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THE TURKISH DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION

presents

**FACT BOOK ON TURKEY
KURDS and THE PKK TERRORISM**

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INTRODUCTION

One has to consider political, social, legal, historical, economic, sociological, demographic and strategic aspects to understand the violence of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) which has caused social sufferings, inflicted great loss on the national economy, and victimized thousands of innocent civilians as well as security personnel since its first significant incidence in 1984. Without taking one of those aspects into consideration any explanation on the issue will be incomplete. Is the PKK terrorism economically motivated? Are Kurds compelled to violence as the last resort because of great oppression on themselves? To what extent foreign support determines the significance of PKK terrorism? Is PKK engaged in a national liberation? Does PKK struggle for more democracy and human rights? The answers to these and many more questions are searched in the light of the values of the modern world and maximum effort is given to avoid prejudice. Trying not to take a racist or fundamentalist side, democracy and rule of law are taken as the stand-point.

To decide whether the ongoing terrorism is an ethnic strife between Turks and Kurds or not largely depends on making choice between democracy with liberties and totalitarianism with dictatorship. There are sufficient criteria for violence to become legitimate. In the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is set forth that it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. Whether the Republic of Turkey respects human rights and the rule of law is attempted to be clarified by reference to the laws and relevant cases.

Given the complicated extensiveness of the subject, some points may still need to be touched. In any case, every aspect of the problem is referred to offer a broad outline. This booklet will be deemed to attain its objective which is to bring a new outlook by questioning deeply rooted prejudices formed through misinformation or insufficient and partial information.

TURKISH DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION

Ankara, May 1996.

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I. WHAT IS THE PROPORTION OF THE CITIZENS OF KURDISH DESCENT TO THE POPULATION OF TURKEY?

It appears to be impossible to reach a definite conclusion on the number of Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin and their proportion to the whole population. The figures given by different orientalists on the subject are sometimes contradictory and they do not confirm each other.

Some of those figures can be described as follows:1

AUTHOR	YEAR	PROPORTION OF KURDS TO TURKEY'S POPULATION	NUMBER OF KURDS WITHIN TURKEY'S POPULATION (in millions)
BRUINESSEN	1978	20%	-
US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY(CIA)	1979	10%	4-6
SOVIET ASIAN ETHNIC FRONTIERS	1979	-	3.2
SIMS	1980	20%	-
BERBEROGLU	1982	20%	-
McDOWALL	1985	20%	-
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA	1987	9,5%	-
HYMAN	1988	-	9
IZADY	1990	24,1%	13.65
ROULEAU	1993	17%	10
BARKEY	1993	20%	12
CIA	1995	20%	-
McDOWALL	1996	23%	13

The discrepancy among these figures might depend on the following factors:

- i. When ethnicity is decided upon the mother tongue, these two may not necessarily correlate, e.g. Kurdish not being spoken as mother tongue by those who are of

Kurdish descent either from the father's or mother's side or both, disagreement on whether Zaza and Kurmanji spoken in Turkey are dialects of the same language or are different languages, and becoming of non-Kurdish speaking tribes into Kurdish speaking through assimilation.²

ii. The latest population census which contains data on population by mother tongue was conducted in the year 1965.

iii. An ethnic group is always in a state of evolution in response to changes of conditions both internal and external, particularly through interprovincial and international migration, and never a fixity.³

iv. It is not always easy to be objective on the issue because of its sensitivity from humanitarian and political aspects.⁴

According to a comprehensive and seemingly the most objective survey supported by the Ford Foundation,⁵ in 1990 Kurdish population in Turkey was 7,046,150 and their percentage was 12.6. If the growth rate of Kurdish and non-Kurdish population between 1985-1990 is considered, the number and the percentage of Kurds for the year 1995 might be estimated as 8.21 millions and 13.08 respectively. Another important outcome of the survey is that there is a growing tendency of Kurds for living in Western Turkey. In 1965 one-fifth of Kurds lived in Western Turkey. In 1990 their ratio was one-third. By the year 1995 this ratio is expected to increase to 40%. Such distribution to whole Turkey avoids building a social structure and population density on the ethnic grounds and it paves the way for the functioning of a freely developing integration model through tolerance and pluralism. Hence, in the general elections held on December 24, 1995, the alliance between pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) and extreme leftist parties could gain 4% of the total votes while ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) gained 8%. 18% of the votes in Southeastern provinces were cast for HADEP.⁶ These election results point to the fact that radical approaches will have less impact on Kurdish question.

II. ARE PEOPLE OF KURDISH DESCENT A SEPARATE HOMOGENOUS COMMUNITY?

While most of the people described as Kurds speak Kurmanji in Turkey, Zazas who do not accept being Kurdish are also usually called as Kurds. In a survey conducted in some provinces of Eastern Turkey in 1995, 7.9% of the respondents identified themselves as Zaza, but not Kurdish. It is acknowledged that 30% of Kurds in Turkey are Alevite and their affinities with Turkish or Zaza speaking Alevis are greater than those with Sunni Kurds.⁸ In addition, including the people called as Kurds outside Turkey, it is seen that there are various dialects such as Sorani, Gurani, Kurmanji, Lorani with major differences that impede someone speaking one dialect to understand one speaking another.⁹ They also include subdialects and their locally spoken forms, e.g. Buhtani, Garmiyani, Baban and so on.¹⁰ It should not be surprising that Turkish Kurds desire to share the destiny of a democratic Turkey on its way to integration to the West through modernization and development, instead of becoming a part of a heterogeneous community entangled in intertribal violence and marked with the hegemony of tribal thinking.

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III. DID KURDS EVER HAVE THEIR OWN STATE?

In the Preface to his book, Mehrdat Izady traces the origin of the Kurds back to 50,000 years ago.¹¹ He presents the Kingdoms of Cappadocia, Commagen and Pontus in Anatolia as Kurdish.¹² Izady admits that he has to reconstruct Kurdish history due to the lack of a distinctive Kurdish civilization and history.¹³ If such efforts to boost Kurdish national identity are set aside, the only state Kurds ever had was the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad founded in 1946 and lasted only for one year. The Republic was formed under the Soviet influence and not supported by Kurdish tribes in Iran.¹⁴ It was destroyed easily by the Teheran government since Soviet influence ceased to exist.

The Treaty of Sevres signed on August 10, 1920 but never put into effect is commented by pro-Kurdish circles as a great opportunity toward statehood. Article 64 of the Treaty stipulated as follows; "... If Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 (Southeastern and some parts of Eastern Turkey) shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.Ö" The Treaty of Sevres was imposed on the government in Istanbul by Allied Powers who won World War I and who by then occupied the city. The Treaty was never put into effect as occupying forces in Anatolia were expelled with the support of the Kurds under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The experience of Kurdish Republic in Mahabad and the Treaty of Sevres prove that initiatives to form a Kurdish state were taken not with local people's demand but by outside powers that sought to gain influence in the Middle East. As already expressed above at the end of CHAPTER II, social realities compel people of

Kurdish descent to share the common destiny of Turkey. Therefore, they should not be expected to sympathize with a separate Kurdish state or political entity.

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IV. DO KURDS CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE NATION?

Two different views, "subjective" and "objective" are referred to explain the concept of "nation". From the point of subjective view, a nation is based on the shared sentiments such as national honor and pride, national joy and grief, and the commitments of the members of the society and particularly on their will to live together under a common government. Objective view requires, however, to share such "objective" characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, and language.

From the point of subjective view, one will see that decades old tribal conflicts, clan type social life, absence of a common historical and cultural heritage (see CHAPTERS II and III), and geographical isolation in remote regions far from the centers of political activity have hindered the emergence of a Kurdish nationality.

From the objective view's angle, heterogeneity of Kurdish communities, deep differences among the languages spoken by Kurds, uncertainty over their racial background, Turkish Zazas' refusal of Kurdishness, and differences in the religious aspect which seems less heterogeneous (in spite of the fact that the majority is Sunni Shafiite, 30% of Kurds in Turkey excluding Zazas are Alevite (see footnote no. 8); 5-7% of Kurds are Shiite, 10-15% are Yarsanist who are also known as Ahl-i Haq, Aliullahi, and Alihaq and who speak Gurani, and less than 5% are Yezidi) sometimes cause deep divisions among Kurds which hinder the development of a Kurdish identity.

On the other hand, mostly economically driven migration of citizens of Kurdish descent from the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey to Western provinces demonstrates that Turkish Kurds would like to reap the benefits of a life in a modern urbanized Turkey and they desire to share the future of Turkey with its territorial integrity.

V. HOW IS THE SITUATION OF CITIZENS OF KURDISH DESCENT IN TURKEY IN COMPARISON WITH THE KURDS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES?

David Ransom, head of the section for South European Affairs at the US State Department summarized the situation of Kurds in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey as follows; "...I have been to Syria and Iran before. In Syria they force Kurds to pick up olive and grapes. In Iran they force them to weave carpets and to work in making jewelry. In Iraq they kill Kurds! But Turkey is different. One-fourth of Turkish parliament is comprised of Kurdish origin MPs and this fact alone is enough to reflect the situation of Kurds in Turkey."²¹

In 1970 an autonomy agreement in Iraq that granted Kurds a regional parliament, the right to broadcast and education in Kurdish was endorsed. But atrocities which reached its highest level in Halabja in March 1988 with the deadly gas attack killing thousands of civilians clearly indicated the policy of Iraqi regime on its Kurdish people.

In Iran with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 a regime that politicizes religion and converts it into a radical form and penetrates all areas of life came to power. According to a report by United Nations Human Rights Commission dated February 1992, fundamental freedoms and human rights were seriously violated by Teheran regime.²² As the US State Department annual country reports on human rights, issued in 1997, state, Teheran Government's human rights record remains poor and there are systematic abuses.

In Syria Hafez Assad has led one of the most oppressive dictatorships in the Middle East since 1970. Kurdish language and literature have been rigorously suppressed and a hard policy of assimilation has been followed by the Assad regime though the Kurds in Syria are less militant than elsewhere.²³

Turkey which is surrounded by such oppressive antidemocratic states is a member of Council of Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) both of which can only be joined by democratic states. It ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and allowed submission of individual petitions by its citizens to the European Commission of Human Rights. Turkey is also a signatory to the European Social Charter, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Rights of the Child and The Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

Syria's connection with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the condition of democracy and human rights in Turkey will be analyzed in the following chapters.

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VI. DO PEOPLE WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS KURDS CONSTITUTE A MINORITY IN TURKEY?

The criteria for determining a minority are set forth as some or all of the following; i. religion, ii. language, iii. race or ethnic origin.²⁴

Treaty of Lausanne dated July 24, 1923, which internationally and legally declares the existence of Turkish state, reserves the status of minority only for the country's Greek and Armenian Christians and Jews. The British, who even could not envisage the establishment of a secular democratic republican state under the rule of law where each citizen irrespective of his/her language, religion and ethnic identity has equal rights and duties, insisted on offering minority status to non-Muslim ethnic groups to secure their rights. But the Jewish, in a display of their loyalty and desire to share the common destiny of Turkey,²⁵ are the first community who waived their rights in Family Law enshrined for non-Muslim communities in Lausanne Treaty. The concept of minority within the Muslim population of Turkey is quite alien²⁶ not only from the point of legal sense but also because of closely tied social structure as a result of living together for centuries without any discrimination. Thus, Kurds are the prime element of the Turkish state.

In Turkey there is no historical or social background to the division as Kurds and Turks on the basis of ethnicity. Having taken their part in the fight against Russian invasion and collaborating Armenians who committed atrocities in Eastern Anatolia in World War I²⁷ and in the fight against occupation forces in the War of Independence, Kurds had become the prime element of the Republic of Turkey which does not seek racial background for citizenship. Republic of Turkey, as a successor state to the Ottoman Empire which had been inspired by the French system on public administration and administrative law,²⁸ adopted a citizenship policy with no ethnic consideration. That policy does not have an oppressive nature. It allows cultural diversity, free expression of folklore and traditions, and communication in any language in daily life.²⁹ Any arrangement that brings differing implementations

of public services and state activities regarding any particular ethnic group which means to amend basic constitutional principles of Turkey will require a broad consensus on a democratic platform. In that case, it should be normal to exclude movements using violence and groups not taking clear stand against violent movements from taking part in that consensus.³⁰ In any case, once such arrangement is put into effect, newer arrangements regarding other ethnic groups and subgroups might be needed. Then, it is quite likely that national integrity and unitary structure of the Turkish state will become diminished.³¹

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VII. ARE THE CITIZENS OF KURDISH DESCENT MAIN VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TURKEY?

In the previous chapters it is stated that racist and chauvinistic attitudes do not have social support in Turkey. In this regard, the assertion that Kurds have been systematically and deliberately subject to human rights violations would not reflect the reality. Article 10 of the Turkish constitution stipulates that individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law irrespective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion or religious sect or any such considerations. According to the same article of the constitution, no privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class. In fact, the cases related to human rights violations should be looked at beyond political considerations. For the application of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights which is quite similar to the Article 10 of Turkish constitution, it is reported that the Convention protects the rights of individuals, not groups as such.³²

In the case of *Ireland v. United Kingdom* (1978) the applicant Government alleged that the United Kingdom applied its Special Powers Act, which was intended to contribute to the fight against terrorist activities, in a discriminatory fashion, focusing its force on the Catholic community, to the exclusion of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland. In spite of statistical evidence supporting this claim, neither the European Commission of Human Rights nor the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 14 given the Government's margin of appreciation and with the justification that the aim of fighting terrorism was legitimate and the means employed were not disproportionate to the ends to be achieved.³³ It should be noted that both the Irish and the United Kingdom Governments agreed that a public emergency existed within the meaning of Article 15 (which provides for derogations from the Convention in certain circumstances).

Due to the violence by Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK)³⁴ in Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey, the state of emergency came out for security reasons. The allegation

that to resort to violence is inevitable in Turkey because of the oppressive nature of the regime does not conform to the reality (see CHAPTER V). While almost 40% of Kurds live in Western Turkey, allegations of human rights violations usually point the areas in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey where PKK violence intensifies. Hence, there is a direct connection between the PKK violence and human rights matters. Under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, "in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law". The reasons for the occasional unlawful and abusive treatments by security forces in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey might be the lack of training on psychological aspect in relations with the local people during the fight against terrorism and the attitudes by some state employees with ultra-nationalist views. In spite of the brutality and intensity of the PKK terrorism, such approach and abuses never reach a wide-scale level and never become systematic. In accordance with the principles of a democratic state respectful for human rights, during 1994 314 government officials were taken to the courts on charges of torture and mistreatment. 35 of these cases were finalized and 11 offenders were convicted. Other cases were continuing.³⁵

To deal with human rights violations regarding primarily ethnic origin of the victims is in itself contrary to the very concept of human rights. It should not be forgotten that fundamental freedoms and basic rights of Turkish citizens which do not have Kurdish origin might also be violated. However, some non-governmental organizations and European universities offer substantial legal aid for the alleged victims of violations if only they are of the Kurdish ethnic origin.³⁶ Moreover, the most serious violations in other countries, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina were usually watched inactively by the countries where many human rights organizations have their centers. Such inaction harmed the reliability of the criticisms on human rights issues by those states and organizations.

