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Atatürk** (1919-1938)

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
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
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
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**BİLÂL N. ŞİMŞİR**



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## Ö N S Ö Z

İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk dizisinin ilk cildi, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ellinci yıldönümünde yayınlanmış ve Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının Nisan 1919 — Mart 1920 dönemiyle ilgili belgeleri içine almıştı. Yani, Atatürk'ün Samsun'a çıkışı arifesinden başlayıp başkent İstanbul'un İtilâf Devletlerince resmen işgaline kadar gelmişti.

Dizinin bu ikinci cildi, İstanbul'un işgalinden sonraki dokuz aylık dönemi kapsamaktadır. 1 Nisan 1920'den 31 Aralık 1920'ye kadar gelmektedir. Bu kısa dönemde önemli gelişmeler vardır.

İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikası bakımından 1920 yılı, "Sèvres yılı" demektir. Kitabın kapsadığı dokuz aylık dönemin ortasında, 10 Ağustos 1920 günü, Sèvres barış andlaşması İstanbul Hükûmetine imzalatılmıştır. Olaylar, Sèvres mihveri etrafında dönmektedir. Dokuz ayın yarısı barış andlaşmasını Türklere imzalatma uğrunda askeri-siyasi tedbirlerle, ikinci yarısı da andlaşmayı onaylatıp yürürlüğe koyma çabalarıyla geçmektedir.

Türkiye bakımından ise 1920 yılı, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın "Devlet kurucusu" olarak ortaya çıktığı yıldır. Bu yıl içindedir ki, yeni Türkiye Devleti tarih sahnesine çıkmıştır. Ulusal Kongreler döneminden Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi dönemine geçilmiştir. Müdafaa-i Hukuk örgütü Heyet-i Temsiliyesinin yerini, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükûmeti almıştır. Kuva-i Milliye, düzenli orduya dönüşmeğe doğru gitmiştir. Yasama, yürütme, yargı güçleriyle tam bir Devlet, Anadolu'da otoritesini kurmuş, dış ilişkilerini geliştirmeye koyulmuştur. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükûmeti, Türkiye'nin tek meşru hükûmeti olduğunu, ülkenin kaderini eline aldığı dünyaya ilân etmiştir. Ve bu yeni Hükûmet, bütün gücüyle Sèvres andlaşmasının karşısına dikilmiştir.

Kitabın kapsadığı dönemin üçte ikisinde, İstanbul Hükûmetinin başında Damat Ferit Paşa vardır. Aslında "iki değirmen taşı arasında" sıkışıp kalmış, otoritesi İstanbul belediye sınırlarına kadar daralmış olmakla birlikte İstanbul Hükûmeti, Halife-Padişahın manevi nüfuzundan yararlanıyor, bu nüfuzu Anadolu'daki yeni Türk Hükûmetine karşı kullanıyordu. Damat Ferit Paşa Hükûmeti, İngilizlerle fiilî bir koalisyon halinde, Anadolu'ya karşı yürüttüğü savaş bu dönemde zenit noktasına çıkarmıştır.

İngiltere, her ne pahasına olursa olsun Sèvres andlaşmasını Türklere empoze etmek kararındaydı. Bu andlaşmayla, dört yıllık kanlı savaşla kazandığı büyük zaferin meyvelerini toplayacaktı. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun paylaşılması süreci bu andlaşmayla taçlandırılacak ve paylaşmadan aslan payını İngilizler alacaktı. Ayrıca, Sèvres andlaşması, muzaffer Avrupa'nın ortak "iradesi" sayılıyor ve İngiltere, Avrupa'nın iradesine karşı baş kaldırmayacağını bütün doğu halklarına ispatlamak zorunluluğunu duyuyordu. Yoksa, Türklerin baş kaldırmaları, boyunduruk altındaki uluslar için "kötü" bir örnek olacak, uzun sürede İngiliz sömürge imparatorluğunu da sarsacak diye ciddi kaygular duyuluyordu. Böyle "kötü" bir çığır açılmasını önlemek, İngiliz İmparatorluğu çıkarları açısından da önem taşıyordu. Bu bakımlardan İngiltere, Sèvres andlaşmasını Türklere empoze etmek için çetin bir savaş vermek zorunda görünüyordu.

Buna karşılık Ankara Hükûmeti, Sèvres andlaşmasını Türk ulusunun "idam fermanı" olarak görüyordu. Buna boyun eğmek, Türklerin, bağımsız bir ulus olarak tarih sahnesinden silinmesi demek olacaktı. Gerçi bu andlaşmayla, İngiliz uydusu bir Hind mihracası gibi, Halife-Padişah tahtında kalıyor, kendisine Anadolu'da bir parça "Mülk" de bırakılıyordu. Ama, bunun, hayatiyeti olan gerçek bağımsız bir Devletle pek ilgisi yoktu. Sèvres andlaşmasının iktisadî, malî ve askeri hükümleri bu küçük "Türkiye"yi kısıvrak bağlayıp uydulaştırıyordu. Açıkçası, dokuz yüzyıllık Türk yurdu da elden gidiyor, Anadolu yağma ediliyordu. Türkiye zararına genişletilen ya da yeni türetilen Devletlere serpilme olanakları hazırlanırken, Türk unsurunun yabancılar içinde dağıtılıp köleleştirilmesi tazgâhlanmıştı. Kısacası, Sèvres andlaşmasına karşı direnmek, Türk ulusu için bir ölüm-kalım dâvası demekti. Türk'ün ölüm-kalım dâvasıyla İngiliz'in önemli çıkarları, Sèvres noktasında düğümleniyordu. Bu düğümü kesip atmak uğrunda iki taraf da sonuna kadar direnmeye kararlıydı. 1920 yılındaki boğuşmanın başlıca kaynağı budur.

Sèvres andlaşmasına karşı Türk direnişini kırmak, Türkiye'yi bu andlaşmayı imzalamaya zorlamak yolundaki tedbirler zincirinin bir halkası olarak, 16 Mart 1920'de başkent İstanbul işgal edilmiştir. İşgalle birlikte Mustafa Kemal'e karşı yürütülmekte olan savaş yoğunlaştırılmıştır. Önce, işgal gününden başlanarak, İstanbul'daki "tehlikeli milliyetçiler", yani Kemalistler yakalamp Malta'ya sürülmüşlerdir. Sürgünler arasında ulusal direniş hareketinin ileri gelenleri, Heyet-i Temsiliye üyesi mebuslar da vardı. Bu bakımdan sürgün politikası, geçici de olsa, ulusal harekete bir darbe olmuştur.

İşgalciler, ikinci adım olarak, Padişah Hükûmetinin manevi nüfuzunu Anadolu'ya karşı kullanmak istemişlerdir. Salih Paşa Hükûmetine ağır baskılar yapmışlardır. Ulusal hareketin ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile arkadaş-

larının İstanbul Hükümetince açıkça ve resmen suçlanmasını istemişlerdir. Yirmi beş günlük iktidarı sırasında başkentin işgaline tanık olan Salih Paşa, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile arkadaşlarını "ası" ilân etmeye yanaşmamış, ulusal hareketin İzmir'in işgali üzerine doğduğunu söylemiştir. Yüksek Komiserler baskılarını sürdürmüşlerdir. (Bkz. Belge No. 2'nin ekleri.) Salih Paşa, ancak iki hafta bu baskılara göğüs gerebildikten sonra, 2 Nisanda istifa etmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Üç gün sonra Damat Ferit Paşa, "Anadolu ayaklanmasını bastırmak" göreviyle Sadrazamlığa getirilmiştir. Bundan sonraki altı ay boyunca Ferit Paşa Hükümeti ile İngilizler, elele, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı amansız bir savaş yürütmüşlerdir. İlk iş olarak, Ahmet Anzavur çetesi ulusal kuvvetlerin üzerine yeniden saldırtılmıştır. Resmen "Paşalık" ünvanı verilerek ayaklanması meşrulaştırılan Anzavur'un ilk günlerdeki "başarıları", İngilizleri epeyce umutlandırmıştır. Ama bu umutlar çabuk sönmüştür. 20 Nisanda İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, "Anzavur hareketinin çöktüğünü" Londra'ya tellerken, General Milne'nin silâh ve cephanelerinin Anzavur'a zamanında yetiştirilememiş olmasına hayıflanır. (Belge No. 16).

Ferit Paşa Hükümetiyle İngilizlerin ortaklaşa körükledikleri Düzce-Bolu ayaklanması gibi, öteki iç ayaklanmalar da söndürülmüştür. Padişah Hükümetinin çıkarttığı "Kemalistlere idam" fetvaları, mahkeme kararları ve bildirilerin, İngiliz uçaklarının yardımıyla Anadolu'ya dağıtılması da pek etkili olmamıştır. Ulusal hareket dağıtılamamış, tersine günden güne güçlenmiştir. İngilizler, Sèvres andlaşmasını Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın ezilmesi gerektiğini, ancak buna Padişah Hükümetinin gücünün yetmeyeceğini anlamışlardır. Anzavur ayaklanmasının bastırıldığı gün, İtilâf Devletleri Spa konferansında Anadolu'yu baştan başa işgal etmek sorununu görüşmüşlerdir. Bu iş için 27 tümen (405.000) asker gerektiğini hesaplamışlardır. Ama bu kadar kuvvet bulunamayacağı kararına varmışlar ve işgale kalkışamamışlardır. (Belge No. 18).

Mustafa Kemal Paşa ise, İstanbul'un işgalini ve Anadolu'ya karşı yoğunlaştırılan savaşı, ulusal hareketi daha da güçlendirmek için ustaca kullanmasını bilmıştır. Malta'ya sürülen mebuslardan kat kat fazlasını Ankara'ya çekmiştir. 23 Nisanda Büyük Millet Meclisini açmıştır. 30 Nisanda, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin yurdun kaderini eline aldığı, tutsak durumda olan İstanbul Hükümetinin kararlarının artık hiçbir hukuksal değeri olmayacağını, yalnız Büyük Millet Meclisi temsilcilerinin ulus adına yükümlülük altına girebileceklerini Lord Curzon'a bildirmiştir. (Belge No. 23).

Büyük Millet Meclisinin açılmasından sonra da Damat Ferit Paşa, halâ Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile yakın arkadaşlarının yakalanıp Malta'ya sürülmelerini İngilizlerden istemiştir. Ama İngilizler bu isteği artık "saçma" bulmağa başlamışlardır. Anadolu'ya ellerinin erişemeyeceği bir yana,

Kemalist hareket artık kişileri aşmış, ulusa mal olmuştur. Kişileri tutuklamakla hareketin çökertilemeyeceğini İngilizler açıkça kavramışlardır. (Belge No. 28'in ekleri) ̈

Padişah Hükûmeti, silâhla yıkamadığı Kemalist hareketi, öglüte çökertme yollarını da denemiştir. Zeki Paşa aracılığıyla Mustafa Kemal'e çağrıda bulunmuştur. "Vatanın âli menfaatleri" için, Büyük Millet Meclisini, Ankara Hükûmetini dağıtmasını; bütün askerî birlikleri merkezi Hükûmete teslim etmesini Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan istemiştir. (Belge No. 42). Bu gibi öğütlerden ya da tehditlerden de bir sonuç çıkmamıştır. Haziran ortalarında, İstanbul'daki İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Komiserleri, kaygularını Hükûmetlerine bildirmişlerdir. Sèvres andlaşmasını Türklere kabul ettirebilmek için ya silâh kullanmak, ya da andlaşmayı değiştirmek gerektiğini söylemişlerdir. (Belge No. 45).

İtilâf Devletleri kodamanları, andlaşmayı değiştirmeyi değil, silâh kullanmayı yeğ tutmuşlardır. Bu kez Yunan ordularını sahneye çıkarmışlardır. 21 Haziran günü Boulogne Konferansında, Yunan ordularının Mustafa Kemal'in üzerine saldırılması kararlaştırılmıştır. (Belge No. 52). Ertesi gün Yunan orduları, Milne hattından genel saldırıya geçmişlerdir. Marmara kıyısından İngilizlerin silâhlı desteğiyle gelişen Yunan saldırısı, 8 Temmuzda Bursa'nın da işgaliyle sonuçlanmıştır. İtilâf Devletleri, Sèvres andlaşmasını Türkiye'ye empoze edebilmek için, bu andlaşmayı bile aşarak Batı Anadolu'yu da Yunanistan'a peşkeş çekebileceklerini göstermişlerdir. Ferit Paşa ise Yunan saldırısının yarım kalmış, Kemalistlerin tam ezilememiş olmasına üzülmüştür. Yunan kuvvetlerinin Ankara'ya, Sivas'a ve hattâ Erzurum'a kadar yürüebileceklerini, bunun Yunanlılar için bir "askerî gezinti" olacağını söylemiştir. Kemalistlerin ezilmesiyle Sèvres andlaşmasının yumuşatılacağı hayaline kapılmıştır. (Belge No. 76).

Batı Anadolu'dan sonra ikinci darbe Trakya'da vurulmuştur. Yine Sèvres andlaşmasının imzalanması arifesinde, Yunan orduları Doğu Trakya'yı da işgal etmişlerdir. Burada, Yunanlılara işgal ortamının hazırlanmasında, Trakya'daki direniş azminin önceden kırılmasında Damat Ferit Paşa Hükûmetinin menfur bir rolü olmuştur. Casfer Tayyar Bey'in kararsız ve kaypak tutumunun da etkisiyle, Doğu Trakya, direniş gösterilmeden Yunan işgaline bırakılmıştır.

Doğu Trakya'da Yunan saldırısının üçüncü günü, 22 Temmuzda, İstanbul'da Padişahın da katılımıyla toplanan Saltanat Şurası, Sèvres andlaşmasını kabul etmeye karar vermiştir. Andlaşma, tam bir diktaydı. Müzâkere edilerek kaleme alınmamış, İtilâf Devletlerince hazırlanıp Türkiye'ye empoze edilmiştir. Yumuşatılması yolunda Padişahın İngiliz Kralına çağrısı (Belge No. 36'nın dipnotları), Sadrazamın yalvarmaları boşa gitmiştir. Andlaşma, galiplerin hazırladığı biçimde, 10 Ağustosta

Sèvres'de İstanbul Hükümetince imzalanmıştır. İngilizler, batı cephesindeki savaşın ilk ravundunu böylece kazanmış görünürler.

Ancak, Batı Anadolu'da Yunan orduları "Kemalistleri ezmek" hedefine ulaşamamışlardı. Güney cephesinde Kemalistler başarılar kazanmışlar, Fransızları durdurup püskürtmüşlerdi. Doğu cephesinde ise başarıya doğru gidiyorlardı. İstanbul'un işgal edildiği sırada Sovyetler Azerbaycan'a girmişlerdir. Sèvres andlaşmasının imzalandığı gün ise Sovyet orduları Ermenistan'a gelip Anadolu'ya bir adım daha yaklaşmışlardır. Ankara Hükümeti ile Sovyetler arasında bağlantılar kurulmuştur. Yardım yolu açılmıştır. İngilizler, "de facto düşmanımız" dedikleri Bolşeviklerle Kemalistler arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişmesini kaygıyla izlemişlerdir. İzlemekten öteye fazla bir şey de yapamamışlardır. Kafkaslardan bir cephe açmayı göze alamamışlardır. Tersine, darda kalınca Batum'u boşaltmışlar, yıllardır kışkırttıkları Ermenileri bile yüzüstü bırakmışlardır. Kemalist-Bolşevik ilişkileri gittikçe gelişmiştir. Sovyetlerden Anadolu'ya para ve silâh yardımları gelmeğe başlamıştır. . .

Sèvres andlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonra Mustafa Kemal'e boyun eğdirmek için yeni yeni projeler hazırlanmıştır. Bu projelerden iddialı birini yine Damat Ferit Paşa ile İngilizler düşünmüşlerdir. Buna göre: 40.000 kişilik bir Padişah ordusu kurulacak, İngilizlerce silâhlandırılıp donatılacak, yabancı subaylarca eğitilecek, yine yabancı subayların kontrolünde İngiliz gemileriyle Anadolu kıyılarına çıkartılacak ve Kemalistlerin üzerine saldırtılacaktı. Türk'ü Türk'e kırdırtmak amacı güden bu projeyi İngilizler ilke olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Ama, kurulacak ordunun Mustafa Kemal'e karşı çarpışıp çarpışmayacağından emin olamamışlardır. Yabancı subayların kontrolü altında olsa bile, Padişah ordusunun Mustafa Kemal'in tarafına geçebileceğini düşünmüşler, böyle bir tehlikeyi göze alamamışlardır. Proje suya düşmüştür. (Belge No. 119'a ek, 133'ün ekleri.)

Bir başka proje, Yunan Başbakanı Veniselos tarafından İngiliz Başbakanı Lloyd George'a sunulmuştur. Veniselos, İstanbul Hükümetinin Mustafa Kemal hareketini bastıramayacağını, Tülat Devletlerinin ise harekete geçmediklerini söyleyerek, bu işin Yunanistan'a bırakılmasını istemiştir. İngilizlerin de desteğiyle Yunan ordularının Mustafa Kemal hareketini bastırmaya yeteceğini öne sürmüştür. Yunan Başbakanı, yapacağı bu hizmetlere karşılık Pontus Rum Devletinin ve ayrıca Boğazlar bölgesinde ayrı bir (Rum) Devletin kurulmasını istemiştir. Proje, İngiliz Bakanlar kurulunda görüşülmüştür. Fransa ve İtalya'nın buna yanaşmayacakları düşünülmüş, kesin bir karar verilememiştir. Bu projeden de bir sonuç çıkmamıştır. (Belge No. 129, 134).

Bu arada, Ankara ile Londra'yı birbirine yaklaştırmak için nabız yoklamaları da yapılmıştır. Bu yoklamalardan biri, Sèvres andlaşmasının im-

zalandığı sıralarda görülmüştür. François Stern adlı, Romen asıllı eski bir İngiliz ajanı, İsviçre'deki İngiliz Elçisiyle görüştüktan sonra, Londra'ya gitmiş, İngiliz yetkilileriyle görüşmüş ve güya Mustafa Kemal adına, İngiltereye gizli müzâkerelere girişme teklifinde bulunmuştur. Elinde herhangi bir yetki belgesi bulunmayan Stern pek ciddiye alınmamış, İngilizler, Mustafa Kemal ile gizli müzâkerelere yanaşmamışlardır. (Belge No. 94, 97, 107).

Daha ciddi bir nabız yoklaması, Dimitri Achkof adlı eski bir Bulgar mebusu aracılığıyla yapılmıştır. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'yı ta Sofya'daki ataşemiliterlik günlerinden tanıdığı ve Paşanın talimatıyla hareket ettiği sanılan Achkof, İngiltere'nin Sofya Elçiliğiyle görüşmeler yapmış, Mustafa Kemal adına anlaşma esasları sunmuş, Ankara ile Londra'nın arasını bulmağa çalışmıştır. İngilizler, bu girişimin ciddiliğinden kuşku duymamışlardır, ama Ankara ile müzâkereyi reddetmişlerdir. (Belge No. 177, 181, 186 ve ekleri, 193'ün ekleri.)

İtilâf Devletleri, son olarak Mustafa Kemal'e bir heyet göndermeğe karar vermişlerdir. Adeta tek çare gibi, bu projeye dört elle sarılmışlardır. Bu konuda uzun uzun kafa yormuşlardır. Hesaplarına göre, gidecek "uzlaştırma heyeti", Anadolu'yu Padişah tarafına çekecek, "ılımlı" milliyetçileri Mustafa Kemal'den ayıracaktı. Böylece Anadolu'nun direnme gücü gevşetildikten sonra, gerekirse, arkasından silâhlı harekâta da geçilerek Kemalist hareket bastırılacaktı. İtilâf Devletleri, önce kendi aralarında, sonra İstanbul Hükûmetiyle bu konuda aylarca yazışma, konuşma yapmışlardır. Damat Ferit Paşa, gönderilecek heyetin silâhlı harekâtle desteklenmesini savunmuştur. Padişah, heyetin Kemalistlerle müzâkereye girişmemesini istemiştir. Fransa, heyet gönderilmeden önce Damat Ferit Paşa Hükûmetinin değiştirilmesini gerekli görmüştür. İngiltere ise önce Sèvres andlaşmasının Padişah tarafından onaylanmasını, arkasından heyetin Anadolu'ya yollanmasını istemiştir... Yazışmalar uzayıp gitmiştir. (Belge No. 113, 114/1. 120, 123, 125 vs...).

Bu yazışmalar yapılırken, Damat Eerit Paşa, 16 Ekim günü istifa etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Bir daha geri dönmek üzere Türk siyaset sahnesinden silinip gitmiştir. Damat Ferit Paşa'nın kesin olarak devrilmesi, Padişah Hükûmetinin Kemalist hareketi bastırma politikasının iflâsı olmuştur. Sultan Vahdettin ile Damat Ferit Paşa, artık Mustafa Kemal'i ezmekten ziyade kendi canlarını kurtarma kaygusuna kapılmışlar, İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine başvurmuşlardır. İngilizler, bu sadık adamlarının can güvenliğini sağlayacaklarını, gerektiğinde kendilerini yurt dışına kaçırabileceklerini vadedmişlerdir. (Belge No. 126, 128, 130).

Son baharda Türk orduları Ermenistan'a karşı zafer kazanmışlardır. Böylece Sèvres andlaşmasının doğu Anadolu'ya ilişkin yapıkları fiilen



yırtılıp atılmıştır. Yıl sonuna doğru genel konjonktür, bir kat daha İngilizlerin aleyhine dönmüştür. Yunanistan'da Veniselos iktidardan düşmüştür. Bolşevikler, Beyaz Ruslara karşı zafer kazanmışlardır. 21 Aralıkta Lord Curzon, Sèvres andlaşmasını onaylatmak için yeni girişimler yapılmamasını İstanbul Yüksek Komiserliğine bildirmiştir. (Belge No. 208'e not). Artık pek az başarı şansı olmakla beraber, aylardan beri sözü edilen "uzlaştırma heyeti", İzzet Paşa başkanlığında Anadolu'ya yollanmıştır. Bir zamanlar Yemen'deki ayaklanmayı yatıştırmış olan İzzet Paşa'nın Mustafa Kemal'i de yatıştırıp yatıştırmayacağı İngilizlerce merakla beklenmiştir. Heyetten uzunca bir zaman ses sada çıkmamıştır. Dağın bir fare doğurması gibi, İzzet Paşa heyeti tam bir fiyasko olmuştur. Yıl sonunda İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri, genel durumun "pek karanlık" olduğunu Londra'ya rapor etmiştir. (Belge No. 218). İstanbul'un işgali üzerine Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya çok kaygulu günler yaşatılmıştı. Dokuz ay sonra, kaygulanma sırası İngilizlere gelmiştir. . . .

Bu cilt, yukarda kısaca değinilen gelişmelerden başka, daha birçok önemli konuda orijinal İngiliz belgelerini kapsamaktadır. Çoğu diplomatik nitelikteki belgeler arasında, bol sayıda İngiliz istihbarat raporları da bulunmaktadır. 1920 yılında İngiliz gizli haber alma örgütünün Türkiye'de oldukça yoğun çalışmış olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu bakımdan ilk kez yayınlanan İngiliz istihbarat raporları ayrıntılı bilgilerle doludur.

Bu belgeler dizisinin, Atatürk tarihi araştırmalarına yararlı olması içten dileğimizdir.

\* \* \*

*İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* dizisi, gerek yurt içinde, gerek yurt dışında ilgiyle karşılandı. Birinci cilt, kısa zamanda başlıca dünya kitaplıklarına, kataloglarına girdi. Herde, Atatürk ve yeni Türkiye tarihi üzerinde çalışacak yabancı araştırmacıların, bu türkçe-ingilizce kitaptan da yararlanacakları umulur. Yurt içinde daha şimdiden kitabın kaynak olarak kullanıldığı görülüyor. Sayın Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Millî Kurtuluş Tarihi* adlı değerli eserini yazarken, kitabın birinci cildinden de geniş ölçüde yararlanmıştı. Belge dizileri yayınlamanın başlıca amacı zaten araştırmacılara kaynak hazırlamak değil midir?

Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı tarihinin tanınmış uzmanı Sayın Prof. Dr. Gotthard Jaeschke, "şimdiye kadar bizim çözemediğimiz bazı sorunları aydınlatıyorsunuz" demek alçak gönüllüğünü göstererek, çalışmamı takdir etti. Chicago üniversitesinden Sayın Prof. Dr. Fahir İz, uzun ve içten bir mektupla, "yıllar geçtikçe katkılarınızın önemi daha çok sayıda aydınlarca anlaşılacaktır" diyerek çalışma şevkimi arttırdı. Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı Sayın Ord. Prof. Enver Ziya Karal'ın içten desteğini her zaman

arkamda hissettim. Sayın Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Sayın Prof. Dr. Afet İnan, Türk Tarih Kurumu Genel Müdürü Sayın Uluğ İğdemir anlayışlı teşviklerini sürdürdüler. Kurumun memurlarıyla basımevi teknisyenleri bana sabırla ve güler yüzle katlandılar. Eskiden kendisiyle aynı kürsüde, bir arada çalıştığım İstanbul milletvekili Sayın Prof. Dr. Halük Ülman, bilimsel çalışmalarımı sürdürmemi teşvik ve takdir etti. Cumhuriyet gazetesi Başyazarı Sayın Nadir Nadi, takdir ve tebriklerini bildirmek lütfunda bulundu. Aynı gazetenin eski yazarlarından Sayın Mehmet Barlas, sütununda kitabı tanıttı. Dışişleri topluluğunda büyüklerim ve arkadaşlarım yakın ilgilerini esirgemediler. Uzakta olanlar mektuplar göndermek inceliğini gösterdiler. Özellikle Viyana Büyükelçimiz Sayın Daniş Tunalıgil'in, Madrid Büyükelçimiz Sayın Zeki Kunalp'ın, Bangkok Büyükelçimiz Sayın Turgut İlkan'ın, eski Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Feridun Cemal Erkin'in ve her zamanki gibi Adis-Ababa Büyükelçimiz Sayın Celâl İ. Çalışlar ile Sofya Büyükelçimiz Sayın Nihat Dinç'in içten mektupları benim için birer teşvik kaynağı oldu. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Genel Sekreteri Sayın Büyükelçi Şükrü Elekdağ, Personel ve İdare Genel Müdürü Sayın Büyükelçi Mehmet Baydur, Milletlerarası Güvenlik İşleri Genel Müdürü Sayın Büyükelçi Arcüment Yavuzalp, Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürü Sayın Büyükelçi Hamit Batu nazik teşviklerini benden esirgemenler arasındadırlar. Bu satırların provaları yapıldığı bir sırada, 25 Haziran 1975 günü, sayın Prof. Dr. Perihan Çambel'in *Bugün* Gazetesinde Kitap hakkında övücü bir tanıtma yazısı çıktı. Sayın Profesör, "Türkiye'nin oluşmasını öğrenmek isteyen bütün Atatürkçü vatandaşlara bu İngiliz belgelerinden Mustafa Kemal'in kişiliğini iyice tanımalarını salık veririm. Bunlardan daha mükemmel, daha aydınlatıcı ve Atatürk ve devrimleri düşmanlarını susturucu dokümanlar olamaz" demektedir. Hepsine ayrı ayrı içten teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

Ankara, 1 Temmuz 1975

BİLAL N. ŞİMŞİR

## BELGELERDE VE DİPNOTLARDA GEÇEN KISALTMALAR

- A.C. : Army Corps (Kolordu)  
A.D.C. : Aide-de-camp (Yâver)  
B.M.I. : British Military Intelligence (İngiliz Askerî İstihbaratı)  
C.G.S. : Chief of the General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanı)  
C.I.G.S. : Chief of the Imperial General Staff (İmparatorluk Genelkurmay Başkanı / İngiltere Genelkurmay Başkanı).  
C.-in-C. : Commander-in-Chief (Başkomandan)  
C.P.O. : Chief Political Officer (Şef Siyasi Subay)  
C.U.P. : Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Komitesi)  
D.B.F.P. : *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 First series...* (İngiliz Dış Politikası Üzerine Belgeler, 1919-1939, Birinci seri...)  
D.M.I. : Director of Military Intelligence (İngiliz Askerî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı Müdürü)  
D.N.I. : Director of Naval Intelligence (İngiliz Bahriye İstihbarat Teşkilâtı Müdürü)  
E.... : *Eastern* (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı *Doğu İşleri* Dairesinin arşiv rumuzu.) (E) den sonra gelen rakamlar belgenin arşiv kayıt numarası).  
e. g. : Lâtince *exempli gratia*'nın kısaltılmışı (Örneğin), Lâtince *ejusdem generis*'in kısaltılmışı (Benzer, Gibi).  
F.O. : *Foreign Office Archives* (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri)  
—/371 : İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *General Correspondance* (Genel Yazışmalar) serisi. (371) rakamından sonra gelen ilk rakam grubu (529 gibi) seri içindeki cilt numarasıdır. Ondan sonraki rakam grubu ise belgenin arşiv kayıt numarasıdır.  
—/406 : İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin *Confidential Print* (Gizli Yayınlar) serisi. (406) rakamından sonra gelen ilk rakam (44 gibi), seri içindeki cilt numarasıdır. Ondan sonraki rakamlar, cildin sayfa ve belge numaralarına karşılıktır.

- G.H.Q. : General Headquarters (Genel Karargâh)  
 G.O.C. : General Officer Commanding (Ordu Kumandanı).  
 H.C. : High Commission / High Commissioner (Yüksek Komiserlik, Yüksek Komiser)  
 H.M. : His Majesty (Zatı Şahane, Haşmetlü)  
 H.I.M. : His Imperial Majesty (Zatı Şahane, Haşmetlü)  
*i. e.* : Lâtince *id est*'in kısaltılmışı (Yâni, şöyle ki, demek ki)  
 inst. : instant (bu ay, içinde bulunulan ay)  
 L. of N. : League of Nations (Milletler Cemiyeti)  
 L.T. : Local Time (Yerel saat)  
       Livre Turque (Türk Lirası)  
 M.I. : Military Intelligence (Askerî İstihbarat)  
 O.C. : Officer Commanding (Kumandan Subay)  
 R.N. : Royal Navy (İngiliz Krallık Donanması)  
 R.N.V.R. : Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (Krallık Donanması Gönüllü İhtiyat Subayı).  
 S. }  
 Sd. } : Signed (İmza)  
 Sgd. }  
 (sic) : Aslında olduğu gibi (yanlış).  
 U. and P. : Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki)  
*viz.* : Lâtince *videlicet* sözcüğünün kısaltılmışı (şöyle ki)  
 Vol. : Volume (cilt)  
 W.O. : War Office (İngiltere Harbiye Bakanlığı)

## **BELGELERİN LİSTESİ VE ÖZETLERİ**



No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
	<b>1920</b>		
1	1 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANINI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 455/M/2279 GİZLİ. .... 3 Haftalık istihbarat raporları özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	3
Ek.	25 mart	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞLİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 18-25 MART 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN RAPORLARIN HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ ..... 3 1. İstanbul Hükümeti, Hükümet ve Mustafa Kemal, Mebusan Meclisi, milliyetçilerin tutuklanmalarının etkileri, Mustafa Kemal Paşa, milliyetçi propaganda, Kilikya'da milliyetçi kuvvetler ve Anadolu'da milliyetçi aleyhtarı hareket konularında haberler ve yorumlar. 2. Salih Paşa kabinesinin istifa etmesi ve yerine tekrar Ferid Paşa kabinesinin gelmesi ihtimali. Hükümetin M. Kemal'e bir heyet göndermeyi Padişaha teklif ettiği, teklifin Felâh-ı Vatan partisine desteklendiği. Meclisin 17 Mart tarihinde yaptığı kapalı toplantıda İstanbul'un işgalinin ve Rauf Bey, Kara Vasıf Bey ve diğer mebusların tevkiflerinin şiddetle protesto edildiği. İstanbul'da milliyetçi liderlerin tevkiflerinin Padişahı rahatlatığı. Meclis Başkanı Celâlettin Arif'in Anadolu'ya geçmesinin ise üzüntü yarattığı. İstanbul'un işgalinin M. Kemal'e anında tellenmesi üzerine, M. Kemal'in genelgeler yayınladığı. İstanbul'un işgali üzerine milliyetçilerin propagandası. Milli kuvvetlere asker toplanmasına karşı Şebn-Karahisar'da ve Amasya'da direnmeler olduğu, fakat hemen bastırıldığı.	3
2	3 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 463. Türk Hükümetince milli hareket liderlerinin reddilmesi konusundaki yazışmalarla ilgili belgelerin ilişikte sunulduğu.	7
Ek. 1	26 mart	İSTANBUL'da İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN OSMANLI SADRAZA-	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		MINA VERİLEN VE MUSTAFA KEMAL VE ARKADAŞLARININ İSTANBUL HÜKÜMETİNCE RED VE İNKÂR EDİLMESİNİ İSTEYEN NOTA ÖRNEĞİ. (Bkz. Cilt I, No. 159'a ek.) . . . . .	8
Ek. 2	28 mart	OSMANLI SADRAZAMINDAN İSTANBUL'da İTİLAFA DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNE CEVABI NOTA. . . . . 1. İtilâf devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerinin istekleri uyarınca Osmanlı Hükümetinin yayınlamayı düşündüğü bildirinin Fransızca çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğu. 2. Türkçe aslı Amiral Webb'e sunulmuş bulunan bu bildiri tasarisının Yüksek Komiserlerce uygun bulunacağı umulduğu.	9
Ek. 3	28 mart	İSTANBUL HÜKÜMETİNCE YAYINLANMASI DÜŞÜNÜLEN BİLDİRİ TASLAĞI. (ÇEVİRİ). 1. İstanbul'un işgali üzerine çıkan mübalâğalı söylentiler sonucu, taşradaki milli teşkilâtların bazı aşırı hareketlere giriştiklerinin öğrenildiği. 2. İzmir vilayetindeki acıklı olaylar sonucunda doğan bu teşkilâtların kuruluşu ve yönetimi ile İstanbul Hükümetinin ilişkisi bulunmadığı. 3. Meşru hakları savunmak için doğmuş olmalarına rağmen bu teşkilatların şiddet hareketlerinin devlete zarar verdiği. 4. Hiçbir resmi sıfatı bulunmayan M. Kemal Paşa ile diğer bazı milliyetçi yöneticilerin Hükümetçe tasvip edilmedikleri.	9
Ek. 4	28 mart	İSTANBUL HÜKÜMETİNCE YAYINLANMASI DÜŞÜNÜLEN BİLDİRİ TASLAĞI. (ÇEVİRİ). (Yukarıdaki metnin İngilizce çevirisi). . . . .	10
Ek. 5	29 mart	İSTANBUL'da İTİLAFA DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN OSMANLI SADRAZAMINA. ORTAK NOTA. . . . . 1. 28 Mart tarihli Osmanlı notasının ve ekinin alındığı. 2. Yayınlaması tasarlanan bildiri metninin, M. Kemal ve milli hareket liderlerinin tasvip edildikleri şeklinde yorumlanabileceği. 3. Bu bakımdan Yüksek Komiserlerin ancak M. Kemal ve milli hareket liderlerinin tasvip edilmediklerini	11



<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
Ek. 6	—	<p>açıkça belirten ve halkın bundan böyle yalnız meşru Hükümetin emirlerine uymasını isteyen bir bildiri metnini kabul edebilecekleri.</p> <p>İTİLAĞ DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNE SUNULAN VE OSMANLI HÜKÜMETİNCE YAYINLANMASI TASARLANAN BİLDİRİNİN DEĞİŞTİRİLMİŞ METNİ. (ÇEVİRİ). .... 11</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. İstanbul'un işgali üzerine çıkan mübalâğalı söylentiler sonucu, taşradaki milli teşkilatların bazı aşırı hareketlerde bulduklarının öğrenildiği.</li> <li>2. İzmir vilayetindeki acıklı olaylar sonunda ve aslında müslüman halkın meşru haklarını savunmak için kurulan bu milli teşkilatların kuruluşu ve yönetimi ile Hükümeti Şahancenin ilişkisi bulunmadığı.</li> <li>3. Aşırı hareketlere girişmiş olan M. Kemal'in hiçbir resmi sıfatı ve Hükümette yeri bulunmadığının ve Hükümetin niyetlerine aykırı hareket ettiğinin ilân olunduğu.</li> <li>4. Halkın yalnız meşru otoritenin emirlerine uyması gerektiği.</li> </ol>	
Ek. 7	—	<p>OSMANLI HÜKÜMETİNCE YAYINLANMASI TASARLANAN BİLDİRİNİN BİR KERRE DAHA DEĞİŞTİRİLMİŞ METNİ. .... 12</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mübalâğalı söylentiler sonucu milli teşkilatların yeniden bazı aşırı hareketlere giriştiklerinin öğrenildiği.</li> <li>2. Bu teşkilatların kuruluşu ve yönetimi ile Hükümetin ilişkisi bulunmadığı.</li> <li>3. M. Kemal Paşa ve teşkilât liderlerinin hiçbir resmi sıfatı ve Hükümette yeri bulunmadığının ve bunların Hükümetin niyetlerine aykırı hareket ettiklerinin ilân olunduğu.</li> <li>4. Halkın yalnız meşru otoritenin emirlerine itaat etmesi ve asayişi bozacak hareketlerden kaçınması gerektiği.</li> </ol>	
Ek. 8	1 nisan	<p>OSMANLI SADRAZAMI H. SALİH PAŞADAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. NOTA. .... 12</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. İtilâf devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerinin 29 mart tarihli ortak notasına karşılık olarak, milli teşkilatlar konusunda yayınlanması tasarlanan bildiri projesinin Yüksek Komisere sunulmuş olduğu.</li> </ol>	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Proje metni. (Bkz. Ek. 6)	
		3. 31 mart günü Yüksek Komiserliklerin müsteşarlarınca bu projenin değiştirilmesinin istendiği.	
		4. Değiştirilmiş proje metni. (Bkz. Ek. 7)	
		5. Bu son projenin, milli teşkilatların bütün mensuplarının Hükümetçe âsi sayıldığı intibamı verebileceği; halbuki bu kimselerin hepsinin âsi sayılmıyacağı.	
		6. Büyük devletlerin kararlarına karşı gelmenin faydasızlığına inanan Hükümetin, milli teşkilat mensuplarını toptan âsi ilân etmenin de sükûn getirmeyeceği kanısında bulunduğu.	
		7. Yayınlanması halinde vahim sonuçlar doğabileceğinden Hükümetin bu bildiri projesini şimdiki haliyle basında yayımlatamayacağı.	
3	4 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 473/S. 2907. .... 16	
		M. Kemal'in Osmanlı Bankası Balıkesir şubesine kendisinden müsaade alınmadan hiçbir yere para göndermemesi yolundaki emriyle ilgili olarak İtilaf devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerince Babıâli'ye verilen ortak nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	27 mart	İSTANBUL'da FRANSIZ, İNGİLİZ VE İTALYAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN BABIALI'ye. ORTAK NOTA. .... 16	
		1. M. Kemal Paşa'dan aldıkları emre dayanarak, Balıkesir Mutasarrıfı ile muhasebecisinin oradaki Osmanlı Bankası şubesinden kasa mevcudunun kendilerine gösterilmesini ve kendilerinin müsaadesi olmadan hiçbir yere para gönderilmemesini istedikleri.	
		2. Bu gayri meşru müdahaleye karşı Osmanlı Bankası Müdürlüğünce yapılan protestonun Yüksek Komiserce de desteklendiği.	
4	5 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 340. 17	
		1. Ferit Paşa'nın 5 Nisan günü yeni kabineyi kurduğu.	
		2. Kendisini Sadrazamlığa atayan fermanda, milli hareketin açıkça isyan olarak suçlandığı ve bu hare-	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
5	7 nisan	ketin liderlerine karşı müeyyideler uygulanmasının istendiği. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. RAPOR. No. 482. ....	17
		1. Türkiye ile yapılacak barış konusunda hazırlanan bir muhtıra metninin ilişikte sunulduğu. Muhtıraya şahsen aşağıdaki görüşleri eklemek arzusunda bulunduğu: 2. İstanbul'un işgalinin milliyetçilerin direnme azmini arttırdığı görüşüne katılamayacağı, tersine, işgalin M. Kemal'e karşı olan gruplara cesaret verdiği. 3. Erzurum, Van ve Bitlis'in Ermenistan'a verilmesinin felâket olacağı görüşünü de paylaşamayacağı. 4. Ermenistan ve Kürdistan için tavsiye edilen Avrupa gözetimi ve Osmanlı vesayeti altında bir idare şeklinin pratik bir çözüm yolu olabileceği.	
Ek.	20 mart	İNGİLTERE AKDENİZ KUVVETLERİ İSTANBUL MERKEZİ SİYASİ SUBAYI YARBAY LUKE TARAFINDAN TÜRKİYE İLE YAPILACAK BARIŞ KONUSUNDA HAZIRLANAN MUHTIRA. (GİZLİ) .....	18
		1. Yüksek Barış konseyince hazırlanmakta olan barış şartlarından bazılarının, kuvvet kullanmadan Türklerle empoze edilemeyeceği, İstanbul'un işgalinin de milliyetçilerin direnme azmini arttırmış olduğu... 2. Edirne, Aydın ve Erzurum vilayetlerini Türkiye'den koparmanın kuvvet kullanmayı gerektireceği, fakat kuvvetle İstanbul Hükümetine şartlar empoze edilebilse bile bunların Anadolu'da M. Kemal'i, Trakya'da Cafer Tayyar'ı bağlamayacağı ve Türk çoğunluğu toptan yok edilmedikçe veya sürülmedikçe Trakya'da, Aydın'da ve Ermenistan'da temelli barış ve sükunun sağlanamayacağı. 3. Trakya ve İzmir'i Yunanistan'a bırakmanın, <i>self-determination</i> ilkesine aykırı düşeceği, buraları idare edebilmesi için İngiltere'nin Yunanistan'a yardım etmesi gerekeceği, buralara sürekli nifak tohumları ekilmesi demek olacağı ve böylesine kusurlu bir politikanın İngiltere'nin menfaatine uygun olmayacağı.	

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		4. Bilgisiz ve hissi basınla İngiliz kamu oyunun halen saptırılmış bulunduğu, "Türkleri Avrupa'dan atmalı" gibi çılgınlıkların kolayca sarfedildiği, aslında ise, Türkleri Bebek'ten atıp Kandilli'de bırakmanın manâsız olacağı gibi, uzun vadede İngiltere için Türklerin düşmanlığının, Yunanlıların düşmanlığından daha tehlikeli olacağı, bu düşmanlıktan kaçınmak gerektiği.	
		5. M. Kemal'in açıklamalarına bakılırsa, Trakya'nın, İzmir'in ve Erzurum şehrinin kaybına Türklerin razı olmayacakları.	
		6. Bağımsızlığa yetenekleri şüpheli ve üstelik Halifeye bağlı olan kürtlerin Osmanlı vesayetinde bırakılmasının uygun olacağı.	
		7. Doğuda ayrı Ermenistan kurulunca bunun, Doğu Rumeli'nin Bulgaristan'a katılması gibi, Rusya Ermenistan'ına katılabileceği. Ermenilerin Osmanlı vesayetinde bırakılabilecekleri.	
		8. Yunanistan'a ise Onikiada ile Türk çoğunluğunun yaşadığı Batı Trakya'yı vermenin kâfi geleceği.	
		9. Böyle bir barışın Türk milliyetçi ve ittihatçı teşkilâtlerinin hikmeti vücudunu ortadan kaldıracığı, fakat yine direnmek isteyen aşırıları olursa bunlara karşı Padişah'ın etrafında bir blok kurulabileceği.	
6	7 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATININ 63. SAYILI HAFTALIK RAPORU EKİ: MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞADAN SADRAZAM VEKİLİ SALİH PAŞAYA. TARİHSİZ TEL. ....	24
		Salih Paşa'nın istifasından sonra Damat Ferit Paşa'nın tekrar Sadrazamlığa gelmesinin memleket için çok tehlikeli olacağı, Anadolu'nun İstanbul'dan kopmasına sebebiyet vereceği, gayri meşru sayılan Ferit Paşa kabinesinin yapacağı barış andlaşmasının millet çoğunluğunca kabul edilmeyeceği.	
7	7	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞADAN BÜTÜN KAYMAKAMLARA TEL. ÇOK GİZLİ. ....	25
		Meclis Başkanının protestosunun iletildiği. 6 Nisan 1920- Osmanlı Meclisi Başkanı Celâlettin Arif Bey'den, İstanbul'da İngiliz, Fransız, İtalyan ve Amerikan Yüksek Komiserlerine, Hollanda ve İsveç Elçilerine mektup.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		İstanbul'un işgalini, Osmanlı Parlamentosuna karşı girişilen saldırıyı şiddetle protesto. Anadolu ve Rumeli müslüman halkının da bu protestoya katıldıkları.	
8	8 nisan	SADRAZAM FERİT PAŞA İLE İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK ARASINDAKİ GÖRÜŞMEYE DAİR MUHTIRA. ....	26
		1. Sadrazam Ferit Paşanın 8 Nisan günü İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine geldiği ve milli hareketi bastırmak programıyla başa geçtiğini belirterek, bu hareket liderlerine karşı Padişah'ın manevi nüfuzundan başka silâh kullanmak kararını açıkladığı.	
		2. Ferit Paşanın Bandırma bölgesinde Anzavur'dan başka İzmit, Bolu, Trabzon, Kayseri ve Harput taraflarında da bazı kişilerin milliyetçilere karşı sevkedilebileceğini söylediği.	
		3. Hükümetin Anzavur'u Paşalığa yükselttiği ve bunun adamlarına depolardaki üniformaları dağıtmayı arzuladığı.	
		4. Ferit Paşanın Anzavur kuvvetleri için İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinden silâh istediği ve Amiralin bu konuyu General Milne ile görüşeceğini söylediği.	
		5. İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin Anadolu'dan toplayabileceği haberleri Ferit Paşa'ya da iletmeyi vadedtiği.	
		6. Ferit Paşa'nın milliyetçiler aleyhinde yayınlanacak ferman ile fetvaları eldeki iki uçakla Anadolu'ya dağıttırmak için Amiral de Robeck'ten yardım istediği ve Amiralin bu uçakların durumunu incelettireceği.	
		7. Bu fermanları Hindistan'a da yollamayı arzu eden Ferit Paşa'ya bu konunun Londra'ya danışılacağını söylendiği.	
		8. Ferit Paşa'nın Anadolu'ya gizli ajanlar göndermesine İngiliz Yüksek Komiserinin yardım vadedtiği.	
		9. "Ayyıldız Cemiyeti" üyelerine karşı ortaklaşa tedbirler almak amacıyla Ferit Paşa'nın bu kimselerin adlarını gizlice İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine bildireceği.	
		10. Ferit Paşa'nın tamamiyle İngilizlere uygun bir yol izleyeceği.	

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		<p>11. Sadrazam'ın Meclisi feshetmekten bu kez söz açmadığı.</p> <p>12. Ferit Paşa'nın çok gizli olarak, Padişahın çevresinden bazı kişilerin uzaklaştırılmaları gerektiğinden de bahsettiği; bunun çok ileri gitmek olacağına kendisine söylendiği.</p> <p>13. Bazı İngilizlerin Türkiye aleyhindeki tutumlarının yumuşatmak için Amiral de Robeck'in Aubrey Herbert'e telgraf çekmesi yolunda Ferit Paşa'nın ricasının kabul edilmediği.</p>	
9	11 nisan	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 372. 29</p> <p>1. Ferit Paşa'nın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret edip milli hareketi bastırma konusunu görüştüğü ve hareketin direnen liderlerine karşı kuvvet kullanmak gerektiğini söylediği.</p> <p>2. Bandırma'yı zapteden Anzavur'un, Hükümetin elinde ilk silâh olduğu; Gemlik ve İzmit taraflarında da milliyetçi aleyhtarı hareket tohumları bulunduğu.</p> <p>3. Bunları milliyetçilere karşı teşkilâtlandırıp kullanmak için Ferit Paşa'nın İngilizlerden yardım istediği; İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin milliyetçilere karşı kuvvetlerin silâhlendirilmelerine müsaade edeceği ve başkaca yardımların sonradan geleceği; milliyetçileri bastırması için İtilâf devletlerinin Hükümeti tamamen destekleyecekleri.</p> <p>4. General Milne'nin de bu görüşe katıldığı.</p> <p>5. Gemlik bölgesindeki milliyetçilere karşı kuvvetleri Anzavur'la birleştirip Marmara sahiline hakim olacağı, sonra İzmit'le Karadeniz arasındaki yarımada'nın ele geçirileceği, milliyetçilerin Anadolu içine ve Karadeniz kıyılarına itileceği. Böylece sıkıştırılan milli kuvvetlere en sonra İngilizlerin denizden hükmedebilecekleri.</p>	
10	12 nisan	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 520/M/2279. 31</p> <p>İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin eklice sunulduğu.</p>	

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Ek.	31 mart	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 24-31 MART 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	31
		1. Salih Paşa kabinesinin istifa edip tekrar Damat Ferit Paşa'nın kabineyi kuracağı haberinin yalanlandığı. Hükümet üyelerinin tevkif edilme korkuları. Kabinenin toplantısı, Mustafa Kemal'den gelen mektubun görüşülmesi.	
		2. Hükümetin Anadolu'dan tam haber alamaması. İstanbul'daki milliyetçilerin Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile haberleşmeleri.	
		3. Ferit Paşa ile Hürriyet ve İtilâf Partisi üyeleri arasında ayrılıklar belirdiği.	
		4. Padişahın bir hükümet darbesinden korktuğu, Sarayda bazı tedbirler alındığı, Türklerin İstanbul'dan çıkarılmaları halinde Saray mensuplarının nereye gidecekleri konusunun görüşüldüğü ve velihtin Konya'ya gidilmesini telkin ettiği.	
		5. Milliyetçilerin kısmi seferberlik ilân ettikleri, M. Kemal'in bu konuda açıklama yaptığı, milliyetçilerin bazı güçlüklerle karşılaştıkları.	
		6. Trakya'da Cafer Tayyar Beyin başarılı olamadığı.	
		7. Biga'dan İstanbul'a giden bir heyetin, milliyetçilerden şikâyet ettiği.	
11	14 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 531/M/2279 GİZLİ. ....	35
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu	
Ek.	10 nisan	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 1-8 NİSAN 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. ....	35
		1. Yeni Ferit Paşa kabinesi,	
		2. Anzavur ayaklanması,	
		3. Mustafa Kemal'in görüşleri,	
		4. Milliyetçilerin Heyeti Temsiliyesi,	
		5. Batı Avrupa'da Türk milliyetçi liderler,	

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		6. Mustafa Kemal'e bir parlamenter heyeti gönderilmesi, 7. Fransızlar ve Türk milliyetçileri, 8. Milliyetçi haber ajansı, 9. Trakya ve Cafer Tayyar Bey, 10. Türk milliyetçilerinin Hint müslümanları ve Mısır ile ilişkileri konularında haberler ve yorumlar.	
12	13-15 nisan	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN BÜTÜN MÜDA-FAYI HUKUK KOMİTELERİNE GENELGE. GİZLİ. ....	42
		Ferit Paşa kabinesinin bir Fetvai Şerif yayımlatarak Anadolu müslüman halkını Halife'ye karşı ayaklanmış gibi gösterdiği. Halife'nin İngilizler elinde esir olduğu gözönünde tutularak, halkımızın yayımlanan Fetva'ya önem vermemesi gerektiği.	
13	15 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 390. ....	42
		1. Osmanlı Hükümetinin 10 Nisan günü milliyetçileri suçlayan bir bildiri yayınladığı, aynı şekilde milliyetçileri suçlayan fetvalar çıkarıldığı. 2. Metinleri kurye ile gönderilecek bu belgelerin etkilerinin büyük olabileceği. 3. Meclisin 12 Nisan'da olaysız feshedildiği, yeni seçimler vadedildiği. 4. Anzavur'un ilerlediği. 5. Milliyetçilerden ise iyi haber alınamadığı.	
14	17 nisan	İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. ....	43
		1. Türk milliyetçilerine karşı kullanılacak kuvvetlerin Türk askeri malzemeleri ile donatılması ve bazı nizami kuvvetlerin seferber edilmesi görüşünün İngiliz savunma Bakanlığınca desteklendiği. 2. Fakat Türk milliyetçilerine karşı kuvvet kullanılırken, kontrolü daha kolay olan nizami kuvvetlerin, başıbozuklara tercih edilmesinin uygun olacağı.	



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15	20 nisan	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. TEL. No. 355.	44
		1. Milliyetçilere karşı kuvvet kullanmasında Türk Hükümetinin desteklenmesi teklifinin uygun olduğu. 2. Ancak, Savunma Bakanlığının, nizami Türk kuvvetlerin kullanılmasını tercih ettiği. 3. Damat Ferit Paşa'ya yumuşak bir barış yapılacağı ümidi verilmemesi gerektiği.	
16	20 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 420.	44
		1. Milliyetçilere karşı Anzavur harekâtının çöktüğü, milliyetçilerin Bandırma'yı yeniden zaptettikleri. 2. Milliyetçilerin 16 Nisanda Kirmastı'da Anzavur'a hücum ettikleri, 19 Nisanda Bandırma'ya girdikleri. 3. Anzavur'un Biga ve Çanakkale tarafına kaçtığı, bir süre kendisini toparlayamayacağı. 4. General Milne'nin müsaadesiyle Sadrazam'ın Anzavur'a göndermeye hazırlandığı silâh ve cephanelerin zamanında kendisine yetiştirilemediği.	
17	20 nisan	(SABAH) — İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ SAN REMO KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK (KISMEN). ...	45
		Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyinin Ermenilerle ilgili 11 Nisan 1920 tarihli muhtırasının görüşülmesi. 1. Muhtıra hakkında bilgi veren Lord Curzon'un, Milletler Cemiyeti veya Amerika'nın Ermenistan mandasını üzerine almadıklarını, belki Norveç'in bu görevi yüklenebileceğini belirterek Ermenilere yardım yapılmasını telkin ettiği. 2. M. Millerand'ın, Ermenilere Fransa tarafından yardım vadedilemeyeceğini belirttiği. 3. Signor Nitti'nin, M. Kemal'in karargâhı olan Erzurum'u da içine alacak büyük bir Ermenistan'ın kurulmasının güç olduğunu, İtalya'nın askeri yardım yapamayacağını, Norveç'in de buna gücü yetmeyeceğini söylediği. 4. Lloyd George ile Lord Curzon'un Ermenilere silâh yardımı yapılması ve Ermeni askerlerinin eğitilmesi konusunda ısrar ettikleri.	

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18	20 nisan	5. Bu konunun İtilâf Devletleri askeri danışmanlarınca incelenmesine ve Milletler Cemiyetine verilecek cevabın Lord Curzon tarafından kaleme alınmasına karar verildiği,  (ÖĞLEDEN SONRA) — SAN REMO KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KATİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. ....	50
		Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşması konusu. 1. Askeri uzmanların, Türkiye'ye barışı kabul ettirebilmek ve Türkleri silâhsızlandırabilmek için en az 27 tümen (405.000 kişilik) askere ihtiyaç gösterdikleri. Venizelos'un, 14 tümeni Yunanistan'ın sağlayabileceğini söylediği. Signor Nitti'nin, M. Kemal önderliğindeki Türk direnişinin uzun ve çetin olacağını, Erzurum'a kadar Türkiye'nin işgali için çok büyük kuvvete ihtiyaç bulunduğunu belirttiği. Bu konunun görüşüldüğü. İtilâf devletlerinin 27 tümen toplayamayacakları. 2. Doğu Anadolu'nun işgali yerine Ermeni ordusunu silâhlandırıp yetiştirme fikrinin ortaya atıldığı, Ermenilerin bu bölgede Kemalistlere karşı başarı kazanabileceklerinin tahmin edildiği. Ayrıca Lloyd George'un teklifi üzerine, Ermenilere yardım etmesi için Amerika'ya çağrıda bulunulmasına karar verildiği. 3. Venizelos'un, barış andlaşmasının Boğazlar konusundaki hükümleriyle Yunanistan'a Trakya ve Marmara'dan asker geçirme hakkının tanınıp tanınmayacağını sorduğu. Sorunun, yazılı olarak Boğazlar komisyonuna sorulmasına karar verildiği. 4. Venizelos'un fikrinde, barış andlaşmasının ön gördüğü, Yunanistan'dan göçedecek Türklerin mallarının Hükümetçe satın alınmasına Yunanistan'ın gücünün yetmeyeceği. Bu konunun da azınlıklar komisyonunca görüşülmesine karar verildiği.	
19	21 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 563/S. 2907. .... M. Kemal'in Düyunu Umumiye'yi, Tütün Rejisini ve Osmanlı Bankasını kontrolü altına almak istediğine	64

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		dair İtalya Yüksek Komiserliğinden alınan belgelerin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	12 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İTALYAN YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAISSA'dan İNGİLTERE VE FRANSA YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNE YAZI. No. 5020. ....	64
		Rodos'taki İtalyan kuvvetleri Kumandanından alınan telgraf çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 2	12 nisan	RODOS'taki İTALYAN KUVVETLERİ KOMUTANINDAN İSTANBUL'DA İTALYA YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE TEL (ÇEVİRİ). ....	65
		Osmanlı Düyunu Umumiyesinin, Tütün Rejisinin, Osmanlı Bankası ve Şubelerinin kontrolünün Müdafayı Millîye tarafından ele alınması için M. Kemal'in emir verdiği.	
20	22 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 575. ....	65
		Türkiye'deki siyasi gelişmelere toplu bakış:	
		1. Aynı zamanda hem M. Kemal'e hem de İtilâf Devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerine hizmet etme güçlüğü karşısında Ali Rıza Paşa kabinesinin 3 Martta istifa ettiği.	
		2. 8 Martta. Salih Paşa başkanlığında benzer bir kabine kurulduğu, Salih Paşanın Türk tarihinde en bahtsız Sadrazam olduğu, İstanbul'un işgalinin bunun zamanına rastladığı gibi, kendisinden M. Kemal'i takbih etmesi de istendiği. Bu kabinenin de 2 Nisanda istifa ettiği.	
		3. 5 Nisanda Ferit Paşa'nın yeniden Sadrazam olduğu ve Dahiliye Nazırlığına milliyetçi aleyhtarı görünen Reşid Peyi getirerek, millî hareketle mücadele etme programıyla işe başladığı.	
		4. Yeni kabinenin milliyetçileri şiddetle suçlayan bildiri yayınladığı, fetvalar çıkarttığı, fakat bunların etkisinin zayıf olduğu.	
		5. Sadrazamın bazı milliyetçileri yollarından caydırmağa da çalıştığı ve 21 Nisanda Cafer Tayyar Beyin Edirne'den İstanbul'a geldiği, fakat milliyetçilerin yine de Trakya'da duruma hâkim oldukları.	

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		6. Ferit Paşa'nın milli harekete karşı kuvvet kullanmağa da başladığı ve ilk önce Anzavur'un milliyetçiler üzerine sevk edildiği. Fakat Anzavur hareketinin çöktüğü, bu durumda Hükümetin diğer bölgelerdeki milliyetçi aleytharı unsurları kullanmasının güçleştiği.	
		7. Ferit Paşa'nın devlet memurları arasında birçok değişiklikler yaptığı ve 12 Nisanda Parlametoyu feshettiği.	
		8. Milliyetçilere bir ihtar olan İstanbul'un işgalinin milli hareketi öldürmeğe yetmiyeceği, bunun Anadolu ile İstanbul arasındaki ilişkilerin kopması sonucunu verdiği.	
		9. Milli hareketi bastırma politikasında Ferit Paşa'nın İtilâf devletlerince desteklendiği, fakat ilk bastırma girişiminin sert tepkiyle karşılaşmasının bundan sonraki başarı şansını azalttığı.	
		10. Ferit Paşanın milli imkânlarla milli hareketi bastıramaması halinde, sert barışı Türklere empoze edebilmek için doğrudan doğruya İtilâf devletlerince kuvvet kullanmak gerekeceği, bu işi Yunanlılara bırakmanın sakıncalı olduğu.	
		<i>Not:</i> Ferit Paşa'yı Sadrazamlığa atayan 5.4.1920 günlü Hattı Hümayun metni.	
21	23 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 429. ....	71
		1. Anzavur'a ulaştırılmak üzere Karabiga'ya cephanes vs. gönderileceği.	
		2. Milliyetçilerin Çanakkale'yi tehdit etmelerine göz yumulmaması gerektiği.	
		3. Sadrazam tarafından aksi söylenmesine rağmen Anzavur'un ciddi bir yenilgiye uğradığı; buna benzer hareketlerin milliyetçilere karşı etkili direniş göstermiyeceği ve barış şartları ilân edilince milliyetçi sempatanlarının artacağı.	
		4. Sert barışı Türklere empoze edebilmek için İtilâf devletlerinin kendi kuvvetlerine güvenmeleri gerektiği, Yunan kuvvetlerini bu işte kullanmanın tehlikeli olacağı.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<i>Not:</i> Webb'ten Curzon'a 29.4.1920 günlü, 513 sayılı tel. Milliyetçilere karşı yürüyen Hükümet kuvvetlerinin İzmit'in doğusunda ilerledikleri.	
22	23 nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 585/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....	73
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	15 nisan	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 8-15 NİSAN 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	73
		1. Ferit Paşa kabinesinin M. Kemal'e karşı tedbirler alması, Osmanlı Meclisinin kapatılması, Anzavur harekâtı, İttihatçıları yargılamak için yeni bir Harp Divanı kurulması.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetinin Bolşeviklere karşı tedbirler alması.	
		3. Anadolu'da M. Kemal'in olağanüstü bir Kongre hazırlığı yaptığı, Kongrede bir milliyetçi parlamento açılması sorununun halledileceği, Celâlettin Arif, Halide Edip ve eşi Dr. Adnan'ın Anadolu'ya geçmeleri, M. Kemal'in konuşması.	
		4. Milliyetçi propaganda: İstanbul surlarına Ferit Paşa Hükümeti aleyhinde milliyetçi afişler yapıştırılması, bazı kişilerin tutuklanmaları.	
		5. Anzavur harekâtının gelişmesi, Hürriyet ve İtilâf partisinin milliyetçilere karşı propagandayı hızlandırması.	
		6. Ali Rıza ve Salih Paşalar zamanında hazırlanan barış tekliflerinin Ferit Paşa hükümetince değiştirilmesi.	
		7. Türk milliyetçileri konusunda İtalyan görüşleri.	
		8. Fransızlar ve Türk jandarma teşkilâtının ıslahı konularında haberler, yorumlar.	
23	30 nisan	TÜRKİYE B.M.M. BAŞKANI MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a MEKTUP. ....	79

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<p>1. İstanbul'un haksız yere işgali üzerine Türk (Osmanlı) milletinin seçim yapıp bir Büyük Millet Meclisi topladığı ve bu Meclisin, yurdun mukadderatını eline almağa karar verdiği.</p> <p>2. İstanbul'un işgalini, Osmanlı Parlamentosunun feshini, İstanbul'daki tevkifleri şiddetle protesto.</p> <p>3. Tutsak durumunda olan İstanbul Hükümetinin emir ve fetvalarının hiçbir hukuki ve dini değeri bulunmadığı ve bu sözde hükümetin girişeceği taahhütlerin de hükümsüz sayılacağı.</p> <p>4. Hak ve hukukunu savunma kararında olan Osmanlı milletinin, âdil ve şerefli bir barış arzuladığı ve ancak kendi temsilcilerine kendi adına taahhüde girişme yetkisi tanıdığı.</p> <p>5. Türkiye'deki hıristiyanlarla yabancıların milletin himayesinde olacakları, fakat bunların vatanın güvenliğine karşı hiçbir davranışta bulunmamaları gerektiği.</p> <p>Belge üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde yorumlar.</p>	
24	30 nisan	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ VEKİLİ R. WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 639/M/2279 GİZLİ. ....</p> <p>İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.</p>	81
Ek.	22 nisan	<p>İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 15-22 NİSAN 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. ....</p> <p>1. İstanbul Hükümetinin milliyetçilere karşı tutumu: Yayınlanan fetvaları Anadolu'ya yollama, milliyetçilere karşı kuvvet kullanma ve Anadolu halkını ayaklandırma konusunun görüşülmesi, bu konu ile ilgili bir komite kurulması; Fransızlarla çarpışmamaları için Adanalılara emir verilmesi.</p> <p>2. İstanbul'dan Anadolu'ya insan kaçırma.</p> <p>3. M. Kemal'in Ferit Paşa ve Anzavur aleyhinde bir bildiri yayınlaması, Bursa'da sıkıyönetim ilân etmesi, milliyetçilerin Ankara'da bir kurucu Meclis açma hazırlıkları.</p>	81

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		4. Ahmet Anzavur'un İstanbul'dan yardım istemesi, Şehir Kışla'da (Sivas) milliyetçilere karşı bir hareket başladığı haberi.	
		5. İtalyanların milliyetçilere yardım ettikleri.	
		6. "Chicago Tribune" muhabiri Paul Williams'ın Anadolu'ya gitmesi.	
		7. Prens Ulviye'nin Padişahla görüşmesi ve Anzavur harekâtı aleyhinde konuşması.	
		8. Avrupa'daki İttihatçı liderlerin Roma'da bir toplantı yapacakları.. bu konularında haberler ve yorumlar.	
25	1 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 614/M. 2353. ....	86
		İstanbul'un işgali üzerine M. Kemal tarafından yayınlanan ve Bursa'da Milliyetçi "Millet Yolu" gazetesinde çıkan bir bildiri çevirisinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	—	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA TARAFINDAN YAYINLANAN VE BURSA'NIN "MİLLET YOLU" GAZETESİNDE ÇIKAN RESMİ BİLDİRİ. (ÇEVİRİ). ....	86
		1. Hilafet merkezi, İmparatorluğun başkenti İstanbul'un İtilâf devletlerince işgalinin hak ve adalete tamamen aykırı bir hareket olduğu.	
		2. Memlekette Hilafet ve Milli bağımsızlığı korumak duygusunun arttığı ve bu amaçla bir hareket doğduğu. Bu hareketi yoketmek için Damat Ferit Paşa'nın Sadrazamlığa getirildiği ve Biga ile Gönen taraflarında Anzavur ayaklanmasının çıkarıldığı.	
		3. Aydın cephesindeki Yunan saldırısının geri itildiği. İşgal kuvvetlerinin Urfa'yı boşalttıkları, Mersin ve Tarsus'un kuşatıldığı.	
		4. Milli kuvvetlerin hiçbir şekilde gerilemeyecekleri ve suçluları ezecekleri.	
		5. Kâzım Beyin Karasi bölgesi kumandanlığına, Bekir Sami Beyin de Bursa kumandanlığına atandıkları ve buralarda güvenliği sağlayacakları.	
		6. "Milli mücadelemizde Tanrının bizimle beraber olduğu".	

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26	1 mayıs	İNGİLTERE'nin BERUT BAŞKONSOLOSU MR WRATISLAW'dan KAHİRE YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNE VE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 17 ve 43. ....	88
		1. M. Kemal'in, Bağdat'ta Ali Nasuhi Beye ve Antep'te Kılıç Ali'ye gönderdiği mektuplarla diğer iki mektubun ele geçirildiği.	
		2. Posta ile gönderilecek bu mektupların, getiren kişinin Halep'teki Amerikan Konsolosuna da bazı belgeler vermiş olduğu. Mektupların propaganda için Mezopotamya'ya giden bir Türk heyetinden çalınmış olduğu.	
27	4 mayıs	BERUT'ta İNGİLİZ BAŞKONSOLOSU MR. WRATISLAW'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 31. ....	89
		M. Kemal'in bazı mektupları konusunda Kahire'deki İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğine gönderilen yazı örneğinin sunulduğu. Mektupların eski bir Türk jandarma subayının getirdiği.	
Ek. 1	21 mart	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan BAĞDAT'ta OS-MANLI MİLLİ HAREKETİ VE BOLŞEVİKLER BAŞKANI NASUHI BEYE. YAZI. No. 759. ....	89
		1. Mezopotamya bölgesini İngilizlerden temizlemek için Türk kuvvetlerinin yardıma gelmelerine şimdilik imkân olmadığı ve bu işi kendilerinin (Mezopotamyalıların) yüklenmeleri gerektiği.	
		2. Mısır'daki kardeşlerimizin de bu uğurda çaba harcadıkları ve yakında para gönderecekleri.	
		3. Gelecek paraların bir kısmının aşiret reislerine dağıtılması, bir kısmıyla silâh ve cephane alınması, İngilizlere karşı çete savaşı yapılması. İngilizlerin harekâtının her tarafta durdurulması. Süleymaniye'deki Mahmut'la da işbirliği yapılması. İstanbul olaylarının manevîyatlarını sarsmaması gerektiği.	
		4. Tanrıdan başarı dileği.	
Ek. 2	20 mart	MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN KILIÇ ALİ BEYE. YAZI. No. 411. ....	90
		1. Çeteler yardımıyla Maraş ve Antep'teki başarıların memnuniyet yarattığı, Fransızların bu bölgeye fazla kuvvet gönderemeyecekleri, bunlardan korkulmaması gerektiği.	



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		2. Yerli liderlerle ilişkilerin sürdürülmesi ve kendilerine durumun ayrıntılarıyla anlatılması. Fransızların hırpalanması gerektiği.	
		3. Peyderpey gönderilecek paraların bir kısmının aşiret reislerine ve çetelere dağıtılması, bir kısmı ile cep hane ve erzak satın alınması. Fransızların temizlenmesine çalışılması talimatı.	
		4. Lübnan, Hama, Humus, Antakya, Urfa taraflarıyla haberleşilmekte olduğu.	
		5. Başarı dileği.	
28	9 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 649/W. 2910. GİZLİ. ....	91
		Osmanlı Hükümetinin tutuklanmasını arzuladığı kişiler konusunda Karadeniz Orduları Başkumandanıyla yazışma örneklerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	22 Nisan	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ AMİRAL WEBB'ten İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'e. YAZI. No. W. 2910. ....	92
		1. Tutuklanmaları telkin edilen kişilerle ilgili bir listenin Sadrazamdan alınarak ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Sadrazamın bu kişilerin İtilâf devletlerince tutuklanmalarını ve Malta'ya sürülmelerini tercih ettiği.	
		3. Listeki kişilerin bir kısmının İtilâf devletlerinin ulaşamayacakları bölgelerde buldukları, ötekilerinin ise Türk makamlarınca tutuklanmalarının uygun olacağı.	
		4. Eski Sadrazam İzzet Paşa'nın tutuklanmasının uygun olmayacağı.	
		5. Bu konulardaki düşüncelerinin bildirilmesi ricası. DAMAT FERİT PAŞA'NIN TUTUKLANMALARINI İSTEDİĞİ KİŞİLERE AİT LİSTE. ....	93
		Kâzım, Ali Fuad, Remzi, Abdülkerim, Nihat, Kâzım Karabekir, Mustafa Kemal, Hasan Rıza, Ahmet İzzet, Hüsnü, İsmail Fazıl, Galip ve Yakup Şevki Paşalar ile Cafer Tayyar, Behiç, Mehmet Selahattin, Hüseyin Selahattin, Selahattin Adil, Ömer Lütfi, Kâzım, İsmet, Hayri, Salih, Ahmet Rıza ve Seyit Beylerin adları.	

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Ek. 2	28 nisan	GENERAL MILNE'DEN AMİRAL WEBB'e. YAZI Tutuklanması istenen kişiler listesinin alındığı. <i>F.O.'in notu</i> : General Milne ile Amiral Webb arasında anlaşmazlık bulunduğu. M. Kemal'in yakalanmasını istemenin "saçma" olduğu.	94
29	11 mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN TRABLUSGARP BAŞKONSOLOSUNDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 28. (BİR ÖRNEĞİ ROMAYA GÖNDERİLMİŞTİR). . . . .	94
Ek.	4 mayıs	TRABLUSGARP'ta (TRIPOLI'de) YAYINLANAN "RAKİB" GAZETESİ KESİTİ: (ÇEVİRİ) Türkiye haberleri: İstanbul'u işgal eden kuvvetlerin M. Kemal ile ilişkileri bulunduğu gerekçesiyle bazı ileri gelen kimseleri ve mebusları sürdükleri. Müslüman halkın İstanbul'u kurtarmak için savaşa hazırlandığı ve İslâm dünyası tarafından desteklendiği. Osmanlı Meclisinin barış şartlarını tespit ettiği. Siyasi çevrelerin Enver Paşa ile ilgilendikleri; Türkiye halkınca kabul edilmeyen barış şartlarının imzalanmayacağı, Türk milletinin istekleri kabul edilmedikçe M. Kemal ordularının gerilemeyecekleri; Kürtlerin Türkiye ile ilişkilerini kopardıkları haberlerinin asılsız olduğu. Karadeniz'de tehlikeli durum.	
30	17 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 596 1. Barış şartlarının İstanbul'da sükûnetle karşılandığı; fakat İstanbul basınının tonunun aşırı heyecanlı olduğu, bu şartların yumuşatılabileceği umudunun belirtildiği. 2. Mitingler yapılması kararlaştırıldığı, fakat bunların yumuşak geçmesi için tedbir alındığı. 3. Ankara'da M. Kemal'in topladığı Meclisin yasama ve yürütme yetkilerini üzerine aldığı; kendisince tayin edilecek temsilciler dışında hiçbir kimsenin	97

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		Barış Konferansında taahhüt altına giremeyeceğine karar verdiği; Meclisin kararlarının Avrupa, Amerika ve Sovyet Rusya Hükümetlerine duyurulacağı.	
		4. Ankara Meclisinin daha şimdiden bir Barış delegasyonu seçtiği haberi.	
		5. Merkezi Hükümetin Milliyetçiler üzerinde hiçbir gücü bulunmadığı, sert barış şartlarının muhalif kişileri de milliyetçilerin kucağına atabileceği.	
		6. Sadrazamın andlaşma metnini almadan bir harekette bulunmayacağı.	
31	22 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. GİZLİ YAZI. No. 733. ....	99
		1. Ankara'da milliyetçi liderlerin faaliyetleri ve politikası ile ilgili dört belge örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Milliyetçi liderlerin bir ara Ankara'da bir Padişah Vekili ilân etmeyi düşündükleri, fakat bu fikirden vazgeçtikleri. Halen Ankara'daki Meclisin bütün yasama ve yürütme yetkilerini elinde topladığı ve Bakanların bu Meclisin "Vekil"leri durumunda olduğu.	
		3. Milliyetçilerin kanunlar çıkarıp kendi faaliyetlerini meşruluk kisvesine büründürmelerinin karakteristik olduğu.	
		4. Ankara Meclisinin, mütarekeden beri yapılmış hiçbir anlaşmayı tanımayacağını ilân etmesinin, muhtemelen Ferit Paşa ile İngiltere arasında bulunduğu ileri sürülen sözde anlaşmayı hedef tuttuğu.	
		5. Milliyetçileri, temsil eden "Barış delegasyonu" hakkında halâ kesin bilgi olmadığı, fakat Ahmet Rıza, Galip Kemali, Ahmet Rüstem ve Muhtar Beylerin adlarının anıldığı.	
		6. Bir süre önce milliyetçilerin kurdukları basın ajanınca yayınlanan ve gecikerek İstanbul'a da ulaşan haber bülteninde çokçası İtilâf devletleri ve özellikle İngiltere aleyhtarlığı yapıldığı, İrlanda'dan Hindistan'a kadar İngiltere'nin güçlüklerinin istismar edildiği.	

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		7. İlişikteki belgelerden birinin İzmir Valisi Nureddin Paşa'ya gönderilmiş olduğu. Valinin milliyetçilerle İstanbul Hükümeti arasında iki yönlü bir durumu olduğu.	
		8. Sadrazamın gittikçe güç durumunda kaldığı; barış andlaşmasını şimdiki haliyle imzalaması halinde taraftarlarının çoğunu kaybedeceği, milliyetçilere karşı mücadeleyi sürdürdüğü takdirde ise müslümanları Yunan saflarında çarpıştırmış olacağı.	
		9. Ferit Paşa'nın barış andlaşmasını imzalamamasının muhtemel olduğu, fakat imzalarsa bile andlaşmanın bütün Türkiye'ye ancak kuvvet kullanarak empoze edilebileceği.	
Ek. 1	6 Mayıs	ANKARA'da GENEL DURUM KONUSUNDA PEK GİZLİ BİR KAYNAK TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. ....	101
		1. Milli Meclisin M. Kemal başkanlığında 23 Nisan günü Ankara'da açıldığı, 174 üyenin katıldığı toplantıda başkanlık divanı seçimleri yapıldığı ve bir yürütme kurulu seçildiği. Böylece kurulan geçici Hükümetin aslında şeklen bir Cumhuriyet Hükümeti olduğu, fakat bunun açıkça itiraf edilmediği.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetinin fetvalarının halkta etkisi yaptığı ve Anadolu'ya etkili bir kuvvet gönderilirse milliyetçilerin yenilebileceği.	
		3. Ankara'da bir Milli Meclis toplama fikrinin 28 Mart günü milliyetçi temsilcilerinin Karasu toplantısında kararlaştırıldığı.	
		4. M. Kemal'in Geyve'ye kuvvet gönderdiği, Müslüman olmayanlara genellikle iyi davranıldığı.	
		5. M. Kemal'in İtalyanlarla ilişkilerinin çok iyi olduğu, İtalyanların yalnız Antalya ile Kuşadası'nda biraz kuvveti kaldığı.	
		6. Bir Fransız subayının yardımıyla Mazhar ve Reşat Beylerle, Bekir Sami Beyin oğlunun İstanbul'dan kaçıp Eskişehir'e geldikleri. Eskişehir'de tutuklanan Fransız askerlerinin serbest bırakıldığı, üç İngiliz subayının da Konya'dan kaçıp Eskişehir'e geldikleri.	
		7. "Chicago Tribune" gazetesi muhabiri Mr. Williams'ın Ankara'ya gelip M. Kemal'le görüştüğü.	

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Ek. 2	1 Mayıs	BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİNİN MİLLETE BİLDİRİŞİ. ....	103
		1. İngilizlerce satın alınan bazı düşman ve hayınların Padişah'a ve Halife'ye isyan edildiği hikâyesini yaydıkları, bu İngiliz casuslarının tek sözüne inanılmaması.	
		2. İstanbul, İzmir, Adana ve Maraş'ı kaybettikten sonra Türk Saltanatı ve Hilafetinin yaşayamayacağı. Devleti ve dini kurtarmaya çalışanlara yardım edilmesi.	
		3. Milletin ve vatanın bütünlüğüne canlarını adayanlara Allah yardım etsin.	
Ek. 3	—	ANKARA'da MİLLÎ MÜDAFAA VEKİLİ FEVZİ PAŞA'DAN NUREDDİN PAŞA'YA. TEL. CEVABEN. (ÇEVİRİ) .....	104
		1. Telgrafımızdan Ankara'daki gerçek durumdan henüz haberdar olmadığımız anlaşıldığından, ileride önemli sorunları tartışabilmek için aşağıdaki bilgilerin verildiği:	
		2. Her sancaktan seçilen beşer mebus ve İstanbul'dan kaçıp gelebilen mebuslar ile Ankara'da Büyük Millet Meclisinin açıldığı; yasama ve yürütme yetkilerini üzerine aldığı.	
		3. Halife'ye ve Padişaha bağlılığını ilân eden BMM'nin seçtiği Başkanlık divanı ve Vekiller Heyeti Başkanıyla üyelerinin adları.	
		4. BMM'nin çıkardığı kanun ve kararların özeti: BMM'ne karşı geleceklerin hayın sayılıp cezalandırılacağı, mütarekeden beri yapılmış ve yapılacak olan andlaşmaların ve verilen tavizlerin tanınmayacağı. Ancak BMM'nin seçeceği delegelere anlaşma imzalamaya yetkisinin tanınacağı; yabancı ülkelerin haberdar edildikleri.	
		5. Milli birliği bozmak için girişilen hareketlerin bastırıldığı, kardeş kanı dökülmesinden bu hareketleri tahrik edenlerin sorumlu oldukları.	
		6. İstanbul'da düşman baskısıyla yayınlanan fetvaların meşru sayılmayacağı. Bu yüzden Anadolu müftülerine fetvalar çıkartılıp dağıtıldığı.	
		7. Kimin kiminle neyi müzakere edeceğinin açık seçik olarak bildirilmesi.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
32	24 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 622 ACELE. ....	106
		General Townshend'in özel görevle M. Kemal'e gönderilip gönderilmediğini soran İtalyan Yüksek Komiserine ne cevap verileceği.	
		<i>F.O.'in cevabı</i> : Haberin yalanlanması.	
33	24 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 743/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....	107
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu	
Ek.	13 mayıs	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 6-13 MAYIS 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ.	107
		1. Milliyetçilere karşı enerjik tedbirler alamadığı için Ferit Paşa kabinesinin durumunun zayıfladığı, Kabinde M. Kemal'in bir mektubunun görüşüldüğü.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetinin, milliyetçilerle anlaşmaya varmak için Nureddin Paşa'yı Anadolu'ya göndermeğe karar verdiği, Fevzi Paşa'nın Nureddin Paşa'ya gönderdiği telgrafta Milli Meclis hakkında etraflı bilgi verildiği ve milletin kendi kaderini eline aldığı açıklandığı.	
		3. M. Kemal Paşa'nın Millet Meclisinde yaptığı konuşma.	
		4. Ankara Hükümetinin aslında Cumhuriyetçi bir Hükümet olduğu, fakat bunun açıkça itiraf edilmediği. İstanbul'un fetvalarının Anadolu halkı üzerinde etki yaptığı, M. Kemal'in İtalyanlarla ilişkilerinin pek iyi olduğu. "Chicago Tribune" muhabirinin Ankara'da M. Kemal'le birçok görüşme yaptığı.	
		5. M. Kemal'in 1 Mayıs'ta yayınladığı bildiri.	
		6. Fevzi Paşa'nın Millet Meclisinde İstanbul'un işgalini anlatması.	
		7. Prens Osman Fuad'ın Anadolu'ya geçtiği haberi.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
34	25 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-IŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 755. ....	112
		1. M. Kemal'in Fransa Dışışleri Bakanına gönderdiği bir yazı örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Bunun Türkçesinin Anadolu ajansı haber bültenlerinin birinde yayımlandığı ve yazının gönderildiği ülkeler belirtilirken Sovyet Rusya'nın adının geçmediği.	
		3. Lord Curzon'a da bu belgenin kopyasının gönderilip gönderilmediğinin bildirilmesi.	
Ek.	30 nisan	TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ REİSİ MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN FRANSA DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANINA YAZI .....	113
		(Bkz. Belge No. 23).	
35	26 mayıs	70 SAYILI İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT RAPORUNA EK: TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ ADINA MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN PADİŞAH'a MESAJ. ....	114
		1. İstanbul'un işgali üzerine, Saltanatı ve bağımsızlığı muhafaza etmek amacıyla Büyük Millet Meclisinin toplandığı.	
		2. Bir zamanlar üç kıtaya yayılmış olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bugün Anadolu'dan ibaret kaldığı ve Anadolu'nun yeniden kutsal savaşa giriştiği.	
		3. Anadolu'yu Padişaha karşı ayaklanmış gösteren hayınlara rağmen aslında milletin Padişahına sadık olduğu, fakat düşmanları vatandan kovuncaya kadar kutsal savaşa devam edeceği, Millet Meclisinin de ilk sözününün Halifeye ve Padişaha sadakat sözü olduğu, son sözününün de öyle olacağı.	
36	27 mayıs	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 766 .....	117
		1. 26 Mayıs günü Sadrazamın İngiltere Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret ettiği, bunun, Paris'te barış şartlarının açıklanmasından beri ilk ziyaret olduğu.	
		2. Sadrazamın önce Hükümetin milli hareket karşısındaki durumunu anlattığı ve kendisinin milliyetçi-	

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- leri suçlama konusunda Yüksek Komiserlerin bütün isteklerine uyduğunu belirttiği.
3. Milliyetçilerle silahlı mücadelede cahil Anzavur yerine Sadrazamın şahsen bir hareket teşkilâtlandırmak istediği, fakat öteki İtilâf devletlerinin kendisine güçlük çıkardıklarını söylediği.
  4. Ferit Paşa'nın Anadolu asilerini bastırmak için 10.000 kişilik bir kuvvet kurup silâhlandırmasına müsaade istediği, bir süre önce ziyaret ettiği İzmit'i hareket üssü haline getirip üç hafta içinde Anadolu'ya boyun eğdirebileceğini söylediği.
  5. 10.000 kişilik bir kuvveti silahlandırmak konusunda Sadrazamın Fransa ve İtalya Yüksek Komiserleri ile de konuşacağı, fakat İngiltere Yüksek Komiseri ile yaptığı gizli konuşmasından onlara söz açmayacağı.
  6. Sadrazamın, barış şartlarını Türkiye'de herkesin çok ağır bulduğunu belirttiği, özellikle Marmara, Trakya ve İzmir bölgelerine değindiği.
  7. Andlaşmanın bu şekli ile imzalanması halinde Hükümetin ve Padişahın çok güç durumda kalacaklarını söyleyen Ferit Paşanın, barış şartlarının yumuşatılması dileğinde bulunduğu.
  8. Sadrazamın, barış şartlarına Türkiye'nin cevap verme mühletinin bir ay uzatılmasını istediği.
  9. Barış şartlarının yumuşatılması için Padişahın İtilâf devletleri Başkanlarına şahsî mesajlar göndermek istediği.
  10. Sadrazamın Kilikya bölgesinde Fransızların çok sert hareket ettiklerinden şikâyet ettiği ve General Dufieux'nün 50 köyü yıktırıldığını söylediği.
  11. Bir Hind yardım derneğinin temsilcisi olduğunu söyleyen bir şahsın Padişahı ziyaret etmek istediği.
  12. Amiral de Robeck'in, Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşmasının çok sert olacağını Türk Hükümetine mütarekeden beri hatırlatıldığını söylediği, Sadrazamın, bu andlaşmanın "çok sert" olmaktan da öteye Türkiye'nin yokedilmesi demek olduğu yolunda cevap verdiği.

*Not:* Sultan Vahideddin'den İngiliz kralına 27.5.1920 günlü telgraf ve İngiliz kralının buna 5.6.1920 günlü



No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		cevabı. Barış andlaşmasının Türkiye yararına biraz yumuşatılması sorunu.	
37	4 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 654.	121
		1. General Gouraud'nun M. Kemal kuvvetleriyle 1 Hazirandan başlamak üzere 20 günlük bir ateşkes anlaşması yapacağı.	
		2. Ayrıca General Gouraud'nun M. Kemal'e bir delege göndererek Fransızların Kilikya'yı ellerinde tutmak ve daha fazla kan dökmek niyetinde olmadıklarını belirttiği.	
38	4 haziran	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. GRAHAME'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 663. ÇOK GİZLİ.	122
		1. Fransa Başbakan ile görüşüldüğü, çok gizli tutulması isteği ile aşağıdaki bilgilerin alındığı:	
		2. (Kilikya'da) Fransız kuvvetlerinin pek güç durumda oldukları.	
		3. M. de Caix'nin Ankara'da M. Kemal ile görüştüğü ve 20 günlük bir ateşkes anlaşması için uyduğu.	
		4. Fransızların başka çıkar yolu kalmadığı.	
39	7 haziran	ŞAM'da EMİR FAYSAL'dan KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAREŞAL ALLENBY'ye. ....	122
		1. Emir Faysal ile General Gouraud arasındaki anlaşmazlık.	
		2. M. Kemal ile anlaşma yapan ve Suriye'ye kuvvet biriktirmeğe başlayan General Gouraud'nun iyi niyetinden şüphe etmekte haklı olduğu.	
		3. Mareşal Allenby'nin araya girmesi ricası.	
40	7 haziran	PARİS'te LORD DERBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 676. ....	123
		1. Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığı Genel Sekreterinin söylediklerine göre, Fransız kuvvetlerinin ancak Pozantı, Urfa, Birecik ve Maraş gibi ileri hatlardan çekilmiş buldukları, fakat Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, Osmaniye, Antep gibi yerlerden çekilmek niyetinde olmadıkları, buralara takviye gönderildiği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. İleri hatlardaki Ermenilerin güvenlikleri konusunda M. Kemal ile General Gouraud arasında görüşmeler yapıldığı.	
41	8 haziran	3. Demir yoluyla kuvvet sevki için Fransa Hükümeti ile Faysal arasında anlaşmaya varıldığı. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 808/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....	124
Ek. 1	27 mayıs	İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu. İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 20-27 MAYIS 1920 GÜNLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. (KISMEN). ....	124
		1. Telgrafhanelerden dışarıya gizli haberler sızmasına karşı M. Kemal'in 16 Mayısta bütün telgrafçıları uyardığı ve İngilizler aleyhinde bulunduğu.	
		2. Trakya Merkez Komitesinin Edirne'de yaptığı bir toplantıda Yunanistan'ın Trakya'yı işgaline karşı kararlar alındığı.	
		3. Anadolu ajansının Ankara'ya bir yabancı diplomatlar heyetinin geldiği, Lazistan halkının Barış Konferansına bir protesto mesajı gönderdiği, Ermenilerin müslümanlara zulüm yaptıkları. . yolunda haberler yayınladığı.	
Ek. 2	9 şubat	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARATININ ÇOK GİZLİ BİR KAYNAKTAN ELE GEÇİRDİĞİ VE YAYILMASINI İSTEDİĞİ BİR TÜRK ŞİFRE TELGRAFI: M. KEMAL'den 14. KOLORDU, I., 56. ve 61. TÜMEN KOMUTANLARINA. ŞİFRE TEL. ...	126
		1. Akbaş silah deposunun yağma edilmesini bahane ederek İngilizlerin Bandırma'ya asker çıkardıkları, Afyon, Eskişehir gibi yerlerdeki silah depolarının da imha edileceğinin haber alındığı.	
		2. Arkada kalan bu gibi silah ve cephaneler düşmanın eline geçer veya ulaştırma yolları kesilirse milli kuvvetlerin zayıf düşecekleri.	
		3. Enerjik davranılarak yabancıların yeni yerler işgal etmelerine meydan verilmemesi gerektiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek. 3	15 şubat	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARATININ ÇOK GİZLİ BİR KAYNAKTAN ELE GEÇİRDİĞİ GİZLİ TELGRAFA: M. KEMAL PAŞA'dan 14. KOLORDU, 56. ve 61. TÜMEN KOMUTANLARINA. GİZLİ TEL.	127
		Akbaş deposundan silâhları kaçırın Albay Şevket Beyin İngilizler tarafından aranmakta olduğu, bu nedenle Şevket Beyle hiçbir şekilde muhabere edilmemesi.	
Ek. 4	3 şubat	OSMANLI HARBİYE NAZIRI SALİH PAŞA'dan BANDIRMA'da 14. KOLORDU KOMUTANINA GİZLİ TEL.	127
		Akbaş deposundan kaçırılan silâh ve cephanelerin Bandırma yoluyla trenle Balıkesir'e yollandığının haber alındığı, gereken tahkikatın yapılarak trenin derhal durdurulması talimatı.	
42	9 haziran	İSTANBUL HÜKÜMETİ İLE MİLLİYETÇİLER ARASINDA GÖRÜŞMELER İLE İLGİLİ İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. No. 72.	128
		1. Merkezi hükümete boyun eğmeleri için milliyetçilere çağrıda bulunmak üzere Suphi Paşa'ya talimat verildiği. Suphi Paşa'nın da milliyetçilerle temas etmek üzere Albay Ahmet Şefik Beyi görevlendirdiği.	
		2. Mareşal Zeki Paşa'nın M. Kemal Paşa ile doğrudan doğruya temasa geçtiği ve 28 Mayıs'ta M. Kemal'e bir mektup gönderdiği. Mektubun çevirisi: "Memleket menfaatleri" hesabına, M. Kemal'in Büyük Millet Meclisini, Vekiller Heyetini feshetmesi; bütün askeri birliklerin merkezi otoriteye teslim edilmesi, Hükümetçe müzakerelere girişmek üzere bir heyet seçilip gönderilmesi istekleri.	
		3. Mareşal Zeki Paşa'nın mektubuna T.B.M.M. Genelkurmay Başkanı İsmet Beyin 30 Mayıs tarihli cevabı. İstanbul Hükümeti ile müzakereye girişmek üzere 6 kişilik bir heyet seçildiği ve müzakerelere 5 Haziranda Çekirce'de başlanmak istendiği. İstanbul Heyetinin de oraya gönderilmesinin istendiği.	
43	12 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL No. 695. ACELE.	136

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		1. M. Kemal'in, Çiçerin'e gönderdiği bir mektupla Sovyet Rusya ile diplomatik ilişkiler kurmak arzusunun bildirdiği.	
		2. Çiçerin'in de cevaben, Türkiye ile sıkı dostluk ilişkileri kurmak için Türkiye'ye diplomatik ve konsolosluk temsilcileri göndermeye hazır olduğunu açıkladığı ve M. Kemal'e başarılar dilediği.	
44	15 haziran	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. GRAHAME'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 710. ....	136
		1. M. Kemal, ile Fransız Yüksek Komiseri Genel Sekreteri M. Decaix arasında 30 Mart tarihinde 20 günlük bir ateşkes anlaşması imzalandığı.	
		2. Fransız kuvvetlerinin Pozantı'dan ve Antep'ten çekilmelerinin anlaşmada öngörüldüğü.	
		3. Anlaşmadan sonra 550 Fransız askerinin esir alındığı, fakat bunların serbest bırakılmalarının beklendiği	
45	17 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 713	137
		Milliyetçi kuvvetlerin İstanbul ve Çanakkale üzerine doğru ilerlemelerinin yarattığı pek ciddi durumu inceleyen Fransa, İngiltere ve İtalya Yüksek Komiserlerinin aşağıdaki ortak telgrafi hükümetlerine yollamayı kararlaştırdıkları:	
		1. İstanbul'un Asya yakasından tehdit edildiği, Trakya'dan da tehdit edilebileceği ve Çanakkale yönünden İstanbul'un gıda ikmalinin tehlikeye düşeceği; İtilâf devletleri kuvvetlerinin bu tehlikeleri püskürtmeye yeterli olmadığı.	
		2. İstanbul'u ve Boğazları mutlaka ellerinde tutmaları gerektiği. Tezelden bol takviye gönderilmesi dileği.	
		3. Milliyetçi kuvvetlerin ileri harekâtının barış şartları belli olur olmaz, yani bu şartların hemen hemen bütün Türkleri milliyetçi yapması üzerine başladığı.	
		4. Bu durumda Türk heyetinin barış andlaşmasını imzalayıp imzalamıyacağının ve bu heyetin neyi temsil ettiğinin düşünülmesi gerektiği, her halükârda İtilâf devletlerinin bugünden itibaren ya kuvvet kullanmak, ya da barış şartlarını değiştirmek zaruretinde oldukları.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		5. Kemalistlerin başarıları üzerine İstanbul'daki taraftarlarının Hükümeti devirmeğe kalkışabilecekleri, işgal kuvvetlerinin bu hareketi bastırmaları mı yoksa kendi haline bırakmaları mı gerekeceği sorusu.	
		6. Birinci durumda zahiri İstanbul Hükümetinin çökebileceği ve İtilâf devletlerinin Hükümete ve sivil idareye el koymak durumunda; ikinci halde ise hasım bir Hükümet karşısında kalacakları.	
		7. Takviye kuvveti gönderildiği takdirde birinci şıkkın tercih edileceği; Türkiye ile yeni bir savaşa girilmeyecek ve barış andlaşmasının toprakla ilgili hükümleri değiştirilecek ise ikinci şıkkın kabul edilebileceği.	
		8. Yüksek Komiserlerinin bu çıkmazı bir kez daha belirtmek arzusunda oldukları: Birinci şıkkın Türkiye ile yeni bir savaş demek olacağı, ikinci şıkkın ise yeniden müzakerelere girişmeyi gerektireceği ve bu müzakerelerin milliyetçilerin durumunu daha da kuvvetlendireceği.	
		9. Yüksek Komiserlerin Hükümetlerinden ortak talimat bekledikleri.	
46	17 haziran	İNGİLTERE'nin BERUT BAŞKONSOLOSU MR. WRATISLAW'dan DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 62. ....	138
		M. Kemal'in temsilcileriyle görüşmek üzere Emir Faysal'ın Halep'e gittiği.	
47	19 haziran	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAREŞAL ALLENBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 599. ŞİFRE. ....	139
		Emir Faysal'dan Lord Curzon'a 5 Haziran tarihli yazının aşağıda aynen nakledildiği:	
		1. Fransızlarla M. Kemal arasında yapılan ve Kuzey Suriye'nin büyük bir kısmı ile Kilikya'yı Türklere bırakan ateşkes anlaşmasının Faysal tarafından hayretle karşılandığı.	
		2. Bu anlaşmanın bir seri yenilginin başlangıcı olacağı ve İtilâf devletlerinin gerilemeleri sonucu Türklerin güneye doğru genişleme arzularının güç kazanacağı.	
		3. Kilikya ve (Kuzey) Suriye'den çekilen Fransız kuvvetlerinin Şam üzerine harekâta geçmelerinden kaygı	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		duyulduğu, Fransız kumandanının bu tedbirlerinin müşterek düşmanın (Türklerin) işine yarayacağı ve M. Kemal'in ihtirasını arttıracacağı.	
		4. Durumun ciddiyeti üzerine İngiltere Hükümetinin dikkatinin çekildiği.	
		5. Yaklaşan tehlikeye karşı ülkesini korumak ümidiyle (Faysal'ın) Fransa ve İngiltere'ye dostluk elini uzattığı ve cevap beklediği.	
48	19 haziran	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANINA YAZI. No. 683. ....	140
		Suriye ile ilgili bir Fransız istihbarat raporu örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	1-7 haziran	SURİYE İLE İLGİLİ HAFTALIK FRANSTZ İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖRNEĞİ. (KISMEN) ....	140
		1. M. Kemal ile bir anlaşma imzalandığı. Buna rağmen bazı yerlerde çarpışmaların devam ettiği.	
		2. Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşması şartlarının yalnız Kemalislere değil, bütün yurt severlere kabul edilemez gibi görünmekte ve M. Kemal'in günden güne güçlenmekte olduğu.	
		3. Özellikle Edirne ve İzmir'in kaybının bütün yurt severlere elem verdiği, bunların şimdi M. Kemal'in davasını benimsedikleri; daha dün âsi diye idama mahkûm edilen M. Kemal'in yarın milli kahraman olacağı.	
49	20 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 879/M/2279 GİZLİ. ....	141
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özütünün ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	10 haziran	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 3-10 HAZİRAN 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	141
		1. Prens Abdülmecid'in Padişaha bir mektup göndererek bazı tavsiyelerde bulunduğu.	

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		2. Barış heyeti başkanı Tevfik Paşa, Padişaha gönderdiği bir mektupta barış şartlarının hayal kırıcı olduğunu bildirdiği.	
		3. Zeki Paşa aracılığı ile İstanbul Hükümetinin M. Kemal ile anlaşmak için son bir gayret sarfettiği.	
		4. "Hakimiyeti Milliye" Gazetesinde, Ankara Hükümetinin programının açıklandığı.	
		5. Milliyetçilerle Bolşevikler arasındaki ilişkiler.	
		6. Millet Meclisi adına M. Kemal imzasıyla 9 Mayıs'ta İslâm dünyasına bir çağrı yayınlandığı.	
		7. Anadolu basınının İngiltere aleyhindeki kampanyaya devam ettiği.	
		8. Trakya'da durumla ilgili haberler ve yorumlar.	
		9. Kafkaslar ve Mısır ile ilgili haberler.	
50	21 Haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN BOULOGNE'da BULUNAN LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1. ....	149
		1. Faysal'a yollanacak cevabi telgraf taslağının kurye ile Boulogne'a gönderildiği.	
		2. Faysal'ın, M. Kemal'in temsilcileriyle görüşmek üzere Halep'e gittiği ve Fransızlara güvenmemesi karşısında Türk milliyetçileriyle birleşmesi tehlikesi bulunduğu.	
		3. Fransız saldırısından korkmaması yolunda Faysal'a Fransa'dan teminat sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı sorusu.	
51	21 Haziran	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan PARİS'te LORD DERBY'ye GENELGE TEL. No. 722. ....	150
		(Roma ve İstanbul'a da gönderilmiştir).	
		1. Milliyetçiler karşısında İstanbul'da zayıf düşmenin İtilâf devletleri politikası için felâket olacağı.	
		2. İzmit yarımadasını savunmak için Fransız ve İtalyan askerlerinin İngiliz askerleriyle işbirliği yapmaları isteği.	
52	21 Haziran	BOULOGNE KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ SEKRETERİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK TASLAĞI (KISMEN). ....	150
		1. Lloyd George'un, son günlerde Kemalist kuvvetlerinin İzmit yarımadasına yığıldıklarını, öte yandan M. Kemal'in Çanakkale'ye kadar uzandığını, bu	

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		tehlikeli durumun önüne geçmek için Yunan kuvvetlerinin Bandırma'ya doğru yürümelerini Venizelos ve Millerand ile birlikte uygun bulduklarını, zira Paris'te Türk (Osmanlı) delegeleriyle buluşma arifesinde M. Kemal tehlikesini önlemeyi gerekli gördüklerini açıklayarak konferansın görüşünü sorduğu.	
		2. Kont Sforza'nın, Yunanlıların başarısızlığı halinde İtilâf Devletlerinin doğrudan Türk milliyetçileriyle müzakereye girişip girişmeyeceklerini sorduğu.	
		3. Lloyd George'un, Yunanlıların yenilmesi halinde yepyeni bir durumun ortaya çıkacağını, fakat Yunan kuvvetlerine güvendiğini, herhalde birkaç hafta içinde durumun aydınlanacağını belirttiği. Sonuç olarak, İstanbul ve Boğazlar bölgesindeki İtilâf devletleri kuvvetlerinin Yunan kuvvetleriyle takviyesine ve Yunanlıların ileri yürümelerine karar verildiği.	
		4. Barış andlaşması tasarısına cevap vermek için 11 Temmuz'a kadar mühlet isteyen Türk delegelerinin bu isteğinin görüşüldüğü. Kont Sforza'nın Türklere 15 günlük mühlet daha tanınmasından yana olduğu. Lord Curzon'un ise bu arada M. Kemal'in başarı kazanarak Türklerin durumunun kuvvetlenebileceğinden kuşkulandığı ve yeniden mühlet verilmesine karşı çıktığı. Lloyd George'un da Lord Curzon'u desteklediği. M. Millerand'ın ise Türklere mühlet tanımayı önce uygun bulduğu fakat Lloyd George'un ısrarı üzerine bu görüşünden vazgeçtiği. Sonunda, Türk cevabının ancak iki-üç gün gecikmesine göz yumulabileceğine karar verildiği.	
53	23 Haziran	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAREŞAL ALLENBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 616. ....	156
		Emir Faysal'dan iki mektup alındığı:	
		1. Birinci mektubun 7 Haziran tarihli olduğu. (Bkz. No. 39)	
		2. 10 Haziran tarihli ikinci mektubunda Faysal'ın:	
		i) Fransız politikasının Arabistan'ı anarşiye sevkettiğini.	



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		<p>ii) Fransızlarla M. Kemal'in yaptıkları ateşkes anlaşmasının Araplar için bir yıldırım darbesi olduğunu, kendi (Faysal'ın) itibarını zayıflattığını, zira Türklere taraftarlık güden birçok kişiyi sürmek, birçok mahalli gazeteyi de kapatmak durumunda kaldığını.</p> <p>iii) Tehlikenin yakın olduğunu, çünkü Türk kuvvetlerinin sınırı aşmış bulduklarını anlattığı.</p> <p>3. Faysal'a, mektuplarının İngiltere Hükümetine iletileceğinin vadedildiği.</p>	
54	23 haziran	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 736.</p>	158
		<p>1. Reşit Bey ile Cemil Paşa'nın İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini ziyaret ettikleri, barış andlaşmasına Türk cevap tasarısının tamamlanmak üzere olduğunu ve 28 Haziran'da Paris'e hareket edeceklerini bildirdikleri.</p> <p>2. Sir de Robeck'in kendilerine biran önce Paris'e hareket etmeyi tavsiye ve bir İngiliz gemisinde yer ayırtmayı vadettiği.</p> <p>3. Türk tasarısının anlayışla karşılanacağı umudunu belirten Osmanlı delegelerine cevaben Amiral de Robeck'in, milliyetçi kuvvetlerin İzmit'te İngiliz askerlerine saldırdığı bir sırada Türk tasarısının soğuk tesir bırakacağını söylediği.</p> <p>4. Yüksek Komiserin, M. Kemal'in adamlarının Paris'te de çalıştıklarını belirterek, Osmanlı delegelerine biran önce hareket ve milliyetçileri takbih etme tavsiyesinde bulunduğu. Delegelerin şiddetle milliyetçileri takbih ettikleri, İngiliz himayesine güvenlerini tekrarladıkları.</p> <p>(Telgrafın gizli bölümü).</p> <p>5. Delegelere biran önce hareket etmelerini tavsiye ederken, Reşit Beyi tezelden İstanbul'dan uzaklaştırma amacı güdüldüğü, zira kendisinin Ferit Paşa'ya karşı entrika çevirmeğe ve milliyetçilerle işbirliği yapmağa yöneldiği; bu oyunda Fransa'nın da parmağı bulunduğu.</p>	

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55	24 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 908/M. 2418/4. ....	159
Ek.	12 haziran	FRANSIZ - TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ KONUSUNDA GİZLİ RAPOR: MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'dan KONYA, DİYARBAKIR VE SİVAS'taki KOLORDULAR, NİĞDE'deki 11. TÜMEN VE ANTEP VE KİLİKYA'daki KUVAYI MİLLİYE'ye. 28/29 MAYIS 1920 TARİHLİ TEBLİGAT ÖRNEĞİ.	160
		1. Fransızlarla milliyetçiler arasında ateşkes anlaşması imzalandığı ve anlaşmanın aşağıdaki hükümleri kapsadığı: i) 29/30 Mayıs 1920 gece yarısından itibaren Fransızlarla çarpışmaların kesileceği ve ateşkesin 20 gün süreceği. ii) Fransızların Pozantı, Sis ve Antep'ten 10 gün içinde çekilecekleri. iii) Yine 10 gün içinde karşılıklı olarak esirlerin serbest bırakılacağı. iv) Adana ve civarı Osmanlı makamları ile haberleşmenin yeniden başlayacağı. 2. Antep, Sis ve Pozantı'nın boşaltılması ve esirlerin serbest bırakılmasıyla ilgili teferruatın ayrı bir tebliğ ile bildirileceği. 3. Ateşkes'in 30 Mayıs sabahı ilân edilmesi ve ileri karakollara emirlerin iletilmesi, anlaşmanın bütün şartlarının uygulanması talimatı.	
56	24 haziran	İNGİLTERE'nin ATİNA ELÇİSİ LORD GRANVILLE'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 161 GİZLİ. ....	161
		Yunanlıların Anadolu'da ileri harekâta geçtikleri. Mustafa Kemal'in Marmara denizi ile ulaştırma hatlarını kesmek amacı güttükleri, şiddetli savaşlar beklediği, doğu Trakya'yı işgal etme işinin, Anadolu harekâtı sonuçlanıncaya kadar geri bırakıldığı, Bulgarların muhtemel kıpırdanışları Yunanlıları sınırlendirdiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
57	24 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 915.	162
		1. Osmanlı Harbiye nezaretindeki müttefiklerarası kontrol komisyonu konusunda anlaşmazlıkla ilgili olarak General Milne'den alınan cevabî yazı örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Kilikya'da Fransız kuvvetlerinin harekâtı, Fransızların M. Kemal ile ateşkes anlaşması yapmaları konularında Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin İngiliz meslekdaşına bilgi vermediği.	
		3. İtalyan Yüksek Komiserinin de İtalyan askerlerinin güney-batı Anadolu'daki harekâtından İngiliz Yüksek Komiserini haberdar etmediği.	
		4. Fransa ve İtalya Yüksek Komiserlerinin ayrılık yarattıklarından sitem.	
Ek.	23 haziran	İNGİLİZ KARADENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'den İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e. YAZI. ....	163
		1. Osmanlı Harbiye Nezaretinin kontrolü ve İstanbul'un işgali konularında kendisinin (Milne'nin) yalnız İngiltere Hükümetinden emir aldığı, Fransa ve İtalya temsilcilerince otoritesinin tanınıp tanınmayacağını onlarla tartışamayacağı.	
		2. Kendisinin, İtilâf devletlerinin Anadolu'daki kuvvetlerinin kumandanı olduğu, bu konuda gerekli göreceği tedbirleri almakta serbest bulunduğu.	
58	24 haziran	YUNAN BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL PARASKEVOPULO TARAFINDAN YAYINLANAN BİLDİRİ. ....	163
		1. M. Kemal'in teşkilâtını dağıtıp asayişini sağlamak için Yunan kuvvetlerinin Anadolu içlerine yürümeye çağırıldığı, bu harekâtın fetih amacı gütmeyeceği.	
		2. M. Kemal taraftarlarının hem Hükümete isyan eden, hem de İtilâf devletleri kararlarını engellemeğe çalışan kimseler oldukları ve Anadolu'da normal hayatı köstekledikleri.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. İzmir ve civarının işgalinde olduğu gibi bu defa da Yunan kuvvetlerinin herkesin can, mal ve namus güvenliğine saygı gösterecekleri.	
		4. Osmanlı idari makamlarının normal görevlerine devam edecekleri, az çok M. Kemal'le işbirliğine katılmış olanların bile korkmamaları gerektiği.	
		5. Ancak, Yunan işgal ordularının emirlerine uymayanların şiddetle cezalandırılacakları.	
59	26 haziran	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 751.	165
		1. İstanbul'un askeri kontrolünün Fransızlara verilmesi, General Milne'nin ise yalnız Anadolu'dan sorumlu olması yolunda M. Millerand'ın teklifinin İngiliz çıkarları bakımından sakıncalı olduğu.	
		2. İngiltere'nin halen Türk milliyetçileriyle savaş halinde bulunduğu, Fransızların ise M. Kemal'le ateşkes anlaşması imzaladıkları; kontrolün Fransızlara bırakıldığı takdirde İstanbul'da milliyetçi bir Hükümetin başa geçebileceği.	
		3. Kumanda bölgelerinin İtilâf devletleri arasında paylaşılması fikrinin General Milne'nin Doğudaki İtilâf devletleri orduları Başkomutanı olması ile taban tabana zıt olduğu.	
60	26 haziran	İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2036. ....	166
		Paris'te çıkan "Cause Commune" adlı Rus dergisinin 26 Haziran 1920 tarihli sayısında Çiçerin'in M. Kemal Paşa'ya gönderdiği 4 Haziran 1920 tarihli mektubunun yayınlandığı. M. Kemal'in Sovyetlerle diplomatik ilişkiler kurma arzusunu belirten bir mektubuna cevap olan Çiçerin'in bu mektubunun özeti. Dergi sayısının eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	26 haziran	PARİS'te YAYINLANAN "CAUSE COMMUNE" ADLI DERGİ KESİTİ: ÇİÇERİN'in MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'ya GÖNDERDİĞİ 4 HAZİRAN 1920 TARİHLİ MEKTUP. .... (Mustafa Kemal'in) Sovyetlerle diplomatik ilişkiler kurma arzusuyla ilgili mektubunun alındığı ve An-	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
61	28 haziran	<p>kara Hükümetinin dış politika ilkelerinin Sovyetlerce memnuniyetle öğrenildiği. (8 ilkenin tekrarı). Sovyetlerin Türkiye ile diplomatik ve konsolosluk ilişkileri kurmak istediği. Türk halkına savaşında başarı dileği.</p> <p>MUSUL'daki İNGİLİZ SİYASİ SUBAYINDAN İNGİLTERE'nin BAĞDAT SİVİL KOMİSERİNE GİZLİ YAZI. No. 4761/C/6. ....</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Şırnaklı Süleyman Ağa'dan alınan bir mektubun ilişikte sunulduğu.</li> <li>2. Süleyman Ağa'nın, kendilerine Bedirhaniler sülalesinden bir yönetici gönderilmesini istediği.</li> <li>3. Kendisine genel mahiyette bir cevap verildiği ve Şeyhülislam'ın M. Kemal aleyhindeki fetvasından bir örnek gönderildiği.</li> </ol>	169
Ek.	25 haziran	<p>ŞIRNAK AŞİRET REİSİ SÜLEYMAN AĞA AL TATAR AĞA'dan MUSUL'daki İNGİLİZ SİYASİ SUBAYINA MEKTUP. ....</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Osmanlı Hükümetine karşı ayaklanmış bulunan M. Kemal'in Anadolu'yu ve Kürdistan'ı İstanbul'dan koparmış olduğu.</li> <li>2. M. Kemal'in yönetimi altında olmak istemedikleri ve İngiltere Hükümetinin yardımıyla kendilerine Bedirhanlar ailesinden bir idareci gönderilmesini istedikleri.</li> <li>3. Ankara'da bir Hükümet kuran M. Kemal'in aşiretleri İngiltere aleyhine kışkırttığı, kendisinin (Süleyman Ağa'nın) ise İngiltere'ye sadık kaldığı.</li> </ol>	170
62	29 haziran	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 934/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....</p> <p>İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.</p>	171
Ek.	23 haziran	<p>İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 16-23 HAZİRAN 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Paris'te barış görüşmeleri ve Tevfik Paşa'nın tel-grafi.</li> </ol>	171

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Türk Hükümetinin konferansa sunacağı barış şartlarının İngiliz istihbarat teşkilâtınca elde edildiği.	
		3. M. Kemal Paşa'nın B.M. Meclisinde yaptığı konuşmanın Bursa'da çıkan "Millet Yolu" gazetesinde yayınlandığı. Konuşmanın özeti.	
		4. Zeki Paşa'nın milliyetçilerle görüşme ve anlaşma denemesinin başarısız kaldığı.	
63	1 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. YAZI. No. 839. ....	175
		İstanbul'da çıkan "Erivan" adlı Ermeni gazetesinde sansüre rağmen yayınlanan bazı yazıların ilişikte sunulduğu. Bunların ilginç görüldüğü.	
Ek. 1	21 haziran	"ERİVAN" GAZETESİNDE ÇIKAN YAZI: "ERMENİLER KİLİKYA'nın BAĞIMSIZLIĞINI İLAN ETTİLER" — "ERMENİ KUVVETLERİ KOMUTANININ MİLLİYETÇİLERE ÜLTİMATOMU". ....	176
		1. Ermenilerin güvendikleri dostlarca terkedildikleri, şimdi düşmanla karşı karşıya buldukları.	
		2. Fransızlar tarafından Türkler karşısında yapayalnız bırakılan Ermenilerin silâha sarıldıkları ve Kilikya'nın bağımsızlığını ilân ettikleri.	
		3. Kilikya'da bağımsızlık ilânından sonra Ermeni kuvvetleri komutanı Serop Roupignan'ın (Serop Paşanın) M. Kemal'e bir ultimatoma gönderip Türk kuvvetlerinin 48 saat içinde Kilikya'dan çekilmelerini istediği.	
Ek. 2	21 haziran	"ERİVAN" GAZETESİNDE ÇIKAN YAZI: MUSTAFA KEMAL İLE FRANSIZLAR ARASINDA YAPILAN ATEŞKES ANLAŞMASI ÜZERİNE MUSTAFA KEMAL'in BAZI KOLORDU KUMANDANLARINA, KİLİKYA VE ANTEP'teki KUVAYİ MİLLİYE KOMUTANLARINA GÖNDERDİĞİ 28/29 MAYIS 1920 TARİHLİ TALİMAT ÖRNEĞİ. ....	177
		(Bkz. No. 55'e ek).	
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		ADANA'da YAYINLADIĞI 2 HAZİRAN 1920 TARİHLİ BİLDİRİ. ....	178
		1. Pozantı ve Sis'in hemen boşaltılacağı. 2. Antep'in de boşaltılacağı, fakat oradaki Ermenilere saldırmayacağı. 3. Karşılıklı olarak esirlerin mübadele edilecekleri. 4. Adana Valisinin Türk Kolordu komutanlarıyla serbestçe haberleşebileceği. 5. Anlaşmanın M. Kemal'in Berut'taki delegelerinin isteği üzerine yapıldığı. 6. Bunun sadece bir askeri anlaşma olduğu. 7. Durumun önceki gibi kaldığı, karışıklık çıkaracakların sert muamele görecekleri.	
Ek. 4	21 haziran	"ERIVAN" GAZETESİNDE ÇIKAN YAZI: GENERAL DUFIEUX'nün BİLDİRİSİ. ....	179
		1. General Dufieux'nün bildirişi üzerine bir Türk delegasyonunun Adana'da Albay Bremont'u ziyareti. Albayın Fransızların Kilikya'da güvenliği sağlamağa geldiklerini, Türk topraklarının zaptetmek niyetinde olmadıklarını söylemesi ve güvenliği sağlamak için Türklerin çaba harcamalarını istemesi. 2. General Dufieux'nün bir Ermeni delegasyonuna Türklerle yapılan son anlaşmanın askeri bir anlaşma olduğunu bildirmesi; kendi emirlerine uyulmasını istemesi, karışıklık çıkaracakların cezalandırılacaklarını açıklaması. 3. 25 Mayıs 1920 tarihli Fransız bildirişi: Fransız kuvvetlerinin 23 Mayıs'ta Antep'te zafer kazandıkları, 1200 Kemalist öldürdükleri, binlerce esir aldıkları.	
Ek. 5	31 mayıs	GENERAL DUFIEUX'nün ADANA'da YAYINLADIĞI BİLDİRİ. ....	180
		1. Bazı kimselerin evlerinde "âsileri" sakladıkları ve bu âsilerin Fransız kuvvetlerini rahatsız ettikleri, bu yüzden Osmaniye'de âsilere karşı girişilen harekâta birçok binanın zarar gördüğü. 2. Bir süredir Adana'da âsilerin evlerde saklandıkları, halkın bunları evlerinden çıkarmadıkları takdirde Osmaniye'deki gibi sert tedbirlere başvurulacağı.	
64	1 temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNİN KOPENHAG'dan ALDIĞI SİYASİ RAPOR. D/57.	181

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65	6 temmuz	Çiçerin'in M. Kemal'e gönderdiği mektup. (Nota) Mektubun 12 madde halinde özeti. Raporun iki maddesi üzerinde Foreign Office'in şüpheli notu. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ KARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT BAŞKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1.0947. ....	182
		1. Ankara'da milliyetçi liderler arasında ayrılık bulunduğu; Küçük Kâzım Paşa ile Fevzi Paşa tarafından desteklenen mutedillerin M. Kemal'den ayrılacakları.	
		2. Bu grubun muhtemelen Ahmet İzzet Paşa'yı lider olarak kabul edebilecekleri.	
66	7 temmuz	İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ SPA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. ....	183
		1. Barış andlaşması tasarısına Türkiye'nin verdiği cevabın görüşüldüğü.	
		2. "Türlere acımamak, M. Kemal'e ders vermek" gibi düşüncelerle, Türkiye'nin teklif ve isteklerinin reddedilmesinin savunulduğu. İtalyan delegesinin daha yumuşak davranılarak bir uyuşma yolu aranması görüşünün paylaşılmadığı. Lloyd George'un Türkler aleyhinde çok ağır konuşması.	
		3. Türk notasına cevap vermek için, Yunan ordularının Anadolu'da kazandıkları başarının yarattığı havadan yararlanmak ve cevabı geciktirmemek görüşünün ortaya atıldığı.	
		4. Barış andlaşmasını imzalaması için Türkiye'ye tanıncak mühletin kısa olmasının istendiği.	
		5. M. Venizelos'un, barış andlaşmasındaki bazı maddelerin değiştirilmesini teklif ettiği.	
		6. Sonunda aşağıdaki kararların alındığı:	
		a) i) Türkiye'nin tekliflerinin reddedilmesi.	
		ii) Barış andlaşmasını imzalaması için Türkiye'ye 10 günlük mühlet tanınması.	
		iii) Türkiye'ye verilecek cevabın bir komisyonca üç gün içinde hazırlanması.	
		b) Andlaşmanın 144. maddesinin değiştirilmesi (Türkiye'ye dönecek gayri müslim göçmenlerin sayısını arttırmak).	



