

A GLANCE AT

TWO YEARS OF WAR

Institut kurde de Paris

POLITICAL OFFICE,

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S GUARDS CORPS

Institut kurde de Paris

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A GLANCE AT

TWO YEARS OF WAR



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INTRODUCTION

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"May the Lord smite thy foe, and set thee his successor on earth, that He may try you by your deeds." Holy Quran 7.129.

Our future days might well be haunted by a deep sense of regret for having regarded the events that came to pass during the fateful days of our Islamic Revolution, not with due interest and attention.

While it took all artistic vision and the imaginative perspicuity of the great poets and mystics of the past to dramatize the ideals of devotion, faith and loyalty; thanks to the Islamic Revolution, we have been witnessing all these virtues personified, and the spirit turned flesh as it were of real people. In a world permeated with divine aspirations of the devotees of God. It is in such a spiritual climate that the tree of our Revolution flourishes.

Luminous moments of valour and self-sacrifice crush incessantly upon the shores of our earthly lives like tempestuous waves, sweeping all like tiny fleck of spray back to the dazzling ocean of light. Only worthless bits of splintered wood, trash, debris, and dead birds are eventually rejected and tossed upon the darkling shore.

In this milieu fraught with Divine blessings, the best thing to do is to edify oneself and purge from all impurities, and ready oneself to treading the path of God.

It is not surprising that the wayfares upon this holy path yearn for a re-enactment of the moments of martyrdom in Karbala. For centuries the followers of Imam Hussein have strived to evoke the inherent meaning of his epic stand, on that unforgettable day, ASHURA, and on that ever since hallowed spot, Karbala, by trying to withstand tyranny and despotism in every realms of life. Thus says Imam Khomeini, in this connection: "Glory to a nation which is blessed with youth such as you who have bestowed upon your people great honour, who have placed the nation upon the wings of angels, and made it proud all over the world."



I kiss your powerful hands and arms, upon which rests the Hand of Allah, and I am indeed proud of this kiss. You paid your debt to the beloved Islam and the Islamic country, eradicated the influence of the superpowers and their lackeys from Iran, and so generously made jihad on the path of Islam."

"I wish I were with you, to have accomplished a great victory."

April 1st, 1982

What grief is deeper than passing by these great moments without the attention and pondering they deserve.

If we review the wars of the early days of Islam we will realise these wars have been carried out with great insight and acuity. The Holy Quran has paid great attention to the wars of the holy of Islam. This is because of the fact that in those wars, Islam was battling against blasphemy and hypocrisy.

The lives of the Prophet and his followers have been graced with many blessings of God. However, the Holy Quran presents clear signs of the Divine help in those wars, and the ordeals by which Allah tries the believers. (1)

In those wars, God exposed the true face of the hypocrites such as the Jews of Bani Quraizah, etc. (2)

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- (1) *God helped you at Badr, when you were a contemptible little force, then fear God, thus may you show your gratitude.*

- Remember you said to the faithful: 'Is it not enough for you that God should help you with three thousand angels (specially) sent down. Yes, if you remain firm, and act aright, even if the enemy should rush here on you in hot haste, your Lord would help you with five thousand angels, making a terrific onslaught. God made it but a message of hope for you, and an assurance to your hearts: (in any case) there is no help except from God, the Exalted, the Wise,' Holy Quran, 3:123-6*
- (2) *"You shall certainly be tested and tried in your possessions, and in your personal selves, and ye shall certainly bear much*

Moreover God made the true and devout supporters of the faith stand out from among the dissemblers (3), the slothful and compromising. (4)

that will grieve you, from those who received the Book before you, and from those who worship many gods, but it ye persevere patiently, and guard against evil, then that will be a determining factor in all affairs." The Holy Quran 3.186

- (3) *"What ye suffered on the day the two armies met, was with the leave of God, in order that He might test the Believers, and the Hypocrites also, these were told: 'Come, fight in the way of God, or (at least) drive (the foe from your city). They said: 'Had we known how to fight, we should certainly have followed you.'" They were that day nearer to unbelief, than to faith, saying with their lips what was not in their hearts. But God had full knowledge of all they conceal." The Holy Quran 3:166-8*
- (4) *"And God turned back the unbelievers for (all) their fury, no advantage did they gain, and enough is God for the believers in their fight. And God is full of Strength, Able to enforce His Will. And those of the people of the Book, who aided them, God did take them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts, (so that), some ye slew, and some ye made prisoners. And He made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a land which ye had not frequented before and God has power over all things..." Holy Quran, 33:25-7*

Alluding to the conduct of the Muslims in the war of Uhud, for instance, the Holy Quran points out the errors (5), as well as the merits of the Muslims in a war, in which they were defeated.

In the same vein, Imam Ali in Nahj ul-Balagha analyzes the social problems stemming from the conflicts between the Muslims and various types of the bigots, the sanctimonious and the hypocrite. But the primary value ever stressed in this book is the unwavering devotion of the Muslims whose noble blood infuses fresh vigor into the Islamic faith.

That is why the devotees of the martyred Imam Hussein have made his valour and the unflinching devotion the supreme example of their lives. It is true that all the followers of Imam Hussein were martyred or taken in captivity in that jihad, yet their struggles served to eternalise and universalise Islam.

Also it is true that after Imam Hussein his descendants each ennobled Islam through his individual self-sacrificing devotion; but over and above all these, it is the memorable martyrdom of Hussein that has stirred the heart and the soul of the Muslims throughout generations.

Hardly ever in history has a people commemorated so passionately the martyrs of centuries past. And rarely ever has a nation drawn so much spiritual vigor and religious inspiration from the blood of its martyrs kept fresh through constant commemoration and mourning. Imam Khomeini says in this connection; "It is Moharram and Safar which have kept Islam alive along with the sacrifices of Imam Hussein. You have to realise that in order to keep your movement alive, you must revive those traditional mournings for the movement of Imam Hussein. These two

(5) *"When a sura comes down, enjoining them to believe in God and to strive and fight along with His Apostle, those with wealth and influence among them ask three for exemption, and say 'Leave us (behind), we would be with those sitting (at home).' They prefer to be with (the women) who remain behind (at home) their hearts are sealed and so they understand not."* Holy Quran 9.86.7

months are the months of Islam, in which we have to remind people of the sufferings of those Imams and the Household of the prophet of Islam. Through this tradition Islam has been able to survive."

Karbala marks the apex of an inherent trend of absolute devotion in Islam. Each incident within this epic drama bear the indelible marks of a supreme providence that fits each separate part and each individual role into the cosmic frame of a Divine scheme.

In order to preserve a faithful account of the multiple aspects of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran, the political office of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, has undertaken this study, hoping that this war, in all its dimensions, would serve as a model for the salvation of all deprived people of the world from the yoke of the superpowers, and would herald an age of the revival and proliferation of the undying Islamic ideals.

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THE BOUNTIES OF WAR

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"You did not slay the enemies, but Allah did!"

"And you did not smite them, but Allah did. In order to test the believers with a good trial, verily Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing". The Holy Qur'an 8:17

In the imposed war, which the Iraqi regime started against Islamic Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran is proving its independence from the east and west despite all the internal and external plots.

The war was financed and engineered by the U.S., and all other leftist and rightist enemies of the Islamic Revolution, indicating the noel trend of resistance that the Islamic Revolution had set, and the severe threat that it posed to the predatory interests of the world imperialism. Islamic Iran aims at mobilizing the masses to rise against the despotic powers and their mercenaries. This opposition is proceeding in a way that it has united a mixed bag of multifarious people with conflicting views, be they the bloated leeches of the Persian Gulf, and the usurpers of the House of Allah in Mecca, the true standard bearers of the world of capitalism, or the false defenders of communism and toilers and workers, or nationalists, proud of being U.S. lackeys under the guise of nationalism, and devotees of the Shah and the monarchy. The threat against their nations is so frightening that they are all fighting against the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Unfortunately, some leaders of the liberation movements of the region who have spent their years travelling to world's capitals, hoping to win their freedom through haggling with abhorrent diplomacy of the predators. Hopeful to have a share in the defeat of the Islamic Revolution, they sometimes hug Saddam, Khaled, Fahd, and even Rajavi and Bani Sadr.

There has never been a revolution - excepting the revolution of the prophets - which has so successfully unmasked all the internal or external enemies.

In this war, our UMMA has been able to repulse the Iraqi aggressors, and from the inside of Iran, they have expelled the liberals who were under the U.S. influence, and were led by Bani Sadr, who in turn was eagerly waiting the downfall of the Islamic Revolution. They were so helpless, they lost face to a degree that even the heads of the National Front and the U.S. supported Ranjbaran party could not salvage them. The MKO, which was assisted by Bani Sadr, lost its foothold in the Iranian political sphere and it became clear that they were doomed.

Hoping to bring to power a cabinet which would follow Bani Sadr, the U.S. realised after a while that Raja'i was not the one they could influence. After Raja'i came to power, and the U.S. found out that the government, along with the cabinet, would stand up to its schemes, started the war after one week after formation of the Raja'i cabinet. Hoping that the war would only last six days, world imperialism forced its mercenary Saddam, into the war fields, dreaming it would create another Israel here. But when it met with the resistance of the Iranian nation, watched its dreams turn into a nightmare then it tried to bring into the scenes its various lackeys whom it had reserved for the rainy days.

So it is not surprising that after the outbreak of the war, Bani Sadr started flocking with the armed forces' coup plotters, and wash-outs. Bani Sadr tried to portray himself as a leader, Napoleon style, aiming at diverting the people. At its face value, Bani Sadr was so successful in his role that the U.S. ordered all its lackeys to accept Bani Sadr's leadership as the head of the struggle against the Imam. Bani Sadr himself took immense pride in being the leader of the "opposition" while being the president at the same time!

Bani Sadr aimed at rapidly ending the war, because of the unequal conditions of the war, and Iran's lack of sufficient weaponry. He projected an image of himself as a national hero, the way Mossadeq did, and blamed all defeats on the Imam and his honest followers, while himself posing as a champion struggling quixotically to save his nation alone!

It was not the U.S. which was the loser in the war, but along with the U.S., it was Bani Sadr, who had been supported by all U.S. supported left and right agents such as the National Front, the Ranjbaran and the MKO).

At this point Bani Sadr started staging a series of absurd propaganda at Azadi Square and in Tehran university. He was doing all these when Iran was invaded by the Iraqi troops, and every once in a while, his office released some of his photographs with the soldiers in the war fronts, pretending he fought along with the, conducting the war operations. While the Iranian people did not know he was idling away his time in Dezful's Vahdati base, where the Shah and his princes used to enjoy themselves at the expenses of the oppressed Iranian people.

One of the war bounties was that it struck not only Saddam, so violently that he would not be able to get up, but it also lifted the mask of falsity off the faces of those who were involved in various conspiracies. The U.S. had placed as much hope in Bani Sadr as it had in Saddam. So when Imam Khomeini and the Iranian UMMA finally entered the arena in 1981, and ousted Bani Sadr and his clique, the U.S. like any other criminal regime, ordered destruction and killing in Iran, fancying it could get somewhere through martyring Imam's honest aides. They martyred more than 72 of the officials of the Islamic Republic in the headquarters of the Islamic Republic party on June 28th, 1981. After that, the U.S. assassins killed so many innocent people, in the streets, along with the Friday prayer leaders, Ayatollah Madani, Ayatollah Dastgheib, Ayatollah Saduqi and Ayatollah Ashrafi Esfahani, during prayers. They were martyred along with thousands of innocent people on the streets or in their homes, only for having supported the Islamic Revolution; while these martyrdoms served to make the Iranian people more and more concerned about their country. They considered the problems of their Islamic Republic as their own problems, and started to provide the war fronts with whatever they could such as foods, money, jewelry donations etc.

At this point, Bani Sadr and Rajavi escaped to France, on a plane piloted by one of the former Shah's personal pilots who flew them to Paris military airport where they were welcomed by reporters.

Liberals in Iran were the heirs of the princes and their descendants. They could never have been isolated without the help of the ULEMA and the Iranian UMMA. Liberals were those who deprived the constitutional revolution of its Islamic features, and celebrated the martyrdom of Ayatollah Sheikh Faziollah Nuri, who

supported the formation of an Islamic government.

Liberals were those who, in 1953, paved the way for the victory of the U.S. in a sinister coup. In 1953, the legal government of Prime Minister Mossadegh (who nationalized the oil company and took away most of the Shah's power) was toppled by a gang of thugs who were paid by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to return the defunct Shah to power. Ever since the coup, in order to take revenge on the ULEMA, the liberals tried to isolate them and called all their own selfish acts "backing the people". After the coup, liberals always termed themselves as heirs to the defunct Shah. In Iran, liberals considered themselves to be the greatest politicians, the greatest Islamic scholars, and the greatest of all things, as if they were superior to the will of the Iranian people. They lacked perseverance in serving Allah, so when they faced problems or criticism they threatened to resign their office.

However, the liberals, decided to unite with Bani Sadr, ignoring their many differences.

Amid this struggle for power by the liberals and Bani Sadr group, it was Imam Khomeini who calmly, resolutely, and with incredible peace guided the people and against showed them the way.

"The presence of you dear Muslims in the arena will counter the conspiracies of tyrants of history, will disappoint and distress the MUNAFIQEEN (Hypocrites), and make the authentic Islam, dominant in Iran, and in the world, through the Help of Allah. Your presence in the scenes, will destroy all "I"s and selfishnesses, and will replace them with "We"s and Islamic brotherhood. It has been your participation in the political affairs which warned the U.S. and the east and their senseless followers that it was you who rose and it is you who will determine your own destinies. Your presence made all organisations, which fought Islam under banners of individualism and nationalism, lose face. Today and the future days are days of defeat of the enemies of Islam. Today is not the day of the defeat of one person, or persons; rather is the day of the defeat of a trend, rejecting Islam, and even if they believe in Islam, their belief is up to the point that it would not militate against the western norms and interests.

Today is the day of the defeat of a trend which has always pained me, a trend which has been more dangerous than all crimes

of the Pahlavi regime. Today is the day of the defeat of a corrupting and falsifying trend all due to your presence.

My beloved people! Beware, and keep calm, but be on your guard. Be present on the arena, for no one can do anything without you. All enemies of the Prophet and the Imam will be destroyed through you.

Be sure that Iran is at the threshold of the victory of your revolution". (Imam Khomeini, June 19, 1981).

Therefore, it is not amazing to see people like Bani Sadr, Rajavi, Fahd, Mubarak, Reagan, Mitterrand, the Soviet Union, and the Tudeh party and other communist parties in Iran such as the majority group of the Fedayeen (affiliated to the Tudeh*party) swarm to Saddam's aid, because they all have realised that they have no place in Islamic countries, moreover the strength of the Islamic Revolution has opened a completely new way before the deprived and the wronged people of the world, which is in complete contradiction with all pre-formulated designs of the east and the west and has been awakening the masses.

THE SPECIAL VALUES OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

The eastern and western superpowers did not know that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was aimed at destroying their very foundations from the day our UMMA started to cry Allah o Akbar (Allah is the Greatest) in the streets, and chanted: "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic". They devoted all their attention to using the "neither east" in the interests of the west, and "neither west" in the interests of the east. The Iranian so-called intellectuals, fancying that they could exploit the political freedom established in Iran, tried to read that which the unselfish and dedicated masses of people had sown.

These people did not know and they will never know because they cannot understand -- the values of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. To realise that, they have to understand the Islamic nature of our revolution and movement. Until then, they have to flee the country in women's costumes and thus turn their backs on the Islamic Revolution, as former President Bani Sadr did.

Funnier than that, look at the leaders of the Tudeh party, still immersed in their sweet dreams, while they confront a Godly

Islamic Revolution, and are unable to draw any conclusion befitting or benefiting them. They have only to order their scanty followers to read the books of the martyred Ayatollah Motahari. Nothing suits them better than the Qur'anic verse: *"Let the unbelievers plunge in their own (crazy games)"*.

So, every time when the eastern and western lackeys in Iran observed a defeat sustained by their masters, they reminded each other that "if they want to, they could take care of Iran any time they wished".

One of the warnings of the Tudeh party is: "The U.S. threat is serious". This shows that they want to draw the Iranian attention to the Soviet Union for help, versus the U.S. threat. While, in fact, the Soviet Union is so weak in the face of the U.S., that it has to overlook the ever increasing military presence of the U.S. in the region. In the recent U.S. backed massacres in Lebanon, for instance, Russia could do nothing, except issuing verbal protest, against the Israeli and the U.S. crimes against the Lebanese people.

What has happened that Mr. Kiyanuri, has been urged to assist the Islamic Revolution in a country which belongs to Mohammad. So all these warnings to Iran, and finding themselves with no followers here, they have restored to these moves. They plan to ready the ground for a day when the U.S. returns to Iran, the taps of the natural gas pipeline to the Soviet Union could at least be turned on, just as it was in the reign of the defunct Shah, as a small share from the fabulous booty which the U.S. took away from Iran. One of the bounties of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran was that Iran was able to actually show the meaning of the motto "neither east, nor west" in an unequal war with Iraq.

The eastern superpower, ever since the World War II, has been daily shrinking away fearing the power of the west, and has only hid itself behind revolutionary movements, and people, only up to a point that it would not collide with the west.

Yes! The Islamic Republic of Iran has thus humiliated the powerful west. The most sophisticated Soviet weaponry used by Iraq in its war against Iran, reveals that, this time, the Russians using their T-72 and even T-74 tanks, come to serve the U.S. in this war. What do these cooperations between the east and the west, show following the Khrushchev's detente policies, even in the war scenes.

The Soviet Union is arming Iraq to the teeth for it wants not to be left out of the gang which has vowed to plunder Iran, and on the other hand, it started to help Saddam only when it realised that the U.S. lackeys in the region, such as Egyptian Mubarak, Saudi King, Fahd, Hassan, Hussein, Khaled, Sadat, Carter, Begin etc. have not been able to do anything to undermine the Islamic Revolution. So, fearing that Iran would grow into a power exerting its influence upon Muslim-inhabited republics in the U.S.S.R. it was intent upon helping Saddam.

Prior to the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the deprived nations, sought refuge from a scorpion named U.S. in a serpent called U.S.S.R., not knowing that there is no difference between them, but now seeing the Islamic people of Iran, independent from the two superpowers, they too want to follow Iran as a model.

In helping Saddam, the U.S.S.R. showed once again that the main cause of the existence of socialism, was the mere being of capitalism, and the eastern camp has always been picking the crumbs off the regal table that the west has made by ravaging the deprived.

Once Ayatollah Montazeri said "Do not forget, in your slogans, 'death to the U.S.' " for in that motto, death to the U.S.S.R. is also implied, for the day when the U.S. is destroyed, so is the U.S.S.R.

If you follow the frenzied game between the superpowers, you will then realise why Imam Khomeini said "the U.S. is the arch-fiend". In the world today, there is no better justification for the U.S. than "the Soviet threat" by which to plunder the oil of Saudi Arabia, and turn the petrodollars to arms, thus curing the unemployment cancer in the west, and depleting the Islamic countries oil reserves. Both the U.S. and Russia know well that the atheistic ideology of the east will never find a foothold in Islamic countries, hence they still go on, using each other's threats to justify their crimes in the region.

The U.S., using its gigantic material wealth, has been able to drive the U.S.S.R. to invade Afghanistan, and using Afghanistan as a very good propaganda device for its own ends elsewhere, it has committed many other crimes. In this process, the U.S. has been always hopeful that it could and has indeed changed a timeless principle for its own benefit, i.e. has made Falsehood overcome

Truth. The U.S. has been totally wrong in this respect.

The U.S. acts and infiltrations in countries such as Chile, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, has made it hopeful of becoming the master of the world. The U.S. regarded the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the same light, and aimed at undermining it from within through the help of its various external and internal lackeys.

The continuation of the revolution, the second revolution, the taking of the U.S. den of espionage by the Iranian students and ending the U.S. espionage there in Nov. 4, 1980 and the third revolution Iraq imposed war on Iran which strengthened the Iranian nation, rather than weakening it, suddenly turned the U.S. dreams into a nightmare.

As Imam Khomeini said then:

"We must stand up to the superpowers for we have the power to do so, provided the intellectuals give up hope in the east or the west and stop being moved and swayed by them. We are as much in opposition with international communism as we are against the U.S.-led western imperialism and zionism and Israel. We should make it clear to the superpowers that we treat the world according to Islamic tenets and school of thought, despite all the difficulties before us.

My dear youth, in whom I have cast all my hopes, take up the Holy Qur'an with one hand, and arms with the other, and defend your dignity in a way to deprive the enemies of the power of thinking against your own selves".

The second and third stages of revolution brought to a point at which it could for ever maintain its offensive stances, foil the U.S. experiences in countering all revolutions.

The U.S. believed our revolution will tread the same path most anti-western revolutions did, that is it would turn east.

When the leaders and the people of a revolution are of the opinion that their revolution depends on a power, and diplomacy behind closed doors, and sophisticated arms, and colorful military pacts, every day they will have to change their stands according to the wishes and discretion of a superpower.

When the U.S.S.R. decided to be silent in the face of the U.S. and the zionist regime's massacres of the Palestinian people in Lebanon, only in exchange for selling its gas to the west and

earning some 'ten billion dollars for its ailing economy, one of the greatest catastrophes of history occurred through its silence.

The U.S. after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, hoped to make our movement dependent on the east, so that it would have to cope with the east alone, for the U.S. has so many cards as Poland, to flash in its dealing with the U.S.S.R. In practice the Islamic Revolution of Iran indicated that no revolution could survive unless it was dependent of the east and the west.

Among the reason for the failure of the revolutions, has been the fact that they have been isolated through the disruptive policies of the U.S. The reason that the U.S. has invested so much hope in the Bani Sadr - Rajavi clique is the fact that it knew it can control them any way it wishes and that is why they clamored that Iran "is oppressed by dictatorship", "force", "monopolies", etc. to undermine the line of Imam Khomeini.

Another catastrophe which has always stopped revolutions, has been the fact that they had surrendered to various international laws designed by imperialism and hence have been drive to do its biddings. While no revolution should submit to those laws which spell out its destruction.

When the Iranian nation realised that the U.S. embassy has been plotting against it, despite all so-called international laws designed by the superpowers, put a halt to the crimes and betrayals of the U.S. den of espionage, and seized it along with its spies, and thus unmasked the faces of the U.S. instruments in Iran and the hypocrites.

Imam Khomeini said in this connection: "When I was in Paris, some people contacted me on behalf of the U.S. and said they would back us up and later said 'wait, it is too soon,' then we found out all was nothing but plots, and what made us victorious was the unity of word and purpose."

The only way to continue the victories of a revolution is brushing aside all western and eastern formulas and turning to the people only as the only solution, and following the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

"Allah indicated to all the deprived of the world that He will make His unchangeable laws prevail. Therefore our UMMA will become victorious through its martyrdom-seeking mo-

rale and intrepidity.

This war showed all the world that not only the U.S. could not do a damn thing, but its lackeys and servants were paralysed also.

THE IMPOSED WAR AS THE TRIUMPH OF THE SPIRITUAL MAN

The revolution led by the prophets and their successors, all aimed at spiritualizing man, who as the crowning achievement of the creation, had to go through excruciating ordeals. What distinguishes the teaching of the prophets from that of others, is the goal that each set for man. Yet the goal and the path is one and the same, for the first Imam, who was the first prophet too, and to all humanity that descended from him. History is shaped by a primary motive inherent within man's soul; and it is propelled, along the path pointed out by all the prophets, toward a day on which the Divine law will ultimately prevail.

Victories, or defeats cannot be values per se. According to this view, there are so many victories which are defeats, indeed and so many defeats which are but victories. Imam Khomeini - who is the standard-bearer of the path of the prophets and their successors, says in this connection: "We have a duty. Allah has put a duty upon our shoulders to fight the opponents of Islam. We will either be victorious, or defeated. If we were victorious, so much the better, thanks be to God. But if we die in this path, or were killed, we have accomplished our duties as well, and therefore are not defeated. Because whether victorious, or defeated, we have acted according to the Orders of God."

As you see, the only people who can abide by these words, are the ones who have indeed become God-inspired, and hence have prevailed over selfishness like so many prophets and Imams such as Imam Ali had done. Such men are proof against failure. Maulavi, the Iranian poet presents the idea in a pointed manner: "I consider my garb as the mightiest armor, and regard anything but Truth, as nothingness."

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, on Feb. 11, 1979, brought about a profound change in the history of mankind, and opened the right way for freedom from the yoke of the super-

powers, and also defeating the Iraqi invaders highlighted the path for the continuation of the Islamic Revolution in all the world. But in our opinion, the victory in the Iraqi imposed war, and the Divine blessings in that war, are beyond all these calculations.' For Imam Khomeini said: "Now that I see the wills of some of the martyrs or their speeches and mottoes written the night before an attack which would bring about their martyrdom, I realise that the Iranian nation has become a nation inspired by Allah Almighty". Dec. 3, 1981.

A NATION INSPIRED BY ALLAH PAVES THE WAY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE DEPRIVED.

The spiritualization of the nation would be achieved in two ways: ideological and practical. Without the first, the second is not possible. The faith of our nation in Islam, guided by the Islamic Jurisprudence, has ignited, within the heart of the people, a holy fire, the mere sparks of which are the epical manifestations which are materialized in course of the war between falsehood and truth.

If the nations in the past have slowed and impeded the movement of their leaders who were inspired by Allah, and had refused to obey them, in sacrificing their lives and possessions, the Iranian nation now has consecrated itself to fulfilling the teachings of the prophets, guided by Imam Khomeini.

May the existence of such combatants be bountiful for Iran and the noble Iranian nation, warriors who deem martyrdom their final wish and sacrificing on the Path of Allah, their authentic aim. May these warriors be proud of their prayers that they have filled the fronts with the sound of their prayers to Allah."

"You warriors should not expect me or the likes of me or any other mortal to admire you, to even be able to admire you. You are the people chosen by God Himself for a heavenly mission. You offered your greatest possession (your lives and souls) on the Path of Allah. Peace on those who were martyred and God-willingly joined Allah, and those who are ready to be martyred. What matters is your presence. You have attained two goals: One, is offering your greatest capital, i.e. your lives and souls, and the other, is the fact that you offered it with sincerity, and wholeheartedly.

What is the most important point is that you, dear youth, have become so pure and sincere in your conduct, that you safeguarded the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially your victories in the Fath ul-Mobin operation, but what is the most important of all is that you have been sacrificing with the utmost sincerity and honesty on this path...

"What has made this sacrifice valuable, is that it is all for Allah and Allah only. No one can assess the Values of Allah. My dear ones, preserve this Bountry of Allah. He has changed you to become pure men for Himself."

"Allah has purchased forthe believers their persons, and goods, and will grant them paradise." The Holy Quran 9:11.

This heaven is different than the ordinary heavens. I hope that you will meet with Allah.

Those who are in paradise do not concern themselves with anything other than Allah, they disregard the bounties of heaven and only heed Allah. No balance can measure and appreciate the amount of sincerity that you put in your services. Only Allah, can do so. We are proud to have been living in such a time that you too have been serving Allah.

You should not even entertain the slightest belief that it has been your weapons which have been victorious on this path. This is not true, for if the weapons could win the war, the Iraqis had more arms than you did, but it was your faith in Allah and your sincerity which made you victorious. You fight for the sake of Allah, and the Iraqis fight for the sake of Satan.

You are the ones who have become victorious in resisting your own lower, human impulses and thus defeating both the inner and outer enemies. You are the followers of Imam Ali who said he will stand up to all the world if they were opposing Allah. He was equipped with faith, with that great spirituality. I hope that you people will be inspired by Imam Ali and by the insights that Allah had granted him. I hope that we all would get our share of what God had granted him.

The secret of the victory of the prophets and the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been the values which surpass the ken of the east and the west. As you see, our leader speaks of things which do not fit the materialistic frames, the Imam pin-points ideas which

the east and the west have no power to comprehend.

"You are victorious in all fields and dimensions, in material as well as spiritual aspects. You are triumphant in the course of history, and your triumph will form the mainstay the deprived people of the world. You are the real victors of history, whether you triumph or get defeated in that process. You have the satisfaction of Allah with you, and your enemies have the Wrath of Allah with them, as they are backing blasphemy. You believe in the fact that you are victorious regardless of whether you are martyred or survive; but they are afraid of death, there is a great deal of difference between these two mentalities.

Allah's Graces which have been granted this nation, give hopes to the Imam to say: "I hope that this Islamic spirit which has embraced this nation, will last until we deliver this country from the last vestiges of disbelief...."

...and I will be ...
 ...in all fields ...
 ...in the ...
 ...and your ...
 ...of the world ...
 ...in this process ...
 ...of Allah with you ...
 ...and backing ...
 ...of which you ...
 ...and afraid of death ...
 ...these two ...
 ...which have been ...
 ...to the ...
 ...this ...
 ...the last ...

REVIEW OF THE TWO~YEAR WAR



Institut kurde de Paris

NOTE:

What will follow is a synoptic review of the evolution of war since the beginning of the Iraqi invasion, and of the events which preceded it. It should however, be borne in mind that one can not properly analyze a still ongoing war whose main configuration have not yet overly shifted. And also exigencies of security still forbids disclosure of situation, which essential as they are within the overall scheme of the events, yet their free discussion might compromise vital military information, or may somehow be maliciously exploited.

Nonetheless, there remain so many areas of intrinsic value and significance that covering them all would lead far beyond the limited scope of this study. One such area would, for instance, be the psychology of martyrdom, and the momentum imparted by it to the all-pervading spirit of valour and devotion in various field of action.

Accordingly the exclusion of the Navy or some other issues of similar nature from our discussion is not due to their lack of importance but rather is prompted by one of the afore-mentioned considerations.

Yet in compliance with the wisdom of the old adage, "If you can not comprehend all, you should not forsake all," the following outline is presented, in the hope that it may serve as a clue to a definitive chronicling of this war.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE ASSAULT

In sessions of the Khuzestan Security commission, held during the office of the Provisional Government, developments in Iran's borders and movements indicating Iraqi preparation for

a massive offensive against Iran and the Islamic Revolution were discussed. Since the very beginning of the Revolution, Iraq had been training its troops and organizing its army in preparation for an eventual aggression. It also took other measures to enable it to establish full control over parts of Iran as soon as it occupied them. Setting up phoney groups, called "Arab Nationalists" subversion and sabotage were all part of the activities to pave the ground for a counterrevolution under the guise of defending Arab nationalism in Khuzestan. The U.S inspired left wing forces further encouraged these attempts, legitimized as the struggles of the Arab people.