Consequently, the view which tells that Kurds in Turkey are subject to human rights violations is not in conformity with the law and cases of human rights. What is right,

in this context, is to describe activities of the PKK as terrorism, the PKK activists as terrorists and the PKK itself as a terrorist organization, and to act accordingly. Therefore, giving support to Turkey in order to end the state of emergency caused by the PKK violence, banning the PKK and related organizations which serve as cover-up for the PKK, and entering into a close cooperation with Turkish authorities or non-governmental organizations are needed. One can conclude that with no consideration of those facts criticisms on Turkey over human rights issues are mostly caused by insufficient knowledge, if not intentionally.

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VIII. ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE OF KURDISH DESCENT SUBJECT TO DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE?

It is partly told in the previous chapters that ethnically based attitudes are not approved in Turkish social life and within the policy of the State. While in the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire the word, "Turkish" was not used officially and widespread, Western authors referred to "Turkish" to name the rulers of the Empire and its subject people in Anatolia.³⁷ Founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who adopted Western philosophy of enlightenment giving preeminence to science and reason referred to "Turkishness" as a factor of unity for the people living within the borders of the Republic. Nonexistence of discrimination in social life is reflected under Article 10 of the Turkish constitution which states that all individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law irrespective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion or religious sect or any such considerations and no privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class.

Discriminative treatment in professions and in cities against people of particular ethnic ancestry almost never takes place.³⁸ On marriage and human relations ethnic origin is far from being determinative.³⁹ Citizens of Kurdish descent in Turkey can live in any part of the country; they can have a profession; they can have their right to cast their votes and become candidates in the elections, and they can take part in public services with no discrimination. It is almost impossible to define such a cohesive social structure within the context of Turkish-Kurdish polarization. In the suburbs of big cities where people from Eastern Turkey have migrated the problems arising from the inability to cope with urban life may become less serious if suburban problems are solved and the share from the economic prosperity increases. Also in such a case, reactions in the form of strengthening ethnic ties and gathering and solidarity with the people from the same region with the same problems eventually resulting in exclusion from the larger community will be weakened.

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IX. ARE THE ACTS OF THE STATE DIRECTED DELIBERATELY AGAINST ITS CITIZENS OF KURDISH DESCENT?

The allegations that Kurdish dissident journalists, writers, politicians and prominent figures are assassinated through State's plot thus the perpetrators remain unidentified, and like in the case of the bombing of the office of the pro-PKK newspaper, "Özgür Gündem" (Free Agenda) "state terrorism" and "dirty war" are waged are frequently brought to the attention. The fight of Turkey as a state under the rule of law against PKK terrorism is attempted to be depicted as repression and genocide of Kurds. In reality, protection of constitutional order against an organization which adopts armed struggle under Marxist ideology is carried out for each citizen regardless of his/her ethnic origin in every part of Turkey to enjoy his/her rights enshrined in the Constitution at least as much as the people living in Western Turkey. During this legitimate struggle against terrorism occasional human rights violations could happen in Turkey like in any other democratic country. For instance, European Court of Human Rights had held that Britain violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights related to the rights to the liberty and security of person by detaining without charge or appropriate procedural safeguards, persons suspected of participating in "terrorist" activities with respect to the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.⁴⁰ In the aftermath of this decision, Britain invoked Article 15 of the Convention which allows the states to take measures derogating from their obligations under the Convention in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Considering the extent and brutality of the PKK terrorism that targets national and territorial integrity of Turkey, it is likely that unlawful actions and human rights violations in the fight against terrorism could also happen in Turkey. Verdicts on such allegations are rendered by independent courts in Turkey regarding the rule of law. Also, petitions related to human rights violations can be submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and in the event of the Commission accepting a petition, a friendly settlement between the petitioner and Turkey can be effected by the Commission under Article 28 of the Convention.

As regards to the statistics of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights concerning individual applications for the year 1996, the order of the countries with highest number of applications which were registered by the Commission is as Italy, France, Turkey, Britain, Poland and Germany with 729, 600, 562, 471, 458 and 334 applications respectively. As for the highest number of individual applications declared admissible, the order of the countries is as follows: Italy, France and Turkey with 370, 75 and 37 applications respectively. The order of the countries with the highest number of cases, which the Court found at least one violation, is Italy, Britain, Greece and France and Turkey with 8, 7, 5 and 4 cases respectively.⁴¹

In spite of the all atrocities by the PKK, nonexistence of the hatred and discrimination against Kurds in Turkish society points that PKK cannot attain its objective. Turkish citizens have identified Kurdish identity with PKK terrorism almost in none of the funerals of officers, soldiers and policemen assassinated by the PKK where the most emotional scenes occur. In that atmosphere, the attacks on persons and organizations known for their separatist standings would serve the aims of the PKK. It is, therefore, not reasonable to think that Turkish state has planned those attacks.⁴² On the other hand, intolerance of its leader against the opposition in the PKK as can be seen in the organization's Marxist-Leninist totalitarian structure results in the killings of the dissidents of the PKK leadership even though they share the same separatist view.⁴³ Also, murders caused by blood feuds, honor or plain personal vendetta are immediately attributed to the State.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, remote small villages on the mountainous terrain of the region become the ideal targets for terrorist attacks. And to deploy security forces permanently in those locations is not an easy task. Then, villagers who do not want to give in under terrorist threats volunteer to guard their villages. Most of these people called as provisional village guards who become the subject of criticism for their uncontrolled behavior are of Kurdish descent. This fact also invalidates the argument that acts of State are directed to Kurds and it further proves that the backing of Kurdish people to PKK is weak.

X. TO WHAT EXTENT ALLEGATIONS OF FORCIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF THE PEOPLE IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY ARE TRUE?

Another issue which is frequently brought to the public attention by Kurdish political movement, PKK supporters and some human rights advocates is the allegations on forcible displacement of the people of Kurdish descent in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. As already stated above (CHAPTER VII), it is hard to think that institutions, which do not recognize the PKK as terrorist and the legitimacy of Turkey's fight against terrorism, are sufficiently informed on the affairs in Turkey.

It is true that continuous migration flow from the rural areas including the Eastern and Southeastern regions occurs (see CHAPTER I). On site surveys covering representatives from all sections of the society in the provinces of destination of migration flows and the provinces of the outflow indicate unemployment and economic difficulties as the main causes for migration.⁴⁵ It is thought that even if a kind of "Kurdistan" emerges in the Middle East,⁴⁶ Kurds will not give up the considerable benefits of urbanized life in Turkey.⁴⁷ On the other hand, as further described above in CHAPTER IX, concentration of small villages which have the high risk of being attacked or changing their locations with the inhabitants' consent should not be objected by the people who are sensitive on the protection of the right to security of person. On the one hand, the difficulties in the delivery of such basic public services as health and education in remote small villages where only a few families live, and on the other hand, the effectiveness of those services in the populated locations which can easily be reached make changing the location or concentration of small remote villages more appropriate not only from the point of security but also for living a life which basic necessities are met.

Allegations related to human rights violations in the fight against terrorism can be considered through administrative and legal channels with regard to the principle of the rule of law; they might be brought to the public attention, and in case all

domestic remedies are exhausted, petitions may be filed to the European Commission of Human Rights. The point which should not be underestimated is that with brutal terrorist methods and intimidations like massacres of defenseless civilians, burning houses of the villagers who refuse to collaborate and forcing them to leave,⁴⁸ the PKK tries to exploit some necessary lawful restrictions applied for security reasons by presenting them as the signs of oppression on Kurds and as human rights violations.⁴⁹

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XI. IS IT FORBIDDEN FOR KURDS IN TURKEY TO SPEAK IN THEIR MOTHER TONGUE?

In the late 1970s Turkish democracy was in severe crisis due to the economic hardships, failing weak governments, the deadlock in the Parliament on the Presidential election, increasing terrorism, worries on the lack of security, the prospect of being dragged to a civil war and finally unfruitful continuous political debates. In that atmosphere, military intervention of September 12, 1980 occurred with the aims of overcoming the crisis and regaining the functioning of democratic institutions.

Following the intervention, a group of politicians including the then leader of the center-right party and current President of Turkey was forced to reside on a location in the country and a ten year ban on politics was imposed on them.

At the end of 1983 with the holding of general elections, Turkey, which is committed to democratic regime, returned to democracy and military rule did not stay permanently.⁵⁰ Among the negative consequences of such an exceptional period, the law no. 2932 was enacted to prohibit the use of the languages other than Turkish as the mother tongue and the activities to publicize them. The law no. 2932 which practically did not have effect was repealed in 1991. Expression of the views in Turkish even by the radical Kurds after the abolishment of the law shows that it had remained ineffective.⁵¹

While it was prohibited to publish newspapers, magazines and books in Kurdish during the implementation of law no. 2932, today there is freedom on this issue. Then allegations of oppressive measures⁵² pertinent to the restriction of Kurdish publications are no longer valid.⁵³ It is notable that in spite of such freedom, Kurdish publications are few and they are not demanded. Anti-terrorism law, the law no. 3713 which abolished the law introducing restrictions on mother tongue also

repealed the Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code which were also thought to be restrictive of freedoms.

The article in the Constitution which clearly states that the language of the State is Turkish does not have an effect in the use of the languages desired by the citizens in their social and daily life. Furthermore, that reflects an important consensus which avoids misunderstandings and different interpretations in the official procedures. Like the disinterest in Kurdish publications, private Kurdish training courses do not become widespread because of the same fact.

Restrictions, regardless of ethnic characteristics, on the freedom of expression are limited to such considerations as national security, territorial integrity, public safety and the protection of morals as set forth in the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The description of the restrictions as antidemocratic and censorship over newspapers and magazines, which serve as propaganda tools for the PKK which terrorizes and kills civilians including youngsters and elderly, security personnel, Kurds and Turks, cannot be justified by the principles and practices of democracy and human rights. A balance must be drawn between public security and public information. By careless reporting the media may aid strategic success of terrorist groups by unwittingly promoting terrorist propaganda.⁵⁴

On the other hand, the Republic of Turkey which desires its citizens to benefit in the broadest manner from fundamental freedoms and rights has adopted arrangements to improve freedom of expression with no regard of ethnic descent. Therefore, Article 8 of Anti-terrorism law has been clarified so as to reduce the sentence terms and to avoid broad interpretation of the article. Subsequently, some of the people sentenced to imprisonment due to the said article were released. Meanwhile, it is reported that positive steps are taken by the courts to create an atmosphere for a free debate on Kurdish problem and defendants charged with the dissemination of separatist propaganda are acquitted.⁵⁵ In the words of the leader of Democratic Mass Party, ("Demokratik Kitle Partisi"-DKP), Feriðtin Elçi, who advocates cultural and political rights for Kurds in Turkey, there is no doubt that Turkey has taken important steps to recognize Kurdish identity and he is optimistic for the future.⁵⁶

The President of Turkey also made statements implying that maintenance of the cultural identity by the citizens of the Republic of Turkey is legitimate.⁵⁷

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**XII. IS IMPRISONMENT OF SOME FORMER MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT OF KURDISH DESCENT INCLUDING LEYLA ZANA
FOR THEIR "POLITICAL ACTIVITIES" AN INDICATION OF
OPPRESSION OF THE KURDS?**

The members of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey are elected as the representatives of the Turkish nation as a whole irrespective of their ethnic origin for Turkish state is not based on ethnic discrimination and racist concept of nation. There should be no reason to transfer Kurdish-Turkish polarization, which does not exist in social life, into the Parliament. Meanwhile, it should be borne in mind that because of the nonexistence of ethnic discrimination in politics parliamentarians of Kurdish descent are not only from the banned pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) but also from the center parties holding majority in the Parliament.

Former parliamentarians of the banned DEP had been elected as the candidates of a center-left party in the 1991 general elections. Their parliamentary membership continued until the Parliament rescinded their immunity by general consent in March 1994. Those former parliamentarians from the banned DEP like any other member of Parliament had enjoyed the freedom which protects legislators from what may be arbitrary or politically motivated detentions or arrests and they had enjoyed freedom of speech which means that members of the Parliament shall not be held responsible for votes cast, speeches made, and opinions expressed in the course of legislative activities or for repeating and disclosing those activities outside the legislature. Both of these freedoms may only be removed by the Parliament itself.⁵⁸ Constitutional court which acts independent from legislature and administrative bodies rejected the request, which is also a constitutional right, to invalidate Parliament's decision to rescind the immunity of DEP members.

Turkish Court of Cassation in its examination of the appeal against the conviction of DEP members concluded that their speeches and expressions of views in the Parliament could not be considered for conviction because of the freedom of speech. Therefore, the argument that former parliamentarians from DEP were convicted due to their parliamentary duties and political activities does not confirm the facts.⁵⁹

In the same decision of the Court of Cassation it was told that there was concrete evidence which exposed the relations between the PKK and its leader and parliamentarians from DEP outside the Parliament and in non-legislative activities. In addition, former parliamentarians from DEP who escaped abroad outspoke that they were adherent to the PKK.⁶⁰ It is hard to understand the reactions, in the name of democracy and human rights, to the trial, and for some of them, the imprisonment of former DEP parliamentarians who were proved documentarily that they acted following the orders by the PKK, one of the most brutal Marxist terrorist organizations which aims at the destruction of democratic rights and freedoms.

In particular, it is proved that currently imprisoned former DEP members acted in common with the PKK and one of them, Leyla Zana was given political training in the PKK camp in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.⁶¹ On the other hand, other former parliamentarians of DEP, who were found to violate Article 8 of the Anti-terrorism law that is seen restrictive of freedom of expression and which punishes disseminators of the propaganda against indivisible integrity of the State with its nation and territory, were released. Also, with the amendments to that article that facilitate narrow interpretation and bring reduction in terms of sentences, some of the convicted had the chance to become free. This is an indication that Turkey has a Western style democracy with the potential for improvement.

While in December 25, 1995 general elections People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in alliance with extreme leftist parties for which the PKK had openly declared its support could receive 4.17% of the total votes in Turkey and gained no seat in the Parliament, persons of Kurdish descent from other political parties were elected. This result shows that ethnically indiscriminating State policy has the support of the people.

XIII. CAN THE TELECAST OF MED TV BE REGARDED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?

In the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights it is stated that the right to freedom of expression shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. In the second paragraph of the same article, some limitations on the exercise of these freedoms which are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, public safety and for the protection of reputation or rights of the others are allowed.

The terrorists commit significant resources and much time and effort to their war of words, which is viewed as a vital backup or even parallel to their violent activities of death and destruction. The terrorists require publicity if they are to spread their propaganda message to its full extent.⁶²

It is obvious that the PKK is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization which acts to destroy territorial integrity and constitutional democratic order of Turkey and also it is a criminal organization which is deeply involved in drug trafficking and extortion (see CHAPTERS XXII, XXIV and XXV).

The television channel, MED TV which is licensed in Britain and which broadcasts internationally via satellite usually presents programs making propaganda of the terrorist organization, PKK including speeches by its chief, Abdullah Öcalan.⁶³ Other pro-Kurdish groups most definitely consider MED TV as a propaganda tool of the PKK. A leader of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party is quoted as saying "this TV could obviously play a very important role if Abdullah Öcalan was not always on the line."⁶⁴ It is almost impossible to see impartiality in the programs of MED TV and no opposing view against the PKK could be heard. In the words of Mr. Douglas Hurd, former Home Secretary of Britain, "the time had come to deny the easy platform of television and radio to those who propagate terrorism."⁶⁵ It should

be unquestionable that such programs represent the abuse of the right to those freedoms to impart information and ideas and they constitute a direct threat against the national security, territorial integrity, and public order of Turkey. Therefore, the restrictions set forth in the second paragraph of the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be applied.

