been fluctuating and disputable; but between January 1902 and May 1904 the frontier was delimited by a Mixed Anglo-Turkish Commission from a point at the extreme south-western corner of the Arabian Peninsula, opposite Perim Island, as far north-eastward as the Bana River, leaving the town of Dāla'—about seventy miles inland from Aden, in a direction slightly west of north—just on the British side of the line and the town of Qa'tabah just on the Turkish side.¹ Beyond the Bana River, the line was not delimited, but on paper it was theoretically produced, in a general north-easterly direction, into the empty and unexplored Rub'ū'l-Khālī, where, at latitude 20°, it was eventually met by another imaginary line, produced in a north-and-south direction from a point on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf opposite the southern end of the Bahrayn Islands, by which the British and Turkish spheres in the hinterland of the Gulf were demarcated in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913.² Thus, by the eve of the War of 1914–18, the entire Arabian Peninsula had been divided in theory between two non-Arab Powers, the British and Ottoman Empires; but this theoretical division, which was impressive on the map, ignored the actual fact that the greater part of either sphere was actually in the hands of virtually independent Arab rulers and tribes. In the hinterland of Aden, for example, the British authorities did not exercise direct authority beyond a radius of ten miles from Aden itself;³ the 4,200 square miles of the Protectorate,⁴ outside the 80 square miles of the Settlement,⁵ were parcelled out among a number of tribal confederations under native chiefs; and these chiefs were in treaty relations with the British Government⁶ which left them entirely autonomous and which, so far from obliging them to pay any taxes to the Paramount Power, qualified them for receiving annual British subsidies. Outside the limits of the Protectorate, again, in the larger section of the Aden Interior which extended, east and north-east of the River Bana, to the fringes of the Rub'ū'l-Khālī, the British Government were in similar, though even looser, treaty relations with

¹ The foregoing facts are taken from British Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, vol. i (issued for official use in 1916; published without alteration in 1920 by H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 179 and 196–7. Dissatisfaction with this new frontier was said to have been one of the causes of the rising against the Turks in the Yaman in 1904.

² For this convention see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 282.

³ Admiralty Handbook, p. 196.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁵ These eighty square miles included three separate enclaves on the mainland, together with the island of Perim (*op. cit.*, p. 199).

⁶ The Imām Yahyā contended that these chiefs with whom the British Aden Protectorate treaties had been concluded had no authority to negotiate.

other tribal confederations, for instance, the Yāfa';¹ but in the greater part of this section the British Government had no relations with the local population at all, but simply a sphere of potential influence recognized by Turkey in virtue of the imaginary north-eastward prolongation of the Anglo-Turkish frontier. Conversely, in large parts of the territory to the north-west of the line, the Turkish Government had nothing more than a potential sphere of influence recognized by Great Britain.

These arrangements which the British Government had made partly with the Ottoman Government and partly with local Arab princes had never been recognized by the Zaydī Imām; and thus the Imām was not breaking any engagement to which he himself was a party when, at the close of the year 1919, he encroached on the British side of the former Anglo-Turkish frontier.² Nevertheless, this encroachment was, in effect, an act of aggression, as the Imām was well aware, and he seems to have taken this serious step on two grounds. The first ground was resentment at the conduct of the British, after the evacuation of the Turks from the Southern Tihāmah, in handing over the port of Luhayyah to their ally, the Idrisī, and provisionally retaining in their own hands the more important port of Hudaydah, whereas the Imām claimed to be the rightful successor of the Ottoman Empire in this quarter.³ The second and more permanent ground for the Imām's encroachment on the Aden Protectorate was a claim, which he maintained, to sovereignty or suzerainty over all Arab rulers and tribes in the Yaman. This claim was based on the fact that his ancestors had actually asserted a more

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 183 and 196.

² It should be noted that the Imamate of San'ā had not yet been officially recognized by Great Britain as a sovereign independent state when the Imām occupied Dāla' at the end of 1919, and that British recognition was naturally withheld throughout the nine years, from the winter of 1919-20 to the autumn of 1928, during which the Zaydī forces were in occupation of territory on the British side of the Anglo-Turkish frontier in South-Western Arabia; so that, as towards Great Britain, the Imām was not juridically bound, either explicitly or implicitly, to take over obligations which had been entered into by the state which Great Britain had formerly recognized as sovereign over the Imām's country, i.e. the Ottoman Empire (which had been the other party to the Anglo-Turkish boundary delimitation of 1902-4).

³ On geographical grounds the Imām might reasonably lay claim to Hudaydah and Luhayyah, as being the natural ports of San'ā; but he could hardly expect that, on this consideration, Great Britain would send her ally the Idrisī empty away and hand the two ports over to the Imām, who during the War had loyally supported his sovereign lord the Ottoman Sultan, Great Britain's enemy. It should be noted that the Imām occupied Dāla', in the British Aden Protectorate, before, and not after, the British evacuated Hudaydah and allowed it to pass into the Idrisī's hands (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 321).

or less effective authority over the highlands and also at certain points along the coasts, including not only Mokha but Aden itself, after the first Turkish occupation of the Yaman had come to an end in the seventeenth century. On this historical ground the Imām Yahyā seems to have contended that the British and Turkish occupations in the nineteenth century were usurpations; that a frontier laid down by agreement between the two usurpers had no legal validity; and that, in encroaching upon the British side of that frontier, he was really reoccupying territory that was part of his own lawful heritage. In this claim on the Imām's part to be the legitimate sovereign of the whole Yaman there were certain flaws. In the first place, before the seventeenth century, the patrimony of these Zaydī Imāms of the Rassī House had been confined to Sa'dah, in the extreme north of the Yaman highlands.¹ Secondly, their authority over the whole Yaman, during the two centuries when they had had the entire field to themselves, had never been made effective. In the third place, such authority as they had established had fallen into decay before the British appeared on the scene for the first, and the Turks for the second, time in the nineteenth century—so much so that when the Turks reoccupied the Zaydī capital of San'ā in 1872 they came at the invitation of the inhabitants themselves. Finally, the Zaydī régime was only welcome among communities of the Zaydī persuasion, and the Zaydī form of Shi'ism was not prevalent throughout the Yaman but only in the highlands—the inhabitants of the Southern Tihāmah, the Aden Protectorate and the Jawf and Najrān (between the highlands and the desert) being predominantly Sunnīs. Although, however, the Imām's claim to sovereignty over the whole Yaman would hardly bear close examination, he seems to have entertained it seriously;² and his attitude on this point was of considerable political importance. If his sole motive for encroaching upon the Aden Protectorate had been to take a territorial hostage for the ports of Luhayyah and Hudaydah, the British negotiators might have found him more inclined towards peaceful evacuation after the two ports had passed into his hands during the first quarter of 1925. As it was, the expulsion of the Idrīsī from the Southern Tihāmah was

¹ Sa'dah was situated not far to the south-east of Sabyā, which eventually became the stronghold of the Idrīsī Sayyids. For the history of the Rassī Dynasty see Rihani, *Mulūkū'l-'Arab*, vol. i, Part (ii).

² The Imām Yahyā does not seem to have admitted the existence of the flaws in his claim. At any rate, he is reported to have stated the claim in the following formula: 'The Yaman is a united country with one people and one religion, whose rulers were our direct ancestors for more than a thousand years back.'

not followed by any *détente* between the Imām and Great Britain over the Aden Protectorate; and on the 5th July, 1927, more than twenty-eight months after Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission to San'ā in 1925,¹ the situation was described in the House of Lords at Westminster, by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in the following terms:

The portions of the Aden Protectorate of which the Imām is in occupation are as follows: the whole of the territories of the Amīri, Qutaybī, 'Alawī and Sha'ib tribes; outlying portions of the Upper Yāfa' territory; about half of the Awdali country and a small border tract belonging to the Subayhīs. The chiefs of these tribes are all in their respective territories, with the exception of the Amīr of Dāla', the head of the Amīri tribe, who has been living in Aden since 1920 and still remains there.

This situation, in which the territories of Arab rulers who had long been in treaty relations with Great Britain, and over whom the British Government had asserted a protectorate as against the Ottoman Empire, had passed under the military occupation of another Arab ruler who had been under Turkish suzerainty himself until 1918 and whose independence had never been recognized officially by Great Britain, was inevitably damaging to British political prestige in South-Western Arabia. It was also damaging to British trade with the interior, through the port of Aden; for the former trade routes across the Amīri country were now blocked;² and though other routes remained open to some extent and for some time, additional customs dues were being levied by the Imām, beyond those regularly levied by the local rulers, so that the trade languished or was diverted from Aden to Hudaydah.³ This situation lasted altogether for nearly nine years, from the winter of 1919–20 to the autumn of 1928; and during this period, when British traders were under so grave a disadvantage, some portion of the former British trade with the Yaman was reported to be passing into Italian and American hands.⁴ The

¹ For Sir Gilbert Clayton's visit to San'ā, which lasted from the 24th January to the 21st February, 1925, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 321, and, further, a statement made in the House of Lords at Westminster, on the 23rd June, 1926, by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. At the time of writing, Sir Gilbert Clayton's report had not been published.

² Statements in the House of Lords at Westminster by Lord Lovat on the 5th July, 1927, and on the 15th March, 1928. There was even some fear that the Zaydis might push their way down to the coast of the Indian Ocean between Aden and Makallah (see a speech delivered by the Earl of Glasgow in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 15th March, 1928).

³ Lord Lovat's statements in the House of Lords at Westminster, just cited.

⁴ Statement by Lord Lamington in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 15th March, 1928.

capture of Hudaydah by the Zaydī from the Idrisī forces in March 1925,¹ which opened up a new trade route, entirely within the Imām's dominions, from the Red Sea coast to the wealthiest part of the Yaman highlands, offered a particularly favourable commercial opportunity to the Italians; for the Italian colony of Eritrea, on the African coast of the Red Sea, was hardly more distant, via Hudaydah, from San'ā than Aden had been via Dāla'; and the Italians enjoyed this commercial advantage of proximity without labouring under the political handicaps, from which the British were suffering, of having a disputed frontier with the Imām and being under treaty-obligations to local rulers in the debatable territory.² On the 2nd September, 1926, the Italian Government prepared the ground for Italian trade in the Yaman by concluding a treaty of amity and commerce with the Imām Yahyā.

The text of this treaty, which has been printed in the appendix to a previous volume,³ need not be analysed here. It is merely necessary to note that this Italo-Yamani treaty of September 1926 had a political as well as a commercial significance in virtue of the first article, in which 'the full and absolute independence of the Yaman and of its sovereign, H.M. the Imām Yahyā', was recognized by the Italian Government. The conclusion of this treaty cannot have been altogether agreeable to the British Government, whose policy it had been—during the secret inter-Ally discussions on the partition of the Ottoman Empire during the General War of 1914–18—to secure the acceptance of a kind of British 'Monroe Doctrine' covering the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. In the event, however, Italy had emerged from the War without any commitment, secret or overt, to Great Britain in this sense;⁴ and in concluding her treaty with the Imām

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 322.

² This point was made by Lord Lovat in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 5th July, 1927.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 586–7. For the Italian text, with citations from the Arabic text, see *Oriente Moderno*, October 1926, pp. 534–6.

⁴ In the abortive secret agreement of the 17th August, 1917, between Great Britain, France and Italy, the parties had pledged themselves—subject to a possible rectification of the frontier of the Aden Protectorate—not to acquire and not to consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula, and not to consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast or on the islands of the Red Sea; but—for reasons over which Italy had no control and with results which on the whole were disadvantageous to Italy—this secret agreement had never come into force; and even if it had done so, it would not have been contravened by the terms of the Italo-Yamani Treaty of the 2nd September, 1926. It may be noted that France had not so free a hand as Italy in this matter, for the same provision had been included in the secret Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, and this secret agreement had both come into force and been put into action, for the benefit

Yahyā in 1926, she was doing nothing to which Great Britain had a right to object, either juridically or morally. This was frankly recognized by the British Government themselves. In January 1927 conversations—described as ‘purely informative’ and as ‘dealing largely with economic questions’—‘on the subject of British and Italian interests in the Red Sea, and in particular on its Arabian littoral’, took place between Sir Gilbert Clayton, on behalf of the British Government, and Commendatore Gasperini, the Governor of Eritrea, on behalf of the Italian Government. On the 5th July, 1927, in the House of Lords at Westminster, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs declared that the Italo-Yamani treaty of the 2nd September, 1926, had not affected the British Government’s negotiations with the Imām; that there had been a full exchange of views between the British and Italian Governments in regard to their respective interests in this part of the world; that there had been no misunderstanding between Italy and Great Britain; and that there need not be any apprehension that legitimate British interests would be adversely affected by Italian policy¹ or action.²

Meanwhile, from the 24th June to the 13th July, 1927, Italy was giving hospitality to a Yamani mission which was headed by the Imām Yahyā’s second son, Prince Sayfu’l-Islām Muhammad, and which was accompanied by a son of the head of the Mirghanīyah religious fraternity, whose head-quarters were at Cheren in Eritrea.

of France, in Syria. Moreover, in an exchange of views which also took place during the General War of 1914–18, the French Government had recognized that, in the Arabian Peninsula, Great Britain possessed ‘special political interests’.

¹ On the 2nd September, 1927, *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo published what purported to be the text of a secret Italo-Yamani Agreement, signed on the 1st June, 1927, as a supplement to the public treaty of amity and commerce which had been signed on the 21st September, 1926. The existence of this secret supplementary agreement was denied at Rome, on the 4th September, 1927, by the Agenzia Stefani. For an English summary and an English translation of the text of the alleged agreement of the 1st June, 1927, as given in *Al-Ahrām*, see *The Times*, 3rd September, 1927, and the *European Economic and Political Survey*, vol. iii, No. 15, pp. 491–2.

² In May 1927 it was reported at Aden that Italian aeroplanes had arrived at Midī, a place which had formerly been in the hands of the Idrisi but which had passed, in 1926, into the hands of the Imām and was in fact the northernmost point occupied by him on the coast of the Tihāmah (see p. 320 below). It was suggested that this visit was ‘intended to impress the tribes with a sense of Italian power and to weaken their allegiance to the Idrisi’ (*The Times*, 23rd May, 1927). Even, however, if the report were true and the motives were correctly interpreted, the parties affected were the Idrisi Sayyid Hasan and his suzerain Ibn Sa‘ūd, and not the British Government or their clients in the Aden Protectorate. In January 1927 the Yamani Director of Communications, in an interview with *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, had taken occasion to deny a rumour that an Italian military mission had been sent to San‘ā.

This Yamanī mission was not only received in state by the King of Italy and by Signor Mussolini, but was given an opportunity of seeing something of the life and industry of different parts of Italy during its stay in the country.¹

In January 1927 the Imām Yahyā also entered into regular relations with another Power, Turkey. On the 15th of that month, Ahmad Unsī Efendī arrived at Constantinople as diplomatic representative of the Yaman, and in the same month the Turkish Government were reported to have despatched Mahmud Nedim Bey, formerly Ottoman Vali of the Yaman, as Turkish consul to San'ā.²

As for the *impasse* in the relations between the Imām and the British Government, this was eventually brought to an end by a further act of aggression, within the borders of the British Aden Protectorate, on the Imām's part.

As far back as the time of Sir Gilbert Clayton's abortive mission to San'ā in 1925,³ when the Imām had refused to withdraw from the Protectorate, he had been 'informed that, while His Majesty's Government were anxious to secure a friendly settlement of their differences with him, they could not recognize that he had any rights whatever within the Aden Protectorate, and they warned him that his continued occupation of parts of it would render him liable to retaliatory measures. In spite of this communication, armed Zaydī forces penetrated further into the Protectorate in September 1927 and only withdrew on being warned that air action would be taken against them. Warnings were then dropped on certain towns in the Yaman that, in the event of further incursions being made into the Protectorate, air action would be taken against them. On the 8th February the Zaydīs kidnapped the 'Alawī Shaykh and a relation of the Qutaybī Shaykh, both of whom were 'entitled by treaty to the protection of His Majesty's Government. After forty-eight hours' notice, air action was taken against Qa'tabah in Yaman territory which was 'understood to be the Headquarters of these Zaydī forces directly responsible for the outrage'.⁴ 'That action resulted in the return of the Protec-

¹ Texts of the speeches exchanged by Prince Sayfu'l-Islām and Signor Mussolini on the 29th June, 1927, in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1927, pp. 280-1. Even Signor Mussolini, accustomed as he was to the highest flights of Occidental rhetoric, must almost have had his breath taken away by the following conceit of Prince Sayfu'l-Islām's Arabian eloquence: 'Your Exalted Person has been the cause and the basis of the peace and tranquillity which reign and persist in the Universe.'

² For Mahmud Nedim Bey's previous career see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 320-1.

³ See p. 312 above.

⁴ Statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 12th March, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question, by the Secretary

torate Shaykhs who had been kidnapped and in a request by the Imām for a truce of thirty days for general negotiations. The request was granted, and the truce took effect from the 25th March. The Acting Resident at Aden proceeded to Ta'izz in Yaman territory to open negotiations, but found that the Imām's representative there was empowered to carry on informal discussion only and not to negotiate a treaty. Subsequently, the Imām was informed that His Majesty's Government were prepared to conclude immediately a brief treaty confined to (1) recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Imām's independence in the Yaman; (2) recognition by the Imām of the frontier of the Aden Protectorate with certain modifications in his favour; and (3) a promise to the Imām of such assistance as His Majesty's Government could render him within the limit of their international obligations. The truce was extended to the 1st June to give the Imām time to consider this proposal. On his asking for a further extension to the 17th July, the Imām was informed that this extension would be given provided that, as an earnest of good faith, he evacuated the town of Dāla' by the 20th June. This he failed to do. Consequently, demonstration flights were made and warnings dropped giving four days' notice, and on the 25th June air action was recommenced. Air action' was 'taken in all on fourteen several days, including one on which an attack was delivered on Ta'izz. The Royal Air Force suffered no casualties during such action'.¹ 'The result of the action was that the Imām withdrew all his forces from the Dāla' area'² on the 14th July, 1928; and before the end of November he had 'evacuated all the country within the Aden Protectorate, the frontier of which was definitely delimited in 1904. However, he still remained in part of Yāfa' and about half the 'Asdali country'³—districts which lay outside the eastern boundary of the Aden Protectorate Proper⁴ but inside the north-western boundary of the Aden Interior as defined by the north-eastward prolongation of the Anglo-Turkish frontier which had been laid down of State for the Colonies, Mr. Amery. Cf. a statement made in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 16th March, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question, by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Lovat.

¹ Statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 2nd July, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question, by Mr. Amery, in continuation of his statement made in the same place on the 12th March, 1928.

² Statement made in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 28th November, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question, by the Under-Secretary of State for War, Lord Onslow. For details of the fighting see the *Corriere della Sera*, 15th, 17th and 31st July; *The Times*, 26th July, 1928.

³ Statement by Lord Onslow, just cited.

⁴ See Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, vol. i, p. 183.

in the years 1902–4 from a point on the coast opposite Perim Island as far as the western bank of the River Bana.¹ Thus, at this stage, the Imām had ceased to trespass on territory which had been recognized specifically in an international agreement as being a British sphere, but he was still in occupation of territory belonging to one tribal confederation, the Yāfa', with some of whose chiefs the British Government had been in treaty relations since 1903 and 1904.²

'In September [1928] the Resident at Aden received a letter from the Imām indicating his willingness to reopen negotiations, and an invitation was sent to him to send a representative to Aden to confer with the Resident there as to the terms of a preliminary agreement.' The British Government proposed that they 'should recognise the complete independence of the Yaman, and that in the preliminary agreement there should be a clause relating to the boundary and a definition of the actual situation of the boundary at the date of the Treaty'.³ The position as it stood after this proposal had been made was described on the 28th November, 1928, in the House of Lords at Westminster by the Under-Secretary of State for War as follows:

A full power has been prepared to enable the Resident to negotiate with the Imām and we have been in frequent communication with the Resident as to the terms to be discussed. I mentioned just now that the Imām has withdrawn his forces over the actual delimited frontier so that now the *de jure* frontier, the old Anglo-Turkish frontier, is in fact the frontier. If recognition of this frontier can be obtained and further frontier incidents can be avoided, it will be possible to take up the various points of detail which may be at issue between the Government and the Imām, and it is hoped that we may be able to come to an understanding with him. I may say that harvesting operations are going on quietly, and that the weekly market at Dāla' is in full swing and attracting people from over the border.⁴

Thus, at the close of the year 1928, the next move lay with the Imām Yahyā. Certainly it was to the advantage of the British Empire to establish stable relations of peace and friendship with the Imām; and there were certain facts which might incline the Imām to find such a settlement to his interest likewise. One of these facts was the restiveness of the Sunnī communities on which he had been seeking to impose his rule since the extinction of Turkish authority in the Yaman after the Armistice of October 1918. In the spring of 1928, for example, during his armistice with Great Britain, he had to cope with raids on the part of the Zarānīq—a Sunnī tribal confederacy in

¹ See p. 309 above.

² Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, vol. i, pp. 196 and 539.

³ Statement by Lord Onslow, just cited.

⁴ *Ibid.*

the Southern Tihāmah between Hudaydah and the Aden border. The recalcitrance of the Zarānīq was serious for the Imām, since they were in a position to harass the trade route from Hudaydah to San'ā; and in May 1928 he launched a punitive expedition against them with the object of driving them back within their own tribal boundaries as a preliminary to reducing them to subjection. These operations, however, were presumably interrupted by the renewal of hostilities between the Zaydīs and the British on the 25th June.¹ North of San'ā, again, the Imām was having difficulties with the still more powerful confederation of Hāshid wa Bakīl; for these communities, who were both highlanders and Zaydīs, were more fanatical than their spiritual chief; they had never forgiven the Imām Yahyā for having come to terms with the Turks in 1911;² and they were apparently no longer disposed to submit tamely to his rule. Finally, in the far north-east, where the oases of Jawf and Najrān—intervening between the barren mountains of 'Asir and the barren sands of the Rub'ul-Khālī—constituted a possible line of communication between the highlands of the Yaman and the steppes of the Najd, the Imām was exposed to a possible danger from the expanding Wahhābī Power.³ In 1926 the communities of Najrān, having repelled a Wahhābī attack in the previous year, were reported to have placed themselves under the Imām's protection. Thereafter, the Wahhābīs appear to have begun to advance in that quarter again—this time by those methods of peaceful penetration which have been described elsewhere.⁴ The Imām Yahyā evidently could not afford to be on bad terms with the Wahhābīs and with the British simultaneously; and in February 1928, after the fresh Zaydī act of aggression in that month which provoked energetic British reprisals,⁵ the Imām sent a mission from San'ā to Mecca with a view to settling the outstanding differences between himself and Ibn Sa'ūd.⁶ This Yamanī mission reached Mecca at the end of March, and thereafter there were rumours that an agreement between King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz and the Imām Yahyā might be achieved. This was significant, at a time

¹ See p. 316 above.

² On this point see Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, vol. i, pp. 165 and 486.

³ It is noted elsewhere that the Wahhābī and Zaydī dominions had become conterminous on the coast of the Tihāmah as far back as 1926, when the former Idrīsīyah Principality had been virtually partitioned between these two Powers; but that, contrary to prognostications at the time, the Wahhābī and the Zaydī rulers had not quarrelled over the division of the Idrīsī's spoils.

⁴ See pp. 296 and 298 above.

⁵ See p. 315 above.

⁶ According to a Cairo journal, cited in *Oriente Moderno*, February 1928, p. 73, this Yamanī mission to Mecca had been preceded by a Najdī mission to San'ā.

when the negotiations between King 'Abdu'l-'Azīz and the British Government, over outstanding differences between the Kingdom of Najd-Hijāz and the Arab states under British mandate or aegis on Ibn Sa'ūd's northern borders, were proving a failure.¹ In fact, it seemed possible that the outcome of the Imām's negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd might be the determining factor in deciding his future policy towards Great Britain.

(v) Relations between Ibn Sa'ūd, the Idrīsī Sayyid of Sabyā, and the Zaydī Imām of San'ā (1926-8).

In a previous volume,² the history of the relations between these three Arabian princes has been recorded down to the spring of 1926.³ By the March of that year, the Imām of San'ā had already made himself master of the Southern Tihāmah, including the two ports of Luhayyah and Hudaydah, which had fallen temporarily into the hands of the Idrīsī since the eviction of the Turks by the British at the close of the General War of 1914-18; and the Zaydī forces were then besieging the two focal points of the Idrīsīyah principality, Sabyā and Jayzān. In anticipation of this Zaydī attack, the Idrīsī Sayyid Hasan—who had recently supplanted his incompetent nephew 'Alī in the rulership of the principality with assistance from the Wahhābī Governor of Ibhā in the interior of the 'Asīr—had apparently offered in February 1926 to recognize Ibn Sa'ūd as his suzerain if he would come to his rescue; but Ibn Sa'ūd was reported to have declined this proposal and to have withdrawn certain Wahhābī garrisons, which had been sent to Sabyā and Jayzān earlier in the year, when the Zaydīs advanced upon those two places in March.

In this situation Sayyid Hasan appears, before the end of the month, to have sought and obtained an armistice from the Zaydīs with a view to negotiations, and these appear to have been duly initiated on the understanding that the Idrīsīyah principality, while retaining its internal autonomy, was to acknowledge Zaydī suzerainty. In the event, these negotiations fell through; and on the 21st October, 1926, an agreement was signed instead between the Idrīsī Sayyid and Ibn Sa'ūd. The text of this agreement, which has been printed in the appendix to a previous volume,⁴ need not be analysed here. It is sufficient to note that the Idrīsī only avoided falling under the Zaydī's suzerainty by accepting the Wahhābī's; and that Ibn Sa'ūd—while this time responding to an overture which he had

¹ For Sir Gilbert Clayton's negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd in 1928, see pp. 304-5 above.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (v) (e).

³ In *op. cit.*, p. 322, fifth line from the bottom, 'spring' should be read instead of 'autumn'.

⁴ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Appendix VII.

rebuffed before—was careful only to assume this suzerainty over the Idrīsī's dominions as they stood at the moment, without incurring any obligation, explicit or implicit, to assist his new vassal to recover territories which he had lost to the Zaydī before the agreement was signed.¹

Thereafter, the Zaydī forces, while remaining in occupation of the Tihāmah as far north as Midī inclusive, appear, notwithstanding the breakdown of the Yamānī-‘Asīrī negotiations and the conclusion of the Najd-‘Asīrī Agreement, to have refrained from reopening hostilities against the Idrīsī, while Ibn Sa‘ūd, on his part, refused to be drawn by the Idrīsī into a war with the Zaydī Imām for the recovery of the Southern Tihāmah. It was apparent that neither of the two surviving Arabian Powers was willing to risk a war with the other for such small stakes as these fragments of the Idrīsī's dominions; and in June 1927 Ibn Sa‘ūd, at the Imām Yahyā's request, sent a delegation to San‘ā in order to settle frontier and other questions outstanding between the two sovereigns. From that time until the close of the year 1928, the *status quo* in ‘Asīr remained undisturbed, while the Wahhābis and the Zaydīs strengthened their hold upon their respective acquisitions. In the summer of 1927 Ibn Sa‘ūd sent a resident² to Sabyā to supervise the fulfilment of the treaty of October 1926; and the Zaydī troops, on their side of the line, put down insurrections among the tribes in that portion of the Tihāmah which they had occupied the year before.

¹ The first article of the Najdī-‘Asīrī Agreement of the 21st October, 1926, ran as follows:

‘His Lordship the Imām Sayyid Hasan b. ‘Alī the Idrīsī recognizes that the former frontiers, defined in the agreement of the 10th Safar of the year [A.H.] 1339, which was concluded between the Sultan of Najd and the Imām Sayyid Muhammad b. ‘Alī the Idrīsī—frontiers which are subject to the House of Idrīsī (*Āl Idārisah*) at the present date—are under the lordship (*siyādah*) of His Majesty the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies in virtue of this [? i.e. the present] agreement.’

The agreement of Safar A.H. 1339 (October 1920) had presumably been concluded with an eye to joint action against the then independent principality of the Āl ‘Ā'id in the interior of the ‘Asīr. The Āl ‘Ā'id were common enemies of the two contracting parties and moreover were friends of their greater common enemy, King Husayn of the Hijāz (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 288). It may be noted that in October 1920, when this first Najdī-‘Asīrī Agreement had been signed, the Idrīsī had been in possession of Luhayyah but had not yet succeeded the British in the occupation of Hodaydah (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 320-1).

² This resident was a certain Sālih b. ‘Abdu'l-Wāhid, a Yamānī by origin and an enemy of the Imām Yahyā. In August 1928 it was reported that Sālih had arrived in Mecca in company with the Idrīsī Sayyid's Wazīr, in order to consult regarding the possibility of concerted action against the Zaydīs; but even if this report was true, there was nothing to show that anything came of it.

(vi) The Signature of an Agreement between His Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Amīr of Transjordan on the 20th February, 1928.

In a previous volume¹ it has been recorded that, on the 25th May, 1923, the British High Commissioner for Palestine announced at 'Ammān, the capital of Transjordan, that, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty's Government would recognize the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the rule of His Highness the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh, provided that such Government were constitutional and were to place His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments. It has also been recorded that the independence of Transjordan was proclaimed by the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh on the same date; but that, nearly two years later, the British Government intimated that the conditions on which they had undertaken to recognize the independence of Transjordan had not yet been fulfilled.

The obstacles to the fulfilment of these conditions were considerable. In the first place, Transjordan itself was an artificial entity which had only been called into existence by the exigencies or accidents of international politics.² The frontiers which divided the settled districts of Transjordan from the states of Palestine,³ Syria and Jabalu'd-Durūz⁴ were as arbitrary as those which divided the ranges of the Transjordanian Badu from the ranges of the Badu paying allegiance to the Governments of Najd⁵ and Hijāz; and indeed the Transjordan-Hijāz frontier had not yet been delimited, even on paper, by the end of the year 1928.⁶ Moreover the task of government in Transjordan was rendered difficult by the great extent of 'the desert' which was nominally included in the Transjordanian frontiers as compared with 'the sown'—especially in view of the fact that the desert borderland of Transjordan in the Shāmīyah marched with the dominions of Ibn Sa'ūd. A second and quite separate difficulty was

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 362-3.

² See *op. cit.*, pp. 361-2.

³ The state of Palestine must be distinguished from the territory subject to the British Mandate for Palestine, in which the state of Transjordan as well as the state of Palestine was included. (See *op. cit.*, p. 361.)

⁴ For the frontier between Transjordan and Jabalu'd-Durūz, see Section (vi) of this part of the present volume.

⁵ For the delimitation of the frontier between Transjordan and Najd, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 337-46.

⁶ See the present volume, Section (iii) of this part.

the idiosyncrasy of the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh, who tended to govern—like his father King Husayn at Mecca,¹ but unlike his brother Faysal at Baghdad or his brother 'Ali at Jiddah²—in the traditional Islamic style, in which no rigid distinction was drawn between the public administration and the sovereign's personal acts or between the public revenues and the sovereign's privy purse. Thus the post-war régime was unwelcome to the settled inhabitants of Transjordan in two respects; it cut them off from their fellow countrymen in the rest of 'Syria' (in the popular sense of the name);³ and it placed them under a régime which in many ways was retrograde by comparison with that under which they had lived, as Ottoman subjects, since the Ottoman Revolution of 1908 or indeed since the innovations of Sultan Mahmūd II and Mehmed 'Ali Pasha. This post-war régime was accepted by many Transjordanians only under *force majeure* and in the belief that it was an unavoidable state of transition on the way towards better things; and public expressions of discontent were not lacking. For example, in October 1926 the Amīr, under pressure of public opinion, appears to have convened an assembly of notables to prepare an electoral law for a Legislative Council; and in 1927 a memorial⁴ was presented to the Amīr by certain Transjordanian notables⁵ demanding the establishment of a National Representative Council to control public finance and to lay down the bases of administration; the cancellation of the Rutenberg Concession;⁶ an economical conduct of the administration by native Transjordanian officials; the substitution of a responsible Council of Ministers for the existing Executive Council; a constructive agrarian policy; the limitation of military service to Transjordanian subjects; a veto on Jewish immigration;⁷ an effort to dispense with the British subsidy;⁸

¹ For King Husayn's Government at Mecca, 1916–24, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 287–99.

² For King 'Ali's Government at Jiddah, 1924–5, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 299–301.

³ i. e. the whole territory under French and British mandate between Turkey on the north, 'Irāq on the east, Najd-Hijāz on the south, and Egypt and the Mediterranean on the west.

⁴ Précis in *Oriente Moderno*, July 1927, pp. 334–5, quoting *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 29th June, 1927.

⁵ Possibly these were identical with the leaders of the Transjordanian 'People's Party', the formation of which was reported in May 1927.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 381–3.

⁷ This demand might perhaps be held to have been met thereafter by the promulgation of the Transjordan Aliens Law, 1927.

⁸ The total grant-in-aid for the financial year 1924–5 was £E75,632-811, for 1925–6 £E101,358-075, for 1926–7 £E64,350-000 (Report on Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1926 (*Colonial No.* 26 of 1927), p. 67; Report for the year 1927 (*Colonial No.* 31 of 1928), p. 76).

and finally the maintenance in force of Ottoman Law until the proposed Representative Council should be established.

Meanwhile negotiations were taking place between the Amīr ‘Abdu’llāh and the British Government which resulted in the signature of an agreement at Jerusalem on the 20th February, 1928.¹ In the preamble to this instrument, the British undertaking of 1923 was rehearsed; but in the text of the agreement there was no express recognition of Transjordanian independence, while there were a number of provisions which cumulatively might seem almost incompatible with independence—except, perhaps, in the technical sense in which the term was used in British treaties with ‘Trucial Chiefs’ in the Persian Gulf. His Britannic Majesty was to be represented in Transjordan by a British Resident acting on behalf of the High Commissioner for Transjordan,² and communications between His Britannic Majesty and all other Powers on the one hand and the Transjordan Government on the other were to be made through the British Resident and the High Commissioner aforesaid (Art. 1). The powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine were to be exercised in that part of the area under Mandate known as Transjordan by His Highness the Amīr through such constitutional government as was defined and determined in the Organic Law of Transjordan³ and any amendment thereof made with the approval of His Britannic Majesty (Art. 2).⁴ No official of other than Transjordan nationality was to be appointed in Transjordan without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty—the number and conditions of British officials so appointed being left to be regulated by a separate agreement (Art. 3). Transjordanian legislation was to be in conformity with British responsibilities and obligations under the Mandate (Art. 4). The Transjordanian Government were to be guided by the advice of the British Government and

¹ Official English text in the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 3069 of 1928. Italian translation of the English text, with citations from the Arabic text, in *Oriente Moderno*, April 1928, pp. 151–4.

² The intention was that the British High Commissionership for Transjordan should be held by the same person as the High Commissionership for Palestine; and the separate appointment of Lord Plumer to the High Commissionership for Transjordan, in addition to that for Palestine, was duly gazetted on the 24th April, 1928.

³ i. e. a law which did not yet exist but which was in contemplation by the contracting parties.

⁴ In the same article, the boundary between Transjordan and the State (as distinct from the Mandated Territory) of Palestine was described as running down the centres of the Rivers Yarmūk and Jordan, the Dead Sea and the Wādi ‘Arabah from the Syrian frontier to the Gulf of ‘Aqabah, which it was to strike at a point two miles west of ‘Aqabah town.

their representatives in a number of matters so comprehensively enumerated as to leave few important activities of state unaffected (Art. 5). The annual budget law and any other law which concerned matters covered by the agreement or matters falling within any one of eight specific categories (relating to currency, differential treatment of foreigners, jurisdiction over foreigners, the personal interests of the Amīr, or the modification of the future Organic Law) were to be referred to the British Government for their advice (Art. 6). His Britannic Majesty was to be at liberty not merely to maintain armed forces in Transjordan but to raise, organize and control them there, whereas the Amīr was not to do likewise without His Britannic Majesty's consent (Art. 10). The Amīr recognized the principle that the cost of the forces required for the defence of Transjordan was a charge on the revenues of that territory; and it was agreed that, at the coming into force of the agreement, Transjordan should continue to bear one-sixth of the cost of the Transjordan Frontier Force—with an eventual obligation to bear further the excess of the cost of British troops stationed in Transjordan over their cost when stationed at home, as well as the whole cost of any forces raised for Transjordan alone (Art. 11). Meanwhile, the balance of these charges was still to be met by British grants or loans in aid (Art. 12). Martial law was to be proclaimed in Transjordan on the British Government's advice and to be administered by British officers nominated by the British Government (Art. 14). The Amīr agreed to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty in all matters concerning the granting of concessions, the exploitation of natural resources, the construction and operation of railways, and the raising of loans (Art. 17); and also agreed that no territory in Transjordan should be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power (Art. 18).

In addition to these provisions for British control, it was provided that, except by agreement between the two countries, there should be no customs barrier between Palestine and Transjordan; that the customs tariff in Transjordan should be approved by the British Government; that the trade and commerce of Transjordan should receive at Palestinian ports equal facilities with the trade and commerce of Palestine (Art. 7);¹ and that, so far as was consistent with the international obligations of His Britannic Majesty, no obstacle should be placed in the way of the association of Transjordan for

¹ Compare with this article the fiscal arrangements established between the Lebanon, Syria and the other states in the territory assigned under an 'A' Mandate to France, as recorded in the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 360.

customs or other purposes with such neighbouring Arab states as might desire it (Art. 8).

This agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn was questioned from one point of view by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and from a different point of view by Transjordanian public opinion.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, having been informed of the agreement officially by the accredited representatives of the British Government at their Thirteenth Session (12th–29th June, 1928),¹ reported to the Council of the League that, while it was 'in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant and of the Mandate for the Mandatory Power to further the development of self-government, especially in the territories under "A" Mandate', the provision in the agreement that the powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine should be exercised in Transjordan by the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh did not seem to be compatible with the stipulation in the Mandate to the effect that the Mandatory should have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they might be limited by the terms of the Mandate. The question came before the Council on the 1st September, 1928, during its fifty-first session; and after the British view had been stated by the representative of Great Britain, Lord Cushendun, the Council adopted a resolution taking note of a declaration on Lord Cushendun's part that the British Government regarded themselves as responsible to the Council for the application in Transjordan of the Palestine Mandate (with the exception of the articles which were not locally applicable)² and then acknowledging that the agreement of the 20th February, 1928, was in conformity with the principles of the Mandate, 'which remains fully in force'.

In making the declaration above mentioned, Lord Cushendun had suggested that, inasmuch as the Palestine Mandate remained in full force in Transjordan, the situation created by the signature of the agreement of the 20th February, 1928, was not comparable to that created by the signature of the Anglo-'Irāqī treaty of the 10th October, 1922³—a treaty which had been intended to be a substitute for a Mandate and not to implement a Mandate which would still be operative. It was thus the British Government's deliberate policy

¹ For the relevant proceedings of the Commission on the 14th June, 1928, see the *Minutes* of their Thirteenth Session, pp. 42–5.

² For this exception see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 361.

³ See *op. cit.*, p. 467.

to retain, for the time being, a more direct responsibility for, and a closer control over, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh's Government in Transjordan than over King Fayṣal's Government in 'Irāq; and one motive for this policy may have been (like the motive of the Permanent Mandates Commission when it questioned the agreement) a desire to protect the people of Transjordan against possibilities of arbitrary rule or mismanagement of public affairs on the Amīr's part. The politically conscious element in the population of Transjordan was likewise fully alive to these possibilities and likewise anxious to guard against them; but British control was not the form of safeguard which these Transjordanians desired. On the contrary, they were inclined to resent the constitutional restriction upon the independence of Transjordan which was implied in the exercise of the British Mandate, as well as the more personal restraints to which individual liberties might be subject under the arbitrary rule of the Amīr; and hence, instead of viewing the agreement of the 20th February, 1928, as a check imposed by Great Britain, in the interests of the people of Transjordan, upon the Amīr, the Transjordanians were ready to entertain the suggestion that it was an unholy compact concluded over their heads and at their expense—a compact in which the Amīr had bartered away the liberties of the country to Great Britain in order to secure British support for himself, while Great Britain had sacrificed the people's liberties to the Amīr in order to strengthen her hold upon the country for 'imperialistic' ends of her own. Accordingly, the publication of the text of the agreement was followed by a movement of protest throughout Transjordan, and this movement was stimulated when the Amīr sought to quash it. Nor was it appeased when, on the 16th April, 1928, the Amīr promulgated a Constitution;¹ for, while this Constitution provided for the establishment of a Legislative Council with which the legislative power was to be shared by the Amīr (Art. 25), it reserved to the latter extensive powers, including the powers requisite to enable him in all circumstances to carry out his agreement with His Britannic Majesty. Among other things, it constituted him public trustee of all public lands and mineral deposits (Art. 67), with power to lease or even alienate them (Art. 68); it empowered him to proclaim martial law (Art. 69); it empowered him, when the Legislative Council was not in session, to promulgate provisional laws, which need not be submitted subsequently to the Legislative Council if the purpose of them was to insure the fulfilment of obligations imposed upon the Amīr by treaties (Art. 41); and finally it empowered him,

¹ Text, translated from the Arabic, in *Oriente Moderno*, July 1928, pp. 285-92.

at any time within two years of the date of application of the Organic Law, and within the limits of obligations imposed by treaties, to modify the Organic Law itself by proclamation (Art. 70).

On the 25th July, 1928, an unofficial Transjordanian National Congress,¹ assembled at 'Ammān, adopted a 'national pact'² (so named, no doubt, in allusion to the celebrated Turkish National Pact of the 28th January, 1920). This manifesto, after recalling the promises made to the Arabs by Great Britain and the other Allied and Associated Powers during the General War of 1914-18, declared Transjordan a sovereign independent constitutional Arab State; repudiated the British Mandate except in the form of technical assistance³ to be defined in an agreement concluded on a footing of equality and without prejudice to national sovereignty; repudiated the Balfour Declaration regarding a national home in Palestine for the Jews;⁴ repudiated military service imposed by a non-constitutional and non-representative Government; repudiated expenditure for the maintenance of any foreign military forces in the country; and demanded that the Transjordan Government should be both self-sufficing and independent in their finances. Further, with an eye to an electoral law which had been promulgated by the Amīr at the beginning of July, the manifesto declined to recognize as an expression of the national will any elections based on rules which were not in accordance with genuine representation, or based on the principle of the non-responsibility of the Government *vis-à-vis* the Representative Council.

That this 'national pact' had been meant in earnest became manifest when, at the beginning of September 1928, the Government set out to compile electoral registers; for a movement to refrain from registration at once arose and became so widespread and so persistent, in spite of certain restrictive measures that were taken against the promoters of it,⁵ that the Government's effort to bring a Legislative Assembly into being in pursuance of the new Constitution was

¹ For the membership see *Oriente Moderno*, September 1928, pp. 404-5.

² Text in *Oriente Moderno*, September 1928, pp. 405-6, from *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 16th August, 1928.

³ There seems to have been a very real feeling of hostility to the employment in Government service of officials who were not of Transjordanian birth, though this feeling was less marked in the case of foreigners occupying posts which evidently required technical qualifications.

⁴ See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, Pt. III B, Section (ii).

⁵ The Amīr's principal complaints against the leaders of the opposition were that their funds had been partly subscribed from a source outside Transjordan, that is, by the Syrian National Party, and that, in their political campaign, they were arousing the fears of the peasantry on a false pretence

seriously embarrassed in the initial stage. The Government retaliated by confining the President and Secretary of the National Congress to their houses, promulgating a law on exile and expulsion,¹ and forbidding any Transjordanian official to take in more than one political newspaper. Nevertheless, the opposition to the agreement of the 20th February, 1928, and to the Constitution of the 16th April was still continuing at the end of the year; and by that time it was expressing itself in a movement for the reunion of Transjordan with Syria—the country to which it had belonged not only under the Ottoman régime but also in the days of the short-lived Arab National State, with its capital at Damascus, which had existed from November 1918 to July 1920. The ultimate objective was an Arab Federation embracing not only Syria and Transjordan but also Palestine, 'Irāq and perhaps other Asiatic Arab countries.

(vii) The Suppression of the Insurrection in the French Mandated Territory and the Consequences on the Border between Jabalu'd-Durūz and Transjordan (1926–8).

In a previous volume,² some account has been given of the insurrection in the French mandated territory from its outbreak in the summer of 1925 down to the reoccupation by the French forces of Suwaydā, the chief town in the Jabalu'd-Durūz, on the 25th April, 1926, and of Salkhad, the second town in the Jabal, on the 3rd June.³ This time, the French retained their hold on the territory in which the insurrection had originated and from which its main driving force had been drawn. Before the end of the year 1926, the French military governor of the Jabal reorganized a native Druse administration recruited from elements amenable to the authority of the Mandatory Power;⁴ and although, in January 1927, insurgent guerrilla bands were still operating in certain other parts of the mandated territory,⁵ these had already been more or less effectively expelled by that date from the Ghūtah (the Damascus oasis), while the Lajāh (the boulder-strewn volcanic wilderness between the Ghūtah and the Jabalu'd-

that the Government intended to introduce conscription. Some of the organizers of the political boycott were confined to their own villages; others were brought in to 'Ammān by order of the Government (though these were allowed to return to their homes after giving the Amīr assurances of their goodwill). One person was placed for a time under police supervision, and one was placed in forced residence at 'Aqabah.

¹ Summary in *Oriente Moderno*, November 1928, pp. 529–30.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (vii) (e) and (f).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 451.

⁴ For details see *Oriente Moderno*, November–December 1926, p. 595.

⁵ For their organization see *Oriente Moderno*, March 1927, pp. 125–6.