For almost two years, Iraq was busy working on the Arab tribesmen of Khuzestan in order to exploit them for its own designs, and to gain political advantages by playing the role of a liberation army once it entered Iran. (A plot which turned out to work quite in the opposite way.)

The same time the oil pipelines were sabotaged along with the trains and public places, the Iraqi army was building border roads, outposts and bases and was training its armed forces to make them ready for the war. The reports would often reach the officials of the Provisional Government but the prevailing mood was to proceed by holding meetings, conferences and negotiations. The meeting between Dr. Ibrahim yazdi and Saddam Hussein is a typical approach.

The dominant attitude of the Provisional Government was that if we do not bother them, they won't bother us -- a great mistake stemming from the lack of understanding about the nature of the Islamic Revolution.

As this point it would be appropriate to look at the formation of the forces in the country prior to the Iraqi aggression.

"THE ARMY"

Almost two years after the victory of the Revolution no basic measures had been taken for any change in the army. After martyr General Qarani, officials who replaced him in the army such as Farabod, had questionable status. after his election, and being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Bani Sadr,

rather than establishing an Islamic army tried to make the army a tool in his own hands, so that he could wield it as a powerful weapon against the Imam's Line. Although the previous standards of individualism and selfishness in the army had been fiercely attacked, the revolutionary and ethical spirit had not yet penetrated the army.

On the organisation and capability of the army, it should be said that after the removal of all dependencies which had penetrated deep into the army, and after purging the army of treacherous commanders, and trying to instil a revolutionary and Islamic spirit into the army, we were beset with plots and treasons committed by elements such as Admiral Ahmad Madani, who made a practice of dispatching of the personnel to their homes or to the place they desired, and also reducing the military training service from two to one year.

In brief, the weakness and lack of experience of officials and obstacles created by the misguided people slowed the transition of the army from the army of the Shah to the army of Islam. After the dismissal of Bani Sadr, when the leadership of Imam's Line over the army was actualized, dramatic improvements occurred. For example, the coordination and joining together of IRGC with the army which led to the great victories for forces of Islam, and defeats for Saddam's army.

"THE IRGC (ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S GUARDS CORPS) AND BASIJ (POPULAR MOBILISATION)"

The IRGC was constantly fighting with counterrevolutionaries and had no chance to set up an organisation to confront enemies such as IRGC to crush it. On the other hand the prevailing attitude in the country tended to weaken the IRGC and change its identity. Even if those following the Imam's Line had not been able to stabilize the IRGC within the Constitution, the opposing factions would have readily dissolved it. To create problems for the IRGC was the main job of those opposing the Imam's Line.

At the time of the Iraqi aggression, the only training that the IRGC men had received was fighting in the mountainous battlefields of Kurdistan. Some of them were directly sent to the

south with some military knowledge. The rest attended their actual military academy in the deserts of Khuzestan through their confrontation with Iraq.

But their adamant faith compensated for all the weaknesses and created an obstacle in the way of Iraqi aggression. These young people were trained day by day to the extent that today one can be confident that the nucleus for the military confrontation with the U.S. in the region has taken shape.

One of the IRGC commanders has said: "It was in the Khuzestan plateau that we realized what a classic war meant. We could resist the Iraqi aggression without being graduated from a special academy, we had not heard an artillery shot yet, we had no commander for regular operations, we could not provide maintenance and support for the fronts properly, and it can be said that we were not ready for a classic war. When this war was imposed on us, sustaining enormous pressures, we barely passed through it various stages."

Basij, was in a vague situation. Although the IRGC had formed the earlier Basij, for a long time there was a dispute whether the Basij should be supervised by IRGC or not. In every corner, a separate forces was training basij members. Many forces could be absorbed by it, but the training did not exceed the drill with M-1 and G-3 weapons. There was neither an organisation nor appropriate establishments. Later thanks to efforts of IRGC and the help of some groups following the Imam's Line, Basij came under the supervision of the IRGC, but now Bani Sadr kept the training facilities from the Basij.

All through the Iraqi preparations, the U.S. was closely studying the internal situation in Iran. The time had not come for the Iraqi aggression yet. The U.S. had its hopes still vested in internal affairs. But internal situation reached a point at which the Imam's Line, represented as martyr Rajaei's cabinet, became dominant. That the UMMA should unify, at the time when Imam's Line was in power, could not be tolerated by the United States.

AGGRESSION, PAUSE AND STABILIZATION:

The U.S. was not able to destroy the Imam's Line. Rajaei began to show what the leadership of the Imam's Line meant.

The internal forces had no power to deviate the UMMA from its true revolutionary path (as desired by the U.S.). In order not to lose the chance of crushing the revolution, the new policy of imperialism materialized as an open confrontation with the incurring blame on the Imam's Line, before the Line could stabilise itself. Bani Sadr took the first step on Sept. 8, 1980. Three days earlier Iraq had started its tactical attacks in Qasr-e Shirin, pounding the city with its artillery. In fact Bani Sadr voiced his hostility well-coordinated with the Iraqi onslaught.

The most popular government in history was, upon its formation, confronted with two internal and external forces intent upon overthrowing it, an indication of the fear of imperialism of the leadership of the Imam's Line. The U.S. decided the ripest moment for the Iraqi aggression against Iran. With 14 armoured, mechanised and infantry divisions, and enjoying the support of all imperialists and their lackeys, Iraq started its aggression along 800 kms of the border line. The main objective of the aggression was to undermine the stabilisation of the Imam's Line, which was threatening the U.S. and regional reactionism.

Clashes with Iraq started on Sept. 5, 1980 in western fronts but the first tactical confrontation in southern border line began on Sept. 13, 1980 and the next day, the war in the south offered its first martyr, an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps man from Omidiyeh Corps.

Skirmishes with the use of individual weapons, which was later replaced by mortars, did not take long and on Sept. 23, 1980 the classic fully equipped Iraqi war broke out.

In its overall offensive, Iraq occupied vast areas of the Islamic territory of Iran without meeting with any obstacle. Iraq had previously prepared all preliminaries, plans, schedules, etc., which being supported by internal imperialist powers and reactionary states in the region which had been similarly mobilized. Various military information, plans and programmes, financial, psychological, political preparation and propaganda accommodations had been placed at Saddam's disposal.

The Iraqi army was swiftly achieving its goals and Iranian positions fell one after another. Iraqi forces were also enjoying a high morale, a firm solidarity, strong combat readiness, and their

feeling of superiority was constantly increasing to the extent that the commander of the 10th Iraqi armoured division who had led the operation in Shush and Dezful fronts (southern fronts) boasted to Saddam: "Let me go and seize Tehran." On the other hand the weakness of organisation and command as well as internal strife unnerved the Iranian forces.

The United States, either by its former advisors in the army or through renegade officers had access to detailed information for example the Iraqis built a bridge on Karun River exactly on the same spot that the Ahvaz 92nd division had built a bridge for 1977-1978 maneuvers.

In fact there was no obstacle on the way of Iraq to a rapid occupation of the oil rich southern province of Khuzestan, a venture which has already been engineered by Pentagon. (For further information about Iraq's military ties with the west please refer to the Third Chapter of the Book. .

It is at this point that one can realise only a fraction of the great part played by martyrdom seekers who, with the everything against them, smashed the giant Iraqi war machine to the extent that the enemy was forced to stop further approach and paralyzed at the very beginning of the war. This was the first step to change fantastic dreams of imperialism into dreadful nightmares.

The epic of Khorramshahr's resistance which after one month forced the inactive and exhausted enemy to give up half of this port city and give up occupation of the eastern part and further advance, opens a new important chapter in the history of the war.

In Abadan, when Iraqi forces entered the city through Zulfaqari district, an old scrap-iron dealer, got the news first, reported it to revolutionary and popular forces. He joined these forces to fight the Iraqis and later, was martyred, along with his son.

Although, the Iraqis had passed Bahmanshir (southeast Abadan) and entered Zulfaqari district, they failed to capture Abadan. The Iraqi defeat in that region, and its withdrawal from Bahmanshir are only part of an epic created by the likes of that old scrap-iron dealer.

No doubt, the main element stopping Iraqi Baathists advances has been the people. The people have experienced all counter-revolutionary moves and conspiracies such as demonstrations, riots staged by imperialism, train explosions and insecurity on the highways, sit-ins and strikes provoked by splinter groups, civil war, unrest in Khorramshahr, Kurdistan, Gonbad, etc. All these paved the group for tempering the steel called the "people".

The morale of the residents of occupied cities or the areas threatened with the occupation, and their attachment to the government, and confrontation with the enemy deserve a lengthy discussion.

People in Abadan, which was under the Iraqi siege, cultivated dates and tomatoes and offered it to the government; and the inhabitants of Hamidiyeh (north west Ahvaz) continued their work and cultivation. An inhabitant of this area said, "We cultivated water melons in a farm where enemy shells exploded."

There is no need to explain the role of the people either in war zones or elsewhere, in supporting the battlefronts. Our combatants believe that if there was not the multiple assistance of the people, and especially at the beginning of the war, they would have suffered not only from the lack of food, clothes, etc., but above all they would be threatened by the danger of demoralisation. If people were not actively present on the scene, the combatants' morale would have been weakened and, therefore, we would have witnessed the rise of the spirit of defeatism, and finally undergo ignominy and disaster.

VARIOUS OUTLOOKS TAKEN REGARDING THE IRAQI AGGRESSION AND THE WAY TO CONFRONT IT:

There were two outlooks in confronting the Iraqi aggression which stemmed from various schools of thoughts.

A - COMPROMISERS:

North - Those who grasped only an appearance of the war and had no understanding of the connection between the revolution and outbreak of the war, observed only defeats and disappointments. They were thinking of holding negotiations and compromi-

sing with the enemy; and naturally they would not think of anything other than escape, when faced with enemy's attacks. Since they held such an opinion, they took a hostile attitude towards IRGC men and Ulema serving in the fronts, and would insult them. Thus promoting hatred and hostility. In their opinion, to solve the problem of the war, it was necessary to remove IRGC men and combatant Ulema from the fronts. They believed that if Khorramshahr and Abadan were lost, the Imam would abandon his uncompromising stance and would agree to hold negotiations and would compromise. In fact in their view the collapse of Abadan and Khorramshahr was a means to pave the way. They argued that the Iraqi army should be confronted with tanks and cannons. Such a classic method needed weapons to fight with, and defeat an enemy which was armed to teeth by both east and west. This could only be achieved at the cost of becoming dependent on superpowers and of reviving the hold that imperialism maintained on our armed forces. This was an excuse for the commencement of talks and for a compromise.

The clear characteristics of this policy was "reliance on instruments" for victory and viewing the revolutionary forces, as saboteurs who would cause weakness and chaos in war. It found the reason for the outbreak of the war, not in connection with the nature of the revolution, but to the "subversive activities" of revolutionary forces.

Had this line of thought gotten its way, no doubt that this war, like many other wars, would have been controlled by the superpowers. They would throw the two countries against each other and later drag them to the negotiation table, at any time they desired.

However, it should be noted that there were some people who were sincerely advocating the classic methods of confronting the enemy and agreed only prima facie with the first groups, but gradually came to recognize the necessity of combining this method with a non-classical system, and participation of the popular warfare.

Keeping this distinction in mind and with regard to the sincerity and devotion of these people who are completely

different from the first group, they should not be included in the first category.

B - FOLLOWERS OF THE LINE OF IMAM KHOMEINI:

In the Imam's opinion, as he has stated, the cause of this war has been the Islamic nature of the revolution and also dependency on the superpowers of the Baathist regime and Saddam in Iraq. The Imam has always referred to Saddam as a U.S. lackey. The Imam has averred his faith in the power of Islam and forces committed to the revolution and Islam. He has described Saddam's forces as ill-fated people who would be vanquished by the will of committed Muslims. Mobilisation of the people, in the opinion of Imam Khomeini and his true followers, was an important element of victory. Later, when Bani Sadr was ousted and IRGC's efforts for the effective participation of the people came to fruition, the Tariq ul-Qods, Fath ul-Mobin and Beit ul-Moqaddas victories were the inevitable rewards.

Another salient feature of this trend renouncing any imposed peace and compromise, and not to favour, even under the most difficult circumstances, peace missions which wanted to complement Iraqi aggression and to subdue the revolution.

For this standpoint unflinching warfare was our sole responsibility. Complying with this insight we would accomplish our religious duty, and even if we were defeated, we would be indeed victorious. Leadership of the Imam's Line changed the situation in a way that the U.S. and other forces, instead of manipulating us by means of war, would take a passive position and would anxiously follow us, and watch over every movement in this war.

Research shows that all wars had been in the control of the superpowers even in liberation struggles, i.e. both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have the same political stance. In Arab-Israel conflicts of 1967 and 1973, with the long air lift between the U.S. and Israel, we note that the USSR openly refused to supply the Arabs with arms and in face, by temporizing it paralyzed the Arabs, thus enabling Israeli to achieve these goals.

The Imam told the peace missions to go and make the required investigations and punish us if we were the aggressor,

otherwise penalize Saddam – this was an unprecedented policy. Apparently we had been defeated in our territory, but while holding negotiations, the Imam held a victorious stance. Now we see the outcome of the war is neither in the hands of the United States nor any other powers, but in the hands of Muslim revolutionaries.

It should be noted that the first trend could never had its way and could achieve nothing but erecting isolated obstacles. While Bani Sadr was in power, this group tried to establish its superiority but after his dismissal, the second line became triumphant.

The operation of the Iranian forces and the policies they have taken in the war with Iraq can be divided into the following categories:

1. Guerrilla, scattered and tactical attacks, night raids etc.
2. Classic operations with the main role being placed by the army (Ground Forces, and Air Force, especially at the beginning of the war) and also with the help of the popular forces and IRGC.
3. Non-classic extensive operations with the coordination and cooperation of army, IRGC and popular forces, which was a beginning for a genuine and liberating movement, opening the way to the volition in organising the fight and to the popularity of the war.

IN THE THEATRE OF THE WAR

Scattered, tactical guerrilla attacks and harassing operations opened a new phase in the war which not only forced Iraq to halt its advance, but enabled us to obtain precious experience at the cost of the lives of our martyrs, in spite of all negative

Propaganda, the significance of IRGC men as well as the value and importance of the popular forces began to dawn upon the world. Of course for some reasons, including the presence of a man like Bani Sadr (who was the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces) "Hoveizeh" operation (by the army); and Imam Mahdi, an offensive (by IRGC), this mutual understanding could show its true face. However, the way was paved for the emergence of the true Islamic Armed Force.

At this point, the regular forces found a chance to make a new organising policy to cope with the new situation and to be ready to deal a blow to the enemy, and holding their newly-won positions force further withdrawal of its troops.

One of the results of guerrilla operations was to gain the time needed for reinforcement of the regular forces. The officials did not use its opportunity that the blood of martyrs had bought them. They could have mobilized the people and further coordinated the different armed forces. They referred to stage of propaganda campaign on the advocacy of a classic war and attempted to dissolve the popular forces in order to start a war of tank against tank and cannon against cannon. To encourage such a method was merely to isolate popular forces which would have led to an ultimate defeat. Had it, through the good-will of its leaders, come out victoriously, it would have entailed the restoration of the U.S. domination through the armed forces.

Meanwhile the liberals were trying to take political advantage of their situation in the army (since they had Bani Sadr there) deploying their forces in a battle against the Imam's Line rather than fighting the enemy.

In order to have a better understanding of the importance that this stage of operations had in the outcome of the war, we may survey the action in one of the main corridors of Iraqi thrust.

With the start of the Iraqi aggression, within a few days, the enemy passed "Tange-Echazzabe" and besieging Bostan and Susangerd, reached Hamidiyeh (1 km from it). It was feared that the enemy might reach the strategic Ahvaz-Andimeshk highway. Isolation of the three (Ahvaz-Khorramshahr, Ahvaz-Bostan, and Ahvaz-Andimeshk) could place Ahvaz in serious peril. The speed

and power of enemy's advance was extraordinary at this stage, while resistance was small. There was a general danger that a myth might emerge portraying the Iraqi army as an invincible force. If that had happened, a massive struggle, even greater than those occurring on June 6, 1963 to Feb. 11, 1979, would have been required to disprove such a myth.

In hamidiyeh strongholds were being built quickly. It was obvious that the enemy would continue its movement as soon as the night was over, therefore, something to be done that night.

On that night the assault which was named the "first night raid" took place. A number of volunteers for martyrdom, under the leadership of martyr "Ghayur Asli", were picked out. It was decided that only those who sought martyrdom should join the group and that should not think of returning. The only weapon available was the RPG7; and the group armed mostly with guns and rifle-grenades, started the operation. Prior to the assault, enemy's personnel carriers were patrolling the road, reconnoitering for the moves of the next day. At 01.00 a.m. with the fire of nine RPG7s on the enemy's tanks and personnel carrier, the night raid was started and the enemy taken by surprise was utterly overrun and destroyed. The operation was not organized and several times their ammunition ran out but the raiders returned for supplies and went back again to the scene of battle. Before dawn, the enemy had been routed and driven back a long distance. At 08.00 a.m. a number of Airborne helicopters struck at the enemy's tanks and ammunition trucks. The enemy totally stunned and pushed even beyond Bostan (of course later due to the absence of the forces to be established in the liberated areas, the enemy returned again but not like the first time). The sight of the wreckage and debris of the Iraqi tanks and personnel carriers inspired the Iranian forces and demoralised the enemy. The enemy had now realised that it should no longer lunge so precipitously. Digging trenches, a sign of the slow down in enemy's advance, began. On the flight of the enemy and this great victory which was achieved with minimum casualties, two main reasons can be mentioned:

1. The enemy could not estimate the extent of faith, bravery and devotion of the Iranian combatants. They could not believe that a small unit could so bravely attack the powerful enemy.

2. The fear they felt in their hearts, the enemy was itself astonished at its own speed of advance and lack of any important resistance. Therefore, with the beginning of the assault, the enemy who was fearful of being lured into a trap, all along, and taking the raid as part of a full-scale and well-designed operation, had to retreat headlong.

At this stage, forces would be dispatched from Tabriz (western Iran) or Tehran and would engage the enemy at some unplanned corner. Or a brother like martyr "Alam-ol-Hoda" would come and organize a small group to establish a core of resistance or an IRGC centre or for the performance of a series of operations. Therefore, the number of martyrs, their names and many other issues are not known at this stage. But one thing is clear and it is that the enemy was feeling defeated in all fronts and was not given any opportunity to reorganise itself and continue its advance.

It was witnessed again and again that brothers in combat would penetrate deep into the enemy's position and by blitzing the enemy from behind, they would start an operation. Martyr Ahmad Moshk, a 16 year-old combatant, provides a representative instance by creeping into an enemy tent at night and before giving them any chance to defend themselves destroys them with grenades and machine gun (he was later martyred).

In a similar attack, martyr Mohammad Shamkhani seized an Iraqi personnel carrier and with the gun mounted on it raked down a large number of the enemy (He was also martyred later).

At the very dark nights, when visibility was greatly diminished, the Iranian raiders would grope for the enemy tanks by touching them and would step back in short distance to zap them. The following quotation might impart a clearer insight into the essence and the underlying spirit of these fragmented episodes, and into the noble, intrepid mind of those unsung heroes who made them happen.

Martyr Sadeq Mohammadpour says, "One night when I was in a front west of Susangerd, a brother called Mohammad... who was some 100 metres away from me said, Sadeq, I think that it is a tank, go and check it. I said, what are you talking about Mohammad. He said go and blast it. I said you mean I go and fire at a tank? Yes, he said. Go and touch it. If it is a tank, then go back and hit it. This was my first experience. So I started shivering with fear..."

Officials say that within the two months of Mehr and Aban (Oct. and Nov.) we had night raids without any interruption.

Many of the committed people who could have been of great value to the revolution in various fields, were martyred. Men who had purged their hearts of selfishness and ambitious feelings and rushed in rapture to embrace God, watered the Islamic revolution with their blood and did not allow any weakness or lack of experience or enemies disguised as friends, defeat the revolution.

In the meantime, the tactical insight and prowess of the troops, were improving day by day and issues such as reconnaissance, planning, etc. were taking distinct shapes. Even later, along with other methods, guerrilla tactics would be employed whenever deemed necessary.

On June 23, 1980, it was decided to start a series of harassing assaults on Dezful sector in Kut Kapau Heights. A limited number of armed and IRGC personnel were present. Through a lightening attack the enemy was hit at a specified point of its position, and the troops returned to their bases.

In this attack, 5 tanks and personnel carriers two 106mm rifles and two vehicles of the enemy were destroyed and 50 of its troops were killed while seven of them were captured.

Only two of the assault unit did not return and it was not ascertained if they were martyred, captured or lost.

This method could not be effective by itself and, therefore a basic re-organisation was needed, to halt the invaders on its track. It must be noted that the enemy's capability to replenish its fast-draining arsenal from the constant flow of arms from the super-powers buffered to a great extent, the otherwise fatal blows dealt by our troops.

CLASSIC WARFARE

We have undertaken a total of three classic offensives which all have failed:

1. Classic operations on Dezful sector:

This operation started on Oct. 15, 1980 on Dezful sector on Jaser-e Naderi (Naderi) Bridge with the participation of the army. During the operation, carried out by the majority of armoured forces, several Iranian tanks were destroyed and a number of troops were either martyred or injured, without achieving any result.

This was not enough for the officials to realise that we could not force Iraq to retreat from its position by tactics similar to its own.

2. Hoveizeh Operation:

At the same time that we had just barely stopped the enemy and were proving sadly inefficient in mobilizing for a decisive counter-offensive, the Iraqi kept on pounding our cities to weaken the spirit of resistance in our people, and to demoralise the combatants.

On Dec. 28, 1980, within a single day more than 95 rounds of artillery shells were fired at densely populated areas in Ahvaz such as Naderi crossings or the grocery market, resulting in the martyrdom of more than 100 of the city residents. Loath to take any concrete action, Bani Sadr was busy procrastinating. But the pressure of public opinion, voiced in Ayatollah Montazeri's message, showed that the military commanders were expected to do something.

In a session on Jan. 2, 1981, Hoveizeh operations were agreed upon. Despite Bani Sadr's pretensions to have taken significant measures, the propaganda in favour of the classic war, and also the insistence on the non-interference of revolutionary and popular forces in the war, no real efforts were made. Therefore, they had to do something and it was for this reason that they decided on a series of operation, to be carried out on Jan. 5, 1981.

In these operations the main role was being played by the armoured forces of the army and a number of IRGC men (about 400) took part as subordinate forces.



The offensive was successful in the beginning and we destroyed a good number of the enemy troops along with a great deal of equipments and weapons (50 tanks, 3 artillery pieces, 500 killed and 800 captured). Lots of equipments were left behind by the retreating enemy. But the enemy's capability in an armoured war and its organisation from the stand point of command and support was much superior to ours. Therefore, it soon rallied its forces and through a massive counteroffensive repelled us. While recapturing the liberated areas, it dealt us a severe blow both in armoured equipment and manpower. Meanwhile, the booties which we had neither taken to the fronts nor destroyed, were again seized by the enemy.

3. NASR OPERATIONS, MAHSHAHR-ABADAN HIGHWAY SECTOR:

In these operations, which were carried out in a classic style, 70 percent of the army and 30 percent of IRGC forces participated. Losing 9 tanks and a number of vehicles, the enemy destroyed many of our tanks or seized them, and a number of combatants were either martyred, injured or captured.

This unsuccessful assault which took place on Jan. 10, 1981, was the last classic operation.

It should be noted that due to our shortages in equipment, especially heavy weapons such as tanks, these losses were irreparable and crippling, they would render the task of restoration and re-organisation almost replace a lost tank, with a far more advanced one. Therefore, we could not repair our damages as our Iraqi enemy did, and thus could not compete with it in terms of losses.

The IRGC was neither playing an effective role in classic operations nor did it want to do so. But it would exert utmost efforts to fulfill the mission delegated to it. "Hoveizeh" was an example, in which IRGC was employed as a subordinate detachment. Moreover, the martyrdom of a number of best IRGC personnel was a manifestation of their serious and sincere commitment, although they had a hard time during Bani Sadr's office as the commander of the armed forces.

LIMITED UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, THE BEGINNING OF SMALL ADVANCES:

After it was clear that we could achieve nothing in classic warfare, the IRGC, which was the representative of Imam's Line in warfronts, was becoming acutely aware of the pressure of a historical mission it had to fulfill. It could rise to the occasion only if it negated definitely the dependence-oriented classic war, and also demonstrated the efficacy of its propounded alternative strategy. Even if this style achieved relative successes, could open a new phase in our tactics, and instill a fresh spirit in to our combatants. Meanwhile, the baneful consequences of the defeats were deeply felt by those in our fronts, and above all the enemy capitalized on them, boosted its spirits and reinvigorated.

The first step in this new direction was taken on March 17, 1981, two months after our last unsuccessful offensive against Iraq. According to a plan, code-named "Imam Mahdi" (AS), it was decided that two hundred of IRGC men should attack the enemy on four sectors with light weapons and RPG7s. The IRGC commanders believed that when the enemy was repulsed four to five kilometres back, and after the seizure of Iraqi defence lines, tanks should cross the river and be stationed in those positions, holding the captured territory. The army only promised to provide 10 minutes of fire, but believed the mission to be suicidal, and that all 200 men would be lost.

The assault started at 07:30 a.m. Our men knew that the enemy, being scared of a night raid, would be on guard till the morning but would go to sleep by dawn. Therefore, this time they attacked at day break.

The enemy was caught by surprise and the operation reached its goals with great speed. With the destruction of a tank battallion and a mechanized batallion of the enemy, the Iraqis withdrew and the plan was precisely implemented and the predicted advance was realized. Again this time, due to the lack of back-up forces, a few days later the Iraqis returned to their previous positions. In these operations the Iraqis left about 100 killed, 68 captives, and 30 destroyed tanks and personnel carriers. We only had 13 martyrs.

Our major victory in these operations was to make our army brethren believe that these methods could be effective.

Although these operations were of minor importance when compared with our future large-scale battles with Iraq, it was a great task at that time, because after six months of war, this was the first time we had such a victory.

It could be said that these successful operations were a projection of the revolution. They forged a new system the growth and continuation of which brought about a series of victories.

This victory was a prelude to future triumphs in which the IRGC was regarded a significant force, making ties between itself and the army ever stronger. Of these operations a few examples will be briefly surveyed.

Λ) Operations of April 4, 1981

Sector Karkh-e-Dezful, south western Dezful with a limited-scale of offensive.

The participating forces: Army and the IRGC.

The extent of advance: 3 kilometres.

The casualties and damages to the enemy: 15 tanks and personnel carriers were destroyed, 80 were killed and 81 captured.

Casualties and damages sustained by the Iranian side: 20 martyrs.

1) Operations of March 17 west of Susangerd began when the Iraqis were close to the city. By digging a number of tunnels and passing under the house and emerging near the enemy camp, the way was paved for an attack. The designer of the operation was IRGC member Isaac Azizi (martyred later), who was a mechanic from Khorasan sq. in south Tehran.

On May 21, 1982, at the same time as the attack on Allah-o-Akbar Heights, a more elaborate form of the above said plan was performed which was also successful and dealt a heavy blow on the enemy. The upshot of the issue was the coordination and cooperation of the army, by means of which the armoured vehicles of the army were stationed in the salient, and enabled the troops to advance farther than ever.

The operations were carried out in two sectors; one on Tappe Cheshmeh (Cheshmeh Hills) with three kilometres of advance, and one on Jesr-e-Naderi where positions seized by the Iranian forces later fell into the hands of Iraqi troops.

B) Operations of April 14, 1981

Sector Shush: Limited-scale offensive.

The participant forces: Army and the IRGC (70% - 30%)

The extent of advance.

Casualties and damages to the enemy: Destruction of 31 tanks and personnel carriers, as well as a helicopter and 200 killed and 44 captives.

Casualties sustained by our side: 15 martyrs.

C) Operations of May 21, 1981

Sector: Allah-o-Akbar Heights, Shush and west of Susangerd simultaneously. The participating forces: Army, the IRGC, and irregular forces of Martyr Dr. Mostafa Chamran.

The style of offensive: A combination of the classic and non-classic.

Code name: Imam Mahdi (AS) for Allah-o-Akbar Heights and Imam Ali (AS) for west of Susangerd.

The extent of advance: 2.5 km in Shush, 12 km in Susangerd, and 8 km in Allah-o-Akbar (seizure of Allah-o-Akbar Heights).

Casualties and damages inflicted upon the enemy: Destruction of 70 tanks and personnel carriers, seizure of 20 tanks and personnel carriers, 700 killed and 844 captured.

Casualties sustained by the Iranian troops: 80 martyred.

D) Operations of Sept. 2, 1981

Sector Shahitiyyeh (west of Allah-o-Akbar) with a limited scale offensive.

Participating forces: Army and the IRGC (50 - 50 percent)

The extent of advance: 1.5 km

Casualties and damage to the enemy: Destruction of 30 tanks and personnel carriers, 100 killed and 60 captured.

Casualties sustained by our side: 70 martyrs.

These operations led to the liberation of Tappe Sabz, north of Shahitiyyeh, two villages of Naji and Saleh Hassan in northern bank of Karkheh River were also freed from the Iraqis.

E) Operation of Sept. 18, 1981

Sector: Susangerd with a limited-scale offensive.

The participant forces: Army and the IRGC (70-30 percent)

Code Name: Martyr Madani.

The extent of advance: 2 to 4 km.

Casualties inflicted upon the enemy: Destruction of 50 tanks and personnel carriers, 400 killed and 190 captured.

Casualties and damages sustained by the Iranian forces: Destruction of 9 tanks and 168 martyrs.

NON-CLASSIC EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS:

A new stage of war in which our forces were embarking on limited-scale offensive, was taking shape. With the elimination of a number of disloyal people the chance was provided to let us plan for extensive attacks, in order to free vast areas of our Islamic territory.

The first of these series of operations was "Same-ul-Aemeh", which led to the lifting of Abadan siege. This removed the danger of its fall after a year of being occupied by the Iraqi forces.

This victory preluded a new tactical and organizational stage of the war: The organisation of forces on the Imam's instructions that neither the Army nor the IRGC could do anything without each other, and nor the two could be of any value without the people. The Karbala plans including: Tariq-al-Qods, Fath ul-Mobin, Beit ul-Moqaddas and Ramadhan are offensives in which in addition to the good coordination of the army and the IRGC, the "popular" elements of this war found their proper places, thus achieve great objectives for the Islamic Revolution.