Accordingly, from 1976 Irish Government has banned from the airwaves expressions of the views of the Provisional IRA and other named groups whose terror toll is much lower than the PKK's. In 1988 United Kingdom Home Office imposed a parallel ban. Both bans were appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. The British government rescinded the ban in 1994 after heated debates.⁶⁶ In 1982 the Irish Minister of Posts and Telegraphs also banned Irish Radio Television (RTE) from any party political broadcasts for the general elections by Sinn Fein, the legal political party of the Provisional IRA. When Sinn Fein challenged the constitutionality of this directive, the Irish supreme court reiterating the government's view ruled that a democratic state had a clear and bounden duty to protect its citizens and its institutions from those who sought to replace law and order by force and anarchy.⁶⁷

Terrorism is a continuing process which starts with gaining financial capability, turning the undecided to sympathizers and sympathizers to militants, having shelter and training facilities and finally ends with bloody attacks. The terrorists have several main objectives in their mind when using the media for their own purposes. These objectives are combined to enable the terrorists to wage a propaganda war and in so doing strengthen and encourage their physical war.⁶⁸ Therefore, giving license to MED TV which makes the propaganda of the PKK, a criminal and terrorist organization shall mean to back terrorism.

In the war against terrorism four elements must combine their resources: the public, the government, the media, and the authorities, e.g. police and if necessary, military force.⁶⁹ In the case of the PKK, which has a well-organized structure out of Turkey and in Europe, a fifth element, the cooperation of the concerned states is crucial in the fight against terrorism. If the sensitivity of a state for the security of its citizens

and protection of its public order and national security is not displayed for the other states' which are in close relations of alliance and friendship, that will not only be immoral but also in contravention of the signed binding international conventions.

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XIV. IS OUTSIDE POWERS' INTEREST IN KURDS MAINLY BECAUSE OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS?

Kurds' becoming of center of attraction at an international level coincided with the ending of the Gulf War in 1991. In fact, Kurds became a point of attraction for the powerful states as early as in the beginning of the 20th century when oil fields were discovered in the Middle East and the weak Ottoman Empire controlling the region was in the course of disintegration (see CHAPTER III). There are lots of evidences from the past and today telling that the concerns for Kurds have been largely due to strategic and national interests in the region rather than humanitarian. Britain which brought emergence of a Kurdish state to the attention with the Sevres Treaty in 1920 took a quite different stand in the negotiations for a new peace treaty with the newly formed Turkish state in Lausanne in 1923. While the future of the Mosul province was being discussed, Lord Curzon, having noticed that the will of the people in the province was to unite with Turkey, argued as follows: "... why shall a plebiscite be invoked in the province? Ankara demands a plebiscite. Kurds have never demanded it. This poor nation even does not know what it means. Arabs and Turks in the province have also never demanded plebiscite. The only people demanding it are the Turks of Ankara."⁷⁰

While there is no country with the exception of Turkey and Israel having a democratic regime in the Middle East, different stands from Western countries on the improvement of democracy and human rights for the same sort of oppressive regimes could be explained by the strategic and economic importance of the rich oil reserves as being the real determinant. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have 9.4% and 26% of proven world oil reserves respectively while Iraq has more than 10%.⁷¹ Russian and French firms signed agreements with Iraq for the development of its oil fields.⁷² Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil firms which are partly owned by the US and British companies, on the other hand, try to protect and increase their share in the world oil market in the absence of Iraq. These relations and common interests have their

reflection on policy. While Russia and France tend to lift the embargo on Iraq, the two other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Britain and the United States of America insist on keeping it. For the autocratic regimes like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where dynasties reign, no word for the respect for human rights and democracy has been spelled.

The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946 is an example of using Kurdish nationalism against the territorial integrity of regional states and for political reasons by the Soviet Union, predecessor to today's Russian Federation. This Republic sponsored by the Soviets in Iran collapsed following the forced removal of Soviets from Iran under Anglo-American pressure. Military leader of the Republic, the Iraqi Kurd, Mulla Mustafa Barzani escaped to Soviet Union and lived there in exile from 1947-1958 and he was then called as "Red" Mulla.⁷³ Russia with its brutal oppression and massacre of Chechens who do not desire to live under Russian rule had caused the most flagrant violations of human rights. Russia apparently implemented a policy that might be construed as backing to separatist violence in Turkey in retaliation of what Russia might regard as material or moral support from Turkey to Chechen resistance and also to have greater share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani oil in which Turkey seemed a potential rival.⁷⁴ It is likely that allowing Moscow to become the venue for the meeting of the PKK controlled "Kurdistan Parliament in Exile" on October 30, 1995 was one of the outcomes of that Russian policy. Furthermore, Communist and ultra-nationalist elements in Russian politics, particularly in the Russian parliament see Turkey as a potential expansionist force that will eradicate Russian influence in the newly independent states of Central Asia and Caucasus. In this context, pro-Kurdish movements and the PKK, the terrorist organization are considered as valuable policy tools to counter what is seen as Turkey's expansionism. In a report presented to the Russian parliament on June 25, 1996, it was expressly stated that Turkey should have serious internal conflicts to stop its expansionist policies against Russia.⁷⁵

It is a known fact that the insurgency in Northern Iraq from 1970-1974 by the supporters of Mulla Mustafa Barzani was backed by the US Administration, Israel and the then ally of the USA, Iran which had dispute with Iraq. But when the

dispute between Iraq and Iran ended with the Algiers Agreement in 1975, the support given to the insurgent Kurds also ended leaving them in the hands of Iraqi regime.⁷⁶

In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 with the declaration of "Safe Haven" it was intended to save people living in Northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppression and the embargo on Iraq had been imposed. The fightings with many casualties among local Kurdish factions and between the PKK and those factions, and PKK's use of the Northern Iraqi territory for its attacks in Turkey that cause the death of innocent civilians point to the fact that the lack of authority in the region should immediately come to an end. The worst suffering from the embargo on Iraq has been sustained by the people in the region. Poverty and the harsh conditions of living continuously in need of foreign aid are the problems that need to be urgently solved. From the humanitarian point of view, those problems might become more pressing than the overthrow of Saddam and the dismantling of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

It is argued that Kurds can benefit from the circumstances created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc in a time when the ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights are focused primarily.⁷⁷ However, considering the developments in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus as a whole, it becomes harder to believe that the attention paid to the Kurds is based on humanitarian concerns and the importance attached to those ideals.

One of the biggest tragedies faced in the history of mankind was experienced in Europe, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most flagrant human rights violations and the violations of the basic principle of no change of borders by force in International Law and violations of UN Security Council Resolutions were tolerated. The determination displayed against Iraq's invasion of oil-rich Kuwait was not repeated in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was also a recognized sovereign state. While one-fifth of Azerbaijani territory has been under Armenian occupation with more than one million Azeri refugees fleeing, the USA imposed embargo on Azerbaijan. When brutalities in Chechnya were exposed to the international community, Chechens'

human rights were not echoed and not defended accordingly by Western public opinion.

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XV. DO THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INDICATE THE NEO-OTTOMAN EXPANSIONIST POLICY OF TURKEY?

It is stated that some Arabs suspect Turkey of harboring Ottoman ambitions.⁷⁸ Similarly, extensive military operations carried out in Northern Iraq are thought to nourish expansionist ambitions in some quarters of Turkish political life which could result in the annexation of Mosul province.⁷⁹ During the operations launched in October 1992 Iraqi Kurdish spokesmen alleged that the real aim of Turkey was not fighting the PKK, but the establishment of a Turkish presence in the area.⁸⁰

These arguments were invalidated as Turkish troops returned to Turkey having attained their objectives with those operations in Northern Iraq. The PKK has used the territory in Northern Iraq where it is declared to be a "Safe Haven" and Iraqi government is unable to realize its sovereignty. Reports indicate that PKK activity with regard to training facilities has been highest in Northern Iraq.⁸¹ The White House statement, dated 26 July 1996, which represents the official position of the United States of America, said: "Northern Iraq should not serve as a sanctuary for activities of the PKK nor should the PKK receive support from any quarter." In the same statement, it was told that the US would urge the people of Northern Iraq to take all appropriate measures to deny the PKK opportunities to exploit northern Iraq for its own purposes. The lack of authority in the "Safe Haven" where PKK could use to infiltrate into Turkey through mountainous and hardly controllable border region for its terrorist attacks compelled Turkey to carry out military operations in the region for the security of its borders and citizens. Also, it should be noted that in 1980s Turkey crossed the Iraqi border with the consent of Iraqi Government to pursue PKK terrorists escaping into Iraq. It would be illogical to think that Iraq allowed the troops of a country into its territory which had expansionist aims on an Iraqi region, Mosul. To maintain peace and stability in the region, Turkey has stressed the importance of Iraq preserving its territorial integrity and compliant with UN Security Council resolutions, and refashioning its development along democratic lines.⁸²

On the other hand, the proven oil reserves in Northern Iraq will probably last for only twenty years and they would not compensate, therefore, the costs of incorporating 4 million Kurds into Turkey.⁸³

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XVI. IS KURDISH PROBLEM THE OUTCOME OF THE NATION-STATE POLICY PURSUED BY KEMAL ATATÜRK, THE FOUNDER AND THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF TURKEY?

While the significant outcomes of the Kemalist policies still persist, it is asserted that with the democratization beginning in 1950s and its acceleration in 1980s centuries old traditions have begun to resurface; taboos have fallen; Turks speak with pride of their Ottoman heritage, and the positive aspects of Ottomanism are attempted to be synthesized with Kemalism. In this opinion, such decentralization measures as allowing ethnic and religious groups a large measure of cultural and administrative autonomy to preserve the unity of the Republic of Turkey might antagonize Kemalist and nationalist sensibilities.⁸⁴ Similarly, it is argued that two different approaches on Kurdish problem in Turkey are represented by the followers of Unionist⁸⁵-Kemalist path and pragmatics.⁸⁶

These assertions indicate that Kemalism is misunderstood and Turkish society is not properly scrutinized. In the previous chapters it is told that people living within the borders of the Republic of Turkey have gathered under the name of "Turk" with no regard of ethnic descent and not excluding their cultural richness, and particularly, no concept of minority for the Muslim population is thinkable. The famous phrase by Atatürk, "Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk" attributes Turkishness not to one's ethnic origin but to the will of the people in much the way a German, Briton or Greek speaks of being American after immigrating into the USA. By translating the said phrase of Atatürk as "Happy is he who is a Turk" thus attributing a racist nature to it,⁸⁷ some Western journalists and authors caused public opinion to be misinformed. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the commander and statesman who in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I led the Independence War against the occupying powers in Anatolia and established the foundation of the unitary nation-state in Turkey. Admittedly, the lack of consciousness for nationhood in the Islamic world and the need for the political unity made the definition of

"Turkish" reasonable and understandable.⁸⁸ It was inevitable that reforms by Atatürk, which aimed at diminishing centuries old Islamic way of social structure, Ummah and replacing it with Western style secular modern structure, would get reaction. In this regard, so-called Kurdish rebellions between 1925-1939 are debatable whether they were in reaction against the abrogation of the institutions dependent on the religious privileges in social life or motivated by Kurdish nationalism.⁸⁹

In the past, particularly under the military rule, some unusual treatments which were not inconsistent with the nature of military regime happened. For instance, a law which prohibited to use and publicize Kurdish as the mother tongue was enacted in 1983 (see CHAPTER XI). Turkishness was attempted to be linked to racial background.⁹⁰ But generally, in the cultural aspect Kurdish identity was implicitly recognized under the name of "Turkish" carrying no racist implication. As long as the issues are not brought to the ethnic lines, language, identity and folklore are acceptable to Turkish society⁹¹ and accordingly, they do not contravene the constitutional principles which relate being Turkish to citizenship in reflection of non-racist principles of Atatürk. Consequently, the abolition of the ban introduced in 1983 on Kurdish publications, sound recordings and speeches to the public did not get reaction and it caused no significant change in social life.

Michael M. Gunter concluded that if Atatürk were alive then [1990] , he would not fear for granting Turkey's citizens of Kurdish ancestry their most elemental cultural rights. This, in Gunter's opinion, probably does not mean the proposal of a federal solution but it implies to express oneself without fear in his/her mother tongue.⁹² Regarding Gunter's view, it might be argued that with the removal of the ban on mother tongue in 1991 democracy in Turkey has reached the expected level within a unitary state. In his monograph published in 1993,⁹³ former French ambassador to Turkey, Eric Rouleau and a British specialist on Turkey, Andrew Mango, in his book published in 1994,⁹⁴ write about the necessity of the freedom for the ethnically based political parties. Though it is forbidden for political parties to operate on ethnical grounds, through the exercise of the right to found political parties without any restriction as guaranteed under the Constitution new parties are formed in lieu

of the ones banned by Constitutional Court.⁹⁵ Or it is possible to become candidate for the general elections from political parties with differing views.⁹⁶ According to Article 83 of the Constitution, Members of the Parliament shall not be held responsible for votes cast, speeches made, and opinions expressed in the course of legislative activities or for repeating and disclosing those activities outside the legislature and unless it is assented by the Parliament, they cannot be detained, questioned, arrested or tried (see CHAPTER XII). Even if parties cannot legally activate on ethnical lines, it is possible to remove that restriction within the context of Turkish democracy. Kemalist view that sets forth the indivisible integrity of Turkish nation with no ethnic discrimination gets its support not from military and bureaucratic pressure but from the democratically formed free will of the people.

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XVII. WILL PEACEFUL MEANS FOR POLITICAL DEMANDS HAVE AN IMPACT ON ACTS OF VIOLENCE?

Another argument asserted particularly by the PKK supporters is that Kurds have no way but armed struggle for they are not allowed to express their demands through democratic and peaceful means. In both, the Act on Political Parties and the Constitution it is stipulated that parties may not operate against the territorial and national integrity of the State and they may not engage in racial discrimination. In case a party is found to breach said provisions of the Act and the Constitution, it may be banned by the Constitutional Court. But since Turkey is a democratic state under the rule of law, the laws and constitutional provisions that introduce bans on ethnically based political activities might be amended with the approval of the majority of the parliamentarians as indicated in the Constitution. Contrary to some descriptions, no oppressive conditions exist on this issue in Turkey. Turkish Grand National Assembly has adopted such constitutional amendments as lowering of the voting age, allowing political parties to cooperate with trade unions and associations, and removal of the paragraphs at the Preamble praising September 12, 1980 military intervention, and the reduction in sentence terms at Anti-terrorism Act which restricts separatist propaganda, all of which have substantially contributed to the improvement of democratic rights and freedoms. Allowing Kurdish broadcasts and political parties advocating separatism and empowering local administrations to grant autonomy can be brought to the agenda and they may be defended by the parliamentarians who have freedom of speech and immunity.⁹⁷ While laws and policies are criticized, it should be normal with regard to the rule of law to expect respect for the laws not only by the State but also by the individuals. Therefore, current democratic structure is suitable for improvement of basic rights and freedoms and the assertion that political demands cannot be defended through peaceful and democratic ways does not reflect the reality. Meanwhile, it is highly doubtful that ethnocentric⁹⁸ pro-Kurdish political movements will receive popular support. Surveys conducted on the citizens of Kurdish descent show that economic and social

problems have the utmost priority with a wide margin over cultural and ideological problems (see footnote no. 45). In spite of this reality, pro-Kurdish political movement tries to gain support with ethnocentric approach, e.g. alleging that Kurds are oppressed and exploited by Turks, instead of dealing with such pressing problems as economic underdevelopment, inadequacy of infrastructure, health services, and housing. Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), on the other hand, has to be considered as a terrorist organization even though its name includes the word, "party" as it was founded and has kept itself functional through violence.⁹⁹

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XVIII. CAN THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED?