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		c) Midilli adasının silâhsızlandırılmaması teklifinin yeniden komisyonda görüşülmesi.	
		d) Askeri komisyonun görüşlerinin Türkiye'ye cevabı hazırlayacak komisyona bildirilmesi.	
		<i>Not : De Robeck'ten Curzon'a. 5. 7. 1920 günlü, 585 sayılı tel :</i>	
		Yunanlılar Bursa üzerine yürürken, İngiliz donanmasının da Mudanya'yı vurma kararı.	
67	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 795. ÇOK ACELE. ....	191
		1. Doğu Trakya'nın hemen işgali ve bunun için Anadolu'dan Trakya'ya Yunan askeri taşınması hakkında Venizelos'un Yunan komutanına emir verdiği ve Yunan komutanının Tekirdağ'a asker çıkarmak için General Milne'den yardım istediği.	
		2. Venizelos'un bu emrinin pek ihtiyatsız ve düşüncesiz bir davranış olduğu, zira şu sıralarda Trakya'nın sâkin olduğu, işgali gerektiren bir sebep bulunmadığı. Anadolu'da milliyetçi direniş kırıldıktan sonra Trakya'nın kolaylıkla işgal edilebileceği.	
		3. Anadolu'daki durumun ise henüz müphem olduğu, M. Kemal'in nasıl bir hareket hattı izleyeceğinin bilinmediği. Yunanlıların Anadolu'da gerilemelerinin pek ciddi sonuçlar doğuracağı, bu nedenle Anadolu'daki Yunan kuvvetlerini azaltmanın akıllıca bir iş olmayacağı.	
68	8 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 984/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....	192
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	1 temmuz	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 24 HAZİRAN-1 TEMMUZ 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	192

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		1. Barış şartları sorunu. Osmanlı Dahiliye Nâzırı Reşit Beyin Padişaha bir muhtıra sunarak barış şartlarını özetlediği ve Anadolu ile anlaşmaya varılmasını telkin ettiği.	
		2. Reşit Beyin ayrıca M. Kemal'e de bir mektup gönderdiği, İstanbul ile Ankara'nın anlaşmaları gerektiğini savunduğu.	
		3. B.M. Meclisinde Barış andlaşması sorununun görüldüğü ve İngiltere aleyhinde sert konuşmalar yapıldığı.	
		4. Barış şartlarının milliyetçilerce reddedildiğinin M. Kemal Paşa tarafından doğrulandığı.	
		5. Ankara'nın yabancı devletlerle ilişkileri, Avrupa ile haberleşme yolu.	
		6. Velihaht ile M. Kemal'in muhabere ettikleri, son olarak 9 Haziran'da M. Kemal'in Velihahta bir mektup gönderdiği.	
		7. Bulgaristan Kralının Padişaha bir mektup yolladığı.	
69	9 temmuz	İZMİR'de KOMODOR FITZMAURICE'ten İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANINA RAPOR. GİZLİ. ....	198
		1. İzmir'de ve Batı Anadolu'da durum: Yunan kuvvetlerinin Edremit ve Susurluk'u işgal ettikleri, Bandırma'ya çıkartma yaptıkları, fakat M. Kemal kuvvetlerinin kesin bir muharebeye girişmeyerek Bursa'ya doğru çekildikleri; M. Kemal kuvvetlerini yoketme veya esir alma amacı güden Yunan harekâtının bu bakımdan başarılı olamadığı.	
		2. Balıkesir'de 850 esir alındığı, Vurla esir kampının ziyaret edildiği.	
		3. Güney'de, Nazilli bölgesinden iyi haber alınamadığı.	
		4. Türk çetelerini İtalyan işgal bölgesine doğru kovulayan Yunanlılar ile İtalyanlar arasında çatışma olduğu.	
		5. İzmir bölgesinden çeşitli haberler.	
70	10 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'dan ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ G. BUCHANAN'a YAZI. No. 643. ....	200
		1. Yakın ve Orta Doğunun hemen hemen her tarafında İtalyanların öteki İtilâf Devletlerinden ayrı ve	

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		<p>özellikle Türk milliyetçilerini desteklercesine bir tutum izledikleri; Anadolu'da İtalyan ajanlarının M. Kemal ile sıkı temasta oldukları.</p> <p>2. İtalyan'ların, Türkiye ile yapılacak barışın İzmir ve Trakya ile ilgili hükümlerini değiştirmek isteyecekleri yolunda raporlar alındığı; İtalyan ajanlarının Türk milliyetçilerinin gittikçe güçleneceklerini düşünerek onlarla iyi geçinmek fikrinde oldukları ve ayrıca Yunanlılardan kuşkulandıkları.</p> <p>3. Doğu'da Banco di Roma'nın da İngiliz aleyhtarlığını körüklediği.</p> <p>4. Bütün bu şikâyetlerin Spa konferansında Kont Sforza'ya anlatıldığı. Kontun dostane niyetler beslediği, fakat vatandaşlarının her zaman kendisiyle aynı düşüncede olmadıkları.</p>	
71	11 temmuz	<p>İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ SPA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KÂTİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. ....</p>	203
		<p>Barış andlaşması konusunda Türkiye'ye verilecek cevabi nota taslağının görüşüldüğü ve şu kararların alındığı:</p> <p>1. Komisyonca hazırlanan taslağın ufak değişikliklerle kabulü.</p> <p>2. 8 Temmuz 1920 tarihli yeni Türk notasının komisyona yollanması ve Komisyona ufak tefek tâvizler verme yetkisinin tanınması.</p> <p>3. Türkiye'ye verilecek notanın en geç 17 Temmuz kadar hazırlanıp bitirilmesi.</p>	
72	13 temmuz	<p>İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI MÜDÜRÜ SIR B. THOMSON'dan DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH'e YAZI. No. S.B. 19940/M.H. GİZLİ. ....</p>	207
		<p>Cemal Paşa'nın, Halil Paşa ve Fuad Bey ile birlikte Moskova'ya gitmiş olduğu, bunların M. Kemal'in temsilcileri gibi davrandıkları ve Mustafa Kemal'in Moskova Elçiliğini yürütmek üzere orada kalacakları haberi.</p> <p><i>Haber üzerinde Foreign Office'in notu: Mustafa Kemal'in Moskova Elçiliği konusunda ilk haber.</i></p>	

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73	13 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞ- LERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1003/M/2279. GİZLİ. ....	207
Ek.	8 temmnz	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 2-8 TEMMUZ. 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	208
		1. Barış şartları ve Yunanlıların ilerlemeleri yüzünden Türkiye'de ümitsiz ve gergin bir hava estiği. 2. Osmanlı Hariciye Nâzırı Reşid Bey ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa arasında mektuplaşmalar ve mektup- ların özeti. 3. Bir Fransız iş adamının Anadolu dönüşünde verdiği haberler. M. Kemal ile Halide Edib'in arasının açıldığı. 4. Ankara'daki milliyetçi liderler arasında ikilik bu- lunduğu, bu konuda haberler. 5. Batı Trakya'da kurulan Hükümet hakkında haber- ler ve bu Hükümet üyelerinin adları, kimlikleri. 6. Samsun ve Trabzon bölgesi hakkında eski bir İn- giliz subayının verdiği haberler. 7. Anadolu milliyetçi basınının iyimserliği. 8. İtalya'da İttihatçılar ve faaliyetleri. 9. Panislamizm propagandası.	
74	14 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞ- LERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 814. ACELE. GİZLİ. ....	213
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75	15 temmuz	İNGİLİZ ALBAYI G. B. STOKES'in KAFKAS- LAR'da DURUM İLE İLGİLİ RAPORU. ....	214

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<p>1. Azerbaycan'ın halen Bolşeviklerin elinde bulunduğu, bunun sorumluluğunun M. Kemal ile Nuri Paşalara ait olduğu. Zira, Bolşeviklerden silâh ve cep-hane almak umudunda olan M. Kemal'in onlarla doğrudan doğruya temasa geçebilmek için Azerbaycan lılara Bolşevik yönetimi kabul etmelerini telkin ettiği. Bolşeviklere karşı ayaklanan Azerlerin bastırıldıkları ve Ermenilerin de yardımıyla Bolşeviklerin Gence'de 15.000 Tatar'ı (Azeriyi) katlettikleri. Halen Bolşeviklerin terör rejiminin hakim olduğu.</p> <p>2. Gürcistan'ın, Bolşevik ilerlemesi karşısında güç durumda bulunduğu, Bolşevik aleyhtarı olan Gürcistan'ın halen Bolşeviklerle bir çeşit mütareke imzalamış sayılabileceği, arada gerçek barış bulunmadığı. Gürcistan'ın çeşitli iç ve dış politika sorunları.</p> <p>3. Ermenistan'ın bir ortak Bolşevik-Tatar (Azeri) saldırısına uğrama tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya olduğu, Türk tarafından M. Kemal'in de kendilerine karşı kuvvet göndermesi halinde Ermenilerin nâzik bir durumda kalacakları.</p> <p>4. Kuzey Kafkasya aşiretlerinin Nuri Paşa tarafından Bolşevikliği kabule ikna edildikleri.</p> <p>5. İtilâf devletlerinin Kafkasya heyetleri arasında dayanışma bulunmadığı, İtalyan ve Fransa heyetlerinin İngiltere aleyhinde faaliyet gösterdikleri.</p> <p>6. Kafkasya'daki telgraf hatlarının ya Bolşeviklerin ya da Türk milliyetçilerinin kontrolünde bulunduğu, İngiliz ve Gürcü çıkarları bakımından Tiflis ve Avrupa arasında telgraf muhaberatının sağlanması gerektiği.</p> <p>7. Sonuç olarak, İngiliz çıkarları açısından Kafkaslardaki durumun halen memnuniyet verici olmadığı ve bunun düzeltilmesi gerektiği.</p>	
76	16 temmuz	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. TEL. No. 829. .... 222</p> <p>1. Paris'ten dönen Ferit Paşa'nın İngiliz Yüksek komiserini ziyaret ettiği, Türkiye'nin pek sert bir barış andlaşması karşısında kaldığını, bunun imzalanmasının tam bir yıkım olacağını söylediği.</p>	

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		2. Ferit Paşa'nın, andlaşmanın imzalanmasına karşı direnen milliyetçilerin aleyhinde konuştuğu, milli hareketin bastırılmasını savunduğu; aslında bu hareketin zayıf olduğunu ve Yunanlılar Anadolu'ya yürüdükleri takdirde Ankara'ya, Sivas'a ve hattâ Erzurum'a kadar ciddi bir direnişle karşılaşmadan ilerleyebileceklerini, onlar için bunun bir "askeri gezinti" (military promenade) olacağını ileri sürdüğü.	
		3. Sadrazamın, barış andlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonra Anadolu'da asayişi sağlamak için İngiltere'den yardım istediği, bu yardım sağlanmadığı takdirde makul insanların bile andlaşmanın imzalanmasına karşı olacaklarını belirttiği.	
		4. (J. de Robeck'in izlenimine göre), Sadrazamın tevekkülle andlaşmayı imzalayacağı ve muhtemelen İtilâf ve Hürriyet partisi üyelerinden yeni bir kabine kuracağı.	
77	18 temmuz	KAHİRE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ MAREŞAL ALLENBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a. ŞİFRE TEL. No. 729. ÇOK ACELE. ....	224
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		2. Fransızların kendisine 14 Temmuzda bir ultiमत verdiklerini bildiren Faysal'ın bunu kabul edemeyeceğini açıkladığı ve İngiltere ve Milletler Cemiyetinin müdahale etmelerini istediği.	
		3. ultiमतın mûhleti bugün (18 Temmuz) sona erdiğinden yarın çarpışmaların başlayabileceği.	
78	23 temmuz	YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA NOTA. No. 3730/St./20. ....	225
		Batum'daki Yunan viskonsolosluğundan alınan haber: Bolşeviklerin Anadolu'ya silâh ve para yardımı yaptıkları. Mustafa Kemal'in Pontus'tan kaçan Rum ve Ermeni mültecilerin kendisine teslim edilmelerini Bolşeviklerden istediği.	
		Nota hakkında Foreign Office'in kısa notu.	
79	25 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1044/M/2279.	226

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		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	15 temmuz	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 8-15 TEMMUZ 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. ....	226
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		2. Osmanlı barış delegasyonunun Paris'ten dönmeğe karar verdiği.	
		3. İstanbul Hükümetinin barış andlaşmasını görüştüğü.	
		4. Padişahın 25 Haziran'da Mustafa Kemal'e bir mektup gönderdiği ve Hükümete itaat etmesini istediği.	
		5. Reşid Beyin de Nureddin Paşa aracılığı ile milliyetçilere çağrıda bulunduğu.	
		6. Büyük Millet Meclisininin 27 Haziran tarihli toplantısında, Yunan ilerlemesi gözönünde tutularak Mustafa Kemal'e olağanüstü yetkiler verildiği. Yetkilerin özellikleri.	
		7. İtalyan'ların Yunanlılar aleyhinde propaganda yaptıkları.	
		8. Bandırma bölgesi hakkında haberler. Yunan Başkumandanı ile Bandırma'da Çerkez Şah İsmail arasında bir anlaşma imzalandığı.	
		9. Panislamizm propagandası.	
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		2. Mr. Bonar Law'ın, bulunmadığı yolunda cevap vermesi.	
81	28 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 858. ....	231
		1. Edirne'deki Türk kuvvetlerinin 26 Temmuzda teslim oldukları ve Yunan Başkumandanının şimdi M.	

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		Kemal'in üzerine yürüyüp Eskişehir ve Ankara'ya kadar ilerlemek niyetinde olduğu.	
		2. Fransızların da bu ilerlemeye taraftar oldukları.	
		3. Askeri bakımdan, General Milne'nin yeni Yunan ilerlemesine karşı olduğu. Anadolu içlerinde güçlükle karşılaşacak Yunanlıların İngilizlerden yardım isteyeceklerini ve İngilizleri de işe sürükleyeceklerini düşündüğü.	
		4. Siyasi bakımdan da Yunan ilerlemesinin sakıncalı olacağı. Bunun, Türk milli hareketini yeniden alevlendireceği, Yunanlıların İtilaf devletleri hesabına ilerlemiş olmayacakları ve Türk hükümetinin barış andlaşmasını imzalayacağı bir anda bu ilerlemenin yeni bir savaşın başlangıcı anlamına geleceği.	
		5. Halen Kilikya'da güç durumda bulunan Fransızların sırf kendi çıkarları için Yunan ilerlemesinden yana oldukları.	
		6. İngiltere Hükümetinin yeni Yunan ilerlemesine razı olmaması dileği.	
82	28 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 861. ÇOK ACELE. ....	233
		1. Kürt teklifleri hakkındaki görüşlerin bildirilmesi ricası.	
		2. Sadrazam'ın İngilizlerle işbirliği halinde, M. Kemal'e karşı Kürtleri kullanmayı teklif etmesi.	
		3. Projenin uygulanmasının büsbütün imkânsız olmadığı, ancak Fransız nüfuz bölgesinde kalan Kürtleri de kullanabilmek için Fransızların da işbirliği yapmaları gerektiği.	
83	28 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1061. ....	233
		1. Antep'teki durum ve Ermenilerle Türk milliyetçileri arasındaki anlaşma konularında iki belgenin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. Belgelerde, milliyetçilerin Fransızlara karşı tutumları ile Ermenilerin Antep'ten ayrılmama kararı konusundaki paragraflara dikkat çekilmesi.	



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Ek. 1	—	ANTEP'teki DURUMLA İLGİLİ OLARAK ERMENİ PATRİĞİNİN İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE SUNDUĞU RAPOR. ....	234
		1. <i>Dörtyol, 4 Haziran</i> —Dörtyol kasabasının, Türk çetelerinin saldırısına uğradığı ve Ermenilerin saldırılara karşı direndikleri.	
		2. <i>Urfa, 9 Mayıs</i> —Urfa'daki Fransız garnizonunun tesliminden beri Ermenilerin Türk saldırısını beledikleri ve güç durumda oldukları.	
		3. <i>Antep, 1 Haziran</i> —Antep'in iki aydır Türkler tarafından kuşatılmış bulunduğu, açlık tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya olduğu, M. Kemal ile yaptıkları anlaşma sonunda Fransızların Antep'ten çekilmeye karar verdikleri, Ermenilerin ise şehri bırakmamak için direnmek azminde oldukları. Maraş'ta da Ermenilerin acıklı durumda buldukları.	
Ek. 2	—	ANTEP'teki DURUMLA İLGİLİ OLARAK ERMENİ PATRİĞİNDEN İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE RAPOR. ....	237
		1. <i>Antep, 12 Haziran</i> — Fransızların 8 Haziranda Antep'ten çekildikleri, Ermenilerin Türklere teslim oldukları, M. Kemal'in otoritesini tandırdıkları, fakat halâ korku içinde buldukları.	
		2. <i>Halep, 16 Haziran</i> — Antep Ermenilerini korumak için, Halep Ermenilerinin Berut'taki General Gouraud'ya başvurdukları, Amerikan Kızılhaçının yardımıyla bir kısım Ermenilerin Antep'ten Berut'a göç ettikleri.	
		3. <i>Halep, 24 Haziran</i> —Maraş Ermenilerinin sefalet içinde buldukları ve göç etmek istedikleri.	
		4. <i>Trabzon, 21 Haziran</i> — TBMM'nin askeri diktatörlük ilân edebileceği, Trabzon Ermenilerinin korku içinde buldukları ve bir savaş gemisi gönderilmesini diledikleri.	
		Ordu ve Giresun'da da durumun gergin olduğu.	
Ek. 3.	—	ERMENİ PROTESTAN CEMAATİ BAŞKANININ VERDİĞİ BİLGİLER ÜZERİNE MUHTIRA	239
		1. Fransızların çekilmeleri üzerine Antep Ermenilerinin milliyetçilere teslim oldukları fakat geleceklerinden kaygulu buldukları.	

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		2. Emir Faysal'ın Halep'te ileri gelen Ermenilerle görüştüğü ve Halep'e karşı bir Türk saldırısı olursa Ermenilerin kendisini desteklemelerini istediği.	
84	29 temmuz	İNGİLTERE PARLAMENTO TUTANAKLARINDAN PARÇA. . . . . Mr. Malone'un, Başbakana yazılı sorusu: İtalyanların M. Kemal'e silâh yardımı konusunda herhangi bir teşebbüs yapıp yapılmadığı. <i>Başbakanın cevabı:</i> Bu konudaki bir rapor üzerine, İtalyan makamlarının gayri resmi olarak dikkatlerinin çekildiği.	240
85	30 temmuz	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İstanbul'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 705.	240
		1. Anadolu'da Yunanlıların yeni bir ileri harekât fikrinden şimdilik vazgeçildiği, fakat Venizelos'la görüşülmekte olduğu. 2. İtilâf devletlerine olduğu kadar Türk Hükümetine de düşman olan M. Kemal'in yenilmesi veya yokedilmesinin, barış andlaşmasının onaylanması için etkili garanti olacağı.	
86	30 temmuz	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1074. . . . . Amiral de Robeck'in Paris'ten dönen Sadrazam Ferit Paşa ile görüşmesi:	241
		1. Sadrazamın, barış andlaşmasının biraz yumuşatılması yolundaki son Türk arzusunun etkisini sorduğu, Yüksek Komiserin andlaşmaya karşı direnme çabasının kötü sonuçlar doğuracağını söylediği. . . 2. Edirne'de Cafer Tayyar beyin andlaşmaya karşı direnmesini önlemek için konuşulduğu. 3. Sadrazamın, Trakya'daki silâhların Yunanlılara verilmemesini istediği. Yüksek komiserin bu konuyu askerlerle görüşmeyi vadettiği. 4. Sadrazam Ferit Paşa'nın, barış andlaşmasını imzalayıp uygulamayı görev saydığı, fakat imzaladıktan sonra memlekette asayışı sağlamak için İngiliz yardımına güvenip güvenemeyeceğini sorduğu.	

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5. Amiral de Robeck'in, andlaşma imzalandıktan sonra asayiş sağlaması için İngiltere'nin işbirliği yapacağını söylediği ve Sadrazamın buna sevindiği.
6. Ferit Paşa ile General Shuttleworth'un M. Kemal'e karşı bir gizli plan hazırladıkları, bu plana göre, andlaşma imzalanmaz 15 bin kişilik bir Padişah ordusunun ve ayrıca doğudan Kürtlerin M. Kemal'in üzerine saldırtılmak istendiği.
7. Sadrazamın son olarak Çatalca hattı yerine Midye-Enez hattına kadarki yerlerin Türkiye'ye bırakılması dileğini tekrarladığı.
8. Türk Genelkurmay Başkanı Hamdi Paşa'nın Kürtçü olması ihtimali.

*Not : Damat Ferit Paşa'dan De Robeck'e 22.7.1920 günlü nota.*

Barış andlaşmasını imzalayacak Osmanlı heyetinin 23.7.1920 günü Paris'e gideceği. Andlaşma hükümlerinin biraz yumuşatılması ricası. Midye-Enez sınırının kabul edilmesi, İzmir'e özel bir rejim tanınması dileği.

87 30 temmuz İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 870. .... 246

Türkiye ile yapılacak barış andlaşmasının Anadolu'da nasıl uygulanabileceği sorununun Yüksek Komiserlerce incelendiği ve aşağıdaki noktaların tespit edildiği:

1. Türk Hükümetinin (İstanbul Hükümetinin) andlaşmayı uygulayacak gücü olmadığı ve İtilaf devletlerinden yardım beklediği, ayrıca 15.000 kişilik bir kuvvet kurmak istediği. (Anadolu'ya karşı sürmek için). Fakat bu kuvvetin, kurulmasının zaman alacağı bir yana, Anadolu'da asayiş sağlamayabileceğinin şüpheli olduğu.
2. İtilaf devletlerinin Anadolu'ya kuvvet yollamak arzusunda olmadıkları, Yunan ordusunu ileri sürmenin de sakıncalı olduğu.
3. Bu bakımdan İstanbul Hükümetince Anadolu'ya bir heyet yollanarak hiç değilse mutedil milliyetçilerin ikna edilmesine çalışılmanın uygun olacağı. Heyetin, barış andlaşması kabul edilmezse Yunanlıların ileri

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		yürüyeceklerini, İstanbul'un elden çıkacağını milliyetçilere anlatabileceği.	
		4. Tam başarı kazanamasa bile heyetin, milliyetçiler arasında ayrılık yaratabileceği ve bunun daha sonra Anadolu'ya karşı girişilecek askeri harekâtı kolaylaştırabileceği.	
88	5 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ BAŞKUMANDANI GENERAL MILNE'den İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1. 9077. ....	248
		Veliaht Abdülmecid Efendi'nin Fransız veya İtalyan yardımıyla Anadolu'ya kaçmak istemediği. Ama Mustafa Kemal kendisine yardım ederse Anadolu'ya kaçacağını söylediği.	
		<i>Haber üzerine Dışişlerinin notu:</i> Velihtın Ankara'da Padişah ilân edilebileceği, onun Anadolu'ya geçişinin Mustafa Kemal'e yararıyacağı.	
89	9 ağustos	İNGİLTERE'nin BERN ELÇİSİ MR RUSSELL'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 94 GİZLİ. ....	249
		Ataşemiliterin telgrafı: Cenevre'de oturan Romanya'lı François Stern'in, M. Kemal ile İtalyanlar arasındaki ilişkiler konusunda gizli bilgilere sahip olduğu ve bunları bildirmek üzere Londra'ya gideceği.	
90	11 ağustos	TİFLİS'te YARBAY LUKE'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 355. ....	250
		1. Ermenilerin 10 Ağustos günü Bolşeviklerle bir anlaşma imzalayarak bazı yerleri Bolşeviklere terkettikleri, Bolşevik kuvvetlerinin ilerlemekte oldukları ve bir Bolşevik temsilcisinin görüşmek üzere M. Kemal'e yollandığı.	
		2. İngiltere'den bol silâh aldıkları bir sırada Ermenilerin Bolşeviklerle anlaşma imzalamalarının İngiltere'ye karşı ihanet demek olduğu.	
91	11 ağustos	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATININ 81 SAYILI HAFTALIK RAPORU EKİ: ÇİÇERİN'den MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'ya GÖNDERİLEN 3 HAZİRAN 1920 TARİHLİ MEKTUP (İNGİLİZCE ÇEVİRİ). ....	251

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		M. Kemal'in mektubunun alındığı, BMM Hükümetinin dış politika ilkelerinin memnuniyetle öğrenildiği. Sovyetlerin BMM Hükümetiyle diplomatik ve konsolosluk ilişkileri kuracakları. Türkiye halkına başarı dileği.	
92	12 ağustos	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNİN SİYASİ RAPORU. No. CX/676/V. Anadolu'da Bolşevikliğin gelişmesi konusu. Ankara'dan İstanbul'a gelen ve milliyetçi liderleri şahsen tanıyan bir Türk aydının İngiliz İstihbarat Teşkilatına verdiği rapor: İttihatçıların, Anadolu'da Bolşevikliğin gelişmesine sebep oldukları. Bunların, M. Kemal önderliğindeki milli hareketi de kontrolleri altına almağa çalıştıkları, fakat başarı kazanamadıkları. Eskişehir'de, BMM'nde Bolşeviklik taraftarları, "Yeşil Ordu" hakkında açıklamalar. "Yeşil Ordu"nun ileri gelen üyeleri: Eyüb Sabri, Yunus Nadi, Şerif Manatof, Şeyh Servet. <i>Not:</i> Raporla ilgili olarak İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında yapılan yorumlar, kaleme alınan notlar.	252
93	13 ağustos	ADEN'de İNGİLİZ SİYASİ TEMSİLCİSİ GENERAL SCOTT'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 25. .... Aden haber bülteni örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	260
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94	14 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MEMURLARINDAN W.S. EDMONDS'un İSVİÇRE'den GELEN ESKİ İNGİLİZ AJANI FRANÇOIS STERN İLE GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR NOTU. .... 1917-1918 yıllarında Odesa'da İngiltere hesabına çalışmış olan ve halen Cenevre'de oturan Romanya'lı François Stern ile görüşüldüğü. Stern'in anlattıkları: M. Kemal'in, İsviçre'de bulunan Suphi Beye, İngilizlerle anlaşmak üzere yetki verdiği, Suphi Beyin	261

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		de kendisine (Stern'e) yanaştığı. M. Kemal'in sözde İngilizlerle anlaşmak üzere ileri sürdüğü teklifler ve şartlar. Stern'in, Suphi Bey ile birlikte ve Malta'da sürgün bulunan Fethi Beyi ve Celâl Nuri Beyi de alarak Ankara'ya gitme, anlaşma için aracılık yapma teklifi. Mr. Edmonds'un, Stern'in teklifini kuşkuyla karşılaması, hiçbir vaadde bulunmaması. Tekrar görüşme kararı.	
95	16 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1154/M/2379 GİZLİ. ....	263
		İngiliz İstihbarat Teşkilâtı İstanbul Şubesinde hazırlanan istihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	29 temmuz	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLATI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 22-29 TEMMUZ 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ (KISMEN). . .	264
		1. Saltanat Şurası tarafından 22 Temmuzda, Barış andlaşmasının imzalanmasına karar verilmesi üzerine, Damat Ferit Paşa'ya karşı propagandanın hızlandığı.	
		2. Yunanlıların Anadolu'da ve Trakya'da başarı kazandıkları, Doğu cephesinde Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın tutumunun belli olmadığı.	
		3. Yunan taarruzu hakkında M. Kemal Paşa'nın izahatı.	
		4. Yunan ilerlemesi karşısında milliyetçi kuvvetlerin moralinin sarsıldığı ve M. Kemal'in, morali yükseltmek için gayret sarfettiği.	
		5. Bazı Hint müslümanlarının M. Kemal Paşa'nın tarafına geçtikleri. Polisin İstanbul'da bir "Türk-Hint Dostluk Cemiyeti" ortaya çıkardığı, cemiyetin M. Kemal ve Cafer Tayyar ile temas kurmak istediği.	
		6. Afganistan'ın Türkiye'ye elçi yollayacağı söylentisi.	
		7. Eski Hidiv'in faaliyetleri.	
		8. Şeyh Sünnisi'nin M. Kemal'den yan çizmeğe meylettiği.	
		9. Necef-i Şerif Şeyhinin M. Kemal ile haberleştiği.	

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96	16 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI'NA LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1155/M. 2279. GİZLİ. ....	270
		İstihbarat raporları haftalık özetinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	5 ağustos	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTI İSTANBUL ŞUBESİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 30 TEMMUZ-5 AĞUSTOS 1920 TARİHLERİNİ KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORLARI HAFTALIK ÖZETİ. GİZLİ. ....	271
		1. İstanbul kabinesinde bazı değişiklikler yapıldığı. Ferit Paşa'nın barış andlaşmasını imzalamak kararında olduğu. M. Kemal ile Damat Ferit Paşa'nın anlaşmalarına imkân olmadığı. Zira milliyetçilerin Ferit Paşa ve kabine arkadaşlarını idama mahkûm ettikleri.	
		2. Damat Ferit Paşa ve 35 adamının Ankara'da giyaben idama mahkûm edildiklerine dair mahkeme kararının 3 Temmuz 1920 günü Anadolu basınında yayınlandığı. Kararın metni ve idama mahkûm edilenlerin adları, sıfatları.	
		3. Panislamizm propagandası: Emir Faysal'ın, İtilâf Devletlerine karşı M. Kemal'in görüşlerini benimseyeceğine dair bir genelgenin Türkçe ve Arapça olarak yayıldığı.	
		4. Mısırlılarla Türkler arasında ilişkiler ve İngiliz aleyhtarlığı.	
		5. Türk kadınlarının Türkiye'de ve Avrupa'da, M. Kemal lehine siyasi faaliyetlerde buldukları. Bu faaliyetin Enver Paşa'nın kızkardeşi, Halide Edip ve Avrupa'da Nimet Muhtar Hanım tarafından yönetildiği ve Türk Kadınlar Cemiyetinin büyük rolü olduğu.	
97	18 ağustos	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MEMURLARINDAN W.S. EDMONDS'un FRANÇOIS STERN VE A. PICTET İLE İKİNCİ GÖRÜŞMESİNE DAİR NOTU. ....	274
		Stern'in verdiği bilgiler:	
		1. M. Kemal'in mütarekede İngilizlerle temas kurmadığından Kont Sforza ile samimi olduğu ve ondan İtalya'nın İzmir'i işgal etmeyeceğine dair teminat aldığı.	

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		2. Kemalist kuvvetlerin elinde 4-5 yıl yetecek kadar cephane bulunduğu.	
		3. M. Kemal'in Seyfi Bey aracılığı ile Faysal ile doğrudan doğruya haberleştiği.	
		4. Talât Paşa'nın, M. Kemal'in İngiltere ile anlaşmasını desteklediği.	
		5. Alfred Rüstem (Bilinski)nin Moskova'da M. Kemal'in temsilcisi olarak bulunduğu,	
		6. Vatikan'ın, İstanbul'da Yunanlıların bulunmasına göz yummayacağı.	
		M. Stern'in, M. Kemal'in ve İtalyanların tesirini büyütmekte olduğu kuşkusu.	
		<i>J. Tilley'in notu</i> : İngilizlerin M. Kemal ile müzakereye girişmek istemedikleri ve barış andlaşmasına sırt çeviremeyecekleri.	
98	16 ağustos	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞI GÖREVLİLERİNDEN OLAN VE M. STERN İLE GÖRÜŞEN ALBAY TWISS'in FOREIGN OFFICE'de TYRRELL'e VERDİĞİ NOT. ....	276
		M. Kemal Paşa'nın İngiltere ile anlaşmaya varmak istediği ve bu amaçla İsviçre'ye özel görevle birini yolladığı. M. Kemal'in şartları.	
99	17 ağustos	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. ....	279
		1. İstanbul'dan alınan iki telgrafın ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. (Anadolu'ya karşı kullanılmak üzere) İstanbul Hükümetinin 25 bin kişilik bir kuvvet kurmasının (İngiliz) Harbiye Bakanlığınca uygun görüldüğü.	
		3. İstanbul Hükümetinin, İtilâf devletlerinden daha kolay, Anadolu'ya barış andlaşmasını kabul ettirebileceği, fakat bunun Yunanlılarca nasıl karşılanacağını bilinmediği.	
Ek. 1	30 temmuz	İNGİLİZ ORDULARI İSTANBUL GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA TEL. GİZLİ. ....	280
		İstanbul Hükümetinin, 25 bin kişilik iki tümen asker toplamak istediği.	
Ek. 2	8 ağustos	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ORDULARI GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA TEL. GİZLİ. ....	280



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100	18 ağustos	İstanbul Hükümetinin kurulacak 25 bin kişilik kuvvetin silâh, teçhizat ve erzakını İngiltere'den satın almak istediği. Alınacak malzemenin cinsi ve miktarı. YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİSİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a NOTA. ....	281
		Anadolu'dan alınan gizli bilgiler: Söke bölgesinden alınan bilgilere göre, 50 yaşına kadar olan müslümanların seferber edildikleri, İtalyanların bu seferberliği destekledikleri. M. Kemal'in bir adamının Söke'de İtalyanlarla işbirliği yapmakta olduğu. Yeni askere alınanların yeni üniformalarının İtalyanlarca sağlanmış gibi görüldüğü ve Türklere silâhlarının geri verildiği.	
101	20 ağustos	FRANSA'nın LONDRA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ M. CAMBON'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a NOTA. ....	281
		Fransa Hükümetinin: 1. Türk barış andlaşmasının (Sèvres)in uygulanması işiyle Paris'teki Büyükelçiler Konferansını görevlendirmek istediği. 2. İstanbul Hükümetince 15 bin kişilik bir kuvvet kurulmasına itiraz etmediği, fakat milliyetçilerin tarafına geçmesini önlemek için bu kuvvetin İtilâf devleti kumandanlarının yönetiminde olmasını şart koştuğu. 3. Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesine karşı olmadığı. 4. Bu konularda İngiltere'nin görüşünün bildirilmesi.	
102	22 ağustos	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI LLOYD GEORGE İLE İTALYA BAŞBAKANI SIGNOR GIOLITTI ARASINDA, LUCERNE'de YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME TUTUNAĞI (KISMEN). ....	282
		1. Signor Giolitti'nin, İtalya'nın Türkiye üzerindeki ilgisinin ticari ve ekonomik nitelikte olduğunu, İtalya'nın toprak almak niyetinde olmadığını anlattığı. 2. Lloyd George'un, M. Kemal'e karşı İtalya'nın tutumunu sorduğu, Signor Giolitti'nin M. Kemal hakkında hiç bilgisi olmadığını söylediği. Ll. George'un, M. Kemal'in pek önemi olmadığını, Yunan zaferinin de bunu gösterdiğini ileri sürmesi. Giolitti'nin, M. Kemal'in elinde yeteri kadar savaş malzemesi bulunmadığını belirtmesi.	

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		3. İstanbul ve Boğazlar bölgesi konusunun görüşülmesi. İtalya'nın buraya asker gönderemeyeceği. Lloyd George'un ise İngiltere'nin de daha fazla asker gönderemeyeceğini belirterek, Gelibolu yarımadasının Yunan kuvvetleri tarafından işgal edilmesini teklif ettiği. Boğazların açık kalması şartıyla Signor Giolitti'nin de buna razı olduğu.	
103	24 ağustos	İNGİLTERE HARBIYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. No. 0152/5315 (M.I. 2) .....	285
		1. İstanbul'dan alınan 28 Temmuz 1920 tarihli haftalık istihbarat raporunda M. Kemal ile Kâzım Karabekir Paşalar arasındaki anlaşmazlık ile ilgili bir paragraf bulunduğ u.	
		2. Son iki ay içinde alınan birçok istihbarat raporunda da bu konuya değ inildiğ i.	
104	24 ağustos	TİFLİS'te YARBAY LUKE'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANINA YAZI. No. 272. ....	286
		Erivan'dan alınan raporun ilişikte sunulduğ u.	
Ek. 1	19 ağustos	ERİVAN'da YÜZBAŞI GRACEY'den TİFLİS'te YARBAY LUKE'e YAZI. No. 37. ....	286
		Sovyetler, Ermeniler ve M. Kemal ile ilgili bazı belgelerin eklice gönderildiğ i.	
Ek 2	9 temmuz	M. KEMAL HÜKÜMETİNDEN ERMENİSTAN CUMHURİYETİ DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA İKİNCİ NOTA. (ÇEVİRİ). ....	287
		1. Önceki Türk notalarına rağmen Oltu'ya karşı Ermeni saldırılarının halâ devam ettiğ i.	
		2. Brest-Litovsk ve Batum andlaşmalarıyla Oltu Sancağ ının Osmanlı toprağ ı olarak tanınmış bulunduğ u.	
		3. Saldırıların dostluk ve iyi komşuluk ilişkilerine aykırı olduğ u.	
		4. Ermeni kuvvetlerinin derhal geri çekilmeleri gerektiğ i. Saldırıların protesto edildiğ i ve sorumluluğ un müslüman halka zarar verene ait olacağ ı.	
105	29 ağustos	İNGİLTERE BAHRIYE İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. No. NID/OL 1306. ....	288
		İngiliz Akdeniz orduları kumandanından alınan üç telgraf örneğ inin ilişikte sunulduğ u.	

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Ek.	28 ağustos	İNGİLİZ AKDENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKUMANDANINDAN İNGİLTERE BAHRİYE BAKANLIĞINA TEL. ....	289
		1. Ermenilerin teslimi üzerine, Bolşeviklerle Türk miliyetçileri arasında bir set olması gereken Ermenistan'ın bağımsız bir devlet olarak varlığının gittikçe güçleştiği.	
		2. Bolşeviklerin M. Kemal'e askerî yardım yapmaları konusunda bir anlaşmaya varıldığı ve bundan İngiliz çıkarlarının zarar görebileceği.	
		3. İngiliz deniz uçakları ile kuzey Anadolu'ya Türkçe bildiriler atıldığı ve ayrıca denizden M. Kemal'e harp malzemesi gönderilmesini önlemek için tedbirler alındığı.	
106	2 Eylül	İNGİLTERE BAHRİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. GİZLİ. ....	290
		Batum'dan alınan ve 15 Haziran-11 Temmuz 1920 tarihleri arasındaki günleri kapsayan raporların bazı bölümlerinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	15 Haziran-11 Temmuz	BATUM'daki İNGİLİZ DENİZ SUBAYINDAN İNGİLTERE BAHRİYE BAKANLIĞINA GÖNDERİLEN RAPORLARDAN PARÇALAR. ....	290
		1. Alınan talimat üzerine, 17 Haziran'da Marsilya'dan yola çıkıp 24 Haziranda Batum'a gelindiği.	
		2. Batum'da durumun sâkin olduğu, fakat İngilizlerin buradan çekilmeleri üzerine ne olacağının bilinmediği.	
		3. Acar'ların, Batum'un Gürcüler tarafından işgaline karşı oldukları. M. Kemal'in de 8000 kişilik bir kuvvetle Acarlara yardım edeceğinin sanıldığı.	
		4. Acarlara ve M. Kemal'e karşı Gürcülerin Bolşevikleri yardıma çağırabilecekleri.	
		5. Bolşeviklerin Azerbeycan'a âniden geldikleri, ayaklanan Azerilerin Bolşevikleri yenilgiye uğratabilecek iken arkadan Ermenilerin haince saldırısına uğradıkları ve 10-15 bin Tatarın (Azerinin) katledildiği.	
		6. Müslümanların bunu unutmadıkları ve Türklerle Bolşeviklerin anlaşmasının şimdi imkânsız olduğu, Bolşeviklerin M. Kemal'e Batum'u vaadederek arayı düzeltmek istedikleri. Azerilerin Bolşeviklere karşı yeniden ayaklanabilecekleri.	

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		7. Ermenilerin Bolşeviklere katıldıkları, Ermenilere gönderilen İngiliz silâhlarının Azerilere karşı ve Bolşevikler lehinde kullanılacağı, bu durumda silâh göndermenin uygun olup olmayacağı sorusu.	
		8. Bakü ve Kafkaslarla ilgili haberler.	
		9. Gürcü Hükümetinin Bolşeviklere karşı sert bir tutum takınmış bulunduğu, Batum'un Türklere verileceği yolunda Çiçerin'den M. Kemal'e yollanan mesajın, Tiflis Hükümetinin tutumunu daha da perçinlediği.	
107	3 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'dan ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'a VE İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e YAZI. No. 808. ....	294
		1. François Stern adlı eski bir İngiliz ajanı aracılığı ile M. Kemal'in İngiltere'ye barış teklifinde bulunduğu. İsviçre'de M. Kemal'in adamlarından Suphi Bey tarafından aracılık işiyle görevlendirilen Stern'in 11 Ağustos günü İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığına gelerek M. Kemal'in şartlarını bildirdiği.	
		2. M. Kemal'in sözde barış şartlarının özeti: Trakya'dan vazgeçme, İzmir'e çıkış, Yunan kuvvetlerinin çekilmeleri, Boğazlarda İngiliz kontrolü, Ferit Paşa'nın istifa etmesi, İngiliz aleyhtarı propagandayı durdurma.	
		3. Stern'in, Suphi Bey ile birlikte Ankara'ya da gitmek istediği, Celâl Nuri ile Fethi Beyin de Malta'dan serbest bırakılarak kendisiyle birlikte gelmelerini teklif ettiği, Türklerle İtalyanlar arasındaki ilişkilerden söz açtığı.	
		4. Stern'in elinde güven mektubu bulunmadığı.	
		5. Stern'e, M. Kemal'in barış andlaşmasını kabul etmesi gerektiği yolunda cevap verildiği ve bu teşebbüsten hiçbir sonuç çıkmadığı.	
108	6 Eylül	İZMİR'de İNGİLİZ KARARGAHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. O.S. 519. GİZLİ. ....	297
		1. Atina'ya gidecek olan General Paraskevopoulos'un M. Kemal'in Sadrazam olması (Sadrazamla görüş-	

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		mesi) halinde güçlüklerin giderilip giderilemeyeceği konusu üzerinde durduğu.	
		2. Manisa'daki Yunan tümeninin Bandırma'ya; Yunan Genel karargâhının da Atina'ya kaydırılacağı haberi. <i>Telgraf üzerine İngiliz Dışişlerinin yorumları</i> : M. Kemal'in Sadrazam dahi olsa görüşünü değiştirmeyeceği. M. Kemal'in Sadrazam olmasının şu sıralarda mümkün görülmediği. Çünkü, başına mükâfat vadedilmiş bulunduğu.	
109	6 Eylül	TİFLİS'te YARBAY LUKE'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 282. ....	298
		Erivan'dan alınan bir rapor örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	25 ağustos	ERİVAN'da YÜZBAŞI GRACEY'den TİFLİS'te YARBAY LUKE'ye RAPOR. No. 38. ....	298
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		2. Bazı belgelerin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 2	21 ağustos	ERMENİSTAN BAŞBAKANI VE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ H. OHANJANIAN'dan ERİVAN'da İNGİLİZ YÜZBAŞISI GRACEY'ye YAZI. Ng. 4884. ÇOK GİZLİ. ....	299
		Yanlış anlaşılmaması için Ermenistan'ın durumunun kısaca açıklanması: Ermenilerin, Bolşevik ve Türk-Azeri tehdidi karşısında buldukları. Buna rağmen ve İngiltere'den gönderilen silâhların zamanında yetişmeden Ermenilerin yine de başarı kazandıkları.	
Ek. 3	28 temmuz	ERMENİSTAN DIŞİŞLERİ SEKRETERİ TERAKOPIAN'DAN TBMM HÜKÜMETİ HARİCİYE VEKİLİ BEKİR SAMİ BEY'e TEL. ....	301
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		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Brest - Litovsk ve Batum andlaşmalarının İstanbul Hükümeti tarafından imzalanmış olduğu, İstanbul Hükümetini ise Ankara'nın tanımadığı. Bu andlaşmaların Ermenistan'ı bağlamadığı.</li> <li>2. Ermenistan Hükümetinin Türkiye'deki Ermeni topraklarından vazgeçemeyeceği. Ermenistan'ın bir parçası olan Oltu'dan da Ermeni kuvvetlerinin geri çekilemeyeceği.</li> <li>3. Ermenilerin tarihi, etnik ve ekonomik haklarını tanıdığı tal dirde, Ermenistan'ın Türkiye ile iyi komşuluk ilişkileri kurabileceği.</li> </ol>	
110	8 Eylül	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1266/5049/45.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ermeni ve Rum temsilcileriyle yapılan görüşme.</li> <li>2. Patriklere gelen raporlara göre, M. Kemal'e karşı ayaklanma hareketlerinin olduğu Yozgat ve Bolu yöresinde Hristiyanların öldürüldüğü.</li> <li>3. M. Kemal'in otoritesinin tam olduğu yerlerde ise hristiyanlara karşı zulüm yapılmadığı. Bunun dikkate değer olduğu.</li> </ol>	302
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111	11 Eylül	<p>İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. ....</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (Anadolu'ya karşı kullanılmak üzere) İstanbul Hükümetinin kuracağı orduda İtilâf devletleri subaylarının bulunmasının andlaşmada öngörülmemiş olduğu.</li> <li>2. Andlaşma hükümlerine göre, Türk Hükümetinin ancak andlaşma yürürlüğe girdikten sonra özel kuvvet kurabileceği; şimdi hemen kurulması istenen bu kuvvet hakkında Lord Curzon'un Harbiye Bakanlığına açıklamada bulunması isteği.</li> </ol>	304

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Ek.	—	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ GENEL KARARGÂHINA TEL. .... Dışişleri Bakanlığının, İstanbul Hükümetince derhal bir özel kuvvet kurulmasından yana olduğu, bu konuda öteki İtilâf devletleri kumandanlarının görüşlerinin bildirilmesi talimatı.	
112	13 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. I. 9276. ÖNCELİKLİ. .... 1. Damat Ferit Paşa'nın, M. Kemal tarafına geçeceğinden kuşkulandığı Veliâht Abdülmecid Efendinin gezilerini kısıtladığı. 2. Veliâhtın şahsi düşmanı olan Ferit Paşa'nın aldığı tedbirleri İngilizlerin isteği üzerine almış gibi göstermek istediği.	306
113	17 Eylül	LONDRA'da İTALYAN BÜYÜKELÇİSİ MARQUIS IMPERIALI'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a NOTA. (ÇEVİRİ) .... 1. İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiserlerin 30 Temmuzda Türkiye'ye barışı kabul ettirebilmek için ya kuvvet kullanmak, ya da milliyetçileri yatıştırmak gerektiğini bildirdikleri. 2. Yüksek Komiserlerin ayrıca Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesini ve M. Kemal'in arkadaşlarına durumun vahametinin anlatılmasını teklif ettikleri. 3. Bu teklifleri büyük bir dikkatle inceleyen ve durumun vahametini gözönünde tutan İtalyan Hükümetinin, Anadolu'da askeri hareketin genişletilmesinin durumu daha da kötüye götüreceği kanaatinde olduğu, 4. Bu bakımdan İtalyan Hükümetinin, Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesinden yana olduğu ve İngiltere'nin bu konudaki düşüncesini öğrenmek istediği.	307
114	21 Eylül	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 2965. .... Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi konusu ile ilgili olarak Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığından alınan muhtıra örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	309

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Ek. 1	20 Eylül	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNE MUHTİRA. ....	309
		1. Türkiye'de düzeni yeniden sağlamak ve barış andlaşmasını uygulamak konusunda teklifleri kapsayan İtalyan notasının eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Fransa'nın, İtalyan tekliflerine prensip itibariyle katılmak niyetinde olduğu, fakat İngiltere'nin de bu konudaki görüşünü öğrenmek istediği.	
		3. Türkiye'de kurulacak başlıca milletlerarası komisyonlar konusunda ayrı bir nota gönderildiği.	
Ek. 2	10 Eylül	PARİS'te İTALYA BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNDEN FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA MUHTİRA. ....	310
		Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi teklifi. (Bk. No. 113)	
115	22 Eylül	ADEN'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ E. SCOTT'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1056 (5411/69). ....	313
		1. Cidde ajanının bir raporuna göre, M. Kemal'in son olarak Kral Hüseyin'e bir mektup yazarak ona "Halife" diye hitap ettiği, Kralın Türk olan karısının da Halifelğin Hicaz'a alınması için çalıştığı.	
		2. Bu raporlara inanmak güç olmakla beraber, M. Kemal'in Kralın desteğini sağlamak için ona iltifatta bulunmuş olabileceği.	
116	23 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 880. ....	314
		(Anadolu'ya karşı kullanılmak üzere) Sadrazam'ın 15.000 kişilik bir ordu kurmasına İngiltere'nin bir itirazı olmadığı.	
117	23 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1050. ....	314
		1. Şeyhülislâm ile Ticaret Nazırının istifaları üzerine Sadrazam'ın bir bildiri yayınladığı ve onları, Anadolu'da asayiş sağlama tedbirlerini geciktirmekle suçladığı. Bildiride, milliyetçi liderler dışındakilere, on gün içinde teslim olmaları şartıyla af vadedildiği.	



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		2. Sadrazamın ayrıca Yüksek Komiserlerden milli hareketi bastırmak için: a) 15 bin kişilik asker ile 25 bin kişilik jandarma kuvveti kurma müsadese, b) İtilâf devletlerinin el koydukları silâhların geri verilmesini, c) Asker taşımak için gemi, d) Yabancı subaylar, e) 25 milyon liralık borç isteği.	
		3. Yüksek Komiserlerin, istekleri Hükümetlerine iletecekleri yolunda cevap verdikleri, ayrıca Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi konusuna değindikleri.	
		4. Sadrazamın, gönderilecek heyetin askerle desteklenmesini ve İtilâf devletleri temsilcilerini de içine almasını istediği.	
		5. Fransa delegesinin, gönderilecek heyetin milliyetçilerle müzakereye girişmesi fikrinde olduğu. Her Yüksek Komiserin bu konuda yazılı olarak fikirlerini açıklayacağı.	
		<i>Not : De Robeck'ten Curzon'a 23. 9. 1920 günlü, 1047 sayılı tel :</i>	
118	24 Eylül	Ferit Paşa kabinesinden istifalar üzerine ilk yorum. İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. ....	316
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin kuracağı 15 bin kişilik kuvvetin barış andlaşmasında öngörülen "özel kuvvet" olacağı. 2. Bu kuvvetin hemen kurulabilmesi için Fransa ve İtalya'nın da muvafakatının istendiği ve Fransa'nın buna razı olduğu.	
119	24 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1339. ....	317
		Anadolu'daki milli hareketi bastırmak için kuvvet toplama tasarısı ile ilgili olarak sadrazamdan alınan mektup örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	—	SADRAZAM DAMAT FERİT PAŞADAN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİNE MEKTUP. ....	

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		<p>1. Osmanlı Hükümetinin Sèvres andlaşmasını imzalamakla yüklendiği görevleri yerine getireceği, fakat Anadolu'nun halen İttihatçı bir ekibin elinde bulunduğu. Bu ihtilâlcî teşkilâtın esas kaynağının Yunan işgali olduğu.</p> <p>2. Osmanlı Hükümetinin Anadolu'daki hareketi bastırmak istediği, Osmanlı Genelkurmayının bu konuda plânlar hazırladığı, Padişaha bağlı subayların ve halk çoğunluğunun ihtilâlcilerin üzerine yürümek için işaretle bekledikleri; ancak hareketi bastırabilmek için, kuvvet toplamak gerektiği, bu kuvvetin bir ay içinde toplanıp bir ay içinde de hazır hale getirileceği.</p> <p>3. İki aydır hazırlanmakta olan askeri projenin uygulanabilmesi için şunlar gerektiği:</p> <p>a) 40000 kişilik bir ordu kurulması. (bu kuvvetin Bursa-Adapazarı ve Karadeniz taraflarından toplanabileceği).</p> <p>b) Mütarekeden beri İtilâf Devletleri kontrolünde bulunan silâhların hemen geri verilmesi.</p> <p>c) Kurulacak orduyu Anadolu kıyılarına taşımak için gemi sağlanması.</p> <p>d) Bu orduya yeteri kadar yabancı subay verilmesi.</p> <p>e) 20 milyon liralık kredi açılması.</p> <p>4. (Millî hareketi bastırdıktan sonra) Anadolu'nun onarımı ve reformu gerektiği. Bu reformlar sayesinde Osmanlı milletinin hürriyet içinde yaşayabileceği.</p> <p>5. Tezelden cevap beklendiği.</p>	
120	25 Eylül	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1058. ....</p>	321
		<p>1. (Barış andlaşmasını kabul ettirmek için Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi konusunun) Yüksek Komiserlerce yeniden görüşüldüğü.</p> <p>2. Fransız Y. Komiserinin, gönderilecek heyetin yalnız mutedil milliyetçilere seslenmesini, kaza kaza dolayarak onları Padişah tarafına çekmesini savunduğu.</p> <p>3. Amiral J. de Robeck'in bunun zaman alacağını söylediği, milliyetçilerin Ferit Paşanın istifasını şart koşmaları halinde M. Kemal'in de sahneden çekilmesinin isteneceğini ileri sürdüğü.</p>	

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		4. Bu konularda Sadrazamla görüşüleceği.	
		5. Bu son barışçı teşebbüsten sonuç alınmadığı takdirde (M. Kemal'e karşı) ya Yunanlıları ileri sürmek ya da İstanbul Hükümetini kullanmak gerekeceği. Yunanlılar ileri sürülünce onlara yeni tâvizler verilebileceği ve böylece andlaşmanın temelden yıkılmış olacağı; Osmanlı Hükümeti kullanıldığı zaman ise asker ve subay yardımı yapmak gerekeceği.	
121	25 Eylül	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT TEŞKİLÂTINCA HAZIRLANAN SİYASİ RAPOR. No. CX/1205/V.	323
		1. Kısa bir zaman önce Bakû'dan dönen bir Türk ajanının verdiği raporun eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Evvelce İslâmiyet ile Bolşevikliğin kaynaşmasına taraftar olan İttihatçıların, bir müslüman ülkede Bolşevikliğin uygulanmasını gördükten sonra fikirlerini değiştirmeye başladıkları.	
		3. M. Kemal'in ise panislamist olmadığı, Türk milliyetçiliği programını Anadolu'da gerçekleştirmek amacı güttüğü.	
Ek.	—	BAKÛ'DAN DÖNEN İNGİLİZ HİZMETİNDEKİ BİR TÜRK AJANININ İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARATINA VERDİĞİ RAPOR. ....	324
		1. Nuri Paşanın 1919'da, Bakû'da "Türkiye Halk Murahhashı"nı kurduğu, bir Konsolosluk gibi çalışan bu murahhashlığın programında, Bakû'da bir Türk komünist partisi kurulması fikrinin de gizli olarak yer aldığı. Nuri Paşa ve arkadaşlarının tedricen Azerbaycan Hükümetini kontrol altına almak amacı güttükleri.	
		2. Milliyetçi Türkiye ile Bolşevikler arasındaki ilişkilerin önce "Türkiye Halk Murahhashı" aracılığı ile yürütüldüğü.	
		3. M. Kemal'in Moskova'ya yolladığı ilk delegenin İbrahim Bey olduğu; daha sonra Celâl Bey ile Kâmil Beyin Bakû'ya gönderildikleri. Moskova'ya iletilmek üzere M. Kemal'in bunlara verdiği mektuplarda Sovyetlerle anlaşma imzalanması, Türkiye'ye para yardımı yapılması tekliflerinin de yer aldığı. Sovyetlerin bu teklifleri prensip itibariyle kabul ettikleri.	

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		4. Daha sonra da Bekir Sami Bey Başkanlığında bir heyetin Moskova'ya gönderildiği. Ermenilere karşı kullanılmak üzere, Sovyetlerin Kemalistlere silâh yardımı yaptıkları.	
122	28 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 1349. ....	327
		1. Anadolu'da Milli hareket konusunda, Mr. Ryan'ın hazırladığı muhtıra örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetince bu hareketin bastırılmasının güç olacağı, bu yüzden başarı şansı pek az bile olsa Anadolu'ya bir heyet yollamak gerektiği.	
		3. Milliyetçilerle temas etmek üzere Anadolu'ya gönderilmesi düşünülen heyet konusunda son günlerde bazı ters gelişmeler olduğu.	
		4. Sadrazamın, gönderilecek heyetle birlikte milliyetçileri bastırmak üzere kuvvet kullanılmasını, heyete İtilâf devletleri temsilcilerinin de katılmasını, heyetin Kemalist hareket önderleriyle pazarlığa girişmemesini şart koştuğu.	
		5. Sadrazamın bu ters tutumunun yarattığı çıkmazdan kurtulma çarelerinin düşünüldüğü, fakat Sadrazamı düşürmekte tereddüt edildiği.	
Ek.	23 Eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSERLİĞİ TERCÜMANI VE İKİNCİ SİYASİ MEMURU MR RYAN TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN ANADOLU'da MİLLÎ HAREKET KONUSU MUHTIRA. ....	328
		1. İstanbul Hükümetini aktif şekilde desteklemek veya değiştirmek konusundaki kararı etkileyecek ana faktörlerin barış andlaşması, İstanbul Hükümeti, Milliyetçiler, Yunanlılar, İtilaf devletleri ve Kürtler olduğu.	
		2. İstanbul Hükümetinin Padişahın otoritesinden, sözde İngiliz desteğinden kuvvet aldığı, fakat Damat Ferit Paşanın çok gözden düştüğü.	
		3. Milliyetçi liderlerin kendi aralarında ayrılıklar bulunduğu, fakat bunların hepsinin barış andlaşmasına karşı oldukları ve Bolşeviklerden destek umdukları.	

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		4. Kürtlerin çoğunlukla milliyetçilerin etkisinde oldukları, fakat İngiltere tarafından ustalıklı Kemalizme ve Bolşevizme karşı kullanılacakları. Bunların hepsinin Ermenilere karşı oldukları.	
		5. İtilâf devletlerinin milliyetçiler karşısında ya boyun eğmek, ya da onlarla savaşmak durumunda oldukları; savaşmak için doğrudan İtilâf devletleri kuvvetleri kullanılabilir gibi Yunanlıların ve bazı Türk kuvvetlerinin de kullanılabilir. Propaganda ile Milli teşkilâtın parçalanabilir, milliyetçi liderlerle halkın arasının açılabilir ve liderlerinin güçsüz bırakılabilir teorilerinin de ortaya atıldığı.	
		6. Ferit Paşanın milliyetçilere karşı bir plan hazırladığı. Yüksek Komiserlerin ise Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermeyi teklif ettikleri, fakat bu heyet konusunda da tam bir görüş birliğine varamadıkları.	
		7. Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin milliyetçilerle anlaşmak için Ferit Paşayı düşürmek istediği.	
		8. Ferit Paşa kabinesinin yerine Tevfik Paşa kabinesinin getirilebileceği, fakat bu halde de başarı umudunun az olduğu.	
		9. Çıkmanın düğüm noktasının, İngiltere'nin Sèvres andlaşmasını ayakta tutmaya kararlı olup olmadığında toplandığı, yoksa milliyetçilere karşı ne Yunanlıların gücünün yeteceği, ne de İstanbul Hükümetini suni olarak güçlendirmenin fayda sağlayacağı.	
123	1 ekim	10. Şimdilik uzlaştırma heyetinin denenebileceği, ama buna büyük umut bağlamamak gerektiği. İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'ye YAZI. No. 3260. ....	333
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyet konusu.	
		1. Fransa Hükümetinin, Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermeden önce İstanbul'da bir Hükümet değişikliğini istediği.	
		2. Sèvres andlaşmasını onaylamaması halinde şimdiki sadrazamın değiştirilebileceği, andlaşmanın onaylanmasının Anadolu'nun yatıştırılmasını ve oraya bir heyet yollanmasını kolaylaştıracağı.	
		3. Heyet konusundaki İtalyan notasına İngiltere'nin de Fransa gibi cevap vereceği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
124	1 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan LONDRA'da İTALYA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ MARQUIS IMPERIALI'ye NOTA. ....	334
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyet konusu. İtalyan notasına cevap.	
		1. Anadolu'ya heyet göndermeden önce Sèvres'in İstanbul Hükümetince onaylanması gerektiği. Bunun için gerekirse Sadrazamın değiştirilebileceği ve ondan sonra heyet gönderilebileceği. Bu konuda Fransa'ya da cevap verildiği.	
125	1 Ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1064.	335
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyet konusu.	
		1. Sadrazamın, Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyetle birlikte Milli hareketi bastırmak için kuvvet de yollanmasını ve heyetin "âsi" (milliyetçi) liderlerle müzakereye girişmemesini istediği.	
		2. General Wilson'a göre, Milli hareketi bastırmak için kuvvet hazırlanmasının uzun zaman alacağı, Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin ise Ferit Paşa iktidarda kaldıkça milliyetçilerle bir uyuşmayı imkânsız gördüğü.	
		3. Ferit Paşanın çekilmesinin yerinde olacağı. Yüksek Komiserlerin Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi için İstanbul Hükümetine baskı yapacakları, aynı zamanda, bugünkü Hükümetin heyetin başarı umudunu yitirdiğini de belirtecekleri ve bu görüşü Padişaha da iletcekleri.	
		4. Kendisinin (Amiral Robeck'in) bu programı isteksizce benimsediği.	
126	1 Ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLTERE YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1065. GİZLİ. ....	337
		1. Ferit Paşanın, milliyetçilerin iktidara gelmeleri halinde kendisinin, Padişahın ve yakınlarının kişisel güvenliğinden kaygı duyduğu.	
		2. İngiltere'nin Padişahu ve Ferit Paşayı koruyacağı yolunda bir vaadde bulunabilmek için yetki ricası. (Bkz. No. 128 ve 130)	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
127	1 ekim	İNGİLİZ ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. No. (M.-I. 2). . . . .	337
		Prens Abdülmecit ve Türk milliyetçileri konusunda İstanbul'dan alınan telgraf örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	16 eylül	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. I. 9293. . . . .	337
		Ankara'daki milliyetçi liderlerin Veliht Abdülmecidin Anadolu'ya geçmesini sağlamağa çalıştıkları ve bu iş için 150.000 lira harcamağa hazır oldukları haberi.	
128	4 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. ÇOK GİZLİ VE KİŞİYE ÖZEL. . . . .	338
		1. Ferit Paşanın, milliyetçi eğilimde bir hükümetin başa geçmesi halinde Padişahın tahttan çekileceğini söylediği, bu sözlerde mübalâğa olup olmadığının kestirilemediği.	
		2. Padişahın tahttan çekilmesinin ciddi sonuçları olacağından İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince Sadrazama şu yolda bir mesaj gönderileceği:	
		a) İstifadan sonra memleketi terketmek isterse Ferit Paşaya yardım edileceği.	
		b) Memlekette kalırsa kendisinin ve Padişahın korunmalarına çalışılacağı.	
		c) Bugünkü durumda Padişahın tahttan çekilmesinin memleketin yararına olmayacağı ve	
		d) Mutlaka çekilmek isterse Padişahın Türkiye dışına çıkmasına yardım edileceği.	
		3. Bu konuda talimat ricası. (Bkz. No. 126 ve 130).	
129	5 ekim	YUNANİSTAN BAŞBAKANI VENİZELOS'tan İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANI LLOYD GEORGE'a TEL. GİZLİ. . . . .	339
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin M. Kemal'i bastıramıyacağı, İtilâf devletlerinin de harekete geçmedikleri, Anadolu'nun gelecek için bir tehdit olduğu.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Duruma radikal bir çare bulmak için milliyetçileri yoketmek üzere yeni bir sefere girişilerek : a) Boğazlar bölgesinde ve b) Pontus'ta ayrı birer devlet kurulması gerektiği. 3. Bu sefer için Yunan ordularının kâfi olduğu, fakat İngiliz kuvvetleriyle de işbirliği yapılabileceği. 4. Kış başlamadan önce bu konuda karar verilmesi gerektiği, yoksa Yunanistan'ın, ordularını terhis etmek zorunda kalacağı.. (Bkz. No. 134).	
130	6 ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 928. .... Padişahın tahttan çekileceği haberi: 1. Sadrazama gönderilecek mesajın uygun bulunduğu. 2. Çekilmesi halinde Padişahın yurt dışına çıkmasına İngiltere'nin yardım edeceği, fakat çekilmemesi için ısrar edilmesi talimatı. (Bkz. No. 126 ve 128).	340
131	6 ekim	RAMLE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR SCOTT'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1135. .. 1. Cidde'den alınan bir rapordan bazı parçaların eklice sunulduğu. 2. Kral Hüseyin'in Sèvres andlaşmasını imzalamak istemediği. 3. Rapor ekinde, Kral Hüseyin ile M. Kemal arasındaki sözde müzakerelerle ilgili bilgiler de bulunduğu.	341
Ek.	19 eylül	MEKKE'de YÜZBAŞI MİAN NASİR-UD-DİN AHMET'ten MR SCOTT'a RAPOR. .... 1. Kral Hüseyin ile M. Kemal arasında bir anlaşma olduğu yolundaki söylentilerde bir gerçek payı bulunabileceği. Söylentilerin ayrıntıları. 2. Suriye haberleri 3. Hicaz haberleri.	342
132	8 ekim	TİFLİS'te ALBAY STOKES'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 428. ....	344



<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		1. 3000 kişilik bir Sovyet kuvvetinin Bakû'ya geldiği ve Bolşeviklerle M. Kemal'in Ermenilere karşı anlaş-tukları.	
		2. Türk subaylarının Azerbeycan'da ve Doğuda da müslüman kuvvetleri teşkilâtlandırıdıkları, Ermeni-lere karşı plânın uygulanacağı kanısı.	
		<i>Not : Paris'te Ermeni Delegasyonu Başkanı Aharonian'dan İngiliz Büyükelçisi Derby'ye 5. 10. 1920 günlü nota.</i>	
		Türk ordusunun Kars üzerine yürüdüğü.	
		Tezelden yardıma ihtiyaç olduğu. Trabzon'un işgal edilmesi, Yunan ordusunun da batıdan yürümesi önerisi.	
133	9 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1394. ....	346
		Anadolu'daki milliyetçi hareketi bastırmak için kuvvet toplamak konusunda Sadrazamın son mektubuylu ilgili olarak İngiliz Karadeniz Orduları Komutanlığı ile yazışma örneklerinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek. 1	28 Eylül	AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLİZ KARADE-NİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL WILSON'a YAZI. No. 3025. ....	346
		1. Milli hareketi bastırmak için Sadrazamın teklifleri konusunda şu soruların akla geldiği:	
		a) Dış yardım olmadan İstanbul Hükümetinin milli-yetçilerle başedip edemiyeceği.	
		b) 20 milyon liralık yardımın yetip yetmiyeceği.	
		c) Hazırlığın üç ay içinde bitip bitmiyeceği.	
		2. Padişah kuvvetlerinin milliyetçilerin tarafına geç-meleri halinde, İtilâf devletlerinin yeni durumla başa çıkıp çıkamayacakları sorusunun da akla geldiği.	
		3. Bu konularda Komutanlığın kanaatlerinin bildiril-mesi ricası.	
Ek. 2	5 ekim	İNGİLTERE KARADENİZ ORDULARI BAŞKO-MUTANI GENERAL WILSON'dan YÜKSEK KOMİSER J. DE ROBECK'e YAZI. ....	347
		1. Milliyetçileri yenilgiye uğratabilmesi için Padişah ordusunda yabancı subayların da bulunması gerek-tiği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		<p>2. 20 milyonluk yardımın 40.000 kişinin ihtiyacına göre hesaplandığı.</p> <p>3. Padişah kuvvetlerinin hazırlanması için en az 6 aylık zaman lâzım geldiği.</p> <p>4. Bu kuvvetlerin milliyetçiler tarafına geçmelerinin pek ciddi bir durum yaratabileceği, ama buna karşı bazı tedbirlerin de alınabileceği; ayrıca muhtemel firarların da düşünülmesi gerektiği.</p> <p>5. Halen Büyükdere'de kurulmakta olan Tümenin ıslahı gerektiği, iyi Türk subaylarının da Padişah ordularına katılmak istemedikleri.</p> <p>6. İyi organize edilmiş 40 bin kişilik bir Padişah ordusunun milliyetçileri yenilgiye uğratmakta güçlük çekmeyeceği.</p> <p>7. Ancak milliyetçi propagandanın etkisiyle halkın bu kuvvetlere silâhli direnişte bulunmaları halinde daha büyük kuvvetlere ihtiyaç olacağı.</p>	
134	12 ekim	<p>İNGİLİZ BAKANLAR KURULU TOPLANTISI TUTANAĞI. No. 54 (20) KISMEN. ....</p>	349
		<p>Başbakan Lloyd George'un kabineye verdiği bilgi:</p> <p>1. Venizelos'un, yolladığı bir telgrafta M. Kemal'e karşı hemen taarruza geçmeyi gerekli gördüğü. Kemalist kuvvetler imha edilirse Türklerin İstanbul'dan atılıp bu bölgede ayrı bir devlet ve ayrıca bir Pontus devleti kurulabileceğini savunduğu; İngiltere'nin de bu harekâta katılmasını ve Yunanistan'a mali yardım yapmasını telkin ettiği.</p> <p>2. Bu konunun son derece gizli tutulması ve M. Kemal'in bundan haberdar olmaması gerektiği.</p> <p>3. Venizelos'un telgrafının bir örneğinin de İngiltere Genelkurmay Başkanına iletilmiş olduğu.</p> <p>4. Barış andlaşmasına aykırı düşen Venizelos'un tekliflerinin Fransa ve İtalya tarafından kabul edilmesinin imkânsız gibi görüldüğü.</p> <p>5. Genelkurmay Başkanlığınca tamamlayıcı bilgilere ihtiyaç duyulduğu, bilgiler toplanınca Genelkurmay Başkanının Başbakana rapor vereceği. Venizelos'un teklifleri üzerine Dışişlerinin yorumları ve kuşkuvarı.</p> <p>(Bkz. No. 129)</p>	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
135	12 ekim	İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANLIĞINDA SIR HAN-KEY'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR E. CROWE'a YAZI. GİZLİ. ....	351
		1. Venizelos'un Başbakan'a yolladığı telgraf örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
		2. Taarruza karşı M. Kemal'in hazırlanmasına vakit bırakmamak için bu telgrafın çok gizli tutulması gerektiği.	
		3. Konunun bu sabahki kabine toplantısında görüşüldüğü.	
136	12 ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'e ŞİFRE TEL. No. 945. ÇOK ACELE. ....	351
		1. Padişah tahttan çekilirse ve Veliht da Ankara'da olursa pek güç bir durumun ortaya çıkacağı.	
		2. Bu yüzden Velihtın firarını önlemesi için Damad Ferit'in teşvik edilmesi gerektiği. Ancak tedbirlerin Türk Hükümetince alınmış gibi gösterilmesi talimatı.	
137	13 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1100. ....	352
		1. Kuvvetli baskı yapılmadıkça Türkiye'nin yakın bir gelecekte barış andlaşmasını onaylamıyacağı; milliyetçilere karşı daha da zayıf düşmeme gerekçesi ileri sürüldüğü.	
		2. Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi için Babiâli'ye tavsiyede bulunulduğu.	
		3. Anadolu'ya heyet gönderilmesine dair nota Sadrazama verildikten sonra da 11 Ekimde Yüksek Komiserlerin gizli olarak Padişahı ziyaret ettikleri. (Görüşmede Sadrazamanın bulunmadığı).	
		4. Padişaha, Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermesi söylenirken Fransa Yüksek Komiserininin Ferit Paşanın değiştirilmesi gerektiğini de söylediği.	
		5. Padişahın Damat Ferit Paşaya bağlı görüldüğü; gönderilecek heyetin milliyetçileri teslim olmaya çağırmasını, yoksa onların şartlarını dinlememesini istediği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		6. Ayrıca Padişahın barış andlaşmasının hemen onaylanması fikrini kabul etmediği.	
		7. Şimdi Babiâliden yazılı cevap beklendiği, Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin Damat Ferit Paşayı değiştirmeye öncelik verdiği.	
138	13 ekim	PARİS'te İNGİLTERE BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3143. ....	353
		Sèvres andlaşmasının yürürlüğe konması konusunda Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığundan alınan nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	12 ekim	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN PARİS'te İNGİLTERE (VE İTALYA) BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNE NOTA. ....	354
		1. Sèvres'in onaylanması ve Anadolu'nun yatıştırılması konusunda İtilâf devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerine benzer talimat gönderilmesi fikri. Fransa Yüksek Komiserine talimat gönderildiği.	
		2. Andlaşmanın yalnız Padişah tarafından onaylanmasının yeterli olacağı, onaylandıktan sonra Damat Ferit Paşa değiştirilirse bir kısım milliyetçilerin İstanbul Hükümeti tarafına dönebilecekleri; arkasından Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyetin halkı aydınlatıp Hükümete bağlayabileceği.	
		3. Kurulacak yeni hükümete mali yardım yapılması ve 15 bin kişilik bir ordu kurulması konusunda Yüksek Komiserlerin işbirliği etmeleri gerektiği. (Kurulacak kuvvetin M. Kemal tarafına geçmesine karşı tedbir alınması).	
		4. Onaylandıktan sonra andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konması için milletlerarası komisyonların kurulması konusunda da Yüksek Komiserlerin birlikte hareket etmeleri telkini.	
139	13 ekim	FİLİSTİN'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR SCOTT'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1144. .	356
		Cidde'den alınan bir rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
<u>Ek.</u>	30 Eylül	CİDDE'de BİNBAŞI BATTEN'den MR SCOTT'a RAPOR. GİZLİ. ....	356
		1. M. Kemal'in Kral Hüseyin ile muhabere ettiği söylentileri.	
		2. M. Kemal ile Kral arasında bir anlaşma bulunduğu söylentilerinin Mekke'de yaygın olduğu. Bu konuda "Al Falah" gazetesinde de yazı çıktığı, başka gazetelerce de yayın yapıldığı.	
		3. Fakat haberlerin doğrulanmadığı.	
140	14 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1103. ....	357
		1. Fransa Yüksek Komiserine gönderilen talimatta: Andlaşmanın (Sèvres'in) tezelden Padişah tarafından onaylanması, hemen arkasından Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin istifa etmesi, yeni Hükümetin Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermesi, Yüksek Komiserlerin yeni Hükümete yardım çarelerini araştırmaları ve komisyonların kurulup andlaşmanın uygulanmasına geçilmesi yolunda bir programın yer aldığı.	
		2. Bu programın İtilâf devletlerinin üzerinde anlaşmaları programdan değişik olduğu..	
141	14 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1104. ....	359
		Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusu:	
		1. İstanbul Hükümetine andlaşmayı onaylattırıp sonra onu düşürmenin doğru olmayacağı, çok baskı yapılırsa Padişahın da tahttan çekilebileceği.	
		2. Veliâhtın andlaşmaya karşı olduğu, tahta çıkarsa milliyetçi muhalefeti daha da canlandırabileceği, yeni Hükümetle çalışmanın daha güç olacağı.	
		3. Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyetin başarı şansı konusundaki görüşlerin de çok çeşitli olduğu.	
142	14 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1105.	360

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Sèvres'in onaylanması konusu. Amiral de Robeck'in telkinleri:	
		1. Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi.	
		2. Andlaşmayı (Sèvres'i) onaylaması için İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüslere devam olunması.	
		3. Ferit Paşayı düşürmek veya iktidarda tutmak için hiçbir teşebbüs yapılmaması.	
		4. Kaderinin şu veya bu Hükümete bağlı olduğu kanısından Padişahın caydırılması.	
		5. Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyetin başarısızlığı halinde milliyetçilere karşı harekete geçmeye hazırlanılması.	
		6. Andlaşma onaylanmasa bile öngörülen komisyonların kurulması.	
143	14 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1408. ÇOK GİZLİ. ....	361
		Yüksek Komiserlerin 11 Ekim'de Padişah ile görüşmeleri.	
		1. Padişah'ın Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesine razı olduğu, ancak heyetle birlikte milliyetçilere karşı kuvvet kullanılmasını da ister gördüğü; heyetin milliyetçileri teslim olmaya çağırmasını, onlarla müzakereye girişmemesini istediği. Milliyetçiler aleyhinde konuştuğu.	
		2. Padişah'ın ayrıca malî yardım istediği,	
		3. Padişah'ın İngiliz dostluğundan söz açtığı, milliyetçilerin iktidara gelmelerinden ve kendi kişisel güvenliğinden kaygı duyduğu.	
		4. Andlaşmanın hemen onaylanmasının Anadolu'daki milliyetçi ateşi körükleyeceğini söylediği ve	
		5. İstanbul'da yumuşak bir Hükümetin başa geçmesinin milliyetçilerin işine yarayacağı kanısında bulunduğu.	
Ek.	11 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'in SULTAN VAHDETİN'e SUNDUĞU NOT. GİZLİ. ....	364
		Genel durum, andlaşmanın onaylanması, Türk Hükümeti ve mali durum konuları.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<p>1. Andlaşmanın (Sèvres'in) kabul edilmemesinin Türkiye'yi yeni felâketlere sürükleyeceği, bunu herkese anlatmak gerektiği, barışçı yollarla andlaşmanın kabul ettirilebileceği görüşü.</p> <p>2. İngiltere'nin, Anadolu'ya bir heyet yollamadan önce andlaşmanın onaylanmasını istediği, andlaşmanın Padişah tarafından onaylanabileceği (Parlamento kararı gerekmediği).</p> <p>3. Bazı çevrelerin, gönderilecek heyetin başarı kazanabilmesi için bugünkü Hükümetin değiştirilmesini savdukları, bu konudaki kararı Padişahın vereceği, İngiltere'nin bu işe karışmayacağı, Padişah'ın yeni Türkiye'yi de yönetmesi dileği.</p> <p>4. Türkiye'nin mali durumunu düzeltmek gerektiğinden, andlaşmanın öngördüğü mali komisyonun bir an önce kurulup çalışmaya başlaması isteği.</p>	
144	15 ekim	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1107. ....</p> <p>1. 7 Ekimde Konya ve Isparta'da milliyetçilere karşı ayaklanma çıktığı haberi.</p> <p>2. Kemalistlerle isyancı kuvvetler arasında çatışma beklendiği.</p>	366
145	15 ekim	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1108. ....</p> <p>1. Milliyetçilerin ellerindeki İngiliz esirlerini serbest bıraktırmamanın şimdilik güç olduğu, zira M. Kemal ile müzakere edilemediği.</p> <p>2. Anadolu'ya yollanacak heyetin bu konuyu da görüşebileceği, İstanbul Hükümetinden yana bir güçlük çıkmayacağı.</p> <p><i>Not :</i> Anadolu'daki İngiliz tutsakları ile Malta'daki Türk sürgünlerinin değıstokuş edilmeleri konusunda İzzet Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa arasındaki yazışmalar. M. Kemal Paşa'nın 12. 8. 1920 günlü mektubu.</p>	367

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
146	17 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1116. ....	368
		Damat Ferit'in, 16 Ekimde istifa ettiği, Padişah'ın Tevfik Paşa ile görüştüğü.	
147	18 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1420. ....	368
		Yüksek Komiserlerin 7 Ekimde Sadrazama verdikleri ortak nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	7 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN SADRAZAM DAMAD FERİT PAŞA'ya ORTAK NOTA. ....	369
		1. Yüksek Komiserlerin, Anadolu'daki durumun yarattığı tehlikeye son vermeyi gerekli gördükleri ve bunun barışçı yollarla gerçekleştirilebileceği görüşünde oldukları.	
		2. Bunun için Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi gerektiği.	
		3. Sadrazamın bu konudaki itirazlarına Yüksek Komiserlerin katılmadıkları.	
		4. Bu bakımdan heyetin, barışçı amaçlarla gönderilmesi, gerekiyorsa müzakereye girişmesi, güvenilir kişilerden meydana gelmesi gerektiği.	
148	19 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1120. ....	370
		1. Ferit Paşa'nın istifasının resmen açıklandığı, Padişahın Sadrazamlığı Tevfik Paşa'ya teklif ettiği.	
		2. Tevfik Paşanın 15 Ekimde İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserleriyle görüştüğü ve bu görüşmede Anadolu'ya yollanacak heyet, mali yardım ve Sèvres'in onaylanması konularına değinildiği.	
		3. Sèvres'in onaylanması için Babıâli'ye resmen nota verilmesi önerisi.	
149	21 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-	



<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<b>İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No.</b>	
		1139. ....	371
		21 Ekimde işbaşına gelen yeni İstanbul Kabinesinin (Tevfik Paşa kabinesi) milliyetçilerle bir uzlaşma Hükümeti olacağı, Kabine'de milliyetçi sempatzamı İzzet Paşa'nın da bulunduğu.	
		<i>Not:</i> Tevfik Paşa kabinesinin üyeleri.	
150	22 ekim	<b>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No.</b>	
		1450. ....	372
		Türkiye'nin son altı aylık durumuna toplu bakış:	
		1. Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin düştüğü, Mütarekenin ikinci yılına bastığı, olaylara toplu bir bakışın yerinde olacağı.	
		2. İstanbul'un işgali üzerine başa geçen milliyetçi aleyhtarı Ferit Paşa Hükümetinin, bütün çabalarına rağmen milliyetçilerle savaşta başarılı olamadığı; Yunan ordularının epey ilerledikleri, Edirne'de Cafer Tayyar'ın teslim olduğu.	
		3. Anadolu'da ise Ankara Hükümetinin duruma hakim olduğu, kendisini Türkiye'nin tek meşru Hükümeti saydığı, İtilâf devletleriyle savaş halinde olduğu, Bolşeviklerle de ilişki kurduğu.	
		4. İstanbul Hükümetinin durumunun gittikçe kötüleştiği, milliyetçileri dize getireceğini ve İtilâf devletleriyle yumuşak bir barış yapılacağını sanan Ferit Paşa'nın hayal kırıklığına uğradığı.	
		5. Barış andlaşmasına ve Ferit Paşa'ya karşı kabine içinde Reşit Bey etrafında ortaya çıkan bir gruba karşı Ferit Paşa'nın üstün geldiği ve Temmuz sonunda yeni bir kabine kurduğu ve bu kabine zamanında Sèvres andlaşmasının imzalandığı.	
		6. Son zamanlarda Ferit Paşa'yı Padişah'tan başka destekleyen kalmadığı, Padişahın ise zayıf karakterli olduğu.	
		7. Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin, Anadolu'yu yatıştırmak için Ferit Paşa'yı değiştirmek gerektiğini Padişaha söylediği. Ferit Paşanın istifa ettiği, fakat ne olursa olsun son altı ayda barış davasına hizmeti dokunmuş	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		sayılacağı, ayrıca İngiliz taraftarlığında samimi olduğu.	
		8. Barış andlaşmasını kabul etmeyen Ankara'ya karşı kuvvet kullanma projesinin gerçekleşmediği, geriye uzlaşma yolunun kaldığı ve Anadolu'ya bir heyet göndermesinin, düşen Hükümetten istenmiş bulunduğu.	
		9. İstanbul Hükümetinin çok kötü olan mali durumunun, Sèvres'in mali hükümleri yürürlüğe konmadıkça düzelemeyeceği.	
		10. Birçok kerre onaylanması istenen Barış andlaşmasının onayı için aslında Türk Parlamentosunun kararı gerektiği, fakat bunun Padişah tarafından da onaylanabileceği, şimdiye kadar önceki Parlamentolarca henüz onaylanmadığı gerekçesiyle Padişahın andlaşmayı onaylamadığı, fakat Tevfik Paşa kabinesi zamanında onaylanabileceği.	
		11. Şimdi ana davanın barışçı yolla Anadolu'nun yola getirip getirilemeyeceği noktasında toplandığı, gönderilecek heyet başarı sağlayamazsa İtilâf devletlerinin yeni bir harekât plânı hazırlamaları gerekeceği.	
151	23 ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 999. ....	381
		1. Sèvres'in onaylanması konusundaki Fransız projesine İngiltere'nin de esas itibariyle katıldığı.	
		2. İngiltere'nin Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesinden önce Sèvres'in onaylanmasını istediği, böylelikle bir olup bitti ile karşı karşıya bırakılacak milliyetçilerin, pazarlığa kalkışamayacakları.	
		3. Andlaşmanın hemen onaylanması konusunda İngiltere ve Fransa'nın, Padişahı tahttan ayrılmak zorunda bırakacak kadar ısrar etmek istemedikleri. İngiltere'nin, Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyette temsilci bulundurmamayı tercih ettiği.	
152	24 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1147. ....	382

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyet konusu.	
		1. Padişah'ın ve Tefvik Paşa'nın Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyette, İtilaf devletleri temsilcileri de bulunmasını istedikleri, heyetin milliyetçileri teslim olmağa çağıracağı, barış şartlarını müzakere etmeyeceği.	
		2. Heyette temsilci bulundurmamak istemeyen Fransa ile anlaşmaya varılması telkini.	
		3. Sèvres'in onaylanması için Yüksek Komiserlerin yeni bir ortak nota hazırladıkları ve bunu yakında İstanbul Hükümetine verecekleri.	
		4. Heyette İtilaf devletleri temsilcilerinin de bulunmasının yararlı olacağı, heyet, milliyetçilere barış andlaşmasını kabul ettiremezse yeni bir harekât planı hazırlamak gerekeceği.	
153	26 ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'e TEL. No. 1014. ....	383
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyette İngiliz delegesi de bulunacaksa, milliyetçilerin ellerindeki İngiliz subay ve erlerini serbest bırakırma işini de ele alması talimatı.	
		Not: 1) <i>Lord Rawlinson'dan Lord Curzon'a mektup.</i> (16. 8. 1920):	
		Altı aydır Erzurum'da tutsak bulunan Albay Rawlinson'un Malta'daki Türk sürgünleriyle değıstokuş edilmesi ricası.	
		2) <i>Lord Curzon'dan Lord Rawlinson'a cevabı mektup</i> (22. 10. 1920):	
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyetin İngiliz tutsaklarıyla Türk sürgünlerini değıstokuş etme işini de görüreceği.	
154	26 ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'ye TEL. No. 1143. ....	384
		Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyette İtilaf devletleri temsilcileri de bulundurulması için Fransa nezdinde teşebbüs yapılması talimatı.	
155	26 ekim	RAMLE'de İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ MR. SCOTT'tan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1205.	385

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Cidde'den alınan bir rapor örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	10 ekim	CİDDE'de BİNBAŞI BATTEN'den RAMLE'de MR. SCOTT'a RAPOR (KISMEN). . . . .	385
		1. M. Kemal ile Kral Hüseyin arasında haberleşme olduğu gelen raporlarca doğrulanıyorsa da bu ilişkilere çok önem vermemek gerektiği.	
		2. Türk ajanları tarafından İngilizlere karşı alet olarak kullanıldığı söylenen Kral'ın, her şeye rağmen İngiltere ile ilişkilerini tehlikeye sokmayacağı.	
156	28 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1157. . . . .	386
		1. Sèvres'in hemen onaylanması için 25 Ekimde Sadrazama ortak nota verildiği.	
		2. Aynı gün İstanbul Hükümetince yayımlanan bildiri, andlaşmanın onaylanabilmesi için Parlametionun toplanacağı yolunda bir paragraf bulunduğu.	
		3. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının da Parlametionun toplanmasını savunduğu, kendisine, İngiltere'nin bir an önce andlaşmanın onaylanmasını istediği yolunda cevap verildiği.	
		4. İktidara gelmeden önce andlaşmanın derhal onaylanmasından yana görünen Tefvik Paşanın şimdi başkalarının etkisinde kalarak değişmeğe başladığı..	
157	28 ekim	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1470. . . . .	387
		Sèvres andlaşmasının bir an önce onaylanması konusunda Yüksek Komiserlerin 25 Ekimde Sadrazam Tefvik Paşaya verdikleri ortak nota örneğinin eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	25 ekim	İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN SADRAZAM TEVFİK PAŞAYA ORTAK NOTA. . . . .	388
		1. Sèvres andlaşmasının, öteki parlamentolardan önce Türkiye tarafından onaylanması gerektiği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Onaylandıktan sonra andlaşma üzerinde artık tartışılmıyacağı ve böylece Anadolu'ya yollanacak heyetin de işinin kolaylaşacağı.	
		3. Türkiye'nin istediği mali yardımın yapılabilmesi için de önce andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konması gerektiği.	
		4. Başlıca bu nedenlerle Yüksek Komiserlerin, andlaşmanın hemen onaylanması üzerinde ısrar ettikleri.	
158	2 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN AVAM KAMARASINDA MEBUS ANEURIN WILIAMS'a YAZI. ....	389
		M. Kemal'in Londra'daki ajanı hakkında 2 Kasım 1920 tarihli mektubun alındığı ve ilgili daireye havale edildiği. (Ajan'ın Spiridon Triandafilides adlı bir Rum olduğu).	
159	3 kasım	YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİSİNDEN İNGİLİZ DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a NOTA. No. 5418/St/20. ....	389
		1. İstanbul'daki İngiliz askeri misyonunun Mısır'da bulunan 10 bin Türk harp esirini serbest bırakmaya karar verdiği ve 400 kişinin şimdiden serbest bırakıldığı.	
		2. Serbest bırakılacak Türk harp esirlerinin M. Kemal'e katılabilecekleri ve bunun Anadolu'daki Yunan askeri harekâtı için tehlike yaratacağı.	
		3. Bu bakımdan Yunan Hükümetinin, Türk harp esirlerini serbest bırakma kararının değiştirilmesini istediği.	
160	5 kasım	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3328. ....	390
		M. Kemal'e gönderilecek heyet konusunda Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığundan alınan nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	4 kasım	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNE NOTA. ....	390
		1. M. Kemal'e gönderilecek Osmanlı heyetinde İtilaf devletleri temsilcileri de bulunmasında Fransa'nın bir sakınca görmediği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		2. Ancak önce Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanmasının, ondan sonra heyetin gönderilmesinin uygun olacağı.	
161	5 kasım	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3338. ....	391
		Sèvres'in onaylanması ve Anadolu'ya bir Türk heyeti gönderilmesi konusunda Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığın-dan alınan nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	5 kasım	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN PARİS'te İNGİLTERE BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNE NOTA. ....	391
		1. Sèvres'in onaylanması ve Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi konusunda Fransa'nın, İngiltere'nin görümlerine katıldığı.	
		2. Andlaşmanın tezelden ve Padişah tarafından onaylanması gerektiği, onaylanmasının Padişahın tahtan çekilmesine sebep olacağı sanılmadığı.	
		3. İngiltere tarafından da onaylanacak Sèvres'in Fransız parlamentosuna sunulacağı.	
		4. M. Kemal'e gönderilecek heyette İtilaf devletleri temsilcilerinin de bulunabileceği.	
162	6 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜ SIR BASIL THOMSON'a YAZI. No. 13608/13608/ 44.ÇOK ACELE. ....	392
		M. A. Williams'tan alınan 2 Kasım tarihli mektubun örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu. Gürcistan Maslahatgüzarının verdiği bilgiye göre M. Kemal'in Londra'da Spiridon Triandafilides adlı bir ajanı bulunduğu, bu raporu doğrulayacak bilgi olup olmadığı.	
163	6 kasım	TİFLİS'te ALBAY STOKES'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 480. GİZLİ. KİŞİYE ÖZEL. ....	393
		1. Ermenistan'ın Türkler tarafından işgalinin Orta Doğu'daki durumu değiştirdiği. Azerbeycan yüzünden Türklerle Bolşevikler arasında anlaşmazlık çıkacağı.	
		2. İngiltere'nin Bolşevikler veya Türklerden biriyle ötekine karşı dostluk kurma zamanının elverişli olduğu. Bolşeviklerle anlaşılırsa İngiltere için ham madde ve pazar sağlanabileceği. Türklerle dostluk kurul-	

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		duğu takdirde de, Türkiye'de Yunan ilerlemesini destekleme politikasından vazgeçmeye karşılık bütün İslâm dünyasının kazanılabileceği.	
164	8 kasım	3. İstenirse Tiflis'ten M. Kemal ile irtibat kurulabileceği. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1173. ....	394
		1. Sèvres'in derhal onaylanmasının İstanbul Hükümetinden ısrarla istendiği.	
		2. Hariciye Nazırının, andlaşmanın hayırhahane yorumlanmasını, onaylandıktan sonra Yunanlıların Türkiye'den çekilmelerini ve Ermenistan sınırının tamamen Türkiye aleyhinde olmamasını ima ettiği.	
		3. Babıâlinin ayrıca Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderme konusu üzerinde düşündüğü, heyette başrolü İzzet Paşa'nın oynayacağı, milliyetçi liderlerle İstanbul arasındaki ön yazışmaların pek bilinmediği, söylenilere bakılırsa milliyetçilerin Sèvres'i kabule yanaşmayacakları.	
165	8 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1174. ....	395
		Sèvres'in onaylanması konusu, İstanbul'un cevabı:	
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin Sèvres'i onaylamak gerektiğini kabullendiği. Ancak milliyetçilerden çekindiği için derhal onaylamak istemediği ve bu işi Anadolu ile temas sonuna kadar ertelemek arzusunda olduğu.	
		2. Hariciye Nazırının, onaylamamın hiç değilse bir ay geri bırakılması ve bu arada Türkiye'ye mali yardım yapılması isteğinde bulunduğu.	
166	9 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİLİĞİNE CEVABI NOTA No. 13648/147/44. (3 Kasım 1920 tarihli Yunan notasına cevap). ....	396
		Türk savaş esirlerinin serbest bırakılmaları konusu: Halen Mısır'da 500, Irak'ta 800 ve Hindistan'da 4000 Türk savaş esiri bulunduğu. (M. Kemal'e katıl-	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
167	10 kasım	<p>maları ihtimali dolayısıyla) bu esirlerin serbest bırakılmalarından vazgeçilip geçilemeyeceği konusunun askeri makamlara sunulduğu.</p> <p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL No. 1189.</p> <p>1. Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusu.</p> <p>a) Türk Hükümetinin, Sèvres'i onaylamak gerektiğini kabul ettiği.</p> <p>b) Ancak Anadolu ile temas sonuna kadar onaylamayı ertelemek arzusunda olduğu ve kendisine hiç değilse bir aylık bir mühlet tanınmasını dilediği.</p> <p>c) Ayrıca andlaşmanın onaylanmasına değin Türk Hükümetine mali yardım yapılması ricası.</p> <p>2. Yüksek Komiserlerin Hükümetlerinden talimat istemeğe, mali yardım için Sèvres'in onaylanması gerektiğini söylemeğe karar verdikleri.</p> <p>3. Anadolu'ya gönderilecek uzlaştırma heyetinin başarı şansının bugün daha az olduğu; çünkü milliyetçilerin Ermenilere karşı başarı kazanmış buldukları.</p> <p>4. Heyetin yollanmasından önce andlaşmanın onaylanması için ısrar etmenin durumu daha da kötüye götürebileceği, bu iki konuyu birbirinden ayırmanın uygun olacağı.</p> <p>5. İstanbul Hükümetinin, işinin güç olduğu, zaman kazanma politikası gütmmediği.</p>	397
168	10 kasım	<p>İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ AMİRAL J. DE ROBECK'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1190. ....</p> <p>1. Wrangel'in Bolşeviklere, Ermenilerin de Kemalistlere yenilmelerinden sonra Sèvres'i milliyetçilere kabul ettirmenin daha da güçleştiği ve Anadolu'ya yollanacak uzlaştırma heyetinin de pek başarı şansı olmadığı.</p> <p>2. Andlaşmayı silâhla kabul ettirmek için yeteri kadar kuvvet bulunmadığı ve Bolşeviklerin de yardımıyla Yunanlılara karşı hücumu geçecek Kemalistlerin tehlikeli olabilecekleri.</p>	399



No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
169	12 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR J. A. C. TILLEY'den İNGİLTERE İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜ SIR BASIL THOMSON'a YAZI No. 13608/44 ACELE. ....	400
		M. Kemal'in Londra'da Victor Vartalide ve Mustafa Reiszade adlarında iki ajanı bulunduğunu, Gürcistan pasaportu taşıyan bu ajanların vize alıp Fransa'ya geçmek istediklerini haber veren Gürcistan'ın Londra temsilcisi Gambashidze'nin, bu kimselerin Batum'a dönmelerine engel olunarak Londra'da tutulmalarını istediği.	
170	12 kasım	İNGİLTERE İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜ SIR B. THOMSON'dan DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR J. A. C. TILLEY'e YAZI. GİZLİ. ....	401
		(Mustafa Kemal'in Londra'daki ajanları konusu). Gürcistan temsilcisiyle işbirliği yapılarak, pasaport bahanesiyle ajanların İngiliz polisine gönderilmelerini telkin. Bunlara vize vermemeleri için Fransızların uyarılabileceği, fakat bu takdirde ajanların başka yoldan gidebilecekleri.	
171	13 kasım	ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 894. ....	402
		1. Ankara'da bulunduğu söylenen İtalyan askeri heyeti konusunda Kont Sforza nezdinde teşebbüs yapıldığı. Kont'un bu haberi inkâr ettiği. 2. Ayrıca, İtalyanların Anadolu'ya askeri yardım yaptıkları haberleri üzerine Genel Sekreterin dikkatinin çekildiği, Genel Sekreterin bu konuda tahkikat yaptıracağı. 3. Fransız Büyükelçisinin de İtalyan ajanlarının Anadolu'da faaliyet gösterdikleri kâsında olduğu.	
172	16 kasım	İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD DERBY'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 13433. ....	403
		Sèvres'in onaylanması ve Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderilmesi konularında Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığında alınan nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	15 kasım	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İNGİLTERE'nin PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNE NOTA. ....	403

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		1. Fransa Hükümetinin, önce Sèvres'in onaylanması, ondan sonra Anadolu'ya heyet gönderilmesi görüşünü savunmuş olduğu halde durumun şimdi değişmiş bulunduğu.	
		2. Sèvres'in onaylanmasından önce Anadolu'ya bir Osmanlı heyetinin gönderilebileceği.	
		3. Fakat Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşma umudunun az olduğu.	
173	19 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI LORD CURZON'dan İNGİLTERE'nin ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'a YAZI. No. 1036. . . . .	405
		İtalyan Büyükelçisiyle görüşme:	
		1. M. Kemal'in yanında bir İtalyan heyeti bulunduğu iddiasını İtalya'nın inkâr ettiği.	
		2. İtalya'nın, Türkiye'ye karşı güdülecek politika konusunda İngiltere ile işbirliği yaparak aradaki kuşku ve yanlış anlaşılmaları gidermek niyetinde olduğu.	
		3. İtalya Büyükelçisinin Kıbrıs konusuna da değindiği.	
Ek.	11 kasım	LONDRA'da İTALYAN BÜYÜKELÇİSİ MARQUIS IMPERIALI İLE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI GENEL SEKRETERİ SIR E. G. CROWE ARASINDAKİ GÖRÜŞMENİN ÖZETİ.	406
		1. Türkiye'nin ve Anadolu'nun yatıştırılması amacıyla İtalya'nın İngiltere'den ayrı bir politika gütmeyeceği.	
		2. Bu amaca erişmek için İtalya'nın, milliyetçi liderlerle anlaşmaya varılmasına taraftar olduğu, askerî harekâta katılmadığı ve milliyetçilerle ilişkilerini büsbütün kesmeyeceği.	
		3. Sınırlı olan bu ilişkilerin mübalâğa edileceği.	
		4. İtalya'nın Akdeniz bölgesinde İngiltere ile ortak bir politika izlemek arzusunda olduğu, buna karşılık Anadolu'daki İtalyan ekonomik çıkarlarının desteklenmesini, Yunan emellerinin sınırlandırılmasını İngiltere'den beklediği.	
		<i>Not : Lord Curzon'un'un 15.11.1920 günlü notu : Imperiali'nin hep kendisine yonttuğu. Kıbrıs'ın hiç kimseye terkedilemeyeceği</i>	
174	19 kasım	İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. GİZLİ. . . . .	408

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		1. İtalya Hükümeti ile Türk milliyetçileri arasındaki ilişkiler konusunda Harbiye Bakanlığının da elinde bazı raporlar bulunduğu.	
		2. Bu raporlardan İtalyanların Türk milliyetçilerine yardım ettiklerinin anlaşıldığı. Raporlar konusunda İstanbul ve Kahire'deki İngiliz temsilciliklerine yazılacağı.	
Ek.	14 haziran	İNGİLİZ ORDULARI İSTANBUL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINA. TEL. GİZLİ. ....	410
		Tanınmış bir İtalyan müteahhidinin milliyetçiler tarafında kalan bir demiryolu köprüsünü onarmak istediği.	
175	20 kasım	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINCA LORD CURZON İÇİN HAZIRLANAN "BOLŞEVİKLERLE TÜRK MİLLİYETÇİLERİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLER" BAŞLIKLİ NOT. ....	410
		1. Bolşeviklerle Türk milliyetçileri arasındaki ilişkiler konusunda Dışişlerinin elinde ilk elden hemen hemen hiç rapor bulunmadığı, konuyla ilgili bilgilerin askeri istihbarat raporlarından derlendiği, fakat bu raporların bazılarının da tam güvenilir olmadığı.	
		2. Mustafa Kemal'in bu konuda 8 Temmuz günü BM Meclisinde açıklama yaptığı, 5 Ağustos günü de bir bildiri yayınladığı ve Bolşeviklerin Türklere yardım edeceklerini açıkladığı.	
		3. Ayrıca Anadolu ajansının haberlerinde, İstanbul'dan, Kahire'den alınan çeşitli istihbarat raporlarında Bolşeviklerin Kemalistlere yardımlarına değinildiği.	
		4. Bütün bu haber ve raporlardan Bolşeviklerle Türk milliyetçileri arasındaki askeri işbirliğinin hiç denecek kadar az olduğunun anlaşıldığı, ancak Bolşeviklerin az miktarda para ve silâh yardımı yaptıkları.	
176	22 kasım	TİFLİS'te ALBAY STOKES'ten İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 126. ....	413
		Kafkaslardaki durum:	
		1. Eylül sonunda Kemalistlerin Ermenistan'ı işgale başladıkları, bu hareketin İtilâf Devletlerine karşı Kemalist-Bolşevik tertibini güçlendireceği ve Sèvres'i kâğıt üzerinde bırakacağı.	

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		2. Ekimde Ermenilerin Bolşeviklerce de tehdit edilmesi karşısında bir Ermeni-Gürcü İttifakı telkin edildiği, fakat Gürcistan'ın bu telkini reddettiği.	
		3. Ekim sonunda Ermenilere karşı Türk saldırısının Kars ve Iğdır yönünden geliştiği. 31 Ekimde Kars'ın zaptedildiği. 7 Kasımda da Gümrü (Alexandropol) de mütareke imzalandığı.	
		4. 10 Kasımda Ermeni Hükümetinin Mustafa Kemal'den 8 Kasım tarihli bir telgraf aldığı, telgrafta barış esasları ve şartlarının bildirildiği.	
		5. Yeniden çarpışmalar olduğu ve yeni bir mütareke yapıldığı. Gümrü'de bir barış konferansı toplanacağı.	
		6. Ermenilerin ellerinden geleni yaptıkları, İtilaf devletlerine sadık kaldıkları, fakat yenildikleri.	
177	22 kasım	İNGİLTERE İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRLÜĞÜN-DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA F. ASHTON-GWATKIN'e YAZI No. CX/1011/V. ....	417
		İngiliz Gizli İstihbaratının Sofya temsilcisinden alınan telgraf: Mustafa Kemal'in şahsi dostu olan eski Bulgar mebuslarından Achkoff'un, İngiltere ile Mustafa Kemal arasında gizli görüşmeler yapılmasını telkin ettiği. M. Kemal ile mektuplaşmakta olan Achkoff'la Sofya'da konuşma yapıldığı. <i>Telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde yapılan uzun yorumlar</i> : İngiltere ile Türkler arasında eninde sonunda yapılacak görüşmelerin, M. Kemal ile değil, İstanbul Hükümeti ile yapılması ve teşebbüsün Türklerden gelmesi gerektiği. Ayrıca İngiltere'nin kendi başına değil, müttefikleriyle birlikte görüşmelere gideceği.	
178	22 kasım	YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA NOTA. No. 5721/St/20. ....	418
		Türk savaş esirleri konusu. Hindistan'daki Türk savaş esirlerinin sayısının 12.000 olduğu, 2000 esirin yola çıkarıldığı, 8.000 esirin de İstanbul'da bulunduğu. Bu esirlerin M. Kemal'in idaresi altındaki bölgelere dönmelerine müsaade edilmemesi isteği.	
179	23 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1234.	420

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Sèvres'in onaylanması. Anadolu'ya gönderilecek heyet konusu.	
		1. Fransa Yüksek Komiserinin Hükümetinden aldığı telgrafta Sèvres'in onaylanmasındaki gecikmenin, M. Kemal'de İstanbul'a üstün geldiği kanısını yaratacağı; fakat andlaşmanın hemen onaylanması için ısrar etmenin ise Tevfik Paşa kabinesini düşürebileceği. Belli bir tarihe kadar onaylamanın geciktirilebileceği, bu arada Anadolu'ya bir heyet gönderileceği.	
		2. Yunan seçimleri üzerine İstanbul'daki durumun daha nâzikleştiği.	
		3. Türk Hükümetine verilecek yeni notanın hazırlanmakta olduğu, İtalyan Yüksek Komiserinin, Sèvres'in onaylanması için kesin bir mühlet tespitine taraftar olmadığı.	
180	24 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1239. ...	421
		1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırının kendisini (Rumbold'u) ziyaret ettiği. Polislere Ekim maaşlarının verileceğini; gönderilecek heyeti Mustafa Kemal'in kabul edeceğini bildirdiği. Heyete İzzet Paşanın Başkanlık edeceği.	
		2. Nâzıra, Heyetin dönüşünü beklemeden, Aralık başlarında Sèvres'in onaylanması gerektiğinin hatırlatıldığı.	
		3. Mali yardım isteyen Nâzıra, andlaşmanın onaylanmasından sonra yardım yapılabileceğinin söylendiği.	
		4. Heyetin dönüşüne kadar andlaşmanın onaylanmayacağı kuşkusunu.	
181	24 kasım	İNGİLTERE'nin SOFYA ELÇİSİ SIR A. PEEL'den DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'a ŞİFRE TEL. No. 175. ....	422
		M. Kemal ile temasta olan ve Sofya'da iyi tanınan eski Bulgar mebusu Atchkoff'un İngiltere Elçiliğine gelip görüştüğü, İngiltere'nin M. Kemal ile gizlice görüşmelere girişmesini telkin ettiği, görüşmelere gidilirse, M. Kemal'in bazı tâvizler verebileceğini ileri sürdüğü ve hattâ bu tavizlerin neler olabileceğini de açıkladığı.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<i>Telgraf üzerine Dışişlerinin yorumları: İzzet Paşa heyetinin dönüşünü beklemenin uygun olacağı. Atchkoff'un verdiği teminatın ne kadar önemsenebileceği sorusu.</i>	
182	24 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1246. ....	423
		Babiâliye verilen cevabî ortak nota:	
		1. Hükümetlerinden aldıkları talimat üzerine, Yüksek Komiserlerin, Sèvres'in Türk Hükümetince onaylanmasını tekrar istedikleri, onaylamanın aynı zamanda Ermenistan'a karşı saldırının takbihini de kapsayacağı.	
		2. Andlaşma onaylanmadıkça Türkiye'ye hiçbir mali yardım yapılamıyacağı.	
		3. Yüksek Komiserlerin vakit geçirmeden andlaşmanın onaylanmasını Türk Hükümetinden istedikleri ve bu konuda teminat bekledikleri.	
183	25 kasım	YUNANİSTAN'ın LONDRA ELÇİSİNDEN İNGİLİZ DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a NOTA. No. 5774/St/20. ....	424
		Anadolu'ya dönen Türk savaş esirlerinin M. Kemal'in ordusuna katıldıkları. Bu esirlerin geri dönüşlerini önlemek için tezelden tedbir alınmasını ısrarla rica.	
184	26 kasım	ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 929. GİZLİ. ....	425
		1. M. Kemal'in yanında bir İtalyan heyeti bulunduğu ve İtalyanların Anadolu'ya askerî malzeme verdikleri yolundaki haberlerin İtalya Dışişleri Bakanlığınca kesin olarak reddedildiği. Bu haberlerin Yunan ajanlarınca uydurulduğunun ileri sürüldüğü.	
185	26 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1250. ....	426
		İstanbul Hükümetinin, M. Kemal'e bir heyet göndermeden önce Sèvres andlaşmasını onaylamak istemediği.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
186	26 kasım	İNGİLTERE'nin SOFYA ELÇİSİ SIR A. PEEL'den DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 510. GİZLİ. ....	426
		1. Eski Bulgar mebusu Dimitri Atchkoff ile İngiltere Elçiliğinde yapılan görüşmeye ait muhtıranın eklice sunulduğu. İstanbul'dan Sofya'ya dönerken Kemalist kurye diye Yunanlılarca yakalanmak istenen Atchkoff'ta Yunan aleyhtarlığı olabileceği ve kendisinin Yunanistan'daki ve Kırım'daki olayların gelişmesi üzerine harekete geçmiş olması ihtimali.	
Ek.	20 kasım	D. ATCHKOFF İLE İNGİLTERENİN SOFYA ELÇİLİĞİNDE YAPILAN GÖRÜŞME HAKKINDA NOT. ....	427
		1. 1903-1908 yıllarında Bulgar Meclisinde mebus olan, M. Kemal'i 1916 yılından beri tanıyan ve Mart 1920'de onunla görüşmüş, o tarihten sonra da kendisiyle mektuplaşmış olan Atchkoff'un İngiltere ile M. Kemal arasında doğrudan doğruya görüşmeler yapılmasını telkin ettiği.	
		2. Achkoff'un, ayrıca Bolşeviklik, Ermenistan, Azınlıklar, Arabistan, Enver Paşa, Fransa ve İtalya, İzmir ve reformlar konularında M. Kemal'in görüşlerini anlattığı.	
		3. M. Kemalle görüşmelere girmekte İngiltere'nin çıkarı bulunduğu.	
		<i>Yazı üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinin yorumu: "Çok ilginç. Müttefikleri birbirine düşürmek için Türk manevrası."</i>	
187	27 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1253. ..	429
		Sèvres'in değiştirilmesi konusu:	
		1. Sèvres andlaşmasında önemli değişiklikler yapmak gerekeceği kanısı. İstanbul Hükümetinin açıktan açığa değişiklik istemediği, fakat milliyetçi liderlerin andmanın değiştirilmesi gerektiği kanısında oldukları.	
		2. Andlaşmanın değiştirilmesi halinde Anadolu'nun yatıştırılmasının kolaylaşacağı. İtilâf devletleri prestijinin, gayrimüslim azınlıkların güvenliğinin sağlanacağı.	
		Bu konuda Sir Rumbold'un görüş ve yorumu.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
188	28 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1573. ...	431
Ek.	24 kasım	İSTANBUL'da İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ YÜKSEK KOMİSERLERİNDEN BABIALİYE ORTAK NOTA. ....	431
		1. Yüksek Komiserlerin 12 Kasım tarihli notalarına ek ve Osmanlı Hariciye Nâzırının 4 Kasım tarihli notasına karşılık: Hükümetlerinden aldıkları talimat gereğince Yüksek Komiserlerin Sèvres'in Osmanlı Hükümeti tarafından onaylanması üzerinde ısrar ettikleri.	
		2. Onaylamanın aynı zamanda Ermenistan'a karşı girişilen saldırının İstanbul Hükümetince takbihini de kapsayacağı, çünkü bu saldırının andlaşmanın çiğnenmesi anlamı taşıdığı.	
		3. Osmanlı Hükümetine mali yardım yapılabilmesinin andlaşmanın onaylanmasına bağlı olduğu, bu bakımdan da andlaşmanın onaylanması gerektiği.	
		4. Andlaşmanın bir an önce onaylanacağına dair Yüksek Komiserlerin Osmanlı Hükümetinden teminat bekledikleri.	
189	3 aralık	(SABAHA)-İTİLAFLI DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KATİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. ....	432
		Ermenistan ve Sèvres konuları:	
		1. Ermenistan'ın Milletler Cemiyetine alınması konusu: Henüz sınırları kesinlikle çizilip garanti edilmediği, ayrıca Türkiye'nin Sèvres'i onaylamadığı için ve dolayısıyla bağımsız bir devlet olarak tanımamış olan Ermenistan'ın şimdilik Milletler Cemiyetine alnamayacağı yolunda karar verildiği.	
		2. Sèvres'in değiştirilmesi sorunu: Fransız delegesinin Sèvres andlaşmasında Türkler lehine değişiklik yapılmasını, özellikle İzmir'le ilgili hükümlerin değiştirilmesini savunduğu; İtalyan delegesinin de bu görüşü paylaştığı, fakat Lloyd George'un Sèvres'de değişiklik yapılmasına şiddetle karşı çıktığı; Fransız ve İngiliz delegeleri arasında tartışmalar.	



<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
Ek. 1	3 aralık	İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA ALINAN KARAR ÖRNEĞİ. .... Yunanistan'ın durumu belli oluncaya ve M. Kemal'e yollanacak heyet dönünceye kadar Anadolu'da barış konusunda kesin karar alınmasının uygun olmayacağı.	441
Ek. 2	3 aralık	İTİLAF DEVLETLERİNİN CENEVRE'DEKİ TEMSİLCİLERİNE GÖNDERİLECEK TELEGRAF TASLAĞI ..... Şimdilik Ermenistan'ın Milletler Cemiyetine alınmayacağı.	441
190	3 aralık	(ÖĞLEDEN SONRA)- İTİLAF DEVLETLERİ LONDRA KONFERANSINDA İNGİLİZ KATİBİNİN KALEME ALDIĞI TUTANAK. .... Ermenistan ve Sèvres konuları: 1. Sèvres'in henüz onaylanmadığı için Ermenistan'ın Milletler Cemiyetine alınmayacağına karar verildiği. 2. M. Kemal'in Sèvres andlaşmasına karşı tutumunun görüşüldüğü, Fransız delegesinin andlaşmada bazı değişiklikler yapılmasını telkin ettiği, İngiliz delegesinin buna itiraz ettiği ve M. Kemal'e gönderilecek heyet ve Yunanistan'daki belirsiz durum da gözönünde tutularak şimdilik kesin bir karara varılamadığı.	442
191	4 aralık	İNGİLTERE ASKERİ İSTİHBARAT MÜDÜRÜNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. ... General Gouraud'nun Ermenilerle ilgili muhtırası örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	447
Ek.	25 kasım	FRANSIZ GENERALİ GOURAUD'nun KALEME ALDIĞI ERMENİSTAN'da FRANSIZ POLİTİKASIYLA İLGİLİ MUHTIRA ÖRNEĞİ. .... 1. Kilikya'daki Ermenilere Fransızlar tarafından silâh dağıtıldığı, fakat Ermenilerin bu silahlarla köyleri yakıp yıktıkları, müslüman halkı katliamdan geçirdikleri. 2. Ayrıca Fransız ordusuna alınan gönüllü Ermenilerin firar ettikleri. 3. Bu nedenlerle Adana Ermenilerine silâh verilmediği, Ermenilerin silâhlandırılmamaları gerektiği.	447
192	6 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1606. .	448

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. M. Kemal'e yollanan İzzet Paşa heyetinin 3 Aralıkta Haydarpaşa'dan yola çıktığı, hesapça 6 veya 7 Aralıkta Ankara'ya varacağı. Fakat milliyetçi liderlerin heyetle Bilecik'te görüşmek istedikleri.</li> <li>2. Heyet üyelerinin adları, sıfatları ve kişilikleri.</li> <li>3. Milliyetçilerin ellerinde bulunan İngiliz esirlerinin listesinin heyete verildiği ve bunların serbest bırakılmasının İzzet Paşa'dan istendiği.</li> <li>4. Heyetin, İstanbul'daki durumu milliyetçilere anlatarak Sèvres'i kabul ettirmeğe çalışacağı, fakat başarı sağlayabileceğinin şüpheli olduğu.</li> <li>5. Andlaşmanın aynen kabul ettirilmesi imkânsız gibi olmakla beraber, Kemalistlerle Bolşevikler arasındaki gerginliğin arttığı ve yeni Yunan Hükümeti Venizelos'un Anadolu politikasına sadık kaldığı takdirde İzzet Paşa'nın başarı kazanabileceği.</li> <li>6. Bolşevik faktörünün Yunan faktöründen daha önemli olduğu, Türkiye'ye Bolşevik sızması tehlikesi anlatılarak M. Kemal'i ikna ve tecrit etmenin mümkün olabileceği, ancak Kemalistlerin halen Bolşeviklere bağlanmamış olduklarının da söylendiği.</li> </ol>	
193	6 aralık	<p>İNGİLTERE GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİN-DEN DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. No. CX/1011/V. ....</p> <p>M. Kemal'in tutumuyla ilgili olarak Sofya'dan alınan 22 Kasım 1920 tarihli bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.</p>	451
Ek. 1	22 kasım	<p>"KEMALİZM" KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE'nin SOFYA'daki GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT GÖREV-LİSİNCE HAZIRLANAN RAPOR. ....</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. M. Kemal'in eski dostu olan Stambulov mebuslarından Dimitri Atchkoff ile görüşmeler yapıldığı. Adıgeçenin, M. Kemal ve Bulgaristan hesabına çalıştığı, M. Kemal ile ilişkilerini sürdürdüğü, Mart ayında da onunla Anadolu'da görüştüğü. O zamandanberi de mektuplaştığı.</li> <li>2. D. Atchkoff'un 19 Kasım'da İngiltere Elçiliğine başvurarak M. Kemal ile İngiltere arasında arabuluculuk yapmak istediği. İngiltere'nin doğrudan doğruya M. Kemal ile ilişki kurmasını tavsiye ettiği, M.</li> </ol>	451

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Kemal'in siyasetini İngiliz elçiliğine anlattığı ve onunla ilişki kurmakta İngiltere'nin de çıkarı olacağını savunduğu.	
		3. Bu konuda Elçilikçe de bir rapor yollanacağı. M. Atchhoff'un, istendiği zaman M. Kemal'den bir mesaj getirebileceğini söylediği.	
Ek. 2	—	ESKİ BULGAR MİLLETVEKİLLERİNDEN D. ATCHKOFF'ın MUSTAFA KEMAL İLE İNGİLTERE ARASINDA ARABULUCULUK TEŞEBBÜSÜ ÜZERİNE İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINCA HAZIRLANAN NOT VE YORUMLAR.	454
		Bunun M. Kemal tarafından bir yoklama olduğu. İngiltere'nin M. Kemal ile bir anlaşma zemini bulabileceği. Ama Türklerin, güçlenince, İngiltere'nin Irak, Filistin, Mısır ve Hindistan'daki durumlarına karşı kışkırtma hareketine girişebilecekleri kaygusu. Anadolu ve Trakya'daki isteklerini elde ettikten sonra Türklerin amaçlarına ulaşip İstanbul'la kaynaşabilecekleri ve yardım için İngiltere'ye dönebilecekleri. İngiltere'nin Türklerle anlaşmaya varması gereken konuların Ermenistan, İzmir, Trakya, Sèvres'in askeri hükümleri ve İstanbul sorunları olduğu. İngiltere'nin şartlarını kabul ettikten sonra M. Kemal'in İstanbul kabinesinde meselâ Harbiye Nâzırı yapılabileceği, böylece milliyetçi hareketin sona erebileceği. . . .	
194	10 aralık	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3676. . . .	457
		General Gouraud'nun Kilikya ve Suriye sorunları ile ilgili açıklaması:	
		1. Kilikya'da Fransa'nın güçlüklerinin asker yetersizliğinden ve Ermenileri Türklere karşı kullanma politikasından doğduğu, bunun Kemalist harekâtına sebep olduğu, fakat artık Ermenilerin kullanılmadığı. Sèvres'de değişiklikler yaparak Türkleri yatıştırmak gerektiği.	
		2. Asıl Suriye'nin Fransa için önemli olduğu, Kilikyadan ise Fransızların çekilebilecekleri.	
		3. Yunanistan'daki durum.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
Ek.	10 aralık	PARİS'te YAYINLANAN "TEMPS" GAZETESİ KESİTİ: .....	459
		1. Fransa'nın Suriye Yüksek Komiseri General Gouraud ile Başbakan Leygues'in Kilikya ve Suriye'de Fransız tutumu konusunda Senato komisyonları önünde açıklama yaptıkları.	
		2. Kilikya'daki güçlüğün kuvvet yetersizliğinden ve Ermenilerin Türklere karşı kullanılmasından ileri geldiği. Fakat şimdi durumun düzelmiş olduğu. Fransa'nın burada kalmak niyetinde olmadığı.	
		3. Kemalist hareketi yatıştırmak için Sèvres andlaşmasında değişiklik yapılması gerektiği.	
195	10 aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA SIR TILLEY'den ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜK-ELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'a MEKTUP. ...	462
		1. Roma'da Galip Kemali Bey'den M. Kemal'e bir mektup gönderildiğine dair gizli bir rapor alındığı.	
		2. Rapora göre M. Kemal'in ajanı G. Kemal Beyin İtalya Dışişleri Bakanlığını ziyaret etmiş ve İtalyanlardan diplomatik destek vaadi almış olduğu. Sèvres'in onaylanmasını beklemeden İtalya'nın İstanbul'a Büyükelçi tâyin etmiş bulunduğu.	
		3. İtalya'nın İstanbul ile Ankara arasında arabuluculuk yapmak istediği.	
		4. Galip Kemali Bey'e istediği zaman İtalya Dışişleri Bakanlığına gelebileceğinin söylendiği.	
196	10 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1623. .	463
		Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusunda Babiâlden alınan nota örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	1 aralık	OSMANLI HARİCİYE NAZIRI SEFA BEYDEN İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'a NOTA. ....	463
		1. Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusunda Yüksek Komiserlerin 24 Kasım tarihli ortak notalarının alındığı.	
		2. Babiâlinin Sèvres'i onaylamayı reddetmediği, ancak Anadolu ile temasa kadar kendisine mühlet tanınmasını istediği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
197	10 aralık	3. Anadolu'ya yollanacak heyetin bir iki gün içinde yola çıkacağı. O bakımdan Heyetin Anadolu ile temasına kadar Türk Hükümetine mühlet tanınması ricası. İNGİLTERE HARBİYE BAKANLIĞINDAN HÜKÜMETE SUNULAN MEZOPOTAMYA'da DURUM İLE İLGİLİ GİZLİ MUHTIRA. ....	464
		1. İngiltere'nin halen Mezopotamya ve İran'da 17.000 İngiliz, 85.000 Hindli askeri bulunduğu; Basra, Bağdad ve Musul'u korumak için bunun asgari miktar olduğu. Bunların masraflarının ancak yarısının karşılanabildiği. 2. Türkiye'de İttihatçılarla Kemalistlerin Sèvres'i değiştirmek istedikleri. İttihatçıları tasfiye etmek için M. Kemal'in yeni bir baş olabileceği. 3. Kafkaslar'da ve Türkiye'de askeri kuvvet durumu. Milliyetçi kuvvetlerin Kâzım Karabekir kumandasında olanlarının şimdi Ermenilerin karşısında olduğu, M. Kemal'in Batı cephesindeki kuvvetlerinin ise 40 bin kadar olduğu. 4. İstanbul'daki müttefik kuvvetlerin 15 tabur, Yunanlıların Anadolu'daki kuvvetinin ise 110 bin tüfek ve kılıç olduğu.	
198	12 aralık	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3688. ....	470
		1. Sèvres'in öngördüğü mali komisyonun Fransız üyesinin yakında İstanbul'a hareket edeceği, Fransızın komisyon Başkanlığına seçilmesinin İngiltere tarafından tanınmaması gerektiği. 2. Fransız Parlamentosunun Sèvres'i olduğu gibi onaylamak istemediği, Fransa Hükümetinin de andlaşmada değişiklik yapılması görüşünde olduğu, zira Bolşevik tehlikesine karşı M. Kemal ile İzmir konusunda anlaşmaya varılamak istendiği. 3. Fransız siyasi çevrelerinin, M. Kemal ile anlaşabilmek için İzmir'in Türklere bırakılması fikrinde oldukları.	
199	12 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI No. 1633 ...	472

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		1. 8 Aralıkta Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa ile görüşüldüğü. 2. Ankara'ya giden heyetten henüz haber alınmadığı, Tevfik Paşa'ya göre, Yunan işgal kuvvetleri yüzünden haberleşme güçlüğü olabileceği, İngilizlerin Yunanlılara talimat verip haberleşmeyi sağlayacakları. 3. Sèvres'in onaylanacağı yolunda Sadrazamın teminat verdiği. 4. Mali güçlük konusunun görüşüldüğü.	
200	14 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ ORDULARI GENEL KARARGÂHINDAN İNGİLTERE HARBIYE BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. No. 1. 9644. .... Milliyetçilerle Bolşevikler arasındaki ilişkilerin gerginleştiği, Sovyetlerin Ermenistan yardım ettikleri. M. Kemal'in Türk Komünist partisini takbih ettiği, "Yenigün" gazetesini kapattığı. Kâzım Karabekir'in milliyetçilerle iyi çalıştığı. İzzet Paşa heyetinden haber alınmadığı.	474
201	15 aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN BERUT'ta MR. FONTANA'ya ŞİFRE TEL. No. 75. İtalya Büyükelçiliğinin verdiği habere göre, M. Kemal'in karışıklık çıkartmak için Sünnisi şeyhini Mardin'e yolladığı.	474
202	15 aralık	İNGİLTERE GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNDEN DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI No. CX/1011/V. .... Mustafa Kemal'in tutumu ile ilgili olarak Sofya'dan alınan ikinci bir raporun ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	6 aralık	"KEMALİZM" KONUSUNDA İNGİLTERE'nin SOFYA'daki GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT GÖREVLİSİNCE HAZIRLANAN İKİNCİ RAPOR. ... 1. M. Kemal ile İngiltere arasında aracılık yapmağa çalışan D. Atchkoff ile yeniden görüşüldüğü. Atchkoff'un Varna'dan dönen oğlunun İstanbul'dan bir mektup getirmiş ve mektubunu M. Kemal ile görüşen yüksek siyasi bir kişi tarafından yazılmış olduğu. 2. Atchkoff'un, istenirse 15 gün içinde M. Kemal'le görüşüp yetki alabileceğini söylediği, İngiltere'nin M. Kemal ile anlaşmaya varmasını ısrarla savunduğu. Fransa ile İtalya'nın M. Kemal ile zaten gayri resmi görüşmeler yaptıkları.	475

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. Atchkoff'un, M. Kemal'in istediklerini de anlattığı. M. Kemal'in, Fethi Bey ile Rauf Beyin serbest bırakılmalarını da öncelikle istediği.	
203	16 aralık	4. <i>Dışişlerinin notu</i> : Atchkoff'un, M. Kemal'den aldığı talimatla hareket ettiği. İngiltere'nin İstanbul'la görüşmek yerine M. Kemal'le görüşmeye itilmek istendiği. İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1307. ....	478
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin Sèvres'i onaylamaktan yeneden yan çizdiği, sebep olarak da Ankara'ya yollanan heyetten haber alınmamasının ileri sürüldüğü. Aslında ise Yunanistan'da ve başka yerlerdeki gelişmeler sonunda andlaşmanın değiştirileceği umudunun beslendiği.	
		2. Andlaşmanın onaylanması için İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince ısrar edildiği.	
		3. Fransız ve İtalyan Yüksek Komiserlerinin de bu yolda çalıştıkları. Ama onaylama umudunun pek bulunmadığı.	
204	17 aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HARBİYE (VE HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ) BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. (E 15678/2/44). ....	479
		Karışıklık çıkarmak için M. Kemal'in Mardin'e Sünnisi'yi yolladığı.	
205	17 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1308. ..	479
		M. Kemal'e yollanan heyet:	
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin, Ankara'ya yollanan heyetten haber alamadığı ve bunu haberleşme güçlüğü ile izah ettiği.	
		2. Bazı raporlara göre ise heyetin milliyetçiler tarafına geçmiş, hattâ İzzet Paşanın Ankara Hükümetinde görev almış olduğu, bu söylentilere inanılmasa bile heyetin milliyetçileri yatıştırmada başarılı olmadığını.	
		3. Bir başka rapora göre Milliyetçilerin, General Gouraud aracılığıyla Avrupa ile temas kurdukları ve Anadolu sorununu halle çalıştıkları.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
206	18 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1314. .... İzzet Paşa heyetinin 8 Aralıkta Ankara'ya varmış olduğu, bu haberin, heyetin milliyetçiler tarafına geçtiği yolundaki söylentileri bertaraf ettiği, söylentilerin milliyetçiler tarafından kasten çıkarılmış bulunduğu.	
207	18 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1660. . 481 Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusu: 1. Osmanlı Hariciye Nâzırına Sèvres'in onaylanması konusunun tekrar hatırlatıldığı. Nâzır Sefa Beyin Ankara'ya gönderilen heyetin Kemalistlerle temasa geçtikten sonra andlaşmanın onaylanacağını söylediği. 2. Nâzırın ayrıca, Yunanistan'daki gelişmelerin de durumu değiştirdiğini, Sèvres'in değiştirilmesine gidilebileceğini, şimdiki haliyle onaylanınca milliyetçilerin tenkitlerine uğrayacaklarını söylediği. 3. Yüksek Komiserin, Sèvres'in en kısa zamanda onaylanması için ısrar ettiği ve Türkiye'nin mali sıkıntıdan kurtulabilmesi için de andlaşmayı onaylamak zorunda olduğunu belirttiği.	
208	21 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1321. GİZLİ. .... 482 Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması konusu : 1. Anadolu'ya yollanan heyetin Ankara'ya vardığına göre Sèvres'in artık Türk Hükümetince onaylanması gerektiğinin Hariciye Nazırına yeniden hatırlatıldığı. 2. Nâzırın, değişen durum karşısında andlaşmanın değiştirilebileceğini, Fransa ve İtalya'nın da bu fikirde olduklarını, şimdiki haliyle onaylanırsa milliyetçileri Bolşeviklerin kucağına iteceğini belirttiği ve biraz daha mühlet tanınmasını istediği. 3. Türkiye'nin oyalama politikası güttüğü, Fransa ve İtalyan Yüksek Komiserlerine kesin talimat gönderilmesi ve Türkiye üzerinde ortak baskı yapılması gerektiği.	