Durūz) was likewise cleared by a French column on the 30th March—1st April, 1927. Thereafter, the only points within the borders of the French mandated territory where insurgent forces of any consequence still remained in being appear to have been Jabalu's-Safā' (another volcanic wilderness, situated east of Damascus on the fringe of the Shāmīyah steppe) and the Jabalu'z-Zāwīyah (east of Aleppo). By the summer of 1927, peace had been so far restored that the military régime under which the City of Damascus had been living for two years was relaxed. On the 17th February, 1928, a decree of the French High Commissioner granted a general amnesty to insurgents throughout the mandated territory who had already submitted or who should submit within the next thirty days; and that period of grace was subsequently prolonged first for six and then for thirty days more. This amnesty was extended to nine persons at that time undergoing internment on the island of Arwād (Aradus). On the other hand thirty-nine persons—including Sultānu'l-Atrash and Dr. 'Abdu'r-Rahmān Shāhbandar—who had been previously convicted by the French authorities of political offences, were excluded from the amnesty by name.¹

With the proclamation of this amnesty, the insurrection may be said to have come to an end. The negotiations between the people of the mandated territory and Monsieur Ponsot, who succeeded Monsieur de Jouvenel as French High Commissioner on the 27th August, 1926,² with a view to the introduction of an agreed organic statute in place of the régime which the Mandatory Power had hitherto imposed by force, will be recorded in a later volume. In this place it is only necessary to complete the history of the insurrection by noting the effects which the French reoccupation of the Jabalu'd-Durūz in the summer of 1926 produced on the other side of the frontier between the territories mandated respectively to France and to Great Britain.

When the French troops reoccupied the homes of the Druse insurgents in the Jabal, those Druses who followed Sultānu'l-Atrash's lead in still attempting to keep up a guerrilla warfare now sent their women and children across the border to Qasru'l-Azraq—an oasis in the Shāmīyah, towards the north-western extremity of the Wādi Sirhān, which lay on the British side of the boundary between the French and British mandated territories as laid down in the Franco-

¹ Eighteen of these political offenders excluded from the amnesty were nationals of the State of Syria, thirteen were nationals of the State of Jabalu'd-Durūz, six of the Lebanon and two of the 'Alawī State. There was a separate list of ordinary criminal offenders who were likewise excluded from the amnesty.

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 457.

British Agreement of 1920,¹ and on the Transjordanian side of the boundary between Transjordan and the Najd, as laid down in the Haddā Agreement of the 2nd November, 1925.² Before the end of the year 1926, more than two thousand Druse refugees, mostly women and children, had gathered at this point in the British mandated territory. Here they were allowed by the mandatory authorities to remain under the supervision of a police officer and the protection of a limited number of their own armed men; and 'positive assurances' were given by Sultānu'l-Atrash and his comrades in arms 'that the hospitality accorded to their women in Transjordan would not be abused by them'. The British mandatory authorities, however, had information that Druse combatants had 'occasionally visited and remained concealed in the oasis'; and this placed the representatives of the Mandatory Power in an embarrassing position.³ On the one hand, it exposed them to suspicion of neglecting to secure the strict fulfilment in Transjordan of the obligations of neutrality towards the neighbouring Mandatory Power at a time when that Power was in difficulties; and this suspicion might readily arise in French minds owing to the traditional rivalry between Great Britain and France in that part of the world—a tradition which had been strong enough to produce considerable local tension during the time between the inter-Allied occupation of Syria in the autumn of 1918 and the French conquest of the interior by General Gouraud in the summer of 1920. On the other hand, the British authorities were deterred from undertaking a forcible evacuation of the refugees, partly by the humane consideration that the oasis of Al-Azraq was their last asylum, and partly perhaps by regard for the fact that the oasis, though displayed on official maps as situated in a corridor of territory under British mandate, was in fact virtually a no-man's-land in which the State of Transjordan, to which it nominally belonged, had not yet exerted its authority. In these circumstances the Druse insurgents were warned that if they continued to transgress the recognized conditions of hospitality, either forcible evacuation or some other effective measure of prevention would be taken; and in 1927, 'to prevent the use of this territory as a base for hostile operations against the Syrian forces, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh placed the oasis and its environs under martial law, and a detachment of the Royal Air Force and the Transjordan Frontier Force assumed control. Seven hundred refugees were repatriated, under generous terms of amnesty offered by the High

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 347.

² See *op. cit.*, p. 343.

³ See the Report on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1926 (*Colonial No. 26 of 1927*), pp. 66-7.

Commissioner for Syria; a few Druses were allowed to remain, to work the salt deposits; and the intransigent remainder, under Sultānu'l-Atrash, were expelled from Transjordan and sought asylum in Najd.¹ Sultānu'l-Atrash and three or four of his comrades appear, in fact, to have been excepted from the amnesty which the French authorities offered to the remainder.² The Wahhābī Governor of the Wādī Sirhān was reported to have welcomed Sultān and his fellow-exiles in Ibn Sa'ūd's name, assigned them camping-grounds between Kāf (Qura-yātu'l-Milh) and Jawf, and made some provision for their needs.

Meanwhile, before the end of 1926, other Druse refugees had gathered at Mafrāq on the Hijāz Railway, just inside the Transjordanian frontier, whence they had either passed on into Palestine or returned to the French mandated territory eventually. From Damascus, also, many refugees had entered Transjordan, settled in the larger villages and established themselves there in trade. This was another instance of the way in which the various upheavals in the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire were causing the local Arab populations to intermingle and so possibly paving the way for their ultimate national consolidation.³

The restoration of French authority up to the border between the French mandated territory and Transjordan also led to some trouble between the French and the native Transjordanians. 'Towards the end of the summer [of 1926], a company of the Transjordan Frontier Force, stationed in the neighbourhood of the northern frontier [of Transjordan], frustrated an incipient movement to form bands for the purpose of raiding into Syria.'⁴ In 1927, 'a misunderstanding as to the *de facto* administrative boundary, which' was 'not entirely superimposed on that laid down in the Anglo-French Convention of 1920. led to a collision of Banu Sakhr tribesmen and Syrian troops, in which the Banu Sakhr suffered some casualties. The establishment of cholera control posts near the Syrian frontier was also complicated by uncertainty as to the boundary.'⁵ In commenting on this report in an audience of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the 26th June, 1928, the accredited representative of the French Government

¹ Report on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1927 (*Colonial No.* 31 of 1928), p. 74.

² See p. 329 above.

³ Other instances were the migration (recorded just above) of Sultānu'l-Atrash and his fellow Druses from the Jabalu'd-Durūz to the Najd in 1927; the migration of an intransigent section of the Shammar from the Jabal Shammar in Najd to the Jazirah in North West 'Irāq in 1921 (*Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 330-1); and the translation of the two Hāshimī princes Faysal and 'Abdu'l-lāh b. Husayn from the Hijāz to 'Irāq and Transjordan respectively.

⁴ *Colonial No.* 26 of 1927, p. 67.

⁵ *Colonial No.* 31 of 1928, p. 74.

recalled the fact that, between the River Yarmūk and the River Tigris, the boundary between the French and British mandated territories 'had only been roughly determined under the agreement of the 23rd December, 1920, by geographical points which, however, were quite definite;' and he submitted that one of these points, Imtān, where the line skirted the southern spurs of the Jabalu'd-Durūz, lay considerably to the north of the limits of the country that actually belonged to the Druses by usufruct. At the same time he testified that 'there was no difficulty between the French and British authorities on the two sides of the boundary'.

In the summer of 1928, the French and British frontier posts on this sector of the border were both stationed in the village of Umm Jamāl, about twenty-five miles south of Salkhad.

(viii) The Franco-Turkish Controversy over the Delimitation of the Syro-Turkish Frontier after the Signature of the 'de Jouvenel Agreement' on the 30th May, 1926.

In a previous volume¹ the history of this controversy has been carried down to the signature at Angora, on the 30th May, 1926, of the Convention of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between France and Turkey which had already been initialled at the same place on the 18th February of that year. In this convention² it had been agreed (Art. 2) that, within a period of two months from its entry into force, a Franco-Turkish Commission specially appointed for the purpose should proceed to effect the delimitation of the frontier in accordance with the boundaries named in Article 8 of the treaty signed at Angora on the 20th October, 1921,³ with due reference to such further definition or adaptation as might ensue from a Protocol of Delimitation which was attached to the new convention as Annex 1. In this Protocol, certain readjustments of frontier in favour of Turkey, as against the territory mandated to France, were agreed upon in the western part of the zone between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates, particularly in the Pāyās and Killis sectors.⁴ On the other hand, east of Chobān Bey, a station on the Baghdad Railway between Aleppo and the bridge over the Euphrates at Jarāblūs, the 'Franklin-Bouillon line' was reaffirmed in the new Protocol. From the station of Chobān Bey to Nīsībīn, the frontier was to follow the Baghdad Railway, of which the track as far as Nīsībīn was to remain Turkish

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (viii).

² Text of the convention and its annexes in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. liv, pp. 195-229.

³ i.e., the so-called 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' (see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 457).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 461.

territory—the stations and sidings in the section between Chobān Bey and Nīsībīn and all the existing installations employed in the working of the line being assigned to Turkey on the ground that they formed part of the railway track.¹ From Nīsībīn to Jeziret Ibn 'Umar the frontier was to 'follow the old road' between the former of these two places and the latter, where it was to join the Tigris. This road was to be identified by the Boundary Commission and to be traced out by them on the spot. The localities of Nīsībīn and Jeziret Ibn 'Umar were to remain Turkish, but the two countries were to have the same rights to the use of the road. In a note addressed by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tefvīk Rüşdi Beğ, to the French Ambassador to Turkey, Monsieur Sarraut, on the 31st May, 1926, with reference to certain points in the convention which these two gentlemen had signed on behalf of their respective countries on the preceding day, it was agreed that, in addition to one French and one Turkish member, the Delimitation Commission should include a President chosen from among the nationals of a third Power; and that, 'should the two High Contracting Parties fail to agree in the matter, the Danish Government' should 'be requested, at the instance of the more diligent Party, to appoint one of its nationals, the two Parties agreeing in advance to accept this choice'.

A request to this effect was duly made; the Danish Government responded by appointing one of its officers, General Ernst; and under his presidency the Delimitation Commission started work before the end of the year 1926 and remained at work during 1927. They appear to have found little difficulty in delimiting the western sector, where concessions to Turkish desiderata had been embodied in the protocol, and the central sector, where the frontier was to follow the Baghdad Railway. Their real difficulties began beyond the rail-head at Nīsībīn; for in the eastern sector, which extended from that point to Jeziret Ibn 'Umar, they no longer had, to guide them, the permanent way of a railway which was still 'a going concern', but were instructed to identify the track of a road which had been built by the Romans and which had remained out of repair since the decline and fall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. This was not so much a diplomatist's or a surveyor's task as an archaeologist's; and archaeology was a science notoriously fertile in controversies. Accordingly, when the Commission arrived at this last sector in the course of its work, the Danish President, it appears, very prudently² asked his French and Turkish

¹ Special arrangements were laid down for the joint use of the river port of Jarāblūs and the branch line connecting it with the Baghdad Railway.

² Disagreement between the French and Turkish Commissioners in regard

colleagues to undertake in advance that, in case of disagreement with one another, they would accept the solution recommended by him. The French Commissioner appears to have assented to this request without reservations, whereas the Turkish Commissioner appears to have confined himself to pointing out that the opinion of the President, supported by one of the Commissioners, would be the opinion of the majority of the Commission—without expressly committing himself to the inference that the expression of such a majority opinion would be tantamount to a regular decision of the Commission which, under the terms of the convention, would have to be put into effect.¹ Thereupon, General Ernst's expectations were fulfilled. The Commission set out to identify 'the old road'; the French and Turkish Commissioners found themselves in favour of two different alignments; and on the 10th January, 1928, the Commission, by a majority vote, decided in favour of an alignment virtually coincident with the French Commissioner's line.² Thereupon, the Turkish Commissioner refused to accept the decision resulting from the vote of his French and Danish colleagues; and the Turkish Government declined to recognize the decision of the majority of the Commission as being a valid decision of the Commission itself.³ Thereafter, the Turkish Government seem to have intimated to the French Government their desire for a resumption of direct diplomatic negotiations on the outstanding point at issue.

The fact was that the more southerly line which the Turks claimed as the true alignment of 'the old road' had been occupied by Turkish forces as far back as October 1922;⁴ that a Turkish advance post had even been established, south of the line claimed as the correct frontier,

to the Nisibin-Jeziret Ibn 'Umar sector appears to have revealed itself as early as the spring of 1927, at a time when General Ernst was absent in Europe on leave.

¹ For this account of General Ernst's request and of his colleagues' respective replies, see *Le Temps*, 1st December, 1928.

² For details see *Oriente Moderno*, February 1928, pp. 54-5.

³ According to the Turkish Government's view, the decision which they refused to accept had not been rendered by the Commission in due form but was a would-be arbitral decision on the part of the President which his terms of reference did not empower him to render. They maintained that the Commission, as such, had not taken the first step laid down in the protocol, which was to identify 'the old road', and that therefore no basis yet existed for making any finding in regard to the *tracé* of the frontier. Compare the Turkish attitude over the Mosul Boundary Award, as recorded in the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 490-4.

⁴ That is, immediately after the expulsion of the Greek Army from Western Anatolia had liberated the Turkish Army for other tasks, and after a first Franco-Turkish Delimitation Commission had failed, in July 1922, to agree on this sector of the frontier.

in May 1923; and that the Turks were unwilling to recede from territory of which they were in possession *de facto*.

The *impasse* created by this rejection of a decision which had been taken by the majority of the Delimitation Commission continued during the year 1928; and meanwhile a new element of danger was introduced into the local situation in the disputed territory. The Turkish Government represented that raids were being made into Turkish territory from Syrian territory by a Kurdish Cheteh, 'Osmān Agha Hājō, at the instigation of the French authorities—a charge to which the French replied by pointing out that the territory in question was the disputed territory, which the French Government regarded as being a part of Syria unlawfully held under Turkish occupation in defiance of the Delimitation Commission's award; that Hājō and his followers were inhabitants of the disputed territory whom the Turks had been seeking to expel into territory under French occupation;¹ and that in these circumstances it was unreasonable to demand that the French authorities should take any responsibility for Hājō's actions. Hājō himself appears to have stated that, during the Kurdish Revolt of 1925,² he had taken the Turkish Government's side, but that he had afterwards become convinced that the Turks were aiming at the extermination of the Kurds and that this had led him to take up arms in self-defence, which he had done in the spring of 1926.³ He also stated that he and his fellow Kurdish refugees in the French mandated territory had no faith in Turkish offers of amnesty, and that they desired to settle permanently beyond the Turkish frontiers.

It may be recalled that already, during the decade immediately antecedent to the General War of 1914–18, when the potentially fertile lowlands between the Amanus and Anti-Taurus on the north and the Syrian Steppe on the south were being opened up by the advance of the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo to Nisibīn, there was a certain influx of Kurdish settlers from the relatively barren highlands; and in the period after the War, when the highlands had been separated from the lowlands by the new frontier between the Turkish Republic and the territory mandated to France, and when the new

¹ Hājō's tribesmen were the Haverkī Kurds of the Tūr 'Abdīn district (Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1926 [*Colonial No. 29 of 1927*], p. 16).

² For the Kurdish Revolt of 1925 in the eastern vilayets of Turkey, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi) (e).

³ 'Hājō and his tribesmen, after a few initial successes, were routed and driven southwards into Syria. He pressed for permission to come into 'Irāq but was dissuaded by the stringent terms which the 'Irāq Government purposely offered him.' (*Colonial No. 29 of 1927*, *loc. cit.*)

régime in Turkey had set itself to denationalize the Kurdish population within the new Turkish frontiers, the former economic motives for Kurdish migration were reinforced by political motives of a far more compelling character. Owing to this movement of migration, which attained considerable dimensions after the suppression of the Kurdish Revolt in the eastern provinces of Turkey in 1925, the northern fringe of the French mandated territory was becoming, by the year 1928, a second Kurdish national home, in addition to the home which the Kurds had retained under the British aegis in the north-eastern corner of the Kingdom of 'Irāq in virtue of the Mosul Boundary settlement of 1925-6.¹ In a previous volume,² it has been suggested that the tenacity with which the Turks maintained their claim to the Mosul Vilayet was largely due to a fear that, if the Kurdish population of that territory were left free to develop their national life outside the frontiers of Turkey under a liberal régime, that development might endanger the success of the policy of denationalizing the Kurdish population inside the frontiers of Turkey—a policy on which the Turkish Government were obstinately bent. The same consideration might explain the Turkish refusal to accept the Delimitation Commission's decision regarding the much smaller piece of territory that was in dispute between Turkey and Syria.

On the 1st November, 1928, President Mustafa Kemal declared in the Chamber of Deputies at Angora that it was necessary to find an effective, practical and radical solution of the Franco-Turkish frontier controversy, and that with this object fresh negotiations had just been started between the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüşdi Beğ, and the new French Ambassador at Angora, Count de Chambrun. Before the end of that month, however, it was reported that these negotiations had reached a deadlock, and this was still the situation at the close of the year.

Note on the Delimitation of the Turco-'Irāqī Frontier.

While the Turco-Syrian Frontier Delimitation Commission failed to arrive at a unanimous decision, with the result that an agreed settlement of this frontier was delayed, the work of the Turco-'Irāqī Frontier Delimita-

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 506-7 and 521. It may be noted that the Kurdish population in the northern fringes of 'Irāq was also being reinforced simultaneously by Kurdish refugees from Turkey. The British authorities in 'Irāq pressed the Turkish authorities, without success, to allow these refugees to return to their homes on the Turkish side of the frontier. (*Colonial No. 29* of 1926, pp. 16 and 20). By the end of 1927, all but about 450 of the refugees had contrived to return to their homes by one means or another (Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1927 [*Colonial No. 35* of 1928], p. 25).

² *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 491-2.

tion Commission was attended with greater success. 'The Mixed Commission charged under the Treaty of Angora¹ with the task of tracing on the ground the frontier set forth in Article 1 of that treaty began its work in March 1927. The President appointed by the President of the Swiss Republic was Monsieur C. F. Baeschlin, Professor of Geodesy at the École Polytechnic of Zurich. . . . The Commission assembled for their first meeting at Mosul on the 19th March. . . . The work of delimitation was finished on the 9th September, and the Commission held their last meeting on the 23rd September. . . . With the agreement of the two delegations, several small deviations were made from the line laid down in the treaty. These and all other decisions were made on a unanimous vote, excepting . . . two . . . which were adopted by a majority against the Turkish delegation, who opposed them.'² The fact that a frontier approximately 235 miles long, running through mountainous and difficult country, had been delimited on the ground by agreement within a period of six months and four days, showed how greatly the political tension had diminished in an area which, from 1918 to 1926, had been one of the worst danger zones in the Middle East.

(ix) The Regulation of the Frontier between 'Irāq and Syria (1926-8).

In a previous volume,³ the history of the Syro-'Irāqī frontier has been recorded down to March and April 1926, when the Syrian section of the Northern Shammar⁴ raided the 'Irāqī section and were routed on 'Irāqī territory by a patrol of British armoured cars.⁵ The feud between these two wings of the Northern Shammar was only one of several transfrontier tribal feuds by which the peace of the Syro-'Irāqī border was disturbed, and in 1926 an effort was made by the French and British mandatory authorities to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the frontier régime. 'At the close of March Colonel Vincent, the French High Commissioner's Chef du Cabinet Militaire, came to Baghdad to discuss a number of questions touching the mutual interests of Syria and 'Irāq. As the result of this visit, agreements for the treatment of frontier tribes, the extradition of offenders,

¹ For this treaty, which was signed on the 5th June, 1926, on behalf of Turkey of the one part and of Great Britain and 'Irāq of the other, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 527-8.

² Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1927 (*Colonial No. 35 of 1928*), p. 52.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (ix).

⁴ i.e. the Shammar who had been split off from the main body of their fellow-tribesmen in Najd and been driven into the northern fringes of the Syrian and Mesopotamian steppes by the impact of the 'Anazah in the seventeenth century after Christ (*op. cit.*, p. 326). They must not be confused with the Shammar who took refuge in 'Irāq in 1921 after the conquest of the Jabal Shammar by the Wahhābīs.

⁵ For further details of this encounter see the Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1926 (*Colonial No. 29 of 1927*), p. 23.

traffic in antiquities and the regulation of motor traffic between the two countries were drafted and . . . formed the basis of subsequent negotiations. It was decided that, for various reasons, these agreements when concluded should be regarded as provisional.¹ The provisional agreement for the prevention of illicit traffic in antiquities was signed on the 11th October, 1926.² In the matter of transfrontier tribal feuds, there were two meetings, at the turn of the years 1926 and 1927, between the French *Délégué* stationed at Dayru'z-Zūr and the British Administrative Inspector stationed at Mosul; and the outcome was the convocation on the 8th April, 1927, at 'Anah on the Euphrates, of a general meeting of tribal chiefs from both sides of the frontier. At this meeting, outstanding issues were referred to a mixed court of chiefs, under the presidency of the Syrian Governor of the Dayru'z-Zūr Province or the 'Irāqī Governor of the Dulaym province, according to the nationality of the plaintiffs in each case. 'Guided by the court and their own common sense, the Shaykhs of the tribes concerned very quickly came to the conclusion that to bury all claims for raids which had occurred up to the time of the meeting was the only way to settle their quarrels;³ and on this basis undertakings to live in the future on friendly terms were drawn up and signed by seven pairs of formerly hostile tribes or tribal groups.⁴ 'These undertakings were well honoured by all concerned up to the end of the year' 1927, except for one or two incidents that occurred in the autumn between the rival branches of the Northern Shammar; 'but before the year closed the High Commissioners in 'Irāq and Syria had, in direct correspondence, gone far towards reaching agreement on a common policy for dealing with this matter.'⁵ The British Government, however, in their report on the administration of 'Irāq for the year 1927, observed⁶ that

although good will and co-operation of the two Governments are excellent palliatives for the disorders which occur, they do not touch the roots of the age-old feuds and customs of the bedouin, which will perhaps only be eradicated when the tribes of the desert at last surrender to the influence of the foreign civilisation which is now rapidly encircling them.

The modification and delimitation of the frontier-line between Syria and 'Irāq was still under discussion between the French and British Governments in 1928.⁷

¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

² Text in *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³ Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for 1927 (*Colonial No. 35 of 1928*), p. 59.

⁴ List in *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 60. See also the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 464-6.

(x) The Signature of a Treaty between Great Britain and ‘Irāq on the 14th December, 1927.

‘Under the treaty concluded at Baghdad in January 1926,¹ the duration of the special relations between Great Britain and ‘Irāq (as defined in the Anglo-‘Irāqī Treaty of 1922²) was extended for a maximum period of twenty-five years. Under Article 3 of the treaty the British Government undertook that the question of ‘Irāq’s admission to the League of Nations would be examined by them in August 1928 and thereafter at subsequent successive intervals of four years. The question of ‘Irāq’s entry into the League formed the subject of discussions between King Faysal and the High Commissioner in the spring of 1927, in which the Head of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office also took part during his visit to Baghdad between the 19th March and the 2nd April. Subsequently, the matter was examined by the British Cabinet, and in July the High Commissioner was authorized to inform the ‘Irāq Government that it was the intention of His Britannic Majesty’s Government to take up with the League of Nations in 1932³ the question of ‘Irāq’s admission, provided that all went well in the interval and [that] the present rate of progress in ‘Irāq was maintained.

‘The discussions at Baghdad had proceeded on the assumption that, prior to the admission of ‘Irāq into the League, a new treaty would be concluded between Great Britain and ‘Irāq to regulate their subsequent relations, and that this treaty would be based on the altered status which ‘Irāq would have then acquired as a fellow member of the League. The question of the form that such a treaty might take had therefore also been discussed concurrently with that of the entry of ‘Irāq into the League; . . . but, whether or not ‘Irāq was admitted to the League, there was no *prima facie* obstacle to the revision at any time of the terms of the treaty of 1922, an article of which expressly provided that nothing should ‘prevent the High Contracting Parties from revising its provisions from time to time.

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 523-4.—A.J.T.

² See *op. cit.*, Part III, Section (x), pp. 466-71.—A.J.T.

³ This decision to take up the question in 1932 and not in 1928 caused considerable disappointment in ‘Irāq. It may be conjectured that one of the considerations which moved the British Government was the probability that, if they had decided to take up the question of ‘Irāq’s admission to the League at the earlier date, the application might have been opposed by at least two States Members, that is, France and Persia. They may also have felt that the Council of the League might suspect them of rather sharp practice if they advocated a termination of the mandatory relationship so soon after securing a favourable decision in the Mosul controversy by extending that relationship for a maximum period of as much as twenty-five years.—A.J.T.

When the 'Irāq Government were informed that the British Government would not agree to recommend to the League of Nations that 'Irāq should be admitted as a member in 1928, they expressed a desire to continue the discussion for the revision of the treaty, with a view to making a further advance in the direction of complete independence. Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner, left Baghdad for London on leave on the 7th July, and had an opportunity of discussing the whole question with Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, before he started on his tour round the British Dominions. As a result the British Government informed King Faysal that they were examining the possibility of revising the treaty of 1922 and that it might be convenient if he were sufficiently within reach during the summer to be consulted personally on points that might arise. King Faysal willingly accepted this suggestion and, having left Baghdad on the 6th August, arrived at Aix before the end of the month. Two members of the staff of the Colonial Office soon after visited His Majesty at Aix and ascertained his views on the subject of the revision of the treaty, and in September the King, having summoned his Prime Minister, Ja'far Pasha, from Baghdad, despatched him to London to remain in touch with the Colonial Office.

In October the British Government decided to open formal negotiations for the conclusion of a revised treaty with 'Irāq, and Sir Henry Dobbs was entrusted with the conduct of the discussions on behalf of the British Government, while King Faysal nominated Ja'far Pasha to act on behalf of 'Irāq. Ja'far Pasha was assisted by Ra'ūf Beg Chadirchī, the 'Irāq Minister for Justice, and Muzāhim Beg Pashachī, the 'Irāq Diplomatic Agent in London. King Faysal himself also came from Aix to London to keep in close touch with the 'Irāq Delegation. The first formal meeting of the representatives of the two Governments to discuss the new treaty was held on the 25th October. The negotiations lasted a little over a month and, agreement having been reached early in December, the King and the High Commissioner were able to leave London for Baghdad, where they arrived on the 15th December. The new treaty was signed in London, on the 14th December, by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby Gore (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies). It was agreed, however, that the treaty should not be ratified, and consequently would not become operative, until the revision of the military and financial agreements had been completed and all three instruments had been approved by the Council of the League.¹

¹ Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the year 1927 (*Colonial No. 35 of 1928*), pp. 15-16.

The text of the Anglo-‘Irāqī Treaty¹ of the 14th December, 1927, is printed in full in the appendix to the present volume and therefore need not be analysed here. It need merely be noted that the new instrument did not differ greatly in purport from the two treaties of the 10th October, 1922, and the 13th January, 1926, which it was explicitly declared to replace and which were to cease to have effect when the new instrument entered into force (treaty of the 14th December, 1927, Art. 16). Perhaps the most important new feature was the pledge that, ‘provided the present rate of progress in ‘Irāq’ were ‘maintained and all’ were to go ‘well in the interval, His Britannic Majesty’ would ‘support the candidature of ‘Irāq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932’ (Art. 8). It may be added that the relations maintained between the British and ‘Irāqī Governments through the medium of the British High Commissioner in Baghdad were described, in the new instrument (Art. 5), in terms that were studiously consonant with the British Government’s recognition of ‘Irāq as an independent sovereign state (Art. 1).²

It was no secret that the ‘Irāqīs had hoped for something more than this; and at one moment the negotiations in London had been within an ace of breaking down. Indeed, on King Faysal’s instructions, Ja‘far Pasha had actually left London *en route* for Baghdad; and it was only after this, at the eleventh hour, that an informal conversation which the King had with certain British Cabinet Ministers enabled him to see the situation in a new light—with the result that Ja‘far Pasha was recalled to London from Marseilles by telegram and the negotiations were resumed, this time with success. As it was, the new treaty was coldly received in ‘Irāq, and the publication of the text in Baghdad on the 20th December was immediately followed by the resignation of two members of Ja‘far Pasha’s Cabinet. After Ja‘far Pasha’s return to Baghdad, he and his whole Ministry resigned office on the 9th January, 1928; but the main reason for this seems

¹ i.e. the English text published in Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2998 of 1927.

² In June 1927, at an official banquet given by King Faysal at Baghdad, the British High Commissioner had recited the following passage from the written instructions that he had received from His Britannic Majesty’s Government in Great Britain, when he had been originally appointed High Commissioner nearly five years earlier:

‘The basic principle underlying the relations between the two Governments is co-operation towards a common end, namely, the progressive establishment of an independent Government of ‘Irāq, friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligation to His Britannic Majesty’s Government. There is no question of His Britannic Majesty’s Government pursuing a policy with any other object in view.’ (*Colonial No.* 35 of 1928, p. 11).

to have been disapproval, not of the new Anglo-‘Irāqī treaty, but of the postponement of the question of compulsory military service.¹ On the 17th February, 1928, Ja‘far Pasha was appointed by King Faysal to be ‘Irāqī Diplomatic Agent in London in succession to Muzāhim Beg Pashachī—a frank opponent of the treaty, though not of friendship between ‘Irāq and Great Britain on any footing that he could regard as being one of true equality.²

Meanwhile, the ratification of the treaty of the 14th December, 1927, waited upon the negotiation of two separate though complementary instruments which were contemplated in the treaty itself (Arts. 12 and 13): a financial agreement to supersede that of the 25th March, 1924, and a military agreement to supersede that of the same date just mentioned.³ These supplementary negotiations had not yet been carried to completion by the end of the year 1928.

(xi) Perso-‘Irāqī Relations (1926–8).⁴

Perso-‘Irāqī relations during these years fell under three heads: first, the régime along the frontier; second, the régime in the Shattu’l-‘Arab and third the interrelated questions of the non-recognition of ‘Irāq by Persia and the status of persons domiciled in ‘Irāq who were of Persian origin.

Frontier relations tended to improve as the two Governments succeeded in asserting their authority more effectively over the Kurd and Lur tribesmen in the Zagros ranges through which the frontier ran; and inter-governmental co-operation was promoted by meetings of officials from either side at Khānaqīn in March 1926 and at Qasr-i-Shīrīn in July 1927. On the 9th July, 1927, at the instance of the British High Commissioner in ‘Irāq, a section of the ‘Irāqī Pizhder tribe, which was accustomed to migrate annually for a season into Persian territory, came to an understanding with the local Persian authorities regarding conditions of sojourn on Persian soil. In August 1927 a Perso-‘Irāqī Mixed Commission settled a long-standing controversy over the division of the water of the Gangir River

¹ Since this question was an internal affair of ‘Irāq, the history of it falls outside the scope of this *Survey*.

² For Muzāhim Beg’s outlook on Anglo-‘Irāqī relations see two interviews, one in *The Times* of the 18th February, 1928, and the other in *The Daily Express* of London, 17th February, 1928.

³ For the Anglo-‘Irāqī financial and military agreements of the 25th March, 1924, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 468.

⁴ The information in this section is taken mainly from the Report on the Administration of ‘Irāq for the year 1926 (*Colonial No. 29 of 1927*), pp. 24–8, and the Report for 1927 (*Colonial No. 35 of 1928*), pp. 61–3.

between the Persian district of Sawmar and the ‘Irāqī district of Mandali. In 1926 the ‘Irāq Government were embarrassed by the activities of a pretender to the Persian throne—Abu’l-Fath Mirzā Qājār, Salar Ad-Dawlah—who, in spite of the ‘Irāq Government’s precautions, succeeded in making his way in disguise across ‘Irāqī territory from Bayrūt to the Persian frontier, raised a revolt among the Avrumān Kurds, was driven back over the ‘Irāq frontier again by Rizā Shāh’s forces in October, and was discovered and arrested in the ‘Arbil district by the ‘Irāqī police on the 31st of that month. Almost simultaneously a Persian Kurdish chieftain, Ismā’il Shakkak (‘Simko’)¹ rebelled against the Persian Government, likewise suffered defeat, and made his way across a corner of Turkey into the Rowānduz district of ‘Irāq. Salar Ad-Dawlah was disposed of under an arrangement by which the Persian Government were to provide for payment of his debts and to give him a subsistence allowance on condition that he would live under police supervision at Haifa; and on these terms he left Baghdad on the 23rd June, 1927. To dispose of ‘Simko’ and his band was less easy, for the ‘Irāqī Government were unwilling to extradite him on the ground that he was a political and not a criminal offender; and ‘Simko’ was unwilling to accept the offer of a pardon and an estate from the Persian Government except on condition that the estate should be situate in his old haunts. He had the advantage of being still at large in the Kurdish highlands; and at the end of 1928, when he had made his asylum in the Rowānduz district unsafe for its native inhabitants, he was reported to have rejected a second offer of an estate outside the highlands—this time on the part of the Government of ‘Irāq. ‘Simko’s’ predilection for the Rowānduz district may have been due to the fact that during the years 1926 and 1927 the Persian and ‘Irāqī Governments were actively engaged, on the Persian Government’s initiative, in opening up a motor route through this very district from Tabriz in Persia to the nearest terminus of the ‘Irāq railways at Kirkūk.

The régime in the Shattu’l-‘Arab was governed by the terms of the Erzerūm Treaty of 1847, to which effect had been given in the findings of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1914, which had fixed the frontier on the Shatt, up-stream from a point two miles below Fao, at low-water-line on the east bank. Thus the whole waterway above that point had been recognized as being subject to the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire and had since become subject to the

¹ Or ‘Semīqō’ or ‘Semitqu’. For some of ‘Simko’s’ previous exploits see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 538-9. In *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, he was erroneously reported killed—not for the first time.

jurisdiction of 'Irāq as the 'successor state' of the Ottoman Empire in this quarter.¹ The effect of this arrangement was that the Persian navigable waters of the River Kārūn, which debouched into the Shatt just below Muḥammarah, were only accessible from the Persian Gulf via the territorial waters of a foreign country. The apparent anomaly of this arrangement was mitigated by the consideration that, whereas Persia possessed other alternative outlets on the Gulf, the navigable channel of the Shatt was the only line of access from 'Irāq to the open sea between Persian territory on the one side and Kuwaytī territory on the other. Nor had any serious trouble arisen in practice so long as 'Irāq's immediate neighbour *de facto* on the eastern bank of the Shatt had been Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammarah, whose subordination to the sovereignty of the Persian Government at Tihrān had been only nominal.² The situation changed when Rizā Shāh eliminated Shaykh Khaz'al and established a direct administration in Khūzistān in 1924.³ Thereafter, there was a series of small incidents in the Shatt, between the local Persian and 'Irāqī authorities, over questions of customs and police control;⁴ and a fresh point was raised in April 1928 by the Persian Minister of Finance, Prince Fīrūz Nusrat Ad-Dawlah, when he was the guest of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at the port and refineries of Ābdān ('Abbādān), where the pipe-line from the South Persian Oilfield had its terminus on the Persian bank of the Shatt. Ābdān Island, on which the port of the same name was situated, and which had formerly been part of Shaykh Khaz'al's domain, was admittedly Persian territory; and the official port offices which the 'Irāqī Government maintained at this point on the Shatt were on board a vessel moored on the 'Irāqī side; but for several years past the 'Irāqī port authority had also maintained offices for routine work on the Persian side, and the 'Irāqī port officer's private residence was there. It also seems to have been the practice for vessels not belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, including British warships, when taking in oil from Ābdān, to moor in 'Irāqī waters alongside a jetty projecting into these waters from Persian territory, and to do this without asking the Persian authorities' permission. The Persian Government now ordered the removal of the subsidiary offices of the 'Irāqī port authority from Persian territory, declared that no foreign warship ought to moor alongside the Persian jetty without permission, and questioned the right of

¹ See the Report on the Administration of 'Irāq for the period April 1923–December 1924 (*Colonial No. 13 of 1925*), p. 52.

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 539–41.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 541–2.

⁴ See *Colonial No. 13 of 1925*, pp. 52–3; *Colonial No. 21 of 1926*, p. 29.

foreign merchant ships, other than those belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to do so either. This Persian *démarche* was followed by negotiations, as a result of which the ‘Irāqī offices on the Persian bank were removed in accordance with the Persian demand, while on the other hand the Persians waived their stipulation regarding British warships in practice without receding in theory from their contention that only vessels belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had a right to moor alongside the Persian jetty. This incident indicated that the Persians were sensitive over the fact that the waterway leading from the Persian Gulf to the two Persian river-ports of Muhammarah and Ahwāz, on the River Kārūn, via the Shattu’l-‘Arab, was under foreign jurisdiction. It may be noted that at this very time preparatory work was being put in hand for the construction of a trans-Persian railway from Bandar Gāz, at the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea, to a point at the head of the Persian Gulf, and that the point selected was the deep-water creek of Khūr Mūsā, which lay entirely in Persian territory, well to the east of the Shattu’l-‘Arab.¹

A more serious issue between the Persian and ‘Irāqī Governments was the status of the considerable element in the population of ‘Irāq which was of Persian origin. ‘Under Article 14 of the ‘Irāq Nationality Law of 1924² persons desiring to renounce ‘Irāqī nationality, acquired under Article 8 of that law, were given until the 6th August, 1926, to complete the necessary formalities. The provisions of Article 8 affected a large number of persons of Persian race living in ‘Irāq: and the Persian Government made representations through the British Legation and the High Commissioner for an extension of this time limit, giving as their reasons the large number of persons concerned, their ignorance of the announcements which had been made public on this subject, and their inability to pay the necessary fees for renunciation of ‘Irāq nationality. The matter was laid before the ‘Irāq Government, who agreed to extend the time limit up to the 31st December, 1927, and to reduce the fee. . . . Legislation to sanction these alterations was not, however, finally passed by Parliament until early in January 1928.’³ Meanwhile a further extension of the time-limit was asked for by the Persian Government.

¹ It also may be noted, once again, that whereas Persia possessed this and other alternative outlets on the Gulf, the Shattu’l-‘Arab was the only line of access from ‘Irāq to the Gulf between Persia on one side and Kuwayt on the other.

² Text in the Report on the Administration of ‘Irāq for 1925 (*Colonial No. 21 of 1926*), Appendix.

³ Report on the Administration of ‘Irāq for 1927 (*Colonial No. 35 of 1928*), p. 63.

There remained the question whether Persian subjects resident in 'Irāq, whose status as such was established, were to have extended to them the privileges in lieu of the Ottoman Capitulations which were secured, under the Anglo-'Irāqī Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924,¹ to nationals of states which had had Capitulations with the Ottoman Government at the time when 'Irāq had formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The Persian Government claimed these privileges for their nationals in 'Irāq;² and, in an interview published on the 17th August, 1928,³ a Persian Minister of State, Tīmūr Tāsh Khān, explicitly declared that Persia did not intend to recognize 'Irāq until this claim had been satisfied; but on several grounds the 'Irāqī Government were unwilling to make this concession. In the first place, under the Ottoman régime in 'Irāq, Persia had not been a Capitulatory Power. In the second place, Persia showed no intention of granting to 'Irāqī subjects in Persia any privileges equivalent to those which Persian subjects would enjoy in 'Irāq if the judicial agreement were extended to them. On the contrary, the Persian Government were taking steps to extinguish the privileges which nationals of certain other foreign countries actually enjoyed in Persia in virtue of existing Capitulations.⁴ In the third place, the number of Persian subjects resident in 'Irāq whose status as such might be expected to be established in accordance with the 'Irāq Nationality Law of 1924 was likely to be so large compared with the number of nationals of the former Capitulatory Powers that the privileges secured to the latter under the judicial agreement of 1924 could not be extended to Persians without danger of serious encroachment upon the normal administrative and judicial functions of the 'Irāqī state. For these several reasons the 'Irāqī Government were disinclined to give way in the matter, and this Perso-'Irāqī controversy still remained unsettled at the close of 1928.⁵

¹ By Article 14 of the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty of the 14th December, 1927 (see Section (x) of this part) the 'Irāqī Government undertook to maintain this agreement in force.

² See a letter from the Persian Government submitted to the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924 (printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1924, Annex 683). See also the oral statements made at a meeting of the Council on the same date by the representative of Persia, Prince Arfa Ad-Dawlah, and by the representative of Great Britain, Lord Parmoor.

³ The *Giornale d'Italia* of the 17th August, 1928, quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, September 1928, pp. 409-11.

⁴ See the following section.

⁵ This controversy came under discussion during the Twelfth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (24th October-11th November, 1927), in the Sixth Committee of the Ninth Assembly of the League (September 1928), and

(xii) Relations between Persia and the Western Powers (1926–8).

In a previous volume¹ some account has been given of the situation of Persia during the years 1922–5—a period which saw the foundation of a new dynasty by Rizā Shāh Pahlawī. During those years the new ruler of Persia was mainly occupied in making his power effective throughout the country and putting down insurrections of tribes or local chiefs who chafed under an assertion of authority on the part of the Central Government at Tih-rān to which they had long been unaccustomed. During the years 1926–8 there were occasional outbreaks of the same kind. In the late summer and autumn of 1926, for example, there was the abortive incursion of Abu'l-Fath Mirzā Salar Ad-Dawlah into Persian Kurdistan, which has been recorded elsewhere ;² and this attempt at a restoration of the old dynasty had been preceded in the July of that year by mutinies—likewise abortive—of Rizā Shāh's troops in Azerbaijan and Khurāsān.³ Again, in January 1928, there was a fresh revolt among the Arab population of Southern Khūzistān, who had enjoyed, down to the close of the year 1924, a virtual autonomy under the local government of Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammarah.⁴ The immediate occasion of this revolt—which started at Qasbah, on the Persian bank of the Shattu'l-'Arab opposite the 'Irāqī town of Fao—was a demand made by the Persian authorities, on occupiers of palm groves who had formerly been Shaykh Khaz'al's tenants, for the payment of rents as well as taxes. A deeper cause seems to have been the rapacity and corruption of the local Persian régime during the three years which had elapsed since its restoration in Southern Khūzistān—a district where such mal-administration was particularly impolitic, considering that, for these Arabs, a Persian régime was at best an alien government, and that they had lost a long-enjoyed autonomy at a time when their Arab kinsmen and neighbours in 'Irāq, just across the Shatt, had been liberated from the suzerainty and the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. After the suppression of this dangerous revolt, the Shāh changed the Governor of Khūzistān and apparently took steps to again during the Fourteenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (26th October–18th November, 1928).

¹ *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xiii).

² See p. 343 above.

³ See letters from the Persian *chargé d'affaires* and the Persian military *attaché* in London published in *The Times* on the 14th July and the 13th August, 1926, respectively.

⁴ For the occupation of Shaykh Khaz'al's principality by Rizā Shāh's forces in 1924 and for the Arab attack on the Persian garrison of Muhammarah in July 1925, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 542.

investigate, if not to remedy, the Arabs' grievances. Finally, in April 1928 there was a new rising, produced by similar causes, in Luristān¹—a district in which the Persian Government had a particularly strong motive for asserting its authority effectively at that time, when it was in the act of putting in hand the preliminary work for the construction of a Trans-Persian Railway which was to be carried across Luristān on its way from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea.² The insurgent Lur tribesmen attacked and killed the Persian Minister of Public Works when he was on a visit of inspection. Accordingly the Shāh superintended the operations in Luristān in person; and before the end of the month law and order appear to have been re-established there—by the distribution of favours more than by the application of force.

In 1927 Rizā Shāh also came into collision once again with the Shī'ī '*ulamā*—this time³ over the introduction of compulsory military service which had been approved by the *Majlis* in 1926. In protest against this law, a number of '*ulamā* took sanctuary in the holy city of Qum and thence telegraphed to the *Majlis*, in November 1927, a demand that compulsory military service should be abolished. The *Majlis* appears to have ignored this demand; but in December the Prime Minister and several other representatives of the Government repaired to Qum and, after conferring with the '*ulamā* there, arrived at a compromise—apparently on the basis that the '*ulamā* should reconcile themselves to the military service law with certain modifications, in consideration of assurances from the Government that the '*ulamā* should retain a generous share of power and office in the new régime. Thereupon, the '*ulamā* emerged from sanctuary and the bazārs at Ispahān and Shirāz, which had been closed as a gesture of sympathy with their action, were re-opened. Thereafter, compulsory military service was enforced, and steps were taken with a view to bringing the peace-strength of the Persian Army up to 50,000 men.

From this brief review it will be seen that although Rizā Shāh still had to reckon with the Shī'ī '*ulamā*, and although his authority was still being challenged in several outlying or not easily accessible parts of his dominions in the course of the years 1926–8, the disturbances were inconsiderable compared to those with which he had had to deal during the four preceding years. Thus the Shāh's energies were released for other tasks, and this fact became apparent in the conduct

¹ For the rising in Luristān in the Spring of 1924 see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 539.

² For this project see p. 345 above.

³ For the intervention of the '*ulamā* in 1924 to prevent the declaration of a republic in Persia, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 536–7.

of his foreign relations. His relations during this period with the U.S.S.R. and with Turkey and Afghanistan are recorded elsewhere.¹ In this place it remains to record his relations with the Western Powers.

In this field, Rizā Shāh's most important achievement during the years here in question was the abolition of the Capitulations. The system of juridical 'servitudes' upon sovereignty which were known collectively by that name had long been irksome to almost all non-Western countries which had been bound by Capitulations *vis-à-vis* Western or Westernized Powers; and since the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18 the sacrosanctity of the system had been breached by such signal events as the denunciation of the Ottoman Capitulations by the Ottoman Government in the autumn of 1914 and the abolition of them by mutual agreement in the Peace Settlement of Lausanne;² the abolition of the Chinese Capitulations *vis-à-vis* Germany, Austria and Hungary in the Peace Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon; the emergence in the Western World of 'successor states' of the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov Empires which were not in a position to insist upon inheriting capitulatory privileges formerly enjoyed by the Great Powers of which they were territorially the heirs; and finally the renunciation of capitulatory privileges by the Soviet Government—a renunciation that was not simply proclaimed in principle but was put into effect in the series of treaties which the Soviet Government proceeded to conclude with non-Western countries *vis-à-vis* which the defunct Imperial Russian Government had been a capitulatory Power. In particular, the Soviet Government had concluded a treaty on this basis with the Persian Government on the 26th February, 1921;³ and this formal and contractual renunciation of capitulatory rights *vis-à-vis* Persia on the part of Russia was of particular importance, since the capitulatory rights *vis-à-vis* Persia which were possessed at that time by the Western Powers were derived, through the operation of the most-favoured-nation-treatment principle, from an earlier Russo-Persian treaty, namely, the Peace Treaty signed at Türkmenchay on the 10th/22nd February, 1828. As between Persia and Great Britain, reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment of subjects and of trade was stipulated for in a peace treaty of 1857 and again in a commercial convention of 1903.⁴

¹ See Section (xiii) of this part.