It is natural that political solutions are searched on political platform. Possible cultural and political demands by the citizens of Kurdish descent might be met in democracy and if democracy is found inadequate, they may be met with the enactment through democratic rules. With its multi-party functioning democracy and its social structure improving in the direction of more pluralism and tolerance and with the reflection of that structure on the process of democratic involvement, Turkey may solve the Kurdish problem peacefully and democratically. Mainstream parties with the support of the masses which do not take the sole ethnocentric view also have the programs considering social and cultural aspects of the problem.¹⁰⁰ Pro-Kurdish and the follower of the banned Democracy Party (see footnote no. 95), People's Democracy Party (HADEP) carried out its propaganda and took part in the general elections of December 24, 1995. "Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation" headed by ?erafettin Elçi, former minister and the candidate in the general elections of December 24, 1995 has been legally founded.¹⁰¹ ?erafettin Elçi later, in January 1997, founded a political party, Democratic Mass Party or "Demokratik Kitle Partisi (DKP)" in Turkish. This party which renounces violence but campaigns for the cultural and political rights of Kurds in Turkey can legally and freely function.

With the expression of the problems through democratic channels and the success of the security forces in the fight against terrorism, the PKK which is dependent on violence has got considerably weakened in Turkey. It is the natural element of the democratic policy that masses could see meeting of their demands through democratic ways. The PKK tries to block this natural process with terrorism.

One of the main goals of the PKK is to impede arriving at solutions to current problems within the context of a pluralistic democracy. The PKK, which claims to

represent Kurds, has got severe reaction against its acts of violence that have caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians including the elderly, women, and both Kurds and Turks. Attempts to introduce PKK, which with its brutal terror has had its place as a terrorist organization in the collective memory in Turkey, as a political counterpart are unrealistic and unconvincing.

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XIX. CAN A POLITICAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE MODEL OF A FEDERATION BRING SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM?

In the context of finding a solution to the Kurdish problem, the disputable model of a federation has been suggested primarily. There are various factors that cause to rule out the model of a federation as an applicable solution to the problem. These factors are as follows:

- i. Inhomogeneity of Kurds and determination at a low scale of the ethnic belonging for the political choices of citizens of Kurdish ancestry.¹⁰²
- ii. Widespread distribution of Kurds into Turkey which prevents them from being located geographically.
- iii. In case of a separate treatment for Kurds, the likelihood of offering the similar for several other ethnic groups in Turkey which eventually shall undermine the territorial and national integrity.¹⁰³

When these factors supported by social, political, historical, sociological and demographical facts are considered, one will see that the model of a federation is far from being applicable and realistic. Finally, the proposal of the model of a federation to solve Kurdish problem in Turkey may be taken serious to the same extent as the proposal of German type federalism for a domestic problem of France, which is also a unitary state.

XX. HAVE TURKISH GOVERNMENTS BEEN INDIFFERENT TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY?

The reasons for Southeastern Turkey's underdevelopment which is to be tackled are the lack of natural resources except limited oil reserves and rich water sources, the remoteness of the region from the places of trade centers, and the mountainous, nonarable nature of the land.¹⁰⁴ The allegation that the region has been neglected by being deprived of public services is untrue. The Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP) which includes world's third largest dam and irrigation system was put into motion in 1965, long before the PKK and with no aim of soothing ethnical separatist tensions,¹⁰⁵ but to close the gap between rich Western regions and the poor East. When the distribution of public investment spending in Turkey on the regional basis between 1983 and 1992 is looked at, the table will be as follows (*million Turkish Liras regarding the value of Turkish Lira by the year 1993):¹⁰⁶

REGIONS HEAD	TOTAL INVESTMENT	AMOUNT OF SPENDING PER HEAD
SOUTHEAST	52,793,970	10.2
EAST	29,230,239	5.5
AEGEAN	112,166,889	14.8
MEDITERRANEAN	66,147,385	9.4
CENTRAL ANATOLIAN	97,041,020	9.8
BLACK SEA	48,224,782	5.9
MARMARA	105,975,811	8.0
TOTAL	551,580,095	9.1

When the balance of account is considered for the five year period between 1986 and 1990, the amount supplied by the Southeast to the budget is 26.1 trillion Turkish Liras and the total spending for the region in the same period is 78 trillion Turkish Liras.¹⁰⁷

Big amount of spending for the realization of GAP is shown as one of the causes of high inflation rate in Turkey. The project, which is to be completed by the year 2005, envisages the construction of 22 dams and 17 hydroelectric power plants, investments for the development of agriculture, transportation, industry and health, irrigation of 1.7 million hectares of land, and production of 27 billion kilowatt hours of energy. The cost for the completion of dams and plants is estimated 32 billion US Dollars and the investments are expected to provide job opportunities in the region.¹⁰⁸

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XXI. WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

It is asserted that Kurds constitute the majority in some regions of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, Northwestern Syria, the North and the East of Iraq and the West of Iran thus that area should wholly be called "Kurdistan".¹⁰⁹ The demographic and geographical distribution of Kurds in the Middle East, their differences and commonalities in religious, linguistic and sectarian aspects, their sociological characteristics and their political tendencies are separate issues which require extensive research. Nevertheless, in consideration of historical background of the region, past and present policies of the states concerned and the tendencies of the Kurds, a decision could be reached on the likelihood of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state.

First of all, demands for independence have not been heard from the Kurds themselves. Though in October 1992, the "Kurdistan National Assembly" in the territory where Iraqi government could not implement its sovereignty unanimously with the consensus of Talabani and Barzani groups-issued their goal of "federation within a democratic parliamentary Iraq",¹¹⁰ never-ending bloody intertribal and factional conflicts due to the lack of nationhood prove that Kurds' ability and/or enthusiasm to unify under their own political authority are not adequate.

The stand taken by Syria, Iran and Turkey for the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq has also reduced the possibility of an independent Kurdish state. One of the reasons that is given for not allowing an independent Kurdish state is that the mountains between Iran and Iraq provide the two countries with a defensible strategic frontier which would not make strategic sense to move the boundary. Also, it is thought that no government will willingly surrender control of oil and water reserves in the region.¹¹¹ In addition to these strategic aspects, social

realities, as described in this study, do not facilitate emergence of an independent Kurdish state.

It is contended that an independent or federated Kurdish state in Northern Iraq dependent on Turkey for its security would not have irredentist claims on its northern neighbor. Also in this view, Western countries could provide security guarantees for Turkey and use their influence on Syria and others to end their support of separatist groups in Turkey.¹¹² But it is difficult to agree that Western countries share Turkey's security concerns as their unsupportive approach was displayed during Turkey's military operation in March 1995 against the PKK bases and terrorists in Northern Iraq where no state's sovereignty was applicable.¹¹³

Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was founded under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan on November 27, 1978. Öcalan adopted then popular Marxist-Leninist ideology among the youth and reflected it unto the ideological roots of the PKK. In the foundation declaration of the PKK, full-hearted belief in the victory of Marxism-Leninism and the revolution was stressed and it was further expressed that US imperialism was the enemy of the peoples in the Middle East; it was aimed in the region to bring down the order of the collaborators and imperialists, the USA coming at the top, and popular wars in Cuba and Vietnam had served as examples. However, Öcalan has changed his views on American imperialism so radically that in his letter to US President Bill Clinton in 1995 he requested from the President to persuade Turkish government to honor PKK's "unilateral cease-fire".

In effect, a totalitarian scheme of organization which consists of Central Committee, Presidential Council-equivalent of Politburo, and the President and the measures carried out which include killing of the opponents of Öcalan and PKK's policy show that a typical Stalinist organizational structure prevails.¹¹⁴ The objectives set forth in PKK's 5th Congress held early 1995 which include the support to revolutionary nature of scientific Socialism, initiation for establishing a revolutionary Socialist International, creation of red power bases in several areas of the land ["Kurdistan"], and formation of a national assembly and a provisional revolutionary government under the command of central red power base prove that the PKK did not give up

Communism.¹¹⁵ Another indication in this line is the cooperation protocol signed between the PKK and the Communist terrorist organization, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) on 22 December 1996. The protocol outlines the methods and aims of the two organizations. As stated in the protocol, "PKK's and DHKP/C's struggle must be on all levels, legal and illegal, peaceful and armed"; "PKK and DHKP/C are against the regime in Turkey and they are against imperialism"; "the continuing unjust war of the ruling classes in Turkey against peoples in Turkey is being kept in motion with the support of imperialism", and "PKK and DHKP/C wish to drive out and remove all military installations in Turkey which belong to the imperialist states, and that PKK and DHKP/C will not grant the imperialist powers the right or privilege to establish military bases in the territory under PKK's and DHKP/C's control."

Among PKK's targets in its "total extermination war that will be imposed through rich tactics and escalation of violence" are all economic, political, military, social, cultural and so forth institutions and organizations of the enemy [Turkey] and the persons in its service both in Turkey and "Kurdistan".¹¹⁶ That Marxist-Leninist PKK's intolerance for all political, social, educational and religious views and institutions, which are not pro-Kurdish, in certain areas, mostly in Southeastern Turkey and PKK's terrorist policy centered on escalating ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks sometimes resulting in the massacres of civilians in spite of grave problems of unemployment, poverty, housing, and health services in the region reveal the ultra-nationalist racist core of the PKK which could eventually extend to ethnic cleansing.

Even if the PKK leader, Öcalan attempts to court such opposing states as the USA and by using Islam, Iran,¹¹⁷ the unchanging organizational structure, ideology and terrorist methods of the PKK attest the fact that the PKK cannot distance itself from its Marxist-Leninist roots of armed struggle.

XXIII. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF THE PKK?

At the outset PKK referred to the liberation of Kurds in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey.¹¹⁸ It is likely that PKK's long term objective is the formation of a "Kurdistan" in an area occupying the territories of those countries. In the documents published on PKK publications, the maps of "Kurdistan" covering the parts of the Middle East can be seen.¹¹⁹ Frequent reference to "Northern Kurdistan" which corresponds to the Southeastern and some parts of the Eastern Turkey and "Southern Kurdistan" implies that the countries which provide shelter to the PKK might become its target in not so distant future. Accordingly, PKK's attack on the Northern Iraqi Kurdish Barzani group started in August 1995 indicates that PKK's aims are not limited to Turkey.

On the other hand, in order not to irritate the states concerned for a possible change in the balance of powers with regard to the change of borders, PKK leader, Öcalan states that his intention is no more than securing political and cultural rights for Kurds in Turkey. Such a statement was included in his letter to President Clinton.¹²⁰ Knowing the sensitivity of Turkish public opinion on the protection of territorial integrity which is also a principle of International Law, Öcalan stresses that he does not seek secession from Turkey. In fact, it will objectively be unwise for the Southeast to be separated from Turkey for it needs material aid and economic investment by the State to overcome its poverty.

In spite of his Marxist and atheist views, Öcalan has sought support from Iran by employing Islamic rhetoric.¹²¹ In addition to this, his close relations with the Greek, the Syriac, the Armenian and the Serb,¹²² and his dwelling in Syria, a country officially declared by the USA as sponsoring terrorism, also where Kurds are persecuted prove that Öcalan pursues an opportunist policy for his self interest and also for the interests of the states he is in service since he expects support from

everywhere except the Kurds themselves although he constantly claims that his struggle is on behalf of the Kurds.

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XXIV. IS THE PKK A POLITICAL PARTY ?

Political parties are the organizations with popular support and clarity and based on collective common sense. Including the parties defending change and structural transformations, they carry out this through social reconciliation and methods of reformism. As the inevitable elements of democracy parties should be the assurances of democracy, freedom, stability and consequently a humane order.¹²³

It is public support which political parties get power from. And public will appear best in equal and democratic competition circumstances. Organizations that do not accept peaceful democratic competition conditions are not political parties. If their principal political means are violence, they are terrorist organizations or revolutionary groups to the extent of their purpose and support.¹²⁴

The characteristics of the PKK are best described by the words of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan: "The tactics of the party is guerrilla. Now it directs political developments. We can say that nucleus of the guerrilla is a more condensed form of our party's nature. It is not worth mentioning that the nucleus of the guerrilla consists of the party's vanguard nuclei for a long time. This state is mostly the same. The most reliable members of the political party build up the guerrilla. In this case, it is the organization of guerrilla nucleus, style of management and methods of working and fighting that we must put more emphasis on... As it is known, top management directs a war. In our organization top managers of the war are parties."¹²⁵

Öcalan clearly stated his methods and targets in the following excerpts from a program broadcast on Channel 4 of Swedish TV on November 4, 1990: "We attack Turkish targets no matter they are for either economic or social or touristic purposes. We will carry out all kinds of attacks by explosives and guns especially in Turkey. Those who go to Turkey are considered to be helping this country in its fight against us and for this reason we will take actions on them."¹²⁶ The violent methods of the PKK may not always be conventional. In March 1992 the PKK poisoned water tanks

at a Turkish Air Force compound in Istanbul with lethal concentrations of potassium cyanide but that was discovered before any casualties had been incurred. A January 1994 report by a Turkish television (but denied by the Turkish foreign minister) stated that the PKK had mounted a gas attack on a village in Eastern Turkey, killing 21 people.¹²⁷

"...If we get better organized, do they think that capital will be comfortable in the metropolises, or tourism be left in peace? This is only a technical matter; we have not resorted to it this year but next year we will involve many other organizations and we will bring tourism to a halt. A bomb to each factory will be more than enough, a couple of rockets to bigger installations will be more than enough. We have enough potential to set up thousands of organizations."¹²⁸ Accordingly, thousands of people including soldiers, civilians, the old, children and women have lost their lives since 1984 as the result of the PKK terror.¹²⁹

In the West there are statements and stands confirming terrorist nature of the PKK. For instance, the USA has expressed that it sees the PKK as a terrorist organization and it fully supports Turkey's fight against the PKK.¹³⁰ The White House statement released on July 26, 1996 said: "the U.S. supports Turkey's efforts to deal with the threat posed by the PKK terror." German federal government officially banned PKK on November 26, 1993.¹³¹ Following the operations of the French police in November 1993, "Kurdistan Committee" and "Federation of Cultural Associations of Patriotic Workers of Kurdistan in France" which were found to be front organizations of the PKK were dissolved.¹³²

With its totalitarian Marxist-Leninist ideology and violence-centered policy, the PKK has distanced itself from the democratic process and before the 1994 local elections it threatened the parties to cease their political activities and not to participate in the elections in Southeastern Turkey.¹³³

In addition to this terrorist nature of the PKK, its activities such as illicit drug trafficking, extortion, and robbery, all of which are normally considered criminal

everywhere in the world, require the PKK to be called as not only terrorist but also a criminal organization.