<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
209	21 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1322. . .	484
		Sèvres'in onaylanması sorunu: Fransız Yüksek Komiserinin, Sèvres andlaşmasının onaylanması için İstanbul Hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüste bulunduğu.	
210	21 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞIŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1679 GİZLİ. ....	485
		Aralık ayının ilk haftasına ait gizli istihbarat raporunun eklice sunulduğu.	
Ek.	9 aralık	İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ İSTANBUL KOLU TARAFINDAN HAZIRLANAN 1920 ARALIK AYININ İLK HAFTASINA AIT İSTİHBARAT RAPORU. ....	485
		1. İstanbul heyetinin 3 Aralıkta Ankara'ya hareket ettiği.	
		2. Roma'dan dönen Galip Kemali Beyin Hükümete bir rapor sunduğu.	
		3. İstanbul Hükümetinin, Londra konferansında Sèvres andlaşmasının değiştirilebileceği konusunu görüştüğü ve Londra'ya bir diplomat göndermeyi konuştuğu.	
		4. Galip Kemali Beyin raporuna göre, Fransa ve İtalya'nın Sèvres'i değiştirmeye taraftar oldukları, Ankara ile İstanbul beraberce hareket ettikleri takdirde Fransa ile İtalya'nın Türk davasına destekçi olacakları, yeni Yunan Hükümeti ile de temasa geçilebileceği.	
		5. 25 Kasım ve 1 Aralıkta Hükümetin, milliyetçilerle görüşme konusunu incelediği, Anadolu'ya gönderilen İzzet Paşa heyeti üyelerinin adları, kişilikleri,	
		6. Heyete verilen talimat.	
		7. M. Kemal'den Padişaha yollanan mesaj.	
		8. Ankara'da yayınlanan "Yeni Gün" gazetesi ile Batum'da çıkan "İslâm Gürcistan" gazetelerinin yazıları.	
		9. Kafkaslarda Bolşevizm.	
		10. Mısır haberleri.	

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
211	21 aralık	İNGİLTERE'nin BERUT KONSOLOSU MR. R. A. FONTANA'dan DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a RAPOR. No. 117. GİZLİ. ....	493
		1. Büyük Lübnan hakkında genel bilgiler.	
		2. Urfa, Antep bölgesinde M. Kemal kuvvetleri. Fransız kuvvetleriyle çarpışmalar. M. Kemal'in isterse Halep'i alabileceği. Halep'te durum.	
		3. Suriye ve Lübnan'da Fransız yönetimi ile ilgili çeşitli bilgiler.	
212	24 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1688. GİZLİ. ....	498
		İngiliz İstihbarat servisi İstanbul kolunun hazırladığı Kasım sonu ve Aralık başına ait devreyi kapsayan İstihbarat raporu örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğu.	
Ek.	2 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSLERİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE 2 ARALIK ÖNCESİ HAFTAYI KAPSAYAN İSTİHBARAT RAPORU ÖRNEĞİ. ....	498
		1. Milliyetçilerin, İstanbul Hükümetine cevapları. M. Kemal'in Sèvres konusundaki görüşünü değiştirmedeği.	
		2. Galip Kemali Beyin Roma'daki temasları.	
		3. Ankara-İstanbul görüşmeleri için M. Kemal'in şartları. Değişen şartlar karşısında Sèvres'in değiştirilmesine gidileceği kanısı. İstanbul kabinesinin toplantıları. Ankara'ya gönderilecek heyet üyelerinin seçimleri.	
		4. Ankara'da karma harp meclisi toplantısı. Milliyetçi Bolşevik ilişkileri.	
		5. Gürcistan müslümanlarının Türk milliyetçilerine karşı tutumları.	
		6. Kafkasya'da Bolşevizm.	
213	29 aralık	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'dan ROMA'da İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR G. BUCHANAN'a TEL. No. 547. ....	507
		1. İstanbul'daki İtalyan Yüksek komiserinin M. Kemal ile görüşme yapılmasını telkin ettiği.	
		2. Bunun, M. Kemal'i tanımak anlamına geleceğinin İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerince belirtildiği.	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		3. İtilaf devletlerinin Türklere karşı birlik halinde hareket etmeleri gerektiğinin Fransa tarafından Roma'ya hatırlatıldığı.	
		4. İngiltere'nin de Fransız görüşünü tamamen desteklediği. Roma'daki Fransız Büyükelçisinin teşebbüslerinin desteklenmesi talimatı.	
214	29 aralık	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3862. ....	508
		Nabi bey ile görüşme:	
		1. Barış konferansına atanan yeni Türk delegesi Nabi Bey ile görüşüldüğü. Nabi beyin söylediklerine göre İzzet Paşa heyetinden henüz haber alınmadığı. M. Kemal'in İzmir sorunu üzerinde ısrar ettiği.	
		2. Tevfik Paşa Hükümetinin de İzmir'de bir muhtar bölge kurulması, İstanbul üzerindeki milletlerarası kontrolün kaldırılması ve Yunanistan'ın Midye-Enez hattına çekilmesini istediği.	
		3. Türk delegesine ümit verilmediği ve Sèvres'in değiştirilemeyeceğinin söylendiği.	
215	29 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a TEL. No. 1339. ..	509
		Sadrazam'ın Ankara'da bulunan İzzet Paşa heyetine geri dönme talimatı verdiği. İzzet Paşa'nın da dönmek niyetinde olduğu.	
216	30 aralık	PARİS'te İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'den İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 3882. ....	509
		30 Aralık 1920 tarihli "Echo de Paris" gazetesinde çıkan mülakat yazısı: Fransa Başbakanının Lloyd George ile Doğu sorunu konusunda aynı görüşte olduğu, yalnız Lloyd George'un, Sèvres'in değiştirilmesi konusunun açıkça tartışılmasını istemediği. Mustafa Kemal ile bir anlaşma lüzumunu kabul etmiş görünmenin şu sırada biraz acemice olacağı.	
217	31 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1707. GİZLİ. ....	510

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Aralık ayı ikinci haftasını kapsayan gizli istihbarat raporunun ilişkide sunulduğu.	
Ek.	16 aralık	İSTANBUL'daki İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNCE HAZIRLANAN VE ARALIK AYI İKİNCİ HAFTASINI KAPSAYAN RAPOR. ....	510
		1. Ankara'ya gönderilecek İstanbul heyeti.	
		2. Ankara'da bulunan Şeyh Sünnisi.	
		3. Anadolu'daki gelişmeler: Seçim reformu tasarısı, Türk Komünist Partisi. "Yeni Dünya" ve "Hakimiyet-i Milliye" gazetelerinin yazıları.	
		4. Ankara'daki Bolşevik heyeti.	
		5. Talât Paşa'nın Moskova'ya gitmek veya Anadolu'ya dönmek niyetinde olduğu. . . .	
		6. Kafkasya'da Bolşevizm.	
		7. Mısır konularında çeşitli haberler.	
218	31 aralık	İSTANBUL'da İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'dan İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'a YAZI. No. 1708.	517
		Yıl sonunda duruma toplu bakış:	
		1. İstanbul Hükümetinin her zamankinden daha güç durumda bulunduğu, Mustafa Kemal'e yollanan heyetin başarı sağlayamadığı, milliyetçilerin yumuşamadıkları.	
		2. İstanbul'da mali durumun gittikçe kötüye gittiği, Yüksek Komiserlerin Türk maliyesini fiilen kontrol etme talimatı aldıkları. Mali güçlüğü, Türk Hükümetini Sèvres'i onaylamağa götürebileceği.	
		3. Mali durum konusunda Osmanlı Hariciye ve Maliye Bakanları ile görüşüldüğü, fakat anlaşmaya varılamadığı, anlaşmazlığın bir süre uzayabileceği.	
		4. Mali kontrol mücadelesinin siyasi mahiyet de alabileceği. Türk Hükümetinin pasif direnme politikası güttüğü, savaş suçlularını yargılamak üzere eski Hükümet zamanında kurulan mahkeme Başkanının bu kez tevkif edildiği. . .	
		5. Genel durumun pek karanlık olduğu. . .	

B E L G E L E R



No. 1

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 1st April, 1920

*No. 455/M/2279.*

Secret.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ended 25th March, 1920 received from the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.c.,

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5166/E-3253*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 1

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.c., Constantinople Branch, For the Week Ending 25th March, 1920.*

THE CABINET. The situation during the past week has been somewhat indeterminate. Despite frequent rumours of its resignation SALIH Pasha's Cabinet still remains in office, since, however, it has not yet presented its programme to the Chamber or received a vote of confidence from that body, its position is no more constitutionally correct than that of FERID Pasha. It seems, however, the general opinion that the fall of the Cabinet cannot long be delayed. Although it was at one time considered possible that RESHID Pasha might be asked to form a Government, public opinion now considers it more likely that the Sultan will request FERID Pasha to do so. It is indeed stated that His Majesty has already taken this step and an announcement to that effect appeared on March the 25th in the "Stamboul", an evening paper published in French interests. It seems clear that in the event of FERID Pasha consenting to

take office, he could count on the support of the Entente Liberal Party, who are at one with FERID regarding the necessity for the immediate dispersal of the Nationalist forces. A number of officers are understood to have expressed to this party their willingness to aid in this task.

*Reports 670, 679, 697, 702*

## 2. THE GOVERNMENT AND MUSTAFA KEMAL.

It is reported that the Cabinet has recommended to the Sultan the despatch of a mission to MUSTAFA KEMAL proposing that it should take with it a copy of the note addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Sublime Porte, together with translations of articles recently published in the European Press against the Nationalist Forces and the Ottoman Government. It is hoped that this may have the effect of modifying views of the Nationalist extremists at ANGORA. The FELAH-i-VATAN Party concur in this proposal.

*Report, 678.*

## 3. THE CHAMBER.

A closed sitting was held on the 17th March at which speeches were made protesting against the occupation of Constantinople. On the grounds that freedom of speech was impossible under the existing circumstances it was proposed that the public sittings of the Chamber should be adjourned sine die. The resolution was unanimously adopted. In the course of his speech proposing the motion Dr. RIZA NOUR protested against the arrest in the vicinity of the Chamber of RAOUF Bey, KARA VASSIF Bey and other deputies, stating that this action was contrary to constitutional law. \* He hoped that his protest would find an echo in all Parliaments "and especially in the House of Commons of Great Britain, the mother of all Parliaments." As, however, the committee of the Chamber continues to hold closed sittings and the deputies constantly meet for deliberation the adjournment of the Chamber is little more than a polite fiction.

It is reported that the FELAH-i-VATAN party has appointed a small committee to keep in touch with negotiations between the Cabinet and Mustafa Kemal and to follow any peace pourparlers that may take

\* 3 Nisan 1920 günü Lord Curzon, Amiral de Robeck'e şu telgrafi iletmiştir. (Tel No. 283):

"We continue to receive alarming reports as to situation of Armenians in Cilicia. (See your telegram No. 318).

You should instruct Turkish Government to remind Mustafa Kemal that Allies have recently arrested several of his friends and associates who will be held as hostages for the Armenians in Cilicia." (*D.B.F.P.*, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 57, No. 41).



place. In the event of the committee reporting unfavourably on the Government policy, the Cabinet will be asked for an explanation. Should this prove unsatisfactory the Chamber will hold a public sitting for the purpose of passing a vote of non-confidence in the Ministry.

It is understood that in reply to a request from the Executive committee of the Chamber for a sum of LT. 10,000 for the payment of members salaries, the Minister of Finance sent only LT. 2,000.

*Reports, 677, 678, 689.*

#### 4. EFFECT OF NATIONALIST ARRESTS.

According to information received from a source within the Palace, the Sultan has expressed himself as much relieved at the recent arrests of the Nationalist leaders. The views expressed to his own confidential circle are to the effect that he had already realised the necessity for such action and that the Allies not taken it, he himself would have been forced to do so. In that case however he considered that much bloodshed would probably have resulted, and that he himself would have incurred odium with a section of his own people and might even have lost his throne.

It is stated that the deputies of the FELAH-i-VATAN group gave their word of honour to remain at their posts under all circumstances. The flight of JELEDDİN ARİF, President of the Chamber, who is reported to have reached ANGORA, has therefore created a painful impression. Great importance is attached by the Nationalists to the arrest of Dr. ESSAD Pasha, head of the MİLLİ Party. In view of the possibility of the arrival in power of a anti-Nationalist Cabinet, the Minister of the Interior has instructed the heads of certain departments to bring him all correspondence which has recently passed between the Government and the Nationalists. It is stated that telegraphic correspondence of this nature was brought to the Ministry of the Interior from the Central Telegraph Office on the 17th inst.

*Reports 673, 677, 678*

#### 5. MUSTAFA KEMAL.

News of the occupation of the capital was telegraphed to ANGORA whilst the operation was in progress. The details, which were given by irresponsible telegraphists, appear to have been highly coloured. On receipt of the news the Nationalist leader immediately issued a manifesto to his followers couched in moderate terms and urging the need for avoidance of individual action or risings of any kind. He assured his followers that the Nationalist Council would take such steps as the situation might demand. Violent articles were published in the Antolian press calling for a

levy en masse of the people. MUSTAFA KEMAL subsequently issued a second proclamation stating that the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies and the consequent paralysis of the action of the Government and the Intelligentsia of Turkey constituted a direct attack by the Christian world on the influence of the Khalif. The proclamation, which has not been seen in this office, is said to call on all Moslems able to bear arms to take them up in defence of Moslem rights and quotes a command from the Koran as authority for this action.

*Reports 691, 692, 707*

#### 6. NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA.

The Nationalists are spreading a report that feeling in Germany regarding the Peace Terms has reached such a pitch that a revolution has broken out, and that the new German Government has determined to support Turkey at all costs.

With a view to encouraging their supporters in the Capital the Nationalist Committee is circulating various reports as to its intentions. These include assertions that there are a large number of officers distributed at various points of the capital, each of whom has a considerable stock of arms at his disposal, that in the event of disturbances in Constantinople the Italians and French would adopt a benevolent attitude towards the Turks, and that large bodies of Nationalist troops are being transferred from MARASH and AINTAB towards SMYRNA. The latter is no doubt the official Nationalist explanation of the French re-occupation of MARASH.

It is stated that photos have been taken of the bodies of Turkish soldiers who were killed at the SHAHZADE Guard House whilst resisting the Allied occupation of that building and these have been given to certain Turkish press men in touch with foreign correspondents for propaganda purposes.

*Reports 692, 694, 705*

#### 7. THE NATIONALISTS FORCES IN CILICIA.

At a meeting of the Sivas Committee of the Nationalist Organisation held on the 29th February details were furnished of the conditions under which the French Military authorities had agreed to revictual MARASH. These are practically identical with those given in our report HA/609 of 5.3.20.

It was stated at the meeting that nothing short of the evacuation of the MARASH district by the French and the disarming of the Armenians would allay public excitement. This was also said to have reached a high

pitch in the URFA district where a concentration of Nationalist bands was reported from BIRIJIK. It was admitted that the feeling had attained a point at which it was a danger to the non-Moslem population.

It was reported that 3,700 Russian and German rifles and 7,000 cases of ammunition had been distributed to the Nationalist forces in the URFA district.

*Report 696*

#### 8. ANTI-NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN ANATOLIA.

A document has been received purporting to be the record of the proceedings of the SIVAS Committee of the Nationalist Organisation held on the 29th February, at which two instances were given in which the Nationalists had found it necessary to resort to arms to enforce their demands for recruits and funds. In every case the reports read to the meeting attributed the difficulties met with to the action of the Entente Liberal Party. It was suggested that these difficulties would disappear if permission could be obtained for the execution of men who did not respond when called upon to join the Nationalist Forces, or who deserted after having done so. It was apparently expected that the desired permission would be forthcoming. These cases quoted occurred in the districts of SHEBIN KARA HISSAR and AMASSIA and appear to have been due to the inordinate demands made by the local Nationalist leaders for contributions to their cause. In both cases the resistance would appear to have been quickly overcome.

*FO. 371/5166/E-3253.*

No. 2

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 3, 1920  
(Received April 23.)

(No. 463.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 309 of the 30th March, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following papers relative to the demand addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Sublime Porte regarding the disavowal of the leaders of the so-called "national" movement by the Turkish Government: —

1. Collective note of the High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier of the 26th March.

2. Note addressed by the Grand Vizier to the High Commissioners on the 26th March.
3. French version of proposed communiqué, enclosed in No. 2.
4. Literal translation of original Turkish of No. 3.
5. Collective note of the High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier in reply to No. 2.
6. French text of revised formula submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to High Commissioners on the evening of the 29th March.
7. Curtailed version of No. 6, which the High Commissioners informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs by a verbal *démarche* of the political officers on the 31st March would alone satisfy them.
8. Note addressed by the Grand Vizier to the High Commissioners on the 1st April.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 306-307, No 189

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 2

*Collective Note communicated to the Grand Vizier.*

DANS la note collective adressée à votre Altesse le 16 courant pour lui annoncer la décision du Conseil suprême au sujet de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont déclaré qu'ils étaient chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kémal Pacha, ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste."

La note responsive de votre Altesse, en date du 17 mars, n'a donnée qu'une satisfaction très partielle à cette demande. Ce qui est encore plus important, le Gouvernement ottoman n'a rien fait depuis le 16 mars pour désavouer publiquement les chefs du mouvement dit nationaliste.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de signaler encore une fois à l'attention de votre Altesse qu'il s'agit en l'espèce d'une demande basée sur une décision formelle du Conseil suprême, décision que les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont qualité ni pour retirer, ni pour atténuer. Ils croient donc de leur devoir d'inviter le Gouvernement impérial de se conformer à cette demande sans plus de retard, en désavouant publiquement et sans

équivoques Moustapha Kémal Pacha et les autres dirigeants du mouvement en question.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *le, 26 mars 1920*

A. DEFRANCE

J. M. DE ROBECK

MAISSA

FO. 406/43, p. 307, No 189/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 2

*Note communicated to High Commissioners.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

SUBLIME PORTE, *le 28 mars 1920*

EN me référant à la note collective que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser conjointement avec ses collègues de France et d'Italie, j'ai l'honneur de lui transmettre ci-après la traduction en français du communiqué que le Gouvernement impérial, en déférant au désir exprimé dans cette communication, se propose de publier.

J'aime à espérer que ce projet de communiqué, dont le texte turc a été déjà remis à M. l'Amiral Webb par Séfa Bey, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, rencontrera son approbation et qu'elle voudra bien m'en faire part afin de me permettre de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à ce sujet. Je dois noter que le passage souligné au crayon rouge dans ladite traduction a été ajouté au texte qui a été remis à M. l'Amiral Webb

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Grand-Vizir,

H. SALIH

FO. 406/43, p. 307, No. 189/2

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 2

*French version of proposed Communiqué.*

(Traduction.)

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation et qu'ainsi les organisations nationales se sont portées à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial n'a été pour rien dans la constitution ni dans la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne (*événements qui ont été d'ailleurs constatés par l'enquête effectuée par les Puissances alliées*) et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivi.

Bien qu'en principe ces organisations aient surgi par suite de la nécessité de la défense de droits légitimes et de la sauvegarde de la vie et de l'honneur, le Gouvernement proclame que les actes excessifs auxquels se sont livrés contrairement à ces buts et de façon à nuire à l'Etat, Moustapha Kémal Pacha, qui n'a aucun caractère officiel, ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement, et quelques autres dirigeants, sont désapprouvés par lui.

FO. 406/43, p. 307, No. 189/3

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 2

(Secret.)

*Literal translation of proposed Formula for Disavowal of "Nationalist" Leaders.  
(Communicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Assistant High Commissioner.)*

INFORMATION has been received that, upon Constantinople being placed under military occupation by the *Entente* Powers, the circumstance has given rise to a number of exaggerated rumours; that the said rumours have, especially in the interior, assumed a form utterly productive of excitement; and that, *inter alia*, certain extravagant acts have been committed by the National Organisation.

It is announced that, although this organisation, which came into being in consequence of the tragic events of Smyrna and the alarming reports which followed that event, and in the creation and management of which the Government had no part or lot, owed its creation, fundamentally, to the necessity for defending legitimate right and preserving honour and life; nevertheless, the extravagant acts committed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has no official character and no position in the Government, and certain leaders—acts which go beyond the said object and are of a nature to cause prejudice to the State—are not approved by the Imperial Government.

FO. 406/43, p. 308, No 189/4

## ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 2

*Collective Note addressed to the Grand Vizier.*

Altesse,

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 29 mars 1920

EN accusant réception de la lettre que votre Altesse nous a adressée à la date du 28 mars et à laquelle était jointe la traduction en français du communiqué que le Gouvernement impérial se propose de publier, nous avons l'honneur de faire à votre Altesse la réponse suivante:

“Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie estiment que le communiqué dont le texte leur a été soumis est conçu dans des termes tels qu'il serait interprété par la population plutôt comme une approbation que comme un désaveu de Moustapha Kémal et des chefs qui, avec lui, ont fomenté le mouvement soi-disant nationaliste.

“Ils ne sauraient donc l'accepter et ne pourraient admettre qu'un communiqué très net notifiant clairement que le Gouvernement désavoue Moustapha Kémal et les chefs du mouvement soi-disant nationaliste qui ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement et invitant la population à obéir dorénavant uniquement aux ordres du Gouvernement légal.”

Agréé, Altesse, &amp;c.

A. DEFRANCE

J. M. DE ROBECK

MAISSA

FO. 406/43, p. 308, No. 189/5.

## ENCLOSURE 6 IN No. 2

*French Text of revised Formula submitted to High Commissioners.*

(Traduction.)

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivi et qui en principe avaient pour but la défense de droits légitimes et la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant les actes excessifs qui se sont produits depuis quelque temps dans certaines localités, tient à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et que, en se livrant aux actes excessifs susvisés, ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.

FO. 406/43, p. 308, No. 189/6

ENCLOSURE 7 IN NO. 2

*Revised Version of Enclosure 6.*

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial que des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance et que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations.

Le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant ces organisations, tient en outre à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et qu'ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.

FO. 406/43, p. 309, No 189/7

ENCLOSURE 8 IN NO. 2

*Grand Vizier to High Commissioner.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire, SUBLIME PORTE, le 1er avril 1920

ME référant à la note collective que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 29 mars 1920, conjointement avec leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires de France et d'Italie, je m'étais empressé de lui faire remettre le texte du projet de communiqué concernant les organisations nationales avec les modifications que le Gouvernement



impérial avait cru pouvoir introduire dans le texte du projet primitivement communiqué à votre Excellence.

Le texte modifié était le suivant:

“Il est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

“Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivis, et qui en principe avaient pour but la défense de droits légitimes et la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes.

“Toutefois, le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant les actes excessifs qui se sont produits depuis quelque temps dans certaines localités, tient à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et que, en se livrant aux actes excessifs susvisés, ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

“En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.”

Le 31 mars, MM. Ledoux, Ryan et Galli, Conseillers politiques des trois Hauts-Commissariats alliés, ont rapporté à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ce texte, en lui déclarant que votre Excellence et ses collègues ne pourraient y donner leur approbation qu'après la suppression des passages qui y ont été biffés par eux. Le projet de communiqué ainsi modifié était réduit, comme votre Excellence le sait, à la forme suivante:

“Il est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial que des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance et que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

“Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations.

“Le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant ces organisations, tient en outre à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha

Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et qu'ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

“En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.”

Ce dernier texte pourrait donner l'impression que le Gouvernement impérial considère comme rebelles tous les adhérents des organisations nationales et désapprouve tous leurs actes sans exception.

Le désaveu, au lieu de n'atteindre que certains dirigeants turbulents et perturbateurs, frapperait tous ceux qui font partie de ces organisations.

Or, ainsi que son Excellence Séfa Bey l'a exposé à votre Excellence, la plupart des éléments qui constituent ces organisations n'ont agi que sous l'empire de la terreur et de l'indignation provoquées par les massacres et les autres actes de cruauté et de violence commis par les Hellènes dans la province de Smyrne et de la crainte de voir se réaliser les bruits qui couraient alors avec persistance au sujet de la formation dans le vilayet de Trébizonde d'un Etat grec sous la dénomination de République du Pont et d'une Grande-Arménie. Leur seul but était de défendre leurs foyers, leur honneur et leur vie. Réproucher publiquement tous les adeptes de l'association serait non seulement une mesure inefficace en pratique, mais encore nuirait à l'accomplissement de la tâche que le Gouvernement impérial a cru devoir assumer et qui consiste à dissiper tout malentendu et à faire respecter les décisions des grandes Puissances alliées autrement que par des mesures coercitives.

Le Cabinet actuel, qui n'est inféodé à aucun parti et qui est foncièrement indépendant, a pour seul et unique but d'obtenir, par tous les moyens légitimes et pacifiques en son pouvoir, une paix équitable que sa confiance dans les sentiments de justice des grandes Puissances alliées lui a d'ailleurs toujours fait espérer.

Il est parfaitement conscient de l'inutilité d'une résistance aux décisions des Puissances et des suites très graves qu'une pareille résistance pourrait avoir pour la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement impérial trouve explicable la formation des organisations nationales en tant que ces organisations visent la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes menacées par les Hellènes.

Il est à noter que la plus grande partie de la population composée d'inoffensifs villageois, qui croient leur vie et leur honneur menacés sympathisent avec lesdites organisations.

Jeter la désapprobation sur toute cette masse produirait dans le pays un mécontentement et une surexcitation telles que l'autorité du Gouvernement, déjà notablement ébranlée, serait complètement anéantie, ce qui rendrait difficile l'inauguration d'une ère de paix et de tranquillité dans le pays.

Par contre, si votre Excellence et ses collègues veulent bien partager sa façon de voir, le Gouvernement impérial a l'espoir qu'il parviendra à rallier à son point de vue, par la persuasion et autres moyens pacifiques, les esprits modérés qui forment la grande masse de la population et à isoler les éléments perturbateurs, afin d'assurer l'application, sans secousses ni commotions, de la paix qui, il en a la conviction, tiendra compte des droits légitimes de la nation turque. Dans le cas où quelques perturbateurs se montreraient récalcitrants, le Gouvernement impérial pourrait toujours les déclarer hors la loi et enayer facilement les effets de leur action subversive.

Fidèle à son programme, le Gouvernement tient à agir comme un facteur de paix et d'apaisement. Il est convaincu que les Puissances alliées elles-mêmes sont désireuses d'éviter des complications pouvant résulter d'éventuelles mesures de coercition.

Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement impérial, ces mesures pourraient devenir inutiles si les Puissances alliées lui permettaient d'agir dans le sens développé plus haut et voulaient bien lui prêter leur appui bienveillant.

Le Gouvernement impérial se considérera heureux et croira avoir bien mérité de l'humanité s'il parvient à réaliser le but qu'il vise en lui épargnant de nouvelles souffrances.

En portant les considérations qui précèdent à la connaissance de votre Excellence, j'aime à espérer qu'elle voudra bien en apprécier le bien-fondé et reconnaître qu'elles justifient la ligne de conduite que le Gouvernement s'est tracée.

Avant de terminer, je me permets d'ajouter que, vu les très graves conséquences qui résulteraient de la publication du communiqué dans la forme indiquée par votre Excellence et ses collègues, le Gouvernement impérial ne pourra, à son vif regret et malgré son désir de déférer à leur demande, le faire paraître sous cette forme dans les journaux.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Grand Vizir,  
H. SALIH

No. 3

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *4th April 1920**No. 473/S. 2907*

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of a collective note, dated the 27th March, which the Allied High Commissioners have addressed to the Sublime Porte in consequence of a report received that Moustafa Kemal had given orders to the Belikessir branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank not to send any funds to Constantinople or elsewhere without his authority.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5241/E. 3659*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 3

*Haut Commissaires de France, de Grande Bretagne et d'Italie à Constantinople  
au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *le 27 Mars 1920*

Les Hauts Commissaires de France, de Grande Bretagne et d'Italie ont été avisés que l'agence de la Banque Impériale Ottomane à BALIKESER avait reçu ordre du mutéssarif, disant agir au nom de Moustapha Kemal Pacha, de lui indiquer, ainsi qu'au Mohassebedji, le détail de son solde en caisse et le total de ses dépôts; il lui était de plus interdit d'envoyer des fonds à Constantinople, ou d'en envoyer dans une autre localité sans l'autorisation de deux fonctionnaires ci-dessous désignés.

Les Hauts Commissaires soussignés appuient la protestation qui a déjà été faite auprès du Gouvernement Ottoman par la Direction de la Banque Impériale Ottomane, contre l'attente ainsi portée, au nom d'un pouvoir illégal, aux droits assurés à cet établissement par son acte de concession.

A. DEFRANCE.  
J. M. DE ROBECK.  
MAISSA

*FO. 371/5241/E. 3659*

## No. 4

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, April 5, 1920  
(Received April 6.)

(No. 340.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

My telegram No. 328 of 3rd April.

Ferid Pasha took office on afternoon of 5th April. My immediately following telegram gives list of Ministers. Cabinet is constructed entirely on non-party lines.

Unless Ferid has already squared leaders of *Entente libérale* this may be source of weakness. Several of new Ministers are almost unknown men.

Imperial decree appointing new Grand Vizier condemns National movement in outspoken terms as rebellion which has already been gravely detrimental and may still further endanger interests of country.

Decree enjoins enforcement of legal sanctions against organisers of movement, and proclaims amnesty for those deluded into joining it. It expressly prescribes establishment of cordial relations with *Entente* Great Powers.

Translation will follow by bag.

FO. 406/43. p. 272. No. 160

## No. 5

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, April 7, 1920  
(Received April 23.)

(No. 482.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a memorandum on the future peace with Turkey, prepared by Mediterranean station. I am in general agreement with the conclusions of this memorandum, but desire to submit the following remarks to your Lordship :—

2. I do not concur in the belief expressed in paragraph 1 of the memorandum, that the recent occupation of Constantinople is likely to intensify the determination of the Nationalist Party. On the contrary, it appears

to have given food for reflection to the half-hearted among the followers of Mustafa Kemal, who fear more than anything else the permanent loss of the capital—in their eyes the only desirable residence in the world. It has, in fact, encouraged the Opposition groups rather than driven them into alliance with the Nationalists.

3. On the other hand, I am disposed to regard the handing over of the vilayets of Erzeroum, Van and Bitlis to the independent sovereignty of the Armenian Republic as certain to prove disastrous. The conception of an autonomous Kurdistan in the present state of development of that country is one which is equally impossible to regard without grave anxiety.

4. The suggestion advanced in the memorandum of an administration under Ottoman suzerainty and European supervision commends itself to me as the only practicable solution of the problem presented by these two regions. A period under a régime of this nature should fulfil a double function, both educating the inhabitants up to a standard in which they may be expected to administer their own affairs, and permitting the Armenian and Kurdish elements to gravitate, the one towards the Armenian homeland, with ultimate absorption by "Russian" Armenia, and the other southwards towards the real Kurdistan.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 311-312, No. 190

ENCLOSURE IN No. 5

*Memorandum by Commander Luke on Future Peace with Turkey.*

(Secret.)

"AJAX" AT CONSTANTINOPLE, March 21, 1920

THE following considerations on the subject of peace with Turkey are submitted:—

The position at present appears to be that there are in contemplation by the Supreme Council certain peace terms which, in the opinion of the Allied authorities in Constantinople, cannot be imposed on Turkey except by force. The territorial clauses of the proposed terms operate primarily in favour of the Greeks, to a lesser extent in favour of the Armenians and Kurds, and, so far as they affect the two former, Greks and Armenians, they appear to be in conflict, to a greater or lesser degree, with the principle of self-determination.

The provisional Allied military occupation of Constantinople, though professedly and in reality disconnected from the question of the peace terms, is likely, judging by the information hitherto available from Thrace and Anatolia, to intensify rather than to diminish the determination of the Nationalists not to accept a peace which violates the principle of self-determination.

2. It is presumably the intention of the Supreme Council, in framing the Turkish peace terms, *inter alia*, to—

- (a) Remove from Turkish rule provinces not inhabited by Turks, while preserving the existence of a Turkish State in the residue of the Empire;
- (b) Assure the safety of non-Ottoman minorities in what remains of Turkey.

It is presumably the desire of the Council that its terms shall be—

- (a) Be capable of application throughout the areas to which they refer; and
- (b) Lead to the permanent pacification of those areas.

3. If the above assumptions are broadly correct, I venture to submit that the proposed terms are in several respects at variance with them. It is unnecessary at present to labour the point that the vilayets of Adrianople, Aidin and Erzeroum are predominantly Ottoman; but it may be well to try to envisage the practical effect of alienating them from Turkey in the treaty of peace.

In the first place, so to do renders vain the idea of dividing the Turkish people and of stimulating the growth of an anti-Nationalist *bloc* around the Sultan and the *Entende liberale*. Far from dividing, such a proposal must tend to unite opposing sections of Turks in the common aim of national defence. No Turk, however bitterly opposed to Nationalism or the C. U. P., will fight to secure the loss of Smyrna and of Thrace.

It follows, then, that terms of this nature must needs be imposed by force; and are the Allies able and willing to provide that force? Force is available, no doubt, to impose them on Constantinople, and perhaps on Smyrna; but would that be sufficient? The enforced acceptance of the terms by a Cabinet in Constantinople would scarcely be considered binding by Mustafa Kemal in the highlands of Anatolia, or by Jafer Tayyer in Thrace; without, therefore, a formidable expedition it would seem difficult, in present circumstances at all events, to apply the terms—in the words of the assumption made above—“throughout the areas to which they refer.”

Again, until such terms can be enforced, what will be the position of the non-Ottoman minorities in the interior? Marash supplies a sufficient answer.

Thirdly, would the terms proposed lead to the permanent pacification of Thrace, Aidin and Turkish Armenia? It is, I think, the conviction of impartial persons who know the Near East that without the wholesale extermination or expulsion of the Turkish majority the answer must be in the negative.

4. Confining the argument for the moment to Thrace and Smyrna, it is evident, if the above conclusions are accepted, that to impose Greek rule on the vilayets of Adrianople and Aidin will—

- (a) Run counter to the principle of self-determination, and will therefore be regarded by the Turks of all classes, and probably by many Moslems outside Turkey, as a grave injustice;
- (b) Will require the assistance of the armed forces of the Entente, which in practice would probably mean those of Great Britain, since French and Italian opinion seems opposed to the policy;
- (c) Will perpetuate strife in those provinces instead of laying the foundation of an enduring and peaceful settlement.

A policy with such serious drawbacks would only seem justifiable by the presence of equally weighty advantages; and it may well be questioned if advantages so considerable exist in the present case. In speaking of advantages, I have advantages to the British Empire in mind. As regards advantages to Greece, that country is presumably the best judge whether it will be to its ultimate benefit to acquire large areas inhabited by a hostile population, and with extremely bad strategical frontiers, even though these areas may be rich and fruitful. In paragraph 10 of my report of the 16th December, 1919, on the situation in Thrace (F.O. print No. 170740), I ventured to forecast the possibility that extensive annexations by Greece in Thrace might tend to unite Turkey and Bulgaria in joint action against Greece. That forecast has received some measure of confirmatin from recent reports from Thrace. Probably only those who know the Near East can realise to the full the hatred inspired by Greece in her neighbours—Christian and Moslem alike. It is almost needless to add that the proceedings of the Greeks in Smyrna have been such as to render the Turks more averse than ever the prospect of Greek rule.

5. While the sacrifice of many things is apparently being contemplated in order that the fullest satisfaction may be given to the demands of Greece, has it ever been thoroughly considered whether it would not be to the advantage of Great Britain in particular, and to the world in general, if we were to rallier the Turks by giving them a peace which, while conforming to the principle of self-determination, and while sufficiently severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive? At present British



public opinion is in danger of being diverted from a true perspective by appeals in weighty sections of the press to sentiment which, if thoroughly sincere, is often equally ignorant, and thus easily exploited. Facile cries, such as that the Turk must be expelled from Europe, are used with much effect, as if there were some mysterious virtue in turning the Turk out of Bebek while leaving him in Kandili. It seems to be thought by those whose judgment is stamped by such cries that there is something essentially occidental in European Turkey, whose manifestation has only been prevented by the blighting presence of the Turk. It is well known, but evidently not sufficiently well, that Constantinople was an oriental city before ever the Turk was heard of, and such persons would do well to ponder the words of Sir William Ramsay, one of the most reliable authorities on the Near East, when he writes: "The Turkish conquest of Constantinople was really the climax of a gradual orientalising of the Byzantine Empire; Isaurians, Cappadocians, Phrygians and Armenians reigned in Constantinople on the throne of the Roman Caesars, and the final stage occurred when a Turkish Sultan sat on the same throne."

✓ Turkey has a "bad press", and it would sound to many like heresy to suggest that Turkey's friendship is possibly as valuable, and even more valuable, to us, than the friendship of Greece. Yet that is what I venture to suggest. Perhaps it would be better to put the same idea inversely by suggesting that a hostile Turkey is more dangerous to us than a hostile Greece. A country geographically situated as is Greece must always be at the mercy of a Power having command of the Mediterranean, whereas Mustafa Kemal in his Anatolian uplands is hardly amenable to sea-power.

6. It is submitted that two dangers in particular now threaten the British Empire from the active hostility of the Turks. One, a general danger, is that the Nationalists will continue to inflame Moslem opinion against the Empire in Egypt, in India, in Central Asia and elsewhere. The other and more immediate danger is that they will ally themselves with the Bolsheviki if the latter enter Transcaucasia, and will then be in a position to work us infinite mischief in our vulnerable eastern marches. The Turk, and, indeed, the Moslem in general, is by instinct opposed to the theory of Bolshevism, which is wholly incompatible with the principles of Islam. Only necessity, as he understands it, will drive him to this unnatural alliance. Cannot the necessity be avoided? I submit that it is worth avoiding, even if the avoiding involves the non-acquisition by Greece of Smyrna and Thrace and the reduction of the area to be ceded by Turkey to Armenia. A stolid conservative people such as the Turks should prove a valuable buffer against the ferment of Bolshevism in the Middle East.

7. The question now arises as to what terms of peace the Turks would accept. Here it is not possible to speak with any assurance, but, judging

from Mustafa Kemal's pronouncements and making allowances for the fact that Orientals (and not only Orientals) generally demand at the outset more than will in the long run satisfy them, it may be conjectured that they will readily assign themselves to the loss of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia and the control of the Straits and a drastic reduction of their armed forces. They might well be brought to acquiesce in the constitution of an autonomous Kurdistan under their nominal suzerainty and of a similar autonomous and limited Armenia, including, say, the bulk of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis and the easterly extremity of the vilayet of Erzeroum, excluding Erzeroum town. They would probably accept, and even welcome, a fairly wide measure of European administrative and fiscal control, provided it were applied under forms that would "save their face" and preserve their *amour-propre*. The Turk has ever attached a greater weight to the outward form than to the real substance of things.

If present indications form any criterion, they will not peacefully accept the loss of Thrace, Smyrna and the town of Erzeroum.

8. Assuming that the terms roughly sketched above would prove acceptable to the Turks or, at all events, to a certain section of the Turks, would they prove acceptable to the Allies and to those whom the Allies are pledged to protect—the non-Ottoman minorities? As regards the rayahs in the territory remaining under the immediate jurisdiction of the Porte, the Allied administrative control which is envisaged should prove capable of assuring their safety and reasonable privileges. As regards the Kurds, a considerable body of Kurdish opinion demands no more than autonomy, the bonds of religion and of the Khalifate inclining it favourably to the maintenance of a nominal Ottoman suzerainty.

The Kurds are in many ways the Asiatic counterpart of the Albanians, and in the case of a people such as they, whose capacity for independent existence is doubtful and unproved, it might well be prudent to preface full independence with a probationary period of autonomy under external guidance.

In suggesting the constitution of an autonomous Turkish Armenia with frontiers contiguous with the independent Armenian Republic of Erivan, I have in mind the precedent of the Turkish autonomous vilayet of Eastern Rumelia and the principality of Bulgaria. Had Eastern Rumelia been incorporated with Bulgaria at the outset many difficulties would probably have arisen. As it was, the transitional stage gave time for certain transfers of population and rendered the ultimate incorporation of the vilayet with the principality certain, provided that the principality made the prospect of union sufficiently attractive to the vilayet. Similarly in Armenia, the hope of attracting the autonomous Turkish province should

provide the Erivan Government with a much-needed incentive to decent administration, while autonomous Armenia, with its Turkish majority, will have time to effect exchanges of population with the vilayets remaining to Turkey, and will have time, too, to weigh pros and cons before making a final decision as to its future.

There remains Greece, who might appear to lose most, or rather to gain least, from the above arrangement. It is important to bear in mind here that Greece was able to realise nearly all her legitimate territorial aspirations in 1913, at the close of the Balkan wars, and that there now remains practically nothing of unquestioned *Graecia irredenta* except the Dodecanese. If, therefore, she now secures the Dodecanese and obtains, as appears to be contemplated, a mandate in South Albania, which will consolidate her position for once and for all in Northern Epirus, she will not be doing so badly. If, further, she is permitted to annex the rich tobacco-growing country now known as "Interallied Thrace", a territory which, despite several years of Bulgarian sovereignty, is still populated by a large Turkish majority, she will be securing a most valuable possession, to which, on purely ethnological grounds, her claim is hardly tenable. She has also, as the result of her participation in the war on the side of the *Entente*, the satisfaction of seeing her higher than she could ever have thought possible before the war. It should not, after all, be forgotten that during the Dardanelles campaign one-half of the nation tried to stab the *Entente* in the back, and that she was brought into the right way only with the greatest difficulty and by the efforts of practically one man. The party then in opposition to that man has still many adherents in Greece and may again return to power. It seems, therefore, but reasonable their deserts, as well as his, should be borne in mind when the claims of the nation as a whole are under consideration.

Is it then worth while to endanger our frontiers, to incur the risk of a fresh war, and to perpetuate bloodshed in the Near East, in order to impose Greece on two provinces to which, even taking into consideration the forced emigration of Greek rayahs, she can produce no conclusive ethnological claim? And should it be thought that Great Britain will receive any gratitude from Greece for the sacrifices which such a policy would demand of her, I would instance the information lately received from Smyrna concerning the obstacles which M. Sterghiade's administration is placing in the way of British commercial enterprise in that city.

9. Finally, the solution here outlined should make it possible to solve the question of the Turkish Nationalist extremist and the Committee of Union and Progress. The latter are professedly fighting for the retention of an Osmanlı Turkey. Create such a Turkey by retaining within the

Ottoman frontiers Thrace and Aidin, retain under a nominal Ottoman suzerainty an autonomous Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan protected by Europeans, and their *raison d'être* as a militant organisation disappears. If they then consent to eliminate themselves, well and good; if not, they publicly proclaim themselves to be not patriots, but adventurers seeking their own ends. In that case we can proceed with the policy of rallying around the Sultan the anti-Unionist and pro-*Entente* elements of Turkey, since we will be in a position to offer them terms which they can accept. The policy should then have every chance of success, for the old affection, or rather respect, for the British is not entirely dead among the Turks, though the class among which it survives is not the most articulate.

H. C. LUKE  
 Commander, R.N.V.R.,  
 Political Officer.

FO. 406/43, p. 312-315, No. 190/1

No. 6

*Appendix "A" to the Weekly Report No. 63; of 7th April, 1920, Issued  
 by the British General Staff Intelligence, Constantinople.*

*Very Secret.*

From: - ANGORA.

To: - SALIH Pasha. Acting Grand Vizier. Constantinople.

I inform you for the last time that, after your resignation, the call of FERID Pasha to power will be a very harmful and dangerous action for the country.

If FERID Pasha comes into power the rest of ANATOLIA which includes the majority of the nation will break its connection with the Capital and will be compelled to fight for its safety.

FERID Pasha's Cabinet can never be considered as a lawful Government.

Whatever peace which FERID Pasha may conclude, to the prejudice of our nation and the country, will not be accepted by the majority of the nation.

In compliance with the Constitutional principle we have formed a responsible Committee here.

This is for your information.

MUSTAFA KEMAL

President of the Representative Committee  
of the Society of ANATOLIA and ROU-  
MELIA Defence of Rights.

This message has also been communicated to FERID Pasha, the Grand VIZIER and to the SULTAN.

FO. 371/5167

No. 7

*Appendix "C" to the Weekly Report No. 63, of 7th April, 1920, Issued by the British General Staff "Intelligence", Constantinople.*

✓ *Very Secret*

From: - ANGORA.

*IN CLEAR*

To: - ALL KAIMAKAMS.

Herewith copy of the protest made by the President of the Parliament.

(Signed) MUSTAFA KEMAL  
For the Representative Committee

7 - 4 - 20.

*Copy.*

This is the letter of protest sent to the British, French, Italian and American High Commissioners, and to the Ambassadors of Holland and Sweden in Constantinople.

In my capacity of Chairman of the Parliament, I protest against the occupation of Constantinople, even a temporary one, and against the blow inflicted on the inviolability of the Ottoman Parliament, in disregard of the Ottoman Constitutional Law, and the Regulations governing the Sovereignty of Nations.

Our Nation, realising that this action is in complete opposition to all principles of Justice and Right, is now compelled to defend her right of existence and her lawful interests.

The Moslems in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA, who have recognised that, as a result of this inauspicious blow to the Capital of the Caliphate and the eternal seat of Islam, their revered Caliph and Sultan has become a slave in the hands of the Entente Powers, and that their sovereignty has been insulted and humbled in the dust, join with me in this protest and are endeavouring to take the steps necessitated by the situation.

I beg your Excellency to communicate this to the Government which you represent.

I take this opportunity of presenting to you my sincere compliments.

JELALEDIN ARIF

President of the Ottoman Parliament.

6-4-20.

FO. 371/5167

No. 8

*Memorandum of Conversation with Damad Ferid Pasha \*.*

THE new Grand Vizier paid his first official visit to the High Commissioner this morning.

2. After complimentary overtures, Ferid Pasha said he had come into power on a platform of subjugating such adherents of the national movement as would not submit to the will of the Central Government. What was he to do with this object? The Government would use moral force, including the authority of the Sultan, for all it was worth, but physical force would be necessary against those who still remained recalcitrant. He had to contemplate the use of gendarmerie and regular troops, more particularly gendarmerie.

3. Ferid Pasha made it clear that he had in view gendarmerie of a special kind. There were, he said, here and there in the country elements opposed to the Nationalists. In the Panderma area there was a movement already in being under Anzavour. The germ of a similar movement existed in the Ismidt area. A similar germ was said to exist at Bolu. The elements of a movement on the same lines had existed, he thought, and might still exist, at Trebizond. He could not speak confidently of the present position there. Further afield, something might be done between Caesarea and Kharput, and still further afield in the direction of Kurdistan.

\* Yüksek Komiser Amiral J. de Robeck, bu muhtırayı 8.4.1920 günlü, 496 sayılı yazısıyla Lord Curzon'a iletmiş ve Damad Ferit Paşa ile görüşmede Tuğamiral Webb ile Mr. Ryan'ın da hazır bulduklarını bildirmiştir.

(FO. 406/43, p. 316, No. 192)

4. The idea of the Government was to utilise elements of this kind. They had decided yesterday to make Anzavour a Pasha and to appoint him Governor of Afion-Kara-Hissar. He was thus transformed from a brigand into a servant of the Government. He perhaps already held Panderma. The Government had a stock of uniforms and wished to put Anzavour's forces into them.

5. The High Commissioner said he would consult General Milne on these proposals. The Grand Vizier promised to submit them in a concrete written form. The High Commissioner suggested for consideration that it might be desirable to avoid the use of the term "gendarmerie", lest difficulty should arise owing to General Foulon's ambiguous position. He urged strongly that, in any direction in which force was used, care should be taken to make it sufficient to avoid the danger of a set-back. The Allies still desired to avoid civil war. The only way to combine repressive action with the avoidance of civil war was to have sufficient forces to crush resistance to the action of the Government.

6. Ferid Pasha said that Anzavour had accomplished much with very scanty resources. He would now be able to give even a better account of himself if he could have some more guns (not a great many) and munitions. The High Commissioner promised to discuss this question with General Milne. He thought the General would probably want to send an officer to see what the requirements were, and what measures could be taken to ensure munitions being put to a proper use. The Grand Vizier acquiesced.

7. Ferid Pasha asked whether the High Commissioner could help him to get news from the interior, with which all telegraphic communication was cut off. The High Commissioner explained that our own information was very meagre, but such as it was it would be at the disposal of the Government. We might get a certain amount through Captain Perring at Samsoun.

8. The Grand Vizier said the Government were preparing a proclamation emphasising the points made in the Hatti-Humayoun, and were obtaining a fetva condemning the Nationalists. They proposed to print these documents and the Hatti-Humayoun itself for general distribution. He asked whether aeroplanes could be used for distribution in the interior. He believed there were three Turkish aeroplanes, and he had in view one very good aviator, the son of a Minister. The Commissioner promised to enquire about these aeroplanes.

9. Ferid Pasha asked whether he would be allowed to send a supply of the same documents to Ameer Ali for distribution in India. Indian Moslems had been misled into regarding people like Talaat and Enver as champions of Islam, which they were not. He was anxious that matters

should be represented in a true light, and that India should know the views of the Caliph, for whom Indian Moslems had so much respect.

10. The High Commissioner said he appreciated the Grand Viziers motives, but he could not commit himself regarding this proposal without consulting His Majesty's Government, as he would be trenching on the sphere of the Indian Government. He asked to see the text of the proclamation and fetva as soon as possible.

11. Ferid Pasha said the Government would want to send agents to accessible outlying places. He asked for facilities for such agents to travel. He promised to submit their names in such a manner as to ensure the necessary secrecy and only to act with the High Commissioner's approval. The High Commissioner promised to assist in this matter.

12. The Grand Vizier said it would be necessary to prevent a number of persons connected with the Ay-Yildiz Association from doing harm. He specified two or three. He had, he said, a complete list of people of this kind who ought to be rounded up by the Allies or by the Turkish authorities, whichever the High Commissioner liked best. The High Commissioner promised to think this over. Ferid Pasha promised to communicate the list secretly.

✓ 13. Throughout the conversation Ferid Pasha emphasised his desire to work entirely on lines approved by the British authorities. He said, *inter alia*, that he would not make the smallest movement of troops without authority.

14. In a preliminary conversation with Mr. Ryan, Ferid Pasha raised three points to which he did not advert in his conversation with the High Commissioner.

15. He spoke of the dissolution of Parliament. He thought it a necessary measure, though it would be necessary to have some sort of Parliament later to ratify peace. He asked whether, if the dissolution led to disturbances, the assistance of the Allies could be relied on.

16. Mr. Ryan agreed that the dissolution of Parliament was desirable. He said that he had no doubt arrangements could be made for the inter-Allied police to be on the alert when the time came. Personally, however, he did not think the measure would cause any immediate disturbance.

17. The Grand Vizier spoke very confidentially of the desirability of removing certain persons from the entourage of the Sultan. He said this was very necessary, but the Sultan was the soul of good nature, and it was difficult to bring him to the point. Ferid Pasha said it would be more easy to get the Sultan to act if he could represent it as the wish of the High Commissioner that the officials in question should be removed. Mr. Ryan



said this would be going too far, but he made certain observations regarding the officials in question, which he said might have good effect if reported to the Sultan as having been made in a conversation with a member of the High Commissioner's staff.

18. Ferid Pasha asked Mr. Ryan whether he would telegraph to the Hon. Aubrey Herbert to ask him to use his influence to moderate the severity of the views of people like Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Asquith regarding Turkey. Mr. Ryan discouraged the suggestion, as, he said, the High Commissioner could only transmit such a telegram through the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office would be sure to turn it down.

*British High Commission,*  
 CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 8, 1920*  
 FO. 406/43. p. 317-318. No. 192/1

No. 9

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 11, 1920*  
 (*Received April 12.*)

(No. 372.)  
 (Telegraphic.)

My telegram No. 340 of 5th April.

Ferid visited me on 7th April; record of interview is on the way to you. Main subject of conversation was question of proposed measures to repress so-called national movement.

Ferid said Government would use full moral influence, but force would be necessary against those who still remained recalcitrant.

Anti-Nationalist movement, organised by one Anzavour in area south of Marmora, is first weapon to hand of Government; it has had considerable local success. Anzavour occupied Panderma some days ago. Now Government have legalised his position by giving him the status of Governor of Balikesser.

Germ of similar movement exists in region between Gulfs of Guenlek (sic) and Ismid.

Ferid wants to know how far Allies will support Government in organising and utilising these movements. I have held out no hope of active British co-operation in operations against national forces in Asia Minor. I have, however, taken sympathetic view, and request that we should

enable Government to make the best use of movements by allowing military material to be used for equipping anti-Nationalist forces.

This is most immediate question. Others will follow, *e.g.*, question of permission of movement of any regular troops whose loyalty Government may be able to command. In all these matters I propose to observe principle that new Government is entitled to full Allied support (short of armed co-operation) in reasonable efforts to repress Nationalists, who continue to defy its authority.

General Milne is most immediately concerned in matter of giving permission for the use of military material and movement of troops. He agrees generally with my views, and is prepared to act on principle stated in preceding paragraph, provided I, as High Commissioner, give necessary authority. I have definitely requested him to do so.

As regards other High Commissioners, I am proceeding on the principle that they must be kept generally informed and given opportunity of expressing views, but that so far as Constantinople and Anatolia are concerned, carrying out of above programme, which is logical outcome of policy of Supreme Council, rests primarily with us in the same way that it rests with French in and north of Cilicia.

Leader of inchoate movement in the region between Gulfs of Guenlek and Ismid at present looks to us for guidance. I am inviting him indirectly to collaborate with Government and Anzavour. I hope in this way whole of Asiatic shore of Marmora would be secured.

There remains peninsula between Gulf of Ismid and Black Sea, which Nationalists are making vigorous efforts to penetrate. I am asking General Milne to study the question of how this shore should be protected in order that Nationalists may be held off Constantinople on every side. Their movement will thus be confined to the interior of Anatolia and Black Sea coast, which latter we can dominate from sea in case of necessity.

No. 10

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, 12th April, 1920  
(Received May 6, 1920)

No. 520/M/2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence reports, issued by the Constantinople branch of M. I. I. C., for the week ended 31st March, 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5166/E-4270

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 10

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch, for the Week Ending 31st March, 1920.*

1. *THE CABINET.*

Last week's report referred to the announcement of the resignation of SALIH Pasha's Cabinet and the assumption of office by DAMAD FERID Pasha, which had appeared in the Constantinople press. It now transpires that the announcement was unauthorised and was made on the faith of a statement by a member of the Entente Liberal party. At the Council of Ministers held on the 28th March much indignation was expressed at the report in question and it was decided to issue an official denial.

SALIH Pasha is said to have received several protests from Senators and former Ministers with regard to the reported return of DAMAD FERID Pasha to power, while a deputation from the Chamber headed by the Vice-President of that body assured the Grand Vizier of their desire that he should remain in office. There is reason to believe that the French share this view and that the Turkish Foreign Minister has received a hint from a French official that this is the case. It is said that the French hope by supporting the present Cabinet to enlist the good offices of MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha in influencing Syrian public opinion in their favour. This view seems to prevail in Turkish Official circles.

The members of the Cabinet seem somewhat apprehensive as to the possibility of their arrest by the Allies, and this question is said to have been raised by the Grand Vizier at a meeting of his colleagues, which took place on the 28th March. The Minister of the Interior is said to have expressed the opinion that in view of the disturbances which would be likely to result from such action it was improbable that it would be taken. It was, however, suggested at the meeting that efforts should be made to put an end to the arrest of prominent Nationalists which were then in progress, and that a protest regarding them should be sent to the British High Commissioner.

The business of the meeting included the reading of a private letter from MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha to the Ministry of the Interior expressing his readiness to provide funds to ensure the support of the officers of the CONSTANTINOPLE garrison. This letter may have been prompted by the report, which had doubtless reached the Nationalist leader, that the opposition had received offers of assistance from certain officers.

*Reports 711, 723, 724.*

## 2. *THE CABINET and the NATIONALISTS.*

The Government appears to be experiencing some difficulty in obtaining reliable information as to the situation in ANATOLIA, and is said to be collecting reports from travellers through railway and landing-stage officials, who pass the information thus obtained to the Ministry of the Interior. Correspondence between the Nationalists in CONSTANTINOPLE and MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha is being effected by couriers of whom a large proportion are Turkish women belonging to the "Islamic Women's Work Association", which was founded by NAJIE Sultane, the wife of ENVER Pasha. The route followed by these couriers is said to be KARTAL — SAMANDRA — SHEIHLI — DUDURLO — GEUIVE — ADA BAZAR.

*Report 730.*

## 3. *THE OPPOSITION.*

The expectation which was general at the beginning of the week that DAMAD FERID Pasha would be called upon to assume office has since become less widespread, and it appears certain that he hesitates to do so. His reluctance to undertake the responsibility of government is probably due to certain divergence of opinion between himself and the ENTENTE LIBERAL party, whose support is essential to him. The chiefs of this party are rather apprehensive of the independent character of DAMAD FERID Pasha and regard him as somewhat of a reactionary. They have

not forgotten that after the Revolution in 1908 he expressed a desire in the Senate to see the absolute power of the Sultan restored. Nor are they unmindful of the independence which he showed when dealing with the Supreme Council in the autumn of last year. They consider that although he would undoubtedly crush the Nationalist movement to a certain extent, he would not be likely to go the length they desire, and would conceivably use the movement for his own ends. It is not suggested that this is actually the case, but merely that it represents the opinion of certain important members of the ENTENTE LIBERAL Party.

*Report 710, 729.*

#### 4. THE SULTAN.

The Sultan is said to fear the possibility of a coup d'état which would replace him by the Heir Apparent. The Palace Guards have been strengthened and sentries are now posted in the corridors of the palace. Special precautions were taken on the occasion of the ceremony in connection with the festival of the Leili ul Reghaib (the conception of the Prophet) when a number of agents were stationed in the Reception Hall itself and every entrance to the Palace was specially guarded. Discussions are reported to have recently taken place at the Palace between the Sultan and the Imperial Princes as to the action to be taken by the Imperial Family in the event of the Allies deciding on the exclusion (sic) of the Turks from CONSTANTINOPLE. The matter was further considered on the 31st March and it is hoped that a report of the decision arrived at will be received. It is, however, understood that the Heir Apparent expressed the opinion that under these circumstances the Imperial Family should leave for ANATOLIA, and suggested KONIA as a suitable place of residence.

*Reports 721, 726.*

#### 5. NATIONALISTS.

Little information has been received regarding the doings of the Nationalists in ANATOLIA. It is, however, reported that partial mobilisation is in progress. In a letter from MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha dated March 18th, which is alleged to have been received in CONSTANTINOPLE on the 22nd, states that this mobilisation is not directed against any particular foreign power but against all Allied forces which may be sent into ANATOLIA for Imperialistic purposes. The letter added that for the present the Christians elements were in no danger.

Colour is given to the report of this mobilisation by further information to the effect that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha has asked for the immediate despatch to ANATOLIA of officers now on leave in CONSTANTINOPLE belonging to the XII, XIV, and XX Army Corps.

According to another report numbers of wealthy Turks have endeavoured to obtain permission, by the payment of large sums of money, to leave ANATOLIA for the capital, but this permission has not been granted. The growing discontent is stated to have resulted in a number of anti-Nationalist committees.

According to a report from the Inspector of Public Safety in the KONIA — ESKI SHEHIR district dated the 19th March, the Nationalists were experiencing great difficulty in dealing with their wounded on account of want of medical supplies.

The desire showed by the French for an understanding with the Nationalists, which is referred to in para. 1., receives support from a telegram said to have been received from the local Nationalist Committee of ESKI SHEHIR that the BILEJIK Branch on the 15th February, according to which the French Military representative at the first named town had informed the Nationalists that most of the Greeks living in the KUPLU district were leaving their business and going to GREECE.

*Reports 712, 716, 728, 730.*

#### 6. THRACE.

JAFER TAYAR Bey's action in the ADRIANOPLE district appears to have been singularly unsuccessful and there is reason to believe that communications between himself and the Central Government are being resumed.

A copy has been received of a proclamation recently issued at ADRIANOPLE announcing the establishment of martial law in that district and the independence from the Central Government of the ADRIANOPLE vilayet.

JAFER TAYAR, however, appears to have entered into negotiations at MUSTAFA PASHA with a Bulgarian delegation which probably consisted of representatives of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

*Reports 708, 720, 727.*

#### 7. ANTI-NATIONALIST DEPUTATION.

A deputation from BIGHA has recently visited CONSTANTINOPLE to complain of the action of the Nationalist forces in that town. The deputation was summoned before the Council of Ministers. The head of the deputation complained of the behaviour of the Nationalist Forces in BIGHA, and said that the lives and honour of the peaceful population of that town were threatened. He declared that he intended to appeal for assistance to the British High Commissioner. The Grand Vizier advised him not

to do so, and asked him to await the return of the Parliamentary Commission now on its way to the Nationalists.

FO. 371/5166/E-4270.

No. 11

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14th April, 1920  
(Received May 6)

No. 531/M/2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week ended 8th April, 1920.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5166/E. 4278

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 11

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
For the Week Ending 8th April, 1920.*

1. *THE CABINET.*

The composition of FERID Pasha's Cabinet has been announced during the past week. It contains very few personalities of note, and, with the exception of the Grand Vizier himself, no one who has any claim to be considered a politician of the first class.

The best known members are:—

- a) *RESHID Bey, Minister of the Interior*, an ex-Vali of SMYRNA, who was Minister of the Interior in the last Cabinet of KIAMIL Pasha. He fled the country after the Nationalist Coup d'Etat of January 23rd 1913 and remained for sometime in SWITZERLAND and ROUMANIA. He was sentenced to death by default by the Committee of Union and Progress Government. He spent the period of the war in SWITZERLAND. He speaks French

well and is usually considered to be Francophile in tendencies. He himself, however, states that though his education and knowledge of the French language bring him into closer touch with the French than any other European nation, he considers his best political friends to be those who are most prepared to aid TURKEY.

- b) *JEMIL Pasha, Minister of Public Works.* A very competent surgeon trained in VIENNA with a reputation outside his own country. Well connected and honest. Speaks French and German well. In 1913 and 1914 and during the greater part of the war was Prefect of CONSTANTINOPLE, i.e. Lord Mayor. In this capacity he showed great energy and public spirit, but his efforts on behalf of sanitation, etc., were thwarted by the Union and Progress faction which always disliked him. Was Prefect of CONSTANTINOPLE after the armistice, but recently resigned owing to the fact that the pro-Nationalist Central Government deprived him of certain of his official powers. A well-groomed, well-mannered, and very presentable Turkish gentleman of about 60 years of age. Has private means.
- c) *ABDULLAH Bey, Sheikh-ul Islam.* Belongs to a family which has already supplied 5 holders of this office. He himself has had various posts in the department of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat of which he was recently Under Secretary. In 1904 he attained the title of "ANADOL KAZASKIERI".

The portfolio of war has been offered to MAHMUD MUKHTAR Pasha, now in SWITZERLAND, from whom a reply has not yet been received.

Detailed particulars of the principal personalities in the new Ministry will be found in report HA/740.

It will be noted that the Cabinet as at present constituted does not include any members of the ENTENTE LIBERALE Party, of whose support, however, FERID Pasha seems assured. It is stated that certain of the leaders of the Party in question have presented to the Grand Vizier a considerable list of their followers whom they desire shall be given certain Government appointments. It is expected that their suggestions will be accepted and that a large number of changes will shortly be made in the personnel of Government departments.

It is expected that the Cabinet will take stringent measures with a view to the destruction of Nationalist power. It is stated that as a preliminary to action of this nature, FERID Pasha will divide up ANATOLIA



into the following three zones under the command of the persons indicated:—

- 1) PANDERMA — BALIKESSIR ..... AHMED ANZAVUR ✓
- 2) ESKI SHEHIR — ANGORA ..... SAID Pasha, formerly ✓  
Military Commandant  
of CONSTANTINOPLÉ.
- 3) ERZERUM — SIVAS ..... ALI GHALIB Bey, ✓  
ex-Vali of KHARPUT.  
*Reports HA/740, 744, 745*

## 2. OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONALISTS.

Meanwhile AHMED ANZAVUR continues his activity and is reported to have occupied the village of GUENAN, where a considerable number of the Nationalist Forces sent against him from PANDERMA and BALIKESSIR are stated to have deserted and joined him.

One of his followers named HASSAN Bey is reported to have left CONSTANTINOPLE on 8th March accompanied by 8 officers. It is believed that other officers are also ready to join AHMED ANZAVUR's forces as soon as they receive orders to do so.

*Report HA/746*

## 3. MUSTAFA KEMAL'S VIEWS.

The Nationalist leader evidently regards the British as constituting the chief obstacle to the success of his plans.

A document has been received in this office purporting to be an extract from a letter written by him to RAOUF Bey, in which he states that the maintenance of CONSTANTINOPLE as the seat of the Caliphate cannot be regarded as a great success for Turkish policy and that the loss by TURKEY of the control of the Straits would signify its direct acquisition by the British. He considered that FRANCE and ITALY could not remain indifferent to this fact, which must, in his opinion, affect the amour propre of the United States. He hoped that the Soviet Government would shortly make clear the line of action which it proposed to adopt with regard to TURKEY, and stated that he was using every endeavour to explain to the people the truth regarding British propaganda in ANATOLIA.

*Report HA/734*

Could he be the Panderma  
 Hassan (Amalya) of one  
 my school master ??

#### 4. NATIONALIST REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL.

Particulars have been received of two meetings of the Nationalist Representative Council stated to have been held at ANGORA on the 8th and 13th March respectively, in the course of which certain military measures were decided on in the event of the occupation of CONSTANTINOPLE or the return to power of FERID Pasha. These included the mobilisation of certain classes, the destruction of the railway at various points, the collection of forced contributions, etc.

MUSTAFA KEMAL, however, by no means appears to have carried out these resolutions in their entirety. It is understandable that he should keep up the morale of his followers by allowing them to pass resolutions of a violent nature, whilst reserving to himself the right to apply them or not as he thought fit.

*Reports HA/735, 748.*

#### 5. NATIONALIST LEADERS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

The report received from SWITZERLAND that TALAAT Pasha had left that country on 3rd April for ITALY, travelling under an assumed name, receives certain colour from information received in this office that the extreme Nationalist and Unionist elements in CONSTANTINOPLE intend to send delegates to meet others of their party in ITALY. The names of the three delegates are given.

*Report HA/755.*

#### 6. PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTATION TO MUSTAFA KEMAL.

It will be recollected that the Chamber of Deputies decided to send a deputation to ANGORA to discuss the situation with MUSTAFA KEMAL. The delegation was headed by Dr. RIZA NOUR, from whom a telegram has since been received announcing his conviction that the Nationalists are right in following their present line of action, and the intention of his colleagues and himself to remain with them. The telegram added that the assumption of office by DAMAD FERID Pasha had finally decided them to take this step.

*Reports HA/743, 756.*

#### 7. FRENCH AND THE NATIONALISTS.

Certain light is thrown on the relations between the French and the Nationalists by a circular telegram dated ANGORA 18. 2. 20. which is reported to have been sent by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha to all Nationalist Sub-Committees, recommending that special attention should be paid

to a French civil official who was expected to travel through ANATOLIA, and instructing local Nationalist leaders to inscribe their names in the book of the Committee of Franco-Turkish friendship.

↳ Meanwhile it is reported that French officers at CONSTANTINOPLE deprecate the occupation of the city by the Allies and state that they are not responsible for it.

*Reports HA/733, 753.*

#### 8. NATIONALIST NEWS AGENCY.

Details have been received of a Nationalist News Agency which is reported to exist at HAIDAR PASHA whence anti-Allied propaganda is said to emanate. The names of the organisers of this Bureau are given.

*Report HA/739.*

#### 9. THRACE.

↳ It seems clear that JAFER TAYYAR Bey has realised that his action in THRACE does not meet with the support which he had hoped from his compatriots in that province. He is said to have telegraphed his submission to the Government on 30th March, stating that he was prepared to obey their orders and declaring that the action which he had recently taken was not directed against the Government, but merely against the eventuality of the Greek occupation of THRACE.

He also despatched a circular telegram to the various officials of the ADRIANOPOLE Vilayet directing them to take their orders from the Governor-General as in the past, and requesting the people to go peacefully about their business.

The endeavours made by him to come to an understanding with the Bulgarian Communists which were reported in last week's summary appear to have met with no better effect than his action in Turkish THRACE. This fact may possibly have influenced him in his decision to make his submission to the Central Government.

*Reports HA/737, 738.*

#### 10. PAN-ISLAMISM.

##### (1) *The Nationalists in TURKEY and INDIA.*

↳ At a meeting of the Representative Council of the Nationalists held at ANGORA on 13th March, a letter was read from the President of the Indian Musulman Delegation, now in LONDON, stating that the Muhammadans of INDIA had resolved to do all in their power to uphold the integrity of TURKEY and begging the Nationalist Committee, as

representative of the Nationalists forces, to strive unceasingly for this end. This Delegation is probably identical with the Indian Caliphate Deputation, consisting of four well-known extreme Pan-Islamists who have visited LONDON in order to lay their views with regard to the Turkish peace terms before the Government, and who are known to be very anxious to get into touch with the Nationalists in TURKEY. It was also stated at the meeting that the "Muselman (sic) Congress of INDIA" had sent a sum of £18,000 to the Commander of the Nationalist Forces to express their recognition of the desire of the Nationalists Forces to defend the Turco-Islamic union. The sum of 10,000 was also promised by various branches of the Mouwahidin Society. This Congress, which is undoubtedly the same as the All-India Muslim League of ALIGARH, which is known to have been for some years under extremist influence, has also requested that some Turkish theologians might be sent to represent the Caliph at their Central Committee, the Congress itself being responsible for all the expenses incurred by these delegates. This request was to be referred to the Sheikh-ul-Islam for decision.

The above information was embodied in a document purporting to report the proceedings of the meeting. The document itself seems genuine, but we have no means of checking the truth of its contents.

(2) *TURKEY and ENGLAND.*

A circular letter, accompanied by copies of his paper, "THE MUSLIM OUTLOOK", is reported to have been received by the students of the Dar-ul-Fanun University, STAMBOUL, from Marmaduke PICKT-HALL, the well-known Pan-Islamic and pro-Turkish agitator in ENGLAND. In this letter he urges Turkish students to do their utmost for their country in its hour of peril.

(3) *TURKEY and EGYPT.*

a) Meetings between the ex-Khedive and Prince ABDUL MAJID the Heir Apparent, continue to take place. At a meeting on 17th March it was proposed that a party of sixty-six Turkish officers of different ranks should be sent for service with MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha, two of whom Lt. Col. VASSIF Bey and Major AHMED KEMAL Bey, were to be entrusted with a large sum of money for the Nationalist leader. It was also suggested that Lt. MUHAMMED MUSTAFA Bey, a repatriated prisoner of war from EGYPT, should join JAFER TAYYAR Bey at ADRIANOPLE to assist him in exciting public enthusiasm for the Nationalist cause.

At a meeting on the 27th March a scheme for sending a delegation to Sherif FEISUL and Sherif ABDULLAH, self-styled Kings of SYRIA and MESOPOTAMIA, was discussed.

b) Two Egyptians, SAID CHIMI Bey and Dr. KEMAL TEWFIK, who are said to be agents of the ex-Khedive, have arrived in CONSTANTINOPLE and visit him once a week. The former, who acted as a spy upon ABDUL AZIZ SHAWISH in CONSTANTINOPLE during 1911-1912 at the order of the ex-Khedive, is now performing the same task upon those Egyptians in CONSTANTINOPLE who are believed to be working against the ex-Khedive. The latter, who is supposed to have come to CONSTANTINOPLE on instructions from Dr. MUHAMMED RUSHDI to complete his medical studies, is in reality acting as courier for the ex-Khedive between this place and EGYPT.

c) A circular is reported to have been received by Dr. MAHUMMAD AMIN sent out by Sheikh ABDUL AZIZ SHAWISH and Dr. AHMED FUAD, in which the Egyptians living at "14, TOWSINISHSTRASSE", BERLIN, congratulate the Egyptian nation on its imminent freedom from British domination and express the hope that they may all live in peaceful union with the Turkish nation. This circular was accompanied by a personal letter asking for subscriptions from the Egyptians in CONSTANTINOPLE to aid the Egyptian Nationalist cause in SWITZERLAND. This was circulated among the Egyptians in CONSTANTINOPLE with a request for subscriptions. The address given in BERLIN is probably that of the "DEUTSCHE ORIENT INSTITUT", which is situated in Tausenstrasse and is the headquarters of all Oriental anti-British propaganda in GERMANY.

*Reports HC/751, 752, HD/741, 749, 742.*

*Constantinople.*

10. 4. 20.

Copies to: — High Commissioner

M.I.I.C.

Geneva

Major Vivian

Major Courtney

*FO. 371/5166/E. 4278*

No. 12

*Appendix "A" to Weekly Report No. 65 Issued by the British General Staff  
"Intelligence", Constantinople.*

*Secret*

*NATIONALIST CIRCULAR REGARDING FETVAS PUBLISHED  
BY THE GOVERNMENT.*

From: — ANGORA.

To : — All Committees of Defence of Rights.

It is very surprising and astonishing that, with a view to encouraging the British in their mischievous movements, the Cabinet of FERID Pasha has caused a "FETVA SHERIF" to be issued, accusing us of treason - as if the Moslem population of Anatolia had risen against their Holy Khalif.

It is manifest that our venerable people and their property are in British hands and that their Khalif is a prisoner in Constantinople.

I request you to instruct our loyal subjects, in a suitable manner, not, to attach the least importance to the FETVA published in the papers.

MUSTAFA KEMAL

Major General.

For the Representative Committee.

13-15/4/20.

FO. 371/5167

No. 13

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 15, 1920  
(Received April 15.)

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram No. 372 of 11th April.

Government issued proclamation on 10th April condemning in unmeasured terms those who, under false cloak of nationalism, intensified disastrous results of policy which dragged Turkey into war. Proclamation gives rank and file one week in which to make submission to Sultan, and threatens leaders and those who persist with condign punishment.

It further expressly threatens with chastisement excesses by Moslems against Christians or *vice versa*.

Government publish simultaneously series of fetvas or religious pronouncements directed against Nationalists.

Effect in interior is expected to be considerable if only these pronouncements can be brought to knowledge of people. Government are considering best means of doing this. I have promised such assistance as I can give.

Translations follow by bag.

Parliament was dissolved on 12th April without incident. Government, adhering to text of Constitution, promises new election within four months. Reports from Panderma show that Anzavour is moving but, no definite news of progress is yet available.

News from Nationalist side still very vague, but striking developments in interior are not improbable.

*FO. 405/43, p. 277, No. 178*

No. 14

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

WAR OFFICE, *April 17, 1920*  
(*Received April 19.*)

Sir,

I AM directed by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office letter No. E 3072/3/44 of the 13th April, 1920.

It is noted that the British High Commissioner at Constantinople has given authority to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief to permit the use of Turkish military material to equip anti-Nationalist forces, and to move certain regular troops.

In this policy the Army Council concurs.

In view, however, of difficulties that may arise after the presentation of the Turkish Peace Treaty, it would seem possible that the distribution of arms to irregular bands might later lead to further trouble. Such bands are under no very definite control, and might well disappear or even join the opposing forces under certain circumstances.

I am to say accordingly that if force is to be used against the Nationalists, it would seem preferable to the Army Council to permit the employment of Turkish regular troops, which under all circumstances can be more easily controlled from Constantinople than irregular bands.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT

*FO. 406/43, p. 298, No. 180.*

No. 15

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 20, 1920**(No. 355.)**(Telegraphic.)*

YOUR telegram No. 312 of 11th April: Measures against Nationalists.

Your proposals for supporting present Turkish Government are approved, subject to following two considerations: —

Firstly, War Office consider that, whenever possible, Turkish regulars, being more easy to control, should be employed rather than Turkish irregulars.

Secondly, we must be careful not to raise in mind of Damad Ferid expectations of a lenient treaty which we shall not be in a position to fulfil, and which may lead him to accuse us of perfidy later on.

*FO. 406/43, p. 300. No. 183.*

No. 16

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 20, 1920**(Received April 21.)**(No. 420.)**(Telegraphic.) R.*

My telegram No. 372 of 11th April.

Anzavour anti-Nationalist movement in Panderma area has collapsed, and Nationalists have again occupied town above named.Anzavour had moved from Panderma viâ Michalich to Kirmasti, apparent intention being to occupy Brussa. On 16th instant his force was attacked at Kirmasti and suffered severe reverse, losing considerable number of prisoners. Anzavour retired to Panderma with 500 men, remainder of his force splitting up and moving further west.

By 19th instant Nationalist forces (including apparently bulk of 61st Regular Turkish Division from Balikesr and of 56th Division from Brussa) had occupied Panderma with some 3,000 men. Other detachments, about 2,000 strong in all, moved on Edinjik and Erdek.



✓ Anzavour is believed to have gone towards Bigha, and in Dardanelles his forces have been broken up, and there seems no possibility of him (*sic*) being able to organise any further movement against Nationalists for some time to come, if ever.

Grand Vizier was arranging to send him supplies of rifles and ammunition form here provided with General Milne's consent, but for various reasons these were not sent in time before he had been defeated.

FO. 406/43., p. 300 , No. 184.

No. 17

*British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council Held at the Villa Devachan, San Remo, on Tuesday, April 20, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

(Extract)

2. The Supreme Council had before it a memorandum from the Council of the League of Nations (A.J.-156 (Appendix<sup>1</sup>).

✓ *Armenia.* LORD CURZON gave a summary of the circumstances which *Memorandum* had led to the receipt of this memorandum from the Council *from the League* of the League. The Council of Foreign Ministers and *Am- of Nations.* bassadors in London had suggested that the protection of Armenia should be undertaken by the Council of the League, which, after consideration of the data available on the subject, had finally replied in the memorandum now before the Supreme Council. A general readiness to do the utmost possible was expressed, but certain questions were asked, which he thought the council would not find it difficult to answer. The attitude of the League of Nations was, he thought, as favourable as could have been hoped. It had realised that the whole world was interested in the Armenian question, and that such an opportunity of redressing a known wrong must not be missed. The Council of the League, however, pointed out, with reason, that it could not itself undertake a direct mandate. As this had never been intended by the Supreme Council, the point need not be stressed. The Council of the League 'had come to the conclusion that the future of the Armenian Nation could best be assured if a member of the League, or some other Power, could be found willing to accept the mandate for Armenia, under the supervision and with the full moral support of the League, under the general conditions laid down under article 22.' He

<sup>1</sup> Not here printed. This memorandum of April 11, 1920, is printed in the *League of Nations Official Journal*, April-May, 1920, pp. 85-87.

thought his colleagues would readily agree to this proposition. It had been hoped that America would undertake a mandate for Armenia, but this hope had, unfortunately, proved illusory. Mr. Fisher, the British representative, had told him that there was some reason to hope that Norway would undertake the mandate. Norway was a very democratic country, outside<sup>2</sup> the main current of European politics; she had an army, but, happily, very little reason for employing it. He thought Norway would approach the problem from a very unbiassed standpoint. This information, the accuracy of which he had no reason to doubt, was, of course, only conveyed to him, and by him to his colleagues, privately. The Council of the League then raised three important points: first, the financial resources required to set up the Armenian State; second, the military resources required to defend it, once constituted; third, the outlets to the sea that it would require. As to the first, the League of Nations had no considerable financial resources of their own, and to launch the Armenian State large sums would be required. The council was disposed to recommend to the Assembly of the League that all its members should guarantee a loan. In the meantime, however, it asked whether the Principal Allied Powers would either find the necessary advances of money or guarantee a loan to be raised on behalf of Armenia. There were, therefore, two proposals; one regarding the future, and the other to tide over the interval. As to the defence of Armenian territory, it must be remembered that the nucleus of what was to be Armenia was the already constituted Erivan Republic; in other words, what had been Russian Armenia. But a considerable extent of ex-Turkish territory was to be added to this. The Council of the League therefore asked whether the Supreme Council would be prepared to use force, if necessary, to place these new territories under the control of the Armenian State. Before answering this question he thought the Supreme Council should hear what its military advisers might have to say concerning the enforcement of the treaty in general, and what means would exist for placing Armenia within its new boundaries. At present these questions were merely speculative. He thought it likely that the Powers might not feel able to guarantee Armenia her ultimate frontiers immediately, especially if they had to encounter trouble in Anatolia. Nevertheless, it was intended to insert these frontiers in the treaty, and, in the end, to see that Turkey respected them. The Council of the League also asked whether the Allied Powers would guarantee the defence of Armenian frontiers until other means of doing so were found. This was a cognate question, which, he thought, should be discussed with the Armenians themselves. The Armenians had forces which might be estimated at 20,000 to 30,000

<sup>2</sup> The typescript text is here indistinct: On another copy this passage read '... democratic country, somewhat outside', &c.

men. These were, unfortunately, being employed in fighting neighbouring States. Efforts were being made to put a stop to this, and a considerable degree of success had already been achieved. If Norway should agree to undertake a mandate, these forces could be equipped and trained by European assistance, and might be sufficient to ensure the defence of the frontier. He hoped the Supreme Council would agree to assist Armenia with equipment and officers. The third question, relating to Armenian outlets to the sea, involved the problem of Batoum and Lazistan. The question of Batoum was on the agenda, and would doubtless be dealt with independently. But he thought in any case it was agreed that a free port for the use of Armenia would be established there. The coast of Lazistan, which was to be attributed to Armenia, contained two small ports. West of this area was Trebizond, which was also to be made a free port, and Armenian access to it was to be facilitated by the demilitarisation of the district. On this point, therefore, a satisfactory reply could be sent to the Council of the League. He hoped, therefore, that his colleagues would agree that a reply on the lines he had indicated might be sent to the Council of the League, in the name of the Supreme Council.

M. MILLERAND said that Lord Curzon's statement appeared to him a little sanguine. As far as financial assistance was concerned, he was quite unable to make a positive declaration that France could either furnish advances or guarantee the loans to Armenia. He would have to consult the Minister of Finance and his experts. As to military assistance he could offer no promises. He did not know whether Italy was prepared to send troops, but, in view of French commitments elsewhere, he was not ready to offer military assistance. The League of Nations appeared to be willing to adopt a decorative attitude, while leaving all the practical difficulties to the Powers. He did not feel in a position to send the League of Nations a reply implying any consent to this arrangement.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the situation for Italy was very much the same. Italy could not offer any military forces, and in the present state of her exchange she could not consent either to give advances or to guarantee loans. He realised that the military difficulties of establishing Armenia were very great, especially if Erzerum were to be included. *Mustafa Kemal* had his headquarters there, and commanded 13,000 or 14,000 well-armed troops. It would not be necessary, no doubt, to declare war on Turkey to have the treaty executed, but in effect it would be necessary to wage it. To take Erzerum and to conduct a campaign in the middle of Anatolia would require big forces. It was hardly fair to tell the League of Nations to proceed in the confidence that the Powers would find the forces, for they could not do so. Personally he would be delighted if Norway accepted the mandate, but he

doubted very much whether Norway would undertake military responsibilities. Her population was too small to furnish the gigantic effort required for keeping a force in Asia Minor. Her moral assistance to Armenia would, no doubt, be of the highest value, and he was prepared to do anything he could to assist Norway in the task. As to the use of the Port of Batum, and access of Armenia to the sea, he was in complete agreement. It was only the general solution of the Armenian problem that caused him anxiety. The larger Armenia was to be, the greater would be its difficulties; more especially if Erezerum, which was not Armenian, were included. President Wilson complained that Armenia was not being made big enough. The bigger it was made, the worse for the Armenians. France could not send troops; nor could Italy. Norway might accept a mandate, but without military responsibility. In these circumstances, he did not know what answer could be sent to the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he quite agreed with M. Millerand that the financial experts must be consulted before any commitments were undertaken on behalf of Armenia. As to troops, Great Britain could certainly supply none; but he understood that this was not required. The Armenians had 30,000 or 40,000 armed men. What they required was equipment and training. Among them the Allies could certainly supply this. He suggested that this question be referred to the military advisers. As far access to the sea was concerned he understood that there was agreement. What concerned him most, for the moment, was the completion of the treaty. He suggested that, as there was agreement regarding the boundaries of Armenia and her access to the sea, both matters which it was necessary to mention in the treaty, the other aspects of the case should be postponed. The question of a mandate over Armenia did not concern Turkey; it could be settled hereafter between the Allies, or by the League of Nations. He further understood that there was a proposal by Boghos Nubar Pasha<sup>3</sup> for the military occupation of Armenia. He would suggest that this document (A.J. 149)<sup>4</sup> be also referred to the military experts of the council.

LORD CURZON said that it was, no doubt, quite true that the present business of the council was to conclude the treaty, but the treaty was to include clauses demanding the recognition by Turkey of a free State of Armenia, and of its boundaries. By inserting such clauses the Allies assumed certain responsibilities. The freeing of Armenia had been one of the most often proclaimed Allied war aims. It had been proclaimed by France, by Great Britain, by President Wilson. The Allies had, therefore, a heavy moral responsibility upon them. They could not wash their hands of the

<sup>3</sup> President of the Armenia National Delegation to the Peace Conference.

<sup>4</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

question. Moreover, he thought the difficulties were not nearly so great as were imagined. All the Prime Ministers had said that they could send no troops. Troops were not needed. Officers and equipment were required. As to finance, no doubt consultation of the Treasuries was necessary. Nevertheless, some answer must be sent to the League of Nations. He submitted that the answer should encourage it to summon its Assembly and to try and raise the financial resources required. It was not possible to drop the matter entirely and leave Armenia in the lurch. He did not think the answer was so difficult to frame, and he was quite prepared to draft one himself, should his colleagues wish him to do so.

M. MILLERAND said that he did not deny the moral responsibility undertaken by the Allies, but they must consider what practical means they had of discharging it. Unfortunately, what Signor Nitti and Mr. Lloyd George and himself had said corresponded to the realities of the case. The Powers could not undertake to supply any money. Seeing the heavy burdens which the Powers already bore, and the special difficulties of the Armenian solution, referred to by Signor Nitti, he thought the best that could be hoped for was that some member of the League of Nations would undertake the task of assisting Armenia. Whether it be Norway or any other State equally well-disposed, he thought the Powers should welcome it and encourage it to take upon itself this task and all its responsibilities and advantages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to add a few words. He agreed with M. Millerand that merely verbal responsibilities should not be undertaken by the Powers. The responsibilities were military and financial. As to the first, the Powers could not find troops. They could, however, send equipment and officers. The question had been referred to the military advisers, and therefore one practical step had been taken. As to a loan, he was told that Armenia would require about £10,000,000. Who was prepared to advance such a sum? America, he was told, could easily find it. Why did the League of Nations not appeal to America? Why did they refer their difficulties to the Supreme Council, which was already overburdened by its own tasks? The League of Nations did not discharge its whole duty by making pious speeches. He believed an appeal from the League of Nations to America would be successful. At least it might have the effect of stopping President Wilson from addressing any further notes to the Supreme Council. He thought the League of Nations was quite able to negotiate a loan and to find a mandatory.

M. BERTHELOT observed that there were rich Armenians who could find the money, and that there were valuable assets in Armenia which could be pledged.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George, and he was greatly obliged to Lord Curzon for undertaking to draft a reply.

LORD CURZON said that he would do his best to draft a reply containing the various considerations advanced. He deprecated ridicule of the League of Nations, seeing that the council, whenever it found itself in a perplexity, referred its difficulties to the League of Nations.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the League of Nations had merely returned the compliment once.

It was agreed—

- (a) To refer to the military advisers of the principal Allied Powers the question of the equipment of the military forces of Armenia and the military questions raised in the memorandum by Boghos Nubar entitled 'Military Occupation of Armenian Territory in Turkey which will form Part of the Armenian State' (A.J. 149).
- (b) That Lord Curzon should draft, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, a reply to the memorandum by the Council of the League of Nations, based on the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George.

*D.B.F.P., Ist series, Vol. VIII, p. 46-51, No. 6*

No. 18

*I.C.P. 99 British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council, held at the Villa Devachan, San Remo, on Tuesday, April 20, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General Sackville-West, Colonel Gribbon, Captain Fuller; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Storr.

*France*: M. Millerand, President of the French Council; M. Bertelot, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); Signor Scialoja, General Badoglio, Signor A. Acton, General Cavallero, Colonel Siciliani, Commander Ruspoli; SECRETARIES, Signor Garbosso, Signor Galli, Signor Trombetti, Lieutenant Zanchi.

*Japon*: Mr. Matsui, General Watanche (Watanabe), Commander Osumi; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Sawada.

*Greece*: M. Veniselos, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Tavoulari.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. SIGNOR NITTI declared the meeting open at 4 p.m., and said that the *Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Naval and Military Measures re- quired to enforce same.* Supreme Council had received a communication from Marshal Foch replying to the questions which had been submitted to him on the previous day by the Supreme Council asking him to assemble his Committee of Military and Naval Experts in order to report upon the measures to be taken to enforce the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. (The official interpreter then read Marshal Foch's report (A.J. 161) see Appendix).

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had nothing to add to what was contained in his report, which had been submitted to the Supreme Council. He wished to refer also to the report of his committee, dated the 29th March (A.J. 140), which contained the views of his committee. Should the Supreme Council desire further information, he would be glad to reassemble his committee, but he would, in that case, wish to be informed precisely as to the terms of reference.

SIGNOR NITTI asked whether any member of the Supreme Council wished to raise any point in connection with Marshal Foch's earlier report. According to that report, a force of not less than 27 divisions was required to enforce the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and it was possible that this force might have to be increased. He would ask Marshal Foch how he thought it was possible that any additional force required would be obtained from Italy, France and Great Britain? It was not possible for Greece to supply more than about half of the additional reinforcements.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the report of his committee embodied the conclusions they had reached in respect of the total amount of troops required to enforce the treaty. If these troops were not available, then the treaty could not be enforced.

SIGNOR NITTI said he understood that the minimum required, in the view of Marshal Foch's committee, was twenty-seven divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH said the whole of his committee were unanimous in agreeing that twenty-seven divisions was a minimum. As a matter of fact, the representatives of Great Britain on his committee wanted at least two more divisions, and the Italian representatives had asked for an additional four.

SIGNOR NITTI enquired how many divisions Greece could supply.

M. VENISELOS said that there were six Greek divisions in Smyrna, and three in Eastern Macedonia, on a war footing, and one in Epirus. Further, Greece had four divisions on a peace footing, which could easily be brought up to a war footing. When Marshal Foch's committee had last met in Versailles to consider this question, a Greek military representative had

been present, and had given his views as to the number of troops that would be required to enforce the treaty in its entirety. If Armenia were omitted, the view of his military experts was that the existing force would suffice.

MARSHAL FOCH thought possibly the Greek view might be a mistaken one. His own opinion was that if Turkey were to be disarmed, and if the protection of minorities was to be guaranteed, the existing forces could not suffice.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the question was, what was the number of men in a Greek division, and what was the total number of men comprised in the twenty-seven Allied divisions, which was (*sic*) envisaged as the minimum required?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the total number of effectives, including accessory services, in a division at full establishment was 15,000.

M. VENISELOS said that he was afraid he must correct the numbers that he had first given. He had been under the impression that the Greek forces would be sufficient to enforce the treaty, on the understanding that it would not be necessary to supply forces for Armenia or to effect the disarmament of Turkey. He wished to point out how very difficult it would be to pursue the Turkish forces into the interior and to disarm them. He wished it to be clearly understood that he did not himself suggest any idea of abandoning Armenia; the Greek Government was quite prepared to cooperate with its Allies in order to save that country. As regards the disarmament of Turkey, he thought this was a matter which should be left to whatever Turkish Government might be at Constantinople when the treaty came to be signed and who would be prepared to sign that treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what were the centres and the sources of revenue in Turkey. It seemed to him to be quite hopeless to endeavour to chase elusive bodies of men who were as active as 'Angora goats' all over Anatolia. Even if the Allied Governments could dispose of twenty-seven divisions more, there would never be an end to the business. What he suggested was that the Allied Governments should endeavour to get hold of the vital parts of Turkey—that is to say, places like Trebizond, Broussa, Konia—and strangle Turkey by seizing these strategic centres. To do this it was hardly necessary to use twenty-seven divisions.

M. VENISELOS said that, if the Allies occupied Constantinople and the Straits, and if they could cut off, as Mr. Lloyd George suggested, the sources of revenue which Turkey had received from Smyrna and elsewhere, Turkey could not hold out very long. Her main arteries would be cut and she would be compelled to give in.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be much better to take the measures that he had suggested than to endeavour to penetrate and occupy the vast deserts in the interior of Anatolia.



LORD CURZON said that, where Turkish revenues were derived from the interior, they came from inaccessible places, such as Konia, Sivas, Angora, Erzerum and Erzingan. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that Turkey should be strangled at her capital and at her ports on the sea coast. What the Allies should attempt to do was to throttle all channels which were accessible rather than try to embark on dangerous expeditions inland.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, if the treaty envisaged the disarmament of Turkey, steps would have to be taken to secure all arms at present existing in the interior, many of which were buried away. But this would mean occupying a very large extend of territory. Such occupation would also be involved if a adequate protection were to be given to minorities. There could be no question that the Turks had a great quantity of arms in the interior of Anatolia, and they were in a position to give the Allies an enormous amount of trouble. If, however, the Allied Governments did not mean to disarm Turkey and to take adequate measures to protect minorities, then a much smaller force would be required than that which had been calculated by his committee.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he wished to ask another question. Supposing that Turkey accepted the treaty, Constantinople would then be detached from Asia, and its importance would be much diminished. Hitherto Smyrna, while in the possession of the Turks, had provided 30 per cent of the Turkish revenue, while Erzerum constituted the principal point of resistance. In these circumstances, Turkey naturally wanted Smyrna for purposes of revenue, and Erzerum in order to enable her to have a centre of resistance under Mustapha Kemal. For the capture and control of Erzerum a very large force would be necessary, as the Turkish resistance would be sure to be protracted and vigorous. He wished to ask Marshal Foch what force would be required to suppress any Turkish action in the south and east of Asia Minor.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this question was fully dealt with on p. 4 of his report.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Veniselos felt at all apprehensive about the safety of Smyrna, supposing that *Mustapha Kemal* attacked in force.

M. VENISELOS said that he himself was quite happy about the situation, but he would like to know whether his views were shared by Marshal Foch.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the (*he*) thought the Greek forces at Smyrna were fully competent to withstand any Turkish attacks so long as they were not required to undertake expeditions into the interior. *which they*

M. VENISELOS said that not only were the Greek forces in Smyrna sufficient to hold off any Turkish attacks, but there were three more Greek

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divisions in Thrace, from which one division could be detached, if necessary, to reinforce Smyrna, or to be used to co-operate with the Allies in the common interest.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were only two points from which it was necessary to drive the Turks in order to effect the necessary territorial changes envisaged in the treaty. The first region was Thrace, and the second was the district of Erzerum. The Allied forces were already at Constantinople and in occupation of Smyrna and Cilicia. He asked whether Marshal Foch could inform the council how many Turks there were now in Thrace, and how they were equipped and organized.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Turkish troops in Thrace were not very considerable in numbers, but by rapid mobilisation they might quickly get together some 30,000 men, or the equivalent of an army corps. The Allies, he thought, would have no difficulty in dealing with this force, as there were plenty of Allied troops within easy reach for the purposes of reinforcement. At Erzerum, however, it was evident that the situation was quite different. The Allied troops there were too far away in order to reinforce quickly, and it would be very difficult indeed to say what number of men we could collect in order to deal with any situation that might arise.

M. MILLERAND said that the views and conclusions of the military experts were quite clear, but unfortunately their report did not deal with the actual facts as they were envisaged by the Supreme Council. The military experts in that report contemplated two very different questions. First, it was necessary to occupy Thrace, Smyrna, Armenia, the Straits, Northern Syria and Mesopotamia. To occupy these districts the experts said that nineteen divisions were necessary. They further stated that the actual occupation of these different regions would not be sufficient. They would also have to organise a police force on a large scale. Further, in order to carry out the disarmament contemplated by the treaty, and in order to safeguard minorities, large additional forces would be required; that is to say, a further eight divisions would be necessary, to be concentrated west of the Haidar Pasha-Alexandretta Railway. The military experts thought that altogether a minimum of twenty-seven divisions would be necessary, of which only nineteen were at present available. M. Veniselos had informed them that he could supply an additional three divisions, which brought the total number of divisions available up to twenty-two. The question he wished to put to the council was how were they to fill the gap of five divisions.

MR LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that four divisions were required for Armenia. If Armenia were omitted, only twenty-three would be required, and the gap referred to by M. Millerand would be one division. That

morning they had discussed the question of finding equipment for 40,000 Armenians, who should be able to fight their own battles in the same way that the Greeks had done. Hitherto other nations had fought on behalf of the Armenians. It had been suggested that the Armenians should be armed and should be given a chance of acting for themselves. If they were not in a position to defend their own frontiers, then he thought that there was no use for a nation of that kind in the world, and not one of the Allied Governments, in those circumstances, would be prepared to assist them to the extent of even a single battalion. That had been the opinion held by the council at their meeting that morning, when they had decided that they should ask the military experts what amount of arms and equipment they could send to Armenia.

M. MILLERAND said that personally he would be quite prepared to accept the solution suggested by Mr. Lloyd George. He was perfectly ready to assist the Armenians in the way proposed, with arms, and to endeavour to put them in a position to defend themselves. He thought that the Armenians should be warned accordingly. Boghos Nubar Pasha had been of opinion that there were some 30,000 effective soldiers in Armenia, but he thought the Pasha was somewhat of an optimist. The military experts had stated that a division contained roughly about 15,000 men. He agreed that Armenia might be asked to supply two divisions, or a total of some 30,000 effectives, but that would still leave the Allied Governments two divisions short of the total forces estimated as necessary by the military experts. He would ask, however, the experts' views as to the actual value of the Armenian troops, and if the experts thought that the Armenians could really supply 30,000 effectives, and if those effectives could be relied upon to defend their country?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that of course these troops would be organised under European leadership.

M. VENISELOS said that he had only just had an opportunity of reading the report of Marshal Foch's committee (A.J. 161). The military and naval experts, at their meeting at Versailles, had contemplated two possibilities: first, the immediate and simultaneous occupation by the Allied forces of the various strategical points in Turkey; and, second, the immediate execution of the treaty. The experts had frankly preferred the second alternative, for, if these strategical areas were to be occupied by the Allied troops an extra eight divisions would be required, making a total of twenty-seven. The experts then said that their programme contemplated, with the force at their disposal—

- (i) The reinforcement of the occupied territories.
- (ii) Taking possession of territories to be ceded by Turkey in Europe.

## (iii) Taking possession of the lines of communication in Asia Minor.

What if the government in Constantinople could not dispose of the "TURKS"?

The point was, how could the Allied forces that were available best be disposed? If they were to go into Armenia, and also to disarm the Turks in the interior, and, further, to protect minorities, enormous forces would be required. As regards Armenia, he agreed that if they were given instructors, equipment and munitions, they might be able to produce two divisions in three or four months. As regards the question of the disarmament of Turkey, he would reiterate that this, in his opinion, was the concern of whatever Government was established at Constantinople, and would accept the terms of the treaty. As regards the protection of minorities, he had never contemplated sending troops to the regions concerned in order to remain there in occupation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this, of course, was quite impossible.

M. VENISELOS, continuing, said he thought the troops that the Allied Governments could dispose of would suffice for the purposes contemplated, except so far as the protection of Armenia, the safeguarding of minorities and disarmament were concerned. These, he submitted, were questions for the Turkish Government at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that M. Veniselos proposed what was really the progressive realisation of the treaty, so far as our forces permitted. As regards Armenia, M. Veniselos said: 'Provide arms to this warlike people, give them munitions and equipment, instruct them in the use of arms and bid them maintain their own borders.' What he himself, however, would ask the Supreme Council to consider was, what were the frontiers which were to be inserted the treaty? If the Allies designated in the treaty certain frontiers, they must, he thought, assume responsibility for the integrity of those frontiers. The Armenian Frontier Commission, which had met in London (he himself had not been a member of it), had contemplated handing over Erzerum to Armenia, as this very powerful fortress, if left in the hands of the Turks, would constitute a perpetual [*sic*] menace to the safety of Armenia. Again, pressure had been brought to bear upon the Allies to give Armenia access to the sea, more particularly at Trebizond. Further, it was proposed to carry the border of Armenia down to Lake Van, which would include a big stretch of country where the Armenians were in a minority, and which was occupied by Turkish troops. He himself thought that it would be long before Armenia and her new army would be able to maintain themselves without external support. The Allied Governments had agreed that they could not send troops to Armenia. Were they then to retain in the treaty the boundaries they had contemplated, or should these boundaries undergo some modification? This, he thought, was a vital question, and ought to be settled at once. It was indeed, a question, not of generalities, but of concrete fact.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired as to the fighting value of the Armenian troops.

M. BERTHELOT said that many of them had many martial qualities, and had fought well against Georgia.

LORD CURZON said that he would ask Marshal Foch the following question: Supposing the Allies trusted the Armenians to raise their own forces in order to defend their frontiers, and if the Allies agreed that they were not in a position to send any troops to reinforce the Armenians, and if the Allied Governments still adhered to the boundaries as at present contemplated, what military forces did Marshal Foch think that Mustafa Kemal could dispose, and would the Turks, in the Marshal's opinion, be able to invade Russian Armenia?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the initial difficulty facing the Armenians was the formation of a new army which should be sufficiently strong to maintain the Armenian frontiers if attacked by the Turks. The Allies might send arms and equipment to the Armenians, but would they be able successfully to oppose *Mustafa Kemal*? Further, supposing they drove off an attack, would they be able to follow up their success?

LORD CURZON said that the question he had put was, would the Turkish troops be in sufficient force to enable them to attack and injure the new Armenian State existing near Erivan?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Turks had in that neighbourhood the elements of about four divisions of Nationalist troops, each division containing some 3,000 to 4,000 fighting men. The Turks, therefore, could dispose of about four divisions confronting the Armenians. To this number must be added a certain proportion of the Turkish gendarmerie, which totalled, for the whole Turkish Empire, some 40,000 effectives. He could not say how many of these gendarmerie could be utilised by *Mustafa Kemal*.

SIGNOR NITTI said that there was no doubt that Armenia was in a very difficult position. Also, the Russians (Tartars) might move southwards, and it was possible that the Georgians also might seize the opportunity to attack. The Armenians, therefore, had to consider the possibility of defending their frontiers against the Georgians, the Tartars, the Russians and the Turks.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he could see no possibility of sending Allied help to Armenia. Moreover, it would be exceedingly difficult for her to constitute the new State and to build up an army, surrounded, as she was, by hostile elements.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the Allied navies could do, not at Constantinople, but near Trebizond and other ports.

ADMIRAL BEATTY stated that the navy could act as had been contemplated in Marshal Foch's report; that is to say, they could take possession

of certain islands and also dominate certain towns on the Black Sea and the Turkish coast. These ports could be practically dominated by the navy with the aid of military forces, and they could provide rallying points for the Christian populations by which they might be enabled to escape if necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether a military force was actually necessary in each case.

ADMIRAL BEATTY said that it was not essential, but its co-operation was desirable.

SIGNOR NITTI thanked the military and naval experts for their attendance, and asked that they would now withdraw.

(At this point the naval and military experts left the Council Chamber.)

M. VENISELOS asked permission of the Supreme Council to remain in the Council Chamber as he had certain points that he desired to raise.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought that the military experts were quite right in pointing out the difficulties which confronted the Allied Governments and insisting on sufficient forces being available in order to impose the terms of the treaty. He, himself, however, did not think that their difficulties were as great as appeared in Marshal Foch's report. The Allied forces were already in occupation at Constantinople, in Syria, in Palestine, on the Straits and—he assumed—in Cilicia. He also understood that the Italians were in Southern Anatolia.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the Italian forces were only disposed along the coast.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proceeding said that there were considerable Greek forces at Smyrna. There were therefore only two places where the Allies were weak, and these were, Armenia and Thrace. Marshal Foch had stated that he was not anxious about Thrace as it was cut off from the Turkish population proper and also from their military equipping stations. They could not, therefore, put up any fight in that region. There remained only Armenia. Marshal Foch had stated that the Allies could not protect the minorities in Turkey without an overwhelming display of military force. He, himself, doubted whether the Allies could ever really protect minorities from marauding bands which it was impossible to pursue into the interior. Further any display of force would only have the effect of scattering the existing Turkish forces over the country. The danger of massacres arose from irresponsible banditti which did not recognise the Turkish Government. There were two methods of protecting Armenia. First, to officer, equip and train a new Armenian army, and then let Armenia demonstrate her right to exist. The Armenians were said to have

fought well, so probably they ought in due course to be able to defend themselves. The Supreme Council were proceeding on the assumption that the United States would lend no assistance in the case of Armenia. He thought, however, that the Allies ought to put the Washington Government in a position in which she must either agree to assist or refuse; and he suggested that this alternative should be submitted to her. Just before the meeting he had spoken to Marshal Foch on the subject and the marshal had expressed himself as strongly in favour of his suggestion. He proposed, therefore, that the United States should be informed that the Allied Powers had now an impossible burden on their shoulders; and they consequently appealed to the United States to take a share of that burden, and to send two or three divisions to assist in constituting an Armenian State. If the United States refused, let their refusal be definitely placed on record. The request that the United States should participate was an entirely reasonable one. There was no question of the Allies shirking their burden, but they had too many commitments already.

LORD CURZON asked if he might be permitted to supplement what Mr. Lloyd George had said. He, himself, felt it was very important that the request for American assistance should come from the Supreme Council. The only other body which could submit such a request was the League of Nations, but the Washington Government had just refused to ratify that part of the treaty which dealt with the League of Nations. There was another point; Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that the appeal to the United States might either form part of the note which was about to be sent to them or that it should form a separate communication. He, himself, thought that the appeal might be embodied in the note which the council was about to issue, as he felt it would make it more difficult for the United States to be captious about the remainder of the note. He suggested, therefore, that they should either revise the note they were to send in reply to the President's last communication, or that an additional paragraph should be added. Again, he would suggest that the United States should be invited to accept a mandate for Armenia. This offer had never yet been made to the United States, and so far, she had been given no opportunity either of accepting or refusing a mandate. He thought that America might be asked to help in two ways, and that the Allies should submit to her (a) the military case, and (b) the financial case. He was informed that America could easily raise 10,000 men or more, and that she would equally give 4 to 5 million sterling, either as a Government contribution, or by private subscription. To conclude, he suggested that the whole case should be put before the American Government and that that Government should be asked to render the utmost assistance in their power.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that the question of a mandate for Armenia had never yet been put to the American Government. Armenia had always been a centre upon which the United States had concentrated her sympathy, but it had been recently stated in private and in public that America was no longer concerned in European questions. In the circumstances, he would ask whether the Supreme Council thought the United States could be invited to accept a mandate for Armenia? His own view was that she would almost certainly give a negative reply. Mr. Lloyd George submitted with great force that it might be put to the Washington Government; was it possible that the United States which had always evinced a most sympathetic interest in Armenia had no longer any interest in that unhappy country? Lord Curzon had stated that there were two questions, the financial and the military. He, himself, would rather say that there was only one question, as that question dominated all the rest. This question was the financial aspect of the situation. If it was a matter of raising several thousands of men, he did not think there would be much difficulty about this. After every war there was always a large number of men who were accustomed to arms and military life, who were fond of adventure and who would be quite prepared to enlist so long as they got good and regular pay. There was, therefore, no doubt that officers and men could be raised without any difficulty. This was a good basis upon which to proceed. It was, therefore, mainly a question of money. It was most probable that the United States would find it most difficult to refuse the appeal of the Allies if the latter said that so long as America would find the money, the Allies would find the men. Further, it might be pointed out to the United States that they were in a much more favourable position from the financial point of view than any of the Allies. On the whole, he thought that the suggestion put forward by Mr. Lloyd George offered the best chance of a satisfactory solution. They had, as it had been said, an excellent basis: there was a young and virile republic in Armenia already in being. It only remained to supply her with officers and equipment and to find the necessary money.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that any proposal submitted in too definite a form would only elicit a refusal. In his opinion, the projected letter to President Wilson must be limited to the formula which had been adopted by the Supreme Council the previous day. He understood that the United States had recently sent a commission to Armenia to enquire into the conditions existing there, and that that commission had strongly recommended that America should not accept any mandate.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that so far as the commission referred to by M. Nitti was concerned, there had been no question of a mandate.



SIGNOR NITTI, continuing, said that if the Allies asked the United States to share in the work of reconstructing Armenia, they might give the impression to America that the Allies were unable, unsupported, to enforce the terms of the treaty. He thought, therefore, it was better that the Allies should limit themselves to the formula which had been agreed upon the previous day. They might make a general appeal on the humanitarian and moral side, but he did not think that they could count on any response to any appeal of a special and definite character.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not concerned with the moral aspect, but he did wish to obtain material help from the United States. He could not see that there was any harm in making an appeal of this nature. If America refused to assist, the Allies would be no worse off, and, in one respect, they would be better off. President Wilson would continue to lecture the Allies about the way they were handling the Turkish question, but if the Allies could retort that they had asked America to come in and assist, and that America had refused, the United States could not continue to complain of the inability of the Allies to protect Armenia. He had reason to believe that Canada might intervene, but she would certainly not take this step until the United States had definitely refused to assist. He suggested that a draft appeal should be prepared and should be submitted to the council in the course of the next day or so, and that the appeal should take the form of asking the United States to assist Armenia to defend herself and to enable her to clear out the Turks from the larger Armenia, for the constitution of which President Wilson himself had asked.

M. BERTHELOT enquired whether this appeal should be embodied in the note which had been accepted the previous day by the Supreme Council, or whether it should form a new note?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this might be decided when the draft was before the council. On the one hand, a very long note would not concentrate upon Armenia the attention which they desired to attract, while a separate note might focus upon Armenia the attention of the American public. It was very important, he thought, that the whole case about Armenia should be given the fullest publicity.

It was agreed—

That the British delegation should prepare a draft appeal to the United States to come forward and assist Armenia on the lines suggested in the foregoing discussion; and that the question whether the appeal should be embodied in the note approved by the council on the previous day, or whether it should form a separate communication, should be decided when the draft was before the council.

2. M. VENISELOS asked permission to refer to Part III of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, 'Political Clauses: Section 2, Straits', articles 1, 3 and 12. In article 1 it was stated, 'these waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations'. Article 3 states, 'the authority of the commission will extend to all waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters within 3 miles of each of these mouths.' Article 12 stated, 'in order to facilitate the execution of the duties with which it is entrusted by this section, the commission shall have power to organise such a force of local police as may be necessary. This force shall be drawn so far as possible from the native population of the zone of the Straits defined in article 28, and shall be commanded by foreign police officers appointed by the commission.' The position taken up by the Powers, as evidenced in the articles he had quoted, was entirely logical, but in article 12 there was an allusion to article 28 of the military clauses, which laid down that the islands should be demilitarised, and should be under the control of the High Commission. He agreed that it was quite right that the commission should exercise the control of the police in the zone of the Straits, but he wished to enquire whether the Supreme Council intended to apply in the case of the islands the control in the construction of the roads, railways and police. No doubt it was the intention of the Allied Powers to have authority to establish, if necessary, a military base on those islands, but, he submitted, it was surely not the intention that any impediment should be placed in the way of the construction of roads and railways. If he could meet the Straits Commission on the subject, he was quite sure that he could easily persuade them to see his point. What he desired to ask was whether, in case of necessity, Greece might be permitted to send troops to Thrace by way of the Sea of Marmora?—as it was possible that she might be precluded from doing this by land; by Bulgaria.

SIGNOR NITTI suggested that M. Veniselos should submit his point in writing to the Straits Commission.

LORD CURZON thought that M. Veniselos was quite right to have asked to be heard by the Straits Commission, whose members were at present in San Remo, and who were, really, alone competent to consider and decide these questions.

M. VENISELOS said that if only he could put his point before the commission he was quite certain it could put things right. He would also be

glad to have an opportunity of submitting to the commission various other questions on the Straits and Sea of Marmora.

It was agreed—

That M. Veniselos should submit in writing to the Straits Commission the points he had raised at the Supreme Council.

3. M. VENISELOS said that he would seek further permission from the Supreme Council to refer to that part of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. He submitted that if the system of State purchase of property of men transferred from one country to another were applied in the case of Turkey and Greece, where millions of men were concerned, the cost would run into millions of money. Turkey was in the habit of carrying her populations with her. If, in consequence of the treaty, the whole of the Turkish populations emigrated, Greece could never find sufficient money to provide compensation. He begged, therefore, that the second part of the article of the treaty dealing with this question might be struck out. He had consulted M. Kammerer, who is the president of the Minorities Commission, on this question, and M. Kammerer had suggested to him that he should submit his point in writing to the secretariat of the Minorities Commission. This he had done.

M. KAMMERER said that the Minorities Commission, of which he was president, had intended that the text as drafted by them should apply only to the populations in Europe, and not to those in Turkey in Asia. He, therefore, personally agreed that the second part of the clause relating to this question should be suppressed.

MR. VANSITTART said that the intention of the British delegation was that every endeavour should be made to encourage inter-emigration as far as possible. He did not share M. Veniselos's fear that this emigration would be as rapid or on so large a scale as M. Veniselos apparently contemplated. He, himself, thought that the right remedy to apply would be to retard the process by limiting the period of time in which compensation would be paid.

SIGNOR NITTI suggested that the Minorities Commission should examine the question.

M. VENISELOS pointed out that the president of the Minorities Commission had already expressed himself in favour of his own point of view.

It was agreed—

That the Minorities Commission should assemble at the earliest possible date and consider the point raised by M. Veniselos and also the objections as submitted by the British representative of the said commission.

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 54-65, No. 7*

No. 19

*Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 21st. April, 1920  
(Received May 8)

*No. 563/S. 2907*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch dated the 4th. April, No. 473/S. 2907, transmitting copy of a collective note dated the 27th. March, addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Turkish Government, consequent on a report received to the effect that Moustafa Kemal had ordered the Belikessir Branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank not to send any funds to Constantinople or elsewhere without his authority, I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information copy of a note, dated the 12th. April, which I have received from the Italian High Commissioner, enclosing a translation of a telegram which he has received from Rhodes, stating that Moustafa Kemal has announced that he has taken control of the Ottoman Public Debt, Régie des Tabacs and the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5241/E 4400*

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 19

*Haut Commissaire d'Italie aux Haut Commissaires de France et de Grande Bretagne à Constantinople.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 12 Avril 1920

*No. 5020*

Le Haut Commissaire Italien a l'honneur de communiquer à ses collègues la traduction ci-jointe d'un télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir du Commandant des troupes italiennes à Rhodes.