² See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, Part II, Section (vi).

³ For this treaty see *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 214-15; the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 387; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 534-5.

⁴ See the *Sitāre-yi-Īrān* of the 28th April, 1927 (quoted in *Oriente Moderno*,

The campaign for a general abolition of capitulatory privileges was opened by the Persian Government in 1927. The first move was a radical reorganization, early in the year, of the Ministry of Justice and the Courts of Law ; and it was perhaps in the light of this preparatory work on the Persian Government's part that, on the 21st March, the question was asked, in the House of Commons at Westminster, whether any modifications had been effected in the system of extra-territoriality obtaining in Persia, and, if not, whether His Majesty's Government proposed initiating any steps to bring about such modifications, in view of the fact that Persia was a Member of the League of Nations. The British Government's answer to both parts of the question was in the negative, and, in the sequel, the abolition of the Capitulations in Persia was accomplished at the instance of the Persian Government themselves and not on the initiative of any one of the capitulatory Powers. The first overt move on the Persian side was made on the 26th April, 1927, at the formal inauguration of the new Judicial Regulations, when the Shāh publicly commanded the Prime Minister to take action with a view to securing the abolition of the Capitulations ; and on the 10th May the Persian Government formally notified all Powers enjoying capitulatory privileges in Persia that those privileges would be abolished on the 10th May, 1928.

In the course of the year ending on the last-mentioned date, *pourparlers* took place between the Persian Government and certain of the foreign Governments interested in the matter. The Persian Government showed a disposition to be reasonable and conciliatory on questions of practice if the question of principle were settled

May 1927, p. 231), for a list of countries at that time possessing capitulatory privileges *vis-à-vis* Persia. The list included Spain, France, the United States, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Great Britain, Italy, Austria and Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, Uruguay, Brazil. The texts of most of the treaties granting capitulatory privileges will be found in Hertlet: *Treaties, &c. between Great Britain and Persia and between Persia and other Foreign Powers* (London, 1891). See further a Note on the Abolition of Extra-territoriality in Persia in *The Asiatic Review*, October 1927, pp. 557-65. In this note, the text is quoted of a unilateral Capitulation, covering all Christian merchants, which was granted to a representative of Queen Elizabeth of England, Sir Anthony Sherley, by Shāh 'Abbās in the year 1598 of the Christian era. Whether this Capitulation (which, after Shāh 'Abbās's death, was re-confirmed in 1632 and renewed, with one modification, in 1736) remained valid in the twentieth century was a nice question for historical criticism. If the answer to this question were in the affirmative, this Capitulation of 1598 constituted a basis for the status of British nationals in Persia which was independent of the Russo-Persian treaty of Türkmenchay. The writer of the note from which these facts are taken observes that, whatever the historical and juridical bases of the foreign Capitulations in Persia might be, the capitulatory régime in practice had produced much less friction in that country than in the Ottoman Empire.

according to their wishes ; and the new Judicial Regulations contained certain safeguards for foreign residents in substitution for the Capitulations—for example, a provision that any lawsuit between a Persian and a foreigner should be referred to arbitration compulsorily on the demand of either party. The French Government, which had replied to the Persian notification of the 10th May, 1927, by making certain reservations, were moved by the aforementioned safeguards, and by an assurance from the Persian Government that French nationals should enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment under the new régime, to notify the Persian Government in December that they accepted the abolition of the Capitulations in principle and were ready to enter into new treaty relations. For Persia, this acquiescence of France was a notable diplomatic success ; but the general outcome of the Persian Government's efforts depended mainly upon the attitude of Great Britain. Great Britain took rank with Russia as Persia's most important neighbour, being in territorial contact with Persia on three frontiers in virtue of her political position in India, in the Persian Gulf and in 'Irāq, apart from the importance of the economic contact between the two countries, as measured by the volume of Anglo-Persian trade and the size of the British Community in Persia, which greatly outnumbered the sum total of all the foreign residents belonging to the other Western countries concerned. In 1927, British trade with Persia was being carried on under a Persian tariff agreed between the two parties in 1920¹—an agreement which was a corollary to and almost the only relic of the comprehensive but abortive Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.² This tariff convention of 1920 was not subject to revision until 1930 ;³ and, on the most-favoured-nation-treatment principle, the benefits of it accrued to the other capitulatory Powers as well as to Great Britain herself.

Thus the attitude of the British Government towards the abolition of the Capitulations in Persia was a matter of great concern to the Persian Government ; and, at this moment, the very geographical situation which had made Great Britain one of the two most important neighbours of Persia, happened to make the attitude of the Persian Government towards a certain British desideratum a matter of great concern to the British Empire. This British desideratum was

¹ Statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 9th May, 1928, by Sir Austen Chamberlain, in answer to a parliamentary question.

² For the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 211–13.

³ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain, cited above.

the completion of an air route between Great Britain and India by the organization of the easternmost section, which was to run from Cairo to Karachi. The first portion of this section would pass over Egyptian territory, and then over the territory of Arab states mandated to or allied with Great Britain, from Cairo via Baghdad to the head of the Persian Gulf;¹ but from that point to the western frontier of the British Indian Empire in Baluchistan the most convenient course for the route to take was to follow the Gulf coast of Persia, and the grant of a right of way along this alignment depended on the Persian Government's will. In this matter, the Persian Government's hands were free; for though they had acceded in 1920 to the International Air Convention of 1919, this step had not yet been approved by the Persian Parliament; and even if that approval were given and if the terms of the convention consequently became binding upon Persia, she would still not be bound to grant Great Britain a right of way along the particular alignment which the British desired. Nor, pending approval by Parliament, was she yet bound by a provisional agreement for opening the coastal right of way to British enterprise which had been signed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the British Minister at Tih-rān, on behalf of Imperial Airways, Limited, in September and October 1925.² The terms of this provisional agreement, in themselves, were favourable to Persia, since they would have provided her with an unsubsidized air service over a remote and inaccessible part of her territory where a local service could hardly have paid its way. Moreover, the aerodromes were to be prepared and equipped at British expense and were then to become the Persian Government's property.³ The provisional agreement, however, had a greater incidental value for the Persian Government as an instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the British Government in the matter of the Capitulations. On the 14th March, 1927, in the *Majlis* at Tih-rān, the Minister of the Interior stated, in reply to a parliamentary question, that the agreement would not become operative without Parliament's approval; and on the 28th April, in the House of Commons at Westminster, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced 'a recent and sudden reversal of policy by the Persian Government, who decided not to allow an international airway along the southern coast of Persia'. According to a further statement made on the 18th May by the same

¹ An air service between Cairo and Baghdad had been in operation since 1921.

² Statement made by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 28th April, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.

³ See a statement by Sir Samuel Hoare in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 12th March, 1928.

Minister in the same place, the Persian Government had declared that, should the Persian Parliament eventually approve the International Air Convention of 1919, they would be prepared to fix a line for international traffic, but that in that event the internal situation and frontier considerations would lead them to choose a line not along the Gulf coast but across the middle of the country.¹ Meanwhile, a concession for internal air services in Persia had been accorded to the German firm of Junkers, which opened one line in February 1927 and a second in March. In the November of the same year it was reported that a contract with the same firm for the establishment of a regular air service between Moscow and Tihṛān had been approved by the Soviet Government; and before the end of the year a Russo-Persian protocol was signed at Tihṛān for the provision of a weekly air postal service between the Persian port of Pahlawī² and the Trans-Caucasian port of Baku, with connexions to Tihṛān at one end and to Moscow at the other, as from the 1st May, 1928.

The Persian Government's refusal to proceed with the provisional Anglo-Persian air agreement of 1925, together with their denunciation of the Capitulations as from the 10th May, 1928, naturally led to an exchange of views between the British and Persian Governments; and it was rumoured that early in November 1927 the British Government presented a note in which they not only asked for the implementation of the air agreement but raised the questions of the recognition of 'Irāq by Persia,³ the rehabilitation of Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammarah,⁴ and the recouping of expenditure incurred by the British Government, during and after the General War of 1914-18, on account of the South Persia Rifles.⁵ The Persian Government were rumoured to have replied by ignoring the reference to Shaykh Khaz'al and declining to take action on the other points.⁶ On the 22nd February, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain refrained from either denying or affirming the accuracy of this rumour when questioned about it in

¹ That is, presumably, along the chain of relatively considerable centres of population—Hamadān, Ispahān, Yazd, Kirmān—between the central desert and the inner edge of the Zagros ranges which constituted the western and south-western rim of the Persian plateau. ² The former Anzali.

³ For this question see Section (xi) above, p. 346.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 539-43 and the present section of the present volume, p. 347.

⁵ See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, p. 210.

⁶ For this rumour regarding an alleged British note see an identical statement in the *Türkische Post* of Constantinople, 17th December, 1927, and in the *Qommünist* of Baku, 11th December, 1927, as cited in *Oriente Moderno*, December 1927, p. 610; and *The Times of Mesopotamia*, as cited in *The Times* (of London) on the 17th February, 1928. The date of the alleged note was given in the first of these two versions of the rumour.

the House of Commons at Westminster; but he let it be understood that no official information had been given to the Press concerning any of the British Government's communications to the Persian Government in these negotiations.

Meanwhile, Persia had been taking other action in order to bring pressure to bear not upon Great Britain alone but upon the capitulatory Powers in general. In 1927 she had introduced a new customs tariff applicable to her trade with countries towards whom her tariff autonomy was not limited; and this tariff was accepted by the U.S.S.R.¹ in the Russo-Persian customs convention which was signed at Moscow on the 1st October, 1927, in pursuance of the Russo-Persian treaty of the 26th February, 1921.² On the 3rd May, 1928, the *Majlis* approved a new customs tariff which was to come into force, simultaneously with the abolition of the Capitulations, on the 10th of that month. The new tariff had alternative minimum and maximum scales—the maximum scale being double the tariff of 1927 as modified by reductions on a few items in the list. This new maximum scale was to be applicable to imports from all countries except those to which more favourable terms were specially conceded by existing (non-capitulatory) treaties or by new treaties.

Meanwhile, Anglo-Persian negotiations on the tariff question were also taking place;³ and on the 10th May, 1928, when the abrogation of the Capitulations was duly proclaimed by a decree of the Shāh, these negotiations resulted in a settlement which was described by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 14th May in the follow terms:⁴

A treaty regulating the commercial relations between this country and Persia was signed at Tihṙān on the 10th May by His Majesty's Minister on behalf of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all other parts of the British Empire which are not members of the League of Nations, and of India. The treaty, which has been concluded for a period of eight years, provides for the abrogation of all provisions of existing treaties which limit in any way the right of Persia to settle her customs tariff autonomously.⁵ It provides that, on condition of perfect reciprocity, British and Indian goods imported into Persia shall not be subject to higher duties than are the goods of any other foreign country. By this

¹ Statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 9th May, 1928, by Sir Austen Chamberlain in answer to a parliamentary question.

² For Russo-Persian relations during the years 1926–8, see Section (xiii) below.

³ Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement of the 9th May, 1928, cited above.

⁴ The text of the treaty signed on behalf of the British and Persian Governments at Tihṙān on the 10th May, 1928, is printed in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume.

⁵ Compare the terms of the Sino-British treaty of the 20th December, 1928 (Part IV, Section (ii) (c) of the present volume).—A.J.T.

treaty, the minimum rates in the tariff approved by the Persian legislature on the 3rd May will be applied to British and Indian goods. It is also provided that if at any time the rates of the minimum Persian tariff are reduced on any frontier, British and Indian goods shall benefit by those reductions, by whatever frontier they are imported. In a protocol attached to the treaty, the Persian Government reserve the right to increase the rates of the minimum tariff in the event of the duties on the chief Persian articles, other than oil, imported into Great Britain or India being increased. In an exchange of notes, it is agreed that the treaty shall provisionally enter into force at once pending formal exchange of ratifications, and that goods consigned to Persia before the 10th May shall not pay rates higher than those in the 1920 tariff.

Further notes were exchanged at the same time maintaining in force, with a view to the conclusion within a year of a full treaty of commerce and navigation, those provisions of existing treaties which do not limit Persia's tariff autonomy. In particular, reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment of subjects and trade and the *status quo* in regard to the national treatment of shipping are to be continued. Other notes exchanged regularised the position with regard to the Dominions.

As regards facilities in Persian territory for the proposed air service between Egypt and India, the Persian Government have formally stated their readiness to enter into negotiations with a representative of Imperial Airways Limited, regarding the conditions on which such a service should be operated.¹

With regard to the abolition of the Capitulations in Persia on the 10th May, the Persian Government have addressed to His Majesty's Minister a list of the safeguards which they are prepared to extend to British nationals in Persia; and steps are being taken to bring these safeguards to the knowledge of British nationals concerned. These safeguards are in complete accordance with the relevant provisions of Persian law as recently amended.²

Finally, the Persian Government have agreed formally that missionary enterprises in Persia shall be authorised to carry on their charitable and educational work on condition of not contravening either public order or Persian laws and regulations.³

¹ An agreement between the Persian Government and Imperial Airways Limited was concluded on the 8th December, 1928. In this agreement the Persian Government accommodated itself to the British Company's desire that, in the Persian sector, the new air-route should follow the Persian coast of the Persian Gulf instead of running inland. Imperial Airways started their regular through-service between England and India in March 1929. The first party of passengers left Croydon on the 30th March and arrived at Karachi on the 6th April. Arrangements were also made for a connexion at Baghdad between the Imperial Airways Service and the service which had been started in Persia by the firm of Junkers (see p. 353 above).—A.J.T.

² For a summary of the list of these safeguards in the Persian Government's note of the 10th May, 1928, see *The Times*, 15th May, 1928. It will be seen that in this matter the Anglo-Persian Agreement of the 10th May, 1928, went further than the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of the 20th December, 1928, since the scope of the latter agreement was confined to the recognition of China's tariff autonomy.—A.J.T.

³ The reference in this last paragraph of Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement

This provisional Anglo-Persian settlement was rapidly followed by a series of provisional arrangements, pending definitive settlements, between Persia and other ex-capitulatory Powers.¹

On the 11th May, 1928, there was signed at Tihṙān a provisional agreement between Persia and France,² to run for a maximum period of one year pending the conclusion of a definitive Perso-French treaty of amity which was to be accompanied by consular, customs, commercial and establishment conventions. This instrument provided that, from the 10th May, 1928, onwards, the nationals of either party should be admitted into and treated in the territory of the other party in conformity with the rules and practices of international common law and on a basis of complete reciprocity. In the matter of personal statute, the nationals of either of the contracting parties in the territory of the other were to remain subject to the prescriptions of their national laws. There was a reciprocal recognition of complete tariff autonomy, and a reciprocal undertaking between the parties to give one another the benefit of their respective minimum tariffs during the year for which the provisional agreement was to run. On the 15th May there was signed at Tihṙān a provisional agreement between Persia and Belgium on the same pattern.³ Further, the Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the American Minister at Tihṙān on the 14th May and to the German Minister at Tihṙān on the 15th two notes⁴ announcing that, on condition of complete reciprocity, the Persian Government proposed, as from the 10th May, to accord to American and German nationals resident in Persia and goods imported into Persia a certain treatment which would be similar to that laid down in the Perso-French and Perso-Belgian agreements aforementioned. In both cases these arrangements were to remain in force until the conclusion of fresh

was to instructions which Western missionary educational institutions in Persia had received from the Persian Ministry of Education in 1927. These foreign institutions had been required to conform to the curricula of corresponding Persian institutions, and in particular to give instruction in the [Shī'i version of the] *Shari'ah* (the Islamic Religious Law). After long negotiations on this point, the American School at Hamadān, which worked under the auspices of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in New York, had closed in December 1927. All the other foreign schools in Persia, however, had still been in operation at the end of that year. (Statement from the Bureau of Education of the Department of the Interior at Washington, published in *The United States Daily*, 16th March, 1928).

¹ It may be noted that a treaty of friendship and commerce between Persia and Poland, which was perhaps the most important of the new non-capitulatory European 'successor states', had been signed at Tihṙān on the 14th April, 1928.

² Text in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1928.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Texts in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

Perso-American and Perso-German treaties and conventions, unless denounced by the Persian Government at thirty days' notice. A provisional arrangement on the same basis of reciprocity and most-favoured-nation treatment between Persia and Italy was embodied in an exchange of notes of the 25th June, 1928.¹ Similar provisional agreements were concluded between Persia and the Netherlands on the 21st June, 1928, and between Persia and Sweden on the 10th August.

Moreover the Persian Government, not content with getting rid of the privileges formerly enjoyed in Persia by foreign nationals and foreign protected persons, took steps during the year 1928 to reduce the number of Persians claiming such status. Early in the year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tīhrān issued a circular to Persian officials at home and abroad instructing them to investigate the cases of all Persians found to be holding foreign passports. If the holder was abroad, he was not to be allowed to enter Persia until he had either proved his right to hold the foreign passport or had obtained a Persian passport from a Persian consulate. In the summer of 1928, the Ministry laid a Bill before the *Majlis* for debarring any person who was originally of Persian nationality from claiming foreign nationality unless he could show a special warrant from the Shāh.

The spirit which had animated the Persians in this successful campaign for the abolition of the Capitulations was likewise displayed in their dealings with their American financial adviser Dr. Millspaugh, whose contract, made in 1922,² was due to expire in September 1927. When the question of a new contract was broached in the May of that year, the Persian Government suggested a reduction of Dr. Millspaugh's powers. Thereupon, Dr. Millspaugh informed them that he would not enter into a new contract which differed from his present contract in any vital way. Thereafter a draft, representing a modification of the Persian proposals of May, was submitted to him in June; but the Persian Government stood out for the right to refer any dispute between Dr. Millspaugh and the Minister of Finance to the Council of Ministers or the *Majlis* alternatively, while Dr. Millspaugh insisted that the right of reference should be to the *Majlis* alone. This difference of view proved insurmountable, and Dr. Millspaugh left Persia before his first contract had run out. Moreover, there was a general exodus from Persia of all American advisers and experts except those engaged upon railway construction.³

¹ Texts in *op. cit.*, September 1928.

² See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 543-5.

³ For the Bandar Gāz-Khūr Mūsā railway, see p. 345 above.

In consequence, on the 29th September, 1927, a Bill was submitted to the *Majlis* for engaging four foreign financial advisers in place of Dr. Millspaugh and his American colleagues, namely, a Chief Inspector of Revenue and a financial and economic expert who were to be of German nationality and a Treasurer-General and a Chief Accountant who were to be of Swiss nationality. All four were to be under the direct control of the Persian Minister of Finance and amenable to the Persian penal code. In November 1927 a German banker, Dr. Bötze, accepted an invitation to go to Persia in order to examine and report on the financial situation. On the 20th April, 1928, it was reported from Berlin that another German banker, Dr. Lindenblatt, had accepted an appointment from the Persian Government, on a longer term than Dr. Bötze, as Dr. Millspaugh's successor. On the 8th September, 1928, a National Bank was opened by the Shāh.

Thus, between 1926 and 1928, Persia had vigorously and on the whole successfully shaken off the greater part of that Western control to which she had submitted, either voluntarily or involuntarily, before; and she had thus come to take a not unimportant part in a general movement for throwing off the political ascendancy of Western Powers by adopting the technique and the culture of Western civilization—a movement which was perhaps the most striking feature of Islamic international history during these years, as it had been during the decade ending in 1925.¹

(xiii) Relations of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan with the U.S.S.R. and with one another (1926–8).

When the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 set almost every foreign Government's hand against the new régime in Russia and the Soviet Government's hand against almost every other Government in the world, the statesmen responsible for the conduct of Soviet Russian foreign relations eagerly scanned the international horizon for any breaches in the hostile cordon and made the most of any diplomatic foothold that offered itself there. During the first ten years of the Soviet Government's existence, there were three fields in which there seemed to be some possibility of breaking the united diplomatic front of the 'Capitalist' phalanx. One of these fields was Germany, another China, and a third the Islamic World, particularly the three Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, which were immediate neighbours of the U.S.S.R.—a geographical situation

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part I, Section (i), and the present volume, Part III A.

which made it impossible for the Great Powers of the Western World to prevent Moscow from entering into direct relations with them.

The course of Russo-German and Russo-Chinese relations down to the close of the year 1928 has been recorded in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* and in other parts of this *Survey*.¹ In this place it remains to carry down to the same date the record of the relations of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan with the U.S.S.R. and with one another.

In these three Islamic countries the diplomatic opportunities that offered themselves to Soviet Russian statesmanship on the morrow of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had been peculiarly favourable, since the Soviet Government had been able to 'steal the thunder' of the British Government and to assume the role of an enlightened and disinterested champion of Turkish, Persian and Afghan liberties at a moment when a new political self-consciousness was arising in Turkish, Persian and Afghan minds. During the century that ended in 1917, a somewhat similar role had been played by the British Empire, thanks to the overbearing and aggressive policy of the Czarism, which had seldom failed to provide British diplomacy with a serviceable foil. Latterly, however, the British Empire had been drawn into abandoning its traditional posture—first by the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 (an agreement in which the traditional British policy in the Middle East was sacrificed to the exigencies of defence against a new danger in Europe) and thereafter, still further, by the military alliance between the two Powers during the General War of 1914–18. Between the outbreak of that war and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the British Government had gone far towards committing itself to a virtual partition of the Middle East between the Russian Empire on the one side and the British Empire, with its Western allies France and Italy, on the other; and then, at the moment when the edifice of 'the secret agreements' had almost been completed, the Power which bore perhaps the largest share of ultimate responsibility for them had suddenly ceased to exist and had been supplanted by a revolutionary 'successor state' which repudiated and published what the Czarism and its Western Allies had done. The

¹ For Russo-German relations see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, Ch. VI, Part II, and vol. iii, App. 1, Part I; the *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 30–1; the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, pp. 214–17; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 63–6, and Part II D, Section (iv). For Russo-Chinese relations see the *Survey for 1920–3*, Part VI, Section (i); the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, Sections (ii) and (iii); the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, Section (vi); the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, Section (ii).

whole of the odium thus created inevitably tended to attach itself to the surviving members of the Entente; and this effect was confirmed when the Principal European Allied Powers continued, for several years after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and after the Armistice of 1918, to carry on in the Middle East a policy into which they had been drawn originally by their alliance with the Czar. This Middle Eastern policy of the Principal European Allied Powers, which played so conveniently into the Soviet Government's hands, was maintained for several reasons. The first reason was military necessity; for the collapse of the Czardom as a military Power before the close of the General War left the Czar's allies 'in the air' and compelled them to some extent to take the place of the Imperial Russian forces in order to prevent the vacuum from being occupied by the Central Powers. Another reason was a temporary hallucination (due to the abnormal tension of mind and mobilization of material forces at the end of a great war) which made it seem feasible for these Western Powers to take over the Czardom's allotted portion in the Middle East in addition to their own. The third and perhaps the most potent reason was *vis inertiae*. It may be noted that the British Empire proceeded further along these lines than either France or Italy. It was the British Army that closed the gap which the dissolution of the Imperial Russian Army had opened on the extreme right flank of the Allies' front by moving up into Northern Persia in 1918 and thence into Transcaucasia and Transcaspia. Again, it was the British Government that played with the idea of entering into the Imperial Russian Government's heritage by forcing upon an unrepresentative Persian Government the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, under which the Persians were relieved of the shadow of partition that had oppressed them since 1907 at the price of seeing the whole of their country dominated by a single foreign Power.¹ Finally, it was the British Government who persisted in giving their moral support to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople and to the Greek Army in Anatolia against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his companions after the other two Allied Powers participating in the occupation of Constantinople and the Straits had come to the conclusion that the new Turkish Nationalist Movement was a force to be reckoned with and had begun to explore the possibility of coming to terms with it while the Greeks were still holding it at bay. Thus the suggestion that, in the Middle East, the mantle of the Czardom had

¹ For this treaty and the means by which it was rendered abortive, see the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 211-15; and the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 534.

descended upon the shoulders of the British Empire found ready acceptance in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan during the period between the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the peace settlement at Lausanne in 1923; and, even after that, this presentation of British policy was still facilitated by the residual Anglo-Turkish controversy over the Mosul Vilayet.¹ Indeed, it was not until after the settlement of the Mosul question by the signature of a tripartite treaty between Turkey, 'Irāq and Great Britain on the 5th June, 1926,² that the suspicion and hostility under which the British Empire had been labouring in the Middle East for nearly ten years showed signs of abating, or rather of being transferred from Great Britain to France. After the settlement of the larger question of the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq, Turkish attention became concentrated on the smaller but still outstanding question of the frontier between Turkey and Syria, in which France found herself constrained to oppose Turkish aspirations in her capacity as mandatory Power.³ Again, after the outbreak of the insurrection in the French mandated territory in 1925,⁴ the relative liberality of British policy towards 'Irāq since 1920 was thrown into relief. For these reasons there was a marked abatement of anti-British feeling in the Middle East during the years 1926-8, though not so marked an abatement of feeling against 'Western Imperialism' as represented now to a greater extent by another Power.

This brief review of the roles played by the Western Powers in the Middle East during the decade ending in 1928 is necessary to an understanding of Soviet Russian diplomatic activities in that region during those years. The monuments of these activities were two sets or systems of treaties, the first of which was built up during the year 1921 and the second during the years 1925-8. The component treaties of the system of 1921 were:

1. The Russo-Persian Treaty signed at Moscow on the 26th February, 1921;⁵

2. The Russo-Afghan Treaty signed at Moscow on the 28th February, 1921;⁶

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi).

² See *op. cit.*, pp. 526-8.

³ For the history of the Turco-Syrian frontier question see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (viii) and the present volume, Section (viii) of this Part.

⁴ For the history of this insurrection, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (vii) (e) and (f), and the present volume, Section (vii) of this Part.

⁵ See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 214-15; the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 387; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 534.

⁶ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 385-6.

3. The Turco-Afghan Treaty signed at Moscow on the 1st March, 1921; ¹

4. The Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Moscow on the 16th March, 1921, with the two subsidiary treaties between the Turkish Government at Angora and the Soviet Governments of Georgia, Erivan and Azerbaijan and between the Turkish Government at Angora and the Soviet Government of the Ukraine which were signed respectively at Kars on the 13th October, 1921, and at Angora on the 2nd January, 1922; ²

5. The Perso-Afghan Treaty signed at Tihṛān on the 2nd June, 1921.³

Thus in 1921 a system of treaties linking Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan with Soviet Russia and with one another was built up on Russian initiative—the only link missing in the chain being a direct treaty between Turkey and Persia.

The component treaties of the system of 1925–8 were:

1. The Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Paris on the 17th December, 1925; ⁴

2. The Turco-Persian Treaty signed at Tihṛān on the 22nd April, 1926; ⁵

3. The Russo-Afghan Treaty signed at Pāghmān (King Amānu'l-lāh's summer residence) on the 31st August, 1926; ⁶

4. The Russo-Persian Treaty signed at Moscow on the 1st October, 1927; ⁷

5. The Perso-Afghan Treaty signed at Kābul on the 28th November, 1927; ⁸

¹ See *op. cit.*, pp. 386–7.

² For this group of treaties between Angora and the various Soviet Governments see *op. cit.*, pp. 370–3.

³ This is the date given in the reference to this treaty in Article 1 of the subsequent Perso-Afghan Treaty of the 28th November, 1927. In the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 546, the date was erroneously given as the 7th September, 1923.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, p. 525.

⁵ See *op. cit.*, pp. 545–6.

⁶ According to *The Times*, 23rd December, 1926, the treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression signed at Pāghmān on the 31st August, 1926, was followed by the signature of a treaty of friendship on the 14th September, 1926.

⁷ The official French text (which, according to Article 8 of the treaty itself, was to prevail over the Russian and Persian texts) is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, March 1928, pp. 98–101, together with the texts of one exchange of notes and two protocols. Ratifications were exchanged on the 31st January, 1928, at Tihṛān.

⁸ An unofficial translation of the Persian text is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, April 1928, pp. 154–6, together with the texts of one protocol and one exchange of notes. An unofficial French translation of the Persian text is printed in *Le Messager de Téhéran*, 10th February, 1928. The Persian text was the only official text, Persian being the official language of both contracting parties.

6. The Turco-Afghan Treaty signed at Angora on the 25th May, 1928;¹

7. The Turco-Persian Protocol (supplementary to the treaty of the 22nd April, 1926) signed at Tihṙān on the 15th June, 1928;²

8. The Perso-Afghan Protocol (supplementary to the treaty of the 28th November, 1927) signed at Tihṙān on the 15th June, 1928.³

It will be seen that, in the system of 1925-8, the network of treaties between the four parties concerned was complete—consisting, as it did, of three treaties between the U.S.S.R. and the three Middle Eastern states and three treaties linking the Middle Eastern states with one another. The Turco-Persian and Perso-Afghan supplementary protocols brought the preceding Turco-Persian and Perso-Afghan treaties into line with the Turco-Afghan treaty, which had been framed on wider and more positive lines than those on which the two preceding treaties had been conceived.⁴

In this place it is unnecessary to summarize, analyse or compare the texts of these two sets of treaties, since all the treaties of the 1921 system and two treaties of the 1925-8 system have been dealt with already in previous volumes of this series,⁵ while the text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of the 17th December, 1925, is printed in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume, as an example of the 1925-8 system. It is sufficient here to point out certain differences in the political circumstances in which the two sets of treaties were concluded.

Perhaps the most significant difference was that Russian diplomacy played a relatively greater part in 1921 than in 1925-8. In 1921, one of the two treaties concluded by the Middle Eastern parties with one another, as well as all the three treaties to which the Soviet Government themselves were a party, was signed at Moscow under the Soviet

¹ An unofficial French translation of the Turkish text is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, July 1928, pp. 283-5, together with the text of one protocol. The official texts were in Turkish and Persian, and, according to Article 8 of the treaty itself, both these texts were to have equal validity.

² The official French text of this protocol (which, according to the concluding paragraph of the protocol itself, was to prevail over the official Turkish and Persian texts) is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, July 1928, p. 285. According to *Le Temps*, 19th June, 1928, two other Turco-Persian protocols (dealing respectively with mutual economic assistance and with postal and telegraphic relations) were signed on the same occasion.

³ An unofficial translation of the Persian text of this protocol is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, August 1928, p. 339. According to *Le Temps*, 19th June, 1928, three other Perso-Afghan protocols (dealing respectively with mutual economic assistance, postal and telegraphic relations, and extradition) were signed on the same occasion.

⁴ On this point, see the Moscow *Izvestia*, 19th June, 1928.

⁵ See the previous foot-notes.

Government's auspices. Indeed, it was apparently the Soviet Government that first suggested the idea of a *rapprochement* between the three Middle Eastern states themselves as a complement to the *rapprochement* between each of them and Russia; and if the Soviet Government had not taken the initiative, it may be doubted whether Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan on their own motion would have come together at this date. On the other hand, in 1925-8 only one out of eight instruments was signed at Moscow, as against one at Paris and six at either Tihṙān, Angora or Kābūl; and it is noteworthy that it was in the new Turco-Afghan treaty negotiated at Angora—presumably without Russian participation or influence—that certain new provisions tending towards a greater measure of solidarity were introduced, and that these provisions were then added, in the form of supplementary protocols, to the Turco-Persian and Perso-Afghan treaties, though not to the three treaties in which the U.S.S.R. was concerned. Thus, by 1928, the direct relations, originally promoted by Russian diplomacy, between the three Middle Eastern states were not merely being maintained by the independent activity of Turkish, Persian and Afghan diplomacy but were being carried further than the respective relations between each of the three states and the U.S.S.R.¹ Moreover, by this time, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan were each extending their treaty relations in other directions. Turkey, for example, which was implicated in South-Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean as well as in the Middle East, concluded a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and judicial regulation with Italy on the 30th May, 1928, at Rome,² and was negotiating, during the same year, for the conclusion of a similar treaty with Greece;³ and on the same 30th May, at Cairo, a treaty of friendship was concluded between Afghanistan and Egypt.⁴ Meanwhile, in 1927, Afghanistan

¹ It may be noted that in the autumn of 1928 the Afghan Minister at Angora was raised to the rank of Ambassador.

² This important treaty is dealt with in Part II, Section (i) (c) of the present volume, in its relation to other South-East European affairs. The official French text is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1928, pp. 227-9.

³ Apropos of the Turco-Afghan treaty of the 25th May, 1928, the Turco-Italian treaty of the 30th May, 1928, and the Turco-Persian protocol of the 30th June, 1928, a statement was made in the Chamber at Angora, to the effect that Turkey intended to extend her relations with European and Mediterranean countries as well as with the Middle Eastern countries and the U.S.S.R. Cf. a speech delivered by Ismet Paṣa at Malatiya, as reported in the *Corriere della Sera*, 15th September, and *Le Temps*, 16th September, 1928.

⁴ Unofficial French translation of the text in *Oriente Moderno*, June 1928, p. 265. The official texts were in Persian and Arabic. For a speech on the solidarity of the non-Western peoples which was delivered in Cairo on the 12th June, 1928, by the Afghan signatory of the Egypto-Afghan treaty of the 30th May, 1928, see *Oriente Moderno*, June 1928, p. 240. At about the

had begun to conclude treaties of friendship with European countries, and this policy received an impetus during King Amānu'llāh's visit to Europe in 1928. An Afghan-Polish treaty was signed at Warsaw on the 5th November, 1927, an Afghan-Latvian treaty at Riga on the 16th February, 1928, and an Afghan-Swiss treaty at Berne on the 17th February, 1928. An Afghan-Japanese treaty was signed in London on the 4th April, 1928. The treaties and provisional agreements, in substitution for the Capitulations, which the Persian Government concluded with the ex-capitulatory Powers in the same year have been dealt with elsewhere.¹ On the 28th November, 1928, a Perso-Egyptian treaty of friendship² was signed at Tihṛān.³

This decrease in Soviet-Russian ascendancy over the foreign policy of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan between the years 1921 and 1928 was the natural consequence of that general change in the international situation in the course of seven years which has been touched upon above. At the time when the treaties of 1921 were concluded, the Soviet Government either had recently performed or were still performing signal services for each of the three Middle Eastern countries in question. A Soviet Russian naval and military expedition despatched to Anzālī, the principal port on the Persian coast of the Caspian Sea, in May 1920, had been the final decisive factor in securing the evacuation of Northern Persia by the British forces and so had opened the way for the Persian Government's denunciation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.⁴ Soviet Russian diplomatic support, reinforced by consignments of munitions and by military co-operation in Transcaucasia, was the mainstay of Mustafa Kemal and his companions in their life and death struggle against the Greeks supported by Great Britain.⁵ Even Afghanistan was indebted to the change of policy in Russia in 1917 for the liberty of action which she used so rashly in 1919 in precipitating the Third Anglo-Afghan War.⁶ Thus, in 1921, all three Middle Eastern countries had good reason to regard Russia same time, an unofficial Afghan mission for the study of the situation in the Haramayn and for strengthening the relations of Afghanistan with the Hijāz and other Islamic countries arrived at Bayrūt.

¹ See the preceding section.

² The official French text of this treaty, which, according to Article 12 of the treaty itself, was to prevail over the Persian and Arabic texts, is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, December 1928, pp. 550-2, together with the French text of an identical letter exchanged on the date on which the treaty was signed.

³ On the other hand it was suggested on the 20th September, 1927, in the *Majlis* at Tihṛān, that Persian subjects should be prohibited from setting foot, not only in 'Irāq, but in any of the Asiatic Arab countries at all.

⁴ *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, p. 215.

⁵ *Survey for 1920-3*, Part IV, Section (iii).

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

as a valuable friend in need ; and the possibility that she might in the future prove to be a dangerous friend, as she had formerly been a dangerous enemy, was hardly a consideration that her Middle Eastern neighbours could afford to entertain at a time when they were conscious of more acute dangers from other quarters. The Turks were then just approaching the crisis of the Anatolian War ; the Persians scarcely yet ventured to believe that the danger embodied in the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 had been surmounted ; and the Afghans had not yet been taken back into the British Indian Government's good graces after their military fiasco. By 1928, however, it had come to be realized in the Middle East that the aggressiveness of the Western Powers, which had evoked the defensive treaties of 1921, was a temporary after-effect of the General War of 1914-18 ; and that, though the habits and ambitions of 'official circles' in Western countries might not cease to be 'imperialistic', the Middle Eastern policy of the Western Powers was now being determined in the last resort by a public opinion which had made up its mind that, at any rate in this part of the world, 'imperialism' was no longer profitable.¹ Even in Egypt, and in those Asiatic Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire over which mandates had been assigned to Great Britain and France, Western Governments, increasingly sensitive to opinion at home, were showing a correspondingly greater disinclination to act with a high hand and a greater discomfort when they failed to find any alternative method of procedure. Noting this tendency, the Middle Eastern peoples gradually became less afraid of the Western Powers, and in proportion as their recent fear of these diminished, their old suspicion of Russia showed signs of revival. Naturally these symptoms were strongest in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, which were immediate neighbours of Russia and which, unlike the Arab countries, had succeeded in rejecting the political domination of Great Britain and France.

This *détente* between the Western Powers and the Middle Eastern countries synchronized with the *détente* between the Western Powers and Germany which was symbolized in the Pact of Locarno ; and thus the Soviet Government were confronted with the prospect of seeing the two main gaps in the hostile cordon round the U.S.S.R. simultaneously closed. Monsieur Chicherin's *riposte* was to enter into competition with the statesmen of Locarno by setting out to build up a rival network of treaties promoting peace on different lines and ramifying from Moscow. The Russo-German treaty of 1926 and the Russo-Lithuanian and Russo-Latvian treaties of 1926 and 1927,

¹ On this point see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, pp. 11-12.

which have been dealt with in the preceding volume,¹ constituted one portion of this network; the Middle Eastern treaties of 1925–8, in so far as they were Monsieur Chicherin's handiwork, constituted the other portion. It must be noted again, however, that the position of Soviet Russia was less dominating in the Middle Eastern system of 1925–8 than it had been in the system of 1921; and it was significant that Persia, like Germany, when she entered into the Moscow system, was careful to insist on the priority of her obligations as a member of the League of Nations.²

While the principal cause of this decline in Soviet Russian influence in the Middle East is thus to be found in the simultaneous decline in the aggressiveness of the Western Powers, there were two contributory causes of a non-political order, one economic and the other cultural.

In economic matters the Soviet Government, hampered as they were by the rigid tenets of the Marxian creed and by the acute economic dislocation and distress of the U.S.S.R. during these years, found it difficult to show themselves as accommodating towards their Middle Eastern neighbours as they had shown themselves on the political plane.

As between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, for example, a sudden and unexplained cessation of the grant of export licences to Russia on the part of the Soviet authorities at Constantinople caused friction between the two countries in February 1926 on the eve of negotiations for a commercial treaty—and this at a time when, owing to Turco-British tension over the Mosul question,³ Turco-Russian political relations were warmer than they had been at any moment since the Peace Conference of Lausanne. A controversy between the two Governments over this restriction of imports into the U.S.S.R. seems still to have been in progress in May 1926, when the port authorities at Odessa were reported to be refusing permission for goods from Turkey to be landed. It may have been a desire on the part of the Soviet Russian and Turkish Governments to counteract the untoward effect of this economic friction upon their political relations that prompted a meeting at Odessa, on the 12th November, 1926, between the two Foreign Ministers, Monsieur Chicherin and Tefvik Rüşdi Beğ—a meeting which gave rise to far-fetched and far-reaching speculations in the Western Press.⁴ Yet, so far from proving to be the prelude to

¹ *Survey for 1927*, Part II E, Section (v) and Part II D, Section (ii).

² See the exchange of notes attached to the Russo-Persian Treaty of the 1st October, 1927.

³ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi) (g).

⁴ See *The Times*, *Le Temps* and the *Corriere della Sera*, 13th and 16th

a portended Pan-Asiatic political coalition, the Odessa meeting was not even followed by any perceptible improvement in Turco-Russian relations in the economic field; for the complaints of Turkish exporters against Russian import restrictions revived in January 1927. Before the end of that month, the negotiations for a commercial treaty were taken up again, in view of the fact that a provisional agreement which had been concluded in 1923 was due to expire in February; but, even at the eleventh hour, agreement was delayed by Turkish objections to several Russian desiderata—for example, an insistence that certain Turkish products should be excluded altogether from the U.S.S.R., a demand that diplomatic immunity and extra-territoriality should be conceded to members of the Soviet Russian Trade Delegation and its branches on Turkish soil,¹ and a suggestion that on both sides Turco-Russian trade should be kept in the hands of the Governments to the exclusion of private traders. In the event, the text of a Russo-Turkish commercial treaty was agreed early in March 1927, and the instrument was signed on the 11th of that month and came into force on the 4th July, after ratifications had been exchanged on the 5th June.² The basis of this treaty was reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment within certain limits. Beyond that, the special Russian desiderata were met by the stipulation that Turkish imports into the U.S.S.R. should be restricted to a maximum annual value (expressed in Turkish currency) and by the provision that the Soviet trade delegate in Turkey and his two substitutes should enjoy diplomatic status. Turkish desiderata were met by the provision that products of either country should be given transit, free of duty, across the territory of the other country *en route* to a third country,³ with special facilities for Turkish trade through the Transcaucasian port of Batum.⁴ There was apparently no November, 1926; *The Times*, 17th November, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, November–December 1926, p. 567 (where the text of the colourless official *communiqué* on the meeting will be found).

¹ For other cases in which international difficulties had arisen over the status of Soviet Russian trade delegates abroad, see the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 214–17; *Survey for 1927*, Part II E, Section (ii).

² On the actual date of signature, one of the officials of the Russo-Turkish Trade Corporation in Constantinople named Akunov was arrested by the Turkish police, apparently on suspicion of espionage, and was not released until the 15th March, 1927.

³ With a view, no doubt, to stimulating the revival of the transit trade between Russia and other countries through the Turkish territorial waters of the Black Sea Straits, the Great National Assembly at Angora, in 1928, approved a law authorizing the Turkish Government to create a free zone within the municipal limits of Constantinople or its neighbourhood.

⁴ For previous Turkish complaints regarding conditions at Batum see *Le Temps*, 8th September, 1926.

vision, however, for the transit of goods originating in a third country across Russian territory *en route* for Turkey (or vice versa).¹ It may be added that this treaty did not have the effect of bringing Russo-Turkish friction in the economic sphere to an end. In February 1928, for example, the Turkish Government had to intervene against certain Turkish chambers of commerce which had been evading the treaty restrictions on imports from Turkey to the U.S.S.R. by making false returns. On the other hand, other possibilities of friction were reduced by the conclusion in August 1928 of four conventions regulating the régime along the frontier between Turkey and the U.S.S.R. in Transcaucasia.²

As between the U.S.S.R. and Persia, a mutually satisfactory economic settlement proved still more difficult to reach than it had proved as between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. In the Russo-Persian treaty of the 26th February, 1921, it had been laid down that a Russo-Persian customs convention should be concluded subsequently, and in fact a commercial treaty was negotiated in 1924; but the terms of this treaty were rejected by the *Majlis* at Tihirān.³ The Soviet Government, who were not willing to accept the modifications which the *Majlis* desired, continued to apply to Persia the Imperial Russian tariff of 1903; and in 1926 they went so far as to place an embargo on imports from Persia into the U.S.S.R.—a measure calculated to produce considerable economic dislocation in Northern Persia, which had been accustomed to use the Transcaspian and Transcaucasian Railways and the Caspian ports as the main channels of its foreign trade.⁴ Moreover, the Soviet Russian Government had so far failed to execute certain measures which had been stipulated for in the treaty of 1921 itself. For example, they had not given Persia facilities for using the waters of the River Atrak, which constituted the frontier between Transcaspia and the Persian Province of Astrabad; they had not handed over to Persia the village of Firūz⁵ or the port of Anzali

¹ For the terms of this Russo-Turkish commercial treaty of the 11th March, 1927, see *Oriente Moderno*, March 1927, pp. 118–20.

² An agreement on the use of waters crossing this frontier seems to have been reached at the beginning of 1927.

³ For Dr. Millspaugh's unsuccessful attempt to bring about an economic settlement between Persia and the U.S.S.R., see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 545.

⁴ See the present volume, p. 343 above, for Persian efforts to find an alternative channel for the foreign trade of Tabriz via Rowānduz and Baghdad. No doubt the alignment of the projected Caspian-Persian Gulf Railway was also chosen with an eye to rendering Northern Persia to some extent less dependent on the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government were said to be hostile to this project.

⁵ On the border between Khurāsān and Transcaspia.

or the South Caspian fisheries; and they had not granted to Persian trade the stipulated right of transit across Russian territory.¹ On the 15th March, 1927, there was an 'incident' off the Persian port of Bār-furūsh, when the local Persian authorities took forcible measures to prevent a Russian fishing fleet from operating in Persian territorial waters.

In the same month, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Alī Qulī Khān Ansārī, Mushāwir Al-Mamālik, who had been the Persian negotiator of the Russo-Persian treaty of 1921, travelled from Tihṛān to Moscow in order to take up the commercial negotiations again.² As a result, a commercial agreement in the form of an exchange of notes and a customs convention was signed in Moscow, simultaneously with the Russo-Persian treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, on the 1st October, 1927. The exchange of notes—which was a provisional arrangement designed to remain in force for two years pending a definitive settlement—restricted Persian imports into the U.S.S.R. to a maximum annual value of 50,000,000 roubles and Soviet imports into Persia to 90 per cent. of Persian imports into the U.S.S.R. in any given year. Transit, free of duty, across Soviet territory, was conceded to Persian products *en route* for a third country, but not to imports from a third country into Persia, unless that third country had a commercial treaty with the U.S.S.R. and unless the goods fell within certain specified categories. The establishment of a Soviet Russian trade delegation in Persia was provided for.³ The customs convention, which was conceived on a most-favoured-nation basis, was to run for five years unless previously denounced by either party at six months' notice; but the Soviet Government appear to have agreed that the convention should become void automatically if Persia introduced an autonomous general tariff,⁴ as she did on the 10th May, 1928.⁵ On the 31st January, 1928, ratifications of all the Russo-Persian agreements of the 1st October, 1927, were exchanged at Tihṛān; and on the 14th January the port of Anzalī (renamed by the Persians Pahlawī, after the dynastic title of Rizā Shāh) was handed over by the Russian to the Persian

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, April 1927, p. 171, citing the *Yeni Qāfqāsyā* of Constantinople (N.B. the *Yeni Qāfqāsyā* was a journal which expressed the views of Transcaucasian Muslim refugees who were hostile to the U.S.S.R.).