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XXV. HOW IS THE PKK FINANCED?

The PKK has to have financial sources as it needs for its terror campaign and for its written, verbal, sounded and visualized propaganda activities, and for its militants, arms, ammunition, printing houses, television studios, transmission facilities, and secret or open bureaus in many countries. In parallel with its terrorist nature, PKK's financial capability is depended on illegal activities. In most of the studies on the PKK, the basic methods to finance the PKK are explained as drug smuggling, extortion and robbery.¹³⁴ Among the financial sources, fund-raising, membership donations, aid from church organizations and financial support provided by local administrations to PKK's front associations and extortion of asylum seekers are also referred.¹³⁵

Annual budget of the PKK was estimated as 86 million US Dollars. In a report by the British National Service of Criminal Intelligence, it is stated that the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds from immigrants and businessmen in 1993. The same report also reveals that PKK's income in 1993 from drug smuggling in Europe was 56 million DM.¹³⁶ It is reported that in the first half of 1994 two-thirds of the heroin seized by German authorities were through the channels of Turks of Kurdish descent.¹³⁷ In 1992, 23 of the 41 operations for narcotics worldwide, smugglers captured were said to be linked to the PKK.¹³⁸ The Turkish Security Department's Smuggling and Organized Crime Division told that since 1984 the security forces had conducted 129 operations against narcotic smugglers who had direct involvement with the PKK. They have seized more than two tons of heroin, 13 tons of hashish, four tons of morphine and 22 tons of acetic anhydrite which is used to produce heroin. The Turkish authorities also said: "The PKK receives commissions from the other traffickers and helps them to smuggle narcotics to European countries through Turkey."¹³⁹

It is expressed that there are two places of origin for the drugs connected to the PKK.¹⁴⁰ Narcotics prepared in laboratories in the Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon are transferred through the Greek portion of Cyprus to Italy, Spain, Germany and other European countries or through smuggling into Turkey from the southeastern border and into former Eastern bloc countries en route to Western Europe. A senior member of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP), Sami Abderrahman said that the PKK sought control on both sides of the Turkish-Northern Iraqi border in order to control drugs trading.¹⁴¹

PKK tries to launder the money obtained from drug smuggling by transferring it from Germany to Turkey. It is reported that Kurdish drug dealers in Germany annually transfer an amount of more than 100 million DM to Turkey.¹⁴²

According to the statement by Rolph Tophoven, the Director of the Terrorism Research Forum in Germany, 69 of 100 incidents of extortion in Germany in 1994 are definitely proved to be in connection with the PKK.¹⁴³ In Southeastern Turkey in the years of 1991 and 1992 when PKK terrorism was rampant, during the incidents of road blockades the travelers who refused to give their money were killed immediately by the PKK terrorists.¹⁴⁴ There are also press reports which indicate PKK's involvement in counterfeiting.¹⁴⁵

The percentage of acceptance of Kurdish asylum-seekers in Europe range from 14 to 21 while the same figure for asylum-seekers from other countries remains around 1 or 2%.¹⁴⁶ Such a high rate of acceptance based on ethnicity is exploited by the PKK which frequently commits fraudulence on asylum, consequently obtaining a considerable amount of income. Through the forgery on visas and passports 4,000-4,500 DM are obtained for each case.¹⁴⁷ In the crimes of the fraud on asylum, trading workers illegally and forgery, it is the terrorist organization, PKK, which controls the market particularly in Germany.¹⁴⁸

The income received with those methods are spent to supply German, Chinese and Russian made arms¹⁴⁹ and to finance MED TV, the propaganda channel of the PKK.¹⁵⁰

XXVI. IS THE PKK A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT?

PKK declares that it inherits the mission of the "liberation of Kurdish nation" and one of its well-known affiliated organizations carries the title, "Kurdistan National Liberation Front-ERNK". However, a national liberation movement first requires the existence of a community which sees themselves as an oppressed nation. The surveys conducted on the Turkish citizens of Kurdish ancestry point out that 61.1% and 19.1% indicate the economic measures and granting of cultural and political rights respectively for the solution of their problems.¹⁵¹ In a paper prepared by Dicle University of Diyarbakyr, economic difficulties, population movements, health problems, problems of infrastructure, inadequate housing, education and investment, high birth rate and unemployment are listed as the most pressing problems.¹⁵² Neither is there an indication of popular support for the PKK (see footnote no. 175). Hence, behind PKK's inhumane brutal violence which is also directed to the citizens of Kurdish descent lies its policy of "first neutralizing people between [the PKK and the State] and then making them supportive of the organization through the feelings of sympathy mixed with fear."¹⁵³

Continuous migration of citizens with Kurdish origin into the Western parts of Turkey, largely due to the economic reasons show their intention of taking their part in the Turkish social life in which no ethnic discrimination exists.

Furthermore, in the United Nations' practices, national liberation movements are limited to the communities which are assumed to have the right of self-determination in the context of decolonization.¹⁵⁴ Having fought side by side against occupiers in the Independence War and investing and spending, as in the case of the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP), much more than the income received from the region (see CHAPTER XX), it will be wrong to refer to colonization in Turkey.

Introducing itself as an organization struggling for the rights of an oppressed nation, the PKK tries to conceal its real face to receive support and sympathy of the international community, notwithstanding its terrorism.

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XXVII. IS THE PKK SINCERE IN ITS CALL FOR CEASE-FIRE?

In the past twelve years more than four thousand civilians including women, children, the old and people of Kurdish descent mostly who had refused to give aid to the PKK lost their lives under the PKK terror. 197 teachers and 38 religious leaders were also the victims of the PKK terrorism.¹⁵⁵ In May 1993, the PKK killed 33 unarmed recruits, not so long after its declaration of "unilateral cease-fire" in March of the same year.¹⁵⁶ The growing popular reaction to PKK's brutal terror and its burning of schools, mosques and official buildings, subsequently the decline of economic investments in the region causing high unemployment and inflow of local people to the big cities¹⁵⁷ where they stay under harsh living conditions make very difficult to perceive the PKK as a peaceful political organization renouncing terrorism and defending rights and interests of the Kurds.

The PKK with its rigid ideological structure and the method of armed struggle has lost its *raison d'être* in a country, Turkey where democracy improves and no ethnic discrimination exists, and everyone's right to life is protected in its every part. The "cease-fire" declaration¹⁵⁸ by the PKK leader, Öcalan on December 14, 1995 was mostly because of his intentions to consolidate the armed units of the PKK and to introduce it to the world public opinion as a peaceful political organization representative of Kurds that could be entered into a dialogue with. With its massacres and terrorist activities the PKK has justifiably caused an outrage in the Turkish public opinion and it is officially regarded as a terrorist organization by many countries (see CHAPTER XXIV). Considering its Marxist-Leninist racist view and unending threat to use violence,¹⁵⁹ taking PKK's "cease-fire" declarations serious shall mean to give support to the enemies of tolerance and pluralism. Not surprisingly, almost one year after the declaration of the so-called unilateral cease-fire, the PKK decided to cooperate with Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), one of the most disgusting Marxist terrorist organizations of Turkey. In the joint statement by the PKK and DHKP/C, it is declared that their struggle must be on all levels, legal and illegal, peaceful and armed, and military.

XXVIII. HOW DOES THE PKK SEE KURDS WITH THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS?

In line with Marxist-Leninist view, PKK's leadership has adopted the ideology reigned in such Communist regimes as Soviet Union, Cambodia under the rule of Khmer Rouge and Cuba, all of which collapsed or in such a course. That ideology tends to penetrate each section of daily life by denying the existence of individual free will and private life and by comprising all values in the Party's leadership, Abdullah Öcalan.¹⁶⁰

This ideological system, which does not allow democratic popular involvement, tries to justify its dictatorial stand by the argument that people are incapable of deciding properly their fate on their own. Therefore, they need to be led and ruled by an ideology, a party, and a leader. Accordingly, PKK leader Öcalan's statements reflect this system: "The enemy [The Republic of Turkey] could have approximately forty thousand village guards in a province like Botan. How could this happen? A people cannot be so much against its national liberation. There is obviously a serious inconsistency." "For example, in the history of our party an experience known as blind Cemal, who imposed himself to the Party and to the war, was undergone and it served as an important counter practice. His approach was like that... You would gather the villagers and tell each one that they would become soldiers. You would bring them. In order to make the people obey your rule, you would beat some of them before the crowd and then you would see how they would get under your rule".¹⁶¹

"...The ones joining our party and beginning the basic training are hardly recognizable. They, themselves, utter this-they represent the enemy. We can find out to what extent they are from our people only after using great efforts for months. They can neither love nor respect. They cannot think and they cannot understand. As for their attitudes and behavior, they are unblessed and crippled. Their behavioral disorder is so grave as of the psychologically and mentally ill people".¹⁶²

"Since the beginning I have regarded Kurdishness as an element of weakness for me. I am aware that the extreme weakness of Kurdish nation presses upon me as a person. For this reason, the condition of Kurdishness is a serious obstacle on making progress... The severe slavery and primitivity experienced by the Kurds caused hatred in me. I think a people which has fitted itself slavery to that extent will not be loved."163

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XXIX. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE PKK ACTIVITIES ON SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE?

Popular support for terrorist organizations is, to some degree, dependent on the negative socio-economic conditions that can be exploited.¹⁶⁴ In parallel, the PKK conducts activities to undermine the economic development of the region.¹⁶⁵ PKK's direct targeting of construction machines, communication facilities, pipelines and other economic assets and its threats against businessmen that will bid, and extortion of small and other businesses that will make investment cause the decline of investments in the region both by private and public sectors.¹⁶⁶

While the most pressing problem of the people in the Southeast is meeting of their basic economic and social needs such as unemployment, inadequate housing, health and education services, PKK's terrorist actions to block investments dispute PKK's claim which introduces the PKK as the "leading force" of the Kurdish people. Particularly, teachers in remote areas trying to overcome ignorance of the local people and introduce them to modernity have been subject to attacks by the terrorist organization, PKK. As the result of those attacks by the PKK, 138 teachers lost their lives and 379 primary schools were set fire as of the year 1994.¹⁶⁷ In consideration of all these facts, it will obviously be irrational for Kurds to back the PKK.

Using the pretext that so-called war waged against Kurds are being financed, the declaration to start terrorist activities in touristic resorts of Turkey¹⁶⁸ (see CHAPTER XXIV) and total extermination plan against economic, political, social and cultural institutions and persons serving them,¹⁶⁹ in other words, inhumane actions including burning of schools and assassination of teachers indicate PKK's intention to undermine economic and social development of Southeastern Turkey by deepening the problems and creating a fertile ground to recruit people, who feel desperate and helpless, through threats and intimidation.

XXX. WHAT IS PKK'S VIEW OF RELIGION?

In line with their Marxist ideology, the PKK and its leader, Öcalan do not have adherence to any religion but they use religious sentiments to gain support in the Middle East where strong Islamic faith persists. For instance, a former mufti, Abdurrahman Dürre in the PKK controlled Kurdistan Parliament in Exile has led "Kurdistan Islamic Movement" to organize people seemingly under the principles of Islam. PKK has also used such organizations as "Imams' Association of Kurdistan", "Patriotic Imams' Association of Kurdistan", "ERNK Imams' Association", and "Patriotic Ulama's Association of Kurdistan" to carry out religious propaganda activities. Meanwhile, the success of pro-Islamic Welfare Party in the 1994 local elections which also gained votes from the people of Kurdish descent apparently started a competition between the PKK and Welfare Party to address religious sentiments and politicize Islam. It is told that the PKK plans to place its sympathizers into the positions of twenty thousand imams to be filled in Southeastern Turkey. In addition, PKK has plans to start close relations with locally active pro-Islamic terrorist organization, Hezbollah.

It is clear that PKK leader, Öcalan whose Marxist views do not have a place for religious belief might present himself in a radical pro-Islamic identity. Öcalan says: "In effect, secularism is an instrument that is used to observe Western and Zionist interests and to subdue national and class-related liberation in the Middle East. Secularism in Turkey should be reversed and one should not be deceived by the concept that state and religious affairs are separate. Religion is inseparably a part of political life and at the same time it is its cultural, moral and social form". "Under the Islamic ideology peoples take anti-imperialist stands. Iran is the most outstanding of them... Even if peoples' struggles have an Islamic appearance, one should not fear this and should not be deterred by their form. What is important is to make them stand as much as possible against Western imperialism."

The power of pro-Islamic movements in the Middle East forces PKK leader, Öcalan to enter into close relations with the extremist pro-Islamic organizations which also use violence and even to endorse their view in order to have influence in the region. With this point, the PKK becomes an element of instability blocking the improvement of democracy and tolerance and the emergence of modernity.

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XXXI. CAN THE PKK BE RECOGNIZED AS BELLIGERENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The status of belligerency can be acceptable in case of a civil war and when some areas of a country are under the authority of belligerent forces.¹⁷⁴ Violent actions in Turkey have not reached the scale of a civil war and the State authority is in full effect in every part of it. It is unlikely that the status of belligerency will emerge as the PKK and its separatism lack the popular support.¹⁷⁵ It is admitted that International Humanitarian Law faces problems on its application with regard to the Kurdish issue. Therefore, endorsement of Geneva Conventions and related Protocols, lobbying in International Red Cross Committee and activities planned for being recognized as legitimate representatives of Kurdish people in the international fora are suggested to so-called Kurdish liberation groups.¹⁷⁶ In any case, whichever method is used, legally unfounded claims that do not represent the facts are hardly acceptable.

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XXXII. IS "KURDISTAN PARLIAMENT IN EXILE" AN INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION REPRESENTING THE KURDS?

At its 5th Congress held early 1995, the PKK decided to form a national assembly, a national congress, and a provisional revolutionary government which would serve to conceal the terrorist nature of the organization and at the same time introduce the PKK as the representative of Kurds to the international public opinion.¹⁷⁷ In line with this decision, a meeting was held under the title, "Kurdistan Parliament in Exile" (KPE) in the Dutch city of The Hague on April 12, 1995. Statements made by the people in the so-called Parliament point out that the "Parliament" acts under the full control of the PKK. Accordingly, Ya?ar Kaya, who was brought to head the "Parliament" could say that they were identical with the PKK (see footnote no. 60). Also, representatives of some states and groups have made statements confirming the control of the PKK over the "Parliament". For instance, the US State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns told that they regarded the PKK as a terrorist organization and the USA had expressed its opposition to the formation of a parliament in exile controlled by the PKK to the Turkish and Dutch governments.¹⁷⁸ Interior Minister of the German state of Bavaria, Guenther Beckstein stated that the "Parliament" in exile was in fact a propaganda tool of the PKK which had been banned in Germany since November 1993.¹⁷⁹

Iraqi Kurdish groups, Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also denounced the "Parliament" which they defined as the tool of a Marxist, Turkey based Kurdish group.¹⁸⁰ According to the leader of Socialist Party of Kurdistan, Kemal Burkay, "KPE" is not the outcome of the joint efforts by Kurdish organizations but a formation realized through *fait accompli*. It could not represent the whole Kurdish national movement and it could not play the role given.¹⁸¹

In the Turkish Grand National Assembly formed through free and democratic elections in which ethnically nationalist pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party also took part, there are many parliamentarians of Kurdish descent from the parties holding the power and the opposition. They can express all economic, social and

cultural problems of their constituencies without denying and hiding their identity in an entirely democratic platform.