(Lifting the Abadan Siege), a grand opening of a new stage:

One of the greatest strategic defeats for Iraq is its failure to learn from the Abadan siege at the time it speedily crossed Karun River and was able to build a bridge across Bahmanshir, entering Abadan through Zulfaqari.

(1) For a time it was not clear to the officials whether

Abadan-Mahshahr and Abadan-Ahvaz highways were disconnected or not. Therefore, although this road was not secure due to the presence of the enemy, normal movement continued, leading to the capture of a number of troops by the enemy, including the then Oil Minister Javad Tondguyan and his companions who were captured on Ahvaz-Abadan highway.

The siege of Abadan was not only a military victory for Iraq but more important than that, a political triumph. Therefore, it would never allow its forces to think of retreating from that sector or of liberation of Abadan's vital roads such as Mahshahr-Abadan and or Ahvaz-Abadan.

After the Zulfaqari epic which drove the enemy back beyond Bamshanshir River, the enemy (which was intent upon occupying Abadan) kept on besieging it.

The occupation of Abadan, and even its siege, was of great importance to the enemy.

During the siege, Hezbollahi forces, from various groups, were continuing their resistance and fight inspite of such adverse circumstances that movement of forces and dispatch of ammunition and equipment was possible only through water and by launches which were extremely vulnerable to the enemy fire. Many times for a necessary move, boats had been waiting for 48 hours. This was all at the time when the commander of the armed forces did not believe and had no interest in preserving Abadan and only the faith and devotion of the forces saved Abadan from destruction.

Our forces in this sector of war were also active in the northern flank of the enemy camps, through various methods including guerrilla, irregular, classic, non-classic, limited-scale, and extensive offensives which all led to the lifting of Abadan siege.

The situation in this front, like many others, was unorganized on the first days but it was infused with high spirits and devotion. Gradually the forces were trained and after the dismissal of Bani Sadr, their efforts bore their fruit. We survey the situation in this sector as an example representative of other fronts, and as an introduction on 'Samen-ul-Aemeh' operations which were an epochal and began a new stage in the war.

A SURVEY OF THE FRONT IN ABADAN SECTOR:

Early in the month of Mehr (October), troops from Isfahan as a detachment from Basij, and under the command and participation of IRGC personnel, arrived in the area by bus. The troops who had no knowledge of the situation, approached Iraqi positions and when faced with the enemy fire, the Basij forces got off the buses and together with a number of gendarmes who were withdrawing in Soleimaniyeh region, made a defensive line. Apparently this was the second group arriving at the area, the first group being from Tehran who had penetrated deep into the enemy lines and were mostly martyred or probably captured. Later when the situation was relatively stabilised our Isfahani brothers found corpses in their night patrols. There were indications on the bodies showing that they were members of Basij dispatched from Tehran. The bodies of the martyrs were found 50 to 100 metres from the enemy's front line.

However, with establishing a defensive line in Soleimaniyeh and having a preparatory centre in Dar Khoein, our brothers were able to slow the enemy's advance in this direction and neutralised Iraqi attacks whenever the enemy tried to move into new positions and push further toward Abadan, its main target.

A little while after these futile attacks, the enemy noted the presence of a growing resisting force and decided to reinforce its northern flank, and in south of Dar Khoein, established installations to repulse our offensives.

Although the enemy was not capable of advancing and its attacks were all repelled by the devotion of our troops, it resisted our assaults and stood its ground so that twice our efforts on Mahshahr-Abadan was defeated.

Before we review the new situation which started after June 11, 1981 the most important events of this sector deserve to be pointed out.

NASR OPERATIONS (CLASSIC):

On Mahshahr-Abadan highway on Jan. 10, 1980 which was discussed.

CONSTRUCTION OF VAHDAT (UNITY) ROAD:

In the month of Farvardin (March 21-May 21) 1981, the construction work of a country road called "Vahdat Road", which opened a dangerous surface way to Abadan was completed. This helped boost the resistance and morale of the Iranian forces. The road started from a point on Mahshahr-Abadan highway which has not reached the areas under the control of the enemy, and through side-roads reached Zulfaqari front where 3 to 4 kms were under Iraqi artillery fire. Construction of this road was an example of outstanding cooperation between Reconstruction Jihad and the Islamic combatants, especially since it was built in a marshy area, unsuitable for the transportation of vehicles.

MARTYR FAZLOLLAH NOORI OPERATIONS:

These operations started with a non-classic limited-scale offensive on May 15, 1981, led to an advance of 2 kilometres and liberation of Madan Heights (renamed after Martyr Moazzeni), which used to be an enemy observation post. During the attack, equally participated in by the army and the IRGC, our forces destroyed and seized 15 Iraqi tanks and killed 100 of their forces while capturing 70 others.

OPERATIONS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF - KHOMEINI, THE SPIRIT OF GOD, JUNE 11, 1981:

One of the major elements which enabled the enemy to continue the siege of Abadan for a year and keep the condition in this sector in a stagnant state, in spite of the efforts of the combatants, was Bani Sadr's mechinatons. Although a plan had been designed in the Supreme Defence Council, under the chairmanship of Bani Sadr himself, he showed no concern for carrying it out, but on the contrary would overshadow it by other diplomatic tricks. Whenever he was questioned on war, he would blame on his opponents the very agitations which were, in fact, his own making; and would conclude that "They would not let me work. If they let me free to deal with the war, I will guarantee the victory". He would openly bargain, in spite of all the authority

put at his disposal, that either the absolute political power should be ceded to him, or there would be no developments in the war.

Bani Sadr, acting contrary to Imam's clear instructions and the needs in warfronts, would fan the flames of disputes between the army and the IRGC and prevent the two from getting closer. He would even prohibit IRGC officials from attending joint session of the commanders. Of course after March 5, being wary of his overindulgence and in order to cure art of his critical situation and conceal his true nature, Bani Sadr invited IRGC officials to attend those sessions.

The difficulty called "Bani Sadr" had become so distressing for the combatants that after his dismissal from the post of commander-in-chief they all welcomed the idea and it was decided to name, as a token of their approval, the operations under performance in Dar Khoein, as "Khomeini the spirit of God, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces."

The intrigues mentioned above would certainly instigate disputes, yet thanks to the faith and incentive of the troops, these could not hamper their activities. In the course of four months of non-stop work and maintaining silence, they had dug a 1300 metre 'T' shaped canal very close to the enemy. It would end at the mine field in front of the enemy's embankments (firing line) and its entrance was parallel to the firing line some 400 to 500 from it.

The site of operations was the support base for the northern flank of the Iraqi forces in Eastern Karun River where strong installations were erected, and a moat had made it virtually impregnable, thus affording the enemy a good measure of self-confidence.

The success of this operation was a warning to the enemy, so that he should not count on an enduring clam and stability of the region, and making it realize that even its strongest flank could be vulnerable

During these operations all troops came from the IRGC and the army supported IRGC infantry and Basij forces, with a M-47 armoured battalion and artillery fire.

The troops were so well-prepared that when one of the officials of the ground forces inspected the canal, he asked in astonishment why they did not start the offensive right away. The combatants were obsessed with just one problem: That if the operations

succeeded, Bani Sadr would exploit it in his own interest, at the time when he played not a constructive, but a destructive part. On the other hand he would stabilise his shaky position against Imam's Line. But if the operations failed he would lash out against IRGC and their lack of discipline. But the main issue was war. On the night that the operations were expected to be launched, at 11:30 hours the Imam announced dismissal of Bani Sadr as the commander-in-chief of the forces thus removing the only existing bottleneck. This was the most desirable change.

Bani Sadr's dismissal complemented the joy over the triumph of the operations, which were in turn key to the end of Abadan siege and an exercise for the great "Samen ul-Aemeh" operations.

These operations achieving an advance of three kilometres, important enemy positions were captured. At least 33 tanks and personnel carriers were seized from the enemy, with 250 of enemy forces killed and 246 others captured. To achieve this victory, 120 IRGC men were martyred.

The strategic advantages were so high that enemy, through 8 counter-offensive, tried to recapture it, and was repulsed each time.

With the fall of the Iraqi strongholds on the northern flank, enemy forces in eastern Karun River began to feel the danger, since 'Vahdat Road' was a great help for the reinforcement of Iranian troops in Abadan. Therefore, the enemy pulled 6 to 7 kilometres back from Zulfaqari fronts and was stationed behind Mahshahr-Abadan highway. It only kept a few units operating as bridge heads (which will be discussed later). The ammunition left behind, indicated that the withdrawal had taken place very hurriedly.

This enemy move, especially since it destroyed a part of Khorramshahr bridge was a blatant sign of its disappointment of capturing Abadan - a situation which completed the happiness over Bani Sadr's dismissal and the victory in Dar Khoein, thus heightening the morale of our forces.

It so appeared from the developments in the battlefronts that Iraq would pull further back in order to take position in western Karun River and obtain a powerful defensive position.

Then, Abadan would be freed and this was what the ever-rising trend of our victories indicated. But a series of internal mishaps changed this situation and brought back hope and happiness to the Iraqi camp, making Iraq insist on the preservation of its positions in eastern Karun which offered several political privileges to the enemy.

In the afternoon of June 21 (the same day on which Bani Sadr was deposed as the President), Dr Mostafa Chamran was martyred in Allah-o-Akbar. On June 27 Hojat ul-Islam Khamenei survived an assassination attempt, but the following day, June 28 the catastrophic explosion at the Islamic Republic Party's headquarters brought about the martyrdom of more than 72 prominent officials as well as the injury to many others.

In the opinion of the enemy, Martyr, Dr. Chamran and Hojat ul-Islam Khamenei (who represented Imam at the Supreme Defence Council and maintained efficiently in the domination of the Imam's Line), were the main and determining factors in small but constant victories.

On June 28 the enemy imagined that the Islamic Republic has been irreparably undermined; yet our confrontation with the Iraqi invaders was taking shape, in spite of the enemy's ebullient optimism. Our information sources reported that there was a full-scale celebration in the enemy's camps.

The enemy's morale was heightened to the extent that some of them would dare to come close to our forces and would fire RPG7s.

Extensive and hostile propaganda had created unfounded impressions of the Islamic Revolution which we had to dispel only in the battlefields. We had to prove that Bani Sadr's ouster had among other things liberated the armed forces, and enhanced the war fronts. As we lacked experience in propaganda and were not aware of the effects of the psychological warfare the required measures had not been taken in this respect.

On July 25, 1981, on Mahshahr-Abadan front a limited-scale operation called 'Martyr Chamran' was launched which was not successful and the enemy was able to capitalize on it.

On July 27, the operations "Ramadhan" in the Tarrah area on Hamidiyeh-Karkheh Noor front reversed the adverse situation to a great extent, showing that in spite of all the damages sustained from the internal enemies, we had still preserved our unflinching spirit to fight on.

This offensive was participated equally with the enemy and IRGC forces and was carried out so powerfully and swiftly that the combatants, giving only 20 martyrs, killed 200 Iraqis and capturing 197 of them; they destroyed 40 enemy's tanks and personnel carriers.

The tactical advantages of this offensive were so significant that for the recapture of the area we freed (by 4 kms of advance), the enemy made 10 counteroffensives but each time retreated, suffering heavy casualties. This offensive was important also from military point of view since beside the wet-land obstacles created in the area there were a few kilometres of dry land which was key point for the control of Ahvaz. This very reason increased the psychological impact of the operation.

Therefore, in order to launch the above mentioned offensives as forcefully as possible, the enemy even moved its forces in fakkeh and within Iraq. A captive Iraqi driver said: "Saddam was in Jofeir but has said that as long as you fail to recapture Tarrah, I won't leave here, since the importance of the area is clear both to the Iranians and to us." (Whether Saddam was there or not it has not been verified but what is important is that it has had its effect on the enemy's forces.)

Simultaneously the firm stance of martyr Mohammad Ali Rajaei in reply to the "Non-Aligned Peace Mission", intensified the case, demoralising the Iraqis but encouraging the Iranian combatants. Moreover, the atmosphere at the Supreme Defence Council completely changed after the dismissal of Bani Sadr, encouraging the high-ranking military officials to think of war and offensives since it has been realised that the only solution to the issue was military pressure on the enemy instead of being led by diplomatic tricks conducive to submission, a policy which Bani Sadr, diligently pursued.

IRAQI OFFENSIVE ON AUGUST 10, 1981

Following Martyr Rajaei's reply to the "Non-Aligned Peace Mission" to the effect that: "We determine the fate of war in the warfronts" and concurrent with the departure of the mission for Iraq, the enemy decided to recover its weakened morale at any cost. The best place to launch its offensive was Dar Khoein front since with its recapture, Iraq would provide the required support for its forces in the northern flank besieging Abadan. In this case Abadan's siege would be further stabilised and this was what the enemy needed politically in order to hold a winning hand in negotiations. Also, the enemy believed that the small numbers of our forces and weapons, in the front, noticed by the enemy in its reconnaissance flights, would guarantee the Iraqi victory.

But the enemy could not use its forces in this region to the best advantage, as it had a bad memory of its previous confrontation with Iranian combatants, and had not yet regained enough spirits to face them again. Therefore, two infantry battalions, one composed of "special forces" were summoned from Susangerd and after showing them a number of air pictures they were told that: "There are only a number of Basiji (mobilisation forces) and a few burned tanks in that area. Go and occupy it." (According to a number of Iraqi POWs).

Though the enemy bombarded the area with artillery fire everyday, but prior to this operations it concentrated a heavy unprecedented artillery barrage on the area, to the extent that IRGC instructed the forces in Khuninshahr and Abadan to go on the alert, as large-scale offensive by the enemy was expected. The barrage was performed by 5 battalions (using a battery of 90 artillery pieces).

One of the characteristics of this offensive was that the enemy had tried to imitate our tactics which we did not expect. But the Iraqi infantry could not perform the role that our committed infantry played at night. In spite of the heavy enemy fire, the awareness, mettle and outstanding performance of our troops who were badly out-numbered saved our positions from collapsing and the enemy suffered 150 killed and 26 captives while a few of our forces were either martyred or injured.

The August 10 Iraqi offensive, which was designed to gain military privileges, gave adverse results through the heavy defeat it sustained in spite of all the measures it had taken.

After the August 30 incident, the Iraqis had celebrations in their camps using tracer blanks and firing into the air. But this time we knew better.

By speeding up our activities, on Sept. 1, and 2, 1981 we launched two offensives in southern fronts. (There was another operation in Sar-Pol-e Zahab on Sept. 3). First, on Hamidiyeh-Karkheh Noor front and the second on Allah-O-Akbar front. In the latter we had a relative success but in the former, we only made a 4 to 5 kms of advance, and the enemy withdrew to beyond the river. The victory in this operation called "Martyr Rajaei-Martyr Bahonar" paved the way for future operations in Hoveizeh and on Ahvaz-Khorramshahr Highway.

SAMIN UL-AEMEH OPERATIONS, THE END OF THE ONE-YEAR-OLD ABADAN SEIGE:

On late July 1981, martyr Kolehdoz presented to a session of the Supreme Defence Council a plan formed by the Khuzestan IRGC for the raising of Abadan siege, together with a general analysis of the situation. The plan was approved and then sent to the Ground Forces. It was later announced that Ground Forces and other army units in the area were pondering over an offensive, along the same tactical lines, as adopted in the sad plan. What remained then was a detailed coordination of the IRGC and Army activities.

During lengthy sessions the mechanism of the operation and merger of the forces was discussed and even the exact date, as well as its name, was chosen. The operation was code named "Samen ul-Aemeh". A few points should be mentioned in connection with this operation:

- Saddam's greatest political advantage, after the occupation of Khorramshahr, was the siege of Abadan. Saddam would often claim that he could occupy Abadan any time he wanted.

- The geographical situation of the region and the deployment of the enemy forces there was such that any blitz or surrounding could deal a fatal blow to the Iraqi army (in a bridge head of 150 sq. kms., east of the Karun River).

The most important reason for pushing the enemy back from the east of Karun apart from its military and political advantages, was Imam's decree that "Abadan siege should be raised". This, one year after the city's siege, weighed as a heavy religious obligation on the shoulders of every person committed to the Imam's Line and religious jurisprudence.

This was our first great offensive. It was carried out with the cooperation and coordination of the army and the IRGC. Victory in this operation meant the start of a new chapter in the war and a prelude to ultimate victory; but its failure would raise many doubts. Therefore, the offensive tactics, and their underlying principles had implications far beyond the significance of a single offensive.

The area under the occupation of the enemy east of Karun was about 13 sq. kms. and almost an equal area between Karun and the southern side of Mahshahr-Abadan highway was in enemy hands. Therefore, the two Ahvaz-Abadan and Mahshahr-Abadan highways fell within the occupied region, and parts of them were actively controlled by the enemy. The occupied area was some 150 sq. kms.

The enemy defences in this area consisted of high embankments, extensive mine fields, infantry lines and a powerful air umbrella which kept our planes and helicopters from penetrating into their lines. All these made the enemy so confident that it would secure the area through two, and sometime one bridge. The ammunition stored there could suffice several days of non-stop fighting.

The operation started at 01:00 hours, Sept. 27, 1981. At 14:00 hours it was announced that the second bridge connecting Iraq with east of Karun was taken. Although the enemy resistance was very fierce in one front and did not allow our forces to advance, the speed of our troops in another front enabled us to advance in that direction, and to link our forces, encircling the enemy. Seizing two enemy bridges and surrounding the enemy in one sector was an auspicious beginning, and a reassuring sign of strength and mobility of our forces, who could compensate by their speed in one front, for the slowness of their fellow-combatants, in another front, swinging around the enemy lines and linking up

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with the troops on the other side.

The enemy forces in this sector comprised:

The 64th armoured brigade, the 3rd armoured division.

The 8th infantry brigade, the 11th division.

The 44th infantry brigade, the 11th division

The independent Seif Saad battalion.

The 301st infantry battalion under the instruction of the 6th armoured brigade.

An infantry battalion from the 13th brigade.

One Qate' from Jeish-Shabi, about 500 personnel.

Five artillery battalions supporting west of Karun in addition to the enemy's artillery stationed in the area.

The casualties and damage to the enemy sustained:

Destruction of 90 tanks and personnel carriers, 100 vehicles, two PMP bridges, seizing 160 tanks and personnel carriers, 30 loaders and bulldozers, five 155mm artillery pieces, 150 vehicles, two catioshas, 106 rifles, and light weapons and some ammunition. The Iraqi casualties were 2,000 and 1,800 were taken captive.

WAR STRATEGY

Operation Samen ul-Aemeh showed that we could embark on extensive successful operations without suffering important casualties and damages. To start the operation we only needed to have a specific strategy upon which the operational plans and procedures could be based.

The second year of the war was opening with the realization that a basic strategy should be adopted for the war. The new Ground Forces Commander and IRGC officials held several meetings in this connection, and reached certain conclusions, which could be outlined as follows:

The issue of war should necessarily be solved in one of the following ways: either Saddam is deposed, or through exertion

(1) Qate' is a unit in the so-called popular (militia) of Saddam's army.

of force by us, the Iraqi regime consents to our just, humanitarian and Islamic conditions; and its imperialistic supporters also give way to our demands. The measures agreed upon to be taken were:

1. Destruction of enemy's forces,
2. Freeing our own forces,
3. To be prepared for the final decisive offensive.

Some 12 plans under the title of "Karbala, from Karbala to Karbala" were prepared and presented to the Supreme Defence Council.

It should be recalled here that prior to Tariq ul-Qods Operations, there were deliberations upon a thrust from Khorramshahr to Basra, but upon the careful analysis of the proposed strategy, and its main elements, it was decided that "Karbala" plans should be given priority.

According to this plan, every stage of the operation was so designed that, immediately after its performance, we needed a very small force to secure our defence line. For example, in the liberation of Bostan, when Tang-e Chazzabeh was recaptured, our defence line was not longer than 3 or 4 kms whereas previously we had to stretch it along 20 to 25 kms. Therefore, we could free the forces stationed on a front of 16 to 20 kms in the northwest of Susangerd.

Also in Fath ul-Mobin offensive, after destroying many of the enemy's forces, when we reached Borqaziyeh, Reqabiyeh and Ein Khosh defiles, we could secure the area with a small number of forces due to the favourable situation of the terrain. Therefore, we could free many of our own forces and prepare for the penultimate offensive in the liberation of Khorramshahr, Hamid Garrison and the 130-kms Ahvaz-Khorramshahr Highway.

Adopting a comprehensive strategy enabled us to set up far-sighted plans for the future, and also eliminate those tactics which were not in keeping with the factual elements of the war.

TARIQ UL-QODS OPERATIONS - THE KARBALA (KIRBILAR PLAN)

The Tariq ul-Qods operations marked the beginning of the organisation of popular forces within the framework of the IRGC and Basij. We knew that if we organised the great power of the people who were willing to volunteer for the war, we could launch offensives even greater than Samen ul-Aemeh. The enemy were stunned by our fatal blows. Iraqi commanders had reasoned that their defeat in northern Abadan had been quite accidental and that

the main cause for such an incident had been the presence of Syrian, Libyan and North Korean military advisors in the army and the IRGC!

We sought to develop tactics which allowed for all such decisive factors as self-foregetful devotion, faith and uplifting incentives. With a Muslim, committed and revolutionary people the war should be "popular" in order to become victorious.

It was due to these motives that while Iraq, was in our territory, enjoying military superiority, there was no hesitation, not a single moment of doubt in the minds of our combatants, as to the final outcome of the war. In fact, when fighting becomes a religious obligation for a combatant in the army of Islam it is fighting itself, not its results, that is, defeat or victory, that counts.

However, according to the Quaranic injunction: "*Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power,*" (Holy Quran - Sura Anfal - 60). The most sophisticated equipments, modern tactics and techniques, compatible with this major role, would be employed. In fact instead of submitting human will and motives to instruments, the instruments should be dominated by the human will, and be placed at the service of people's faith. Therefore, under no adverse circumstances should the lack of hardware stop our forces from fighting with an army to whose arsenals are ceaselessly replenished from four corners of the world. That is why, not a single Islamic combatant would hesitate to fight with Israel (which is admittedly equipped with the most sophisticated military hardware).

With Bani Sadr's dismissal, the theory for the dissolving or merging revolutionary institutions faded away; and in the case of the army and the IRGC, the efforts to develop a system utilizing both classical skills and the tactics of guerrilla and popular fighting, replaced that theory.

Naturally in this sytem the major part is played by the infantry forces who embody the said faith and devotion. It should be noted, for instance, that the Israeli army relies primarily on its Air Force, and then on the armoured forces. In the Iraqi army the "armoured" division forms the backbone of the army.

The victories achieved through the coordination of these two forces (army and the IRGC), in the raising of Abadan siege, was enough encouragement to pursue such a policy.

Tariq ul-Qods was the first manifestation of the popular war, and its victory testified to the soundness of its organisations and tactics. It made simultaneous use of the elaborate interceptive tactics of the jet fighters, as well as of the volunteer missions of a number of highly devoted infantry men who, within the first hours of the operation managed to cripple the enemy batteries.

To liberate a region bigger than that liberated through the Samen ul-Aemeh operation needed a larger number of fighters who could only be drawn from the people. IRGC undertook training and organizing these popular groups. The composition of the participating forces was 20 per cent army and 80 per cent forces under the IRGC.

Before giving an account of the operation and its aftermath it would be in order to note the following matter:

We had realised that the Iraqi tactic to confront the offensive of our infantry was that of counteroffensive. In night raids

our infantry men would attack intrepidly the enemy embarkments and destroy their armoured vehicles which formed the main part of its forces, without least concern for their own lives. The enemy, which was incapable of confronting us at night: (their tanks could not make the required maneuverings), had concluded that it should reckon on its front line forces, no matter how powerful they were, since their destruction was inevitable.

In the documents seized in the course of the war, it has been mentioned: "We do not count on our (front) line forces. Our main stay lies in the deeper lines". By adopting this tactic, the enemy would naturally create a condition in which our forces being exhausted by hours of fighting to break the enemy's front line and occupy its positions, were confronted with fresh Iraqi forces, stationed deep within the Iraqi lines behind the front. That is why the enemy would always launch a swift and heavy counter-offensive the next day.

In the Samen ul-Aemeh the geographic features of the area was such that we could cut the Iraqi forces in depth, attacking from the banks of the Karun River. So we decided to attack their

counteroffensive forces from the beginning. For after the operations, the river itself was a good obstacle against the enemy counter-offensive.

In the plan for Tariq ul-Qods operations, the second and third lines of the Iraqi enemy were attacked simultaneously with the front line, not giving the enemy an opportunity to move their forces in depth. This was done successfully in northern Karkheh front.

The problem of destroying the counteroffensive forces of the enemy had always been studied carefully and carried out successfully. One of the reasons for our victories had been the performance of these counteroffensive operations. By carrying out these plans, the enemy would be destroyed in depth to the extent that for long it could not launch any counteroffensive, allowing our forces to stabilize.

The main factor for the success of these plans was wasting the enemy's time and drawing on the speed, courage and devotion, which the unbending faith of our combatants provided.

A SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS AND ITS OBJECTIVES:

The objectives were as follows:

1. To cut the enemy's connection from north to the south which was possible with the occupation of Tang-e Chazzabeh and its closure. Chazzabeh is a defile, which affords a passage way of only 1000 to 1500 metres in width for more than 4 kms. It was the only route for the enemy to transfer forces from north to south. With the speedy movement of the Iraqi armoured and mechanised forces, it was able -- in case we launched an attack west of Susangerd or Hoveizeh -- to transfer, within two hours, a great number of its forces, from Dezful and Shush areas to this front, or vice versa. If we could seize this area with the defence force stationed along 1 to 1.5 kms, we could slow the enemy's movements; as it did not have a brigade or a division there and could only deploy a battalion.

This region was bounded on the north by Ramli Heights, and on the south by a marsh. If this objective was reached, the south by a marsh. If this objective was reached, the

enemy could no longer make any movement from Dezful to Jofeir and Hoveizeh and back, and would be forced to detour a long way inside its own territory.

2. To liberate Bostan on which the enemy and particularly Saddam himself had staged an extensive propaganda.

3. To destroy enemy forces, estimated to be some six bridges.

4. To liberate some 70 villages with 4,500 to 5,000 tribesmen who were under the domination of Iraqi Baathist forces in the occupied areas.

5. To reach and rehabilitate international border near Hor-ol-Azim.

6. To liberate a vast area of 300 to 350 sq. kms, more than twice the areas liberated in the raising of the Abadan siege.

On Nov. 29, 1981, the operations were underway at midnight, on the two main lines to the north and south of Karkheh. On the northern front the success was 100 per cent but on the south, it was 70 per cent. However, after several counterattacks all of which failed, the Iraqi forces were gradually forced to evacuate the areas. The liberated areas was even larger than what was anticipated in the plan.

The liberation of Tang-e Chazzabeh, which was deep within the enemy's defences, was the most important objective of the plan. With the beginning of the operation, the enemy was attacked in Ramil, on its northern flank where it could not expect any attack. This attack was simultaneous with the confrontation in the front and second lines where the enemy's reserve artillery was active. The enemy's artillery, being attacked from behind, was silenced after one hour of fighting and was seized by IRGC men undamaged, including nineteen 152 mm artillery pieces known as Khamse-Khamse. A number of Iraqi tanks seized by the IRGC men in Abadan offensive, attacked the enemy positions now with an unusual speed and maneuvering. The enemy was completely confused to see that one of its own tanks has opened fire on its own installations.

To make possible the transportation on Ramli Heights, Jihad personnel had constructed a special road in desert where one

ordinarily sinks knee-deep into the flowing sand. The IRGC men decided to go the rest of the way at any cost. The previous night's rain had helped a great deal, hardening the Ramli area, making transportation possible. The enemy thought that the rain would prevent us from making any attack. All IRGC men believed that the heavy rainfall on that night was a divine help.

Another existing incident testifying to the acuity and speed of the IRGC men was that after our deep penetration into the enemy lines, the headquarters of the 26th armoured brigade, from the 5th division, was captured and only the commander of the brigade and five of his companions could escape. The remainder of the brigade was destroyed.

On the second day of the operations, all the objectives in one of the northern Karkheh fronts had been achieved, and Tange Chazzabeh was in hands of the Islamic forces.

In the southern front, Bostan was liberated, but a number of objectives were not reached, enabling the enemy to launch several counterattacks to recapture Bostan. Thanks to the superb resistance of our forces, the enemy was defeated, sustaining heavy losses. Later, when the enemy felt the danger of being surrounded and destroyed, it retreated in a few phases, and was stationed in southern Karkheh-Koor giving up about 650 sq. kms of the Islamic territory.

The documents seized from the enemy showed that the enemy had predicted the offensive and had planned counterattacks for it. But it never predicted the adamant faith of the Islamic forces which enabled them to walk 20 kms and then engage the Iraqi troops in a 24-hour battle.

The enemy, never thought of being attacked from sandy heights, and further, had planted the area with mines. The demolition teams of the Islamic forces had opened new paths at appropriate times. On the night of the operation, a small number of our forces assigned to raid the lines of Iraqi reserve forces, lost their way on the minefields, thus being martyred or injured.

The damages sustained by the enemy were destruction of 180 tanks and personnel carriers, 200 vehicles, four helicopters and 13 planes.

100 tanks, 70 personnel carriers, 19 152mm artillery pieces, 250 vehicles, 70 anti-aircraft pieces, 23 pieces of 14mm rifles, two Shiikas and 150 road constructing vehicles and a great amount of ammunition bearing the emblem of Saudi kingdom were seized.

The Iraqi casualties were 3,500 killed and 546 captured.

FATH UL-MOBIN OPERATIONS -- KARBALA (2) PLAN:

After Tariq ul-Qods operations, when the strategic procedures for the continuation of the war were being elucidated, two regions were proposed for the next operations.


A. West of Karun and Khorramshahr

B. The area west of Shush and Dezful.

The region (B) was approved by the Supreme Defence Council. The main reason for them to approve this plan was that if the operations carried the day a fewer number of forces would be needed to defend the liberated areas, thus freeing a greater number for the next operation. The next reason was the presence in the region, of two powerful 10th and 1st mechanised divisions which had remained undamaged so far and made a formidable asset in enemy hands. If the two divisions received a severe blow, with a high percentage of destruction to its equipments, it would amount to a strategic set back to the Iraq armoured capacity.

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF THE REGION:

Possessing an elevated terrain, the region overlooks the eastern side of Shush and Ahvaz-Dezful highways. Compared to the site of Samen ul-Aemeh operations where armoured forces had a great chance to maneuver with ease and speed but the infantry had to move with care; the existence of heights and narrow passes here greatly impeding the maneuverability of the armoured vehicles, provided excellent positions for the infantry activities. However the domination of the enemy over strategic points in the region had made our penetration very difficult. The terrain had an area of more than 2,000 sq. kms.