LE HAUT COMMISSAIRE  
(S) MAISSA

## ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 19

*Commandant Italien à Rhodes à M. le Haut Commissaire à Constantinople.*

*Rhodes, 10 Avril 1920*

*Télégramme*

Moustafa Kemal a donné l'ordre que la Défense nationale prenne le contrôle de la Dette publique Ottomane, de la Régie des tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman et des succursales de la Banque Ottomane.

FO. 371/5241/E 4400

No. 20

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 22, 1920*  
(*Received May 8.*)

(No. 575.)

My Lord,

I PROPOSE in the present despatch to take up the connected narrative of the main developments of the political situation in Turkey from the point to which I brought it by my despatch No. 226 of the 13th February.

2. The despatch just quoted recorded the importation into Ali Rıza Pasha's Cabinet of elements which gave the Central Government a more definitely Nationalist character than it had had before, without making it so openly Nationalist as to involve a break with the Allied representatives here. Ali Rıza Pasha himself did not long survive this reconstruction. He resigned suddenly on the 3rd March for reasons which have never been fully disclosed. The bad news from Cilicia was at that moment becoming generally known in Constantinople, and there were strong rumours of an important Greek advance in the Smyrna area. These may have been factors in deciding the Grand Vizier to retire, but his resignation was probably fundamentally due to the increasing difficulty of serving two masters, namely, Mustafa Kemal and the Allied High Commissioners, whose demands for satisfaction in connection with specific incidents tended ever to multiply.

3. Ali Rıza Pasha himself, while refraining from any pronouncement as to the immediate reasons for his retirement, made no secret in private conversation of the embarrassments in which the uncompromising attitude of the Nationalist leaders had involved him. They had, he said, kept him in

office only because it suited them to do so rather than risk the advent to power of an anti-Nationalist Cabinet, but they had no real desire to make his task easy. Certain Nationalist journalists on the other hand sought to represent Ali Rıza Pasha to the public as a Minister who had resigned because he found himself in a situation in which no honourable man would do otherwise. This situation, their leaders were left to infer, was created by the Allies.

4. The crisis lasted some days. Its logical outcome would have been the constitution of a definitely Nationalist Cabinet. Logic, however, has little to do with the complicated interplay of Turkish domestic politics, and amusement rather than surprise greeted the accession to power on the 8th March of a Government practically identical with its predecessor, except that Salih Pasha replaced Ali Rıza Pasha as Grand Vizier.

5. In the improbable event of Salih Pasha's name being handed down to posterity, it will be as that of one of the most luckless Grand Viziers in Turkish history. He is a man of no strength of character or ability, and he had the misfortune to take office at a moment when compromise was no longer possible. The only singular feature of his tenure of office was that he succeeded in clinging to it for a fortnight after the occupation of Constantinople on the 16th March. That he did so was due to the unwillingness of the Nationalist leaders to take up the challenge of the Allies in Constantinople before they had had time to rally their supporters in the interior, and to the unwillingness of the High Commissioners to take any action expressly aimed at compassing Salih Pasha's fall. The Allied High Commissioners felt that the logic of the situation could no longer be ignored and that Salih Pasha must be succeeded either by a declared Nationalist or by a declared anti-Nationalist. The first alternative presented no advantages. The second presented the disadvantage that it was certain to produce a rupture between Constantinople and the provinces, and any advantages it might otherwise have offered seemed likely to be nullified by the impossibility of holding out to any Government, however disposed to work with the Allies, the prospect of a peace tolerable in the eyes of even moderate Turks.

6. Nevertheless, it was the Allied High Commissioners who dealt Salih Pasha the *coup de grâce*. The intimation of the occupation of Constantinople had been accompanied by a demand for the disavowal of Mustafa Kemal and the other Nationalist leaders. I need not recapitulate here the history of the "disavowal incident", which was fully given in my telegrams Nos. 309 and 328 of the 30th March and the 3rd April, and my despatch No. 463 of the 3rd April. It is enough to say that the Government were ready to go far in the direction of a paper disavowal but were not prepared to

omit a phrase implying that the national movement was in principle justified by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and that only its excesses were condemned. The Allied High Commissioners insisted on a categorical and unqualified disavowal and the Government resigned on the 2nd April.

7. During the period between the occupation of Constantinople and Salih Pasha's resignation, the political opponents of the Nationalists had been straining every nerve using every artifice to drive the Grand Vizier from power, and to bring Damad Ferid Pasha back. These efforts were defeated by the tenacity of Salih Pasha, the hesitancy of the Sultan, the difficulty of arranging on what basis a Ferid Cabinet should be constructed, and perhaps by some reluctance on the part of Ferid Pasha himself to assume office without some prospect of being able to obtain a mitigation of the peace terms. On this last point he was left no ground for illusion, for at an interview of the 1st April a member of my staff impressed on him most strongly that no change in the Government could be expected to alter the general lines of the peace, and that the most any Grand Vizier could hope for was to avert developments which might make the treaty even more severe. Reshid Bey, the only other statesman of definitely anti-Nationalist complexion who was in the running for the Grand Vizierate in the expected event of Salih Pasha's fall, had been similarly warned, though in his case the French displayed some anxiety not to discourage him completely.

8. The fall of Salih Pasha owing to causes independent of the internal political intrigues against him ended any hesitation which Ferid Pasha may have felt. He assumed office on the 5th April, but he included Reshid Bey in his combination as Minister of the Interior, and he filled the other posts with men unconnected with any political party, most of them being men distinguished in their professions and little known outside them. It was, in fact, another of those politically neutral Cabinets so dear to the Palace and to all conservative elements here, but it came in with a very definite programme of combatting the national movement by every possible means.

9. The means available were of three kinds, viz, moral influence, physical force, and the purging of public offices in Constantinople, with other measures of a similar kind, such as the dissolution of Parliament. All these have been tried concurrently from the 5th April up to the date of writing.

10. Moral influence was brought to bear by the vigorous condemnation of the national movement in the Imperial decree appointing Ferid Pasha, the Government's declaration, and the fetvas of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, coupled with a promise of pardon to such of the rank and file as should

submit within a week. I sent home the text of these documents in my despatches Nos. 494 of the 9th April \* and No. 542 of the 17th April. Especial importance attaches to the fetvas, owing to the reverence in which such pronouncements are held by the bulk of the Moslem population. The efficacy both of the fetvas and the other pronouncements is, however, impaired by the difficulty of circulating them in the interior and by the possibility of their being countered by rival pronouncements, including fetvas of other ecclesiastical luminaries, representing the Sultan-Caliph as being in duress and incapable of lawfully exercising his functions.

11. Something has also been attempted in the way of persuading individual adherents of the movement of the interior to reconsider their attitude.

12. It is too soon to estimate the effect produced by the methods described in the two preceding paragraphs. Reports reach Constantinople of messages of loyalty from Bafra and Trebizond. One concrete result has been the arrival in Constantinople on the 21st April of Colonel Djaffer Tayyar Bey, of Adrianople, the author of the *rodomontade* reported in my telegram No. 245 of the 17th March. It looks as if this officer had not found the support he hoped for either in Thrace itself or outside, and had elected to retire, with the credit of having submitted to the Sultan, from a position which did not answer his expectations. These signs of weakening on the part of the national movement must not be exaggerated. Djaffer Tayyar may live to fight another day, and in any case the broad fact remains that

\* Bu yazıyla Amiral de Robeck, Damat Ferit Paşa'nın Sadrazamlığa atanmasıyla ilgili şu Hattı Hümayunu Lord Curzon'a göndermiştir :

*Turkish Text of Imperial Rescript on April 5, 1920, appointing Ferid Pasha Grand Vizier.*  
(Translation)

My Illustrious Vezier, Ferid Pasha,

In consequence of the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha, we have, in view of your evident abilities and merit, confided to you the Grand Vezierate, and to Durri Zade Abdullah Bey the Sheikh-ul-Islamate.

The new Cabinet, formed by you in accordance with article 27 of the Constitution, has been approved by us.

The disturbances, fomented under the name of "nationalism", have placed in a grave position our political situation which, since the conclusion of the armistice, had gradually approached a satisfactory point; and the corrective measures attempted up to the present to counteract this have remained without result.

As, in view of the events which have recently occurred, a continuance of this state of rebellion may possibly give rise to a still more serious situation (which God forbid!), it is our firm desire that the prescriptions of the law be applied against those known persons who have organised and encouraged these disturbances (...)

May God crown your efforts with success.

(F.O. 406/43, p. 319-320, No. 193/1)



the first effect of Ferid Pasha's advent to power was what the High Commissioners had anticipated. The provinces have ceased to regard the authority of the Central Government, and all telegraphic communication between them and Constantinople is cut off. The regular troops in the interior are practically all, so far as is known, committed to the national movement. The Nationalist leaders control the situation in Anatolia, and they still, unless Djaffer Tayyar's withdrawal makes a change, control the situation in Thrace.

13. I turn to Damad Ferid Pasha's second means of action, namely, physical force. He cannot count on regular troops anywhere outside Constantinople. There had, however, been growing up during the earlier part of the period under review an anti-Nationalist movement in the region between Panderma and Balikesser under the leadership of one Ahmed Anzavour, a Circassian, who had previously had some local success against the Nationalists in the same area, but who had apparently collapsed. Anzavour has a considerable following of Circassians, who are numerous in that district, and he had support from anti-Nationalist elements in Constantinople, including, according to some accounts, the Sultan himself. Anyhow, when Ferid Pasha returned to power, his movement had revived sufficiently to be the one definite force opposed to the Nationalists, and it was an essential feature of the new Grand Vizier's programme to utilise this force and to develop any similar embryo forces elsewhere. Anzavour was legitimised by being made a Pasha and an officer of the Central Government, and in due course he occupied Panderma. Unfortunately his success has been shortlived. Within the past few days he has been driven from Panderma, and by all accounts the Nationalists have assembled such forces against him as to make it doubtful whether he can recover himself. This setback deprives the Government of any immediate hope of securing Broussa or the Anatolian railway beyond Ismid, and diminishes the probability of their being able to utilise the germs of other anti-Nationalist movements in the Yalova and Ismid districts.

14. Ferid Pasha's chances of fostering anti-Nationalist movements in more remote areas, where he had counted on them to some extent, such as the north coast of Asia Minor, the Bozkır region south of Konia, and the Kurdish frontier, are obviously very problematical.

15. The Government have in the meanwhile proceeded with their third means of action, viz., the purging of public offices. Four of the high officials in the Sultan's immediate entourage, who were supposed to exercise an evil influence, have been removed. Considerable changes of personnel have been effected in the Ministry of War and other departments, including the appointment of new permanent Under-Secretaries of State

in the most important. In order to establish more direct control at the Ministry of War the dilatoriness of which in furnishing supplies for Anzavur is said to be one of the main causes of that leader's defeat. Ferid Pasha himself took charge as Acting Minister on the 21st April.

16. On the 12th April Ferid Pasha dissolved Parliament, which had already gone on strike as reported in my despatch No. 408 of the 25th March, and thus freed himself of a Chamber consisting almost entirely of nominees of the Nationalist leaders.

17. Such has been the evolution of the present situation in Turkey. It remains to consider that situation in relation to the Allies.

18. The occupation of Constantinople marked the culmination of a series of developments, which, as I have insisted in earlier despatches, rendered a conflict inevitable between the Allies and the Turkish national movement. The culmination might have been deferred until the announcement of the Turkish peace terms, had it not been for various incidents of which the most notable were the troubles in Cilicia. These incidents precipitated strong action on the part of the Allies, designed to strengthen their own position where it could alone be made really strong, and to serve as a warning to the Nationalists. The warning was not wasted, but it naturally did not suffice to kill national movement. The inevitable result ensued in the shape of a rupture between Constantinople, where the Allies were strong, and Anatolia, where the national movement was, if not absolutely strong, at least the only effective force.

19. No Government could stand in Constantinople in open opposition to the Allies and after the occupation no Government could long go on hedging. This brought Ferid Pasha back to power, and brought him back in conditions which made no other course possible for the Allies than to back him in his efforts to repress the national movement. This policy is now being pursued on the lines indicated in my telegram No. 372 of the 11th April. It would be useless, however, to attempt to disguise the fact that Ferid Pasha's first endeavour to repress the movement has met with so severe a rebuff as to make the chances of ultimate success doubtful in the interior, or the still more important fact that he lacks the one thing which would really justify his anti-Nationalist policy, namely, the ability to hold out to his countrymen any hope of a peace which would leave Turkey in possession of Smyrna, Thrace, and a good part of the eastern provinces of Asia Minor.

20. I crave your Lordship's pardon if I appear to dwell too often and too constantly on the probable effects of a drastic peace. The insuccess of Ferid Pasha's efforts so far to resist the national movement by native means makes it all the more certain that such a peace can only be imposed

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✓ by armed force, and that that force must be supplied and wielded by the Allies. The present situation in Cilicia affords proof how unwise and how wickedly unjust to the Christians of Asia Minor it would be to engage in the enterprise without adequate forces or without a settled determination to see the thing through to a finish. Past experience in the Smyrna area shows on the other hand how dangerous it would be to entrust the task of imposing the Peace terms to the Greek army. I can only hope that the Powers of Western Europe, having apparently decided irrevocably to impose this drastic peace, will provide for its execution in such a manner as to ensure success, and to secure their object with a minimum of bloodshed, and above all with a minimum of danger to the lives of non-combatants of every creed and race, not to mention that material havoc and devastation which can only help to render illusory any reparation clauses that the treaty itself may contain. ✓

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

4060./43, p. 337-340, No. 213

No. 21

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 23, 1920  
(Received April 23.)

(No. 429.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

My telegram No. 420 of 20th April.

Latest information that Anzavour has retired to Guenen, followed by considerable Nationalist forces, and is awaiting arrival of munitions, &c., which must now be sent to Kara Bigha.

I submit that Nationalist threat to Dardanelles, which this retirement entails, must not be overlooked.

Grand Vizier stated, on 21st April, that Anzavour force was unbroken, and does not appear to despair of success of policy of combating Nationalists by means of countermove in areas where moral suasion will be available.

Moral suasion seems to have succeeded in case of Jaffar Tayar (see my telegram No. 245 of 17th March), who returned to Constantinople yesterday. His abandonment of extreme attitude appears to have been

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✓

✓ due to exhortations of French officers at Adrianople, coupled probably with consciousness that his appeal to Nationalist sentiment in Thrace had not as much success as he hoped.

At interview with Grand Vizier on 22nd April, Jaffar Tayar seemed submissive, but I hear he says the one thing Thrace will not tolerate is Greek occupation.

It is too soon to say whether Anzavour's move is broken past repair, or what success, if any, moral suasion will have in Anatolia. Following points are, however, clear:—

1. Anzavour has suffered severe defeat in serious conflict with Nationalists, and cannot therefore be relied on as counterpoise to their efforts, even if he recovers himself at all.

2. Other movements on same lines as Anzavour's are too inchoate to be counted on for purposes of effective resistance to Nationalists in near future\*.

3. Announcement of drastic peace terms must inevitably detract still more from effectiveness of anti-Nationalists, many of whom will be thrown into sympathy, if not active co-operation, with Nationalists.

Allies must therefore rely on their own resources to enforce drastic peace, and it is desirable, from political as distinct from military point of view, that Western Powers should be prepared to undertake the task with their own forces. Use of Greek army for enforcement of peace terms in Thrace and Anatolia will involve grave danger of general massacres of civil population, Christians and Moslems alike, and devastation of the country-side.

*FO. 406/43, p. 320, No. 194*

\* Amiral Webb 29.4.1920 günlü, 513 sayılı telgrafıyla Lord Curzon'a şunları yazar: "Military situation up to 27th instant, as stated by Grand Vizier in conversation with me, was as follows:—

1. Loyal Government and volunteers had been obtained control over a considerable area of country eastward of Gulf of Ismid. Following places were occupied by them: Adabazar, Duzjé, Bolu, Gerece, Zafaranbolu, Beybazar, Mudurlu. Government troops were moving on Narluhan.

2. Government wishes to extend its hold southwards along Anatolian Railway, but its troops had not advanced in this direction further than Geive.

3. Telegraphic communications have been restored between Constantinople and Adrianople, and Grand Vizier to-day, 29th, appears to think that Government's control of Thrace was in process of being satisfactorily reestablished."

*(F.O. 406/43, p. 333, No. 203)*

No. 22

*Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, 23rd April, 1920  
(Received May 20)

No. 585/M/2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports received from the Constantinople Branch of the M.I.I.C., for the week ended 15th April, 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5167/E. 5039

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 22

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch, for the Week Ending 15th April, 1920.*

Secret.

## 1. THE CABINET.

Any doubt that may have existed regarding the intention of FERID Pasha's Cabinet to use a strong hand in dealing with the Nationalists was dispelled by the reply made by the Grand Vizier to a delegation of the ENTENTE LIBERALE Party, which visited him on the 6th inst., in the course of which he stated that he had returned to power to reconstruct a ruined Empire. His only fear was lest the delegation, whose members had recommended to him action of a violent nature, might in the future accuse him of acting in a tyrannical manner.

FERID Pasha's words were soon translated into action. The measures adopted by the Cabinet include the issue of a Fetwah declaring MUSTAFA KEMAL and his associates rebels against the authority of the Caliph, and enjoining on all Moslems the duty for obeying the call of the Caliph to take action against the Nationalists. Simultaneously with the publication of this Fetwah by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Government issued a statement of their intentions which amounted in substance to a declaration that they were prepared to carry out the orders of the Imperial Rescript appointing FERID Pasha Grand Vizier, to which reference was made in a previous Summary.

The Chamber of Deputies was closed on the 12th inst. MUSTAFA NATIK Pasha, newly appointed Governor of CONSTANTINOPLE presented himself at the Chamber of Deputies and handed to the Vice-President the Imperial Iradeh ordering the dissolution of the Chamber under Article 7 of the Constitution. Only fifteen deputies were present at the moment in the Chamber, which was closed by the Police Authorities, the doors being subsequently sealed.

Measures against the Nationalists appear to be led by AHMED AN-ZAVUR who has been appointed MIRMIRAN — equivalent to Brigadier General — and nominated to the Governorship of a Province. He thus becomes an official instead of an irresponsible leader of a band.

It is stated in Sublime Porte circles that a commission of Ministers has been appointed to prepare the draft of an order for the formation of a fresh Court Martial to try certain Unionists. Foremost amongst those whom it is intended to bring to justice is MARSHAL FUAD Pasha, who, it will be recollected, presented to the Sultan a memorandum from the Nationalists praying for the dismissal of FERID Pasha. It is also understood that the Cabinet plans include the confiscation of the fortunes of war profiteers.

The Ministry of the Interior contemplates radical changes in the personnel of the Police Force. These are believed to include the replacement of NURREDDIN Bey, present Chief of Police and the discharge of a number of commissaires. In view of reports which have been circulated by this office implicating the Police, in Nationalist plans for causing disturbances in the town, this measure may be considered a very salutary one.

*Reports 778, 759, 764, 768, 786.*

## 2. *THE GOVERNMENT AND BOLSHEVISM.*

The Minister of the Interior is reported to have addressed a memorandum to the Public Security Department drawing the attention of its Director to the fact that a number of persons were engaged in Bolshevik agitation in TURKEY. He directed that a special organisation should be formed for the purpose of prosecuting these persons and of "setting bounds to the evils committed by them." It should, however, be noted that Bolshevism and Nationalism are frequently synonymous terms when used by the Turkish opponents of the latter.

*Report 792.*

## 3. *THE NATIONALISTS.*

The fact that MUSTAFA KEMAL has severed communication with the capital renders the obtaining of reliable news with regard to Nationalist action in ANATOLIA somewhat difficult.

It is, however, certain that the Nationalist leader despatched a telegram from ANGORA on the 8th April to the Nationalist centres requesting them to nominate immediately their representatives at an Extraordinary Congress.

Reports have also been received to the effect that a Government has been formed at ANGORA, which is said to include SUBHI Bey as President of the Council and AHMED RUSTEM Bey as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

JELALLEDIN ARIF Bey, President of the now defunct Chamber of Deputies, is said to have been appointed President of the Nationalist Parliament into which the Congress referred to above will doubtless resolve itself.

JELALLEDIN ARIF is reported to have passed through BOLU en route for ANGORA and to have made a speech in the course of which the following sentence occurs: — "CONSTANTINOPLE has been taken from us, but we conquered it by blood and by blood we shall regain it from the treacherous English."

Prominent Nationalists whose arrival at ANGORA has been reported include HALIDE EDIB HANUM and her husband Dr. ADNAN Bey, former head of the Red Crescent Society, together with FERID Bey, a former Minister of Public Works.

Information as to Nationalist tendencies towards genuine Bolshevism is furnished by a report from ESKI SHEHIR at which town it is stated MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha arrived about 3rd April, in company with a Russian named Dr. AKIF AHMEDOF, who has not yet been identified. MUSTAFA KEMAL in the course of a speech stated the Nationalists would even obtain help from CHINA. By joining up with the Bolsheviks he considered they would be able to protect Turkish territory and ensure their independence, and stated that though ENGLAND was at present the only country in which Bolshevism had not obtained a footing, it would eventually take root even there. The source from which this report has been obtained states that propaganda on these lines is being carried on throughout ANATOLIA with the approval of the Nationalist Representative Council.

Further information has been received as to Nationalist lines of communication with the Capital. These are said to include one by sea through MUDANIA, a line which is reported to have been established by HAZIM Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior.

Various reports are current regarding the issue by the Nationalists of counter Fetwahs to that promulgated in CONSTANTINOPLE by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. According to these reports the line taken by the Nation-

alists is that of representing the Çaliph as in the hands of unbelievers and the invalidity of any orders issued by him under such circumstances. No information is at present available which would definitely establish the issue of such Fetwahs and it should be noted that the report from ESKI SHEHIR referred to above makes no mention of such issue. The reports should, therefore, be taken to indicate the probable attitude of the Nationalists with regard to the Sheikh-ul-Islam's Fetwah.

*Reports 769, 770, 776, 785, 787 790, 795.*

#### 4. NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA.

A Manifesto obviously issued from Nationalist sources was affixed to the walls of STAMBOUL in the early hours of the 14th April. It was in manuscript. Addressed to the Holy Islamic Brotherhood it declared that FERID Pasha and his colleagues had made Moslem religion an instrument for their foreign sympathies, and had sold to the British their religion and their country. It accused the Government of exciting animosity between Moslems and Moslem nations and of arousing the Circassians against the Turks in accordance with British plans. Declaring that the Government had made the Caliph an instrument in the hands of the British, it called upon all Moslems to rise, and in conformity with the Prophet's command, to come to the help of their brothers who are determined to defend the country to the last man. Very few copies of this Manifesto were seen. It is stated that four were seized by the Police and sent to the Ministry of the Interior. Suspicion has fallen on ISMAIL HAMI Bey, ex-Editor of the "MEMLEKET" and on MAZHAR Bey, former manager of the EVKAF Printing Press. Seven persons are stated to have been arrested as authors of the Manifesto.

The existence of a Nationalist Propaganda Bureau has been established. It is understood to be under the direction of Lt. HAKKI Bey.

*Reports 761, 789.*

#### 5. OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONALISTS.

The anti Nationalist movement of which AHMED ANZAVUR is the head has made considerable progress during the past week, culminating in the occupation of PANDERMA. Its repercussion has been felt at ADA BAZAR, where a popular movement is stated to have broken out on the 9th April against ESHREF Bey, the Nationalists leader, who is stated to have fled from the town with thirty of his comrades. A number of Nationalists who failed to escape were beaten and imprisoned by the populace, amongst whom the Circassians played a prominent part.



It is worthy of note that the ESHREF Bey in question is KEUSHJE ZADE ESHREF Bey of SMYRNA, who was recently released from confinement at MALTA.

According to a report from ISMİDT, the population of KANDIRA, where a Nationalist band arrived on the 5th April, refused to afford any assistance whatever to MUSTAFA KEMAL's men.

According to the statement of KECHFİ Bey, Vali of BROUSSA who has arrived at CONSTANTINOPLE, the villages of KARAJA BEY and KIRMASTI have been occupied by ANZAVUR's cavalry.

The latter has published a manifesto inviting all Circassians to join him against the Nationalists Forces.

It is stated that the Entente Libérale Party have decided to embark on active propaganda operations against the Nationalists. An office of propaganda will be created, the direction of which is believed to have been offered to KEMAL Bey, formerly Chief Inspector of Police.

*Reports 776, 791, 793, 794.*

#### 6. TURKEY AND PEACE CONDITIONS.

It is understood that the peace proposals prepared by the Cabinets of ALI RIZA and SALİH Pashas have been modified by the present Government which is prepared to grant large concessions to the Christian elements.

As regards CILICIA it is believed that the Government is willing to agree to the administration of the ADANA Vilayet remaining in French hands conditionally on its continuing to form part of the Ottoman Empire.

*Report HA/777.*

#### 7. ITALIAN VIEWS REGARDING THE NATIONALISTS.

A report has been received from an Italian source dealing with the views on the Nationalist question adopted by the chief personnel of the Italian High Commission. According to the report in question the Italian High Commissioner is pro-Nationalist in the sense that he considers the Nationalist — Unionist combination to be the strongest actually and potentially in Asiatic TURKEY. He is, however, considered to lack energy.

Colonel VITALI, the Military Attaché, appears to be the chief pro-Nationalist force. This officer is perfectly honest and his sympathy is one of conviction. He believes the majority of the Nationalists to be pure patriots but appears to be ready to accept estimates of their strength which are far too high.

Marchese DI SORAGNA, a cautious man, is at present opposed to Colonel VITALI's views on the ground that if the Nationalists are successful against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, they will certainly give no concessions, commercial or otherwise, to ITALY. He believes that on the contrary they will be most arrogant and that the cry "TURKEY for the Turks" will be readily roused.

As regards Nationalist plans, the report states that the general impression at the Italian High Commission is that the Nationalists will certainly fight to retain CONSTANTINOPLE, SMYRNA, and ADRIANOPE. It believes that they will make some surrenders to ARMENIA, but is uncertain whether they have decided to accept a French Mandate over CILICIA. It considers that outside the regions occupied or threatened by the Greeks, the Nationalists have little or no popular support.

*Report 773.*

#### 8. THE FRENCH AND TURKISH GENDARMERIE.

Agent referred to in the preceding paragraph reports that General FOULON, who has been appointed to reorganise the Turkish Gendarmerie, has been ordered by his Government:

- 1) To confine his activity to his legitimate sphere — viz. reorganisation and the prevention of abuses in the Gendarmerie and to abstain from all political activity and propaganda.
- 2) To see that no scandals occur among French officers engaged in reorganising the Gendarmerie, such as intrigues with Turkish ladies, etc.

This is interpreted as:—

- a) The result of MARASH on the French War Office.
- b) The natural annoyance of the French High Commission at seeing officers carrying on a policy and propaganda of their own quite independently of the French diplomatic and military chiefs here and at times in opposition to their declared policy.

*Report HA/771.*

#### 9. PAN-ISLAMISM.

(1) *Constantinople and the Pan-Islamic Movement.*

MUHAMMAD HILMI, a well-known Pan-Islamic Egyptian in CONSTANTINOPLE, in an interview on 6th April with an Indian officer, stated that he was proposing to leave very soon for Europe with an Italian passport, describing him as a subject of ITALY.

FO. 371/5167/E-5039

## No. 23

*Mustafa Kémal Pacha, Président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie,*  
*à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Grande Bretagne.* ✓

ANGORA, *Le 30 Avril, 1920*

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'à la suite de l'occupation injuste et injustifiée de la Ville de Constantinople par les forces alliées, la nation ottomane considérant Son Khalif et ainsi que Son Gouvernement comme prisonnier, a eu recours à la réunion d'une Assemblée Suprême Nationale et a fait des élections sur une large échelle. L'Assemblée Suprême Nationale dans sa séance d'ouverture du 23 Avril 1920, a déclaré par une vote solennelle prendre en main les destinées présentes et futures de la Patrie, tant que Son Khalif-Sultan et sa Ville Eternelle resteront sous la domination et (l') occupation étrangères.

L'Assemblée Suprême Nationale m'a fait l'honneur de me charger de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence la protestation énergique de ses membres contre cet acte arbitraire et contraire aux stipulations de l'Armistice qui a, une fois de plus, confirmé la nation ottomane dans son pessimisme sur le resultat de la Conférence (sic) de la Paix. Le parlement, sanctuaire sacré et reconnu comme tel, par toutes les nations civilisées a été violé en pleine séance; du sein de la Chambre les représentants de la nation ont été enlevés par la police anglaise comme des malfaiteurs malgré les vives protestations de la Chambre, des sénateurs, des députés, des généraux, des hommes de lettres ont été arrêtés dans leurs domiciles avec des menottes aux mains et deportés; enfin nos établis(s)ements officiels et privés furent occupés par la force des baïonnettes en se basant simplement sur le droit du plus fort.

Le peuple ottoman, vu la violation de tous ses droits et l'atteinte portée à sa souv(e)rainté a, par l'ordre de ses représentants réunis à Angora, élu un Comité Exécutif du sein même de l'Assemblée, qui a pris de suite en main le gouvernement du pays.

En soumettant à Votre Excellence ce qui précède j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer les desiderata de la nation exprimés et adoptés à la séance du 23 Avril, 1920.

1 — Constantinople siège du Khalifat-Sultanat ainsi que le gouvernement de Constantinople est considéré par la nation ottomane comme prisonnier des Alliées et par conséquent les ordres et les Fetvas émanants de Constantinople occupée, ne peuvent avoir aucune valeur légale et religieuse.

euse et tous les engagements contractés par le soi-disant gouvernement de Constantinople sont considérés par la nation comme nuls et non avenus.

2 — La nation ottomane tout en gardant son sang froid et modération est résolue à défendre ses droits sacrés et plusieurs fois séculaires comme état libre et independant, et déclare son désire pour la conclusion d'une paix équitable et honorable tout en ne reconnaissant qu'à ses propres envoyés le droit de prendre des engagements en son nom et pour son compte.

3 — L'élément chrétien ottoman ainsi que les éléments étrangers établis dans le pays, restent sous la sauvegarde de la nation; cependant ils ne doivent rien entreprendre contre la sécurité générale de la Patrie.

Dans l'espoir d'un accueil favorable aux justes réclamations de la nation ottomane, je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer l'assurance de la haute consideration avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Excellence le plus humble et dévoué serviteur\*.

Au nom de l'Assemblée Suprême Nationale  
Ottomane et par son ordre  
Le Président de l'Assemblée  
MOUSTAPHA KÉMAL.

FO. 371/5051/E. 7090

FO. 406/43, p. 402-403, No. 271/1

D.B.F.P. Ist series, Vol. XIII, p. 67, No. 58.

\* Mustafa Kemal'in kendi imzasını taşıyan bu tarihî belgenin orijinali üzerine, İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı görevlileri aşağıdaki yorumlarını not etmişlerdir:

"The High Commissioner at Constantinople in his No. 755 of May 25th (E. 6161) asked to be informed whether any copy of the Angora communication had reached the Foreign Office and, by what channel.

We can now tell him it reached Lord Curzon direct. It is dated April 30th.

D. G. Osborne  
26/6"

"It calls for little remark.

He asserts that Ottoman Christians "restent sous la sauvegarde de la nation": a sufficiently perilous position.

Tilley  
26/6"

"It is practically a proclamation of rebellion against the Sultan.

H  
C(urzon)."

Mustafa Kemal'in bu notasının bir örneği Fransa Dışişleri Bakanına da yollanmış ve bu örnek, İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğinin 25 Mayıs 1920 günlü ve 755 sayılı yazısıyla Londra'ya iletilmiştir.

No. 24

*Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, 30th April, 1920  
(Received, May 20)

No. 639/M/2279.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ended 22nd April, 1920, received from the Constantinople Branch of the M.I.I.C.,

I have, &amp;c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5167/E. 5072

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 24

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
for the Week Ending 22nd April, 1920.*

## 1. THE CABINET.

Copies of the Fetwabs and of the proclamation of the Government regarding the Nationalists were despatched to the provinces on the 15th inst. The period of grace accorded to the Nationalists in which to make their submission was extended to the 22nd inst. A certain divergence of opinion is understood to exist in the Cabinet regarding the methods to be adopted in dealing with the National Forces. The matter was debated at considerable length at a meeting held on the 17th inst at the Palace. One portion of the Cabinet is understood to favour the despatch of Turkish troops against the National Forces through PANDERMA, BIGHA, SAM-SUN, TREBIZOND, and other ports. It wishes to obtain the assistance of Allied troops, if possible. The remaining fraction is opposed to action of this nature and especially to the despatch of Allied troops. It considers that the anti-Nationalist feeling already existing among the Moslem population of the ANATOLIAN littoral is by no means negligible and thinks that efforts should be made to exploit this by the despatch of hojas as propagandists.

The more influential portion of the Cabinet, however, appear to have decided that a force should be raised composed of Gendarmerie and Volunteers, a part of which should be placed at the disposal of AHMED

ANZAVUR Pasha. A commission composed of the following persons has been formed to discuss the question of the composition of this force:—

HAMDI Pasha  
 NAZIF Pasha  
 OSMAN RIFAAT Pasha  
 SULEYMAN SHEFIK Pasha  
 ARIF Pasha  
 KARA SAID Pasha.

The Government is, however, considerably hampered in its preparations by its lack of confidence in the loyalty of the Government forces, and more especially the officers. The fact that the Turkish War Office staff is composed largely of officers with Nationalist sympathies, renders the carrying out of satisfactory preparations exceedingly difficult.

The despatch of a mission to TREBIZOND under the leadership of ALI GHALIB Bey, who will be accompanied by a number of Kurdish dignitaries and by Turkish hojas for propaganda purposes has been decided upon.

With a view to the improvement of the situation in CILICIA, the Minister of the Interior is understood to have addressed a circular letter to 14 notabilities of ADANA urging on them the importance of influencing and of preventing the local population from attacking the French forces of occupation. The letter points out that aggressive action on the part of the Turks would only involve a further prolongation of the occupation and might affect the decisions of the Peace Conference to the disadvantage of TURKEY. It further calls attention to the recently published Fetwahs, copies of which are sent for distribution. The letter in question is stated to have been despatched on 15th April by a French torpedo boat.

The Government is understood to have formed a Commission to enquire into the cases of certain Unionists whom it desires to bring to trial. Lt. Col. RASIK Bey is stated to have been appointed President of it.

*Reports 811, 820, 828, 830, 835, 847.*

## 2. NATIONALISTS AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

Further particulars are to hand regarding the route followed by Nationalists escaping from CONSTANTINOPLE. The names of the villages along the line of the route are given and it is stated that the Nationalists have organised guides and escorts in each of them to ensure the safe conduct of their partisans.

A number of non-commissioned officers and men of the CONSTANTINOPLE Garrison and of the Gendarmerie of the surrounding districts are reported to have joined the Nationalists through various routes.

*Reports 806, 808, 819.*

### 3. NATIONALISTS IN ANATOLIA.

MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha issued a manifesto on the 13th April stating that the enemies of TURKEY had provoked civil war in order to destroy the independence of the country, and had engineered the return to power of DAMAD FERID Pasha. The manifesto also attributed the action of AHMED ANZAVUR to foreign influence. It accused ANZAVUR of facilitating the task of the Greeks at a moment when the SMYRNA front was firm, URFA had been evacuated, and MERSINA, TARSUS, and HADJIN, had been surrounded by Nationalist Forces. MUSTAFA KEMAL expressed his confidence of victory and added that it had been decided to establish martial law at KARASI and HUDAVENDIGHAR under Colonel KIAZIM Bey and Colonel BEKIR SAMI Bey respectively.

In publishing this manifesto at BRUSSA, the last-named officer informed the public that "any word, propaganda, or action tending to destroy the National union" would be punished with death.

A certain light is thrown on Nationalist intentions by the report of a meeting of the Nationalist Representative Council stated to have been held at ANGORA on 28th March, at which, in addition to the members of the Council in question, certain representatives from various parts of ANATOLIA were present. It appears clear that the Nationalists propose to assemble at ANGORA, as soon as practicable, a species of Constituent Assembly, and the main decisions of the meeting consisted in deciding on questions which were to be laid before this Assembly. The chief of these would appear to that of determining the form which the Turkish Government was henceforward to take, the consideration of measures called for by the present situation, and the modification of certain clauses of the Constitution. The Representative Committee which was stated to have nominated four administrators to regulate military, financial, internal, and foreign affairs apparently found need of a temporary sovereign, in view of the present situation of the Sultan, whom it affects to consider no longer a free agent. Reference was made to an arrangement said to have been entered into between the Bolsheviks and the Nationalist, the date of which was given as 27th October 1919. It should be noted that a report of a meeting of the MUVAHIDIN Society published by this office on 16. 2. 20. (HC/319) gave the date of the signature of this arrangement as 27th December 1919.

According to information received at the Ministry of the Interior, MUSTAFA KEMAL has requested the Valis of the Anatolian provinces to meet in conference at ANGORA during the month of May.

The Nationalists Press in ANATOLIA is said to have revived the report, at one time current in the capital, that an arrangement regarding the future of TURKEY had been entered into between FERID Pasha and representatives of the British Government.

ALI FUAD Pasha, O.C. XX Army Corps, arrived in BRUSSA on the 17th April, and is stated to have met with an enthusiastic reception. In receiving the Armenian Patriarch he assured him that the Nationalists had issued strict orders for the punishment of any person maltreating Armenians.

Prominent Nationalists who have arrived at ANGORA include YUNUS NADI Bey, Editor of the "Yeni-Ghun".

*Reports 802, 810, 814, 816, 840, 843, 50.*

#### 4. ANTI-NATIONALISTS.

Shah ISMAIL, chief associate of AHMED ANZAVUR, appears to have taken umbrage at the elevation of the latter to the rank of Pasha. It at one time appeared likely that a split would occur between the two leaders. The difficulties were, however, smoothed over, partly no doubt by the efforts of the Government, but mainly by the common danger which threatens them from the Nationalists.

In view of the extent of the latter AHMED ANZAVUR sent a special messenger to CONSTANTINOPE to beg for reinforcements and assistance in the form of armament. The letter expressed the opinion that unless these could be sent quickly the situation of the Muhamidic forces would be critical. Subsequent events have amply justified ANZAVUR's judgement.

The commencement of an anti-Nationalist movement is said to have been observed at SHEHIR KISHLA (SIVAS) where a certain KIAZIM TIRNOBA Bey AZIZIE is stated to be prepared to take action on these lines, provided funds and ammunition can be sent him.

*Reports 818, 829, 831, 848.*

#### 5. ITALO-TURKISH RELATIONS.

SHAHIN Bey and BASRI Bey, deputies for SHAMLIK and DEBRE respectively, are reported to be organising a Turco-Italian Club with the object of improving the relations between these two nations. The first-named has already been reported as an Italian propaganda agent. (HA/-338).



The Ministry of the Interior is stated to have sent to the Ministry of Foreign affairs a report based on information received from agents in ASIA MINOR and from a deputation which had arrived at CONSTANTINOPLE from GUENAN.

The report states that, according to the evidence of eye witnesses, Italian troops in the districts of SMYRNA, KONIA, and ANTALIA, had supported the Nationalists with guns, machine guns, and ammunition. The Minister of the Interior is understood to have expressed his opinion that this delivery of war material was connected with the efforts of certain personalities in fomenting political intrigues.

*Reports 804, 832.*

#### 6. AMERICANS AND NATIONALISTS.

Paul WILLIAMS, correspondent of the "CHICAGO TRIBUNE" has recently left for ANGORA. Local Nationalists are stated to have supplied him with letters of recommendation for MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha. It is also reported that through the intermediary of a certain MEHMET ALI Bey, a friend of YUNUS NADI, he received a letter from AHMED IZZET Pasha.

*Report 837.*

#### 7. NATIONALIST INTRIGUE AT THE PALACE.

The pro-Nationalist tendencies of Princess ULVIEH have already been made the subject of report. The Princess in question is understood to have paid a visit to the Sultan on the 16th inst. and to have told him that the Nationalists were preparing to crush AHMED ANZAVUR Pasha. She added that in view of the numbers and resources of the Nationalists, resistance to them could only mean the useless shedding of Moslem blood. She declared that ANZAVUR's movement, which was merely aiding British policy, was most unpopular in the Moslem world, and added that her view was also that of all the Princes of the Imperial house. She feared lest Nationalist success might result in the dethronement of the Sultan.

DAMAD ISMAIL HAKKI Bey, Chief of the Palace Staff, is reported to have given a dinner at his private residence on the 15th April to a number of senior Italian officers. Those present included Colonel ROLETTO and Dr. PELLEGRINI.

*Reports 849, 815.*

#### 8. UNIONIST ACTIVITY IN EUROPE.

According to information received by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Unionist leaders in SWITZERLAND and elsewhere intend to

what is for right / ✓

hold an assembly very shortly at ROME. Amongst those who are reported to have arrived already in ITALY for the purpose of attending this assembly is AHMED JEVDET Bey, the proprietor of the Turkish newspaper "IK-DAM".

*Report 817.*

*FO. 371/5167/E. 5072*

No. 25

*Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 1st. May, 1920  
(Received, May 20)

*No. 614/M. 2353.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, the translation of a proclamation by Mustafa Kemal which was published in the Nationalist paper "Millet Yolou" of Broussa, subsequent to the Military occupation of Constantinople by the Allies.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5048/E. 5059*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 25

PROCLAMATION

(Official Communique)

(Published in the "Millet Yolou" of Broussa).

The seat of the Kaliphat, the Capital of our Empire was occupied by the Powers of the Entente, which constitutes an act entirely contrary to Right and Justice. Our nation was attacked and insulted in such a manner as cannot be shown on any other page of our history.

Following upon these misdeeds a feeling has arisen in the country with the ultimate end of defending the Right of the Kaliphate and to save the National Independence. A movement has been formed with this sole end. In order to annihilate this cause our enemies began to sow seeds of

intrigue in the interior of the country. At Constantinople our enemies in order to accomplish these ignoble designs, have brought into power the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, and also to encourage Ahmed Anzavour with the result that in the region of Bigha and Guenan troubles and intrigues have broken out.

The offensive action and attacks made by the Greeks on the Aidin Front had been repulsed and in this area the situation can be regarded as safe. In Cilicia the occupying forces have evacuated the town of Ourfa, those in Mersina, Tarsus, Belemetdik were completely surrounded. The attacks which have been made by Anzavour are purely in order to assist the Greeks. His action in aid of Greek interests and against the paramount interest of the Nationalists are active treason.

These criminal acts have not gained for our enemies any advantage, but far from it and the National Force will not be set back in any manner, but will shortly crush and wipe out the criminals who will be chastised by justice for their temerity.

To this effect the National Congress Extraordinary at which the Members sat voted that Colonel Kiazim Bey, Commandig the 61st Division of the Karassi zone and Commandant Bekir Sami Bey also be delegated to keep order and security in the vilayet of Broussa in order that the enemy may not shown signs of their nefarious projects. Bekir Sami is the chief of the National Force, Civil and Military in Broussa, and it is his duty to watch and to stop all which militates against the National unity and will punish severely any functionaries, civil or military, who show negligence in their duty, according to the seriousness of the crime these functionaries will be punished, even to capital punishment. He has been given unlimited and extraordinary powers.

For the cause of National Independence. In the ultimate struggle as always. Now also we are assured of being the object of a rich blessing from God. The Supreme Being is with us.

Signed: In the name of the  
General Assembly.  
MUSTAFA KEMAL

No. 26

*Mr. Wratishaw, British Consul General in Beyrout, to the British  
High Commissioner in Cairo.*

BEYROUT, *May 1st, 1920 3.5 p.m.,  
(Received 4. 10 p.m. May 2nd)*

*Telegraphic*

*Decypher*

*No. 43*

Adressed to Egypt 17, Repeated to Foreign Office.

Following letters have come into my possession. They appear to be authentic.

1. From Omer Shevki "Chief of Turkish National Movement in (? Egypt)" to tribes round Mosul urging them to action against British.

2. From same to Captain Nedjeb agent of movement in Aleppo in a similar strain.

3. From Mustafa Kemal to Ali Nousseouhi Bey, representing Turkish National movement in Baghdad, inciting him to do his best to impede British action.

4. From Mustafa to Kilij Ali Pasha, Commander of Nationalist forces at Aintab, and Marash, congratulating him on success against French and inciting him to further efforts.

I will forward first three by post leaving fourth with French.

Person who gave me these letters states that he handed to United States Consul at Aleppo in charge of British interests a further batch stolen from a deputation of (? five) persons who recently arrived there from Egypt by one of their number, Mahomet Ali Effendi, an ex-Captain in Turkish Army. Their Chief was a Colonel name unknown. Deputation was in possession of large sum of money for purpose of propaganda in Mesopotamia but could do nothing after loss of letters and is believed to have gone to Damascus.

FO. 371/5047/E. 4067

No. 27

*Mr. Wratislaw, Consul-General in Beyrout, to Earl Curzon.*BEYROUT, *May 4 1920*  
(Received May 22)

No. 31

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith the copy of a Despatch which I have today addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo concerning certain letters from Mustafa Kemal and the "Central Organisation of the National Ottoman Operations in Egypt" which were given to me by an ex-officer of Turkish gendarmery\*.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW  
Consul General

FO. 371/5048/E. 5162

\* Yazının yalnız Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile ilgili ekleri alındı.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 27

*L'Empire Ottoman doit vivre! au-dessous — le monogramme imperial.*

MOUSTAFA KEMAL PACHA, COMMANDANT  
EN CHEF DES FORCES NATIONALES OTTOMANES,  
A NASSOUHY BEY, CHEF DES OPÉRATIONS NATIONALES  
OTTOMANES ET DES BOLCHEVIKS À BAGDAD.

No. 759.

Honorable Bey!

Nous avons appris les atrocités et les injustices que les lâches Anglais sont en train de commettre en Mésopotamie. Nous pensons nous associer à vous par notre force et notre entreprise, afin de nettoyer vos régions de ces microbes de l'humanité; seulement des circonstances très graves ne nous le permettent pas. Par conséquent, vous devez, vous même, prendre à votre charge l'accomplissement de ce devoir Islamique important.

D'ailleurs les efforts que vous avez déployés depuis votre départ, en vue de mener la Guerre sainte, ont fait naître dans le coeur de chaque musulman des sentiments de vive allégresse.

Nos frères d'Egypte, de leur côté, n'épargnent aucun sacrifice à cet effet. Dans quelques jours ils vous enverront une somme d'argent importante qu'ils sont en train de réunir.

Distribuez des sommes suffisantes aux chefs de tribus qui se trouvent dans vos environs, et ce, après avoir délibéré avec les membres de la commission qui vous apportera cet argent. Procurez-vous également, avec une partie de ces dites sommes, des armes, des munitions de guerre et les provisions nécessaires. Jusqu'à mon arrivée, tâchez d'expulser et d'éloigner de là ces vils Anglais, et en vue de gêner leur marche et leurs opérations, renoncez au programme bolchevik et appliquez pour le moment le système des "Tcheté".

Arrêtez de tous côtés, par vos armes, les opérations des Anglais et intéressez-vous avec un grand soin et avec zèle à attirer à vos côtés, par la menace et par la force de l'argent, les personnes qu'ils se sont conciliées. J'aime à croire que les événements de Constantinople n'affaibliront pas votre moral. C'est une question qui n'a pas d'importance. Associez-vous aux Moudjéhid de l'honorable Cheikh MAHMOUD qui se trouve à Souleimanié. Toute l'humanité et tout l'Islam approuveront vos actes pour la raison que chacun approuve les Guerres Saintes qui se font pour la Patrie.

Ceci constitue pour nous un droit évident auquel aucune Nation et aucun Gouvernement ne peuvent s'opposer. Vous devez montrer que vous êtes les nobles descendants de nos aïeux les ottomans.

Que Dieu vous prête son appui mon Cher.

Le 21 Mars 1920

Le Commandant en Chef des  
Forces Nationales Ottomanes —  
Premier férik

Signé: MOUSTAFA KEMAL

FO. 371/5048/E. 5162

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 27

*MOUSTAFA KEMAL PACHA, COMMANDANT  
EN CHEF DES FORCES NATIONALES OTTOMANES,  
A L'HONORABLE MOUDJEHID KILINDJE ALEY PACHA.*

No. 411

Le devoir national que vous avez accompli à Marasch, à Aintab et aux environs, avec le concours des membres des "Tchetés" (bandes) envoyés à votre Excellence via Elboustan, a réjoui tous les ottomans. Les forces que les Français ont expédiées en Syrie sont très minimes. J'espère que ces forces ne vous épouvanteront pas et ne déprimeront pas votre

moral. Les Français étant gênés par les Allemands, ne pourront plus envoyer dans vos régions d'autres forces expéditionnaires. Ils ne pourront envoyer que des forces peu considérables de Beyrouth à Alexandrette, qui ne sauraient vous inquiéter.

Le devoir de patriotisme qui s'impose aujourd'hui à vous est celui d'entretenir des rapports constants avec les chefs locaux, de leur expliquer en détail et d'une façon convainquante les injustices et les atrocités que les lâches et vils Français sont en train de commettre; de gêner les expéditions françaises et d'entraver leurs opérations et enfin de ne point les laisser envahir votre patrie.

Tâchez de bien utiliser les forces que nous vous enverrons successivement. Veuillez distribuer aux chefs des tribus et des "Tchéts" ainsi qu'aux Moudjehid, les sommes d'argent qui vous seront envoyées par nos Moudjehids d'Egypte. Tâchez, en même temps, de vous procurer, avec une partie des sus-dites sommes des armes, des munitions et des provisions dans la mesure du possible. J'attends minute par minute que vous nettoyez nos régions de nos ennemis les Français, et que vous me donniez de bonnes nouvelles annonçant la victoire. Nous sommes en correspondance avec les chefs de Damas, du Liban, de Hama, de Homs, d'Antakié, de Sahyoun (sic) d'Islahié, de Djoum, d'Ourfa et des environs.

Je suis certain que tous ces chefs vous prêteront leur concours matériel et moral. Je vous souhaite bonne chance.

*Le 20 Mars 1920*

Le Commandant en Chef des Forces  
nationales ottomanes: premier férik  
Signé: MOUSTAFA KEMAL

*FO. 371/5048/E. 5162*

No. 28

*Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th May 1920  
(Received May 27)

*No. 649/W. 2910*  
*Secret*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter, dated 22nd April, which I have addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, regarding

a list of persons whom the Ottoman Government wish placed under arrest, and also a copy of his reply thereto, dated 28th April.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5090/E. 5357

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 28

FROM: — British High Commissioner, Constantinople.

TO : —General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

*Secret.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 22nd April 1920

No. W. 2910

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a list of persons, suggested for arrest, which I have received from the Grand Vizier.

His Highness has stated to me that, while he cannot vouch absolutely for the culpability of all the persons in the list, he considered that it was desirable to take steps to prevent their doing any harm and proposed that they might be arrested either by the Allied or by the Turkish authorities. I have since gathered that he would prefer that they should be arrested by the Allied authorities, and deported to Malta.

2. A number of those figuring in this list are at present out of reach. With regard to those whose arrest is feasible at the moment, I am of opinion that, apart from those persons who already appear in the lists prepared by this High Commission in conjunction with the military authorities, or other persons known to us to be undesirable, the responsibility for any further persons known to us to be undesirable, the responsibility for any further arrest should be left entirely to the Turkish Government, and that the utmost engagement that should be given would be to consent to consider the possibility of deporting any persons whose detention here, after arrest, might be a source of serious embarrassment to the Government, or whose safekeeping (sic) should present sufficient importance from our point of view to justify their being taken over.

3. In particular, I consider that the arrest of the ex-Grand Vizier Izzet Pāshā would be most impolitic, and provided you concur, I propose to inform the Grand Vizier that I am unable to give my approval to such a step.



4. I shall be glad if you will let me have your views on the whole matter at an early date.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5090/E. 5357*

#### A LIST OF PERSONS SUGGESTED FOR ARREST

KIAZIM PASHA, Sub-Chief of General Staff.  
ALI FUAD PASHA, O.C. at Angora.  
REMZI PASHA, of Salonica (the dunmé recently released from prison).  
ABDUL-KERIM PASHA, Member of DIVAN-I-TEMYİZ-I-ASKERİE.  
NIHAD PASHA, Staff MIR LIRWASI. (sic)  
KIAZIM KARABEKİR PASHA, O.C. at Erzerum.  
MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA, leader of National Movement.  
HASSAN RIZA PASHA, Artillery MIR LIWASI (?? FERİK).  
AHMED IZZET PASHA, Ex-Grand Vizier.  
HUSNİ PASHA, Senator, President of TEJEDDUD PARTY.  
ISMAIL FAZİL PASHA, a deputy, father of ALI FUAD PASHA above.  
DJAFFER TAYYAR BEY, Colonel, O.C. at Adrianople.  
BEHİDJ BEY, Colonel.  
MEHMED SILAHUDDİN BEY, Staff Colonel, President of MERKEZ  
DAİRESSİ.  
HUSSEİN SILAHUDDİN BEY, KOL ORDU KOMANDANI.  
SILAHUDDİN ADİL BEY, Staff Colonel, Director General of İMALAT-I  
HARBİE.  
OMAR LUTFİ BEY, Staff Colonel, President of HARBİE DAİRESİ.  
KIAZİM BEY, Staff Colonel.  
İSMET BEY, Staff Colonel.  
GHALİB PASHA, FERİK, formerly Director General of Public Security.  
HAİRİ BEY, Colonel, living at Scutari.  
SALİH BEY, Colonel, Master of the Imperial Stables.  
AHMED RIZA BEY, now in Paris.  
SEYYİD BEY, Senator.  
Two A.D.C.'s of Heir Apparent, names not yet ascertained.  
People in Switzerland etc., like TALAT, DJAVID, ENVER, etc.,  
YACOUB SHEVKİ PASHA, Staff MIR LIRWASI (Sic.).

*FO. 371/5090/E. 5357*

## ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 28

FROM:— General Sir G. F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O.,  
 Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, Constantinople  
 TO :— His Excellency, the High Commissioner, Constantinople.

5897/2 'P'

CONSTANTINOPLE, 28th April 1920

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. W. 2910, dated 22nd April, forwarding a list of persons whom the Ottoman Government desire to place in arrest.

I have no remark to make \*.

G. F. MILNE  
 General.

Commanding-in-Chief  
 Army of the Black Sea

FO. 371/5090/E. 5357

\* Bu yazışmalar üzerine Foreign Office'de şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

“1) The reply of General Milne would not suggest that cordial cooperation exist between him and the Acting High Commissioner. His advise is sought - and not given.

2) The list of candidates for arrest is made up of about 25 % absentees - e.g. Enver Pasha, Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

3) The Nationalist movement has reached a volume such that the arrest of the lesser members within reach would not cause any appreciable effect.

28/V (1920) Heathcote.”

“Yes. I do not know many of these names but it is somewhat absurd to suggest the “arrest” of Mustapha Kemal.

31. 5. (1920) Tilley.”

“I do not like at all the reply of General Milne. It is evidence of stained relations with the H. Commission of which we have had further proof. . .

H.”

No. 29

*British Consul General in Tripoli, N. Africa, to Earl Curzon.*

No. 28

Same sent to Rome.

May 11th 1920

(Received May 21.)

My Lord:—

I have the honour to report that the local Arabic newspaper the ‘Rakib’ of the 4th instant publishes Suliman al Baruni’s communication of the 6th January last to the representatives of the allied powers in Constantinople. This fills two pages of the newspaper. The third page I have the honour

to enclose with my translation of nearly all of it. It will be observed that the paragraph headed 'the black sea' has been 'blacked' by the censor, but so imperfectly that it has been easily made out. In the following paragraph I am not sure what the epithet 'Hajjaj' applied to King Hussein means. The dictionary gives:— 'quarrelsome', 'litigious', 'dogmatical person', 'tyrant', 'who makes frequent pilgrimages'. It may be an allusion to Hajjaj the general who butchered the Moslems insurgents in Irak at the end of the 7th century A.D.

The 'Liwa al Trablusi' of the 6th instant clamours for the application of the constitution, denounces 'the lovers of slavery and the champions of colonization', and complains bitterly of the lately appointed native members of the local tribunals being given a consultative instead of a deciding voice. It publishes an account of the Jerusalem riots, which is I suppose exaggerated, saying:— 'there are different estimates of the number of killed, but 'it cannot be less than 80 and some put it at 400'. It publishes the following under the heading 'Intelligence from Irak':— 'The English have invited notables, cultured men, and high officials of the country to a constituent assembly to decide on a form of government for Irak. This step is intended to pacify the people and throw dust in the eyes of the simple. The youth of the country are using their moral and material force to set at nought these efforts and show the people their real purpose. Our correspondent travelling in north Irak reports that the English attacked Arab villages in the region of Aan, burnt their houses, and put to the sword men women and children. The Arabs rose in revenge for these atrocities, and under the leadership of Sheikh Narjis one of the Sheikhs of Deilem attacked the English. A number of officers who had escaped from Irak and have joined the rising are also in command of these Arabs, and violent combats are continuing in that region'.

Very few here read and understand this journalism, but I have evidence that, read out and half understood, it is beginning to have a dangerous effect on the minds of the Moslem vulgar.

*FO. 371/5142.*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 29

TRANSLATION

from the 'Rakib' of Tripoli of May 4th 1920.

*TURKEY*

The forces occupying Constantinople have used their position to banish some leading men (senators?) of the Government, some Sheikhs, and some deputies, on the plea of their connection with Mustafa Kemali

(sic) Pasha. The commandant at Adrianople Jafer Tayar Pasha has broken off all relations with Constantinople, and has made preparations for resistance in conjunction with that nationalist leader Mustafa Kemali Pasha.

*Kur* -- The position in the east is most serious, especially in Irak, Syria, Arabia, Anatolia, and Kardistan. (sic) The peoples of these regions are preparing to defend (resist ?) the capital with active resistance, but in the meantime awaiting a further step on the part of the English in regard to the seat of the Caliphate. All Afghanistan, Turkestan, Persia, the Musulmans of India, and the Moslems of the world have declared their adhesion to the cause.

### CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

The chamber of deputies in Constantinople has communicated to all the parliaments of Europe the conditions of peace which Turkey can accept. These are contained in six articles, and include the retention of Turkey in Europe, and the evacuation of Smyrna. The population of that town are armed, equipped, and prepared to expel the Greeks as they despair of the powers ordering Greece to withdraw quickly.

### ENVER PASHA

Political circles of all descriptions are much occupied with Enver Pasha. It is reported that he and his uncle Khalil Pasha and his brother Nuri Pasha have 15,000 (150,000 ?) armed men, and that the Bolsheviks have filled his treasure with gold, have supplied him with excellent arms and large stores, and are about to send men to reinforce his army which is commanded by Ottoman officers who have devoted themselves and their property to the cause of God.

### TURKEY AND THE TREATY

The Ottoman Government is sending delegates to Paris to take a copy of the treaty of peace and afterwards communicate it to their people and take their opinion. The Sublime Porte will make other proposals to the powers, and, if they are not accepted, Turkey will refuse to sign the treaty.

### THE STUDENTS

The students of Constantinople have found one enthusiastic league to sacrifice the flower of their youth if there is the slightest sign of the latest English programme being carried out.

*MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA CHIEF OF THE NATIONALIST  
MOVEMENT*

The correspondent of the 'Epoca' states that the national army will not leave its position unless all the demands of the Turkish people are satisfied, or if it does leave its position it will be to move forward and maintain its principles by force.

*KURDS AND TURKS*

The Kurds have assured the Sublime Porte of their devotion to the throne of the Caliphate, and contradicted the reports spread by designing persons of their having broken off from the Turkish Government. ✓

*THE BLACK SEA*

The position in the Black sea has become dangerous through the many Russian mines, and the insurance company (?) has refused to accept the risk of any steamer in that sea in which more than 15 steamers have been sunk within 16 days. The Russian have already launched 15 submarines, and it has been ascertained that they have constructed 130 and will launch them in the Black sea. ??

*THE HEJAZ*

Fighting has broken out between the Sherif of Mecca and the Emir of Nejd and Imam of Yemen who purpose to free the sacred places from the tyrant Hussein, and hand them over to Turkey, which is the desire of all Moslems and is one of the demands lately presented to England by the Moslems of India.

The fighting continues.

FO. 371/5142.

No. 30

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 17, 1920  
(Received May 17.)

(Ho 596.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

RECEPTION of peace terms, so far as they are yet known here, has been calm. Tone of Turkish press in Constantinople is one of extreme depression. There is so far no note of defiance, but hope is expressed that

Conference may still be induced to modify conditions, which are stated to be not only unfair to Turkey, but inimical to future tranquillity.

Public meeting is being arranged to take place during next few days, but precautions are being taken to ensure orderliness and moderate language.

Everything so far is based on very incomplete summaries of treaty. These are conflicting on various points.

I could have wished to receive full and authoritative summary from Foreign Office to enable me to control other sources of information.

I must warn you against drawing any inference as to what will happen in Thrace or Anatolia from calmness displayed here. News arrives very slowly from Anghar, (sic) but course of events there up to about 3rd May is now definitely known. National Assembly convoked by Mustafa Kemal met about 23rd April, and assumed all powers, both legislative and executive. Executive powers were delegated to Government also presided over by Mustafa. Assembly passed various resolutions, including one formally denying competency of any persons except delegates to Peace Conference appointed by Assembly itself to take any decision regarding destinies of Turkey. Steps were taken to communicate decisions of Assembly to Governments of Europe, America and Soviet Russia.

Anghar Assemby is reported to have already appointed so called Peace Delegation, including Ahmed Riza, Ghalib Kemaly and Ahmed Rustem Billinsky, all of whom are in Europe. This, however, lacks confirmation.

Central Government is, of course, quite without power over Nationalists at Anghar and over bulk of Asia Minor; Anghar maintains touch with certain persons in Constantinople, who may serve as link between Nationalists and elements here who have hitherto opposed Nationalists, but whom drastic nature of peace is likely to throw into their arms.

Grand Vizier continues to manifest utmost depression, but I think he is awaiting text of treaty before taking any line.

*F.O. 371/5048/E. 4890*

*F.O. 406/43, p. 351-352, No. 225*

*D.B.F.P. 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 73, No. 64*

No. 31

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 22, 1920

*(Received June 4.)**(No. 733. Secret.)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 596 of the 17th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following papers, which throw considerable light on the activities and policy of the Nationalist leaders at Angora:—

- (a) A report from a very secret source on the general situation at Angora.
- (b) A translation of a proclamation said to have been issued by the National Assembly now sitting at Angora. This has also reached me from a secret source. I cannot vouch for its authenticity, though I see no reason to doubt it.
- (c) A translation of a report issued by the Nationalists themselves of the proceedings at the first sittings of the National Assembly.
- (d) A translation of a telegram addressed by Fevzi Pasha at Angora to "an important personage" in Constantinople.

2. The last two documents are of particular interest as being official pronouncements by Nationalist leaders of undoubted authenticity. I would draw your Lordship's attention to the following points of interest:—

3. The Nationalist leaders evidently considered the question of setting up a deputy Sultan in Anatolia, and abandoned the idea. It is possible that this decision may have been due to difficulty in getting any Imperial Prince to risk the adventure. However that may be, the theory invented to explain the course actually adopted is interesting. The leaders of the movement profess loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, but declare him to be in duress, and state that to appoint a deputy Sultan would be to play into the hands of the enemy, whose aim it is, according to them, to separate the functions of Sultan and Caliph. They therefore meet the situation by maintaining that in the abnormal circumstances there is nothing for it but for the National Assembly to unite in itself all powers, executive and legislative, which are normally exercised by different organs in the State and have their point of contact in the person of the sovereign. The Provisional Government set up at Angora is expressly stated to be merely a delegation of the Assembly, and the Ministers are for that reason called "Vekil", *i.e.*, an attorney or person acting under powers conferred by another.

4. It is characteristic of Turkish methods to seek to invest with a form of legality the most lawless transactions. The National Assembly is being used to enact so-called laws intended to cover the responsibility of the National leaders. Among these is a law making it punishable with death to oppose the will of the National Assembly. This law is already invoked to justify certain "executions" in areas where the Nationalists are at grips with the supporters of the Central Government.

5. The resolution of the Assembly declaring its non-recognition of any agreement entered into since the armistice is probably aimed particularly at the alleged agreement between Damad Ferid Pasha and His Majesty's Government, which has recently been resuscitated for propaganda purposes both in Asia Minor and in Paris. It is interesting to note that this preposterous document has found its way even to South America.

6. I am still without definite information regarding the personnel of the Nationalist "Peace Delegation." It is said to consist of Ahmed Riza Bey and Ghalib Kemal Bey, who are certainly in Europe, and Ahmed Rustem Bilinsky and Mouhtar Bey. Bilinsky was supposed to have returned to Angora after the occupation of Constantinople, but it is noticeable that his name does not appear in the list of the Provisional Government. From this and certain more positive indications from various sources, I conclude that he has almost certainly made his way to Europe. Mouhtar Bey, sometime Turkish Minister at Kief and a well-known adherent of the Committee of Union and Progress, is also believed to have recently gone to Europe.

7. The Nationalists started some time ago a news agency, which publishes in the interior daily news bulletins. These reach Constantinople after a certain delay. They contain a certain amount of information regarding what passes at Angora. Their most striking feature, however, is violent anti-*Entente* propaganda, directed to some extent against the French in Cilicia and Syria, but mainly against the British. The British get the whole credit of the occupation of Constantinople and of the harshness of the attitude of the Allies towards the Turk. The British Government's difficulties in all parts of the world, from Ireland to India, are exploited, and they are the object of constant attack, including accusations of the most scurrilous description. Supposed American sympathy with Turks is a good deal advertised in these bulletins. A noticeable feature of recent issues has been the almost complete omission of any mention of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus generally, an omission probably due to a desire to cloak Turkish activities in those regions.

8. The "important personage", to whom the telegram mentioned above under (d) is addressed, is Nouredin Pasha, who was Vali of Smyrna soon after the armistice and who subsequently played a considerable role



in the organisation of the Nationalist movement in the Balikesser area. The position of Nouredin Pasha *vis-à-vis* of the Central Government is obscure. His activities are at least tolerated by the Government, and it is conceivable that he may have backing from the Sultan and some elements in the "Entente libérale" Party. It is, moreover, probable that Damad Ferid himself is not unwilling to keep a door open for an understanding with the Nationalists. Damad Ferid is sincerely anxious to re-establish the authority of the Central Government, but there is a growing feeling that he does not wish to push the policy of repression by force beyond a certain point.

9. The Grand Vizier's position is in fact one of increasing difficulty. He is criticised on all hands, and his attempts to bolster up his position are hampered at every turn by the fundamental illogicality of his position. He held a meeting on the 10th May with a number of ex-deputies still in Constantinople. He is reported to have said at this meeting that the Government would never consent to the loss of Thrace and Smyrna, and to have been met with the not unnatural rejoinder that in that case it was difficult to understand why he was fighting the Nationalists. This puts the matter in a nutshell. Should Damad Ferid Pasha sign the Peace Treaty as it stands at present, he cannot hope to carry with him more than a few even of those who at present support him. If, notwithstanding this, he should attempt to remain in power and to continue the struggle against the Nationalists, he will, in effect, be using Moslems to fight the battle of the Greeks.

10. It is quite possible that, notwithstanding all his desire to serve the Sultan and keep things together, Damad Ferid Pasha will find this prospect so intolerable that he will resign rather than sign the treaty. Whether he signs it or not is, however, merely a detail in a complex situation, for it remains true that the treaty, even if signed, can only be imposed on Turkey, as a whole, by the use of force.

I have, &c.

J. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/43, p. 390-392, No. 261

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 31

*Report from Angora.*

THE Nationalist Assembly held at Angora under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal on the 23rd April consisted of 174 members, and included twenty-four deputies who had arrived from Constantinople, among whom were Jelaledin Arif, Riza Nur, Yonus Nadi and Jani Beys. The meeting, at which I was present, concerned itself with the election of presidents, and

Mustafa Kemal made a long speech in which he gave an account of the activities of the Nationalist organisation during the past twelve months. The Assembly then elected Mustafa Kemal, first president; Jelaeddin Arif, second president; Bektashi Abdul Mejid, of Kırshcir, first vice-president; Abdul Halim Chelebi, first [sic] vice-president. An executive council was then selected from among the members of the Assembly and included Mustafa Kemal, Jelaeddin Arif, Dr. Adnan, Hakkı Behij, Bekir Sami, Hamdullah Subhi, Jami, Fevzi Pasha, and Colonel Ismet Bey as Chief of the General Staff. The Provisional Government thus established is actually republican in form, but in view of the sentiments of the people towards the Sultan this is not openly avowed.

The Government fetwas have made a deep impression upon the population and the prevailing opinion is that if a really efficient force were to be sent to Anatolia from Constantinople the Nationalists would be easily defeated.

The fetwas that have been issued bore no signature, but other Nationalist announcements usually bear the signature of Mustafa Kemal, just as official documents of the Central Government bear the signature of the Sultan. The decision to form a National Assembly at Angora was taken at a meeting of the Nationalist Representative Council held at Karasu on the 28th March.

Mustafa Kemal has been collecting troops and sending them to Geive, but they are not very numerous, as the Nationalists are short of certain supplies. In general the non-Moslem population is at present well treated, but in Gieve and at Ortakeui 1,100 Greek houses have been burnt. In that district many people were killed, including a Greek officer.

Mustafa Kemal's relations with the Italians are excellent. At the Assembly speeches in favour of the Italians were made, and it was stated that the territory occupied by Italian troops had been completely evacuated. Mustafa himself informed the Assembly that the Italians had now only a few troops at Kush Ada and Adalia. Major Fuad Bey told me that the Nationalists had obtained large quantities of arms and munitions from the above-mentioned places.

Mazhar Bey, formerly Governor of Uskub, Reshad Bey, formerly Commander of the Parliament Guard, and the son of Bekir Sami Bey have arrived here. They escaped from Constantinople with the help of a French officer and went to Mersine, whence they travelled viâ Eski Shehir and Konia.

The French officer and ten French soldiers who were arrested in Eski Shehir were released on the 23rd April, and were allowed to return to Constantinople viâ Bilejik and Bursa.

When I was in Konia I saw three British officers and four soldiers who had escaped with the help of a Turk and were caught in Akabad. They were brought to Eski Shehir, and I have seen one of them taking a walk under escort. He was wearing a Scottish cap.

The correspondent of the "Chicago Tribune", Mr. Williams, was in Angora for five or six days, and had a few interviews with Mustafa Kemal, but, as he speaks very little French and no Turkish, he had some difficulty in making himself understood, although an officer acted as his interpreter. On the 27th April Mr. Williams left Angora for the Smyrna front, and I travelled in the same train as far as Eski Shehir. He made certain statements about the Turkish peace terms to some journalists, but what he said was mostly nonsense. But he also stated openly that the British had tried to prevent him from going to Angora, and the Anatolian press repeated the statement.

ESKI SHEHIR, May 6, 1920

FO. 406/43, p. 392-393, No. 261/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 31

*Proclamation by the Great National Assembly.*

(Secret.)

THE following is a translation of the text of a proclamation to the nation by the Great National Assembly, taken from a copy which is in the possession of the Sublime Porte:—

"The Great National Assembly, consisting of representatives of the whole nation, taking into consideration all that has been said and all that has occurred, has decided to appeal to the country as follows:—

"Certain enemies and traitors against their religion and their country, bought by the English, have circulated among you stories of revolution against the Sultan and the Caliphate. This is being done for the purpose of fomenting internecine strife amongst the nation which has taken up arms and is sacrificing its blood for the purpose of restoring the power and prestige of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, by driving from the country the enemies of religion, who have occupied with their troops Smyrna, Adana, Marash, Urfa and Aintab, all of which are parts of the Ottoman Empire. We, representatives of the nation, swear by God and His Prophet that there is no revolution against the Sultan and Caliph. What the enemy heartily desires is that there may be discord, in order that our country may suffer the same fate as India and Egypt. Believe not the words of the English spies; refuse absolutely to hear them; for by sowing discord amongst

us they desire to enfeeble us, for the sole purpose of enslaving our nation. The dominion of the Turkish Sultanate and Caliphate could no longer exist after the loss of its Stamboul, its Smyrna, its Adana and its Marash. Help those who are striving to save the Empire and our religion from the enemy which is seeking to destroy the country, and assist those who are striving to retake these beloved portions of our country. Continue the holy war for the re-establishment of the power and the prestige of the seat of the Caliphate and of the Sultanate. Trust not the words of traitors and cowards, but assist those who are desirous of punishing them in conformity with the decisions of the National Assembly. May the Grace of God and the divine help of our Holy Prophet be the guide and support of those who devote their lives and their souls to the union of the nation and of the Fatherland! Amin.

“By order of the Great National Assembly.

“MUSTAFA KEMAL, *President.*

“*May 1, 1336.*”

FO. 406/43, p. 393, No. 261/2.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 31

*Translation of Telegram sent by the Representative Committee  
From Fevzi Pasha to Nouredin Pasha.*

IN reply:—

I have seen the telegram dated the 2nd May, 1920, received by the Representative Committee.

From the manner in which you addressed it, it is clear that you have not yet been made acquainted with the true situation in Anatolia. In the first instance, therefore, I beg to give you some information for your guidance in order to be able to discuss the important matters which you will have to communicate to us:—

1. A High National Council of 300 members has been formed, composed of ten deputies with extraordinary powers, elected by committees of second degree, electors and members of the administrative and municipal councils of all the sanjaks of the Empire without exception, the representation being five deputies per sanjak, and those deputies who have succeeded in escaping from Constantinople in order to come here. This High National Council has assumed both the legislative and executive powers and undertaken to deal with the destinies of the nation and country.

The High National Council has proclaimed its attachment to the Caliph and Sultan.

The following members have been elected:—

Mustafa Kemal Pasha: President of the High National Committee.  
Jelaleddin Arif Bey (formerly President of the Chamber): Second President.

His Excellency Chelebi Abdul Halim Effendi: First Vice-President.  
Haji Bektashi Veli Ghelebi Jemaleddin Effendi: Second Vice-President.

The executive duties of the High National Council have been entrusted to the Cabinet under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

The Ministers forming the Cabinet have one by one been elected and appointed by the High National Council. The following are the Ministers thus elected:—

Religious Affairs: Mufti Fehmi Effendi.

National Defence (*i.e.*, War Office and Marine): General Fevzi Pasha, ex-Minister of War.

Interior: Jami Bey.

Foreign Affairs: Bekir Sami Bey.

Justice: Jelaleddine Arif Bey, Second President of the High National Council.

Finance: Hakki Behij Bey.

Instruction: Dr. Rıza Nur Bey.

Social Economy: Yussuf Kemal Bey.

Public Health and Assistance: Dr. Ednan Bey.

C.G.S.: Colonel Ismet Bey.

2. The council first made a law determining the special method of election of the Ministers and defining their powers.

Then, by the Law for the Protection of the Country, accepted unanimously and published in all parts of the Empire, it decided that any person suspected of participating in disorders or controversy, or anyone showing disaffection, either in speech or act or writing, towards the High National Council, whose object is to rescue the Caliph and Sultan and the Turkish Empire from the hands of strangers and to repel their attacks, will be regarded as a traitor to his country, and, if found guilty, will be hanged accordingly. The council further decided that indirect participants should be tried under paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Penal Code.

Finally, the High National Council passed the necessary resolution with reference to the non-recognition of any agreement entered into, or any concession granted, since the armistice, or to be granted in the future.

The High National Council has further declared that it will refuse to recognise the authority of anyone to make a decision respecting the destinies

of the nation except the delegates to the Peace Conference appointed by the High National Council.

The position and the decisions of the High National Council have been communicated to the European and American Governments and to the Soviet Republic of Russia.

3. The source and object of all disorderly movements intended to break up the national unity have been realised and these movements have been repressed by the nation. The responsibility in this world and the next for the blood of brothers shed on this occasion rests with those who provoked it.

4. The nation is convinced that the fetvas issued in Constantinople under enemy pressure are not in conformity with the Moslem law. Fetvas in accordance with the law, signed by all the mustis in Anatolia, have been published and notified to the whole Moslem world.

✓ 5. Will you, therefore, kindly state clearly who wishes to negotiate, with whom, and on what subject?

FEVZI, General,  
Minister of National Defence,  
High National Council.

FO. 406/43, p. 395-396, No. 261/4.

No. 32

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.

✓✓ Telegraphic

Decypher

No. 622 (D).

Urgent

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 24th, 1920, 3.0 p.m.

(Received May 25, 9.0 a.m.)

✓ Italian High Commissioner asks me if report that General Townshend is being sent by His Majesty's Government on special mission to Mustapha Kemal is correct. What reply should I give?\*

FO. 371/5256/E. 5200

\* Eu telgrafa, İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığının 27.5.1920 günlü ve 473 sayılı acele kayıtlı şifre telgrafıyla şöyle cevap verilmiştir: "you can deny the report". (Haberi yalanlayabilirsiniz.)

No. 33

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

No. 743/M/2279

CONSTANTINOPLE, 24th May 1920

Secret

(Received June 10)

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports, for the week ended 13th May 1920, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5168/E. 6151

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 33

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
for the Week Ending 13th May, 1920.*

Secret.

## I. THE CABINET.

There is reason to believe that during the past week the position of DAMAD FERID PASHA's Cabinet has become sensibly weaker in consequence of a certain loss of confidence among those who have hitherto supported it. This is chiefly due to the failure of the Government to take energetic and adequate measures against the Nationalists. At the same time there appears to be considerable disappointment and no little anxiety in Government circles because British help was not forthcoming for the purpose of crushing the Nationalists. It also seems to be clear that the Grand Vizier is unwilling to take any really decisive steps with regard to the latter before receiving a report from TEWFIK Pasha.

Reports of the Cabinet Councils held on the 6th, 7th, and 8th May convey the impression that a number of Ministers consider that no real success against the Nationalists can be obtained, unless considerably greater forces than those recently sent to ANATOLIA are utilised. Two Ministers are said to have urged that the immediate assistance of the Allies should be requested for the settlement of the Anatolian question, to which the Grand Vizier replied that no steps in this direction could be taken until information regarding the terms of peace had been received from the Peace Delegation.

At the Cabinet meeting of the 8th May, the Grand Vizier read a communication from MUSTAFA KEMAL stating that he was prepared to meet representatives of the Central Government in the neighbourhood of CONSTANTINOPLE in order to attempt to come to some understanding solely for the purpose of avoiding bloodshed.

The ENTENTE LIBERALE Party seems distinctly less favourable to DAMAD FERID Pasha. At a general meeting of the party in question held on the 8th March the majority of those present agreed that it would be impossible to disperse the Nationalist Forces by means of volunteers and decided to advise the Grand Vizier to come to some arrangement with the Nationalists. A communication to this effect was drawn up at the meeting, stated that only by the plan suggested would it be possible to change the feeling of "justified" hostility to the Government.

On the 9th May the Grand Vizier received a deputation of a number of deputies with whom he discussed the situation. From a report of the proceedings which has been received it would appear clear that the deputation was far from feeling confidence in the Grand Vizier.

*Report 932.*

## 2. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONALISTS.

The Government appear to have decided some three weeks ago to come to some arrangement with the Nationalists. NUREDDIN Pasha was, therefore, instructed, to endeavour to get into touch with them, which he succeeded in doing on the 2nd May, telegraphing to the National Representative Council. He received a reply signed by General FEVZI Pasha, explaining the situation in ANATOLIA and giving details of the National Assembly which had been opened at ANGORA on 23rd April. According to the telegram in question the Assembly had concentrated in its hands executive and legislative power and "had taken charge of the destiny of the nation". MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha was elected President, JELALLEDIN ARIF Bey 2nd. President, and Mevlevi Chelebi ABDUL HALIM Effendi, and Haji Bektashi JELALLEDIN Effendi Vice-Presidents. The executive power was vested in a body of Commissioners (*Vekil*), chosen by the majority of votes of the National Assembly. They are as follows:—

Religious Affairs	Mufti MUSTAFA FEHMI Effendi
National Defence	Ferik FEVZI Pasha
Interior	JAMI Bey
Foreign Affairs	BEKIR SAMI Bey
Justice	JELALLEDIN ARIF Bey
Finance	HAKKI BEHIJ Bey
Public Instruction	Dr. RIZA NUR Bey



Economic Affairs	YUSUF KEMAL Bey
Public Health	Dr. ADNAN Bey
Chief of Gener. Staff	Lt. Col. İSMET Bey

The Commissioners, are presided over by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha who was stated to have "proclaimed his fidelity to the Sultan and Caliph". The Assembly passed a special law defining the powers of the Commissioners and a further law dealing with the "betrayal of the country". The former was published in the Nationalist Press on the 6th May. The latter, after a preamble declaring the desire of the Assembly to save the Sultanate and Caliphate and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire from a foreign yoke, decreed the punishment by death of any person guilty of disloyalty to the Assembly. The Assembly also declared that any contracts, concessions or alliances entered into or granted since the Armistice would be considered as non-existent, and refused to recognise the authority of any persons or commissions, other than its own delegates who might be sent to the Peace Conference. It further stated its intention of communicating its views and decisions to the European and American powers and to the Russian Soviets. The telegram closed by a statement that the nation clearly understood that the Fetwas published in STAMBOUL under hostile pressure were contrary to Holy Law and that the united Muftis of ANATOLIA had published Fetwas in accordance with the latter.

Yielding to the pressure of the Entente Libérale Party, and possibly also to that of the Sultan, the Grand Vizier appears to have decided to send NUREDDIN Pasha to ANATOLIA to attempt to negotiate with the Nationalists.

According to a report which has reached this office, the Government calls on the National Forces for unconditional submission, in exchange for which a general amnesty is to be proclaimed "for all except those whose relations with the Unionist leaders cannot be denied or who have been implicated in the massacres and deportations". The Government informs the Nationalists that it desires to see the whole strength of the country uniting round the Throne and Caliph and a settlement of the questions of SMYRNA and THRACE in conformity with the interests of the Empire.

*Reports 921, 922, 931.*

### 3. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

Particulars have been received of the opening of the National Assembly, the official account of which has been published by the Anatolian News Agency. MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha delivered a speech lasting two and a half hours, in the course of which he brought forward a resolution stating the form which he considered the Government should take. He

said that the Assembly, which was composed of deputies invested with full powers by the electors, had been "created to take charge of National administration, to assume the defence of the country and Caliphate, and that it was not entrusted with legislation and control alone, but was responsible for the destiny of the Nation". He considered that the Assembly should chose a Government from amongst its members and should accept the principle that the members of this Government should be responsible to the Assembly.

MUSTAFA KEMAL also gave an account of the course of events from the Armistice up to the occupation of CONSTANTINOPLE. He explained the circumstances under which he had been appointed Inspector of the Army in ANATOLIA, and the reasons which had induced him to place himself at the head of the Nationalist Movement.

The members of the Government were then elected, their names being those given in the preceding paragraph.

*Report 921, 937.*

#### 4. SITUATION IN ANGORA.

A report received from ANGORA states that the Government established there is actually republican in form, but that in view of the sentiments of the people towards the Sultan this is not openly avowed.

The Government Fetwas are stated to have made a deep impression on the population, amongst whom the opinion prevails that if really efficient forces were sent against them the Nationalists would be easily defeated.

Nationalist announcements usually bear the signature of MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha, just as official documents of the official Government bear the signature of the Sultan.

MUSTAFA KEMAL's relations with the Italians are said to be excellent. It is stated that speeches in favour of the latter have been made in the National Assembly and that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha intimated that the Italians had only a few troops at KUSH ADA and ADALIA.

Three British officers and 4 soldiers are said to have been seen in KONIA.

The correspondent of the "CHICAGO TRIBUNE" Mr. Paul WILLIAMS spent five or six days at ANGORA and had several interviews with MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha. He is reported to have stated that the British had tried to prevent him from going to ANGORA. The Anatolian Press has given publicity to this statement.

*Report 928.*

### 5. NATIONALIST MANIFESTO.

A manifesto signed by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha on behalf of the National Assembly was issued on the 1st May. It refutes the charges of revolution against the Sultan which it declares have been brought by "certain enemies and traitors against their religion and their country, bought by the English". It declares that there is no revolution against the Sultan and Caliph, and states that the object of the enemies of TURKEY in spreading reports to that effect is that "there may be discord in order that our country may suffer the same fate as INDIA and EGYPT". The anti-British character of the Nationalist movement, of which the above words form a specimen, is further evidenced by the following sentence:— "Believe not the words of the English spies, refuse absolutely to hear them, for by sowing discord amongst us they desire to enfeeble us for the sole purpose of enslaving our nation". After declaring that "the dominion of the Turkish Sultanate and Caliphate" could no longer exist after the loss of STAMBOUL, SMYRNA, ADANA, and MARASH, it concludes by an appeal to the nation to "help those who are trying to save the Empire and our religion from the enemy who is seeking to destroy the country, and assist those who are endeavouring to retake those beloved portions of our land". "Continue the Holy war for the re-establishment of the power and prestige of the seat of the Caliphate and of the Sultanate.

*Report 929.*

### 6. THE SULTAN.

According to the Nationalist Press FEVZI Pasha, who it will be recalled was Minister for War in SALIH Pasha's Cabinet and ultimately escaped to ANGORA, speaking in the National Assembly on the 27th April, described the occupation of CONSTANTINOPLE in somewhat lurid language. He stated that "armed soldiers were not allowed to take part in the Friday Selamlık, though their presence there was necessary" and gave an account of his reception by the Sultan at the conclusion of the ceremony stating that His Majesty used the following words: — "I am very sad. I did not want to come to the Mosque. But it is a religious duty. I did not think it well to leave unsaid the prayers which I owe to God. I am extremely pained at seeing the result of the faults of thirty years fall upon your Cabinet. We have to yield to pressure. My inconsolable state and sadness prove how I feel under the ruthless oppression of the English".

In pursuance of the anti-British policy of the Nationalists his speech contained the following sentences: — "All telegrams from the various ministries were censored after the occupation. A copy of every telegram was translated into French and given to the British. The British stated that

they wished to bring into power a Cabinet which would sign the peace terms. The British would not accept the peaceable intentions of the Cabinet. They wish to make Moslems fight amongst themselves. The nation will see and understand the truth."

*Report 941*

7. *OSMAN FUAD.*

The eldest sister of Princess KERIME, wife of Prince OSMAN FUAD Effendi, recently informed one of the daughters of the Khediva mother, that Prince OSMAN FUAD and his wife had gone to PANDERMA in a motor-launch and had then proceeded to the interior of ASIA MINOR.

*FO. 371/5168/E. 6151*

No. 34

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 25, 1920*  
(*Received June 10.*)

(*No. 755.*)

My Lord,

IN the enclosures in my despatch of the 22nd May, 1920, mention is made of a communication alleged to have been addressed to the Allied and to certain other Governments by the Nationalist Congress. No copy of any such communication has reached me direct from Angora, but about a week ago my French colleague received a communication addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which I enclose.

2. A Turkish version of the same communication has been published in the interior in one of the news bulletins mentioned in the despatch referred to above.

3. It is a noticeable, though perhaps merely an accidental, detail that this Turkish version describes the document as having been addressed to the *Entente*, the neutral Powers in Europe and the American Government, without any mention of Soviet Russia, whereas in the telegram to Noureddin Pasha, enclosed in my despatch under reference, Soviet Russia was specifically mentioned.

4. I should be glad to be informed whether any copy of this communication has reached your Lordship direct, and, if so, by what channel.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
*High Commissioner*

*FO. 406/43, p. 402, No. 271*

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 34

*Note communicated by Turkish Nationalist Congress to French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

ANGORA, le 30 avril 1920

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de votre Excellence qu'à la suite de l'occupation injuste et injustifiée de la ville de Constantinople par les forces alliées, la nation ottomane, considérant son Kalif ainsi que son Gouvernement comme prisonniers, a eu recours à la réunion d'une Assemblée suprême nationale, et a fait des élections sur une large échelle. L'Assemblée suprême nationale, dans sa séance d'ouverture du 23 avril 1920, a déclaré par un vote solennel prendre en main les destinées présentes et futures de la patrie, tant que Son Kalif-Sultan et sa ville éternelle resteront sous la domination et l'occupation étrangères.

L'Assemblée suprême nationale m'a fait l'honneur de me charger de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence la protestation énergique de ses membres contre cet acte arbitraire et contraire aux stipulations de l'armistice qui a, une fois de plus, confirmé la nation ottomane dans son pessimisme sur le résultat de la Conférence de la Paix. Le Parlement, sanctuaire sacré, et reconnu comme tel par toutes les nations civilisées, a été violé en pleine séance; du sein de la Chambre, les Représentants de la nation ont été enlevés par la police anglaise comme des malfaiteurs, malgré les vives protestations de la Chambre; des sénateurs, des députés, des généraux, des hommes de lettres ont été arrêtés dans leurs domiciles avec des menottes aux mains et déportés; enfin, nos établissements officiels et privés furent occupés par la force des baïonnettes en se basant simplement sur le droit du plus fort.

Le peuple ottoman, vu la violation de tous ses droits et l'atteinte portée à sa souveraineté, a, par l'ordre de ses représentants réunis à Angora, élu un Comité exécutif du sein même de l'Assemblée, qui a pris de suite en main le gouvernement du pays.

En soumettant à votre Excellence ce qui précède, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer les desiderata de la nation exprimés et adoptés à la séance du 23 avril 1920.

1. Constantinople, siège du Kalifat-Sultanat, ainsi que le Gouvernement de Constantinople, est considérée par la nation ottomane comme prisonnière des Alliés, et, par conséquent, les ordres et les fetvas émanant de Constantinople occupée ne peuvent avoir aucune valeur légale et religieuse, et tous les engagements contractés par le soi-disant Gouvernement de Constantinople sont considérés par la nation comme nuls et nonavenus.

2. La nation ottomane, tout en gardant son sang-froid et modération, est résolue à défendre ses droits sacrés et plusieurs fois séculaires comme Etat libre et indépendant, et déclare son désir pour la conclusion d'une paix équitable et honorable, tout en ne reconnaissant qu'à ses propres envoyés le droit de prendre des engagements en son nom et pour son compte.

3. L'élément chrétien ottoman, ainsi que les éléments étrangers établis dans le pays, restent sous la sauvegarde de la nation; cependant ils ne doivent rien entreprendre contre la sécurité générale de la patrie.

Dans l'espoir d'un accueil favorable aux justes réclamations de la nation ottomane, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer, &c.

Au nom de l'Assemblée suprême nationale ottomane et par ordre.

Le Président de l'Assemblée,  
MOUSTAPHA KEMAL

FO. 406/43, p. 402-403, No. 271/1

No. 35

*Appendix "A" to Weekly Report No. 70, Issued by the British  
General Staff "Intelligence", Constantinople.*

*Message Submitted to H.I.M., the Sultan, by the Great National Assembly.*

*26th May, 1920.*

✓ *Secret.*

Our Khalif & Sovereign.

We have met on this occasion in a Great National Assembly in order to study the situation which has arisen owing to the occupation of Constantinople and the tragic events which followed and with the object of ensuring the defence of the rights of the Sultan and our National independence. The deputies have come from every part of ANATOLIA that is not under foreign invasion and have been elected with full powers by the Nation. They have regarded it as their duty of fidelity and obedience to submit certain matters to Your Imperial Presence in accordance with a decision which they have unanimously adopted.

Our Padishah. You are well acquainted with the story of the dream which was dreamed by Sultan OSMAN, the founder of the Sultanate, on a night which is famous and beloved in the annals of our National history. The memory of this dream has been handed down from one generation to another. Of the Holy Tree which spread its shadows over three continents and under which an Islamic world of a hundred million was sheltered, only

the great trunk remains shorn of all its branches. This trunk is ANATOLIA and its roots which strike deep, are embedded in our hearts. When our great ancestors conquered and occupied the tracts of RUMELIA which are a world in themselves, they obtained their armies from the soil of ANATOLIA. In order to find means of protecting the main lines of communication with distant countries, they again referred to ANATOLIA and established settlements from that country at the most important points. Compact masses of this people extended as far as BOSNIA, HERTZEGOVINA and the MOREA. They were brought down to the Gulf of BASRA. They were established here and there on the roads leading to PALESTINE and SYRIA.

Our Padishah. For the honour and the maintenance of the illustrious seat of the Caliphate the people of ANATOLIA have for centuries regarded it as their most sacred duty to sacrifice their lives on battlefields far away from their hearths and homes. ANATOLIA has been emptied and has been brought to a state of ruin. But whatever suffering and misery has been endured for the enhancement of the majesty and power of the Sultan over his dominions, it was regarded as a favour bestowed upon it. That land is surrounded by the graves of innumerable martyrs fallen for the Faith in battle, which extend from the interior of HUNGARY to the deserts of the YEMEN, and from the CAUCASUS to BASRA. Again it is old ANATOLIA that is now engaged in a new Holy War for the sake of her freedom and liberty.

Illustrious Padishah! When on all sides the banners of ISLAM were suffering defeat, they came and collected together in the direction of ANATOLIA, and in these parts they sought their last refuge. Upon the invasion of SMYRNA you know how most prosperous and cultivated part of the country was completely ruined by fire, plunder and massacre. After this barbarous incursion had been made, which was not supported by right, and which aimed at reducing your people in this, their last home, to a state of slavery, you personally communicated to the press of the world the bitter feelings which it had aroused in your heart. The occupation of SMYRNA came after the others. Against this condition of affairs what was a nation able to do which had for thousands of years brought Sultans to the most magnificent thrones in the world? Seeing that the Sultan was prevented from, and deprived of the right of, employing his armies as a result of a miserable war, the nation itself took up arms and hastened to the areas that were the object of attack in order to save the faith and the national honour.

Our Padishah! For thirty years the heroes of Islam in the CAUCASUS, both men and women, put up a defence against an enemy a hundred times stronger than themselves. Since twenty years ALGERIA is living under a

luckless regime. For ten years unfortunate MOROCCO has refused to recognise a French Occupation and will not surrender its arms. In TRPOLI a handful of heroes are engaged in the same struggle. To-day the Islamic World finds itself on all sides deprived of its arms. Your Great Nation, which has risen up in order to throw off the yoke of oppression and treachery, has, for ever one thousand one hundred years, since the time of the ABBASID, & FATIMITE Caliphate, and since that of the SELJOUK Turks, waged a holy war for the sake of liberty, independence and religion. Your Nation which is the standard-bearer of ASIA and of Islam, and which enjoys a worldwide reputation, does not expect its life to be saved through the mercy of thirsty enemies.

Your Majesty! There are traitors who are continuously working to deceive the people and to interpret our national defence to Your Imperial Presence as being in the nature of a rebellion. These persons wish to plunge the nation into civil war and thus open the road for enemy conquests. For, whichever side is victorious or vanquished, both alike are your subjects. All are in the same degree your faithful children. We cannot abandon our national defence until the enemy standards are withdrawn from our paternal homes. The religious edifices in Constantinople, each of which constitutes an imposing evidence of the love for the Faith of a great Sultan, are surrounded by enemy soldiers. We are obliged to continue our holy struggle until the impure feet of these men are removed from our national soil. God is on the side of your children who are protecting their mothers' homes and are striving for the honour and independence of the Sovereign-Khalif. It is a thousand times preferable to live under the modest and unfortunate rule of our own administration than to enjoy the ease and enjoyment which are the price of foreign slavery.

Our Padishah! Our hearts are full of feelings of fidelity and homage we are attached to your throne by closed hands than ever before. The first words at our Assembly were expressions of fidelity to our Khalif and Padishah. The last words will be to the same effect, and we submit the above with all humility and respect.

(Signed) MOUSTAFA KEMAL

By order of the Great National Assembly.



No. 36

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, May 27, 1920  
(Received June 17.)

(No. 766.)

My Lord,

THE Grand Vizier called on me on the morning of the 26th May for the first time since the presentation of the peace terms in Paris. He had not yet received the text of the draft treaty, and as none of the High Commissioners have received it either, so far as I can ascertain, the conversation in so far as it related to the peace terms was based upon the imperfect telegraphic summaries which have reached Constantinople.

2. The Grand Vizier spoke first of the position of his Government in regard to the Nationalist movement in the interior. He reminded me of the circumstances in which he had assumed power. The Allied High Commissioners had, on the 16th March, called upon his predecessor to disavow the National movement. Salih Pasha's Government had sought to temporise, and a renewed and categorical demand of the High Commissioners on the 26th March had forced them to resign. He himself had taken office a few days later, and the new Government had complied with all the requirements of the High Commissioners. They had obtained religious pronouncements condemning the Nationalists as rebels. The Sultan had issued a rescript instructing the Government to punish them. This work had been taken in hand at once. Although things moved slowly, as they always did in Turkey, and although the Government had hitherto been on the defensive, because the rebels had all the organisation on their side, a beginning had nevertheless been made.

3. On coming into power the Grand Vizier said he found already in existence an anti-Nationalist movement directed by one Anzavour. This man was, however, an uneducated person, and his operations were peasant warfare. He, the Grand Vizier, had set himself to organise something on more regular lines. It was at this point that he found himself tied hand and foot as regards the physical means of action, i.e., men, arms, and munitions. This was not, he hastened to add, due to the attitude of the British military authorities; on the contrary, he was able to cite more than one instance in which General Milne had relaxed the terms of the Armistice in order to enable action to be taken. The Grand Vizier suggested pretty plainly that his difficulties had their origin in the opposition of the other Allies.

4. After this preface and some further observations purporting to be a résumé of a conversation between himself and the British officer at the head of the Allied control at the Ministry of War, Damad Ferid Pasha led up to a definite request that the Turkish Government should be allowed to recruit and equip a force of anything up to 10,000 men for service against the rebels in Anatolia. He observed that in the course of the conversation with the British officer mentioned above, the point had arisen that, as Turkey was to be allowed a total armed force of 50,000 men under the Treaty, the Turkish Government would be justified in asking for authority at once to recruit a force on that scale in order to restore order, but, the Grand Vizier said, he neither needed nor could afford to maintain so large a force. He had recently visited Ismid, which, under the advice of his military experts, he had made the base of his repressive operations, and he had returned with the conviction that the smaller force which he now had in mind would suffice to reduce the whole of Asia Minor to submission in three weeks. The National forces he said, were in reality inconsiderable. They had concentrations in certain places like Ecki-Chehir, Konia and Angora, but they were people of low character—malefactors—who would stick to Mustafa Kemal in order not to fall into the hands of justice. Experience had shown that wherever the Government shoved itself in any force the law-abiding inhabitants welcomed the opportunity of declaring their loyalty to the Sultan and his Government.

5. The Grand Vizier definitely asked me to obtain permission from the Supreme Council for the equipment and utilisation of a force of up to 10,000 men, on the lines indicated above. He said he was about to address a similar request to the French and Italian High Commissioners. He did not intend to say anything to them of his conversation with the British officer, which had been confidential.

6. Speaking of the Peace Treaty Damad Ferid Pasha said that it was universally regarded in this country as excessively severe, and was regarded in some quarters as insusceptible of practical application. He had only telegraphic summaries to go on, but according to these, one of the proposals was to create a sort of independent territory stretching along the southern shore of the Marmara and up to the Black Sea. The effect of this would be to cut the Sultan off from his dominions in Asia. Then there were the questions of Thrace and Smyrna. In Thrace there was a highly-organised movement of resistance which he regarded as intimately connected with the larger movement in Anatolia. The only difference was that, whilst the leaders in Anatolia were recalcitrant and refused their submission to the Sultan's Government, Thrace still professed loyalty to the Sultan. If, however, the Greek troops were moved into Eastern Thrace, the guns would go off at once.

7. If Constantinople were to sign the treaty in its present form, said Damad Ferid Pasha, his Government the Sultan would be in a most embarrassing position, for they would then be called on to enforce, as against the movements in Thrace and Anatolia, peace terms which all alike considered excessively severe and unjust. If, on the other hand, the treaty could be mitigated in the matter of the three regions he had mentioned, it would, so far as he could judge from the summaries received, be possible to secure acceptance for the rest. The Grand Vizier urged that in these circumstances it would be politic as well as just to modify the treaty. However great Turkey's fault had been, she would be amply punished by the loss of vast lying territories amounting to nearly three-fourths of the Empire.

8. The Grand Vizier turned to the question of the period allowed for the Turkish reply. He said that the delegates despatched from Paris with the treaty had been delayed, and had telegraphed that they only expected to reach Constantinople on the 28th or 29th May. This would leave little time for consideration here. Moreover, Tewfik Pasha reported that he was at work on a draft reply, which would be ready in ten days. This also would have to be examined here. Ferid Pasha assured me that he had no desire to procrastinate, but he asked that the period allowed should be prolonged one month on the understanding that, if it were possible to get the answer sooner, it would be handed in before the prolongation expired. He said he would lay this request before my French and Italian colleagues also, and he stated that it was his intention to confirm the request to the three High Commissioners in writing.

9. Damad Ferid Pasha went on to say that the Sultan desired to address a personal appeal to the King, begging His Majesty in conjunction with the heads of the other Allied States, to mitigate the peace terms. He asked me whether I would transmit this message. The Sultan did not intend, he said, to address himself to the other heads of State direct, as the appeal to the King would be an appeal to them also. I undertook to transmit the message but, I said, I should feel bound to inform my French and Italian colleagues that I had done so. \*

\* 27 Mayıs 1920 günü Amiral Sir J. de Robeck'ten Lord Curzon'a şu telgraf çekilmiştir:

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

*No. 628  
Telegraphic.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 27, 1920  
(Received May 28)

To His Majesty the King of England, London.

"The peace terms communicated to Turkish Delegation, Paris, have plunged whole of Turkey into depths of grief. I am encouraged by wealth of historical ties between the British and Ottoman Empires and by my absolute confidence in the sense of justice and

10. The Grand Vizier mentioned the situation in Cilicia. He had received on the previous day a deputation representing the Mussulman inhabitants of that district, who complained of the extraordinary severity of the measures adopted by the French commanding officer, General Dufieux. The French had, according to the deputation, destroyed fifty villages and this was partially confirmed by official information which spoke of the destruction of thirty villages. The French, he said, were employing those drastic methods because they thought they had to do with the Nationalists. He could not complain of action really directed against the Nationalists, but there was a limit to severity, and, in speaking to me, he was actuated by motives of humanity, and hoped that if the question came up at a meeting of the High Commissioners I might use my influence in favour of less drastic methods. He mentioned, as an indication of the extent to which the French were preoccupied by the situation in Cilicia, that they had asked him to recall the Vali of Adana. He had agreed to do so, but he thought that the French must themselves have begun to realise that severity had been pushed too far, because he understood from the Minister of the Interior that the French High Commissioner was telegraphing to General Gouraud to ask for the recall of the French general whom he had mentioned.

11. The Grand Vizier mentioned incidentally in the course of the conversation that a certain person, apparently a Turk, and the son of a former Minister, had sought an interview with the Sultan as representative, he said, of some Indian philanthropic association. He had been referred to the Porte, and had hesitated to go there. Ferid Pasha mentioned this inci-

equity of your Majesty and of the English nation, over whose fortunes your Majesty so nobly presides, (groups omitted) recognise a pressing appeal to your Majesty to intervene with other *Entente* Powers in order to alleviate the severity of the treaty in those of its clauses which are incompatible with independent State, and to save from partition at least the Turkish-speaking provinces.

"Turkish and Ottoman dynasty will thus remain eternally grateful to your Majesty - MEHEMMED VAHIDUDDIN, representative."

(*F.O. 406/43, p. 379, No. 247*).

Bu telgrafla Londra'dan şu cevap verildi:

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.*

*No. 506*  
(*Telegraphic.*) R.

*Foreign Office, June 5, 1920*

Your telegram No. 628 of 27th May.

Following is reply of His Majesty the King to the Sultan of Turkey:—

"I have received Your Majesty's appeal of 27th May. The future of Turkey is in the hands of the Allied Governments, who have devoted long and patient effort to the construction of an equitable Treaty of Peace, and who may be trusted to act with justice to all parties and interests concerned."

(*F.O. 406/43, p. 400, No. 266*).

dent in order to assure me that those now in authority here were in no way disposed to have irregular relations with persons or societies in India. Their desire was to work in a perfectly straightforward and open way with the British representative here, and, if the individual in question had come to him at the Porte as suggested, he would have told him to apply to the Turkish Peace Delegation in Paris.

12. Before the Grand Vizier left me, I reverted to the subject of the treaty, and reminded him that my predecessor, Rear-Admiral Webb, and myself had lost no opportunity since the armistice of impressing on the Turkish Government that they must look for a treaty of the most rigorous description. The Grand Vizier admitted this, but he suggested that it was a question of how the word "rigorous" was employed. He used a simile, and said that a treaty which lopped Turkey of her arms and her legs would be rigorous enough in all conscience even though it left a head and trunk; but a treaty which deprived her of Smyrna and Thrace, struck at vital parts of the head and trunk as well, and such a treaty was something more than rigorous. It meant the annihilation of Turkey. He reminded me that the Supreme Council in their reply to the Turkish Peace Delegation last year, had promised that the Turkish-speaking parts of the Empire would be left. That promise was not being fulfilled. Greece for instance had no claim to Smyrna except a claim based in memories of Homer. These memories were very ancient. If they constituted a title, they might be invoked in connection with many another place in the Mediterranean besides Smyrna. I promised to report all that his Highness had said faithfully to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
High Commissioner.

FO. 406/43, p. 420-423, No. 296

No. 37

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 4, 1920  
(Received June 4.)

(No. 654.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.

My despatch No. 732 of 22nd May.

Admiral Le Bon informs me, and French High Commissioner confirms, that General Gouraud has arranged for armistice with forces of Mustapha Kemal, lasting twenty days and beginning midnight 31st May to 1st June.

Further, it appears that General Gouraud sent envoy to Mustapha Kemal, pointing out that, as French did not intent to retain, Cicilia, he did not wish for further bloody fighting for a country in which French interested themselves.

*FO. 406/43, p. 397, No. 263.*

No. 38

*Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.*

PARIS June 4, 1920  
(Received June 4.)

(No. 663. Very Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

REFERENCE my telegram No. 661 of 4th June.

I have seen President of the Council.

Following is true statement of case, but please treat it as very confidential.

French troops were in very precarious situation and one battalion at Biridjik [?] was completely surrounded, and Gouraud said he could not assist them, Feisal having refused him any facilities for military purposes over railways, and there was every fear that they would be massacred.

M. de Caix, passing through Angora on his way home, saw Mustapha Kemal, and agreed with him for a suspension of hostilities for twenty days, during which it is hoped French battalion will be able to make a safe retirement.

President of the Council said there was no other alternative to course now pursued.

*FO. 406/43, p. 397, No. 264.*

No. 39

*Amir Feissal to Viscount Field-Marshal Allenby.*

DAMAS, 7th June 1920

Lordship,

I enclose herewith the letter which I have received from General Gouraud in which he refuses my request as to giving a declaration tranquilizing the people, so that I may be able to accept the invitation and proceed to the Conference.

My reply is attached herewith.

Your going through it is quite enough.

I do not want absolutely to create difficulties yet I became to believe that the French Government is till far from the proposed agreement in spite of my whole intention and sincerity which I exercised towards them, according to your exhortations and to the views of your Government.

I am by no means to be blamed if I become suspicious of its good intentions after I have seen the actions of its representative and his agreement with Mustafa Kemal and his starting to concentrate his troops in Syria.

I do not deem it prudent, though I am in earnest desire, to proceed to Europe before I receive from your government the lines of action which I must take, not only as to the Eastern Zone and its relations with the French but as to the general policy in Syria particularly and in Mesopotamia and Syria as a whole, in regard to the situation of our seditious and common enemy with General Gouraud after this armistice.

I am likewise informed by the General that he has submitted my statement to his government. So I hope that you will kindly intervene with them so that they expedite the approval of my statement as early as possible, for the sake of Peace and the favour of putting an end to all the troubles among the Allies.

Awaiting your full instructions upon which I am to draw my lines of actions favourable to both sides, I close with due respects.

Signed. FEISSAL

FO. 371/5036/E. 7777

No. 40

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

PARIS, June 7, 1920  
(Received June 7.)

(No. 676.)  
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 1895 of 5th June.

I saw Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, and questioned him according to your instructions. The position is as follows: —

Troops are being drawn in from outlying posts such as Bozanti, Ourfa, Biridjik and Marash, as they were dangerously exposed. But French have no

intention whatever of evacuating districts of Mersina, Tarsus, Adana, Osmanie and Aintab. Reinforcements are being sent there, mostly, I gather, colonial troops, and all should have arrived by beginning of July.

With reference to safety of Armenians in advanced posts now being evacuated, negotiations are proceeding between Gouraud and Mustafa Kemal, which French Government believe will ensure safety of Armenians.

French Government have now made satisfactory arrangements with Feisal for conveyance of troops by railway.

*FO. 406/43, p. 400-401, No. 268*

No. 41

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th June 1920  
(Received June 22)

*No. 808/M/2279.*

*Secret.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, summary of the Intelligence Reports issued by the Constantinople branch of the M.I.I.C. for the week-ended 27th May 1920.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5169/E. 6939*

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 41

*Extract of Weekly summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by  
M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch, for the Week Ending 27th May, 1920.*

Judging from the terms of a telegram addressed by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha to all telegraphists on 16th May, the Nationalist leader would appear to have been somewhat apprehensive as to the possibility of leakage of information through Telegraph offices. The first three sentences of the message in question are anti-British in character and refer to the occupation of the capital by British forces and to an alleged British order that Turkish troops should attend the ceremony of the Selamlık without arms. It calls on the telegraphists to perform their duties conscientiously, and threatens



them with the penalty of death in the event of their not doing so. It begs them not to allow enemy gold to tempt them to actions which might bring "about the ruin and destruction of the nation".

A report received from YALOVA confirms the tenor of this telegram and states that Nationalist Censors are constantly present in the Telegraph offices.

A telegram from the Governor-General of BRUSSA to the Kaimakam of YALOVA dated 15th May gives information of a Congress recently held at ADRIANOPLÉ under the auspices of the Central Committee of THRACE, at which a resolution was passed to refuse to allow that Province to be separated from TURKEY and given to GREECE. A further resolution was adopted, expressive of determination to oppose any attempt at Greek occupation. The Thracian Central Committee which was reported to have been composed of three delegates from each Sanjak, assumed responsibility for political and other measures which it might think necessary to adopt and for the general organisation of the country for armed defence.

The Anatolian Press Agency of the 6th May announced the arrival at ANGORA on the previous morning of a foreign delegate, who was said to be a diplomatist sent on a special mission to open negotiations with the Great National Assembly. The agency stated, on official authority, that the diplomat in question had had an interview with MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha and regarded his arrival as a proof that EUROPE was willing to deal "directly with the nation instead of with an incompetent and enslaved Government".

This agency also reported on 6th May that the population of LAZIS-TAN had forwarded to the Peace Conference "through the intermediary of the French Commissioner of TREBIZOND" a protest against the annexation of their country to ARMENIA.

Anti-Armenian propoganda was the feature of the agency's issue of the 8th May in which it was stated that "the Armenians continue their atrocities against Moslems in ARMENIA". "On April 14th, near the village of HACHARBARASHT, a quarter of an hour's distance from ERIVAN, eight people were killed and on the night of April 16th a massacre of the Moslem population was begun. In this cruel and savage manner six Turkish women were killed with daggers and a number of women and girls were illtreated subsequently being burnt to death in their houses". Reference is also made in the issue of May 11th to the "ceaseless activity" of the Sinn Fein in IRELAND.

The fly sheets of the Anatolian Agency are published by the SHEMS Printing House, SAMSUN, and are sold at the rate of 100 paras per copy for the benefit of the "DAR-ul-EYTAM" or Orphanage Society.

*Reports 981, 985, 992.*

FO. 371/5169/E.6939

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 41

Secret.

*The Following is the Decypher of a Turkish Telegram Which Has Been Obtained From a Very Secret Source and Must Not Be Circulated.*

From: — ANGORA.

*Dated 9/2/20.*

To : — G.O.C. 14th Army Corps, PANDERMA.  
 O.C. 56th Division, BROUSSA.  
 „ 1st „ IZMID.  
 „ 61st „ BALIKESRI.

✓ On the pretext of the pillage of some arms and ammunition from the depot at AKBASH, DARDANELLES, which was under the supervision of the Entente troops, the British landed 200 men at PANDERMA. It is reported that our ammunition depots, which are in places where there are Entente troops, such as at AFION KARA HISSAR, and ESKISHEHIR, will be destroyed, or the ammunition will be removed to a place where we shall be unable to draw advantage therefrom.

If the arms and ammunition which we have behind the zone of operations of the National Forces are to be seized one by one on some pretext or other, and if the lines of Communication are to be occupied, the position of our National Forces which are fighting to-day will be much weakened owing to these treacherous actions.

With regard to the question of help, we deem it necessary to express hereby our opinion, believing that our commanders at AKBASH will be our guides.

✓ We see that some of our comrades are losing time by their hesitation to offer opposition. They think that the extension of occupation would probably provoke official hostilities. In such cases our commanders, who will, of course, take advantage of all the National Forces which they possess, may secure a force stronger than the enemy, and the operations which they will carry out in the name of the Nation may in no way result in official hostilities. The fact that the enemy is in isolated districts in a foreign country, often with colonial troops, decreases his audacity. I therefore request all our commanders to assume a very energetic and strict attitude against

further foreign occupations and offences, which will be directed to the aim of diminishing our assistance to the national forces on the fronts and of rendering us weak in the case of the defence of our independence.

9-2-20.

(Signed) MUSTAFA KEMAL  
For the Representative Committee.

(Countersigned) MAHMUD  
Acting O.C. 20th Army Corps.

FO. 371/5169/E. 6939

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 41

*The Following is the Decypher of Turkish Telegrams Which Have Been Obtained From a Very Secret Source and Must Not Be Circulated.*

Secret.

From:— ANGORA.

Dated 15/2/20.

To :— G.O.C. 14th Army Corps, PANDERMA.  
O.C. 61st Division, BALIKESRI.  
O.C. 56th " BROUSSA.

It is reported from CONSTANTINOPLE that it was the tug "BU-LAIR" which carried the arms and ammunition transferred from the AKBASH depot, and that Colonel SHEVKET Bey assigned this tug for this purpose.

It is further reported that the British have been informed of this, that SHEVKET Bey is in hiding, and that no communication should, therefore, be addressed to him.

When you required to communicate with CONSTANTINOPLE I beg you to do so through the Representative.

16/2/20.

(Signed) MUSTAFA KEMAL.  
For the Representative Committee.

(Countersigned) MAHMUD.  
Acting O.C. 20th Army Corps.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 41

Secret.

From:— The Ministry of War.

Dated 3/2/20.

To :— G.O.C. 14th Army Corps, PANDERMA.

It is reported that the arms and ammunition which was plundered at AKBASH was unloaded at PANDERMA and from there sent to BALIKESRI by train.

Please make inquiries respecting this case and when you have ascertained the facts, arrest the trains at once and let me know the result.

3/2/20.

(Signed) SALIA. (Sic)  
Minister of War

FO. 371/5169/E. 6939

No. 42

*Appendix "B" to Weekly Report No. 72 of 9th June, 1920, Issued by the British Military Intelligence, Constantinople.*

*Negotiations Between the Government and the Nationalists.*

According to information received from a source which is believed to be reliable, SUBHI Pasha was instructed on May 25th to make an appeal to the Nationalists to submit to the authority of the central government, in the interests of national unity. The Nationalists were asked to agree to an Armistice whilst the delegates whom they were asked to send to CONSTANTINOPLE on June 1st were negotiating the terms of the agreement. It would appear that Staff Colonel AHMED SHEFIK Bey was charged by SUBHI Pasha with the task of getting into communication with ANGORA, and the Grand Vizier's proposals were forwarded by telegraph from BILEJIK on or about May 27th. It would also appear that at the same time AHMED SHEFIK Bey proposed to meet the Nationalist delegates at BILEJIK on June 1st, but there is no information to show whether anything further resulted from these negotiations.

At the same time it would appear that Marshal ZEKKI Pasha had established direct contact with MUSTAFA KEMAL through the intermediary of Major REJEB SEZAI Bey, who was the bearer of two letters to ANGORA. The following is a translation of the second of these letters said to have been sent to MUSTAFA KEMAL at ANGORA on May 28th.

"I address you as an old and experienced Marshal who has served his country with honour and dignity for more than fifty years, who cherishes no other object than that of ensuring the highest interests of his august sovereign and of his beloved country, and who has won the confidence and sympathy of both senior and subaltern officers. I trust you will take into serious consideration the proposals which I am about to put before you. During the tragic general war your patriotic services on the DARDANELLES and PALESTINE fronts aroused feelings of esteem and sympathy in my heart for you. You may therefore rest assured that it is under the influence of such sentiments that I make these proposals to you, and I

count upon the patriotism both of yourself and of your associates to save the country from complete destruction. This will be the last attempt to negotiate.

I assure you upon my military honour, which is pure and spotless, that both the central government and we ourselves realise as clearly as yourself and the assembly over which you preside that the peace proposals handed to the delegates of our government by the Powers are impracticable and inapplicable. It is our unanimous desire, above all that of the Sultan, to obtain a modification of the peace conditions which are unacceptable and insupportable, to an extent that will be in keeping with the interests and the dignity of the Empire.

For this purpose the Government is resolved to face all difficulties, and it is a primary condition of success that every support should be given to a government which enjoys the confidence of the Entente Powers, with whom, whether we like it or not, we are obliged to maintain good relations, and that the whole world should realise that all the energy and strength of the country is united for the same purpose.

Although I have not the slightest doubt of your patriotic motives and purposes I perceive that you have fallen under the influence of a group whose sole purpose is to secure their personal safety, even though it cost the existence of the country.

Such a man as yourself, whose patriotism and devotion are acknowledged by everybody, ought to have realised in the first place the impression produced upon the Allied Powers by the situation which has been created in ANATOLIA; and secondly, what was likely to be the attitude, in view of such a situation, of a central government which had been formed under influences that were unavoidable.

At a time when our peace delegates were doing their utmost to obtain a modification of the peace treaty in such a manner as would be compatible with national honour and interests, and with the independence of the Empire, you deserted the central government, whose efforts for the welfare of the country cannot be denied and, you abandoned the centre of the Sultanate and Khalifat of EUROPE, and your conduct gave rise to internecine strife and to bloodshed among Moslems, which has merely aggravated our situation still more.

Since the government has adopted in principle the purposes which you proclaim, our aims are identical, and your obstinate continuation of the revolt will be commented upon unfavourably both by the Sultan and by the nation, for it will be said that your motives can only be dictated by personal interests.

Before taking any definite step therefore, I have considered it my duty to draw your attention once again to the following proposals. If you and your associates agree to these conditions which are put forward solely in the name of the welfare of the nation and of the country, I assure you that I will use the influence which I possess with His Majesty the Sultan to secure a re-consideration of the decisions taken against you and your associates. I will also act as an intermediary to obtain an amnesty in order that you may be restored to your former rank and honour.

1. The immediate abolition of the "Council of Commissioners" formed by the Great National Assembly. In the interval, while a chamber of deputies is being assembled in CONSTANTINOPLE within the period designated by the law, the above-mentioned Assembly, which possesses no official or legislative authority, will be dissolved.

2. The submission to the authority of the central government of all Army Corps, military units, and of the national organisation and administration.

3. The Militia having ceased operations as a result of my request to the Grand Vizier that there should be no more bloodshed until the receipt of a reply to these proposals, the necessary measures to be taken to prevent the troops under your orders from committing any act of hostility either against the local population or against the militia.

4. In accordance with the request formulated in my first letter, the names of the delegates whom you will appoint to discuss the details of the above-mentioned matters, as well as the place of meeting, to be communicated to me.

V The Imperial Government has a clear conscience, for it has fulfilled the patriotic duties which it assumed at a moment when the vital interests of the country were in question. If my proposals are not accepted by you, you will be responsible for the consequences both to yourself and to the country.

As there is no time to lose, I await an immediate reply."

On May 30th REJEB SEZAI Bey is reported to have received the following reply for transmission to Marshal ZEKKI Pasha:

"The Great National Assembly at ANGORA has been informed of the contents of the second communication from His Excellency SEKKI (sic) Pasha, Inspector General of Reforms in ANATOLIA. Whilst reserving its liberty of action, the Great National Assembly, in order to ascertain to what extent its own purposes may be reconciled with those of the Central Government, has appointed the following persons to commence negotiations with the Government delegates at CHEKIRJE on June 5th 1920:

İSMET Bey, Staff Colonel.  
 REFET Bey, Major of Artillery.  
 REJEB Effendi, Mufti of KIRSHEHIR.  
 NEJATI Bey, Deputy of SIVAS.  
 İBRAHİM Effendi, Lieutenant, Orderly Officer.  
 İSMAIL HAMI Bey, Secretary.

The Government delegates should therefore proceed to SHEKİRJE on the same date.

Orders have been given to the Military Commander of MUDANIA not to prevent the passage of delegates in possession of official credentials. Orders have also been given to the National Forces of ADA BAZAR, SABANJA, İSMİDT, and the neighbourhood thereof, to cease operations until further orders.

The Committees of the National Organisation will resume their liberty of action not later than June 7th."

(Sgd) İSMET, Colonel, Chief of General Staff of the Great National Assembly.

Issued by General Staff 'Intelligence'

Army of the Black Sea

CONSTANTINOPLE

9th June, 1920

FO. 371/5169

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 42

*Campaigns Projected by Mustapha Kemal.*

NOTE:— In considering the two Plans of Campaign issued by Mustapha Kemal, and given in Sub Appendices "C1" and "C2", it should be clearly understood that there is no possible doubt of the authenticity of these documents. They were obtained amidst a mass of . . (c) . material from the archives of the late Nationalist Government so bulky that the payment made for it would never have repaid the pay the encipherers. It is the work of many men for many months. The ciphers used are numerous and have been worked out in G.S. I, A. B. S. It has been impossible, with the Staff available here to do more than dip into this material. Until the key has been settled and a decipherer began it is impossible to say what any document is about. Probably fifty incomprehensible or trivial documents have to be tackled before an important paper such as the attached comes to light. The possibility of forgery can therefore be confidently set aside.