The PKK, on the other hand, in its Congress resolutions, envisioned formation of such institutions as "National Assembly" and "National Congress" that may give the PKK an appearance of representing people. But the real face of the PKK is seen in the statements which tell the adherence to Marxist-Leninist traditions, assuming the role of the ideological vanguard of socialism in the world in a period when it is believed that socialism has collapsed, the foundation of a revolutionary Socialist International similar to those established in the era of working class movements in the 19th century and after October Revolution, and adoption of revolutionary characteristic of scientific socialism.¹⁸² Therefore, "Kurdistan Parliament in Exile" will serve the function of the parliaments of totalitarian repressive Communist regimes all of which have failed in all economic, social, ideological and political aspects. In other words, it will endorse and declare the decisions and policies of the leader of terrorist organization, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan which has a dictatorial position and it will remain as a body trying to introduce them as the realization of the will of Kurdish people.

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XXXIII. WHAT ARE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PKK AND OTHER PRO-KURDISH GROUPS?

It was normal in the antidemocratic revolutionary Marxist tradition in which PKK has its roots for the groups to charge each other with being "fascist", "social chauvinistic", and "nationalist reformist". At its beginning, the PKK had made similar accusations against pro-Kurdish and extreme leftist groups. For instance, it had directed similar charges against Kurdistan Nationalist Liberationists (KUK).¹⁸³ Being aware of PKK's intolerance for democracy and different views within itself and its totalitarian oppressive antidemocratic nature which sometimes results in killings of inner party opponents, pro-Kurdish groups know that it is very difficult to reach a conciliation with the PKK. The lack of principles in PKK's leadership which always centers on self interests makes it hard to rely on the PKK. In July 1983 a protocol was signed between Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) and the PKK which remained in effect until 1987. The protocol provided the PKK with bases in Northern Iraq. But the leader of the same PKK, Abdullah Öcalan told on the television channel under his control that the clan of Barzani [KDP] had been in the service of the enemy for 15 years trying to block patriotic actions.¹⁸⁴ PKK did not refrain from attacking Barzani supporters in August 1995. KDP's representative to Turkey, Safeen Dezai said in a statement that Öcalan's aim was not democracy but having a rule by force and he was a trouble for the people in Turkey and Kurds.¹⁸⁵ A senior member of the KDP, Sami Abderrahman told Reuters news agency that the PKK had made their lives hell in Northern Iraq. According to Abderrahman, there were 350 villages along the Turkish-Iraqi border to which displaced persons were unable to return because of the PKK.¹⁸⁶ Socialist Party of Kurdistan, which had decided to cooperate with the PKK in March 1993, did not take part in the so-called Kurdistan Parliament in Exile (KPE), declared on April 12, 1995 under the PKK control (see CHAPTER XXXII). In fact, "KPE" which purports to represent Kurdish people is solely comprised of pro-PKK people and institutions and that is an indication of distrust of PKK by pro-Kurdish groups.

According to Selim Çürükkaya, who had been promoted to the European section of the PKK and the coordination of its publications "Serxwebun" and "Berxwedan", Öcalan started propaganda activities against People's Labor Party (HEP) and prevented it from operating on legal platform by trying to impose his leadership when legally founded pro-Kurdish HEP had a possibility of gaining public support.¹⁸⁷ Another legally founded political party, Democratic Mass Party ("Demokratik Kitle Partisi"-DKP) of Şerafettin Elçi, which advocates cultural and political rights of Kurds has also been subject to attacks by the PKK for its non-violent stance.¹⁸⁸

Since the influences of the states which see their interests in the region have role in the alliance relations between pro-Kurdish groups, the unities between those groups do not live long. In this context, PKK's leadership which is dependent on Syria has to consider Syria's interests in its relations with other pro-Kurdish groups. The meetings held near Dublin on August 9-11 and September 12-16, 1995 with the participation of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the USA, Britain and Turkey were aimed at bringing peace into Northern Iraq. PKK's attacks against KDP forces in Northern Iraq might have been motivated by the plans to undermine these peace efforts under the direction of Syria and Iran which stayed out of the said peace process.¹⁸⁹

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XXXIV. CAN PKK'S PRESENCE IN NORTHERN IRAQ CONTRIBUTE TO A JUST AND FINAL SETTLEMENT?

Upon the declaration of "Safe Haven" in Northern Iraq, Iraqi government has lost its control where Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have stayed as dominant groups. The disputes over the share of the revenues originating from the crossings of the Turkish-Iraqi border and the disagreement on the control of some areas of the region sparked an armed conflict between the two groups and the PKK has exploited the lack of authority by having bases in Northern Iraq to launch terrorist attacks in Turkey. Turkey, which in no way can tolerate attacks against its citizens and security forces had to carry out military operations against PKK bases in Northern Iraq. Therefore, as long as PKK's presence in Northern Iraq continues, Turkey's security will be at stake and Turkish troops may be obliged to enter Iraqi territory.¹⁹⁰ Hence, the PKK becomes an element of instability in Northern Iraq. The PKK, which is concerned of being excluded totally from the region in the outcome of the meetings held near Dublin on August 9-11, 1995 and September 12-16, 1995, began attacking KDP forces and intensified its efforts to form a federation in "Southern Kurdistan".¹⁹¹ Many Kurds lost their lives in the fightings between the PKK and KDP which erupted with PKK's attacks. The PKK has a leader in a dictatorial position living for years out of Iraq, in Syria.¹⁹² The PKK, which is only striving to sustain its leader, Öcalan's personal position of dictatorship, uses every terrorist method. Bloody fightings caused by the PKK in Northern Iraq further proves that with PKK's presence no peace and stability could be achieved. For this reason, Öcalan's positive response on December 10, 1995 to the cease-fire call made to the PKK and KDP should not be expected to bring a lasting long term peace and stability into the region. A KDP statement on May 15, 1997 said: "the KDP have repeatedly urged the PKK not to establish military bases inside Northern Iraq to avoid another crisis in the area, since their domain of activity is not there. Yet the PKK did not heed KDP's requests and consequently have turned the region once again into a battleground where the real victims would be the population of the border region. The KDP called upon the PKK to end its presence in the border

areas so the indigenous people could return to their homes and live in peace and security." In parallel with these calls of the KDP, Turkish troops entered once again into Northern Iraq in May 1997 to wipe out PKK's positions.

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XXXV. WHY IS SYRIA SO OFTEN ACCUSED OF SPONSORING PKK TERRORISM?

The relation between the PKK terrorism and Turkey's southern neighbor Syria is frequently subject to discussions. Studies on the PKK point Syria's support and sponsoring since its early years. In 1981 when the PKK consisted of 75-80 militants, Syrian President Hafez Assad's brother, Rifad Assad who was also chief of the Syrian intelligence had contact with the PKK.¹⁹³ It is stated that without its Syrian safehouse after 1980 the PKK would probably have never been resurrected as it was in 1984.¹⁹⁴ After it lost its training camps in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982, Syria gave hand to the PKK. The PKK militants placed in military camps were trained under the supervision of Syrian officers.¹⁹⁵ Its leader, Öcalan dwells in Damascus and there he has headquarters where he commands the PKK.¹⁹⁶ Among the facilities provided to the PKK by Syria are the following:¹⁹⁷

- i. Giving shelter to PKK militants.
- ii. Supplying identity cards and money for PKK cadres going to Lebanon and other countries.
- iii. Building relations between the PKK and other extremist organizations against Turkey.
- iv. Holding of conferences and congresses.¹⁹⁸
- v. Supply of arms, explosives and income.
- vi. Opening of PKK bureaus.

It is told that in 1987 Öcalan was allocated a Mercedes car, special protection force by Syrian Kurds and a three storey house by Rifad Assad.¹⁹⁹ Today there are still indications of Syrian support to the PKK. A PKK member of Syrian citizen captured in Gaziantep province revealed that in a camp on the Syrian part of the Turkish-Syrian border he had been trained with approximately 60 Turks and Syrians; Syrian security forces were aware of the PKK activities in Syria; funds were raised for the PKK; leaflets and newspapers particularly in the regions near Turkey were distributed with no charge, and some Syrian parliamentarians gave support to the PKK.²⁰⁰ It is reported that before its declaration of "unilateral cease-fire" in December 1995, PKK transferred its military buildup from Northern Iraq to Syria.²⁰¹

Syria's use of terror to have political and economic gainings is the characteristic of the oppressive dictatorial regime and it is not solely against Turkey.²⁰² For instance, Hezbollah militants based in the Syrian controlled capital of Lebanon, Beirut and Bekaa Valley ambushed and killed 6 Israeli soldiers patrolling in Southern Lebanon. It is pointed out that arms shipped to Hezbollah by Iran are transferred via Syria.²⁰³ According to Western and Arab intelligence reports, Bekaa Valley has been the home not only to the PKK but also to extremists from Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Bosnia and even the French Basque region.²⁰⁴ Syria also contributes through the vital provision of safe houses and offices from which innumerable organizations have been able to recruit potential trainees.²⁰⁵ Philip Wilcox, the US State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, in his statement to the members of the House International Relations Committee on July 25, 1996 said: "Syria continues to provide safe haven and logistic support to a variety of terrorist groups, both Arab and non-Arab, such as the Kurdish PKK." According to Ambassador Wilcox, the USA has urged Syria to join its neighbors and the rest of the international community in opposing all forms of terrorism, and to change its policies accordingly.

The support given by Syria to the PKK is said to be due to the Syrian view that because of the building of the dams on Euphrates river for the Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) the release of downstream water on the river remains

inadequate. The security protocol signed between Syria and Turkey in 1987 guaranteed to supply Syria with no less than 500 cubic meters per second of water per month and in return Syria agreed to end support to the PKK. However, Hafez Assad has increased its support for the PKK to force Turkey into releasing more water (from 500 cubic meters to 700 cubic meters).²⁰⁶

Also, by publishing official maps showing the Turkish province of Hatay as part of Syria, Syrian government declares its expansionist aims against Turkey.²⁰⁷ It appears that Syria sponsors the PKK terrorism to weaken Turkey to realize this long term plan.

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XXXVI. WHAT IS THE GREEK POLICY TOWARDS THE PKK GIVEN HER FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH TURKEY?

There are many disputes which have long past between Greece and Turkey bringing them to the edge of war such as Cyprus, territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, air space over the Aegean Sea, and persecution of Turkish minority in Western Thrace. After the end of World War I, Greece attempted to invade Western Anatolia but the Greek Army was expelled by the Turkish forces led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who later founded the Republic of Turkey.

Disputes between two countries should be settled through dialogue, cooperation, and good neighboring relations. Greece, however, may pursue policies which do not conform to the principles of friendship and neighboring. News and studies related to Greek support for PKK terrorism, statements by the captured PKK militants and by Greek parliamentarians themselves indicate the cooperation between the PKK and Greece on terrorist activities targeting Turkish economy and killing innocent civilians.

On April 14, 1995 a group of Greek parliamentarians headed by the Deputy Speaker of the Greek Parliament met with the head of terrorist organization, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. During the talks Öcalan promised to sabotage the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline in Turkey thus aiding Greece's plans on the issue of oil transport.²⁰⁸ On April 10, 1997 some 110 members of the Greek parliament invited Abdullah Öcalan to Greece. Öcalan, in his reply to this invitation, said that it would be a great honor for him to visit Greece.²⁰⁹ Terrorists, who are perpetrators of bloody incidents, in their statements, have told in detail the political and military training facilities, the camps, and easing of control for their border crossings they have had in Greece.²¹⁰ One of them, Gyyaseddin Altun told that he had gone to Athens from Frankfurt, Germany and he had been met in the airport by a person under the code name, Cemal. Together they went to a house in Athens belonging to the PKK. One week later, in a camp at a military district 200 km. away from Athens he had been trained with other 20 people by a PKK member under the code name, Faik and by a Greek

person for two months. Gyyaseddin Altun was then brought to Athens and he was told the phone numbers which he could contact in Turkey. He entered into Turkey through the river, Maritsa with the assistance of Greek authorities.²¹¹ Nuri Akbulut, who went under the code name of Renas-Hac-Ahmet-Mehmet, was captured on January 13, 1995 as the perpetrator of placing explosives and an incident of murder. Nuri Akbulut, in his statement, said: "While undertaking activities on behalf of the PKK terrorist organization in Germany, I had a discussion with Mustafa Karasu, the person responsible for the PKK's activities in Europe. During our talks, he told me that after my training in explosives I would be sent to Izmir. In April 1994 I was sent to Athens from Germany by plane. Our training location was a farmhouse-like building in a mountainous region 150 kilometers far from Athens. In this house, a total of 23 persons took a two month political training course. The training was given by a person who went under the code name of Cemal. At the end of the course 13 persons including myself were assigned to training in explosives. Our training lasted 25 days. We passed to Turkey via the river, Maritsa. After coming by bus from Istanbul to Izmir, I procured the necessary materials for explosives." He further told that the bomb he had prepared hidden in a bag behind a telephone booth had been found before it had exploded. According to his statement, having found out that the then Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was to come to Izmir to make a speech, he left a high-explosive bomb he had prepared at the entrance of the Izmir Fair but the police managed to render the bomb ineffective. He also said that he, with a friend, had strangled a taxi driver to death with a wire while trying to seize the cab.²¹² It is noteworthy that terrorists trained in Greece have targeted the touristic places such as restaurants, hotels and ferryboat in crowded big Turkish cities in a period when Turkey was the world's fastest growing tourist market.²¹³

On the April 5, 1995 issue of the Sunday Times newspaper in a report said to be originated from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) it was expressed that a terrorist training camp was located in the north of the Greek city, Salonika and the CIA had the photographs of it. Reports indicate that the Greek National Intelligence Service may have knowingly allowed PKK operatives to train at a camp located on Euboea, a large island northeast of Athens. The camp used for explosives and weapons training, was reportedly abandoned in mid-1996 after US intelligence became aware

of its existence and submitted a report to the US Government.²¹⁴ As stated in US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, Greek government continues to tolerate the official presence in Athens of two Turkish terrorist groups-the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan, the front organization of the PKK and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C). According to German intelligence units, fund-raising calls were made for PKK terrorists being trained in Greece and in this way 1.3 million DM were collected by 1994. The same sources indicate that arms transfer to the PKK is realized via Greek port, Valos and Syria to reach its destination in Turkey. Also the PKK camp in the Greek portion of Cyprus was mentioned.²¹⁵ The head of Kurdistan Solidarity Committee, retired Admiral Naksakis, in his speech aired on the Greek Cypriot radio on January 27, 1996, told that newly formed Greek government under the premiership of Kostas Simitis would follow the policy of the former government on Kurdish issue.