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POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION:

By holding the heights, the enemy had within its artillery and missiles range the two cities of Shush and Dezful -- as a result of which Shush was half-ruined and almost depopulated. But Dezful, less damaged, was still resisting and giving more martyrs everyday. Liberation of these two cities and their restoration was of great importance due to political reasons.

The radar heights and 4th and 5th sites were also very important because, in addition to controlling all the flight from there and providing the air defence for the entire region, the enemy could pound Dezful from there by surface-to-surface missiles - as it was doing so everyday. To better grasp the political and military importance of the area it suffices to quote Saddam who once said: "If the Iranians retake the site and the radar, I will give them the key to basra."

The region had other strategic points such as Ein Khosh, Ali Gareh-Zad Heights, Shavriyeh site, Tange Reqabiyeh, Doselk, Shajnoli, etc.

ORGANIZING THE POPULAR WAR:

The war assumed a popular shape during Tariq ul-Qods operations to a limited extent but became more extensive in the Fath ul-Mobin offensive.

The joint army and IRGC command, from the highest to the lowest ranks, were engaged in these operations. The plans for the coordination of army and IRGC forces were studied in an atmosphere free from conflict and prejudice. The merger of forces took place, enabling the combatants to complement each other's weak points and benefit from their capabilities. Command in various ranks was determined in a realistic manner based on a fraternal understanding and not in a rigid and inflexible way which lead to the promotion of possible weaknesses, thus damaging the operations.

One of the best points of this stage of war was the flexibility and ease in adjusting the various organisational systems and also the capacity of absorbing popular forces. For example, after

rehearsing the plan and when preparations for the operations were underway, it was realized that the actual combat capability of the forces was three times as much as that which was initially predicted. In fact from this point of view, Fath ul-Mobin was a brilliant experiment in leading a popular war.

PRESENCE OF THE PEOPLE:

In addition to the great combating force, what one could see in all fronts and behind them was the "people", eager to volunteer to do anything no matter how small. They had brought with them from all over the country whatever they deemed necessary.

The active presence of the people in all fields resembled a seething river which engulfed you and swept you along its course. This was a community in which people were trying to serve and make sacrifices.

For instance, visiting a workshop, one realized that each one of the workers would try to outstrip the others in rendering a service. If few were needed, many would volunteer. On highways, convoys of trucks and trailers carrying people's gifts to the fronts would never end. It seemed as though whole country was moving towards warfronts.

Such an atmosphere of devotion, love and loyalty pervaded the whole region that whoever experienced it could not help being affected by it. Hardly anyone could be found not inspired by this sublime feelings.

Enemy's attempts before the start of "Fath ul-Mobin" offensive:

After Tariq ul-Qods operations, the enemy made an all-out attempt to find out about our future movements. For example it began movements in Shush and Dezful with the objective of capturing some of our forces in order to get information as to the future areas of operation. To this end, it commissioned one of its mechanised brigades to set up an armoured patrol composed of 400 people, to capture some of our personnel. But instead the enemy sustained heavy casualties while capturing only one of us.

However, with the information it collected (especially through the U.S. satellites), the enemy came to the conclusion that we would have a great operation in Shush. Therefore, it moved heavy equipments and large force there, expanding the mine fields and adding 10 individual brigades together with a number of "Jeish ul-Sha'bi" brigades to its two reinforced divisions in the region.

CHAZZABEH OFFENSIVE

The next attack launched by the enemy was in Chazzabeh. The enemy which thought we would start our offensive on Feb. 11, started an offensive on Feb. 6, in Tange Chazzabeh with the following objectives:

1. To exhaust our forces in this front and disrupt their organisation, which was formed for the Fath operations.

2. To waste our time and postpone Fath offensive, and through these objectives it hoped to:

- A) Attain some results on the scene of peace missions, if possible, and open negotiations from a powerful position.

- B) With the time it gained, it would strengthen its defensive system and forces at the scene of Fath operations.

3. In case of success in Chazzabeh and gaining access to Bostan, it would open a new active front, and thus prevent us from any activity in the region, neutralising our initiative and wasting our energy. To this end it had staged an extensive propaganda on the capture of Bostan.

4. To force us to use and exhaust our weaponry in Chazzabeh, deterring us from launching a great offensive such as Fath ul-Mobin.

To reach the above mentioned objectives, the Iraqi army had to accumulate a great force in Chazzabeh which included the following:

The enemy had made one of its brigades retreat from Shavriyeh and stationed it in Chazzabeh as well as a batallion from the 24th mechanised brigade, the 6th armoured division which was stationed in southern Naisan, the 3rd brigade from the 9th division stationed in Gilan-e Gharb, the same brigade which had launched

a counteroffensive in "Shaikouh". In addition to this, Saddam called for a general mobilization: "I want to mobilize you for an obligatory purpose," he said once. In a stupid and clumsy imitation of our attitude, in which Islamic motivations are the main incentive of the people, Saddam tried to give to the subject a religious appearance. This mobilization was launched from Baath Party centre and failed to attract people. For example, in Basra they gathered the people in a stadium where they placed a man and a woman in front of them. Later, they announced that those who wished to fight should go and join the man and those who refuse to fight should stand beside the woman. The entire crowd joined the woman.

However, the Iraqi regime by means of its terror, tactics collected 10,000 people and dispatched them to training camps. After receiving a trivial training, the group was dispatched to the area in 1000-man organised brigades most of whom were killed in Chazzabeh.

The offensive began on Feb. 6, 1982, lasting for 20 days with continuous heavy artillery, barrage upon the positions of our troops in Chazzabeh. Their devotion and self-sacrifice could be itself a separate book in the history of war.

However, the enemy, despite all its superiorities, reached only a fraction of its objectives, including wasting a great amount of our ammunition and weapons and exhausting a great number of our forces, martyring many of them. But altogether it could postpone our Fath operations only for 48 days and had no way to obviate the fate awaiting it. The enemy was forced to retreat even from its primary positions in Chazzabeh.

From a military point of view, this Iraqi defeat, with regard to the numerous casualties it suffered, (we could count at least 2,000 bodies of Iraqi forces) and foolish waste of ammunition and weaponry, was nothing but committing suicide. But gaining a superior political stance and hindering the Fath operations had so tempted the Iraqi commanders that they were carried away to such insane extremes.

In the siege of Abadan, Iraq had claimed that only 80 of its forces had been killed while announcing the figure as 34 for Tariq ul-Qods. But it claimed that 200 of its troops were killed in Ghazzabeh, confessing to the larger number of casualties it suffered in this stage.

UM UL-HASANEIN OPERATIONS:

In order to keep the enemy from regrouping and, also worry about other fronts, such as Chazzabeh, and to weaken the enemy's command and decision-making power, it was decided to launch a series of diverting operations in various fronts, except for the Fath theatre. There were a number of projects to be implemented but, due to some reasons, none were performed except "Um ul-Hassanein".

Finally the operations, in three stages, were launched on March 14, 16 and 17, 1982 on Hamidiyeh-Karkheh Noor fronts. Our forces struck the enemy in southern Karkheh Noor in a guerilla style which had not been used for a long time.

The superb results achieved in these operations showed how effective the methods that our forces had developed could be. Our forces received minor casualties while the enemy sustained 700 killed and more than 150 captives and 15 of its tanks and personnel carriers as well as seven mortar launchers were destroyed.

IRAQI OFFENSIVE ON MARCH 19, 1982:

Meanwhile, Iraq prepared itself to launch an offensive in Shush in order to disrupt our organisation and thus postpone our big offensive. But in this offensive due to the vigilance of our troops, the Iraqi army suffered 2,000 casualties and 200 captives, undergoing a severe defeat. But since it had advanced for several kilometres in some fronts, half of our camouflaged lines and passes were discovered by the enemy and our movement cannals were blocked.

The continuation of the movement by Iraq could have caused difficulties for our plans. This issue made us, despite the lack of 100 per cent readiness on our part, decided to speed up the operation in order to take the initiative away from the enemy. Although our pause there could gain us time to prepare, should not

have let the enemy to embroil and exhaust our forces.

Another danger the offensive might cause, in case of victory, was its advance in Karkhah and reaching a strategic natural defensive line which would cause us a great problem.

The enemy force in this offensive was two divisions.

A FEW POINTS ON THE OPERATIONS:

In spite of all the problems, the great Fath operation was launched in a short period of time, achieving outstanding results.

The offensive started on early hours of March 22, 1982 and reached its second and third stages on March 24 and 27. On March 29 the whole area was cleared of the enemy forces and our troops were stationed on the defensive lines.

Incidents which took place in this stage of war each could make an unforgettable legend, and are so many that require an independent treatment. For example the enemy had stationed a powerful battery of 82 pieces on Ali-Gereh-Zad Heights which used to pound heavily on great part of the region and even Dezful. To silence this battery was one of the objectives projected to be achieved in the first hours of the attack. A relatively big force of ours (three brigades from the army and three brigades from the IRGC) penetrated deep into the enemy lines with no confrontation and emerged suddenly, close to the artillery position. The enemy had no chance to fight. With this move and heavy attacks by our troops from behind the lines, the enemy had no alternative other than destruction or submission. This battery was seized by the combatants undamaged.

The wireless report of the Iraqi enemy describes the scene: It was reported to the command headquarters that the battery was threatened. The headquarters protested that a number of armoured battalions were in front of them, therefore, how they could claim that they were being attacked. Again when the command of the artillery asked for permission of the command headquarters to

withdraw as far as possible, the headquarters could not believe it. It could not believe that only a few hours after the start of the operations, the artillery was threatened to that extent, because no matter how weak the forces in front of them were, a long time would be needed to overrun them, of which battle there was no report. The enemy could not imagine that so many forces would penetrate close to its artillery without the notice of the forces in front of them.

In another case, mortar positions on Kut-Gapoon Heights, without having the chance to fire even once, were seized by our forces and the mortar launchers were turned against the enemy. A command headquarters in west of Kut-Gapoon was attacked so swiftly that nine astonished Iraqi commanders were arrested while trying to escape.

A number of enemy's positions were captured in the first hours of the attack, thus destroying the enemy's command system which was regarded as its basis of power. Of course the enemy had experienced Tariq ul-Qods but could not transfer command headquarters to distant areas because in this case it could not set up the proper communication with its units.

CAPTIVES:

One of the main characteristics of Fath ul-Mobin operations was the large number of captives, an indication of our power and speed in surrounding and destroying the enemy, some of the eye witnesses of the incident are quoted below:

- At 10 a.m. on March 27, 1982 after the capture of the radar and sites, an interesting scene had been created there. The Iraqis willing to surrender were so great in number that there was not enough time to pay attention to all of them. As soon as a vehicle emerged many people shouted "Iraqi, Iraqi", asking to be taken away from the area.

- A truck driver had gone somewhere and was not to be found. One of the captives drove the vehicle carrying others to the P. O. W. camp.

- The captives were ashamed when faced with the Islamic attitude and hospitality extended to them and some would hide their faces with their hands while others were weeping.

- There was a heavy traffic of our vehicles and infantry in addition to the Iraqi personnel to the extent that some were feeling the danger of a counteroffensive. If launched, it would be very difficult to withstand. But the 365 artillery pieces seized from the enemy and the destruction of its forces and weaponry, had not left much to do for an army whose expertise was counteroffensives.

Enemy's Damages and Casualties:

Destroyed weaponry:

361 tanks

18 planes

25,000 killed

15,000 captives


Booties:

150 tanks

some 500 vehicles

170 personnel carriers

182 mm artillery, 165 pieces; 152mm artillery, 130 pieces



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THE BATTLE OF BEIT UL-MOQADDAS-KARBALLA PLAN

After the Fath ul-Mobin operation, which attained its objectives in a very short time, the Islamic forces were informed immediately that they should be prepared for an operation as soon as possible.

One of the most distinct characteristics of the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation was our quickness in rebuilding and rallying our forces for a large-scale battle especially after the battle of Fath ul-Mobin. The Beit ul-Moqaddas operation was one which the U.S. thought impossible and considered us too powerless to recapture even Hamid Garrison. The operation acquires an augmented interest and importance by the fact that our main forces were composed of the ordinary people, in both operations; and naturally to prepare unskilled people for a war is quite different from mobilizing a regular army which operates professionally.

The period between the two operations was not more than a month. But for the enemy which had been in the region for more than a year and a half, it was a good opportunity. They had enough time to make and to carry out their defensive decisions and to position themselves in the necessary strongholds in the lines established after the Fath ul-Mobin operation. It was in total readiness that they were awaiting our imminent offensive. On the other hand it could not be a very long period for us since we had to attack and overrun the enemy in its bunkers and strongholds, and to keep on advancing.

Therefore, we had to pause and ponder our new strategy before engaging a well-prepared enemy who was licking the wounds we had inflicted upon him in the Fath ul-Mobin operation.

THE NATURAL FEATURES AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE OPERATIONAL REGION:

The Beit ul-Moqaddas operational region covered more than 5,400 square kilometers, that is, close to three times the area of the Fath ul-Mobin operational region. This region was bounded, on the north by Karkhah Nur (formerly Karkheh Kur) River, and the town of Hoveizeh; on the south, by the Shat Al-Arab River and Khorramshahr; on the east by the Karun River; and on the west the Al-Athim swamp and the Iraqi border fortification.

The terrain, unlike that of the Fath ul-Mobin, offered no important natural barriers which could be used as a shelter or supply point in offensive operations and was entirely flat. However, the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr highway and the Karun and Karkheh rivers provided quite tenable defensive lines; but for the time being the Iraqis were lucky enough to hold them.

It was an advantage for the enemy to be 'defending' and lying in wait in its bunkers, and a great disadvantage for us 'attackers'. Because in such areas the enemy could staff a huge attacking force in the flat plain by means of only a few heavy machine guns; and finally, stop and destroy them by bringing in reinforcement.

The important geographical features and the important and strategic areas of the region are as follows:

- The port of Khorramshahr: the port where the enemy had built its strongest defensive position during a period of more than a year and a half of occupation. It had destroyed a major part of the city and by creating of mine fields and digging tunnels had prepared even for a city battle (if necessary).

Apart from its high economic significance, Khorramshahr was considered by Iraq as a winning card, politically and geographically, mainly because of its strategic situation.

- The Shat Al-Arab river: This river which forms by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates crosses Basra in Iraq and drains into the Persian Gulf. To control this river means to control the lifeline of Iraq. As it is Iraq's sole line of access to the vital sea-routes of the world.

- Jofier: Located some 30 kms south of Hoveizeh, it was communications and coordinating centre of the Iraqi divisions number 5 and 6 and the enemy's back-up forces. It was also the supply base for Nashweh and even Basra inside Iraq.

Jofeir in the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation could be compared to "Dosolak" in Fath ul-Mobin whose capture precipitated in further disintegration of the enemy forces. Several kilometres of asphalt road built by the enemy in middle of the plateau could testify to Jofier's importance.

- Karkheh Nur River: Although it is not very wide it had become impossible to cross because the enemy, especially after the victorious Tari ul-Qods operation, in November of 1981, had constantly felt danger from this area, located east of Hoveizeh. To defend this area the enemy had created extensive strongholds with several mine fields, barbed wire, trenches and earth bunkers in addition to pill boxes which could very well impede or greatly slow down, infantry forces. On the peripheries of these defences the Iraqis had erected tank positions in short distances from each other, which could open murderous fire on the advancing infantry forces.

For an operation in this area, it was decided to avoid a frontal attack at this sector, and by prolonging the attack, the Islamic forces would have the chance to circle the enemy or attack it either from behind or from the flanks.

-Abadan-Khorramshahr road: This road is on the fairly high level and it is the only barrier which dominates a vast area of the plateau. For the enemy it offered a very good position from which it could easily repel. These advantages would turn in our favour if we succeeded in recapturing the road from the enemy, a boon which the amazing action and divine inspirations of our combatants made possible.

- Karun River: With a width of 150 metres it was considered as one of the most important and strategic natural barrier and a difficult obstacle for the swift infiltration of our forces, which constituted the essential principle of our operations. For this reason the main efforts of the operation had been put on effecting the safe passage of our forces from the Karun. The crossing of a great infantry and armoured forces from this river was alone one of the decisive stages of the operation and a great hazard.

In general an operation aimed at capturing an enemy bridge or to lay a bridge across river for the passage of troops and military equipment, in order to reach the other side of the river and setting up a bridge head there is a perilous military task.

Undoubtedly, in this operation the Islamic forces achieved one of the most astonishing military tasks. Speaking in terms of military tactics, it is extremely difficult to undertake an offensive operation concurrently with laying bridge, crossing it and holding the position. At the same time as our forces launched an attack against well-prepared enemy it also accomplished the passage of sizable infantry and armoured equipment across the river, and reached Ahvaz-Khorramshahr highway, capturing an area of about 800 sq. kms.

To understand the significance of just this one stage we will make a comparison. At the start of its aggression, Iraq laid a bridge on the Karun and crossed the river but the maximum amount of territories it was able to occupy was something about 150 sq. kms. At that time, however, Iraq did not confront any considerable resistance; but at the time of our attack during the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation we advanced in the face of the most dogged and fierce enemy fighting.

It is worthy of notice that our unbelievable quickness in launching the operation prevented the enemy from closely hugging the Karun, as it had done in Karkheh Nur. This was one of the objectives of our fast preparation and early start of the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation.

THE ENEMY'S COMBATCAPACITY IN THE REGION:

The enemy forces in the region, some of which had been dispatched just before or during the operation were as follows:

1. The 3rd armoured division consisting of the 12th, 6th and 53rd armoured brigades, and the eighth mechanised brigade.
2. The 5th mechanised division including the 26th and 55th armoured brigades and the 15th and 20th mechanised brigade.
3. The 6th armoured brigade including the 16th and 30th armoured brigades and the 25th mechanised brigade.

(1) Of course some of the units named here had suffered substantial blows in previous battles, but were again sent to the fronts after regrouping. For example the 10th armoured division had four brigades under its command in the Fath ul-Mobin operational region but Iraq was able to reconstruct and send the remains of this division to the battle of Beit ul-Moqaddas but this time with two brigades.

Also some of the Iraqi brigades had been totally destroyed but they were sent to battle again after a few months with a new composition and personnel.

(2) This division which had positioned itself in the south of the Karkheh Nur and Hoveizeh since the beginning of the Iraqi invasion, had set up its headquarters which resembled a large township by itself with its built in a traditional-style, the houses comprising rooms and halls built along the sides of spacious courtyards with complete facilities suitable for permanent living. On the sides of some of these buildings they had erected several layers of sandbags reaching the roof. They had streets, squares and various halls, in addition to a gasoline station and some facilities had been left incomplete, all indicating that Iraq never imagine leaving the region.

4. The 7th infantry division including the 19th and 39th infantry brigades.

5. The 9th armoured division including the 43rd and 35th armoured brigades and the 14th mechanised brigade.

6. The 10th armoured, division including the 17th armoured brigade and the 24th mechanised brigade.

7. The 115h infantry division including the 44th, 48th, 49th 45th, 13th, and 22nd infantry brigades.

8. The 12th armoured division including the 37th armoured brigade and the 46th mechanised brigade.

Also, the 2nd, 4th and 8th Iraqi division were positioned west of the Shat Al-Arab.

B) ENEMY INDEPENDENT BRIGADES:

The 10th armoured brigade and the 90th, 109th, 238th, 409th, 416th, 417th infantry brigades, and the 49th, 501st, 601st, 602nd, 605th and 606th armoured brigades and the 9th, 10th and 20th border brigades and the 31st, 32nd and 33rd special forces.

(1) This brigade was Saddam's most favourite military unit equipped with the best and most advanced gears, including T-72 tanks. In the Fath ul-Mobin operation it had been sent to battle due to the importance of the missile sites and radars, but as soon as the first indications of defeat were observed, this brigade was the first to retreat on the orders from Saddam, thus only a small amount of war spoils of any value was seized from this brigade.

In the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation 40 per cent of this brigade was destroyed and later in the Ramadhan operation it was reconstructed and sent into fighting in decisive moments, and the Islamic forces inflicted heavy blows on the brigade in terms of destruction of equipment and the seizure of war spoils.

The basic philosophy behind the formation of forces such as the 10th armoured brigade, with well-trained but ruthless personnel, has been the guarding of Saddam and his presidential palace against possible coup attempts or upheavals within the Iraqi army. Also this brigade had a fundamental role in vicious crimes committed in Hoveizeh during the war.

C) OTHER FORCES IN THE REGION:

30 commando companies, 10 irregular army Qati's (1), the independent Saif Sa'd tank battalion and the Honain, Salahaddin, and Hatim reconnaissance battalions.

From another point of view, the Iraqi forces stationed in the Beit ul-Moqaddas operational region have been estimated at 86,000 infantry troops, 41 tanks battalions with about 1,345 tanks, 38 mechanised battalions with about 1,330 personnel carriers, and 530 artillery pieces of various kinds which were continuously active. On the other hand the enemy aircrafts had the region under most severe bombardments and the number of Iraqi aircraft downed during the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation was a new record in the war.

(1) Each Qati' with about 550 soldiers.

Taking into consideration the enemy's large concentration of forces it was to our advantage that the fronts were spread out along a vast region so that when the enemy was engaged along a wide front, he could not bring the shattering bulk of his forces to bear on one concentrated point. Under such circumstances the enemy could not benefit from its sure advantageous organisation, maneuvering and concentration, while on the other hand, we could transfer our troops to the front wherever we intended to carry out our main attack while feigning to be attacking in another front. Of course, in the course of the operations and its later stages, our attacking fronts were obvious for the enemy but with the crippling of enemy forces, it was now incapable of any counter-measures.

A SUMMARY OF THE OPERATION, FIRST STAGE:

The operation began west of the Karun river in its first stage on April 22nd, 1982. The enemy never believed that we could cross the Karun, and at the same time leap to the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road. Since the loss of this road would cost the enemy so much, it quickly began fierce counter-attacks in order to regain parts of the road which we now controlled. To describe the situation one of our brothers puts it this way, "The conditions were so unbearable under the enemy pressure that our boys would readily go under the ground if the earth opened its mouth, but no one was thinking of retreating."

48 hours of magnificent resistance, which was only possible through God's bidding for fortitude and resistance in His path, finally and with the help of God, the Islamic forces got a chance to put themselves together. They picked out the areas where they would be stationed, strengthened their weak points, filled in the gaps and built earth-bunkers in front of points where the enemy could aim at with its point blank tank fire.

In the Karkheh Nur front, despite the fact that our forces were able to cross the river with all the previously mentioned defences set up by the enemy, they advanced to and occupied the second line of the enemy positions, but after 48 hours of resis-

tance against enemy counter-attacks, they were given orders to retreat from their positions temporarily since other units of the Islamic forces had not been able to make an advance with equal success. Also the order was given because the advancing group of the Islamic forces were in danger of the enemy's high maneuverability made possible by a single open front. Therefore, in this front, the enemy only suffered losses in equipment and destruction of forces and the Islamic forces returned to their original positions waiting for orders to resume action again when other advancing Islamic forces further south (moving towards the border behind the enemy positions in this front) would threaten the enemy positions here from behind.

SECOND STAGE:

The second stage of the operation began on May sixth with an attack from the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road towards the border.

- Concurrent with the second stage of operation Beit ul-Moqaddas, in the border region of Fakkeh (West of Shush) the Islamic forces launched an attack for the recapture of height No. 182 which was an excellent defensive position. This attack was aimed primarily at destroying the enemy forces in the region and preventing it from linking up its forces in the south where the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation was underway. The operation also freed a significant portion of our forces in the Fakkeh region which immediately joined the troops in the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation. The operation was completed with total success, with one enemy armoured battalion destroyed and a number of tanks and personnel carriers seized while some 809 Iraqi soldiers were taken captive and heavy casualties were inflicted.

In this stage our forces successfully reached a point 17 kms east of the border. Of course, here our troops put up an unbelievable fight against the frantic enemy counter-attacks until the end of the next day (May 7th) when our forces were able to dig inside new positions.

The horrified and disillusioned enemy finally came to the conclusion that it could no longer withstand the crushing waves of attacks made by troops who actually mocked the volleys of

sharpnel and incessant barrage. The capture of a few kilometres of the border line was not the only stake, in fact with the excellent movement of our forces, part of the enemy forces stationed in the south of the Karkheh Nur River and Jofier, Hoveizeh, the Hamid Garrison and... that is, the entire Iraqi 6th division became threatened with encirclement by the Islamic forces, or destruction and captivity. On the other hand, the banks of the Shat-al-Arab River, and Basra and Khorramshahr had been jeopardized as well.

Iraq's fear was neither unfounded nor useless, since it caused Iraq to give immediate orders for the retreat of its forces leaving all the installations, and connecting roads which they had built for a permanent stay in the Jofier region.

The enemy had no other choice than letting its forces flee from the region in order to rescue its 6th division and other forces. Iraq had realized that if it decided on keeping its forces in the region, it would lead to a situation which would put its forces in a position to fight simultaneously both with the Islamic forces crossing the Karkheh Nur River, and from behind with forces which were operating on the border line. Iraq knew that it would not have the strength for such an encounter and it would only result in thousands of casualties and surrender of its troops and the destruction of equipment, in addition to large amounts of war spoils for the Islamic forces.

The enemy forces had already felt the pinch during the Fath ul-Mobin operation when it was surrounded by the Islamic forces and it was loath to have the same experience over again.

Moreover, Iraq thought that by fleeing the region it could prevent the fall of Khorramshahr; and could counter the threat on Basra by concentrating its forces and defences in the Basra-Khorramshahr line. If Iraq could keep Khorramshahr it could use it to some extent as an advantage to mask the defeats it had suffered up to that point, by propaganda of world imperialism and continue to show a winning political card.

At 03.00 a.m. on May 8th, we witnessed one of the fastest Iraqi flights, this time from the Jofier region, and our forces chased and cleared up the region from the enemy. Also by 10.00 a.m. our forces were able to completely free the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line up the point reached in the first stage of the operation and thus linking our forces in the north and south. Now the supply route of

our forces had been established through this asphalt road and by eliminating the problem, caused by long distances and bad dirt road, the transportation and supply condition of our forces was drastically improved.

Later when the enemy was able to save much of its forces at the expense of a humiliating escape from its position, it generally concentrated its forces on the Shalamcheh-Khorramshahr line and the asphalt road which linked the two town, while it began heavy counter-attacks along with continuous artillery barrage and bombing raids.

One of the tactics which the enemy used to counter our infantry troops was by creating gaps in their ranks, and isolating them so it could destroy them in small pocket. With the maneuverability of its armoured forces, Iraq thought it was able to isolate our infantry troops, who without having any other choice, had stuck themselves to the ground, and to destroy them gradually by concentrating its fire upon them. And also it was well aware that we lacked the capability to transfer our troops as fast as it could. But in actuality, the resistance of our fighters once again thwarted the enemy's plans, while on the other hands, the Iraqis stalled our movement in order to continue and complete the operation.

THIRD STAGE:

The third stage of the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation originally began on May 9th, and was resumed on the next day but both offensives were successful.

By 'unsuccessful' it is meant that we could not carry out our offensive long enough to attain all the objectives determined before. But in these two offensives we inflicted remarkable losses on the enemy, including the capture of 15 officers, 64 NCOs, and 215 Iraqi soldiers.

On the above-mentioned days, our forces twice attempted to free Khorramshahr but in the Shalamcheh-Khorramshahr axis, Iraq still had the upper hand. The past ten days, since the beginning of the operation, our forces having borne the burnt of several counter-offensives was too exhausted to overrun the elaborate defences of the city, by sheer force. During these ten days they had

carried out continuous operations and sustained many counter-attacks along with great ground and air fire from the enemy. Therefore, in order to move on to Khorramshahr, a re-organisation and a reinvigoration of our forces were necessary. It took us another ten days for further reconnoitering of the situation in the region and study the enemy's capability, to devise tactics best suited to our resources.

During this period, Iraq had begun a new propaganda campaign against us. The enemy had succeeded in regaining the Shahabi outpost in the region in one of its counter-attacks, and it was making much out of this small victory. The Iraqis made extensive filming of the offensive which indicated that they badly needed a topic to blow up in their propaganda campaign, aimed at getting more support from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, after meeting behind closed doors for four days, the GCC did not reach a definite decision to support Saddam, whose ploys had not been convincing enough for the members to approve the award. The GCC postponed its decision to a meeting later in Riyadh, but a few days later our forces recaptured the outpost and Saddam's propaganda turned against himself.

At 21:00 hours on May 22, the Islamic forces began an operation aimed at the liberation of Khorramshahr. This time the operation was successful, and in the morning on May 23, our forces managed to cross the bridge leading into Khorramshahr in the west of the town, the Pol-e Now bridge, and reached the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab River.

In order to raise the siege of Khorramshahr, the enemy had planned to attack simultaneously from Shalamcheh in the west, and by its besieged troops, inside Khorramshahr, from the east, thus trapping our forces in the area by the Arayez stream and the Pol-e Now Bridge. If successful, this operation, would have connected the besieged enemy forces in Khorramshahr with other units in the Shalamcheh area. Again, if the enemy had succeeded in this operation, it would either try to push our troops further back by a few counter-attacks or it would pull back its forces safely, the later being most likely.

The enemy troops surrounded by the Islamic forces were not in very good spirits and most of them were in great panic.

"Soon shall we cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers..." the Holy Quran 3-151. Our troops, through the inspiration received from Imam Khomeini, trusted that God had visited terror upon the hearts of the enemy forces and they had lost all capability to take action. Imam Khomeini had confirmed and stressed this fact in his speeches.

Some of the Iraqis were so depressed that they were sitting inside the homes in Khorramshahr in tears. The apparition of a divine nemesis for the crimes and atrocities committed by them during a year and a half of their occupation, loomed ominously in the minds.

The enemy ordered its troops to be positioned within the triangle of the Karun River and the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr highway in the north of Khorramshahr and to retreat back into the city in order to prepare for their planned attack. During their retreat, the enemy forces destroyed large amounts of ammunition, namely the munitions depot of the 48th infantry brigade, thus giving the indication that Iraq cherished little hope of resisting and stopping our forces from entering Khorramshahr.

Among the besieged troops in Khorramshahr two different views regarding the imminent battle were held. One group believed that resistance was useless and they were willing to surrender themselves to the forces of Islam. But the other group, who were more loyal to the Iraqi regime's policies, were still looking for some way of resisting our forces. One distinguished exponent of this view was the commander of the Iraqi forces in Khorramshahr at the time, Colonel Ahmed Zaydan, who was in contact with the command headquarters of the 11th division and received his line of orders from there by a long-distance wireless.