As has been remarked on in paras. 13 and 14 of the Report to which this is appended the most notable feature of the scheme is the difference in character between the force destined to attack the Greeks around SMYRNA and that to be brought against the French in CILICIA. With the limited forces at his disposal it must be clear to MUSTAPHA KEMAL that the launching of a serious attack with regular troops against the French would be followed by disastrous results. The hand of the Allies would be forced thereby into giving the Greeks permission to advance into ANATOLIA, which advance could only be opposed by a Nationalist force weakened by the drafting of troops to the French front. It is evident that MUSTAPHA KEMAL would be anxious to avoid the creation of such a situation.

An attack on the British forces at ISMID would tend to produce similar results.

From the Nationalist point of view an advance against Armenia would be the most likely operation to meet with success but no mention of this is made in the scheme. As far as can at present be ascertained the relations between MUSTAFA KEMAL and KIAZIM KARABEKIR the Commander of the XV Corps are not very cordial and doubt exists as to whether KIAZIM KARABEKIR would be willing to carry out MUSTAPHA KEMAL's orders in an unqualified manner. This probably accounts for the emission from the scheme of proposals for an attack against Armenia.

An offensive against the Greeks may now be considered. A few local successes at the commencement of the Campaign would bring many recruits flocking to the Nationalist colours most of them bringing rifles which at present are hidden. The Nationalists on this front are better organised than in any other area and already the irregulars are in some cases being assimilated by regular units and in others formed into regular battalions under the command of regular officers.

Ammunition dumps at KONIA and ESKISHEHR are readily accessible to the forces on this front and railway communication is better than on any of the other fronts. Reference is made in the scheme to the two Greek bases SMYRNA and ESKI FOCHA and his plan is evidently to advance from the neighbourhood of SALIHLI along the vallé of the GEDIZ CHAI and attempt to break the Greek Army into two in a manner similar to that attempted by the Germans in their advance along the SOMME valley in the Spring of 1918. In this connection MANISA may be likened to AMIENS as an important railway junction the less of which would place the Greek Army in a most precarious position. Mention is made of a small force at SOKIA and an examination of its composition reveals the fact that it will be extremely mobile. It is therefore presumed



that the main function of this force will be to deny the use of the AIDIN railway to the Greeks by a series of raids. This would render the task of turning the right Greek flank an easy matter. To summarise, the following general plan of campaign is prognosticated.

The French troops in CILICIA will be contained by Nationalist irregulars a situation which the recently reported armistice will not materially affect.

A heavy attack will be launched against the Greeks in the neighbourhood of SALIHLI while at the same time every effort will be made by the Nationalist to "bluff" the British into leaving ISMID.

Apart from the interest attaching to the plans of campaign prepared by the enemy, even in general terms, anyone studying the situation should notice how the details fit in with other information and particularly with the report of a trusted agent which is reproduced below. Particularly it should be noticed that both MUSTAPHA KEMAL and the Agent, *as far as Western Anatolia is concerned*, practically ignore the existence of "bands". Greek propaganda and the newspaper correspondents have made so much play with the "irregular forces" that the facts have been obscured.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL, subject to a certain necessity for play acting before a formal denunciation of the Armistice is trying to register the population and remobilise the Regular Army. He is collecting arms and not distributing them. In CILICIA, Arabs and Kurds will not be mobilised to the order of Turks and other methods.

The report of a trusted Agent (No. 25) who has recently toured Western Anatolia is attached as Sub-appendix "C3" in illustration of how these plans are being executed in practice, together with Notes thereon ("C4").

FO. 371/5169

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 42

*The Following is the Decypher of a Turkish Telegram Which Has Been Obtained From a Very Secret Source and Must not be Circulated.*

*Secret.*

From:— ANGORA.

Dated 24/1/20.

To :— G.O.C. 14th Army Corps, YUSSUF IZZET Pasha.  
 G.O.C. 12th Army Corps, FAHREDDIN BEY.  
 O.C. 56th Division, BEKIR SAMI Bey Effendi.  
 O.C. 61st Division KIAZIM Bey.  
 Col. RAFET Bey NAZELLI.

*To Be Opened Personally. Very Urgent.*

1. According to the latest information it is understood that the enemy has the following forces of occupation at the different places mentioned below, these forces being composed of French colonial and Armenian soldiers:—

1070 at ADANA, 270 on the TOPROK KALE-ISLAHIA Railway line, 200 on the OSSMANIA-ADANA Line, 300 at FATHA, 600 at KILIS, 1200 at AINTAB, about 1200 at MARASH. Against this the ARAB Government has one Division near ALEPPO. This Division is between the advanced position of ALEPPO-MUSLIMIA and ALEPPO-KILIS-ALEXANDRETTA.

In the port of ALEPPO, under Arab Government, a national organisation has been brought into existence and this national organisation is determined in every way not to separate itself from the solidarity of ISLAM. As it is supposed that they will move with us instructions have been sent to them. Their Divisional Commandant, a person called Lt.-Col. AMIN Bey, with the Mudir of Police of ALEPPO SHAKIR NEYMET Bey, Lt.-Col. G.S. is connected with the organisation. For the purpose of establishing a speedy liaison a cypher was sent to them, and they were informed that the necessary communications should be sent by this cypher through the nearest telegraph centre in a position to accept cyphers.

2. Upon the opposition of the inhabitants of MARASH and PAZARJIK to the unbearable attacks of the French, on the 21st of January, very severe fighting commenced and is still continuing. Our countrymen who have exhibited extraordinary sacrifices during this fight have obtained considerable success. It is understood that our countrymen were subjected to a great number of attacks in other parts under French occupation. It is imagined that the general external situation as well as that in the occupied zone of ADANA and EAST ADANA will, in the near future, oblige the National Movement to attempt to regain our legitimate rights. When this occurs action will be taken as follows:

- a. The National Detachments of the 20th Army Corps will move in the direction of the ADANA-JEIHAN region, and those of the 3rd Army Corps in that of the ISLAHIA-AINTAB region. These detachments will be reinforced by local armed organisations.
- b. The National Forces of ALEPPO after insuring the regions of ALEXANRETTA, LAZKIN, HOMS, DEURT-YOL, will form three strong detachments, the first will move in the direction of JEIHAN, the second in that of ISLAHIA and the third towards the region of AINTAB. To out the communications of the French forces

in East and West AMANUS the tunnel of ANTILLI will be destroyed.

- c. As soon as the two detachments of both sides enter the sphere of operations, the French forces will be left between 2 forces and cut off from their lines of Communication, and it will be proper for the National Commandants to send a note before the fight to the French Commandants of the nearest post in the following terms:—

We see that you are determined to cut in pieces our sacred Country inhabited by Moslems, under some pretext or other, and to annex it and to enslave the free Moslem nations. We have no patience left to endure this situation any longer. We, attached to our religion and national desires, have determined with all our being to put an end to your manifold transgressions, the nature of which is well known to us. Our forces are very much superior to what you imagine. Abandon the idea of this useless bloodshed, and be free from the just condemnation of your nation. You must return to your country in 48 hours, after handing over your arms and ammunition, in which case we shall not fail to pay you every honour, but, if the contrary happens, we shall not hesitate from making any sacrifice to obtain our legitimate rights. Awaiting your reply.

4. The Army Corps must at once organise the National Forces and place them in a state of readiness for action in accordance with the instructions of the previously given plan. It is very important that the fight commenced at MARASH should end to our advantage, and consequently we beg that the 3rd Army Corps should assist MARASH in every way from now onwards, and that the other Army Corps should urgently create strong armed organisations at those parts under occupation which were allotted to them, and to be able to do so they are earnestly requested to send now to the occupied zone National Detachments with the aim of protecting these organisations.

MAHMUD G.O.C. 20th A.C.

(Signed) MUSTAFA KEMAL

24/1/20.

Issued by General Staff "Intelligence".

Army of the Black Sea.

CONSTANTINOPLE

9th June 1920.

FO. 371/5169

## No. 43

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**Telegraphic**No. 695**Urgent.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 12th, 1920**(Received June 13th)*

Mustafa Kemal's letter. Begins:—

Chicherin received a letter from Kemal in which he expresses the desire to start diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia at once and to unite both States in their struggle with international Imperialism. Chicherin in his reply says that the Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the fact that the programme of the Nationalists is in full accord with the principles of the Soviet Government and in order to establish a close friendship with Turkey it is ready to send Russian diplomatic and Consular Representatives to Turkey. Chicherin ends his letter by wishing Mustapha Kemal every success in his present struggle. Ends.

*FO. 371/5178/E. 6346*

## No. 44

*Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.*PARIS, *June 15, 1920**(Received June 15.)**(No. 710.)**(Telegraphic.) D.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 692 of yesterday's date.

Armistice was drawn up at Angora by M. Decaix, Secretary-General of French High Commissioner, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. It was signed on 30th May for twenty days. Under it, French troops were to be allowed to withdraw from Bozanti and Sis to Tarsus-Aleppo, and from Aintab to certain distance outside the town and towards railway. Guarantees were given for safety of Armenians at latter place. French soldiers recently made prisoners were to be returned. After signature of armistice about 550 French troops, who were retiring from Bozanti, were attacked and captured. French Government expected their delivery in accordance with armistice condition above mentioned.

*FO. 406/43, p. 417, No. 287*

No. 45

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, June 17, 1920  
(Received June 18.)

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

FOLLOWING is translation of identic telegram which my colleagues and I have decided to send to our Governments:—

“The High Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy, informed by naval and military authorities of very serious situation resulting from forward and offensive movement of Nationalist forces in the directions of Constantinople and Dardanelles, have conjointly examined possible consequences of this situation, particularly from political point of view, and have decided to address to their Governments following identic telegram:—

“1. Constantinople is threatened from side of Asia, perhaps shortly from side of Thrace, and may see its commercial relations and its food supply compromised, if not interrupted, on side of Dardanelles. The Allied forces are insufficient to ward off all these dangers.

“2. Yet Allies must at all costs remain masters of Constantinople and the Straits.

“The High High Commissioners therefore urgently support the proposals of naval and military commanders, particularly in regard to immediate despatch of considerable reinforcements.

“3. The High Commissioners note that action of Nationalist forces was set in motion, just as they had foreseen, immediately that peace conditions became known, and that nature of these conditions had made nearly all Turks Nationalists.

“4. In these conditions, it becomes more than ever necessary to consider whether Turkish Delegation will sign treaty, and to consider, moreover, what that delegation actually represents. In any case, the Allies are from to-day on under necessity either of employing force to impose their will, and even to maintain themselves in Constantinople, or of introducing substantial modifications into treaty.

“5. The approach of Kemalists, and their military successes, may have as their consequence provocation of a movement of their partisans at Constantinople for the overthrow of present Government, the Chief of which is absent, and substitute a Nationalist Government in its place. In this event, ought High Commissioners to suppress such a movement and maintain Government of Damad Ferid by force, or ought they to

restrict themselves to maintenance of order and allow events to take their course (*laisser-faire*)?

"6. In the former case, the façade of Government, which is all that exists to-day, runs the risk of collapse, and Allies would then be under the obligation of taking Government and administration into their own hands. In the latter case, the High Commissioners find themselves in the presence of a Government representing a party which is declared rebellious, and which has already opened hostilities against Allied troops at several points.

"7. The High Commissioners are of opinion that the former attitude should be adopted if Allied Governments desire to uphold treaty and are resolved to despatch the necessary forces immediately; and that latter should be adopted if Governments are not prepared to undertake a new war against Turkey, and entertain possibility of modifying certain clauses of treaty, notably those dealing with territorial questions.

"8. The High Commissioners desire especially once more clearly to expose this dilemma; the first alternative being a breaking off of armistice and renewal of war; the second being an inevitable change of attitude and opening of negotiations for maintenance of treaty. These negotiations would be begun under disadvantageous condition, in consequence of strength of Nationalist organisation, the successes with which their forces have already met and the difficulty of proceeding to disarmament of Turkey.

"9. The High Commissioners beg their Governments to inform them of their intentions, and to send them identic instructions with as little delay as possible."

*FO. 406/43, p. 423-424, No. 297*

No. 46

*Mr. Wratislaw, Consul-general in Beyrout, to Earl Curzon.*

BEYROUT, June 17, 1920  
(Received June 19)

*Telegraphic*

*No. 62*

Date Feisal was expected at Aleppo June 15th. It is reported that object of his visit is to meet emissaries of Mustafa Kemal.

Addressed Foreign Office 62, repeated Constantinople.

*FO. 371/5035/E. 6783*

No. 47

*Lord Allenby to Earl Curzon.*CAIRO, 19th June 1920  
(Received June 20)*Telegraphic**No. 599*

Following from Faisal for you.

Begins.

Your Lordship,

I was greatly surprised to hear of armistice between French and the Turks under Mustapha Kemal which leaves greater part of Northern Syria and Cilicia to Turks. This armistice which is followed by such a marked retreat, even before ratification of Treaty of Peace by Turks, will be the commencement of a series of defeats in near East in which not only French but all of Allies will be involved and will shortly menace peace of Mesopotamia, Mosul and other places. Consequently desire of Turks to extend their domination towards the South will be strengthened and sphere of their influence, both actual and moral, will be overwhelming. All these things add to gravity of situation and give rise to difficulties which prejudice conclusion of possible permanent peace. The weak policy of a demoralized East and their neglect of the Arab friendship, which I, according to Your Lordship's exhortations, extended to them, have led to this grave consequence.

The concentration of French troops which have evacuated Cilicia and Syria leads one to believe their Commander in Chief intends to find some excuse for starting military operations against my Government in Damascus, and to inflict deep injuries upon it, though it is the friend of your noble Government. Undoubtedly these measures of the French Commander can be considered as being favourable to our common enemy and will consequently strengthen ambition of Mustapha Kemal and those who are behind him.

I therefore wish to draw the attention of British Government to seriousness of situation which if neglected may have grave consequences to Arab country where British interests, both there and throughout the East, will be seriously menaced.

According to Your Lordship's direct and indirect advice I have offered my hand in friendship to French, and I tender it likewise to your Government, hoping efficient steps will be taken to safeguard my country from impending danger.

I anxiously await Your Lordship's early reply to this letter and take this opportunity to renew to Your Lordship the expression of my faithful friendship towards your country.

Dated June 5th.

Ends.

FO. 371/5035/E. 6781

No. 48

*The British High Commissioner in Egypt to Earl Curzon.*

THE RESIDENCY, CAIRO, *June 19th, 1920.*  
(Received July 6)

No. 683.

(365)...

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, copy of the undermentioned paper.

I have, &c.

(For the HIGH COMMISSIONER)

From Frech Liaison Officer.

Intelligence Report (Syria) for period 1st to 7th June 1920.

FO. 371/5052/E. 7765

ENCLOSURE IN No. 48

*Renseignements. Semaine du 1 au 7 Juin 1920.*

(Extraits)

*CILICIE.*

Un accord a été conclu avec Moustafa Kémal, Président de l'Assemblée Nationale d'Angora et chef du mouvement nationaliste turc.

Malgré cet armistice les hostilités continuent sur certains points et des difficultés surgissent par suite des différences d'interprétation des clauses.

D'autre part les conditions du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie paraissent inacceptables non seulement aux nationalistes mais aussi à tous les patriotes. Elles augmentent au contraire chaque jour la puissance de Mustafa Kémal, car les éléments modérés turcs, qui ne partageaient nullement les sentiments des kémalistes font bloc avec les nationalistes, parce



que leur amour propre et leur patriotisme ne peut tolérer des amputations aux territoire national qu'ils considèrent comme rendant la Turquie non viable.

La perte d'Andrinople et de Smyrne notamment est douloureusement ressentie par tous les patrites turcs; plutôt que de s'y resoudre, ils préfèrent embrasser la cause de Mustafa Kémal qui, hier encore rebelle condamné à mort par le Gouvernement du Kalifa sera demain le héros national groupant autour de lui toutes les energies turques.

FO. 371/5052/E. 7765

No. 49

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 20th. June 1920.  
(Received July 2)

No. 879/M. 2279.

*Secret.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week-ended 10th June 1920.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5169/E. 7554

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 49

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
for the Week Ending 10th June, 1920.*

1. *THE SULTAN.*

Prince ABDUL MEJID Effendi, the Heir Apparent, recently addressed a letter to the Sultan regarding the action which His Majesty should take in the event of the Peace conditions being carried into effect. The Prince characterised them as a death sentence on TURKEY and thought that nothing short of redrafting the Treaty in its entirety would make it acceptable. He considered that as the Treaty destroyed the natural frontiers of CONSTANTINOPLE, the retention of that city as the seat of the

Khalifat was a valueless concession, more especially in view of the fact that its military and political administration was to be placed under a Commission of Control of the Straits. He recommended the Sultan to declare to the Allied Powers that under present circumstances he could no longer bear the responsibilities of the Sultanate and of the Khalifate and that he would leave to them the nomination of a successor to the Prophet. He further advised that the Sultan should issue a proclamation to the Moslem world stating that the function of the Khalif as a religious head must remain in suspense until his liberty had been restored to him. He also recommended that the Imperial influence should be utilised to put an end to the struggle between the Government and the Nationalists, with a view to obtaining a union of parties in the present crisis. He recommended that a delegation under the Presidency of an Imperial Prince should be sent to ANATOLIA with a view to bringing about a rapprochement between the two parties.

*Report 1042.*

## 2. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

According to a letter reported to have been received by the Sultan from TAWFIK Pasha, the head of the Peace Delegation is much disappointed at the Peace terms. He confesses that his belief that TURKEY would received "fair treatment" at the hands of the Allies was unfounded, but declares his conviction that ITALY, and to a lesser extent, FRANCE would assist in obtaining a modification of the present terms, since these powers believe that the treaty on the present lines will not be lasting. With a view to ensuring the assistance of FRANCE he recommends the recognition of the interest of that country in CILICIA, but considers that there is little or no, likelihood of obtaining an autonomy for THRACE and expresses the belief that it is essential to Turkish interests that the role of Great Britain in MESOPOTAMIA should be "purely consultative and advisory in character". As a first step in the direction of Moslem unity, of which in his opinion the restoration of TURKEY as a power depends, he recommends that attempts should be made to bring about a rapprochement with PERSIA.

*Report No. 1048.*

## 3. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONALISTS.

Undeterred by previous failures the Government has made a final effort to come to an understanding with the Nationalists through Marshal ZEKKI Pasha, who addressed an appeal to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha. This was based chiefly on grounds of patriotism and assured the Nationalist leader that the Central Government realised, as clearly as himself and his

followers, that the peace proposals in their present form were impracticable. The Marshal stated that the Government was, prepared to face all difficulties in its efforts to obtain their modification, but it was a primary condition of success that every support should be given to the Government enjoying the confidence of the Entente powers "with whom whether we like it or not we are obliged to maintain good relations".

He suggested that MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha had fallen under the influence of the C.U.P. and told him that he should have realised the impression which would be produced upon the allied powers by the situation which had been created in ANATOLIA.

He made the following proposals and said that in the event of their acceptance he was prepared to use his influence to secure a reconsideration of the death sentences passed on the Nationalist leaders and the restoration to MUSTAFA KEMAL himself of his former rank:—

- (1) The immediate dissolution of the National Assembly and the Council of Commissioners.
- (2) Submission to the authority of the Central Government of all the Army Corps in ANATOLIA and of the Nationalist Organisation and Administration.
- (3) The immediate cessation of hostilities against the punitive forces.

He asked that MUSTAFA KEMAL should appoint a delegation to discuss these proposals at any place of meeting which might be decided upon.

To this letter a reply was returned on 30th May that the National Assembly agreed to appoint a commission to negotiate with the Government delegates at CHEKIRJE on 5th June. Six delegates were named, the chief of whom was Colonel İSMET Bey.

It should be noted, however, that the National Assembly reserved its liberty of action and declared that its object in meeting the representatives of the Central Government was that of ascertaining the extent to which its own purpose might be reconciled with that of the Cabinet.

*Reports 1036.*

#### 4. NATIONALIST PROGRAMME.

The official Nationalist organ the "HAKİMET-İ-MİLLİE" of the 13th May published details of the Nationalist programme said to have been read by Dr. RIZA NUR before the National Assembly, the main points of which may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) The Nationalist foreign policy has for its object the inducing of the Allies to respect the national independence of TURKEY.

- (2) The home policy aims at the union and co-operation of the various elements and of the restoration and maintenance of public security.
- (3) The object of the economic policy is that of nullifying hostile economic pressure, special (sic) consideration, however, being given to the economic interest "of those powers which give actual proof of their friendship".
- (4) The assimilation of the Nationalist Forces to the regular army with a view to the above policies being supported, if necessary, by adequate military measures.

Educational, sanitary, and judicial reforms were also outlined in a somewhat vague manner.

*Report 1044.*

#### 5. NATIONALISTS AND BOLSHEVIKS.

The "Anatolian Agency" which is the official Press Bureau of the Great National Assembly, published the following statement on May 19th:—

"The news of the conclusion of the treaty between The Soviet Government and the Great National Assembly was received in BATUM with great satisfaction and enthusiasm."

*Report 1045.*

#### 6. NATIONALIST APPEAL TO ISLAM.

An appeal to the whole Moslem world was issued by the National Assembly on 9th May, being published in the official organ of that body on the 13th idem. Although referring to French operations in CILICIA, it is chiefly devoted to an attack on British policy which it states is that of destroying the unity of Islam. It accuses the British of bad faith in the occupation of CONSTANTINOPLE and attributes the appointment of FERID Pasha as Grand Vizier to British influence. The statement that FERID Pasha has signed an agreement with ENGLAND is again revived, and it is alleged that "the British have even taken the fiendish step of turning against us our own nation, our own Government, and our own Sheikh-ul-Islam". The appeal protests against the assertion that the Nationalists are enemies of the Khalif and states that the Fetwa of the latter was written under constraint. It declares that the religious leaders in Asia Minor affirm "that henceforth it is the bounden duty of all Moslems to strive to rescue the Khalif from captivity".

Quoting the saying of Sultan SELIM "we are a nation that has ruined itself for the union of Moslem hearts" it appeals for the support of the Nationalist cause "in order that the sun of Islam which has been eclipsed

may not be completely extinguished and that it may once again shine upon our Moslem world". The appeal is signed in the name of the Great National Assembly by MUSTAFA KEMAL. ✓

A further proclamation was also issued on 24th May which had evidently been written for the special benefit of the uneducated classes. It is interesting to note that the British are singled out for special condemnation. The French and Italians are also attacked, a somewhat unusual proceeding in Nationalist propaganda. This may be due to a new departure, but is more easily explained by the fact that for the Anatolian masses the world consists solely of Moslem and Jiaoul. (sic)

*Reports 1037, 1047.*

### 7. THE NATIONALIST PRESS.

The Nationalist Press of ANATOLIA continues its diatribes against the British with a bitterness reminiscent of the period during the war when the Turkish Press was entirely controlled by the Germans, except that the present anti-British propaganda campaign is based upon still wilder inventions and a less intelligent distortion of facts. The main lines of this campaign are as follows:—

- (1) The British who are the determined enemies of Islam are trying to subjugate the Islamic world (a) by sowing dissensions among Moslem nations, (b) by subordinating the Khalifat to British authority.
- (2) In Moslem countries outside the Turkish Empire dissensions are created by means of money distributed to potentates and tribal chiefs.
- (3) In order to obtain control of the Khalifat, the British bribed Damad FERID Pasha to sign a secret agreement, and having brought about his appointment as Grand Vizier, forced him to issue Fetwas and to undertake military measures against the Nationalists.
- (4) The whole Islamic world, however, is in an open or latent state of revolt against the British who are the incarnation of Imperialist tyranny.
- (5) RUSSIA, having abandoned her former Imperialist views, is the champion of oppressed nations in general, and in particular of the Moslem nations groaning under and threatened by the tyranny of British Imperialism. ??
- (6) The Moslems of ANATOLIA are therefore certain of the active support of the Moslems of RUSSIA as well as of the moral support of the whole Islamic world.

*Report 1038.*

### 8. THRACIAN SITUATION.

According to a report from Colonel MUHIEDDIN Bey, said to have been despatched on May 27th to the Ministry of War, numerous refugees were arriving in ADRIANOPLE from Western THRACE, and in particular from the BASHMAKLI, DARIDERE, KARAGACH, and DEDE-AGACH districts. Those of them capable of bearing arms were being enrolled by the THRACE PASHA ELI Association, while the women and children were being sent to the KIRK KILISSE, VIZE, and MIDIA districts. Colonel MUHIEDDIN Bey further stated that large numbers of volunteers were being enrolled to assist in resisting the Greek occupation, and he asked for special instructions in view of the attitude of the regular Army Corps, of which the Artillery commanders were said to have informed him on the 24th May that they would join the National Defence Forces with all their men and equipment if the Greeks tried to occupy THRACE.

In a second despatch dated June 1st. Col. MUHIEDDIN Bey gave an account of the Greek advance along the right bank of the MARITZA, but stated that so far the Greek troops had not attempted to cross to the other side. In the same report he stated that about 45,000 volunteers had been assembled in various districts to the south of ADRIANOPLE, as well as to the north of ENOS, and that all preparations had been made for resistance. He stated that at the request of the officers of his Army Corps, he had informed the Greek Commander that, if the Greek troops attempted, before the signature of the Peace Treaty, to occupy Eastern THRACE, they would be alone responsible for the results of such an aggression. He concluded by begging to be allowed to risk his life with his Army Corps, which he stated could not be prevented from making common cause with the National Forces, and if this request could not be granted he tendered his resignation.

JAFER TAYYAR issued on the 20th May a circular order to the commander of the Nationalist Forces in THRACE in which the Greek occupation was anticipated for the beginning of June. The inhabitants of occupied districts were directed to remain calm in order that there should be no useless bloodshed.

Volunteers of the Nationalist Army, whether in Eastern or Western THRACE, were to report on 22nd May at the latest under the penalty of death. In order that the Central Government should not be placed in a difficult position, operations were to be carried out by the Nationalist Forces only. Martial law was proclaimed as from the date of reception of the circular. JAFER TAYYAR directed that it should be explained to all volunteers that the allied powers had only attributed THRACE to GREECE for political reasons and that the zones hitherto occupied by the former

would be left to the Hellenic Army alone, that the allied military specialists had stated it would not be wise to send troops to support the Greeks and that therefore the Volunteers would have to face "only the Hellenic Army which we have often fought and conquered and which has no great military value". Reprisals were threatened in the event of the Greeks illtreating Moslems in the districts they might occupy. Doubtless with a view to encouraging his supporters JAFER TAYYAR stated that they could count on the assistance of two Bulgarian divisions. No information has, however, been received in this office, which would tend to confirm this statement.

*Reports 1031, 1032.*

### 9. PAN-ISLAMISM.

#### (1) TRANS-CAUCASIA.

From various reports which have been received from BAKU, one is able to piece together with more or less accuracy the actual sequence of events attending the Bolshevik Coup d'Etat and the subsequent developments arising therefrom.

It appears clear that the Bolshevik coup had been carefully prepared beforehand by ORJANIKIDZE, the Chief Commissar in the Northern CAUCASUS, in direct agreement with MUSTAFA KEMAL, through the latter's agents in BAKU. Some doubt appears to have been expressed by ORJANIKIDZE as to whether the small detachment of regular soviet troops which were available, would be sufficient to effect the coup in view of the possibility of the AZERBAIJAN troops putting up an opposition. Large numbers of the latter, including practically all the officers, were definitely anti-Bolshevik. It was essential to guarantee that the AZERBAIJAN troops would not oppose the Coup d'Etat, and this was attained by despatching them all to the Armenian front and diverting their attention in that direction. This plan was successful, but nevertheless there were moments when numbers of the AZERBAIJAN troops showed an inclination to return to BAKU. This clearly explains the order of the Government that the troops would remain on the Armenian front, which was their 'real' front. The fact that no efforts were made to destroy the railway line, or otherwise impede the advance of the first Bolshevik detachments towards BAKU also points definitely to the whole plot having been previously agreed upon. As far as the Tartar population was concerned, events were so cleverly planned and so quickly carried out that they had no say in the matter. The true nature of the conspiracy was concealed from them by appointing one or two more or less well known Tartars as members of the Revolutionary Committee. This again was nothing more than temporary bluff. SULTANOFF, one of the members of the "REVKON" is by no

means a Bolshevik. However, this more served its, and helped to tide over the critical stage until Soviet troops were drafted into BAKU. No excesses were committed, and the town and province maintained their outward appearance of calm. Soviet troops were then hurried in. These were for the most part anything but regular troops, and consisted mainly of independent bands of hill men and DAGHESTAN cut throats, who were hurriedly got together and persuaded to go to AZERBAIJAN under the promise of much loot. No sooner arrived in AZERBAIJAN than they began to ponder, and were hurried off to the Armenian front. A certain number of regular troops also arrived under the command of LEVANDOVDSKY, but they were very limited in number, only a few thousand at the most, and of very poor morale and discipline. Reports state that they were also very badly dressed and equipped. With the arrival, of LEVANDOVDSKY, the Bolsheviks felt that they had the situation safely in hand and at once commenced a regular Bolshevik régime. Extraordinary Commissars came down from the North, and a Cherezvichaika (Inquisitory Commission) was inaugurated. Arrests were carried out, and a considerable number of persons are said to have been shot and a greater number still to have disappeared. Among the victims were many Tartars. Some concern is felt as regards the fate of General DRAZENKOS' detachment containing a large number of Volunteer Army Officers, which was interned at GABJI. The Tartars are not in a position to expel the Bolsheviks, and strange as it may appear they actually prefer the Russians in power over them to either the Turk or their own Azerbaijani Begs. There is no national feeling among the Tartar population, in which respect they are very different from the Georgians and Armenians. There are strong rumours of a number of German officers with LEVANDOVDSKY, and it is known that a number of German or Austrian prisoners of war have come across to BAKU from TRANSCASPIA. This, however, was only to be expected. The Bolsheviks are continuing an energetic propaganda, the tendency of which is to exaggerate the number of troops at their disposal, and by assuming an attitude of aggression which they are physically unable to undertake, to encourage Bolshevik elements in GEORGIA and ARMENIA by creating a false impression of their power among the Allies, and to influence the latter in their policy in the Caucasus.

(2) *TURKEY and EGYPT.*

An Egyptian who has just arrived in CONSTANTINOPLE from GERMANY, having served as a Volunteer in the Turkish Army during 1915, stated that ABDUL MELIK HAMZA, formerly Editor of the German Pan-Islamic paper "Die Islamische Welt" has been sent by SAAD PASHA ZAGHLUL to ITALY to assist ABDUL HAMID SAID. It has been



known for sometime that ABDUL HAMID has been engaged in sending bombs to EGYPT from ITALY for the Egyptian Nationalists. It is doubtless for this work that ABDUL MALIK, who has been a prominent Nationalist agent in SWITZERLAND for some time past, has gone to ITALY.

*Reports 1033, 1035, 1040, 1041, 1046.*

CONSTANTINOPLE.  
12. 6. 20

Copies to:— High Commissioner  
M.I.I.C.  
Geneva  
Major Courtney  
Major Vivian.

FO. 371/5169/E. 7554

No. 50

*Foreign Office to Earl Curzon (Boulogne).*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 21st, 1920

*Telegraphic.*

*Cypher.*

*No. 1*

Feisal's message to you repeated in Allenby's telegram No. 599, and M. Wratislaw's telegram No 62.

Papers containing draft telegram to Feisal and draft reply to French have been sent to Boulogne in case you may wish to take the opportunity of discussing the question there. In view of Feisal's reported visit to Aleppo to meet Mustapha Kemal's emissaries, and his obvious distrust of French intentions there appears to be some danger of his joining hands with Turkish nationalists unless he is reassured without delay.

Would it be possible to obtain assurances from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to show Feisal that he need not fear unprovoked attack by the French?

FO. 371/5035/E. 6781

## No. 51

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 21, 1920.*

(No. 722. Circular.)

(Telegraphic.)

ADMIRAL DE ROBECK'S telegram No. 682 of 10th June.

French and Italian Governments will certainly agree that any weakening in face of Nationalists in or near the capital would be fatal to Allied policy. We would urge them, therefore, to furnish their High Commissioners and military commanders with all instructions necessary to ensure the co-operation of French and Italian troops in the defence of the Ismid peninsula and in preventing the Nationalists from endangering our position in Constantinople. We also trust that they will send such reinforcements as General Milne may find necessary for his purpose, in accordance with the suggestion contained in the penultimate paragraph of above-mentioned telegram.

(Addressed to Rome, No. 265; repeated to Constantinople, No. 559.)

*FO. 406/43, p. 426, No. 301*

## No. 52

*British Secretary's Draft Notes of a Conference Held at the Villa Belle, Boulogne, on Monday, June 21, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

(Extract).

2. M. MILLERAND said that he would ask Mr. Lloyd George to open the question of Turkey.

*Turkey* MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that a military situation of quite a serious character had developed in the last few days in Turkey around the Straits. It had been known to the Allied Powers that there was a formidable national movement proceeding in Asia Minor, but this movement had, until recently, constituted no menace to Constantinople. The previous week, however, Mustafa Kemal's force had moved on to the Ismid Peninsula in considerable numbers. If they established themselves on the shore of the Bosphorus, they would be able, unless prevented, to link up with the Bolsheviks. The Allied troops on the spot were, in the main, British, although there was a certain number of French and Italian soldiers there also.

The opinion of the Allied military advisers was that if the attack should develop, considerable reinforcements would be required, and the number of these reinforcements their advisers placed at at least one division. A few Italian troops were on their way to support the British, but these would not be adequate for the purpose. The only division available was a Greek division, which could be withdrawn from Thrace. M. Veniselos had happened to be in London the previous Friday, and, on being consulted by Mr. Lloyd George, had stated that he was quite willing to send this division if the Allies desired it. Mr. Lloyd George explained that he had consulted M. Veniselos in this way, as the matter was one of great urgency, and the question could not be deferred until the meeting of the conference. On the previous Saturday, Mustafa Kemal had practically reached the Dardanelles. Mr. Lloyd George said that he had consequently telegraphed to M. Millerand that he wished to consult with him on the Sunday. Had it been possible, he would have sent a similar message to the President of the Italian Chamber, but it was out of the question for any Italian representative to reach England by the Sunday. He had also asked M. Millerand to bring with him Marshal Foch, and he had invited M. Veniselos to be present. He himself, on his part, had been accompanied by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. The whole matter had received the most careful consideration of M. Millerand and himself, as well as of their military experts, at an informal meeting which had been held at Hythe the previous day. It had been decided, subject to the approval or otherwise of the other Allied and Associated Powers, that the Greeks should be asked to occupy the Ismid Peninsula. The only British reinforcements within reasonable distance of the threatened spot were two battalions at Batoum, but these were quite inadequate to influence the situation. They had, therefore, not been withdrawn. As he had said, no troops were immediately available from either France or Italy. It had been evident to M. Millerand and himself, and to their expert advisers, that Mustafa Kemal must not be allowed to reach the Bosphorus. News had reached them on Saturday that Mustafa had penetrated as far as the Dardanelles, and on Sunday they had been informed by the Greek Commander-in-chief that the Greek army was quite confident that if a strong Greek contingent could be sent to Panderma, on the south coast of the Sea of Marmora, they could march behind Mustafa Kemal and cut off the Turkish Nationalist army. M. Millerand and himself had, on receipt of this information, consulted Marshal Foch, who was the supreme military adviser to the Allies (as there was no time for the Supreme Military Commission at Versailles to assemble) as to what he thought of this project, and the Marshal had expressed himself in favour of it. Mr. Lloyd George said that he now wished to proceed to the following point. The Turks were shortly coming to Paris to discuss the terms of peace, which

had been handed to them. There was little use, he thought, in the Allies discussing these terms should Mustafa Kemal be successful and block the Dardanelles. If, however, we were able to show Mustafa that we were quite capable of dealing with him and his Nationalist troops, there was no reason why the discussion on the terms of peace should not take place. He wished to impress upon his colleagues the fact that M. Millerand and himself had come to this provisional decision as it was vital to take immediate steps to meet this new danger. It was, however, not too late for this conference to cancel the instructions which had been sent to the Greek Commander-in-chief. He wished, further, to point out that the British Government has received from its naval and military commanders in Turkey very alarmist telegrams regarding Mustafa Kemal's advance, confirming the information they had received from other sources. In conclusion, he would remind the conference that in arriving at the above decision, M. Millerand and himself had been guided by their most eminent adviser, Marshal Foch, who had reported in favour of the project.

M. MILLERAND enquired whether any member of the conference had any remarks to make in respect of Mr. Lloyd George's statement. If not, it would be understood that the conference generally approved of the measures that had been taken by Mr. Lloyd George and himself.

COUNT SFORZA said that he had purposely waited until the conference has [had] approved of the line taken by M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George before expressing certain doubts which he himself felt about the successful issue of the project. These doubts could not now sway the main issue. It was, of course, important that the conference should be unanimous. Briefly, what he wished to say was this. As the Greek division was presumably on its way to the Ismid Peninsula, the conference could only wish them every success. It was true, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, that we could not hold conversations with the Turks in regard to the terms of peace should the Nationalist army be successful, but if, in spite of the good wishes which would follow it, the Greek division did not succeed in damming the flood, the Allied Powers would have to meet the Turkish delegates in Paris and examine the Turkish reply to the draft treaty. In that event, he asked whether it might not be the case that the Allied Powers might even have to conduct *pourparlers* with the Turkish Nationalists, who, on their part, might conceivably, having grown wise by experience, be prepared to show themselves not altogether unreasonable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he agreed with Count Sforza that much depended on the successful outcome of the Greek venture. If this venture should fail, it would be clear that Mustafa Kemal disposed of formidable forces, and that these forces represented the whole strength of the Turkish

Empire. In that case, as Count Sforza had rightly pointed out, a new situation must be squarely faced. In committing the Greek troops to this project, M. Millerand and himself had, as he had said, acted on the advice which had been given by Marshal Foch and General Weygand, both of whom were well acquainted with the quality of the Greek army, and both these distinguished generals had been of opinion that the project was a sound operation. If they had over-estimated the fighting value of the Greeks, or (as possibly more likely) they had under-estimated Mustafa Kemal's strength, then a new situation would arise. The next three or four weeks would determine this.

COUNT SFORZA said he understood that unfortunately Mr. Lloyd George shared to some extent his own apprehensions. He would like to be permitted to add one word to what he himself had just said. Mr. Lloyd George had laid stress upon the fact that M. Millerand and he had been guided by the opinion of Marshal Foch. He would like to know whether Marshal Foch, at the San Remo Conference, had not stated that any big thrust at Turkey would require some 300,000 to 400,000 troops. The Greek Commander-in-chief, however, appeared to be of opinion that he could drive the Nationalists back with a single division. This seemed to him rather like the case of a doctor who saw a small boil on the skin of his patient, and who, without investigating what internal trouble this might or might not signify, thought he could cure the patient by merely removing the boil. What would be the result of the Panderma expedition? He himself was convinced that a single Greek division would not be able to cope with what might expand into a very formidable situation. This was the doubt at the back of his mind, but, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, in three to five weeks the Allies ought to know which way the wind was blowing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to explain that when Marshal Foch had mentioned 300,000 to 400,000 men as being necessary to deal any effective thrust at the Turks, he was referring to the number of troops that would be required if an expedition into the interior of Anatolia was contemplated in order to enforce the terms of the Treaty of Peace. What was now projected was merely a local operation intended to extend the Greek front up to the Dardanelles and to assist the British troops on the spot to hold the Ismid Peninsula.

M. MILLERAND enquired whether there were any objections on the part of any member of the conference to the military operations which had been explained by Mr. Lloyd George.

It was agreed—

To approve the arrangements made with M. Veniselos for reinforcing by a Greek division the Allied forces in the area of Constantinople and the Straits, and for concerted action by the Greek forces in the Smyrna area.

3. M. MILLERAND said that he would now put to the conference a somewhat *Turkish Applica-* different question from that which they had just been con-  
*tion for an Exten-* sidering, although it was undoubtedly linked up with it;  
*sion of the Time* that is to say, the application of the Turkish delegation for  
*allowed for the* a second extension of the period allowed for their reply  
*Submission of* to the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The extension  
*their Reply to the* now asked for was up to the 11th July. This application  
*Terms of the* had been made by the head of the Turkish delegation,  
*Peace Treaty* Damad Ferid Pasha, who had arrived at Versailles.

LORD CURZON asked whether this was not an application for a second postponement.

M. MILLERAND replied in the affirmative, and said that in the first instance the period had been one month. A fortnight's extension had been granted, and the present was an application for a further extension of two weeks.

LORD CURZON said that on the expiry of this further period, should it be granted, the Turkish delegation would certainly ask for yet another extension.

COUNT SFORZA thought that it was in the common interest to grant the extra fortnight. In spite of the personal antipathy existing between Mustafa Kemal and Damad Ferid, each in his way profited by any success attained by the other. As a Yugoslav had said to him during the war: 'We Yugoslavs stand to score by any success which either of the principal combatants may gain.'

LORD CURZON enquired what was the reason for this present application. The Turks had originally asked for a month in which to consider their reply. They had then begged for an extension of a fortnight, and the Allied Powers had, having regard to the circumstances of the case, thought it not unreasonable to grant this. It was now evident that the Turks were awaiting events, and should the Greeks unfortunately not succeed in their venture, in another fortnight Mustafa Kemal would be in a very strong position, and the situation would be much more difficult and embarrassing for the Allies than at present. He himself had not seen a copy of the application for the second postponement. He would be glad to know what were the reasons for the application, and he thought that the conference would do well to examine the possible motives for submitting it. Another point was this. If the extension were granted, when the second fortnight had elapsed, what would happen? The Turks would come to the Quai d'Orsay and they would hand over their reply to the draft treaty. But this would not mean the conclusion of the matter. Another month might elapse, as had happened in the case of the German treaty, while the Allies were

considering their answer to the Turkish reply. On the whole, he was in favour of insisting that the Turks should hand in their reply at once.

M. MILLERAND said that the application for the second postponement was dated the 18th June, 1920.

(M. Millerand then read the application).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, so far as his recollection went, no such favour in regard to postponement was shown to the Germans, and the question of the German treaty was a far more complicated one. On the other hand, the Turkish treaty was a simple matter. The treaty lopped off, as it were, certain limbs from the old Turkish Empire. This was not a complicated question and required very little explanation. He agreed with Lord Curzon that a further extension was undesirable, and that we ought to insist upon the Turks handing in their reply at once.

M. MILLERAND said that he himself was inclined to share the doubts and hesitation of Count Sforza in regard to this matter. He wished to point out that in the period for which the Turks were now asking a second extension, the Allied Powers meant to take certain violent measures, which, however, in the circumstances, were quite justifiable. At the same time he was disposed to think that it might be wise to grant a certain further latitude to the Turkish Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned the expediency of this. The Turks had already been given six weeks in which to submit their reply. It was quite true that we were preparing to take measures of a coercive character, but these measures were not directed against Damad Ferid and the Turkish Government, but against Mustafa Kemal, who was acting in defiance of that Government. The present situation reminded him somewhat of a case where the Turks, when remonstrated with for having annihilated over a million Armenians, had replied: 'We have certainly killed a million Armenians, but you must remember that at the same time we have killed no less than [*than*] 2 million Moslems.' Procrastination in the present instance was especially fatal, as we were dealing with an Oriental country, and any hesitation on the part of the Allies would have its repercussion in the East, where there would be a disposition to think that the Allies were not acting in entire agreement. They would imagine that Italy was opposed to the terms of the Turkish treaty, that France was opposed to them, and that Great Britain alone was standing out for these terms. If, however, that were really the case, how was it that full agreement had been reached at San Remo? Unanimity was of the greatest importance. If there were disagreement or hesitation, encouragement would be given to forces that would soon grow beyond our control. For this reason he urged that there should be no further extension. The Turks should be told that they must

answer at once, that it was quite a clear case. There was no necessity to consult any experts on the subject. Whatever might be urged by the Turkish delegates, it was of course quite certain that they would have fabricated their statistics in advance to support their arguments.

M. MILLERAND said that in that case he did not wish to insist upon his point of view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in that event M. Millerand should be invited by the conference to send a telegram to Damad Ferid, signed by him on behalf of the conference, giving the Turkish delegation an extra twenty four hours only.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that there might be a brief extension, say, up to the 1st July.

M. MILLERAND inclined to this view, as three days had elapsed before sending a reply to Damad Ferid.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he adhered to his opinion that it would be a great mistake to give any extension at all. He feared the effect of the public press and the various countries announcing 'another extension of time.'

It was agreed—

- (a) That the application of the Turkish delegation for a second extension of the time allowed for their reply to the Turkish Peace Treaty should not be granted.
- (b) That M. Millerand, as president of the Boulogne Conference, should telegraph this decision to Damad Ferid Pasha.
- (c) That if the Turkish delegation defers its reply for two or three days, no objection will be raised.

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 346-351, No. 33*

No. 53

*Lord Allenby to Earl Curzon.*

CAIRO, 23rd June, 1920  
(Received June 24)

*Telegraphic  
No. 616.*

My telegram No. 558 of June 9th.

I have received two letters from Feisal at Damascus.

1. In first, dated June 7th, is enclosed copy of correspondence of General Gouraud. It appears that Feisal recently presented him with



formal declaration for signature on behalf of French Government drafted at Damascus and purporting to be a modus vivendi within terms of San Remo decision. By it French recognition of Feisal's sovereignty should await impending remonstrance in Paris: on the other hand French authorities should be prepared after friendly discussion to hand over to Syrian Government all the areas at present occupied by their troops with the exception of Lebanon. Finally French Government should expect Arab Government to unite with it against common enemy. In reply, General Gouraud refused to sign such a document without referring to French Government who had, he said, made their position quite clear by their recent proclamation to which they would probably have nothing to add. In forwarding this correspondence, Feisal asks to be excused if recent behaviour of French authorities and in particular their agreement with Mustapha Kemal has made him suspicious of their bona fide.

He states finally that he does not desire to go to Paris he has received instructions from His Majesty's Government as to his duty with regard both to French zone and to Mesopotamia and Syria in general.

2. In his second letter, dated June 10th, he reemphasizes his opinion that persistence of French in their present policy aided by Great Britain from motives of sincere friendship is reducing Arabia to anarchy. News of armistice with Mustapha Kemal has come upon his people like a thunderbolt, he says, and has greatly damaged his prestige. He has since had to suppress several local newspapers and to banish a number of people who have been shown sympathetic to Turks.

(?The) danger he states, is imminent since Turkish forces have already crossed frontier. He ends with a strong reaffirmation of his friendship (3 groups missing) (?The) full text of these letters follows by bag.

In acknowledging them I have confined myself to an undertaking that I will communicate their contents to His Majesty's Government at first possible opportunity.

*FO. 371/5036/E. 7174*

No. 54

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, June 23, 1920  
(Received June 24.)

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 734 of 23rd June.

Reshid Bey and Jemil Pasha called on me this morning, 23rd June. They said that, thanks to preparatory work done in Paris, drafting of Turkish reply by Government here had not involved much labour, and that draft reply had now assumed form so nearly final that it would be easy to put finishing touches to it with Grand Vizier at Paris. They took line that granting further extension of time was foregone conclusion.

They said that they had intended to leave on 26th June, but that steamer for Venice was not now expected to leave before 28th June.

I urged importance of their starting at earliest moment, and, as it happens to fit in with other arrangements, I offered accommodation as far as Taranto in H.M.S. "Caradoc," sailing 26th June.

Delegates expressed hope that Turkish Government's objection to present draft treaty would be considered indulgently. I said that I could not disguise cooling effect likely to have been produced on any sympathy for Turkey felt in England by recent unprovoked attack on our troops at Ismid by so called National force. I pointed out that observers at a distance must find it difficult to discriminate between Central Government and Nationalists, when latter have started warlike operations against us within stone's throw of capital. I added that Nationalists were not only operating in Asia Minor but also in Paris, where every effort was being made to persuade Allied public opinion that Mustafa Kemal and his associates alone stood for Turkey.

I said that best thing delegates could do was to get quickly to Paris and satisfy Allies that legitimate Government of Turkey have no connection with Nationalists, who are our avowed enemies, and that delegation really represents Sultan and his people and not rebels against his authority.

Delegates denounced Nationalists with utmost fervour, but urged strongly that Turkey should be given just peace, and one likely to assure her future stability. This, they said, could only be assured by placing her under aegis of single Power, and England was the only Power qualified to fill necessary role of guide and protector. They did not expect England to undertake task from purely disinterested motives, but at least her motives

would not be local economic ones. They would be founded on her interest in regenerated Turkey as element of order and stability in the East generally. (Secret.)

My offer of transport to Taranto and my language generally were inspired by knowledge that Reshid has since returned here, being engaged in intrigue against Ferid Pasha, and strong suspicion that for some time past he has been tending towards collaboration with Nationalists for peace treaty purposes. Object of intrigue against Ferid is to reduce him to nullity in peace negotiations and perhaps to force his resignation. Game of Nationalists appears to be capture of peace delegation, in subordinate ranks of which they have strong sympathisers.

French have also hand in this game. Reshid Pasha is probably sincere in belief that Great Britain is only Power really capable of helping Turkey, but he is on most intimate terms with French, who dislike Ferid, and would be glad to see Reshid in his place. Latter might be specially convenient instrument in their hands if pro-Nationalist element in high French circles gain ascendancy, as they seem increasingly likely to do, and succeeded in giving new orientation to French policy in Turkey on lines of establishing understanding with Mustafa.

*FO. 406/43, p. 432, No. 309*

No. 55

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 24th. June, 1920  
(Received, July 8)

*No. 908/M. 2418/4.*

*Secret.*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram, No. 709 of 16th. June, relative to the situation in Cilicia, as described by Dr. Kennedy, I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, copy of a report which I have received from the Military authorities, containing a statement published by Mustafa Kemal, regarding the conditions of armistice between the French and the Nationalist forces in these regions.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5052/E. 7895*

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 55

*Copy of an Intelligence Report adressed to Admiral de Robeck.*

*June 12th. 1920*

✓ *Secret*

*Franco - Turkish Relations.*

As a result of negotiations between the Nationalists and the French, the following conditions of armistice have been arrived at:

1. From midnight on the 29/30th May, 1920, French hostilities to cease on all fronts. The Armistice is to last 20 days.

2. At Bozanti and Sis, the French troops with their arms and munitions will retire to the rail line Adana/Mersin. The town of Aintab will be evacuated by the French. The French troops who are in the town will assemble at the Head Quarters situated outside the town.

The evacuation of Aintab, Sis and Bozanti, will take place within the first 10 days of the Armistice.

3. Within the first 10 days of the armistice all French prisoners in the hands of the Turks will be given up, and all civil and war prisoners retained at present by the French will be also given up.

4. Communications between Ottoman officials and the town of Adana and neighbourhood to be resumed.

Details concerning the evacuation of Aintab, Sis and Bozanti, as well as details regarding the release of prisoners, will be given in a communiqué.

At present it is given out that the armistice will be declared on the morning of the 30th. May. The order will be given out on the 30.5.20 to the Advance Guards troops.

The above named terms will be given effect in all details. I desire (Moustafa Kemal) that they shall be respected. On the day that the troops are informed of my orders, the same orders will also be given out here.

These orders have been communicated to:

- 12th. A.C. at Konia
- 13th. A.C. at Diarbekr
- 3rd. A.C. at Sivas
- 11th. Division at Nigdé

as well as to the National Forces at Cilicia and Aintab.

*28/29th. May 1920*

President of the National Council

(Sd) MOUSTAFA KEMAL

Informant thinks that this Armistice has been signed by a certain French officer and Mustafa Kemal because this army officer has left Constantinople for Antalia and with him a certain number of Kemalites. (sic).

*FO. 371/5052/E. 7895*

No. 56

*Lord Granville to Earl Curzon.*

*Telegraphic*

Athens, June 24th. 1920  
(Received June 28)

*No. 161.*

*Secret.*

Following information derived from two conversations yesterday with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War.

Greek advance in Asia Minor began June 22nd advanced Turkish troops being scattered without difficulty. Object to cut Kemal's communications in direction of Sea of Marmora. They hope Kemal will stand which he will be obliged to do for political and prestige reasons in which case they expect important battle in very few days and feel assured of victory. On the other hand military and strategical reasons may make Kemal retire which will render operations much longer, more costly, and more difficult.

Xanthi Division is ready on receipt of definite orders to embark at Dedeagatch to reinforce British troops at Ismid.

Idea of occupying Eastern Thrace postponed till conclusion of operations in Asia Minor.

They are very nervous as to possible action by Bulgaria who they say has not disarmed and has at present some 50,000 men or more than double number allowed by treaty.

Please inform D.M.I.

Repeated to Constantinople for General Milne.

*FO. 371/5134/E-7350*

No. 57

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 24, 1920

*(Received July 2.)**(No. 915.)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 822 of the 11th June, 1920, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from General Milne in response to my request for any observations with regard to the replies of the French and Italian High Commissioners (copies of which accompanied my despatch referred to above) particularly with reference to cypher telegrams.

2. In forwarding this reply for your Lordship's consideration, I venture to offer the following remarks with regard to the contentions put forward by my colleagues.

3. Movements of French troops have take place in Cilicia without any intimation having been conveyed to myself by the French High Commissioner here. Warlike operations have been engaged in, events have occurred which have profoundly affected the safety of the native Christian population, and finally an armistice has been concluded by the French authorities with Mustapha Kemal, who is in open rebellion against the Constantinople Government and in direct conflict with the forces of the Allies. All this has taken place without any direct information of the facts being conveyed to me by my French colleague.

4. Similarly no communication has ever been made to me at any time by my Italian colleague with regard to the disembarkation and movement of Italian troops in the south-west portion of Asia Minor. Officially, in fact, I am not aware of their existence there.

5. From the above I suggest for your Lordship's consideration that it would appear that my colleagues wish in these matters to have one law for themselves and another for us.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

## ENCLOSURE IN NO. 57

*General Sir G. F. Milne to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 23, 1920*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 9th June, forwarding letters received from their Excellencies the French and Italian High Commissioners on the subject of the supreme control of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control of the Ottoman Ministry of War.

I have to remind your Excellency that I received orders from His Majesty's Government to carry out the military occupation of Constantinople and to assume control of the War Office. This is therefore a purely military question, and so long as the representatives of the Allies do not recognise my authority, I am unable to discuss any of the points in question.

As regards the question of the telegrams, I have issued instructions, as I am in no way responsible for operations in Thrace, that all messages be shown to the commission, but as I am in command of Allied forces in Asia Minor, I must reserve to myself the liberty of taking such action as I consider right in this case.

G. F. MILNE,

*Commanding-in-chief, Army of Black Sea.*

FO. 406/44, p. 60, No. 37/1

No. 58

*Proclamation issued by General Paraskevopoulos.*

*June 24, 1920.*

(Translation).

THE Greek army has been invited by the Supreme Council to advance into the interior of the country in order to break up the Nationalist organisation of Mustapha Kemal and to re-establish order and security in the interest of the entire population, without distinction of race or religion. This advance of the Greek army is with no aim of conquest. The fate and political situation of this territory will be settled by the Treaty of Peace which will be signed by the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Government.

The partisans of Mustapha Kemal, who compose the Nationalist organisation, are not only rebels who oppose the decisions of the victorious Allies, but also the enemies of their own country and Sultan. Since the armistice, they have done nothing but, illegally and forcibly, recruit and

impose taxes, and terrorise the peaceful population of the vast and rich lands of Anatolia, and obstruct the resumption of industry and the normal way of living.

The Greek occupation of Smyrna and Hinterland has so far proved its respect for the rights of the inhabitants without distinction of race and religion. In spite of great difficulties, it has assured order, equality, and justice for all. The Greek army will observe the same attitude under the present circumstances.

*The lives, honour, and worldly goods of all inhabitants, no matter of what race or creed, will be regarded by us as sacred.*

The Ottoman administrative authorities (police, judicial, financial, communal, and others, only excepting military) will continue their functions as in the past, and the Ottoman functionaries are invited to resume their duties. Those of them who, through misguidance, fear, or by the order of a superior authority, have to a certain extent collaborated with the Nationalist organisation of Mustapha Kemal, have nothing to fear, provided that henceforward they abstain from collaborating or communicating with this organisation, and that they respect the orders and security of the Greek army.

I make the same promise to partisans of Mustapha Kemal, on condition that they cease all relations with him and return peaceably to their occupations.

On the other hand, I demand entire obedience to my orders and those of the commanders of the army of occupation; peaceful conduct, strict abstention from any act which would be harmful or dangerous to the Greek army or its material, or any act of a character harmful to public order or the life, honour, or belongings of the inhabitants of this region.

Those who disobey, without distinction of race or creed, will be immediately and severely punished by martial law. The clemency which has on several occasions during the past year been shown by the Greek occupation cannot be continued to-day under the existing circumstances. In consequence, persons arrested for offences committed against the army or public safety will be tried by court martial and executed on the spot.

I. PARASKEVOPOULOS.

*General Officer, Commander-in-chief*



No. 59

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, June 26, 1920  
(Received June 26.)

(No. 751.)

(Telegraphic.)

GENERAL MILNE has shown me a telegram from War Office which states that M. Millerand has proposed that French should assume entire military control over Constantinople on behalf of Allies, whilst General Milne should, as hitherto, be responsible for Asia Minor.

I would point out that acceptance of this proposal would mean that our predominant position at Constantinople as Power which defeated Turkey in war, made armistice and executed military occupation of town this year, would be sacrificed, and that French would take our place and play leading rôle.

We are now at war with Turkish Nationalists, and have in addition to ensure execution of terms of Peace Treaty. If we hand over Constantinople to French we give up control of place, which is strictly only possible base for all military and naval operations in Turkish area.

We should also resign to French our present predominant position in being able to influence the Sultan, Turkish Cabinet and Sublime Porte. We are the Power which is determined to execute Peace Treaty in spite of Nationalists; our French Allies may, however, at any time decide that a policy of compromise with Nationalists is more in accordance with their interests. They have been in communication with Mustafa Kemal, and have made an armistice with him in Cilicia. If they controlled Constantinople they would be in a position to bring in a Nationalist Government here, which would create a situation making execution of present Peace Treaty impossible.

I can see no advantage to Allied cause in M. Millerand's proposal, and its only object appears to be to establish French in position of predominance in Constantinople at our own expense.

The argument in favour now put forward, viz., that separate areas of command are necessary to ensure Allied occupation, is diametrically apposed to contention previously maintained that General Milne was in supreme command of Allied armies in Orient.

*FO. 406/43, p. 434, No. 313**D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 95, No. 94*

No. 60

*Lord Derby to Earl Curzon.*

PARIS, 26th June 1920  
(Received June 29)

No. 2036.

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the "Cause Commune," the Russian Weekly newspaper published in Paris, prints in its issue of to-day's date a letter signed by Monsieur Chicherine to Mustapha Kemal Pasha at Angora. The letter acknowledges a communication received from Mustapha Kemal expressing the wish to establish relations with Soviet Russia and to participate in the struggle against foreign imperialism, and setting forth the eight fundamental principles of the Government at Angora. Monsieur Chicherine's letter recapitulates these eight principles which are as follows:—

1. The independence of Turkey
2. The Union with Turkey of all territories undoubtedly Turkish.
3. The independence of the States of Arabia and Syria.
- ✓✓ 4. The right of self determination to be granted to the populations of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan and Lazistan, of the Batoum Region, of Eastern Thrace, and of the districts inhabited by Turco-Arabs, it being understood that by this is meant that a plebiscite will take place in these areas, that refugees and emigrants who have been compelled by "force majeure" to leave their homes will be able to participate in it, and that for this reason they will be permitted to return there.
- ✓ 5. All the rights accorded to the minorities of European States enjoying the greatest freedom to be similarly accorded to the minorities of the new Turkish State.
6. The question of the Straits to be solved by a Conference of the States situated on the shores of the Black Sea.
7. The abolition of the capitulations and of economic control by foreign States.
8. The abolition of all foreign spheres of influence.

The letter expresses the hope of the Soviet Government that diplomatic negotiations will permit the Turkish Nationalist Assembly to determine the exact frontier between Turkey and Armenia and Turkey and Persia in conformity with the principles of justice and self-determination, and declares that the Soviet Government is ready to serve as arbitrator as soon as the interested parties shall have requested it to do so.

It concludes with expressions of friendship and sympathy with the new Turkish State.

The text of the article which publishes the letter is forwarded for convenience of reference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DERBY

FO. 371/5178/E. 7384

ENCLOSURE IN No. 60

*Extract from the "Cause Commune" 26 June 1920.*

**TCHICHERINE ET MUSTAPHA-KEMAL PACHA**

Le 4 juin, par l'intermédiaire du représentant du nouveau gouvernement ottoman, Tchitcherine a adressé la note suivante à Moustapha-Kemal pacha, président de la Haute Assemblée Nationale turque, siégeant à Angora:

Monsieur le Président de la Haute Assemblée Nationale turque,

Le Gouvernement soviétiste a l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la lettre dans laquelle vous exprimez le désir de rétablir des relations normales avec nous et de participer à la lutte commune contre l'impérialisme étranger qui menace nos deux pays. C'est avec une grande satisfaction que le Gouvernement soviétiste a pris connaissance des principes fondamentaux de la politique extérieure du nouveau gouvernement d'Angora.

Ces principes sont les suivants:

1. Déclaration de l'indépendance de la Turquie;
2. Réunion à l'Etat turc, de tous les territoires incontestablement turcs;
3. Déclaration de l'indépendance des Etats d'Arabie et de Syrie;
4. Décision de la Haute Assemblée Nationale Turque d'accorder le droit de disposer d'elles-mêmes aux populations de l'Arménie turque, du Kurdistan, du Lazitan (sic), de la région de Batoum, de la Thrace orientale et des localités habitées par des Turco-Arabs. Il va sans dire que le gouvernement laisse entendre, par cette déclaration, qu'un plébiscite aura lieu dans ces régions et que les réfugiés et les émigrants, qui avaient été obligés de quitter leur pays par suite de circonstances indépendantes de leur volonté, pourront y participer, et c'est pourquoi ils devront être autorisés à revenir dans leur pays respectifs;
5. Reconnaissance, aux minorités nationales des localités faisant partie du nouvel Etat turc à la tête duquel est la Haute Assemblée Nationale

Turque, de tous les droits accordés aux minorités nationales des Etats européens les plus libres;

6. La question des Détroits doit être résolue par une conférence des Etats situés sur les bords de la Mer Noire;

7. Abolition des capitulations et des contrôles économiques des Etats étrangers;

8. Abolition de toute "sphère" d'influence étrangère.

Le Conseil soviétiste prend en considération le désir de la Haute Assemblée Nationale Turque de travailler en commun et de lutter ensemble contre les gouvernements impérialistes d'accord avec les hauts principes de libération des peuples opprimés.

Le gouvernement soviétiste espère que les négociations diplomatiques permettront à la Haute Assemblée Nationale Turque de déterminer les frontières exactes, entre la Turquie et l'Arménie d'une part, et la Perse de l'autre, conformément aux principes de la justice et du droit des peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes. Le gouvernement soviétiste est prêt à servir d'arbitre entre les parties intéressées, quand elles en manifesteront le désir.

Dans le but d'établir des relations amicales et durables entre la Turquie et l'Arménie, le Gouvernement soviétiste propose de rétablir à bref délai les relations diplomatiques et consulaires. Le gouvernement soviétiste tend une main amicale à tous les peuples du monde et, restant fidèle à son principe, il reconnaît à tous le droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes. C'est avec le plus grand intérêt que le gouvernement soviétiste suit la lutte héroïque menée par le peuple turc pour son indépendance et sa souveraineté. Dans la pénible période que traverse actuellement la Turquie, le gouvernement soviétiste pose des fondements durables de l'amitié, qui unira à l'avenir les peuples de la Turquie et de la Russie.

Portant l'exposé ci-dessus à votre connaissance, j'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Président de la Haute Assemblée Nationale, de vous adresser, au nom du peuple de la République fédérative ouvrière et paysanne, les meilleurs souhaits de succès au peuple de la Turquie luttant pour son indépendance.\*

TCHITCHERINE,

Commissaire du peuple  
aux Affaires étrangères.

FO. 371/5178/E. 7384

\* Bu belge İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki şekilde yorumlanmıştır:

"If this document is genuine, it wd seem that, as Mustapha Kemal Pasha has also sent communications to the French and British Foreign Secretaries, while we are dealing with Krassin, it is now a parti à quatre. Points 6, 7 and 8 would doubtless be seductive to the Turks, but Point 4 concerning self-determination of various areas is distinctly comprehensive and "districts inhabited by Turco-Arabs" (probably Cilicia and a wide belt of

northern Mesopotamia) is too vague to be attractive to the Nationalists. Mustapha Kemal's alleged official correspondence with Moscow may be by-play to influence the San Remo decisions, and, on the whole, even Nationalist Turks would probably prefer to settle with the Entente than accept the embraces of Bolshevik Moscow.

G. H. Fitzmaurice  
30/6/20"

"Probably, but a patriotic Turk might well hesitate between the illicit embraces of Moscow and marriage lines of the Entente. If he decided for the latter there is always the L. of N. as a Davece Court.

D. G. Osborne  
30/6"

No. 61

*Copy of Confidential Memo. No. 4761/C/6 of 28th June, 1920, from P. O. Mosul to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, (copy to S. S. O. Mosul; and A. P. O. Dohuk for information and favour of passing to A. P. O. Zakho).*

I forward herewith a letter received from Sulaiman Agha of the Shernakh together with a further batch of papers brought down by his mulla, Abdul Karim. ✓

From these papers it appears that:—

- (a) Sulaiman Agha has been elected as their chief by the Shernakh confederation in supersession of Abderrahman.
- (b) that Akif Beg has taken over command of the 2nd Division from Ali Beg who we had reason to believe a moderate.

The chief point in Sulaiman's letter is the request for a ruler of the Badr Khan family to be sent to them. ✓✓

In the other papers we find Moh'd Saleh etc. Yuzbashi Rashid Beg spreading the news of the recent disturbances and trying to bring about an attack on Zakho. Akif was apparently supporting this but the project falls through owing to the shortage of rifles, no support by trained troops and possibly the passive resistance of the Shernakh tribes.

The "Ahd Committee" in Mosul seem to be in connection with Moh'd Saleh. ✓

I am replying to Sulaiman in general terms, assuring him of the Government's favour and that his request re. the Badr Khans has been forwarded. I am informing him of the Tel Afar troubles and the nature of the

people who caused them and am sending him a copy of the Shaikh al Islam's fatwa against Mustapha Kemal. To attempt to dispel the Armenian bogey, which here crops up once again, I am informing him of the decision of the Peace Conference of giving Kurdistan an opportunity of voicing its wishes for its future.

The originals should be compared with the translations which are not vouched for.

*FO. 371/5069/E. 10033*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 61

From:— Sulaiman Agha al Tatar Agha, Rais Ashnat Shernakh,  
To:— British Political Officer, Mosul.

*25/6/20*

I am sending you herewith my man Abdul Karim of Bitlis who is my personal clerk in whom I have every confidence and whose words may be considered as mine.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha has severed Kurdistan and the Vilayets of Anatolia from the Turkish Government of Constantinople and according to the plan of the Committee of Union he established a temporary Independent Government at Angora. It is hard for us the people of Kurdistan to be under such a low and despicable set of intriguers who have been treacherous to the Ottoman Government. For want of a chief who would unite all Kurdistan under him and do away with this conspiring lot, they have taken in hand the civil and military administration and are driving us like sheep before them. In order to overthrow them the whole of the Kurdish nation must become one body, and for establishing the independence and self government of Kurdistan under the protection of Great Britain some members of the Bedir Khan family which is the most notable of Kurdistan who are now residing at Constantinople should be brought to Mosul and Zakhō.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha has established a Cabinet at Angora and is inciting all our tribes to take hostile measures against the British Government and is pressing them with propaganda. I, notwithstanding, swear by my honour to do all I can to impede the progress of these instigators and to give all assurances of a peaceful attitude towards the British Government. Bearer, Abdul Kerim will supply all the necessary details. Please place him under your favourable regards. With due respects. Sd - Sulaiman Agha.

*FO. 371/5069/E. 10033*

No. 62

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th. June 1920  
(Received July 14)

No. 934/M. 2279

Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, summary of Intelligence Reports issued by the Constantinople Branch of the M.I.I.C., for the week-ended 23rd June 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5170/E. 8234

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 62

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued By M.I.I.C.,  
Constantinople Branch, For Week Ending 23rd June, 1920.*

Secret

## 1. THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

A telegram received on 21st inst. from TEWFIK Pasha states that in an interview with the general secretary of the Peace Conference, the latter had given him to understand that:—

- (1) The subservience of the Sublime Porte to a "certain Great Power" was regarded by the French Government as contrary to French interests. ✓
- (2) The Peace Conference might make certain concessions with regard to the International Commission of the Straits, the capitulations, the economic and judicial clauses, and even the territorial conditions, provided that the Sublime Porte could guarantee the integral application of the treaty which would be signed by the Turkish plenipotentiaries. ✓

The Chief of the Turkish Peace Delegation hoped to get into communication with the Nationalist delegates reported to be in PARIS, and urged that the Grand Vizier, or a special representative, should proceed to that town forthwith.

Report 1066

## 2. *TURKISH COUNTER PROPOSALS.*

A document has been received in this office purporting to be the summary of the counter proposals which the Turkish Government intends to present to the Peace Conference. The principal points of the counter proposals are as follows:—

- (1) The Turkish Government accepts the principle of the League of Nations unconditionally.
- (2) The cession of any territory to GREECE, viz: THRACE and SMYRNA, is unacceptable to the Turkish Government.
- (3) The independence of ARMENIA is recognised, but objections are made with regard to the port on the Black Sea.
- (4) The independence of the HEJAZ is recognised.
- (5) The articles concerning MOROCCO and TUNIS are agreed to.

The attitude adopted by TURKEY with regard to THRACE and SMYRNA is a firm one, and it will be interesting to see what action they will take when the psychological moment for enforcing the peace terms arrives.

*Report 1074*

## 3. *THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.*

In the summary for the week ending 13th May, page 4, para 3, an account was given of a portion of MUSTAFA KEMAL's speech on the occasion of the opening of the Great National Assembly convened at AN-GORA. The BRUSSA newspaper "MILLET YOLU" in its issues of 7th - 28th May gives the continuation of the speech.

MUSTAFA KEMAL read a letter addressed by him to the Grand Vizier on the subject of the meeting of the Crown Council as reported by the T.H.R. agency and the report of the same meeting as issued in the STAMBUL Press, in which he had pointed out that the discrepancy in the statements of the Agency and the Press tended to create disturbances in the country.

The Nationalist leader then recounted to the Assembly the series of events which led to DAMAD FERID Pasha's mission to PARIS, at which period he received a summons from SHEFKET TORGUD Pasha, who was then Minister of War, to return immediately to the capital. MUSTAFA KEMAL being at a loss to understand this request asked JEVAD Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff for an explanation. The latter who replied by telegram stated that the presence in ANATOLIA of MUSTAFA KEMAL was not looked upon favourably by the British.



It was then that MUSTAFA KEMAL decided to convoke a General National Assembly at SIVAS, the Eastern provinces having already convoked an Assembly at ERZURUM. Meanwhile the Direction of Posts and Telegraphs refused to forward any telegrams from the Associations for the Defence of National Rights, which to the Nationalist mind was a grave crime amounting to a betrayal of Islam. Correspondence then took place between the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, the Ministry of War, and the General Direction of Posts and Telegraphs.

The Nationalist leader then read a passage of a circular from ALI KEMAL Bey, then Minister of the Interior, which stated that the Government, though fully realising the injustice of the occupation, was not in a position to declare war against GREECE or any other country. On the other hand the Government hoped that the delegates to the PARIS conference would succeed in saving the integrity of the country. The circular advised MUSTAFA KEMAL to "take defensive measures against those who were preparing to act and to give them no opportunity to restore their position."

MUSTAFA KEMAL stated that in reply to the above communication he wrote to H. M. the Sultan informing him of the orders issued by the Minister of the Interior and the General Direction of Posts and Telegraphs. He pointed out that these orders were issued with intent to silence the voice of the nation and assured His Majesty that the sole aims of the people were to save their holy patrimony and H. M.'s throne from dismemberment. He pointed out that the action taken was opposed to the welfare of the country and when the circumstances became fully known there would be a want of confidence in the Government.

Continuing his speech the Nationalist leader stated that it was not until his arrival in SIVAS on June 27th 1935 that he learnt from a circular issued by ALI KEMAL Bey to the Civil Authorities that he had been dismissed from the Army. As a result of this circular MUSTAFA KEMAL sent telegrams to the Grand Vizierate and to the Minister of War, the purport of which was that, having received no orders from H. M. Sultan to this effect, he would not recognise ALI KEMAL's circular and that such policy could only create anarchy in the nation, confusion among Ministers, lawlessness and disorder in the country. The telegrams announcing ALI KEMAL's withdrawal from the Cabinet were, however, sufficient proof of the Government's disapproval of his action.

After the announcement in the Press of the resignations of ALI KEMAL and SHEFKET TORGUD Pasha, MUSTAFA KEMAL received a despatch from the latter which stated that the Council of Four had allowed the Turkish delegation to proceed to PARIS. The Minister of War pointed

out that the fate of the nation was unknown, but one source of consolation was that enemy public opinion appeared to be turning in their favour. When, however, the enemy saw the present opposition, they would put an end once and for all to the already precarious existence of the country. The Minister appealed to MUSTAFA KEMAL as a friend and a patriot to return immediately, without raising any difficulty.

The Nationalist leader saw no reason to reply to this despatch, having by this taken steps for the convocation of the Sivas Conference after that of ERZURUM.

On 2nd July MUSTAFA KEMAL received a telegram from the Secretary of the Imperial Palace written in the name of H. M. the Sultan, which begged MUSTAFA KEMAL to return to CONSTANTINOPLE, pointing out that his organisations in ANATOLIA were attracting the attention of the British. The Secretary stated that MUSTAFA KEMAL's dismissal had not been confirmed, but it was thought desirable in the interests of the country that the Nationalist leader should be granted leave, which could be extended until the situation was more settled and peace had been concluded.

On the same date MUSTAFA KEMAL received a letter from (Damad) FERID Pasha written in a very cordial manner, informing him that the latter had once more been appointed Minister of War. (Damad) FERID stated that he found the situation a somewhat difficult one and added that, knowing and understanding MUSTAFA KEMAL so well, he was at a loss to account for the misunderstanding between the Government and the Nationalist leader; it was, however, the Sultan's opinion that in the interests of the country he should relinquish his command and should apply for leave and a change of air!

To this MUSTAFA KEMAL replied that he could well find a change of air in ANATOLIA!

Further correspondence then ensued between (Damad) FERID, MUSTAFA KEMAL, and the Sultan, regarding MUSTAFA KEMAL's position in ANATOLIA, the result being that the latter declared himself willing to sacrifice his military career, but refused to relinquish the leadership of the Nationalist Forces and remained in that capacity as a loyal and patriotic citizen.

*Report 1065*

##### 5. THE NATIONALISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT.

In continuation of para 3, of the summary for the week ending 10th June, a final reply from the Nationalists to the Government was sent from ANGORA on June 14th. The reply was uncompromising, the Nationalists

refusing to have any dealings with the Government and stating that they would continue to act independently until a "legal" form of administration was established.

ZEKKI Pasha's negotiations have thus definitely broken down.

*Report 1067*

*FO. 371/5170/E. 8234*

No. 63

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 1, 1920.*

*(Received July 14.)*

*(No. 939.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that an Armenian newspaper published at Constantinople—the "Erivan"—submitted its proposed issue to the Inter-Allied Censorship Bureau on the 21st June. The majority of the articles being considered unsuited for publication under present conditions obtaining at Constantinople, the editor was so informed. The paper was, however, published in defiance of the censor's instructions, and has since been suppressed.

2. The articles referred to are, however, of sufficient interest to merit your Lordship's consideration, and I have the honour to enclose translations.

3. I would particularly invite your Lordship's attention to the reported comments of Colonel Bremond on the proclamation of General Diefueux.

4. It is perhaps superfluous to remark upon the state of affairs now obtaining in Cilicia as revealed by these proclamations and orders, compared with the tranquillity which was general in that province whilst under British military occupation last year.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
*High Commissioner*

*FO. 406/44, p. 65, No. 45.*

## ENCLOSURE I IN No. 63

*Passages deleted in the Armenian bi-weekly paper "Erivan" of June 21, 1920, and published contrary to instructions.*

THE ARMENIANS PROCLAIM THE INDEPENDENCE OF CILICIA.  
ULTIMATUM GIVEN TO THE NATIONALISTS BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE ARMENIAN FORCES.

RECENT information received from Adana is really wonderful. The Armenians have understood that their only salvation was to take up arms, defend their honour and fight for the future generations, instead of waiting to fall a prey to savages. Oh! hope, oh! wonderful and swift event. The Armenians placed their confidence in others for years and years without any result. The Armenians were hungering for peace, and, then abandoned by their friends, fell a prey to an ambitious enemy and were thus repeatedly persecuted. In order to assure his honour and existence, the Armenian has now had recourse to a desperate remedy. He is now face to face with his enemy; the enemy who, not content with having persecuted him for centuries, attempted lately to give him the *coup de grâce*.

The Armenian never wished or proposed to begin hostilities, but the recent conduct of his friends and enemies has induced him to take up arms and undertake a determined defence. The Armenians have been deceived by false promises. When the French came to Cilicia and hoisted their flag, the Armenians never expected that the future would bring them such disastrous results. Now the French are hauling down their flag and leaving us alone in the hands of the Turks, whose sanguinary appetite has become keener. This is known not only to the Armenians, but also to the civilised world. Is it possible to remain quiet and indifferent before such a menace? No! To do so would mean that the Armenians should sign their death sentence with their own hand.

Then our friends, in adorning our graves with wreaths, would put up an inscription stating:—

J "Here lie the Armenian people who did not know life and who are worthy to die."

No! Such a coward's suicide is inconceivable for us. That is why we have decided to save the present and secure the future.

No! It is with the object of preventing this that we have declared the independance of our mother country Cilicia.

The Armenians' situation is critical. You are all living under the same "Sun" and you are called upon to assist our heroes, morally, materially, and physically. You must give help to those who fight in order to save their

honour and what remains of the ruins of Roupignan. They must be victorious. God is on their side.

If they are vanquished they will have the honour of being buried in the sacred ruins of their fatherland. Then shame to the others (allusion to the Allies).

After the proclamation of independence, an ultimatum was sent to the Nationalists.

As the result of a Franco-Nationalist's arrangement, the French have withdrawn their troops from Cilicia, concentrating them on the line Mersina-Adana, thus leaving the Armenians in the hands of their tyrants. The Armenians of Amanos thereupon proclaimed the independence of the country, as being a province attached to Armenia.

The commandant of the Armenian national troops called Serop Roupignan, alias Serop Pasha, alias Prince Chichmanoff, alias Mourad Pasha, sent an ultimatum to Mustafa Kemal calling upon him to withdraw his troops from Cilicia within forty-eight hours, and stating that otherwise he would not be responsible for any subsequent events which might take place. A special delegate presented a copy of this ultimatum to the French commandant at Adana. This declaration of independence has been proclaimed in all the other districts evacuated by the French as a result of their agreement with the Kemalists. The Armenians are master of the situation and firmly maintain their position in the whole of Cilicia.

FO. 406/44, p. 66, No. 45/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 63

ERIVAN

*Copy of the Agreement made between Mustafa Kemal and the French.  
Circular from Mustafa Kemal to his Commanders.*

THE following are the results of my negotiations with the French:—

Article 1. Hostilities against the French will cease on all fronts from midnight 29th/30th May.

Art. 2. The French troops occupying Bozanti and Sis will evacuate these places, taking with them all their arms, ammunition and stores, and withdrawing on to the railway line Mersina-Adana. This evacuation must be completed within ten days.

Art. 3. Within ten days' time all French prisoners of war interned in our camps will be sent at liberty. The French will reciprocate by setting free our prisoners, either civilian or military.

*They give it*

*RROR  
arr the specially  
defeat and  
test of the French!*

Art. 4. Free communication is allowed to take place between the Ottoman officials of Tarsus and Adana. The evacuation of Bozanti, Sis and Aintab will be arranged for in a special agreement as well as the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners between the two parties. For the present we have to ensure that hostilities cease immediately as from the 30th May in the early morning. This order must be communicated to our advanced lines on the 31st May at latest.

I strictly insist on the fact that my orders in this respect must be carefully acted upon. Please let me know the exact time, day, hour and minute at which you communicate my present orders.

This order is simultaneously communicated to:—

1. The Commander 12th Army Corps, Konia.
2. The Commander 10th Army Corps, Diarbekir.
3. The Commander 3rd Army Corps, Sivas.
4. The Commander 11th Division, Eregli.
5. The Commandant of the Nationalists, Cilicia.
6. The Commandant of the Nationalists, Aintab.

MUSTAFA KEMAL

*The President of the Great National Assembly.*

*May 28/29, 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 67, No. 45/2*

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 63

*Erivan.*

THE following is the French official communiqué in connection with the Franco-Kemalist agreement:—

Article 1. The camps of Bozanti and Sis will be evacuated at once and our troops concentrated on the railway line between Adana and Mersina.

Art. 2. French troops will evacuate Aintab. It is agreed that no attacks whatever will be made against the Armenians there. This evacuation to be made at least fourteen days after the signature of this armistice.

Art. 3. The two parties have agreed to a mutual exchange of their prisoners of war, or civilians interned in prisoners camps for political reasons. The two parties will endeavour to arrange that this exchange be made within ten days.

Art. 4. The Governor of Adana is entitled to communicate freely with the Turkish Army Corps Commandants with regard to the prompt execution of the clauses inserted in the act of armistice signed between the two parties.

*French Official Communiqué with regard to the Franco-Nationalist Agreement.*

I consider it desirable to publish the following clauses of the Act of Armistice:—

1. On the demand of Mustafa Kemal's delegates in Beyrout we have agreed to sign an armistice with the former.
2. This agreement is only of a military character.
3. Therefore the situation remains as before, and persons who try to foment disorder will be severely dealt with.

COLONEL BREMONT

*Adana, June 2, 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 67, No. 45/3*

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 63

*Proclamation of General Duficux.*

WHEN the proclamation of General Duficux was published, a Turkish Delegation visited Colonel Bremond, who made the following speech:—

Sirs,

The proclamation of General Duficux is made in your own interests. You know perfectly well that the French came to Adana in order to ensure public order and not to take possession of your lands. You know that France has been your advocate at the Peace Conference and that, against the wishes of her Allies, she succeeded in obtaining a decision that the Turks were to remain in Constantinople. If France had kept silent you would have lost Constantinople. If you wish Constantinople to remain yours, endeavour to establish order in Cilicia by means of an extensive propaganda and I will assist you.

*Declaration of General Duficux to an Armenian Delegation.*

Sirs,

According to certain rumours it was alleged that the former Turkish Governor of Cilicia was to regain his post. I assure you that this will not happen as long as I am here, and I expect to remain for a long time. The arrangements latterly come to are of a purely military character. Please note that my last proclamation is still in force and that I shall insist upon its clauses being strictly observed. Any disorders in the city will be severely dealt with.

*Official French Communication under date of May 25, 1920.*

The French forces advancing on Aintab on the 23rd May have defeated the Kemalists forces. 1,200 Kemalists were killed on the battlefield. Thousands of prisoners were captured. Amongst the prisoners captured were one commandant and two colonels. The army corps flag was also taken. It was a decisive victory. On the 5th May we attacked and repulsed the counter-attacks of Isset Bey, Nationalist commandant, and his forces, close to Tel Chapta, 25 kilom. distant from Ourfa. Many soldiers of the enemy were killed and captured.

FO. 406/44, p. 68, No. 45/4.

ENCLOSURE 5 IN NO. 63

*Proclamation by General Dufieux*

ADANA, May 31, 1920.

SOME of the inhabitants are giving shelter to rebels, who are, to my knowledge, lodged in various houses. On the 28th May these rebels attempted to give trouble to the French forces. The French commandant gave a limit of two hours for these rebels to be expelled from the houses where they were hiding. As these orders were not carried out, the rebels were expelled by force and punished. As a result, several buildings in Osmanic were damaged. Persons who suffered from the bombardment must hold the rebels responsible. This will be a lesson to them. I know that for some days past rebels have been hidden in private houses in Adana. It is the duty of everyone to expel the rebels from their houses in order to avoid further unfortunate incidents. This must be understood, otherwise I shall employ very severe measures, as I did in Osmanic, and the losses will be heavier. People must understand that guns sometimes are blind when shooting, and that innocent people may suffer for the guilty. It is in order to save you from further misfortunes that I publish the present proclamation.

*Inhabitants of Adana.*

It depends on your own good sense to avoid disasters in this city. You must on your own initiative expel the rebels who have come here in order to foment trouble. If you do not pay heed to this, I warn you that the consequences will be terrible.

GENERAL DUFIEUX

*Commandant of the 1st Army Corps in Orient.*

FO. 406/44, p. No. 45/5



No. 64

*A Political Report Issued by British Intelligence Services in Copenhagen.*

CY/1205

Source:— D/57.

COPENHAGEN, 1.7.20.

**AGREEMENT WITH MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA.**

(Compare Circular No. CX/4372 (V), dated 12.6.20. and headed 'Soviet Russia, Anti-British agreement with Representatives of Eastern Countries').

Litvinoff has received the text of a note addressed recently by Chicherin to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The note confirms the following:—

1. The Soviet Government will make war with the Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha against foreign Imperialism. ✓

2. The Soviet Government recognises all obligations mentioned in the contract of six weeks ago. ✓

3. The munition factory at Thoula will be placed at Mustapha Kemal Pasha's disposal. ✓

4. The Soviet Government recognises the independence of Turkey and the re-union of all real Turks in their territory.

5. The Soviet Government recognises the independence of Arabia and Syria.

6. The Soviet Government gives Kurdestan, Lurestan? and the Batoum district to the Turkish Armenians. ✓

7. The Soviet Government will allow Eastern Thrace and the territories belonging to it to decide to whom they will belong.

8. The definite solution of the Dardanelles question will rest with a conference of the Black Sea States. ✓

9. All economic agreements and agreements regrading spheres of influence made by the Powers with Turkey will be annulled.

10. The Soviet Government will serve as intermediary in the Armenian, Persian-Turco frontier question.

11. The Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha agrees to replace Bolshevik by Turkish and Persian troops in the event of the former being withdrawn from Persia for tactical, political or other reasons. ?

12. The Soviet Government authorises the Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha to collect all military material of which they may stand in need in Trans-Caucasia.

The Soviet Government proposed that two military missions should be sent to Caucasia, one Russian and one Turkish, to discuss the best means of carrying out their plans.

S.I.S. Copies to:—

F.O.

W.O.

D.N.I.

Sir B.T.

A.I.I.

S.I.S. The contract of six weeks ago referred to in Clause (2) would appear to be the agreement with the representatives of Eastern countries described in Circular No. CX/4372/V 12.6.20.

FO. 371/5178/E. 7986

Bu rapor üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şunlar not edilmiştir:

"Point (6) reads like gibberish even if we take "Luristan" for an error for "Lazistan". It is difficult to guess what may be meant by "the territories belonging to" Eastern

Thrace.

G. H. Fitzmaurice

10/7/20

D. G. Osborne.

Tilley

10. 7."

No. 65

*British General Headquarters, Constantinople, to the Director of Military Intelligence, London.*

6.7.1920

(Received 7.7.1920)

*Telegraphic*

*Secret*

I.0947 cipher July 6th.

It is evident that there is a difference of opinion amongst Nationalist leaders at Angora. On ground that the extremist policy is dangerous and the possibility of Russian support is a delusion some of the moderate men backed by latest arrivals from Constantinople, e.g., Kuchuk Kiazim Pasha and Admiral Fevzi Pasha are stated to be breaking away from Mustapha Kemal. This party would probably reject Damad Ferid as a leader, but would probably accept Ahmed Izzet Pasha if the latter would form a Government.

F.O. 371/5052

No. 66

I.G.P. 120] *British Secretary's Notes of an Inter-Allied Conference held at the Villa Fraineuse, Spa, on July 7, 1920, at 11 a.m.* ✓

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Mr. Vansittart; **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Mr. Philip Kerr.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the Council; M. François Marsal, Minister of Finance; M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer; **SECRETARIES,** M. Laroche, M. Massigli.

*Italy:* Count Sforza, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Marquis della Torretta; **SECRETARIES,** Signor Galli, Signor Ricotti.

*Japan:* Viscount Chinda; **SECRETARIES,** Mr. Saito, Mr. Sawada.

*Greece:* M. Veniselos.

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE,** in declaring the meeting open, invited M. Millerand to make a statement.

*Treaty of Peace with Turkey Turkish Reply.* **M. MILLERAND** said that the Allied Powers were now in possession of the Turkish reply to the terms of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Turkey. He fancied that the Allied representatives had made themselves acquainted with its contents. The question now arose as to what answer should be made by the Allies to the note. In his own view there were possibly a few secondary considerations in regard to which the Allies might be prepared to make some small concessions. He himself did not attach very much importance to these. One request which had been made by the Turks was that there should be a Turkish delegate on the Straits Commission. This, he thought, might be granted. As regards the main question, he suggested that the reply of the Allies to Turkey should be a simple and clear statement to the effect that they could not accept the protest raised in the note, and that they should fix a limited number of days within which the Turks would have to give their final decision.

**MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that he was entirely in agreement with M. Millerand's views.

**COUNT SFORZA** said that he was quite prepared to fall in with the views expressed by M. Millerand and accepted by Mr. Lloyd George. At the same time he ventured to suggest that it might be as well to consider the danger which might arise from the Sultan being turned out of Constantinople and the consequent unrest all over Islamic countries. He questioned whether

it would not be more expedient to have a Turkish Government at Constantinople with whom to negotiate rather than have that Government located outside. The question he was putting to himself was: Could not some compromise be found by which the Allies would be able to reinforce the authority of the Turkish Government at Constantinople so that they might assist that Government to combat the Nationalist movement in Anatolia, which not only threatened us, but the whole world?

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he agreed with what M. Millerand had said.

M. VENISELOS said that he was in entire accord with the President of the French Council. The only way to bring Mustafa Kemal to heel was to defeat him everywhere. A military defeat was the one thing which would bring him to his senses. He himself was born in Turkey and knew Turkey well, and he was perfectly certain that the only right way to deal with the Turk was by conquest. As regards the Turkish request that they should be represented on the Straits Commission M. Veniselos raised no particular objection to it, but at this point as regards protection of the Straits he desired to say, with all respect, that in his view the conditions already laid down were not really adequate to guarantee the freedom of the Straits. He hoped, therefore, that the Allies would not weaken the present conditions. Nor did he think it desirable that any concessions should be made in respect of Armenia. As regards his own country, he was quite sure that none of the Allies contemplated going back upon what had been promised them. He suggested, therefore, that it would be advisable to profit by the recent successes gained by the Greek army in the west of Asia Minor<sup>1</sup>. The effect of these successes on Mustafa Kemal and upon the Central Government at Constantinople must be very considerable. Although the Central Government were not co-operating with Mustafa Kemal, they had at the same time a considerable interest in his success of [or] the reverse. He thought that the Turks should be informed that the only consequence of their refusing to accept the terms submitted would be to make the conditions harder.

LORD CURZON said that there were two questions before the conference. The first was the substance of the reply, and the second was the time of the reply. As regards the substance, he agreed with what M. Millerand had said. He himself saw no objection to the admission of a Turkish delegate to the Straits Commission. Indeed, this had been contemplated in London at the Ambassadorial Conference over which he had presided. The Turks, however, also asked that there should be a Turkish delegate on the Financial Commission. This he regarded as undesirable, as the Turkish delegate

<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the decision of the First Conference of Boulogne the Greek army in the west of Asia Minor had launched a successful offensive against Turkish nationalist forces on 22 June, 1920.

would have infinite scope for intrigue and might make the exercise of proper financial control difficult, or even impossible. As regards the question of the passage of war material through the Straits, he thought that this was a matter which could appropriately be examined by the Allied military, naval and air experts. The above were, in his opinion, the only points upon which it was desirable to meet the Turks. He himself was certain that it would not be difficult to draw up a complete and a powerful reply to the Turkish note. This note was skilfully composed, evidently by someone with considerable legal knowledge. In all respects it was an able document. But, as he had said, it would be easy to prepare a strong and convincing answer to it. With respect to the appropriate moment when the reply should be sent in, he gathered that M. Millerand and M. Veniselos were of opinion that the best thing to do would be to send in this reply at once. His own view was that it would be advisable to watch the progress of the present military operations. The right moment to send in the reply would be when the operations had achieved their maximum of success. On this question the advice of the military experts should be sought. He had that morning received a telegram stating that the Turkish delegates proposed to return to Constantinople on the 6th July, leaving behind them only Reshed Pasha and a few secretaries. The reason of this, he understood, was that Reshed distrusted Damad Ferid, and was anxious to get the conduct of negotiations into his own hand. On the whole, he was inclined to suggest that the Allies should wait a week before sending their answer to the note. Count Sforza had enquired as to whether means might not be found by which the Allies could strengthen the hand of the Sultan and the Central Government at Constantinople by reducing the power of Mustafa Kemal and his Nationalists. The only means of accomplishing this was, he thought, military success. At the same time there was always the possibility that the Turks might refuse outright to accept the treaty. No provision could be made for this eventuality. The Allies had had to confront this possibility in the case of the treaties both with the Germans and the Hungarians. They were quite well aware, however, that nations generally were so anxious for peace that, although the delegates on the other side might at first absolutely refuse to sign, after the lapse of five or six weeks they changed their minds. What was important was, if the desired result was to be secured, that the Allies should show a firm and united front. In conclusion, he would suggest that, except on the minor points to which he had referred, the reply of the Allies should refuse to accept the protest and suggestion contained in the Turkish note, but that their reply should not be handed to the Turkish delegates until the present military situation had developed a little further.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to ask M. Veniselos what the military position now was in Thrace and Asia Minor.

M. VENISELOS said that, as regards the military situation, the Greek military commanders had been actively carrying out the instructions which had been issued to them consequent on the decision reached at the Allied conferences at Boulogne, which were that Greek troops should go up to the railway line in order to free the shores of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora\* In Asia Minor his own view was that the Greek troops should remain where they were for the present, but it was important that they should maintain their positions until the Turkish Government had signed the treaty; in other words, they should hold their ground and await the course of events. Already the successes which had attended their arms had struck a serious blow at Mustafa Kemal's prestige. He thought it might be advisable that the Turkish Central Government should be invited to send officials of their own to Asia Minor in place of the officials of Mustafa Kemal, as this would undoubtedly increase the prestige of the Government at Constantinople. He himself was in favour of not awaiting possible further successes, but to act at once. He was apprehensive lest the impression which had been caused by the successes recently gained might tend to be effaced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received reports from the British officers attached to the Graecian armies, which stated that the impression created by the Greeks on the Turks was very considerable, and would prove very salutary to the enemy. He might add that the British officers also had been greatly struck by the efficiency of the Greek arms. As regards the signing of the Turkish Treaty, there was no doubt that the whole world desired some sort of settlement, and desired that that settlement should be made as

\* Marmara yöresinde Yunan ilerlemesi İngiltere'nin aktif desteği ve işbirliğiyle oluyordu. 5 Temmuz 1920 günü Amiral de Robeck, Lord Curzon'a şunları telliyordu:

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 5, 1920

No. 785

(Telegraphic)

I had a conference on 4th July with General Milne and General Bridges, latter having just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Balıkesir.

Question to be decided at once was should Greeks be allowed to advance on Brussa. General Milne and myself decided that it was absolutely necessary for them to do so, no British or other Allied troops being available. British Navy was to support by occupying Mudaria (Mudania) and Guemlek. General Milne hoped to push forward from Ismid railway at an early date.

General Bridges has conveyed above decisions to Greek General Headquarters.

(Foreign Office requested to inform Admiralty)

(Repeated to Athens.)

(F.O. 406/44, p. 61, No. 39.)

soon as possible. He thought, therefore, that the Allies should adopt the procedure which they had followed in the case of the German Treaty; that is, they should give the Turks a definite period within which they must sign the treaty. He would [? could] not at the moment recall exactly what that period was.

M. BERTHELOT stated that the period of delay granted after the final reply of the Allies to the Germans was five days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that in the case of the Turks it might be necessary slightly to increase this period, which might be from ten to fifteen days. He perceived no use in keeping the Turks in Constantinople if the whole body of the Turkish nation refused to obey that Government's orders. The only advantage of keeping it there would be to hold the Sultan and the members of his Government as hostages; but so long as their orders were not obeyed they could not be regarded as an effective Government. The Turk was a continual source of trouble in Europe and Asia. He was a nuisance and a curse. He protested in his note that no devastation had been committed, but it was notorious that everywhere the Turk went he was a vertiable devastating agent. Mr. Lloyd George suggested, therefore, that the reply of the Allies should be condensed into a few pages, which should compose a complete but compressed statement of their case. This case was an overwhelming one. England and France and other Powers had kept Turkey alive again and again. In 1878 Great Britain, assisted by France, had saved Turkey from dismemberment. European Powers had kept the Turk alive financially. And what had been the result? As soon as war broke out the Turks had slammed the door in the faces of those who had shown constant friendship to her [*sic*]; she had prolonged the war by two years, and she had very nearly, by her action, brought the Allies to defeat. She had added two years of debt, of war, of risk and of devastation. The Turk now pleaded for mercy, but he was not entitled to mercy. He was, in fact, the worst criminal of the whole of our enemies. In conclusion, he thought it desirable that a clear and condensed statement should be sent to the Turks in reply to their note, with the least possible delay, before the present impression, due to the military successes in the Crimea<sup>2</sup> and Asia Minor, faded. He further thought it desirable, in the interest both of the civilised and Islamic world, that both the Turkish note and the Allied reply should be published without delay.

M. MILLERAND enquired whether Count Sforza had anything to say.

<sup>2</sup> *The Times* of July 7, 1920, report that the British War Office had received a telegram stating that the White Russian forces of General Wrangel, based on the Crimea, had routed a cavalry corps of the Red Army.

COUNT SFORZA said that he merely wished to explain what he had meant in his earlier statement, and to comment upon what Mr. Lloyd George had said. Everything that the British Prime Minister had said, from the moral aspect of the case, was, in his opinion, quite correct. His own objections were, however, from another point of view, which was that of expediency. He wished also to refer to the observations which had been made by Lord Curzon, who had reminded the conference that the countries which had at first most demurred to signing treaties of peace had finally given way. The present case, however, was not precisely identical. It was possible that the enemy, by absconding, might cause a deep embarrassment to the Allies, and he wondered, in the circumstances, whether, on the whole, it was wise to employ force and force alone, rather than to employ the words of peace. Marshal Foch had said that as soon as Allied forces leave the coast of Anatolia they would require an army of 300,000 men in order to reduce the Turkish Nationalists to submission. This was a serious matter, and he thought that it was in the common interest to avoid military operations in the future. It was for this reason that he ventured to counsel the adoption of methods of conciliation rather than the utilisation of force alone. That was the thought which he had desired to express to the conference. He was, however, convinced that the important thing was that the Allies should present a united front, and he therefore was prepared to agree with what Mr. Lloyd George had said; and he was certainly in favour of their striking while the iron was hot, and profiting by the impression made by the recent successes.

M. VENISELOS begged to thank Count Sforza for the sympathetic way in which he had spoken of his country. The Greeks would gladly not resort to military means and to use other methods if this appeared in any way possible. But, as he had said, the Turks could understand no argument but force and military defeat. As regards the Turkish Treaty, he would venture to suggest one or two slight modifications. His first proposal referred to article 144, from which he would quote the following:—

‘The Turkish Government solemnly undertakes to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes and re-establishment in their businesses of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure since the 1st August, 1914.’

He desired to draw special attention to the suggested date, which was the 1st August, 1914. He wished to propose that the month should be deleted, as thousands of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race had been expelled just a short time before August 1914. The matter might, he thought, be referred to the experts, but he himself was in favour of substituting the 1st January, 1914.



LORD CURZON said that when the Turkish Treaty was being drafted in London early in the year, so far as his recollection went, the British delegation had been quite prepared to meet M. Veniselos on this point.

M. MILLERAND said that he had no objection at all to the proposed alteration.

COUNT SFORZA agreed with M. Millerand.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had no objection.

LORD CURZON suggested that the 1st March might be a suitable date.

M. VENISELOS said that he would agree to this, but he wondered whether, as a compromise, the 1st February might not be fixed. The second point referred to the Island of Mitylene. (M. Veniselos then elaborated his contention with the aid of a map.) This island contained some 140,000 inhabitants, and under present arrangements it was to be demilitarised. But he could not understand what argument had determined the Allies to reach this decision. Under the treaty conditions the Greeks could neither build a road nor a railway without first approaching the French, Italian and British Governments, and this was a matter which was felt deeply by the inhabitants. He was quite prepared to accept that there should be no fortifications, and that such fortifications as existed should be at once dismantled. But complete demilitarisation was a different matter, and it was really necessary that the Greek Government should have power there to construct roads and to build railways. Demilitarisation, in fact, had, so far as he could see, no real *raison d'être*. Moreover, there was always a danger that troops might one day land upon this island.

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR H. WILSON said that his recollection was that the reason why it had been decided to demilitarise Mitylene was that the naval and air authorities had been in favour of this course. At that time the Allies had not had any idea that the Greeks would be as actively engaged as they had lately been in military operations against Turkey. In consequence of these operations and the successful way in which they had been carried out, he himself had now come to hold a different opinion, and was prepared not to press for the demilitarisation of the island. At the same time, he could not commit his naval and air colleagues without consulting them.

M. VENISELOS said that he quite agreed that no aerodromes should be built on the island.

M. MILLERAND suggested that the military, naval and air experts should first express their views on the pertinent parts of the Turkish reply, and that the matter should then be referred to a drafting committee, which should be charged with the duty of drafting an answer to the note. The French member of this committee he proposed should be M. Berthelot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British nominee would be Mr. Vansittart.

COUNT SFORZA stated that M. Carlo Galli would represent Italy.

M. MILLERAND suggested that the Turks should be given ten days, after receiving the Allied reply to their note, in which to submit their final decision. The draft of the new committee should, he thought, be considered by the Inter-Allied Council on the following Saturday.

It was agreed—

- (a) (i) That the proposals of the Turkish Government should be refused under all heads, subject to one or two minor modifications, referred to in the preceding discussion, in the clauses dealing with the Straits Commission.
- (ii) That the Turkish delegation should be granted a period of ten days, after the receipt of the Allied reply, within which to sign the treaty.
- ✓ (iii) That the drafting of the Allied reply to the observations of the Turkish Government should be undertaken by an expert committee composed of—

M. Berthelot,  
Mr. Vansittart,  
Signor Carlo Galli,

whose draft reply should be considered on Saturday, the 10th July.

- (b) That in article 144, second paragraph, of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, the date 'the 1st August, 1914', should be altered to the '1st February, 1914.'
- (c) (i) That M. Veniselos's proposal to exclude the Island of Mitylene from the demilitarised zone should be remitted for immediate examination by the Military, Naval and Air Commission, under the Presidency of Marshal Foch.
- (ii) That the remarks of Marshal Foch's Commission should be communicated direct to the commission appointed to draft the reply to the Turkish observations.

No. 67

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 8, 1920, 10.25 a.m.

*(Received July 9, 1.30 p.m.)**Telegraphic**No. 795**Very urgent*

Greek Commander-in-Chief has informed General Milne that he has received orders from M. Venezelos (sic) to proceed at once to effect military occupation of Eastern Thrace and to transfer troops from Asia Minor for the purpose. He asks General Milne to request me to co-operate with British men-of-War in landing of these Greek troops at Rodosto.

This proposal of Mr. Venezelos is, I think, most rash and ill advised. Thrace is at present perfectly quiet and Nationalists there are giving no trouble. Once the Nationalist opposition in Asia Minor has been (? repulsed) Thrace can be occupied without difficulty, and it is impossible that Nationalists there will show much opposition in view of their ill successes in Anatolia.

But at present situation in (? Asia Minor) is not clear and operations are in progress. The Nationalist forces have been driven before Greek advance but only a relatively small part of Asia Minor has been occupied and we cannot foresee what action Mustafa Kemal may take, what further forces he may dispose of, and whether Turkish population will remain quiet under Greek occupation. Any set back suffered by Greeks in Asia Minor would have most serious effect, would revive Nationalists' hopes and go far to destroy effect of success hitherto obtained. Until situation is defined a reduction of Greek forces in Asia Minor is therefore unwise.

Addressed to Foreign Office, who is requested to inform Admiralty, repeated British Delegation, Spa.

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 97-98, No. 97*

No. 68

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th July 1920

*(Received July 20)**No. 984/M. 2279**Secret.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, weekly summary of intelligence reports issued by Military Intelligence i.c., Constantinople Branch, for the week ended 1st July 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5170/E. 8567*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 68

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.c., Constantinople Branch,  
for Week Ending 1st July, 1920.*

*Secret.*

The amelioration of the Peace conditions continues to be the principal concern both of the Central Government and of the Nationalists, and although all attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the Sublime Porte and ANATOLIA have hitherto failed, the absence of the Grand Vizier has furnished an opportunity for an interesting development in the form of an attempt on the part of RESHID Bey, the Minister of the Interior to direct the policy of the Government towards an agreement with ANATOLIA.

*A memorandum was submitted to the Sultan on June 18th by RESHID Bey whose summary of the situation contained the following points:—*

- ↳ a) The Peace delegation had unanimously decided that no loyal subject of the Sultan would sign the treaty as it stands.
- b) After having carefully studied the Peace conditions the delegation had come to the following conclusions:
  - (1) The British, whose prestige had been damaged in the world war, had chosen GREECE as an instrument for the protection of British interests in the Near East, and for that reason supported M. VENEZELOS in

order that GREECE might be strong enough to carry out British desires.

- (2) FRANCE and ITALY had been forced to agree to British proposals.
- (3) Both FRANCE and ITALY, however, regarded the treaty as inapplicable and contrary to the interests of both countries.
- (4) Neither FRANCE nor ITALY were in a position to make any sacrifices, and it was generally felt that GREECE alone would be unable to enforce the decisions.
- (5) The delegation believed that sooner or later the British would be forced to agree to certain modifications.
  - c) The Delegation had been informed that the Treaty was strongly condemned by the Khalifat Committee and other Islamic Committees, which would do all in their power to effect an amelioration of the conditions.
  - d) The differences between the Central Government and ANATOLIA increased the difficulties of the Delegation, and it was indispensable that a reconciliation should be immediately effected in the interests of a united front.

RESHID Bey concluded with a suggestion that the Sultan should personally intervene to bring about a reconciliation with ANATOLIA and stated that everything depended upon His Majesty's action in the matter. (HA. 1105).

*The Peace conditions* formed the subject of discussion at the Cabinet Councils of June 17th, 21st, 23rd, and 24th, when RESHID Bey was present. At the first of these meetings he gave an account of the activities of the Turkish Peace delegation in PARIS and stated that he believed that M. MILLERAND, having been impressed with information received direct from ANATOLIA, was dubious as to the value of any agreement with the Turkish Delegation. He agreed that the treaty itself destroyed the very foundations of national independence, and considered that, although both the Italian and French Press had been favourable to TURKEY, it would be impossible to obtain a modification of the clauses concerning SMYRNA and THRACE unless the whole nation were united. To this end he proposed taking certain steps himself, but would not go into details. He concluded by complaining that AHMED RIZA Bey had failed to assist the delegation.

On June 20th RESHID Bey sent a communication to MUSTAFA KEMAL through the intermediary of BEKIR SAMI Bey at BRUSSA, which is believed to have included a summary of the Government's counter proposals.

At the Council held on June 21st RESHID Bey suggested that Government and Nationalist representatives should meet at ANGORA to try once again to bring about a reconciliation, and added that the support of ANATOLIA would strengthen the position of the Delegation in PARIS. This was strongly opposed by REMZI Pasha, the Minister of Agriculture, who said that the Nationalists had "taken the bit between their teeth" and were capable of stipulating that the Allied Forces should all be sent to ANGORA as prisoners of war! He advised asking the British under what conditions and to what extent they would be prepared to support TURKEY. Finally the Sheik-ul-Islam, who presided, decided that the matter should be submitted to the Sultan, but the sequel to the dispute was the resignation of REMZI Pasha on June 28th. The refusal of the Allies to wait any longer than June 26th for the Turkish reply was discussed at the Council held on June 23rd, and apparently caused deep consternation. RESHID Bey thought that it would be useless for him to return to PARIS, and when the acting Foreign Minister remarked that the Peace Conference would not deviate from the "path of justice", retorted that the "path of justice" would take the line of putting the treaty conditions into execution on June 27th. When the acting Foreign Minister referred to a telegram from the Grand Vizier stating that there was a current favourable to TURKEY, RESHID Bey ironically replied that the Grand Vizier's informant would be as successful in PARIS as he had been in GREECE. This was perhaps a reference to Monsieur PAILLARES, Editor of the "BOSPHORE" newspaper in CONSTANTINOPLE, who is known to have recently approached M. VENEZELOS on behalf of Damad FERID Pasha.

The final form of the Turkish reply was approved by the Council of Ministers on June 24th, and the Grand Vizier was instructed to approach M. LLOYD GEORGE in order to obtain a few days delay until the arrival of RESHID Bey in PARIS.

RESHID Bey then went to the Palace, but was not received in audience, a circumstance which is worthy of note in view of the contents of the above mentioned memorandum, and of the fact that RESHID Bey was to leave for PARIS the following morning (HA 1100).

*The Sultan's reply to a petition against the Nationalists* presented by a delegation from ANATOLIA on June 15th, may afford some clue to His Majesty's attitude towards RESHID Bey's suggestions. A person who was present when the delegation was received stated that the Sultan replied that the greatest danger came from without and that the interior situation was a "family affair", which would be settled in private, but that nothing could be done at present because the Government was powerless in face of foreign interference on the one hand and Nationalist pressure on the other. (HA 1114).

Instructions to the Grand Vizier, in the meanwhile, were reported to have been transmitted by wireless telegraph by the French authorities, and informed Damad FERID Pasha that the Cabinet considered the counter proposals drawn up by TEWFIK Pasha and brought to CONSTANTINOPLE by RESHID Bey to be the best possible defence. The Grand Vizier was therefore requested to make no communication to the Peace Conference until the arrival in PARIS RESHID Bey. This was regarded as a distinct victory for the latter who represents the Francophile elements at the Sublime Porte, and who is believed to be desirous of supplanting the Grand Vizier.

It was further reported that in its final form the Turkish reply was a combination of TEWFIK Pasha's proposals and the scheme drawn up by the Senate Commission mentioned in last week's summary (HA 1087).

*The Great National Assembly discussed the Peace Treaty on May 22nd, and, as was to be expected many violent speeches were made in which the British were attacked with particular virulence, and it was unanimously agreed that the conditions could not even be considered. RASSIH Effendi of ADALIA asked how the treatment of IRELAND was in harmony with Mr. LLOYD GEORGE's demand that the right of minorities should be respected, any how the peace conditions agreed with this principle. REFIK Bey of KONIA also attacked the British Premier and accused the British of being the real organisers of the war. ALI SHUKRI of TREBIZOND stated that Moslems under British rule were not allowed "to acquire either fortune or learning; they were treated like slaves and forced to work to fill the pockets of the English lords". British animosity against the Unionists was in reality caused by the British desire to destroy the Turkish intelligentsia to neutralise the effect upon the Moslem world of the revolution of 1908. The French and Italians had no more voice than TURKEY and the whole world was under the influence of the British. HAMDULLAH SUBHI of ADALIA said that the only remedy was to abandon CONSTANTINOPLE and when the enemies of the Turks held out to them "this despicable peace we shall shown them our swords". After attacking the French the speaker dwelt at some length upon help from outside. He said that if an agreement could be made with BULGARIA, the Turks would join the Bulgarians to prevent the Greeks from entering THRACE. "We shall unite with those who are for us in RUSSIA", he added, "They are sending us an army. Our brothers are arriving bearing the standard of the declaration of our Faith . . . the Khirgies are arriving! The Bashkirs are arriving! The Caucasian Moslems are arriving!". HA 1091.*

*The rejection of the Peace Terms by the Nationalists was further confirmed by MUSTAFA KEMAL himself, who regarded the peace conditions as*

KARLAN

incompatible with the national honour. Other prominent Nationalists expressed the same opinion in the most vehement terms, and it was said that if the Nationalists were not asked to negotiate, operations would be commenced on the SMYRNA front. (HA 1098).

*The influence of Pan-Turanian ideas will be noted in the above-mentioned speech of HAMDULLAH SUBHI, and this was even more clearly manifest in the speech made by NEJATI Bey of ERZERUM, who said that before the ancestors of the Turks came to ANATOLIA . . . . . ed an Empire in the ALTAI. He cited an English . . . . . SIETCH (?) in having stated that if the URALTAI civil . . . . . not been destroyed by the Romans and Tunisians, moder . . . isation would have been a development thereof. (HA 1090).*

*Conditions in ANATOLIA would appear to be not unsatisfactory so far as the treatment of Christians is concerned at present, and the Nationalists appear to be well provided with funds. (HA 1088a).*

*Nationalist relations with Foreign Governments are influenced by the individual attitude of the powers concerned. The Italians are very popular, and at the beginning of June an Italian representative with credentials from Count SFORZA and M. NITTI was in ANGORA for the purpose of concluding an agreement whereby the Italian Government in exchange for grain from ANATOLIA and certain economic concessions, would make an advance of £T 3,000,000 to the Nationalist Government, supply war materials and aeroplanes with instructors, if possible, and afford all moral support. M. FAGO left ANGORA on June 8th, but other Italian delegates were expected.*

*The French have become unpopular, and are regarded as being dominated by the British. In addition to the mission which negotiated the armistice between the Nationalists and the French, M.M. MAUBERT and HES-LOUINS were also in ANGORA in June, but ostensibly for commercial purposes.*

*The Americans are not important politically.*

*The Greeks are not in communication with the Nationalists, but informant believed MUSTAFA KEMAL might agree to negotiate later on. (H.A. 1088a).*

*The weak points of the Nationalist organisation are principally:—*

- a) A deficiency of trained and competent officers
- b) Indecision as to policy and action.
- c) Want of co-operation between the different commands owing to personal ambitions.



(H.A. 1088 a).

*Communications with EUROPE are maintained via ADALIA and ITALY*, where MUSTAFA KEMAL has an official representative EDİB Bey, alias SERVED YEHAD, a former Staff Colonel. (H.A. 1088)

*The existence of a current opposed to MUSTAFA KEMAL* is mentioned by a person who was recently in ANGORA, and is worthy of note in view of future developments. (H.A. 1099).

*Nationalist activities* in general seem to be following the usual lines. Forcible recruiting has occurred in the districts that have recently come under Nationalist domination, and a raid has occurred in the BEYCOS district. The Cilician situation is stationary, but the Greek advance has aroused great anxiety, and various absurd rumours have been circulated in order to hearten Nationalist sympathisers.

Travellers from ANATOLIA state that POLICARPOS Bishop of KONIA, and ARDAVAST SURMEYAN have been installed at ANGORA, respectively as the Greek and Armenian "patriarchs". (HA 1104).

*The Heir Apparent and the Nationalists are said to be in communication* with each other, and the former was reported to have recently received a communication from MUSTAFA KEMAL dated June 9th in which the latter pleaded the Nationalist cause on the usual lines. He appealed to the Heir Apparent to persuade the Sultan to accord the Nationalists his favour and help, because "the Great National Assembly would prefer that the seat of the Khalifat and Sultanat... should cease to be a toy at the mercy of human passions", and that it should be united "to the nation which is ready to sacrifice itself for love of it". The Heir Apparent's reply is not yet known. (HA 1106).

*A letter from the King of BULGARIA was reported to have been delivered* to the Sultan on June 18th by a Bulgarian Archbishop during the Bairam reception ceremony. This report has only been accepted with reserve, but the informant has hitherto proved to be reliable, and the contents of the letter were practically innocuous. After the usual greetings the letter dwelt at some length upon the brotherhood in arms of the Turkish and Bulgarian nations, and upon the dangers to both peoples in the annexation of THRACE by GREECE. Mention was then made of diplomatic efforts that were being made and of the unanimous feeling in BULGARIA that it was necessary to take steps to obviate the possibility of an accomplished fact before the definite conclusion of the negotiations. The Bulgarian people were said to be ready to face further sacrifices so that the efforts made in the past may not have been in vain, and the letter terminated with pious expressions fitting the occasion.

If the letter is indeed genuine, it is worthy of note that there is no definite mention of intended action, but at the most a statement as to the trend of general opinion (HA 1115).

FO. 371/5170/E. 8567

No. 69

*Commodore Fitzmaurice to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station.*

H.M.S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, July 9, 1920

(Confidential.)

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of the 2nd July, 1920, I have the honour to forward the following report on affairs at Smyrna and in Western Anatolia:—

*Political and Military*

2. The Greek advance northwards continues, but information as to the progress of operations is difficult to obtain. Adramyti and Susighirlik (25 miles north-east of Balikesri), have both been occupied, and it is believed that the junction of the Greek troops who landed at Panderma, took place at the latter-named town. Reports, however, tend to show that Mustapha Kemal's forces decline to commit themselves to a definite engagement with the Greeks, and are retiring towards Brusa. Therefore, as it is understood that the *raison d'être* of the Greek offensive operations is the annihilation or capture of Mustapha Kemal's forces, the Greeks cannot as yet be said to have been completely successful in their operations.

3. The true total of prisoners taken at Balikesri was 850, and not 1,300 as stated in my letter of the 2nd July. These prisoners, and others captured in the neighbourhood of Alacheir are accommodated in a camp at Vourlah Scala. This camp was inspected by representatives of the British High Commissioner and head of British Military Mission, Smyrna, on the 5th July, and the conditions under which the prisoners are living, were found satisfactory.

4. In the southern area, it is stated (*a*) that the Turks have burnt the upper town and railway station of Nazilli, and massacred all the Christian inhabitants with the exception of seventeen, and (*b*) that the Greeks have occupied the town, but, owing to the entire lack of reliable information from this area, I am as yet unable to state whether there is any truth in either of these reports.

5. As reported in my telegram No. 782Z, General Nider sent a Greek force to pursue the Turkish irregulars who had burnt Jelet station. As these irregulars had manifestly come from the Italian zone, the Greeks followed them back into that zone with the intention of occupying the hills round Arvalia, south of the Ephesus road, so as to cut them off. The officer in charge of the Italian troops in that neighbourhood protested to the Greek colonel in command against this invasion of the Italian zone. The Greek colonel replied that he was acting under orders. Hereupon the Italian officer ordered his men (number unknown) to advance in open order upon the Greeks, who remained in column until the Italians actually opened fire, whereupon they fixed bayonets and charged, wounding several Italian soldiers and taking ten prisoners, with a loss to themselves of two men wounded. They subsequently released the ten prisoners. This incident has naturally given rise to considerable excitement in Graeco-Italian circles, and I understand that the matter is the subject of much discussion between the Greek and Italian authorities. It is to be hoped that the Italians will take to heart the Greeks' rough and ready hint' that they are at last determined to take active measures to counteract the underground tactics which the Italians have been steadily using against them for the past year or more.

6. The Greeks, by means of an attractive scheme of increased wages and bonuses, are engaged in raising a short-service volunteer force, composed of men who have completed their service with the colours, and they hope that the number so raised will not be less than 40,000 men.

7. The situation as regards the "Hezir Reis" and vedette No. 14 remains unchanged. Captain Loprestis arrived at Smyrna yesterday, the 8th July, and assumed command of the "Lemnos" as successor to Captain A. Gonatas. He called on me the same forenoon, and I have to-day returned his call. He speaks passable English and informs me that he is an ardent admirer of Great Britain.

8. The British Military Mission, Smyrna, ceased to exist as from the 7th July, and Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., has now become British Liaison Officer with the Hellenic General Officer Commander-in-chief. A small portion of his staff, however, remains at Smyrna.

#### *General*

9. At the request of the commanding officer of the French sloop "La Suippe," all men-of-war at Smyrna dressed ship on the 4th July, on the occasion of the canonisation of St. Joan of Arc. To the request of the same officer, made through the Greek senior naval officer, that a salute of twenty-one guns might be fired, I replied that I regretted that such a salute was not authorised by my regulations.

10. At the urgent request of Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. G. Stevens, D.S.O., staff officer to Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, I sent him to Panderma in H.M.S., "Tribune" on the 7th July, but only after receiving from him a written undertaking that he considered that it was essential he should join Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges in the least possible time.

11. H.M.S. "Centaur" arrived at Smyrna, 4.45 A.M., the 7th July, and sailed for Constantinople the following afternoon. I regret that it was not possible for her to remain for a longer period.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE,  
*Commodore, Smyrna.*

*F.O. 406/44, p. 139-140, No. 107/6*

No. 70

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).*

*Foreign Office, July 10, 1920*

*(No. 643.)*

Sir,

DURING the Conference at Spa I had more than one conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, concerning the independent, and in some cases scarcely loyal, attitude pursued by Italian officials, military officers and agents in almost every part of the Near and Middle East. From every quarter, I said, information reached me of Italian intrigues with the Turkish Nationalists, Italian dissociation from Allied policy and interests, Italian attempts to make things difficult for Allied and, in particular, British forces, representatives and actions. From a confidential report which had recently come into my hands from Constantinople I extracted a number of specific incidents, of which I undertook to furnish Count Sforza with a more detailed résumé. But from my own knowledge and recollection I was able to refer him to examples of the sort of conduct of which I thought I had good reason to complain in the Caucasus, at Constantinople and more particularly in Egypt.