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**XXXVII. COULD THERE BE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
TERMINATION OF THE TERRORISM BY ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY
FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA (ASALA) AND THE
BEGINNING OF PKK TERRORISM IN MID EIGHTIES?**

When the Armenian terrorism and the once most active terrorist organization, ASALA which killed more than fifty Turkish diplomats abroad, US²¹⁶ and French citizens are scrutinized, one will see that they had many common grounds with the PKK in the conditions they flourished and in their training, relations, foreign connections, and financial sources. ASALA like the PKK had been trained by Syrian backed Palestinian terrorists²¹⁷ and sponsored by Greece,²¹⁸ and it had received income from drug smuggling,²¹⁹ and according to Israeli intelligence organization, MOSSAD, in the camps at the Trodos mountains of the Greek portion of Cyprus militants from the PKK and ASALA were given military training by the advisers to Abu Nidal.²²⁰ A declaration of cooperation between the PKK and ASALA was announced in Lebanon on April 6, 1980. It was reported that ASALA members joined PKK terrorists to fight against Turkish troops.²²¹ ASALA apparently dissolved after a series of murderous internal splits in the mid-1980s.²²² In spite of groundless charges of genocide in 1915 directed against Kurds as well as Turks, the tactical cooperation between Armenian terrorists and the PKK, targeting of territorial integrity of Turkey by both terrorist organizations, and finally, the support given to them by the same circles increase the possibility that there is a link between the withdrawal of ASALA and initiation of extensive violent acts by the PKK on August 15, 1984.²²³

CONCLUSION

Kurds, who became a center of attraction for the West with the disintegration of Ottoman Empire, are seen as the people that are subjected to torture, mistreatment, and oppression by the Middle Eastern dictatorships. From this point of view, they are deprived of the basic human rights; their houses are destroyed; a dirty war has been waged against them. Consequently, they are forced to an armed revolt. In fact, there have been scenes in some Middle Eastern countries confirming these views. Turkey, on the other hand, has a unique position in such Middle Eastern world.

Turkey's status as a European country was first mentioned at the international level in the text of the Paris Peace Treaty signed in 1856 following the Crimean War. The background of Turkish political parties extends to the party of "Union and Progress" founded in 19th century. Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, successor state to the Ottoman Empire, with his reforms, placed Turkey's position irreversibly in the West. Secularism which does not allow exploitation of sacred Islamic sentiments to rule in politics, state affairs and social order became one of the basic principles of the Turkish state. First multiparty elections in Turkey were held in 1946. The dictatorships had survived for about forty years in Portugal and Spain. The military regime of Greece continued for eight years. In Turkey, however, the longest serving military rule was for three years. Turkey's democratic and social progress is not independent from the ones in Europe. When Council of Europe was founded in 1949, Turkey was among the members. It is also a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was set up to counter expansionist Eastern Bloc by Western democracies. Democracy is a way of life embraced by Turkish nation which has inherited the great tolerance of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire had become the sanctuary for the oppressed people from various parts of Europe. The communities from each religion and race could freely have their ceremonies, traditions, and social life. Particularly at its glory days, Ottoman Empire was the most developed of its era. Tolerance, hospitality and sympathy for the persecuted, which became the national characteristics, have been kept in the time of

the Republic of Turkey. Jewish scientists fleeing the Nazi persecution in Germany sought refuge in Turkey. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees escaping the wrath of Saddam Hussein were accepted into Turkey in spite of Turkey's limited resources and the security risks they brought. Then, how realistic will it be to see Turkey, which opens its doors to the oppressed both from its West and East with its fifty-year old pluralistic multiparty democracy as the equivalent of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), ideologically totalitarian organization getting support from world's most brutal regimes in the Middle East and radical extremist pro-Islamic states, which employs outrageous terrorist tactics and also involves internationally in organized crime? How realistic will it be to present fighting PKK terrorism as the war waged against Kurds?

Said tolerance, openness and democracy facilitate free expression of the demands for the improvement of democracy and human rights in Turkey. Those demands could be met to the extent they conform to the will of Turkish nation for more democracy and freedom.

Particularly due to the enhancement of democratic view in the past years, different proposals for the solution of the Kurdish problem have had echoes at business, political and academic circles. The conditions for the realization of the will of the people in a liberal atmosphere are almost totally set. Considerable steps were taken to improve the freedom of expression provided that propaganda for violence is not made. Turkey having its place in Western security and economic organizations for almost fifty years initiated the implementation of Customs Union Agreement which is an important step towards full membership in European Union. Most of the obstacles on the way of expressing Kurdish identity through cultural, folkloric and traditional aspects were removed. The easing of cultural exchange in a pluralistic and tolerant society encourages the unity on the basis of citizenship with no racist imposition and with no ethnic hatred but with openness and democratic involvement. This process in Turkey introduces itself as being considered as Turkish citizen in line with the constitution of the Republic of Turkey on one side, and the realization of all ethnic, religious and sectarian forms of affiliation freely in private life and on cultural basis on the other. The progress that will be made in Turkey's

economic and political integration into the European Union and in the long term its adaptation to the economic and common foreign, defense, social and financial policies of European Union will clear the way for Turkey to adopt being European as her supra identity.

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34 The PKK will be introduced in detail in the following chapters.

35 Turkish Democracy Foundation, *Human Rights, Democracy, Terrorism in Turkey* (Ankara: Turkish Democracy Foundation, 1995), p. 13.

36 London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project and Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex might be worth noting. See Associate Professor Semih Gemalmaz, *Avrupa İnsan Hakları Komisyonu Kararları 1 [European Commission of Human Rights Decisions, Volume 1]*, (İstanbul: İnsan Hakları Derneği Yayınları, 1995); "Application on Burning the Village Was Found Admissible by the European Commission of Human Rights", *Demokrasi*, 11 February 1997.

37 Mango, *Türkiye'nin...* [Turkey:...], p. 48; Ahmet Taner Kaya, "Kürt Asıllı Türk Olur Mu?" [Is It Possible To Be Turkish Of Kurdish Descent?], *Cumhuriyet*, 22 November 1995. For the naming of the land of Anatolia as "Turkey" since 3rd Crusade around 1174 A.D., long before Atatürk, see Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği [Turkish Identity]* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), p. 134 and Halil Kemal Türközü, *Türkmen Ülkesi (=Doğu Anadolu) Adı ve Emperyalizmin Etkileri*

[The Title of Turkoman Land (Eastern Anatolia) and the Influence of Imperialism] (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1985), p. 8.

38 Mustafa Özbek, "Güneydoğu Anadolu Göç Sorunu" [Southeastern Anatolia's Migration Problem], Türk Metal Haber Bülteni, pp. 3-4.

39 Özbek, "Güneydoğu Anadolu..." [Southeastern Anatolia's...], p. 5.

40 Council Of Europe, Short Guide..., p. 121.

41 Human Rights News, Press Release of the Secretary to the European Commission of Human Rights, 10 January 1997. Also see "European Commission of Human Rights 1996 Report: Turkey is at the 3rd Place in the Individual Applications to the Commission", Cumhuriyet, 14 January 1997.

42 According to the information from the Ministry of Interior, 80% of the perpetrators of such crimes have been identified. In 1994 perpetrators of 893 murder cases were arrested and handed over to the courts. Also Turkish Grand National Assembly established a commission to handle the issue. See Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., p. 17.

43 For example, see 3 September 1995 issue of "Milliyet" which quoted from the PKK publication, "Serxwebun" as saying "militants were sentenced to death with such charges as "taking stand with criticism [against the party]" "being depressed" and "illness". Also see Erciyes University, PKK Reality, p. 59; Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 85. In the words of Eduard Vermander, chief of the Berlin Office for the Protection of Constitution, PKK acts internally very brutally up to killing. See Berliner Morgenpost, 2/3 December 1995.

44 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 21.

45 When the migrants from Eastern Turkey in Western regions were asked what the most serious problem of Turkey was, among the answers, inflation and

unemployment led with 54%. In Southeastern Turkey the percentage for the same answer was as high as 65 while the answer, "Kurdish problem" was voiced by 12.5% of the respondents in the Southeast and 18% of the migrants in Western Turkey. See Mustafa Özbek, "Güneydoğu Anadolu..." [Southeastern Anatolia's...], p. 8. Also see Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., p. 20.

46 The issue will be further described in the following chapters.

47 Fuller, "The Fate...", p. 117.

48 The Kurdish villagers who were allegedly had to leave their villages in Turkey because of the State oppression in 1994 had a very difficult life under PKK threat and repression in the Atrush refugee camp in Northern Iraq. The camp's atmosphere indicated that villagers behave not by their free will but under PKK's pressure. "The UN oversees this (Atrush) camp. Insiders and recent visitors say the PKK run everything else. It is cover for their operations... refugees, many of whom want to go back to Turkey, are intimidated by the PKK to stay and add numbers to their political and military power base against Turkey. The dilemma then, who is a refugee, who are terrorists...", see Channel 4 News, Channel 4 TV, 23 March 1995. That dilemma caused United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to close the camp on 21 January 1997. "The PKK leaves its bloody mark of destruction and massacre on Kurdish villages where peasants refuse to cooperate...", see Christian Kreil, Oberösterreichische Nachrichten, 1 August 1995.

49 "...so long as Turkey's handling of ethnic minorities and human rights continues to draw criticism, the new Kurdish militancy is bound to thrive, and its sense of mission will harden.", see Munir Morad, "Irak ve Türkiye'de Kürtlerin Durumu: Mevcut Etilimler ve Umutlar" [The Situation of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey: Current Trends and Prospects] in Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araştırma [The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview], p. 124.50 For Turkey's commitment to democracy, see Dr. Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is The Only Muslim Democracy, Middle East Quarterly (March 1994).

51 Mango, Türkiye'nin... [Turkey:...], p. 66. In the 24-30 March 1996 issue of the pro-PKK Kurdish newspaper, "Azadiya Welat" it was said: "In Turkey, first "Welat", then "Welate Me" was published. Now "Azadiya Welat" is being published. It is quite positive that [Kurdish] newspapers are published. But from the aspects of grammar and linguistics they are not successful and the unity is not formed. This adverse situation turns Kurds off in reading Kurdish."

52 Gunter, The Kurds..., pp. 44-45.

53 In the words of Mahmut Kılınç, a member of PKK controlled "Kurdistan Parliament in Exile", "...it is not a problem [for Kurds] for a long time in Turkey to publish a magazine or newspaper". Thus, he pointed out the reduced limits on the freedom of press in Turkey on MED TV, the propaganda channel of the PKK on the date of 19 January 1996. In the December 1995/January-February 1996 edition of Military Review, the official publication of US Armed Forces, General Stephen H. Button reports that using, playing music and writing in Kurdish are free, as quoted in "No End Is Near In The PKK Problem", Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1996.

54 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 214.

55 Fiahin Alpay, "Kürt Kimliğini Tanıyoruz" [We Recognize Kurdish Identity], Milliyet, 2 November 1995.

56 "Kurdish Question in the View of Ferafettin Elçi, the President of the Democratic Mass Party: 'I Am Optimistic for the Future'", Milliyet, 10 January 1997.

57 After becoming President, Süleyman Demirel, in his statements, referred to "constitutional citizenship". See Fiahin Alpay, "Kürt Kimliğini Tanıyoruz" [We Recognize Kurdish Identity], Milliyet, 2 November 1995.

58 Özbudun, "Constitutional Law" in Introduction to Turkish Law, p. 43.

59 Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., p. 22.

60 "Naif Günefl from DEP said: 'We are all adherent to the PKK'.", *Hürriyet*, 17 April 1995. "Former head of DEP, Yaflar Kaya said: 'Kurdistan Parliament in Exile is not a body standing in the shadow of the PKK. Because functionally we have the typical characteristics of the PKK'", *Türkiye*, 10 September 1995.

61 As quoted from the decision by the 9th Penal Chamber of the Court of Cassation in *Yeni Sayfa*, 25 November 1995.

62 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 207.

63 "Apo [the nickname for 'Abdullah'] on Live Broadcast", *Hürriyet*, 22 April 1995; "Apo said: 'My Grandma was Turkish.'", *Hürriyet*, 21 April 1995; "File of MED TV from Çiller to Major", *Hürriyet*, 22 November 1995. "In each programme there are always the words of 'Kurdistan' and the leader of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan". See Yalçın Dofian, "British Support to PKK's TV", *Milliyet*, 24 August 1995. "Participating in a programme with a phone call on MED TV which broadcasts from London, the leader of terrorist organization PKK, Abdullah Öcalan declared its unilateral cease-fire. Apo threatened to turn Turkey into the hell if his cease-fire call would not receive a positive response.", *Hürriyet*, 15 December 1995.

64 "Did You SeeÖ?", Chris Kutschera Reports on the Phenomenon of Kurdish Television", *The Middle East*, (September 1996), p. 42.

65 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 207.

66 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 223.

67 Vincent Porter, "Broadcasting Pluralism and the Freedom of Expression in France, Germany and Ireland" in *National Identity and Europe: The Television Revolution* ed. by Philip Drummond, Richard Paterson and Janet Willis (British Film Institute Publishing, 1993), p. 68.

68 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 209.

69 Shane Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, Number 3 (July-September 1995), p. 215.

71 Dr. Andrew Rathmell, "The Struggle for Control of Gulf Oil", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7 Number 8 (August 1995), p. 356.

70 Hikmet Ulufibay, «mparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik [Petro-politics From the Period of Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey] (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Yayınları, 1995), p. 217. For the inclusion of Kurds in Iraq against their will with the imposition by British colonialism because of the importance to the British of oil in Iraq's Kirkuk region, see the footnote in Fuller, "The Fate...", p. 112.

72 Rathmell, "The Struggle...", p. 357.

73 Gunter, *The Kurds...*, pp.110-111.

74 Mustafa Balbay, "Shell-Güneydoğu-Hollanda-Fransa" [The Shell Company-The Southeast-The Netherlands-France], *Cumhuriyet*, 7 December 1995.

75 A. D. Orlov, "Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Yayılımı ve Rusya'nın Güvenliği" [Geopolitical Expansion of Turkey and Russia's Security], *Avrasya Dosyası*, Volume 3 Number 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 93-98.

76 Turan Yavuz, *ABD'nin Kürt Kartı* [Kurdish Card of the USA] (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993), pp. 49-78; Izady, *The Kurds*, p. 68; Fuller, "The Fate...", p. 108.

77 Fuller, "The Fate...", p. 112.

78 Rouleau, "The Challenges...", p. 115.

79 James Wyllie, "Turkish Objectives in Northern Iraq", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7 No. 7 (July 1995), p. 308.

80 Ofra Bengio, "The Challenge to Territorial Integrity of Iraq", *Survival* (Summer 1995), p. 84.

81 "Bomb School: International Terrorist Training Camps", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (March 1997), p. 136. The US Department of State's annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* for 1996 reports that the terrorist PKK continues to use northern Iraq as a safehaven and base for attacks on Turkey.

82 Hikmet Çetin (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs), "The Firm Anchor-Turkish Foreign Policy In Troubled Seas", *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Volume 38 No:4/1993 Special Issue, p. 25.

83 Barkey, "Turkey's...", p. 64.

84 Rouleau, "The Challenges...", p. 124.

85 "Unionist" means to be inspired by the policies of the party of "Union and Progress" whose stay of power coincided with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and which pursued nationalistic policy rather than Ottomanism.

86 Hamit Bozarslan, "Çafidafı Türkiye'de Kürt Sorununun Siyasal Yönleri" [Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey] in *Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araftırma* [The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview], p. 118.

87 Mark Muller, "Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation during the 1990s" in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s* edited by Robert Olson (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 176.

88 Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 12.

89 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 22; Mango, *Türkiye'nin... [Turkey:...]*, p. 58.

90 As quoted from the indictment by the Military Prosecution under Martial Law in 1971 which contained the charges of violating Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code in *Türk Ziya Ekinci, Devlet ve Ben [State and I]* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995), p. 107.