In any case, the enemy attack from the west in Shalamcheh, despite strong insistence by the Iraqi military commanders, was defeated and the enemy had to pull back the desist retreat from the attack. On the other side, the enemy forces in Khorramshahr were further distressed as Colonel Zaydan struck a mine and was killed.

On May 24, a group of enemy troops made a decision to surrender themselves. At first a few officers and soldiers surrendered themselves to our forces, and then they swarmed in by thou-

sands. The total number of Iraqi soldiers and officers who surrendered on this day reached 12,400.

Here we should point out the effect on the Iraqi forces, of our messages, which were broadcast by loudspeakers and radios promising forgiveness rather than punishment and calling the Iraqis to brotherhood and liberation from the grips of imperialism.

Thus Khorramshahr which had fallen into the hands of the Iraqi invaders at 16.30 hours on the 26th of October, 1980 after 34 days of resistance, was won back to our Islamic nation after 575 days, at 11.00 hours on May 24th, 1982 in an operation which lasted less than 48 hours (beginning from the time when the operation to besiege the port started), a task that was thought impossible by the military analysts around the world.

When foreign reporters visited Khorramshahr on one of the two days before the final operation, they had this same impression. The Iraqi regime had invited the reporters in order to display its strength and control over the city and to show that 'Al-Mohamreh', as they had called Khorramshahr would remain in Iraqi hands and the flood of propaganda by the western news agencies spoke of the Iraqi forces' high morale.

In order to show that its previous propaganda had not been biased but impartial, and in order to amend for its disgrace to a certain extent radio said in a talk on May 26th that, "Since the time when western reporters visited Iraqi forces in Khorramshahr and reported on their high morale not more than three or four days have passed; but behold now, all of a sudden the entire city has been wrested out of Iraqi grip."

Enemy losses during the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation were:

A- Divisions

The 3rd Armoured Division	80 percent destroyed
The 11th infantry division	80 percent destroyed
(Both of the above mentioned divisions were stationed in Khorramshahr)	
The 5th mechanized division	20 percent destroyed
The 6th armoured division	20 percent destroyed

The 7th infantry division	40 percent destroyed
The 9th armoured division	50 percent destroyed
The 10th armoured division	50 percent destroyed
The 12th armoured division	20 percent destroyed

B- Independent brigades

The 10th armoured brigade	40 percent destroyed
The 31st, 32nd and 33rd special force brigade	heavy losses inflicted
The 9th, 10th and 20th border guard brigades	entirely taken captive
The 238 infantry brigade	taken captive
The 501 infantry brigade	taken captive
The 417 infantry brigade	destroyed
The 605 infantry brigade	destroyed
The 601, 602, 416, 419 infantry brigades	50 percent destroyed

C- Total enemy captives: 19,000.

D- Total enemy casualties: Estimated at 16,000 to 16,500.

CONCLUSION:

After the Beit ul-Moqaddas operation and the mayhem of the Iraqi forces, the Iraqi regime adopted a new policy towards the war in close coordination with the U.S.

1. To stop bragging about its military victories and instead masquerade as the innocent party in the war.

2. to retreat from some of the western territories of Iran and take position in the necessary defendable lines near the border.

Concurrent with these decisions and complementing them, the U.S. made an attempt to suppress the Muslims of southern Lebanon and Palestinians by means of the Israelis and thereby create a good excuse for Saddam's new policy, keeping the Iraqi people and army from questioning his political about-face, and this total withdrawal of former claims, so that he could be rescued from his calamities, without burning in the fire which he had ignited and fuelled himself.

Of course, for a period, we also were on the verge of falling into the triangular U.S.-Israel-Iraqi trap, and we were about to relegate the war into the position of a secondary concern all because

the Lebanese diversion almost distracted us. However, Imam Khomeini's warning pierced the wall of illusion, which was enveloping our minds. Then we realised that there was no other choice but to destroy the Iraqi regime and replace it with an Islamic and popular one in order to free the region from the grip of the U.S. Even if we had let ourselves be diverted by the events transpiring in and had done all in our power to aid the people there, ultimately we would have come to the conclusion that all our efforts and resources could not have effected any considerable change in regional conditions.

On the other hand, the hybrid state of neither-war-nor-peace which Saddam wished to impose upon us was in no way acceptable to us for a stage of constant alertness along our extensive borderlines with Iraq was not a desirable condition.

In addition, the issue of damages and the massive destruction brought by the invading enemy in the areas it occupied, and the enormous expenses of the past two years of war, all and all were just part of the disputes which had to be settled by Iraq, but it continued to remain heedless and treated us with insolence.

Summing up the issues we realise that we have no other choice but to continue the war even inside Iraqi territory and we should not also lose any chances. Therefore, after a period of lethargic inactivity, which weighed heavily upon us, orders were put out to launch operation Ramadhan.

From this point on, the war enters upon a new stage, disturbing the equilibrium of power which the world imperialists had hitherto maintained in the region. This iconoclastic trend, the U.S. would employ all its resources, to abort.

Just an example the U.N. which had turned a blind eye to the crimes and aggressions of the Iraqi regime for a year and a half; all of a sudden, and upon our declaration of the decision that we would continue our defence in the Iraqi territory, expressed deep concern, and issued a resolution debarring us any further action.

The start of the Ramadhan operation was in itself a proclamation by the Islamic Revolution that it goes on growing and gaining fresh vigor, despite all the impediments, set up on its path, by the world oppressors.


War should continue until our just demands have been met and the imperialism should not be permitted to achieve its aim of destroying the Islamic Revolution by re-organising the Iraqi mercenary regime.

In this analysis we made no reference to:

1. The effective part played by the Air Force, the Navy, the Ground Forces Air Support Units.

2. The combatants of the Islamic Revolutionary Committees, the Police, the Gendarmerie and a number of other popular forces such as the Fedayeen-e Islam and the Martyr Chamran Forces, for the reasons we stated in the beginning. In the future, however, with the help of God, their role must be studied in the history of the Iraqi imposed war.

Wassalam.



BEITOLMOGHADDAS OPERATIONS

Institut kulde de Paris

GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPOSED WAR

Institut Kulturelle Paris

Institut kurde de Paris

IRAQ AND THE IMPOSED WAR:

An analysis of the position taken by Iraq in the imposed war can not be undertaken without a proper study of the Iraq's stand on the eve of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

It is hard to understand how a government, with a basically Soviet-styled military and socialist-oriented economy, could have upon the victory of the Islamic Revolution veered around overnight, to make giant strides towards west.

In 1972 and during the office of Hassan-ol-Bakr, a friendship pact was signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union for expanding economic military and cultural relations between the two countries. The pact was enforced at least until 1978-79. However, despite maintaining its constant ties with Moscow, Baghdad furtively turns to the west to purchase arms, coinciding with the time the Shah's regime was fast deteriorating. Writes Washington Post in its November 4, 1980 issue, "France's aid to Saddam is in keeping with Carter's doctrine and is extended because France is better capable of doing so. During 1977-78 France sold as much as two billion dollars in arms to Iraq."

The Washington Post's assertion proves that as the ex-Shah's government was losing its foothold, U.S. strategy in the region aimed at attracting Iraq to the west.

In 1977 and later in 1978 during which the Islamic Revolution was gaining impetus, the French government acted as an intermediary between Iraq and the west, to promote the U.S. policies in the region. As the Islamic Revolution in Iran triumphed, the west made heavier investments in order to drive Iraq a little further

ahead along the course of its own strategy, thus preparing to implement its schemes.

In 1979 Saddam took the full reign of his government as the number one man of Iraq. He occupies the office of presidency as well as the offices of prime ministry and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces ousting Ahmad Hassan Bakr from the country's political scene. Saddam's political strategy after taking office is thoroughly in keeping with the designs of the west, whereby he has sought to:

1. Create an atmosphere of hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. Purging, arresting and killing members of the opposition and muzzling the Communist party there in a bid to woo the west

3. Coming closer to the reactionary governments of the region such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt.

And thus is the ground paved for the fruition of the west's schemes against the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

But Saddam's dependence on the west is not a post-war development, since his waging of a war against the Islamic Republic is by itself an outcome of his dependence on Washington, an adventurism which was promoted also by other elements such as his personal ambitions, and the fear of the spread of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as shared by Washington, Israel and Iraq.

1. HOSTILITY WITH THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN:

Washington's efforts for stamping out the Islamic Revolution in Iran were made initially in coordination with Baghdad, and soon developed in dimension. Iraq's subversive scheme in Iran started out by agitating the quasi-Arab groups within Iran, a widespread killing of Shiite Muslims among them Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Sadr (spiritual leader of the Shiite Muslims in Iraq), expulsion of Iranians from Iraq, instigating border unrest. It climaxed in Iraq's abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran. The prelude properly fitted Washington's scenario for embroiling the Islamic Republic in an unwanted war, since such an introduction was sufficient grounds for pitting Iraq against the Islamic Republic of Iran within a short span of time.

2. PURGING AND EXECUTIONS WITHIN BAATH PARTY CELLS:

The coming to power of Saddam was marked, among other things, by his disbanding of the Communist Party of Iraq, the execution of many of its heads and other measures obliterating any eastern-oriented entity in that country. Baghdad soon assumed an affected interest in alliance with Syria, principally with the idea of encouraging pro-Syria elements to avow their sentiments without reservation. But later he reversed his decision for an alliance with Syria and bringing various charges against Hafez Assad's government, executed each and every pro-Syrian element. They were a group of thirty members of the leadership council of the Baath Party and five members of the Revolutionary Council.

Saddam's coup in Iraq (July 1979) was not a development independent of the future relations of that country with the west: a development which Washington had speeded up in light of the emerging Islamic Revolution in Iran. Washington had decided that Saddam should soon embroil Iran in a war, and therefore, in a pre-emptive move to do away with the opposition who might, in the course of the war, impede or thwart his plans, it was necessary that the purging be done speedily. Such a purge would, in the meantime, serve as Baghdad's pledge of allegiance to Washington, whereby to woo Washington's unwavering support.

3. EXPANSION OF RELATIONS WITH REACTIONARY COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

Ever since its coming to power, the Baathist government in Iraq has been preoccupied with an ambition of assuring a strategic role in the Persian Gulf.

During the seventies and in the wake of the evacuation of British troops from the Persian Gulf, and Washington's high estimation of Iran and the development of military connections between the Persian Gulf states and Iran, Ahmad Hassan Bakr was tempted to court Washington by modernizing Iraq's armed forces and by trying to show off Baghdad's potential capability.

On the advent of the Islamic Revolution and the removal from power of Ahmad Hassan Bakr, and the coming to power of Saddam Hussein, Washington felt the need to find another substitute for the government which once safeguarded its interests in this part of the world. The culmination of the Islamic Revolution in Iran spearheaded the name of Iraq as a capable substitute for policing the Persian Gulf, which of course, meant that it would be given sufficient support by the reactionary governments of the region for the fulfillment of U.S. schemes which included the imposition of a war upon Iran. Saddam headed for the Persian Gulf states, the first Iraqi President to do so in 12 years (since the visit to Saudi Arabia by Ahmad Bassan Bakr).

Writes 'Jeune Afrique' in its June 9, 1982 issue under the headline. "For Whom the Bells Toll":

'The story started in Taif of Saudi Arabia, Baathist Saddam Hussein was visiting the city along with high-ranking delegations composed of the most conservative leaders of an Arab monarchical government which he always belittled... That was the first visit of an Iraqi head of state to the Saudi kingdom since the fall of Malek Faissal in 1958. Theoretically the idea behind the visit was to further develop relations between the two countries and reach an agreement on a common strategy for preventing the annexation of Oods to Israel. The statesmen of the Saudi Arabian government are specially concerned about the Islamic developments in their neighbouring countries since the fall of the Shah. Not that they are worried about any potential danger by the Islamic Republic in the very near future, but that they fear that models of the Islamic Revolution might pass into other countries. The 1979 incidents in Mecca has increased their fear.'

Thus the Baghdad regime proceeded to impose a war upon Iran in keeping with the U.S. strategy, and eventually on September 22, 1980, launched an all-out offensive against Iran.

The start of the war against Iran and Washington's efforts for balking Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, made it possible for European countries to expand their relations with Iraq. This was in keeping with agreements previously entered into

with Iraq during the Islamic Revolution and in accordance with Carter's doctrines, justifying their arms sales to Iraq during the ensuing war. As an example Baghdad received a fleet of sixty F-1 Mirages which are said to be flown by Egyptian pilots.

Thus fitting Iraq within the framework of the tactical positions described above, Washington prepared the ground for embroiling Iran in a war, to achieve two goals: first, to stamp out the Islamic Revolution; and second, to push Baghdad away from the eastern bloc fold. It should be noted, however, that at the inception of the war, Washington did not intend to make Saddam Husein dependent and subservient to the United States, Why? Because even before the war, Saddam Hussein was considered a U.S. inspired agent at the head of the Baath Party. Washington's principal goal was to obstruct the channels through which the Islamic Revolution might infiltrate into Iraq, and at the same time minimize Soviet influence in that country. Saddam's award in the event of the success of the scheme would be Iraq becoming the Persian Gulf Gendarme, a hope which was frustrated during its futile war with the Islamic Republic.

BAGHDAD FRUSTRATED IN ITS ENCROACHMENTS

So far, since the first day of its encroachments upon the Islamic Republic Baghdad has suffered three major military set-backs. Baghdad's military set-backs in Abadan (which led to the liberation of the city on September 27, 1981) and later in Khorramshahr (which led to the liberation of the city on May 24, 1982) had military significance with political implications. But later on and during the third phase of the war which marked a (self-declared) ceasefire (by Baghdad), and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the western parts of the country, Saddam's set-backs in the battlefronts came to be regarded as portending his eventual fall from power.

Saddam was trying hard to crush the Islamic Republic by occupying an entire area in Khuzestan Province of Iran and by getting support from the counterrevolution in Kurdistan. Saddam's propaganda introducing the province as an Arab Province aimed to promote the same objective. But as the Iraqi troops were bogged

down in Iran, sporadic efforts were made in order to bring about a ceasefire while Iraqi troops were in Iranian territory. But the continuation of counterattacks by Iran and later the ousting of ex-President Bani Sadr from office heralded repeated defeats for invading enemy troops. After his set-back in Abadan and in the wake of Tariq ul-Qods offensive by Iran (November 29, 1981) in a public appearance, Saddam Hussein proposed a ceasefire and peace-talks. He had realized that Washington and Israel had placed their hopes on him and expected him to show resistance. As the heads of state in the region and even of the reactionary governments found themselves at loggerheads as to whether they should continue supporting Saddam Hussein or favour a relatively just peace between the two countries, it was even harder for Saddam to live up to the expectations of Washington and the west. But since Saddam found his government on the verge of collapse he decided to adopt a more flexible stand and watered down his terms for a cease-fire. Saddam's apparently relenting attitude towards Iran, was in fact a spurious gesture assumed to gain some measure of legitimacy for his demands. But in the wake of military set-backs, the lifting of the siege of Abadan, the Tariq ul-Qods offensive (by Iran), and just before the Fath ul-Mobin offensive (March 22, 1982) Saddam in a letter to (Guinea President) Ahmed Sekutire declared that he had accepted the third clause of Iran's proposition for a ceasefire, viz., ascertaining the aggressor in the conflict. However, he disregarded Iran's stipulation for the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi

troops from Iranian territory in so doing Saddam wanted to throw all the blame for the continuation of the war upon Iran. In the meantime the firm stand of the Islamic Republic in the conflict provided an ideal opportunity for the countries of the region to step up their poisonous propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Beit ul-Moqaddas operations dealt a heavy blow on the Baghdad regime. Iraq's high command was hard put to it to mention anything of the Iraqi expulsion from the Iranian territory

hitherto occupied by Iraq. It was only after Saddam's eventual confession to certain "tactical" withdrawals that the political circles could gauge the extent of Iraq's defeat. Now Baghdad resorted to diverse diplomatic alternatives in its efforts to impel the Islamic Republic to negotiation. Among these efforts was the delegation of the Islamic Conference visiting Tehran and Baghdad, but were unsuccessful in gaining concessions in Baghdad's interests. Iraq had sustained the most shattering defeat in the operation which led to the liberation of the Persian Gulf port city of Khorramshahr. Said Imam Khomeini in reference to the liberation of the port, "The liberation of Khorramshahr was no simple achievement. It can not be justified in natural terms that a group of 15,000 to 20,000 enemy soldiers should queue up for surrendering themselves. Our country is now becoming the favourite topic of discussion in many quarters."

He said elsewhere disproving Saddam's denials of defeat, "Had they been capable of compensating their defeat, they would have confessed to their set-back. But they have been defeated once and for all..."

In the wake of the liberation of Khorramshahr, western analysts, expressed surprise at the little resistance put forth by Iraqi troops and yet at the same time referred to Iran as a potential threat in the region.

Western government declared they would like to see an end to the conflict with a negotiated settlement of disputes. But the question which seems to obsess them is whether after taking back the city of Khorramshahr, Iranian troops would remain at the internationally recognised borders or they would cross over. But remembering the capability of Iraqi armed forces and also recalling the presence of a nationalistic zeal in the region they tried to attain a two-fold objective: Present Iran as a threat to the region, and at the same time dissuade the Islamic Republic from launching attacks against Iraq.

Thus by portraying Iran as a potential threat, the Arab governments of the Persian Gulf continued their support for Baghdad, while pondering schemes whereby to halt the on-going war.

Immediately after the defeat of his forces during the Beit

ul-Moqaddas offensive, Saddam found himself under pressure from several directions, in the first place he has suffered a severe political blow which had somewhat precipitated opposition within the Baath Party. The foreign press now consider Iraq's set-back in Khorramshahr as an incident portending Saddam Hussein's demise as Iraq's President. For this reason, closer cooperation of the governments of the region with Saddam's government was necessary. But a military victory over Iraq could not be without graver political implications for Saddam Hussein. By sustaining defeat in Khorramshahr and by withdrawing from the city, for the first time Iraq was exposed to serious danger. Having suffered severe political set-backs, Iraq tried hard to play host to the Non-Aligned Conference in Baghdad in order to regain some of its lost prestige, and also to take the opportunity to persuade some non-aligned countries to drag Iran to negotiation. In this way Saddam hoped he would save himself from the trouble. Iraq's military forces found themselves just barely capable of holding in the battlefronts. In contacts made with various political blocs outside Iraq (mainly with pro-U.S. political groupings) Hussein made efforts to get foreign support for ending the war. The United States, too, rushed to help Saddam by instigating Israel to invade Lebanon, thus creating a political atmosphere conducive to helping Saddam declare a ceasefire.

In justifying its declaration of a ceasefire, Iraq's supreme military command alleged it had inflicted a heavy blow upon Iran's military forces rendering the country incapable of any future attack. Subsequently a uni-lateral ceasefire was declared in order to ostensibly mobilize Iraqi forces to fight against Israel. The order to withdraw was issued directly by Saddam Hussein. The Supreme Command Council, and the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq refused to assume any responsibility with respect to the withdrawal.

As the second phase of the war continued, Iraqi forces continued their withdrawal from the western part of the country, incurring military, political and economic set-backs for the Baghdad regime. A clarification of the function of the western powers and also of the reactionary governments of the region would cast light on the political developments in Iraq during the war.

IRAQ LEANING TOWARDS WEST

"Before embarking on a war against Iran, I held serious talks with certain military commanders as regards to establishing friendly relations with the United States. But once the war broke out I abandoned following up the idea because the intention might have been thought to arise from weakness and desperation..." (Interview of Saddam with the TIME magazine).

"We currently have satisfactory relations with France based on mutual trust, but we are willing to further expand our present relations. I have not yet found the opportunity to meet Mr. Mitterrand, because of the war I have not left Iraq to any foreign country during the past two years. It might also be difficult for Mr. Mitterrand to visit Baghdad; but at any rate, it seems that a meeting between us would be necessary in the earliest opportunity." (Interview with Saddam, published in July 29, 1982 issue of Le monde).

Western concern for the maintenance and expansion of Zionist influence in the region and its intention to check the spread of the Islamic Revolution was the underlying incentive for embroiling Iran in an unwanted war. The Baathist Party of Iraq avows its commitment to anti-imperialist struggles but on the other hand makes suicidal efforts to improve its relations with the promoters of Zionist interests. Not only Baghdad refused to protest against their support for Israel but pursued the expansion of relations with the United States and France. Saddam's interview with the Time Magazine highlights his about face towards the west:

'Israel considers itself as a country being at war with Iraq, whereas since the 1973 war we have not done anything against Israel. But despite this ever since our engagement in the war with Iran, Israel launched a war of accusations against us in a bid to justify its air attack on our nuclear reactors. You would be better advised to remind Israel of its long range interests rather than exhausting all its resources in occupying Arab lands.'

Saddam's stand reveals that much as the west has failed to attain its principal goal of stamping out the Islamic Revolution. In the course of war it has increased Saddam's dependency on west so much so that, he proclaims his unabashed dependence on the west. Writes Henry Kissinger in the issue of the Washington Post:



"Had Iraq triumphed in the war there would be no fear today in relations to the Persian Gulf and our interests in that part of the world would not have been endangered as they have been now, after Iranian offensive. At any rate it would be to our own interest to impose a ceasefire in the area, and gradually approach a more compromising government which will probably some time in the future substitute the present regime in Iran."

The western support for Iraq during the Iraqi-Iran war and its political military and economic aid to Baghdad is manifested today in the apparent silence of Baghdad towards the U.S. encroachment upon southern Lebanon and Saddam's unofficial recognition of Israel. The west started out its political support for Saddam Hussein on the advent of the war and increased such support by declaring its agreement with an imposed ceasefire as proposed by the United Nations. During the war, France, the United States and the majority of European countries pointed out the need for safeguarding Iraq as a country crucial to the maintenance of the balance of power in the region. Clude Cheysson repeatedly declared his support for Iraq. Just when Iran was on the verge of victory he evoked the Algiers Agreement of 1975 and in his April 15, 1982 interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anba noted, "The establishment of the balance of power in the region would require an independent Iraq." He also emphasised that Iraq's present stand is vital for the west and for the whole world for that matter. On April 15, 1982 the U.S. State Department announced that it was ready to resume political relations with Iraq. The announcement was published in the way of Reagan's decision to expunge Iraq from the list of countries which promoted terrorism. As for the British relations with Iraq they need no further expansion since Iraq had always benefited from political and even military support from Britain in light of its firm economic relations with that country.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM WEST

During the past year France and England have sought to further increase their domination of Baghdad. The west has tried to take the place of Moscow and its satellites as regards to the

export of technology and other items of Iraq as far as they can. Says Saddam in an interview with the Times Magazine, "If you ask me for example whether we can find the technical experts in the Soviet Union or in the United States, I would say that the technology we need in Iraq can be found in the United States, or in Europe or in Japan." The volume of contracts signed between Baghdad and European countries has reached unprecedented proportions, so much so that western media refer to Iraq as the west's biggest trade partner topping even Saudi Arabia. Western press report that during 1981 Iraq purchased as much as 6.6 billion Deutsche mark from West Germany showing a surprising increase on the preceding year. Writes the Arabic weekly Al-Ossbu'ul Arabic in its Dec. 20, 1981 issue:

"France has topped all other countries in its export of foodstuff to Iraq. The agreements entered into between Iraq and French companies in 1981 totalled 4.7 billion dollars in value."

Also despite a lack of direct diplomatic relations with Baghdad in 1981, Washington increased its exports to Iraq three-fold, compared to the preceding year. U.S. exports to Iraq during 1981 reached to about 950 million dollars, even in excess of Soviet exports to Iraq during the same period. The U.S. Agreement for the sale of five commercial Boeing aircraft to Baghdad and Baghdad's sale of oil to the United States signifies the expansion of relations between the two countries. Later on Japan, England, Belgium, Spain and Austria entered into various economic agreements with Baghdad which even threatened Soviet interests in Iraq. But the Soviet Union, too, is trying hard to exploit what has remained for it in Iraq in a bid to end the war in an honourable way to Baghdad. Write Jeune Afrique in its June 9, 1982 issue:

"Precisely 45 days after the war the Saudi statesmen sent a regal gift to Saddam Hussein, which was in fact a top secret report by U.S. intelligence in which the economic, social and military situation was analysed. The document also included detailed information about the status of the armed forces in Iran, the total number of forces, the position, as well as their servicable hardware and other highly classified information which was in brief a detailed plan for aggression."

Thus the United States positioned itself in the forefront of aggression against the Islamic Republic. Immediately after th

advent of the war the United States delivered four AWACs to Saudi Arabia for reconnaissance purposes and for spotting and tracing Iranian fighters and reporting them to Baghdad. The U.S. endorsement of the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Jordan and gaining the U.S. Senate approval for the sale of the same weapons, which were in fact intended to be delivered to Iraq, is just another example of Washington's military aid to Baghdad. Muslim troops have so far seized a sizable haul of U.S. made weapons from Iraqi invaders. The inscriptions of these weapons indicate that they once belonged to Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt. In addition, many other countries such as Italy, which normally are not authorized to send military weapons to any other country without the explicit consent of Washington, have, ever since the advent of the war, shipped large amounts of weapons to Iraq.

Reports indicate that on May 22, 1982 the Italian government authorised the sale to Iraq of 11 war ships, and a floating pier costing 1,800 million dollars. In addition to clandestine arms sale by the U.S. to Iraq, France and England continuously increase their sale of arms to Iraq. France tops all other countries in the sale of weapons to Baghdad. According to the weekly *Al-maallah* published in London, just single sale items of heavy artillery pieces to Baghdad by the French government neared a hefty sum of one billion dollars.

According to foreign reports, on June 21, 1982, Iraq receives 1.5 billion dollars worth of weapons from France in exchange of 70 million barrels of oil to that country. The hardware included special air-defence systems for a fleet of sixth F-1 mirages, anti-aircraft missiles and radars; only one advanced electronic early warning system of AWACs networks costing 600 million dollars. In addition to the said sixty french F-1 mirages, other weapons such as light tanks, and semi-heavy weapons composed only a fraction of Iraq's war provisions for time being. But Britain, too, seems inclined to step up efforts to sell a fleet of 300 HAWK fighters in order to transform the Soviet-styled air force of Iraq into an European one. The *Crescent International* reported in its August 16, 1982 issue that a high-ranking British military delegation arrived in Baghdad for talks on a 2-billion dollars arms sale agreement involving the sale of 300 HAWKS to the Iraqi government.

Other European countries such as West Germany have also provided arms to Baghdad, though in a smaller scale. Western dispatches reported that a vessel carrying arms to Iraq from Hamburg had run aground in the Tiran Strait. The vessel was later rescued by Zionist ships and its cargo later carried to Iraq via Port of Aqba. Still other countries such as Austria, Spain, Sweden and some Latin American countries such as Brazil have sold a considerable quantity of arms to Iraq during the war. The composition of the countries which now sell arms to Iraq also reveals Baghdad's desperate attempts in a total about-face from its previous policies towards the west, and reveals the U.S. political schemes regarding Baghdad. The Zionist Minister of Defence, in response to a question by a reporter on the evaluation of the Iraq-Iran war after the liberation of Khorramshahr said,

"Efforts for drawing Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia around Iraq, in a treaty of alliance, would seem very desirable, and it is no secret that Washington would endorse an alliance like that, but then it would provide a good excuse to the Soviets for interfering in the affairs of Iran."

The U.S.-inspired invasion of southern Lebanon for safeguarding Saddam Hussein was carried out in light of the same considerations. But as the Islamic troops launched the Ramadhan Offensive (July 13, 1982) Washington's plans were thwarted. The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, discovered and neutralized Washington's plot at the right time.

IRAQ AND THE REACTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REGION:

Ever since the outbreak of the war, Baghdad decided to attain a two-fold goal and respect to its relations with Persian Gulf states. First it tried to depict the Islamic Republic as a potential threat to the peace in the region; and secondly, it tried to show itself as a dominant power capable of maintaining peace and protecting the interests of the Gulf states. Hussein's fast ebbing powers in carrying out a successful war against the Islamic Republic, automatically disproved Saddam's claims. As the war continued, the governments of such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Sheikdoms had second thoughts on supporting Iraq. On the

one hand they longed to see an end to the war; while on the other, they would like to see Iraqi government well-maintained. Therefore, although at the outset of the war they put all their resources at Iraq's disposal, to stamp out the Islamic Revolution, and as the war continued they beefed up their efforts by resorting to diplomatic measures as well.

Aid to Iraq during the war fall in the following three categories: a. economic aid, b. military aid and c. political aid.

ECONOMIC AID:

Based on available records, ever since the outbreak of the war (upto the publication of this survey in February 1983) Arab government have extended between 22 to 30 billion dollars aid to Baghdad, which has been expended mainly on arms purchase from the eastern bloc as well as the west. As an example Saudi Arabia paid as much as one billion dollars to Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Saudi officials have also assumed to shoulder the 10 billion franc worth of arms purchased from France. The Kuwaiti parliament also has endorsed several loans to Baghdad, totalling two billion dollars.

MILITARY SUPPORT:

Military support for Baghdad has been made in several forms thus far ranging from recruitment of troops to Iraq, to dispatching weapons and military equipment, purchase of weapons and allowing the transit of military equipment to Iraq.

From the very first day of the war, certain Arab government such as Egypt considered dispatching troops to Iraq. Washington, too, tried to open the gates of the Arab world to Egypt. As the war escalated and as Iranian troops scored repeated victories in the battlefronts, Egypt was actually planning dispatch of troops to Iraq. Sending regular enforcement however, had quite different implications, from the low-profile presence of the Egyptian soldiers and pilots in Iraq. Worried about the consequence of their military involvement in the Persian Gulf war, the Persian Gulf states do not dispatch troops to the battlefronts, while certain cliques in those states try to encourage the involvement of conventional armies from Egypt and Jordan in Iraq. Iraq's repeated

set-backs, specially those sustained during the Beit ul-Moqaddas offensive, served to dissuade Egypt from sending troops to Iraq. But the development did not cause cancellation of one-billion worth of aid in weapons to Iraq.

Jordan is the only country which openly conscripts for Iraq. The B.B.C. of London reported in a broadcast that the group numbers 5,000. Jordan, naturally insists to refer to the group as volunteers, and tries to keep secret reports to the actual dispatching of its troops to Iraq. In the meanwhile Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continue to provide weapons to Iraq and at the same time facilitate the shipment of purchased arms to Iraq. Write the Italian daily *Le Repubblica*, in its July 23, 1982 issue:

"Last Tuesday night a large number of trucks carrying army tanks and howtizers from Saudi Arabia were seen in Baghdad. The port of Dammam in Saudi Arabia has now become the principal port of the Persian Gulf receiving Iraq imports. Other reports say 70 other large trucks carrying 40 army tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and caisson are heading for Iraq via Kuwait."