On two separate occasions, in London and at San Remo, the Italian Prime Minister had promised to send an Italian battalion to reinforce the British garrison at Batoum, which at that date it was an object of interallied policy to hold, at any rate provisionally. The French had carried out a

similar undertaking, but the Italians had twice failed to redeem their pledge. At Baku the different treatment meted out to the Italian representative by the Bolsheviks as compared with the British and French, and more particularly the British, was an indication of the separate relations which the Italians were known for some time to have established with the revolutionary party. At Constantinople the independent attitude of the Italians was so notorious that it was a matter of common belief that the Alliance no longer existed, and the British Commander-in-Chief was reluctant to make use of Italian troops in the military crisis that had recently arisen because of his uncertainty as to their inclinations. Everywhere the Italians were reported as assuring the Turks that were behind them in resisting the Turkish Peace Treaty, while in Anatolia we were credibly informed that Italian agents were in close touch with the partisans of Mustafa Kemal. ✓

I said to Count Sforza that I could understand a policy of this description, which might or might not be inspired by a regard for Italian interests, provided it was pursued by an independent, a neutral, or a hostile Power. But I could not understand it, so long as it was pursued by a member of the Alliance which had fought and won the war, which had continued since the war to meet the other Allies in friendly conference, and which had only a few weeks ago on Italian soil drawn up the Peace Treaty with Turkey, against which the majority of these manoeuvres appeared to be directed. As long as the Alliance continued —and I was not aware that the Italians either desired or proposed its rupture— it seemed to me that the Allies were bound by the obligations of a common loyalty to adhere to that policy, not only in the persons of their Ministers and principals in Europe, but of their agents in all parts of the East.

Did the Italians, I asked, formally and seriously object to the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty? Many reports had reached me to that effect, both at London and later at San Remo; and when we went to the latter place the British Delegation had been led to expect that a serious attempt would be made by Italy to modify its conditions in respect more especially of Smyrna and Thrace. It was true that Signor Nitti had made a brief fight, or rather had raised some doubts, about the decision concerning the Chatalja lines, and had shown no marked enthusiasm for the Smyrna solution. But the Italian attitude had not been pushed to the point of opposition, and the treaty in its present form had been finally accepted by them, not only without protest but with unqualified assent. Did the Italian Delegation, I asked, adhere to this position, or were they even now at Spa about to press for modification?

Count Sforza admitted that his Government had felt, and continued to feel, very serious doubts about the Thracian and Smyrna policy of the Allies, but he did not anticipate that it would now be possible to modify

it, and he accordingly accepted the obligations of loyalty to a policy which he admitted to be equally binding upon his Government with the remaining Allied Powers.

Upon the other issues raised by me, Count Sforza was constrained to admit that, though explanations might be forthcoming in individual cases, there was probably some justification for the complaint that I had made. He explained the situation, somewhat, naively, as having arisen from a far-sighted desire on the part of Italian agents and representatives in the East to anticipate the situation which they contemplated would shortly arise in that part of the world. In their judgement the Nationalist forces in Turkey would be in the ascendent in the future, and it was politic therefore, with a due regard to Italian interests, to be on good terms with that section of the Turkish community. Even now at Constantinople the Italians would welcome a situation in which by some means we could persuade the Nationalist Party to join in the acceptance of the Peace Treaty. Further, the Italians were animated by a traditional suspicion of the Greeks, who were even now doing much to provoke them in Asia Minor, and in these circumstances it was not surprising that Italian agents should sometimes in distant parts carry their feelings to a point that was not in strict accord with the policy being pursued by their superiors in Europe.

Count Sforza assured me that he did not himself in any degree countenance these proceedings, and he promised to issue instructions that would produce a more loyal atmosphere and attitude.

Upon the position in Egypt and the conduct of the Italian colony there I spoke with even greater warmth. The Italians had over and over again during the past two years promised to recognise the British protectorate over Egypt — a recognition which I believed had not yet been forthcoming. Meanwhile we had made enormous concessions to the Italian ambitions in Africa. We had ceded to them a great slice of territory in Jubaland, and had even added to the original cession. We had further accommodated them about Sollum. In these circumstances it was really intolerable that in almost every communication that came from Egypt I should find mention of Italian intrigues with the Nationalist Party and Italian hostility.

One of the chief centres of this mischievous influence in the East was the Banco di Roma, which appeared everywhere to be a focus of anti-British agitation, and evidence of whose activities reached me from many quarters.

Count Sforza assured me that he was greatly concerned by what I had told him. He proposed to hold up the return to Egypt of the Italian representative, Count Negretti, until he had seen him on his own return to Rome. He was convinced that no such charges would be brought against

Banco di Roma

the Count, to whose friendliness and British sympathies many spontaneous tributes had been made; he proposed to give Count Negretti strict instructions to place a much needed check upon the political proclivities and proceedings of his compatriots in Egypt.

Count Sforza appeared throughout our conversations to be animated personally by most friendly intentions, but he made no great effort to disguise that his countrymen were not always similarly imbued.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

FO. 406/44, p. 62-63, No. 41

No. 71

*British Secretary's Notes of an Inter-Allied Conference held at the Villa Fraineuse, Spa, on Sunday, July 11, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; His Excellency the Earl of Derby, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Reginald Tower, Major-General Thwaites, Captain Domville, R. N., Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr. *France*: M. Millerand, M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer, M. Laroche; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: Count Sforza, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Marquis della Torretta; SECRETARY, Signor Carlo Galli.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

*Greece*: M. Veniselos.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

I. M. MILLERAND, having declared the meeting open, stated that the first *Draft Reply to Turkish Note on Treaty of Peace* question to consider was the draft reply to Turkey (Paper A.J.-203, Revise). He wished to know whether the members of the conference had had time to study it, or whether they would like it to be read to them.

LORD CURZON asked permission to make one or two observations on the reply. The draft, he said, had been drawn up in conformity with the general lines laid down by the Allied conference. The draft was brief and concise, and amounted to a refusal to meet the Turkish request. One concession was made, which was that Turkey was offered a seat on the Straits Commission; and in various points of detail it had been considered necessary to alter

slightly the terms of the treaty. At their meeting some days previously, M. Veniselos had referred to Turkey's obligation to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who had been forcibly driven out. The date named in article 144 was the 1st August, 1914. M. Millerand had suggested that some date in the previous spring should be substituted, and had then proposed the 1st January. He (Lord Curzon) had himself suggested the 1st March, and the conference had finally accepted as a compromise the 1st February. The experts, however, had thought that this date might puzzle some people, and had therefore substituted the 1st January, 1914. This slight modification would require the formal approval of the present conference. Article 178 of the treaty had been modified in the draft. In regard to this he had nothing to say, although possibly other members of the conference might find occasion to make some comments. Since the draft had been prepared, a further representation had been received from the Turkish delegation. This was a very long document, and it included many points of detail, which were of no great significance, and his own opinion was that it might be wise to give way in respect to some of these. In order that there should be no delay in forwarding the reply to the first Turkish note, he suggested that the conference might decide to give a certain latitude to their experts to make such concessions as they deemed reasonable and safe, so long as no questions of principle were affected. If this were not done it would be necessary again to assemble the Supreme Council, and having regard to the great pressure under which they were working he hoped this might be avoided.

M. MILLERAND said that Lord Curzon had made a very concise statement of the various points upon which a decision had to be taken by the conference that morning. He would now, as chairman, put to the conference one by one the several points on which their decision was required. The first point was the question of authorising Turkey to have a Turkish representative on the Straits Commission. He enquired whether anybody had any objection to raise to this.

(This resolution was passed.)

M. Millerand, continuing, said that the second point was the proposed substitution of the 1st January, 1914, for the 1st February of that year, the date which had been provisionally approved by the conference when they had last discussed this question. He wished to know whether there was any objection to this alteration.

(The date of the 1st January, 1914, was accepted.)

The third point was the suggested modification of article 178.

Some discussion then followed as to the modification suggested in the draft reply to Turkey, in the course of which, after M. Kammerer had explained the reasons for introducing the suggested modification,



M. Millerand said that Lord Curzon had referred to a fresh note which had been received from Turkey, asking for various concessions, mainly on points of detail; Lord Curzon's proposal being that discretion should be accorded to the experts, who had prepared the first draft, to submit a reply to the second note.

Some discussion ensued as to the date when the reply should be sent to the Turks by the secretary-general of the conference.

M. VENISELOS begged leave to draw the attention of the conference to the last sentence of the proposed reply. He referred in particular to the words:—

'If the treaty is not signed in its present form, the Allied Powers will take such action as they may consider necessary to enforce its signature and execution.'

He was of opinion that this sentence, more especially the words 'to enforce its signature and execution,' should be omitted, because, as it now stood, the Allies were definitely bound to the statement that in case Turkey refused to sign, the only thing she had to fear—with the exception of the loss of Constantinople— would be the enforcement of the treaty in its present form; whereas, if the above words were omitted, the Allies would then hold a very effective menace over the Turks as to what might happen to them in case they did not sign. There was an additional reason, however, why M. Veniselos proposed the elimination of these words. It was stated in the reply that in case of refusal on the part of the Turks to sign the treaty, Constantinople would be taken away from them. He begged permission to state, however, that he did not consider the terms of the treaty wholly adequate for the protection and freedom of the Straits. The Allies had recently had undeniable proof of this by what Mustafa Kemal had done in the Dardanelles. He (M. Veniselos) had heard that the Kemalists had even gone so far as to open infantry fire on the British men-of-war stationed at Constantinople. Therefore the taking away of Constantinople from the Turks would not of itself contribute to the safety and freedom of the Straits, unless the country around the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora on the Asiatic side, and that of the Sanjak of Bigha, were detached from Turkey in order to form a separate State along with Constantinople, to which State might be entrusted the safety and freedom of the Straits. Furthermore, in case of refusal, the Turks ought to be deprived of the concessions given them in Smyrna by creating there the special régime, as it not [? now] stands in the present treaty. That was done for the sake of Turkish susceptibilities, to which no such deference should be given in case of their refusal to sign.

LORD CURZON said that he was inclined to support M. Veniselos, but for reasons which were quite different from those which the Greek Prime

Minister had advanced. The end of the final paragraph of the draft ran as follows:—

‘If the treaty is not signed in its present form the Allied Powers will take such action as they may consider necessary to enforce its signature and execution.’

In his own opinion it was practically futile to say that the Allied Powers meant to enforce the signature. He strongly deprecated the Allied Powers placing themselves in a false position, and taking upon themselves an obligation which they were not prepared to fulfil.

M. MILLERAND suggested that for the words ‘to enforce its signature and execution,’ the words ‘in the circumstances’ should be substituted.

LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA having signified their assent to this proposal, it was agreed—

- (a) To approve generally the draft reply to the Turkish observations on the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey, subject to the omission of the final words ‘to enforce its signature and execution,’ and the substitution of the words ‘in the circumstances.’
- (b) To remit the examination of the new Turkish note to the expert committee, which had drafted the reply to the previous note, the said expert committee being granted full powers and discretion to make such concessions on minor points of detail as it might deem desirable and prudent, without further reference to the Supreme Council, and to embody them in the reply referred to in the previous conclusion.
- (c) The expert committee to be authorised to finish its work in Paris, on the understanding that the final version of the note would be ready for presentation to the Turkish delegation not later than Saturday, the 17th July, 1920.

(At this point M. Veniselos withdrew from the conference.)

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 543-546, No. 62*

No. 72

*Sir B. Thomson, the Director of the British Intelligence, to Mr. C. E. Heathcote -  
Smith, Foreign Office.*

*No. S.B. 19940/M.H.*

✓ *Confidential*

Scotland House,

*13th July, 1920*

Dear Mr. Heathcote-Smith,

We have received information that Djemal Pasha was present at a preliminary meeting of the Third International Congress at Moscow about the middle of June. He was accompanied at the meeting by Halil Pasha and Fuad Bey, and they were acting as Mustapha Kemal Pasha's representatives. They are to remain in Moscow to manage Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Legation\*.

Sincerely yours,  
(Signed) B. H. THOMSON

*FO. 371/5173/E. 8298*

\* Bu yazı üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şunlar not edilmiştir:

"This is I believe the first news we have had of Mustapha Kemal's Legation in Moscow. The Bolshevik Mission in London denied some time back (about 25 June) any alliance with Kemal.

Qy. Refer to Russian Department (Mr. Hoare) and keep in reserve for next Conference with Russians.

C. H. Heathcote-Smith  
16.VII."

No. 73

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *13th July 1920*  
(Received July 27)

*No. 1003/M. 2279.*

*Secret.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, weekly summary of Intelligence Reports issued by the M.I.I.C., Constantinople branch, for the week-ended 8th July 1920.

I have, etc.

J. D. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5170/E. 8940*

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 73

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
For Week Ending 8th July, 1920.*

*Secret.*

The sanctions accorded by the Peace Conference to GREECE and the extraordinary rapidity and facility of the advance of the Hellenic army in ANATOLIA has brought about an atmosphere of hopelessness and tension in Turkish circles. The sudden return of the Grand Vizier from PARIS and the news of the indefinite postponement of the Turkish peace has, if possible, intensified the general despair, but it is the utter failure of the Nationalist forces to hold the Hellenic Army that has really robbed the Turks of their last hope. As will be seen Bolshevik propaganda seems to be making progress in ANATOLIA, and the Nationalists may, in the blindness of despair, attempt to follow the same path as that which has led to the ruin of AZERBAIJAN. Meanwhile Nationalist partisans in CONSTANTINOPLE are making a brave show with rumours of victories against the Greeks in all directions, and there is reason to believe that the Italians are responsible for some of the wild stories that have been circulated.

*RESHID Bey and the Nationalists.*

In the summary for the week ending June 3rd (page 2) mention was made of a communication sent by RESHID Bey to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha. A document has now been received which purports to be the communication in question and also MUSTAFA KEMAL's reply thereto.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs after stating that he has been made proud and honoured by the present manifestations in ANATOLIA, asks to be allowed to submit certain truths to the Great National Assembly. He states that the events which have occurred since the Armistice have very much perturbed him and his one aim has been to discover the real author of the hate and distrust directed against the Turkish nation. With this end in view he accepted the post of Minister of the Interior, hoping to be able to instil into his colleagues the principle of national independence. But it was obvious that all his colleagues would not admit this principle and RESHID Bey merely consented to become a member of the Peace Delegation in order to understand matters relating to the Peace Conference. Continuing he relates that after having attended the Conference he is obliged to admit that whether the nation is united or not, the Turkish people is in a helpless position. RESHID Bey then concludes by suggesting that the Great National Assembly should send a delegation of deputies to BRUSSA to assist in discussing and deciding on the replies to be given to the Peace Conference.

To this a reply was sent by MUSTAFA KEMAL on June 22nd which confidently expressed the belief that sooner or later justice would triumph and that TURKEY would be restored to peace and prosperity. The Nationalist leader pointed out that EUROPE would soon be aware of the great difference between a delegation with a nation behind it, and one with no support of any kind. He stated that the Nationalist delegates had received definite instructions as to the line to be taken and would, if the necessity arose, act in union with the delegates of the Central Government. The Nationalist leader also stated that Damad FERID's activities were being watched with much interest as were those of the delegation of the Central Government.

The letter concluded by thanking the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his good intentions and his sincerity and asked him to accept wishes for his success.

*Report 1127.*

### ANATOLIA.

Information received from a French business man with military training and of decidedly Anglophile sentiments who has recently returned from ANATOLIA confirms, previous reports that order and security appear to be good and the Christian population goes its way unmolested; all police, gendarmeries, and contre espionage services being well organised.

On the other hand there would seem to be noticeable military activity, trains proceeding westward being crowded with troops who are well armed and disciplined. No artillery or aeroplanes have been seen, however. All prisoners of war are sent to BILEJIK where they are equipped and mobilized.

As far as it is possible to judge there are no Germans in ANGORA, but at ESKI SHEHIR there are several civilians of doubtful nationality who stated they were going to ANGORA and would return to ESKI SHEHIR in uniform. SABRI Bey, a Roumanian Moslem, a native of the DOBRUJA is with the Nationalists at ANGORA, but it is not known what his mission is there.

One interesting and significant item of information received from the same source is that the Director of the railway works at ESKI SHEHIR, who is a dangerous Nationalist and Bolshevik, has converted the railway works into an arms and munitions factory.

Dissension has apparently arisen between HALIDE EDIB Hanum, the famous Turkish Novelist and speaker and MUSTAFA KEMAL, but the reason is not known. This lady and her husband, Dr. ADNAN Bey,

former President of the Turkish Red Crescent Society, have left ANGORA for ADA BAZAR for the purpose of organising hospitals and Red Cross centres.

*Report 1124.*

*Nationalist split.*

A report which would be of great interest if based on fact has been received from the source mentioned in the preceeding paragraph, to the effect that a decided split has occurred in the Nationalist party. A more moderate group of prominent military officers, which includes such men as ALI FUAD Pasha, Col. ISMET Bey, and NUREDDIN Pasha, has apparently come into being. It is, however, without a leader and therefore unable to terminate the dictatorship of MUSTAFA KEMAL which is the chief aim. Their programme, however, includes such objects as:—

- 1) The separation of the Executive from the Legislative authority.
- 2) A reconciliation with the Central Government, provided DAMAD FERID retires from power.
- 3) The strengthening of the prestige of the Khalifate and Sultanate.
- 4) Direct negotiations with the Entente Powers for the conclusion of a speedy peace with the best terms obtainable, based upon *the complete independence of whatever territory may be left to TURKEY.*
- 5) The immediate rupture of all relations with the Bolsheviks and the Unionists outside TURKEY.

A conference of this more moderate party was recently held in ESKI SHEHIR, the object of which is believed to have been to win over MUSTAFA KEMAL's supporters.

AHMED IZZET Pasha was asked to become the protagonist of this group in CONSTANTINOPLE with a view to succeeding to the Grand Vizierate should the scheme develop successfully. AHMED IZZET Pasha declined this invitation on the grounds that he did not wish to be involved in politics and would undertake no action without the Sultan's full knowledge and consent. The invitation was again repeated, but again emphatically declined.

*Report 1122.*

*THRACE.*

In a previous summary reference was made to a so-called Government formed at HAMIDLI in the RHODOPE mountains in Western THRACE.

Details have now been received of the members of this Government, prominent amongst whom are:—

- 1) TEVFIK Bey, President. Of Bulgarian nationality, and one of the wealthiest men in THRACE. At one time was leading member of the THRACE Islamic Council.
- 2) BEKİR SIDKİ Bey, Minister of the Interior. At one time connected with the GUMULJINA branch of the Bulgarian Tobacco bank.
- 3) MAHMUD NEDİM Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Was Foreign Minister in the temporary Government of THRACE at GUMULJINA, established by the Unionists at the end of the Balkan war. Is a dangerous member of the C.U.P. and has always been closely connected with SHEREF Bey, now interned at MALTA.
- 4) JELAL Bey, Public Instruction. Formerly Unionist deputy for GUMULJINA and until recently the CONSTANTINOPLE agent of the THRACE Pasha ELİ Association. Was of considerable assistance to the French Intelligence in the capital.
- 5) Dr. DOCHKOFF Effendi, Economy, a Turkophile.
- 6) VANGEL YORGIEFF, Posts and Telegraphs. A Bulgarian. Member of Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee. Has great influence with various revolutionary sub-committees now active in THRACE.
- 7) KOSTAKI YORGIEFF, Public Works, a Bulgarian of THRACE.
- 8) FUAD Bey, a Staff Major of the Turkish Army, known to be a Unionist. Closely connected with JAFFAR TAYYAR Bey.

*Report 1126.*

#### *SAMSUN and TREBİZOND.*

A British ex-officer recently returned from SAMSUN states that in the course of an interview with the local Nationalist Governor, NAFİZ Bey, the latter showed perfect courtesy and friendliness, promising to help him to transact business and giving him a personal guarantee.

Informant gathered from various merchants in SAMSUN that there were many desertions from KEMAL's Army and that dissatisfaction was growing among the peasants owing to the requisition of money and foodstuffs.

During informant's stay in TREBİZOND he noticed the friendly relations existing between the Italians and the Nationalists.

It would also appear that the French Consul, M. LEPISSIER is on very friendly terms with the Nationalists and is in close touch with the Vali of the district. The feeling of the Turks is in consequence pro-French.

*Reports 1130 and 1133.*

*The Nationalist Press.*

The tone of the Nationalist Press is still very optimistic, though of course facts are distorted to such an extent that often there is no truth whatever in the announcements made. A typical example is an extract from the "ERTOGRUL" of June 9th which states that the Bolshevik Army advancing on the Caucasus "was received with great manifestations of joy in AZERBAIJAN and BAKU".

The "MILLET YOLU" of June 17th claims that ISMIDT has been occupied by the Nationalist forces. Another paper states that "FERID the Accursed" under the guise of going to the peace Conference took flight from CONSTANTINOPLE, anticipating trouble and that he has been replaced by HAMDI Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff.

*Reports 1136, and 1132.*

*Unionists in ITALY.*

Emanuel CARASSO, the notorious Unionist who was instrumental in establishing the original connection of the C.U.P. with Freemasonry, has been in ITALY for some little time past, and as a result of enquiries with regard to his rumoured return to this town, it would appear that this has been hindered by the disturbed political situation in ITALY. Associated with CARASSO is MISHON VENTURA an Italian Jew of CONSTANTINOPLE, who was at one time in business in EGYPT, and as a result of a disastrous lawsuit with a British firm, became strongly Anglophobe. He subsequently became acquainted with TRAVESTA, a well-known Italian lawyer who is an intimate friend of M. GIOLITTI. CARASSO is said to possess considerable influence among GIOLITTI's supporters and through his friendship with VENTURA and TRAVESTA is in close touch with the Italian Premier. The CONSTANTINOPLE "letter box" for CARASSO appears to be AVRAM, the son of MISHON VENTURA. According to information from LONDON, the object of TALAAT's recent visit to ROME was partly to confer with CARASSO and further information from LONDON reported friction between Unionists and Nationalists in EUROPE owing to the predominance of Jewish and Freemasonic influences among the Unionists. It would appear that the Unionists are trying to exploit their influence in Italian Jewish Freemasonic circles to obtain the control of the Nationalist movement.

*Report 1128.*

*PAN-ISLAMISM.*

(1) The Turkish Nationalists and other Pan-Islamic elements continue to carry on an active propaganda in favour of the throne of TURKEY



and the Khalifat, finding as usual much convenient material in the fanatical activities of anti-British Muslims in INDIA and AFGHANISTAN. 1/11

a) Extracts from the "ERTOGRUL" (sic) of BRUSSA and from the Anatolian Press Agency are illustrative of Turkish efforts to prove that Pan-Islamists and Nationalists throughout the East are only too ready to join hands, if the British will not guarantee the safety of the Khalifat. The Amir of AFGHANISTAN, as well as prominent members of the Indian Khalifat Delegation, have made speeches and written letters promising their aid to TURKEY if it is required, and these are duly quoted and embroidered in the interests of Nationalist TURKEY. CC

b) An addition to the Pan-Islamic propaganda is supplied by the circulation in CONSTANTINOPLE of the Tripolitan paper "EL LEWA EL TARABOLSIA" (The Tripolitan Standard), supported by the Italians. Writers in recent copies of this paper deride the Muslim tribes from SYRIA to BAGHDAD for ignoring the sacred claims of TURKEY and the KHALIFAT by simply working and fighting for the independence of their own small kingdoms. CC

FO. 371/5170/E. 8940

No. 74

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 14th, 1920  
(Received July 15)

*Telegraphic*  
*No. 814*  
*Urgent*

*Secret.*

Information from a very secret source has been received to the effect that about June 21st Tewfik Pasha was proposing to get into communication with a nationalist deputation from Angora which was then in Paris, and which was said to have been in touch with general secretary of Peace Conference.

Corroborative information has since been received that two prominent nationalists Ahmed Rustem and Reshad Nihad were actually in Paris at that (? same, sic) time as Mustafa Kemal's representatives.

The evidence is strong and I suggest activities of these two nationalists should be followed.

FO. 371/5053/E. 8301

No. 75

*Report on Situation in Trans-Caucasia, dated July 15, 1920.**(Received August 5.)*

## I. AZARBAIJAN.

Azərbayjan is now in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The responsibility for this lies with Mustafa Kemal and Muri (?Nuri) Pasha. The former desired to establish contact with the Bolsheviks, as he hoped to get large supplies of arms and ammunition from there. He therefore made every effort to persuade the Azərbayjan Government to accept Bolshevik rule, promising them that the Bolsheviks would leave them to manage their own country and not interfere with them. The Azərbayjan Government as a body, and Yusufbekov, Fath Ala Khan, and General Mehmandarov in particular, declined absolutely to agree to Mustafa Kemal's suggestion but, Gajinski, one of the Ministers, and General Shaikhliniski, Assistant Minister of War, backed by the Ittihad Party, betrayed the Government and carried out the *coup d'État* of the 28th April with the help of a number of Turkish officers in the Azərbayjan forces. Fath Ali Khan Hoiski has paid with his life for his determined opposition to Mustafa Kemal and the Bolsheviks. General Mehmandarov is a prisoner in Bolshevik hands. Yusufbekov is in a place of safety.

Once in possession of Baku the Bolsheviks at once began to show their hand, and it was soon evident that they had no intention of allowing any Tartar to enjoy any measure of power. Gajinski and others hold office, but all power is in the hands of the Bolsheviks. This has caused a split between the Bolsheviks and the Tartars.

Although firmly established in Baku, the Bolsheviks quickly realised that they were by no means acceptable to the Tartars in the provinces as revolts against their rule broke out in many places. The most serious revolt, and one which might well have succeeded but for the local Armenians assisting the Bolsheviks, took place at Ganja. The Bolsheviks quelled it, massacring, it is stated, 15,000 Tartars. This has seriously widened the Bolshevik-Tartar breach, and the Bolsheviks are now seeking to win back the Tartars by inviting them to assist in a joint attack on Armenia. The Tartar does not forgive easily, and there is little doubt that serious anti-Bolshevik risings could be organised all over Azərbayjan without much difficulty.

The Armenians in Azərbayjan are actively co-operating with the Bolsheviks. This is due partly to their overpowering animosity towards the Tartars and partly to the desire to save their own skins. The Armenian

representative at Tiflis, Begzadian, admitted to me that the Armenian Government is unable to influence them.

It is safe to state that Azarbaijan as a whole is quite disillusioned as to the true character of the Bolsheviks and is bitterly anti-Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks have inaugurated a deliberate policy of putting to death every Tartar intellectual in order to destroy any chance of an anti-Bolshevik movement being organised. Credible witnesses state that some hundreds of Tartars are interned on Nargin Island, and so effective is the Bolshevik espionage system that people speak in whispers in the streets. In short, a reign of terror prevails.

## 2. GEORGIA.

It has been the misfortune of Georgia that for the past year or more it has been consistently misrepresented in London and Paris as being Bolshevik at heart. It is unnecessary to discuss here the sources of this misinformation, but I wish to place on record, as an individual who has had probably as good opportunities as anyone of studying the situation in Georgia, my conviction that Georgia is anti-Bolshevik. The number of Bolshevik agents and propagandists put to death by the Georgian Government alone affords adequate proof of this, but it has nevertheless failed to kill the calumny, emanating from the entourage of General Denikin, that because Georgia wishes to be independent of Russia she is Bolshevik. As for the Georgian Government, its members realise very clearly that, if ever the Bolsheviks take Georgia, they will be the first to pay the penalty of their opposition. The arrival of the Bolsheviks in Azarbaijan immediately placed Georgia in a very difficult position. Deprived by the policy of the Allies of any chance of obtaining adequate arms and ammunition, she found herself attacked by Bolshevik forces from Baku. Her troops fought and defeated the Bolsheviks, but it is improbable that they would have succeeded but for the fact that when their ammunition ran out the Italians provided them with 2,000,000 rounds. The representatives of our Italian ally in Trans-Caucasia do not appear to be bound by any decision of the Supreme Council, and accordingly profit by every occasion to secure popularity at our expense.

It is worth noting that Georgia did not hesitate to fight the Bolsheviks, although she was greatly preoccupied at the moment with an unfortunate misunderstanding with our military authorities at Batum regarding the province of Batum. It is not my intention to enter into the merits of this controversy, which is now a matter of the past. But it should be noted that the atmosphere created by it was hardly favourable to an impartial expression of opinion regarding Georgia by our representatives at Batum.

After the fighting, Georgia made a treaty with the Soviet Government. Neither side at heart intends to observe the provisions of this treaty. The Bolsheviks have signed the treaty only because they feel they are not at the moment ready to attack Georgia; Georgia because she was committed by the action of her representative at Moscow to a treaty of which she does not approve. The representative in question was sent to Moscow to negotiate. He sent a wireless message stating that it was essential for him to be given the powers of a plenipotentiary. The Georgian Government despatched two wireless messages to him: the first making him a plenipotentiary, the second giving the terms the Georgian Government was prepared to accept. The representative received the first message at once, but the second was delivered to him only after he had already signed the treaty drawn up by the Bolsheviks. Georgia can therefore hardly be said to be at peace with the Bolsheviks. It is more correct to say that a truce exists between them which either party can terminate at pleasure.

The Bolsheviks lost no time, once the treaty was signed, in sending an envoy, Kirov, with a mission of some fifty members to Tiflis. The real object of this mission appears to be to register all property claimed as Russian. Presumably when the Bolsheviks feel in a position to threaten Georgia more actively they will present a demand for payment for such property under threat of war. The Georgian Government has confiscated a large amount of money and propaganda publications which the Bolshevik Mission endeavoured to smuggle into Georgia; it has arrested several members of the mission for engaging in propaganda work; on the murder of Fath Ali Khan Hoiski it informed Kirov that if any member of a foreign mission in Georgia came to harm at Bolshevik hands the whole of his mission would be killed. As regards popular feeling, it may be mentioned that when half a dozen of the Bolshevik Mission entered a restaurant those in the restaurant rose in a body and insisted on their immediate expulsion.

As regards her internal affairs Georgia's main difficulty has been, in the words of one of her Ministers, that "she has been so preoccupied with her foreign relations that she has had no time to devote to her internal affairs." One question which needs careful handling is that of the Ajarians. There is every reason to believe that the Georgian Government will adopt a sane and sympathetic attitude towards the Ajarians, and that it will succeed in gaining their sympathies. There is no intention to interfere with their particular system of land tenure.

The Georgian Government is most anxious to secure the economic development of the country, and would prefer British assistance to any other for this purpose. British capital will naturally demand some guarantee of Georgian stability, and such stability in turn depends upon the satisfactory solution of Georgia's foreign problems.

In the first place it is essential to Georgia that the independence of Azerbaijan be restored. If this is arranged by the Allies, well and good. If not, Georgia will be compelled to help in any way she can the anti-Bolshevik Government of Azarbaijan to re-establish its power.

Secondly, in her own interests, Georgia must prevent Armenia from going under Bolshevik rule, whether peacefully or by force. Her relations with Armenia are at present very close, and it is probable that the realisation by both parties of the community of their interests will shortly lead to a military alliance between Georgia and Armenia. To make this alliance effective, both States look to the Allies to help them to obtain adequate supplies of munitions of war.

For both political and economic reasons the Georgian Government is anxious to establish as close contact as possible with Great Britain. Little as the Georgian Government really wished British troops to leave Batum, the handing over to it of the province and port of Batum has created an atmosphere of trust in us and confirmed the belief in our justice. The Georgian Government wishes to do all it can to encourage British trade with Georgia. It is ready to ask the British Government to establish a British naval base at Batum and will give every facility for that purpose. Apart from Georgian wishes in this matter, it is perhaps worthy of consideration on other grounds, viz., that if, as is possible, the Bolsheviks defeat General Wrangel and occupy the Crimea, Bolshevik submarines may appear in the Black Sea. Failing the establishment of a British naval base at Batum, the presence there of one of His Majesty's ships is very desirable, if only as an outward and visible sign that we have not entirely abandoned Georgia.

In the existing state of affairs Tiflis has become and is likely long to remain the centre of political and commercial activity in Trans-Caucasia. It is important therefore, if British interests are to be properly safeguarded, that the British Mission should be second to none in efficiency, and for this purpose no time should be lost in the selection and despatch of suitable and numerically adequate personnel. In this borderland of West and East a certain measure of display is not only advisable but necessary, and this should not be ignored.

To sum up, Georgia is the foundation on which alone we can build in order to restore our very favourable situation, which the Bolshevik invasion of Azerbaijan has partly destroyed. I submit that it is to our interest to give Georgia all possible political and moral support. By helping Georgia alone can we hope to save Armenia or restore independence to Azerbaijan and so safeguard our interests in Persia.

### 3. *ARMENIA.*

The present unhappy position of Armenia is in great measure due to the failure of the Armenian Government to control its animosity towards Azerbaijan. Even now the Armenian Government would prefer to see Russia permanently established in Azerbaijan than that Azerbaijan should regain her independence.

The Government presided over by Ohanginian is an improvement on its predecessor under Khatissian, as the latter really always wished to go back under Russian rule. This is not Ohanginian's policy, and he and his Government have wholeheartedly opposed the acceptance of Bolshevism. They have dealt sternly with internal Bolshevism and have on two occasions attacked and repulsed Bolshevik troops wishing to enter Armenian territory. They are now threatened with a joint Bolshevik-Tartar invasion, but the arrival of arms and ammunition has encouraged them, and it is probable that they will offer a stubborn resistance. If, however, Mustafa Kemal can send any considerable forces to attack them simultaneously from the Turkish side their position will be precarious. They are daily recognising more clearly the necessity of making common cause with Georgia, and a military alliance with the latter appears to be imminent.

### 4. *THE NORTH CAUCASIAN TRIBES.*

Like Azerbaijan, these tribes were persuaded to accept Bolshevik rule by Nuri Pasha, and, like Azerbaijan, they now see their error and cordially detest the Bolsheviks. There have already been anti-Bolshevik revolts amongst the tribes and a serious rising of perhaps 50,000 men requires only organisation and funds. No great sum of money would be required and efficient organisers of such a movement could be found. It is probable indeed that, whether supported from outside sources or not, such a rising will before long take place. It would be infinitely more effective if outside support in the shape of money could be provided and the rising co-ordinated with a similar one in Azerbaijan. It might well result in the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the Caucasus south of the Terek River. The Kuban Cossacks would almost certainly seize the opportunity of attacking the Bolsheviks at the same time. If the rising succeeded, the North Caucasus Republic would come into being again, and in this event should be granted recognition by the Allies as soon as it shows its capacity to administer the tribes.

### 5. *THE ALLIED MISSIONS IN TRANS-CAUCASIA.*

Thanks to the conduct of the French and Italian Missions, the inhabitants of Trans-Caucasia are convinced that, whatever may be the state of affairs further west, there is no solidarity of the Allies in Trans-Caucasia.

Members of the French and Italian Missions have consistently decried Great Britain to the Georgian Government. When the trouble arose about Batum province, both missions urged Georgia to invade that province or she would never get it. It will be remembered that on this occasion the Italian representative did not scruple to report to the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople that Georgian troops had entered Batum province with the authorisation of the British military authorities.

*The Italian Mission.* — This mission originally came out to report with a view to Italy taking a mandate for Trans-Caucasia. When this fell through the mission remained and displayed considerable political and commercial activity, the necessary funds being provided from German sources through the Banca di Roma. Similarly large quantities of German goods were imported. Indeed, the Italian Mission has worked throughout in German interests. At a time when the Supreme Council decided not to allow the Trans-Caucasian States to obtain munitions of war, the Italian Mission contracted to supply Azerbaijan with arms, ammunition, &c., and the contract was signed by Colonel Gabba, the head of the Italian Mission. The contract was not fulfilled owing to the interference of His Majesty's Government. The Italian Mission was not discouraged by this, and recently sold 2,000,000 cartridges to the Georgian Government.

The powerful wireless installation at Tiflis belonging to the Georgian Government is managed for them by the Italians, and is largely used by them in Italian commercial interests, besides, there is good reason to believe, for communicating with Bolshevik headquarters at Moscow. In the light of events in Trans-Caucasia it is more true to say that Italy is an ally of the Bolsheviks than of Great Britain. The Italian Mission at Baku is allowed to fly its flag and to communicate with Tiflis. The Italian officer in charge, Captain Intsom, is free to travel to and from Tiflis. This officer, when asked for help by a British officer in Baku, replied that he could do nothing. He has made no attempt to ameliorate the lot of our prisoners there, while the representative of Georgia, so frequently accused of being Bolshevik, has been unremitting in his efforts to help them.

The failure of the Italian Minister at Tiflis, M. Mercatelli, to call on his British and French colleagues, while he was daily exchanging visits with the Bolshevik envoy, is another indication of Italian policy.

*The French Mission.* — The French have really two missions, diplomatic and military. Their diplomatic representative is Comte de Martel. He has missed no opportunity of decrying us to the Georgians. When our intention to evacuate Batum was announced, he impressed on the Georgian Government that this was due to our weakness. Annoyed at not being able to take part in my negotiations with the Georgian Government, he announc-

ed that he would take his own line. He then went to Batum, where, although well aware that the province was under British administration, he received an Ajarian deputation. He subsequently informed General Cooke Collis of this. It is significant, however, that about the same time a French officer of the mission at Batum visited Alambari and there addressed an Ajarian meeting, and a few days later addressed a similar meeting within five miles of Batum. On each occasion he urged the Ajarians to resist the Georgians, promising that the French would secure them their independence.

A few days before he left Tiflis for Batum Comte de Martel ordered the French battalion at Batum to place a guard on certain cotton in dispute between him and the Armenian Government. This was carried out, although the French battalion was under the orders of General Cooke Collis and not of Comte de Martel, and although General Cooke Collis had ruled that the Armenian Government was at liberty to export the cotton from Batum.

The French Military Mission has recently been increased from six to ten officers. It is in charge of Colonel Corbelle, who may be described as openly Anglophobe. His policy appears to be identical with that of his predecessor, Colonel Chardigny, whose anti-British policy is largely responsible for the present unsatisfactory situation in Trans-Caucasia. During my recent visit to Tiflis, Colonel Corbelle informed the Georgian War Office that he had received orders to arrange for the evacuation of the French battalion from Batum. He was informed that arrangements for the evacuation of all Allied troops from Batum had already been made. The French Military Mission has, since the evacuation of Batum, attached to itself two members of General Wrangel's Mission to Batum, the remainder of which left for the Crimea just before our occupation. The idea appears to be to further anti-Bolshevik Russian interests in Trans-Caucasia. This does not appear entirely in accord with the *de facto* recognition of the three States by the Allies.

It is not clear for what purpose France maintains a military mission in Trans-Caucasia. In any case, its activities in no way help the Allied cause.

#### 6. COMMUNICATION WITH TIFLIS.

Both in our own interests and in those of Georgia it is very important that something should be done to establish safe and rapid communication between Tiflis and Europe. Outside Georgia the land telegraph lines are in the hands of Bolsheviks or Turkish Nationalists. As regards wireless telegraphy, the station at Tiflis is in the hands of the Italians, who can communicate with a ship at Constantinople or with Rome direct. The



Georgian Government has agreed to let the British Mission have the use of the station for a certain period daily, in order to communicate with Basra. British messages marked urgent are sent by wireless by one of His Majesty's ships at Batum, but atmospherics in the Black Sea region are a frequent source of delay. Other messages are sent by ships. I understand from the High Commissioner at Constantinople that a suggestion was made to erect a powerful installation on Balwer Island, but was vetoed. In view of the importance of establishing safe and rapid communication with Tiflis, this suggestion might perhaps be reconsidered. Telegrams at present often take ten days to a fortnight to reach Tiflis from London, and no regular mail service for British letters exists at all.

#### CONCLUSION.

From the point of view of British interests the present situation in Trans-Caucasia is far from satisfactory. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be saved. In my opinion it can be saved if a consistent policy be adopted and followed. It would be both unwise and unfair not to realise that the three Trans-Caucasian Republics are less to blame for the existing situation than we ourselves. In our whole-hearted support of General Denikin we not only failed to make General Denikin concentrate his energies on the defeat of the Bolsheviks and to prevent him from stirring up unnecessary trouble in Trans-Caucasia, but we also sacrificed our own interests in withholding arms and ammunition from the three States which would have enabled them to meet the Bolshevik peril when it threatened them.

We still enjoy a greater influence than any other foreign Power in Trans-Caucasia, and we can maintain and increase this influence at relatively small cost. For this purpose we should give the Trans-Caucasian States all possible political and moral support and help them to obtain adequate quantities of munitions of war and equipment. No opportunity should be missed of showing the States that we are keenly interested in their future. The economic importance of Trans-Caucasia should not be ignored, and, given a definite friendly policy towards the States, any and every commercial concession we may desire can be obtained.

The importance of Tiflis as a centre of political activity for the Middle East is great and increasing, and demands the maintenance there of a strong and efficient British Mission. Events are tending more and more to make Tiflis the centre of Russian and Turkish political activity in the Middle East.

C. B. STOKES, *Lieutenant-Colonel*

No. 76

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, July 16, 1920  
(Received July 18.)

(No. 829.)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No. 652.

Ferid Pasha and Peace Delegation returned here on 14th July.

Reshid Bey is only plenipotentiary remaining in Paris.

Ferid Pasha called on me this morning, 16th July. He said he wished to represent to me, results of his journey without entering into details, which I already knew. Turkey, he said, was confronted with treaty of utmost severity, only alternative to signing which must be total ruin. This was realised by reasonable people like himself, but unfortunately country was full of irresponsible madmen, who took line that treaty was death sentence, and that Turks should not put rope round their own necks. These people clamoured against signature, and fixed their hopes on support of Islamic world and Bolsheviks.

Grand Vizier said that recent attack on British at Ismid (for which as head of Government he expressed regret) had shown what lengths rebels would go to, and had proved correctness of his often-repeated contention that they were enemies not alone of Turkish Government, but also of Great Britain.

It was not only here, he said, that wild ideas prevailed. In Paris he had been beset by all sorts of Asiatics, who spoke in same strain as opponents of signature here. He himself realised fantastic nature of hopes founded on Islamic and Bolshevik support, but people who entertained them were numerous. What then, he asked, would be the value of treaty which was going to impose all sorts of obligations on Turkey if signed by Government, whose duty it would be to discharge these obligations honestly and loyally, but who would be incapable of doing so? He did not wish to exaggerate strength of movement in the interior. He agreed with me that failure of Kemalists to put up any resistance to Greek advance showed how little hold they had, how sick and tired peasants were of war, and how ready they were to welcome peace from any quarter.

He had maintained last year that movement was bluff, and had made proposals for repressing it with small expenditure of force, failing which grave situation would arise. He had not been listened to, and grave situation which he foretold had come about. Even now, however, position was such

that if Greeks were ordered to Angora, or even Sivas, advance would be military promenade and trouble would not be encountered until they approached Erzeroum. ??

While taking this unexaggerated view of movement in Asia Minor, Ferid Pasha nevertheless insisted on seriousness of situation which would arise if peace were signed without any guarantee that Government who signed it would be able to enforce their views on extremists.

If Government remained in their powerless condition they might be swept away, though it was difficult to say whether their fall would follow or precede moment fixed for signature of peace.

Grand Vizier thus led up to usual appeal for British assistance in retrieving situation in Asia Minor, and he summed up his attitude as follows:—

Reasonable men saw there was no alternative to signature except destruction. Reasonable men from Sultan downwards would plump for signature if they knew Great Britain would help Government to restore order in Turkey after signature. If, however, they were not assured of such help, even reasonable men would be against signature.

I promised to report all this to your Lordship. I urged repeatedly great importance of signing lest even worse fate would befall Turkey. I pointed out that peace itself contemplated creation of instruments, *e.g.*, gendarmerie, which would be forged with Allied assistance and would be available for restoration of order. To this Grand Vizier retorted that these instruments could not be brought into existence until Kemal had first been repressed.

Grand Vizier said he had explained above views, though in less detail, to Lord Derby, who had telegraphed to Prime Minister and had been summoned same day to Conference with latter at Spa. He had not been able to see Lord Derby on his return to Paris, but he had himself also given Prime Minister written statement of his views as far as they could be reduced to writing in form of letter.

Impression derived from this conversation and preliminary conversation with Mr. (group undecypherable) is that Grand Vizier personally has resigned himself to signature and is trying to convert others to this view. There is distinct movement of opinion in this direction, but it is to a large extent confined to one political group namely, *Entente libérale*. This detracts from its value. Ferid Pasha will probably have to reconstruct Government in any case within a few days. If he does so on programme of signing peace and recruits Cabinet mainly from *Entente libérale*, it will challenge violent opposition.

Sultan is beset by opposing influences. He probably leans towards signature, and it is probably in order to confirm him in this that Ferid is so anxious to be able to promise British support afterwards.

There is talk of convening Crown [*sic*] Cabinet as soon as rejoinder of Supreme Council to Turkish answer has been officially received, but no decision has been taken.

*FO. 406/44, p. 69-70, No. 46*

No. 77

*Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon.*

CAIRO, July 18th, 1920  
(Received July 18)

*Telegraphic*

*No. 729.*

*Very Urgent*

Feisal reports that regular and irregular forces of Mustafa Kemal have crossed Euphrates at Jerablus and are threatening Aleppo from (? East). Their advance guard is said to be at Munbij. Feisal hints at co-operation between them and French.

In a letter dated July 14th Feisal reports ultimatum from French was handed to him on that day. He states Arabs rose against Turks relying on declarations of British Government and, later, believing in covenant of League of Nations, expressed their wishes as to future to American Commission. As a result of their confidence they are in a critical position and are threatened by black troops. Acting on British advice he and his advisers have done their best to come to an understanding with French but his honour makes it impossible for him to accept fatal conditions of ultimatum. He places direct responsibility for what may happen on French and a moral responsibility on Great Britain, as a result of whose promises Arabs entered into war.

He requests intervention of Great Britain and League of Nations and wishes to know attitude of former before expiration of ultimatum.

He reserves to himself and his Nation their rights before League of Nations, Great Britain, and all Allied Governments in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of an Allied Army, and as person whom Great Britain recognized to be head of Syrian independent Government.

My immediately following telegram contains full terms of ultimatum.

As this expires to-night hostilities will presumably commence to-morrow. Arab liaison officer Beyrout has given notice to British liaison officer that he will evacuate his post to-morrow.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Jerusalem.

FO. 371/5037/E. 8427

No. 78

*Note of the Greek Minister in London to the Foreign Office.*

No. 3730/St/20.

LÉGATION DE GRÈCE, 23rd July 1920

The Greek Minister presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and has the honour to forward to His Lordship the following communication of 2nd July received by the Greek Government from the Greek Vice-Consul at Batoum —

“According to reports of passengers escaped from Novorosisk the Bolsheviks send regularly to the Turks of Asia Minor ammunitions and money in gold by small crafts going to Surmena and Rizonte. The representatives of Mustapha Kemal are asking the Bolsheviks in Novorosisk to hand over to them the Greek and Armenian refugees from Pontus under the pretext that they are recruited by the British Authorities there”.

The Greek Government thought that this information might prove of some use to His Britannic Majesty's Government and entrusted the Greek Legation to bring it to their notice.\*

FO. 371/5178/E. 8842

\* Bu Nota üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde şu yorum yapılmıştır:

“Surmena and Rizonte” are evidently meant for Surmeneh and Rizé on the coast of Lazistan to the East of Trebizond.

The only action that could be taken as regards the alleged Nationalist demand that the Greek and Armenian refugees from the Samsun-Trebizond (Pontus) area should be handed over to the Kemalists would be in connection with the Krassin pourparlers, but the Greek Minister does not suggest this.

G. H. Fitzmaurice

26/7”

“Inform Constantinople of the reported gun-running.

D. G. Osborne.

26/7”.

No. 79

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 25th July 1920.

No. 1044/M/2279.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, weekly summary of Intelligence reports issued by M.I.1c, Constantinople Branch, for the week ended 15th July 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5170/E. 9649

ENCLOSURE IN No. 79

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.1c., Constantinople Branch,  
for Week Ending 15th July, 1920.*

The most important development of the week has been the weakening of extremist Turkish opinion, which has hitherto been so strong that advocates of the signing of the peace treaty were unable to obtain a hearing. The cold douche of Damad FERID's exposure of the true situation, and the utter collapse of the Nationalists, seem to have had a sobering effect, and in official circles the party in favour of signing the treaty has been gaining ground. RESHID Bey's last action before leaving for PARIS was to make a final appeal to the Nationalists to submit to the Central Government, and it would appear that he has also clearly realised the perils which might result from the continuation of Nationalist activities. The Nationalists, however, still appear to be dominated by the extremist party, and are most uncompromising in their resolutions, at all events. [There is no further information with regard to Nationalist relations with the Bolsheviks, but the Italians are still assiduously pursuing their pro-Nationalist policy, which has been manifested by the dissemination of fantastically false reports of the Turko-Hellenic hostilities in ANATOLIA and by the smuggling of war material for the Nationalists.]

#### *THE TURKISH PEACE DELEGATION.*

A telegram to the effect that in view of the adjournment of a reply there was no need for the delegation to remain in PARIS was received by the Cabinet Council on June 8th. The telegram also stated that the Con-

ference would give its decision according to the result of military operations and that, as the operations of the Greek Army were carried out by order of the Conference, Greek troops would only occupy within the limits designated by that body.

*Report 1146.*

#### *THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEACE TREATY.*

The Cabinet Council at its sitting of July 10th was officially informed that a further extension of ten days would be accorded to the Peace Delegation. A telegram was read from the Grand Vizier which urged the signing of the Treaty, in view of the attitude of the Entente Powers and the rebellion in ANATOLIA.

This telegram made a deep impression on those present and IHSAN Bey, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the only hope of the country was to follow the advice of GREAT BRITAIN. RESHAD Bey, while agreeing in principle with IHSAN Bey, pointed out that recent attempts to obtain the support of the British had failed, and if peace were signed, the Government would be accused of endorsing the policy which permitted the Greeks to invade ANATOLIA.

After a discussion as to the procedure to be adopted, the Council was adjourned until the following day. On June 11th the Council was informed that His Majesty expressed the opinion that no decisions should be taken until the return of the Turkish Peace Delegation.

*Report 1161.*

#### *THE SULTAN AND THE NATIONALISTS.*

The Sultan, who is greatly distressed by the results of Nationalist action, is stated to have sent a letter on June 25th to MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha imploring the Nationalist leader to yield unconditional obedience to the efforts which His Majesty's Government are making to safeguard the higher interests of the country and to put an end to the discord and animosity which are causing the ruin of the country, and to place his army at the disposal of the Government.

The Sultan points out that although the downfall of the Empire is now inevitable, history imposes the responsibility of saving the people from the impasse into which they have fallen and he calls upon the Nationalists to help in the difficult task and to avoid creating difficulties and so to prevent ultimate success.

The letter concludes by stating that the Sultan will, in spite of all their misdeeds, grant His love and His Imperial pardon to all his subjects who repent.

*Report 1142.*

*RESHID BEY AND THE NATIONALISTS.*

On the same day as the Sultan's letter to the Nationalists, RESHID Bey made an appeal to the Nationalists through NURREDDIN Pasha who, it will be remembered, was sent by the Central Government a few months ago to negotiate with the Nationalists and eventually joined their movement.

This letter, like the Sultan's begs the Nationalists to unite round the throne and the Khalifat and by this means to persuade EUROPE that all engagements entered into by the Government will be carried out. The Minister for Foreign Affairs points out that the actions of the Nationalists forces are merely hastening the annihilation of the country and that the aims of the Central Government and the Nationalists being to a great extent identical, it is not compatible with patriotism or logic to persist in mutiny.

RESHID Bey gives details of the channels through which communications may be sent to the Sultan and tells NURREDDIN Pasha that he feels confident he will ably and patriotically carry out the duty of rallying the people round their Sultan and Khalif.

*Report 1162.*

*THE GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.*

A meeting of the Great National Assembly is said to have been held at ANGORA on June 27th at which some very important decisions were arrived at:—

- 1) In view of the Greek invasion MUSTAFA KEMAL was nominated Dictator.
- 2) MUSTAFA KEMAL will have under his orders a military Council, all Staff officers, and also a Civil Consultative Council.
- 3) MUSTAFA KEMAL is given full powers until a normal situation is restored, the reasons for any actions he may take to be given to the Great National Assembly.
- 4) MUSTAFA KEMAL has authority to use war material and to legalise capital punishment, but for questions dealing with armistice and peace, the vote of the Great National Assembly is to be taken.
- 5) Every man fit for military duty is enrolled in the ranks of the National Defence, the regular army as well as volunteer bands being under the orders of the General Staff.
- 6) MUSTAFA KEMAL to be known as "President" of the National Defence and will have authority to conclude treaties with neighbouring powers with the object of completing the necessary measures of defence for the country.



- 7) The armistice of MUDROS was annulled and all engagements entered into by the Armistice repudiated.
- 8) The National Assembly will present the above for Imperial sanction. In the event, however, of their not being sanctioned it will reserve its liberty of action.

These decisions were accepted and ratified by an overwhelming majority, with only three opposing votes. MUSTAFA KEMAL was entrusted with the execution of the above decisions and will communicate their result to the Great National Assembly.

In connection with Article No. 7, it will be interesting to note that it was reported by this office on 9. 7. 20 that before adjourning for the BAI-RAM recess, the Great National Assembly passed a resolution repudiating any alliance, secret treaty or agreement concluded by the Sublime Porte since the Armistice and especially since March 6th (? 16th) 1920. Damad FERID was accused of having concluded a secret treaty with the British and for this reason no treaty would be regarded as valid.

*Reports 1155, 1144.*

#### THE ITALIANS.

The Italians are still actively engaged in propaganda detrimental to the Allies and the Italian News Agency, under the management of M. ALBERTI recently issued a communiqué to the effects that the 28th Greek Division had been completely annihilated, the remainder of the Greek Army had taken flight, the SMYRNA front had been pierced, etc., etc.

According to the statement of the Commander of the Greek warship "KILKIS", Admiral LEBON recently made a protest to the Italian High Commissioners with regard to the landing of arms and munitions at a point on the Black Sea coast from an Italian merchant steamer. It is stated that an apology was offered by the High Commissioner, who promised to take steps to prevent the repetition of such an occurrence.

*Reports 1145, 1171.*

#### THE SITUATION AT PANDERMA.

According to a reliable British source, who was in PANDERMA between 2nd and 8th July, the Nationalists do not appear to be gaining much support from the population in the PANDERMA — MANIAS — BALIKESSIR area, the farmers and small owners rightly resenting the contributions levied by the Nationalists, it is believed without the consent of ANGORA. This lack of support is of course to be explained by the fact that the population of the PANDERMA hinterland, consisting as it does of Pomaks, Cherkess and Tartars, is more independent than the true Turk

and resents ill-treatment. After the suppression of ANZAVUR's Anti-Nationalist movement, a severe policy was inaugurated by the Nationalists and now that the local inhabitants realise the Greeks do not propose to pillage and burn and that trade communications will once more be opened to them, the Greek invaders are becoming fairly popular.

An agreement was concluded at PANDERMA between the C-in-C of the Greek Army and Sheikh or Shah ISMAIL, a Circassian, the latter giving an undertaking that no Nationalists should be murdered and that he would be responsible for the good behaviour of the Circassians in his area.

TEWFIK Pasha, a Circassian, at whose house the agreement was made offered to supply 200 horsemen to assist the Greeks.

*Report 1157.*

### *PAN-ISLAMISM.*

During the week more information has been received regarding the previous history and present activities of some of the more prominent anti-British agitators in TURKEY.

(a) A brief history of the early life of ZAKARIA KHAN before he came to TURKEY has been obtained which differs in some points from the account given by himself. ZAKARIA KHAN is known to be in correspondence with various people of Bolshevik or anti-British tendencies, amongst whom may be mentioned the well known Colonel BEKIR SAMI Bey. Recently a petition has been addressed by ZAKARIA KHAN to the British Authorities in CONSTANTINOPLE, begging to be sent back to INDIA or AFGHANISTAN and further stating that if he is not allowed to leave CONSTANTINOPLE he will escape to ANATOLIA. The implied threat that he will make trouble there or in AFGHANISTAN is quite obvious.

(b) With regard to the activities of Persians in CONSTANTINOPLE and their means of communication with BERLIN, it was reported at the beginning of June that a letter had been received by Sheikh ASSAD ULLAH of the Young Persian Association in CONSTANTINOPLE from the well known TAQI ZADEH in BERLIN. This letter, which is written in good Persian, purports to be a purely private communication, but from the fact that in it TAQI ZADEH talks about his "immovable property", when he is known to be living on the charity of the German Government, and that he sends his respects to ASSAD ULLAH's family, when the latter has no family, it is strongly suspected that the letter is written in some prearranged code. It has not been sent through the ordinary post, but appears to have been delivered by hand.

No. 80

*Parliamentary Question to the British Prime Minister.**Wednesday, 28 July 1920.*

EMIR FEISAL AND MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

51. Lieut.-Colonel A. MURRAY asked the Prime Minister whether he has any information to the effect that an offensive and defensive alliance has been concluded between the Emir Feisal and Mustapha Kemal, or whether there are any signs of definite military co-operation between the two?

Mr. BONAR LAW: The answer is in the negative.

FO. 371/5038/E. 9135

No. 81

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 28, 1920.

*(Received July 29.)**(No. 858.)**(Telegraphic.)*

GENERAL MILNE informs me that Turkish troops at Adrianople laid down their arms on 26th July and that King of Greece, accompanied by his Ministers, was to make ceremonial entry into the town on 27th July. He tells me that General Paraskevopoulos, Greek supreme commander, now proposes to renew Greek advance in Asia Minor against Mustapha Kemal, to advance up to Anatolian Railway, occupying Eskishehir and Afion Karabavar, (sic) and to send column up to Angora. He has submitted this plan to Supreme Council for approval, and has already begun to re-transfer troops from Thrace to Asia Minor.

French, who have hitherto been against giving a mandate to Greek army in Asia Minor, have veered round and are now strongly in favour of this Greek advance. Marshal Foch's liaison officer has discussed plan with General Paraskevopoulos, and is giving latter support of French military opinion.

General Milne is strongly averse on military grounds to any further Greek advance being authorised. Plan may lead to Greek troops getting compromised in interior, thus requiring us to give military assistance to extract them. With forces at his disposal and summer well advanced General Milne is definitely opposed to our becoming involved in any military operations outside area to be demilitarised under Peace Treaty.

*This is a hostile  
power*

But political objections to Greek advance are equally weighty. Nothing could be more calculated to cause general revival of Turkish nationalist movement and to give it renewed support amongst masses of population, with whom, owing to its failure to defend the country, it has lately become considerably discredited; moreover, it is not to be supposed that Greeks will undertake advance for love of Allies, but will require very definite *quid pro quo*.

Turkish Government signs treaty on 28th July, and a further Greek advance is therefore beginning of a new war on the part of Greece. For Allies to allow such a situation to arise would alienate all moderate Turkish elements, upon whom we must now count to pacify country and with Allied guidance to restore normal conditions.

It is almost certain that present Grand Vizier would resign, and local situation would present great difficulties.

I cannot but think that a renewal of Greek advance after signature of peace would much discredit British prestige in Moslem world, and would be used against us by our enemies as a sign that we intended to make no peace with Islam.

Reason that French are supporting Greeks in this new plan is probably to deny use of Anatolian Railway to Nationalists, and thus create a more favourable situation for themselves in Cilicia, where their position is now difficult. In this they are considering only their own interests, and seemingly take no account of adverse effects which would be caused to Allied and particularly British interests by execution of Greek plans.

Object of Turkish Treaty which is now being signed is to bring about peace and settled conditions. A renewed Greek advance will perpetuate disorder and rebellion, and only sound Allied plan to my mind, now that Turks have accepted treaty, is to give them our fullest support and guidance—naval, military and political—in dealing themselves with discredited nationalist movement in Anatolia. This would, moreover, be in accordance with advice expressed in your telegram No. 106 of 5th May.

I trust His Majesty's Government will give its earnest consideration to the above remarks and veto any [group undecypherable] Greek advance in Asia Minor\*.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 72.)

*F.O. 406/44, p. 96-97, No. 57*

*D.B.F.P, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 106-107, No. 102*

\* Bkz. Belge No. 85

No. 82

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, 28th July, 1920  
(Received, July 29)*Telegraphic.**No. 861.**Very Urgent.*

Following sent to Foreign Office, No. 861, repeated to Bagdad No. 28. My immediately preceding telegram.

May I have your views of Kurdish proposals in case it should take more definite shape than at present. Grand Vizier is in touch with Conservative Kurdish opinion which stands for autonomy now assured by treaty but which sees spectre of Bolshevism and disintegration of old-fashioned Kurdish system behind Mustafa Kemal.

Grand Vizier's position is this:— "Kurdistan is to be autonomous State under Treaty. Kurdish leaders hate Mustafa because he wants to bring Bolshevism in to support him. I hate Mustafa Kemal because he wants to ruin the country. You hate Mustafa Kemal because he does not want your Treaty, let us therefore together use Kurds against him." Scheme is not necessarily wholly impracticable though of course it is still attended by some of the difficulties suggested in my telegram No. 401 and your reply sent from San Remo on April 24th., and it would be difficult to work it out without wholehearted French co-operation in view of inclusion of large part of Kurds in French sphere of influence.\*

FO. 371/5069/E. 9076

D.B.F.P., 1919-1939, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 108, No. 103

\* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde şu yorum yapılmıştır:

"I see no reason for departing from the policy laid down by the S. (ecretary) of S.-(tate) in his tgm (telegram) from San Remo (E. 3747). If the Kurds themselves ask us or the French to arm them against Mustapha Kemal the case will be different.

"Qy. direct Admiral de Robeck to inform the Grand Vizier that H.M.G. do not see their way to accepting his suggestion, at any rate at present.

H. Young

29/7

D. G. Osborne

29/7"

No. 83

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 28, 1920

*(Received August 10)**(No. 1061.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of reports received from the Armenian Patriarchate regarding the situation at Aintab, together with copies of a memorandum summarising information received from M. Bezdijian, president of the Armenian Protestant Community, which completes the reports of the Patriarchate regarding the arrangement reached between the Armenians and the Nationalists on the 12th June.

2. I venture particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to the paragraph in the report of the 1st June, from Aintab, regarding (1) the haughty attitude of the Nationalists towards the French authorities, as shown by the refusal of the mutessarif to go and discuss matters with the French Commandant, and (2) the determination of the Armenians not to abandon Aintab, even though deserted by the French, but to resist, if necessary, to the end.

I have, &amp;c.

*F. O. 406/44, p. 103, No. 72*

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 83

*Report on the Situation at Aintab, communicated to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck by Armenian Patriarchate.*

*Deurt-Yol, le 4 juin (Union nationale)* — Après avoir été assiégée pendant des mois entiers d'une manière systématique, la ville de Deurt-Yol est depuis deux semaines en butte à une attaque incessante de nuit et de jour de la part de milliers de bandits turcs. Grâce aux armes par les Français aux Arméniens pour leur oeuvre de défense et grâce aussi aux armes que possédaient les Arméniens eux-mêmes, la résistance de ces derniers est assurée.

Quoique Deurt-Yol soit assiégé de toutes parts, les Arméniens ont réussi à garder en leur possession la route vers la mer et, par là, il leur est possible de communiquer avec Alexandrette et Mersine. Rentrée d'émigra-

tion, la population avait déjà épuisé ses provisions. Elle a actuellement à peine de quoi manger encore une quinzaine de jours. C'est une situation désespérée d'où une aide efficace peut seule la tirer.

*Ourfa, le 9 mai.* — Après la reddition de la garnison française d'Ourfa et sa destruction par trahison, de nouvelles forces françaises avancèrent vers la station située à 50 kilom. de la ville. Aussi longtemps que ces troupes seraient maintenues, il était naturel que les Turcs, malgré qu'ils soient très montés contre les Arméniens, se tiendraient tranquilles. En fait, les jeunes Arméniens attendent dans leurs quartiers, les armes à la main. Les femmes et les enfants se rendent seuls au marché et assurent le ravitaillement desdits quartiers. La terreur est constante.

La situation matérielle et économique est pitoyable. Elle n'avait jamais été bien florissante. Mais pendant le siège elle a encore empiré. On a pris aux gens aisés ce qu'ils possédaient, et actuellement la misère est générale. Lors des événements d'Ourfa, les Arméniens subirent des dégâts considérables. Les quelques maisons neuves furent également détruites. Par bonheur, les pertes en vie humaine sont jusqu'à présent relativement peu considérables: 8 morts et 13 blessés.

*Aïntab, le 1er juin.* — Aïntab est encerclé depuis deux mois. Une population de 15.000 âmes environ dépense son capital et les vivres s'épuisent. A raison de 100 drachmes de ration journalière par tête, les provisions suffiront à peine un mois encore. Après, c'est la famine inévitable, si des secours ne nous parviennent d'ici là. La population d'Aïntab s'est habituée au danger, mais le cauchemar de la faim la préoccupe.

Il y a une quinzaine de jours, le colonel manda auprès de lui les membres de l'Union nationale et leur déclara qu'une partie ou la moitié de la population devrait s'éloigner d'Aïntab vu les difficultés du ravitaillement. Cela causa une impression pénible et le moral (sic) de la population en souffrit, car celle-ci en déduit que la France se propose d'évacuer Aïntab. On arriva à un accord avec le colonel en décidant que les orphelins, les déportés et ceux des indigènes qui le désirent seront transférés ailleurs et, dans la nuit de lundi, 25 mai, 3.000 Arméniens quittèrent la ville sous la protection des soldats français, mais dans les conditions qui rappelaient les déportations turques; il n'était permis d'emporter avec soi qu'une couverture et de quoi se nourrir pendant quelques jours; de plus, on devait aller à pied.

Quand, le soir du départ, les Arméniens se furent réunis auprès des forces françaises, les bandes turques lancèrent trois boulets sur la foule massée. Heureusement, les boulets tombèrent trop loin et l'on n'eut pas à déplorer les pertes.

Le 11 AVRIL  
1920

Après le départ de ces 3,000 Arméniens, le colonel ordonne que des préparatifs pour un second convoi commencent. Cette fois la population voulut partir toute ensemble. Mais, entre-temps, le Général de la Motte était arrivé à Aïntab. Tout en recommandant lui-même de partir, il se montra plus coulant sur le nombre de ceux qui pourraient rester. Il fixa ce nombre à un maximum de 8,000 âmes.

Le lendemain, le colonel fit connaître à la population qu'un armistice avait été conclu entre le Général Gouraud et Moustafa Kémal, dont une des clauses essentielles était le rétablissement de l'autorité turque sur les quartiers arméniens d'Aïntab. Il fit appeler auprès de lui le mutessarif turc pour s'entretenir avec lui au sujet de l'armistice. Mais le fonctionnaire turc refusa de venir, disant que si le colonel désirait lui parler au sujet de l'évacuation d'Aïntab, c'était à lui d'aller le trouver. Le lendemain, le Général de la Motte revint en cette ville. Le mutessarif et un fonctionnaire spécialement désigné à cet effet par M. Kémal, Irfan Bey, se rendirent à l'Etat-Major, mais il n'y eut pas moyen d'arriver à un accord au bout de trois heures d'entrevue: les uns arguant des instructions reçues de M. Kémal comme quoi les Français devaient évacuer Aïntab, le général voulant, conformément aux ordres du Général Gouraud, retirer ses troupes de différents points de la ville pour les cantonner dans le collège.

Les deux parties décidèrent de demander de nouvelles instructions et de fixer ensuite les conditions locales de l'armistice à Kilis. Les délégués turcs sont déjà partis pour cette localité.

Depuis deux jours, le colonel nous informe que les quartiers arméniens devront être livrés aux Turcs au plus tard le 8 juin et les Arméniens craignent que les Turcs, une fois maîtres de la ville, ne les considèrent comme des insurgés et ne les condamnent à mort sous différents prétextes, à supposer même qu'ils ne les massacrent tous sans autre forme de procès. Le colonel s'est laissé convaincre et a proposé que les notables, ainsi que les plus compromis, quittent la ville dès maintenant. Cela est impossible et serait même lâche. Ce point fait depuis deux jours l'objet de nos discussions. Il déclare que nous devons absolument démolir nos positions jusqu'au 8 courant et les livrer aux Turcs, qui n'auraient pas, soi-disant, les moyens de nous nuire. Enfin, ce matin nous avons décidé d'émigrer tous à la fois. Le colonel nous a répondu que les moyens de transport manquaient et qu'il pouvait à peine mettre à notre disposition 80 à 100 voitures. Le nombre des émigrants eut été de 11,000 à 12,000 personnes; tous les biens des Arméniens passeraient aux Turcs. Le colonel n'a même pas voulu se charger de la clef de l'église dans laquelle nous avons réuni une partie de nos biens, en disant qu'il ne pouvait pas y porter des fonctionnaires, ni veiller sur elle. Ce n'était là, d'ailleurs, qu'une simple manifestation, car les Arméniens ne veulent pas quitter Aintab.



Aujourd'hui, à midi tous les Arméniens au-dessus de 20 ans se sont rassemblés dans les églises pour examiner la situation; des discours furent prononcés et les débats durèrent plus de deux heures. Une foule compacte s'était massée dans l'église protestante. Un referendum fut organisé et l'on décida, à la presque unanimité, contre deux voix, de rester à Aïntab, de lutter contre les Turcs et, s'il le faut, de mourir sur la brèche.

Quand nous fîmes connaître cette résolution au colonel, ce dernier en fut très surpris, car il nous avait toujours déclaré que, si nous continuions à nous battre contrairement aux dispositions de l'armistice, nous prendrions ainsi une attitude hostile aux Français, qui ne pourraient en aucun cas nous aider.

Les Turcs vont, vraisemblablement, nous sommer le 7 juin de démolir nos barricades et les Arméniens se verront forcés d'entrer dans une lutte inégale.

D'après les lettres tant officielles que privées qui sont reçues de Marache, la situation des Arméniens serait indescriptible, encore qu'il n'y soit pas procédé à des massacres en règle. La terreur règne. Depuis cinq mois, le nombre des Arméniens de Marache a été réduit au tiers.

FO. 406/44, p. 104, No. 72/1

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 83

*Report on the Situation at Aintab, communicated to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck by Armenian Patriarchate*

Aïntab, le 12 juin (Vicaire N. Tavoukdjian) — Le colonel français d'Aïntab manda auprès de lui les membres de l'Union nationale, dans la matinée du 8 juin courant, et leur déclara que: (1) les Français ne peuvent plus avoir un rapport quelconque avec les Arméniens; (2) les autorités turques occuperont à midi les quartiers de ces derniers; (3) les lieux situés à l'ouest de la ville et occupés par les Français, entre autres, l'hôpital turc se trouvant à proximité de l'hôpital américain, seront livrés aux Turcs; (4) les Arméniens devront se rendre à 11 heures du matin auprès des Turcs pour s'entendre avec eux. Cette déclaration fut faite sur un ton sec. Elle dénotait une décision sans appel. Les Arméniens, en entendant ces mots, tombèrent dans un désarroi indescriptible. C'était parfaitement compréhensible de leur part: ils formaient le corps responsable d'une population qui avait lutté héroïquement et victorieusement pendant 70 heures sans discontinuer et le colonel leur disait de ne pas recommencer la lutte, car les conséquences en seront désastreuses, les Arméniens resteraient isolés, &c. L'Union nationale réunit immédiatement une assemblée générale des Arméniens, et un nouveau bureau, élu sur une base plus large, fut chargé d'entrer en pourparlers avec les Turcs.

Le 9 juin, au soir, l'hôpital turc fut livré aux Turcs. La nuit suivante, les Arméniens évacuèrent une de leurs positions les plus importantes, la mosquée d'Akcul. Les rues des quartiers arméniens seront rendues à la circulation. De même, les autres voies publiques seront ouvertes demain. Les autorités turques ont proclamé l'état de siège.

Conformément à l'une des conditions concertées avec les délégués arméniens, avant hier soir, vers le tard, des proclamations furent affichées où il était dit que nul Arménien ne serait poursuivi ni puni par le Gouvernement pour des faits antérieurs, et que les Arméniens conserveraient leurs armes. Des conseils y étaient également donnés à la population de vivre dans une bonne harmonie mutuelle, &c.

Hier, on fit publier la nouvelle que le Gouvernement d'Aidin (? Aïntab) relève officiellement de Moustafa Kémal Pacha et trois délégués de l'Union nationale télégraphièrent, au nom de la nation, à ce dernier que les Arméniens d'Aïntab reconnaissent son autorité et promettent de vivre en paix et de collaborer sincèrement avec leurs compatriotes musulmans.

Malgré cela, la population arménienne est très tourmentée. Un sentiment d'insécurité vis-à-vis des Turcs la préoccupe. Plus d'un Arménien voudrait quitter la ville à n'importe quel prix, mais les moyens en font défaut.

*Alep, le 16 juin* (Père Yessaïan) — Pour adoucir la situation des Arméniens d'Aïntab, nous avons envoyé à Beyrouth deux représentants, qui se sont adressés par écrit au Général Gouraud. Le général a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas ne pas respecter les clauses de l'armistice conclu avec M. Kémal et que les Arméniens devaient également s'y conformer. A la suite d'une seconde démarche, son conseiller fit la déclaration suivante: (1) Les Arméniens ne seront ni arrêtés, ni emprisonnés par les Turcs et ils conserveront leurs armes; (2) la vie des Arméniens sera assurée d'une façon catégorique et, si un empiétement quelconque est commis par les Turcs, des mesures seront prises pour leur protection efficace; (3) l'alimentation des Arméniens sera assurée. Le conseiller promit de télégraphier ces instructions à Aïntab, ce qu'il fit immédiatement. Depuis deux semaines, les Arméniens vieux, dans la misère ou inaptes à se battre, au nombre de 3,500, partent d'Aïntab grâce à l'intervention de la Croix-Rouge américaine et des autorités françaises. La pénurie de vivres a rendu ces mesures nécessaires. Quant aux réfugiés de l'orphelinat américain, on les transfère depuis trois semaines à Beyrouth. Ils sont au nombre de 300 environ. La Croix-Rouge dirige enfin sur cette même ville ceux qui veulent se rendre en Amérique à leurs propres frais.

*Alep, le 24 juin* (vicaire) — La situation à Marache est extrêmement dangereuse et misérable. La population sollicite dans des lettres officielles de mettre un terme à cet état des choses, ou plutôt demande qu'on la trans-

fère en corps en d'autres lieux. D'après le témoignage des agents de la Croix-Rouge américaine, la misère y est affreuse. Le consul, Dr. Lambert, qui vient de rentrer, pensa qu'il n'est pas possible à la population arménienne de Marache de vivre plus longtemps dans cette ville.

*Trébizonde, le 21 juin* (vicaire) — Le Vali Hamid Bey, appelé à Angora, vient de quitter notre ville. On dit que la "Grande Assemblée nationale" se propose de proclamer partout la dictature militaire. La population chrétienne est très préoccupée, car elle manque de tout moyen de défense. La réalisation de la mobilisation constituerait une véritable calamité, et, si des mesures efficaces et promptes ne sont pas prises, de nouvelles déportations et de nouveaux massacres sont à craindre. Un croiseur devrait mouiller en notre rade.

La situation à Ordou et à Kerassound est grave. Des incidents sanglants s'y produisent continuellement.

*FO. 406/44, p. 105-106, No. 72/2*

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 83

*Memorandum upon Information communicated by M. Bezdjian*

1. M. BEZDJIAN, President of the Armenian Protestant Community, called at the British High Commission on the 8th July and stated that he had received letters from Beyrout up to the 17th June which gave the following information about the situation at Aintab.

2. On the 12th June the Armenians who remained in Aintab after the French evacuated it were driven by want of provisions and under strong pressure from the French to come to an agreement with the Nationalist leaders to suspend hostilities on the following conditions:—

(a) Turkish gendarmes to be quartered in certain houses in the Armenian quarter.

(b) Armenians to retain their arms and to be allowed to go out unmolested in order to obtain provisions.

3. The French informed both sides that they must keep the peace, and that whatever side broke it would be severely punished.

4. The Armenians were very anxious for the future, as they distrusted the good faith of the Nationalists and the ability of the French to hold them to the terms of the agreement. They were also unable to move about the country owing to the presence of Nationalist hands, which rendered the roads insecure.

5. M. Bezdjian also stated that he had received information from a trustworthy source to the effect that Emir Faisal had come to Aleppo about

the middle of June, where he had held communications with the leading Armenians, to whom his attitude was friendly. It appeared that they apprehended a combined movement of the French and the Turkish Nationalists against Aleppo, and wished in that eventuality to secure the neutrality, or if possible the active support, of the Armenians.

*FO. 406/44, p. 106, No. 72/3*

No. 84

*Parliamentary Question Addressed to the British Prime Minister.*

*29th July 1920*

ITALY (MUSTAPHA KEMAL).

Mr. MALONE asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been called to the fact that munitions have been supplied to Mustapha Kemal in Asia Minor from Italy; whether the Allies have made any representations to the Italian Government; and, if so, what steps have been taken?

The PRIME MINISTER: A report to this effect from a Turkish source recently reached His Majesty's Government, who brought it unofficially to the attention of the Italian Authorities.

*FO. 371/5216/E. 9231*

No. 85

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1920*

*(No. 705.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

YOUR telegram No. 858 of 28th July. \*

Question of renewed Greek advance on Asia Minor was discussed with M. Veniselos at Spa. At that time he did not favour movement if Turks decided to sign treaty, and he made it conditional upon supplies of equipment, arms, &c., by ourselves. No immediate action therefore seems to be practicable, but he is being consulted on the subject, and we will acquaint you with result.

\* Bkz. Belge No. 81

In reply to your arguments, it should be borne in mind that Mustapha Kemal is enemy of Turkish Government no less than of the Allies, and that his defeat or disappearance, so far from being a cause of offence at Constantinople would relieve Turks of task which they are powerless to perform themselves, and would be most effective guarantee for ratification of treaty and setting up of new conditions created thereby.

FO. 406/44, p. 97, No. 58

FO. 371/5053/E. 9072

No. 86

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1920

(Received August 10)

(No. 1074.)

My Lord,

I RETURNED on the 26th instant the visit which the Grand Vizier paid me on his return from Paris and had a long conversation with him, of which the following is a summary. I have already reported the main points in my telegram No. 860 of the 28th July.

2. The Grand Vizier said he expected the new delegation appointed to sign the Peace Treaty to arrive in Paris on the 27th July.\* He asked me

\* Damat Ferit Paşa, Osmanlı Hükümetinin Barış andlaşmasını imzalamaya karar verdiğini ve andlaşmayı imzalayacak heyetin Paris'e yollandığını aşağıdaki notayla İngiliz Yüksek Komiserine bildirmişti:

*Damat Ferid Pasha to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.*

*Sublime Porte, le 22 Juillet 1920*

Monsieur le Haut Commissaire,

J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que Hadi Pacha et Riza Tevfik Bey, Sénateurs et anciens Ministres, ainsi que Réchad Haliss Bey, Ministre de Turquie à Berne, ont été désignés pour se présenter devant la Conférence de Paris en qualité de délégués du Gouvernement Ottoman à l'effet de signer le Traité de Paix.

Hadi Pacha et Riza Tevfik Bey, qui devaient partir par l'express-Simplon, ont dû différer leur départ, vu l'impossibilité d'utiliser cette voie par suite des derniers événements en Thrace.

Le Haut-Commissaire de France ayant mis gracieusement à leur disposition un bateau de guerre français, ils ont(en) profiteront pour partir le vendredi, 23 courant, viâ Constandja-Bucarest.

my impression regarding the effect which would be produced by the final appeal for certain relaxations which the Porte had made. I returned no direct answer, but dwelt on the unfortunate consequences of attempts at resistance in Thrace, reports of which had reached me. Ferid Pasha insisted on the fact that the Government had issued categorical instructions to the authorities at Adrianople not to resist. He said that the whole trouble in Thrace was due to the fact that Djafer Tayyar had been allowed to return to Adrianople. He reminded me of the circumstances in which he had done so. The Grand Vizier was alluding to the fact that, when Djafer Tayyar came here in April, the French authorities regarded him as having come with a guarantee of facilities for return, and sent him back to Adrianople under the care of a French officer.

3. The Grand Vizier insisted that Djafer Tayyar, though he now held no official position, was the soul of the movement of resistance in Thrace. He spoke of the danger of the situation there drifting under the control of a revolutionary committee, such as often came uppermost in times of trouble in the East. He said he read between the lines of the latest telegrams from the Turkish Commanding Officer in Adrianople that he was losing his hold on the situation.

4. Ferid Pasha consulted me as to what further he could do to prevent resistance and useless bloodshed in Thrace. He had already, he said, sent instructions to the gendarmerie authorities not to associate themselves with

Le Gouvernement Ottoman, étant résolu à signer le traité proposé par la Conférence de la Paix, désire toutefois, faire un nouvel appel aux sentiments de justice et d'équité des grandes Puissances de l'Entente afin qu'elles veuillent bien consentir à y introduire les modifications et déclarations suivantes:

1. Faire reculer la ligne frontière Strandja-Tchataldja jusqu'à celle d'Enos-Midia, qui avait été fixée précédemment comme frontière de la Turquie.

2. En cas d'acceptation de cette extension de frontière exclure les rives de la Marmara de la zone neutre et restreindre celle-ci aux Détroits;

3. Doter Smyrne, à l'instar de la ville libre de Hamburg, d'une régime spécial autonome;

4. Le Gouvernement Ottoman tient à déclarer que le Khalifat étant un point d'union islamique et constituant, par conséquent, une question religieuse, il ne pourrait trouver place dans un traité politique.

En priant Votre Excellence de faire part de cette démarche à son Gouvernement je lui serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien user de son influence auprès de lui pour l'amener à y faire un accueil favorable.

Eu égard aux énormes sacrifices que la Turquie accepte j'aime à espérer fermement que le Conseil suprême de la Paix lui accordera au moins cette satisfaction.

Veillez agréer, etc.

DAMAD FERID

any movement of resistance. These instructions to the gendarmerie were additional to those sent to the military authorities, and had been issued, he explained with some malice, through the French, who were always asserting a special position in gendarmerie matters. His one desire, he assured me, was to take no action in Thrace except such as might have for its object to secure the life and honour of the Moslems. He invited the co-operation of the British military authorities to this end. He suggested sending a personal mission, accompanied by a British officer, to impress further on the Turkish Commander at Adrianople the instructions already issued to him.

5. I observed that there were no British military authorities in Thrace except our liaison officers with the Greeks. I said I was sure their influence would be used to prevent any excesses. For the rest, I promised to discuss with General Milne the point raised by his Highness.

6. Ferid Pasha mentioned that the French had ordered the Turkish military post at Hademkeui to withdraw, and had taken possession of all arms and munitions in store at that place. He expressed great anxiety that these supplies should not fall into the hands of the Greeks. He urged strongly that the Greeks were advancing not in the way of warfare, but to take possession of an area assigned to them under the treaty, and that therefore all stores, both military and otherwise, not only at Hademkeui, but everywhere this side of the Maritza, were Turkish Government property, and should be restored.

7. I promised to discuss this also with the military authorities, observing that it was, perhaps, affected by article 200 (1) (c) of the Peace Treaty.

8. The Grand Vizier turned to the more general question of the situation which would be created by the Peace Treaty. He assured me more than once that his one idea, once it was signed, was to execute it loyally and in every particular in so far as in him lay. He had already appointed a commission at the Porte to advise on the necessary measures for this purpose. In signing the treaty he believed himself to be rendering a service to his country, for which there was no other alternative except complete destruction, and also to humanity. The first task confronting the Government after signature would be the restoration of order in the country. Could they count on British help in doing so?

9. I took this opportunity to broach the question of the ratification of the treaty by Turkey, a matter which has been much in my mind, as under the Constitution such a treaty as the present requires the consent of Parliament, if only because it involves the cession of territory. The Grand Vizier was slow to give me a definite answer, but, on being pressed, dismissed the matter quite lightly. He said the treaty would certainly be

VEER

ratified, and ratified by the Sultan, for the very good reason, he implied, that there was no one else to do it. He explained that it was with a view to ratification in this manner that he had inserted in the record of the Cabinets' decision, which record had been endorsed by the Crown Council, a passage stating that, although any treaty involving territorial changes required under the Constitution the consent of Parliament, this was in present circumstances impossible, and the treaty must be accepted under the general clause giving the Sultan the right to declare war and conclude peace.

10. I said I had dwelt on this, because the treaty would not come into force until it was ratified, but, when it did come into force, the restoration of order, which his Highness was so eager to take in hand, would have to proceed on lines defined in the treaty itself. The treaty, I pointed out, contemplated the elaboration of the means of establishing law and order with Allied assistance. I referred especially to articles 159 (ff) and 200 of the treaty.

11. The Grand Vizier was somewhat diffuse in this portion of the conversation. He spoke at some length of the congeries of influences, both European and Asiatic, which had been at work to prevent the signature of the treaty. He hinted, with a preliminary apology for his frankness, at the intrigues of Great Britain's Allies. The general trend of what he said was, however, perfectly clear, especially in view of the language he has held in other conversations. What he was driving at was that he wanted Turkey to be set on her feet by her own efforts, and with the support and assistance of Great Britain as distinct from the other Allied Powers.

12. I congratulated Ferid Pasha on the great courage he had shown over the question of signing the treaty. I said I was sure that, once it was ratified, the British Government would collaborate in the restoration of order, as it would be a duty arising out of the treaty itself, and Great Britain could be relied on to discharge all obligations imposed on her by the treaty. For obvious reasons I said nothing about action by Great Britain as distinct from the other Allies. His Highness nevertheless expressed great gratification at what I had said and promised to repeat it to the Sultan, who, he said, had been very anxious, and who would find in my statement consolation and encouragement.

13. At this point I impressed on the Grand Vizier the importance for all right-thinking Turkish statesmen and leaders of opinion of combating the idea, spread abroad by Mustafa Kemal, that Turkey's hope lay in Bolshevik support, and of impressing on their countrymen the disaster to which similar hopes had led in Azerbaijan, for instance, where at least 12,000 Moslems had paid the price of a similar illusion with their lives. The Grand Vizier agreed with me. In speaking of the Bolshevik organisa-



tion, he mentioned that the Persian Ambassador had already spoken to him an early departure for Moscow to treat with the Soviet Government.

14. Turning to his own plans for the restoration of order, Ferid Pasha said he had been discussing confidentially with the British General at the Ministry of War two schemes, one for organising the small army of 15,000 men to be allowed to Turkey immediately after the treaty, and the other for utilising the Kurds as an instrument of attack on Mustafa Kemal. As regards the 15,000 men, he said a plan was in preparation, and he hoped to talk it over in its final shape with General Shuttleworth that afternoon. As regards the Kurds, he said that Kurdish leaders here were keenly alive to the danger of any Bolshevik leaven being introduced into the traditional system of Kurdistan, and were for that reason most eager to counteract Mustafa Kemal.

15. I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that any plan for organising the Turkish army of 15,000 men must be subject to article 200 of the treaty, but agreed that there was no objection to preparatory work being undertaken by the Turkish Government. I said I could only submit his Kurdish scheme to your Lordship and see what you said.

16. Before I left, the Grand Vizier returned once more to the appeal for reconsideration even now of certain stipulations of the treaty. He said the Porte had asked for three concessions, to all of which they attached importance, and he besought me to submit for favourable consideration at least one of the three, that relative to the substitution of the Enos-Midia for the Tchataldja line. That, he intimated, was the most important of all. The Porte desired that the inhabitants of Constantinople should not have to wake up of mornings with a Greek reveille in their ears.

17. General Milne told me on the day following this conversation that the Grand Vizier had had on the afternoon of the 28th July the conversation with General Shuttleworth foreshadowed in his statement to me. The Turkish Chief of Staff, who has recently been Acting Minister of War, was also present. The only point connected with this latter conversation which it is necessary to include in the present record is that, while the Grand Vizier spoke to me of the Kurdish scheme as an integral part of his immediate plans, the Chief of Staff said at the meeting with General Shuttleworth that it would not be necessary if there were no further Greek operations in Asia Minor. This discrepancy may have some significance

in view of the fact that the Chief of Staff, Hamdi Pasha, is a leading light in the Kurdish movement here.

(Copies to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of Black Sea; His Majesty's Minister, Athens).

I Have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/44, p. 106-108, No. 73

No. 87

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July, 30, 1920.  
(Received August 1)

(No. 870.)

(Telegraphic) R.

WHEN treaty is signed, or even when it is ratified and has entered into force, how will it be possible to re-establish order and authority of Government in Anatolia, and consequently how will it be possible for treaty to be executed there?

This serious question has been examined by the French, British and Italian High Commissioners, who concur in submitting to their Governments following considerations and opinions:

1. Turkish Government professes to be ready to execute faithfully its obligations and to secure execution of treaty. It lacks, however, means of doing so, and consequently requests Allies either to lend assistance or to permit creation of requisite means as rapidly as possible.

2. According to Government these means consist chiefly in reorganisation of armed force authorised by treaty and prescription of special units (15,000 men).

3. This organisation cannot, however, take place except under control of military mission prescribed by treaty, and will take a certain time. Further, contrary to opinion held by Government, it is doubtful whether this first force of 15,000 men will be sufficient to re-establish in Anatolia the authority of Government and forcibly to impose the execution of treaty.

4. In these conditions two solutions should be considered:—

- ✓ (a) Re-establishment of authority and imposition of treaty by action of light forces.
- (b) Attempt to obtain voluntary acceptance (at least by majority of Nationalists) of treaty and decision taken by Sultan and Government to sign and execute it.

✓ 5. As regards (a), the Allied Governments are doubtless not desirous of sending to Anatolia sufficient forces.

Operations would thus have to be committed to Greek army more or less, but further advance of this army into Asia would be in contradiction with clauses of treaty itself, and would not improbably prove less easy for this army than operations executed hitherto. Greek Government, who perhaps would willingly undertake it, would doubtless insist on excessive recompense.

6. As regards (b), we possess no trustworthy information on the situation in Anatolia and Angora. It is probable Kemalist extremist chiefs are attempting to deceive the population.

Possibly if truth were known discouragement would act on the masses, and wisdom and reason would inevitably penetrate to at least the moderate Nationalists.

Consequently it would be essential to make truth known.

7. Granted the foregoing, the High Commissioners concur in submitting to Allied Governments following proposal: To recommend to Turkish Government formation of a mission composed of persons possessing real authority and capable of obtaining a hearing from moderate Nationalists. This mission would be sent to Anatolia to explain the situation and to communicate authentic documents and notes exchanged with Conference and to report Greek successes and Nationalists' defeats in Asia Minor, and to make it clear persistence in attitude exacted by Kemalist chiefs would make inevitable the advance of Allies, and particularly of Greek army, loss of Constantinople and disappearance of Turkey. Mission would, on the other hand, emphasise that acceptance of treaty would result in termination of war, of actions, of conscription and the establishment of order, tranquillity, good administration and the prosperity of country. Mission would convey text of a declaration made in the name of Allied Governments by High Commissioners setting out the foregoing.

It would communicate it to the population and to those with whom [two groups undecypherable]. If mission did not succeed entirely, it is reasonable to hope that it would at least sow seeds of discord amongst Nationalists, thus facilitating military action which would have to be under-

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taken. Its despatch would, in any case, gain time necessary for the organisation of Turkish forces, which would permit of taking action without having recourse to dangerous use of Greek army.

High Commissioners urgently solicit instructions from Allied Governments whether these proposals are acceptable.

*FO. 406/44, p. 98-99, No. 61*

No. 88

*British General Headquarters in Constantinople to War Office.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 5th August, 1920

(Received August 7).

*Telegraphic*

*Secret*

*I.9077 cipher August 4th.*

Following from a very reliable source. Heir? apparent Abdul Mejid Effendi states he is unwilling to escape from Constantinople to Anatolia with assistance of French or Italians. He believes some great political advantage would have to be given for such assistance. If Mustapha Kemal can provide him with strong mounted escort or if his safety can be assured beyond doubt to travel by aeroplanes or submarine he is however willing to escape.\*

*FO. 371/5277/E 9693*

\* Bu belge üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Prince Abdul Mejid, the second son of Sultan Abdulaziz (d. 1875), has for over a decade been in close association with C.U.P. elements in contrast to the present Sultan's aloofness from that body.

The underlying idea is that he should be proclaimed Sultan at Angora.

G. H. Fitzmaurice  
10/8"

"I read this to mean that Abdul Mejid will go if that can be managed without placing him under an obligation to the French or Italians — in itself a praiseworthy disposition.

I should doubt if his presence would do Mustapha Kemal much good: he would not have enough prestige with the real Sultan still in Constantinople.

Tilley  
11. 8"  
C.

No. 89

*Mr. Russell (Berne) to Earl Curzon.*

BERNE, 9th August, 1920  
(Received August 10)

*Telegraphic**No. 94**Secret**No Distribution*

Following from Military Attaché.

Colonel Twiss M.I. 3 War Office: Secret and Personal. Begins.

A Monsieur François Stern, Roumanian subject domiciled in Geneva who was recommended to me as trustworthy by a reliable person asked to see me recently and made a confidential statement to the following effect:

1. He has proofs in his possession that Italian Government have encouraged and are assisting Mustapha Kemal and are fomenting anti-British intrigues in Mesopotamia and elsewhere in the East; and that Vatican associates itself with this policy and is moreover encouraging Sinn Fein cause and intriguing with Bolsheviks.

2. Representatives of young Turk party in whose confidence Monsieur Stern is said to be, and for whom he claims to be acting, wish to substitute a British for the present Italian orientation and as proof of good faith would use their influence to end present anti-British activities in Mesopotamia and elsewhere and would guarantee that their influence would be effective.

3. As Monsieur Stern is ready to pay his expenses to London I thought it best to facilitate his journey so that he could tell you his story himself and produce what proofs he may have.

He should arrive in London about Wednesday next and I have asked him to call on you immediately.

Letter by bag which leaves to-day.

FO. 371/5225

No. 90

*Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS, August 11, 1920.

(No. 355.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

I HAVE been notified by Armenian Government of an agreement concluded by them yesterday, 10th August, at Tiflis, with the Russian Soviet representative, Legrand, according to which, as a preliminary to the final peace negotiations to be continued at Erivan, Armenia has consented that Bolshevik troops shall temporarily occupy Zangezur, Karabagh and all the district of Nakhichevan south of Shahtakhti. The Armenian Government have been informed by Legrand that Bolshevik troops have already advanced by rail towards Tabriz, and that on the 31st July the Bolshevik emissary to Mustafa Kemal, a certain Eliava, proceeded via Maku and Bayazid to Kemal's headquarters.

I expressed to the Armenian representatives here my amazement at this reversal of their previous decision, which was reported in my telegram No. 315 of the 6th July (repeated Constantinople telegram No. 229), and said that the Armenian Government's consent to the Bolshevik occupation of Nakhichevan, which opened their road into North-West Persia and into Turkey, almost amounted to an act of treachery against Great Britain, and was especially deplorable at the time when Armenia had just received a large consignment of British munitions. The Armenians defended their action on the ground that they had reached the limit of their resistance, and they asseverated the continued loyalty of Armenia to the *Entente*. Further, they claim that the time which they hope to gain by the negotiations to be continued at Erivan will enable them to organise resistance should the Bolsheviks fail to keep their promise ultimately to evacuate Nakhichevan.

Though the Armenians were undoubtedly hard pressed, I am not satisfied that their military position was as desperate as they claim.

I am despatching text of agreement by first opportunity, and will endeavour shortly to go to Erivan.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 272, and Tehran, No. 124.)

FO. 406/44, p. 23-24, No. 10/1

No. 91

*Appendix "A" to the Weekly Intelligence Report No. 81 of August 11, 1920, issued by British General Staff, Constantinople.*

LETTER FROM CHICHERIN TO MUSTAFA KEMAL DATED  
JUNE 3rd (1920).

TO: The President of the Great National Assembly.

FROM: The Commissaire for Foreign Affairs of the United Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Government has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter in which you state that you are taking part in the struggle against the foreign Imperialism which threatens both nations and express a desire to enter into official relations. It is with pleasure that the Soviet Government has become acquainted with the main lines of the foreign policy of the Turkish Government as represented by the Great National Assembly at ANGORA. The principles in question are the following:—

- (1) The declaration of Turkish Independence.
  - (2) The annexation to Turkey of essentially Turkish territories.
  - (3) The declaration of the Independence of Arabia and Syria.
  - (4) We think it natural that in accordance with the decision given by the Great National Assembly, the races in Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, Batoum area, and in the parts where Turks and Arabs live intermingled, should be left free to fix upon and establish their own destiny and that refugees and emigrants should be allowed to return to their homes in order to participate in a referendum in these zones.
  - (5) In the case of the minorities in the lands which belong to the New Turkish Government as represented by the Great National Assembly, all the rights which are accorded to minorities in the present countries of Europe should be conceded.
  - ✓ (6) The question of the Straits should be entrusted to a Conference to be held among the Governments that border upon the Black Sea.
  - (7) The abolition of the capitulations and of international financial control.
- The Russian Soviet Government has received with satisfaction the desire expressed by the Great National Assembly to participate in efforts and military operations which have as their object the liberation of oppressed peoples. It hopes that the Great National Assembly will allow the question of the frontiers between Turkey, Persia and Armenia to be fixed by help of political conversation and that the necessary right and justice will be granted to the peoples who are to decide their own future.

✓ The Soviet Government always accepts with pleasure to act as intermediary upon the invitation of these concerned. It offers forthwith to enter

P. Rompich  
1920.10.15

into political and consular relations in order to establish bonds of friendship and cordiality between Russia and Turkey.

The Soviet Republic of Russia which recognises the right of every nation to control its own destinies is following with great attention the valiant struggle which the Turks are making to preserve their independence and is pleased to see that the friendship is to bind Turkey and Russia and which is of great importance to the former country in these days is based on firm foundations.

Sir, while submitting the above for your consideration I have the honour to inform you in the name of the Council of Peasants & Workmen's Republic that we wish all success to the people of Turkey in their struggle for independence.

(Sd) CHICHERIN.

Commissaire for Foreign Affairs.

Issued by General Staff 'Intelligence'  
Army of the Black Sea

CONSTANTINOPLE.

11th August 1920.

FO. 371/5170

No. 92

*A Report from British Secret Intelligence Services, Constantinople.*

CX/676./V.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 12.8.1920.

*Secret.*

#### *AFFAIRS IN ANATOLIA.*

The development of Bolshevism in Anatolia is, according to the following report, clearly due to the co-operation of the Unionists, who have attached themselves to the Nationalist movement, rather than to the Nationalist movement itself. It is scarcely open to doubt that the introduction of Bolshevism into Turkey, as the foremost of the Eastern Muslim countries, was in accordance with the plan of campaign formulated by the Unionist leaders, when the defeat of Germany ruined their former schemes. The rise of the Nationalist movement in Turkey merely provided a practical vehicle for the progress of this later Unionist programme which included the spread of Bolshevism. The Soviet Government had directed its attention to the possibilities of Islam as early as 1917, but, in spite of constant efforts, no progress has been made, in Turkey at least. After the Armistice



we saw from reports emanating from Geneva, Rome and London, the development of Unionist activities working in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Russia. These same Germans and Turks who had been working together during the war again came to notice in association, and as early as February 1919 it became evident that the Unionist chiefs were actively preparing a Pan-Islamic movement in connection with Bolshevism and with the assistance of the very efficient, but so far unsuccessful, German organisation which had been co-operating for five years against British prestige in the East. After the Armistice, too, the purely Russian efforts of the Bolsheviks to develop Bolshevism as an Eastern world movement were assisted by the many Indians and other Pan-Islamists, who had gravitated to Berlin and Moscow on the final defeat of Turkey. As soon as the Nationalist movement under Mustapha Kemal showed signs of reaching serious proportions, the Unionists made an immediate attempt to gain control of so potentially powerful an instrument. In spite, however, of the expenditure of a certain amount of money, the attempt then failed, partly owing to personal jealousies as, for example, that between Mustapha Kemal and Enver, and partly owing to the Nationalist dislike of the Jewish Free-Masonic elements dominating the Unionists. More oblique methods were then adopted and advantage was taken of the circumstance that Mustapha Kemal, having realised the impracticability of rousing the Muslim world by such poor instruments as the Mouvahidin Society and ordinary Pan-Islamic propaganda, was turning in despair to the Soviet Government. The reluctance to accept Bolshevism in principle may be seen from the little we know of the earlier stages of Mustapha Kemal's dealings with the Soviet Government. In the first proposals for an agreement it was stipulated that the Nationalists should place no obstacle in the way of Bolshevik propaganda in Anatolia, but only in so far as it was not in conflict with the tenets of Islam. This agreement was reported to have been concluded in the autumn of 1919 and it was shortly afterwards that the activities of Bolshevik propagandists in Anatolia were first reported. It has since become evident that an energetic campaign has been in progress in Anatolia assisted in some cases, as at Eski Shehir, by the Nationalist authorities but we cannot be sure, and it still seems unlikely that Mustapha Kemal had any cordial sympathy with that campaign. It is to be observed that the Nationalist Assembly has never officially declared its adherence to Bolshevism and it has never been very clear by what means or under what auspices the movement was gaining ground. The present report enables us in some measure to trace the progress of the Bolshevik movement, and it is now clear that, beneath the reluctant acceptance by the Nationalists of Bolshevik assistance in their dire necessity, there is in progress now in Anatolia an active and virulent Bolshevik campaign fostered by the Union-

ist wing, which may end by breaking from the control of its promoters and by overwhelming Nationalist and Moderate Turkey alike in the Bolshevik maelstrom.

The report has been supplied by a well-educated and intelligent Turkish gentleman, who has just returned from Angora. He is personally acquainted with all the leading Nationalists and his information may be accepted as reliable.

#### REPORT.

The most important development in Anatolia to-day is undoubtedly the movement towards Bolshevism. The genuine Nationalists who are devoted to Mustapha Kemal are strongly opposed to the Unionist wing (i), in that the former wish to make use of Bolshevik assistance solely for their own particular purposes, but without adopting the Bolshevik organisation of society (ii). The Unionist wing, however, of which Eyub Sabri may be regarded as one of the principal leaders, insist that it is useless to hope for the slightest assistance from the Bolsheviks unless Bolshevism is adopted with all its consequences; and they maintain that the tenets of Islam are capable of complete reconciliation with Bolshevik doctrines. Curiously enough, the "Pan-Turanians", of whom Adham (Adnan) Bey and his wife Halide Edib Hanum are the leading lights, side with Mustapha Kemal in this matter, and are in opposition to their former Unionist friends (iii). There are now about one hundred deputies who have been won over to the Bolshevik cause, and this party is steadily gaining in strength. It is in constant communication with Talaat, who is the principal protagonist of Islamic Bolshevism in Europe and who is making every effort to obtain control of the Nationalist movement, with the assistance of the Russians and Germans (iv). This difference of views between the real Nationalists and the Unionists, who have attached themselves to the movement, is aggravated by certain personal rivalries and jealousies (v). Nevertheless, the Unionists are rapidly gaining ground and they are responsible for the formation in Anatolia of what is known as the "Green Army" (Yeshil Ordu) organisation (vi). This is only an army in the sense of the "Salvation Army" for instance, and is not at present a military organisation, as can be seen by the pamphlets containing the statutes and regulations of the organisation. It is disguised under the name of "The People's Party" (Khalk Firkasi). The "Green Army" is a Bolshevik-Islamic creation and is nothing else but the vehicle for the fulfilment of the Soviet Government's campaign to rouse the whole Islamic world against Europe in general and Great Britain in particular. Hitherto the activities of the "Green Army" have been confined to the Muslims of Russia and of Central Asia, but the "invasion" of Anatolia is now rapidly becoming an accomplished fact. Sherif Mamatoff (viii)

and Vakass (viii) were the advance guard of the "Green Army". For months they have been preparing the ground which is now considered fit for cultivation. One of the most fervent Turkish converts to Bolshevism is Sheikh Servet (ix), a native of Malatia in Kurdistan and a doctor of theology. He has seconded the efforts of the Bolshevik propagandists with the utmost energy and has written a book which is now being printed at Eski Shehir, entitled "A Leaf from the Golden Age" (Asr-ı-Saadetdan Bir Yaprak). The "Golden Age" was the lifetime of the prophet and the object of the book is to prove by the Koran and by Muhammadan traditions that the tenets of Islam and Bolshevism are identical. The Sheikh is a very well-educated Muslim who has travelled extensively in every Muslim country, and wields considerable influence. Just prior to the commencement of the "Green Army" Campaign, about the end of June, the Soviet Government sent an inspector to Anatolia to make the final arrangements for the "Green Army" campaign. This man was Derboff (x), formerly People's Commissar in the Kharkof district. He visited Angora and was in Anatolia for about a month. The significance of the "Green Army" campaign at the present moment is in connection with the Pan-Muslim Congress which is shortly to be held at Baku (xi) and which will take important decisions as to ways and means of action. If the Unionist wing succeeds in dominating the Nationalist movement by that time, there will undoubtedly be serious complications. For among other things the Congress will decide upon the time and place of assembly of the Khalifat Congress. It has been decided that the present Khalif must be replaced, as he has become a passive instrument in the hands of non-Muslim (xii). The Khalifat Congress will consist of representatives of the entire Muslim world, and, after declaring the present Khalif incompetent, will proceed to nominate another Khalif. If the Unionists obtain the upper hand, it is almost certain that either the Amir of Afghanistan or the Sheikh of the Senussi will be nominated, the former having by far the better chance. On the other hand, if the real Nationalists maintain their position, the nominee will most probably be Prince Abdul Haid. (sic) The Heir Apparent has already signified his willingness to join the Nationalists in Anatolia and his A.D.C. was in Angora at the same time as myself, mid-July. Mustapha Kemal had recently had two communications from him and is endeavouring to arrange for his flight from Constantinople to Angora. There is not the slightest doubt that, both at the Imperial Court and among the Heir Apparent's entourage, there is a very powerful party in favour of the Nationalists.

Mustapha Kemal's position, however, is by no means secure, and so far as the Bolsheviks are concerned there is little doubt that he will be outwitted. Two delegates who left Angora for Moscow in April had only just arrived when I reached Angora, and in the telegram announcing their

??(1)

arrival they complained bitterly of difficulties and hardships which they had suffered on the way. Two other delegates subsequently left Angora for Moscow and reached their destination safely and easily, but by that time both Halil (xiii) and Jemal (xiv) had also reached the Soviet capital. One of the first delegates was a certain Osman (xv), the other two were the deputies Bekir Sami (xvi) and Seifi (xvii). Some idea of the nature of the relations between the Nationalists and the Soviet Government may be obtained from the correspondence between Mustapha Kemal and Chicherin during the month of July, which is appended in the form of a translation from the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of 8th July. It will be noticed that the Bolshevik Foreign Commissioner is very non-committal so far as material assistance to the Nationalists is concerned, and it is possible that there was some special significance in the final phrase, "we wish all success to the people of Turkey". The word in Turkish used for "people" was not "Millet" but "Khalk", which means the "masses" rather than the "nation". The same word is used to designate the disguised "Green Army" organisation, already mentioned, and which is to be called "The People's Party" or "Khalk Firkasi".

In his reply to this communication Mustapha Kemal avoids the word "Khalk" and used the word "Millet" in referring to both the Russian and Turkish nations.

That the Bolsheviks are playing for their own hand alone and have not the slightest intention of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Mustapha Kemal is too obvious to need comment. If the Bolsheviks ever give any armed "assistance" it will assuredly take the same form as that given to the epheremal "Republic" of Azerbaijan.

The Mouvahidin Society (xviii) is in existence but no longer meets and is dying of inanition chiefly owing to its members being absorbed by the new Islamic Bolshevik movement, which has now devepoled into the "Green Army" campaign. There is no other Islamic Society of any kind, but the "Green Army" is far more dangerous and far more likely to bring about general Islamic upheaval than either the Mouvahidin or any other Society. The campaign must be costing millions but Moscow seems to be able to find the money. The following are some of the most prominent members of the "Green Army":—

Eyub Sabri, member of the former Unionist Government. Intimate friend of Talaat. Prisoner of war.

Nazim, ex-Vali of Kharput.

Yunis Nadi, notorious Unionist, Editor of the "Yeni Gun" (suppressed).

Sherif Manatoff, the Muslim Bolshevik mentioned above.

Vakass, a Kurd who has travelled in Central Asia; mentioned above.

It is that journey that is...  
 founded...  
 same turned...  
 FA KEMAL

Suleiman, a veterinary major of Trebizond.

Sheikh Servet, already described.

Sherif Manatoff is now so sure of his ground that he has recently become exceedingly bold in his utterances. For instance, one evening in my hearing, he cried in the course of conversation, "Long live the new Prophet Lenin" — a remark which seriously offended some of the more religious-minded persons present and annoyed the others who regarded it as stupid and tactless.

There was only one non-Turkish Muslim delegate in Angora when I was there. This was an Indian named Mirza Azim-ud-Din (xix), who said he was on the staff of the "Muslim Outlook". He belongs to the same revolutionary association as Miss Sylvia Pankhurst (xx), whom he often mentioned as a friend and associate. It also appears that Miss Pankhurst is in correspondence with Halide Edib, or rather has been corresponding with her. Mirza Azim-ud-Din's objects in visiting Angora were:—

- (i) to arrange for the despatch to Afghanistan of propagandists to stir up trouble.
- (ii) to get into communication with the Bolsheviks for the supply and transport of arms and explosives to India.

He stated that either the "Muslim Outlook" or his Society would pay all expenses of the first operation. The Nationalists agreed to the proposal, but wanted "cash in advance". This was agreed to and Mirza was to return to England at once and make arrangements, but his departure was postponed on account of his falling ill with malaria. He arrived in Angora via Adalia about July 25th. He was accompanied by a Nationalist who had proceeded from Constantinople to meet him, probably at Adalia or Rhodes. In Angora he was being sponsored by the well-known Indian Abdur Rahman Peshawari, alias Nihad. His age is about 40; he speaks English perfectly and a little French. There is nothing striking in his appearance. He is not very goodlooking for an Indian. He does not wear spectacles.

#### Notes

(i) In Circular CX/4271, (V) dated 4.6.20., it was stated that when Talaat went to Switzerland in April 1920, he was refused admission to the Nationalist Club in Lausanne and the Nationalists made it quite clear that, although they were ready to accept financial assistance, they would tolerate no interference.

(ii) The Great National Assembly has never made an official declaration of adherence to Bolshevik principles, and reports of debates as published in the Angora "Takvim-i-Vekai" (Official Gazette) show clearly the cleavage between the two parties.

(iii) The main purpose of the Committee of Union and Progress has always been Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism, of which the original exponents were Russian Muslims. This policy was adopted by the Committee and fostered by the Germans as a means

of embarrassing Russia, the arch-enemy of Turkey. Talaat and the other Unionist leaders, with their appreciation of "Real Politik", understand clearly that no appeal based on Pan-Turanism will produce any response in the form of efficacious outside help. Pan-Turanians like Halide Edib, however, influenced more by sentiment than logic, would be unable to jettison their old ideas so easily and might thus find themselves in opposition to the Unionists of the opportunist school.

(iv) Reports from Geneva and London give abundant evidence of the association between the Unionists on the one hand and the Germans and Russians on the other. The notorious Dr. Prufer, who played a conspicuous part in the German Oriental intrigues, is again employed in the same direction while Herr Kopp, Bolshevik representative in Berlin, is known to have been in constant intrigue with both the Turkish Unionists and the other Pan-Islamic anti-British elements in Europe.

(v) It is notorious that considerable jealousy exists between Mustapha Kemal and Enver.

*F. O. 371/5178/E. 11702*

*Bu belge üzerine, İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır :*

*SIR W. TYRRELL.*

"This long Circular, upon the progress of Bolshevism in Anatolia under the strenuous efforts of the C.U.P., is of importance almost in its entirety. It gives what on the whole seems to be an excellent representation of its subject up to the beginning of August. Indirectly it bears upon the prospects of Bolshevism farther East than Anatolia.

The Report is in two parts: (1) by the S.I.S. representative in Constantinople (pages 1-3) is in essentials a reflection of the second part; and (2) by "a well-educated Turkish gentleman, just returned from Angora, and personally acquainted with leading Nationalists" (pages 3-9). The writer who appears to be a Moderate Nationalist, is vouched for as reliable by S.I.S. His statements are well annotated by S.I.S. notes (pages 9-11). A translation of an important Turkish newspaper article of 8.7.20., on Turkish relations with the Russian Soviet, is given as an Appendix (pages 12-16).

Part (1) scarcely requires comment here.

Part (2) contains a mass of statements, from which a brief connected outline of the main facts may be constructed as follows:—

At present two main divisions of Nationalists; (a) genuine Nationalists following Mustafa Kemal; (b) a Unionist group with Sabri Effendi as a principal visible leader; but with Talaat and the C.U.P., in harmony with their Russian and German associates, providing the real guidance. Kemal's party desire to use the Bolsheviks to further Nationalist aims without adopting the Bolshevik organisations of Society. The Unionist group, whose ultimate purpose is Pan-Islamism, believe that nothing effective can be got from Bolshevism without accepting all the consequences of Bolshevism.

(In this connection see the suggestive Circular *CX 1738/V* of 12.7.20. and the comments thereon).

The Unionist wing is making intense efforts to capture the Nationalist movement, and is steadily gaining in strength. About one-third of the National Assembly at Angora has already gone over to it. The acute controversy in the Moslem priesthood as to whether the principles of Bolshevism confirm with the principles of Islam form an important phase of the same effort.

The Prince who was till lately the Turkish Heir Apparent is, a strong supporter of Kemal Nationalist schemes.

A move in the Unionist campaign has been the formation in Anatolia of a Bolshevik-Islamic, non-military "Green Army", otherwise called the "People's Party".

A Pan-Muslim Congress is foreshadowed, to decide the time and place of a Khalifat Congress whose purpose will be the election of a Khalif free from constraint. The Emir of Afghanistan, is the most likely candidate of the Bolshevik Unionists: the Prince Abdul Hajid (? Abdul Medjid, lately the Turkish Heir Apparent) of the Nationalists.

It is thought that Mustapha Kemal will in the end be outwitted by the Unionists. Moscow is said to be finding the money for the Unionist campaign.

The translated Turkish article (pages 12-15) gives Chicherin's letter of June 3rd to the Nationalist Assembly at Angora, and the Assembly's. The former has appeared in S.I.S. Reports before: the latter, however, is new information. Clauses 3 and 4 (page 14) in this letter are of particular interest as indicating Kemalist-Nationalist aims rather than those of the Bolshevik-Nationalists.

? Eastern Department.

P.I.D.

20.9.20.

*İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında bu belge üzerine ayrıca aşağıdaki yorumlar da yapılmıştır:*

"Eyub Sabri's reported activities on page 3 would go to show the unwisdom of releasing political prisoners at Malta until after ratification.

G. H. Fitzmaurice.

22/9."

"This shows that there are two parties in Anatolia and not only one. The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist, who, induced by patriotic and religious motives, have been, and are, endeavouring to resist the Peace terms and the resultant dismemberment of Turkey and the reduction of the prestige of the Ottoman Khalifate. They have failed: their adherents are going even to the other and far more dangerous party, that of Enver and Talaat and the C.U.P. — Jew — German — Bolshevik combination. The latter are not concerned with the defence of Turkey but with the Pan-Islamic offensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed against Great Britain. The plans for this offensive have recently been discussed at Baku. Enver and his associates have sacrificed Turkey to the Bolshevik conception of Pan-Islam, have accepted the principles of Lenin and are disseminating them by means of the Green propagandist Army. Mustafa Kemal on the other hand has rejected Lenin's principles and is consequently about to be discarded in favour of Enver and Talaat. While he is in agreement with the Pan Islamists as to the necessity of transferring the Khalifate from the present Sultan, who is said by both parties to be under Allied control, his idea is to bring Prince Abdul Majid to Angora and confer it on him, thus retaining the Khalifate in the House of Ottoman. Enver and Talaat on the other hand appear to have accepted the Bolshevik proposal to confer the Khalifate (by election, in accordance with Bolshevik theory but in accordance with their practice by arrangement) on the Emir of Afghanistan.

"Mustafa Kemal must therefore be aware that his cause is a best one and might well be disposed in his dilemma to consider it more politic for the sake of Turkey and the Sultan to accept the Treaty and with it the support of Great Britain and her Allies as an alternative to acquiescing in the complete eclipse of Turkey and the throne of Ottoman for the sake of the spread of Bolshevism and the very dubious overthrow of British power in the East.

"It would seem well worth while to put this before him. If he could be induced (possibly through Prince Abdul Majid or else directly) to accept the situation and transfer his activity and influence from Angora to Constantinople he could do far more to save Turkey than by prolonging resistance at Angora while Enver has supplanted him. It could with truth be permitted but to him that he is far the best successor to Damad Ferid and circumstances might make him willing to accept the place. This would probably achieve the pacification of Anatolia and solve a lot of problems.

D. G. Osborne.

23/9."

"This is bound up with the question of a mission to Mustapha Kemal suggested by the French and discussed on another paper. It can hardly be treated piece-meal but the policy suggested by Mr. Osborne can be born in mind.

H.

Seen by Sir Eyre Crowe

25 Sep. 1920."

C.

"Information from a very secret source is to the effect that Mustafa Kemal would be prepared to accept the Treaty on certain unobjectionable conditions. But this information is indirect and difficult to verify.

D. G. Osborne

25/9

FO. 371/5178/E. 11702

No. 93

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.*

*Aden, August 13, 1920*

*(Received August 27)*

(No. 25.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of 22nd Aden news letter, dated the 13th August, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, *Major-General.*

FO. 406/44, p. 583, No. 370

ENCLOSURE IN No. 93

*22nd Aden News Letter*

(Secret)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 30th July, 1920:—



*Tihama.* — The Idrisi commandant at Bajil, Sheikh Mahomed Tahir Ridwan, has written to the Political Officer, Hodeida, to say that he has intercepted a letter from Sheikh Omar Mizjaji, a Hodeida merchant, to the address of the ex-Vali, Mahmood Nadhim, the purport of which, he says, is that the Turkish Government are victorious; that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Nationalists and enemy of the existing wretched Turkish Government, has entered Constantinople with all his forces and co-operated with the Turks there; that Anwar Pasha has returned from Afghanistan with a large quantity of gold, and has seen sent a part of it to Mustafa Kemal in order to strengthen his armies; that Colonel Jacob has written an article in the "Times" praising Mahmood Nadhim and the other Turks in the Yemen, and giving hopes for the fulfilment of their aspirations. The Idrisi commandant says that Kaimakams Jamil Bey and Khalil Bey, who are in Marawa and through whom Sheikh Omer Mizjaji transmits his letters to Mahmood Nadhim are engaged in propaganda work, the object of which is to incite the Arabs against the British Government.

This is a sample of the rumours that float about the Yemen\*.

FO. 406/44, p. 583, No. 370/1

\* Raporun diğer bölümleri M. Kemal ile ilgili değil. Buraya alınmadı.

No. 94

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmonds of Foreign Office on the Conversations with M.F. Stern.*

August 14, 1920

I was instructed to see Monsieur François Stern who called yesterday evening before the Berne telegram (No. 94) about him arrived.

He said he was a Roumanian subject, understood Turks and their ways very well having been in Constantinople on a visit in 1911 (he is about 25), and had worked for M.I. 1.C. in Odessa in 1917 and 1918. M. I. 1. C. inform me that, though they have never caught him working against us, he is unsatisfactory and expensive.

He was accompanied by a M. Auguste Pictet, a Swiss, who, Mr. Koppel informs me, worked satisfactorily for the P.I.D. in Switzerland during the war.

Both of these gentlemen have just arrived from Switzerland. M. Stern has already seen Colonel Twiss of the D.M.I.'s department.

M. Stern desires to arrange terms between us and Mustapha Kemal. He states that he has been approached by an emissary of Mustafa Kemal's in Switzerland - a Turk named Subhi.

The proposals which, according to M. Stern, Subhi was authorized by Mustafa Kemal to make, are roughly the following, but they were propounded before Mustafa Kemal knew the terms of the treaty:—

1. Mustafa Kemal renounces Thrace.
2. Turkey to have an assured outlet at Smyrna.
3. Greek troops to be removed and replaced - if at all, by Italians.
4. The Straits to be controlled, if at all, by Great Britain.
5. Mustafa Kemal will welcome British technical advisers.
6. Damad Ferid to go.
7. Great Britain generally not to favour the Greeks.
8. Mustafa Kemal to disband his forces and surrender his arms.
- ✓ 9. Mustafa Kemal to stop the anti-British propaganda in Egypt, India, Mesopotamia and elsewhere.
- ✓ 10. Mustafa Kemal to cease intriguing with the Italians.

Messrs. Stern and Pictet urge us to negotiate with Mustafa Kemal through Subhi. They argue that we shall have to make terms with Mustafa Kemal some day and that, if we do not do it through Subhi now, we shall be obliged to do it later either through the Italians or through Feisal and then the terms will be much less advantageous to ourselves.

M. Stern's practical proposal is that he should go to Angora with Subhi. He would like to have one or both of the following released from Malta to go with him, as he says that they carry great weight with Mustafa Kemal:—

JELAL NURI, Subhi's brother. (In June 1919 Jelal Nuri was in Italian pay at Rome agitating against the cession of Thrace -94154/19- and in May 1920 Admiral de Robeck deported him from Constantinople as undesirable.)

FETHI BEY, a leading C.U.P. man, once Minister at Sofia. (I did not ask them why they supposed Jelal and Fethi would urge Mustafa Kemal to come to terms).