² 'Alī Qulī Khān seems to have been preceded by an unofficial mission of Persian business men, who went to Moscow earlier in the year under the leadership of the Chairman of the Tihṛān Chamber of Commerce.

³ For the terms of the Russo-Persian commercial agreement of the 1st October, 1927, see *Oriente Moderno*, December 1927, pp. 613–15.

⁴ For this point see the Moscow *Izvestia*, 15th May, 1928.

⁵ See Section (xii) above, p. 354.

authorities—the harbour installations being consigned to a Russo-Persian company for a term of twenty-five years.

As between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan, negotiations for a commercial treaty were carried on at Moscow from May to August 1928, but in this case, again, the Soviet Government sought to deny transit across Soviet territory for imports from a third country into Afghanistan, with the exception of goods belonging to certain specified categories; and over this point the negotiations appear to have broken down.

This outline of the economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and its Middle Eastern neighbours during the years 1926–8 suggests that, on the economic plane, the foreign policy of the Soviet Government was less easy to distinguish than it was on the political plane from the foreign policy of the Czardom;¹ and this consideration, in Turkish, Persian and Afghan minds, was no doubt one of the contributory causes of that diminution of Soviet Russian influence in the Middle East which has been noted above. The other contributory cause was of a cultural nature; for the substitution of the Soviet régime for the Czardom, which had placed Russia in a more favourable position than before for presenting herself to the Middle Eastern peoples as a political friend, had had the opposite effect on the cultural plane. The Czardom, which had been feared and hated politically in the Islamic World as an aggressive Power, had at the same time enjoyed a certain prestige as a vehicle of Western civilization; and some of those Muslim peoples that had been subdued after strenuous resistance by the superior force of Imperial Russian arms had afterwards shown an unexpected readiness to adopt the Russian version of Western culture. The Soviet régime, however, repudiated not merely Western political ‘imperialism’ but the whole way of life of the Western ‘bourgeoisie’; and this aspect of Soviet Russian policy had no attraction for the Islamic peoples during the ten years ending in 1928. During those years, the leadership of the three independent Islamic countries adjoining the U.S.S.R. was in the hands of men who were not less eager than the Russian Communists to put an end to the political ascendancy of the Western Powers, but in whose eyes the sovereign means towards the attainment of this political goal, as well as the ultimate object in pursuing it, was to adopt the technique

¹ Moreover, under the new régime in Russia, as under the old, economic means might be made to serve political ends. For example, the Soviet Government maintained consulates at places in the south of Persia where there were no Soviet Russian nationals or commercial interests to look after. The inference was that the functions of these establishments were political.

and institutions and ideas of Western civilization.¹ These Islamic leaders were concerned, not to overthrow Western society, but to force an entrance into it on a footing of equality with the original members; and although this 'Westernizing' movement in the Islamic World sometimes evoked an 'anti-Western' reaction where it was pushed on too fast or was carried to extremes,² the Islamic reactionaries sought refuge from the abominations of the West in a return to the strict letter of the holy law of Islam, to which the Marxian revolutionary creed, no less than 'bourgeois' orthodoxy, was anathema. Thus, in this fierce and momentous internal struggle in the bosom of Islamic society, Communism failed to find favour on either side; and indeed the influence of this doctrine on Islamic society was so slight that it hardly entered into the issue. In the Islamic World, at this time, the names inscribed on the banners of the opposing camps were not 'Communism' and 'Capitalism' but 'Westernization' and 'Islam'.

Thus there was a tendency for Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan to establish a certain unity of front towards the U.S.S.R. as well as towards the Western Powers; but the three Middle Eastern states did not on that account abstain altogether from the luxury of falling out with one another. Between Turkey and Afghanistan, it is true, the possibilities of controversy were narrowed down by the absence of a common frontier—though Turkish encouragement of King Amānu'llāh's 'Westernizing' activities gave the King's Afghan opponents occasion for resentment. Between Turkey and Persia, however, frontier controversies could and did arise during the period under review.

In the autumn of 1926, one of Rizā Shāh's Ministers, Timūr Tāsh Khān, visited Turkey on a diplomatic mission which was to set the seal on Turco-Persian friendship; but in the summer of 1927 the frontier relations between the two countries were disturbed by the course of Turkish military operations against recalcitrant Kurdish tribesmen under Turkish sovereignty.³ Rizā Shāh had his own troubles with other Kurdish tribes on the Persian side of the frontier;⁴

¹ On this dual aspect of the policy of Islamic 'Herodians' in the 'post-war' period, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, p. 1.

² The 'anti-Western' reaction in Afghanistan, which came to a head at the end of the year 1928, will be dealt with in a future volume.

³ For the repercussion of Kurdish insurrections against the Turks upon the frontier relations between Turkey and another neighbouring country, 'Irāq, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. i, Part III, Section (xi) (e), and the present volume, p. 336 above.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, pp. 536-9, and the present volume, Section (xi) of this Part.

but the Kurdish problem in Persia differed from the problem in Turkey owing to a marked difference in policy. In Persia the problem was purely social and economic, for the Government were simply concerned to maintain order and repress brigandage among the turbulent and poverty-stricken Kurdish tribesmen. There was no attempt to 'Persianize' the Persian Kurds; and indeed it would have been difficult to give a meaning to any such programme, since the Persian Kurds spoke an Iranian vernacular as their mother-tongue and had no desire to transfer their allegiance from the Persian Government to any other. In Turkey, on the other hand, where the Kurds were the victims of a policy of forcible 'Turcification', the Kurdish problem was primarily political.

The trouble began with an anti-Turkish outburst in the Persian press against alleged misconduct on the part of the Turkish frontier authorities, who were accused of countenancing and promoting Kurdish raids from the Turkish to the Persian side of the frontier. The Turks protested against these charges, recalled their Ambassador from Tihṛān to report, and retorted with counter-charges of the same kind. Thereafter, on the 5th September, 1927, the Turkish *chargé d'affaires* at Tihṛān requested the Persian Government to prevent certain Kurdish insurgents, against whom the Turkish Government were on the point of taking action, from seeking asylum on Persian territory and further to prevent them from receiving aid from their kinsmen on the Persian side; and on the 11th and 17th September the Persian Government announced that they had taken steps to comply with the Turkish Government's desires. On the 1st October, however, the Turkish *chargé d'affaires* presented a note alleging that a party of Turkish troops had been captured by Kurds on Turkish soil and carried away captive into Persia, and demanding the release of the prisoners, with an apology, under threat of a rupture of diplomatic relations. The Persian Government, on their part, alleged that the Turkish force had been cut to pieces with the exception of one officer who had been hospitably received by a Persian frontier post and eventually escorted back to safety. They therefore refused to accept the Turkish note and proposed a joint investigation. To this end Mirzā Muḥammad 'Alī Khān Furūghī was sent as envoy extraordinary from Tihṛān to Angora and was appointed Ambassador in the course of the year 1928; but protracted negotiations on the frontier question between this representative of the Persian Government and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently failed to produce any positive result.

Thus, at the close of the year 1928, the Kurdish question was still

disturbing the relations between Turkey and Persia, as it had been doing during the past four centuries ; and it might also again disturb the relations between either or both of these countries and 'Irāq—the third of the three states among which Kurdistan was now partitioned—as it had done on certain occasions since the General War of 1914–18, particularly in the controversy over the Vilayet of Mosul.

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PART IV

CHINA

(i) The End of the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Ankuochün (Coalition of Northern Tuchüns) and the Beginning of Reconstruction.

(a) THE CAMPAIGN OF 1928

IN the preceding volume,¹ the history of the civil war between the forces fighting under the flag of the Kuomintang and the forces of the northern coalition of tuchüns has been recorded down to the local campaign, on the borders of Chihli and Shansi, between the 'Model Tuchün' of Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan, and the ruler of the Manchurian provinces, Chang Tso-lin. In the military sense, this local campaign had been indecisive, since Yen, in his offensive, had failed to capture Peking, while Chang, in his counter-offensive, had failed in turn to drive Yen out of his provincial capital. Thereafter, the fighting had been brought to a standstill by the advent of the winter of 1927-8; but the political situation had been changed to the Ankuochün's disadvantage; for Yen was now irrevocably committed to the Kuomintang cause, and thus the position of the Ankuochün in Shantung and Chihli—the last provinces remaining to them inside the Great Wall—was threatened thenceforward from the west as well as from the south.

The principal partners in the northern coalition at this time were Chang Tso-lin (who was still standing outside his own borders), Chang Tsung-ch'ang (who had been driven back northward almost up to the southern border of his province of Shantung at the close of the preceding campaign), and Sun Ch'uan-fang (who had lost almost his last foothold in his former province of Kiangsu). The once dominant Wu P'ei-fu had gone into retirement; and only a few tatters from his mantle had fallen on the shoulders of his former subordinate Yang Sen, who was now playing for his own hand in eastern Szechuan.² Nor were the surviving partners in the Ankuochün more than superficially united among themselves—as was to be proved in the course of the coming campaign. On the other hand, there were personal rivalries among their opponents which the common Kuomintang colours covered but did not overcome. At this

¹ *Survey for 1927*, Part III, Section (i).

² For Yang Sen's collision with the British Navy in 1926, see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 308-13.

stage, in fact, the Nationalist forces were under three separate commands. In Shansi there was Yen Hsi-shan with his provincial troops; in Honan there was Feng Yü-hsiang with his Kuominchün; and in the middle and lower Yangtse Basin there was the army of the Kuomintang proper, whose Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, was responsible to (and for) the reunited Kuomintang Central Government at Nanking.¹ In theory, the authority of the Nanking Government was recognized by Yen and Feng; and the nine provinces² which were supposed to be under the direct control of Nanking were far more extensive, populous and wealthy than Yen's single province³ or Feng's three.⁴ The effectiveness of this control, however, varied in proportion to the distance from the centre of power, and on the fringes it was not far from vanishing point. The provinces of the southern littoral, in particular, were inclined each to go their own way; and the commanders of the troops from Kwangsi were showing an inclination to defy their nominal Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, and build up an empire for themselves in Hunan and Hupeh.⁵ The rivalry between this 'Kwangsi Faction' and Chiang Kai-shek did not come to an open breach until the spring of 1929, but it was already latent at the beginning of 1928; and this threat of disunity in his own forces weakened Chiang Kai-shek's hands in that year's campaign.

The campaign of 1928 opened early in April with a drive by Chang Tso-lin down the Peking-Hankow Railway against Feng's position in northern Honan; but Chang's advance soon came to a standstill—possibly because his right flank was now exposed to attack from Shansi—and when Chiang Kai-shek advanced up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway and invaded Shantung on the 10th April, Feng was free to fall simultaneously upon the right flank of Chang Tsung-ch'ang, with the result that the Shantung tuchün suffered a severe defeat and Feng's Muslim cavalry 'cut in' in front of Chiang's advance-guard by occupying Taianfu—a point on the railway about thirty miles south of Tsinanfu, the capital of the province. Tsinanfu was evacuated by the Ankuochün on the 30th April and was occupied without incident by Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the following day. The collision between Kuomintang troops and Japanese troops at Tsinanfu on the 3rd May is dealt with elsewhere.⁶ An incidental effect of this collision

¹ For the reconstitution of a reunited Kuomintang Government at Nanking in the autumn of 1927, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 357-8.

² Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang. ³ Shansi. ⁴ Honan, Shensi, Kansu.

⁵ The province of Kiangsi was also semi-independent at this time under Chu Pei-teh.

⁶ See Section (ii) (a) below.

was to put Chiang Kai-shek out of the running in the race between the three Nationalist commanders for the occupation of Peking—a mishap which was particularly mortifying for the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief since it was followed within less than a week by a surrender of the prize on the part of Chang Tso-lin. On the 9th May Chang Tso-lin sent a circular telegram¹ to all the provinces of China in which, after repeating his denunciations of Communism, he announced that he had ordered his troops to cease fighting immediately, on account of the misfortunes which the civil war was bringing upon the country. As regarded national politics, he declared that the question of right and wrong rested with the people. Whatever may have been the intention behind this gesture, Chang was compelled to act up to his declaration by the intervention of the Japanese Government. On the 18th May the Japanese representatives at Peking and Nanking presented a memorandum to the Ankuochün and Kuomintang Governments, warning them both that, 'should the disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, the Japanese Government on their part' might 'possibly be constrained to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria'. In presenting this memorandum to Chang, the Japanese Minister at Peking informed him that, if he did not withdraw to Manchuria at once, his passage would be barred by Japanese troops at the boundary between the provinces of Chihli and Fengtien, where the Peking-Mukden Railway ran through a narrow pass between the mountains and the sea.² Simultaneously, Japanese women and children were withdrawn from the Peking-Tientsin area; reinforcements (accompanied by 12 field guns and 9 aeroplanes) which raised the Japanese detachment at Tientsin from 462 to about 4,500 men, arrived on the 24th May;³ and on the 1st June the defence of the several foreign concessions at Tientsin was organized by the foreign forces on the spot under Japanese command. In these circumstances Chang Tso-lin evacuated Peking on the night of the 2nd-3rd June and withdrew the bulk of the Manchurian forces

¹ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th May, 1928.

² It is here that the Great Wall strikes the coast; and this easternmost sector of the Great Wall marked the boundary between Chang Tso-lin's own domain and the territory which he was occupying in China Proper.

³ The Japanese Tientsin Defence Force was an expression of the same policy as were the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway Defence Forces sent out in 1927 and 1928. (See pp. 403-13 below.) For the strengths of the several foreign contingents at Tientsin before the arrival of these Japanese reinforcements, see a statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 14th May, 1928.

from Chihli, in good order, along the Peking-Mukden Railway. As Chang's own train was passing under the bridge, just outside Mukden, over which this Chinese line was crossed by the Japanese South Manchurian Railway, the train was blown up, and Chang died of wounds thus received—the official date of his death being the 21st June.¹ Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had been making a simultaneous (though less tragic) railway-journey to his own rear; and upon his arrival on the 4th June at Nanking Yen Hsi-shan was promptly appointed commander of the gendarmerie at Peking and Tientsin. On the 8th Yen's forces duly marched into Peking, while Feng's remained outside the gates; and thus Chiang, having lost the race himself, had at least the consolation of having prevented Feng from winning it. The only 'incident' on this historic occasion was the disarming and internment, by Feng's troops, of part of a Manchurian brigade which had stayed behind to keep order during the interregnum on the understanding that they should afterwards be allowed to march away with the honours of war. The Diplomatic Corps, which had been one of the parties to this understanding, protested; and eventually the Manchurian troops were allowed to depart as had been originally arranged. At Tientsin, where the Chinese city was held by a remnant of the armies of Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang, the advance of the Nationalists was resisted on the 9th; but this resistance was brought to an end by the defection of the Chihli contingent on the 11th; and the Chinese city of Tientsin was taken over by Yen's troops next day; but the disbanded northern soldiery pillaged the city on their retreat, and it was several days before order was restored. At Tientsin, however, in happy contrast to Tsinanfu, there was no collision between Chinese troops and the foreign troops guarding the foreign concessions. Thereafter, Chang Tsung-ch'ang and his soldiery—now more disorderly and more straightened for means of subsistence than ever—settled down at Tongshan, on the

¹ For the ostensible facts, see a statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 5th June, 1928. It was almost inevitable that the Japanese should be accused of having instigated or even arranged this act of violence; but Chang had no lack of bitter enemies; and, on the principle of *cui bono*, it was difficult to see how Japan stood to gain by his destruction, especially when he had fallen in with Japanese wishes by withdrawing from Peking. Nevertheless, the persistent refusal of Baron Tanaka's Government to make any authoritative statement on the matter lent some colour to the very widespread Chinese belief that Japanese personages in responsible positions were privy to the plot and were consenting to Chang's death, on the calculation that Chang's Chief-of-Staff, Yang Yu-ting, would be more convenient to Japan as ruler of Manchuria than Chang himself. Some colour was lent to this belief by the subsequent death of Yang Yu-ting at the hands of Chang Tso-jin's son Chang Hsüeh-liang (see p. 383 below).

Peking-Mukden Railway, just inside the Great Wall, in a no-man's-land between the advance-guard of the Nationalist forces and the rear-guard of the Manchurians. Here they began to exact supplies from a local Sino-British coal-mining company, the Kailan Mining Administration; and on the 24th June a detachment of British troops was sent to the spot¹—apparently with the tacit approval of both the Manchurian and the Nationalist authorities, who were not yet prepared to deal with Chang Tsung-ch'ang themselves.

Meanwhile, on the 10th June, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had publicly resigned his offices of Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Military Council of the Kuomintang Government, on the ground that the war was over.² On the 3rd July he arrived at Peking and was followed by Feng on the 6th, when the Nationalist commanders in a body attended a ceremony in the Western Hills in order to announce to the spirit of Sun Yat-sen the definitive success of the campaign which he had originally inspired.

It remained to stamp out the embers; for Chang Tsung-ch'ang's remnant at Tongshan still remained in being; and on the 23rd July a detachment of them landed at Chefoo in Shantung and captured it. On the 3rd September, however, Chefoo came under the Nationalist flag again; and on the 9th September operations against Chang Tsung-ch'ang's main body at Tongshan were started under the command of the Kwangsi commander Pai Tsung-hsi, with whom the Manchurian forces co-operated passively by barring Chang Tsung-ch'ang's line of retreat from Chihli into Fengtien. Chang's troops put up no effective resistance to their assailants; but when, in their flight, they collided with the Manchurian cordon on the 16th September, they inflicted a severe defeat on it. Within a few days, however, they had all either dispersed or surrendered, and fighting had ceased by the end of the third week in September. Therewith, the civil war between Ankuochün and Kuomintang came to an end.

(b) THE SITUATION AT THE CLOSE OF THE CIVIL WAR BETWEEN
THE KUOMINTANG AND THE ANKUOCHÜN

After the break-up of the Ankuochün coalition, withdrawal of the Manchurian contingent to the north of the Great Wall, and dispersal of the armies of Chang Tsung-ch'ang and Sun Ch'uan-fang, the Kuomintang flag flew throughout the territories of the Chinese

¹ Foreign interests in this district of the Peking-Tientsin area had been under the protection of United States troops, but these had been withdrawn on the 19th May.

² Text of this announcement, and extract from an accompanying statement, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th June, 1928.

Republic¹ with the exception of the three north-eastern provinces of Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang (together constituting Manchuria). It is true that the allegiance of the three south-western provinces of Szechuan, Kweichow and Yunnan was only nominal. Yet although Szechuan was the greatest of the Chinese provinces in both area and population, the attitude of the south-west was of little importance. This great region was split up among a number of petty tyrants, ranging from Wu P'ei-fu's former henchman Yang Sen² on the Upper Yangtse to 'the aboriginal tuchün' in Yunnan; it had produced no Government claiming the allegiance of All China in rivalry to Nanking; and, although Yunnan marched with French Indo-China and with British Burma, the pressure of foreign Powers was less felt in this remote and land-locked part of China than in any other. If the Kuomintang Government at Nanking succeeded in effectively asserting their authority elsewhere, they could look forward to bringing the south-west to heel whenever they had the energy to spare. The crux in completing the reunification of China was not the south-west but Manchuria, where there was not only the strong local Chinese Government established by Chang Tso-lin, whose authority extended over all three north-eastern provinces, but where the Chinese had to reckon with the vested interests of two foreign Powers, Japan and the U.S.S.R.³

For some time before Chang Tso-lin's death, there had been a sharp division of sentiment and policy in his entourage. The older school were in favour of continuing to take the lead in the Ankuochün coalition against the Kuomintang—a policy which meant spending the resources of Manchuria on military campaigns outside her own borders. The younger school sympathized with the programme of the Kuomintang—particularly, perhaps, in the matter of relations between China and foreign Powers—and were in favour of coming to a friendly understanding with them, though they did not contemplate going so far towards unification as to surrender their own local autonomy. In their policy towards the Kuomintang, the younger school had the support of Chang Tso-lin's son Chang Hsüeh-liang, who took control of the Manchurian Government at Mukden on the 20th June, 1928 (the day before the official date of his father's death);

¹ Excluding Tibet and Outer Mongolia, which had been dependencies of the Manchu Empire but whose international status in 1928 was in dispute (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part VI, Section (i)).

² Before the fall of Peking in June 1928, Yang Sen had signified his recognition of the Nanking Government by accepting a commission in the Kuomintang army.

³ See Section (ii) (d).

and the young general's accession to power transformed the relations between Mukden and Nanking. When the Nationalist commanders congregated at Peking at the beginning of July, Chang Hsüeh-liang sent them a friendly message; and when they destroyed the remnants of Chang Tsung-ch'ang's army in September, the Manchurian forces co-operated with them against their own former allies. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government had intervened.

On or about the 18th July, 1928,¹ the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, upon being consulted by Chang Hsüeh-liang, advised him to pause before coming to an agreement with the Nanking Government; and though this advice was given personally and unofficially, the Consul-General expressed the belief that his Government were of the same mind. This was borne out by a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Tanaka, in an interview with the representatives of foreign Governments at Tokio on the 25th July; and something in the nature of an ultimatum was delivered to Chang Hsüeh-liang in a personal interview on the 9th August by Baron Hayashi, who had been sent on a special mission to Mukden—nominally to attend the funeral of Chang Tso-lin. In this interview, Baron Hayashi was reported to have declared that the unification of Manchuria with the territories under the Kuomintang Central Government would jeopardize Japan's special interests, privileges and acquired rights in the three eastern provinces of China, and that for this reason the Japanese Government desired the Manchurian Government to adopt a waiting policy for the time being. The Baron was reported to have added that, if Chang Hsüeh-liang were to override Japan's wishes and to hoist the Kuomintang flag, Japan had decided to take a free hand to act on her own initiative. Chang Hsüeh-liang appears to have shown recalcitrance; and the Japanese Government refrained from forcing the issue.² In the end, Baron Hayashi and

¹ The date was not without significance. On the 7th July the Nanking Government had announced their intention of terminating immediately all the 'unequal treaties' which had not yet expired (see below, p. 422). The Sino-Japanese commercial treaty of 1896 ran out, after several prolongations, on the 19th July, and on that date Mr. Wang notified the Japanese Consul-General at Nanking of the termination of the treaty as from the 20th. (See further p. 423 below.) These contemporary events at Nanking might have had something to do with Japanese action at Mukden. This suggestion was denied by Baron Hayashi on the 17th August in an interview with the correspondent of *The Times* at Kyoto. It may be noted, however, that, besides the diplomatic action taken by the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden on the 18th July, military action was taken in another part of China, namely the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu railway-zone, by Japanese forces. (See p. 411 below.)

² One of the considerations in Baron Tanaka's mind may have been the declared attitude of the British Government. In the House of Commons at

Chang Hsüeh-liang arrived at an understanding that the Kuomintang flag should not be hoisted in Manchuria until after a lapse of three months, but that thereafter Japan would not interfere in the relations between Mukden and Nanking. On the 9th August Baron Tanaka announced enigmatically to the Seiyukai Party (of which he was the leader) that the Japanese Government had no intention of opposing the union of the Nanking and Mukden Governments, but that they could not endorse it. On the 17th August, upon his return from Mukden to Tokio, Baron Hayashi announced¹ that Chang had agreed to suspend negotiations with Nanking temporarily. He added that Japan had no objection to Manchuria uniting with a unified China, but that she would object strongly to Manchuria becoming attached to one of the several contending factions and so being drawn into the civil war.

Japan made no protest when, upon the inauguration of the new constitution of the Kuomintang Central Government at Nanking on the 10th October,² Chang Hsüeh-liang was appointed one of the sixteen State Councillors. Nanking and Mukden had still to agree upon the future of the district of Jehol—a territory situated immediately outside the Great Wall, to the north-west of Peking, which had originally formed part of Inner Mongolia, had gradually been colonized by Chinese and had eventually become attached to the province of Chihli, but was now in Manchurian hands and was producing lucrative opium revenues.³ Before the end of December 1928, however, a comprehensive agreement was reached by which Nanking agreed to leave Jehol as well as Manchuria under Chang Hsüeh-

Westminster, on the 13th July, 1928, in answer to a parliamentary question, the following statement had been made by Sir Austen Chamberlain:

‘His Majesty’s Government regard Manchuria as being part of China; they do not recognise Japan as having any special interests in that territory other than those conferred by Treaty and those referred to in Baron Shidehara’s statement at the Plenary Session of the Washington Conference on 4th February, 1922.’

In the same place, on the 30th July, 1928, in answer to the question ‘What is our attitude towards Japanese intervention in Manchuria?’ the Secretary of State had declared:

‘We do not recognise Manchuria as anything but a part of China. We recognise that Japan has great interests in Manchuria, which has a great Japanese population, and may well have a certain anxiety as to the protection of those persons. But our interest is a united China under one Government, which can take obligations and keep obligations, and with which we can negotiate a friendly settlement and maintain friendly relations.’

¹ In an interview with the correspondent of *The Times* at Tokio (*The Times*, 18th August, 1928).

² See p. 390 below.

³ The province of Chihli proper appears to have been completely evacuated by the Manchurian forces before the end of August 1928.

liang's administration and to give him the title of Commander of the North-East Frontier Defence Force, while Chang accepted his appointment to the State Council at Nanking and modified the personnel of his Government without relinquishing his own position as head of it. In token of this agreement, the Kuomintang flag was hoisted in all the territories under Chang Hsüeh-liang's authority on the 29th December, 1928.

Thus the one surviving effective ruler in China who had not yet paid formal allegiance to the Kuomintang had fallen into line with Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan before the close of the year;¹ and the new year began without the Government at Nanking having come into conflict with either Feng or the Kwangsi commanders, although the relations between the latter and Chiang Kai-shek were already ominously strained. Meanwhile, apart from the obscure local struggles in the south-west, disorders in China were confined to sporadic insurrections against one or other of the several rulers that were flying the Kuomintang flag.

In August 1928, for instance, the extreme north-western corner of Chang Hsüeh-liang's domain was raided by a party of horsemen from Outer Mongolia who momentarily interrupted communications along the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Manchouli-Hailar sector. The object of the raid was to detach from Manchuria the Barga Buriat principality—a fraction of Outer Mongolia, traversed by this north-western section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had been detached from the rest of Outer Mongolia since the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911.² The Barga Buriat Prince rejected the

¹ On the 10th January, 1929, Chang Hsüeh-liang confirmed his position in Manchuria by suddenly arresting and executing Yang Yu-ting, the Chief-of-Staff of the army which he had inherited from his father Chang Tso-lin. For the possibility of a connexion between the execution of Yang Yu-ting and the *attentat* against Chang Tso-lin in the preceding June, see p. 378 above. Whether or not Yang Yu-ting had been privy to the murder of his old master, he was believed to have been angling for Japanese support by offering facilities for completing the Kirin-Kwainai Railway (see pp. 436-7 below). He was also believed to have been intriguing with Pai Tsung-hsi and the other Kwangsi leaders against Chiang Kai-shek. The execution of Yang Yu-ting was thus a blow to the Kwangsi Faction, and in this way it had an important influence on the fortunes of the Nanking Government.

² In 1912 the Barga Buriats had declared their independence of China. Thereafter, under Russian mediation, the Barga Buriat principality had been made autonomous under nominal Chinese sovereignty and a virtual Russian protectorate—a Sino-Russian agreement on the subject being signed on the 6th November, 1915 (see MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, vol. ii, p. 1,247). After the Russian Revolution of 1917, and after the withdrawal of the Japanese expeditionary force to Harbin in 1920, the principality had come under the control of the Chinese tuchünship at Mukden,

raiders' demands and the latter were quickly driven off upon the arrival of Manchurian troops. The incident was significant only because the Soviet Socialist Republic of Outer Mongolia had by this time become virtually a member of the U.S.S.R.¹ The Soviet Governments at Urga and at Moscow both denied that they were implicated in this disturbance of the peace.

Far more formidable and destructive was a Muslim insurrection in Western Kansu against Feng Yü-hsiang's régime, which broke out in April 1928.² The instigation was said to have come from Chang Tso-lin, when he was on the point of launching that offensive against Feng which opened the final campaign of the civil war between Ankuochün and Kuomintang.³ Chang's object was to create a diversion in Feng's rear which would prevent Feng from deploying his full strength in Chihli; but the old civil war in Chihli and the new civil war in Kansu each followed its own course without either having any decisive influence upon the fortunes of the other. The war in Kansu immediately developed into a war of religion⁴ on traditional local lines, and was waged with the barbarity which had characterized the insurrection of 1862-76.⁵ The Muslim insurgents, advancing from the west, gained ground so long as Feng's energies were taken up by the war in Chihli; but these Muslim successes in Kansu did not save the Ankuochün from destruction; and in August Feng marched west to stem the tide. Before the end of September the tide had definitely turned,⁶ but this did not put an end to the horrors of the struggle; for the Muslims now set themselves to exterminate the non-Muslim population in the territory still held by them. The total loss of life

while the rest of Outer Mongolia had fallen under the influence of the Soviet Government at Moscow.

¹ In addition to Outer Mongolia, the small mountainous territory of Uriankhai, which had likewise formerly been recognized as part of the Chinese Empire, had passed over into the orbit of the U.S.S.R. by this date.

² The scene of this insurrection was so remote that the first reports of it (derived from Western missionaries) did not begin to reach the outer world till the autumn. One of the best of the accounts available was a letter dated the 5th November, 1928, from a missionary at Minchow, Mr. W. W. Simpson, which was printed in the *North China Daily News* and cited in *The Times*, 4th December, 1928. For other news see *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th and 11th October, and 21st November, 1928, and a letter in *The Times*, 5th December, 1928.

³ See p. 376 above.

⁴ Not a war of race; for the Muslims of Kansu, unlike the Turki Muslims of Sinkiang (the Tarim Basin), were of the same Chinese race as their non-Muslim fellow provincials.

⁵ For this previous Muslim insurrection in Kansu, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 335.

⁶ E. g. the city of Liangchow, beyond the Yellow River, was retaken by the Kuominchün before that date.

in Kansu, during the year 1928, from the sword, pestilence and famine was variously estimated at from 200,000 to 500,000 souls. The Muslim troops which Feng himself had raised and had used with effect in the advance upon Peking¹ remained loyal to him; but the struggle in Kansu was a serious drain upon his strength; and this may have been one of the reasons why he refrained from trying conclusions with Chiang Kai-shek, not only throughout the year 1928, but also when Chiang was at grips with his Kwangsi opponents in the spring of 1929.²

By April 1928, when the Muslim reign of terror in the north-west began, the Communist reign of terror in the south was on the wane. The critical moment here had been when the Communists had seized but failed to hold Canton in December 1927.³ They still remained at large both in eastern Kwangtung⁴ and in southern Kiangsi and Hunan; but early in 1928 Pai Tsung-hsi, a member of the Kwangsi Faction who was in command of the Kuomintang forces at Wuchang, began operations against the Communists in the two latter provinces⁵ which ended in their being dispersed or driven away.⁶ Thereafter, the Communist régime was substantially confined to the Haifung and Lukfung districts of eastern Kwangtung, in the immediate hinterland of Swabue.⁷ The moving spirit here was a certain P'eng P'ai, who had originally come to the district in 1923 in order to organize a peasant union in the name of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In the autumn of 1927, when bodies of Communist troops drifted down upon this district from the north,⁸ P'eng P'ai had set up a local Communist régime which far surpassed the Kansu Muslim insurgents in refinement of cruelty, though happily its campaign of extermination against non-Communists took a comparatively moderate toll of lives owing to the smallness of the area which this régime controlled. Like 'the Old Man of the Mountain' in medieval Persia and the founder of the

¹ See p. 376 above.

² This will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1929*.

³ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 358-62.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 362.

⁵ Pai Tsung-hsi was conducting this independent local campaign while his nominal Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek was engaged in the campaign against the Ankuochün. Pai's object was to consolidate the hold of the Kwangsi Faction over south-central China. He did not take part in the northern campaign until September 1928, when he conducted the final operations against Chang Tsung-ch'ang in north-eastern Chihli. (See p. 379 above.)

⁶ For reports of some of the earlier vicissitudes of these operations, see a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th May, 1928.

⁷ A port on the coast, east of Bias Bay. The district had at all times been wild and lawless.

⁸ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 359-60.

Taip'ing Movement in Kwangsi in the second quarter of the nineteenth century after Christ, P'eng P'ai was reported to have made himself an impregnable stronghold in the hills, whither he could withdraw on the approach of punitive expeditions, in order to sally out again after their departure. P'eng P'ai seems still to have been at large at the end of 1928.¹ Meanwhile, the greater part of Kwangtung and Kwangsi was under the control of Li Chai-sum, a member of the Kwangsi Faction who had returned to power at Canton after the suppression of the Communist *émeute* there at the end of 1927.² Under Li's régime during the year 1928 relations between Canton and Hongkong improved, and along the southern littoral as a whole—notwithstanding the failure to smoke out the nests of Communists and pirates which it harboured here and there—there was a distinct decrease of disorder and increase of prosperity.

The explanation was that the Chinese Revolution—with all the conflicts between Chinese and Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners which it brought in its train—was a kind of social cyclone; and it was now two years since the storm had begun to travel northwards from Canton towards Peking. In 1927 the storm-centre had hovered over the Yangtse Basin and its track had been marked by disturbances, or threats of disturbances, at Wuhan, Kiukiang, Nanking and Shanghai. In 1928 it moved farther north over Honan and Shantung, and again its track was marked by disturbances—this time at Tsinanfu and Chefoo. The sufferings of Honan and Shantung could be measured by the stress of the famine which visited those two provinces in 1928. As the storm passed on from Shantung into Chihli, its violence began to abate. There was no disturbance when Peking passed out of the hands of the Ankuochün into those of the Kuomintang;³ and neither at Peking nor at Tientsin nor at Tongshan was there any violent collision between Chinese and foreigners. Finally, at Mukden, at the farthest extreme of China from Canton, the change of régime was carried out without any revolutionary breach of continuity.

¹ For P'eng P'ai's reign of terror, see *The Times*, 12th January, 9th and 13th February, 10th and 29th March, 1928; *The Observer*, 12th February, 15th and 22nd April, 1928.

² *Survey for 1927*, p. 362.

³ Peking did, however, begin immediately to feel the effects of ceasing to be one of two rival capitals of China. The liquidation of the Ankuochün Government and the transfer of all the central administrative offices from Peking to Nanking produced serious impoverishment and unemployment. Peking was being overtaken by the fate that had already befallen Petrograd, Constantinople and Vienna, and the symptoms of social and economic dislocation were the same.

(c) THE BEGINNING OF RECONSTRUCTION

When the Kuomintang commanders addressed the spirit of Sun Yat-sen in the Western Hills on the 6th July, 1928, they might reasonably claim that the first of the three stages into which their master had divided the programme of the Chinese Revolution was now accomplished. The period of military conquest was over, the period of political tutelage had begun; and this claim was duly made in the preamble to the new Government Organization Law which was promulgated at Nanking on the 3rd October. By that time there were even signs that the third stage had begun, in which power was to pass from the Kuomintang Party to the Chinese people; for, on certain public affairs of fundamental importance, public opinion was asserting itself much more vigorously and effectively than before. It was significant that these questions in which the people themselves were showing concern were not constitutional but social and economic. The three insistent demands were for peace, disbandment of troops and sound finance. Peace was the paramount desire; disbandment was demanded as a preventive measure against an otherwise inevitable resumption of civil war; while sound finance and disbandment were inseparable demands because neither could be realized apart from the other. The progress made towards these popular goals in 1928 will be surveyed briefly here; but it may be convenient first to deal with the constitutional reorganization, to which the leaders of the Kuomintang first turned their attention, and with certain personal relations among these leaders themselves.

In the preceding volume,¹ the political history of the Kuomintang has been carried down to the installation of a new united Kuomintang Government at Nanking on the 20th September, 1927, the return of Chiang Kai-shek from abroad in November, his marriage on the 1st December to a sister of Mr. T. V. Soong and Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, and his reassumption of the post of Commander-in-Chief before the close of the year. Chiang Kai-shek's return and restoration to power was immediately followed by the resignation of Sun Fo (Sun Yat-sen's son) from the Ministry of Finance and of Dr. C. C. Wu from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by their departure from China on the 25th January, 1928, for a prolonged tour in Europe with fifteen companions, including Hu Han-min, an influential leader of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang.² Thus they were not present at the Fourth

¹ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 357-8.

² For Mr. Hu Han-min's return to China in the autumn of 1928, see p. 390 below.

Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which was at last held at Nanking on the 3rd–8th February and which set up a provisional Government.¹ The temporary withdrawal of these two statesmen was due to disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek; ² but this rift was not so serious as the possibility of friction between Chiang and Feng or between Chiang and the Kwangsi Faction,³ since in these two cases a personal disagreement would be likely to result in a military collision. Throughout the year 1928 the Kwangsi Faction was on the rise, not only in the Middle Yangtze Basin, where Pai Tsung-hsi was suppressing the Communists for the benefit of his own party,⁴ but also in Canton, where Li Chai-sum had come back into power after the suppression of the Communist *émeute* of December 1927.⁵ For the time, however, the Kwangsi commanders hesitated to break with Chiang Kai-shek; and in April 1928 Li found it politic to pay a visit to Nanking. Meanwhile, in the Foreign Ministry at Nanking an underground struggle had been going on between Mr. C. C. Wu's adherents and his successor in office, General Hwang Fu. This struggle was decided against Hwang Fu by the Tsinanfu incident of the 3rd May.⁶ He had been too closely identified with a friendly policy towards Japan to survive the shock to public opinion throughout China which was the immediate reaction to this affair. Hwang Fu resigned towards the end of May and was succeeded on the 14th June by Mr. C. T. Wang.⁷ On the other hand, Sun Fo's successor in the Ministry of Finance, Mr. T. V. Soong, was gaining in authority with the support of public opinion, as will be recorded below.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang opened at Nanking on the 8th August, and was attended by Feng Yü-hsiang, as well as by the two Kwangsi commanders Li Tsung-jen from Hankow and Li Chai-sum from Canton. The most important business on the agenda were the interrelated problems of finance and disbandment, in which the fundamental question of centralism versus regionalism was involved; but this question was debated in the Committee on the political and not on the economic plane. The contentious issue was whether the branch

¹ For details of the personnel and organization of this provisional Government, see a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 19th March, 1928.

² See extracts from their letters of resignation in *The Times*, 8th May, 1928.

³ For relations between Chiang and the Kwangsi Faction, see Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement, just cited.

⁴ See p. 385 above.

⁵ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 358–62.

⁶ See Section (ii) (a) below.

⁷ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 21st June, 1928.

political councils of the Kuomintang at Hankow, Canton, Peking and elsewhere should be abolished or maintained; and on this issue the session broke up on the 15th August, when the representatives of the Kwangsi Faction destroyed the quorum by withdrawing in a body. Thereafter, Feng Yü-hsiang went west to deal with the Muslim insurrection in Kansu,¹ and a compromise was patched up between the Kwangsi Faction and Chiang.

Before breaking up on the 15th August, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang had authorized the drafting of a provisional constitution, and a Government Organization Law was duly promulgated at Nanking on the 3rd October.² In general this document was pervaded by the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen; and the particular doctrine of the three stages of revolution was invoked by the supporters of the most important and the most hotly contested provision, whereby the Chinese state was explicitly placed under the supervision and supremacy of the Kuomintang Party. In the final text of the law, this provision was inserted in the preamble, as follows:

The Kuomintang of China, in pursuance of the Three People's Principles and the Five Power Constitution of the Revolution, hereby establishes the Republic of China.

The Party, having swept away and removed all obstacles by military force and having passed from the period of military conquest to that of political tutelage, now must establish a model government based upon the Five Power Constitution to train the people, so that they may be able to exercise their political powers and to expedite the handing over of such powers by the Party to the people.

Accordingly, the Kuomintang, in the execution of the duty of direction and supervision of the Nationalist Government which devolves on it by virtue of its history, hereby formulates and promulgates the Law governing the organisation of the National Government.

Thus on the ground that the Chinese Revolution had now entered upon the second of Sun Yat-sen's three stages without having yet reached the third, the Chinese Republic was given a constitution on the contemporary Russian and Italian model, in which one particular party, and not the people as a whole, was the depository of political power. It may be noted that in Italy, at any rate, this régime was avowedly intended to be permanent. It remained to be seen whether in China a similar régime, having been introduced as a transitional measure, would eventually give place to the democratic policy which had been Sun Yat-sen's ultimate goal.

The term 'Five Power Constitution', in the passage quoted from

¹ See p. 384 above.

² For its main provisions see *The Times*, 6th October, 1928; *The Manchester Guardian*, 6th October and 7th November, 1928.

the preamble, referred to the five *Yuan* (boards) of which the new Government was composed in accordance with another doctrine of Sun Yat-sen. Three of these corresponded to the executive, legislative and judicial powers of Western political theory, while the fourth and fifth corresponded to the board of public examiners (of candidates for public employment) and the board of censors of the Chinese Imperial régime. The Executive Board was to be the senior *Yuan* and was to exercise control over ten Ministries: finance, foreign affairs, war, agriculture, industry, education, railways, interior, communications and health. At the head of the five *Yuan* there was to be a State Council, the Chairman of which was to be *ex officio* President of the National Government and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force. There were to be from twelve to sixteen State Councillors, and the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the five *Yuan* were to be chosen from among these. All laws promulgated and all mandates issued by virtue of a decision of the State Council were to be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of the five *Yuan*.

The new Government were installed on the 10th October (the official anniversary of the foundation of the Republic). On that date Chiang Kai-shek took the presidential oath and assumed office. Two of his State Councillors were Feng Yü-hsiang and Chang Hsüeh-liang.¹ The President of the Executive Board was Tan Yen-kai, of the Legislative Board Hu Han-min,² and of the Judicial Board Wang Chung-hui. The Ministers of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were Mr. T. V. Soong and Mr. C. T. Wang as before. The Minister of Railways was Sun Fo. The appointments of Yen Hsi-shan to be the Minister of the Interior and of Feng Yü-hsiang to be Minister of War were more or less honorary, since each of these commanders was prevented from attending more than occasionally at Nanking by the cares of rulership in his own domain.

While this constitution-making occupied the foreground of the political stage at Nanking, the crucial question, on which the existence of the Nanking Government depended, was finance; and the real burden and heat of the day was borne by the Finance Minister

¹ On Chang Hsüeh-liang's appointment to this post see p. 382 above.

² For Mr. Hu Han-min's departure from China at the beginning of the year see p. 387 above. He had recently returned to China from abroad with an open mind and, after examining the situation, had decided to give his support to the Nanking Government. In the opinion of at least one foreign observer who was particularly well qualified to judge, this decision of Mr. Hu Han-min's had an important effect in consolidating the Kuomintang régime at a moment when its fortunes were in the balance.

Mr. T. V. Soong. In seeking to provide ways and means for the moment and to evolve financial order out of chaos with a view to the future, Mr. Soong had to reckon on the one hand with the provincial administrations and the military commanders and on the other hand with those All-China administrative services which had been built up with the aid of a foreign staff—particularly the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle.

Mr. Soong's first success after taking office was gained in February 1928, when he persuaded the provincial administration of Chekiang to hand over to the National Finance Ministry at Nanking the control and collection of national revenues in the province and also to increase the subvention from provincial funds to the Nanking exchequer. The Chekiang administration further undertook not to levy any new provincial taxes without Nanking's consent. This agreement was even more valuable as a precedent than it was for its immediate effect in increasing the national revenues.

Mr. Soong's next step was to mobilize effective public opinion by organizing an Economic Conference, which met on the 20th June, 1928, at Shanghai and was attended by bankers, industrialists, merchants and owners of 'department-stores' as well as representatives of the Government. In his invitation, Mr. Soong had suggested that the national finances could never be placed on a firm basis without the cooperation and approval of the people, and in his opening address he asked for recommendations on five problems: currency reform, improvement of national credit by revising the management of foreign and domestic loans, simplification of taxation, revival of trade, and reallocation of public expenditure with the double purpose of reducing the total and applying the reduced amount to productive purposes. After examining these problems in sub-committees, the conference passed a number of salutary resolutions on the 28th and 29th June. It submitted that the existing services of secured loans ought to be maintained, that the status of unsecured loans ought to be investigated, that a strong central bank ought to be established, that a special fund ought to be created for putting the railways in working order again, that the Army ought to be limited to fifty divisions of 10,000 men each, with a total military budget not exceeding \$ (Mexican) 192,000,000, and that a commission ought to be appointed to take charge of disbanded soldiers and employ them on reconstruction work. The reconstruction work suggested was the re-conditioning of the railways together with river conservancy and harbour development. The fund envisaged for this purpose was \$ (Mexican) 300,000,000 (about £30,500,000 sterling),

and it was contemplated that this should be raised by a loan. At the close of the proceedings, telegrams calling for the reduction of the Army at an early date and for the rigid limitation of military expenditure were sent to the Government at Nanking and to all the military commanders. Mr. Soong then convened a National Financial Conference at Nanking which confirmed the resolutions of the Shanghai Economic Conference and defeated an attempt of the Kwangtung delegates to retain control of national revenues within their own provincial boundaries. While this Nanking Conference was in session, the Military Council at Nanking published a disbandment scheme which had been hastily drawn up by the four commanders at Peking—an attempt to forestall the interference of the bankers which was in effect a tribute to the bankers' growing power. This scheme contemplated the maintenance of an Army of fifty to sixty divisions, together with a gendarmerie 200,000 strong; it was to be carried out by a commission consisting simply of the four commanders themselves and of official nominees; and it ignored the financial aspect of the problem, which made the co-operation of the bankers essential. After the Nanking Conference had finished its work on the 11th July, Mr. Soong hastened to Peking, where the military commanders had assembled in order to address the spirit of Sun Yat-sen on the 6th July.¹ Mr. Soong carried a message from the Chinese bankers of Shanghai that if there were no disbandment of troops there would be no reconstruction loan; and the Shanghai Chinese bankers were in a strong position for delivering an ultimatum to the generals, because almost all the liquid assets in China that were in Chinese possession were in their hands, while within the charmed circle of the International Settlement the bankers were proof against the argument of *force majeure*. At Peking Mr. Soong saw all the four leading commanders except Feng Yü-hsiang (who had already left), as well as the heads of the Maritime Customs and Salt Administrations.