It need hardly be reminded how much the countries of the Persian Gulf region have sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Current reports are all documented proof of the continuing support for Baghdad by the countries of the region, much as they have recently emphasised on a need for ending the war.

POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR BAGHDAD:

Political support is normally based on economic and military support. The reactionary governments of the region have voiced their highest political support for Saddam Hussein by admiring Saddam's programme for ceasefire. The mediation committee of the Islamic Conference, too, was formed for the promotion of the same objectives, and for establishing a political channel whereby Arab governments might support Saddam.

In order that political support for Baghdad may bring its anticipated results, propaganda against the Islamic Republic seemed all the more necessary. The reactionary governments of the region launched widespread propaganda against the Islamic

Republic, calling it a war-monger. The media in those countries now continue publishing aspersions against Iran as invented by Saddam. Among scandalous allegations against the Islamic government are the surreptitious relations between Iran and Israel, and unfounded reports of the execution by Iran, of Iraqi prisoners of war, or the fabricated conspiracy for undermining the government in Bahrain (dispatches of December 16, 1981).

Propaganda against the Islamic Republic gained impetus in the wake of the U.S.-inspired plot in Bahrain, and consequently such countries as Saudi Arabia, whose political support is desperately needed in Baghdad, rally to give political support to the Iraqi regime. Says Saudi Minister of the Interior Nayef Iban Abdul Aziz to the Kuwaiti daily 'Assiyasah', "The conflict with Iran, which was brought about by the expansionist policy pursued by the Islamic regime, is not one between Iran and Iraq, but rather a conflict because of Iran's ambition to gain control of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which starts out with Bahrain, and spreads to all states in the region."

By the statements of this order, the statesmen of the Gulf states tried to justify Iraq's encroachments upon Iran. But the political efforts of the Arab governments of the Persian Gulf, are by no means confined to such activities. Governments such as Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia try time and again to compel Syria into accepting to mediate between Iran and Iraq, but every time their efforts have been fruitless. Those states continue their support for Baghdad as the war goes on. But in the wake of the Beit ul-Moqaddas offensive (April 30, 1982) and after the liberation of Khorramshahr, the government of the region tried to make arrangements for an early ceasefire between Iran and Iraq upon the approval of the west and also upon the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council and the Soviet Union. In the course of talks between Saudi and Baghdad officials, the Saudis assured Baghdad of all manners of support in the event it pulls back its troops from Iran.

As though admitting his defeat, and also upon exploiting the July 22, 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon by the United States and Israel, Saddam declared a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops from Iran. Subsequently the reactionary governments of the region declared their political support for the Baghdad initiative. Says Radio Qatar in a broadcast on June 21, 1982, "The Arab community hails the decision adopted by President

Saddam Hussein for withdrawing his troops from Iranian territory, and regards the move as a bold decision adopted from a position of power."

Radio Umm al Qaiwain (United Arab Emirates) said in a broadcast on the same day that the Islamic Conference Organisation has described Iraq's complete pull-back of its forces from Iran as a positive step which help the Islamic Mediation Committee to continue its efforts, seeking an end for the war between the two countries.

Other governments of the Persian Gulf states declared their support for Iraq's move, and by so doing hoped to prevent Iran from fulfilling its legitimate demands by way of its confrontation with the ruling government in Iraq. As the leader of the Islamic Republic Imam Khomeini exposed Washington's plot to stage an invasion of southern Lebanon in order to distract Iran from the principal arena of its struggle, the Iranian forces decided to continue in the battlefronts with a yet firmer determination.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RAMADHAN OFFENSIVE

As the west and the reactionary governments of the region expressed fear of an impending thrust into Iraq by Iranian troops, impelled by western governments, especially the United States, Britain and France, the United Nations decided to hold a session to discuss the Iraq-Iran conflict. In a resolution published at the end of their session of July 13, 1982, members of the Security Council called for a ceasefire between the two countries, and a cessation of hostilities by the two armies (Agence France Dispatch of July 13, 1982).

The resolution also calls on both parties to withdraw their forces to the internationally recognised borders. It also anticipates the dispatch of U.N. peace keeping forces to the Iran-Iraq borders to exercise surveillance over the maintenance of peace in the area. The news media of the world then reflected on the resolution and commented ironically that while the United Nations has issued a resolution calling for a ceasefire between the hostile parties, Iran is preparing itself for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

At the onset of the Ramadhan operations (July 13, 1982) Baghdad somewhat lost its political foothold. As their first reaction

to the Ramadhan Offensive, western countries voiced support for Baghdad. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Sa'dun Hemadi quoted in an interview the French Foreign Minister as saying that Iraq figured prominent in the establishment of peace in the region while also declaring French support of Baghdad. Likewise a C.N.N. reporter expressed his concern about the formation of what he called an Islamic fundamentalist superpower in the region. Meanwhile Radio France in a commentary on July 15, predicted the fall of all Persian Gulf sheikhdoms as a corollary of Saddam's fall. This common fear was reflected by the Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Clement Zabjuki, when he told Reuters, "The United States should sell arms to the Persian Gulf countries and also allow them to provide the same to Iraq." Similarly another Washington officials declared, "We will exploit all available resources to halt the war." Yet officials admit that Washington does not presently have sufficient influence to check Iran's thrust. Also sporadic propaganda campaigns by Washington and the west attempt to convince regional countries that Iran's thrust into Iraq would threaten the entire countries of the region. While stabilizing its military presence in the Persian Gulf, Washington also intimated that it would be ready to perform a military maneuver there if the Arab states of the Persian Gulf should welcome the proposal. The proposal, however was rejected by the latter, thus, thwarting Washington's efforts to compensate losses incurred as a result of Iran's thrust into Iraq.

As the Ramadhan Offensive continued the U.N. Security Council held several sessions in which it called on the belligerent countries to halt the war. Such a call proving that Washington would do much better if the war were halted, especially since despite a shifting to military-oriented policy, it failed to impose its military strength on the Persian Gulf states. To date, Washington's presence here under various guises does not amount to a military power big enough to stage a remarkable maneuver in the region. The White House endeavours to convince Arab states that the situation is such as to require its military presence in this part of the world. But it has yet to convince them and once Iraq is totally defeated it is unlikely that the Persian Gulf states would endorse even a limited U.S. presence. As the Ramadhan Offensive continued, Washington, the west, and even the Soviet Union seemed to maintain a passive stance towards the on-going war.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE IMPOSED WAR

Had the United States lost Berlin, it could still have defended western Europe, albeit by a lavish expenditure. Similarly if the United States had lost Korea, it could still have defended Japan, though at greater expense. But the absence of any such contingencies in the Gulf creates quite a different strategic scenario there; and hence a set-back there could not be countenanced or justified, as it could have been as regard the afore-said conflicts. Should the situation at the Persian Gulf be aggravated, the prospects of establishing new bridgeheads and bases from which Washington could safely 'protect' other countries, would undoubtedly diminish. The inevitable set-back for western countries in the Persian Gulf would mean an end to their global influence there, imposed by the U.S. after World War II.

The above is the essence of a commentary which appeared in a western periodical sometime ago. The periodical portrays the U.S. position in the Persian Gulf as essential to its very existence. It emphasizes Washington's role in controlling the Iraq-Iran conflict. As Professor Ard Bellow Tacker, a U.S. State Department expert pointed out about Washington's strategy in the Persian Gulf, after the culmination of the Islamic Revolution:

"As the Islamic Revolution in Iran is gradually shaping, the nucleus of the potential threat to the U.S. Security interests has shifted from Europe to the Persian Gulf. Today the interests of the west are threatened by three elements.

"1. First, the countries of the Persian Gulf which try to deny the west its right of unhindered access to their resources and which endeavour to frustrate any effort and any exertion of force in assuring such rights.

"2. Invasion by the Soviet Union.

"3. A devouring power declaring a revolutionary movement in the international system."

In order to safeguard its interests, the west would need to implement a forceful dual strategy. The first policy would pave the way for an independent policy, that is a return to the economic interference of the classic U.S. dollar policy. The second policy which would also impel the Soviet Union to accept it, is a political strategy based upon cooperation for arms control and a novel effort towards detente. Therefore, Washington would principally show deeper support for friendly countries in the region, while pondering on alternative solution to check the recurrence of the Iranian experience in those countries.

"In countries such as Iran where Washington's influence fails to achieve any result, an offensive strategy would seem appropriate. In the event of Washington's set-back the non-nuclear forces of the United States, which are stationed in the region, would provide back-up support for any intrusive strategy." (Middle East Current).

Washington recognised that it is incapable of enhancing its influence in Iran today and that it should assume an 'offensive' strategy, and exploit its non-nuclear forces. Upon this premise it finally challenged the Islamic Revolution in a war which not only failed to stam out the Islamic Revolution, but also brought along its special blessing in disguise. Writes George Ackman in his book, "The American Diplomacy, 1900-1950".

"The (Persian) Gulf states are the wealthiest of all nations.. They feel, more than any other country, the threat inherent in the export of the Islamic Revolution (export of an Islamic culture). They also realise the failure of the United States in understanding the situation.

"For many years, first with support from Britain and later Washington, the countries of the region were tranquil. But as statesmen told us, today they are finding themselves placed between fire and water. On the one hand, they are flushed by (Imam) Khomeini's power, and on the other, frigid by Carter's weakness.... And now (Imam) Khomeini is on the scene - the man

who has aggravated their problems, had declared a new Islam, and transformed the "Americanized Islam" of the Persian Gulf to the "Golden Islam" (Hassnein Haikal). Confess the Americans in documents seized at the former compounds of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, "We have nothing with which to threaten (Imam) Khomeini. Especially with our Middle East policy, (Imam) Khomeini will become a power which we will have to recognize."

But truly, what else can the Satan do to its enemies who have generated a current to destroy it. It is likely to make efforts first to control the currents, and secondly to destroy those currents. Warns Harold Brown in a statement on January 28, 1980 touching on U.S. military expenditure in 1981, "The most serious threat to U.S. security (in the Persian Gulf) is not Soviet expansionism, but rather one caused by the uncontrollable tumults in third world countries." (A classified document, seized from the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran). But precisely in what part of the world have 'uncontrollable tumults' been experienced other than Iran which the United States has to 'recognize'?

"I cannot help wondering whether American diplomacy is not something like one of those unsightly pre-historic monsters with a body as big as my room and brain as small as a pin head. When the U.S. diplomacy realizes that its interests are being threatened, it makes a frenzied and indiscriminate attack on everything surrounding it and not only fails to kill its enemies but even bungles its other interests."

U.S. STRATEGY DURING THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR:

Much has already been said on why the United States has been so much preoccupied with the idea of stamping out the Islamic Revolution. But to cast light on what will come later in this same chapter, it would serve the purpose to touch on few points, in a general manner.

The United States can exercise its policy of expansionism and colonialization of the Third World Countries by:

1; Importing raw materials from the Third World Countries at very low prices.

2. Exporting expensive luxury and entirely unnecessary consumer items, and military weapons to Third World Countries.

3. Making big money by investments in Third World Countries.

In order to successfully attain this last objective, the United States needs to make investments in countries which have "law and order". The advent of the Islamic Revolution transformed this "law and order" to a social current capable of uprooting the world-devouring powers. Says the Times in its December 30, 1979 issue.

WEAKENING BAGHDAD, TILTING IT TOWARDS THE WEST:

The ruling Baath Party in Iraq has now leaned to the west. Thanks to efforts of Saddam Hussein, coupled with the lack of public support for the party, the government's dependence on the armed forces, and the oil revenues and also because of the personality of the party's key figures. A 14-man delegation from the United States now forms a practical U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which comprises a Consulate, a cultural building, and educational wing and especially a separate economic department. To stamp out the Islamic Republic of Iran. U.S. Imperialism now resorts to Saddam Hussein.

Aside from personal peculiarities which make him turn to the west, Saddam Hussein is also heading a government in a country which shares a long border with Iran, and has had border disputes with Iran, providing the necessary excuse to launch an attack against the Islamic Republic. His armed forces also boast of modern weaponry, and well-trained personnel. He has had good relations with reactionary governments of the region, and his claim of Iraq's supremacy in the Persian Gulf, provided the west with the long awaited golden opportunity. In his private meeting with a high-level U.S. guest, Saddam told him that Washington would be much better advised to feel less concerned about its scattered bases and instead help him (Saddam) to "get rid of Soviet bases in Adan". In response to Saddam's sincerity towards Washington, and also in response to his self-sacrificing gestures for safeguarding U.S. interests, Brezhnev noted that he did not see any difference between the interests of the United States and those of Iraq (London

Times - July 17, 1980). Washington, finding Saddam so sincere and so subservient, tightened its hold upon Iraq and brought it to the circles of its own dependent governments by throwing it into a war with the Islamic Republic, thus, depleting its military and economic resources and thereafter impelling it to enter into survive agreements with Washington. Today, more than two years after the outbreak of the war, Washington has already made significant advances towards this goal.

ARMS SALES TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION:

With the imposed war, and Saddam Hussein's failure in fulfilling his military goals, and the instigation of anxiety among Arabs, arms flow to Baghdad from every reactionary state ranging from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Immediately after that Washington increased its arms sales to countries which in their turn stocked Hussein's arsenals. One such example was an 8.5 billion dollar arms sale to the Saudi Arabia, by the U.S.

In its June 4, 1980 issue, the Wall Street Journal commented that despite Washington's reluctance to aid Baghdad openly, there were clues proving secret military aid to Baghdad by Washington.

Writes the Economist in its September 27, 1980 issue in relation to Jordan's military aid to Iraq and the Zionist's silence in this respect:

"Some Israelis resent the positive response given by their Prime Minister. Mr Menakhem Begin to a U.S. suggestion this week for keeping calm while Iraqi transport planes are landing right on the bordering Jordanian fields, carrying military provisions for Iraq in its war with Iran.

Radio Jordan said that the request had been submitted by the U.S. Ambassador, Samuel Loys. The U.S. Ambassador has, however, pointed out that Israel's assent to non-aggressive flights between Jordan and Iraq, would serve to safeguard U.S. interests in the region, such an explanation has satisfied Mr. Begin."

The statement of the U.S. Ambassador to Begin about the non-aggressive flights between Jordan and Iraq and its significance, deserves closer perusal: increasing arms to Iraq currently fighting Iran would safeguard U.S. interests in the region.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION:

As the Persian Gulf was intensified, Washington exploited U.S. media to convince the world that the war has jeopardized U.S. interests as well as the lives of its friendly governments in the region, except for Pakistan. We believe that there are no disputes between us and the Muslim nations, which cannot be settled. We respect Islam, and are ready to cooperate with all Muslim states; and ultimately we are ready to cooperate with other nations to formulate a joint security scheme, which respects all creeds and values, and which contributes to the independence, security and progress of all nations." (New York Times - January 24, 1980).

Following this statement, U.S. military officials launched a series of activities to materialize Carter's wishes. Among Washington's schemes for beefing up its military presence in the Persian Gulf, under the pretext of the war are:

A) The formation and support of a Persian Gulf Cooperation Council and later transforming it from an economic entity to a military organisation.

B) Entering into separate agreements with the states of the region: (1 3.2 billion dollar aid to Pakistan for military and economic purposes, the sale of 8.5 billion dollars worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, military aid to Oman and other agreements with this state for using military bases there, military and economic aid to Turkey and the performance of the 'Bright Star' manoeuvre and so on and so forth).

WASHINGTON PLANS TO IGNITE A WAR:

To embroil the Islamic Republic in a war with Iraq, Washington used the expertise of all veteran politicians and analysts. One such personality was one-time National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezinsky who in sharp contrast with his colleagues, Cyrus Vance and Edmund Musky is an expert on "to-secret operations", and "behind the curtain foreign policy."

Brezinsky has been head of the National Defence Council, and is actively involved in CIA operations, and at behind the curtain relations between Washington, Baghdad and the Baath Party,

immediately before the outbreak of the war. In order to collect information and prepare Baghdad for the upcoming war, Brezinsky made frequent secret visits to Baghdad. In its February 8, issue, the Weall street Journal disclosed one such visit to Baghdad. Also in its June 17, 1980 issue the Times reported on a meeting between Brezinsky and Saddam Hussein and other meetings between him and high-ranking U.S. officials. Writes the weekly Eight Days in May 1980:

"Following his visit to Baghdad in early May (1980), Brezinsky noted 'we do not see any substantial clashes of interests between Washington and Baghdad. We believe Iraq has decided to be independent (viz., from the eastern bloc), it looks forward to the security of the Arabian Gulf (namely that it would like to remain immune from the waves of the Islamic Revolution), and I do not think relations between the United States and Iraq will break down'".

SALES OF AWACs TO SAUDI ARABIA:

In order to ensure a victorious war against the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the United States sold and delivered AWACs to Saudi Arabian blatant disregard of paragraph eight of an agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which provided that AWACs purchased by Saudi Arabia should be delivered to that country in the course of the three years from 1985-87. The United States, however, delivered four AWACs to Saudi Arabia and also provided U.S. pilots and technicians to operate the sophisticated machinery. The AWACs were meant to be utilized in collecting data for the Saudi government about the Iraq-Iran war, which also was a security issue for the Saudis.

The Saudis made available the data collected by the AWACs to the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as keeping also Washington up-to-date on the on-going war. In this way, Saudi Arabia was acting as a potential military base at the service of the United States and in the interest of Iraq.

COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE STATES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN IRAN

By the agency of its spies who are still working in Iran under the disguise of diplomats at the U.S. Embassy, Washington endeavoured to collect all sorts of political, and military information about the Islamic Revolution by establishing connections with various personalities. But information collected proved useless, either because it was incorrect or too limited in scope. In one report the London Institute of International Strategic Studies estimated that about 140,000 people in the Armed Forces defeated since the ouster of the defunct Shah. In its October 11, 1980 issue, the Eight Days Magazine reflected Washington's views that the Iranian Air Force was soon to be ruined because of the lack of jet fuel, in the wake of the ruining of the Abadan Refinery. Also in its September 23, 1980 issue, the New York Times reflected Pentagon's analysis of the defence capability of Iran and noted that at the time Iran had about 100,000 ill-trained but revolutionary personnel, an irregular army and a small number of loyal pilots. But now Washington confessed that it had not fully comprehended the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and that its information about Iran was incorrect. Writes the Armed Forces Journal, a magazine whose export from the United States is banned:

"The idea is not how information is capable of improving success, but rather how any information pertinent to the occasion should be collected.

"This lesson is specifically significant to the United States. The only revolution which our national security planners have appreciated is our own revolution. At any rate during the past years we have not even cared to make an effort. According to public opinion, our efforts for collecting data during the past decade have been rotten to the core, and even long before that such efforts were sacrificed in favour of developing technical gears for collecting intelligence. However, the United States has stationed its Rapid Deployment Force at a strategic area, where Iraq has committed catastrophical blunders."

THE UNITED STATES, IRAQ, AND THE RAMADHAN OFFENSIVE:

After Iraqi troops were pushed out of Iran (except for certain strategic points in the western parts of Iran) and in the wake of Iran's defensive thrust into Iraq, Washington, obsessed by a growing fear of the Islamic Revolution, established more friendly relations with Saddam, which we discussed in some detail earlier in this chapter. In the following pages we will review other aspect of Washington's reaction to the Islamic Revolution.

WASHINGTON'S FEAR OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION:

In the wake of a successful Iranian thrust west of the border and after at least 600 Iraqi tanks, and countless other military weapons were destroyed, Washington, which had hitherto referred to the Islamic Revolution as fading, began to talk of Iran's potential threats to other countries on the region. Says U.S. analysts in relation to the Islamic Revolution and its military capacity:

"Imam Khomeini, who has attained the highest military triumph, now intends to attain three objectives which is certain to generate concern throughout the oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf, and even beyond the area. His three objectives are:

"1. To bring to power the Shiite majority in Iraq.

"2. To receive billions of dollars reparation from the rich countries of the Persian Gulf, among them from Saudi Arabia which supports Iraq.

"3. And of the highest implication to the west, the establishment of a theocracy intermingled with a religious zest and nationalistic spirit by fundamentalist Iranians, as the predominating power in the Persian Gulf.

Iran's goals nas ominous implications to the Americans." (Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1982).

And that is how the United States voices its fear of the growing power of the Islamic Revolution: (a "theocracy by fundamentalist Iranians"), judging that the emergence of Iran as a dominating power in the Persian Gulf portends disaster for Washington. The reason is all too clear. During the years following the culmination of the Islamic Revolution, Washington learned of the un-

yielding and uncompromising attitude of the Revolution towards the predatory class of the world powers. Says the avowed Zionist, Senator Barry Goldwater in relation to the Ramadhan Offensive, "The United States should aid its friendly Arab nations by whatsoever means, other than by sending troops to those countries. Iran's eventual triumph upon Iraq will establish it in the region as a powerful state: what is now threatening Iraq will in the future engulf all Arab countries of the region." (Associated Press July 15, 1982).

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SADDAM

Saddam who upon the onset of the Ramadhan Offensive found himself on the threshold of an imminent fall, made efforts to come closer to Washington, hoping to find a way out of the impasse. In an interview with the Times Magazine in July 1982, Saddam desperately asked for closer relations with Washington, and said that even before the war, he had looked forward to relations with the United States. Then, rather naively Saddam declared that he gave up the idea of actively proceeding with his intention to establish relations with the United States, since he feared that the move might be interpreted as one prompted by the circumstances. Says Saddam in his July 14, 1982 interview with the magazine, "I personally do not oppose the United States. We would like to have friendly relations. How can we establish such relations?" American circles voiced support for Saddam in the wake of the magazine's interview with him. The Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Clement Zablocki in the wake of Ramadhan Offensive and after Saddam's interview with the Times Magazine said, "The United States should provide arms to the Gulf States, and must allow them to deliver same to Iraq. The United States should exploit all its resources for ending the war."

The Voice of America (VOA) on Washington-Baghdad relations in an analysis on June 22, 1982 said, "A report on Iraq prepared for Mr. Reagan indicates that in the event of Saddam's fall and the consequent instability in Iraq, the interests of the west would be jeopardized. The reports anticipates continuing commercial relations between Iraq and the United States, and closer and warmer relations between Baghdad and Washington."

U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE WAR

Washington confessed that by attacking Iran, Iraq has committed a grave blunder. Says the Armed Forces Journal in its April 1982 issue, "A profound panic has been caused by Iraq's strategic blunder. They are fighting a Revolution which has no symptoms of declining and as long as no drastic changes have been made in Iran's political stand, no military operations by Iraq is likely to bring about the fall of the Revolution. This has been the principal lesson learned in this war..."

Washington endeavours to keep Saddam in power by establishing peace; and to carry out this objective, Washington tackles a two-fold strategy.

A) Exertion of pressure by the friends of the United States to make Iran negotiate or probably to review its cease-fire conditions.

To this end, many and varied proposals for mediation have so far been put forward, but admittedly not invariably all of them were moved by Washington. Says the weekly Al-Majallah (a Saudi-financed weekly published in London):

"American sources have disclosed to our magazine that the United States has asked Turkey and Pakistan to contact Imam Khomeini's government and encourage him to end the war by peaceful means. In the meanwhile, Britain has called on several sources and among them the Indian government to encourage Imam Khomeini to open negotiations with Baghdad. Informed British sources have said that Mrs. Gandhi has accepted to do so..." (Report of Islamic Republic News Agency -IRNA- June 21, 1982).

By turning to a diplomacy of 'negotiations', and the sending of envoys and delegations such as that from the Islamic Conference and the United Nations, Washington endeavours to resume its efforts to this end, whereby Saddam may find a way out of the impasse.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION:

At the same time as dispatching envoys and 'messengers', Washington endeavours to consolidate the countries of the region in order to prevent Saddam's fall from power. In the near future, we may witness the holding of frequent meetings by member countries

of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, and a fresh boosting of military, and economic aids to Iraq.

While extending military aid to Baghdad, Washington is also trying to consolidate the Persian Gulf states in a common military front such as the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, so that together and also by receiving aid from the United States, they may challenge Iran in a war, along with Saddam's troops, while probably benefiting from the Rapid Deployment Forces of the United States.

But obviously Washington's principal efforts are directed at facilitating a peace formula capable of retaining Saddam Hussein in power.

SOVIETS AND THE IRAQI IMPOSED WAR

The Soviet's stand concerning the imposed war, since its inception, varies according to 3 stages:

A. From the beginning of the war until Bani Sadr's ouster.

B. From the ouster of Bani Sadr until the liberation of Khorramshahr.

C. From the liberation of Khorramshahr until the 5th stage of Operation Ramadhan.

The starting phase of the war, as regards its advantages for Moscow, met with implicit agreement from this superpower rather than opposition. In the second phase, which included Iran's victories, the Soviets provided Iraq with arms at the same time as attempting to end the war with the stabilization of Saddam. The third phase of the war, delayed due to the Zionist invasion of Southern Lebanon and the U.N. Security Council's resolution, which bearing the endorsement of the U.S. and Soviet Union, called for a ceasefire, was marked by the beginning of the Ramadhan offensive, eliciting from the Soviets an implicit expression of anxiety over Iran's thrust into Iraqi territory.

Studying Moscow's position during different stages of the war reveals that the heavy-handed manipulations by the Pentagon and CIA, within the Iraqi government, motivated the Soviet Union to adopt passive and self-centered policies in order to secure its own interests. All in all, the Soviet's performance was similar to and coordinated with those of western Europe and reactionaries in the region.

(1) Imam Khomeini, in one of his speeches, said, "I think the U.S. has beguiled the Soviets too in the issue of Iraq."

A: MOSCOW AND THE BEGINNING OF THE IMPOSED WAR:

Although the Soviet announced their impartiality at the beginning of the war, the advantages the war afforded them clearly showed Moscow's satisfaction over the war at that stage.

To explain this issue, it should be said that the Soviet's interest in Iraqi aggression upon the Iranian territory was more of an indirect nature. The most important advantage of the war from the Soviet point of view was that it overshadowed its occupation of Afghanistan.

The occupation of Afghanistan was considered as a Soviet attempt to reach warm waters. This issue roused harsh international reaction, so that there was not a single day passed without a conference being held in Europe, Africa, the Middle East or anywhere else, in order to condemn Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. But with the outbreak of Iraqi imposed war, the situation, particularly in the Middle East, changed, and the two main problems of the region, prior to Iraqi aggression, namely, the issue of Palestine and the problem of Afghanistan took a back seat. The U.S. was at least blamed for the issue of Palestine and the Soviet Union for its occupation of Afghanistan. With the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the said problems were overshadowed and conferences and councils of the countries of the world, particularly in the Middle East, were all diverted towards the war. Naturally it was not difficult for the Soviets to foresee Iraq's intention to invade Iran. But it was in the interest of this superpower to remain silent until the last days before the war, because the war could divert attention of the west and reactionary regimes from Afghanistan to Iran. In fact the Soviet Union could get concessions in the issue of Afghanistan in return for granting concessions to the U.S. to start the war.

The problem of Afghanistan and distracting public opinion from it was not the only aspect of the imposed war which proved to favour Moscow. The Soviets also hoped to weaken and eliminate Iran's role in the Afghanistan nation's resistance. From the Soviet point of view, the war would have automatically hindered Iran from performing an active role in Afghanistan.

The Soviets also had in mind gaining popularity through mediating and ending the war under special circumstances. Moscow's understanding of this war was similar to that of other

wars between belligerent countries. It hoped that by bringing Iran and Iraq together, while Iraq was in Iran's territory, it could both revive Soviet influence in Iraq as well as infiltrate Iran through the establishment of peace between the two countries.

It can be said briefly that the Kremlin hoped to achieve the following advantages:

1. Stabilizing the government in Afghanistan.
2. Weakening Iran in the war.

Iraq achieved a series of its military objectives during the first few months of the war: Khorramshahr, Qasr-e-Shirin, Susangerd and some other border cities were occupied without any reaction from Moscow. Radio Moscow's portrayal of Iraq as an anti-imperialist country, at the beginning of the war, precluded any sort of condemnation of this aggression.

The meeting of the Russian Ambassador with Hojat ul-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani, only two weeks after the start of the war, and the problems discussed in this meeting clearly revealed that the Soviet Union was confident in a speedy end to the problem of Afghanistan now with the beginning of the war. In this meeting, held on October 8, 1980, the Russian Ambassador, complaining of Iran's refusal to negotiate with Afghan authorities, promised that the problem of Afghanistan and issues arising from its military occupation would soon be over and the situation would soon return to normal in that country. From the Soviet's point of view the continuation of the war and Iraqi forces remaining in occupied lands proved it necessary to mediate and end the war, with a view to entrenching Saddam in Iranian territory. The U.S. inspired groups were particularly trying to get a lion's share imposing a peace which tilting the scales in the interest of the west also procured more privileges for Saddam. Towards this end and in anison with the Islamic Conference and the U.N., the Soviets commissioned a committee of the non-aligned countries to investigate the views of Iran on ending the war.

Although the position of the Non-Aligned countries was better than that of the Islamic Conference, their plan was also in the nterest of Iraq. The non-aligned mission was hoping that with the mplicit recognition of Iraq's fault in its invasion of Iran, Iran could be persuaded to give up its rights. This position was not in fact different from that of the Soviet, since the Soviets were

implicitly saying that they were against the aggressor while openly declaring Iraq as anti-imperialist. It was for this reason that Moscow never put pressure on Iraq to pull its forces from Iran, i.e. it never denounced or condemned this action of Saddam. From the Soviet point of view the termination of the war with a peace concocted by the non-aligned mission could at this stage achieve many Kremlin objectives. This peace was particularly necessary at a time when Iraq was still in Iran. In such a case, a peace brought about by the non-aligned mission would be conducive to improving the political and economic situation of the pro-Soviet group in Iraq, and thus Iraq would have rewarded the non-aligned mission for services rendered, in harmony with the Soviet interests.

The continuation of the war by Iran and its refusal of mediatory terms was much more worrying for Kremlin than for the west, since Moscow's alleged neutrality made it difficult for the Soviets to provide direct help to Iraq. If the Soviets had any difficulty in providing arms for Iraq somehow, Iraq would either turn to other sources, particularly the west, or would sustain a disgraceful defeat for lack of weaponry. The downfall of Saddam and the Baath Party would seriously endanger Soviet interests. Moscow, therefore, sent military aid to Iraq through third parties of the eastern bloc such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria. At the same time the Soviet Union made efforts to expand its economic relations with Iraq in order to increase its influence there.