Messrs. Stern and Pictet laid frequent stress on the close relations between the Italians and Turks. All communications between Mustafa Kemal and his sympathisers in Europe passed through Italy. The Italian Government, they said, was strengthened in its pro-Turk policy by the Vatican which was anxious by all means to counter the activities of the Orthodox Patriarchate, (sic) which now derived great support from the Hellenic Government. On this account, they said, the Vatican paradoxically enough, favoured Moscow to a certain extent.

M. Stern also said that he and Subhi could not possibly go to Angora via Italy as the Italians must not know of their mission. (But how he supposed Subhi could be in Turkey without the Italians' knowledge he did not say.)

By way of stressing the close connection between Mustafa Kemal and the Italians he explained that Subhi is a relative of Mustafa Kemal's emissary in Rome, an Albanian named Ahmed Dinio, and that this Ahmed Dinio has been an intimate of Count Sforza's ever since Count Sforza smuggled him away from Abdul Hamid years ago.

I asked M. Stern whether he had any credentials. He had none. Everything had been done verbally so that communications which had to pass through Italy should not be discovered by the Italians.

M. Stern added that he had written to Mr. Philip Kerr asking for an interview in order to explain to him the proposals which Signor Giolitti will shortly make to the Prime Minister.

M. Stern is staying at the Waldorf Hotel. He will call again at 11 a.m. on Monday for an answer to his proposals, of which I merely took note.

The scheme scarcely seems one to take seriously. It may be either a mere money-making venture of M. Stern's own or a clumsy Italian trap. He is, however, the sort of man who if he gets "No" here will try to get "Yes" out of the Prime Minister or War Office.

Qy. Reply that we cannot go back on a treaty which we have signed.

FO. 371/5225

W. S. Edmonds 14.8.

No. 95

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 16th August 1920.

(Received September 1)

No. 1154/M. 2379.

Secret.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of the weekly summary of Intelligence Reports for the weekended 29th Jult 1920, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C.

I have, &c.

J. M. de ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 371/5170/E. 10707

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 95

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C., Constantinople Branch,  
for week ending 29th July, 1920*

*(Extracts)*

The almost unanimous decision of the Crown Council held on 22nd July that the Peace Treaty should be signed has been followed by an intensification of the campaign against DAMAD FERİD Pasha, in which the Heir Apparent is taking a prominent part. As will be seen his action in renouncing his rights to the succession is regarded as part of the general "drive" against the Grand Vizier. There is also further evidence tending to confirm the report that certain French influences are at work to bring about the fall of DAMAD FERİD Pasha, but so far there is no proof of any direct action on the part of the French official authorities. With regard to the Peace Treaty the Sublime Porte has acted with unusual celerity in taking measures in preparation for the task of fulfilling the peace conditions, and there seems to be no reason to doubt the good faith of the Grand Vizier. With regard to the Nationalists, there is evidence to show that in spite of MUSTAFA KEMAL's most plausible explanations, the successes of the Greeks in Anatolia and Thrace have resulted in a dawning realisation of the impossibility of successful armed resistance and of the danger of maintaining an uncompromising attitude. The situation in the Eastern provinces is still obscure, and all that can be affirmed is that KIAZIM KARABEKİR seems to have prepared for action of some kind, but whether for or against MUSTAFA KEMAL is not known. In all probability KIAZIM KARABEKİR does not know himself, but is waiting to see which line of action would best further his own personal interests.

1. The CROWN COUNCIL held on July 22nd consisted of about 50 selected persons, including ex-Ministers, Senators and Generals, and, with the sole exception of General RIZA Pasha, the Council agreed unanimously that the peace conditions should be accepted. ARISTIDI Pasha, who was present, afterwards expressed the opinion that the Council had been devised by the Sultan and DAMAD FERİD Pasha solely to divide the responsibility for the decision to sign the Treaty in accordance with their view of the necessities of the situation. He added that he had never known such a Crown Council in all his experience, and it must be admitted that it bore no resemblance to the traditional DIWAN formerly convoked by the Sultans of Turkey in times of danger.

*(Report HA/1206.)*

2. *The Application of the Peace Terms* is already under consideration, and on July 24th the Grand Vizier sent a communication to Marshal ZEKI Pasha, Inspector General of Reforms in Anatolia,

Major General PERTEV Pasha, Director of Military Schools,  
Major General ZEKI Pasha, formerly Turkish attaché to the German High Command,

ABDULLAH Pasha, former Minister of War.

The letter explained that the Allies had left the application of the peace treaty to Turkey and that failure to fulfil the conditions, which would involve the suppression of the Anatolian insurrection, might eventually result in the loss of Constantinople. The four above-mentioned officers were therefore informed that an Imperial Iradeh authorises them to advise the Government as to what they considered to be the best means of dealing with the situation.

On July 25th the Ministerial Council further discussed the application of the peace terms, for which purpose it was decided to form a commission composed of the Under Secretaries of the various state departments.

(HA/1221.)

3. *MUSTAFA KEMAL's explanation* of the situation was embodied in a circular dated July 1st addressed to the Nationalist Committees of Anatolia. The opening lines of this communication are illuminating in many respects,

“It has been brought to my knowledge that the form and character of the Greeks' offensive, which anticipated the movements we were ourselves about to make, has caused much unrest and anxiety among the people, and given rise to doubts with regard to the sacrifices made up to the present by the Nationalist Organisations....”

After an assurance that “our army” would do its duty until it was “completely annihilated”, it was stated that the Nationalist “retreat” was rendered necessary on account of a flanking movement from the sea coast of the Marmora. The “retreat” was described as a perfectly orderly strategic movement to the rear and in no sense a defeat. The inadequacy of the Nationalist forces in the struggle against the “whole Christian world” was admitted, but “the courage and patriotism of our nation... in the fight for its honour and independence” was a favourable omen, as was also “the awakening of Islam ... and the humane and liberal movement ... in Russia.” The Islamic world was said to be closely united about the “Muhammadian Committee” of Angora, and sympathetic movements were said to have actually commenced or to be in preparation in Afghanistan,

Indian, Baluchistan, Persia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. The sole mission of the "Turkish Army, the vanguard of the Islamic world against Christianity" was to gain time in order to combine for action. An agreement was said to have been concluded with the Bolsheviki and "within a month" Soviet divisions would be with the Nationalist Forces. The Red Army would soon crush Poland and "joining hands with the German Army" would bring reason to the "despots who recognise the independence of no one in the world but themselves." Finally the committees were ordered to communicate these details to the "worthy children of the nation".

(Report HA/1207.)

4. *The broken morale of the Nationalist Forces* was tacitly admitted in a General Order dated July 15th in which MUSTAFA KEMAL made an impassioned appeal with a view to an offensive against the Greeks. Peace and independence were to be secured only by advancing. "Let none seek safety in flight either before or during the fighting, for measures which have been taken in the rear will frustrate such a purpose. Deserters will be shot without pity as cowards and traitors". "On the other hand those who advance will be rewarded with honours and wealth". An inspection of the front made by MUSTAFA KEMAL and 10 deputies between July 19th and 23rd brought to light such an unsatisfactory state of affairs that upon the return of the inspecting party to Angora a secret sitting of the Grand National Assembly was held, and resulted in the resignations of "Commissioner" for Interior Affairs, and the deputies FERID and HAMID Beys; HAKKI BEHIJ, Finance "Commissioner" took over Interior Affairs *ad interim*. The Grand National Assembly was subsequently prorogued. In the meanwhile SUBHI Bey, the Vali of Konia had arrived in Constantinople as a delegate from MUSTAFA KEMAL, who was said to be prepared to submit to the Central Government provided DAMAD FERID Pasha were replaced by AHMED IZZET Pasha.

(Report HA/1229.)

#### 9. PAN-ISLAMISM.

(a) The efforts of the Turks and others to seduce the loyalty of the Indian troops in this part of the world have been dealt with more than once in the Weekly Summary. It is now learnt that a considerable number are serving under false names with the Turkish Nationalists in Anatolia. The majority of these Indians are probably deserters and are of no political importance; their only real danger lies in the fact that they are being accorded preferential treatment by MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha, being given

officers' rank in place of Turks far better qualified for the post. This treatment does not at all please the Turks who are serving with them and it may also have a bad effect on the Indians who may be brought to fight against them. Amongst those who are said to be serving with the Nationalists under assumed names are some who have been known to this office for some time as working with the Turks and as having caused several desertions in Chanak and round the Ismidt area.

(b) In endeavouring to trace five Indian deserters from Stamboul and the persons responsible for their desertion, the Turkish Police discovered the existence of a newly formed Society called the "TURCO-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY", the objects of which, according to its printed programme, were to encourage religious fraternity and commercial relations between the Turkish and Indian Muslims, who have for centuries been associated in the active defence of Islam. The Society was formed by a group of Turks and Indians who are well known for their strong Pan-Islamic intriguing tendencies and the founders are men who are known to have great influence with Turks, Indians, Kurds and Persians. There were to be two Committees, one of which was to have a Turk as President and the other an Indian. Through all its discussions or meetings the great desire of the Society to enroll more and more Indians into its membership is very apparent. It had the official sanction of the Heir Apparent who offered to supply half the monthly cost of its maintenance. At the second meeting of the Society it was decided that two delegates should be sent to get into touch with JAFFAR TAYYAR in Thrace and MUSTAFA KEMAL in Anatolia to co-operate with them and discuss the lines on which the Society should work. The first messenger was to be sent to Thrace as it was felt that the work of JAFFAR TAYYAR was almost unknown to the Muslim world at large owing to lack of propaganda. A Turkish officer was selected for this purpose and left for Thrace accompanied as far as Hadim Keuey by a *Roumanian Muslim* named SADAT Bey, who is said to be attached to the Constantinople Branch of the Roumanian Prisoners of War Commission. The ease and "slickness" with which this arrangement was made points to some practice on the part of this group in sending emissaries to the Nationalists. The motor car in which the first stage of the journey was made flew the Roumanian flag. The delegate was supplied with the printed rules of the Society and also with a private letter setting forth the needs for fresh plans to support the Indian cause and suggesting that the Society should be a centre, whence branches could be formed all over Europe and with the Indian colony in America for mutual instruction and advice. It begged that MUSTAFA KEMAL would publicly declare the policy of the Great National Assembly towards the Islamic world and India and asked that he should arrange the issue of a fatwa in support of the Indians fighting

against the British. At a subsequent meeting it was suggested that a delegate should be sent to Switzerland to get into touch with the Indian Khalifat Deputation but it was decided that such a step was too risky at present and that the most important work at the moment was propaganda. Now that the existence of the Society has been discovered by the Police, it will not be able to continue its activities as a Society, but none of the real leaders were arrested and it is not likely that they will give up their efforts to carry on a secret propaganda with the idea of seducing Indian troops and compassing the ultimate downfall of the British domination in the East.

(c) Rumours are still current in Afghan circles in Constantinople regarding the appointment of an Afghan Ambassador to the Turkish Court. It was stated in a previous Weekly Summary that one Sirdar Haji ABDUL AZIZ KHAN was to fill this post, but it is now reported that Sirdar ABDUR-RAHMAN KHAN has arrived in Batoum en route for Constantinople to take up the appointment. He is said to have had charge during the war of Afghan interests in Persia, and it is possible that he may be identical with a man of the same name who was Afghan Representative in Kushk in March 1920. If so, his previous unpleasant experiences with the Bolsheviks at Kushk will probably discourage him from collusion with the extremists in Turkey, but the name is a very common one and the information is, at best, a rumour.

(d) It was reported in last week's summary that the Ex-Khedive had obtained an Italian passport to leave Constantinople, but he has apparently not yet left, owing, it is alleged, to his mother's reluctance to accompany him. Although he complains bitterly of the attitude of Great Britain towards the Islamic world and her present neglect of the Egyptian question, he is still endeavouring to obtain the sanction of the British Government to his receiving some of the private income accruing from his Egyptian properties. In March last he sent one JAMES Bey (brother-in-law of Sir Gerald LOWTHER) to England to plead for him (whether he did so is unknown), and he has now sent a Syrian, HILMI Effendi, to Damascus via Beyrout to obtain the help of the Emir FEISUL and his father in the same cause.

The Ex-Khedive still keeps up a close intimacy with Mgr. DOLCI, the Catholic Archbishop of Constantinople, who acts as a go-between for the former in his dealings with the Italian Government. He is endeavouring to arrange, through Mgr. DOLCI, the transfer of some of his property in Egypt to the Italians in exchange for their recognition of his right to the throne of Egypt. He is naturally very opposed to the acceptance of the Peace Terms by Turkey, no doubt feeling that when Peace is concluded, Constantinople will not be such a safe place for him to continue his intriguing activities as it has formerly been. He expressed his feelings on this point



to the Sultan at a recent meeting when the Heir Apparent was present, but the Sultan acknowledged that the Allies were too strong for him and that he had no option but to sign.

(c) Owing to the recent failure of MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha's forces against the Allies, the SHEIKH-ul-SENUSSI is reported to feel acutely the awkwardness of his position. After the Armistice, feeling that the Nationalist cause would ultimately triumph, he threw in his lot with them and supported the counter-fatwas to those of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, upholding all Muslims and Turks who joined the forces of MUSTAFA KEMAL. Now that he realises that the power of the Khalifat is on the wane and that the position of the Allies has been strengthened, he hesitates to remain a partisan of the Nationalists and is therefore said to be considering whether, in spite of his prejudice towards the Sherif of the Hejaz on account of the latter's claims to the Khalifat, he will take refuge with him, or whether he will go into hiding in Cilicia until he sees the ultimate solution of the present crisis.

(f) MUSTAFA KEMAL Pasha, no doubt with the object of countering the strong feeling of resentment produced in the Muslim world by the recent Bolshevik massacres of Muslims in Elizabetpol, has recently issued a circular addressed to the President of the sub-committees of the Defence of Ottoman Rights. While acknowledging that certain "incidents" occurred in the invasion of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks, he states that most of them were caused by the MUSSAVAT Party, whose members are Shiah and under the influence of the English. He asserts that all these were punished, but that all who took part in the affair, actuated simply by love for Turkey, humanity and Islam, were spared. Although in this circular he speaks of the Shiah as being under the influence of the British, it is interesting to note that a document has recently been obtained, purporting to be a letter from the Chief Mujtehid of Kerbela to MUSTAFA KEMAL himself. The writer acknowledges on behalf of the Sheikh of Najaf-i-Sherif previous letters and presents. The letter, which was read at a meeting of the National Assembly at Angora, states that the Sheikh undertakes to send instructions to his agents in the East, to operate in every way possible with the work of the Nationalists in the Islamic cause and also agrees to send a representative to the Islamic Congress at Angora. He also, in promising to send propaganda missions to Persia, asks that 15,000 pounds in gold may be sent to him to bear the expenses of these delegations. The authenticity of the document cannot be guaranteed, but it is believed to have been sent overland to Nissibin and thence telegraphed to Angora, and, if genuine, it is the first proof that we have had of MUSTAFA KEMAL's direct communication with Mesopotamia.

(g) Bolshevik influence is becoming more and more apparent in Turkish Nationalist circles and a printed publication in Turkish entitled "ISLAM BOLSHEVIK JERIDESSI" is now being secretly circulated. It is very anti-British in tone and a recent issue prophesied the complete destruction of British prestige by the Bolsheviks, whose conquering armies were proceeding to join the Muslims in their fight for the safety of the Khalifat. Old Islamic Societies in new forms are springing up and the idea of Bolshevism is apparent in all their plans. When the TAALI ISLAM JEMIETE (Progress of Islam Association) issued an announcement against Bolshevism early in this year, many of the members whose sympathies were with the Nationalists resigned and the centres in the provinces came under a Nationalist organisation. Attempts are now being made to reorganise the Association, to elect a new President, and to form centres in the occupied territories. This renewed activity on the part of the Association is said to be due to the desire to preserve the rule of the Khalifat in the territories which, owing to the signing of Peace, are being detached from the Ottoman Empire. The task of forming a centre in Syria has been allotted to ALI GHALIB Effendi, the secretary of the "DAR-ul-HAKUMAT".

*FO. 371/5170/E 10707*

No. 96

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 16th August 1920

*No. 1155/M. 2279.*

*Secret*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of the weekly summary of Intelligence Reports, issued by the Constantinople Branch of M.I.I.C., for the week-ended 5th August 1920.

I have &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5170/E. 10708*

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 96

*Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.I.C.,  
Constantinople Branch, for Week Ending 5th August, 1920.*

*Secret*

*Extract*

The political situation has been practically stationary during the past week and the only outstanding event has been the re-modelling of the Cabinet as reported in the press. As was foreshadowed in the summary of 22nd July, 1920, the changes in the administration make no difference to the Turkish Government's determination to accept the peace conditions. RESHID Bey, as was to be foreseen from the summaries of July, 1920, has been jettisoned and, for the moment at least, DAMAD FERID Pasha has triumphed. In this way there has arisen a clean issue for there can be no question of a compromise between DAMAD FERID Pasha and MUSTAFA KEMAL. The Nationalists have indeed condemned the former to death together with other members of the last Cabinet, but with the significant exception of RESHID Bey. The new Cabinet has been adversely criticised by those who favour a policy of compromise with the Nationalists, but it is generally realised in other circles that DAMAD FERID Pasha alone has the resolution to deal drastically and consistently with the Nationalists. Whether he will obtain the necessary support for a military expedition is another question.

1. *The Condemnation of DAMAD FERID Pasha and his Supporters* was published on 3rd July, 1920, in the press of Anatolia. The following is a summary of the announcement:--

The High Court of Justice of Angora, having heard the evidence against DAMAD FERID Pasha and his colleagues accused of treason, gives the following judgment - Having acted against the national desire DAMAD FERID Pasha and his colleagues are guilty; they condemned those as rebels who fought to save the Khalif from slavery, to free the country from invaders, and to ensure the national independence; they condemned the Grand National Assembly as rebellious and plotted against it; FERID caused to be promulgated "Fatwas" contrary to the precepts of the Holy Law, and thus led Islam astray; with enemy money he armed people like ANZAVUR and brought about fratricidal strife. As a result of the evidence submitted the following have been condemned to death by default in accordance with Art. 2. of the High Treason Law, with the proviso that if they should be apprehended there may be a further hearing.

DMAAD FERID.

DURRIZADE ABDULLAH, Sheikh-ul-Islam.

RUSHDI, Minister of Justice.

SAID MULLAH, Under Secretary of Justice.

General HAMDI, known as KIRAZ HAMDI.

JEMIL Pasha, Minister of Public Works.

MUSTAFA NATIK Pasha, President of Court Martial.

SULEIMAN SHEFIK Pasha.

AHMED ANZAVUR Agha.

RIZA Bey, Minister of Finance.

FAHREDDIN Bey, Minister of Education.

✓ ALI KEMAL, Editor of "Peyam Sabah".

✓ REFI JEVAD, Editor of "Alemdar".

KADRI Pehlivan.

MUSTAFA SABRI.

ZEIN-el-ABEDDIN.

MEHMED ALI, Ex-Minister of Interior.

HASSAN TAHSIN, Chief of Police.

ALI NAZIM Pasha.

YAVER Pasha.

Dr. RIZA TEWFIK.

ADIL Bey, Ex-Minister of Interior.

JEMAL Bey, Ex-Governor of Konia.

✓ KECHEJIZADE FUAD Pasha, Senator.

MEVLAN ZADE RIFAAT.

REFIK HALID.

TAYAR Pasha.

VASFI Khoja.

SADIK Bey, President of Entente Liberal Party,

SHABAN Agha.

In conformity with Art. 6. of the Penal Code,

RUSHDI Bey, Ex-Minister of Interior.

KARA SAID Pasha.

REMZI Pasha.

REFIK Bey, Minister of Estates and Landed Property.

SAFFET Khoja.

EVANOSZADE SAMI Bey.

all of whom are implicated, are condemned to ten years' imprisonment under the same conditions.

✓ In conformity with Art. 375 of the Penal Code, all their goods and property are confiscated and their civil rights are forfeited.

July 3rd, 1336.

(Report HA/1235.)

2. *PAN-ISLAMISM.*

(a) A translation of a circular has recently been received which appears to show that the Emir FEISUL is in touch with and eager to uphold the principles of MUSTAFA KEMAL in his schemes against the Allies. The circular is in the form of an announcement made by MUSTAFA KEMAL to the Nationalist Committees in Anotolia and includes a proclamation purporting to come from Emir FEISUL, which is to be widely circulated by every possible means among the Muslims. MUSTAFA KEMAL announces that he was as late as June 1920 in treaty with various Arab Chiefs, to whom he made certain proposals, which were afterwards laid before FEISUL and accepted by him. The proclamation itself is in Turkish and Arabic and is addressed to the Great National Assembly. In it FEISUL ascribes all the evils and misfortunes endured during the last centuries by Muslims to the self-seeking interests of their leaders. He asserts that a country can only be happy and united if it obeys the principles of its religion, namely the Koran, in every detail. Unity in a nation is an absolute necessity and all people must work to that end if their land is to be self-governed and not ruled by a foreign power.

The main interests of the report lies in its confirmation of the fact that MUSTAFA KEMAL has lately arrived at a practical understanding with the Emir FEISUL.

(b) A document, purporting to have been written by ABDUL AZIZ SHAWISH on behalf of the Egyptians in Constantinople early in 1915, when the Turks were setting out on their "victorious" march into Egypt, has been seen. It sets out the decisions of the Egyptian Party in Constantinople as to the line of action to be pursued in Egypt, after its conquest, and states that the sole motive of Turkey's entry into the war was the desire to free Musulman and Ottoman Egypt from foreign domination. The system of Government for Egypt should be moulded upon the Turkish system and a list of prominent Turks and Egyptians in Constantinople, who should form the advisory delegation to the Commander-in-Chief and the Provisional Government of Egypt, is given. The necessity of founding a branch of the C.U.P. in Egypt is emphasised and the names of the dignitaries to be included in it is added. From the wording of this document and the fact that the names of many prominent Unionist Turks are suggested as suitable to fill important posts in the new Government, it is evident that ABDUL AZIZ SHAWISH was using all his energies in the wide cause of the C.U.P. and not merely as an Egyptian Nationalist. Many of the Turks named in the document are known to be still active in intrigues of an anti-British and Pan-Islamic character.

(c) Attention has been drawn to the important role open to Turkish ladies in underground politics by some few details which have recently appeared in the Turkish Press regarding the Nationalist and Unionist intrigues of the wife of KIAZIM Bey, an ex-A.D.C. of ENVER Pasha. Our enquiries show that this lady, who is also ENVER Pasha's sister, was connected with the Turkish Women's Association which was started in May, 1920, with the main object of securing, through the help of the lady members of the Red Crescent Association, regular correspondence with Anatolia. The Association was in touch with a Unionist centre at Rhodes, which was started by AZMI Bey, former chief of the Turkish Police, whose wife travelled backwards and forwards between Constantinople and that island with Italian assistance. All the women's clubs and associations in Constantinople were controlled by this main Association and they were all used for political purposes under the cloak of charity, funds being obtained by the sale of goods made by Turkish women at low rates of pay. HALIDE EDIB HANUM, the most energetic leader of the women's movement, was frequently aided by American ladies in Constantinople, who were possibly ignorant of her political activities, and, after her departure from this town, correspondence between her and her successor was carried on through the medium of a lady member of the American mission in Constantinople. The Association was in close touch with Turkish ladies in Europe whose centre was at Munich under the direction of Princess NIMET MUKHTAR, a member of the family of the former Grand Vizier, SAID HALIM Pasha. Constant communication is maintained by letter and personal visits between Rome, Lausanne and Munich and it is alleged that the centre at Munich is the headquarters of an intelligence organisation for the benefit of MUSTAFA KEMAL. Although the Constantinople Association has been broken up by the Turkish Police, none of its principal members have been arrested and their activities therefore are not likely to cease.

FO. 371/5170/E. 10708

No. 97

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmonds on his Conversations with MM. F. Stern and A. Pictet.*

16.8.1920.

Messieurs Stern and Auguste Pictet called again this morning. M. Stern read out some lengthy notes on the situation. In so far as it is apparently accurate, M. Stern's information does not seem to contain anything that we did not know before. His object seems to be to magnify the influence

of Mustafa Kemal and of the Italians with that purpose he tries to tell us a lot of rubbish.

The following are the points which he touched upon:—

Mustafa Kemal, upon the conclusion of the Armistice, tried without success several times to meet British generals at Constantinople. Finding that he could not get into touch with the British authorities he became very intimate with Count Sforza. Among other things Count Sforza assured him that the Italians would not occupy Smyrna.

M. Stern could obtain details of Count Sforza's pro-Turkish activities while he was in Turkey.

M. Stern could obtain details of the agreement concluded between the Italians and Mustafa Kemal.

M. Stern has with him full details of the units making up Mustafa Kemal's forces. He estimates that they have munitions for 4 or 5 years.

Mustafa Kemal, M. Stern says, is in direct touch with the Shammar and Anezeh, who have 500,000 well-equipped horsemen at his disposal.

Mustafa Kemal's emissary with Feisal is Seifi Bey (late chief of the Turkish Army Intelligence) and through him Mustafa Kemal maintains direct touch with Feisal. Feisal, M. Stern is sure, would be most unpopular in Mesopotamia.

Turkish Nationalism and Arab Nationalism now work together under orders from Angora.

One Ahmed, Talaat's brother-in-law, told M. Stern that Talaat fully approves of Mustafa Kemal coming to terms with Great Britain and that Talaat himself is subordinate to Mustafa Kemal.

M. Stern estimates Enver's force to consist of from 20 to 25,000 Tartars, Afghans and other Moslems. Enver is still profoundly pro-German and is supported by Moscow. At Angora his adherent are in a minority.

In M. Stern's view, an agreement between Great Britain and Mustafa Kemal would finish Enver once and for all.

Alfred Rustem (Bilinski) is now at Moscow as Mustafa Kemal's representative.

The Vatican will not tolerate the presence of the Greeks in Constantinople, and when this became a possibility a year ago the Vatican proceeded to promote disturbances in Ireland. The propaganda organisation of the Vatican is immensely strong and in order to prevent the Greeks obtaining Constantinople and San Sofia, the Vatican goes to the length of supporting Sinn Fein and Egyptian and Indian Nationalists agitators. (M. Stern explained that he was himself a Catholic).

M. Stern will be glad to submit a plan of reconciliation with the Vatican.

Signor Gioletti will propose to Mr. Lloyd George that Greek troops in Turkey should be replaced by Italian troops. (M. Stern learnt this before the Turkish Treaty was signed and is not sure, therefore, whether it still holds good). The object of the Italians is to pose as the protectors of Islam. In M. Stern's opinion, they have already usurped the position which Great Britain held in Turkey in the days of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe\*.

W. S. EDMONDS

16/8/20.

FO. 371/5225.

\* Mr. Edmonds'un bu servis notu üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"See also notes communicated to me by Col. Twiss (W.O.) who saw Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern wished to see me and Col. Twiss proposed to come and introduce him but I declined. I do not think it would be wise to see him.

I told Col. Twiss we could not negotiate with Mustapha Kemal and we could not go behind the Treaty. It might very likely be time that M. Kemal was anxious to negotiate with us. Col. Twiss seems to think the W.O. would be . . . . enough to negotiate with him.

I understand Mr. Fitzmaurice regards Mr. Stern as an emissary of Talaat.

Mr Kerr . . . see these minutes as Mr. Kerr proposes to tell on him.

Inform Constantinople and Rome.

J. Tilley

16/8"

"It would be interesting to have proofs of Italian intrigue, and I think Col. Twiss might be asked to pursue this aspect of the question. I have little confidence in Mr. Stern's statements.

H.(enderson?)"

"And I none.

I hope Mr. Kerr will see him . . .

C.(urzon)

17/8"

"Mr. Kerr has gone for a holiday, but I have ascertained that he did see Mr. Stern the day before yesterday and has sent to Sir J. Tilley a note of his interview.

R. H. C. "

(...) birer kelime okunamadı.

FO. 371/5225

No. 98

Col. Twiss to Foreign Office.

Notes on Turkish Question.

August 16, 1920

1. Mustapha Kemal wishes to come to an arrangement with Great Britain, and has sent an Emissary, now in Switzerland, to see if anything can be done in this respect. X has long been on friendly terms with his



family (of Albanian extraction), and possesses his entire confidence; he informed him of his plans and of the intention of his Chief.

2. As the basis of this agreement with Great Britain, Mustapha Kemal engages:—

- (a) To disband his troops in Anatolia.
- (b) To abolish the organisation of Anti-British propaganda, and the agitation kept up by his agents in Mesopotamia, in Cilicia, in India, the Caucasus, Persia, etc.,
- (c) To abandon his relations with the Italian Government.
- (d) He engages to safeguard all the political, military, and economic interests, in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government.
- (e) To abandon definitely all claim to Thrace and Adrianople.

3. In return, he requires the following from His Majesty's Government:—

- (a) To replace the military missions (in Turkey) by missions of technical experts and specialists in all branches.
- (b) Not to oppose the entry into power of another Prime Minister in place of Damad Ferid Pasha, whose presence in power would prevent all hope of pacification.
- (c) No longer to favour the Greeks at the expense of the Turks.
- (d) With regard to Smyrna, Broussa, and the Treaty, X would be obliged to put himself into communication with Angora. He knows people who would be in a position to exercise a decisive influence on Mustapha Kemal in regard to this question. X is of opinion that a compromise would be arrived at in this question.

4. As regards the other questions of guarantees which His Majesty's Government might wish to demand, X would find it easy to give all the necessary detail.

5. If His Majesty's Government shows itself ready to enter into unofficial conversation with Angora, the troubles in Mesopotamia and elsewhere could be stopped in the course of a few weeks, merely the time necessary to transmit the necessary instructions to the agents in these regions.

6. X knows all the details of the negotiations which have taken place between Count Sforza and Mustapha Kemal, through a man who has served as intermediary a year ago and since that time.

7. X can also give information on the part played by the Vatican in the affairs of Constantinople and of Ireland.

8. Relations of Enver Pasha with Berlin and Moscow. His schemes and plan of action.

9. Italy intends to make capital out of her role of intermediary between the Angora Government and Great Britain. X knows the proposals which Giolitti intends to make in this respect, to Mr. Lloyd George, in the course of their coming interview in Switzerland.

X intimates that he is still capable of adding numerous important details on these subjects.

Mustapha Kemal is ready to utilise his forces, if necessary, for action against the Bolshevick advance in the Caucasus, and to place them at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

FO. 371/5225/E. 9975

1. *Mustapha Kemal Pacha*, désirant aboutir à une entente avec l'Angleterre envoya un émissaire qui se trouve en Suisse pour voir ce qu'il y aurait à faire dans ce sens. Je me trouve depuis longtemps en rapports étroits avec sa famille (albanaise d'origine) et par ce fait jouissant de son entière confiance il me confia ses projets et les intentions de son chef.

2. Comme base de cet accord M. K. s'engage:

- a) A dissoudre ses forces en Anatolie.
- b) A supprimer l'organisation de propagande anti-anglaise et les agitations entretenues par ses agents en Mésopotamie, en Cilicie, aux Indes, Caucase, Perse, etc.
- c) A renoncer à ses accords avec le Gouvernement de Rome.
- d) S'engage à sauvegarder tous les intérêts politiques et militaires et économiques au gré du Gouvernement de sa Majesté.
- e) Il renonce définitivement à la Thrace et à Andrinople.

3. Il demanderait du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté:

- a) de remplacer les missions militaires par des missions de techniciens et spécialistes en toutes branches.
- b) de ne pas s'opposer au remplacement de Damad Ferid Pacha, dont la présence au pouvoir empêcherait toute pacification.
- c) de ne plus favoriser les Grecs aux dépens des Turcs.
- d) (au sujet de Smyrne, de Brousse et du Traité, je devrais pouvoir me mettre en communication avec Angora et connais les gens qui seraient en mesure d'exercer une influence décisive sur MUSTAPHA KEMAL au sujet de ces questions.) Mon opinion personnelle est nettement optimiste pour un "compromis" possible.

4. Pour toutes les autres questions et garanties que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté voudrait exiger, il me sera facile de donner tous les détails dont je peux disposer.

5. Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste se montre favorable à une conversation officieuse avec Angora, les troubles en Mésopotamie et ailleurs, pourraient être arrêtés au bout de quelques semaines, temps matériel nécessaire pour faire parvenir les ordres aux agents de ces endroits.

6. Je connais tous les détails des tractations passées entre le Comte SFORZA et MUSTAPHA KEMAL, par celui même qui a servi d'intermédiaire il y a un an et depuis.

7. Rôle que joue le Vatican dans l'affaire de Constantinople (et d'Irlande).

8. Relations d'Enver Pacha avec Berlin et Moscou. Ses projets et son plan d'action.

9. L'Italie cherche à jouer à son profit le rôle d'intermédiaire entre le Gouvernement d'Angora et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Je connais les propositions que Giolitti se propose de faire à ce sujet à Monsieur Lloyd George, à leur prochaine entrevue.

Beaucoup d'importants détails restent à donner.

Mustapha Kemal est prêt à mettre ses troupes et ses officiers pour une action éventuelle contre l'avance des Bolchévik (sic) au Caucase, — à la disposition du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

FO. 371/5225/E. 9975.

No. 99

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

WAR OFFICE, *August 17, 1920*

*(Received August 17.)*

Sir,

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward herewith copies of telegrams of the 30th July and 8th August, 1920, from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Constantinople.

I am to say that, while not venturing any opinion on the infringement of the peace terms, which the course of action therein proposed would constitute, the Army Council would have no objection, from the military point of view, to permission being granted to the Ottoman Government to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men.

There is no doubt that the terms of the Peace Treaty could be enforced in Anatolia far more easily by the Turkish Government than by an

Allied force. Such an arrangement would, however, affect the Greeks very closely, and it is not known whether they will look upon it favourably.

I am, &c.

*FO. 406/44, p. 117, No. 82.*

H. J. CREEDY

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 99

*General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.*

*(Secret.)*

*(Telegraphic.) P.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1920

INSTEAD of the 15,000 men allowed by peace terms, Ottoman Government requests permission to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men. Composition of each division as follows: one cavalry regiment; three infantry regiments, each three battalions; three companies heavy machine guns, two batteries mountain howitzers; auxiliary and supply services.

*FO. 406/44, p. 117, No. 82/1*

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 99

*General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 8, 1920

*(Secret.)*

*(Telegraphic.) P.*

CONTINUATION of my telegram of the 30th July.

The number of troops referred to if sanction is given for Turks state they will require to purchase from one of the Allies greater proportion of their equipment. Main items are as follows: 50,000 bivouac tents, 11,000 horses, 80,000 pairs boots, 50,000 great-coats, 50,000 service dress, winter, 50,000 summer, 1,700 assorted waggons, 2,500 pack-saddles; rations for whole force. If force here remains at present strength little of this can be supplied here beyond 10,000 suits khaki drill and 20,000 pairs boots, mostly larger size than Turks usually require. As regards rations, these would have to be obtained from Egypt, distribution of which would, however, entail increase in R.A.S.C. personnel here. It is the wish of present Turkish Government that the British should supply the whole of these demands. Reserves are included in numbers given.

*FO. 406/44, p. 118, No. 82/2*

No. 100

*The Greek Minister in London to Earl Curzon.*

The Greek Minister presents his compliments to the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, and has the honour to transmit herewith to His Lordship the following confidential report which has reached the Greek Government from the Greek G. H. Q., in Asia Minor —

“According to information received from various quarters the situation in the region of Sokia can be resumed as follows: On August 10th an order of mobilisation was issued at Nea-Ephesos, calling up the Musulmans up to the age of 50, and this mobilisation is receiving support from Italy. Anyone refusing to enlist is enrolled by force. An official emissary of Mus-tapha Kemal has arrived at Sokia and is collaborating with the Italians.

The uniforms of the recruits are new and seem to have been supplied by the Italians.

The arms collected from the Turks at the moment of their disarmament have been returned to them”.

18th August, 1920.

FO. 371/5216/E. 10112

No. 101

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.*

(Received August 21)

LE Gouvernement français serait très heureux de connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement britannique au sujet des propositions suivantes:

1. Le Gouvernement français propose de charger la Conférence des Ambassadeurs de Paris des décisions concernant la mise en application du Traité turc.

2. M. Millerand ne verrait pas d'objection à l'organisation immédiate des 15,000 hommes de troupes spéciales prévues pour l'armée turque, à la condition de l'autorisation des commandants interalliés, qui devraient s'assurer contre l'adjonction éventuelle de ces troupes aux nationalistes.

3. Il ne fait pas d'objection à l'envoi en Anatolie d'une mission ottomane chargée de faire comprendre aux nationalistes les dangers de leur politique et à l'emploi par cette mission de déclarations concertées des Hauts-Commissaires alliés.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 20 août 1920.*

F.O. 406/44, p. 119, No. 85

✓ *Notes of a Conversation Between the British and Italian Prime Ministers Held at the Villa Haslihorn, Lucerne, on Sunday, August 22, 1920, at 10 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; Sir M. Hankey.

*Italy*: Signor Giolitti, President of the Council; Dr. Mattoli, Secretary and Interpreter.

(Extract)

6. He (Mr. Lloyd George) would propose now to discuss the question of Turkey. He had had many conversations with Signor Nitti and with Baron Sonnino on the subject, and he would like to know Signor Giolitti's view.

✓ SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that Italian interests were commercial and economic and not territorial.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE presumed that, in referring to economic penetration, Signor Giolitti referred to the sphere of influence provided for in the Tripartite Agreement.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI replied in the affirmative. He said Italy was also interested in getting coal from Heracles [*Heraclea*].

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if Italy had agreed with France on this subject?

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that France was getting coal, but there was plenty more to be obtained besides what France had.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether any definite agreement had been reached with France?

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that the Banca Commerciale had secured some coalmines, but had had to give them up to the French Government. Now they were looking out for other places for coal which would not interfere with France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that from his recollection of the conference at San Remo he gathered that there was no close agreement on the subject between France and Italy.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said it was a very difficult matter, as the French bankers wanted everything, but it was important to get an agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was difficult where French bankers intervened.

✓ SIGNOR GIOLITTI said Italy did not want places that France had, but other places where coal could be got without touching French interests.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again asked if any agreement had been reached?

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said not to his knowledge, although Signor Nitti might have arranged something.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what was Italy's attitude towards Mustafa Kemal?

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said he knew nothing about him and had had no opportunity to discuss it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Greek victories showed that he had no great value.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that he lacked material of war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in his view, the Turks were no longer a formidable people. Constantinople would constitute a great difficulty for the Allies.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that Italy had taken but little part there. They had a small force sufficient only to defend the lives of Italians if attacked.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the control of the Straits meant a substantial garrison.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that frankly Italy could not send soldiers beyond her boundaries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the same applied to Great Britain, who had a good many troops in Constantinople now, but could not maintain them there for any length of time.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that Italy could keep the soldiers now in Constantinople, but owing to their internal position could send no more troops beyond their boundaries. They had even had to desist from sending them to Albania. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that Italy only had one battalion, about 1,000 men in all, in Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said we could not maintain troops for long so that it would be left either to the French or the Greeks.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI suggested that men-of-war could keep the position open.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that men-of-war could not be sent without holding the shores.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that the Turks had no great force in these regions, so that the Straits could easily be controlled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Turks would not want many men to make difficulties in the Straits, which were so narrow.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that the guns of the ships could deal with the Turks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British had discovered at the Dardanelles that ships were not of much value against forts and troops which required plunging fire from howitzers. When the Dardanelles were attacked there had only been a relatively small Turkish garrison there. Unless the land on both sides were held ships were of little value. Hence, as neither Great Britain nor Italy could send troops, it would have to be handed over to the Greeks, or the French - or else to the Bolsheviks, for later on the Russians would want it.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said that at present Russia had so much to do at home that she would not wish to go to the Dardanelles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in ten years' time the position would be different.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said there was time to think the matter over therefore.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said if Italy could only send 1,000 men it might be necessary to bring in the Greeks in order to hold the troops with their other Allies\*.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said he hoped that this was true, but he doubted if the Greeks could hold it for long.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the population of Gallipoli was purely Greek, and the Greeks would therefore require less troops than anyone else to hold it.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of how the Straits were to be held would have to be decided soon.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI pointed out that Mustafa Kemal was nearly finished.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed he had but little war material. Nevertheless, it would always be necessary to hold the Straits against a possible attack. It was no use for Italy to have mines at Heracles [*Heraclea*] if the Straits were not to be open.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said it was necessary for all the world for the Straits to be open.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. He believed that the population of the Gallipoli Peninsula was about 30,000, which would include 4,000 men capable of bearing arms. The Greeks could hold it lightly, as they would be able to call up men from the local population in case of necessity.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI agreed.

\* In the rough notes of Sir M. Hankey for the minutes of this meeting this passage read: 'If we would bring Greeks in with others, [we] might be able to hold Straits. They would hold Gallipoli.'



MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if Signor Giolitti would have any objection to the Gallipoli Peninsula being held by Greece?

SIGNOR GIOLITTI said he would not so long as the Straits were kept free.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Greece, being a nation with a great coast line, was at the mercy of a maritime Power, and therefore could be compelled to keep the Straits open.

(At this point Mr. Lloyd George handed Signor Giolitti a draft statement for publication.)

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 770-772, No. 87*

No. 103

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

*24th August 1920*

*No. 0152/5315 (M.I.2)*

Sir,

With reference to Constantinople Weekly Intelligence Report, No. 79 for the week ending 28th July 1920, forwarded by the War Office to the Foreign Office on the 16th August 1920, I am commanded by the Army Council to invite attention to paragraph 5 of the first section, relating to the friction between Mustapha Kemal and Kiazim Kara Bekir. ✓

During the last two months a number of reports have been received bearing on this subject, notably the Constantinople Secret Political Reports C.X./1423/V. of 14th July and C.X./1663/V. of 23rd July, both of which have been received by the Foreign Office.

In this connection I am also to invite attention to Appendix C.3 of Constantinople Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 72, forwarded by the War Office to the Foreign Office on 30th June 1920, particularly paragraphs 47 to 50.

I am, &c.

(Signature)

*FO. 371/5055/E. 10367*

No. 104

*Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS, August 24, 1920

(Received September 22)

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 263 of the 16th August, 1920, I have the honour to enclose copy of despatch No. 37, dated the 19th August, received by me from Captain Gracey at Erivan.

I have, &amp;c.

H. C. LUKE

FO. 406/44, p. 36, No. 15

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 104

*Captain Gracey to Commander Luke.*

ERIVAN, August 19, 1920

(No. 37.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour herewith to forward for your information copies of agreements, note from Kemal Pasha, official communiqués, private telegrams and press news:—

Agreement between Soviet Russia and the Republic of Armenia on the 10th August, 1920, at Tiflis, translated from the Russian text and received by me on the 17th August.

Note received from Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Government to the Foreign Office of the Republic of Armenia, dated Angora, the 8th July, 1920, and received by me the 18th August.

Official communiqués of the Armenian Commander-in-chief's Staff, dated the 13th, 16th and 18th August, 1920.

Confirmation copies of my telegrams to you Nos. 36, 37, 38, dated the 13th, 14th and 18th August, 1920.

Press news:—

- (a) A hideous crime relating to the murder of the two Armenian Members of Parliament in Gerussi by the Bolsheviks.

- (b) The Armenian Communists.
- (c) Relative to the murder of the Armenian revolutionists by the Bolsheviks in Karabagh and Zangezour.

I have, &c.

GEO. F. GRACEY

FO. 406/44, p. 36, No. 15/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 104

*Second Note from Mustafa Kemal's Government to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia.*

ANGORA, July 9, 1920

(Translation.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your communication dated the 30th June, which was an answer to my letter of the 24th June, 1920.

Notwithstanding our and the Commander-in-chief's note of the Eastern army, Kiasim Karabekir Pasha, to stop in the district of Olti all attacks which were made without any legal foundation, and to recall to their districts all your troops, yet the above-mentioned district has not been evacuated, but, on the contrary, new attacks were made on the 2nd July, 1920.

Your own and your Commander-in-chief's replies do not refute the attacks which have taken place, and you state that the movement has been produced according to the request of the Moslem population, and that this population has not been persecuted or violated, and that no aggression was made on the Ottoman boundary, which would upset the existing relations.

It is not unknown to you that the relations existing between the two Governments are based on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, recognising officially the Republic of Armenia and its complement the Treaty of Batoum which, being signed by the empowered delegates, was accepted and ratified by both Governments.

The district of Olti entering into three provinces, determined by the decisions of the above treaties, and according to the plebiscite freely carried on by the people, forms the personal property of the Ottoman Empire.

If owing to certain reasons the Ottoman administration or military forces are not found temporarily in the above-mentioned districts this cannot cause the de facto nor de jure removal of the Ottoman Government therefrom.

At this moment, when it was expected to resolve in a peaceful way and on the principles of right and justice the controversies (if there are any) arising due to the complete compliance of the Treaty of Batoum, the aggressions of the Armenian troops in the district of Olti openly go against our wishes to maintain the friendly and good neighbourly relations, and at the same time they prejudice our indisputable rights.

✓ The call or the request of the Moslem population of Olti is not a justification to legalise the attack made; if we agree that the said population having made such an appeal, then that will draw upon them the responsibility of this crime.

As I informed you by my first communication, our Government and the Turkish nation are not hostile to the Armenian Government and the Armenian people, and they want to find a means in order to secure our mutual interests. If my points of view will be examined by the Government of Armenia, from all sides and in an impartial way, I shall hope that the sincerity of my observations and the friendliness of the sentiments that my people bears towards you will be trusted.

Finally, I request again the withdrawal, without any delay, of your troops, and, on the basis laid down in the Treaty of Batoum which exists between us two and is now legally exercised, I protest against these accomplished movements and lay the responsibility on those who have caused any injury to the Moslem population.

I beg, &c.

The Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the  
Great National Turkish Council,

BEKIR SAMI

True copy:

Seal of the XIth Army, and Signature.

FO. 406/44, p. 37-38, No. 15/3

No. 105

*The Director of Naval Intelligence to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*

*August 29th, 1920*

No. NID/OL 1306

The Director of Naval Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward herewith copies of three telegrams from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,

Nos 396Z., 397Z. and 398Z., giving a broad statement of the general position in the Near East. A similar letter has been sent to the War Office.

FO. 371/5178/E. 10596

ENCLOSURE IN No. 105

*Copies of Telegrams*

*From. C-in-C. Mediterranean.*

*To. Admiralty.*

*Recd. 28.8.20.*

396Z. Recent reliable information enables broad statement of general situation to be made. The yielding of Armenia to Soviet pressure has had a threefold effect: firstly. Armenia instead of serving as a buffer between the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists has become a corridor. secondly. The existence of Armenia as an independent state has become increasingly difficult. thirdly. The position of Georgia is unfavourably affected. (1811/26)

397Z. Early in August a clear understanding was reached between Moscow and Mustapha Kemal concerning military assistance to be provided by the former for service in Anatolia against the principal common enemy Great Britain. In all probability a portion of the Russian infantry division and cavalry division styled? "Soviet deliverance for Anatolia" has already arrives at Erzurum. These events cannot fail to encourage the Kemalists who were previously discouraged. If events were such that from the Polish and South Russian fronts Soviet troops could be released and further reinforce the Turks, then our interests in Mesopotamia, Persia and even in Constantinople would become in face of the position (sic) of the Bolsheviks a matter of grave concern. (2016/26)

398Z. It now seems that Wrangel will save? us from such a gloomy and perilous prospect by military operations which strike at the root of the Soviet occupation of the Caucasus. Pamphlets in Turkish are being dropped from seaplanes at the principal ports along the North Anatolian coast by H.M.S. "Ark Royal". Arrangemnets are also being completed in order to stop the supply of war material to Mustapha Kemal by sea (2101/26)

FO. 371/5178/E. 10596

No. 106

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.**Admiralty, September 2, 1920**(Received September 6)**(Confidential)*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extracts from reports, dated the 27th June and the 11th July, which have been received from the Senior Naval Officer, Batoum, covering the period from the 15th June to the 11th July, 1920.

2. A copy of the above has also been sent to the War Office.

I am, &amp;c.

O. MURRAY

*FO. 406/44, p. 29, No. 13.*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 106

*Extracts from Reports by the Senior Naval Officer, Batoum.*

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 15 TO 27, 1920.

(A.) — *Operations*

I LEFT Marseilles in "Ceres" on the 16th June intending, in accordance with "Ceres's" sailing orders from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to arrive at Malta on the morning of the 18th June.

On the evening of the 17th June, when off Marittimo, your message was received, directing "Ceres" to proceed to Chanak with all despatch. I proceeded at 25 knots, and turned over to "Emperor of India" on the morning of the 19th June, arriving at Constantinople the same evening.

2. On the 21st June I sailed in "Emperor of India" for Batoum, with Colonel Stokes and M. Gambashidze on board, arriving at Batoum 0600 L.T. on the 24th June.

3. On that morning a conference was held on board between myself and the Military Governor of Batoum, and the mission to Georgia. The latter left by special train for Tiflis, arriving next morning.

4. The town and province of Batoum remain quiet. Colonel Stokes reported the Georgians would be ready to take over on the 30th June, but, owing to the transports having been ordered elsewhere, this date cannot

be accepted. As reported in my telegram No. 605Z, the military authorities are not prepared for Georgian troops to be in Batoum for more than twenty-four hours, and I concur in the advisability of this.

His Majesty's transport "Mourino" sailed on the 25th June for Constantinople with the securities of the Baku Bank.

5. As regards the evacuation of Russians, the Military Governor considers that all Russians who are compromised can be accommodated in "Rio Pardo," and this ship accordingly leaves for the Crimea to-morrow, the 28th. It is observed that steamship "Negro" sailed for Crimea on the 26th June empty.

Inter-Allied steamship "Kizil Ernak" sailed for the Crimea on the 22nd June with 1,000 Russians.

6. Steamship "Sviet," which was set on fire on the 18th June, is still burning.

*Appreciation of Situation, June 28, 1920*

BATOUM

In the town all is quiet, but much anxiety prevails as to what will take place when the British leave. We are now supplying 45,000 people with 1 lb. of bread daily at a price of 20 roubles per lb., and no one expects the Georgians will keep up this supply.

2. The Adjarians are strongly against the occupation of Batoum by the Georgians, and declare they will not allow the Georgian troops through, and if the latter come by sea they intend, with the assistance of the Turks, or rather the Lazés, to turn the Georgians out after our departure. This it is probable they will be able to do with little difficulty.

3. It is believed that Mustafa Kemal, while unable to give active support to the Adjarians, has promised to assist them with a division of Lazés, which is being organised, and which may amount to some 8,000 men with 6 mountain guns and two German officers. They are little more than brigands, and would doubtless rob the town. The opinion is universal that no attack on the town will be made while British troops remain.

4. Colonel Stokes has reported that the Georgians will be ready to take over on the 30th June, but that date cannot be accepted by us owing to lack of transports, as it is most undesirable for British and Georgian troops to be in the town together.

5. This delay in the removal of our troops, after their departure has been decided on, is very unfortunate, as it gives the Adjarians a considerable time to organise against the passage of the Georgian troops into the province.

6. The Georgians, Adjarians, and, it is believed, the Turkish Nationalists, are all anxious for us to remain.

## GEORGIA

7. The Government remains strongly anti-Bolshevik, although they have made a treaty with the latter and accepted a Bolshevik mission in Tiflis. There is, however, a very strong element of Bolshevism among the Georgians generally, though it is possible that, as they become aware of the desolation and waste caused by Bolshevism in Azerbaijan, the desire to receive them in Georgia may be lessened. It is possible that, should the Georgians find themselves unable to hold Batoum against the Adjarians and Turks, they may call in the aid of Red troops from Azerbaijan. Whether these troops would be sent would probably depend largely on how far the Tartar revolt against the Bolsheviks progresses; the Reds would no doubt welcome the opportunity of getting even as far as Tiflis. Personally, I have no doubt that the Georgians will be unable to hold Batoum even if they ever get there.

## AZERBAIJAN

8. I had a long conversation to-day with Mr. van Loo, the well-known American merchant of Batoum, who is most reliable and who is distinctly pro-British, who was in Baku when the Bolsheviks arrived and only left there last week.

9. There is no doubt that the arrival of the Bolsheviks was a complete surprise to the inhabitants generally, and that the town was really taken by a party of 30 Turkish officers, who handed it over to the Bolsheviks, and who since have been got rid of by the latter.

10. Although there has been no indiscriminate looting at Baku, the way the entire country has been systematically desolated and cleared of everything of value is remarkable; it has infuriated the Tartars. Their rising was well organised, and in and near Elizabetpol they entirely wiped out two Bolshevik detachments; one, a regiment of infantry, the other, a body of artillery. It is extremely probable that they would have succeeded in clearing the whole of the country of the Bolsheviks had they not, while attacking the Bolsheviks in front, been themselves treacherously attacked by the Armenians in the rear. Thereupon there ensued a massacre of Tartars. The report states that from ten to fifteen thousand of them were killed, and further, which is unusual on these occasions, many of the Tartar women were violated.

11. The Tartars, and the Mahommedans generally, will not forget this, and any real liaison between the Turks and Bolsheviks now seems more impossible than ever. The latter are trying to make amends by giving Batoum to Mustafa Kemal, but as he will be able to take it when he likes, the gift is not of great value. Nuri Pasha is understood to be at the head of



some 10,000 Tartars, and there are sure to be further Tartar risings against the Bolsheviks, and also, in co-operation with the Turks, massacres of Armenians.

12. Mr. van Loo says that many of the more intelligent Bolsheviks do not think that Bolshevism can possibly last through the winter, owing to lack of food, and that the mortality in Russia will be enormous. The discipline and moral of the Red Army appear to be low.

13. He tells me that our prestige among the Mahommedans has been greatly lowered by our abandonment of Enzeli and Resht, and they say that if we do not reoccupy those places we shall be in danger of losing India, and that Bolshevism can never (though Pan - Islamism may) obtain any hold in Afghanistan or India.

14. As regards the British prisoners, they were badly treated at first, but, owing to the good offices of the American Consul, Mr. van Loo says their position has improved, and that there were prospects of further improvements. He stated it is untrue that they were made to clean the streets. It has since been reported that they have been removed from prison and are now under domiciliary arrest.

#### ARMENIA

15. While the Armenian Government is strongly anti-Bolshevik, the Armenians of the Azerbaijan frontiers have, under the influence of the Bolsheviks, been forming Soviets, and those in Azerbaijan have joined the Bolsheviks against the Tartars.

16. This action on the part of the outside Armenians is sure to result in serious massacre by both Tartars and Turks, which we cannot prevent. Any arms we may send to Armenia will doubtless be used against the Tartars, and consequently pro-Bolsheviks, and it seems very questionable that we should permit their despatch.

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 15 TO 27, 1920

#### (B.) — Intelligence

During a conference with Brigadier-General W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, C.M.G., D.S.O., on the 25th June, I heard that there was a rumour that when we evacuated Batoum the Americans intended to send a battleship here and land 600 marines to protect their communications with their Armenian Relief Commission.

2. Mr. van Loo, an American who has lived in Batoum and the Caucasus for several years, and has recently come from Baku, gave me the following information:—

- (i.) The oil at Baku, which the Bolsheviks are taking to Astrakhan, distributed to Russia owing to lack of transport.
  - (ii.) He was informed by a Bolshevik Chief of Artillery that no ammunition was now being, or could be, made in Bolshevik factories, owing to lack of material. That now in use is from the stocks captured from Denikin and Kolchak.
  - (iii.) The number of Tartars massacred by the Bolsheviks and Armenians was 10,000.
  - (iv.) Very small number of Chinese among Bolshevik troops at Baku.
  - (v.) Bolshevik Regular troops are now being withdrawn for service on the Polish front, and are being replaced at Elizabetpol and district by local levies, raised largely from the workmen of the oilfields, many of whom are really anti-Bolshevik.
3. The following has been obtained from military sources:—

## GEORGIA

The Georgian Government have adopted a firm attitude towards Kirov's mission, which has already started propaganda. The mission is stated to have demanded the expulsion of Allied missions from Tiflis, but the Georgian Government refused. Chicherin's message to Mustafa Kemal, giving Batoum to the Turks, has confirmed Georgia's attitude.

4. Pavlov's Army Headquarters at Vladikavkaz are reported to have received orders to place themselves under Kirov's direction, and concentration at Vladikavkaz has been ordered; there are 2,000 Bolsheviks now there. Concentration has been delayed by risings in Chechnia and Daghestan.

*FO. 406/44, p. 29-31, No. 13/1*

No. 107

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) and Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

*Foreign Office, September 3, 1920*

No. 808.

Sir,

I have to bring to your knowledge a recent offer to mediate peace between His Majesty's Government and Mustafa Kemal. The emissary was a young Roumanian named François Stern, who during the war was employed by His Majesty's Government, not very satisfactorily, on intelli-

gence work in South Russia and Roumania and who has latterly been living in Switzerland in close touch with Turkish circles.

2. M. Stern came over from Switzerland and called at this Department on the 13th ultimo. He explained that he had always been conversant with Turkish affairs having been on a visit to Constantinople with his family in 1911 and that he had been approached by one Subhi Bey, an emissary of Mustafa Kemal's, who was at that time in Switzerland, with proposals which he felt to be very much to the advantage of His Majesty's Government.

3. The terms which, according to M. Stern, Subhi Bey was authorized by Mustafa Kemal to make, were in brief the following:

- (1) Mustafa Kemal renounced all claim to Thrace;
- (2) Turkey should be given an assured outlet at Smyrna;
- (3) Greek troops should be removed from Turkey and replaced, if at all, by Italians;
- (4) The Straits should be controlled, if at all, by Great Britain;
- (5) Mustafa Kemal would welcome British technical advisers;
- (6) Damad Ferid Pasha should resign;
- (7) Great Britain should, in general, cease to support the Greeks;
- (8) Mustafa Kemal would disband his forces and surrender his arms;
- (9) Mustafa Kemal would stop anti-British propaganda now going on in Egypt, India, Mesopotamia and elsewhere;
- (10) Mustafa Kemal would cease intriguing with the Italian Government;

4. M. Stern urged that we should have to make terms with Mustafa Kemal some day and that we could do so much more profitably through him now than if - as we otherwise should be obliged to - we negotiated later through the Italians or through Feisal.

5. M. Stern's practical proposal was that he should go to Angora with Subhi Bey. He asked that Jelal Nuri and Fethi Bey might be released from Malta to accompany him, since they carried great weight with Mustafa Kemal. He did not, however, explain why he supposed that the influence of Jelal Nuri and Fethi would be on the side of peace.

6. M. Stern laid great stress on the close relations between the Italians and Turks. All communications, he said, between Mustafa Kemal and his sympathisers in Europe passed through Italy. The Italian Government were strengthened in this pro-Turkish policy by the Vatican, for the Vatican was anxious to use all means at its disposal in order to counter the activities of the Orthodox Patriarchate, which was now deriving great support from the Hellenic Government. M. Stern indeed (he stated that he was himself a Catholic) went so far as to say that the propaganda organisation of the

Vatican, which was very efficient, proceeded to promote Sinn Fein disturbances in Ireland a year ago when the presence of the Greeks in Constantinople became a serious possibility.

7. M. Stern stated that he and Subhi Bey could not possibly proceed to Angora by way of Italy since the Italians must not know of their mission. And by way of further emphasizing the close connection between Mustafa Kemal and the Italian Government he explained that Subhi Bey is a relative of Ahmed Dimo, an Albanian who is Mustafa Kemal's emissary in Rome. Ahmed Dimo, he added, has been an intimate of Count Sforza ever since Count Sforza allowed him to take refuge in the Italian Embassy upon one occasion when he was wanted by Abdul Hamid.

8. M. Stern explained that he had no credentials since in order to avoid arousing Italian suspicions all communications on this subject (which had passed through Italy) had been verbal.

9. M. Stern endeavoured to enlist the support of the War Office and of Mr. Philip Kerr, the Prime Minister's private secretary. In each case he was told while peace with Mustafa Kemal was desirable, acceptance of the Treaty by Mustafa Kemal was a necessary preliminary and from both of these quarters he was referred to this Department.

10. Apart from M. Stern's personality, which commanded little confidence, it appeared to me to be out of the question to consider the terms which he proposed. They amounted, as you will observe, to nothing less than throwing over the Treaty which we have signed and the Greeks upon whom enforcement of the Treaty must in such a large measure rest. In spite, therefore of his repeated requests for an interview with Sir John Tilley, M. Stern was received only by a subordinate member of this Department, and after due consultation with the Prime Minister's private secretary and with the War Office, M. Stern was informed that the only answer which could be given to his communication was that Mustafa Kemal must accept the Treaty and the authority of the Sultan.

11. The mission of M. Stern, it may therefore be hoped, has led to nothing. But I have thought it worth while to inform you of the occurrence, firstly because it was perhaps not unconnected with Italian policy in the Near East, and secondly because it may be anticipated that the Turks will confront His Majesty's Government with other such attempts to evade the obligations of the Treaty.

I am, &c.

No. 108

*British Headquarters in Smyrna to War Office.*SMYRNA, September 6, 1920, 17.45  
(Received September 7, 9.25)*Peraphrase**Secret*

PRIORITY "A".

O.S.519 cipher 6.9.20.

I am told by General Paraskevopoulos who is in exceptionally good spirits that he leaves for Athens tomorrow for a few days. He discussed possibility of solving difficulties by Mustapha Kemal (? *becom*)ing Grand Vizier while Greck Army withdraws to area ceded to Greece and mentioned 6 weeks (? extension) being allowed to Turkey by Allies. I am led to suppose from unofficial information that Manissa division is about to move to Panderma for Ismid and that G.H.Q. will shortly move to Athens.\*

FO. 371/5135/E-11047

\* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Mustapha Kemal "meeting" rather than "becoming" Grand Vizier sounds a more likely rendering. If M. K. genuinely agrees to respect the Turkish signatures on the Treaty, many difficulties would solved.

The "six weeks extension" would presumably refer to ratification.

G. H. Fitzmaurice  
8/9"

"If Mustapha Kemal accept the Treaty difficulties might certainly be solved. I expect the word is really "becoming". But I do not believe, that Mustapha Kemal, if he does become Grand Vizier, will really change his spots. He will merely be a Bolshevist. Who pretends to accept the Treaty but whose policy is to make all the trouble he can for Great Britain. He will continue to work hand in hand with the Arabian extremists until he can overthrow Mesopotamian independence — unless by great luck we can meanwhile set up an Arab Government in Mesopotamia which will be friendly to us and looking for our support.

J. Tilley  
8/9."

"It is not possible for Mustapha Kemal to become Grand Vizier at present. There is a price on his head.

H.(enderson)."

No. 109

*Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS, September 6, 1920

*(Received September 27)**(No. 282)*

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 272/75 of the 24th August, I have the honour to enclose copy of despatch No 38, dated the 25th August, received by me from Captain Gracey at Erivan.

I have, &amp;c.

FO. 406/44, p. 38, No. 16.

H. C. LUKE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 109

*Captain Gracey to Commander Luke.*

ERIVAN, August 25, 1920

*(No. 38)*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. Ohandjanian called upon me on the 20th instant, and the following is a brief outline of his conversation. I informed him that the agreement which they made with Soviet Russia, whereby they opened up Nakhichevan to Soviet troops, would be received very unfavourably in England.

He then stated some of the reasons why this agreement was made, and since then has given me an official statement, also one from the Commander-in-chief, General Nazarbekof, describing the military situation.

He stated that if Commander Luke and the writer could not give them material assistance with troops, then it was very necessary that we should use our influence through diplomatic channels with the Bolsheviki. And that it was extremely necessary for us to come to their assistance. "Our own force is quite insufficient and with the threatening attitude of Kemal Pasha, and with his troops and the Bolshevik troops on our frontiers, we are surrounded on every side. This was the chief cause of our signing the agreement. There was no other alternative, and we had to make the best terms that we could get. The fact that we stood out for control of the railway line to Julfa proves this. And, of course, the precarious condition of our country forced us to agree."

✓ “We had only half a battalion of tired troops at Nakhichevan against three regiments of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. And half of this force was destroyed by the enemy.”

He then stated very decisively that the life of Armenia depended entirely upon the good-will of Europe, and also to what extent they would assist her diplomatically.

He again requested that we procure for them fifteen-minute periods daily with the Basra wireless station. He maintained that their military situation demanded this, that their communication from the outside world was cut off, and that it took three weeks to receive telegrams from Paris.

I have the honour herewith to enclose:—

- (A.) — Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ohandjanian’s statement regarding the treaty made with Soviet Russia.
- (B.) — General Nazarbekof’s, Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Armenian Republic, report on the cessation of hostilities on the Nakhichevan front.
- (C.) — Dr. Ohandjanian’s note to M. Legran, of the Mission of the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic, Tiflis.
- (D.) — Copy of telegram sent by Armenian Foreign Office to Karabekir Pasha for Honourable Bekir Sami, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Great Turkish National Council.
- (E.) Official communiqués of the Armenian Commander-in-chief’s Staff, dated the 19th, 21st and 24th August, 1920.
- (F.) — Press news:—
  - (a) Peace treaty signed by Turkey.
  - (b) Bolsheviks in Karabagh and Zangezour.
  - (c) Mussavat Party.

I have, &c.

GEO. F. GRACEY, *Captain.*

FO. 406/44, p. 38-39, No. 16/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 109

(A.)

*Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Captain Gracey.*

*Erivan, August 21, 1920*

(No. 4884. Very Confidential.)

Dear Sir,

TAKING into consideration the fact that the situation created in the south of Armenia cannot be deprived of interest for the Allied Powers, and

that with regard to Armenia it can be interpreted erroneously, I have the honour to communicate to you the following for your information:—

As it is known to you from the very beginning, the Government of Armenia was showing to the representatives of the Allied Missions in Caucasus the danger of the union through the territory of Armenia of the Bolshevik and Turkish-Azerbaijani forces threatening the interests of Armenia and of the Allied Powers in the East.

Then even my Government was indicating on the high importance of transmitting to Armenia the regions of Karabagh, Zangezour and Nakhichevan, in order to assure a successful resistance to the aimed junction of the Bolsheviks with the Turkish-Azerbaijanians; it was also indicating on the necessity of urgent military and other help to be delivered in time to Armenia by the Allies. The decision of the Chief British Command in Transcaucasia, transferring the Armenian Karabagh to the administration of Azerbaijan, and not allowing the occupation of the region of Zangezour by Armenian troops, struck a sensible blow to the interests concerning the defence of the Armenian boundaries from the invasion of the Bolsheviks and Turkish-Azerbaijani forces.

Yet, in the beginning of June 1920, under the hardest conditions, when the promised armament had not arrived from England to Armenia, my Government decided to start immediately the attack on Vedi-Bassar, Sharur, Nakhichevan and Zangezour, in order to hinder the union of Bolsheviks and Turkish-Azerbaijani forces. My Government had to fight simultaneously almost on all the boundaries of Armenia, against the joined forces of the Bolsheviks and the Azerbaijanians, and against Karabekir Pasha's forces on the Turkish boundary.

In spite of these hard circumstances the troops of Armenia occupied first Vedi-Bassar, then Sharur; they repelled all the attacks of the enemy on the Kasakh and Olti fronts, took Peniak and even occupied temporarily Zangezour. But political and war conditions being complicated at that time, my Government was compelled to stop further movement of the Armenian troops on Nakhichevan.

The short report of the Commander-in-chief of the Armenian troops, herewith enclosed, could explain to you the fundamental reasons, having caused the discontinuation of the above-mentioned movement and having rendered temporarily impossible the further operations in the direction of Nakhichevan.



I avail myself, &c.

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

H. OHANDJANIAN.

Chief of Political Section,

P. YAKOOLIAN.

For Secretary,

A. PAHLAVOUNI.

FO. 406/44, p. 39-40, No. 16/2

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 109

(D.)

(Translated copy from the Armenian text.)

*M. Ter-Akopian to Colonel Mirimanian.*

SARIKAMISH, July 28, 1920

[Printed literally.]

IT is requested that the present wire be despatched through the Commander of the Fifteenth Ottoman Regiment, Karabekir Pasha, to the following address:—

ANGORA.

Hon. Bekir Sami, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Great Turkish National Council.

I have the honour to reply to your message of the 8th July, 1920. We will overlook now the normal side of this question concerning the Brest-Litovsk and Batoum Treaties, which have been sealed by the Government of the Sultan, a Government which you do not recognise.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in which Armenia has had no part, nor has she signed it; or again, the Batoum Treaty, which has not been confirmed nor ratified by the Parliaments of the two countries, these treaties cannot have any real force or be of a binding nature to Armenia.

The fact that you have accepted as a basis the Brest-Litovsk and Batoum Treaties, this fact causes us great regret and deprives us of any hope of coming to a satisfactory agreement with you, because you are continuing to follow the aims of the antirevolutionary and imperialistic Governments of the German Kaiser and Turkish Sultan's, which have produced the above-mentioned two treaties, which do not recognise the existence of a vital Armenia, and which deny the principles of right and justice and the right of self-determination of nations in international relations.

We sincerely wish to create good-neighbourly relations with Turkey and all other nations. But we, the Armenian people, find it necessary to take as a basis for negotiation the historical, ethnographical and economical rights of each nation.

The Armenian nation, recognising the legal rights of each people, cannot naturally renounce its incontestable rights over the Armenian provinces in Turkey, the boundaries of which, according to the Peace Treaty now handed to Turkey by the Allied Powers, will be settled by the High Arbitrator, the President of the United States of America.

Armenia, having signed this Peace Treaty, has decided to remain faithful to the decisions of the High Arbitrator, and awaiting his decision she has no intention to take any steps to cross the former Russian-Turkish frontier. And we had a full right to hope that Turkey will not interfere in those questions related to the internal affairs of Armenia. And your claims concerning the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the district of Olti, which forms an uncontested part of the Armenian Republic, and the aggressive movement of your soldires in the above-mentioned districts are incomprehensible and cannot be allowed.

The Armenian people, faithful to its love for peace, is ready to give a friendly hand to the people that will fully recognise its historical, ethnographical and governmental rights. And the relation of the Armenian nation with other nations depends entirely upon their attitude towards us.

Please accept the assurances of my consideration.

Secretary of Foreign Office,

TER-AKOPIAN.

(True copy.)

FO. 406/44, p. 42, No. 16/5

No. 110

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 8th Sept. 1920

(Received September 21)

No. 1266/5049/45.

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1228. of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith, copies of the Minutes of the 45th Meeting held on the 1st inst., between the Armenian-Greek Section of my Staff and the Representatives of the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates and of the Greek High Commission.

2. According to the latest reports received by the Patriarchates, massacres have taken place on a considerable scale, particularly at YOZGAD and BOLOU - areas in which there had been revolts against Mustapha Kemal's authority - and, in this connection, I also have the honour to enclose copy of a letter, dated the 1st inst., from the Armenian Patriarch, on behalf of the Mixed Armenian Council, who fear a general massacre of Christians in Turkish territories not under Allied occupation, and ask that measures may be taken to prevent the commission of this crime by the Kemalists.

3. It is noticeable that, whilst complaints of massacre and pillage invariably follow on any challenge to Mustapha Kemal's authority, whether it be from the advance of the Greek forces, or merely from local anti-Nationalist movements amongst the population, little or no persecution of Christians appears to occur in those districts in which the authority of Mustapha Kemal has remained undisputed.

I have, &c.

J. M. de ROBECK  
HIGH COMMISSONER

FO. 371/5214/E. 5214

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 110

*Le Patriarche des Arméniens à Sir J. de Robeck.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 1er Septembere 1920

Monsieur le Haut Commissaire,

Nous avons l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que les nouvelles qui nous parviennent des territoires non occupés de l'Anatolie sont de nature à nous inspirer les craintes les plus vives quant au sort des populations chrétiennes, particulièrement quant au sort des Arméniens qui vivent encore sous le régime Kémalistes. (sic) Votre Excellence n'ignore sans doute pas les récents événements de Bolou où, d'après les témoignage même de témoins oculaires, échappés par miracle au carnage, toute la population Arménienne mâle a été massacrée et les femmes et les enfants ont été brûlés vifs dans l'église arménienne par les bandes Kémalistes.

D'autre part les nombreuses vexations et mesures arbitraires auxquelles sont exposés journellement (sic) les Arméniens des autres localités et ceux du littoral de la mer Noire en particulier, démontrent d'une façon indéniable que la mentalité turque qui a présidé aux événements de 1915, à ceux de Marache et à ceux de Gueyvé tout récemment, subsiste dans son intégralité chez les partisans de Moustafa Kémal.

Cette situation nous fait un devoir de jeter un nouveau cri d'alarme et d'attirer la très sérieuse et bien veillante (sic) attention de Votre Excellence sur les circonstances qui font évidemment craindre un massacre général des chrétiens dans tout le territoire non occupé. Nous ne doutons pas que les Grandes Puissances de l'Entente ne tiennent à empêcher, par tous les moyens, que Moustafa Kémal commette ce nouveau crime, dénoncé par nous à l'avance.

Nous avons vu que l'avance partielle des troupes Helléniques en Asie Mineure n'a pas suffi à amener un changement dans l'attitude des Kémalistes au delà de la zone d'occupation et, nous nous empressons de déclarer qu'il ne nous est pas possible de nous faire des illusions sur les mesures que compte prendre, le gouvernement de Constantinople.

Nous supplions instamment, pour toutes ces raisons, Votre Excellence de vouloir bien employer Ses bons offices auprès de Son Haut Gouvernement, afin que des mesures efficaces et définitives soient prises pour empêcher les Kémalistes de commettre un nouveau forfait.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Haut Commissaire, les assurances de notre très haute considération.

Le Patriarche des Arméniens  
ZAVEN

FO. 371/5214/E. 5214

No. 111

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

*War Office, September 11, 1920  
(Received September 13)*

Sir,

1. - (1.) I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 27th August, relative to a proposal by the Turkish Government to raise a force of two divisions for the repression of the Nationalist movement. In his mention of the force of 15,000 men allowed by the Peace Treaty, I am to say that the Army Council presume that—

- (a) Earl Curzon of Kedleston refers to the 15,000 "Special Elements" sanctioned by articles 152 and 157, and
- (b) His assent to the immediate raising of this force by the Turkish Government disposes of the question of raising a special force for Brussa, which has formed the subject of separate correspondence under War Office dated the 30th July, and Foreign Office dated the 10th August.

SEPARATE

Should the latter assumption, be correct, the Army Council will withdraw their proposal for the employment of Allied officers, for the attachment of whom to the "Special Elements" the terms of the Peace Treaty appear to make no provision though I am to take this opportunity to observe that the motive inspiring the proposal of the Army Council was the possibility of co-operation between Turkish Governmental and Nationalist forces rather than any consideration of military efficiency.

(2.) On the above assumption the Army Council are instructing the British commander at Constantinople, in a telegram, of which a copy is attached, to obtain the views of the other Allied commanders at Constantinople regarding this question, and I am to say that the Council assume that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is taking steps to obtain the consent of the French and Italian Governments to the proposal for the immediate raising of a force of 15,000 "Special Elements."

2. I am further to say that the whole question raised above appears to the Council to be inseparable from that of the setting up, at a very early date, of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Organisation and Control, which forms the subject of separate correspondence under Foreign Office letter dated the 30th August, and War Office letter dated the 14th August; for, though the limitation of the "Special Elements" to the number of 15,000 does not appear, in accordance with article 153, to come into force until three months from the date of the treaty coming into force, presumably the Commission of Organisation and Control will be required to function forthwith to superintend the process of reduction of the Turkish armed forces in general, in accordance with article 164 of the treaty, and the creation of the force now proposed.

Also, although the special zone defined in article 179 will not, in accordance with article 180, commence to be delimited until fifteen days after the treaty comes into force, it appears to the Council that the decision of the Military Commission of Control may be necessary in order to modify the limitations of article 157, which otherwise permits not more than 5,000 of these "Special Elements" to be in any one of the territorial areas which have still to be defined. Presumably, in order to raise the proposed force, the Turkish Government will be required to use territory falling within the special zone round Constantinople, and though, generally speaking, the limitations of the military clauses of the treaty will not operate until three months after the ratification of the treaty, it appears to the Army Council that Lord Curzon intends to adopt the principle, in which they concur, of anticipating during the interregnum, as far as possible, the actual limitations of the treaty which will eventually come into force. Should this assumption be incorrect, the Council trust that Lord Curzon will inform them at an early date.

I am, &amp;c.

B. B. CUBITT

(P.S. — A copy of this and connected correspondence has been sent to the British Representative, Allied Military Committee, Versailles.)

FO. 406/44, p. 147-148, No. 116

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 111

*War Office to General Headquarters, Constantinople.*

*War Office, September 1920*

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram dated 30th July.

Foreign Office are opposed to infringement of principles of Peace Treaty contained in proposal for formation of two Turkish divisions, but have no objection to Turkish Government raising immediately 15,000 "Special Elements" defined in articles 152 and 157 of treaty. Please obtain and telegraph views of other Allied commanders at Constantinople.

FO. 406/44, p. 148, No. 116/1

No. 112

*British General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13.9.1920, 23.00

*(Received September 14, 13.40)*

*Paraphrase*

*Secret*

**PRIORITY**

*I. 9276 cipher September 13th.*

On June 16th Abdul Medjid Effendi heir-apparent was persuaded to move to Dolma Bagtche from Tchamlidja (?) lest he should be carried off to (?) Angora. Recently he has been prevented by Damad Ferid from taking his accustomed yachting trips. On September 7th he made an urgent demand for his private steamboat. It was thought advisable to communicate his request to the Turkish Government without delay as there have recently been several reports that Mustapha Kemal was anxious to secure him, and such action would have grave (group undec.) (?) consequences.

The Grand Vizier asked:—

1. What action did I (?) recommend him to take.
2. What help could he rely on from the British.

Replies were that the High Commissioner had been informed and I proposed to take no further action (group undec.) the Navy were patrolling the north end of the (?) Bosphorus. Damad Ferid who is a personal enemy of Abdul Medjid is using this incident to place a strong guard round his house and to report that these measures are being taken at the request of the British. These assertions do not contain a word of truth.

FO. 371/5277/E. 9693

No. 113

*Marquis Imperiali to Earl Curzon.*

*Italian Embassy, LONDON, September 17, 1920*

*(Received September 20)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

ON the 30th July last the three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople sent to their respective Governments a similar telegram, in which they set forth the serious difficulties which were being met with by the Turkish Government in re-establishing its authority and order in Anatolia, and the obstacles which would therefore arise with regard to the application of the Treaty of Peace when the latter came into force. They stated that there were only two ways of meeting this state of affairs — *i.e.*, that of imposing the conditions of the treaty by means of force, and that of attempting pacification and conciliation with regard to the Nationalist elements.

After having gone into the reasons which militated against the carrying out of fresh military operations, and also of entrusting the same to Greek troops, the three Allied High Commissioners proposed that their Governments should recommend that the Turkish Government should form a commission composed of authoritative persons whose advice would be listened to by moderate Nationalists, and send it to Anatolia in order to explain the full gravity of the situation, and to make the followers of Mustapha Kemal understand the advantages which would accrue to the country by the acceptance of a treaty which was unavoidable, as well as the prejudice to which Turkey would be exposed if they persisted in maintaining an uncompromising attitude.

According to the proposal put forward by these High Commissioners, a declaration drawn up by the representatives of the Allied Powers in accordance with the ideas set forth above would be entrusted to this mission.

The Italian Government has considered these proposals with the greatest attention and with the utmost impartiality, and is bound to acknowledge that the critical condition of things in Turkey, which becomes aggravated every day, may irremediably endanger the pacification of the country and may render the application of the treaty impossible. Furthermore, the present state of affairs in Turkey not only gives rise to political consequences of the gravest description, but also renders the resumption of any kind of economic activity impossible. This represents a great loss for all, and progressively impoverishes the country and the finances of the Turkish Government, as has already been pointed out in a recent telegram sent jointly by the three High Commissioners.

The Italian Government is of the opinion that, in the interests of all, no means should be left untried in order that the present situation might not continue to become more complicated and aggravated. It is likewise of the opinion that an eventual extension of military operations in Anatolia would not tend to alter such situation favourably and therefore definitely, since, even if these operations were conducted with success, they would exasperate Turkish national feeling and aggravate the rancour already existing, thus perhaps giving rise to fresh massacres among innocent and unarmed populations.

In such circumstances the Government of His Majesty cannot but express itself as in favour of the proposal put forward by the High Commissioners at Constantinople with a view to sending a mission out to Anatolia.

The Italian Government is even of the opinion that the mutual objects in view would be more easily attained if this mission were composed of representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, or if the mission sent out by the Government at Constantinople were at least officially accompanied by representatives of the three Powers.

The Italian Government begs the Government of His Britannic Majesty to acquaint it with its point of view with regard to the matter.

I beg, &c.

IMPERIALI



No. 114

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.**(No. 2965).**Received September 21*

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum communicated by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September, enclosing a communication from the Italian Embassy respecting the proposed despatch of a mission to Anatolia.

*Paris, September 20, 1920.**FO. 406/44, p. 156, No. 126*

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 114

*Memorandum communicated by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
September 20, 1920.*

PAR une note dont le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'adresser, ci-joint, à l'Ambassade britannique une copie, le Gouvernement français vient d'être saisi par le Gouvernement italien de propositions tendant à hâter le rétablissement de l'ordre en Turquie et la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix signé avec cette Puissance.

Ces propositions donnent lieu de penser qu'une entente pourrait aisément intervenir entre les trois Gouvernements sur les moyens d'assurer le résultat recherché.

Sous réserve de certaines modifications et en recommandant l'adoption de mesures complémentaires qui lui paraissent nécessaires au succès de leur action, le Gouvernement français se propose de donner son adhésion aux mesures suggérées par le Gouvernement italien. Il tiendrait, cependant, à savoir si le Gouvernement britannique partage les vues exposées et à connaître les observations que le projet ci-joint de réponse au Gouvernement italien pourrait appeler de sa part.

En ce qui concerne l'organisation des principales commissions internationales, dont le prompt fonctionnement constitue un des éléments essentiels de la pacification, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères envoie aujourd'hui même à l'Ambassade britannique une note spéciale répondant aux notes de Lord Derby en date du 7 et du 17 de ce mois.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,**Paris, le 20 septembre 1920.**FO. 406/44, p. 156-157, No. 126/1*

## ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 114

*Memorandum addressed by the Italian Embassy to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 10, 1920.*

LE 30 juillet dernier, les trois Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople ont envoyé à leurs Gouvernements un télégramme identique pour leur indiquer les graves difficultés dans lesquelles se trouve le Gouvernement ottoman pour rétablir son autorité et l'ordre en Anatolie et leur signaler les obstacles qui surgiront à l'occasion de l'application du traité lorsqu'il entrera en vigueur. Ils envisageaient deux voies d'issue à cette situation : celle d'imposer l'exécution du traité par la force, ou bien de tenter une action de pacification et conciliation avec les éléments nationalistes.

Après avoir examiné les raisons qui déconseillent de procéder à de nouvelles opérations militaires et d'autant moins d'en confier le mandat aux troupes grecques, les trois Hauts-Commissaires proposaient à leurs Gouvernements de recommander au Gouvernement ottoman la création d'une mission composée de personnalités d'autorité reconnue, en état de se faire écouter par les nationalistes modérés. Cette mission aurait dû être envoyée en Anatolie pour y exposer la gravité de la situation et faire comprendre aux partisans de Mustapha Kémal les avantages que le pays tirerait de l'acceptation du traité — désormais inévitable — et les préjudices, par contre, auxquels la Turquie serait exposée en persistant dans une attitude d'intransigeance.

D'après la proposition des Hauts-Commissaires, cette mission aurait dû emporter avec elle une déclaration rédigée par les représentants des Puissances alliées et inspirée des principes précités.

Le Gouvernement italien, ayant examiné ces propositions avec la plus sérieuse attention et le plus grand esprit d'impartialité, dû reconnaître qu'effectivement les conditions critiques de la Turquie, qui deviennent plus graves tous les jours, pourraient compromettre la pacification du pays et rendre impossible l'application du Traité de Paix.

D'autre part, tout en faisant abstraction de tout arrangement territorial, l'état de choses actuel en Turquie ne produit pas seulement des conséquences politiques d'une portée considérable, mais empêche la reprise de toute activité économique, ce qui aboutit à un préjudice pour tous et appauvrit progressivement le pays ainsi que les finances du Gouvernement ottoman, comme l'ont signalé les trois Hauts-Commissaires dans un télégramme identique récent.

Le Gouvernement italien estime qu'il est dans l'intérêt commun de ne négliger aucun moyen en vue d'empêcher que la situation actuelle ne continue à se compliquer et à empirer. Il juge également qu'une intensifi-

cation éventuelle des opérations militaires dans l'Anatolie n'aiderait pas à la modifier avantageusement et, d'autant moins, définitivement, puisque même dans le cas de succès, elle exaspérerait le sentiment national ottoman, irriterait les rancunes déjà existantes, et pourrait donner prétexte à de nouveaux massacres de populations innocentes et désarmées.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut qu'exprimer un avis favorable à la proposition faite par les Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople d'envoyer une mission en Anatolie.

Le Gouvernement italien est d'avis qu'on atteindrait plus aisément les buts communs si ladite mission était composée de représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de l'Italie, ou tout au moins si la mission constituée par le Gouvernement de Constantinople était accompagné(e) officiellement par des représentants des trois Puissances.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a l'honneur de prier le Gouvernement de la République de vouloir bien lui faire connaître sa manière de voir à ce sujet.

*Ambassade d'Italie, Paris,*

*le 10 septembre 1920,*

*FO. 406/44, p. 157-158, No. 126/2*

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 114

*Reply of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Memorandum of September 10, 1920.*

PAR une note du 10 septembre, l'Ambassade d'Italie a bien voulu faire part au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des mesures que le Gouvernement royal, après examen des propositions formulées par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople dans le télégramme identique du 30 juillet, considère comme nécessaires pour le rétablissement de l'ordre en Turquie et la mise en application du Traité de Paix conclu avec cette Puissance.

Le Gouvernement italien, s'inspirant des propositions des Hauts-Commissaires, se déclare favorable à l'envoi en Anatolie d'une mission tirant de sa composition une autorité suffisante pour se faire écouter des éléments modérés au parti nationaliste, leur faire comprendre l'inutilité d'une prolongation du conflit, la ruine irrémédiable à laquelle la situation actuelle conduit la Turquie, et les convaincre du désir des Puissances de les aider à la restauration économique de leur pays.

De l'avis du Gouvernement royal, cette mission devrait être composée soit de délégués de l'Italie, de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, soit de personnalités turques désignées par le Gouvernement de Constantinople et accompagnées de représentants des trois Puissances. La mission serait

autorisée à s'appuyer d'une déclaration publique rédigée par les représentants des Puissances et s'inspirant des intérêts bien entendus de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement français, loin d'être opposé à l'envoi d'une mission, estime avec le Gouvernement royal que cette mission peut contribuer grandement au résultat poursuivi. Il croit cependant que, désignée par un Gouvernement ottoman contre lequel les partisans de Kémal ne seraient animés d'aucun ressentiment antérieur, elle n'aurait pas à être étayée de la présence officielle de représentants alliés, présence qui, par ailleurs, comporterait de sérieux inconvénients. Dans de telles conditions, un échec de la mission, dont l'éventualité ne peut être écartée, placerait, en effet, les Puissances dans une situation plus difficile encore et rendrait désormais impossible tout accommodement. Pour les mêmes raisons, il semblerait préférable que la déclaration publique envisagée émanât officiellement du seul Gouvernement de Constantinople, la mission étant, d'ailleurs, autorisée à faire état des dispositions favorables et des intentions bien connues des Puissances.

De l'avis du Gouvernement français, les chances de succès de cette mission ne seraient, cependant, appréciables que si le Gouvernement de Constantinople, auquel les éléments nationalistes seraient invités à se rallier, n'était pas en lui-même, pour des motifs antérieurs et souvent personnels, un obstacle à toute réconciliation, même de la part des éléments les plus modérés. Le Gouvernement actuel, en refusant de ratifier le Traité de Paix, se refuse au seul acte utile en son pouvoir et enlève aux Puissances le dernier motif de désirer son maintien. Aussi longtemps qu'elle demeurera en suspens, la ratification de ce traité constituera matière à divisions en Turquie et éloignera de Constantinople les éléments modérés prêts à reconnaître le fait s'il est accompli, mais non à y participer.

La ratification n'est pas moins urgente, si par la mise en vigueur des dispositions essentielles du traité, par la constitution des commissions internationales, par l'organisation d'une force de police, la création des ressources financières les plus indispensables et une amélioration des conditions économiques, les Puissances entendent restaurer l'ordre en Turquie.

Les Hauts-Commissaires paraissent, d'autre part, estimer qu'il conviendrait, pour donner chance de succès à une mission en Anatolie, d'encourager au préalable la constitution d'un Ministère nouveau pouvant inspirer confiance aux éléments modérés, offrant cependant de sérieuses garanties d'indépendance à l'égard de Kémal et disposé à se prêter à la ratification du traité. C'est par ces mesures que le Gouvernement français croit nécessaire de préparer les voies au succès du programme proposé par le Gouvernement italien.

De l'avis du Gouvernement français, il y aurait donc lieu d'autoriser les Hauts-Commissaires tout d'abord à se concerter pour favoriser la forma-

tion d'un Ministère nouveau dans les conditions prévues, ensuite à surveiller la constitution, sous la forme indiquée, de la Mission d'Anatolie et la rédaction de ses instructions, enfin à assurer l'organisation d'une force de police uniquement destinée au maintien de l'ordre et faire connaître les moyens qui, dans la pensée des Alliés, permettraient au Gouvernement ottoman de parer aux besoins financiers les plus pressants.

D'autre part, les trois Gouvernements examineraient d'urgence les conditions dans lesquelles devraient être constituées la Commission de Contrôle militaire et naval, la Commission financière et la Commission des Détroits, dont le prompt fonctionnement se lie étroitement à la mise à exécution des mesures proposées.

*FO. 406/44, p. 159, No. 126/3.*

No. 115

*British Acting High Commissioner, Aden, to Earl Curzon.*

*REMLEH, 22 September 1920*

*No. 1056 (5411/69)*

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the British Agent, Jeddah, has sent me a report, which he has been unable to authenticate, that Mustapha Kemal recently wrote a letter to King Husein addressing him as Caliph.

The British Agent also states that the King's Turkish wife is actively engaged in an attempt to bring about an agreement between the King and the Turkish Government for the transfer of the Caliphate.

Although these reports hardly seem credible, it is not impossible that Mustapha Kemal may have flattered the King as reported in order to obtain his support.

A copy of this Despatch has been sent to the High Commissioner, Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SCOTT  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 371/5187/E. 12131*

No. 116

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).**Foreign Office, September 23, 1920**(No. 880)**(Telegraphic.) R.*

YOUR despatch No. 1086 of 2nd August, paragraph 13 of enclosure.

His Majesty's Government have no objection to Grand Vizier's raising the forces at his disposal to 15,000 without awaiting the installation of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, for which the Inter-Allied commanders can act provisionally.

*FO. 406/44, p. 159, No. 127*

No. 117

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.**CONSTANTINOPLE, September 23, 1920**(Received September 24)**(No. 1050)**(Telegraphic.) D.*

MY telegram No. 1047 of 23rd September\*.

Immediately after resignation of Sheikh-ul-Islam and Minister of Commerce Grand Vizier published communiqué accusing them of having

\* 23 Eylül 1920 tarihli ve 1047 sayılı telgrafında Amiral de Robeck, Şeyhülislâm ile Ticaret Nazırımın 19 Eylül 1920 günü Ferit Paşa Kabinesinden istifa ettiklerini bildirdikten sonra bu konuda şunları yazıyordu:

"These Ministers belong to "Moderate *Entente libérale*" party, and were principal advocates in Cabinet of repression of Nationalist movement by force.

Circumstances of their resignation are rather mysterious, especially as they have carried with them Ali Kemal, who was absolutely identified with Grand Vizier until a short time ago. I hear from more than one source, but find it difficult to believe, that they have gone in with Italians under auspices of Jewish financier Carasso. French High Commissioner continues to urge me to join in positive action to bring about change of Government, and we are constantly discussing the question of most suitable successor. I have hitherto declined to entertain French High Commissioner's suggestion, not because I see much positive advantage in retention of Ferid, but because there is nothing in situation to justify departure from rule constantly followed by High Commissioners during armistice of not intervening to make or break Cabinets.

It is moreover, very uncertain how far we could trust any Government which we might bring into power to uphold treaty. Tewfik would probably be the best all-round candidate, but he is very weak, and exposed to many Nationalist influences."

*(F.O. 406/44, p. 159-160, No. 129)*

delayed measures to restore order in Anatolia by refusing to agree to renewal of amnesty in favour of all except leaders of Nationalist movement, which remainder of Cabinet agreed to in considering necessary as preliminary measure. Communiqué states that amnesty is now renewed on condition of submission within ten days.

At the same time Grand Vizier addressed note to High Commissioners containing lengthy review of situation and formulating following desiderata:—

1. 15,000 troops and 25,000 gendarmes to be recruited in small area under effective authority of Government and area occupied by Greek vedettes ceded to them.

2. Guns and material held by Allies since armistice to be placed at disposal of Government.

3. Naval convoys for transports carrying Government troops.

4. Military foreign officers for gendarmerie and other services, as contemplated in treaty.

5. Loan by Allies of £. T. 25,000,000, being estimated cost of three months operations with margin for unforeseen expenses.

Note speaks of further appeal for Allied capital for reconstruction purposes, and recognises that Turkish expenditure must be controlled by public debtor or Financial Commission if it can be instituted in time.

Note concludes with outline of elaborate scheme for reorganisation of whole administration of Turkey, which only awaits Imperial sanction.

High Commissioners met on 21st September to consider this communication. They agreed on obvious conclusion that note is not practical to last degree. They decided to inform Grand Vizier that they could only refer it to their Governments, but to seize opportunity of approaching Grand Vizier with a proposal for mission of pacification to Anatolia which was approved of in your telegram No. 717 of 4th August and has since hung fire. There is as yet no agreement amongst High Commissioners exact form or scope of action of this mission, and it was decided that French High Commissioner should broach proposal to Grand Vizier verbally and in general terms only. Grand Vizier replied that, in effect, purely Turkish mission, unsupported by force, would produce no effect, but that there might be some advantage in mission accompanied by Allied representatives. High Commissioners met again on 22nd September. I said that rather than abandon attempt at conciliation I would be disposed to agree to send Allied representatives with Turkish mission.

My French colleague demurs to idea of giving mission character of formal negotiations with Nationalist leaders. My Italian colleague was loath to commit himself on any question of detail, as he said that last news

that he had from Rome was that Italian Government had informed British and French Governments that they favoured idea of mission, but thought it would be more productive of result if it were composed, or at least accompanied by, Allied delegates. After much discussion, it was agreed, at my suggestion, that each High Commissioner should put up written suggestions regarding precise mode of action, with to further discussion on 24th September.

I will send communiqué and note in reference to above by King's messenger.

*FO. 406/44, p. 160, No. 130*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 142-144, No. 142*

No. 118

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

*Foreign Office, September 24, 1920*

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th September, and to state, for the information of the Army Council, that they are correct in presuming that the force of 15,000 men mentioned in the letter from this Office of the 27th August refers to the "special elements" sanctioned by articles 152 and 157 of the treaty.

2. As regards paragraph 1 (i) (b) of your letter, the raising of the 15,000 men does not preclude the Turkish Government from employing in the event of the Greek forces being withdrawn from Broussa and the neighbouring villages before the ratification of the treaty, such gendarmerie and police forces as may be at their disposal, and a further communication which is being addressed to the War Office will show that the French and Italian Governments have been asked to agree to the immediate organisation of the gendarmerie.

3. The French Government have signified their assent to the immediate raising of the 15,000 men on the conditions set forth in the letter from this Office of the 27th August, and His Majesty's Government are notifying the High Commissioner that they also have no objection, and are informing the French and Italian Governments that they have done so.

4. His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to hasten the setting up of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Organisation and Control, but meanwhile they do not consider that the raising of the gendarmerie



and "special elements" need await the installation of the commission, for which the Inter-Allied commanders can act provisionally. In accordance with the amended article 153, the reduction in the Turkish armed forces is to come into force six months after the ratification of the treaty. The "three months" mentioned in your letter is apparently a clerical oversight.

5. With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, I am to state that the assumption of the Army Council would appear to be incorrect, but the sense of the paragraph in question is not quite clear.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE

FO. 406/44, p. 161, No. 131

No. 119

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 24, 1920*

*(Received October 5)*

*(No. 1339)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1050 of the 23rd September, containing the substance of a letter which I have received from the Grand Vizier formulating a scheme to raise forces to repress the Nationalist movement, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of this letter.

FO. 406/44, p. 166, No. 142

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

ENCLOSURE IN No. 119

*Grand Vizier to High Commissioner.*

[Non datée.]

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

EN signant le Traité de Sèvres, la Turquie a pris des engagements de natures diverses que le Gouvernement ottoman s'est mis en devoir d'exécuter aussitôt. La guerre balkanique a profondément reculé les frontières de la Turquie d'Europe, et aujourd'hui la partie de l'Asie Mineure qui est aban-

donnée à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan n'est plus, par suite de guerres étrangères et civiles, qu'un monceau de ruines. On ne peut supposer qu'une nation détruise son propre foyer; il apparait donc que l'Asie Mineure est entre les mains d'une équipe d'affilée au Comité "Union et Progrès," et que la masse du peuple est le jouet d'un certain nombre d'opresseurs puisant leur force, non pas dans la collaboration de ceux qui ne sont leurs victimes, mais dans une organisation formidable, telle que l'histoire n'en connaît pas.

Le Gouvernement ottoman est en lutte avec une société secrète et révolutionnaire, laquelle, selon le cas fait souplement et alternativement du patriotisme, du touranisme, du panislamisme, du nationalisme et de l'internationalisme. Elle déploya durant douze ans toute son activité à exploiter dans le pays les mauvais instincts humains, aux mépris des lois et de la morale mais heureusement la masse du peuple est restée réfractaire à cette influence délétère. La victoire sur cette société peut être considérée comme certaine, à condition cependant que les révolutionnaires ne s'alimentent pas en forces morales; car cette organisation doit son origine au mécontentement national provoqué par l'occupation par les Grecs, en mai 1919, de Smyrne, partie inaliénable de la Turquie, et où rien n'est grec, sauf peut-être la légende qui veut qu'Homère y ait vu le jour.

L'occupation de ces régions par la Grèce fut une cause puissante de l'exaspération du peuple ottoman, qui pouvait renforcer l'organisation révolutionnaire, presque déchué jusqu'à ces derniers temps, s'il la croyait sincère. Le peuple turc examine le passé et l'avenir. Il en arrive à cette conclusion que le Roi Philippe de Macédoine, et son illustre fils Alexandre, n'avaient de grec que leur culture d'esprit et n'avaient comme argument que d'avoir été les conquérants du monde hellénique. Toute la Macédoine, qui contenait une population turque détenant la majorité absolue par rapport à chacune des races qui l'habitent, fut arrachée à la Turquie par le Traité de Londres en 1914, (sic) et le Traité de Sèvres lui arrache aujourd'hui la presque totalité de la Thrace, y compris la ville d'Adrien, qui devint plus tard la cité de Mourad Ier, et qui avec sa forêt de minarets, ses mausolées, son commerce actif et son industrie variée — tout ce flot de souvenirs chers au peuple turc — ne présente aucun caractère hellénique.

D'autre part, l'occupation de la province de Brousse, l'extension probable des opérations de l'armée grecque en Asie Mineure, l'élargissement des frontières de la République arménienne aux dépens des provinces ottomanes, sont de nature à aggraver la situation en Anatolie. De pareilles éventualités si elle venait à provoquer le Kurdistan, jusqu'ici tranquille et demeurant en expectative, la complication serait au comble.

Je m'excuse auprès de votre Excellence de m'étendre sur ces détails, sans quoi l'énigme de l'Asie Mineure resterait enveloppée de mystère.

La situation ainsi établie, le Gouvernement ottoman se déclare prêt à entreprendre sur son propre territoire l'oeuvre de pacification qu'il s'est engagé à accomplir. Cependant, la responsabilité découlant d'un engagement ne peut être envisagée qu'avec une liberté d'action dans l'accomplissement de cet engagement. Je me permets de rappeler à votre Excellence qu'à partir du mois de mai 1919 jusqu'à ce jour je n'ai pas manqué une seule occasion de porter, soit verbalement, soit par écrit, à la connaissance des Cabinets des grandes Puissances de l'Entente que plus on apporterait de lenteur dans la répression, plus le mouvement insurrectionnel s'étendrait. Ce que nous pouvions facilement faire l'an dernier avec des forces relativement restreintes, exige aujourd'hui l'emploi de forces considérables.

Dès le lendemain de la signature du Traité de Sévres, l'Etat-Major ottoman s'est mis au travail pour élaborer un plan de campagne et des projets d'équipement et d'autres concernant l'intendance. Pour entreprendre l'opération il nous faut recruter des troupes disponibles dans la province de Brousse, et dans la région comprise entre Ada-Bazar et le littoral de la mer Noire, où les hommes n'attendent qu'un signal depuis deux mois. Les maréchaux, les généraux, les officiers de tous grades sont prêts à partir pour diriger l'expédition contre les rebelles. Les 80 pour cent des officiers en Asie Mineure suivent le mouvement contre leur gré, tandis que des milliers d'officiers de la capitale, qui mettent l'esprit de discipline et l'honneur militaire au-dessus de leur vie, restent inébranlables dans leur fidélité au Trône et à l'Etat. Quant aux soldats recrutés, il serait illogique de douter de leurs sentiments de haine à l'égard des révolutionnaires qui ont incendié leurs villages, pillé leurs biens, laissé mourir leur femmes et leurs enfants. Les officiers et ceux des Puissances qui coopéreront à cet oeuvre pacificatrice auront peine à retenir l'élan de ces hommes, poussés par un sentiment de vengeance. Aussi sommes-nous sûrs de la fidélité des soldats que nous allons appeler sous les armes.

L'Etat-Major croit indispensable de commencer l'exécution du programme et estime qu'il suffira d'un mois pour le rectementst et d'un autre mois pour terminer avec succès une partie de l'opération. Avec l'occupation d'Eski-Chéhir, de Konia et d'Angora, foyers de l'insurrection, et d'un point stratégique sur le littoral de la mer Noire, la première phase de la campagne pourrait être considérée comme terminée. Le nord de l'Asie Mineure doit suivre la destinée du sud. Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que la qualité des forces dont disposent les chefs révolutionnaires est plutôt négative que positive étant donné que ces forces sont tenues par la terreur. L'apparition de l'armée du Sultan, que le peuple turc vénère, amènera la désagrégation de cette organisation, témoin les derniers événements de Brousse et de Thrace.

Pour appliquer immédiatement le projet militaire élaboré depuis deux mois le Gouvernement ottoman demande :

1. 40,000 hommes, dont 15,000 de troupes prévues par le traité, et 25,000 gendarmes sur les 35,000 que prévoit également le Traité de Sèvres. Ces troupes seraient recrutées dans les provinces occupées provisoirement par les Grecs, et sur lesquelles le Traité de Sèvres reconnaît la souveraineté du Sultan: dans la province de Brousse, dans la presque île d'Ismid et dans la région d'Ada-Bazar jusqu'à la mer Noire d'où le peuple a déjà chassé les rebelles.

2. La livraison immédiate des canons, mitrailleuses, fusils et de tout le matériel de guerre, des munitions et des moyens de transport qui lui appartiennent, mais restent depuis l'armistice sous la surveillance des Puissances de l'Entente.

3. Une force navale pour convoier les transports, portant des troupes.

4. Un nombre suffisant d'officiers étrangers pour la gendarmerie et autres services, tel qu'il est convenu dans le Traité de Sèvres et ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'indiquer plus haut.

5. Un emprunt de £ T. 20,000,000 (les dépenses montant exactement à £ T. 15,777,440, prévues pour période d'opérations de trois mois; le reste est destiné aux frais imprévus).

Cependant, pour ramener l'Asie à la vie, le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité n'y suffit pas. Cette contrée est ruinée de bout à l'autre. Il faut restaurer les villes et les villages détruits, et procurer des semences aux champs dévastés, des bêtes de somme et de trait, des instruments agricoles et des capitaux agriculteurs aux commerçants et aux industriels ruinés. Pour cette oeuvre de réparation aussi nous nous adresserons aux capitaux des nations alliées. Nos dépenses peuvent être contrôlées par la Dette publique ou la Commission financière, si elle peut se réunir à temps.

L'Empire ottoman démembré, réduit à un petit royaume, ne peut plus être gouverné par les lois et règlements qui jusqu'ici le régissaient. Aussi, dès la signature de la Paix, le Gouvernement ottoman s'est-il empressé d'élaborer un projet de réformes générales et de réorganisation des branches de toutes les administrations. La publication en aura lieu aussitôt que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan l'autorisera par un hatt-i-humayoun.

Cette organisation nouvelle, adaptée à la situation récente et de nature à assurer le développement du peuple ottoman, aux points de vue intellectuel et matériel, à l'aide de nouveaux programmes d'instruction publique des projets sur l'industrie, sur la vie économique du pays, sur le commerce, sur l'agriculture, à l'aide de la modification du régime administratif, où est admis le système communal, lequel garantit pleinement les droits des minorités, du système judiciaire, permettant de distribuer la justice sans longu-

eurs, avec le minimum de frais pour le plaignant, système qui aura également pour but de restreindre le nombre des procès, à l'aide enfin de l'amélioration de l'administration de l'Evkaf par la création de communautés musulmanes lesquelles auront une large part dans cette administration. Grâce à ces réformes, la nation ottomane, quelles que soient les races, en majorité ou en minorité, qui la composent, vivra dans une liberté large et saine, et compatible avec les mœurs, le caractère et les traditions de chaque communauté. Le régime du droit et de la liberté pourra succéder à cette période de barbarie du comité révolutionnaire, qui en dix ans divisa la nation, ayant substitué à la liberté une tragique tyrannie, et fit usage de la charte de 1908, laquelle garantissait la vie et les biens des gens comme la liberté des hommes, pour massacrer, piller et persécuter ceux-ci.

Tout en espérant fermement la réponse prompte que la situation comporte, je prie, &c.

DAMAD FERID

FO. 406/44, p. 166-168, No. 142/1

No. 120

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 25, 1902*

*(Received September 26)*

*(No. 1058.)*

*(Telegraphic.) D.*

MY telegram No. 1050 of 23rd September.

High Commissioners held further meeting on 24th September and exchanged concrete proposals. All were agreed that any mission to Anatolia should be sent by Sultan, but French High Commissioner considered it should address itself only to moderate Nationalists and should therefore be accompanied by a certain show of force, and should proceed gradually from district to district rallying moderates to their allegiance to the Sultan. I objected that this would be very slow, and urged that rapidity of action was essential as moment was now favourable but might be much less so in near future if Bolsheviks were enabled (*e.g., as result of peace with Poland*) to give effective support to Nationalists. I suggested rapid procedure of promoting despatch by Sultan of Turkish Mission accompanied by representatives of High Commissioners should be attempted at once, and that recourse might be had to French High Commissioner's procedure if other failed.

Acting Italian High Commissioner agreed generally with my view, though he will not commit himself very far pending further instructions from his Government. French High Commissioner ended by agreeing to my suggestion. He again tried to get me to agree to joint action with a view to change of Government. I met this by suggesting that we should see whether first advance of Nationalists was met by demand for Ferid's retirement, in which case opportunity might be provided for asking that Mustafa Kemal and other extremists should also withdraw from the front of the stage.

It was decided that political officers should consider choice of person suitable to sound Nationalists in first instance as to their willingness to receive mission that is now contemplated, and should simultaneously have further exchange of views with Grand Vizier on whole subject.

Details such as composition of mission and place of meeting if it comes off were reserved for later consideration.

I trust that your Lordship approves of line which I am taking. Task of mission will be in effect to make last appeal to good sense and real patriotism of Nationalist leaders and to encourage numerous elements on whom leaders have now little hold except that of force. I cannot say prospects of success are at all great, but we have reached deadlock, and it seems worth while to make this final attempt at pacific solution before resorting to others which for practical purposes may be reduced to two alternatives, viz.: (1) to utilise Greeks further and thereby destroy basis of present treaty in view of necessity of compensating them for further efforts, or (2) to [group omitted] Turkish Government mere tool of Allies and enable it to restore order by giving it every kind of assistance including money and officers. (End of D.)

I am assuming that His Majesty's Government do wish settlement contained in present treaty to hold good and not to be modified if it can be avoided either in favour of Greeks or of Turks.

*FO. 371/5056/E. 11862*

*FO. 406/44, p. 161-162, No. 132.*

No. 121

A Political Report by British Secret Intelligence.

Dated 25.9.20.

CX/1205

TURCO-BOLSHEVIK CO-OPERATION.Introduction.

The information embodied in the following report has been supplied by a Turkish agent, who has recently returned from Baku after visiting en route Petrovsk, Grozni, Novorossik and Trebizond. As he left Baku early in August, any developments which may have occurred there in connection with the expected Islam-Bolshevik Congresses are naturally not included in his information. The agent is personally acquainted with all the prominent Unionists, whose movements and aims he recounts and, as most of the information here recorded was obtained at first hand from them, it may be accepted as reliable - allowance (sic) being made for their exaggerations in figures, a point, which may be borne in mind in connection with the reported despatch of gold to Anatolia from Moscow.

The present report, while confirming on general lines the report of the 12th August on "Affairs in Anatolia" (*Circular CX/676 (1) dated 2.9.20*), modifies to some extent the impression created by them. The earlier report indicated that the Turkish Unionists, as apart from the true Nationalist movement, were whole-heartedly in favour of wedding Islam to Bolshevism. From the present report, however, it becomes abundantly clear, confirmed as it is by original documents, that, although the alliance may find favour with Talaat and other Unionists in Europe, it is decidedly repugnant to those Unionists, who are actual witnesses of Communism as applied by the Bolsheviks in a Muslim country - however cordially they may have espoused the Bolshevik cause for the purpose of securing their own ends.

The difference is thus shown to be one of degree rather than of kind and we may now modify the theory advanced in the foreword to Circular CX/676, V. dated 2.9.20 and say that the Turkish Unionists are prepared to go much farther on the Red road than the Nationalists for the achievement of their private and political purposes.

It is, further, clear that, if Mustapha Kemal Pasha cherishes any aspirations regarding union with other Muslim countries, they are on the basis of purely Turkish interests and cannot be dignified as Pan-Islamist, except in the degraded sense, because they are focussed upon the fulfilment of purely Nationalist schemes in Anatolia.

The Unionist scheme, on the other hand, appears to include ambitions of a more extended nature. Not only does it aim at the "liberation" of Turkey, but also at obtaining control of the Bolshevik organisation, described in the report as the "Turkish Communist Party", and, thereby, at gaining the adherence of the Muslims of Russia and Central Asia.

The method adopted by them is one of "peaceful penetration". It will be remembered that the unfortunate Mussavat Government of Baku was successfully overturned by the Communists mainly as a result of the assistance given by the numerous Turkish Unionists, who had prepared the ground by gaining important positions in the administration. The same process is being re-enacted in the case of the Nationalist movement in Anatolia and already we may say that Baku, the Unionist stronghold, and the centre of Oriental intrigue, is becoming the rival of Angora.

Without further and more precise information of the activities of Talaat and other Unionists in Europe, we cannot identify with certainty the hidden hand, which is shaping the complicated schemes of the Unionists in the Middle East; but Halil Pasha, the uncle of Enver, is clearly the guiding spirit of the actual operations on the spot and behind him looms the shadowy figure of Talaat supported by all the Islamic fanatics and malcontents of the day.

The report, which follows, has been divided for the sake of clarity into two parts:—

- (i) The Nationalists and the Bolsheviks.
- (ii) The Unionists and the Bolsheviks.

Notes in amplification or elucidation of the text have been prepared.

The letters to which casual references are made in these notes have been seized from a Turkish Bolshevik recently arrested in Constantinople. These letters will themselves form the subject of further reports:—

FO. 371/5178

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 121

*Report.*

*PART I.*

*The Nationalists and the Bolsheviks.*

In 1919, when the Mussavat Party was in power in Azerbaijan, Nuri Pasha, after escaping from Batoum, proceeded to Baku and founded there an organisation called the (*Committee of*) "*Representation of Turkey by the People*" (Turkia Khale (sic) Murahasslighi). This organisation, while functioning



after the manner of a Consulate, included secretly in its programme the formation of a Turkish Communist Party in Baku. All its expenses were met by the Azerbaijan Government. ✓

Nuri Pasha's principal associates at that time were:—

- (i) Halil Pasha
- (ii) Kutçuk Talaat Bey
- (iii) Nail Bey, former Deputy of Trebizond, and
- (iv) Dr. Fuad Sabit, a Turkish doctor, formerly of no political importance, who, however, assisted Mustapha Kemal to organise the first Nationalist Congress at Erzurum in 1919. ✓

While acting as a plank between Soviet Russia and Turkey, the private object of these persons was to fill as many as possible of the important positions in the Baku Government with their own supporters from Turkey, in order, ultimately, to gain complete control of the Azerbaijan Government. ✓

(1) *Relations between Nationalist Turkey and the Bolsheviks were conducted through the "Representation of Turkey" Committee - at first in the person of Dr. Fuad Sabit Bey and afterwards through Halil Pasha. Later one Naim Jevad (formerly a Lt. Col. of Staff in the Army commanded by Nuri Pasha) was sent to Baku by Mustapha Kemal as Nationalist representative (2). It was not, however, until the Allied occupation of Constantinople (16th March 1920) that really serious overtures between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks were made.* ✓✓

*Mustapha Kemal's first delegate to Moscow was Ibrahim Bey, former Military Commander of Trebizond (3). (Date of his despatch to Moscow unstated but believed to be early in May).*

As, however, some considerable time elapsed without any communication from Ibrahim Bey, *other couriers were sent from Anatolia with letters from Mustapha Kemal to the Soviet Government. These couriers were officers of the 11th Division at Bayazid and were named:—*

- *Jelal Bey, Lieut. of Artillery*
- *Kiamil Bey, 2nd Lieut. of Infantry*

They arrived in Baku on June 5th, made over their letters to the "People's Representation" Committee for despatch to Moscow and left Baku on the return journey, bringing with them from Baku numerous papers and books of Bolshevik literature. They were, however, robbed and murdered at Shusha by brigands of the Taki Khan tribe, and the Bolshevik papers and literature never reached Anatolia.

In the letters carried by them to Baku and destined for Moscow Mustapha Kemal Pasha stated that the Great National Assembly had definitely decided

to conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Government. In addition to the arms and munitions necessary for the continuation of the Nationalist struggle in Anatolia, the Soviet Government was asked to advance a sum of £Tqs. 50,000,000 in gold, £Tqs. 5,000,000 of which was to be sent as soon as possible as a first instalment. In return Mustapha Kemal Pasha undertook to attack Armenia simultaneously with a projected Soviet attack upon Georgia. Proposals were also made for the establishment of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Soviet reply to these proposals arrived at Baku about the commencement of July by the hand of a Lett named *Obmayil*, who came from Moscow in Halil Pasha's company. The Soviet Government agreed in principle to the Nationalist proposals. As, however, the Bolsheviki were anxious for proof of Nationalist bona-fides before acceding to all demands, a sum of £Tqs. 500,000 in gold only was sent (4) instead of the five millions desired. The remainder, it was stated, would be sent later with Eliava (5), who was being appointed as Soviet Ambassador in Angora.

*Obmayil*, who carried this reply and the money, was First Secretary to the Soviet Mission to Angora and was proceeding in advance of Eliava and the remaining members of the Mission. He left Baku on July 18th and was accompanied by Halil Pasha as far as Nakhichevan (5). The journey was made in a touring car followed by a lorry. *Obmayil* carried a large number of documents in addition to the money.

The main body of the Soviet Mission under Eliava was to proceed to Angora via Novorossisk and Trebizond. Eliava, himself a soldier, was to be accompanied by sixty Russian Staff officers.

(Agent does not state whether Eliava's Mission has yet arrived in Anatolia and it would seem from independent information that it has not).

Meanwhile a Nationalist Mission passed through Baku en route for Moscow. It consisted of the following persons:—

- (i) *Bekir Sami Bey*, the Deputy
- (ii) Dr. Tali, brother of No. (i)
- (iii) Seifi Bey, former Director of Military Intelligence at the Ottoman War Office.
- (iv) Yusaf Kemal Bey, former Deputy of Kastamuni and several secretaries (7).

As regards the working out of the terms of the agreement: the simultaneous attack upon Georgia and Armenia by the Soviet and the Turks respectively has been postponed owing to the unforeseen developments on the Polish front. In order, however, to "liquidate" Armenia as soon as possible the Nationalists were supplied by the Russians with the forces and supplies which were to have been utilised against Georgia (8) - the attack upon Georgia being postponed

until later. *A considerable number of rifles and guns have actually been made over to the Turks* and on July 18th the XIth Army Corps of the Red Army received orders to advance into Armenia. At the same time the Turkish 11th Division at Bayazid commanded by Col. Javid Bey also advanced and occupied Nakhichevan and Soviet and Turkish Cavalry met at Ordubad, 40 miles East South East of Makhichevan (sic) on the Perso-Armenian frontier.

*FO. 371/5178*

No. 122

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 28, 1920*

*(Received October 11)*

*(No. 1349)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my most recent telegrams relative to the position of the Turkish Government and the Allied High Commissioners here in regard to the Nationalist movement in Anatolia, I have the honour to transmit here with a memorandum in which the 2nd Political Officer of this High Commission has essayed to present a connected view of the situation and to examine it with special reference to the question of what, if any, action can usefully be taken to deal with it.

2. I agree generally with Mr. Ryan's presentation of the situation. As regards the action to be taken, I am of opinion that, however small may be the chance of terminating the present state of affairs in Anatolia and securing acceptance of the Peace Treaty by the purely pacific expedient of sending a mission to represent the true facts of Turkey's present position to everyone concerned, an attempt to do so should be made. In forming this opinion I have been greatly influenced by the consideration that, even with the whole-hearted support of the Allies, it would be impossible for the Turkish Government to organise a force adequate to repress the Nationalists and to restore order in Anatolia without months of preparation, and that any attempt to organise such a force without the support of the Allies, including considerable financial aid, would be entirely futile.

3. The situation has unfortunately developed, since Mr. Ryan's memorandum was written, on lines unfavourable to the project of despatching such a mission. I succeeded on the 24th September, as reported in my telegram No. 105 of the 25th September, in inducing my French colleague to agree to the proposal that the High Commissioners should promote the despatch by the Sultan of a mission which should be accompanied by Allied

representatives and which should be prepared to treat with the Nationalist leaders. The next step was to arrive at the best method of broaching the subject to the Nationalists on the one hand, and on the other to bring it to a head with the Grand Vizier, who was understood from the preliminary conversations not to be favourable to the sending of a mission provided it was accompanied by Allied representatives.

4. The Grand Vizier took a very different line when the Political Officers of the High Commission called on him on the 25th September with the latter object. He said he had never contemplated the substitution of a mission for repressive measures, or the despatch of a mission to treat with the leaders whom six months ago the Turkish Government had, under strong Allied pressure, denounced as rebels and outlaws. He defined his attitude as being that a mission might serve a useful purpose subject to three conditions, viz.:—

- (a.) That the organisation of repressive forces should be concurrently proceeded with;
- (b.) That the mission should be accompanied by Allied representatives; and
- (c.) That the mission should have no truck with the criminal authors of the Kemalist movement.

5. Your Lordship will not fail to perceive how much this attitude has in common with that taken up by my French colleague up to the 24th September. The subsequent situation is somewhat ludicrous, as M. Defrance considers it essential to drive Damad Ferid Pasha from office, as a preliminary to the execution of a programme which he agrees with the Pasha in considering the only sound course of action, while I find myself in disagreement with both, yet hesitate, for reasons which I have reported, to take any action calculated to precipitate the Grand Vizier's fall.

6. I am studying the best means of emerging from this deadlock, and will continue to report developments by telegraph.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/44, p. 168-169, No. 144

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 122

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan respecting the Nationalist Movement in Anatolia.*

WE are now definitely confronted with two immediate issues, namely, whether we should take active hand in maintaining or changing the present Turkish Government, and whether we should attempt the unification of Turkey.

2. The main factors in the situation are as follows:—

- ✓ *The Peace Treaty*, which all Turks regard as harsh and unjust, but which some regard as the only alternative to complete ruin, while others think it may still be combated;
- ✓ *The Constantinople Government*, which exercises little real authority, and which is practically bankrupt;
- ✓ *The Nationalists* in the interior, who are reputed to be weakened by internal dissensions, and by their failure to make good in face of the Greek advance;
- The Greeks*, in shining armour, ready, militarily, to advance, but unwilling, politically, to do so except at a price;
- His Majesty's Government*, whose policy is undeclared, but who to outward appearances seem anxious only to curtail liabilities in this country;
- ✓ *The French*, who seem to be divided into two camps, according as they desire to batten on a restored, though reduced, Turkey, or to deprive the Turks of the power to hurt them in Syria, Cilicia and Heraclea;
- The Italians*, who see both political and economic interest in upholding Turkey, and who "suck up" to the Turks generally, primarily to the Nationalists, secondarily, so far as the two things are compatible, to the Constantinople Government; and
- ✓ *The Kurds*.

3. There are, of course, many minor factors and many remoter ones, and there are many subdivisions of those enumerated above.

4. *The Constantinople Government* derives what little authority it does possess from the Sultan, and from the illusion that it enjoys Allied, especially British, support. The secession of the two leading representatives of the "Moderate Entente libérale" within the last few days deprives it of its last claim to be regarded as more than the personal Government of Ferid Pasha. Ferid Pasha, already unpopular and deserted by his few remaining supporters among the active politicians, can only retain power either by convincing the Sultan that the above illusion is a reality, and thereby securing the continued confidence of at least the Sultan or by converting the illusion into a reality, and thereby again widening the circle of his supporters.