Mr. Soong returned to the charge on the eve of the opening of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on the 8th August.² In a statement addressed to the Committee, he pointed out that, since January, the Nanking Ministry of Finance had had to provide for military expenditure at the rate of \$(Mexican) 320,000 a day, and that the Government was on the road to bankruptcy. He insisted that the only hope of salvation lay in a unification of the national finances, an accurate budget and the establishment of a budget committee with plenary powers and full

¹ See p. 379 above.

² For the political results of this session, see p. 389 above.

control over revenue and expenditure. The Minister's warning to the Committee was reinforced by a memorandum from Chinese business organizations in Shanghai; and before the Committee dispersed from Nanking, it was visited by a delegation of Chinese business men from Shanghai a hundred strong, representing the Chinese Chambers of Commerce in the Foreign Settlements, Nantao and Chapei, together with sixty guilds. The business men, who felt themselves to be inadequately represented on the Central Executive Committee itself, put their case before the Committee through this delegation very vigorously and urged insistently that the recommendations of the Shanghai Economic Conference should be carried out.

In September Mr. Soong announced that so far the Ministry at Nanking had secured full financial control in three provinces only—Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei—but that Fukien and Kiangsi were on the point of falling into line. In the same month it was announced that the Nanking Government would make themselves responsible in these five provinces for the execution of the recommendations of the National Financial Conference which had met at Nanking in July,¹ and that the same measures would be extended to all the provinces by groups. The new Central Bank of China was organized in October and opened at Shanghai on the 1st November.

This was a beginning; but the crux was the problem of the disbandment of the troops, and here there was a vicious circle. Without funds in hand to employ the disbanded soldiers upon productive work, disbandment could not begin; yet, unless the military commanders first gave evidence of good faith by beginning to disband, the loan from the Shanghai Chinese bankers, which was to provide the funds, was unlikely to be forthcoming. In October the Government announced that a conference of all the military commanders, to deal with disbandment, was soon to be convened. Meanwhile the business men kept up their pressure. In December sixteen Chinese business organizations in Shanghai, headed by the General Chamber of Commerce, sent an urgent memorial to Nanking addressed to the Presidents of all the boards in the new constitutional hierarchy from Chiang Kai-shek downwards. In this memorandum they recalled the resolutions of the Shanghai Economic Conference of June, insisted especially upon the demands for the disbandment of troops and the drawing up of an accurate budget, as being indispensable preliminaries to all reform, and complained bitterly that nothing had been accomplished during the six months that had elapsed. Thereupon, rumours of imminent action became rife; and on the last day

¹ See p. 392 above.

of the year, at Nanking, a Conference on the Reorganization and Disbandment of the Army was duly opened. This conference was attended not only by Chiang, Feng and Yen but by members of the Kwangsi Faction and by a delegate from Chang Hsüeh-liang. The sequel will be recorded in the *Survey for 1929*.¹

From this brief and necessarily imperfect account of the beginning of reconstruction in China during the year 1928, it will be apparent that the result achieved at this stage was mainly negative. The action of the various disruptive and destructive forces that had been playing havoc with the life of the Chinese people during the preceding seventeen years had been checked; but the process of positive reconstruction was only very slowly getting under way, and what had been accomplished by the end of the year might seem little compared with what remained to be done. Nevertheless, the achievement of the Kuomintang in 1928 was impressive when viewed in relation to the difficulty of the task and to the scantiness of the resources at the disposal of the men who were grappling with it; and an observer who took these pertinent considerations into account might be inclined to marvel, not that these Chinese statesmen had accomplished so little, but that they had succeeded, in the circumstances, in accomplishing anything at all.

¹ It may be noted here that at the third general session of the Reorganization and Disbandment Conference, on the 11th January, 1929, Mr. Soong presented a memorandum which might be regarded as the first budget speech ever delivered, under modern conditions, by a Chinese Minister of Finance. The recommendations contained in Mr. Soong's memorandum were formally endorsed by the conference.

*Statement of Loans issued by the Nanking Government
(as at the 16th March, 1929).*

1. Treasury Bonds, issued on the security of the 2½ per cent. surtax; first series issued at Shanghai, June 1927	\$30,000,000
Ditto. Second series issued at Shanghai, October 1927	40,000,000
2. Ditto. Issued at Tientsin, July 1928	9,000,000
3. 'Spring Festival' Special Bonds of the Fifteenth Year	8,000,000
4. 'Currency Reform' Loan issued October 1928. (This loan, being secured upon the German Boxer Indemnity cancelled by Art. 128 of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the Sino-German agreement of the 20th May, 1921, was in fact a charge upon Customs surplus)	30,000,000
5. Loan for Redemption of Central Bank Hankow Notes issued December 1928	45,000,000
6. 'Famine Relief' Loan issued January 1929	10,000,000
7. 'Disbandment' Loan issued January 1929	50,000,000
8. 'Reorganisation' Loan issued June 1928	40,000,000
	\$262,000,000

The aggregate charge on the increased Customs Revenue in respect of the above-mentioned issues for the current year was \$44,524,000.

Note on the Importation of Arms and Munitions into China from Abroad, 1919-29; and on the Arrival of Colonel Bauer in China in the Autumn of 1928.

'By an agreement dated the 5th May, 1919, the Governments of Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, the United States, Tsarist Russia, Brazil, France and Japan agreed effectively to restrain their subjects and citizens from exporting to or importing into China arms and munitions of war or material destined exclusively for their manufacture until the establishment of a Government whose authority was recognised through the whole country. This policy was subsequently endorsed by the Governments of the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium.'¹

Germany was not a party to the agreement; and on the 5th April, 1927, it was alleged in the *Reichstag* at Berlin that the German Government had been conniving at shipments of arms to the Ankuochün forces. This was denied by Dr. Stresemann; and it appeared that, while consignments of arms in transit across Germany had been shipped from Hamburg to Tsingtao for the use of the Ankuochün, the Association of Hamburg Ship-owners had subsequently decided to refuse to accept arms for China whether in transit or not, while German Consuls in China had protested against such shipments on the ground that any breach of neutrality during the Chinese civil war would react unfavourably on German commercial interests.

In January 1928 there were several conspicuous importations or attempts at importation by nationals of states which were not parties to the agreement of 1919. A Norwegian steamer, the *Skule*, delivered at Tsingtao, to the Ankuochün forces, a shipment of munitions imported through the agency of German firms. Another steamer, the *Praga*, flying the Czechoslovak flag, arrived at Manila with a cargo of rifles, destined likewise for the Ankuochün forces, which were said to have been ordered from the Brno Small Arms Factory (a concern in which the Czechoslovak Government had a controlling interest) and to have been transported across German territory for shipment at Hamburg with the German Government's permission. Early in the same month, seventeen truckloads of arms, which proved subsequently to be of German origin, were detained by the local police and customs officials at Kiel, whence they were to have been conveyed to China in another chartered Scandinavian steamer. This last incident stirred public opinion in Germany and was ventilated in the Budget Committee of the *Reichstag*; and on the 24th February the German Government issued a warning to German firms trading with China to abstain from traffic in arms and munitions, whether these originated in Germany or not.

Meanwhile, at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking on the 21st February, the German Minister had declared the readiness of his Government to accede to the agreement of 1919;² and in March the members of

¹ Communication issued by the Foreign Office in Whitehall on the 25th April, 1929. For statistics of imports through the Maritime Customs at the Treaty Ports during the year 1926, see a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 4th July, 1928.

² Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 28th March, 1928.

the Diplomatic Corps sent an identic telegram to their respective Governments, calling attention to the importance of the agreement of 1919 and suggesting that Governments which had not yet taken measures to prohibit the export of arms and munitions to China should be induced to do so as soon as possible. On the 1st March, the Japanese Government invited the Government of the U.S.S.R. to take common action with the other Powers; and Monsieur Chicherin, though he declined this invitation (on the ground that, as diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and China had been broken off, the U.S.S.R. could not join in an agreement regarding China with other Powers), was reported simultaneously to have given the Japanese Government a definite promise that arms would not be exported from the U.S.S.R. to any Chinese faction. Simultaneous representations were made by the British Government to the Czechoslovak Government, to which Dr. Beneš replied that Czechoslovakia could not become a party to the agreement unless it were really an international agreement equally binding on all states.¹ At the end of March, the German Government showed their good faith by introducing into the *Reichstag* a Bill prohibiting the export of arms from Germany to China and the underwriting in Germany of exports of arms to China; and this Bill was carried through into law, as a matter of urgency, just before the close of the session, on the 30th of the month.

'On the 21st May Sir Austen Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons at Westminster that steps had been taken to prevent the insurance in Great Britain of shipments of arms to China. He pointed out that without special legislation it would not be possible to prevent British firms undertaking business of this nature, and stated that, at the request of the Foreign Office, all marine underwriters at Lloyds, together with the Institute of London Underwriters and the Liverpool Underwriters Association, had voluntarily agreed not to underwrite consignments of arms and/or munitions to China.'²

After the termination of the civil war between the Ankuochün and the Kuomintang in the summer of 1928 the situation changed; and 'with the conclusion of treaties with and the recognition of the National Government by practically all the parties to' the 'agreement, its continued operation' became 'anomalous, particularly in view of the fact that it' was expressly intended to last 'until the establishment of a Government whose authority' was 'recognized throughout the whole country'. Accordingly, the Diplomatic Corps in Peking 'unanimously agreed to cancel the agreement of 1919'; and this decision took effect as from the 26th April, 1929, when

¹ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain, just cited.

² The Institute of London Underwriters proceeded to circularize the underwriting associations of the principal markets of the world, suggesting that they should enter into a voluntary agreement on the lines of the undertaking which the London Underwriters had given to the British Government. Such an agreement was adopted by the underwriting associations of France, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Greece, Japan, Poland, Switzerland, Jugoslavia and the United States—and also by the association of Czechoslovakia for the duration of the German law of the 30th March, 1928. (Statement by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 10th December, 1928.)

it was formally notified to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Senior Minister at Peking.¹

While the embargo on the import of arms and munitions into China was thus terminated, the question of the embargo on the export from Germany of military, naval and air-force instructors was ventilated (without being raised officially) in the autumn of 1928, upon the report that Colonel Maximilian Bauer, a distinguished member of General Ludendorff's staff during the General War of 1914-18, had been engaged by the Kuomintang Government at Nanking as a military and commercial adviser. Thereupon it was stated in the German press, as on the authority of Colonel Bauer himself, that he had neither received nor accepted any appointment under the Chinese Government. In November 1928, however, Colonel Bauer arrived at Shanghai; and he then stated that he had come, not as military adviser to the Nanking Government, but as economic and industrial adviser to President Chiang Kai-shek.² In December 1928, on the eve of the Nanking Conference on the Reorganization and Disbandment of the Chinese Army,³ it was rumoured that the engagement of German military instructors was on the agenda. If the Chinese were contemplating the engagement of any foreign military instructors, it was natural that they should choose nationals of a state with a great military tradition but without capitulatory rights—two conditions which Germany and German nationals would fulfil.⁴

(d) THE POLICY OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT AT NANKING TOWARDS THE CHINA MARITIME CUSTOMS AND THE SALT GABELLE.

The success or failure of Mr. Soong's efforts as Minister of Finance at Nanking partly turned on his policy towards the China Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle. In the efficiency of these two administrations, both the public credit and the public revenue of China were concerned; for, in the past, the proceeds of the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle had not only covered the services of the public loans with which they were respectively charged, but had yielded important annual surpluses to the Chinese Exchequer; and these surpluses had been one of the surest sources of supply for the Chinese Government. This relatively high and regular yield from these two administrations, as compared with other Chinese revenues, had been due to the fact that, in the organization and control of both the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, the Chinese authorities had been associated with

¹ The quotations in this paragraph are taken from the communication, quoted above, from the Foreign Office in Whitehall.

² Nevertheless, the engagement of Colonel Bauer apparently dated from a visit paid to Germany in the summer of 1928 by a Chinese military mission under General Chen Yi.

³ See p. 394 above.

⁴ The part played by Colonel Bauer in Chiang Kai-shek's campaign against the Kwangsi General in the spring of 1929 will be dealt with in the *Survey for 1929*.

foreigners who were aloof from Chinese politics and who did their work with that integrity and efficiency which had become the standards of Western administration in recent times. These foreign officials in Chinese employment had also been assisted in their work by the fact that, as nationals of 'Treaty Powers', they had personally enjoyed the rights of extra-territoriality. Moreover, in the last resort, they had been able to count on the collective support of the foreign Powers; for the Chinese tariff was fixed by treaty, and the Chinese bonds secured on the proceeds of the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle were mostly held by foreigners whose respective Governments were disposed to take action if the interests of their nationals in China appeared to be threatened. Thus, by several different threads, the financial strength of the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle was bound up with that system of foreign intervention in Chinese affairs which the Chinese people had come to resent and which the Kuomintang Party was pledged to terminate; and, as Minister of Finance in a Kuomintang Government, Mr. Soong, when he had to deal with the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, sometimes found himself in a perplexing position.

In a previous volume, the history of the relations of the Maritime Customs Administration with the declining Chinese Central Government at Peking on the one hand and with the rising power of the Kuomintang on the other hand has been carried down to the virtual dismissal of the Inspector-General then in office, Sir Francis Aglen, by the Peking Government towards the end of January 1927.¹ In the same place it has been mentioned that eventually Sir Francis Aglen was sent on leave for a year on the understanding that he would retire at the end of that period, and it has also been mentioned that another British subject, Mr. A. H. F. Edwardes, was appointed Acting Inspector-General by the Peking Government for the interim. This appointment was not recognized by the Kuomintang Government,² who were at war with the Government at Peking; and the situation remained in suspense throughout the year 1927; but it was brought to a head early in 1928 by the imminence of Sir Francis Aglen's official retirement, for this would raise the question whether a definitive appointment to the office of Inspector-General should be made, and if so, by what authority, since the Peking Government, though *in articulo mortis*, were not yet defunct.

On the 27th January, 1928, the Nanking Government announced

¹ *Survey for 1926*, pp. 294-5.

² Statement issued by the Acting Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang Government, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, on the 29th January, 1928.

that they did not recognize the right of any authority other than themselves to control the Maritime Customs Administration or to appoint an agent for the exercise of such control.¹ Simultaneously, they invited Mr. Edwardes to Shanghai—an invitation which Mr. Edwardes accepted with the Peking Government's approval. On the 29th January, 1928, the Acting Foreign Minister at Nanking, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, declared that the Peking Government had sunk to the position of a mere regional administration; that the appointment to the post of Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs was a purely domestic issue (i. e. an issue purely within the jurisdiction of whatever Government made good their claim to represent the Central Government of the Chinese Republic); and that, until a definitive appointment was made, the Nanking Government in future would only recognize subordinate appointments to posts in the Customs Service in the territory under their control when these were made on the recommendation of the Customs Commissioner at Shanghai, Mr. F. W. Maze.

The crux was that the Customs Administration still paid allegiance to the Peking Government, as the only Government claiming to represent the Chinese Republic that had yet been recognized internationally, and that this allegiance gave the Peking Government political prestige and a prospect of future financial advantage.² After Shanghai, as well as Canton, had come under the Kuomintang Government's rule *de facto*, the paradoxical situation had arisen that the Maritime Customs revenues were being collected by agents recognizing the Peking Government's authority, in the territories of a rival Government with which the Peking Government were actually at war.³ This situation placed the Kuomintang Government in a dilemma; for they must either continue to allow the Peking Government to retain this attribute of sovereignty in the Kuomintang domain, or else they must sweep away the Maritime Customs Administration there. The latter step would not only seriously embroil the Kuomintang Government with the Foreign Powers; it might also diminish or even destroy a source of revenue which would otherwise

¹ Text of proclamation in *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th January, 1928.

² The prospect was that the Peking Government might endeavour to float a new loan on the security of prospective revenues from the Maritime Customs. The Peking Government derived no present financial advantage from the situation because at this time there was no surplus for the Customs Administration to hand over after existing charges had been met.

³ In February 1928 it was estimated that more than 70 per cent. of the total proceeds of the Maritime Customs was coming from Kuomintang territories—the reason being that about 40 per cent. of the total proceeds was obtained at Shanghai.

flow into the Nanking exchequer as soon as the Kuomintang had completed the discomfiture of the Ankuochün in the forthcoming campaign of the civil war.¹ Mr. Edwardes, in negotiating with the Kuomintang Government during February 1928 at Shanghai, was concerned to prevent the disruption of the Maritime Customs Administration; and he suggested, as a provisional working arrangement to meet the political difficulties of the moment, that any surplus which might remain after all existing obligations had been met should be divided by the Customs Administration *pro rata* among the ports at which duty was collected. These negotiations failed, and the situation remained indeterminate until after the Ankuochün Government had been extinguished. On the 2nd October, 1928, it was announced that Mr. Edwardes had been appointed Officiating Inspector-General and Mr. Maze Deputy Inspector-General; but on the last day of the year Mr. Edwardes resigned, on the ground that the Maritime Customs Administration was suffering from dual control; and on the 10th January, 1929, Mr. Maze was appointed Inspector-General without any qualifying adjective.

As for the fortunes of the Salt Gabelle, it has been recorded in a previous volume² that, at the close of the year 1926, the whole of the Salt Revenue was being retained by the local Chinese authorities except the proceeds from the salt-fields near Tientsin (less certain monthly payments to the tupan of Chihli) and from other districts in the neighbourhood of Peking. At the end of June 1927 it was announced that the Nanking Kuomintang Government had authorized the issue of a loan secured on the Salt Revenue surplus for 1928 in Kiangsu and Chekiang and had also decided to abolish the district inspectorates of the Salt Administration, in which, as in the chief inspectorate, Chinese officials were associated with colleagues of foreign nationality. In the provinces under the Kuomintang Government's control, the inspectorate establishments were duly abolished on the 1st July and the work of administration and collection was taken over by the Government itself. The Tientsin salt-fields alone remained in the Salt Administration's hands, and in 1927 the revenue from this field was greatly diminished by the depredations of the Ankuochün and by the northward advance of the civil war, which cut off the Tientsin salt-fields from their markets in Honan. The total net Salt Revenue collected for the year 1926 amounted to \$57,907,000—a decrease of \$6,380,000 as compared with the corresponding figure for 1926³—and of this no less than \$52,557,000 was

¹ See Section (i) (a) above.

² *Survey for 1926*, pp. 279–80.

³ See *op. cit.*, p. 279.

retained either by the Kuomintang Government or by provincial authorities, so that the sum paid into the Group Banks in 1927 was only \$5,350,000, as compared with \$16,615,000 in 1926. Thus in 1927, so far from there being any possibility of releasing a surplus to the Peking Government, the question arose whether the service of the secured loans could be covered; and even after the reserve in the Group Banks had been almost exhausted, one of these loans—the Anglo-French loan of 1908—fell into default.

The Kuomintang policy towards the Salt Gabelle underwent a change immediately after Mr. Soong's appointment to the Ministry of Finance at Nanking at the beginning of 1928.¹ Early in February 1928 Mr. Soong restored the four district inspectorates held by foreign officials in Kiangsu and Chekiang; and on the 20th February he announced that the entire personnel of the Salt Administration, foreigners included, was to be reinstated. In the same announcement, he declared that the Kuomintang Government had not repudiated and would not repudiate any of China's just obligations, and that they were arranging for the 'so-called Salt Loans' to be placed on a basis which would be an evidence of the Government's good faith. He laid it down, however, that the service of these loans was to be met by his Ministry direct, out of general public funds, and that the Salt Administration officials were no longer to earmark for this purpose any of the revenues that passed through their hands. No less than seventeen foreign officials of the Gabelle had been reinstated by the 24th February; but they were not permitted to collect the duties, their salaries were reduced by 40 per cent. as a contribution to the conduct of the war against the Ankuochün, and meanwhile no contribution for the service of the Salt Loans was made by the Nanking Treasury. Accordingly, in April 1928, the Foreign Chief Inspector informed the Ministry of Finance at Nanking that the reopened offices would be closed again and the staff withdrawn unless satisfactory assurances on the above-mentioned issues were given forthwith, and unless the staff and administration were left subject to the orders of the Chief Inspectorate. On the 5th May, the Chief Inspectorate made good the default on the Anglo-French loan of 1908; but, a few days earlier, its last source of revenue had been taken from it by the Ankuochün Government, which, in the throes of dissolution, seized the depot near Tientsin. Thereafter, the Kuomintang Government, in anticipation of the conquest of western Shantung and northern Chihli, directed the district inspectors at Chefoo and Tientsin to stop all payments as from the 3rd June and

¹ See p. 388 above.

to hand over all funds collected.¹ On the 2nd July, \$173,000 deposited in the Bank of China at Peking in the name of the Foreign and Chinese district inspectors of the Salt Administration at Tientsin were transferred, by order of the Nanking Government, to their own credit. In view of these proceedings, representations were made to the Nanking Government in September 1928 by the French, British and Japanese Governments; and on the 24th of that month the Nanking Government decided that while all revenue collected by the district inspectors was to be credited locally to the account of the Ministry of Finance in the Chinese collecting banks, standing orders were to be given for the monthly transfer, to the foreign district inspectors, of quotas which in the aggregate would bring in the \$10,000,000 required annually for the service of the loans secured on the Salt Revenue. This new arrangement was accepted at the beginning of November by the Foreign Associate Chief Inspector of the Salt Administration, Mr. Hussey Freke; and on the 16th November Mr. Soong publicly confirmed him in his office. On the same date, Mr. Soong issued the following official *communiqué*:

It has been found necessary to revise the regulations hitherto governing the Salt Administration for the purpose of making it an effective part of the National Government under the exclusive control of the Ministry of Finance. While the inspectorate of the service will be under new regulations and continue to collect all the salt revenue, it will no longer be entrusted with the custody of any funds except those provided by the Minister of Finance to meet the service of loans. While these funds will in practice be furnished from the collections of the different salt areas in varying proportions, the Minister of Finance assumes full responsibility for making adequate provision for the loan service.²

The French, British and Japanese Governments took note of this scheme without accepting it as a satisfactory alternative to the arrangement laid down in the Reorganization Loan Agreement of 1913,³ under which the Salt Revenue had been in the joint custody of the Chinese and Foreign Associate Chief Inspectors, who had lodged it in the foreign Group Banks and had provided therefrom for the service of the secured loans before releasing the surplus to the Chinese Government.⁴ The three Powers placed upon the Nanking Government the responsibility for meeting all commitments that might result from their deliberate departure from the terms of the 1913 agreement.

¹ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 27th June, 1928.

² *The Times*, 17th November, 1928.

³ Statement issued on the 19th November, 1928, by the Foreign Office in Whitehall.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1926*, p. 277.

This was the situation at the close of the year 1928. The Nanking Government duly made arrangements for meeting the autumn payments due on the Salt Revenue loans; and the quotations of these loans in the foreign markets rose by several points.

(ii) Relations between China and Foreign Powers.

(a) THE DESPATCH OF JAPANESE DEFENCE FORCES TO THE TSINGTAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY ZONE IN 1927 AND 1928 AND THE TSINANFU INCIDENT OF MAY 1928.

During the years 1925 and 1926, when the storm-centre of the Chinese Revolution had hovered over the southern littoral and the Yangtse Basin, and when Russian Communist influence had been in the ascendant in the counsels of the Kuomintang, the campaign against foreign encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty had been directed first and foremost against Great Britain and British nationals.¹ In the course of the year 1927, however, the situation underwent a radical change; for Russian Communist influence, after reaching its zenith in January, declined to its final fall in December; and at the same time the storm-centre of the Revolution travelled forward again from the Yangtse Basin, where the predominant foreign interests were British, towards the north-eastern provinces, where the predominant foreign interests were Japanese. In response to this double change in the situation, the Chinese movement against foreign 'imperialism' took a new direction, and its brunt began to fall upon the Japanese, while the British in China experienced a certain relaxation of pressure.

As soon as Chiang Kai-shek's troops crossed the southern boundary of Shantung in the 1927 campaign of the civil war between Kuomintang and Ankuochün, Japanese interests in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway were placed in jeopardy; and the Japanese Government acted as the British Government had recently done, in somewhat similar circumstances at Shanghai, by sending a Defence Force to the spot. This measure was repeated when, in the spring of 1928, Shantung became one theatre of the final and conclusive campaign of the Chinese civil war; and this time there was a violent collision between the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalist forces.

The risk of such a clash was inherent in the policy; and though that risk had been run with impunity by the British Defence Force at Shanghai and by the Japanese Defence Force which had been

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, Section (xi); the *Survey for 1926*, Part III, Sections (xi) and (xii).

despatched to Shantung and then withdrawn again in the preceding year, it must be remembered that Shantung was a particularly dangerous field for the despatch of a Defence Force by Japan, of all Powers. From 1915 to 1922, the Japanese Government's attempt to step into the German Government's shoes in this Chinese province had been the burning question in China's foreign relations; and the feeling aroused throughout China by this foreign encroachment upon the homeland of Confucius had done more than anything else to awaken a national consciousness in the Chinese people. Accordingly, Japanese policy in Shantung had become 'the acid test' of Sino-Japanese relations. The signature of the bipartite Shantung Treaty at Washington on the 4th February, 1922,¹ and the withdrawal of the last Japanese troops from Shantung on the 17th December of that year,² had been followed by a Sino-Japanese *détente*; but the painful memories which the settlement of 1922 had begun to efface in Chinese minds were sharply recalled when Japanese troops reappeared at Tsingtao and Tsinanfu in 1927 and again in 1928; and these memories revived some of the animus which the Japanese policy of 1915-22 had evoked at the time.

The Japanese reoccupation of Tsingtao was less provocative than the reoccupation of Tsinanfu. Tsingtao was a maritime 'treaty port' in a territory which China had been compelled to lease to a foreign Power in 1898; and this territory had only been brought back under Chinese administration in 1922 by certain effects of the General War of 1914-18 and of the Washington Conference of 1921-2 upon which the Chinese could not have reckoned. On the other hand, Tsinanfu was an inland city³ which was not a 'treaty-port' but a 'trade-mart', i. e. it had been opened to foreign trade by a unilateral decree of the Imperial Chinese Government in 1904. Moreover, while Tsingtao was a small place on a mountainous peninsula, Tsinanfu was a large city with an estimated population of over 377,000, a provincial capital and a railway junction. The two railways which met at Tsinanfu were the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu line and the Tientsin-Pukow line (the latter constituting the principal section of the railway route between Peking and Shanghai). In 1927 and 1928 both these railways were Chinese property; for on the 1st January, 1923, in pursuance of the Sino-Japanese treaty signed at Washington on the 4th February, 1922, the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway had been formally transferred to the

¹ *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 460-2.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

³ There were, of course, internal cities in China which could be reached by ocean-going ships, e. g. Hankow up the Yangtse; and Tsinanfu was situated near the southern bank of the Yellow River; but the Yellow River, unlike the Yangtse, was not navigable.

Chinese by the Japanese Government¹—subject only to the retention of a Japanese traffic-manager and a Japanese joint-accountant until China's purchase of the railway from Japan had been completed.² In the neighbourhood of the railway junction, and outside the walls of the Chinese City, a trading centre had been laid out in 1906 on the Chinese Government's initiative; and this new quarter attracted the foreign residents and foreign business concerns to whom Tsinanfu had been thrown open in 1904. It must be noted, however, that the trading centre was neither a foreign concession nor a foreign settlement but was a piece of territory under ordinary Chinese administration which the Chinese Government had always reserved the right to control and develop at their own discretion.³

At the beginning of 1927 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tokio was still occupied by Baron Shidehara, who had represented Japan at the Washington Conference in 1921–2 and had pursued a studiously moderate and conciliatory policy since taking office in June 1924.⁴ From January 1927 onwards some pressure was put upon Baron Shidehara at home to take precautionary measures in China in case the militant movement against foreign privileges, the brunt of which was then being borne by the British in the Yangtse Valley, might travel farther north and come to be directed against the Japanese (as eventually happened). On the 14th March, however, the Japanese Minister of War stated that, while an increase of 400 men in the Japanese garrison in North China was contemplated, the Government had not yet seen any necessity for despatching land forces to Shanghai (as the British Government had done).⁵

An immediate and conspicuous change of policy occurred when, on the 16th April, 1927, the Government of which Baron Shidehara was a member resigned and were succeeded on the 19th by a new Government in which General Baron Tanaka, the leader of the Seiyukai Party, combined the offices of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. On the 28th May, 1927, Baron Tanaka's Government announced that, in view of the situation created by the advance of the Kuomintang forces and the contingent threat to Japanese interests in Shantung, they had decided to despatch to Tsingtao two battalions,

¹ *Survey for 1920–3*, p. 463.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 461.

³ These facts about Tsinanfu in general and about the trading centre (in Chinese 'Shang Pu') in particular are taken from pp. 153–5 of the *Official Guide to China* (second [revised] edition) issued by the Japanese Government Railways (Tokio, 1924, Official Series, vol. D.).

⁴ See the texts of his two speeches of the 21st January, 1926, and the 18th January, 1927, printed in the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 500–11.

⁵ For the despatch of the Shanghai Defence Force in January 1927, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part III A, Section 8 (xii) (f).

with the necessary ancillary troops, for the protection of Japanese interests in the province. They added that, while they regarded this action as an indispensable measure of defence, they had no intention of keeping the troops on Chinese soil for a prolonged period and would withdraw them immediately when the fear of danger to Japanese residents ceased to exist. The troops landed at Tsingtao on the 31st May; and on the 8th July they moved up the railway and occupied various points on it, including Tsinanfu itself, while 500 naval ratings were landed at Tsingtao for local defence and 200 more troops, with artillery, arrived there on the 12th July from Dairen. At this moment, Chiang Kai-shek, advancing up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway, was within striking distance of Tsinanfu, and at Kaomi (a point on the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway) one of Sun Ch'uan-fang's commanders had revolted against his master and had hoisted the Kuomintang flag. In fact, it looked as though the situation would arise that actually arose in the next campaigning season with unhappy consequences. On this occasion, however, the danger was averted; for, before the end of July 1927, the revolt at Kaomi had been suppressed and Chiang had begun to fall back southwards towards Pukow.¹ On the 29th August Baron Tanaka announced that it had been decided to withdraw all Japanese troops from Shantung in the immediate future; and the withdrawal was duly completed by the 8th September.²

The original landing at Tsingtao at the end of May 1927 and the advance to Tsinanfu in July evoked popular protests in China; and during July an anti-Japanese boycott, tentatively supported by the Nanking Kuomintang Government, was partially enforced in the Lower Yangtse Basin and at Canton. In Shantung itself, however, the Japanese Defence Force came and went without falling into any violent collision either with Chinese troops or with the Chinese civil population; and thus, in the first experiment, Baron Tanaka's policy might seem to have been justified by its fruits. Accordingly, in his announcement of the 29th August, the following intimation appeared:

In case peace and order are disturbed in future not only in Shantung, but in any part of China where many Japanese reside, and it is feared that their safety may be affected, the Japanese Government may be constrained to take such self-defensive steps as circumstances require. We remain firmly convinced that the timely despatch of troops certainly

¹ For these events in the Chinese civil war, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 327 and 329. The despatch of the Japanese force was probably one of the factors that accounted for the non-success of Chiang's operations in this campaign.

² Statement made by the Japanese Government to the League of Nations on the 28th May, 1928.

accounts for the fact that, notwithstanding serious disturbances, we have been able to protect our residents satisfactorily and to prevent the occurrence of any untoward event.

As early as December 1927 a force of marines was being held in readiness to disembark from seven Japanese warships anchored off Tsingtao; but the experiment which had been tried without mishap in the summer of 1927 was not actually repeated till the following spring, when Shantung had become the theatre of a campaign in the Chinese civil war again.

On the 10th April, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek began a fresh advance up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway into Shantung.¹ Thereupon, Japanese marines were landed at Tsingtao; on the 17th April these marines were held in readiness to proceed to Tsinanfu, while additional Japanese warships were ordered to assemble at Tsingtao; and on the 19th April the Japanese Government despatched 5,000 troops to Shantung for the protection of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway Zone and of Japanese nationals at Tsinanfu.² At the same time, as on the previous occasion, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement declaring that the despatch of these troops was an indispensable measure of self-defence, that it did not imply unfriendliness towards China, and that Japan had no intention of taking sides for or against any Chinese faction or of interfering in the Chinese civil war. Meanwhile three companies of Japanese troops, travelling from Tientsin by train, reached Tsinanfu on the 20th; and the main body, which came from Japan to Tsingtao by sea, had completed its disembarkation by the 28th April and was moving up to Tsinanfu along the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway. Thus, before the Ankuochün forces evacuated Tsinanfu on the 30th April and the Kuomintang forces belonging to Chiang Kai-shek's army entered the city on the 1st May, about 2,000 Japanese troops had established themselves there, had made arrangements for protecting about four-fifths of the trading quarter, and had erected barricades and barbed wire entanglements at two points therein.³

¹ See p. 376 above.

² The number of Japanese nationals at Tsinanfu at this time was estimated to have been about 2,000.

³ From this point onwards, the narrative is based partly on the statement sent by the Japanese Government to the League of Nations on the 28th May, 1928 (text in *The Times*, 30th May, 1928); partly on a statement signed by Chiang Kai-shek and Hwang Fu (text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th May, 1928); and partly on messages from the Peking correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, who was in Tsinanfu at the time (*The Manchester Guardian*, 11th and 12th May, 1928). See also a statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 14th May, 1928.

On the 2nd May Chiang Kai-shek himself arrived at Tsinanfu and 'proposed to the Japanese commander', General Fukuda, 'that, as the Southern Army would by all means ensure the maintenance of peace and order, the Japanese troops might speedily be withdrawn and the above-mentioned defence-works be removed. Accordingly, the defence-works were removed at 11.0 p.m. on the night of the 2nd May, and some of the Japanese residents who had gone to places of safety returned to their homes'.¹ At this moment, the Japanese force at Tsinanfu was not only greatly outnumbered by the Kuomintang troops, but was isolated from its base and from its reserves at Tsingtao through the cutting of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway by another body of Chiang Kai-shek's forces. In these circumstances, on the 3rd May, fighting broke out between the Japanese and Chinese Nationalist troops in Tsinanfu. So much was common ground, but on the question of how the collision occurred, the Japanese and Chinese accounts were incompatible. The Japanese version was as follows:

On the 3rd May, at 9.30 a.m., the house of a Japanese, by the name of Chohei Yoshifusa, was looted by regular soldiers belonging to the Southern Army. About 30 Japanese soldiers commanded by a lieutenant hastened to the scene. The plundering Chinese soldiers had fled to the neighbouring Chinese barracks. From these barracks they fired on the Japanese soldiers, some of whom were wounded. The Japanese then responded to the fire. On the outbreak of this collision the Southern troops, with which Tsinan was crowded at the time, almost simultaneously began, at various points, to fire on the Japanese troops, to massacre the Japanese residents, and to plunder Japanese houses. The Japanese troops endeavoured to afford shelter and protection to the Japanese residents, and also to drive the Southern troops out of the Foreign Quarter or to disarm them. In the face of much danger the Japanese Consul contrived on several occasions to get into touch with the Chinese and endeavoured to bring about the suspension of hostilities. As, however, the Chinese troops continued fighting, probably because the orders of General Chiang Kai-shek to the contrary were not obeyed, hostilities were not discontinued until the afternoon of the 5th.²

According to the Chinese version:

The immediate cause of the Tsinanfu massacre of Chinese soldiery and civilians by Japanese troops arose when a Nationalist soldier passed through a street which the Japanese had included in the area occupied by their troops. The soldier was killed, and a large detachment of Japanese troops then went to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs and broke into it. They dragged out the Foreign Commissioner, Tsai Kung-hsi, bound him with ropes, stabbed him with bayonets and swords, cut off his nose and

¹ Japanese statement of the 28th May, 1928.

² Japanese statement cited above.

ears, and murdered him. They also killed the entire office staff and burned the building. The same Japanese soldiers then invaded the temporary office of the Nationalist Foreign Minister, Hwang Fu, and, failing to find the Minister, looted and burned the building. While these atrocities were taking place the Japanese directed gun-fire upon Nationalist troops and civilians, killing great numbers. They stormed our posts and disarmed some of our troops. This occurred on the morning of the 3rd May, and on the evening of the same day, while Chiang Kai-shek was negotiating with the Japanese commanders, the Japanese again shelled our military quarters, destroying our wireless station. Under such untoward circumstances the Chinese troops could not be restrained, so they returned the fire.¹

As presumptive evidence in favour of their assertion that the Chinese Nationalist troops were the aggressors, the Japanese recalled what had happened at Hankow on the 3rd January, 1927,² at Kiukiang on the 6th January, 1927,³ and at Nanking on the 24th March, 1927.⁴ As regards the fate of the Kuomintang 'Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shantung', Mr. Tsai Kung-hsi, there seems to be no doubt that he disappeared during the fighting; but the Japanese denied that they had killed him knowingly, and also denied all allegations of atrocities, while they accused the Chinese troops of having committed atrocities upon the fifteen Japanese civilian residents who had lost their lives up to the 15th May.

On the 7th May General Fukuda at Tsinanfu received reinforcements of 2,000 men from Tsingtao; and at 4.0 p.m. on that afternoon he sent an ultimatum to the local Chinese Nationalist Commander, Chiang Tso-ping, demanding that the Chinese troops should withdraw to a distance of twenty *li* (about seven English miles) from Tsinanfu and from either side of the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao Railway from end to end, that any Chinese troops which had committed outrages on Japanese troops and residents should be disarmed, and that the responsible officers should be punished. The time-limit given was twelve hours. General Fukuda refused to grant a request for the extension of this period, and on the 8th, as soon as the twelve hours had expired, he launched a vigorous attack upon the Chinese forces with a view to carrying out his objects by force. On that day, the Chinese troops were driven to the prescribed distance of twenty *li* from the city and the railway except for a body, estimated to have been about 4,000 strong,⁵ that remained in the Walled City. 'In consequence, early in the morning of the 9th the Japanese troops bombarded the central *points d'appui* of the Chinese troops, such as

Statement by Chiang Kai-shek and Hwang Fu, cited in a previous foot-note.

² *Survey for 1926*, pp. 348-51.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 351-2.

⁴ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 382-94.

⁵ Japanese statement of the 28th May, 1928.

the offices, within the Walled City, of the Tuchün (Military Governor of the Province) and of the Taoyin (District Governor), and the Walls, and at the same time took all possible means to induce the Chinese troops to get away and escape. As a result, early in the morning of the 11th, the greater number of the Chinese troops changed into plain clothes and escaped from within the Walls. Thus, except for the "ununiformed soldiers" in ambush, the Chinese troops were driven outside the 20 Chinese mile limit.¹ This Japanese bombardment of the Walled City of Tsinanfu was reported to have been carried out with three-inch field guns and Stokes mortars; and in such a densely populated area the casualties inflicted upon the civilian inhabitants must have been considerable.²

Here, again, the Chinese and the Japanese versions were irreconcilable on the question of who was the aggressor. According to the Chinese, the cessation of fighting on the 5th had been brought about by the voluntary withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the Japanese zone of occupation under direct orders from Chiang Kai-shek. Thereafter Chiang Kai-shek himself had retired to Taianfu, about forty miles south of Tsinanfu; and his representative remaining at Tsinanfu, General Chiang Tso-ping, who received the Japanese ultimatum on the 7th, had paid a personal visit to General Fukuda and had asked for an extension of time in order to enable him to communicate with his superior officer Chiang Kai-shek and with the Kuomintang Government at Nanking. General Fukuda had refused this request and had also refused to receive an envoy from Chiang Tso-ping who appeared before the Japanese lines on the 8th, five minutes before the time-limit was due to run out. At 4.0 p.m. on the 8th precisely, the Japanese artillery opened fire.³ According to the Japanese version, the Chinese troops, after the cessation of fighting on the 5th, proceeded to dig trenches round the trading quarter and to place guns, trained on Tsinanfu, in position on the neighbouring hills; and after the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on the 7th they not only failed to comply with its demands but 'assumed an even more threatening attitude'.⁴ In these circumstances, General Fukuda's refusal to grant an extension of the time-limit and his resort to 'positive military action' as soon as it expired were represented by the Japanese

¹ Japanese statement cited above.

² Unofficial reports from Japanese sources estimated that about 200 Chinese civilians were killed and 2,000 Chinese soldiers killed or wounded, as against 14 Japanese civilians killed, 15 wounded, 131 Japanese houses looted, 40 Japanese soldiers killed and 143 Japanese soldiers wounded.

³ This Chinese version will be found in *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th May, 1928.

⁴ Japanese statement of the 28th May, 1928.

Government as having really been indispensable measures of self-defence.

The two bouts of fighting at Tsinanfu, on the 3rd–5th May, 1928, and on the 7th–11th, were happily not followed by a third. Meanwhile, on the 8th May, the Japanese Government had decided to send an additional division at war-strength to Shantung, to replace the three companies which had been sent to Tsinanfu from Tientsin by five further companies from Japan, and to ‘despatch an additional number of cruisers and destroyers to the Yangtse and to South China for the purpose of safeguarding Japanese residents in case unforeseen happenings should occur in the southern districts out of possible misunderstandings relating to the Tsinan incident’.¹ The number of additional warships sent was twenty-seven. In the Tsinanfu district itself, the Japanese forces were reported to have disarmed about 20,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in all. Pending a settlement of the Tsinanfu affair, the Japanese prohibited the flying of the Kuomintang flag at Tsinanfu and in the twenty-*li*-wide zone on either side of the Tsinanfu–Tsingtao Railway, and on the 20th July they drove off by force a body of Chinese troops who tried to cross the zone. Moreover, they took possession of the Tientsin–Pukow Railway likewise, over a section extending from a point a few miles south of Tsinanfu to the bridge over the Yellow River, suspended traffic along this line (which was of vital importance commercially as well as strategically), and impounded fifty locomotives and four hundred pieces of rolling-stock which were the property of this railway.

At the same time the Japanese Government declared, in a *communiqué* of the 9th May, 1928, that the troops and warships would be withdrawn as occasion permitted on the disappearance of the necessity for their continued presence. On the 21st June the additional twenty-seven Japanese warships that had been sent to southern Chinese waters were recalled. On the 26th the Japanese Minister of War was authorized to arrange for the withdrawal of the Shantung Defence Force as and when he thought opportune. Six thousand men from the additional division that had been ordered to Shantung on the 8th May were duly withdrawn about the middle of July; and on the 14th August Imperial sanction was granted for the withdrawal of five companies from Tientsin. Six thousand more men from the additional division were withdrawn in October and November, leaving the Japanese Shantung Defence Force at a strength of about six thousand all told. The completion of the withdrawal, however, waited

¹ Statement issued at Tokio by the Japanese Government on the 9th May, 1928.

upon the outcome of negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Nanking Government, and these were far from conclusion at the end of the year 1928.

The anticipatory reduction of the Japanese forces, in advance of a settlement, may be ascribed partly to considerations of financial economy and partly to the surprising mildness of the anti-Japanese reaction in China which was evoked by the events above recorded. Notes of protest were addressed to the Japanese Government by the Nanking and the Peking Governments simultaneously on the 5th May; and on the 11th a telegram from the Nanking Government¹ was received by the Secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva and was circulated to all States Members of the Council. A similar telegram was sent by the Nanking Government to President Coolidge. From the outset, however, the Nanking Government exerted themselves to restrain popular manifestations of anti-Japanese feeling in the territories under their control.² The popular indignation was sincere and widespread; it showed itself in Chinese communities as far afield as Singapore and Rangoon; but there was much less organized action than there had been on earlier occasions on which the genuine feeling had been less intense and the provocation less signal. Anti-Japanese boycotts were declared sporadically throughout the year in many parts of China, but they were only put into execution half-heartedly and intermittently.

Meanwhile, though Sino-Japanese hostilities had ceased on the 11th May, the Japanese Army remained in occupation of the zone round Tsinanfu and along the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao Railway; and there was no prospect of this anomalous state of affairs being brought to an end until the incidents of the 3rd-11th May had been disposed of by agreement between the Governments of Tokio and Nanking.

On the 15th May, 1928, the Japanese War Office instructed General Fukuda to make the following demands upon the Nanking Government:

1. A formal apology from General Chiang Kai-shek in connexion with the Tsinanfu incident.

2. The punishment of General Ho Yao-tsu and others primarily responsible for the outrages.

3. The suspension of hostilities, propaganda and warlike activities within 20 *li* (seven miles) from Tsinanfu, Tientsin and the Shantung Railway.

4. The Chinese negotiator must produce credentials from General Chiang Kai-shek.³

¹ Text in *The Times*, 12th May, 1928.

² E. g., at Shanghai.

³ *The Times*, 16th May, 1928.

Thereafter the negotiations passed from military into civil hands and became involved in the negotiations over treaty revision. In this connexion, they are dealt with elsewhere.¹

(b) THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NANKING INCIDENT OF THE 24TH MARCH, 1927, AS BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY.

In the preceding volume,² some account has been given of the outrages upon foreign persons and property which were committed at Nanking, on the 24th March, 1927, by the soldiery of the Kuomintang Army; and it has been recorded that Consuls and Consulates, as well as private individuals and private interests, were attacked and that the incident affected no less than five Great Powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. It has also been mentioned that the representatives of these Powers at Shanghai and Hankow presented identic notes, demanding satisfaction, to the local Nationalist authorities on the 11th April, 1927, and received five separate and variant answers from Mr. Eugene Chen on the 14th; but that thereafter these negotiations lapsed owing to the virtual interregnum in the Kuomintang régime during the remainder of that year.