The Lebanese weekly Alshara wrote that Saudi Arabia paid one billion dollars for arms purchased from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The magazine openly admitted the arms were purchased for delivery to Iraq.

Other reports indicate the delivery to Iraq of hundreds of T-56, T-54, T-72, T-74 and even T-76 tanks by the Soviets. During the war, Iraq received a large quantity of Russian arms such as Sam missiles, ground to ground missiles, various tanks and spare parts and even assembled Mig fighters. This does not include arms, which U.S. inspired countries like Egypt have given to Iraq, although Egypt's weapons were all Soviet made.

Moscow's purpose in sending these arms to Iraq was

securing Saddam rather than prolonging the war. Moscow thought that without this aid Saddam would certainly fall.

Despite help to Saddam from various groups, the war continued and at the same time the conflict among internal political wings also increased.

The existence of Liberals led by Bani Sadr was well tolerated by the Soviet Union at the time, despite its underlying hostility towards them; as Moscow was sure that Bani Sadr would try to end the war in a compromising manner, in order to escalate domestic unrest. For this reason, less than one month before Bani Sadr's dismissal, the non-aligned mission came forward with a new proposal, which stipulated Iraq's withdrawal from occupied territory, and the creation of a buffer zone between the two countries to be controlled by non-aligned countries until differences were settled. Bani Sadr was well-disposed towards this plan and even after his ouster from the high command of the Armed Forces, by Imam Khomeini, he clamored about his intention to end the war in a just manner, and that others did not let him. Moscow's anxiety increased with the intensification of opposition against Bani Sadr; and upon Bani Sadr's downfall, the Soviet's hope for a compromising end to the war was completely ruined.

THE SOVIET FROM BANI SADR'S FALL TO THE LIBERATION OF KHORRAMSHAHR:

With the downfall of Bani Sadr, the Soviets' hope for ending the war, the redomination over Iraq and establishing better relations with Iran turned to disappointment.

The war was chosen by the revolutionary forces as the only way to achieve their legitimate rights and all Bani Sadr's plans and tactics were brushed aside. Military operations were pursued assiduously and during two series of operations, the first of which was raising the siege of Abadan, and the second was Tariq ul-Qods, smashing blows were inflicted upon Iraqi forces.

At this time, the Soviet Union which had been somewhat disappointed at ending the war, tried to continue its military aid to Iraq, and at least for sometime prevented any political measures for peace, which it considered as instigating and useless.

The most important problem for the Soviets in this situation was to show politically that Russia considered Iraq as valuable and hence would not let Iran topple Iraq's government.

To perpetuate the notion that Iraq was an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist country just as Iran was, radio Moscow tried to bundle the two together, in its routine commendations of their positions. In this manner Moscow tried to make Iran understand that the Soviet Union would not keep silent about its interests in Iraq and that the continuation of war was not in our best interests.

With these types of support the Soviet Union tried to achieve other objectives. In particular, the Soviet Union was trying to cover up its secret military support for Iraq and by showing direct and indirect support for Iran it was trying to urge Iran to end the war.

For example, in many of its commentaries on the imposed war, without referring to the invading country, radio Moscow pointed out that the war was destroying the resources of the two anti-imperialist countries of Iran and Iraq; and its only benefit was for the west, particularly the U.S. In these analyses and commentaries it always presented the U.S. as the war monger without specifying through what agency the U.S. started the war. The conclusion often reached in these discussions was the urgency of ending the war, with Iraq in Iran's territory. They wanted an end to the war because Iraq was turning away from its dependence on the eastern bloc and was about to join the west.

The interesting point here was the contradictory statements by Radio Moscow about the Baghdad regime, and efforts made by this superpower in order to attract Iran. For instance radio Moscow in its Persian programme dated April 16, 1982 broadcast a commentary on the imposed war saying:

"Two attitudes could now be observed parallel with each other in the international arena about the Iran-Iraq war, on the one hand, there are the forces who resort to every sort of trickery in order to prolong the war, internationalize or Arabize it."

The radio then added that the social-minded and peace-loving sources, identify and expose the parties which work to promote U.S. plans and increase confusion..."

The point worthy of consideration in this commentary was condemnation of groups who insist on internationalizing and Arabizing the war. If this is the actual issue (which is our belief too), Saddam's effort in this regard are no secret. He tries to internationalize the war involving countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. He chose Arabism as the axis for attracting these regimes, modelling the war after the historic war of Qadisiyeh, between the Persians and Arabs.

This policy is that of the U.S. Therefore, Radio Moscow, on the one hand, condemns those attempting to internationalize the war (among them Saddam, who is precisely doing this) and on the other hand, not only refers to Saddam as anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist, but does not consider Iraq as the aggressor.

It is again interesting to review Radio Moscow's commentary dated May 31, 1982, in which it was pointed out that Iraq is supported by pro-U.S. and reactionary regimes of the region, while Iran is supported by the progressive regime of the Middle East.

The commentary said:

"It seems that there are circles, who would like to see the armed clashes between Iran and Iraq turn into an international conflict. In fact some of the Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia support Iraq and other Arab countries such as Syria, Libya, Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen are supporting Iran."

Therefore, considering Radio Moscov's confirmation of support for the Iraqi regime from pro-U.S. regimes of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, is it not self-evident that the U.S. started the war through Saddam in the first place? And if this is so, then why do the Soviet's not even condemn Iraq but even approve of the regime in some cases. For instance, Radio Moscow in its Persian programme on May 2, 1982 said:

"The Soviet Union tries to have normal relations, based on equality with all countries, particularly Iran and Iraq, but about Iraq it should be said that the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq signed ten years ago, helps to maintain such relations. It should however be emphasized that this treaty is not against other countries and does not harm their

legitimate rights and interests. However, according to the 4th paragraph of this treaty both sides have undertaken to fight against imperialism and Zionism without swerving."

By taking this stand, at a time when Iran's victories were on the rise making Iran more determined to inflict a heavy defeat upon the enemy by liberating south of the country, the Soviet Union desperately tried to portray Iraq as anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. Moscow also tried to justify its relations with Iraq as regards the 1972 friendship treaty. The interesting point is Moscow's insinuation that Iran could get more support from Moscow by means of signing a friendly agreement with the Soviet Union.

The best evidence for the mendacity of Moscow's claim is Saddam's interview with the Times Magazine on July 19, 1982, which proved that Iraq was by no means committed to the struggle against Zionism.

In connection with Zionist regime Saddam said in the interview:

"Israel considers itself a country which is at war with Iraq although we have not taken any measure against Israel since the 1973 war. In spite of this, Israel started to defame us in order to justify its hostile attack against the atomic installations of Iraq."

In another part of this interview, Saddam said:

"You should warn Israel to think of its long term future and do not spend all its forces in seizing Arab lands."

Thus, in this interview, Saddam became closer to recognizing Israel instead of fighting against Zionism. He explicitly pointed out that just one year after signing the friendly agreement with Russia, that is in 1973, he withdrew from fighting against Israel. He at last warned the U.S. that Israel should be concerned about its long-term future. Yes! Saddam sees long-term prospects for Israel and explicitly announces the recognition of Israel, but none of these issues motivated the Soviet Union to adopt a correct and clear position about Iraq's invasion of Iran and it furthermore continued its implicit support of Iraq.

Other cases of violation of the Iraq-Soviet agreement on the part of Iraq occurred, while Soviet's silence over these indicated Moscow's approval of these actions. For instance, the

strategic Topolov bomber aircraft, given to Iraq supposedly to fight Israel, are being used to bomb Iran's residential regions. The 10-meter long missiles devastate houses but the Kremlin neither condemns the unauthorized use of these arms nor denounces the attacks against residential areas, in the name of its neutrality in the war. Instead it only urges the two "anti-imperialist countries" to end a conflict which is only in the interest of the U.S. Iran's heedlessness of Moscow's efforts and its continuation of offensives against the Baathist enemy finally led to the liberation of a large part of southern Iran particularly Khorramshahr. With the liberation of Khorramshahr, Moscow in fact realised that the continuation of the war would bring about the victory of Iranian forces. Since Iraq's acceptance of Iran's conditions could not be brought about easily, Soviet strategy was directed towards political cooperation with other powers in order to end the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr.

THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE LIBERATION OF KHORRAMSHAHR OPERATION RAMADHAN:

With the fall of Khorramshahr, Soviet anxiety over the eventual overthrow of Saddam and the Baath Party through a continual war by Iran, was intensified. On the other hand, its hope of bringing an end to the war through political means also increased.

The U.S. and Zionist invasion of southern Lebanon which was also to the benefit of the Soviet, brought the war to a standstill and the Soviets seized this opportunity, along with other western countries to take measures to end the war. Moscow's effort, to this end, in agreement with the U.N.'s security council, will be studied later. But it is more important to explain the manner in which these efforts were put together for the announcement of an imposed cease-fire.

In fact, after the liberation of Khorramshahr all parties interested in the Iraqi imposed war unanimously agreed that the war should end as soon as possible. Each of these, of course, insisted

on the issue from the stand point of their own interest. Radio Moscow for instance, one week from the liberation of Khorramshahr, on May 31, 1982, in a commentary on the imposed war said in its Persian programme:

"The expansion of operations, for instance and these extension into Iraqi territory about which some discussion has recently been heard, can embroil more countries in this armed conflict. Yes, such a danger exists and it is clearly seen that American and Israeli governments would make a huge profit in this way."

Voicing these concerns radio Moscow in conclusion quotes the Daily Pravda of Moscow as saying:

"Now that efforts are resumed to find peaceful solutions to the conflict, social sources of the world expect that these efforts will lead to a settlement."

Thus, Moscow tried to assure Saddam's regime that Soviet Union would support the efforts directly to end the conflict. In the wake of Secret contacts between different political sources, either from west or east, with Saddam, he announced a unilateral ceasefire and then proposed a withdrawal from Iranian territory in order to gain international support, to maintain his regime. Obviously Saddam was never willing to withdraw from Iranian territory unconditionally, since this initiative would be detrimental to political survival of his regime. Among the important factors which led to the Iraqi withdrawal was the operations carried out by Islamic combatants and the weakness of the Iraqi army to counter them. One of the reasons for Iraq's confidence over the aftermath of the withdrawal was the unanimous support for Saddam by the superpowers including the Soviets.

It is necessary here to refer to the coordinated support extended by the U.S. and the Soviet Union towards Saddam's announcement of ceasefire:

The U.S. support for Saddam after his announcement of a ceasefire and withdrawal of his forces from Iran was echoed in an article published in the Washington Post on June 14, 1982. In an article published in the Washington Post following the said announcement the former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote:

If Iraq had won the war there would be no apprehension and anxiety in the Gulf today and our interests in the region would not be in as much danger as they are now. However, with a view to maintaining a balance of power in the region, it is in our interest to effect a ceasefire there as soon as possible and, gradually approach a moderate regime which will probably succeed the Iranian regime in the future...:

This is the position of U.S. and Kissinger in a person who still secretly plays an important role in compiling U.S. foreign policy. Moscow's position is not much different from that of the U.S. Radio Moscow in a commentary, about the Iraqi withdrawal and ceasefire, presented in its Arabic service on June 21, 1982 said:

"The Iraqi leadership has decided to pull its forces out of all Iranian territory occupied in the course of nearly two years of armed clashes. It will not be an exaggeration if we say that this has been a positive move by Baghdad which can well help the efforts of various countries and organisations of the world which aim at stopping the bloody clashes."

Thus, we realize that after two years of damages and casualties inflicted upon the Islamic Republic of Iran by Iraq, Moscow acquits Iraq of all its crimes only because Iraq halted its aggression, which was in fact due to the struggles of the Islamic nation. Moscow presents the issues in a way to suggest that Iran was unable to force the Iraqis out of its territory and Iraq made such a positive move voluntarily. This position of Moscow carried an implicit promise of support for Iraq by the Soviets, to urge Saddam to swallow the ignominy of a political defeat Russia's interests in Iraq are preserved and Saddam's government secured.

Pursuing this policy Moscow, along with other western countries, concentrated its efforts in the U.N. in order to play a part in imposing the ceasefire upon Iran. These efforts intensified as Iran's resolution to continue the war grew firmer.

As Iran's intention to extend its operation beyond its borders, to achieve its legitimate rights, became clear, the big powers stepped up their efforts in the U.N. Just one day before the commencement of the Ramadhan offensive, the U.N. Security Council, which had held a session on the war at Jordan's request, issued a resolution urging both sides to cease fire and withdraw



their forces from each others's territories. This decision was obviously welcomed by Saddam and countries supporting Iraq, but it could not weaken the determination of the Islamic troops to continue the war.

The Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, exposed and thwarted the U.S. plot in relation to the Zionist invasion of Southern Lebanon, aimed at diverting Iranian public opinion from the war. The Imam rallied public opinion towards defeating Iraq thus foiling efforts by the superpowers to end the war. This caused some anxieties for Moscow.

By the beginning of Operation Ramadhan in Iraqi territory, the Soviet Union which had constantly kept silent during the Iraqi aggression upon Iran, implicitly confirming it, voiced its apprehensions over Iran's thrust into Iraqi territory. On the second day of the operation, July 14, 1982, radio Moscow broadcasts the penetration of Iranian forces into Iraq implying that this Iranian move was carried out despite the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the Iranian territories and also despite the U.N.'s resolution calling for a ceasefire.

ZIONIST REGIME AND THE IMPOSED WAR:

As a part of the U.S. policy in the region, Israel has constantly worked towards prolonging and deepening the war ever since its inception.

From the first days of the Islamic Revolution the Zionists were well aware of its true nature. In association with the U.S. attempting to undermine the Islamic Revolution, the Zionist regime instigated Iraq to war against Iran.

Historically anxious to enlarge its political foothold in the region the Zionists seized upon the opportunity offered to them by the imposed war. Considering the trend of the Zionist expansionism in the region, the prospect of an Israel extension from the Nile to the Euphrates did not seem too unlikely. A study of the Israeli intrusive attempts in the course of the imposed war would clearly reveal the valuable service rendered to the U.S. by Iraq.

Iraq cannot obviously be so naive as not to realise the Zionists' objectives in the region, then why is it that, in coordina-

tion with the very Zionist plans, Iraq attacked Iran? The basic motives for the Iraqi aggression upon Iran could be sought in Saddam's quixotic aspirations and, above all, his dependency upon the imperialist powers which saw their regional interests in grave danger by the consolidation of the Islamic Revolution.

Israel's vital interest in the area had also been jeopardized in the like manner. The Zionists were thinking, like Saddam, that with the beginning of the war, the Islamic Revolution would soon be defeated and a pro-U.S. regime would be once again installed in Iran.

Eversince the collapse of U.S. predictions, the Israeli Zionists supported the Iraqi regime in various ways. Upon the occurrence of any Iranian victory in the battle fronts, Israeli authorities immediately brought up the notorious issue of arms sales to Iran and exploited it for the propaganda purposes.

The best way of impairing the Islamic Republic's reputation, as conceived by the Israelis, was through its feigning support for it. According to the Imam's statement, Israel itself knew that if it touched a sea that would turn filthy. In this way it wanted to publicly calumniate Iran. Israel's plans were thoroughly transparent obvious during the past years.

For instance after the Operation Fath ul-Mobin, Ariel Sharon, Israeli Defence Minister, announced that Israel has sold \$27 million worth of arms to Iran.

Similar rumours were spread repeatedly by the Voice of America and other western media coinciding with Iran's victories. The objective of this propaganda was to prevent the Islamic Revolution from gaining political influence in the world.

In the middle of the war, when the Iraqi regime reached a quandary about why it was waging a war against Iran instead of fighting against Israel, the Israeli Air Force, according to a well-calculated plan bombed Iraq's atomic reactor, in order to create an anti-Zionist popularity for Iraq in the region. Referring to Israel's move, Imam Khomeini said:

"It so appears now that Saddam, finding himself at the threshold of a fateful defeat, in a war of aggression that he himself enkindled, has resorted to a collusion with Israel, having the latter bomb the nuclear installations in Iraq. This farce aimed at white-

washing Saddam, by projecting him in the image of a sworn anti-Zionist warrior in the region, and thereby placing him in the anti-imperialist camp as well. Through this preposterous travesty they have sought in vain to portray us, in this Islamic land, as accomplices of the Zionist regime."

Considering that Iraqi air defence did not fire a single shot at Israeli aircraft and did not down any of these planes during the Israeli air attack against the Tamuz nuclear reactor of Iraq, it is obvious that Iraq welcomed such a blow since it was to cover up Iraq's dependence on the U.S. All through the war, Israel has constantly tried to feign support for Iran. Because had the Zionists openly opposed the Islamic Republic they would have given it a great tactical advantage, as well as a strong political leverage. Also they would have made it a lot more difficult for the reactionary regimes of the region to oppose Iran.

The repeated victories scored by Iran in the battlefronts and finally the liberation of Khorramshahr caused Israel to betray its anxiety over this victory, which sped up the attainment of the immediate objectives of the Islamic Revolution.

Following this victory Israel radio, in its Persian service said: "The Persian Gulf war takes many lives from both sides and the parade of Iraqi captives in Iran draws the yelping of vultures and jackals."

Clearly, Israel radio betrayed the onset of uncertainties among Israeli authorities. Israel, which had managed to annex the Golan Heights and occupied southern Lebanon exploiting the diversion created by Saddam in going on war against Iran, at last abandoned its previous position and openly attacked Iran after the Iranian thrust into Iraqi territory during the Operation Ramadhan. Just a few days before the operation Ramadhan, a former Israeli official requested the U.S. to take action to end the war through an agreement with the Soviet Union. U.S. compliance with this was later echoed in the resolution of the U.N.'s Security Council which also had Soviet backing. But greater significance, was Begin's speech among a group of South Lebanese people.

Referring to Imam Khomeini's speeches in which the Imam has stated, "One of our important tasks has been the issue that

Israel should be destroyed," and that the creation of a day of Qods has been made for the same purpose, Begin angrily accused Iran of starting the war against Iraq. He said: "Those who have started the war against Iraq want to pass through Iraq in order to defeat us. But I warn the Iranian forces that should they intend to do so before they could reach Beit ul-Moqaddas, our air force and armoured forces will teach them a lesson such that those who survive the attack may go and relate it for others."

Begin's speech after two years of false propaganda against the Islamic Revolution clearly shows that which the Iranian thrust into Iraqi territory, Israel found its future in serious danger and after exactly two years of war, now as soon as we make a further advance, it is immediately reflected upon an unmistakably nervous reaction on the part of Israel.

When Israel accused Iran of starting the war against Iraq, it showed that Israel has come to realize it to be in its best interest to voice its open support for Iraq. By presenting Iran as dangerous vis-a-vis the Arabs of the Persian Gulf it portrayed Iran as the main danger. The issue of Arms Sales from Israel to Iran is now out of question, and Israel supposes that it could intimidate Iran and compel it into a conciliatory position, by threats of an air strike similar to one that Iraq was stricken with.

Mobilization of Muslims on Qods day and worldwide demonstrations at the same time, as Iran's military successes was on the rise and Saddam on verge of a final defeat, intensified Israel's fear to an extent that it was finally compelled to creep out of its insidious ambush and confront the Islamic Republic out in the daylight.

THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE IMPOSED WAR:

The non-aligned peace mission travelled to Iran and Iraq several times, requesting an end to the war and its settlement through negotiations. The non-aligned countries including India, Cuba, Zambia and the Palestine Liberation Organisation were pursuing a line of policy which aimed at preservation of Iraq for the east, and prevent it from falling completely into western hands. They also intended to dissuade Iran, by bringing it to the negotiation table, from taking military measures which would probably lead to Saddam's fall.

This problem was not unrelated with Soviet's support for Iraq. Three years ago when it was decided that the chairmanship of the 1982 summit of non-aligned countries would be given to Saddam, the heads of the non-aligned countries never thought what would become of the movement if Saddam was dominated by the west. With the beginning of the imposed war and Saddam's leaning towards the west, the effort of the non-aligned was aimed, first, at ending the imposed war in a way which would satisfy Saddam; second, at preventing Saddam's dependence to the west; third, confirming Soviet interests together with the interests of the non-aligned countries in Iraq; and fourth, humiliating Iran in the war thus preventing a wider spread of the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Conference and the U.N.'s efforts for establishing western domination over Iraq, was considered as an instigating factor for the non-aligned countries to follow their so-called peace-seeking measures.

From the non-aligned countries' point of view, Iraq, which was being supported by western dominated regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, could be completely dominated by the west through the mediation of these countries and with the probable establishment of a peace, as such the interests of these countries in Iraq would be endangered, along with Moscow, non-aligned countries have had extensive interests in Iraq. For example, countries like India, Cuba and Yugoslavia enjoy extensive economic relations with Iraq while they have good political ties with this country.

The existence of Indian workers in Iraq and economic agreements between the two nations, also industrial and particularly agricultural relations between Iraq, India and Cuba were part of the interests at stake. Similarly expanded relations between Yugoslavia and Iraq including a Yugoslavian economic project, with an income of about \$700 million, encouraged the non-aligned countries to end the war soon, in order to maintain their interests.

The western threat to the interests of the non-aligned countries and the Soviet Union, was not the only reason for the non-aligned's efforts to establish peace. the increase of discontent within

the Iraqi army in relation to the constant defeats of the Iraqi regime in the war highlighted the possibility of important changes in the Iraqi leadership. The non-aligned countries found it necessary to do their best to halt the war in order to prevent the occurrence of such changes.

The other difficulty the non-aligned were facing was they had not taken an explicit and open stand on the condemnation of the aggressor. Although the non-aligned considered the problem with more flexibility and even implicitly recognized Saddam as responsible, they presumed upon Iran's forgiveness too heavily. This mission never wanted to antagonize Iraq by putting pressure on Saddam, and thus endangering the interests of the non-aligned.

Therefore, the non-aligned mission could not reach a proper solution to end the war last year, and their shuttlings proved fruitless.

After several visits to Iran and Iraq, the non-aligned peace mission finally presented a plan to end the war last year. The said proposal consisted of the creation of a buffer zone on the two countries' borders which was under Iraq's occupation at that time. This plan was welcomed by Bani Sadr, the reason being his willingness to escalate domestic political strife which would be facilitated by an end to the war.

This plan was itself showing that the non-aligned were giving priority to the problem of ending the war and securing Saddam rather than thinking of Iran's rights.

When the proposal was rejected by the Islamic Republic, it added to the difficulties of the non-aligned in coming up with better conditions for putting an end to the war. The expansion of military operations, particularly in the Fath ul-Mobin operations, caused these peace missions to resume their mediating efforts. This mission tried to give more assurance to Iran by internationalizing the Iraqi imposed war against Iran. For instance, it suggested collecting war reparation for Iran in an international fund. Thus, although the non-aligned felt the necessity of paying the reparation to Iran, they distorted and debased the manner of its payment.

With the beginning of the Operation Beit ul-Moqaddas and the victories of the Islamic combatants in recapturing Khorramshahr, the non-aligned channelled their peace making efforts to the U.N., having realised the futility of their previous methods.

On the other hand, with the non-aligned conference looming ahead, and with the war reaching a critical stage, after the victory in Khorramshahr, it seemed difficult to take a definite position in the war.

With the beginning of Operation Ramadhan the U.N. plan, which was counted on by many parties, seemed hopeless. Since Baghdad, as the previously chosen venue of the non-aligned conference, did no longer seem a proper choice now, the non-aligned countries welcomed the idea of an expedient change of venue with a sense of relief, as it freed them from the restraint of obligation to Baghdad regime. Therefore, with the beginning of operation Ramadhan, non-aligned efforts to change the venue to another place intensified, while they also renewed their peace making efforts.

It must be admitted that this veracity of the non-aligned in honouring of Iran's motion for the change of venue could be exploited as an asset to gain credibility and confidence for the future moves of the non-aligned. But it should be remembered however, that this veracity will be availed only when it embrace the conditions put forth by the Islamic Republic.

EUROPE AND THE IMPOSED WAR:

The countries, which could essentially gain a great economic advantage from an Iraqi tilt to the west, were the European countries.

Because of the pre-war dependence of the Iraqi regime on the U.S., Saddam. was hard put to it to approach the European countries to purchase arms, once the war had started. Europe had a long-term policy in order to fully dominate Iraq. European domination was not of course unrelated to the U.S. role in Iraq and it was in fact considered as the first stage of Iraq's emergence out of the domination of the east.

The important European countries such as France, England and Germany could increase their volume of exports to Iraq and also sign large contracts with Iraq in order to strengthen their ties with this country. From the political point of view, these countries tried to support Saddam and the establishment of an imposed peace. They had not ceased from strengthening Saddam's military power thus enabling him to resist Iran's demands. Among these countries, France played a special role.

FRANCE AND THE IMPOSED WAR

French policy towards the imposed war was focused on supporting Iraq from the very beginning. French hostility towards the Islamic Revolution coordinated with the U.S. and aiming at the destruction of the Revolution, was the basis of French policy. The French government, either under Giscard D'Estaing or under Françoise Mitterand, pursued several objectives through supporting Iraq:

One of these goals was, along with the U.S., exerting more influence in Iraqi politics, in order to minimise the Soviet influence in this country. Preserving and expanding French economic interests in Iraq was another reason. The last goal of France was preparing Iraq to counter the shock waves of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. Therefore, France did not take a neutral stand towards the Iraqi invasion of Iranian territory, as proved by French policy towards the war and its military support for Iraq.

A few days after the outbreak of the imposed war, the American daily, the New York Times, called the European countries' silence towards the war, "Strange", since their oil important played an important role, and their security depended on the situation of the region. This daily reported that French oil imports from Iraq totalled 600 thousand barrels daily, taking first place, among Iraq's oil importers.

The New York Times then added: "If European countries, so much depended on Iraq's oil, face a probable cut of Iraq's oil, they should either put up with the consequent damages themselves, or exert pressure upon Iraq to end the war."

Therefore it is evident that the west would continue to help Iraq as soon as the region's oil exports are not affected. This tactic clearly exposes the hostility of the west, especially, the U.S.

and France towards Iran, and their friendship with Iraq. Despite the reduction of Iraq's oil production we can see that France exerts no pressure on Iraq to end the war. The reason being the Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia have provided European countries with sufficient oil by an increase in oil production enabling them to continue support for the Iraqi regime.

In Nov. 1980, when the Iraqi forces halted their advance after occupying part of Iranian territory in the west and south, the American Daily "Washington Post" quoting Ronald Cohen a reliable French source, wrote: "Iraq's defeat is the greatest threat to the stability of the (Persian) Gulf." It added that official statements, in the French media indicate that France has sent large amounts of raw materials to Iraq. France openly made all efforts to prevent Saddam's downfall and it seems that France was looking for a way to somehow end the war before it became too late.

This analysis was made at a time when France was trying to stabilise its position in Iraq which is embroiled in a war. That is why France, besides providing Iraq with material aid, plays the part of a mediator in ending the war, and while the French President voices his deepest concerns over the continuation of the war.

France's military role in Iraq was constantly developing as the war progressed, at a time when the Socialist government of France refused to release three Iranian PT boats. The French government began to deliver 60 F-1 Mirages and other needed weapons to Iraq. "Almajalleh" magazine, printed in London, quoting informed sources in France, wrote that the French and Iraqi regimes, recently, signed a pact on basis of which France was to equip Iraq with heavy artillery at a cost of one billion dollars. This was reported in Nov. 1981, in the process of the first stage of Iran's victories with the raising of the siege of Abadan.

Three months later, Feb. 7, 1981, the International News Agencies reported that Iraq bought military equipment and heavy arms from France at a cost of 700 million dollars. The rush of French weapons to Iraq increased greatly during the war, especially during the victories Tariq ul-Qods offensive. Following Iran's success in destroying and expelling the Baathist enemies from the Bostan region and the liberation of this city, Iraq, once more turned to France for much needed weapons. According to "As-Safir"



daily, April 5, 1982, Saudi Arabia declared its readiness to pay for the weapons France supplied to Iraq. According to semi-official data, Iraqi orders for French weapons reached 10 billion francs last October, added "As-Safir".

The extent of French military aid to Iraq was not limited to this. According to German daily *Zud Deutsch Zeitung* (July 28, 1982), Iraq was using an anti-aircraft system called "Ronald" manufactured jointly by France and West Germany. Iraq has ordered 150 of this kind of anti-aircraft systems costing 4 billion dollars. "Ronald" systems are to be added to French tanks (MX1-30). The number of these systems received so far by the Iraqis has not yet been disclosed.

All the above mentioned weapons have been delivered to Iraq during the war to stimulate Saddam to continue the war and to reject Iran's conditions.

Meanwhile, the delivery of three patrol boats ordered and paid for before the revolution by Iran was obstructed by the French Government. Moreover, France has taken many other measures against Iran such as supporting Iranian counter-revolutionaries - from Baktyar to Rajavi - who had fled to France as well as declaring its support for Iraq.

FRENCH ECONOMIC ROLE IN IRAQ:

France plays a major economic role in Iraq which in fact amounts to bilateral economic cooperation, since France is one of the major importers of Iraqi oil. France had been buying 600,000 barrels of Iraqi oil daily which fell to a minimum at the inception of the war. However, the war caused no reduction in French exports to Iraq and French imports remained at third place in Iraq's imports after Japan and West Germany.

France and Iraq have signed numerous pacts during this period which can be put in operation if the war ends and oil production is stepped up. Also the continuation of the war might endanger Saddam's rule to France's detriment. The French daily "Le monde" wrote on July 19, 1982 that the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war worries the French company in charge of a major project in Iraq's Health Ministry. Referring to dangers threatening

this 45 billion franc project by the continuation of war, this daily wrote, sixty other companies which had signed macro size agreements with Iraq experienced a similar anxiety since Iraq's economy had been seriously damaged. According to "Le monde", the war caused reduction in French exports to Iraq. In fact the amount of French exports rose 73.3 percent in 1981 and showed a rise of the same rate in 1982. France's anxiety increased unprecedentedly especially after Iran's victories in "Fath ul-Mobin" and "Beit ul-Moqaddas" operations.

The daily "Le point" wrote on May 26th, 1982 that, the development of the Iraq-Iran war has seriously worried the French government. The estimated guarantee fee for insuring the Iraqi imports against the probable failure of payment ran up to 20 billion francs (15 billion francs for weapons) which would weigh heavily upon the French budget if the Iraqi regime collapsed.

Naturally, the existence of such broad French economic interests in Iraq, which has greatly extended Saddam's dependence on western policies, has provided the justification for western attempts to make Iran accept an imposed ceasefire.