91 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 24.

92 Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 127.

93 Rouleau, "The Challenges...", p. 111 and p. 123.

94 Mango, *Türkiye'nin... [Turkey:...]*, p. 68.

95 For instance, People's Democracy Party (HADEP) which replaced the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) was legally founded and it currently operates. Former secretary general of DEP who was brought to preside HADEP expressed that he found most of the views of DEP correct. See Özgür Ülke, 12 May 1994.

96 Former members of the Parliament from the banned DEP were elected from the center-left party in 1991 general elections.

97 Possibly criminal and unconstitutional acts in the Parliament by the former MPs from the banned pro-Kurdish Democracy Party, whose immunity was rescinded by the Parliament and who were tried and convicted, are found within the scope of

their freedom of speech by the Court of Cassation thus those acts were not considered in their case.

98 Bedri Baykam, "Etnik Ayrımçılık Irkçılık" [Ethnic Discrimination Is Racism], *Aydınlık*, 9 December 1995.

99 Erciyes University, *PKK Reality*, pp. 16-25.

100 "It is possible to solve the problem through the participation of the people in the region without giving concession in principles. For the Southeast, we will put into effect the similar of the general project. Improvements in the cultural aspect should first be endorsed by the State. If it endorses [the improvements], it will be their protector." "Leader of Motherland Party (ANAP), Yılmaz disclosed his projects for the aftermath of December 24 general elections: "Unarmed Solution to the Southeast.", *Milliyet*, 7 December 1995. "In the declaration of the Republican People's Party (CHP) the problem in the Southeast has been pointed out in three different sections under the titles as follows: i. CHP will facilitate a democratic solution for the ethnical sensitivities and CHP will solve the Kurdish problem, ii. CHP will carry Turkey toward calmness and internal peace, iii. CHP will tackle the economic imbalance between the regions". "Different Solutions by the Parties to the Kurdish Problem", *Siyah-Beyaz*, 13 December 1995.

101 *Hürriyet*, 19 October 1995.

102 Candidates from the pro-Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP) participated in 1991 general elections from the lists of the center-left party in Southeast Turkey and they could gain only 18% of the votes in the region. See Ankara Journalist Association, *PKK Reality in Turkey and in the World* (Ankara: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1994), p. 15. In the general elections of December 24, 1995 pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in alliance with extreme leftist parties could gain 4% of the votes in whole Turkey and 18% in the Southeast. See Andrew Finkel, *ATV* as quoted in Taha Akyol, "Sandıkta Çıkan Mesaj-3" [Message Given by The Voters-3], *Milliyet*, 29 December 1995. For the figures based on the percentage of the

spoiled and invalid votes related to the instructions by the PKK in 1994 and 1989 local elections which prove that the PKK, the most notable symbol of separatism in Turkey, does not represent Kurds in the Southeast, see Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 27.

103 If a state converts into the federation with multi-legal system with regard to the races and faiths, that will create "Balkanization" and "Lebanonization". See Taha Akyol, "Lewis ve Üniter Devlet" [Lewis and the Unitary State], Milliyet, 8 January 1996. Social and historical conditions and sub-divisions with the experience of self-rule are necessary for the survival of federalism but not found in Turkey. See Çifidem Nas, "Türkiye için Federalizm Geçerli Bir Çözüm Mü?" [Is Federalism A Valid Proposal For Turkey?], Yeni Yüzyıl, 6 March 1996.

104 Mango, Türkiye'nin... [Turkey:...], p. 55.

105 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 28.

106 As quoted from İller İtibariyle Çeşitli Göstergeler [Various Indications with Regard to the Provinces], a publication by State Planning Organization in Ali Rıza Kardüz, "Devlet Doğu'dan 1 Alıyor, 3 Veriyor " [State Gives 3 to the East and Takes 1], Sabah, 23 July 1993.

107 Kardüz, "State Gives...", Sabah, 23 July 1993.

108 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 28. The General Directorate Of Press And Information Of The Turkish Republic, GAP-Southeast Anatolia Project, Introduction.

114 Erciyes University, PKK Reality, pp. 58-67; Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Separatist Terror..., p. 5; Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 85; Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 19.

115 PKK, 5. Kongre Kararları [5th Congress Resolutions] (Köln: Weftanen Serxwebun, 1995), p. 230 and p. 251.

116 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], p. 248.

117 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 23.

118 PKK Kuruluş Bildirisi [PKK Foundation Declaration], p. 22. Gunter finds interesting that in a program of the PKK in 1977 the small Kurdish area in the Soviet Union was not mentioned. See Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 59.

119 Yeni Sayfa, 18 July 1995.

120 Al-Hayat, 19 October 1995.

121 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 23.

122 Yeni Sayfa, 18 July 1995.

123 Erciyes University, *PKK Reality*, p. 15.

124 Erciyes University, *PKK Reality*, p. 3.

125 Erciyes University, *PKK Reality*, p. 17.

126 Erciyes University, *PKK Reality*, p. 20. A similar announcement was made in a press conference by a member of Central Committee of the PKK in Beirut/Lebanon on June 1, 1997. See "The PKK Warned in Severe Terms Israel and the USA Which Gave Support to the Invasion of Southern Kurdistan [by Turkey]: You Would Also Be Hit!", *Özgür Politika*, 4 June 1997.

127 Ron Purver, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism", *Conflict Studies*, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, No. 295 (December 1996/January 1997), p. 14.

128 Beatrice Fournier-Mickiewicz, Jean-Claude Salomon, Xavier Raufer, and Jean-Luc Vannier, *Deux "guérillas dégénérées" exemplaires: Tigres de la Liberation de l'Eelam Tamil et le Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan* (Paris: Numero Special Des Notes Etudes de l'Institut de Criminologie, October 1995), p. 60.

129 The statement by Öcalan, MED TV, 15 October 1995.

130 For the figures and samples of the brutalities by PKK, see Ankara Journalist Association, *PKK Reality...*, pp. 38-40; Turkish Democracy Foundation, *Human Rights...*, pp. 9-12. Politicians who are critical of Turkey might witness the PKK terror at first hand: "The village men carried out the dead bodies wrapped in blankets. They unrolled them gently for us to see. One child had an arm crooked, as though trying to protect her face. There was blood everywhere. The oldest must have been about 17, the youngest about seven. The whole family had been asleep in the village of Gürümlü when terrorists smashed a window and lobbed in a hand grenade. The three girls were killed instantly, the baby's cradle was destroyed. Outside all was apparently normal: a cockerel perched on a dung heap and hens pecked away in the sun. But the whole village, high in the ragged mountains on the Turkish side of the border, was in a state of shock. It was, the inhabitants said, the second attack by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) on the village in a few days...", Ann Clwyd (British MP), *The Times*, 4 April 1995.

131 Dr. David L. Arnett (Press and Cultural Affairs official of the US Embassy), "The Statement by the US Embassy to Ankara", Akflam, 22 November 1995. "Human Rights Watch Group which has its center in the USA states that the PKK uses every method to obtain arms including drug trafficking and extortion", Akflam, 22 November 1995. According to the US State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*, the PKK is a Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and throughout Europe.

132 According to Eduard Vermander, Head of the Berlin State Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the banned Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) is the

most dangerous group [among foreigners] and this communist cadre organization is responsible for criminal acts of the most serious kind. See Berliner Morgenpost, 2/3 October 1995.

133 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 27; Michael Gunter, "The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey", Conflict Studies, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, No. 270 (May 1994), p. 21.

134 «smet «mset, PKK: Ayr›l›kç› fiiddetin 20 Y›l› (1973-1992) [The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence (1973-1992)] (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Yay›nlar›, 1992), pp. 207-217; Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 63; Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Separatist Terror..., p. 8; Erciyes University, PKK Reality, pp. 50-57; Mickiewicz, Salomon, Raufer, Vannier, Deux "guérillas dégénérées"..., pp. 41-49; Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 29.

135 According to the Director of International Relations of the Swedish Police, Olander, PKK legally robs Swedish state through social aids. See Yeni Yüzy›l, 12 November 1995.

136 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 29.

137 Mickiewicz, Salomon, Raufer, Vannier, Deux "guérillas dégénérées"..., p. 42.

138 «mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 211.

139 "Security Forces Continue to Battle PKK Drug Smuggling", Turkish Daily News, 24 May 1997.

140 «mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], pp. 215-217.

141 Reuters, 21 May 1997.

142 As quoted from the German magazine, "Der Spiegel" in Hürriyet, 21 February 1995.

143 Yeni Yüzyıl, 12 November 1995.

144 *Özset, PKK:...*[The PKK:...], p. 209.

145 "PKK's Central Bank", Hürriyet, 27 September 1995.

146 Metin Dalman and *Özmail Tabak*, Avrupa'da İnsan Ticareti ve PKK [Human Smuggling in Europe and the PKK] (*İstanbul: DTPA Türk-Alman Basın Ajansı*, 1995), p. 41.

147 Dalman and Tabak, Avrupa'da İnsan... [Human Smuggling...], pp. 54-55.

148 Dalman and Tabak, Avrupa'da İnsan... [Human Smuggling...], p. 160.

149 *Özset, PKK:...*[The PKK:...], p. 217.

150 As quoted from the statement by the chief of the Main Department of Anti-terrorism of Prosecution, Patrick Lalande in Yeni Yüzyıl, 12 November 1995.

151 Özbek, "Güneydoğu Anadolu..." [Southeastern Anatolia's...], p. 14.

152 "One More Report on the Kurdish Issue", Evrensel, 25 December 1995.

153 *Özset, PKK:...*[The PKK:...], p. 131.

154 *Pazar*, Uluslararası Hukuk... [Lectures on...], pp. 23-24.

155 The Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., pp. 9-12.

- 156 Mickiewicz, Salomon, Raufer, Vannier, Deux "guérillas dégénérées"..., p. 60.
- 157 Among those who had to move to safer areas because of terrorist pressure were the local Syriac Christians. See The Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., p. 20.
- 158 "Unilateral Ceasefire by Apo ", Hürriyet, 15 December 1995.
- 159 "Öcalan threatens to turn Turkey into a hell unless Turkey observes his ceasefire call", "Unilateral Ceasefire by Apo ", Hürriyet, 15 December 1995.
- 160 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], p. 30.
- 161 Erciyes University, PKK Reality, pp. 57-58.
- 162 As quoted from the statement dated 29 May 1990 by Abdullah Öcalan in Ahmet Aydın, Kürtler, PKK ve A.Öcalan [Kurds, the PKK and A. Öcalan], (Ankara: KAYAP Yayınları, 1992), p. 183.
- 163 *Çikibine Dofiru*, 15 October 1989.
- 164 Erciyes University, PKK Reality, p. 16.
- 165 The Turkish Democracy Foundation, Human Rights..., pp. 11-12.
- 166 Erciyes University, PKK Reality, p. 47; Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 28; Ankara Journalist Association, PKK Reality ..., p. 26; Foundation For Middle East And Balkan Studies, Separatist Terror..., p. 8.
- 167 "The Teachers Massacred, The Schools Burned Down and The PKK Reality", a brochure by National Education Foundation.

168 As for PKK's terrorist campaign against tourism, Öcalan did not refrain from making the following threat: "Unless Germany lifts the ban on the PKK, the dead bodies of German tourists may return to Germany [from Turkey]", MED TV, 28 January 1996.

169 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], p. 248.

174 Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk... [Lectures on...], pp. 19-20.

175 A PIAR-Gallup poll in 1992 found out that 29% of Southeastern Turkey's population and 28% of the people nationwide agreed that the PKK represented the Kurds of Turkey. In a book of interviews (Rafet Ballı, Kürt Dosyası [The Kurdish Dossier] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1992)) none of the 23 Kurdish intellectuals and leaders endorsed PKK's representation, however. In 1989 local elections mayoral candidates who were known to be pro-PKK could have attracted 7% of the total votes. In 1994 local elections, only 10% of the votes were spoiled in spite of the orders from the PKK to boycott the elections or cast invalid votes. See Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 25.

176 Jane Connors, "İnsani Hukuk Düzeni ve Kürt Sorunu" [Humanitarian Legal Order and the Kurdish Question] in Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araştırma [The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview], p. 97.

177 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], pp. 132-135.

178 USIA Wireless File, 12 April 1995.

179 Reuter, 2 July 1995.

180 Arab News, 14 April 1995.

181 Azadi, 5-11 March 1995.

182 PKK, 5. Kongre... [5th Congress...], pp. 228-230.

183 Gunter, The Kurds..., p. 62.

184 MED TV , 8 November 1995.

185 Yeni fihak, 3 September 1995.

186 Reuters, 21 May 1995.

187 Selim Çürükkaya, Apo'nun Ayetleri [Verses of Apo] (Switzerland: July 14 Publications), pp. 211-214.

188 In an article at the pro-PKK newspaper, "Özgür Politika" (Free Politics), fierafettin Elçi was introduced as a traitor. See M. Sait Aziz, "KDP'nin ihanetine Sessiz Kalmak" [Staying Silent on the Betrayal of the KDP], Özgür Politika, 2 June 1997. The attacks against Democratic Mass Party (DKP) are not only verbal. On May 25, 1997 a party meeting of the DKP in Stockholm, Sweden was stormed by the PKK militants and this incident was denounced in a declaration of the DKP on 10 June 1997.

189 "Syria owes its determinant position to Talabani as much as the PKK". "PKK's Intention Is To Sabotage Peace", Yeni Yüzyıl, 4 December 1995. "Foreign relations representative of the KDP, Hoshyar Zebari said: "[PKK] has been misled by Syrian Intelligence", Yeni Yüzyıl, 5 December 1995.

190 Prime Minister Tansu Çiller told the Turkish parliament on April 25, 1995 that Turkish Forces would intervene again and again if required. See Wyllie, "Turkish Objectives...", p. 307.

191 Evrensel, 20 September 1995.

192 The statement by KDP member, Necirvan Barzani, Sabah, 8 September 1995.

193 *meset*, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 89.

194 Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 126.

195 <mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 228.

196 Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 99; <mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 14; Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 32; Wyllie, "Damascus-...", p. 350.

197 <mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 227.

198 Most of the PKK congresses and conferences were held in Syrian controlled Lebanese territories. See Gunter, *The Kurds...*, p. 99.

199 <mset, PKK:...[The PKK:...], p. 228.

200 *Milliyet*, 2 December 1994.

201 Foreign Report, 16 November 1995.

202 Wyllie, "Damascus-...", p. 350.

203 "Hezbollah Kills 6 Israeli Troops", *International Herald Tribune*, 16 October 1995.

204 "Lebanon Arrests Japan Terrorist in the Bekaa", *International Herald Tribune*, 19 February 1997.

205 "Bomb School, International Terrorist Training Camps", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (March 1997), p. 135.

206 Criss, "The Nature of...", p. 32.

207 Wyllie, "Damascus-...", p. 351.

208 Turkish Democracy Foundation, *The Terrorist Base in Europe: Greece* (Ankara: Turkish Democracy Foundation, 1995), p. 20.

209 As quoted from Greek newspaper *Eleftherotipia*, 10 April 1997 in Anatolian Agency, 16 April 1997.

210 Turkish Democracy Foundation, *The Terrorist...*, pp. 24-26.

211 Cem Baflar, *Terör Dosyası ve Yunanistan II* [Terror Dossier and Greece II] (Nicosia: International Affairs Agency, 1995), p. 48.

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