When, at the turn of the years 1927 and 1928, a new united Kuomintang Government established themselves at Nanking, their chief concern in foreign affairs was the same as that of all other Governments that had claimed to speak for the Chinese Republic since the beginning of the Revolution. They were concerned to get rid of the 'unequal treaties' between China and certain foreign Powers. In this enterprise, however, they laboured under two handicaps from which their rivals at Peking—including the then moribund Ankuochün Government—had been exempt. In the first place they lacked diplomatic recognition; and in the second place the five principal Treaty Powers were alienated from them by the still unsettled controversy over the Nanking affair. It was evident that the Kuomintang Government would have a better prospect of obtaining the consent of the Powers to treaty revision if this stumbling-block were first removed.

As an earnest of conciliatory intentions in regard to a settlement of the Nanking Incident, the Kuomintang Government issued two unilateral 'mandates' on the 18th March, 1928. In the first they

¹ See pp. 429-30 below.

² *Survey for 1927*, Part III, Section (iii) (c).

ascribed the responsibility for the outrages to a Chinese Communist, Lin Tzu-han, at that time Director of the Political Department of the Sixth Army; ordered Lin's arrest; and published the names of nineteen responsible officers and fifty-one 'responsible local desperadoes' who had been already executed. In the second mandate they declared that the protection of foreign lives and property was the duty of the Government, and enjoined the performance of this duty upon the local military and civil authorities. Simultaneously Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement that the Political Council of the Kuomintang Government, of its own motion, had approved an attempt to settle the Nanking Incident and had instructed the Foreign Minister, Hwang Fu, to initiate discussions with the Powers.

These overtures were the first-fruits of conversations which had been taking place at Shanghai between representatives of the Kuomintang Government and of the British, American, Japanese and French Governments—now acting separately and no longer collectively as they had done in April 1927. The British Minister in China, Sir Miles Lampson, arrived at Shanghai on the 5th March, 1928 (on his way back to Peking from a visit to Hongkong and Canton)¹ and there met Hwang Fu. In these Sino-British conversations, substantial agreement seems to have been reached over the form in which the Kuomintang Government should give satisfaction for the outrages which British subjects and the British Government had suffered; and it was also agreed that some reference should be made, in separate but simultaneous notes, to the desirability of revising treaties between China and Great Britain, and also to the action of British (and American) warships in the Yangtse, off Nanking, on the 24th March, 1927, in putting up a barrage round Socony Hill.² The negotiations broke down, however, over a Chinese demand that the reference to the barrage should take the form of a British apology; and on the 25th March, 1928, Sir Miles Lampson sailed from Shanghai for Peking, leaving it to the British Consuls-General at Shanghai and Nanking to take the negotiations up again as opportunity offered. Meanwhile, Sir Miles Lampson's abortive negotiations with Hwang Fu paved the way for the successful conclusion five days later, on the 30th March, of the Sino-American negotiations which had been proceeding at Shanghai on parallel lines since the

¹ The visits paid to Canton by Sir Miles Lampson towards the end of February and by Sir Cecil Clementi, the Governor of Hongkong, on the 9th-11th March, went far towards restoring, on the southern littoral, the traditional cordiality of Sino-British relations.

² For the circumstances in which this action had been taken, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 388-9.

26th February between Hwang Fu and the United States Minister in China, Mr. MacMurray. The Chinese and American negotiators adopted the expedient of relegating the contentious questions of treaty revision and the Socony Hill barrage to separate notes; and the Chinese, after experiencing the effect of their demand for an apology upon the attitude of Sir Miles Lampson, refrained from addressing a similar demand to his American colleague. Accordingly a settlement of the Nanking Incident, as between the Kuomintang Government and the United States, was embodied in three pairs of notes¹ exchanged between Hwang Fu and Mr. MacMurray on the 2nd April.

In his first note Hwang Fu, in the name of his Government, expressed regret and accepted responsibility for the outrages suffered by the United States Government and by American citizens at Nanking on the 24th March, 1927, while declaring that the incident had been 'entirely instigated by the Communists prior to the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking'. He mentioned that 'the troops of the particular division which took part in the unfortunate incident, at the instigation of the Communists', had been disbanded. Finally, he announced that, 'in accordance with the well-accepted principles of international law', the Nationalist Government undertook 'to make compensation in full for all personal injuries and material damages done to the American Consulate and to its officials and to American residents and their property at Nanking'; and he proposed that injuries and damages should be verified and compensation assessed by a Sino-American joint commission. Mr. MacMurray, in his reply to this note, accepted its terms—with emphasis upon the desirability of inflicting punishment at an early date on Lin Tzu-han.

In his second note, Hwang Fu asked for an expression of regret on the United States Government's part for the bombardment of Socony Hill. To this Mr. MacMurray replied by recalling the circumstances and declaring that, in the United States Government's opinion, 'its naval vessels had no alternative to the action taken—however deeply it deplores that circumstances beyond its control should have necessitated the adoption of such measures for the protection of the lives of its citizens in Nanking'.

In his third note, Hwang Fu expressed the hope that, in view of the settlement of the Nanking Incident, a new epoch would begin in the diplomatic relations between China and the United States; and he suggested that 'further steps' might 'be taken for the revision of

¹ Texts in *The United States Daily*, 6th April, 1928.

the existing treaties and the readjustment of outstanding questions on the basis of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty'. In reply Mr. MacMurray submitted that the question of treaty revision could 'scarcely be considered germane to that of amends to the American Government and its nationals for the Nanking Incident', but declared his willingness to put on record his Government's established policy, and proceeded to do so in the following terms:

The Government and the people of the United States are in full sympathy with the desire of the Chinese people to develop a sound national life of their own and to realise their aspirations for a sovereignty so far as possible unrestricted by obligations of an exceptional character. With that in view, the American Government entertains the hope that the remedying of the conditions which necessitated the incorporation of such provisions in the earlier treaties may from time to time afford opportunities for the revision, in due form and by mutual consent, of such treaty stipulations as may have become unnecessary or inappropriate. To that end, the American Government looks forward to the hope that there may be developed an administration so far representative of the Chinese people, and so far exercising real authority, as to be capable of assuring the actual fulfilment in good faith of any obligations such as China would of necessity have for its part to undertake incidentally to the desired readjustment of treaty relations.

On the 26th April the Nanking Government paid \$100,000 (Mexican) to the United States Consul-General at Shanghai on account, pending the forthcoming joint assessment.

This Sino-American agreement was the only settlement that emerged from the four parallel sets of negotiations at this time; for the Sino-French, like the Sino-British, negotiations hung fire on the verge of success, and the Sino-Japanese negotiations were interrupted in consequence of the landing of Japanese troops in Shantung on the 19th April.¹

As far as the British Government were concerned, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 30th July, expressed the opinion that 'the first step in' their 'relations with the Nationalist Government must be a settlement of the Nanking Incident'.² This condition was fulfilled on the 9th August by the exchange, between Mr. C. T. Wang and the British Consul-General at Nanking, Sir Sidney Barton, acting for Sir Miles Lampson, of three sets of notes³ conforming closely to the Sino-American

¹ See p. 407 above.

² He had already emphasized this point in interviews held on the 18th and the 23rd July with Hu Han-min and Sun Fo, members of the Kuomintang mission abroad who were visiting London. (For this mission see p. 387 above.)

³ Texts in British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 3188 of 1928.

correspondence of the 2nd April. The British negotiator's exposition of his Government's policy, in reply to Mr. Wang's third note, was as follows:

His Majesty's Government in Great Britain recognise the essential justice of the Chinese claim to treaty revision, and in their declaration of the 18th December, 1926, and their seven proposals of the 28th January, 1927, they have made their policy abundantly clear, and have taken such practical steps as lay in their power to carry it into effect. In order to give further expression to the friendly and sympathetic attitude which they have always maintained towards China, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain are prepared in due course to enter into negotiation with the Nationalist Government, through their duly authorised representative, on the subject of treaty revision. His Majesty's Government in Great Britain do not intend to allow the Nanking incident to alter their previous attitude towards China, and prefer to consider it as an episode bearing no relation to their treaty revision policy.

At the end of August 1928 the British Consulate-General at Nanking was reopened after having been closed since March 1927. The consular premises, which had been intermittently occupied by Kuomintang troops,¹ were in a dilapidated condition, and, while they were being put in order, a house at Nanking was placed at the British Consul-General's disposal by the Kuomintang Government.

As between France and the Kuomintang Government and between Italy and the Kuomintang Government, the Nanking Incident was settled by notes exchanged respectively on the 1st and the 9th October, 1928.² These settlements followed the lines of the Sino-American and Sino-British settlements—except that there was no Chinese demand for a counter-apology, since no French or Italian warships had taken part, on the 24th March, 1927, in the bombardment of Socony Hill.

The Sino-American, Sino-British and Sino-French mixed commissions of investigation and assessment had none of them concluded their labours by July 1929. The amount of compensation to be paid for the life of the Italian missionary who had been murdered at Nanking on the 24th March, 1927, was agreed on the 30th October, 1928.

Before the Nanking Incident had thus been disposed of, other

¹ Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 2nd April, 1928.

² Texts of notes exchanged between the French *chargé d'affaires* in China and Mr. C. T. Wang on the 1st October, 1928, in *Le Temps*, 18th October, 1928, and in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 5th January, 1929. For the Sino-Italian settlement of the 9th October, 1928, see the *Corriere della Sera*, 10th October, and *The Times*, 31st October, 1928.

incidents involving foreign Governments and nationals had occurred. The Tsinanfu Incident of May 1928 is dealt with elsewhere.¹ On the 16th April, at an earlier stage of the same campaign in the Chinese civil war, an American citizen who was head of the American Presbyterian Mission hospital at Tsining, in Shantung, was shot dead by soldiers; and a note of protest² regarding this crime was transmitted by the United States Government to the Kuomintang Government on the 15th May. In August 1928, again, the United States Minister in China addressed a strong note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking regarding the non-evacuation of American property in China, public and private, which had been occupied by Kuomintang troops and authorities.

Nevertheless—apart from the murders of Japanese nationals and the looting of Japanese properties at Tsinanfu—the year 1928 was favourably distinguished from each of the three previous years by the relative shortness of the roll of outrages in China in which foreign Governments, individuals and interests were numbered among the victims.

(c) THE PROGRESS OF TREATY REVISION AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC AT NANKING BY FOREIGN POWERS.

In previous volumes,³ some account has been given of the revision of 'unequal treaties' between China and foreign Powers from the close of the General War to the end of January 1927. This process was carried further during the next two years.

Before recording the events of those years, it may be well to recall two points. The first point is that, in this matter of treaty revision, a remarkable uniformity and continuity of policy had been maintained throughout by the several Governments which had each claimed, at different times and places, to represent the whole of China. Their frequently parallel and sometimes identic action had not been appreciably affected by the fact that they were often at war with one another; and the same policy was carried on with no change in principle, when in June 1928, after the occupation of Peking by the Kuomintang forces, the Wai-chiao Pu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) at Peking was closed and the whole initiative in treaty revision on the Chinese side was concentrated in the hands of the Kuomintang Government at Nanking. The second point to be recalled is that, in

¹ See pp. 407–13 above.

² Text in *The United States Daily*, 23rd May, 1928.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 326–37; *Survey for 1926*, pp. 271–7.

general, 'the unequal treaties' consisted of two sets of provisions: tariff and commercial clauses, in which the principal 'inequality' was that they deprived the Chinese Government, but not the other contracting party, of tariff autonomy; and extra-territoriality clauses, which deprived the Chinese Government of jurisdiction over private individuals of foreign nationality, and their property, on Chinese soil. Many of the treaties contained an article providing for the revision of the tariff and commercial clauses, at stated intervals, by free negotiation between the parties, upon due notice on either side. The policy of the Chinese, in pursuing their aim of getting rid of 'unequal treaties' altogether, was to interpret such provisions as entitling them, when one of these stated dates approached, to demand negotiations for revising not merely the tariff and commercial clauses of a treaty but the treaty in its entirety—such demand being often coupled with a declaration that the existing treaty would terminate at a certain date in any event, whether or not it had been revised by agreement in the meanwhile. If the other party demurred to the demand that the whole of the treaty should be thrown into the melting-pot, or if negotiations covering the whole of a treaty were opened but did not lead to any agreement upon a fresh basis by the date which the Chinese had laid down, the next resort of the Chinese was to declare the treaty terminated as from that date and to announce their intention to treat the nationals of the other party in China accordingly. The employment of this *ultima ratio* was governed by expediency, that is, by the Chinese diplomatists' estimate of the other party's ability and inclination to resist or retaliate.

At the end of January 1927 the situation was as follows. The last 'unequal treaty' of the old type that the Chinese Government had concluded had been the Sino-Swiss treaty of the 13th June, 1918. In the Sino-Bolivian treaty of the 3rd December, 1919, and the Sino-Persian treaty of the 1st June, 1920, extra-territoriality had been expressly ruled out. In the Sino-German treaty of the 20th May, 1921, and the Sino-Austrian treaty of the 19th October, 1925, China had entered for the first time into treaty-relations on a footing of equality with European Powers—her former treaties with these two Powers having lapsed when she had intervened in the General War of 1914–18 on the opposite side. The Sino-Austrian treaty was a comprehensive and elaborate instrument which seemed intended by the Chinese negotiators to serve as a model for other 'equal treaties' which they hoped to conclude in the future. In the treaty of the 31st May, 1924, between China and the U.S.S.R., all former treaties and agreements between China and Russia were cancelled

and it was laid down that new treaties on a footing of equality were to be negotiated in place of them. By the end of January 1927 the Belgian, Japanese and French Governments had all entered into negotiations with the Wai-chiao Pu at Peking—under pressure (of the kind described above) from the Chinese side and under protest on their own part.

Meanwhile, on the 10th November, 1926, the Wai-chiao Pu had notified the Spanish Government that it intended to terminate the Sino-Spanish treaty of the 10th October, 1864, on the strength of a revision clause therein; and it had proposed, in the same note, that a new treaty should be concluded 'on the basis of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty'. In reply, the Spanish Government agreed in principle to the conclusion of a new treaty but contended that the existing treaty became subject to revision only on the 10th November, 1927, and not on the 10th May, as the Wai-chiao Pu had suggested in its interpretation of the relevant clause (Article 23 of the Sino-Spanish treaty of the 10th October, 1864). The Spanish Government also contended that this clause referred to the tariff and commercial provisions of the treaty only and not to the extra-territoriality provisions. The Wai-chiao Pu yielded on the question of dates, but insisted that the revision clause covered the whole treaty because this instrument 'was one primarily for commercial intercourse and most of its articles directly or indirectly had a bearing on this intercourse'. Negotiations began on the 8th August, 1927, and on the 18th of that month the Chinese draft of a new treaty was handed to the Spanish Minister at Peking; but the standpoints of the two parties still remained unreconciled on the 10th November, 1927. Accordingly, on that date, the Generalissimo of the Ankuochün Government, Chang Tso-lin, issued a mandate¹ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs declaring the treaty of the 10th October, 1864, to be of no effect as from the 10th November, 1927; instructing the Wai-chiao Pu to negotiate and conclude a new treaty with the Spanish Government as speedily as possible 'on the basis of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty'; and ordering the local Chinese authorities to extend full and due protection, 'in accordance with the rules of international law and usage', to the Spanish Legation and Consulates and to the persons and property of Spanish nationals in China. The Spanish Legation protested against this action on the 14th November and the Spanish Government endorsed this protest

¹ Text in *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1402. An explanatory statement (text also in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*) was issued by the Peking Government on the same date.

on the 17th.¹ They contended that the revision clause in the 1864 treaty applied to one part of the treaty only; that, even in regard to this part, it authorized, not a unilateral denunciation, but merely a request for revision by agreement; and that, before Spain had consented to enter into negotiations in 1927, she had obtained a promise from the present Minister for Foreign Affairs at Peking that, pending the signature of a new Sino-Spanish treaty, Spain should receive treatment not less favourable than that granted to the other countries with which China was in process of negotiating new treaties. In a reply delivered on the 25th November, 1927,² the Wai-chiao Pu contested all these points and suggested that the negotiations for a new treaty, on a footing of equality, should be expedited. On the 4th December, 1927, the Kuomintang Government at Nanking followed up the action of the Ankuochün Government at Peking by issuing a series of regulations for the treatment of Spanish subjects, under which these were to be subject to Chinese law and in general were to receive the treatment accorded to nationals of 'non-treaty-Powers'.

On the 28th April, 1928, the Peking and Nanking Governments simultaneously requested the Portuguese Government to enter into negotiations for a revision of the Sino-Portuguese treaty of the 26th March, 1887, and this, again, not merely in respect of the tariff and commercial clauses to which, on the face of it, the revision clause in the treaty applied, but in respect of the treaty as a whole. It was intimated that if revision by agreement were not effected at an early date, the treaty would be denounced unilaterally on the Chinese side.

In May 1928 the Peking Government, *in articulo mortis*, secured two last diplomatic successes in the shape of treaties, on a footing of equality, with two countries with which China had not yet been in treaty relations. On the 19th May, 1928, a Sino-Polish treaty was signed at Peking. On the 26th, a Sino-Greek treaty was signed in Paris by the Chinese and Greek Ministers there.³

After the fall of the Ankuochün Government at Peking, the Kuomintang Government at Nanking issued, on the 7th July, 1928, a mandate⁴ declaring that, since the unification of China was now an accomplished fact, it was their task to make every effort to

¹ Texts of the two communications from the Spanish Legation to the Wai-chiao Pu in *op. cit.*, pp. 1403-4.

² Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 1404-5.

³ Greek nationals in China had formerly enjoyed French protection, but latterly the Chinese authorities had been unwilling to concede them the benefit of this.

⁴ Text in *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th July, 1928.

carry the policy of treaty revision to completion. This mandate contained the following 'specific declaration':

First, all unequal treaties between the Republic of China and other countries which have already expired shall *ipso facto* be abrogated and new treaties shall be concluded.

Secondly, the Nationalist Government will immediately take steps to terminate, in accordance with the proper procedure, those unequal treaties which have not yet expired, and conclude new treaties.

Thirdly, in the case of old treaties which have already expired but have not yet been replaced by new treaties, the Nationalist Government will promulgate appropriate interim regulations to meet the exigencies of such a situation.

These interim regulations were promulgated forthwith on the 8th July, 1928, under seven heads:¹ first, they were to apply only to nationals of countries whose treaties with China had already expired and with whom new treaties had not yet been concluded; second, all diplomatic and consular representatives were to be entitled to proper treatment in accordance with international law; third, the persons and property of foreigners in China were to receive due protection under Chinese law; fourth, foreigners were to be subject to the provisions of Chinese law and to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts; fifth, pending the enforcement of a national tariff schedule, the regular customs duties on imports into China from foreign countries, or by foreigners, and on exports from China to foreign countries, were to be collected in accordance with the existing tariff schedule; sixth, all taxes and duties payable by Chinese citizens were to be payable equally by foreigners; seventh, matters not covered by the foregoing regulations were to be dealt with according to international law and to Chinese municipal law.

Simultaneously, the Nanking Government notified the Danish and Italian Governments respectively that the Sino-Danish treaty of the 13th July, 1863, and the Sino-Italian treaty of the 26th October, 1866, had terminated on the 30th June, and invited them to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of new agreements on a footing of equality. On the 11th July a similar notification, reinforcing that of the 28th April, was transmitted from Nanking to the Portuguese Minister, and another on the 13th to the French Minister, declaring that the Sino-French commercial conventions of 1886, 1887 and 1895, relative to trade between China and French Indo-China,² had terminated on the 7th July. Finally, on the 19th July, the Nanking

¹ Summary in *The Times*, 10th July, 1928.

² Texts of all three documents in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 1st September, 1928, pp. 1198-1202.

Government transmitted to the Japanese Minister a notification that the Sino-Japanese treaty of the 21st July, 1896, would terminate next day—the 20th July, 1928. It will be remembered that negotiations for a revision of the Sino-French and Sino-Japanese treaties had been started at Peking in January 1927. In the case of the Sino-Japanese treaty, the close of a decennial period, which had given the Chinese the right to ask for a revision of the tariff and commercial clauses, had occurred on the 20th October, 1926; but the Chinese, having waited until the arrival of that date before presenting their demand for revision, had themselves proposed an extension up to the 20th April, 1927; and during the negotiations this extension had been prolonged, in five instalments, down to the 20th July, 1928—the date on which the Nanking Government now declared the treaty to terminate.

The Italian Government replied on the 11th July, 1928,¹ the Danish Government on the 14th, the Portuguese on the 25th. All three Governments contested the Nanking Government's assertion that the treaties had terminated—and this on the double ground, already taken by the Spanish Government, that the revision clauses only applied to part of the treaties and that, even in regard to this part, they authorized, not a unilateral denunciation, but merely a request for revision by agreement. At the same time, they all three declared themselves ready, on certain conditions, to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of new treaties on a footing of equality. Meanwhile, the Italian Government's contention that the existing Sino-Italian treaty was still in force was challenged in the field of extra-territoriality. On the 20th July, the Chinese Judge of the Shanghai Provisional Court refused to allow the Italian Vice-Consul to sit on the bench on the ground that Italian extra-territorial rights had been abrogated, but he receded from this position the next day on it being made clear that the Vice-Consul was attending not as an Italian representative, but as the Senior Consul's deputy. A week later a similar objection was taken to the participation of the Vice-Consul in an Italian civil case. On this occasion the Chinese Judge refused to sit and the Italian deputy adjourned the case, affirming his right to sit and protesting emphatically against the absence from the bench of the Chinese Judge.

The French Government replied to the Nanking Government's notification in sharper terms, and the Japanese Government's reply, which was despatched on the 1st August, 1928,² was pointedly

¹ Text of this reply in the *Corriere della Sera*, 12th August, 1928.

² The note was dated the 31st July, 1928.

combative. After contesting the Nanking Government's assertion that the treaty had terminated, the Japanese Government denounced the suggestion that Japanese subjects in China should come under the interim regulations of the 8th July as 'an outrageous act' in which they were 'wholly unable to acquiesce'. They added that they were still prepared to effect a revision of the existing treaty by negotiation if the Nanking Government were to recognize the validity of the existing treaty by withdrawing the interim regulations as far as Japanese subjects were concerned. Otherwise they declared that they would decline to resume negotiations; and, if the Nanking Government 'should persistently attempt to enforce the interim regulations unilaterally', they intimated that they might be obliged to take such measures as they deemed suitable for securing their treaty rights and might also insist on the existing treaty remaining in force for the whole duration of the decennial period which had begun to run on the 20th October, 1926. In their counter-reply, the Nanking Government neither renounced their contention that the treaty of 1896 had terminated nor formally withdrew the interim regulations of the 8th July, 1928; but they stated that they desired to preserve trade and diplomatic relations and that they did not intend to discriminate against Japan; and in this connexion they observed that, in the matter of the interim regulations, they had exercised particular care. In practice, the Nanking Government had not attempted and did not attempt to apply the interim regulations to Japanese subjects. The Japanese Government refrained from continuing the correspondence; but at the same time they did not shut the door upon the resumption of negotiations, as they had threatened to do.

Thus the Nanking Government's *démarches* of July 1928 had only partly achieved their object. The success or failure of the Chinese policy of treaty-revision would be determined ultimately by the response which it received not from small countries like Belgium, Denmark and Portugal, or from a Power of intermediate calibre like Spain, but from the Great Powers which were in a position to vindicate their own interpretation of their treaty-rights by force; and, of the three Great Powers whom the Nanking Government had challenged, Italy alone had shown herself at all disposed to fall in with the Chinese proposals. At this critical moment, the scales were turned in the Nanking Government's favour by a spontaneous concession on the part of one of the greatest of the Great Powers, the United States.

On the 24th July, 1928, the Secretary of State at Washington, Mr. Kellogg, addressed a note¹ to the Nanking Government in which,

¹ Text in *The United States Daily*, 26th July, 1928.

after referring to the Sino-American correspondence of the previous March in settlement of the Nanking Incident,¹ he announced that the American Government were ready to begin at once, through the American Minister to China, negotiations with properly accredited representatives of the Nanking Government in reference to the tariff provisions of the treaties between the United States and China, with a view to concluding a new treaty. Copies of this note were communicated to the other seven signatories of the treaty 'relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China' which had been signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922.² Presumably this was done in deference to Article 7 of that treaty, in which the parties had agreed that 'there should be full and frank communication' between them whenever a situation arose which involved the application of the treaty in the opinion of any one of them. If so, it was done somewhat late in the day; for the new Sino-American treaty, which Mr. Kellogg had foreshadowed in his note of the 24th July, was signed on the very next day at Peking by the United States Minister in China, Mr. MacMurray, and by the Minister of Finance in the Nanking Government, Mr. T. V. Soong.

The text of this treaty need not be analysed here, since it is printed in full in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume of this *Survey*. It is sufficient to note that it related exclusively to the tariff and commercial clauses of previous Sino-American treaties; that it abrogated anything in such clauses that was incompatible with a reciprocal application of the principle of complete national tariff autonomy; that it made the application of this principle subject to the condition that either party should enjoy, in the territories of the other, treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country; and that its provisions were to become effective on the 1st January, 1929, if ratifications had been exchanged by that date.³

The signature of this treaty, in which China obtained the recognition of her tariff autonomy from a Great Power, was a notable step in the general process of treaty revision. On the other hand, the actual revision of Sino-American treaty-relations, thus effected, applied to one part of the field only; and this limitation was at variance with the usual Chinese contention that the whole field,

¹ See pp. 414-16 above.

² See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 477-8.

³ It may be noted that the coming into force of the treaty was not necessarily synonymous with its taking practical effect. Owing to the insertion of the most-favoured-nation-treatment clauses, this Sino-American treaty could have no practical effect until tariff autonomy had been conceded to China by all the other Treaty Powers likewise.

including not only tariff and commercial clauses but extra-territoriality, was covered by the revision clauses which most of the existing treaties contained. Thus, while the Chinese had reason to hope that the new Sino-American treaty would serve as a precedent for a general acceptance of the Chinese demand for tariff autonomy, they also had reason to fear that it might be taken as a precedent for confining treaty-revision, at any rate in the first instance, to this single head. Such considerations can perhaps be detected in the reply to Mr. Kellogg's note of the 24th July, 1928, which was returned by the Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang Government at Nanking, Mr. C. T. Wang. In this reply Mr. Wang—apparently ignoring the treaty which, in the interval, had just been signed at Peking by his colleague Mr. T. V. Soong—notified the appointment of Mr. C. C. Wu as Chinese plenipotentiary for the negotiations proposed by Mr. Kellogg and expressed the hope that these negotiations would 'result in a proper settlement of all questions which' were 'in need of immediate solution'. This reply caused Mr. MacMurray to point out—'in order to avoid any possibility of misconception of the purpose of' the United States Government in the existing circumstances—that, whereas Mr. Wang's note to him referred to negotiations soon to commence, it was 'now the fact that such negotiations as the American Government had in contemplation' had 'already been satisfactorily concluded'. Thereafter, on the 20th October, 1928, it was explicitly declared at the Department of State in Washington that the position of the United States, regarding the termination of treaty provisions covering extra-territoriality in China, remained unchanged since it had been set forth by the Secretary of State on the 27th January, 1927. On that occasion, Mr. Kellogg had declared that the United States was prepared to put into force at once those recommendations of the Extra-Territoriality Commission which could be put into force without a treaty, and to negotiate the relinquishment of extra-territorial rights as soon as China was prepared to provide protection by law and through her courts to American citizens, their rights and property.¹

¹ It should be noted that extra-territorial rights, in the strict sense of the term, by no means covered all the abnormalities in the status of foreign Powers in Chinese territory. Some measure of the extent to which foreign interference in China trenching upon Chinese national sovereignty is given by the fact that, during the year 1928, six new river gunboats, destined exclusively for service in Chinese waters, were being built for the United States Navy in a shipyard on Chinese soil (the Kiangnan Docking and Engine Works at Shanghai). The second of these gunboats was placed in commission on the 2nd March, 1928. The six old gunboats previously maintained on the Yangtse by the United States Government were placed out of commission one by one, as the new gun-

Nevertheless, the gains which the Nanking Government derived from the treaty of the 25th July, 1928, were substantial. In the first place, it was announced, at the Department of State in Washington on the 28th September, 1928, that the signature of that treaty constituted a recognition of the Nanking Government by the United States as the Government of the Chinese Republic. In the second place, the treaty of the 25th July, 1928, was followed, before the close of the year, by a number of others. In fact, it led to the solution of the difficult question of the Chinese Customs Tariff, which the Peking Tariff Conference of 1925-6 had failed to solve,¹ and which probably would never have been solved by all the Powers acting together.

On the 17th August there was signed at Peking a provisional Sino-German commercial treaty, as a supplement to the general treaty of the 20th May, 1921, and as a prelude to a definitive treaty of commerce and navigation which was to be negotiated as soon as possible. The principal effect of this instrument was to bring Germany's position regarding the Chinese tariff into line with the position taken in the treaty of the 25th July, 1928, by the United States; for the new Sino-German treaty annulled a stipulation, contained in an exchange of notes annexed to the treaty of 1921, that German imports into China should pay duty on the basis of the Chinese general tariff until a Chinese autonomous tariff came into general effect.

The pattern of the Sino-American treaty of the 25th July, 1928, was followed still more closely in a Sino-Norwegian treaty signed at Shanghai on the 12th November, 1928, and again in a Sino-Dutch treaty signed on the 19th December, a Sino-British and a Sino-Swedish treaty signed on the 20th December, and a Sino-French treaty signed on the 22nd December—all four at Nanking.² Later on the day on which the Sino-British treaty was signed, the British Minister in China ceremoniously presented his credentials to President Chiang Kai-shek. The new Sino-French treaty applied to all territories under the French flag and not merely to Indo-China. In regard,

boats were placed in commission. Another illustration was the action taken by British consular and naval authorities in March 1927 in preventing Chang Tsung-ch'ang from transferring rolling-stock belonging to the Shanghai-Nanking Railway to the north bank of the Yangtse—the ground of the veto being that the whole property of this railway was mortgaged to British interests as security for a loan. (Statement by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 23rd May, 1927, in answer to a parliamentary question.)

¹ For the history of this conference, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part III, Section (viii).

² The points of correspondence and discrepancy between these five treaties and the Sino-American treaty of the 25th July, 1928, are set out in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume of this *Survey*.

however, to the existing Sino-French conventions relative to trade between China and French Indo-China, which the Nanking Government had previously declared terminated as from the 7th July, 1928, it was agreed in an exchange of notes¹ that a new convention should be negotiated forthwith and that, pending its conclusion, the *status quo* should continue. In a further note, Mr. Wang announced that the *status quo* would terminate on the 31st March, 1929, in any event, even if the new convention had not been negotiated by that date. To this announcement the French Minister returned a non-committal reply.

The same pattern was followed, in the matter of the recognition of Chinese tariff autonomy, in a Sino-Belgian preliminary treaty signed at Nanking on the 22nd November, 1928, a Sino-Italian preliminary treaty signed on the 27th November, a Sino-Portuguese preliminary treaty signed on the 19th December, and a Sino-Spanish preliminary treaty signed on the 27th December—all these, again, being signed at Nanking. These five preliminary treaties, however, all alike went beyond the Sino-American treaty of the 25th July, 1928, inasmuch as they further provided in principle for the relinquishment in each case, by the non-Chinese contracting party, of extra-territoriality. It should be added that in every case this relinquishment of extra-territoriality was conditional, and that the conditions varied from one treaty to another.²

Thus, by the close of the year 1928, China had obtained some measure of treaty-revision, in every case including a recognition of her tariff autonomy, from eleven out of fifteen³ 'Treaty Powers' to whom she had still been bound by 'unequal treaties' at the beginning of the year;⁴ and on the 5th December, when four of the new treaties

¹ Texts in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 5th January, 1929, pp. 31-2.

² The points of variation in the conditions attached to the relinquishment of extra-territoriality in these five preliminary treaties, as well as the points of correspondence and discrepancy between these five treaties and the Sino-American treaty of the 25th July, 1928, in regard to the recognition of Chinese tariff autonomy, are set out in the volume of documents supplementary to the present volume of this *Survey*.

³ List in *The China Year Book*, 1928, p. 440.

⁴ It was a sign of the times that on the 3rd August, 1928, the Pope sent a message to the Apostolic Delegate in China, for the Catholic Episcopate and Clergy there, in which, after claiming that the Holy See had been the first party to treat China not only on a footing of perfect equality but also with special sympathy, he expressed the hope that the legitimate aspirations and rights of the most numerous nation in the world might be fully recognized. In this context, he pointed out that the Catholic Church enjoined upon its adherents the duty of obedience and respect towards lawfully constituted authority. The Vatican was not a 'Treaty Power' in China, and perhaps not a Power at all at this time in the technical meaning of the term, since the State

had already been signed and when the signature of the other seven was in prospect, the Nanking Government duly promulgated a new autonomous tariff, with a notification that it would come into force on the 1st February, 1929. Having achieved their aim in principle, the Chinese showed moderation in the use which they made of their newly asserted liberty; for the schedule of the new tariff was based, not on the original proposals which had been put forward at the Peking Tariff Conference of 1926¹ by the Chinese delegation, but on the modified version of these proposals which had been suggested by the delegations of the foreign Powers.

No objection was taken to the new tariff by the four 'Treaty Powers' that had already signed new treaties or by the seven that were then engaged in negotiations with the Nanking Government. There remained four other 'Treaty Powers' that had not yet made any concession to Chinese desires, namely, Brazil, Japan, Peru and Switzerland; but, out of these four, three had so little interest in their relations with China and so little opportunity for bringing any pressure to bear on the Chinese Government, even if they had the will, that they could virtually be left out of account. The only one of the four whose attitude was important was Japan; and the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, Mr. Yada, refused to accept the note announcing the promulgation of the new Chinese tariff at the Nanking Government's hands.

The special stumbling-block in the way of treaty-revision in the case of Japan and China was the fact that this issue had become involved with a number of other issues outstanding between these two Powers. During the interval between the signature of the new Sino-American treaty on the 25th July, 1928, and the signatures of ten other new treaties, recorded above, in November and December, a fresh effort to arrive at a Sino-Japanese settlement had been made. It has been mentioned above that the Japanese Government had not taken Mr. Wang's reply to their note of the 1st August as precluding a resumption of negotiations. On the 20th August, Mr. Yada went to Japan in order to confer with Baron Tanaka. Mr. Yada returned to China on the 6th September; and towards the end of that month a certain General Chang Chun arrived in Japan, ostensibly in order to attend the Japanese military manoeuvres on the Nanking Govern-

of the Vatican City had not yet been recognized by Italy. At the same time, the Vatican was *de facto* a Power of imponderable but immense influence in the world, and the Papal diplomatists enjoyed a reputation for political foresight and sagacity. For this reason, it was significant that the Pope should have taken this step at this juncture.

¹ For this conference see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 370-6.

ment's behalf, but actually in order to prepare the ground for a renewal of diplomatic negotiations. As a result of Général Chang Chun's mission, informal negotiations were opened at the beginning of October between Mr. Yada and Mr. T. V. Soong, the Nanking Minister of Finance, and the scope of these negotiations was subsequently extended so as to bring in Mr. C. T. Wang, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The following subjects were reported to have been included in the discussion:

1. The Nanking Incident of the 24th March, 1927;
2. The Hankow Incident of the 3rd April, 1927;¹
3. The Tsinanfu Incident of the 3rd-11th May, 1928;²
4. The continued occupation of the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao Railway Zone by Japanese forces;³
5. Treaty Revision;
6. Tariff Revision;
7. The future status of Manchuria;⁴
8. The question of whether the unsecured loans (including the Nishihara Loans) which had been made by Japanese financiers to the now defunct Peking Government should be recognized by the Nanking Government.

On the 17th October the Japanese Minister in China, Mr. Yoshizawa, returned to Japan to confer with the Government; and on the 28th Mr. Arita, the Chief of the Far Eastern Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, left for Shanghai in the hope of furthering Mr. Yada's negotiations, which were to have been resumed, after a pause, on the 20th November. The Nanking Government, however, now demanded, as a preliminary condition for resumption, that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn from Shantung; and on this point the Japanese, while not insisting that a settlement of the Tsinanfu Incident must first be reached, did insist that they must first receive satisfactory guarantees for the safety of Japanese nationals in Shantung. Thus the general Sino-Japanese negotiations came to a deadlock over a matter which had no intrinsic connexion with the question of treaty revision; and Mr. Yada left Nanking. From Shanghai, he continued his negotiations over the Chinese tariff with Mr. Soong; and on this matter a provisional agreement between these two negotiators was reported to have been reached, when Mr. Wang took objection to this agreement being consummated before the Japanese Government had announced a definitive date for the with-

¹ For this incident, see the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 398-9.

² See Section (ii) (a) above.

³ See Section (ii) (a) above.

⁴ See Section (i) (b) above and (ii) (d) below.

drawal of their troops from Shantung. On the 19th January, 1929, Mr. Yoshizawa came to Shanghai; and on the 30th notes were exchanged between the Chinese and Japanese Governments according to which Japan took note of the new Chinese import tariff and also of the fact that it would be in force as from the 1st February, 1929. In other words, Japan did not, like other countries, recognize China's right to tariff autonomy, but merely intimated that she would not oppose the new tariff schedule being put into force. It was generally understood at the time that in return the Chinese Government had given to Japan some kind of assurance that measures would be taken to meet the unsecured debts, and also that with the enforcement of the new tariff there would be no further collection of the 'Washington surtaxes' which Japan had never recognized. Thus the tariff question was disposed of provisionally as between China and Japan; but the other questions at issue between the two countries still remained unsettled.

The Japanese Government appear to have felt some concern at finding themselves in a position of diplomatic isolation *vis-à-vis* China; and in September 1928 Count Uchida, who had gone to Europe in order to sign 'the Kellogg Pact' at Paris,¹ visited London and Washington in order to explain Japanese policy in China to the British and American Governments. After Count Uchida's return to Japan, when the Sino-Japanese negotiations at Nanking broke down in November, suggestions appeared in the Japanese press to the effect that Count Uchida's mission had resulted in a *rapprochement* between the British and the Japanese Governments in regard to the protection of their respective interests in China.² These suggestions apparently received some encouragement from official quarters in Japan; and there were even rumours of a possible revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance³ which had been liquidated at the Washington Conference of 1921-2.⁴ On the 28th November, 1928, in the House of Commons at Westminster, in answer to a question whether the Foreign Secretary could make any statement regarding the

¹ See the present volume, Part I A, Section (i).

² Compare the suggestions that appeared in the French Press, after the conclusion of the provisional Anglo-French Naval Compromise in the summer of 1928, to the effect that the Anglo-French Entente of 1904-19 was being revived.

³ These suggestions may have been based on a passage in a speech delivered by Mr. Baldwin in London at the Lord Mayor's banquet on the 9th November, 1928, in which the Prime Minister of His Britannic Majesty's Government in Great Britain had declared that 'the spirit of the historic Anglo-Japanese Alliance still flourishes and constitutes one of the strongest guarantees of peace in the Far East'.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part VI, Section (iv) (5).

progress of conversations between Great Britain and Japan in regard to joint policy in China, Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that relations between Great Britain and Japan with regard to China were based on the obligations of full and frank communication laid down in Article 7 of the Washington Treaty of the 6th February, 1922,¹ and on the fact that Japan and Great Britain had much larger interests in China than had the other Washington Powers. In these circumstances, he stated, the two Governments had agreed informally that the close contact which they desired to maintain could best be promoted and developed by constant communication and consultation between their respective Ministers at Peking. In answer to a supplementary question, Sir Austen Chamberlain gave an assurance that no sort of differentiation or preferential treatment was given by the British Government to the Japanese Government and Japanese policy in China, as against the United States Government and American policy.

This was the situation at the turn of the years 1928 and 1929. Evidently the progress of treaty revision and the recognition of the Nanking Government by most of the Powers were symptoms that the efforts at reconstruction which the new Government were making had impressed foreign observers favourably. It was also significant that there was a marked increase of cordiality in the relations between the Nanking Government and the Powers at a time when the Nanking Government were steadily forcing the pace in the process of bringing these relations on to a new basis. The promulgation of the new autonomous tariff was justified by success in two directions. On the one hand, the new schedule was eventually accepted, as has been recorded above, by all the Treaty Powers whose attitude was of any practical importance. On the other hand, the control which the Nanking Government were asserting over the provinces proved strong enough already to secure the remission of the additional tariff revenues to Shanghai from all parts of China except Manchuria. This was a notable advance on the road towards the stabilization and consolidation of the Chinese Republic.

¹ For this article, see p. 425 above. It should be observed that this instrument was not a bilateral Anglo-Japanese treaty but a nine-Power treaty, and that one of the nine contracting parties was China. In view of this, it is difficult to see how Article 7 could cover conversations *à deux* between two of the parties respecting their interests in the territory of one of the other parties.

(d) THE ECONOMIC RIVALRY BETWEEN THE CHINESE, JAPANESE AND RUSSIANS IN MANCHURIA.

In a previous section of this part¹ some account has been given of the diplomatic action taken by the Japanese Government during the year 1928 in regard to Manchuria²—first in order to prevent the Chinese civil war between Kuomintang and Ankuochün from spreading beyond the Great Wall into the three north-eastern provinces, and thereafter in order to retard the *rapprochement* between Chang Tso-lin's son and heir at Mukden, Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the Kuomintang Central Government at Nanking. The special concern, thus displayed by the Japanese Government, over the political future of the Manchurian provinces of China was due to the peculiar importance of Japanese economic interests in this Chinese territory for the whole national economy of the Japanese Empire.

The economic situation in Manchuria, stated briefly, was as follows. Manchuria was the only large region in the northern temperate zone that had not yet been fully developed economically. Its economic importance was increased by the fact that it offered empty lands for agricultural colonization in proximity to the congested provinces of northern and central China (particularly Shantung) and mineral resources for exploitation in proximity to the industrial districts of Japan (a country deficient in coal and iron). The process by which Manchuria was being opened up in the twentieth century was not unlike that by which the Western United States had been opened up during the nineteenth. Railway construction and immigration were going forward simultaneously and interdependently—the new railways being indispensable to the immigrants not only for their actual migration to their new homes but for the marketing of the agricultural produce which they raised after settling there, while the new population was indispensable to the railways because it created the wealth that enabled them to pay their way. For this new wealth, thus produced, three nationalities were competing—the Chinese, the Japanese and the Russians—and their prospects were partly governed by their respective political standing in Manchuria at this time. The whole of Manchuria was juridically part of the Chinese Republic; and in 1928 almost the whole of it was under the administration *de facto*

¹ Section (i) (b).

² For the previous diplomatic history of Manchuria, see *A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria* by Sir Harold Parlett (published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Humphrey Milford, London, 1929).

of a local Chinese Government with its capital at Mukden¹ (the administrative centre of the southernmost of the three Manchurian provinces, Fengtien). The exceptions were the territory of Kwantung, on the Liaotung Peninsula, containing the naval base of Port Arthur and the commercial port of Dairen, which was leased to Japan, and the zone containing the South Manchurian Railway, which was likewise under Japanese administration. In virtue of Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese treaty of the 25th May, 1915, regarding South Manchuria, the leases of both the Kwantung territory and the South Manchurian Railway were to run for ninety-nine years as from the 27th March, 1898.² On the other hand, the zone containing the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had formerly been under Russian administration, had reverted to Chinese administration in virtue of the Sino-Soviet Russian agreement of the 31st May, 1924.³

The history of railway construction and railway competition in Manchuria down to the year 1926 has been dealt with elsewhere⁴ and need not be recapitulated. It is sufficient to recall that both the Chinese, with Japanese connivance, and the Japanese themselves were openly encroaching upon the Russian sphere, while the Chinese were on the watch to make discreet encroachments upon the Japanese sphere as opportunity offered. For the time being, the economic ascendancy in Manchuria, as far as it was determined by the control of railways, lay in the hands of Japan. Ultimately, however, the economic and therewith the political destinies of the country would be determined by the factor of immigration,⁵ and here the ascendancy lay with the Chinese. The Japanese population in Manchuria numbered less than a quarter of a million, of whom the great majority resided either in the leased territory or in the railway zone. Moreover, these Japanese residents were mostly business men and technicians and officials who had not struck permanent roots in the country. The only Japanese subjects that had settled in any considerable numbers on the land in Manchuria in the territory under Chinese administration were Koreans; but even these only numbered about 800,000 as against a Chinese population which was already estimated at 20,000,000 and which was rapidly increasing.

¹ For the political relations between Mukden, Peking and Nanking during the year 1928, see Section (i) (b) above.

² *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 463-4 and 469.

³ *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, p. 342.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 337-46 and 350-6; *Survey for 1926*, pp. 280-3.

⁵ For the movement of population in Manchuria see the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 433; *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 350-1; and an article by C. W. Young in *Current History of New York*, July 1928.

The infiltration of Chinese immigrants into Manchuria dated back to the conquest of China by the Manchus in the seventeenth century after Christ, which was the origin of the political union of the two countries. Under the Manchu Dynasty, the movement had been intermittently tolerated but more than once prohibited for fear that the subject race might swamp the ruling race in its homelands; and this fear was justified by the event when the building of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways opened up a new means of ingress from China into Manchuria, and when the decline and fall of the Manchu Dynasty finally removed the political ban. During the first quarter of the twentieth century there was a great and growing seasonal influx of agricultural labourers into Manchuria from Northern and Central China; and of these an annual residue took up their permanent residence in Manchuria; while those who returned home became familiar with the opportunities offered by the new country. Thereafter, in 1927 and 1928, the movement not only increased suddenly in scale¹ but changed in character under the double incentive of a severe famine in Shantung and of the civil war between Kuomintang and Ankuochün, in which Shantung became a theatre of operations during the last two campaigns.² The majority of these latest comers passed through Southern Manchuria in order to settle in the vaster, emptier and more fertile region between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the frontier of the U.S.S.R. It was significant that the new immigrants were bringing their women and children with them, for this meant that they had come to stay.

This was the background to the history of economic rivalries in Manchuria during the years 1927 and 1928.