FRANCE, IRAQ AND RAMADHAN OPERATIONS:

Because of extensive France-Iraq economic contracts and the stabilisation of the Islamic Revolution's power through Saddam's defeat, International efforts especially supported by Arab regimes, exerted in order to prevent Iran from attacking Iraqi territory.

Following the American backed invasion of southern Lebanon, French authorities repeatedly declared thir support for Iraq and emphasised ending the war on the basis of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Claude Cheyssaun speaking in France's National Assembly declared that the 1975 Agreement was a good basis for settling Iran-Iraq conflicts. In his speech he also stressed the necessity of ending this war since it endangered the whole region.

Iran's attack into Iraq, despite U.N. Security Council's moves to save Saddam, and the beginning of the Ramadhan Operations met with the opposition from European countries, especially that of France.

According to the Islamic Republic News Agency dispatches, "Claude Cheyssaun", French Foreign Minister, in a meet with his Iraqi counterpart, on July 16, 1982 said that France had shown its support for Iraq and that as far as France was concerned any threat to Iraq's national integrity would undoubtedly be a threat to the region's stability.

In this speech, he was trying to dissuade Iran from continuing the Ramadhan operation, threatening that this offensive would encounter serious resistance.

Following five striking stages of Ramadhan Operation, Claude Cheyssaun reaffirmed France's support for Iraq. In an interview with Kuwaiti Daily "Al Anba.a" justifying the steady support of the French government for Saddam, he said: "Establishing an equilibrium in the region requires an independent Iraq." He then emphasised that: "Iraq is of special importance for the world in general and for the west in particular." Therefore, adopting such stances, France succeeds in ushering an 'independent Iraq', independent of the communist camp, that is, to the western world. Saddam's interview with 'Times' magazine as well as with 'Le monde', was actually declaration of Iraq's positive response to the west's and especially France's invitation.

In his interview with 'Le monde', printed in Paris, (July 29, 1982) Saddam said, "Our relations with France are satisfactory and mutually reliable. However, we would like to make these relations even stronger. I have not yet had the opportunity to meet Mr Mitterrand. I haven't travelled out of Iraq because of the war for two years and Mr. Mitterrand may consider it difficult to come to Iraq under these circumstances, any way, our meeting seems necessary at a more suitable time."

Thus we observe that, Saddam expressed his sorrow for not having the opportunity to meet Mitterrand, a person who despite his anti-imperialist slogans during his election campaigns, showed his real character by travelling to Israel and signing bilateral co-operative pacts with the Zionist regime while at the same time gaining such influence over so-called anti-Zionist Saddam during his imposed war against Iran.

It may seem that the west is the winner of the Iraq-Iran war. Even if the situation continue in this fashion for a while naturally, Iran will not be the real loser. Today, everyone knows that the major loser of this war is the Soviet Union which for a while had been silent over the war because of certain interests, implicitly approving of it. However, it can be emphasised that Iraq's defeat is necessary to pave the way to fight the Zionist regime which enjoys all-out western support and has sincere relations with Iraq. The continuation of this war will prove that the west, the U.S. or Europe, especially France, will not be the winner. On the contrary they may even be in a worse situation than the Soviet Union after the Iraqi regime's defeat.

THE U.N. AND THE IMPOSED WAR

The policy of the U.N. in the previous year, that is, before the Islamic Republic could score its dazzling victories, was to side with Iraq without an apparent concern for ending the conflict. For in its made scramble with the Soviet Union, for a political foothold in Iraq, the west reckoned an outstretched war more to its own advantage.

In the early months of the war, a resolution was passed at the U.N. Security Council calling for the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. The resolution, without any reference whatsoever to the presence of the invading Iraqi troops inside Iranian territory, and not even calling for the withdrawal of the invaders from the occupied lands of the wronged party, was a vivid manifestation of the west's interest in the continuation of the imposed war.

The rationale of this claim is that the west itself had initiated the war against Iran by backing Iraq, and consequently it was naturally unwilling to demand an Iraqi withdrawal. Otherwise, it would have been compelled to recognize the rights of Iran politically, which act would have involved Iraq in a dispute with the international organisation of the United Nations.

This point was several times mentioned (by Iranian officials) during the trips to Iran of Olaf Palme, the special U.N. envoy who was acting as a mediator. Nevertheless, the United Nations did not take the least measure in condemning the aggressive party and calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territory.

In fact, the United Nations along side the west, was entertaining the notion that persuading Iran to submit to its (UN) conditions for ending the conflict, would result in a political defeat for the Islamic Republic and a victory for Iraq.

Moreover, by so doing the U'N' would have been able to earn a credit for itself at international level. On the other hand, the rejection of the U.N. terms by Iran, prolonging the war, would at the same time put the west in a better position to further its influence over Iraq.

The only point reiterated by Olaf Palme, in the course of his repeated visits to Iran, was to persuade the Islamic Republic's authorities to forgo their legitimate rights, and he was at the same time trying hard to convince Iran to pave the way for a compromise with Iraq, while Iraqi troops were still occupying many Iranian cities and towns.

The repudiation by the Islamic Republic of the U.N. conditions for ending the Iraq-Iran war, caused the U.N. authorities to abandon their 'peace-seeking' measures and let Iran alone.

However, in the course of time, and after the Islamic combatants launched the successful operation Beit ul-Moqaddas which led to the liberation of vast areas of the occupied territory in southern Iran, particularly the port city of Khorramshahr, once again the ground was laid for the west to renew its efforts to bring an end to the Iraqi imposed war.

The reason why the west, prior to these (Beit ul-Moqaddas) operations, was not insisting on the termination of the war, was that the Iraqi troops were stationed inside Iranian lands so that not only did not their presence jeopardise the interests of the west but instead enfeebled Iran which opposed the west.

After the conquest of Khorramshahr and clearing the south of Iraqi troops, the west had, for the first time, to cope with the possibility of an Iranian thrust into Iraq. This would not only endanger the interests of the west but also would damage the Soviet influence in Iraq, thus adding to the probability of the Iraqi regime's collapse.

Thus because of the value that Saddam had for east and west, they tried to lay the ground for halting the war and thus preventing an Iranian attack upon Iraqi territory. To this end, on the one hand they advised Iraq to call for a cease-fire and withdraw its troops, and on the other, they attempted to distract the attention from the war, by engineering an attack on southern Lebanon.

Concurrent with the U.S.-backed Zionist attack upon southern Lebanon and Iran's involvement in the events of that

country, Iraq declared a unilateral cease-fire coinciding with a withdrawal of its forces from Iran.

Following this apparent retreat of the Iraqi troops, the U.N. Security Council, upon a proposal extended by Jordan, and backed by the U.S., the Soviet Union and European countries, held a session on discontinuation of the war. After studying the proposal by Jordan, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire to be observed by the belligerent parties and demanding withdrawal of troops by both sides from each others' territories.

Interestingly, the United Nations calls for the evacuation of the Iraqi troops from Iran at a time when the former, as imagined by the world's political opinion, has apparently completed its withdrawal of troops from the latter's occupied territory. Conceivably, if Iraq had delayed its declaration of withdrawal from Iran for six more months, the U.N. too would have issued its resolution to the same effect after the same period. Why? Because what the west aimed at was to forestall the political repercussions of the Iranian thrust into Iraq, and nothing else. This tactic of the United Nations, was also a scheme by the west to keep Saddam in power, while the announcement of a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops by Iraq was a preparation to implement this plan.

The U.N. resolution provided Iraq with an opportunity for political show-off, pledging to dispatch its troops to fight against Israel. Nonetheless, the lightning offensive by the Islamic troops inside the Iraqi territory foiled this other attempt of the west.

With the continuation of the war and after Iran's total rejection of the U.N. resolution, the western mass media, in a desperate attempt to urge an Iranian consent to halt its operations inside Iraqi territory, began to blame the United Nations that why the organisation had not issued a similar resolution at the outset of the war, i.e. when Iraq invaded Iran!

Among the, London-based Sunday Times pointed out that the United Nations, through its failure to demand (in its Sept. 1980 resolution) an Iraqi withdrawal from Iran, had greatly damaged its credibility.

The newspaper, despite its apparent sympathy with Iran's position, tried to say that the west conceded that the U.N., under those circumstances, had indeed made a mistake and that neverthe-

less, in its new resolution by demanding the withdrawal by both belligerents, the U.N. has made up for its past error and taken a step in alleviating the turmoil in the region.

However, the commencement of the Operation Ramadhan, just one day after the said resolution was passed at the Security Council, very soon thwarted the scheme for a cease-fire and a compromising solution to the existing conflict.

The stationing of troops from the Islamic countries or the United Nations on the borders of the belligerent nations, which had been pointed out in the resolution of the Security Council, was ridiculed even more than the scheme itself, after Iran started its operations inside Iraq. Consequently the U.N. officials, after realising their inability to carry out the plan, adopted certain other policies towards the issue. As an example, we can refer here to a statement made by the U.N. spokesman, in an interview after the Iranian penetration into Iraq. He declared that, the plan for effecting a cease-fire and for the stationing of troops on the borders of the two countries, would be enforced only when the two sides of the conflict both agreed with it.

Naturally, considering the fact that the United Nations has always backed Iraq and has never pressed it for the restitution of Iran's rights, it would never succeed in getting the approval of both parties, and therefore, the war will continue as the only way for Saddam's defeat.

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE IMPOSED WAR

The intensity of the efforts launched by the peace missions of the Islamic Conference Organisation particularly during the past year was fluctuating in keeping with the interests of certain influential governments among the Islamic nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and some other countries in the region.

These missions, in the course of their shuttlings between Iran and Iraq, did not achieve any significant or concrete results. On the one hand, Saddam as the war initiator, could not accept Iran's terms for ending the war, because this would amount to a defeat for him, even greater than one sustained in the battlefields. On the other hand, the ruling regimes in the region did not see any

good in the prolongation of the war, particularly since they saw the prospect of a defeat for the Baathist regime of Iraq not so improbable.

As a result, during the war and particularly during the last year, these countries, either through the ICO, or by resorting to Iran's friends such as Syria and Algeria, or by way of exerting psychological pressures, to foist a peace upon the Islamic Republic, renewed their endeavours for terminating the war.

After Iran successfully concluded the three phases of its military operations called "Raising the Siege of Abadan", "Tariq ul-Qods" and "Fath ul-Mobin", respectively the ruling regimes in the region stepped up their diplomatic efforts to end the Iraq-Iran conflict. This time, the renewal of the efforts by the peace mission for ending the war was aimed at hindering the consolidation of Iran's military power for repelling the aggressor.

To this end, only a few days before commencement of the Operation Beit ul-Moqaddas by Iran's Islamic combatants, members of the ICO peace mission made another attempt to impose peace between the two sides by visiting Iran and Iraq for reviewing the positions of the countries.

Following a letter sent by Saddam Hussein to Ahmad Sekou Toure, head of the ICO peace commission, on the acceptance by Iraq of Iran's third term, i.e., the recognition of the aggressor, the commission renewed its exertion to pin the Islamic Republic down to a flexibility in its terms.

The spread of the rumours that certain wealthy gulf states had assumed the payment of war reparations to Iran, intensified the propaganda in favour of peace. The ICO peace delegation, by bringing up these two points, that is, Saddam's apparent acceptance of Iran's third term as well as the payment of the war indemnities by the reactionary Arab government, tried to convince the Islamic Republic to withdraw its demand for a cease-fire coinciding with Iraqi troops withdrawal, and agree to the Iraqis retreat after final negotiations.

As a matter of fact, there was nothing new in the proposals put forth by the delegation. In fact, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were only trying to make up for the blunder they had made in their estimations of Saddam's status, so they could tide him over the plight caused by his own war of aggression.

To this end, a flood of propaganda was afoot to stress the exigency of peace in the region. However, after realising Iran's firm determination in its terms, they (the reactionary Arab rulers) tried to project to the world a pugnacious picture of the Islamic Republic. By so doing they found another justification to further extend financial aid and military equipment to the Iraqi regime.

Along side the efforts of the Islamic Conference Organisation which came to nought, the Muslim World Congress too dispatched a delegation to Iran and Iraq to exert their efforts for ending the war. The head of the delegation, Mr. Davalibi, after hearing the statements of President Ali Khamenei of the Islamic Republic, addressed him asking for a solution to end the war, different from what Iran had reiterated over and again. Nonetheless, Iran's stand was naturally fixed and unchangeable.

After the Operation Beit ul-Moqaddas and the victory of the Islamic combatants in expelling the Iraqi army from all the occupied territory in the south of the country, including the port city of Khorramshahr, the reactionary regime of the region, disappointed with the peace attempts, focussed their efforts on two points:

1. Compromise with the U.S. on Israel's invasion upon south Lebanon, and

2. Supporting the U.N. Security Council on the cease-fire resolution and assignment of forces on the borders of the two countries.

There is no doubt that the U.S.-sponsored attack on south Lebanon was launched with the prior knowledge and agreement of the Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf region. This was done in a futile attempt to exert pressures (on Iran) to discontinue the war against Iraq and to divert Iran's attention from Saddam towards Israel.

The support for the Security Council too took place following talks between Saddam and authorities of certain Arab states such as Saudi Arabia on the withdrawal of the remaining Iraqi troops from Iran, and after the west and other reactionary regimes in the region promised (Saddam) political support for ending the war.

This, in fact, reveals the keen interest of the Arabs in the region for putting an end to the Iraq-Iran war.

Obviously, after Iran's successful thrust into Iraq they were frustrated with respect to both of the said objectives. Therefore, those countries have decided to make renewed efforts to end the conflict. Today the Security Council too is active in this regard alongside these countries; although, the very mediation endeavours of these states are part of an extensive scheme aimed at slandering the Islamic Republic. But it should be stressed that so far, these conspiracies have never been able to affect our firm determination and we will continue our struggle until the fulfillment of our legitimate rights.

REACTIONARY REGIMES IN THE REGION AND THE IMPOSED WAR:

"We are aggrieved to see the powers, that should have been put together to wipe the Israel out and liberate Qods, are now, through a collusion among the archdemons of our time, international Zionism and the Iraqi Baathist Party, expended in fighting against the most unflinching enemy of Israel and the United States."

Imam Khomeini on the occasion of the War Week
(September 18, 1981)

The reactionary regimes in the Middle East region can be divided into two categories, as regards their stand towards the Iraqi imposed war:

A. The Gulf states, headed by Saudi Arabia, and

B. The governments outside the region, led by Egypt.

The Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf region, particularly during the last year, have centred their efforts for ending the war. Having realised that the Iraqi imposed war was fruitless and that its

prolongation would most probably result in more victories for the Islamic Republic, some of these governments, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, tried their best to compel Iran to put an end to the war, disregarding the fulfillment of its rights.

The formation of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, (P)(GCC) in the beginning of the imposed war, was in fact a surety given to the Gulf states in return for the aids extended by them to the Iraqi regime.

The U.S. support for the (P)(GCC) and its expansion of military relations with Saudi Arabia as well as the signing of security pacts between all the Gulf states and the Saudi Arabia, were all assuming far greater significance for the Sheikdoms in the light of the new problems arising from the failure to put an end to the war.

Saudi Arabia, declaring support for Iraq, staged a series of attempts to establish an imposed peace in the region. The ICO peace mission, along side with Saudi Arabia's support in serving the interests of Iraq, travelled to the two warring countries for several times. However, due to Iran's insistence on implementing its terms for ending the imposed war, the ICO delegation did not achieve important results.

The U.S.'s failure in involving the Persian Gulf Arabs in the war, followed by another defeat of that superpower in dragging Egypt and Jordan into the war in a classic manner, caused that the reactionary regimes in the region, increase their financial aids to Saddam on the one hand, to prevent his collapse, and augment their peace efforts, on the other.

As an example, we may refer to a report published in As-Saffir newspaper (March 21, 1982), to the effect that Saudi Arabia was ready to pay for the armaments purchased by Iraq from France. Semi-official figures estimated the Iraqi regime's armaments orders to be around 10 billion francs.

Following a similar policy, the Kuwaiti parliament approved a 2-billion-dollar loan to the Baathist regime of Iraq. On the other hand, with regard to the expansion of Irano-Syrian relations and the cutting of the Iraqi oil pipelines from Syria, the reactionary governments once again extended an urgent aid to Saddam Hussein.

According to a West German news agency report, after the Iraqi oil pipelines from Syria were disconnected, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and several other members of the (P)(GCC), provided Iraq with an emergency aid of 50 million marks. Of course, this was in addition to the military aid extended to Iraq by Saudi Arabia, which was expended on purchasing Soviet-made equipment for the Iraqi regime.

Ash Shera', printed in Lebanon wrote in one of its issues that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had purchased great amounts of heavy arms from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The paper further revealed that the weapons were purchased to be delivered to the Iraqi regime. The Lebanon based newspapers also disclosed that the military equipment purchased by Saudi Arabia from Poland alone, amounted to 2 billion dollars. These were, of course, only parts of the aids offered to Iraq by the (P)(GCC) member countries.

However, the continuation of the war, from a financial stand point, has always called for the backing of Saddam by the Arab regimes.

Upon, the massive victories of the Islamic combatants and the liberation of Khorramshahr, the ruling regimes in the region were terrified. Their fright stemmed from the ominous prospect they saw of the outcome of their support for saddam.

Imam Khomeini's statements to the effect that "Today, Iran is a power in the region" and his warning to the reactionary governments to quite their support for Saddam made these regimes to have second thought about continuing their backing of the Iraqi ruler.

On the one hand, the Arab governments thought that, after the thrust of the Islamic combatants into Iraq, Iran would confront them from a position of strength, and on the other, they feared an eventual retaliation by a victorious Iran, if they decided not to support Saddam Hussein any more.

This state of confusion among the reactionary regimes in the Persian Gulf region, was abated to some extent by the effective military aids extended to the Iraqi regime by Egypt and Jordan, while the Security Council, through a resolution, was bringing to bear upon Iran the international pressure for ending the war.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran's "Operation Ramadhan" began, the reactionary regimes adopted a lenient stand towards Iran. During the five stages of the destructive operations in which the occupation of territory was only part of the main objective, they tried to cloak the truth by reporting Iran's offensive to be unsuccessful.

In a mild tone, Radio Riyadh, urged Iraq and Iran to welcome the efforts of the peace missions and stop a war which it said, is in the interest of the Zionist enemy.

Thus these governments have tried to perpetuate the notion that the delay in resuming the operations started by the Islamic combatants inside the enemy territory was because of Iran's weakness. By inculcating such an illusion and through inviting Iran and Iraq to peace and reconciliation, they aimed to blur the issues arising from their involvement in the war.

Of course, the U.N. support and the agreement of the two superpowers, that is the Soviet Union and the United States, to preserve Saddam, is among the significant factors encouraging these regimes to insist on their stand on the issues of war and peace.

In addition to what was said, there is another point deserving mention: the last sign of political support by these countries, for Iraq in the war, was their efforts for holding the Non-Aligned Summit meet in Baghdad.

However, with the change in venue of the summit, these governments realised that their assistance to a regime lacking political stability and security, was a blunder. Yet, if they are not going to change their policy, with the continuation of the war, they would naturally have to expect critical consequences.

B - THE GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE REGION:

The second series of U.S.-inspired regimes in the region which supported Saddam since the outbreak of the Iraqi imposed war including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, North Yemen, etc.

The least measures the said regimes took in support of Saddam was dispatch of troops to Iraq to fight against Iranian defenders. These so called volunteers were either bought or sent forcibly for these regimes have always pursued a political track along the lines of the U.S. interests in the region.

Egypt and Jordan had a greater share in assisting the Iraqi regime from military viewpoint. There are numerous reports on the dispatch of Egyptian weaponry to Iraq. For instance, the newspaper 'Al-Majalleh', published in London, wrote, "Presently 3,000 Egyptian soldiers and 270 military advisors are helping Saddam in his war against Iran."

The newspaper 'Al-Riyadh' wrote on May 1, 1982 that 'Egypt would directly supply Iraq with spare parts and equipment needed for the Soviet-made weapons.' This undertaking of the Egyptian regime is being carried out within the framework of an agreement signed between the two regimes sometime after Mubarak's coming into power.

The idea of Egyptian and Jordanian troops participating in the imposed war was presented through a vast propaganda in foreign press and political circles. The registration of so-called Jordanian volunteers started by the King of Jordan.

Commenting on the dispatch of Jordanian 'volunteers' to the Iraqi warfronts, the Jordanian government officially declared "The King of Jordan, after the formation of a special committee chaired by Jordanian Prime Minister for implementation of the plan on dispatch of 'volunteer' forces to Iraq, called on the Persian Gulf states including Saudi Arabia to send their military units to the battlefronts to assist Iraq.

The dispatch of these 'volunteers' did not have the slightest effect in the war and following the liberation of Khorramshahr, regimes such as Egypt and Jordan embarked on their efforts to impose a cease-fire upon Iran.

The request of the Egyptian Defence Minister Abu Ghazala from Reagan for taking measure to prevent the expansion of Iran's influence in the Persian Gulf and the statement by the Jordan's King to the effect that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a threat to all regional countries with Iraq as the starting line, all were designed to promote an international urgency for compelling Iran to accept a cease-fire in the wake of negotiations held between international circles and Saddam, all the reactionary and imperialistic circles declared they would support an Iraqi cease-fire announcement.

The inability of the Iraqi regime to continue the war and the necessity (felt by Saddam) for holding the Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Baghdad, coupled with the international supports for Iraq, made Saddam declare a cease-fire, followed by withdrawal of the invading troops from some parts of the Iranian territory.

Then, at the Security Council, Jordan submitted a request for a cease-fire, and the council in a resolution voted in favour of a cease-fire and withdrawal of the two countries' troops from each others' territories.

Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, realising that the dispatch of their military forces to Iraq proved useless, this time focussed all their energy on political measures.

These regimes completed their military measures to stop the Iraqi imposed war upon Iran, through an agreement with the Zionist regime to attack Sothern Lebanon. Nonetheless, this plot was discovered and foiled thanks to the insight of the Imam and his reiteration of the point that a rational way to fight against the Zionist regime was the defeat of the Iraqi regime.

Saddam again asked for help from the reactionary countries after the commencement of the Operations Ramadhan and once again reports on participation of Egyptian pilots in the Iraqi army were circulated.

The participation of Egyptian pilots in the Iraqi army also proved useless prompting Saddam to renew his endeavours for a cease-fire. Thus it should be pointed out that the reactionary regimes of the region cannot relegate their forces for long to a mercenary service in a weak army. For the continuation of the war because of Iraq's refusal to accept the legitimate conditions of Iran, will inevitably lead to Iran's victory. The trend of the war is itself the best evidence of this assertion.

THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT AND THE IMPOSED WAR

With the outbreak of the Iraqi imposed war, the Steadfastness Front announced support for the Islamic Republic, against the aggressions of the Baghdad regime. The anti-Zionist characteristics of the Islamic Revolution prepared the grounds for this support in political, cultural and economic spheres.

On the whole the Iraqi imposed war upon Iran plunged the region into a critical situation. The reactionary regimes of the region which had inflamed the fire of the war with the interference of the United States, were no more willing for its continuation. Yet, at the same time, unable to bear victory over Iraq, they tried to exert further pressure upon Iran by variously supporting Iraq in this war.

The role of the Steadfastness Front is very clear in countering these endeavours. For instance, Saddam's primary tactic for expanding the war against Iran was his effort to Arabize the war, which scheme too failed thanks to the support of the Arab progressive front for Iran: and denunciation of Saddam, by the front.

The Steadfastness Front in its fourth meeting in Tripoli announced support for Iran in the Iraqi imposed war while condemning any plots aimed at projecting as a war of Arabs against Persians.

The U.S. efforts aimed at reviving the Fahd scheme and foisting it upon the countries in the Middle East in order to put pressure upon the Islamic Revolution and obstruct the ways of its expansion, or in other words block its path towards Qods, was also foiled by Imam Khomeini's message which exposed the said scheme, and also through the Steadfastness Front's banning of the Fez conference.

The Amman Conference which was held at the beginning of the war in Jordan, with the support of reactionary Arab regimes, apparently aimed at codifying a unified strategy against Zionism, but in reality to adopt a uniform policy against the Islamic Revolution. The Conference failed due to non-participation of the Steadfastness Front and the main parties engaged in war against Zionism.

The renewed endeavours of the United States to bring back Egypt into the Arab fold and to legalise the Camp David treaty which necessitated the involvement of Egypt in the Iraqi imposed war, was also foiled by the Steadfastness Front Summit meet which condemned the idea and issued warning to the reactionary regimes of the region. Therefore, Egypt announced that it could not involve militarily in the war against Iran for certain reasons but that it would continue military aid to Saddam.

With regards to the said political support of the Steadfastness Front, the reactionary Arab regimes which extended large scale financial assistance to some of the member countries of the Front, including Syria and the PLO, requested the discontinuation of the Front's supports for Iran through imposing some pressures.

However the Steadfastness Front would not stand against the Islamic Revolution with regards to the great significance of the Revolution in the region. Apart from the war, the Islamic Revolution by its nature put the member countries of the Steadfastness Front in a position that vis a vis their people, they found it the best policy to support the Islamic Revolution.

Of course, the Front laid particular emphasis upon the contribution of the Islamic Revolution to the anti-imperialistic plans in Palestine. Still, the relations of the Islamic Republic with members of the Steadfastness Front were not completely on equal terms. For instance, Syria as the unswerving opponent of the Zionist regime and the United States, also as one of the real supporters of Palestinian cause has had the most friendly relations with Iran.

Another issue which helped the expansion of friendly relations between Iran and Syria was Saddam's enmity with President Hafez Assad. Because as Saddam tried to overthrow the Islamic Republic through U.S. plans, it equally endeavoured to topple the Syrian regime and bring to power a U.S.-inspired regime in that country. Iran's relations with Syria have been on a better standing in comparison with other members of the Front with regard to Syria's whole-hearted support for the Islamic Republic since the onset of the war.

Other members of the Front realizing the inherent dangers of the Iraq regime for themselves after the beginning of the war,

announced support for Iran in the imposed war. For example, contrary to Syria, Algeria tried to have an impartial stance towards the war, Libya did not have an explicit position as Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen presently preferred economic relations to everything. Nevertheless, the Steadfastness Front did not hesitate about supporting the anti-U.S. and anti-Zionist policies of the Islamic Revolution. Syria exerted all its efforts to back Iran in this war, since it felt threatened by Saddam. Libya and Algeria together with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen tried to expand their relations with Iran.

Following the refusal of heads of the Steadfastness Front to participate in the Fez Conference and its consequent failure, Hafez Assad set out on a trip to the Persian Gulf countries. Simultaneously with his trip to these countries, rumours on his mediation efforts to end the war, intensified. Iraq which favoured mediation efforts to end the war, seemed very pleased with this trip and following consultations with Kuwait, it implicitly introduced Kuwait as the party to negotiate. But, when the real goal of Hafez Assad's trip to the region, which was appeasing the Saudi King for ostracising the conference, was revealed, Saddam, out of disappointment, turned Syria's imagined mediation down.

Parallel with the increase of Iran's prestige for expulsion of the enemy from its territory, the Steadfastness Front tried to strengthen its economic ties with Iran.

For the first time, an economic treaty of great magnitude was signed between Iran and Syria, according to which Iran was to supply Syria with its domestic oil needs. Also, according to the agreement, Iran was to be provided with Syrian refined oil.

The importance of this economic treaty lay in the political support of Syria for Iran (in connection with the war) for Syria previously received its domestic oil from Iraq through Iraqi pipelines which transferred surplus Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean Sea.

When this contract was concluded between Iran and Syria, the government of Hafez Assad cut the Iraqi oil exports through Syria and dealt another blow upon Iraq's economy, proving the sincerity of the Front, especially that of Syria towards Iran.

Meanwhile, the economic relations of Iran especially with Libya, South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) and Algeria was expanded through the signing of contracts in various economic fields.

The Iraqi attack upon the aircraft carrying the late Algerian Foreign Minister over the Iranian skies thoroughly revealed the enmity of Iraq with the members of the Steadfastness Front.

The Steadfastness Front which had reiterated its support for Iran in the imposed war, not only stressed this resolution but Syria and Libya too announced that they would continue their support until the overthrow of Saddam.

The promise of support of the Steadfastness Front for Iran until the overthrow of Saddam and particularly after the liberation of Khorramshahr, is worth studying. Almost all the circles supporting Saddam and the governments which considered their interests vested in Saddam's rule in Iraq, insisted on the discontinuation of the war, after the recovery of Khorramshahr. The U.N. call asking both Iran and Iraq to stop the war reached its climax after the Security Council issued a resolution on a cease-fire and withdrawal of troop by both sides.

At this stage, the U.S. plan was based on two factors:

1. Preservation of Saddam in power through the termination of the war by means of international support, and
2. Attacking the Steadfastness countries as a preface for a renewed attack upon the Islamic Revolution.

Through this plan the U.S. hoped that: Firstly, halting the war it would strengthen Iraq and take measures against Syria and Palestine through creating an alliance including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan; and then threaten the very existence of the Steadfastness Front by weakening or overthrowing the Syrian regime. Secondly, it would again follow up its strategy for the annihilation of the Islamic Revolution in the region.


This plot of U.S. which would be completed by the Zionists invading southern Lebanon, was also discovered and foiled through the spiritual leadership of Imam Khomeini.

At this juncture, the Operation Ramadhan was launched against the enemy, disturbing all the calculations and disproving the expectations of the U.S. and Saddam.

The continuation of the war and the idea to hold the Non-Aligned Summit Meet in Baghdad once again was opposed by the Steadfastness Front. Syria and Libya announced they would not attend the Baghdad Conference, thus damaging the credibility of the conference to some extent. Other measures by Iran against the venue of the summit, especially Imam's message on Saddam's scheme for bombarding the site of the conference, had telling effects in convincing political circles to support a change in the venue of the conference.

Thus today, by supporting the Islamic Republic, the Steadfastness Front is in fact supporting the Palestinians, for Iran proved through dispatch of its forces to southern Lebanon that it was a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian movement. Furthermore, the Steadfastness Front has realised that if Iran left Saddam alone Iraq would not leave Syria and other countries supporting Iran in comfort, and the opening of new fronts by Iraq, supported by the U.S. is not something very far from reality.

On the whole, since Iraq's enmity with Iran and the Steadfastness Front is fuelled by the support of the U.S. and its agents in the region, therefore, the continuation of relations between Iran and the Steadfastness Front for thwarting the conspiracies of the archdemon and overthrow of Saddam seems necessary and inevitable.



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