On the 24th August, 1927, the Japanese Minister in Peking, Mr. Yoshizawa, communicated to Chang Tso-lin certain desiderata of the Japanese Government regarding the construction in Manchuria, by Chinese enterprise and with Chinese capital, of two railways³ which might be held to compete with the Japanese South Manchurian

¹ Exact and complete statistics were lacking, and the current estimate that in each of these years the volume of migration into Manchuria from the provinces south of the Great Wall approached a million must be accepted with caution, at any rate as far as the year 1928 is concerned. On the 11th July of that year it was stated in the official gazette (*Kung Pao*) published at Harbin that the flow of immigrants into Northern Manchuria had entirely ceased by that date, and that, up to date, the number of immigrants into Northern Manchuria since the beginning of the year was not more than about 200,000, according to preliminary estimates.

² See the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, Section (i), and Section (i) (a) of this part of the present volume.

³ From Mukden to Kirin and from Tungliao (in Fengtien) to Chaoyang (in Jehol).

Railway; regarding the levying in Manchuria of the Washington surtaxes;¹ regarding the leasing of agricultural land to Japanese subjects in Manchuria;² and regarding the opening of certain Japanese branch Consulates on the Korean border and the sale and distribution of a Japanese newspaper in Mukden, with which there had been interference on the Chinese side. As soon, however, as it became known in Manchuria that the Japanese Government had presented fresh demands, there was a wave of anti-Japanese feeling which expressed itself in a formidable demonstration at Mukden on the 3rd September, 1927. In deference to this Chinese reaction, the Japanese allowed their demands to lapse.

Chinese public opinion asserted itself successfully for a second time before the end of the year. As the result of a visit paid to Japan in the autumn of 1927 by a partner in the firm of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., Mr. Thomas Lamont, this American financial house was on the point of issuing a loan for the Japanese South Manchurian Railway Company; but when this transaction became publicly known, there was so great an outcry in China that the American financiers withdrew. A protest was addressed to the Japanese Minister in China, Mr. Yoshizawa, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Kuomintang Government at Nanking, Mr. C. C. Wu; and it was still more significant that the transaction was denounced in strong terms by Chang Tso-lin's chief-of-staff, Yang Yu-ting,³ in an interview with the foreign press correspondents at Peking on the 29th November, 1927.

The continuance of friction was indicated in April 1928 by the emergence of a minor dispute between the Japanese and Chinese railway administrations in Manchuria over certain locomotives and rolling-stock. This dispute, however, was soon settled, and simultaneously a more important occasion of controversy was removed by an understanding that the Japanese would abandon their opposition to the building of the Heilungcheng section of the Chinese railway from Mukden to Kirin on condition that the Chinese, on their part, ceased to obstruct the extension of the Kirin-Tunhwah Railway to a point on the frontier between Manchuria and Korea, where it would link up with the Japanese railway system. The construction of this

¹ For the resistance of the Japanese to the collection of these surtaxes in Manchuria in January 1927, see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 295.

² The right to lease land in Manchuria had been given to Japanese subjects by the South Manchuria Treaty of the 25th May, 1915 (*Survey for 1920-3*, p. 469). For the complaints of Japanese and Korean settlers in Manchuria regarding their treatment by the local Chinese authorities, see *The Times*, 21st December, 1927, and 17th April, 1928.

³ For the execution of Yang Yu-ting by Chang Hsüeh-liang on the 10th January, 1929, see p. 383 above.

link was of importance for Japanese trade because it would materially shorten the distance between Japan and the interior of Manchuria, as compared with the existing route via Dairen.

A sign of the times was the change which was reported to have taken place in the attitude of the President of the South Manchurian Railway, Mr. Yamamoto. When he came to Manchuria from Japan to take up his post in the autumn of 1927, Mr. Yamamoto had intimated that he was in favour of pushing forward Japanese economic penetration in Manchuria vigorously. A year later, on the 4th September, 1928, Mr. Yamamoto was reported to have attended a Cabinet Council at Tokio in order to exhort the Japanese Government to authorize certain changes of policy in Manchuria with a view to allaying Chinese and foreign suspicions regarding Japanese intentions.¹

Thus, by almost insensible degrees, the position of the Chinese in Manchuria was growing stronger not only *vis-à-vis* the Russians, but also *vis-à-vis* the Japanese.

¹ According to this report, the first step in the new policy was to be the conversion of some of the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchurian Railway, such as soya beans, oil, shipping, soda, glass, and iron industries, into joint stock companies with no restrictions as to the nationality of the shareholders—the intention being to attract foreign capital to Manchuria and to destroy the idea that this country was a Japanese preserve. Mr. Yamamoto was also expected to negotiate various railway extensions, including a line from Kirin to Kwainei on the Korean border. This railway had already been completed as far as Tunhwah and would eventually lead into a new port on the Japan Sea, intermediate between Vladivostock and Dairen. On the 30th October, 1928, the New York National City Bank issued \$19,900,000 of thirty year 5½ per cent. External Gold Bonds of the Oriental Development Company, a Japanese concern largely interested in Manchuria. A natural inference would be that this loan was connected with railway building, and that its ultimate object was akin to that of the projected Morgan Loan which had aroused such an outcry in China in November 1927 (see p. 436 above).

APPENDICES

(i) Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, signed at Jiddah, the 20th May, 1927.¹

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part; and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, on the other part;

Being desirous of confirming and strengthening the friendly relations which exist between them and of consolidating their respective interests, have resolved to conclude a treaty of friendship and good understanding, for which purpose His Britannic Majesty has appointed as his plenipotentiary Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz, his son and Viceroy in the Hejaz, as his plenipotentiary.

His Highness the Amir Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz and Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton, having examined their credentials and found them to be in good and due form, have accordingly agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

Art. 1. His Britannic Majesty recognizes the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

Art. 2. There shall be peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies. Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain good relations with the other and to endeavour by all the means at its disposal to prevent his territories being used as a base for unlawful activities directed against peace and tranquillity in the territories of the other party.

Art. 3. His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes that the performance of the pilgrimage will be facilitated to British subjects and British-protected persons of the Moslem faith to the same extent as to other pilgrims, and announces that they will be safe as regards their property and their person during their stay in the Hejaz.

Art. 4. His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes that the property of the aforesaid pilgrims who may die within the territories of His Majesty and who have no lawful trustee in those territories shall be handed over to the British Agent in Jeddah or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be forwarded by him to the rightful heirs of the deceased pilgrims; provided that the property shall not be handed over to the British representative until the formalities of the competent tribunals have been complied with and the dues prescribed under Hejazi or Nejdi laws have been duly collected.

¹ The text is reprinted from the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2951 of 1927.

Art. 5. His Britannic Majesty recognizes the national (Hejazi or Nejdi) status of all subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty or territories under the protection of His Britannic Majesty.

Similarly, His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies recognizes the national (British) status of all subjects of His Britannic Majesty and of all persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who may at any time be within the territories of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies: it being understood that the principles of international law in force between independent Governments shall be respected.

Art. 6. His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Art. 7. His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade.

Art. 8. The present treaty shall be ratified by each of the high contracting parties and the ratifications exchanged as soon as possible. It shall come into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications and shall be binding during seven years from that date. In case neither of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention to terminate the treaty it shall remain in force and shall not be held to have terminated until the expiration of six months from the date on which either of the parties shall have given notice of the termination to the other party.

Art. 9. The treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies (then Ruler of Nejd and its then Dependencies) on the 26th December, 1915, shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the present treaty is ratified.

Art. 10. The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both texts shall be of equal validity; but in case of divergence in the interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text shall prevail.

Art. 11. The present treaty shall be known as the Treaty of Jeddah.

Signed at Jeddah on Friday, May 20th, 1927 (corresponding to the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345).

(ii) Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of 'Irāq, signed in London, the 14th December, 1927.²

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Sea, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of 'Irāq,

Desiring to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

² The text is reprinted from the British Parliamentary Paper *Cmd.* 2998.

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Recognizing that the terms of the Treaties of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, corresponding with the 19th day of Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, and on the 13th day of January, 1926, corresponding with the 28th day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, 1344, Hijrah, are no longer appropriate in view of the altered circumstances and of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Irāq and stand in need of revision: and

Considering that the revision of the terms of the said Treaties of Alliance can best be effected by the conclusion of a new Treaty of Alliance and Amity:

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms of equality and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Sea. Emperor of India,

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Right Honorable William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore, M.P.,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies; and

His Majesty the King of 'Irāq:

Ja'far Pasha el Askeri, C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs;

who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed as follows:

Art. 1. His Britannic Majesty recognizes 'Irāq as an independent sovereign State.

Art. 2. There shall be peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of 'Irāq. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to observe friendly relations towards the other and to do his best to prevent in his own country any unlawful activities affecting peace or order within the other's territory.

Art. 3. His Majesty the King of 'Irāq undertakes to secure the execution of all international obligations which His Britannic Majesty has undertaken to see carried out in respect of 'Irāq.

His Majesty the King of 'Irāq undertakes not to modify the existing provisions of the 'Irāq Organic Law in such a manner as adversely to affect the rights and interests of foreigners or as to constitute any difference in rights before the law among 'Irāqis on the ground of difference of race, religion, or language.

Art. 4. There shall be full and frank consultation between the High Contracting Parties in all matters of Foreign Policy which may affect their common interests.

Art. 5. His Majesty the King of 'Irāq agrees to place His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in a position to give information to His Britannic Majesty regarding the progress of events in 'Irāq and the projects and proposals of the 'Irāq Government, and the High Commissioner will bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of 'Irāq any matter which His Britannic Majesty considers might prejudicially affect the well-being of 'Irāq or the obligations entered into under this Treaty.

Art. 6. His Majesty the King of 'Irāq undertakes, so soon as local conditions in 'Irāq permit, to accede to all general international Agreements already existing or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations in respect of the following: The Slave

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Trade; The Traffic in Drugs; the Traffic in Arms and Munitions; the Traffic in Women and Children; Commercial Equality; Freedom of Transit and Navigation; Aerial Navigation; Postal, Telegraphic, or Wireless Communication, and measures for the Protection of Literature, Art, or Industries.

His Majesty the King of 'Irāq further undertakes to execute the provisions of the following instruments in so far as they apply to 'Irāq: The Covenant of the League of Nations; The Treaty of Lausanne; the Anglo-French Boundary Convention; the San Remo Oil Agreement.

Art. 7. His Majesty the King of 'Irāq undertakes to co-operate in so far as social, religious, and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

Art. 8. Provided the present rate of progress in 'Irāq is maintained and all goes well in the interval, His Britannic Majesty will support the candidature of 'Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932.

Art. 9. There shall be no discrimination in 'Irāq against the nationals of any State, member of the League of Nations, or of any State to which His Majesty the King of 'Irāq has agreed by Treaty that the same rights should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the said League (including companies incorporated under the laws of such States), as compared with those of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce, or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft.

Nor shall there be any discrimination in 'Irāq against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States.

Art. 10. His Britannic Majesty undertakes, at the request of His Majesty the King of 'Irāq, and on his behalf, to continue the protection of 'Irāqi nationals in foreign countries in which His Majesty the King of 'Irāq is not represented.

Art. 11. Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the validity of the contracts concluded and in existence between the 'Irāq Government and British officials; in every respect those contracts shall be interpreted as if the British Officials Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, were in existence.

Art. 12. A separate Agreement shall regulate the financial relations between the High Contracting Parties. This Agreement shall supersede the Financial Agreement of the 25th day of March, 1924, corresponding with the 19th day of Sha'ban, 1342, Hijrah, which shall thereupon cease to have effect.

Art. 13. A separate Agreement shall regulate the military relations between the High Contracting Parties. This Agreement shall supersede the Military Agreement of the 25th day of March, 1924, corresponding with the 19th day of Sha'ban, 1342, Hijrah, which shall thereupon cease to have effect.

Art. 14. His Majesty the King of 'Irāq undertakes to maintain in force the Judicial Agreement signed on the 25th day of March, 1924, corresponding to the 19th day of Sha'ban, 1342.

Art. 15. Any difference that may arise between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by

Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In such case, should there be any discrepancy between the English and the Arabic texts of this Treaty, the English shall be taken as the authoritative version.

Art. 16. This Treaty shall come into force as soon as it has been ratified and ratifications have been exchanged in accordance with the constitutional methods of the two countries, and shall be subject to review with the object of making all modifications required by the circumstances, when 'Irāq enters the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of this Treaty. This Treaty shall replace the Treaties of Alliance signed at Baghdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, corresponding with the 19th day of Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, and on the 13th day of January, 1926, corresponding with the 28th day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, 1344, Hijrah, which shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of this Treaty.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate in the English and Arabic languages, this fourteenth day of December, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven of the Christian Era, corresponding with the eighteenth day of Jumada-al-Thani, One thousand three hundred and forty-six, Hijrah.

(iii) Chronology of Events and Treaties, 1st January–31st December, 1928.

N.B. The references in brackets indicate published texts of treaties and documents. The following abbreviations are used: *Cmd.* (British Parliamentary Paper); *D.I.A.* = *Documents on International Affairs* (published as a supplement to the present volume); *E.E.P.S.* = *European Economic and Political Survey*; *E.N.* = *L'Europe Nouvelle*; *E.I.* = *L'Esprit International*; *L.N.T.S.* = *League of Nations Treaty Series*; *T.* = *The Times* (London); *U.S.D.* = *The United States Daily*; *U.S.T.S.* = *United States Treaty Series*.

Abyssinia

1928, Aug. 2. Treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy signed at Addis Abbaba (*E.N.* 12.1.29; *D.I.A.* 1928).

Afghanistan

1928, Jan. 8. King and Queen of Afghanistan arrived in Rome to begin tour of European capitals. King and Queen arrived back at Kābul on July 1, having visited Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Persia.

Feb. 16. Treaty of friendship with Latvia signed. Ratifications exchanged July 6 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).

Feb. 17. Treaty of friendship with Switzerland signed. Ratifications exchanged April 20 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).

April 4. Treaty of friendship with Japan signed in London.

April 30. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship with Poland of Nov. 3, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).

May 25. Treaty of friendship and security with Turkey signed at Angora (*T.* 28.5.28; *E.E.P.S.* May 15/31, 1928).

June 7. Treaty of friendship with Egypt signed in Cairo. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 10.

Afghanistan: cont.

- June 15. Four protocols supplementing treaty with Persia of Nov. 29, 1927, signed at Tihṙān (*E.N.* 31.8.29).
- Nov. 22. Shinwāri tribes attacked Jalalabad as a protest against King Amānu'llāh's reforms. Kābul attacked on Dec. 14. On Dec. 23 and 24 women and children from foreign legations at Kābul evacuated by aeroplanes to Peshawur. Rebels driven back on Dec. 26-7.

Albania

- 1928, June 2. Navigation agreement concluded with Hungary (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
- June 5. League of Nations Council heard Albanian Government's complaint regarding Albanian properties in Greece.
- Sept. 1. Albanian National Assembly passed resolution proclaiming Ahmed Bey Zogu King of the Albanians. Zogu took oath as King. Official recognition of new régime notified by Italy on same day, by Greece and Hungary on Sept. 4, by the United States on Sept. 12, by Jugoslavia on Sept. 18, by Rumania on Sept. 20, by France on Sept. 21, by Great Britain on Sept. 22, by Germany on Sept. 24, by Spain on Sept. 26, by Czechoslovakia on Oct. 2, and during October by Japan, Colombia, Egypt, and Belgium.
- Oct. 22. Arbitration and conciliation treaties with U.S. signed at Washington.
- Nov. 10. Ratifications exchanged of extradition treaty with Greece of June 25, 1926, and of commercial treaty and nationality convention of Oct. 13, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).

Arabia

- 1928, May 8. Negotiations between Ibn Sa'ūd and Sir Gilbert Clayton opened at Jiddah, with a view to settling outstanding questions regarding Najd, 'Irāq, and Transjordan. May 22, negotiations suspended. Conference resumed on Aug. 1, but broke down within a week.
- July 26. Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Hijāz met at Haifa to discuss questions relating to Hijāz Railway. Conference adjourned on Aug. 15 without agreement.

Argentine

- 1928, Jan. 12. Treaty regarding literary and artistic rights signed with Mexico at Buenos Ayres.
- Feb. 28. Argentinian delegate on League Committee on Arbitration and Security protested against wording of Art. 21 of Covenant on ground that Monroe Doctrine was not a regional understanding but a unilateral declaration.
- May 3. Medical agreement signed with Denmark at Buenos Ayres.
- May 14. Agreement signed with Sweden regarding compensation for occupational accidents.
- Sept. 11. Extradition convention signed with Sweden.
- Oct. 2. Medical convention signed with Sweden at Buenos Ayres.
- Oct. 23. Ratifications exchanged of frontier convention with Brazil of Dec. 27, 1927.

Austria

- 1928, Jan. 17. Additional agreement regarding debt settlement with Rumania signed. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 25.
- Jan. 18. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of commerce and navigation with Finland of Aug. 8, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Jan. 31. Liquidation Commission which succeeded Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Austria withdrawn.
- Feb. 21. Ratifications exchanged of air convention with Czechoslovakia of Feb. 15, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).
- Feb. 23. Debate in Austrian National Assembly on South Tirol question. Signor Mussolini replied in Italian Chamber on March 3. During summer, communications exchanged between Dr. Seipel and Signor Mussolini in which former declared that he considered South Tirol question purely cultural and an internal affair of Italy.
- Feb. 24. Agreement signed with Poland regarding execution of Arts. 266 and 273 of the Treaty of St. Germain (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- Feb. 29. Agreement with Germany signed in Vienna regarding assistance to unemployed. Came into force March 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- March 14. Ratifications exchanged of double taxation convention with Switzerland of Oct. 24, 1927.
- March 26. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Hungary of March 11, 1927, regarding settlement of questions arising from frontier delimitation (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- April 6. Commercial convention signed with Denmark (for Iceland).
- April 16. Ratifications exchanged of judicial assistance convention with France of March 4, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv).
- April 19. Agreement concluded with Germany for assimilation, as from Oct. 1, of railway traffic regulations in the two countries.
- May 1. Convention with Jugoslavia regarding judicial relations signed in Belgrade.
- May 11. Air navigation convention signed with Italy.
- May 16. Commercial agreement with France signed in Paris. Came into force provisionally Aug. 1.
- May 22. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Poland of Nov. 24, 1926, regarding double death duties (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
- May 24. Ratifications exchanged of extradition convention with Estonia of Oct. 15, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- June 11. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia of July 21, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxi).
- June 11. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Spain.
- June 14. Additional commercial convention with Hungary signed. Ratifications exchanged July 14 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- June 17. Provisional commercial convention concluded with Persia.
- June 19. Treaty of friendship comprising trade treaty and consular agreements signed with United States.
- July 9. Supplementary commercial agreement with Jugoslavia signed. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 31.
- July 21-2. Demonstrations in favour of Anschluss in course of German singers' festival held in Vienna.

Austria: cont.

- Aug. 16. Arbitration and conciliation treaties with United States signed at Washington (*U.S.T.S.* Nos. 776 and 777).
- Aug. 17. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of insurance conventions signed on March 29, 1924 (2); June 15, 1924 (1); June 18, 1924 (2); Sept. 27, 1924 (2); Jan. 17, 1925 (3). All came into force Aug. 31 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).
- Sept. 29. Agreement concluded with Spain at Vienna modifying economic convention of Feb. 3, 1925. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 18 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).
- Oct. 5. Commercial convention signed with Lithuania in Vienna. Came into force immediately.
- Oct. 22. Treaty of extradition and judicial co-operation signed with Finland.
- Dec. 11. Treaty of commerce concluded with Estonia.
- See also under *Hungary*, Jan. 1.

Belgium

- 1928, Jan. 11. Ratifications exchanged of liquor smuggling convention with U.S. of Dec. 9, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii; *U.S.T.S.* No. 759).
- Jan. 16. Ratifications exchanged of convention and protocol with France concerning employment of seamen of June 1, 1921.
- Jan. 23. Extradition and judicial assistance convention with Finland signed. Ratifications exchanged May 5 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- Jan. 30. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of commerce and navigation with Jugoslavia of Dec. 16, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).
- Feb. 10. Ratifications exchanged of industrial treaty with France of Dec. 24, 1924 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- Feb. 17. Additional protocol signed to extradition treaty with Lithuania of May 17, 1927.
- Feb. 23. Commercial agreement with France signed. Ratifications exchanged April 6 (*E.N.* 7.4.28; *L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
- March 2. Ratifications exchanged in Lisbon of agreements with Portugal regarding Belgian and Portuguese Africa, of July 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi). April 14, agreement concluded regarding point of junction on river Luao of Belgian and Portuguese railways.
- March 28. Agreement concluded with Portugal regarding transmission of judicial and extra-judicial acts.
- April 13. Agreement with Luxembourg concerning exchange of information regarding lunatics signed on April 2 and 13 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
- April 16. Agreement with Netherlands concluded regarding exchange of information concerning lunatics (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv).
- April 23. Ratifications exchanged of extradition and legal assistance conventions with Czechoslovakia of July 19, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- April 26. Sanitary agreement concluded with Luxembourg by exchange of notes of April 23 and 26.
- April 30. Ratifications exchanged of consular treaty of Feb. 8, 1927, with Estonia (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).

Belgium: cont.

- May 4. Agreement concluded with Switzerland regarding search for escaped criminals.
- May 11. Ratifications exchanged of conciliation and arbitration treaty with Portugal of July 9, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- May 15. Agreement with Persia (See under *Persia*, May 10).
- May 17. Extradition convention with Lithuania signed. Ratifications exchanged May 16 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
- May 23. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of conciliation and arbitration with Spain of July 19, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- May 23. Notes exchanged with France on May 22 and 23 regarding notification of contagious illness in frontier region.
- June 12. Consular convention with Poland signed in Brussels.
- July 4. Labour agreement with France signed. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 4.
- Aug. 16. Provisional commercial agreement signed with Lithuania. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- Sept. 12. Conventions regarding nationality of married women and military recruiting signed with France.
- Oct. 12. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Turkey of Aug. 28, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
- Oct. 25. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation with Poland signed.
- Oct. 29. Convention with Norway for the prevention of maritime taxation signed in Brussels.
- Nov. 22. Treaty with China (see under *China*).
- Dec. 15. Commercial agreement with Spain signed (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).
- Dec. 26. Agreement with Denmark and Iceland signed in Brussels for the exemption of shipping profits from double taxation.
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan 8; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Germany*, Aug. 26-7; *Outlawry of War*.

Bolivia

1928. Dec. 6. Fighting between Bolivian and Paraguayan troops on frontier. Dec. 10, diplomatic relations with Paraguay broken off. Pan-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration, at opening session in Washington, adopted resolution urging pacific settlement of dispute and appointed committee to consider measures of conciliation to be adopted if necessary. Dec. 11, League of Nations sent telegrams urging pacific settlement of dispute. Dec. 12, Bolivia telegraphed to League giving account of incident and placing entire responsibility on Paraguay. Bolivia and Paraguay replied to League's telegram of the 11th. Dec. 14, Pan-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration offered to mediate in dispute. Bolivian reserves called up. Dec. 15, further fighting on frontier between Paraguayan and Bolivian forces. League Council sent message to both Governments regarding obligations under Covenant. Dec. 16, mobilization ordered in Paraguay. Dec. 17, Paraguay accepted Pan-American Conference's mediation offer. Dec. 18, Bolivia accepted Pan-American Conference's mediation

Bolivia: cont.

- offer. Replies to League's telegram of Dec. 15 received from Bolivia and Paraguay. Dec. 31, Special Committee of Pan-American Conference announced that both parties had accepted protocol of conciliation drawn up by the Committee.
- Dec. 25. Convention demarcating frontier signed with Brazil at Rio de Janeiro.

Brazil

- 1928, Feb. 13. Convention regarding venereal diseases signed with Uruguay at Montevideo. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 15.
- Feb. 16. Two conventions signed with Uruguay at Montevideo, (i) regarding employment of funds from boundary settlement, and (ii) modifying treaty of July 22, 1918, regarding establishment of a labour institute. Ratifications of (ii) exchanged on Nov. 15.
- Feb. 25. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration convention with France of Aug. 27, 1927, relating to payment in gold of certain Brazilian state loans (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv).
- March 8. League Council decided to invite Brazil to reconsider her resignation from the League. April 9, Brazilian Government replied maintaining its decision to resign. June 14, Brazil's membership of League ceased on expiry of two years' notice.
- June 7. Agreement regarding diplomatic representation concluded with Great Britain by exchange of notes.
- Aug. 18. Frontier treaty with Venezuela signed at Rio de Janeiro.
- Sept. 15. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship with Turkey of Sept. 8, 1927.
- Nov. 15. Frontier treaty signed with Colombia at Rio de Janeiro.
- See also under *Argentina*, Oct. 23; *Bolivia*, Dec. 25.

Bulgaria

- 1928, Feb. 11. Temporary commercial agreement with Estonia concluded. Came into force July 24 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- Feb. 12. Treaty of commerce and navigation with Turkey signed. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 31 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxi).
- March 10. Protocol regarding stabilization loan signed at Geneva. Ratified by Bulgaria on June 4. Sept. 8, additional Act increasing amount of loan signed. Council finally approved loan on Sept. 17.
- Sept. 24. Inter-Allied Commission released certain charges in favour of loan. Nov. 1, agreement signed in London for issue of loan; ratified by Bulgaria on Nov. 15. Nov. 20-1, loan issued in New York and London.
- June 22. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Latvia.
- Aug. 10. British and French Ministers at Sofia made representations to Bulgarian Foreign Minister on subject of suppression of Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.
- Dec. 17. Ratifications exchanged of agreement of Dec. 9, 1927, with Greece regulating settlement of property of exchanged Graeco-Bulgarian populations.

Canada

- 1928, March 15. Treaty of commerce with Czechoslovakia signed at Ottawa. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 30 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 Sept. 17. Exchange of notes with United States of Aug. 2 and Sept. 17 regarding reciprocal exemption from taxation on income of shipping companies.
 See also under *Outlawry of War*.

Chile

- 1928, Feb. 1. Commercial *modus vivendi* concluded with Salvador.
 April 18. Agreement regarding drug traffic concluded with Germany. (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx.)
 June 2. Ratifications exchanged of extradition treaty with Paraguay signed in Montevideo in 1897.
 July 9. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Norway of Feb. 9, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx.)
 July 13. Resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru announced by State Department at Washington. Oct. 10, suspension for four months of Tacna-Arica Boundary Commission announced.
 Aug. 4. Ratifications exchanged of extradition treaty with Colombia of Nov. 16, 1914 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii.)
 Sept. 29. Ratifications exchanged of consular treaty with Netherlands of Nov. 4, 1913 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).

China

- 1928, Jan. 6. Chochow surrendered by Shansi troops to northern forces after nearly three months' siege.
 Jan. 9. Chiang Kai-shek issued circular telegram announcing his resumption of post of Commander-in-Chief of Nationalist armies and his intention to resume hostilities against the northerners and to suppress Communism.
 Jan. 18. Chiang Kai-shek made recommendations to Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang declaring that abrogation of 'unequal treaties' should wherever possible be achieved by peaceful negotiation.
 Jan. 25. Unofficial mission from Nanking Government consisting of C. C. Wu, Sun Fo, Hu Han-min, and others left for tour of various countries to prepare ground for treaty revision and to investigate political and economic problems.
 Jan. 27. Nanking Government issued proclamation, interpreted to mean that they intended to take control of Maritime Customs from Peking Government. Acting Inspector-General, Mr. Edwardes, invited to go to Nanking.
 Feb. 3-10. Fourth Plenary Session of Kuomintang held at Nanking to reorganize Nationalist administration. Government Council and Military Council formed, both with small standing committees.
 Feb. 26. Agreement reached at Dairen between representatives of Peking and Nanking Governments regarding future administration of postal services, by which powers of foreign Director-General would be shared by Chinese officials. March 13, representatives of

China: cont.

- Washington Treaty Powers protested to Peking Government that proposed arrangement contravened conditions agreed on at Washington.
- Feb. 15. Nanking Government promulgated trade-mark law requiring re-examination by Oct. 18, 1928, of trade-marks registered at Peking.
- Feb. 20. Nanking Government announced that personnel of Salt Inspectorate would be restored to their positions.
- Feb. 21. Members of Diplomatic Corps at Peking decided to urge their Governments to induce Powers which had not done so to prohibit exports of arms and munitions to China, in accordance with Arms Embargo of 1919; German Minister declared that his Government was ready to accede to agreement. March 1, Japanese Government appealed to Soviet Government to prohibit export of arms to China. March 27, M. Chicherin replied that Soviet Government could not join in agreement with other Powers in matters affecting China, but that it would not export arms to any Chinese faction. Feb. 17, Czechoslovak Government refused to accept arms embargo agreement unless it was equally binding on all states. March 30, German bill prohibiting export of arms to China passed Reichstag.
- March 5. Negotiations between Sir M. Lampson and General Hwang Fu for settlement of Nanking Incident began at Shanghai. Sir M. Lampson left for Peking on March 25.
- March 18. Nanking Government issued two mandates: one ordering arrest of persons responsible for Nanking Incident and announcing execution of some of those concerned; the other enjoining general protection of foreign lives and property.
- March 30. Notes exchanged between Nanking Government and U.S.A. recording settlement of Nanking Incident of March 1927 (*U.S.D.* 6.4.28).
- April 3. Agreement reached between Shanghai Municipal Council and Chinese Ratepayers' Association. April 18, agreement ratified by foreign ratepayers at annual general meeting; resolution adopted to admit Chinese to public parks of settlement.
- April 14. After many rumours, campaigning started on large scale with Nationalist advance northwards.
- April 11. Agreement reached by British and Chinese electors regarding British concession at Tientsin.
- April 18. Arrangement reached between Chinese and Japanese authorities in Manchuria settling disputes over through traffic and over rolling-stock seized by Chinese.
- April 19. Japanese Government ordered 5,000 troops to be despatched to Shantung for protection of railway zone. April 20, three companies from Tientsin arrived at Tsinanfu; Peking Government protested against despatch of troops. April 21, Nanking Government made similar protest. April 25, advance guard of defence force from Japan reached Tsinanfu.
- April 28. Peking and Nanking Governments both informed Portuguese Government that they proposed revision of Sino-Portuguese

China: cont.

- treaty of 1888 during next six months. Further notification given by Nanking Government on July 11. On July 25, Portuguese Government replied agreeing to negotiate new treaty, but denying Chinese right of abrogation.
- April 30. Northerners withdrew from Tsinanfu. Railway line between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu cut, thus isolating about 2,500 Japanese troops at Tsinanfu. May 1, Chiang Kai-shek's army entered Tsinanfu. May 2, Nationalist authorities asked Japanese at Tsinanfu to remove certain protective safeguards; Japanese agreed. May 3, Japanese property at Tsinanfu looted. May 3-5, fighting between Chinese and Japanese soldiers. May 7, Japanese reinforcements reached Tsinanfu from Tsingtao; Japanese military authorities demanded withdrawal of Nationalists from Tsinanfu, punishment of officers connected with incident, &c. May 8, Nationalists having failed to comply with Japanese demands, Japanese troops attacked them. Japanese Government decided to send a full division (15,000 to 18,000 men) to Shantung. By May 9, Tsinanfu, with exception of walled city, had been cleared of Nationalist troops. On May 9, Japanese bombarded walled city. By May 11, Japanese troops in occupation of whole of Tsinanfu.
- May 9. After a big campaign against Yen Hsi-shan's and Feng Yü-hsiang's forces, Chang Tso-lin issued circular telegram to civil and military authorities throughout China announcing that in view of Tsinanfu and other incidents he had ordered his troops to suspend hostilities.
- May 11. League of Nations Secretariat received telegram from Nanking Government complaining that territorial integrity and political independence of China had been violated by Japanese aggression at Tsinanfu.
- May 13. Nanking Government published telegram addressed to President Coolidge inquiring attitude of his Government and people towards the Tsinanfu Incident.
- May 15. Japanese War Office instructed Japanese commander at Tsinanfu regarding terms to be demanded from Nationalist Government.
- May 18. Memorandum on Japanese policy in China and Manchuria handed to Peking and Nanking Governments; Chang Tso-lin warned to retreat at once to Manchuria or Japan would close Manchuria against him. May 25, Peking Government replied. May 29, Nanking Government replied.
- May 19. Treaty of friendship and commerce with Poland signed.
- May 20. U.S. note handed to Nanking Minister for Foreign Affairs calling attention to murders of American missionaries during Nationalist advance through Shantung.
- May 26. Treaty of friendship with Greece signed in Paris.
- May 28. Japanese note on Tsinanfu Incident sent to League.
- May 31. Japanese commander at Tsingtao demanded withdrawal of Chinese troops to distance of 7 miles from city by June 1.
- June 2. Chang Tso-lin issued circular telegram announcing his

China: cont.

- intention to withdraw to Manchuria. June 3, Chang left Peking for Mukden. June 4, Chang's train bombed outside Mukden; Chang seriously wounded, and Wu, Governor of Tsitsihar, killed.
- June 8. Shansi troops entered Peking.
- June 10. Yen Hsi-shan arrived at Peking. Chiang Kai-shek announced his resignation from all military offices.
- June 12. Shansi troops entered Tientsin. Kwangsi troops under General Pai Tsung-hsi arrived at Peking from Hankow.
- June 14. Mr. C. T. Wang appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the place of General Hwang Fu.
- June 15. Directorate of Posts withdrawn from Peking to Nanking, indicating that Nanking would be future capital. June 21, name of Peking changed to Peiping.
- June 17. Manifesto demanding treaty revision published by Nanking Government.
- June 20-30. Economic conference called by Mr. Soong, Nationalist Minister of Finance, and attended by officials, bankers, and merchants, held at Shanghai. July 11, Official Nationalist Financial Conference, convened by Mr. Soong, at Nanking, concluded its discussions and submitted recommendations.
- June 20. Chang Hsüeh-liang, Chang Tso-lin's eldest son, proclaimed Governor of Fengtien Province. June 21, Foreign Consuls at Mukden officially notified that Chang Tso-lin died that day.
- June 24. Detachment of British troops arrived at Tongshan to protect lives and property of British and other foreign employees of Kailan Mining Administration.
- July 1. Nanking Government denounced (as from June 30) treaty with Italy of Oct. 26, 1866, and proposed negotiation of new 'equal' treaty. July 11, Italian Government declared willingness to negotiate new treaty, but denied Chinese right of abrogation.
- July 2. Sum of \$173,000 deposited in Bank of China in name of District Salt Inspectors at Tientsin transferred to Nanking Government's credit without depositors' consent.
- July 7. Nanking Government denounced treaty of July 13, 1863, with Denmark as from June 30 and suggested negotiation of new 'equal' treaty. July 14, Danish Government declared willingness to negotiate new treaty but denied Chinese right of abrogation.
- July 7. Nationalist Government issued Mandate announcing that all 'unequal treaties' which had already expired would *ipso facto* be abrogated and new treaties concluded; that they would take steps to terminate treaties which had not yet expired; and that interim regulations would be issued.
- July 8. Government issued 'interim regulations' subjecting nationals of Powers whose treaties had 'expired' to Chinese laws.
- July 10. Japanese Cabinet decided that 7,000 reservists in Shantung should begin to withdraw on July 20.
- July 11. Chinese Minister in Washington asked U.S. Government to appoint plenipotentiaries for treaty negotiations.
- July 13. Nanking Government announced termination, as on July 7,

China: cont.

of three conventions with France of 1886, 1887, and 1895 regarding trade on Indo-Chinese frontier. French Government replied denying Chinese right of abrogation especially as France had been negotiating new conditions.

July 13. Sir A. Chamberlain stated in House of Commons that H.M.G. regarded Manchuria as part of China.

July 18. Japanese Consul-General at Mukden advised Chang Hsüeh-liang to reconsider proposed agreements between Manchuria and Nanking. Aug. 9, further warning given by Baron Hayashi (representing Japan at funeral of Chang Tso-lin); Chang Hsüeh-liang agreed to defer decision for three months.

July 19. Japanese Government announced its terms for settlement of Tsinanfu Incident. Nationalist Government informed Japanese Consul at Nanking that Sino-Japanese Treaty of July 21, 1896, was abrogated as from July 20. Aug. 1, Japanese reply, dated July 31, despatched, refusing to accept denunciation and threatening decisive measures if Japanese nationals were deprived of treaty privileges. Aug. 16, Nanking Government's reply received, promising no discrimination against Japan.

July 24. U.S. Government addressed note (*U.S.D.* 26.7.28) to Nanking Government announcing that it was ready to negotiate a treaty providing for Chinese tariff autonomy. July 25, treaty signed at Peking (*D.I.A.* 1928; *U.S.D.* 28.7.28; *E.E.P.S.* 31.8.28; *E.N.* 1.9.28).

July 29. U.S. Government received telegram from Nanking expressing hope that settlement of all outstanding questions would follow signature of tariff treaty. July 30, U.S. Government replied that negotiations contemplated had been satisfactorily concluded by signature of tariff treaty.

Aug. 1. National Reconstruction Committee announced project for converting Nanking into capital of China.

Aug. 8-15. Fifth Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang, postponed from Aug. 1 in absence of quorum, held at Nanking.

Aug. 9. Agreement with Great Britain for settlement of Nanking Incident of March 1927 signed at Nanking (*T.* 14.8.28; *Cmd.* 3188).

Aug. 17. Treaty with Germany signed at Nanking, providing for reciprocity in customs and similar matters (*E.N.* 1.9.28).

Sept. 9. Pai Tsung-hsi, commanding Kwangsi troops, attacked remnants of Chihli and Shantung armies along Peking-Mukden Railway between Tientsin and Manchurian border. By Sept. 16, Northerners had retreated beyond Lwan River.

Sept. 12. Nanking Government proposed to Norwegian Government conclusion of new treaty dealing with customs and other matters.

Sept. 24. Nanking Government announced that henceforth local Chinese collectorates would pay into specified banks a proportion of receipts amounting to sum required for service of foreign loans secured on Salt Gabelle.

Oct. 2. Nanking official news agency announced that Nanking Government had confirmed appointment of Mr. A. H. F. Edwardes

China: cont.

- as Officiating Inspector-General of Maritime Customs and had appointed Mr. F. W. Maze Deputy Inspector-General.
- Oct. 4. Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China promulgated at Nanking (*D.I.A.* 1928).
- Oct. 7. National Government announced formation of a Central Bank of China and issue of a short term loan designed to restore currency. New Bank opened at Shanghai on Nov. 1.
- Oct. 9. Sino-French settlement of Nanking Incident of March 1927 effected by exchange of notes of Oct. 1 and 9 (*Temps*, 18.10.28; *E.N.* 5.1.29).
- Oct. 10. New National Government formed on basis of Organic Law of Oct. 4.
- Oct. 19. Conversations opened at Nanking between Mr. Wang, Chinese Foreign Minister and Mr. Yada, Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, for settlement of Nanking and Tsinanfu incidents and other outstanding questions. Further conversations took place early in November; no agreement reached, owing to Chinese demand that evacuation of Japanese troops from Shantung should precede settlement.
- Oct. 22. National Bureau of Registration of Nanking announced that time-limit for re-examination of trade-marks formerly registered at Peking had been extended to April 18, 1929.
- Oct. 28. National Government issued manifesto detailing programme of internal reform.
- Nov. 10. National Government confirmed appointment of Mr. F. Hussey Freke as Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Gabelle.
- Nov. 11. British Consulate-General reopened at Nanking.
- Nov. 12. Tariff autonomy treaty with Norway signed. Notes exchanged on Nov. 15 and 17 regarding negotiation of treaty to replace that of 1847 in its entirety (*E.N.* 5.1.29).
- Nov. 16. Chinese Minister of Finance issued official announcement that regulations governing Salt Administration had been revised, bringing it under exclusive control of Ministry of Finance. Nov. 19, French, British, and Japanese representatives announced in Chinese press that statement of Nov. 16 did not imply that their Governments accepted new scheme as satisfactory.
- Nov. 18-23. Further Sino-Japanese conversations at Nanking. Negotiations broke down on question of withdrawal of troops from Shantung.
- Nov. 21. Army ratings detailed to serve as permanent anti-piracy guards for British steamers plying between Shanghai—Hongkong—Singapore.
- Nov. 22. Provisional treaty with Belgium providing for tariff autonomy and for conditional abolition of extra-territoriality signed at Nanking (*E.N.* 5.1.29; *D.I.A.* 1928).
- Nov. 27. Treaty with Italy on similar lines to that with Belgium signed at Shanghai (*E.N.* 5.1.29).
- Nov. 28. Sir Austen Chamberlain explained in House of Commons that in view of obligations of Washington Treaties and of predomi

China: cont.

- nant interests of Japan and Great Britain in China, British and Japanese Governments had agreed informally to maintain close contact by means of constant communication and consultation between their respective ministers at Peking.
- Dec. 5. New Chinese tariff promulgated, to come into force on Feb. 1, 1929. On receipt of Chinese note announcing promulgation of new tariff, Japanese Consul-General returned it, expressing surprise at revision of tariff as fixed by treaty without Japan's prior consent.
- Dec. 12. Treaty with Denmark, on same lines as Italian and Belgian treaties, signed at Nanking.
- Dec. 13. Students' riot at Nanking; anti-Japanese and anti-treaty agitation; Mr. Wang's house wrecked.
- Dec. 19. Tariff autonomy treaty signed with the Netherlands; tariff and extra-territoriality treaty signed with Portugal.
- Dec. 20. Treaties granting Chinese tariff autonomy signed at Nanking with Great Britain and Sweden. (British treaty: *T.* 28.12.28; *E.N.* 5.1.29). Sir Miles Lampson presented credentials as British Minister to Chiang Kai-shek, thus formally recognizing National Government.
- Dec. 22. Treaty with France granting Chinese tariff autonomy signed at Nanking (*E.N.* 5.1.29).
- Dec. 27. Tariff autonomy and extra-territoriality treaty with Spain signed at Nanking.
- Dec. 29. Manchurian authorities announced adoption of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles and hoisted the Nationalist flag.
- Dec. 31. Conference of military leaders on disbandment of Chinese armies opened at Nanking.

Colombia

- 1928, March 9. Commercial treaty with Sweden signed in London.
- March 15. Ratifications exchanged of boundary treaty with Peru of March 24, 1922 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- March 24. Treaty signed with Nicaragua at Managua for settlement of dispute over sovereignty of Great and Little Corn Islands and the Mosquito Coast.
- April 10. Agreement concluded with United States regarding sovereignty of Serrano and Quita Sueno Banks and Roncador Cay.
- May 5. Convention with Vatican regarding missions signed at Bogota (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- May 7. Extradition treaty with Costa Rica signed at San José.
- June 12. Extradition treaty signed with Mexico.
- July 11. Arbitration treaty signed with Mexico.
- Oct. 8. Convention signed with Costa Rica regarding mutual recognition of professional degrees.

See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Brazil*, Nov. 15; *Chile*, Aug. 4.

Conferences, International

- 1928, Jan. 16–Feb. 20. Sixth Pan-American Conference held at Havana.
- March 24–April 8. International Missionary Conference held at the Mount of Olives.

Conferences, International: cont.

- March 31–April 16. Conference on Emigration and Immigration held at Havana.
- May 7–June 2. Conference for protection of Literary and Artistic Works held in Rome, attended by representatives of 53 nations; adopted amendments to Berne Copyright Convention of 1886.
- May 30–June 16. Eleventh Session of International Labour Conference held at Geneva. Draft convention adopted regarding methods of fixing minimum wages, together with recommendation regarding application of convention.
- June 20–22. Little Entente Conference held at Bucarest.
- Aug. 29–31. Fourth Conference of European Minorities held at Geneva.
- Nov. 26–Dec. 14. Economic Statistical Conference held at Geneva, attended by 41 States. Convention and final Act signed on Dec. 14.
- Dec. 10. Pan-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration opened at Washington.
- Dec. 12–14. International Civil Aeronautics Conference held in Washington.

Costa Rica

- 1928, March 15. League Council appealed to Costa Rica to return to League, of which she ceased to be a member on Jan. 1, 1927.
- July 18. Costa Rican Government replied asking for interpretation of reference to Monroe Doctrine in Art. 21 of the Covenant. Sept. 1, Acting President of Council replied elucidating this point.
- Aug. 17. Exchange of notes with Germany of July 13 and Aug. 17 regarding certain claims.
- See also under *Colombia*, May 7, Oct. 8.

Cuba

- 1928, Jan. 9. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Spain of July 15, 1927.
- June 29. Radiotelegraphic convention with Mexico signed.
- Oct. 5. Extradition convention signed with Italy at Havana.

Czechoslovakia

- 1928, Jan. 7. Ratifications exchanged of four agreements with Poland of Feb. 8, 1927, regarding disposal and exchange of acts (*L.N.T.S.* lxx). Protocol of April 14, 1927, regarding exchange of acts came into force on May 24, 1928.
- Feb. 2. *Modus vivendi* with Vatican, signed on Dec. 17, 1927, came into force (*E.N.* 18.2.28).
- Feb. 18. Convention signed with Poland relating to fishing in frontier waters.
- March 5. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Turkey of May 31, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
- March 8. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Germany of March 25, 1927, regarding railway in the Schweinitz valley (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv).
- March 22. Frontier agreement with Germany signed.

Czechoslovakia: cont.

- April 6. Ratifications exchanged of establishment convention with Turkey of May 31, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv).
 May 7. Extradition convention with France signed in Paris.
 May 11. Labour agreement with Germany concluded (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
 June 17. Agreement with Persia (see under *Persia*, May 10).
 July 2. Commercial agreement with France signed (*E.N.* 26.1.29).
 Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Estonia of June 20, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
 July 16. Naturalization treaty signed with United States.
 Aug. 16. Arbitration treaty signed with United States.
 Sept. 19. Protocol signed prolonging treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia.
 Nov. 4. Protocol signed with Germany in Berlin regarding draft of an agreement concerning Hamburg Free Zone.
 Nov. 16. Arbitration convention with Spain signed in Prague.
 Dec. 13. Commercial agreement with Spain signed.
 See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, Feb. 21, June 11; *Belgium*, April 23; *Canada*, March 15; *China*, Feb. 21; *Conferences, International*, June 20-2; *Hungary*, Jan. 1; *Outlawry of War*.

Danzig

- 1928, March 3. Permanent Court of International Justice gave advisory opinion dissenting from High Commissioner's decision regarding claims of former Danzig railway officials employed on Polish railways.
 March 6. Railway convention with Poland signed at Danzig.
 Aug. 4. Three economic agreements signed with Poland.

Denmark

- 1928, Jan. 2. Treaty of commerce and navigation with Spain signed. Ratifications exchanged March 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
 Jan. 13. Ratifications exchanged of customs agreement with Germany of Oct. 8, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).
 Feb. 14. Provisional agreement with Germany for the prevention of double taxation signed (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 March 14. Arbitration treaty signed with Spain. Ratifications exchanged May 24 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
 March 28. Ratifications exchanged of insurance convention with Netherlands of Oct. 23, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
 April 4. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty with France of July 5, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 April 5. Treaty with Haiti for pacific settlement of disputes signed at Washington.
 April 13. Ratifications exchanged of legal declaration with Estonia of May 9, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).
 May 18. Conciliation treaty signed with United States.
 June 14. Arbitration treaty signed with United States.
 Aug. 22. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Greece.
 Sept. 8. Agreement with Persia (see under *Persia*, May 10).
 Oct. 25. Convention for assistance to nationals concluded with

Denmark: cont.

Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Ratification deposited Nov. 22 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).

See also under *Argentina*, May 3; *Austria*, April 6; *Belgium*, Dec. 26; *China*, July 7, Dec. 12.

Egypt

1928, Feb. 28. Ratifications exchanged of commercial convention with Hungary of Feb. 16, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).

March 4. Sarwat Pasha presented note explaining reasons for rejection of draft Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance. Sarwat Pasha resigned office. British note presented objecting to Public Assemblies Bill before Egyptian Parliament. March 30, Nabhās Pasha, new Egyptian Prime Minister, presented note declaring that British note of March 4 constituted departure from rules of diplomatic intervention. April 4, British note presented stating that, as negotiations for treaty of alliance had broken down, relations had returned to *status quo ante*. April 29, British ultimatum sent demanding withdrawal of Public Assemblies Bill. April 30, five British warships left Malta for Egypt. Egyptian Parliament decided to withdraw Public Assemblies Bill. May 1, Egyptian reply to British ultimatum delivered. May 2, British note delivered threatening further intervention if Bill were revived. British warships *en route* for Egypt instructed to take new course.

June 9. Provisional commercial agreement with Switzerland concluded. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 11.

June 13. Provisional commercial agreement with the Levant States under French mandate concluded.

June 21. Provisional commercial agreement with Palestine concluded. Came into force June 21 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx; *Cmd.* 3236).

June 25. King Fu'ād dismissed Nabhās Pasha from office; Muhammad Pasha Mahmūd became Prime Minister. July 19, royal decree issued suspending parliamentary régime for three years.

Nov. 28. Treaty of friendship with Persia signed at Tihṙān (*D.I.A.* 1928).

See also under *Afghanistan*, June 7; *Albania*, Sept. 1.

Estonia

1928, Jan. 20. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Russia of Aug. 8, 1927, regarding settlement of frontier disputes (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Feb. 1. Commercial treaty with Yugoslavia signed at Belgrade.

March 3. Convention with Russia signed regarding protection of trade-marks. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 30 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).

March 12. Commercial convention with Turkey signed at Angora.

March 25. Provisional commercial treaty signed with Latvia. Ratifications exchanged April 16 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).

May 15. Ratifications exchanged of convention of July 22, 1927, with Latvia regarding immovable property (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).

June 11. Legal declaration signed with Sweden (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxi).

June 23. Agreement concluded with Sweden regarding reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates.

Estonia: cont.

- July 1. Provisional commercial agreement with Italy signed.
 - Dec. 7. Commercial treaty with Germany signed in Tallinn.
- See also under *Austria*, May 24, Dec. 11; *Belgium*, April 30; *Bulgaria*, Feb. 11; *Denmark*, April 13.

Finland

- 1928, Jan. 24. Ratifications exchanged of commercial convention with Turkey of June 2, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).
 - March 3. Ratifications exchanged of insurance agreement with Germany of June 18, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 - March 17. Convention signed with Russia modifying agreement of June 5, 1923, regarding navigation of Finnish vessels in the Neva. Ratifications exchanged July 31 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
 - April 16. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Sweden of Dec. 14, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
 - May 31. Treaty of conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement signed with Spain. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 26 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 - June 7. Treaty of friendship and arbitration with United States signed at Washington (*U.S.T.S.* No. 768).
 - June 9. Conciliation treaty with Netherlands signed at Geneva.
 - June 11. Ratifications exchanged of conciliation treaty with Switzerland of Nov. 16, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
 - Aug. 11. Additional commercial agreement with Spain signed. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 3 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
 - Aug. 21. Arbitration and conciliation treaty and two agreements regarding passports and civil procedure signed with Italy.
 - Sept. 24. Exchange of notes with Russia at Helsingfors regarding the settlement of frontier disputes (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 - Oct. 6. Provisional commercial agreement with Lithuania concluded. Came into force Oct. 15 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 - Oct. 23. Convention with Norway regarding reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates signed.
 - Dec. 12. Treaty of arbitration and judicial settlement signed with Hungary.
- See also under *Austria*, Jan. 18, Oct. 22; *Denmark*, Oct. 25.

France

- 1928, Jan. 20. Convention relating to assistance to nationals signed with Saar. Came into force Feb. 15.
- Jan. 21. Commercial agreement with Switzerland concluded. Ratifications exchanged March 3. Additional clause signed March 11. Ratifications exchanged April 13 (*E.N.* 31.3.28; *L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
- Feb. 6. Arbitration treaty with United States signed in Paris, replacing treaty of 1908 (*D.I.A.* 1928). Notes exchanged on March 1 and 5 asserting that new treaty did not affect provisions of Bryan Treaty for advancement of peace of Sept. 15, 1914.
- Feb. 11. Consular convention with Lithuania signed in Paris.
- Feb. 23. Agreement with Germany regarding Saar customs signed. Ratifications exchanged March 29 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).

France: cont.

- March 3. Arbitration and conciliation treaty with Sweden signed.
- March 7. Commercial agreement signed with Italy in Paris. Ratifications exchanged March 31 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
- March 10. Arbitration and conciliation treaty with the Netherlands signed at Geneva (*D.I.A.* 1928).
- March 16. Agreement with Germany signed regarding deduction at source of 26 per cent. on Reparation account (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- March 21. Ratifications exchanged of *compromis d'arbitrage* of Oct. 30, 1924, with Switzerland regarding dispute over Savoy Free Zones; consent of Swiss Federal Assembly to suppression of neutral zone in Upper Savoy officially notified to French Government.
- March 29, question formally submitted to Permanent Court of International Justice.
- March 22. Air navigation convention with Spain signed. Came into force same day (*E.N.* 15.9.28; *L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).
- March 28. Convention with Rumania for settlement of debt signed (*E.E.P.S.* 15.7.28).
- April 18. Agreement with Yugoslavia relating to Yugoslav loan signed. Ratifications exchanged May 15.
- May 9. Extradition treaty and other legal conventions with Lithuania signed.
- May 10. Agreement with Persia (see under *Persia*).
- May 15. Ratifications exchanged of frontier delimitation treaty with Germany of Aug. 14, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxv); also of commercial agreement with Germany of Aug. 17, 1927.
- May 16. Labour agreement with Great Britain signed (*Cmd.* 3138; *L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- May 27. Consular convention with Poland of Dec. 30, 1925, came into force (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).
- June 1. Protocols with Germany and Saar Governing Commission of Sept. 14 and Nov. 13, 1926, and agreement and protocols with Germany of Dec. 22, 1926, regarding Saar frontier questions came into force (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).
- June 12. Convention signed with Spain for the delimitation of the frontier inside Samport tunnel.
- June 28. British note presented to French Government containing proposals for effecting compromise between British and French views on naval armaments. July 20, French Government replied. July 28, further British note (*D.I.A.* 1928). July 30, announcement by Sir A. Chamberlain in House of Commons regarding Anglo-French conversations. Sept. 11, Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japanese approval of principle of Anglo-French compromise had been communicated to Great Britain. Sept. 28, notes from U.S. Government delivered to French and British Governments rejecting compromise as basis of discussion (*D.I.A.* 1928). Oct. 6, Italian reply to proposals delivered to French and British Governments. Oct. 22, documents relating to negotiations issued as White Paper (*Cmd.* 3211) and as French Blue Book.
- July 6. Arbitration treaty with Portugal signed.

France: cont.

- July 8. Supplementary commercial protocol signed with Poland.
 - July 9. Ratifications exchanged of customs agreement of Jan. 26, 1927, with Italy (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
 - July 17. Convention signed with Spain regarding international railway station at Canfranc. Came into force July 19.
 - July 20. Commercial *modus vivendi* with Lithuania signed.
 - Aug. 13. Agreement with Germany signed relating to admission of residents of one country into the other; additional exchange of notes on Sept. 7.
 - Nov. 28. An Italian émigré, di Modugno, sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 200 frs. for murder of Count Nardini, late Italian Vice-Consul in Paris, on Sept. 12, 1927. Nov. 30, demonstrations in Italy against verdict.
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Arabia*, July 26; *Austria*, April 16, May 16; *Belgium*, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 10, Feb. 23, May 23, July 4, Sept. 12; *Brazil*, Feb. 25; *Bulgaria*, Aug. 10; *China*, July 13, Oct. 9, Nov. 16, Dec. 22; *Czechoslovakia*, May 7, July 2; *Denmark*, April 4; *Germany*, Aug. 26-7; *League of Nations*, Sept. 3-26; *Outlawry of War*; *Tangier*.

Germany

- 1928, Jan. 6. Commercial treaty with Yugoslavia of Oct. 6, 1927 came into force. Oct. 19, supplementary agreement signed.
- Jan. 17. Convention with Great Britain for prevention of double taxation in navigation signed (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi; *Cmd.* 3027).
- Jan. 29. Arbitration and conciliation convention signed with Lithuania; also three frontier treaties and one treaty regarding Memel Territory (*E.N.* 30.6.28).
- Feb. 4. Insurance convention signed with Switzerland. Ratifications exchanged May 4 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- Feb. 13. Ratifications exchanged of frontier agreement with Poland of Feb. 16, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
- Feb. 13. Customs agreement with Netherlands concluded. Ratifications exchanged April 7.
- Feb. 27. Agreement with Norway of Nov. 25, 1927, regarding reparation of losses suffered by Norway during the War, came into force.
- Feb. 29. German ratification of optional clause of statute of Permanent Court deposited at Geneva.
- March 10. President Coolidge signed Act providing for return of or compensation for German property seized during War.
- March 13. Ratifications exchanged of air agreement with Italy of May 20, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- March 14. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of convention of June 21, 1926, regarding mining areas intersected by frontier (*L.N.T.S.* lxxii).
- March 20. Civil procedure convention with Great Britain signed.
- March 24. Convention signed with Italy putting into force Hague Conventions on private law.

Germany: cont.

- March 24. Ratifications exchanged of legal declaration with Portugal of July 21, 1927.
- March 24. Commercial treaty signed with Greece. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 22.
- April 5. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Japan of July 20, 1927 (*E.N.* 6.8.27; *L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
- April 7. Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed with Siam. Came into force Oct. 24 (*E.N.* 6.10.28).
- April 13. Exchange of notes with Latvia regarding reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).
- April 14. Ratifications exchanged of claims agreement with Mexico of March 16, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- April 16. Permanent Court of International Justice gave judgement regarding German minority schools in Upper Silesia.
- April 25. Double taxation convention with Sweden signed. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 14 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- April 28. Customs convention with Netherlands signed.
- May 5. Conciliation and arbitration treaties with United States signed at Washington.
- May 15. Note from Persia (see under *Persia*, May 10).
- May 25. Insurance treaty with Poland signed.
- May 29. Arbitral tribunal to decide disputes regarding interpretation of Dawes Plan gave opinion against German contention that net proceeds of German property, rights and interests liquidated by Allied Powers should be included as part of Dawes annuities.
- May 31. Ratifications exchanged of air navigation convention with Spain of Dec. 9, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).
- June 18. Agreement concluded with Luxembourg regarding expulsion of foreigners. Came into force July 1.
- July 5. Financial agreement with Poland signed in Berlin.
- July 6. Legal agreement concluded with Switzerland.
- July 16. Ratifications exchanged of conciliation and arbitration treaty with Italy of Dec. 29, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- July 26. Agreement signed with Great Britain relating to surplus German property in China (*Cmd.* 3204).
- July 31. Commercial treaty with Lithuania signed in Berlin.
- Aug. 26-7. Herr Stresemann, during visit to Paris for signature of Peace Pact, discussed question of evacuation of Rhineland with M. Briand and M. Poincaré. Sept. 5, Franco-German negotiations regarding evacuation of Rhineland began at Geneva. Conversations extended to include British delegate on Sept. 8. On Sept. 11 and 13, question discussed at private meeting of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Germany. Sept. 16, third conference of six Powers held; announced that agreement had been reached regarding opening of official negotiations concerning German request for early evacuation of Rhineland, and regarding constitution of committee of financial experts to reach complete and definite settlement of the Reparation problem, and on accep-

Germany: cont.

- tance of the principle that a commission of 'Verification and Conciliation' should be constituted (*D.I.A.* 1928).
- Aug. 29. Protocol signed modifying arbitration and conciliation treaty with Switzerland of Dec. 3, 1921.
- Sept. 1. Commercial treaty with South Africa signed.
- Sept. 13. Permanent Court of International Justice gave judgement supporting German claim for indemnity from Poland in respect of Chorzow Factory.
- Sept. 24. Double taxation agreement signed with Netherlands.
- Oct. 30. Commercial treaty and consular and judicial agreement signed with Lithuania.
- Nov. 10. Financial agreement signed with Rumania.
- Dec. 11. Supplementary commercial agreement signed with Sweden.
- Dec. 14. Financial convention signed with Poland.
- Dec. 15. Question of German minorities in Upper Silesia discussed by League Council.
- Dec. 15. Two agreements concluded with Yugoslavia in Berlin regarding (i) social insurance and (ii) seasonal workers.
- Dec. 21. Protocol signed with Russia in Moscow regarding mutual interpretation of trade treaty of 1925.
- Dec. 31. Notes exchanged with United States extending jurisdiction of Mixed Claims Commission (*U.S.T.S.* No. 766).
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, Feb. 29, April 19, July 21-2; *Chile*, April 18; *China*, Feb. 21, Aug. 17; *Costa Rica*, Aug. 17; *Czechoslovakia*, March 8, March 22, May 11, Nov. 4; *Denmark*, Jan. 13, Feb. 14; *Estonia*, Dec. 7; *Finland*, March 3; *France*, Feb. 23, March 16, May 15, June 1, Aug. 13; *League of Nations*, Sept. 3-26; *Outlawry of War*.

Great Britain

- See under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8; *Arabia*; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Brazil*, June 7; *Bulgaria*, Aug. 10; *China*, March 5, April 11, June 24, July 13, Aug. 9, Nov. 11, Nov. 16, Nov. 21, Nov. 28, Dec. 20; *Egypt*, March 4; *France*, May 16, June 28; *Germany*, Jan. 17, March 20, July 26, Aug. 26-7; *Haiti*, Feb. 25; *Iceland*, April 27; *Irāq*, May 28; *Jugoslavia*, Feb. 9; *Mexico*, March 8; *Netherlands*, March 30; *Norway*, Jan. 17; *Outlawry of War*; *Panama*, Sept. 25, Sept. 26; *Persia*, Jan. 19, May 10; *Portugal*, Jan. 27; *Salvador*, Jan. 7; *Tangier*; *Transjordan*; *United States of America*.

Greece

- 1928, Jan. 18. Additional agreement concluded with United States regarding settlement of Greek War Debt.
- Jan. 30. New international loan issued under auspices of League for refugee settlement and stabilization.
- Feb. 16. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Latvia of Feb. 25, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
- March 21. Treaty of non-aggression, conciliation, and arbitration with Rumania signed (*E.I.* July 1928; *D.I.A.* 1928).
- April 25. Liquor traffic convention concluded with United States.

Greece: cont.

- May 30. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Spain. Nov. 1, new commercial régime came into force.
- June 12. Greek Chamber decided not to ratify commercial convention with Russia of June 23, 1926.
- June 28. Navigation Agreement concluded with Hungary (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
- Aug. 11. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of navigation, civil and commercial rights with Spain of Sept. 23, 1926.
- Sept. 23. Pact of friendship and arbitration with Italy signed in Rome (*E.N.* 6.10.28; *E.E.P.S.* 15.9.28; *D.I.A.* 1928).
- Oct. 11. Protocol signed with Yugoslavia regarding procedure for settlement of questions relating to Salonika Free Zone (*E.E.P.S.* Oct. 15/31, 1928).
- Nov. 1. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Yugoslavia of Nov. 2, 1927.
- Nov. 14. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Norway of June 29, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
- Nov. 30. Ratifications exchanged of establishment and juridical protection convention with Switzerland of Dec. 1, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).
- See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1, Nov. 10; *Bulgaria*, Dec. 17; *China*, May 26; *Denmark*, Aug. 22; *Germany*, March 24.

Guatemala

- 1928, April 12. Mixed Boundary Commission with American President constituted to establish provisional boundary line between Guatemala and Honduras. June 5, U.S. representative on Mixed Commission having abandoned idea of tracing frontier and recommended arbitration, U.S. Secretary of State suggested submission of dispute to arbitration by Central American Tribunal (*U.S.D.* 7.6.28). July 19, Guatemala agreed to arbitration (*U.S.D.* 24.7.28). July 27, Honduras refused to submit dispute to Central American Court but suggested arbitration by President of U.S. or Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court (*U.S.D.* 3.8.28).
- Nov. 17. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Netherlands of May 12, 1927.

Haiti

- 1928, Jan. 14. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Netherlands of Sept. 7, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
- Feb. 25. Commercial agreement with Great Britain concluded. Came into force March 1 (*Cmd.* 3182).
- March 19. Ratifications exchanged of commercial convention with Italy of Jan. 3, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
- See also under *Denmark*, April 5.

Hijāz. See under *Arabia*, July 26.

Honduras

- 1928, June 5. Ratifications exchanged of extradition treaty with United States of Feb. 21, 1927 (*U.S.T.S.* No. 761).

Honduras: cont.

July 19. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with United States of Dec. 7, 1927.

See also under *Guatemala*, April 12.

Hungary

1928, Jan. 1. Austrian customs officials at St. Gotthard on Austro-Hungarian frontier discovered consignment of machine-gun parts sent from Italy under guise of machinery. Feb. 1, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania appealed for intervention of League Council. March 7, League Council appointed Committee of three to investigate. April 13, technical experts left Geneva for Hungary to examine question on the spot. June 7, Council considered report of Committee of Three and adopted series of resolutions.

Feb. 22. Four conventions with Jugoslavia signed dealing with financial and economic questions.

March 9. Hungaro-Rumanian optants dispute considered by League Council. New proposal for reconstitution of Mixed Arbitral Court accepted by Rumania with qualifications which were declared to amount to a refusal, and by Hungarian delegate unreservedly. Disputants urged to negotiate afresh on basis of Council's recommendations.

June 8, Council again urged disputants to make reciprocal concessions and find solution on basis of Council's earlier recommendations.

Aug. 26, disputants having failed to agree on basis of negotiations, Hungary again referred question to League Council.

Sept. 21, resolution of League Council recommending early opening of direct negotiations accepted by both parties, while each adhering to their respective juridical points of view. Dec. 15, conference opened at Abbazia. Dec. 22, negotiations suspended till Jan. 18, 1929.

March 26. Insurance convention with Poland signed.

May 11. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of three financial conventions of May 21, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv); of double taxation convention of Dec. 25, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv); and of convention of July 25, 1927, regarding Hungarian traffic through Fiume (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).

May 12. Two double taxation conventions signed with Poland.

July 4. Commercial treaty signed with Italy.

July 13. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Italy of Dec. 10, 1927, for settlement of certain outstanding questions (*L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).

Oct. 8. In note to U.S. Government adhering to Kellogg Pact, Hungary protested against provisions of Treaty of Trianon.

Oct. 23. Commercial agreement concluded with Lithuania (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).

Nov. 8. Treaty of commerce signed with Sweden.

Nov. 30. Conciliation and arbitration treaty signed with Poland.

Dec. 2. Commercial treaty signed with Poland. Additional protocol signed Dec. 3.

Dec. 29. Additional commercial agreement signed with Spain.

See also under *Albania*, June 2, Sept. 1; *Austria*, March 26, June 14; *Egypt*, Feb. 28; *Finland*, Dec. 12; *Greece*, June 28.

Iceland

- 1928, March 10. Declaration and convention signed with Sweden at Stockholm regarding tonnage certificates (*L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 April 27. Double taxation agreement signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3094; *L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
 Nov. 30. Maritime declaration signed with Norway (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 See also under *Austria*, April 6; *Belgium*, Dec. 26.

‘Irāq

- 1928, May 28. Mixed Frontier Commission set up under Anglo-‘Irāqī-Turkish treaty of June 5, 1926, completed its work.
 June 3. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Persia by exchange of notes of May 23 and June 3.
 See also under *Arabia*, May 8.

Italy

- 1928, Jan. 25. Protocol signed extending treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia of Jan. 27, 1924, for six months (*E.E.P.S.* 31.1.28).
 Feb. 22. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration treaty and trade agreement with Lithuania of Sept. 17, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxiii).
 April 19. Arbitration treaty with United States signed.
 May 30. Pact of arbitration, neutrality, and conciliation with Turkey signed in Rome (*E.E.P.S.* 15/31.5.28; *D.I.A.* 1928).
 June 18. Railway convention signed with Switzerland.
 June 29. Agreement with Persia (see under *Persia*).
 Aug. 13. Nettuno conventions with Yugoslavia of July 20, 1925, ratified by Yugoslav Parliament (Croat deputies being absent and Agrarians refraining from voting). Nov. 14, ratifications exchanged of Nettuno Conventions and of Belgrade Conventions of July 24, 1924 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii and lxxxiii).
 Sept. 10. Ratifications exchanged of financial convention with Spain of Nov. 28, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
 Oct. 6. Aviation treaty and protocol signed with Spain.
 Oct. 24. Frontier traffic agreement signed with Switzerland.
 Nov. 27. Ratifications exchanged of claims convention with Mexico of Jan. 13, 1927.
 See also under *Abyssinia*; *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, Feb. 23, May 11, Aug. 17; *China*, July 1, Nov. 27; *Cuba*, Oct. 5; *Estonia*, July 1; *Finland*, Aug. 21; *France*, March 7, June 28, July 9, Nov. 28; *Germany*, March 13, March 24, July 16, Aug. 26-7; *Greece*, Sept. 23; *Haiti*, March 19; *Hungary*, May 11, July 4, July 13; *Outlawry of War*; *Tangier*.

Japan

- 1928, Jan. 23. Fisheries convention signed with Russia. Ratifications exchanged May 23 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
 May 31. Liquor traffic convention signed with United States.

Japan: cont.

- July 24. Commercial agreement concluded with New Zealand. Came into force August 9 (*Cmd.* 3287).
- Aug. 24. Arbitration treaty with United States of May 5, 1908, renewed for five years on Aug. 23, 1923, expired. Proposal for new treaty had been submitted to Japan on Dec. 31, 1927, but negotiations had not yet concluded.
- Aug. 25. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Latvia of July 4, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- See also under *Afghanistan*, April 4; *Albania*, Sept. 1; *China*, Feb. 21, April 18, April 19, April 30, May 15, May 18, May 28, May 31, Nov. 28, Dec. 5, Dec. 13; *France*, June 28; *Germany*, April 5, Aug. 26-7; *Outlawry of War*.

Jugoslavia

- 1928, Feb. 9. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Great Britain of May 12, 1927 (*Cmd.* 3065; *L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- May 16. Ratifications exchanged of pact of friendship and of arbitration and conciliation treaty with Poland of Sept. 18, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxviii).
- Oct. 18. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Latvia. Came into force Nov. 1.
- Nov. 27. Ratifications exchanged of judicial assistance convention with Poland of May 4, 1923.
- See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, May 1, July 9; *Belgium*, Jan. 30; *Conferences, International*, June 20-2; *Czechoslovakia*, Sept. 19; *Estonia*, Feb. 1; *France*, April 18; *Germany*, Jan. 6, Dec. 15; *Greece*, Oct. 11, Nov. 1; *Hungary*, Jan. 1, Feb. 22; *Italy*, Jan. 25, Aug. 13.

'*Kellogg Pact*.' See under *Outlawry of War*.

Latvia

- 1928, April 20. Treaty of friendship and commerce signed with U.S. Ratifications exchanged July 25 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
- May 18. Protocol signed with Russia additional to convention of Oct. 10, 1927, regarding arbitral procedure in civil and commercial matters. Ratifications exchanged August 29 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiv).
- May 28. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Turkey.
- June 21. Legal agreement signed with Sweden.
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Feb. 16; *Bulgaria*, June 22; *Estonia*, March 25, May 15; *Germany*, April 13; *Greece*, Feb. 16; *Japan*, Aug. 25; *Jugoslavia*, Oct. 18.

League of Nations

- 1928, Feb. 6-15. Committee of Jurists, charged with duty of preparing for conference on Codification of International Law, met at Geneva. Fourth session held at Geneva June 22-8.
- Feb. 20-March 7. Arbitration and Security Committee held second session at Geneva. Models drawn up of general and bilateral

League of Nations: cont.

- arbitration and non-aggression treaties. June 27–July 4, Third Session of Committee. Further model conventions drawn up.
- March 5–10. 49th Session of the Council.
- March 15–24. Fifth Session of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference held at Geneva. States represented included U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Turkey. Russian proposals for complete general disarmament rejected; alternative Russian proposal for disarmament by stages referred to Governments for consideration. Second reading of draft convention drawn up at Commission's Third Session in March–April 1927 postponed.
- May 14–19. Consultative Committee, set up in 1927 to follow application of Economic Conference's recommendations, held first meeting at Geneva.
- June 4–9. 50th Session of the Council.
- Aug. 27–30. Special Committee met at Geneva and adopted draft convention for submission to Council on supervision of private manufacture of arms and publicity of arms manufacture.
- Aug. 30–Sept. 8. 51st Session of the Council.
- Sept. 3–26. Ninth Assembly. Sept. 7, Herr Müller (German Chancellor) made speech referring to failure of Powers to carry out general disarmament (*D.I.A.* 1928). Sept. 10, M. Briand replied to Herr Müller (*D.I.A.* 1928).
- Sept. 12–26. 52nd Session of the Council.
- Dec. 10–15. 53rd Session of the Council.
- See also under *Albania*, June 5; *Argentina*, Feb. 28; *Bolivia*, Dec. 6; *Brazil*, March 8; *Bulgaria*, March 10; *China*, May 11, May 28; *Costa Rica*, March 15; *Germany*, Dec. 15; *Greece*, Jan. 30; *Hungary*, Jan. 1, March 9; *Lithuania*, March 30; *Spain*, March 9; *Transjordan*.

Lithuania

- 1928, March 30. Lithuanian-Polish conference opened at Königsberg. April 2, conference adjourned, having appointed three Mixed Commissions to deal with economic subjects and communications; security and indemnities; and local traffic and identity cards, &c.
- May 8–13, commission on security and indemnities held first session at Kovno. Polish draft of non-aggression pact rejected by Lithuanians. May 18, commission on juridical and local traffic questions opened at Warsaw. May 21, first session of commission on economic and transit questions. May 31, Polish note to Lithuania regarding mention of Vilna as capital in new Lithuanian constitution (*T.* 5.6.28). June 6, MM. Voldemaras and Zaleski heard by League Council. Sir A. Chamberlain appealed to M. Voldemaras to show a more conciliatory spirit. June 25, commission on security and indemnities renewed work at Kovno, and commission on economic questions and communications at Warsaw. July 7, security commission broke off discussions, having been unable to reach agreement. July 14, last meeting of economic and communications commission at Warsaw; no agreement reached. July 24, Lithuanian

Lithuania: cont.

- note to League protesting against impending Polish army manœuvres near frontier. July 27, Polish note to League refuting Lithuanian allegations. Sept. 8, League Council adopted resolutions to effect that if no appreciable progress was made in Lithuanian-Polish negotiations, question should be submitted to investigation by experts. Nov. 3, Polish-Lithuanian conference reopened at Königsberg in plenary session. Nov. 7, conference ended without any agreement being reached except regarding local frontier traffic (q.v.). Dec. 14, League Council adopted resolutions recommending continuation of negotiations and asking Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and Transit to propose measures for improving communications between the two countries. May 26. New Lithuanian constitution came into force. Capital of republic said to be Vilna (*D.I.A.* 1928).
 Sept. 24. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Russia.
 Nov. 7. Agreement signed with Poland at Königsberg regarding local frontier traffic.
 Nov. 14. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with U.S.
 See also under *Austria*, Oct. 5; *Belgium*, Feb. 17, May 17, Aug. 16; *Finland*, Oct. 6; *France*, Feb. 11, May 9, July 20; *Germany*, Jan. 29, July 31, Oct. 30; *Hungary*, Oct. 23; *Italy*, Feb. 22; *Russia*, Dec. 31.

Luxembourg. See under *Belgium*, April 13, April 26; *Germany*, June 18.

Mexico

1928. Jan. 11. Law promulgated modifying Arts. 14 and 15 of petroleum law of Dec. 26, 1925. March 27, new regulations promulgated carrying amendments into effect.
 March 8. Ratifications exchanged of claims convention with Great Britain of Nov. 19, 1926 (*Cmd.* 3085). First meeting of Mixed Claims Commission held in Mexico City on August 22.
 March 16. Treaty with United States for examination of live stock at frontier signed at Washington.
 May 25. Treaty of friendship with Turkey signed in Rome. Ratifications exchanged June 27.
 Oct. 23. Extradition treaty signed with Panama.
 See also under *Argentina*, Jan. 12; *Colombia*, June 12, July 11; *Cuba*, June 29; *Germany*, April 14; *Italy*, Nov. 27.

Najd. See under *Arabia*.

Netherlands

- 1928, Feb. 13. Interpretative declaration signed of treaty with U.S. of Dec. 18, 1913, for pacific settlement of disputes. Ratifications of treaty and protocol exchanged on March 10 (*U.S.T.S.* No. 760; *L.N.T.S.* lxxiv).
 March 30. Treaty for frontier delimitation in Borneo signed with Great Britain.
 April 4. Arbitral award given assigning sovereignty over Palmas Island to Netherlands.

Netherlands: cont.

June 20. Agreement with Persia (see under *Persia*).

June 24. Commercial treaty with Portugal signed.

July 10. Agreement concluded with U.S. regarding petrol exploration in Netherlands Indies.

July 25. Commercial treaty signed at Angora with Turkey.

July 27. Ratifications exchanged of conciliation treaty with Sweden of May 21, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).

Oct. 27. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Siam.

Dec. 27. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Spain.

See also under *Belgium*, April 16; *Chile*, Sept. 29; *China*, Dec. 19; *Denmark*, March 28; *Finland*, June 9; *France*, March 10; *Germany*, Feb. 13, April 28, Sept. 24; *Guatemala*, Nov. 17; *Haiti*, Jan. 14.

New Zealand. See under *Japan*, July 24; *Outlawry of War*.

Nicaragua

1928, Jan. 3. Following report of fighting between General Sandino's forces and U.S. marines, orders issued for despatch of 1,000 U.S. marines to Nicaragua to augment force of 1,415 marines already there. By end of July there were about 6,000 marines in Nicaragua. March 7, Nicaraguan Senate passed amended draft of electoral law. Draft rejected by Chamber of Deputies on March 13. March 21, President Diaz issued decree appointing General McCoy chairman of National Board of Elections and conferring on Board powers to supervise elections. Nov. 4, Presidential Elections carried out under U.S. supervision. General Moncada (Liberal) elected by large majority.

See also under *Colombia*, March 24.

Norway

1928, Jan. 16. Agreement concluded with Russia for reciprocal communication regarding nationals arrested (*L.N.T.S.* lxx).

Jan. 17. British Colonial Office announced that lease of Bouvet and Thompson Islands in S. Atlantic Ocean had been granted to a Norwegian firm. Jan. 18. Norwegian Government announced that Bouvet Island had been occupied on Dec. 1, 1927. Nov. 16, British claim to Islands waived.

Feb. 24. Industrial property convention signed with Russia. Ratifications exchanged July 5 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxix).

June 5. Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed with United States at Washington.

Dec. 27. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Spain.

See also under *Belgium*, Oct. 29; *Chile*, July 9; *China*, Sept. 12, Nov. 12; *Denmark*, Oct. 25; *Finland*, Oct. 23; *Germany*, Feb. 27; *Greece*, Nov. 14; *Iceland*, Nov. 30.

Outlawry of War

1928, Jan. 5. French note to U.S., in continuation of proposals regarding renunciation of war (originating in M. Briand's statement of April 6, 1927), and in reply to Mr. Kellogg's note of Dec. 28, 1927, suggesting

Outlawry of War: cont.

a multilateral instead of a bilateral treaty. Jan. 11, American note to France. Jan. 21, French reply. Feb. 27, further American note. March 26, French note to Mr. Kellogg containing French reservations. April 7, agreement reached between France and U.S. to submit correspondence to other Great Powers. April 13, American note sent to Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan, enclosing American draft treaty. April 21, French draft treaty published. April 27, German Government replied to American note, accepting draft treaty. April 29, Mr. Kellogg replied to French reservations in speech before American International Law Association. May 9, Italy replied to American note. May 19, British Government's reply sent, containing so-called 'British Monroe Doctrine'. May 24, British Dominions and India invited to become parties to treaty. May 26, Japan replied to American note. May 30, Irish Free State and New Zealand replied. June 1, Canada replied. June 2, Australia replied. June 12, India replied. June 15, South Africa replied. June 23, U.S. note handed to all Locarno Powers and British Dominions and India, enclosing revised draft treaty. July 11, Germany replied. July 14, France and Irish Free State replied. July 15, Italy replied. July 17, Belgium and Poland replied. July 18, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and Canada replied. July 20, Japan and Czechoslovakia replied. July 27, M. Briand issued invitations for signing of Pact in Paris on Aug. 27. Aug. 27, Pact signed by plenipotentiaries of 15 Powers. U.S. circular note sent to 48 other states, inviting their adherence. Similar invitation addressed to U.S.S.R. by French Government.

See also under *Russia*, Dec. 31.

Palestine

1928. Sept. 24. Incident at Wailing Wall at Jerusalem during Day of Atonement Ceremonies (*Umd.* 3229).

See also under *Egypt*, June 21.

Panama

1928, July 25. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Spain of March 15, 1926, for reciprocal recognition of academic titles and diplomas.

Sept. 25. Commercial treaty signed with Great Britain.

Sept. 26. Commercial travellers treaties signed with Great Britain and with U.S.

Nov. 29. Agreement concluded with Venezuela regarding diplomatic representation.

See also under *Mexico*, Oct. 23.

Pan-American Conferences. See under *Bolivia*, Dec. 6; *Conferences, International.*

Paraguay. See under *Bolivia*; *Chile*, June 2.

Permanent Court of International Justice. See under *Danzig*, March 3; *France*, March 21; *Germany*, Feb. 29, April 16, Sept. 13.

Persia

- 1928, Jan. 19. British Government replied to Persian note of Nov. 22, 1927, claiming sovereignty over Bahrein Islands.
- Jan. 31. Ratifications exchanged of neutrality, fisheries, and customs agreements with Russia of Oct. 1, 1927.
- April 14. Treaty of friendship and commerce with Poland signed.
- May 10. Abrogation of foreign capitulations in Persia came into force, together with new customs tariff. Provisional agreements regulating commercial relations and status of nationals signed with Great Britain (*E.E.P.S.* 15.7.28; *D.I.A.* 1928). Provisional agreements concluded with France on May 11 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii); with Belgium on May 15; with Czechoslovakia and Netherlands on June 21; with Italy on June 25; with Sweden on Aug. 10; with Switzerland on Aug. 28; with Denmark on Sept. 8 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii). Notes promising most-favoured-nation treatment delivered to Germany on May 14 and to U.S. on May 15 (*E.E.P.S.* 15.7.28).
- May 31. Frontier traffic convention signed with Russia.
- June 15. Protocol signed with Turkey supplementing treaty of friendship and neutrality of April 22, 1926 (*E.E.P.S.* 15.7.28).
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8, June 15; *Austria*, June 17; *Egypt*, Nov. 28; *Irāq*, June 3.

Peru. See under *Chile*, July 13; *Colombia*, March 15.

Poland

- 1928, Jan. 3. Exchange of political prisoners with Russia.
- Feb. 10. Concordat with Vatican signed in Rome.
- May 4. Official of Russian Legation at Warsaw shot at and wounded.
- May 5, Soviet Minister presented note of protest to Polish Government. May 7, M. Chicherin presented note of protest to Polish Minister in Moscow. June 3, Polish reply presented. June 16, further Russian note demanding more severe restrictions on Russian refugees in Poland.
- May 22. Tonnage certificates convention with Sweden signed. Came into force Oct. 22 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxii).
- Aug. 16. Arbitration and conciliation treaty with U.S. signed.
- Aug. 18. Legal convention concluded with Switzerland.
- Dec. 5. Arbitration convention signed with Spain.
- See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8, April 30; *Austria*, Feb. 24, May 22; *Belgium*, June 12, Oct. 25; *China*, May 19; *Czechoslovakia*, Jan. 7, Feb. 18; *Danzig*; *France*, May 27, July 8; *Germany*, Feb. 13, March 14, April 16, May 25, July 5, Sept. 13, Dec. 14; *Hungary*, March 26, May 12, Nov. 30, Dec. 2; *Jugoslavia*, May 16, Nov. 27; *Lithuania*, March 30, Nov. 7; *Outlawry of War*; *Persia*, April 14; *Russia*, Dec. 31.

Portugal

- 1928, Jan. 18. Conciliation and arbitration treaty signed with Spain. Ratifications exchanged May 28 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxvii).

Portugal: cont.

- Jan. 27. Agreement for mutual recognition of load line certificates signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3033; *L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 April 15. Protocol signed with Vatican regarding Portuguese jurisdiction in the East. Ratifications exchanged May 3 (*E.N.* 29.9.28).
 Sept. 11. New Mozambique convention signed with South Africa.
 Oct. 17. Arbitration treaty signed with Switzerland.
 See also under *Belgium*, March 2, March 28, May 11; *Canada*, March 15; *China*, April 28, Dec. 19; *France*, July 6; *Germany*, March 24; *Netherlands*, June 24.

Rumania. See under *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, Jan 17; *Conferences, International*, June 20-2; *France*, March 28; *Germany*, Nov. 10; *Greece*, March 21; *Hungary*, Jan. 1, March 9.

Russia

- 1928, March 31. Ratifications exchanged of agreement with Sweden of Oct. 8, 1927, concerning rights and obligations of Russian commercial delegation in Moscow (*E.E.P.S.* 15.11.27; *L.N.T.S.* lxxi).
 June 24. Ratifications exchanged of convention with Turkey of Jan. 8, 1927, regarding rivers Aras and Arpatchai.
 July 17-Sept. 2. Sixth Congress of Third International held in Moscow.
 Aug. 6. Four treaties with Turkey signed at Angora, regarding (i) pasture rights: (ii) frontier communications: (iii) settlement of disputes: (iv) inspection of cattle.
 Dec. 23. Ratifications exchanged of railway convention of July 9, 1922, with Turkey.
 Dec. 31. M. Litvinov proposed to Polish Government signature of protocol making 'Kellogg Pact' binding before original signatories ratified it. Identical proposal made to Lithuania.
 See also under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8; *China*, Feb. 21; *Estonia*, Jan. 20, March 3; *Finland*, March 17, Sept. 24; *Germany*, Dec. 21; *Greece*, June 12; *Japan*, Jan. 23; *Latvia*, May 18; *League of Nations*, March 15-24; *Lithuania*, Sept. 24; *Norway*, Jan. 16, Feb. 24; *Persia*, Jan. 31, May 31; *Poland*, Jan. 3, May 4.

Saar

- 1928, Aug. 15. Provisional air navigation convention signed with Switzerland. Came into force Sept. 15 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
 See also under *France*, Jan. 20, Feb. 23, June 1.

Salvador

- 1928, Jan. 7. Commercial *modus vivendi* concluded with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3071; *L.N.T.S.* lxxx).
 April 25. Ratifications exchanged with Uruguay of arbitration treaty of Nov. 6, 1924.
 See also under *Chile*, Feb. 1.

Siam. See under *Germany*, April 7; *Netherlands*, Oct. 27.

South Africa. See under *Germany*, Sept. 1; *Outlawry of War*; *Portugal*, Sept. 11.

Spain

1928. March 9. League Council invited Spain to reconsider resignation from League. March 23, Spanish Government withdrew resignation. Sept. 10, Spain elected to non-permanent seat on Council and declared re-eligible in three years' time.

April 26. Treaty of arbitration, conciliation, and judicial settlement signed with Sweden. Ratifications exchanged June 16 (*L.N.T.S.*

May 28. Commercial convention signed with Sweden. Additional exchange of notes on August 9 and 25. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 19 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).

May 31. Supplementary commercial agreements with Great Britain concluded (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).

Dec. 31. Commercial *modus vivendi* signed with Switzerland.

See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1; *Austria*, June 11, Dec. 20; *Belgium*, May 23, Dec. 15; *China*, Dec. 27; *Cuba*, Jan. 9; *Czechoslovakia*, Nov. 16, Dec. 13; *Denmark*, Jan. 2, March 14; *Finland*, May 31, Aug. 11; *France*, March 22, June 12, July 17; *Germany*, May 31; *Greece*, May 30, Aug. 11; *Hungary*, Dec. 29; *Italy*, Sept. 9, Oct. 6; *Netherlands*, Dec. 27; *Norway*, Dec. 27; *Panama*, July 25; *Poland*, Dec. 5; *Portugal*, Jan. 18; *Tangier*.

Sweden

1928. Feb. 4. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Turkey.

Oct. 27. Conciliation and arbitration treaty signed with U.S.

See also under *Argentina*, May 14, Sept. 11, Oct. 2; *China*, Dec. 20; *Colombia*, March 9; *Denmark*, Oct. 25; *Estonia*, June 11, June 23; *Finland*, April 16; *France*, March 3; *Germany*, April 25, Dec. 11; *Hungary*, Nov. 8; *Iceland*, March 10; *Latvia*, June 21; *Netherlands*, July 27; *Persia*, May 10; *Poland*, May 22; *Russia*, March 31; *Spain*, April 26, May 28.

Switzerland

1928. April 28. Ratifications exchanged of establishment convention with Turkey of Aug. 7, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).

Dec. 11. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Turkey (*Temps*, 12.12.28).

See also under *Afghanistan*, Feb. 17; *Austria*, March 14; *Belgium*, May 4; *Egypt*, June 9; *Finland*, June 11; *France*, Jan. 21, March 21; *Germany*, Feb. 4, July 6, Aug. 29; *Greece*, Nov. 30; *Italy*, June 18, Oct. 24; *Persia*, May 10; *Poland*, Aug. 18; *Portugal*, Oct. 17; *Saar*; *Spain*, Dec. 31.

Tangier

1928. March 3. Franco-Spanish agreement signed in Paris regarding application of Tangier Statute of 1923. July 25, agreement embody-

Tangier: cont.

ing modifications to statute of Tangier proposed by French and Spanish Governments signed by representatives of France, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3165).

Transjordan

1928, Feb. 20. Treaty signed with Great Britain at Jerusalem (*Cmd.* 3069; *E.N.* 19.5.28; *E.E.P.S.* 31.3.28; *D.I.A.* 1928). Sept. 1, League Council adopted resolution recognizing that treaty was in conformity with principles of mandate for Palestine.

See also under *Arabia*, May 8.

Turkey. See under *Afghanistan*, Jan. 8, May 25; *Belgium*, Oct. 12; *Brazil*, Sept. 15; *Bulgaria*, Feb. 12; *Czechoslovakia*, March 5, April 6; *Estonia*, March 12; *Finland*, Jan. 24; *Irāq*, May 28; *Italy*, May 30; *Latvia*, May 28; *League of Nations*, March 15-24; *Mexico*, May 25; *Netherlands*, July 25; *Persia*, June 15; *Russia*, June 24, Aug. 6, Dec. 23; *Sweden*, Feb. 4; *Switzerland*.

United States of America

1928, June 4. Arbitration treaty of 1908 with Great Britain expired. Negotiations on draft treaty submitted to British Foreign Office on Dec. 7, 1927, not yet concluded.

See also under *Albania*, Sept. 1, Oct. 22; *Austria*, June 19, Aug. 16; *Belgium*, Jan. 11; *Canada*, Sept. 27; *China*, March 30, May 13, May 20, July 11, July 24, July 29; *Colombia*, April 10; *Czechoslovakia*, July 16, Aug. 16; *Denmark*, May 18, June 14; *Finland*, June 7; *France*, Feb. 6, June 28; *Germany*, March 10, May 5, Dec. 31; *Greece*, Jan. 18, April 25; *Guatemala*, April 12; *Honduras*; *Hungary*, Oct. 8; *Italy*, April 19; *Japan*, May 31, Aug. 24; *Latvia*, April 20; *League of Nations*, March 15-24; *Lithuania*, Nov. 14; *Mexico*, March 16; *Netherlands*, Feb. 13, April 4, July 10; *Nicaragua*; *Norway*, June 5; *Outlawry of War*; *Panama*, Sept. 26; *Persia*, May 10; *Poland*, Aug. 16; *Sweden*, Oct. 27.

Uruguay. See under *Brazil*, Feb. 13, Feb. 16; *Salvador*, April 25.

Vatican. See under *Colombia*, May 5; *Czechoslovakia*, Feb. 2; *Poland* Feb. 10; *Portugal*, April 15.

Venezuela. See under *Brazil*, Aug. 18; *Panama*, Nov. 29

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