5. *The Nationalists* were reported two or three months ago to be riven by dissensions of a fundamental kind. All recent reports seem to me, however, to tend to two conclusions, namely, that the leaders, however divided, are all equally irreconcilable to the Peace Treaty in its present form, and that, while varying in their attitude towards Bolshevism as a social system, they are at one in looking to the Bolsheviks for support in present trouble.

6. The other main factors have been sufficiently described above, except *the Kurds*, whose importance is apt to be underrated. Many of them are politically undistinguishable from Turks, and these are mainly under Nationalist influence. The rest are in varying degrees votaries of Kurdish national aspirations, and proportionately anti-Turkish. These are, of course, disunited, but if carefully handled by His Majesty's Government they might be used as a counterpoise to Kemalism, Bolshevism and forces of sheer disorder. We have to reckon with the fact that they are just now very disgruntled, because of the limitation of the area assigned to Kurdistan by the treaty, the inclusion of a large part even of that area in the French zone of influence, and, above all, the uncertainty as to their future frontier with Armenia. The one thing which unites all Kurds is hatred of the idea of Armenian domination in Kurdish districts, and they regard the Americans who are to delimit the frontier as a mixture of ignorance of the East and fanatical pro-Christianism.

7. If the appreciation in paragraph 5 of the Nationalist leaders is correct, the Allies must choose between yielding to them over the treaty or fighting them in some way or other. Assuming that the treaty is to stand, or, if modified, is to be modified only to the disadvantage of the Turks, the first alternative is excluded. If the second be chosen, there are three and only three ways of fighting the Nationalist leaders. The first is by direct action of the Allied Great Powers; the second is by further utilisation of the Greeks; the third is by utilisation of such Turkish elements as are prepared to accept the treaty as a necessary evil.

8. Direct action by the Powers is excluded. The Italians are adverse to the object with which such action might be undertaken, viz., the destruction of the Nationalist organisation. The French are divided regarding it. His Majesty's Government are unwilling to put money or men into an adventure in Anatolia.

9. The further utilisation of the Greeks cannot be resorted to consistently with the maintenance of the treaty in its present shape. The Greeks must be rewarded for further effort, perhaps by an extended Smyrna area, perhaps by Constantinople, perhaps by a Pontine Republic. The further utilisation of the Greeks is also open to other objections, including that of increased danger for Christians outside areas effectively occupied.

10. If, then, we desire the treaty to stand in its present form, the only hope, and that a faint one, lies in utilising the Turkish elements which are ready to resign themselves to it. This the present Turkish Government ask us to do. They say we made them sign a treaty — the penalty for the non-execution is stated; but we stand in the way of every endeavour to render its execution possible. They submit military plans for our approval and we receive them in silence, though it needs but a little force in the

background to encourage all Anatolia to go anti-Nationalist. They are ready for immediate financial control, and we dilly-dally over instituting it, while, in the meantime, we block every way by which Turkey might hope to raise money.

11. As a variant on this last alternative, it is suggested that the Nationalist organisation can be broken up by taking steps to bring the realities of Turkey's desperate plight to the knowledge of Anatolia generally, and isolating the leaders to such an extent as to render them impotent. This suggestion rests on the theory that the masses of people are sick and tired of Nationalists, that the active opposition to them in many localities needs only a little encouragement to become really effective, and that the class intermediate between the big Nationalist leaders and the sheep-like peasants are moderate and lukewarm enough to be easily detached from the irreconcilables in present circumstances.

12. Six weeks ago the position was that the High Commissioners favoured the view just described, and considered that useful results might be obtained by getting the Turkish Government to send a mission of pacification to Anatolia. Ferid Pasha, whom I then sounded, was dead against this. The Ministers who have just resigned have also always declared themselves dead against conciliation, unsupported by force, in any form, and their chief declared grievance against Ferid is that he takes no serious action in regard to the Anatolian situation. Their real motives are obscure, and their enemies say that they have been got at by the Italians, with a politico-financial programme of which the notorious Salonika Jew, Carasso, is the exponent. It is useless to try to fathom the mud in which nearly all the politicians of Constantinople are wallowing. All that is necessary is to glance at the present position in regard to the conciliation proposals.

13. Ferid Pasha's first moves after the resignation were to renew the offer of an amnesty to all Nationalists except the leaders, and to address a long note to the High Commissioners, in which he put forward elaborate military proposals, asked for a loan of £T. 20,000,000, and outlined a grandiose scheme of administrative reform, which he had been hatching for some little time past. This note has a double character. It is doubtless intended to show his own people that he does stand for serious action in Anatolia, and that it is the Allies who block the way. It is also a formal call upon the Allies to support the Turkish Government in every way, if they want the Turkish Government to execute their treaty.

14. The High Commissioners have met this by informing Ferid Pasha verbally that they favour the sending of a mission to Anatolia to attempt to bring it into line with Constantinople. Ferid rejoins by saying that a purely Turkish mission without force behind it would be futile, but that a mission accompanied by Allied representatives would have a good chance of success.

MARASU

15. The High Commissioners are not agreed as to the nature and scope of the mission to Anatolia. The most definite attitude is that of M. Defrance, who favours a Turkish mission, which would proceed gradually with a certain force accompanying it, and would rally the people to their allegiance to the Sultan, advancing only as and when the collapse of the Nationalists in each successive district made it possible. He maintains strongly, however, that for this to succeed Ferid Pasha must disappear. He does not seem to realise how much his proposal has in common with what Ferid Pasha has been urging on us, and how great the practical difficulties would be.

16. However his views may be evolving otherwise, M. Defrance is firm on one point, viz., that the disappearance of Ferid is a first condition of any scheme for winning moderate Nationalists back to submission. For the rest, he is lukewarm about any form of negotiations with the Nationalist leaders themselves, and equally lukewarm about using boldly the only threat which the Allies can use, viz., that of a further Greek advance. He admits that that is the Allies' only eventual weapon, but he is very reluctant that it should be used.

17. The Italian Acting High Commissioner tells us that his Government have signified to Paris and London their concurrence in the proposal that a mission should be sent to Anatolia, but have suggested that it would have a better chance of success if composed of Allied delegates, or if, at least, it were accompanied by Allied delegates. M. Arlotta is slow to move beyond the bare suggestion that a mission should be sent, until he hears further from Rome.

18. Such is the setting in which we have to face the two issues stated in paragraph 1. Are we to drive Ferid Pasha from power? And what practical form are we to give to the project of a mission to Anatolia, which is at present too amorphous to be realisable unless the High Commissioners can agree on a detailed proposal?

19. Ferid's resignation would clear the air and end what is in many ways a false position. There is, however, no Government in sight which would appeal more to the Nationalists and of which we could be certain that it would nevertheless stand sincerely for the Peace Treaty. I am therefore averse from positive action to drive Ferid from office. If the current in favour of doing so proves too strong, or if he resigns of himself under the pressure of circumstances, I think the only hope for the future would lie in a Tewfik Government, but only if we could make sure that it would not be dominated by Nationalist influences, that Tewfik Pasha realised that no modification of the treaty favourable to Turkey was to be looked for, and that the sooner he ratified the treaty the better it would be. Izezt Pasha's



candidature is being boomed in several quarters, perhaps under high financial inspiration. I cannot believe that he would really stand for the Peace Treaty.

20. As for the mission to Anatolia, I share the view that no Turkish mission, whether sent by Ferid or by another, is likely to effect anything unless it is amenable to Nationalist wishes, *i.e.*, modification of the treaty. A mission with Allied representatives might conceivably effect something if the Allied delegates were empowered to use more or less definite threats of forward Allied action in the event of continued resistance by the Nationalists. Even in this case, however, the hopes of success would be very slight.

21. The crux of the whole matter is to my mind the question whether His Majesty's Government want the treaty to stand or not. If they do not, I see no better course than to let the situation "rip" and go from bad to worse, as it is bound to do. This is a gloomy prospect, because even the Greeks cannot overrun the whole of Anatolia, and beyond the limits of effective occupation the Nationalist movement must either remain in being as an organised force or, in dissolving, leave behind it widespread disorder. We cannot suppose that, *pari passu* with the disintegration of the movement, the Constantinople Government, weak as it is, would automatically regain its authority.

22. If, however, we do want the treaty to stand, I repeat that I see no hope except in artificially strengthening the Turkish Government by giving it strong Allied support, including financial help in some shape.

23. As a preliminary, the mission of conciliation might be tried, but no great hope should be founded on it, and it should be realised that its failure should be followed either by what is suggested in the immediately preceding paragraph or by letting loose the Greeks.

A. RYAN

*Constantinople, September 23, 1920*

*FO. 406/44, p. 169-172, No. 144/1*

No. 123

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

*Foreign Office, October 1, 1920*

(No. 3260.)

My Lord,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 2965 of the 20th September transmitting copy of a note, with enclosures, received from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposed despatch of a mission from Constantinople to the Nationalists.

In their draft reply to the Italian note of the 10th September (which is identical with a note addressed to His Majesty's Government by the Italian Embassy in London on the 17th September) the French Government expressed themselves in favour of a mission of pacification to the Nationalists, but in order to promote the success of this mission they propose, not that it should be composed of, or at least accompanied by, representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, but that it should be preceded by a change of Ministry at Constantinople.

You should inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government have carefully studied their note of the 20th September and its enclosures, and they fully concur in the view expressed in the draft reply to the Italian Government to the effect that delay in ratification of the treaty is a primary cause of dissension in Turkey, and keeps away from Constantinople those moderate elements which, while ready to recognise the *fait accompli*, are not prepared to incur any responsibility for it. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the first essential is, for the above reasons, to bring pressure to bear on the present Government to ratify the treaty without further delay. Should the present Grand Vizier refuse to do so, it would then be time to consider the question of finding a successor who would be more amenable. It is considered that ratification would clear the ground for the pacification of Anatolia, and should therefore precede the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists.

You should add that His Majesty's Government will reply in a similar sense to the note received from the Italian Government, and are communicating their views to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople for his guidance. At the same time they are prepared to give full consideration to any alternative policy he may advocate in agreement with his French and Italian colleagues.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

*FO. 406/44, p. 163-164, No. 137*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 153-154, No. 149*

No. 124

*Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali.*

*Foreign Office, October 1, 1920*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 17th September regarding the proposal of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople that they should recommend to the Turkish Government

the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists. The note adds that the Italian Government favour this proposal, but consider that in order to attain the end in view the mission should be composed of, or at least accompanied by, representatives of Italy, France and Great Britain.

2. His Majesty's Government have carefully studied the views set forth in your Excellency's note, and fully concur in the necessity of putting an end to the present situation in Turkey. They are, however, of opinion that delay in ratification of the treaty is a primary cause of continued dissension in Turkey, and that for this reason the first essential is to bring pressure to bear on the Turkish Government to repair the omission. Should the present Grand Vizier refuse to do so it might be necessary to consider the question of finding a successor who would be more amenable. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, ratification would clear the ground for the pacification of Anatolia, and should, therefore, precede the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists.

3. His Majesty's Government are informing the French Government of their views, and are also communicating them to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople for his guidance. At the same time they are prepared to give full consideration to any alternative he may advocate in agreement with his Italian and French colleagues.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

FO. 406/44, p. 164, No. 138

No. 125

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 1, 1920

(Received October 4)

(No. 1064.)

(Telegraphic) D.

MY telegram No. 1058 of 25th September.

(R.) Political officers visited Grand Vizier on 25th September and communicated proposal of High Commissioners. Grand Vizier took more hostile line than was expected in view of preliminary conversations some days before. He said that, in welcoming proposal for mission accompanied by Allied representatives, he had not intended to supersede his own earlier proposal. He summed up his attitude as follows:—

1. Conciliatory methods cannot usefully be employed to produce settlement in Anatolia unless organisation of means of repression is proceeded with concurrently.

2. Proposed mission should be accompanied by Allied delegates.

3. There should be no negotiation with most compromised leaders of rebel movement. (End of R.)

Grand Vizier called on me on 27th September and reaffirmed this attitude. On this I consulted further with General Wilson and my French colleague. Former is strongly of opinion that any forcible repression would take months to organise, and would not then be really efficient. French colleague, while agreeing personally with Grand Vizier's view as to inutility of purely pacific mission, continues to urge that any conciliatory action is doomed to failure if undertaken while Ferid remains in power. He also lays stress on hostility of financial circles to Ferid, which renders financial straits of Turkish Government even more desperate than they would be under some other Grand Vizier.

Having regard to Ferid's uncompromising attitude and situation generally, I have been forced reluctantly to acquiesce in view that he had better go. High Commissioners are now agreed in principle (1) to make a written communication pressing on Turkish Government proposal to send mission; (2) to accompany presentation with verbal intimation that they consider prospects of success of mission would be destroyed by continuance in power of present Government; and (3) to follow this action immediately by communication of their views to Sultan through Tewfik Pasha, whom they consider most suitable candidate for Grand Vizierate.

Action is only delayed owing to hesitation on the part of acting Italian High Commissioner to proceed without definite authority from his Government.

I am adopting this programme without enthusiasm. I see no rational alternative, but it is a leap in the dark so far as Anatolia is concerned and as regards Constantinople; substitution of one bankrupt Government for another is unlikely to produce much improvement until Financial Commission is a going concern.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 164-165, No. 139*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 152-153, No. 148*

Oh Dirty Politics... on the poor man here  
 been used to their ends, and then too much...

Approved  
 1st Nov 1914

No. 126

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 1, 1920

*(Received October 3)**(No. 1065, Secret.)**(Telegraphic)*

MY telegram No. 1064 of 1st October.

Ferid has inkling of what is coming. He is concerned for personal safety of himself, Sultan, and persons identified with his policy in event of advent to power of Government of a Nationalist complexion. I trust I may be authorised to tell him that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate any action against his person or that of the Sultan in any eventuality.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 145, No. 140**D.B.F.P., 1st. series, Vol. XIII, p. 151-152, No. 147*

No. 127

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

WAR OFFICE, 1st October, 1920

*MISC (M.I.2)*

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram No. I.9293 dated the 16th September, 1920, from General Headquarters Constantinople relative to Prince Abdul Mejid and the Turkish Nationalists.

*FO. 371/5277/E. 12153*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 127

*British General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.**Despatched 2045 16/9/20**Received 0800 20/9/20**Paraphrase.**Secret. —**I. 9293 cipher September 16th.*

(E. 11554) My I 9276 September 13th. It has recently been reported by a very reliable agent that Nationalists leaders at Angora all hoped that

Prince Abdul Medjid would go to Angora. In their opinion his presence would tend to prevent military Commanders, whose allegiance to Angora Government was doubtful, from breaking away. Every effort is being made at Angora to induce Medjid to proceed there. Nationalists leaders have stated that to secure this end they are willing to pay 50,000 Turkish pounds.

FO. 371/5277/E. 12153.

No. 128

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 4, 1920

(Received October 4)

(*Most Secret and Personal.*)

(*Telegraphic.*) P.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1065 of 1st October.

As an outcome of conferences with the Sultan, Grand Vizier stated to a member of my staff, with whom he had a very confidential conversation on 1st October, that, sooner than consent to work with a Government of Nationalist leanings, the Sultan might probably abdicate, as he was reaching the limits of his endurance.

It is Ferid's opinion that, if he resigned, the next Government would most certainly oppose acquiescence in the treaty, as the feeling prevails most strongly, even amongst moderate Nationalists in Anatolia.

Whether Ferid Pasha is consciously exaggerating the Sultan's dependence on him it is extremely difficult to say. In some quarters he is accused of representing himself to the Sultan as being the only Grand Vizier who inspires confidence in the British, and of representing to us that he is the only man whom the Sultan trusts.

There may be some foundation in fact for this accusation, but, on the other hand, the detachment of his attitude, in most recent interviews, towards several questions suggests that it is not for personal reasons that he is clinging to power; also, he seems to have a genuine concern and devotion for the Sultan.

Although I feel bound to report this matter, I am sending message to the following effect, because the prospects would be grave if the Sultan abdicated, and also because Ferid has definitely asked whether, in the event of his resignation and of the Sultan's abdication, the British would help them, in order that they might make a dignified exit from the country:—

1. If Ferid considered it advisable to leave the country after his resignation, I would help him in every way.
2. I will do all I can to protect the Sultan and Ferid if they are placed in position of imminent personal danger.
3. I strongly impress on the Sultan that by his abdication at the present time the opportunities of future utility to his country would be sacrificed and the situation would be complicated.
4. The question whether, in the event of the Sultan finding no alternative but abdication, I would help him to leave Turkey is one to which, except under your Lordship's instructions, I could not reply. Regarding this point I would like your Lordship's views. If the contingency arose, which I do not consider probable, I should have to take immediate action.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 165-166, No. 141*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII. p. 154-155, No. 150*

No. 129

*Telegram from M. Venizelos to Mr. Lloyd George\*.*

ATHENS, October 5, 1920

✓  
*Secret*

✓ Obligated to take decisions very soon about the demobilisation of the army whose indefinite maintenance on war footing becomes henceforward impossible from a political and financial point of view and useless if an immediate utilisation were not foreseen, I beg leave of Your Excellency to expose my point of view on the situation in Anatolia which does not cease to preoccupy me.

I am convinced that the Turkish Government will be unable to reduce Mustapha Kemal and that it would be extremely dangerous to grant the permission requested by them to form new divisions, for these would fatally reinforce the nationalists. The prolongation of the actual state of affairs in Anatolia would be full of menaces for the future. The Allies' inaction would embolden Kemal, complete the destruction of the Christian populations and leave a free hand to the intrigues of certain Powers desirous of using Kemal and Bolshevism in order to hinder the pacification of the East.

\* A copy of this telegram was forwarded by Sir M. Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, to Sir E. Crowe on Oct. 12. In his covering letter Sir M. Hankey said that the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) regarded the telegram "as rather specially secret because if anything were to come of it, it would be important not to let Mustapha Kemal have time to prepare for the attack."

The only radical remedy would be a new campaign with the object of destroying definitely the nationalist forces around Angora and the Pontus, with the following double consequences.

1. Of driving the Turks out of Constantinople which would form, together with the zone of the Straits, a separate state the existence of which would constitute a unique efficacious guarantee of the liberty of the Straits.

2. Constitution of a separate state at the Pontus with the Greeks that have remained there and those who having emigrated to escape from the Turkish persecutions during the last 50 years are dispersed in the South of Russia and whose total number amounts to 800.000. This state collaborating with Armenia and Georgia would form a solid barrier against Islamism and eventually against Russian imperialism. The forces which Greece now disposes of would be sufficient to ensure the complete success of this expedition but for political and financial reasons the Hellenic Government would be unable to assume the exclusive initiative and responsibility thereof as in June last. They would nevertheless be ready to collaborate with all their forces with England if she were willing to take such an initiative in order to arrive at the aforesaid objects and if she were willing to give Greece the necessary financial assistance to that effect.

Were the British Government to partake these views it would be of the utmost importance that a decision should be arrived at without delay for in a few weeks the winter season commences in Anatolia which renders a campaign almost impossible. If a very prompt decision were not taken the Greek Government would have to put to execution their plan of demobilisation that important political reasons oblige them to consider. Once the demobilisation accomplished the Government foresee that the country would be unwilling for a new mobilisation within a few months.

I should be extremely obliged to Your Excellency if you could kindly let me know your views on this subject and beg you to accept the assurance of my high consideration of my most cordial devotion.

*D.B.F.P., 1919-1939, 1st. series, Vol. XIII, p. 157-158, No. 152*

No. 130

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

*Foreign Office, October 6, 1920*

*(No. 928.)*

*(Telegraphic.) P.*

YOUR Personal and Secret telegram of 4th October and your telegram No. 1065 of 1st October.



The assurance which, in the second of your above-mentioned telegrams, you suggest giving to the Grand Vizier and the terms of your message in the first are approved.

In regard to point 4, raised in first of your above-mentioned telegrams, in case of extreme necessity I do not think we could refuse, but you should most strongly impress on the Sultan that he should not abdicate.

FO. 406/44, p. 168, No. 143

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 158, No. 153

No. 131

*Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.*

RAMLEH, October 6, 1920

(Received October 21)

(No. 1135.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith extracts from a report by Major W. Betten, acting British agent, Jeddah, for the period ending the 20th September, 1920. \*

Your Lordship will observe that King Hussein repeated his refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Turkey until His Majesty's Government has given an undertaking to fulfil what he calls their "agreements" with him.

With regard to the discussions between the Nejd deputation and King Hussein, I have already fully reported to your Lordship. It has previously been found impossible to obtain from Constantinople, or any other source, details of the old Turkish boundaries alluded to in Major Batten's report.

The "El Falah", also mentioned in the report, was a Damascus newspaper, but on the occupation of that place by the French the editor fled to Mecca, where he has restarted it. The paper is composed of reports of fictitious Arab victories in Syria and articles vilifying the French generally.

In the report by Captain Nasiruddin, which Major Batten forwards, some further details are given of the alleged negotiations between King Hussein and Mustapha Kamal (Kemal).

\* Yazının 1 No'lu eki M. Kemal ile ilgili değil. Buraya alınmadı.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure are being sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Jeddah (the last named without enclosure).

I have, &.

ERNEST SCOTT,  
ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER.

FO. 406/44, p. 322, No. 261

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 131

*Report by Captain Mian Nasir-ud-din Ahmad for the period ending September 19, 1920.*  
*(Confidential.)*

RUMOURS about an understanding between the King and Mustapha Kemal have been very persistent, and I am inclined to think there is some truth in this news. It has been reported that Mustapha Kemal sent his agents through Ibn Rashid's territory and they have, for the sake of secrecy, been called the Mashariqa. Mustapha Kemal has promised, and according to some actually sworn, allegiance to King Hussein as Khalifa, on the condition that he breaks all relations with the British Government. As a preliminary to this step the King is said to have called a conference of trustworthy Meccan leaders and instructed them to husband their present resources and not to waste their food supplies, as Mecca may stand in need of this precautionary measure later on. This apparently hinted at a probable blockade of the Hedjaz by us if the news leaked out. I have reported before this that the King allows very little grain to go out to the Bedous, and he refused permission to grant more than one or two bags of cereals to the Bedous who came to ask for it during my presence at the palace.

2. There is another story that instead of Mustapha Kemal swearing allegiance to King Hussein, it is the latter who has taken the oath in favour of Mustapha Kemal. Colour is given to this story by the King's utterance that he was prepared to submit to any Khalifa the Moslems chose. And since Mustapha Kemal is considered to be the present leader of the Nationalist movement in the interests of Islam, the inference is only natural.

3. The King received a telegram from Syria to the effect that a free fight took place between the Hauranis and Kurds at Damascus, wherein 600 men were killed in the "Maidan" alone. Such French troops as were present in the city looked on the scene with amusement and did not interfere. Noori Sha'lan has been killed by some unknown person. The telegram goes on to say that the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church declared that the only hope of the Syrians, both Moslems and Christians, lay in Sherif Hus-

sein. The King is afraid that such actions and utterances of the responsible people in Syria will be misinterpreted by the diplomats of Europe, and he will be accused of all this outlawry and secret intriguing.

4. The King is also said to have imbued some Persian pilgrims with his way of thinking, and they have promised to do their best on their return to clear his position. Some of the pilgrims openly denounced the British Government for the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which they said proved its designs on the Persian independence. The King is also trying to find means of communication with Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, and I am almost certain that he has taken up a very conciliatory attitude towards the Idrisi, whom he has written a letter a couple of days ago. All these reports lead one to the conclusion, that slowly but surely the King is trying to reconcile all shades of opinion, and climbing from his high pedestal which he held in the belief that his revolt would bring all the world round his feet. It must be sorrowfully admitted that his trust in the British Government is very much shaken, if not entirely shattered, which is not at all strange when he sees all sorts of opinions in the press in his favour, which gives him an exaggerated idea of his own importance.

5. An Indian named Ismail Khan, who had been residing at Mecca for the last 5 or 6 years, and was subject to occasional fits of insanity, had a fit again on the 10th September, and made remarks derogatory to the Arab ulemas. The matter was reported to the King, who put him in gaol, where he is said to have been severely treated, the marks of which were seen on his body. The man died on the 16th, and the general belief is that poison was administered to him at the King's orders. His relatives found him quite (sic) fit on the morning of the 16th and were apprised of his death in the afternoon.

6. The primitive method of applying red-hot iron to the tongue to identify a thief is resorted to by the Hashimite Government. This the Turks never did. The British Government is freely blamed for this change from the comparatively humane methods of the Turks to the present day brutal measures of the King, and in the present age of advanced civilisation. A case has recently come to my notice where this has been done, but there are many others that occur daily.

7. The caravans for Medina left Mecca during the period under report. The majority consisted of the Persians, while there is a certain number of Indians also, who number about 1,200. One Indian, S. Murtaza Hussain, who has been in Mecca for some years, and is a great favourite of the King, asked the latter's permission to proceed to Medina. The caravans having already left a day previously, the King refused the request, and, pointing towards me, said that, "If I let you go now, this person will catch me by the throat if anything happened to you."

8. It is a common sight in Mecca to see officers of the Arab Government in uniform and carrying umbrellas, even on horseback. The daily parade of the officer cadets consists of about 10 minutes of marching with their rifles, after which their arms are collected at one place and they clear stones from the open space opposite the barracks. Their uniform was certainly obtained from our stores, but as we could not apparently supply the head-dress the cadets have to find their own, and they are therefore seen parading in all colours of the rainbow. One cadet is about 2 feet in height and 11 years of age.

9. The King has by his constant "snubbings" estranged some of the experts on the Agricultural Mission. One of them, Sayyed Ahmed Daaq, exchanged some very stiff telegrams with the King, and refused to stay at Taif, in spite of the King's definite orders. He with some others is shortly leaving for Syria, and the excuse the King gives for this is that owing to the disturbed condition of their country they are anxious about their families, and therefore do not put their hearts into their work and had better go. Their story is that all their suggestions for improvement have systematically been vetoed by the King, and they have never been given a chance to do anything. They say that the King considers his personal knowledge superior to that of the experts even in matters of mechanism. 'Arif Bey, who is a great flatterer and also a rabid Nationalist, is staying on, and may be appointed as Minister of Public Works. He is afraid of returning to Beirout, and although dissatisfied even here, would prefer to wait for a while, as he has all his family here. He is also thinking of proceeding to India with a view to influence the Moslem opinion there in favour of the King Hussein.

*Mecca, September 19, 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 326-327, No. 261/2*

No. 132

*Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS (VIA CONSTANTINOPLE), October 8, 1920

*(Received October 18)*

*(No. 428.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

FOLLOWING for information is from sources considered reliable:—

(a.) 3,000 troops 1st Soviet Army arrived Baku from Krasnovodsk.

(b.) Bolsheviks and Kemal Pasha have come to an agreement to overrun Armenia.

Turks are to take Batoum province and to receive Azerbaijan and Daghestan from Bolsheviks. Eighty Turkish officers have been sent to organise Mussulman forces in Azerbaijan and Daghestan, of whom some are already at Baku. The recent visit of Enver Pasha to Baku, presence of Khalil Pasha in Zangezour, intention to attack Armenia and eagerness of Mussulmans to see Bolsheviks replaced by Turks in Azerbaijan and Daghestan are all factors favouring execution of above plan.

Armenian Government state that Armenian population of Kan district, roughly 25 miles south-west of Gerusi, has been driven out of district by Bolsheviks — Russian or Tartar or both is not clear. \*

(Reported to Constantinople, No. 331, and Tehran, No. 158.)

FO. 406/44, p. 50, No. 25

\* 5 Ekim 1920 günü Paris'teki Ermeni Delegatesi A. Aharonian, İngiliz Büyükelçisi Lord Derby'ye şu notayı verdi:

*Armenian Delegate to the Earl of Derby.*

(Extraits)

M. L'Ambassadeur,

PARIS, le 5 Octobre 1920.

“Je reçois de mon Gouvernement un télégramme du 2 Octobre m'informant que des forces turques, composées de réguliers commandées par Kiazim Karabékir, ont repris une nouvelle avance dans la direction de Kars, à la suite de la remise d'une ultimatum invitant à évacuer les régions d'Olti, Kars et Ardahan “en exécution du Traité de Brest-Litovsk”. Ces forces, qui sont en nombre supérieur à celles dont dispose l'armée arménienne sur ledit front, ont pour objectif la réalisation du Traité de Brest-Litovsk attribuant les provinces de Kars et de Botoum à la Turquie; elles visent ainsi à la jonction des Turcs avec les bolcheviks et leur mouvement constitue une violation flagrante du Traité de Sèvres. (...)

“Le mouvement entrepris par Kiazim Karabékir, lieutenant de Mustapha Kémal au Caucase, est une nouvelle tentative des Turcs tendant à relier les deux grands tronçons de l'Islam par la suppression de l'Etat qui fait obstacle à cette union, soit l'Arménie. De leur côté, les bolcheviks favorisent un tel mouvement. (...)

“La nécessité d'aider l'Arménie n'en apparait que plus urgente. Or, dans les circonstances actuelles, le Gouvernement arménien considère que le moyen le plus efficace pour réduire à néant le plan turco-bolchévique consisterait dans l'occupation de Trébizonde par les Alliés. Elle aurait pour effet de diviser les forces kémalistes, d'alléger les fronts où s'exerce leur activité, d'empêcher que Trébizonde continue à leur servir de base d'opérations et de ravitaillement, enfin, de rendre impossible toute collaboration efficace entre Jeunes-Turcs et bolcheviks.

“Indépendamment de cette mesure primordiale, il appartient aux principales Puissances alliées de décider l'adoption de toute autre mesures susceptibles de porter leur fruits, telle qu'une pression à exercer sur la Turquie, conformément aux conditions qui lui ont été signifiées touchant son maintien à Constantinople, l'avance de l'armée hellénique sur les fronts qu'elle occupe, etc. (...)

Le Président de la Délégation de la République arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.

A. AHORONIAN.”

(F.O. 406/44, p. 46-47, No. 19/1)

No. 133

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, October 9, 1920  
(Received October 25)

(No. 1394.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1339 of the 24th September, forwarding copy of a letter received from His Highness the Grand Vizier formulating a scheme to raise forces to repress the Nationalist movement, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter dated the 28th September which I have addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, together with a copy of the latter's reply, dated the 5th October, on this subject.

I have, &amp;c.

FO. 406/44, p. 187, No. 161

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 133

*High Commissioner to General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.*  
(No. M. 3025.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 28, 1920

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of an undated letter\* which was received on the 20th September from His Highness the Grand Vizier.

2. This letter reviews the general situation in Turkey and the position of the Government with regard to the Nationalist movement at the present time as it appears to His Highness.

3. The letter then goes on to formulate certain definite proposals of a military and financial nature with which the Ottoman Government wishes to proceed in order to combat the Nationalist movement, and with regard to which the assistance of the Allies is required.

4. There are certain considerations respecting these proposals which have occurred to me and which are enumerated briefly below:—

(a.) Is it possible for the Turkish Government, without assistance from the Allies in money and the loan of Allied officers, to organise a military force capable of overcoming the Nationalist forces?

\* Bkz. Belge No. 119'a ek.

(b.) Assuming that the Allies approve in principle of the proposals made, is the Grand Vizier's estimate of £T .20,000,000 sufficient, considering that recruits will presumably have to be obtained by voluntary enlistment and that the services of Allied officers, if lent, will be a very expensive item?

(c.) Is the Grand Vizier's estimate of only three month's operations justifiable in view of the necessity of first organising, officering, recruiting and training the 15,000 men, with the assistance of foreign officers, few of whom will have a working knowledge of Turkish, and of Turkish officers of a low level of efficiency?

5. Assuming that the 15,000 men, with the due proportion of Allied officers in control, are eventually trained and equipped to take the field against the Nationalists, can the possibility be discounted of their going over whole or in part to the side of the Kemalists as a result of enemy propaganda, a change in the political situation in the capital or other causes? If such a development is considered possible, taking into consideration the relatively small numbers of the Allied forces of occupation when the contemplated reductions have been effected, will the Allied military forces be in a sufficiently strong position to deal with the new situation which will be created should the Governmental troops prove untrustworthy?

6. The above questions have occurred to me in connection with the Grand Vizier's proposals, and I should be much obliged if you would favour me with your considered opinion regarding them and such other points as may present themselves to you.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/44, p. 187-188, No. 161/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 133

*General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, to the High Commissioner.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 5, 1920

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. M. 3025, dated the 28th September, and to reply as follows:—

1. Reference paragraph 4 (a.). I am of opinion that Allied officers would be a necessity with any Turkish force to bring it to a condition of reasonable efficiency sufficient to overcome the Nationalists.

The question of a loan is beyond my province, but good and regular pay and proper equipment of all kinds would be required to attain success.

2. Reference paragraph 4 (b). Steps are being taken to make a rough estimate of the cost of the force of 40,000 men asked for.

3. Reference paragraph 4 (c). I consider that it would take at least six months to organise, equip and train the force named.

4. Reference paragraph 5. Should the new troops prove disloyal while stationed in or near Constantinople, the situation would be most serious, and if accompanied by rising in the town, as appears probable, would create a thoroughly dangerous situation. This might be minimised, however, by strongly guarding ammunition depots and by transferring all or the majority to the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. I do not, however, consider it likely that the troops would be disloyal as long as they were well paid and looked after and not required to fight. At any rate considerable warning should be obtainable.

When the time came to send the men to Anotolia to fight the Nationalists there would appear to be more possibility of desertion. In this case, however, the danger also would be less as they would be outside our area and desertion from allegiance and refusal to fight for the Government need not necessarily be followed by readiness to fight for the enemy.

Much would depend upon the political situation at the moment, and the chances of desertion should be decreased as much as possible by keeping the force under training until a good spirit had been infused into it.

5. Reference paragraph 6. Other points which present themselves to me are as follows:—

(a.) A force as at present represented by the division which the Turks are forming at Buyuk Dere would be quite unreliable. The officers of this force are quite incompetent and neither in spirit nor training would it be anything approaching efficient.

Should Allied officers, however, be attached as instructors and advisers, and should regular pay and good rations be given, much improvement could be effected in a comparatively short time.

The question is also complicated by the fact that the majority of good Turkish officers seem unwilling to join the forces, either owing to Nationalist leanings or other reasons. If any political action could alter this attitude the organisation of the force would be facilitated, but even in this case little shortening of the suggested period of six months could be contemplated.

(b.) The question as to whether the numbers suggested would be sufficient depends mostly upon the spirit of the opposing forces and the inhabitants of the Nationalist areas.

I consider that both sides are very averse to fighting and that if one side could be made to act with anything resembling vigour, the other would give way. A properly organised Government force should, therefore,



✓ find little difficulty in defeating the Nationalist armies, provided the Bolsheviks do not give considerable active and material assistance, and I consider the numbers proposed would be sufficient for this purpose.

Should, however, the population have been moved by Nationalist propaganda to such an extent as to cause them to render armed assistance to the Nationalist forces, guerilla warfare would supervene, which would entail the employment of much larger forces to enforce subjection. I am of opinion that at present the population would not adopt this attitude, as information at hand tends to show that all they want is peace, but this may change with circumstances.

I suggest that the attitude of the population is a matter in which political action would have great effect.

I have, &c.

H. F. M. WILSON, *General*,

*Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.*

FO. 406/44, p. 188-189, No. 161/2.

No. 134

*Extract From British Cabinet Minutes No. 54 (20) of October 12, 1920.*

(8) With reference to Cabinet 53 (20), Appendix II, the Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet, as a matter of urgency, that he had received a very important telegram, dated October 5, 1920, from M. Venizelos, stating that for financial and economic reasons he had to take decisions in regard to the demobilisation of the Greek forces in the Smyrna region. M. Venizelos, in his telegram, had set forth his apprehensions in regard to the menacing position in Anatolia if Mustapha Kemal was not dealt with. He had suggested that the only radical remedy was a new campaign with the object of destroying definitely the Nationalist forces around Angora and the Pontus. Such a campaign would result (1) in driving the Turks out of Constantinople, which would form, together with the zone of the Straits, a separate State; and (2) in the constitution of a separate State in Pontus where the population would be mainly Greek, composed partly of the Greeks who have remained there, and partly of those who have emigrated from time to time to escape Turkish persecution and are now dispersed in South Russia to a total of 800,000. He pointed out that this State, collaborating with Armenia and Georgia, would form a solid barrier against Islamism, and, eventually, against Russian Imperialism. The Greek forces would be sufficient to ensure the success of the expedition, but for political and financial reasons the Hellenic Government would be

unable to assume the exclusive initiative and responsibility there of. He suggested that the Greeks would be ready to collaborate if Great Britain would take the initiative and give the necessary financial assistance. Owing to the approach of winter, he asked for an immediate decision. If demobilisation had once occurred, Greece would be unwilling to undertake a fresh mobilisation within a few months.

The Prime Minister asked that the utmost secrecy should be observed in this matter, as, if any action should be deemed advisable, it was most important that Mustapha Kemal should not be forewarned.

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF stated that a copy of this telegram had been communicated to him by Sir John Stavridi.

M. Venizelos had shown himself so good a judge of what the Greek forces could accomplish that he was inclined to think it probable that the Greek forces could reach Angora. Before advising the Cabinet, however, on the military aspect of this question, he had felt it necessary to obtain further information as to the number of divisions it was proposed to employ and how long they could remain in the field if Mustapha Kemal's forces retired in front of them; as to what exactly was meant by Pontus; and as to the cost of the expedition.

There was a short preliminary discussion on the political aspect of the question, in the course of which it was pointed out that M. Venizelos's proposals amounted to tearing up the Turkish Treaty; that the proposed State of Pontus would be virtually a Greek State; that Constantinople would be almost hemmed in by Greek territory; and that the proposal was not likely to be at all acceptable to the French and Italian Governments.

It was agreed—

- (a.) To reserve the further consideration of the question until the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had received the information he had asked for;
- (b.) That the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on receipt of the required information, should send a report direct to the Prime Minister.\*

FO. 371/5135/E-12640

\* İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında bu belge üzerine aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır: "What the Prime Minister describes as the "results" and M. Venizelos as the "consequences" of the proposed campaign to destroy the Nationalists around Angora, (i.e. driving the Turks out of Constantinople and establishing a Greek Pontine State), are, of course, in part only the Greek conditions and price of cooperation. There is no necessary causal connection between an attack on Nationalist Turks at Angora and the eviction of non-Nationalist Turks from Constantinople.

D. G. Osborne  
14/10"

“On another paper went in today I have argued that even if Greek troops are employed to clean western Anatolia up to Angora there is no reason whatever for modifying the Treaty. By so clearing the country the Greeks are strengthening their own (? garrisons) hold on Smyrna and that is sufficient reward.

J. Tilley  
14/8 (sic)”

“The objection to M. Venizelos' proposal contained in the penultimate paragraph are very weighty. A further objection is the heavy expenditure it would entail of which we should probably have, as usual, to bear the lion's share.

H.”

No. 135

*Mr. Hankey to Sir Eyre Crowe, Foreign Office.*

*12th October, 1920.*

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Crowe,

I enclose copy of a telegram the Prime Minister has received from M. Venizelos\*. The Prime Minister regards it as rather specially secret because if anything were to come of it, it would be important not to let Mustapha Kemal have time to prepare for the attack. The matter was raised at the Cabinet this morning, when the C.I.G.S. reported that before advising the Cabinet on the military aspects, he wanted further information. I daresay Lord Curzon will be asking you for advice on the political aspects. I am sending him a copy of the telegram.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY

FO. 371/5135/E. 12594

\* Bkz. Belge No. 129

No. 136

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *12th October 1920*

*Telegraphic  
No. 945  
Cyber  
Very Urgent*

Your despatch 1336 (September 23rd, Turkish Heir Apparent).

If as appears possible Sultan were to abdicate and if at the same time the heir apparent were at Angora, a very difficult situation would arise.

You should therefore encourage Damad Ferid to take every precaution against Prince's escape, such precautions being taken on authority of Turkish Government and not as if on our instigation.

FO. 371/5277/E. 12258

No. 137

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 13, 1920.

(Received October 14.)

(No. 1100.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

THERE is no prospect of ratification of treaty by Turkey in the near future unless very strong pressure is used. Argument most commonly employed is that it would still further weaken Government *vis-à-vis* Anatolia, as Government would present the appearance of not merely having submitted to treaty but of having welcomed it.

At meeting on the 7th October High Commissioners decided finally to proceed at once with written communication to Porte recommending despatch of mission to Anatolia.

At my instance it was decided to drop proposed verbal intimation regarding desirability of change of Government.

Just before this meeting, new element was introduced into situation by receipt of message from Sultan asking High Commissioners to visit him. It was decided to reply that High Commissioners would accept on condition that audiences should be strictly private, which implied that Grand Vizier should not be present.

My French colleague was very insistent on this, and we all agreed that audiences would serve more useful purpose if Grand Vizier did not attend.

Note recommending despatch of mission as purely pacific experiment, and without limitation as to persons with whom it should enter into relations, was handed to Grand Vizier the same day, and reply concerning audiences was conveyed simultaneously. Grand Vizier evinced disposition to give way regarding character of mission if I agreed that audiences should have strictly private character.

Audiences took place on the 11th October. At preliminary meeting of High Commissioners my French colleague again urged that Sultan should be practically told to change his Government, but he agreed to formula proposed by me giving us much greater latitude as to language to be used.

Practical result was that French High Commissioner did suggest definitely that change of Government would be desirable, whereas I merely pointed out that Ferid Pasha was regarded in some quarters as serious personal obstacle to success of mission, but that it was for His Majesty alone to decide whether change of Government might be desirable either now or later on if Nationalists put forward removal of Ferid as condition.

Conversation with Sultan showed him to be devoted to Ferid. He intimated that proposal regarding mission would be accepted, but he was very insistent that mission should be sent to demand submission and not to listen to conditions, and that we should have clear idea beforehand of what future course of action would be if overtures of mission were scouted. I promised to take your instructions on this point.

Sultan spoke of ratification of treaty as majority of Allied Parliaments had accepted it but, he rejected the idea of immediate ratification on the ground indicated above.

High Commissioners are now awaiting written reply of the Porte to mission proposal.

My French colleague continues to place removal of Ferid in forefront of his programme, but Acting Italian High Commissioner has come round entirely to my view for reasons which I do not quite understand.

Present intention of High Commissioners is to attach one civilian and one military delegate each to proposed mission.

*FO. 406/43, p. 173, No. 146*

No. 138

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

*(Received October 15.)*

*(No. 3143.)*

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 12th October, respecting the enforcement of the Turkish Treaty.

*Paris, October 13, 1920.*

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 138

*Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

LES Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont, au cours des dernières semaines, échangé de multiples notes sur les différents points que soulève la ratification et la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et le rétablissement de l'ordre en Turquie. Ces notes ont permis de constater, sur l'ensemble de la question, une communauté de vues permettant d'établir ou de mettre à l'exécution un programme d'action.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que le Gouvernement français considère maintenant l'envoi d'instructions aux Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople comme la procédure la plus pratique et la plus rapide pour obtenir les résultats désirés.

Le Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople vient de recevoir pour instructions de se concerter avec ses collègues sur les mesures à prendre et de se mettre d'accord avec eux sur le programme suivant:

1. Les trois Gouvernements sont d'accord sur la nécessité de commencer par obtenir immédiatement la ratification du Traité de Paix par la Turquie. Le Gouvernement anglais estime que c'est du Ministère de Damad Férid qu'elle doit être obtenue par une pression concertée et énergique. Le Gouvernement français se rallie à cette opinion. Il considère qu'une ratification par le Parlement ottoman n'est pas nécessaire et qu'il suffit d'une ratification par le Sultan.

2. Aussitôt après cette ratification, la démission du Ministère Damad Férid et son remplacement par un Ministère convenablement choisi par les Hauts-Commissaires rendraient possible un ralliement au Gouvernement de Constantinople des éléments nationalistes modérés. Le Gouvernement britannique, dont le point de vue en ce qui concerne le maintien de Damad Férid jusqu'à la ratification a été adopté, sera certainement d'accord sur la nécessité de son remplacement aussitôt après la ratification.

3. La lassitude des populations d'Asie Mineure et d'une partie même des éléments nationalistes se manifeste et paraît propice à un rapprochement avec un Gouvernement de Constantinople renouvelé. On doit donc espérer qu'une mission, composée de personnalités turques, choisie par les Hauts-Commissaires et offrant toutes garanties de loyalisme, pourrait utilement éclairer les populations d'Anatolie sur les dispositions conciliantes du Gouvernement de Constantinople et des Puissances et procurerait des résultats importants. Le Gouvernement français estime d'ailleurs que cette commission ne doit pas être accompagnée de représentants alliés, dont la présence, en cas d'échec de la mission, compromettrait les Pui-

P. Sic. sur, renouvelé

sances. Les dispositions favorables des Alliées étant suffisamment connues, la commission n'aurait besoin de s'appuyer que sur une déclaration du Gouvernement de Constantinople tout en étant autorisé à le laisser entendre que les Alliés sont favorables à l'accord que poursuit la mission.

4. Les Hauts-Commissaires se concerteraient en même temps l'appui à donner au nouveau Gouvernement de Constantinople, notamment sous les formes suivantes:

- (a) Moyens financiers (avances, taxes douanières, utilisations de dépôts de banque, aliénation d'immeubles et de matériel, etc.) permettant au Gouvernement de reprendre son autorité sur les services publics actuellement sans ressources.
- (b) Constitution immédiate de la force publique de 15.000 hommes prévue par le traité, toutes garanties étant prises contre une défection que la situation nouvelle et l'affaiblissement de Mustapha Kémal rend d'ailleurs plus improbable qu'il y a quelques mois.

5. Aussitôt après la ratification du Traité, les Commissions internationales (Commission financière, Commission des Détroits, Commissions de Contrôle militaire) seront constituées. Le Gouvernement britannique a déjà fait connaître que, sauf réserves sur quelques points de détail, il donnait son adhésion aux propositions françaises actuellement soumises au Gouvernement italien.

La ratification du Traité de Paix une fois obtenue, les Commissions internationales pourront, en fait comme en droit, fonctionner régulièrement.

Les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres et à Rome ont été priés de communiquer les instructions qui précèdent aux Gouvernements britanniques et italien et d'insister pour que les trois Hauts-Commissaires soient invités à agir de concert dans le sens indiqué.

La même communication a été adressée à l'Ambassade royale d'Italie à Paris.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,*

*Le 12 octobre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 175, No. 147*

No. 139

*Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.*RAMLEH, *October 13, 1920.**(Received October 21.)**(No. 1144.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a report (with enclosures) by Major W. Batten, acting British agent, Jeddah, for the ten-day period ending the 30th September, 1920.

The person Omer Shakir mentioned in the report is the editor of the new Mecca newspaper "Al Falah", whilst Arif Bey is King Hussein's Syrian agricultural expert.

As Major Batten points out, the tone of Emir Abdullah's letter to Captain Nasiruddin does not preclude the possibility of an advance towards Syria after his arrival at Medina, but I think the Emir may be relied upon to forgo the honour of leading such an unpromising undertaking.

Copies of this despatch and enclosures have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &amp;c.

ERNEST SCOTT,  
*Acting High Commissioner.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 342, No. 263.*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 139

*Report by Major Batten for the period September 20 to 30, 1920.**Extract**(Secret) ✓**King Hussein and Mustapha Kemal.*

RUMOURS that Mustapha Kemal was in communication with King Hussein were reported to me about the 6th September.

Since then I have reported by telegram whatever has been able to be ascertained on the subject, but absolute proof is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.

An understanding between the King and Mustapha Kemal has been generally talked about in Mecca, and Captain Nasiruddin heard of it from many sources. Arif Bey was the most decisive, speaking as if he had seen the documents, and assumed that it existed, in his discussions as to



his possible propaganda in favour of King Hussein in India. Omer Shakir was equally definite, but being wary, talked of the assertion of it in "Al Falah" as if it had been copied from another paper. The heading of the first reference in "Al Falah" was: "Mustapha Kemal swears allegiance to King Hussein." After the denial in the "Qibla", "Al Falah", on the 22nd September, acknowledging the denial, stated that "it appears that the King has no official news about the matter" The stress lies on "official", and the wording seems to convey more than appears on the surface.

Omer Shakir himself said, in conversation with Captain Nasiruddin, that official denials do not prevent the parties concerned being aware of the matter.

None of the reports and information received here prove actually that communications have been exchanged, or that an understanding exists, but the reports, prior to the statement in "Al Falah", coupled with that statement and its denials, the assured manner in which Arif Bey referred to the understanding, when discussing another subject, and, finally, the fact of your having received reports to the same effect independently, together with the inherent probability of an understanding in view of the present political situation, all point to some such understanding being in existence.

I reported that Omer Shakir was leaving for the north. This was after news of the alleged sweeping successes against the French. He received orders at the last minute to postpone his departure, apparently owing to the bad news since received.

It does not appear he was the actual bearer of any communications from Mustapha Kemal, though he knew of them \*.

FO. 406/44, p. 343, No. 263/1.

\* Raporun öteki bölümleri Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile ilgili değil. Buraya alınmadı.

No. 140

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 14, 1920.

(Received October 17.)

(No. 1103.) D.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram No. 1100 of 13th October.

When on the point of despatching telegram under reference I received letter from French colleague, marked "very secret and personal", in which he said he had just received from Paris a telegram to the effect that, as

result of exchange of views between capitals, three Governments recognised necessity of immediate agreement in order to expedite ratification and application of treaty. Action was based on community of views existing between the three Governments. French colleague was instructed to concert urgently with myself and Italian colleague measures necessary to carry through the programme of which the following is summary:—

1. Ratification of treaty by Sultan to be obtained without delay by Allied joint action.

2. Resignation of present Cabinet to be brought about immediately after ratification of treaty and new Ministry to be formed of persons selected by High Commissioners and adapted to bring Nationalists into line.

3. New Government to send Anatolian mission composed of persons selected by High Commissioners and presenting fullest guarantee of loyal attitude. Mission to explain real situation, benevolent intentions of the Powers for reconstruction of Turkey, uselessness and danger of resistance to treaty, and advantages to Turkey of restored unity. Mission not to be accompanied by Allied representatives, as this would increase the difficulties surrounding any subsequent attempt at settlement in case of failure. Mission to be backed by declaration of Constantinople Government and to explain that action of Government had support of the Allies.

4. High Commissioners to examine means of helping new Government by advance, consent to new taxation and sale of Government property, and immediate formation of force of 15,000 men contemplated in treaty with the necessary precautions against desertions.

5. Allies to proceed as soon as treaty is ratified with constitution of various commissions, early functioning of which is in the interests of both Turkey and Allies.

From verbal explanation of French colleague at meeting on 13th October I gather the above represents not so much the agreed programme of Allies as French Government's conception of logical results of their exchange of views. He said that French Government had put it up to London and Rome with the request that British and Italian Governments should instruct their High Commissioners similarly, and he admitted that he could not ask us to join him in action until we had received definite instructions. I trust therefore that I may be in time to point out grave objections to proposed programme.

No. 141

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 14, 1920

*(Received October 18.)*

No. 1104

*(Telegraphic)*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

French programme would involve complete departure from principle hitherto observed of not interfering directly in question of constitution of Turkish Government.

Also later suggestion that we should force present Government to ratify treaty and then force Sultan to dismiss it hardly requires comment. My repugnance to conduct so far short of decent standards would make it difficult for me personally to carry this part of programme through. There are, however, serious objections of expediency as well. You know my reasons for fearing that if Sultan is tried too far he may abdicate. I have hitherto considered balance of probability to be against his doing so, but French proposals would increase chance of it greatly. Owing to strict secrecy of communications which have reached me I am precluded from disclosing to my colleagues how definite are grounds for apprehension.

I have, however, told them that proposed course would place Sultan in position so impossible that he might resign rather than tolerate it.

If Sultan abdicated we should have in present heir apparent successor notoriously hostile to treaty. Even if he did not repudiate ratification by his predecessor as unconstitutional he would leave nothing undone to infuse new life into Nationalist opposition. Even if Sultan consented to remain after indignity of being forced to dismiss only Minister in whom he has personal confidence, after that Minister had been used to force him to ratify treaty, our position would be no better than at present.

Ministry composed of puppets of High Commissioners would certainly possess no authority, and unless we were prepared to take over Government ourselves outcome would be Government of extreme anti-Nationalists without Ferid's sense of responsibility or much more probable Government of definite Nationalist sympathies with whom neither we nor Sultan could work.

We should be taking leap into darker darkness than ever, and in doing so we should be assuming maximum responsibility consequently.

As regards proposed mission, opinions vary widely as to chances of success, but such as they are they would certainly be much diminished by refusal to send Allied delegates. In any case High Commissioners have already committed themselves to promise to send delegates.

Continuation in my telegram immediately following.

*FO. 406/44, p. 176, No. 149*

No. 142

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 14, 1920.

*(Received October 18.)*

*(No. 1105.)*

*(Telegraphic.) D.*

I CAN suggest no better alternative policy than following in the present difficult situation:—

1. Proceed with mission on lines agreed between High Commissioners.
2. Continue to urge on Turkish Government immediate ratification, but refrain from exerting strong pressure, at least until Allied ratifications are definitely in sight.
3. Leave local political situation to develop on its own lines, i.e., make no attempt to keep Ferid in power or to drive him from power.
4. Dissuade Sultan, as and when opportunities offer, from regarding his personal position as bound up in that of any particular Ministry.
5. Prepare quite definitely for the contingency of the failure of mission, i.e., decide at once on course of action in that event, recognising that if Nationalists have to be quelled by force, and if force to be used is Turkish, Allies must help Turkish Government financially and with officers to organise army and gendarmerie, and that such organisation must necessarily be affair of five or six months.
6. Proceed with constitution of financial and military commissions, especially former, without further delay and without awaiting ratification of treaty even by Turkey.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 176, No. 150*

No. 143

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 14, 1920.

(Received October 22.)

(No. 1408. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1100 of the 13th October, I have the honour to state that my French and Italian colleagues and myself were received by the Sultan on the 11th October in consequence of a request made by His Majesty through the Grand Vizier on the 6th October.

2. The Sultan received us successively in order of precedence, i.e., French, British, Italian. He kept my French colleague about an hour and a quarter, myself about two hours and a quarter, and the Acting Italian High Commissioner an hour and a half. He was attended by Emin Bey, Director of the Civil List, but at my audience he requested Mr. Ryan to interpret, in order to avoid the necessity for using three languages, and during the latter part of the interview he dismissed Emin Bey.

3. The Sultan was less nervous than when he first received the High Commissioners. He conveyed the impression of having been carefully coached by Ferid Pasha, who appears to enjoy his entire confidence, and he spoke from short notes, which had probably been prepared in consultation with the Grand Vizier. He confirmed my previous impression that he is man of little force of character, but of no mean intelligence, and he displayed the same tenacity in clinging to a point which I had remarked at my previous interview. He was somewhat discursive and at times difficult to follow, but in the main lines of what he said he was clear and consistent.

4. I had prepared for my guidance a note of what I wished to say on various subjects. At an appropriate moment in the conversation I gave His Majesty a Turkish translation of this, undated and unsigned, explaining that it was in the nature of a verbal communication reduced to writing for the sake of convenience. I enclose a copy of the English original of this note.

5. The Sultan began by intimating that the reply to the joint note presented to the Grand Vizier on the 7th October regarding the proposed mission to Anatolia would be an acceptance. He expressed gratification at the willingness of the High Commissioners to attach delegates of their own to the mission. He promised to give the mission his full support but observed pointedly that such support could be moral only and not material. On my saying that his support would contribute greatly to the mission's chances of success, he observed that moral forces had lost much of their efficacy

during the war, and asked whether it might not be better if moral and material influences mutually reinforced each other. By this he appeared to mean that it would have been better to adopt the plan of combining conciliation with a display of force in dealing with the Nationalists, but he did not press the point.

6. The point which he did press, and that very strongly, was that the mission should go to admonish and to call for submission, and must not brook discussion or any attempt on the other side to formulate conditions. There should, he said, be a very clear understanding as to what action should be taken if the Nationalists refused to submit, and he asked what that action would be. I agreed that the question was important, and I promised to submit it for your Lordship's instructions.

7. His Majesty indicated not obscurely his apprehension lest the Allied delegates with the mission, whose role would be even more important than that of the Turkish members, might be more disposed than himself to make concessions to the Nationalists, and he was clearly anxious to establish the point that for them too the mission must have the character described in the previous paragraph.

8. He made great use of the argument that the Nationalist leaders had outraged in their persons and interests great numbers of his loyal subjects in Anatolia, and he dwelt on the difficulty of remitting the penalties entailed by such crimes. He spoke of the repulsion with which too wide a clemency would inspire the victims of the outrages, and he insisted that their rights, which had been contravened, derived from God, and that even a sovereign had not the right to condone the violation of them.

9. The Sultan made a strong appeal for financial assistance from the Allies. He spoke not as a Sovereign, but as the father of his people, and he drew a moving picture of the prospect ahead of the population of Constantinople, so largely dependent, directly and indirectly, on salaries, already plunged in distress in the mild season of the year and faced with the blackest misery during the coming winter. I took the opportunity of emphasising the importance for everyone of constituting the Financial Commission, and getting it to work in anticipation of the coming into force of the treaty.

10. Returning to the subject of the mission, the Sultan asked my private advice as to who the Turkish members should be. He said he had been a hermit in his own country and knew no one. To speak quite frankly, he considered that the only policy for his country was to stand in with Great Britain, and he needed my help and guidance in his choice. I said that I was not prepared to suggest names on the spur of the moment, but that I would take advice on the subject. On my mentioning my foreign colleagues, he demurred to my consulting them at his instance.

11. After the withdrawal of the official in attendance on him, the Sultan spoke in great confidence of his personal attitude. He said that his policy of reliance on Great Britain was based on settled convictions which he had inherited from his father and had held unchanged for forty years. He would have shrunk from the burden of sovereignty on the late Sultan's sudden death had he not seen that the war was near its close, and had he not hoped that a sovereign who could hold out an unstained hand to England would be received back into an ancient friendship. He had worked for a separate peace and failed. Then had come the armistice, thanks to the mediation of General Townshend, but peace had not followed as he hoped, and all he had sought to do since had been ineffectual. He was now threatened with the advent to power of the Nationalists, who were merely an evolution of the Committee of Union and Progress, men with whom he could not work without the sacrifice of his principles and his honour. He did not mind, he said, sacrificing his health, which was unequal to the strain imposed upon it, but he had not upheld his principles throughout a lifetime only to abandon them when he was close upon 60 years of age.

12. Throughout this part of the conversation, which was of an intimate nature, the Sultan showed that the question of his personal future was greatly preoccupying him.

13. In the latter part of the conversation the Sultan reverted to the question of ratification of the treaty, which he had mentioned in passing earlier, and with which I had dealt in my note. He expressed the view, which is widely held, that if Turkey were to take the lead in ratifying the treaty it would add fuel to the flames in Anatolia, as the Nationalists would accuse the Government of not having merely submitted to, but willed, the treaty which deprived Turkey of so much.

14. The Sultan also asked me very confidentially what I thought of the suggestion which my French colleague had just made to him, that a change of Government would conduce greatly to the success of the proposed mission. I said that I had expressed my views in the note which he had read, and I added nothing except a further non-committal observation.

15. The Sultan laid great stress on the argument that any moderate-serving Cabinet which might now take power would be merely a stepping-stone to a Government of a definitely nationalist complexion. "We would be going back to last year", he exclaimed. And again, "The only neutral people in this country are the people who are capable of nothing."

16. Except in those parts of the conversation which I have indicated as confidential the Sultan seems to have held very much the same language

to my colleagues as to myself, and to have spoken from the same notes. We all brought away the impression that His Majesty would be very loth to part with Ferid Pasha.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
High Commissioner.

FO. 406/44, p. 178-179, No. 155

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 143

*Note handed to the Sultan by High Commissioner.  
General Situation.*

(Confidential.)

YOUR Majesty has doubtless been informed of the important communication made by the High Commissioners to the Sublime Porte on the 7th October.

This communication was made after prolonged consideration. It has been suggested that the action now recommended is inconsistent with the attitude taken up by your Majesty's Government at the instance of the High Commissioners six months ago. The High Commissioners do not so consider it. There are new elements in the situation which did not exist then. The Peace Treaty is now a *fait accompli*. The so-called National movement has proved its incapacity to make good the boasts in which its leaders indulged last year. It has become clear to all thinking men that persistence in the course advocated by the extremists can only involve Turkey in fresh disasters. The Allies do not desire that such disasters should overtake Turkey. They wish the Peace Treaty as it stands to be the foundation of Turkey's future. They are not prepared to modify it in Turkey's favour, but they do not wish either that it should become necessary to modify it to Turkey's disadvantage. The High Commissioners consider that the moment has come to represent all this very clearly to every element in the country, and to give every one who truly desires the good of the country an opportunity to rally round your Majesty's throne and person on the basis of acceptance of the treaty. They hope that it may be possible by purely means to bring the great majority to this way of thinking. In recommending the use of such means they have been influenced by a desire to avoid useless civil war, and by a consideration of the difficulties from a financial and military point of view of organising effective forces of repression in any near future. They are willing to attach representatives of their own to the proposed mission in order to increase its chances of success.



*Ratification.*

The British Government would have preferred to see the treaty ratified by Turkey before the despatch of the proposed mission. There is only one way in which the treaty can be ratified and that is by an act of your Majesty. Turkey has not, therefore, the same reasons for delay as the Allied Powers, which cannot ratify until their Parliaments have re-assembled. Ratification by Turkey would be welcomed in Europe as a proof of sincerity and good intentions in regard to the execution of the treaty, and would show people in Anatolia that the Government had not signed the treaty merely to gain time, but had done so with a serious intention and from a conviction that no other way of salvation lay open to Turkey.

*Turkish Government.*

It is thought in certain circles that the proposed mission would have better chances of success if the Government under whose advice your Majesty despatched it were less repugnant to the so-called Nationalists than the Government now in power. This is a question which deserves your Majesty's careful consideration, and it is one which only your Majesty can decide. I could not presume to offer advice on the subject, because to do so would be to depart from the rule which my predecessor and I have followed since the armistice of not seeking to influence your Majesty's choice of Ministers. This rule has only once been departed from, and on that occasion only a subordinate Minister was in question. The British High Commission has on no occasion sought to bring about the fall, the advent to power or the maintenance in power of any particular statesman. My only desire is that Turkey should have the Government best suited to guide her through her difficulties, and I repeat that it is for your Majesty to decide whether the new turn of events renders desirable a change of Government either now or at a later stage, if, as is possible, the Nationalists should make such a change a condition of compliance with your Majesty's orders.

Before leaving this subject I would like to say that, whatever may be the necessities of the new situation, I cannot express too strongly my sense of the services which the present Grand Vizier has rendered to the cause of peace and the loyalty with which he has worked with myself and my colleagues. I know well that in this he has only carried out your Majesty's orders. I am confident that, whatever turn events may take, your Majesty will continue to exercise the wise guidance with which you have directed the course of events during the difficult period of the armistice. I look forward to a time when, after the restoration of peace, your Majesty will, as

Sultan of a new Turkey, be able to assure the destinies of your country and the prosperity of your subjects in happier conditions.

*Finance.*

My colleague and I have been much preoccupied with the grave financial situation to which this country has been reduced. The Allied Governments themselves have had to make enormous sacrifices during and since the war, and financial difficulties exist everywhere. They are bound to consider their own interests, but I beg your Majesty to believe that they are to the necessity of restoring the financial position of Turkey. This must take time, and the conviction of the British Government is that no serious improvement can be effected until the Financial Commission contemplated in the treaty is instituted. They have appointed their own commissioner, and they would like to see the commission start work in anticipation of the entry into force of the treaty as a whole. I would point out that many of the financial and economic clauses have been drafted in a sense entirely favourable to Turkish interests. People talk too much of the smallness of the new Turkey; even with its new limits it will be a considerable country, full of natural sources of wealth. The Financial Commission should be able to bring it to a high level of prosperity. It is evident that the sooner it makes a beginning, the sooner will it be able to devise means of alleviating the present difficulties and laying the foundations of future prosperity.

*FO. 406/44, p. 180-181, No. 155/1*

No. 144

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 15, 1920.

(Received October 18.)

(No. 1107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

RELIABLE information received to the effect that serious anti-Nationalist movement broke out in sanjaks of Konia and Isbarta about 7th October.

Conflict was expected between Kemalist forces and insurgents collected about 40 miles north of Konia.

*FO. 406/44, p. 177, No. 151*

No. 145

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 15th, 1920

(Received October 17.)

Telegraphic

Decypher

No. 1108

Your telegram No. 937.

However anxious we may be to secure release of our prisoners in nationalist hands, afraid that it is not at present practicable owing to difficulty of negotiating. I understand that military authorities have been for some time endeavouring to do so but that Mustapha Kemal has hitherto refused to treat with them\*.

If Commission now under discussion should materialize and include Allied elements, our representatives might be authorised to take up question with nationalist leaders.

No difficulty need arise on the side of the Turkish Government, though if certain political deportees should be (? selected) and (? I consider) it might, as you point out, be desirable to stipulate that they should not be allowed at present to return to Turkey.

FO. 371/5090/E. 12831

\* İstanbul'daki İngiliz Komutanlığı, eski Sadrazam Ahmet İzzet Paşa aracılığıyla Anadolu'daki İngiliz tutsakları konusunda Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile görüşmek istemişti. Ancak Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya yazılan mektubu yetkisiz bir binbaşı imzalamıştı. İzzet Paşa bunu Muzaffer Bey adında bir yüzbaşıyla 25 Haziranda Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya yolladı. Tam Sevr andlaşmasının imzalanacağı sıraya rastlayan, üstelik ciddilikten uzak olan bu İngiliz girişimini Mustafa Kemal Paşa reddetti. İngiliz subayları, Anadolu'da rehlin tutulan İngiliz tutsaklarını kurtarmak istiyorlardı, ama bunların karşılığında Malta'ya sürülen Türkleri salıvermeyi düşünmüyorlardı. Üstelik İngilizler Anadolu'da kurulan yeni Türk Devletini hor gören bir tutum içindeydiler. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, 12 Ağustos 1920 günü Ahmet İzzet Paşa'ya şunları yazdı:

"... Müslüman ve bilhassa Türk olunca insan hayatına zerre kadar kıymet vermen ve bu itibarla dahi Türkiye hakkındaki suikastın bin türlü âsârını göstermekten zevk duyan İngilizlerin... birkaç İngilizin hayatı endişesiyle vaki muhaberelelerinin tarz-ı serdinde bile... zannolunduğundan çok kavi ve rasih bir Hükümet-i milliye tesis eylemiş olan bir milleti halâ istihlaf ve istihkâr etmek nahveti icra-i tesirinden hali kalmamıştır..."

"Mübadele-i üsra gibi görüşmek arzu ettikleri mesail Hükümetçe Hükümete yazılır, görüşülür ve merasiminc de bu itibarla riayet olunur hususattan bulunduğu cihetle İngilizlerin terk-i nahvetle bu tarik-i düstüvü ihtiyarları halinde ikinci teklifin nazar-ı dikkate alınması câiz olabilir..."

(Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Türkiye - İngiltere, Kutu 48, Dosya 2).

No. 146

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 17, 1920.

*(Received October 18.)**(No. 1116.)**(Telegraphic.) R.*

My telegram No. 1103 of 14th October.

Damad Ferid resigned on 16th October, but no public announcement has yet been made. Sultan is understood to have consulted Tewfik Pasha.

FO. 406/44, p. 177, No. 152

No. 147

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 18, 1920.

*(Received November 1.)**(No. 1420.)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1100 of the 13th October\*, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the joint note addressed to the Grand Vizier by the Allied High Commissioners on the 7th October.

2. The Grand Vizier's note to the High Commissioners of the 20th September was enclosed in my despatch of the 24th September\*\*, and the preliminary reply returned by the High Commissioners on the 22nd September was enclosed in my despatch of the 20th October, 1920.

I have, &amp;c. ↓ ११

J. M. DE ROBECK  
High Commissioner.

... FO. 406/44, p. 190, No. 166

\* Belge No. 137

\*\* Belge No. 119

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 147

*Joint Note addressed to Grand Vizier.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 7 octobre 1920.

POUR faire suite à la note en date du 22 du mois passé qu'ils ont adressée à son Altesse le Grand-Vizir en réponse à sa communication du 20 septembre 1920, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Altesse que leurs Gouvernements sont unanimes à estimer qu'il est urgent, tant dans l'intérêt de la Turquie que dans celui des Alliés, de mettre un terme aux difficultés et aux dangers résultant de la situation en Anatolie et que le règlement de cette situation ne doit et ne peut être, dans les circonstances actuelles, poursuivi que par des moyens de conciliation.

Les Gouvernements alliés sont d'avis que le seul moyen à employer est l'envoi en Anatolie d'une commission chargée d'exposer la situation exacte résultant de la signature du traité, la nécessité d'exécuter les clauses de ce traité, les dangers devant résulter pour la Turquie de la prolongation du présent état de choses et le devoir impérieux qu'ont, en conséquence, tous les sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de se rallier au Gouvernement légal.

Les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont pas manqué d'examiner, avec l'attention qu'elles comportent, les objections soulevées par le Grand-Vizir contre ce projet, tel qu'ils le conçoivent, lorsqu'il a été porté verbalement à la connaissance de son Altesse, le 25 septembre. Si de leur côté ils reconnaissent le bien-fondé de quelques-unes de ces objections, ils n'en sont pas moins pénétrés de la conviction que les conditions auxquelles son Altesse a voulu subordonner son acceptation de leur proposition sont en ce moment irréalisables, vu les difficultés qui entoureraient le recrutement et l'équipement d'une force de répression, le manque total de moyens pécuniaires, et la situation de fait qui existe, dans les nombreuses régions de l'Anatolie qui reconnaissent une autorité autre que celle du Gouvernement légitime.

Les Hauts-Commissaires estiment donc qu'avant de penser à d'autres mesures, il faut entamer une action rapide, et par conséquent donner à la commission, au moins d'abord, un caractère purement pacifique, n'exclure la possibilité de pourparlers avec aucune des personnes avec lesquelles cette commission parviendra à entrer en contact, et la faire partir dans les conditions les plus aptes à contribuer au succès de ses efforts. Ils considèrent en outre que, pour aboutir aux résultats espérés, cette commission doit nécessairement être composée de personnalités choisies d'accord avec les Hauts-Commissaires alliés et non seulement jouissant d'une haute autorité

et de l'estime générale, mais en outre susceptibles d'inspirer confiance à tous ceux à qui elle aura à s'adresser et, par suite, de les ramener au devoir envers le souverain et le pays.

FO. 406/44, p. 190-191, No. 166/1

No. 148

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 19, 1920.

(Received October 21.)

(No. 1120.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

My telegram No. 1116 of 17th October\*.

Ferid's resignation has now been announced officially.

Reason given is ill-health. He remains to transact business until successor is appointed.

Ferid realised that his position was rapidly becoming untenable and bowed to the inevitable.

Language held by French High Commissioner to Sultan undoubtedly contributed greatly to his fall.

Sultan offered Grand Vizierate to Tewfik Pasha on 17th October. Tewfik Pasha called on French High Commissioner and myself on 18th October. He seemed to have every intention of accepting office, and said he hoped to complete his Cabinet by 21st October.

Principal points raised in conversation with me were following:—

*Mission to Anatolia.*— He seemed to think what was contemplated was Allied Mission, with Turkish delegate attached. I explained that proposal was to send Ottoman Mission, to which, however, High Commissioners had expressed readiness to attach Allied delegates. I said that I was personally inclined to think that participation if Allied delegates would increase chances of success, but I was in correspondence with you on the subject, as difference of opinion had manifested itself as to desirability of such participation. Tewfik Pasha declined to express opinion either way until he could consult future colleagues.

*Financial and Economic.*—Tewfik Pasha insisted on need for immediate assistance on finance matters. I will telegraph further after consulting Sir A. Block.

\* Belge No. 146

*Ratification of Treaty.*—I emphasised importance attached by His Majesty's Government to very early ratification by Turkey. Tewfik Pasha avoided expression of personal views, but described attitude of Sultan as being that, as he would not have Parliament behind him, he would gravely compromise his position in country by taking initiative, whereas he could very well ratify without Parliament after one or two Allies had first done so. This is in agreement with what Sultan himself said to me on 11th October. Tewfik Pasha added, rather significantly, that if Sultan took initiative now he would be merely complying unofficial verbal suggestions, and would not be able to justify himself by reference to official demand of Allies.

In view of this remark and of fact that it would no longer be question of using Ferid to obtain ratification and then insisting on his dismissal, I now see no objection to presentation of joint formal demand for immediate ratification.

FO. 406/44, p. 177-178, No. 154

No. 149

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 21, 1920.

(Received October 25.)

(No. 1139.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

My immediately preceding telegram gives the list of new Cabinet which took office to-day, 21st October\*.

✓ Cabinet is evidently intended to be one of "safe", even of moderate Nationalist, leanings—Ministry of conciliation, in fact.

✓ Most significant selection is that of ex-Grand Vizier Izzet Pasha for Minister of the Interior. He is generally credited with strong Nationalist sympathies, but he has kept very quiet for a long time past.

Imperial decree appointing new Grand Vizier is very short and entirely colourless.

FO. 406/44, p. 189, No. 163

\* Amiral de Robeck, 21 Ekim 1920 tarihli, 1138 sayılı telgrafiyle yeni Hükümet üyelerini şöyle bildirmişti:

Grand Vizier, Tewfik Pasha.

Sheik-ul-Islam and Acting Minister of Pious Foundations, Nouri Effendi.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seyfa (Sefa) Bey.

Minister of the Interior, Izzet Pasha.

Minister of War, General Zia Pasha.

Minister of Marine, Salih Pasha.

Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works till return of Titular from abroad, Rashid Bey.

Minister of Public Works, Abdullah Bey.

Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and Acting Minister of Justice, Hussein Kiazim Bey.

Public Instruction, Reshid Pasha.

Council of State, Mustafa Arif Bey.

(F.O. 406/44, p. 189, No. 162)

No. 150

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 22, 1920.

(Received November 8.)

(No. 1450.)

My Lord,

THE fall of Damad Ferid Pasha from power marks the beginning of yet another new phase in the history of Turkey since the termination of hostilities, and provides a suitable occasion for submitting to your Lordship a connected review of the general course of events in this country since the date of my despatch No. 575 of the 22nd April. I seize the opportunity the more willingly as the departure of Damad Ferid Pasha almost coincides with the completion of the second year of the Great Armistice, and as I am myself on the point of relinquishing my duties as High Commissioner.

2. I explained in the despatch just mentioned how the logic of the situation following the occupation of Constantinople on the 16th March had necessitated the advent to power of a frankly anti-Nationalist Government. It may indeed be said that that was the principal consequence of the occupation, for otherwise the position here since the 16th March has differed little from what it was before. I expressed doubt, however, as to whether the new anti-Nationalist Government could hope to reduce the Nationalists to submission, if the peace were to be a drastic one, and I foreshadowed the danger of attempting to impose such a peace, unless the Allies were prepared to see it through by force of arms.

3. In one respect my previsions have been fully justified by the event. Every endeavour of the Central Government to use force against the Nationalists has been a failure. The experiment of employing irregular levies produced mere disorder in the areas disputed between the Central Government and the Kemalists. All attempts to organise regular forces of repression



have hitherto been equally sterile, and the preparations which are now being made are attended by no better prospect of success. It is the considered opinion of the British military authorities here that, even if adequate financial resources were assured, which they are not, it would be impossible to organise, equip, and train even a small effective force without the assistance of Allied officers, and without devoting months to the task.

4. In another respect I must admit myself to have been in the wrong, in that I took an unduly gloomy view of the effects of the utilisation of Greek troops to enforce a drastic peace. Djafer Tayyer Bey returned to Thrace on the 1st May in circumstances which are still obscure, and to which it is now not worth while to recur, beyond saying that the Grand Vizier was personally violently opposed to his being allowed to go, and that the French military authorities insisted on it. Although he no longer held any official position he continued to be the leading spirit in the defence movement, but when the time came for the Greeks to occupy the new territory assigned to them under the Peace Treaty the movement collapsed, and the Greek advance was unattended by either difficulties or horrors. On the Asiatic side also the provisional occupation by the Greeks of territory outside that assigned to them by the treaty has produced no serious consequences. Their behaviour has been in the main exemplary, and they have been received in some places with resignation, in others with positive relief.

5. The return of Djafer Tayyer to Thrace was not followed by an open renewal of the cleavage between Thrace and the Central Government. The Grand Vizier had, as I have said, personally opposed his going, but once he was back in Adrianople there seems to have been a tacit understanding by which Djafer Tayyer was not to attack the Greeks in their then positions, but was not debarred from resisting if they entered Eastern Thrace. The position between Constantinople and Adrianople until the Greeks did advance was one of unstable equilibrium based on nominal submission to the Central Government.

6. The position in Anatolia has been very different. Throughout the whole of the period now under review, the Central Government has been unable to exercise even nominal authority outside what is little more than a suburban area. If the Nationalists have not established themselves on the very shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles it is because they are held off by British and Greek troops. They have set up a *de facto* Government at Angora. This Government exercises effective control in every part of Asia Minor not in foreign occupation. It claims to be the lawful Government of the whole of Turkey. It professes loyalty to the Sultan, but it declares him to be a prisoner in the hands of the Allies, and consequently incapable of exercising the authority normally vested in him.

It has invented the theory that all power is therefore vested in the "Great National Assembly", which opened its proceedings at Angora on or about the 23rd April. Among the earliest resolutions passed by the Assembly was one formally denying the competency of any peace delegates not named by itself to enter into arrangements regulating the destinies of Turkey.

7. The Angora Government and its satellites impose almost intolerable burdens on the population, but even where they are most hated they are feared, and they have been strong enough to quell such local risings as have hitherto been attempted against them. Dissension is rife among the leading spirits, and the military leaders of the movement have been much criticised for their failure to stay the Greek advance. There are no signs, however, of real disintegration. The movement is still in being, and the measure of its leaders' audacity is given by the recent invasion of Armenia.

8. The attitude of the *de facto* Government of Anatolia towards the Allies has been clear and consistent. For them the position is not armistice but war. Nationalist forces attacked the British at Ismidt towards the middle of June, and they resisted a French landing at Heraclea about the same time. Such of the leaders as disapproved of the former adventure deprecated it not as a crime but as a blunder. British officers have for months been held as prisoners of war in the interior. When General Gourand (*sic*) sent his Chief Political Officer to Angora in May, Mustafa Kemal accorded a short-term armistice in Cilicia, but he refused to renew it when it expired. The *de facto* Government has entered into relations with our *de facto* enemies, the Bolsheviks. The Angora news bulletins advertise military operations on half a dozen anti-Allied fronts, among which Mesopotamia is very significantly included. A distinction is made, indeed, in favour of the Italians, whose presence at Adalia and elsewhere is temporarily condoned. They are no longer regarded as being solid with the Allies, but as being rather the natural supporters of Nationalist Turkey in the struggle against an Anglo-Franco-Hellenic peace. The British are singled out for special hatred, and France is sometimes regarded as a potential friend, but in all essentials the Nationalist attitude towards the French is that of enemies engaged in active warfare.

9. The position of the Central Government throughout the whole period has been one of constantly increasing difficulty. When Ferid Pasha returned to office early in April, he fell into two capital errors. His optimism lead him to suppose that his advent to power might avail to mitigate the peace terms. His sense of logic mislead him into believing that because he and the Allies were alike anti-Nationalist, the Allies, and especially the British, would make common cause with him in his endeavours to reduce Anatolia. The last six mounths have been one long disillusionment as

regards the second of these beliefs, for any Allied action against the Nationalists has been independent of, though parallel with, the unfruitful efforts of the Central Government. As for the former belief, the announcement of the peace terms on the 10th May dissipated the illusion that any Turkish Government, however constituted, could hope for mercy as Turks understood it, i.e., a favourable territorial settlement.

10. The political history of Constantinople during the three months which elapsed between the presentation of the peace terms and the signature of the treaty is one of obscure intrigue, and need only be dealt with in its roughest outlines. In taking Reshid Bey into the Cabinet which took office on the 5th April, Ferid Pasha tried a wise but dangerous experiment. It broke down as was almost inevitable, on a personal rivalry, which was accentuated as a result of the *chassé-croisé* of the two statesmen between Constantinople and Paris. Eventually a group formed round Reshid Bey in the Cabinet, which stood, or appeared for purposes of home politics to stand, on a platform of non-acceptance of the treaty, and which seemed to lean somewhat towards the Nationalists. A trial of strength took place towards the end of July, and Ferid won. He resigned on the 30th July and returned to power the following day with a Cabinet in which several posts were held by politicians of pronounced views belonging to the Moderate *Entente libérale* Party, i.e., the more important of the two factions into which the old anti-Committee *Entente libérale* had broken some little time before.

11. A very select Crown Council convened shortly before the change of Government had already endorsed, with only one dissentient voice, the policy of signing the treaty. Fresh delegates had been despatched to Paris for this purpose even before the change, and these delegates signed the treaty on the 10th August under instructions from a Cabinet completely committed to that policy. From the beginning, however, this Cabinet, like its predecessor, had within it discordant elements. Ferid Pasha had become increasingly difficult for any colleagues with strong views to work with owing to his desire to concentrate all authority in his own hands. The support of the Moderate *Entente libérale* was half-hearted, and eventually, on the 19th September, the two leading representatives of this group in the Cabinet presented their resignations. They were supported, to the general surprise, by Ali Kemal Bey, the most powerful writer on the anti-Committee and anti-Nationalist side, a man who up to a short time before had been Ferid Pasha's leading henchman in the press and was by many regarded as his evil genius.

12. These dissidents claimed to have abandoned Ferid Pasha because of his slackness *vis-à-vis* of the Nationalists in Anatolia. The alternative explanation offered by their enemies was that they had been won over to the Italian interest. It was even asserted by the scandal-mongers that

the wilderness into which Ali Kemal had wandered was provisioned with manna dispensed by the Salonica Jew financier, Carasso, now become an Italian subject, and a creature of M. Giolitti. Whatever the real motives of the dissidents, their coup failed, and Ferid Pasha survived their defection with a slightly rearranged Cabinet. He had, however, sustained too many shocks to last long. Shaken by a recent illness surrounded by abuses of which he was ignorant or which he was not strong enough to check, unpopular with almost every element in the country, whether sympathetic or opposed to the Nationalists, beset with financial difficulties, credited with responsibility for all the extravagances of an over-zealous president whom he had appointed to the court-martial, and accused of having pushed his personal despotism to Hamidian extremes, he was left in the end with practically no support save that of the Sultan.

13. The Sultan, so far as he can be judged from a short experience, is a man of weak character, highly-strung and at present over-wrought, cautious to the verge of timidity, but not without personal convictions, and certainly not devoid of mental grasp. Ferid Pasha's credit with him rests on a close family connection, a friendship of long standing, and a certain community of temperament and outlook. The Grand Vizier's influence was perhaps impaired by the unfortunate episode of the Heir Apparent, which I reported in my despatch No. 1336 of the 23rd September, 1920. His critics maintain that even before that incident, and more than ever after it, Ferid Pasha maintained his hold on the Sultan only by persuading His Majesty that he was *persona grata* to the Allies as no other Grand Vizier could be. I cannot think so poorly of the Sultan's intelligence as to accept this as the sole explanation of his reluctance to part with Ferid. In any case, any illusion on the part of His Majesty as to Ferid's indispensability from the point of view of the Allies was dispelled on the 11th August, when the Allied High Commissioners were received in audience and explained to him direct their view of the general situation.

14. My French colleague had for many weeks before this event displayed an implacable hostility, in a political sense, towards Ferid Pasha. His constant cry at every meeting held to consider the position in Anatolia was that no rapprochement with Constantinople was possible so long as Ferid remained in power. He lost no opportunity of urging me to join him in action at the Porte or the Palace to secure the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. Ferid Pasha's attitude at certain moments towards the High Commissioners' proposals for *rapprochement* gave M. Defrance a handle which he was not slow to use. When the matter came to a head, I declined to join in any demand for the Grand Vizier's dismissal. I agreed, however, when [we discussed beforehand the general nature of the language to be held to

the Sultan on the 11th August, to base myself on a formula which would make it clear that I held no brief for Ferid Pasha's maintenance in office.

15. M. DeFrance strained this formula to the utmost to suit his own views and practically told the Sultan that he regarded Ferid's departure as a necessary condition of the pacification of Anatolia. My own language was less categorical. I drew His Majesty's attention to the existence in certain quarters of a belief that Ferid Pasha's personality of itself constituted an obstacle to a reconciliation, but I disclaimed any pretension to influence his choice of Ministers, which, I said, was a matter that only His Majesty could decide. The Sultan gave no sign in his conversation with me, or so far as I know with my colleagues, of any lack of confidence in Ferid Pasha; but the Grand Vizier himself realised that his position had at last become untenable and he resigned on the 16th October. He was succeeded on the 21st October by Tewfik Pasha, with a Cabinet composed of Ministers who may be described as men of moderate Nationalist sympathies, but sober minds.

16. This result must be accounted a diplomatic victory for M. DeFrance, through it is far from clear what his real object was in fighting for it, over whom he would conceive himself to have achieved, it or what eventual advantage to French interests he hoped to secure. The solution of these riddles must be sought in an obscure suspicion, of which I fear M. DeFrance has never disabused himself, that Ferid Pasha is in some sense a political protégé or even creature of the British Government, and in the fact that the French are endeavouring to combine two radically incompatible policies in their attitude towards the Nationalists. They see in the more moderate members of that party the future rulers of Turkey, with whose aid they hope to carry through a policy of economic and cultural penetration, but at the same time they realise that the Nationalist movement is irreconcilable to their pretensions in Syria and the future French zone of influence.

17. For myself I see no reason to regret the disappearance of Ferid Pasha at the present juncture, except in so far as it adds to the uncertainties of the future. It is very possible that, if the newly-formed Government proves to be not repugnant to the Nationalists, and yet sincerely willing to submit to the treaty, positive advantages may ensue from the change. Whatever may be the requirements of the future, however, it is only just to Ferid Pasha to say that during the last six months he has rendered manful service to the cause of peace. He has many defects, not the least of which is his inability to choose or to use capable subordinates, but he has shown not a few of the qualities of statesmanship, and he has acted with a rare signleness of purpose. He has not been deterred from his task by the physical danger of

assassination, nor shrunk from the obloquy so readily showered on Ministers in times of national disaster. Office could have few attractions for him, and though, after accepting it, he developed violent political passions, I believe his leading motive throughout to have been to save what might be saved of his country, and to serve a sovereign who was also his friend. I believe him, moreover, to be perfectly sincere in his professions of anxiety that the policy of Turkey should have a definitely British orientation. I have said that I do not regret his departure at the present juncture, but I should be much more disposed to do so if it were the desire of His Majesty's Government to play a leading part in shaping the future destinies of Turkey.

18. During the period between the signature of the Peace Treaty and the fall of Ferid Pasha, two questions gradually thrust themselves forward almost to the exclusion of all others, and towards the end a third was added. These three questions form the heritage of the new Government. They are Conciliation, Finance and Ratification.

19. It did not take long after the signature of the treaty for every serious student of the situation, both native and foreign, to realise that things had come to a complete impasse. The rebel Government in the interior continued to declare itself irreconcilable. It was inconceivable that this attitude, which must of course have been foreseen at San Remo and in Paris, should induce the Allies to modify a treaty which they had produced after so many months of labour, and parts of which they had decided to put into execution in favour of the Greeks without awaiting the formality of ratification. Who, however, was to bell the Angora cat? The Allied Great Powers were not prepared to undertake a campaign in Asia Minor. The further employment of the Greeks meant further payment for their services and numerous new complications. The Turkish Government claimed that if allowed to organise a comparatively small force at once it could itself re-establish its authority, but it was universally agreed that this would require money, and the best military opinion was that, even with money, an efficient and trustworthy force could not be organised without months of preparation under Allied auspices.

20. There remained, for the purpose of immediate action, only the alternative of conciliation. The contention of its advocates is that, having regard to the exhausted state of the population, the dissensions among the leaders, the disillusionment caused by Mustafa Kemal's failure to contest the latest Greek advance, the decline of Bolshevik power, and the evident danger to Turkey of complete ruin, if the Allies were driven to use force, there is at least a hope that the situation may be represented to the bulk of the rebels in such a light as to rally them round the Central Government

on the basis of acquiescence in the treaty. This proposal now holds the field. The Allied High Commissioners after an exchange of views with Ferid Pasha formerly requested the late Government on the 7th October to send a mission to the interior with the above object, and they offered verbally to let Allied delegates accompany the mission. Ferid Pasha and the Sultan reluctantly decided to acquiesce in principle, but when the former saw that his fall was inevitable he preferred to leave it to his successor to reply officially to the High Commissioners' note.

21. There is no doubt that the new Government will agree to send a mission, but it is not yet certain whether they will wish Allied delegates to accompany it. In the meantime, the High Commissioners have themselves been thrown back into uncertainty as to how far the British and French Governments are willing to go in the matter of sending Allied delegates. The French Government appear to be hostile to the idea, and I am still without your Lordship's final instructions as to what my own attitude should be. The Italian Government on the other hand show great eagerness to act as honest brokers between Constantinople and Angora, and are believed to have already broken the ground on their own account with the Nationalist leaders.

22. The financial situation of the Central Government during the last few months may be summed up in a formula almost as simple as that of Mr. Micawber: Indispensable monthly expenditure, not less than £ T. 1,400,000. Monthly revenue, less than £ T. 1,000,000, and dwindling. Credit, none. Result, misery. The age of financial miracles is not, however, past, and by one expedient or another the Government contrived to pay its way until early in September, when the Treasury ran too dry to meet the indispensable payments for August. Bankruptcy was only averted by an act of spoliation, i.e., the application to current expenditure of a fund held by the Government in trust for orphans. It was undesirable that such a situation should recur, and on the 1st October the Allied delegates on the Public Debt Administration were placed in provisional control of the finances, with a view more especially to regularise the sale of various stocks which had been previously dealt with in a haphazard and extravagant fashion. Thanks to this measure the indispensable payments for September have been assured, and those for October, soon to fall due, can be assured in the same manner. It is hoped that a more stable position may be established before the end of November, by instituting the Financial Commission provided for in the treaty, and by arranging for the application of the financial clauses without awaiting the coming into force of the treaty as a whole. There is no other way of salvation. It is true that it will be long before the Financial Commission can establish the finances of Turkey on a sound basis, but it will be able to afford immediate relief by restoring

the Government credit with financial establishments. The rights reserved to the Commission under the treaty are so extensive that the Government can obtain no credit until the Commission comes into being and begins to exercise its powers.

23. The Allies have more than once urged on the Constantinople Government the desirability of an immediate ratification of the treaty by Turkey. There is no doubt that according to the Constitution this requires the assent of the Turkish Parliament. It is universally agreed, except by the Nationalists, who do not recognise even the signature of the treaty, that this requirement cannot be fulfilled, and that the treaty must be ratified by an Act of the Sultan. The Sultan himself fully admits this, but he has urged that he should be allowed to wait until some at least of the Allied Parliaments have accepted the treaty, as he says that his position *vis-à-vis* of his own subjects would be gravely compromised if he were to take the initiative and ratify the treaty by an unconstitutional Act before the Allies on their side had done anything. It is certain that, whether he originally derived it from Ferid Pasha or not, the Sultan personally holds strongly to his view, but it is possible that under Tewfik Pasha's advice he will recognise its impracticability, and will consent to ratify the treaty at once, provided the High Commissioners convert the suggestions which they have hitherto made into a formal demand. It was intimated to Tewfik Pasha, while he was still engaged in constructing his Government, that while the Allies are disposed to apply certain parts of the treaty which are beneficial to Turkey, e.g., the financial clauses, without waiting for the treaty as a whole to come into force, they desire that ratification by Turkey should be the first step.

24. It is clear from the foregoing review that the crucial question to-day is whether Anatolia can be brought into line by purely pacific means. The attempt must obviously be made, but it would be rash to count confidently on a successful issue. If the proposed mission fails, the Allies must be prepared with some definite plan of action. Anatolia cannot be left to stew in its own juice. Even if the Nationalist movement should disintegrate, the process must be accompanied by widespread disorder, economic stagnation and loss of life unless the authority of a Central Government is built up simultaneously. Even now there is a good deal more actual shedding of blood than is generally realised in Europe, and it is at once just to the Nationalists and disquieting for all who are interested in the preservation from massacre of the Christian population of the interior to record the fact that the danger to non-Moslem lives is greatest where Nationalist authority is least secure. Moreover, the question is not merely an internal one. There can be no real peace or stability in the adjoining countries,



cc  
 especially those with strong Moslem elements, so long as the area to be included in the future Turkey continues to be a storm-centre.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
 HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/44, p. 195-200, No. 173

No. 151

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

*Foreign Office, October 23, 1920*

(No. 999.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegrams No. 1100 of 13th October and Nos. 1103, 1104 and 1105 of 14th October.

Instructions sent to your French colleague had already been communicated to His Majesty's Government, who generally concur in them, except that they cannot commit themselves to financial help. Resignation of Damad Ferid, reported in your telegram No. 1116 of 17th October, appears to dispose of objections submitted in your telegram No. 1104 of 14th October.

With regard to alternative policy proposed in your telegram No. 1105 of 14th October, His Majesty's Government still consider ratification by Turkey to be the next essential step both in order to confront the Nationalist with a *fait accompli* and so avoid bargaining regarding the treaty and also to facilitate institution and working of the commissions, in which lies the only hope of pacifying the country should the mission fail. Neither we nor French, we imagine, would press for immediate ratification if it really entailed abdication of Sultan. His Majesty's Government would have preferred not to send a representative with the mission in order not to be associated in a possible rebuff, but if you are committed on this point they will leave it to the decision of yourself and your colleagues. It is hoped to ratify here early in present session, and you can use this as an argument with the Porte.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 1128, and Rome, No. 478)

FO. 406/44, p. 181, No. 156

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 162-163, No. 160

No. 152

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 24, 1920

(Received October 24)

(No. 1147.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

MY telegram No. 1120 of 19th October.

Tewfik Pasha informed Mr. Ryan on 23rd October that desire of Sultan and new Cabinet was that mission to Anatolia should be accompanied by Allied delegates abundantly showed that new Government were acting in complete accord with Allies, and would greatly increase chances of successful issue.

Grand Vizier said that instructions to mission were being prepared and that intention was not to invite Nationalist leaders to state their conditions, but rather to demand submission, in view of danger to country if they persisted in opposing the treaty.

In view of above, I venture to urge that His Majesty's Government should come to a rapid understanding with French Government regarding question of Allied delegates. Latest instruction received by my French colleague indicated French Government hold strongly to the view that Allied delegates should not be sent.

High Commissioners have agreed in joint note calling for immediate ratification of treaty by Turkey. This will probably be presented on 25th October. I hope it will produce early ratification. If it does, I am strongly of opinion that we should agree to send delegates with Turkish Mission, especially in view of verbal promise given to late Grand Vizier and Sultan. Allied delegates need not officially form part of mission, but their presence would show that Allies and Central Government were working on same lines, and they would be in a position to exercise considerable influence on Nationalist opinion.

I do not see force of French objection that failure of mission accompanied by Allied delegates would render subsequent action more difficult. Objection would be very cogent if intentions of Allies were to try purely Ottoman Mission first, and if that failed, make proposals of their own more acceptable to Nationalists. As, however, object of any eventual pacific action of Allies would be same as that of present mission, *i.e.*, to secure acceptance of treaty as it stands, it appears to be desirable (a) to start off Turkish Mission in conditions most conducive to success, and (b) to be prepared with plan of subsequent action in the not improbable event of failure even in these conditions.

FO. 406/44, p. 182, No. 159

No. 153

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).**Foreign Office, October 26, 1920**(No. 1014.)**(Telegraphic.)*

YOUR telegram No. 1147 of 24th October: Mission to Anatolia.

In the event of British delegate accompanying mission, he should take up with Nationalist question of release of Colonel Rawlinson and other officers and men, also the release of Messrs. Medlicott and party if they still appear to be in Nationalists hands. \*

*FO. 406/44, p. 189, No. 164**D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 164, No. 164*

\* Malta'daki Türk sürgünlerine karşılık Anadolu'da rehin tutulan İngiliz subaylarını, özellikle Albay Rawlinson'u kurtarmaya İngilizler büyük önem veriyorlardı. Albay Rawlinson'un büyük kardeşi Lordlar karaması üyesiydi ve Lord Curzon'u zaman zaman sıkıştırıyordu. Lord Rawlinson'la Lord Curzon arasında şu yazışmalar olmuştu:

*Lord Rawlinson to Lord Curzon.*

August 16, (19)20.

Dear Lord Curzon,

As you know my young brother has been a prisoner with Mustapha Kemal at Erzeroum since July last. (Sic). We have had no communication of any sort or kind since that date and are somewhat anxious concerning him. Now that the peace with Turkey has been signed could we not arrange an exchange of prisoners? I understand that we have several Turks in our charge at Malta whose return to Anatolia would be much desired by Mustapha Kemal. Pray forgive my troubling you in this matter but after six months we begins to feel anxious.

I have just been staying the week end at Trent where the garden is looking quite butiful.

Your sincerely,

(Signed) Rawlinson.

*(FO. 371/5090/E. 11697)*

*Private Secretary to Lord Curzon to the Major-General Lord Rawlinson, Government House, Farnborough, Hants.*

Dear Lord Rawlinson,

October 22nd, 1920.

We have now received the High Commissioner's opinion about the possibility of obtaining the release of Colonel Rawlinson and the other British officers by an exchange of prisoners.

Admiral de Robeck is anxious to leave no stone unturned to secure their early release, but he points out that owing to the practical difficulties of communication it is not possible at the present moment to open negotiations with the Nationalists with any chance of success. The Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople are now discussing with the

Porte the despatch of a Turkish Mission of pacification to the Nationalists and it is possible that Allied Delegates would accompany it. In that event the British Delegate would be empowered to discuss the question of release with Mustapha Kemal.

Lord Curzon is deeply disappointed that there is no immediate prospect of starting negotiations, but in the circumstances he can only accept Admiral de Robeck's view.

Although it is true that communication with Erzeroum becomes very difficult in winter owing to the snow, I understand that in a normal year the town is not entirely cut off.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) Private Secretary.

(F.O. 371/5090/E. 12831)

No. 154

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

*Foreign Office, October 26, 1920*

(No. 1143.)

(Telegraphic.)

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 1147 of 24th October: Mission to Anatolia.

Please communicate to French Government arguments contained in telegram under reference, and urge them to instruct French High Commissioner to agree to Allied delegates accompanying the mission. If necessary, they could go unofficially without being members of the mission.

(Confidential.)

I understand quite privately from French Chargé d'Affaires that his Government are not likely to insist on their point of view.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1103.)

FO. 406/44, p. 190, No. 165

No. 155

*Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.*

*RALMEH, October 26, 1920*

*(Received November 5)*

(No. 1205.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship extracts from a report (with enclosures) by Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for the ten-day period ending the 10th October, 1920.

Copies have been addressed to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT,

*Acting High Commissioner.*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 155

*Extract from a Report of Major W. Batten (Acting British Agent, Jeddah) for Period October 1 to 10, 1920.*

*King Hussein and Mustafa Kemal.*

WITH regard to the present political situation, it appears to me that while all reports tend to prove that communications have passed between Mustafa Kemal and the King, even if no actual understanding exists between them, it would be unwise on my part, and possibly unfair to King Hussein, to be too much influenced by these reports and give them undue weight.

I note that Ibn Saud alleges [Turkish] agents to be using the King as a tool in intrigues against Great Britain, but this allegation may be tainted by partiality.

While it is quite probable, in the present situation of the Middle East, that messages were sent to the King, it does not follow that he should have replied otherwise than ambiguously to them, or have done more than acknowledge their receipt.

The chief sources of information on this subject, Omer Shakir and Arif Bey, are by no means reliable, especially the latter, who appears to be a typical Syrian windbag.

Although the King considers he has every reason to be disappointed with Great Britain, and is, I think, genuine in his belief that he has failed to make good the hopes raised among the Arabs, in addition to his unreasonable grievances over the withholding of the subsidy and other matters, he is not likely to be so foolish as to embark deliberately on a course which would endanger his relations with the only Power which is in a position to afford him assistance and secure him from the threat of external aggression\*.

FO. 371/5243/E. 13696

FO. 406/44, p. 605, No. 380

\* Raporun öteki bölümleri Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile ilgili değil. Buraya alınmadı.

No. 156

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 28, 1920

(Received November 1.)

(No. 1157.) R.

MY telegram No. 1147 of 24th October.

Collective note demanding immediate ratification of treaty by Turkey was handed to Grand Vizier on afternoon of 25th September.

Later on same day Government published statement of policy most significant passage of which was as follows:—

“Cabinet, being convinced of absolute necessity that Government and nation should work hand in hand, will summon Parliament as soon as effort to secure union has produced result, in order to render possible ratification, in legal form, of Peace Treaty in accordance with requirements of Constitution.”

Statement was doubtless drafted before receipt of collective note of High Commissioners, but Tewfik was already aware of our views regarding ratification. I therefore hoped that passage quoted above was mainly for public consumption, and that intention was to devise some formula which would combine immediate ratification with reservation of right of Parliament, if and when assembled, to have treaty formally submitted to it.

Attitude of Ministers does not, unfortunately, confirm this view. Tewfik himself manifested hesitation and embarrassment when note was presented, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who paid me his first official visit on 27th October, expressed very definite view that order of proceedings should be to effect composition with Nationalists, then to convene Chamber representing non-occupied areas, then to ratify. Minister for Foreign Affairs urged that this was the only course at all compatible with Constitution, and that it was also the only practical course, as immediate ratification by Sultan and Government would be so resented by Nationalists as to destroy all chance of bringing them into line by peaceful means.

I said that your telegrams showed increasing anxiety on the part of His Majesty's Government for immediate ratification by Turkey; that this was preliminary condition of assistance which they were willing and eager to render, e.g., by instituting Financial Commission and bringing that and clauses into operation as soon as possible; and that delay would entail financial chaos, besides being fraught with dangerous possibilities for Turkey.

I exhausted every argument in favour of immediate ratification, but I made little or no impression. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to speak to Tewfik, whose views, however, he stated to be identical with his own. I promised to report what Minister said, but intimated that I could hold out no hope of favourable reception by His Majesty's Government of programme which he outlined.

Three other important Ministers have taken similar line in private conversations with members of my staff.

Constitutional difficulty is very real one and can only be got over by some formula on lines indicated above, but I fear it looks as if High Commissioners may have greatest difficulty in obtaining from new Government ratification in any shape at all until they have first tried to bring Nationalists round.

Attitude of Government is hardly consistent with what Tewfik led us to expect in conversations preceding his advent to power, but this merely illustrates fact that in any tight place he is more likely to be influenced by others than to exercise any real control. Ministers are also encouraged in their view by knowledge that Sultan, however much he may differ from them, otherwise also shrinks from immediate ratification.

*FO. 406/44, p. 193, No. 168*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 165-166, No. 166*

No. 157

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 28, 1920.*

*(Received November 10.)*

*(No. 1470.)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 999 of the 23rd October, and to my telegram No. 1147 of the 24th October, which crossed each other, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a joint note, dated the 25th October, which has been addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to his Highness Tewfik Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, regarding the necessity for the early ratification of the Peace Treaty by Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK  
*High Commissioner*

*FO. 406/44. p. 205, No. 178*

*Joint Allied Note address to Grand Vizier.*

Main en c. d'Empire 11  
est elle par déjà in existante
388
 AU moment où son Altesse le Grand-Vizir, investi de la confiance de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan, vient de constituer un nouveau Gouvernement, dont la tâche principale est de rétablir l'autorité légale, dans tout le territoire de l'Empire, afin d'assurer, en même temps que l'ordre, la sécurité et le retour à un état de choses normal, l'exécution intégrale et loyale du Traité de Paix signé à Sèvres le 10 août dernier, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie croient devoir attirer l'attention de son Altesse sur la question de la ratification du Traité de Paix par la Turquie.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés estiment que cette ratification, qui en tout état de cause doit nécessairement précéder la ratification par les autres signataires, est la mesure la plus urgente à prendre dans l'intérêt même de la Turquie.

En effet, toute discussion au sujet du traité ou au sujet d'une clause quelconque du traité n'aura plus de raison d'être lorsque ce traité sera devenu, en ce qui concerne la Turquie, définitif par la ratification du Gouvernement ottoman, et la tâche de la Commission qui doit être envoyée en Anatolie en sera grandement facilitée.

2
 De plus, les moyens pour le Gouvernement ottoman d'obtenir les concours financiers et économiques qu'il demande d'une façon si instante ne peuvent être étudiés et mis en action que par la Commission financière dont la création est prévue par le Traité de Paix; or, bien qu'en principe les Commissions prévues par le traité ne devraient être formées et fonctionner qu'après la ratification du traité par ceux des signataires indiqués dans le traité lui-même, les trois Gouvernements alliés, animés d'intentions bienveillantes et désireux de répondre le plus tôt possible au pressant appel du Gouvernement ottoman, sont disposés à envisager l'envoi des diverses commissions, et notamment de la Commission financière dès que le traité aura été ratifié par la Turquie, mais cet envoi ne saurait évidemment avoir lieu avant cette ratification.

Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, qui sans être les seules sont du moins parmi les principales, les trois Hauts-Commissaires soussignés insistent d'une façon toute particulière auprès de son Altesse le Grand-Vizir sur la nécessité de la ratification immédiate du traité par la Turquie.

*Constantinople, le 25 octobre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 205-206, No. 178/1.*



No. 158

*Foreign Office to Mr. Aneurin Williams, M.P., House of Common.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, 2nd November 1920.

Dear Sir,

I am desired by Mr. Cecil Harmsworth to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd November conveying certain information with regard to the agent of Mustapha Kemal in London \*.

Mr. Harmsworth is much obliged for this information, which he is passing on to the competent Department of the Foreign Office for their information and observations.

Yours very truly,

FO. 371/5291/E. 13608

\* Bu yazıya ekli bir notta, Mustafa Kemal'in Londra'daki ajanının Sipiridon Triandafilides adında, eskiden Osmanlı Ordusunda subaylık yapmış bir Rum olduğu kaydedilmiştir.

No. 159

*Greek Minister in London to Earl Curzon.*

LEGATION DE GRECE, 51, Upper Brook St. W.1.  
3rd November 1920.

No. 5418/St/20.

My Lord,

I have been instructed by my Government to bring to Your Lordship's kind consideration the following point of view with regard to a decision taken by His Majesty's Military Mission in Constantinople.

The aforesaid Mission decided to release ten thousand Turkish prisoners, actually detained in Egypt, the greater part of them originating from the interior of Asia Minor; one batch of 400 has already left Egypt and directed through Constantinople and Ismid to Asia Minor.

It is suggested from Greek military quarters that these prisoners once released and sent to Asia Minor might very probably be enrolled through voluntary or forced engagement in Mustapha Kemal's troops. As for the part of the prisoners who originate from the territories of Asia Minor occupied by Greece, the aforesaid risk does not occur and consequently there should be no objection to their release; it should only be desirable that the latter, in case they were released, should not be sent to Asia Minor through the Pontus.

The military reasons for which the release of ten thousand Turkish prisoners is considered dangerous to the operations of the Greek forces in Asia Minor induce my Government to recommend to Your Lordship's kind consideration the revision, if possible, of the the decision in question.

I have, &c.

FO. 371/5143/E-13648

No. 160

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

(Received November 6.)

(No. 3328.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Turkish mission to Mustapha Kemal.

*Paris, November 5, 1920.*

FO. 406/44, p. 194, No. 171

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 160

*Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR sa note du 27 octobre, l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu appeler à nouveau l'attention du Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, sur l'opportunité pour les Puissances de faire accompagner par des délégués alliés la mission ottomane chargée par le Sultan de se rendre en Anatolie auprès de Moustapha Kémal, en vue de le convaincre du danger crée pour son pays par son opposition armée au Traité de Paix.

Le Gouvernement britannique estime, comme l'Amiral de Robeck, qu'il n'y a pas d'inconvénient à autoriser l'adjonction, demandée par le Sultan et le nouveau Grand-Vizir, de représentants des Puissances alliées. Ces derniers n'ont pas besoin de faire partie intégrante de la mission ottomane et se borneront à l'accompagner pour montrer l'accord des Puissances et du Gouvernement ottoman vis-à-vis de l'opinion nationaliste.

M. Leygues estime toujours qu'il ya de très sérieux inconvénients à compromettre ainsi les Alliés et à les placer en situation de demandeurs vis-à-vis des Kémalistes: loin de faciliter le résultat, une telle décision risque de le retarder. Ce n'est que dans le cas où la ratification immédiate du Traité turc serait obtenue du Sultan et du nouveau Gouvernement

ottoman que le Haut-Commissaire français pourrait se rallier à la participation de délégués des Puissances à la mission d'Anatolie, et uniquement pour éviter de faire échouer les pourparlers avec les Kémalistes.

*Paris, le 4 novembre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 194, No. 171/1.*

No. 161

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

*(Received November 6.)*

*(No. 3338.)*

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the despatch of a Turkish mission to Anatolia.

*British Embassy, Paris, November 5, 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 195, No. 172*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 161

*Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR sa note du 24 octobre, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu faire connaître au Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté touchant la ratification du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ainsi que l'envoi d'une mission turque, accompagnée de délégués alliés, en Anatolie.

M. Leygues s'empresse de faire connaître à Lord Derby qu'il partage entièrement les vues exprimées par cette note. En effet, sur la question de l'assistance financière à fournir à la Turquie, le Gouvernement français ne peut envisager de faire des avances, prélevées sur des fonds publics, à la Turquie, et il a fait connaître ce point de vue à son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople. Il a également fait connaître, de la façon la plus ferme, que la seule mesure immédiate indispensable est la ratification du Traité de Paix par le Sultan. Il ne pense pas, d'ailleurs, que cette ratification soit de nature à entraîner l'abdication du Sultan, et fait observer à ce sujet que, si la ratification était refusée, ce ne pourrait être que par suite d'arrière-pensées, dont les Gouvernements alliés auraient grandement à se préoccuper.

*This is largely a reaction to Peace Treaty*

Le Gouvernement français a pris note de l'information d'après laquelle le Traité de Sèvres pourrait être ratifié très prochainement par le Gouvernement britannique, et il se propose de son côté de soumettre le plus tôt possible ce traité à la ratification du Parlement français. Toutefois, il ne pense pas pouvoir laisser entamer cette discussion avant la ratification par le Gouvernement ottoman, celle-ci devant être préalable. Ce serait, en effet, le seul cas où un Traité de Paix signé par une Puissance ex-ennemie n'aurait pas été ratifié d'abord par ladite Puissance.

En ce qui concerne l'adjonction de délégués alliés à la mission d'Anatolie, le Gouvernement français a déjà donné à Constantinople des instructions exactement conformes à celles qu'à reçues l'Amiral de Robeck, à savoir qu'il faut éviter dans toute la mesure du possible de compromettre des représentants alliés dans les négociations avec Moustafa Kémal. D'autre part, M. De France est autorisé à se joindre à ses collègues, si cela est indispensable au succès de cette mission, pour décider l'adjonction de membres alliés.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,  
le 5 novembre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 195, No. 172/1.*

No. 162

*Sir Eyre Crowe to Sir Basil Thomson.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 6th. 1920.*

*Immediate.*

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to Sir Basil Thomson and begs leave to enclose for his information copy of a letter from Mr. Aneurin Williams to Mr. Harmsworth dated 2nd. instant. It will be seen that according to the Georgian Chargé d'Affaires the Turkish Nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal, has an agent in London named Spiridon Triandafilidés and Sir Eyre Crowe would be glad to learn as early as possible whether Sir Basil Thomson has any confirmation of this report.

*FO. 371/5291/E. 13608*

No. 163

*Colonel Stokes (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS, November 6, 1920.

(Received November 15.)

No. 480.

*Telegraphic.**Confidential. Personal.*

Successful invasion of Armenia by Turks has modified situation in Middle East. Turks are bent on getting control of Azerbaijan, Bolsheviks are determined to retain Azerbaijan in Russia. Discord between Turks and Bolsheviks is thus inevitable. (We are) hostile to both will not fight either.

Moment is opportune to secure friendship of one of the two against the other. Friendship with Bolsheviks may stop their actual advance eastward and southward but their propoganda will continue. It may also give us raw materials badly needed for our industries and markets for our manufactures. On the other hand it is difficult to believe in permanent Bolshevik regime. Friendship with Turks will cost us abandonment of our policy of supporting Greek expansion in Turkey. It will bring to our side whole of Islam and it is vital to continuance of our Eastern Empire that Islam should be on our side. There.... any fear of Islam unit(ing) against us. Gulf between Sunni and Shiah is wide and can be widened if necessary. There is no Mohommetan (sic) nation with which our prestige does not even now stand higher than that of any other foreign country and there is none which does not desire our friendship. From Bokhara and Kabul.... we can have Islam on our side.

I venture to submit above for Your Lordship's consideration. If desired contact could be established from Tiflis with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol XIII, p. 170, No 171*

No. 164

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 8, 1920.

(Received November 9.)

(No. 1173.) R.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram No. 1157 of 28th October.

I have lost no opportunity since 27th October of urging on Porte the importance of immediate ratification of treaty. My French colleague has been equally insistent, and Acting Italian High Commissioner appears to be supporting us loyally. We have driven Turkish Ministers from position that they must wait until Parliament can be convened to sanction ratification. Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose visit I returned on 2nd November, voiced the unanimous opinion of Cabinet that immediate ratification would hopelessly compromise new Ministry in eyes of Nationalists and that attempt at conciliation must precede ratification, though he stated emphatically that Government were prepared to assume responsibility of ratification, and that they did not intend to make it condition of acceptance of treaty by Nationalists.

Minister for Foreign Affairs held his ground, notwithstanding every argument I advanced regarding the certain financial crisis and other dangers inherent on delay.

One feature of all these recent conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and others, emphasised the desire of Government to obtain from High Commissioner something with which to placate Nationalists. They have hinted at, but not suggested, three things, viz.:—

1. Promise of "benevolent interpretation" of treaty.
2. Assurance that Greeks would after ratification withdraw from territory not assigned to them by treaty.
3. Protection against the possibility of Armenian frontier being decided in sense entirely adverse to Turkey.

As regards (1), I have taken the line that there can be no question of interpretation until treaty assumes definite shape.

As regards (2), I have said that we desire nothing better than eventual withdrawal of Greeks, but that there can be no question of it so long as Nationalists make open war on Allies and the legitimate Government are not in a position to give effect to treaty.

Point (3) has been raised only by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I have not made any statement.

In conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2nd November I insisted on necessity for answer to High Commissioners note of 25th October. This has elicited the reply dated 11th November summarised in my immediately following telegram. High Commissioners have arranged to meet on 7th November with object of agreeing on recommendations to Governments regarding future line of action. I will telegraph further when meeting has taken place.

Turkish Government have in the mean time been considering question of mission to Anatolia. It seems to have been decided in principle to send mission in which leading role will be played by İzzet Pasha. There is some talk of placing it under the presidency of one of the Imperial Princes. It is uncertain to what extent preliminary communications have been exchanged with Nationalist leaders. Government deny that even preliminary contact has yet been established, but all sorts of rumours are afloat, and, if there is any foundation for them, attitude of Nationalist leaders regarding acceptance of treaty is uncompromising.

Question of Allied participation in mission has lapsed, at any rate for the time being, as Government refuse to fulfil necessary condition of such participation, *i.e.*, ratification of treaty before the commission starts.

*FO. 406/44, p. 204, No. 176*

*DBFP, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 170-171, No. 172*

No. 165

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 8, 1920.*

*(Received November 9.)*

*(No. 1174.)*

*(Telegraphic.) R.*

REFERENCE to High Commissioners' collective note of 25th October, Turkish Government recognises that, whatever happens, treaty must be ratified, and they have no intention of evading this obligation.

They cannot, however, agree with High Commissioners regarding desirability of immediate ratification, which would give rise to misinterpretation and suspicion in Anatolia; weaken authority of, and confidence in, Government; and compromise chances of successful accomplishment of task undertaken by them.

Government therefore consider it desirable to postpone ratification until contact has been established with Anatolia, not with a view to dis-

cussion regarding treaty, but with a view to explaining situation and reasons which make ratification necessary.

Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that High Commissioners will appreciate force of these considerations and will use their influence to obtain the consent of their Governments to postponement of ratification for at least one month in order that Government may have time to get into touch with Anatolia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, relying on assurance of benevolent support given when Cabinet was being formed, trusts that High Commissioners will not refuse their help in securing immediately for Turkish Government financial and economic assistance which they require without subordinating such assistance to ratification of treaty.

*FO. 406/44, p. 205, No. 177*

No. 166

*Earl Curzon to Greek Minister in London.*

*13648/147/44*

*Foreign Office, November 9, 1920*

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 5418/St/20 of the 3rd November suggesting that in view of the military situation in Asia Minor it is desirable to suspend the repatriation of 10,000 Turkish prisoners who are believed to be awaiting release in Egypt.

According to information which I have received from the military authorities there are only some 500 Turkish prisoners of war now left in Egypt and not more than 800 in Mesopotamia. There are, however, about 4,000 Turkish prisoners of war to be repatriated from India and in view of the objections raised in the note which you were so good as to address to me, I have asked the competent authorities whether it would be possible to suspend repatriation of these men. As soon as the decision of the military authorities reaches me I shall not fail to address a further communication to you.

*FO. 371/5143/E-13648*



No. 167

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 10, 1920.**(Received November 11.)**(No. 1189.)**(Telegraphic.) R.*

FOLLOWING are extracts from reply addressed by Turkish Government to Allied High Commissioners' amended note of 25th October demanding ratification of treaty:—

“Turkish Government fully realises that in any event treaty must be ratified, and they do not intend to attempt to nullify obligations incumbent on them.

“They consider in the interests of task of reconciliation it is desirable to postpone ratification until contract (sic) is made with Anatolia, not with a view to entering into discussion on the subject of treaty, but in order to make known situation and reasons which render ratification necessary. I venture to hope that your Excellency will use your influence with your Government to induce them to consent to postpone ratification of treaty for one month at least in order to give Government time to enter into relations with Anatolia beforehand.

“I also venture to hope that you will not refuse aid in procuring for Imperial Government without delay financial and economic assistance which they need without making it contingent upon ratification of treaty.”

High Commissioners decided to acknowledge receipt of this note, saying that they have been instructed to insist on immediate ratification of treaty and could only refer matter to their Governments, and adding that, as financial or economic assistance is solely dependent on future financial commission, and as this commission can only be constituted and function after ratification of treaty by Turkish Government, any assistance of this nature is necessarily contingent upon ratification.

We also concur in submitting to our Governments following considerations relative to present situation and reply to be made to note of Turkish Government, which we are merely acknowledging whilst awaiting instructions which we request.

Attempt at reconciliation by means of despatch of a mission to Anatolia would have had more chances of success if it could have been made at the period when it was suggested to Allied Governments—that is, more than three months ago. At present, chances of success are far less for following reasons: Lapse of time since Greek advance in Asia Minor, [groups

omitted], and, above all, successes of latter in Armenia and junction of their forces with Red armies coming from East.

In spite of these considerations, attempted reconciliation should not only be pursued but encouraged and facilitated by Allies, since it is only remaining method which can be contemplated at the moment in [group undecypherable] of further use of Greek army, which would possess serious drawbacks. Allied Governments and High Commissioners consider ratification of treaty by Turkish Government should be immediate and should precede despatch of mission to Anatolia; Turkish Government holds, on the contrary, that despatch of mission should precede ratification, and requests postponement of ratification of which they promise, it is true, performance.

To insist on ratification before despatch of mission presents risk of making situation even worse than it is at present. Cabinet might resign and possibly no one would be willing to take office under such circumstances; treaty would remain unratified; ground would not even have been cleared for attempt at reconciliation; cleavage between Constantinople and Anatolia would be more accentuated than ever, and only remaining means to put an end to it would be force.

In these circumstances, High Commissioners propose not to connect the two questions of ratifications and of despatch of mission. Reply made to Porte might make no mention of latter question and might insist on immediate ratification as being all the more indispensable since, in addition to reasons described above, Turkish Government is now under obligation of disowning action of Nationalists against Armenia which constitutes a violation in anticipation of treaty and a new marked act of hostility against Allies. In these circumstances any delay to ratify would run risk of causing consequences grave and prejudicial to Turkey.

Time which must elapse before High Commissioners can receive their instructions and send their reply will already account for a [? group omitted] of postponement demanded by Turkish Government, which will be able to take advantage of it to undertake reconciliatory steps in Anatolia which they are preparing. Thus High Commissioners, on their side, will be able to see whether Turkish Government is proceeding as expeditiously as circumstances permit with despatch of mission and conduct of negotiations with Angora.

High Commissioners, whilst recognising great difficulties of Turkish Government's task, feel that [two groups undecypherable] this Government has not attempted to procrastinate and gain time in the hope, vague and undefined it is true, that in view of events such as political complica-

tions in Greece, and especially complete annihilation of Armenia, might improve situation of Turkey and permit certain modifications in Treaty of Sèvres.

Above is identic telegram from three High Commissioners to their Governments.

I request instruction as to reply to be made to Porte.

FO. 406/44, p. 206-207, No. 180

DBFP, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 172-173, No. 173

No. 168

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 10, 1920.*

*(Received November 11.)*

*(No. 1190.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram No. 1189 of 10th November represents views of myself and colleagues on 7th November, but telegraphic information since received appears to me to have considerably modified situation in a sense distinctly to our disadvantage. ✓

General Wrangel's army has been driven back from Perekop line with heavy losses as result of Bolshevik attack in force, and is rapidly retiring.

Kemalists have overrun Armenia, which may now be considered as lost to Allies, and there is considerable danger of Georgia, including Batoum, sharing similar fate (see General Harrington's telegram to Troopers, No. 1-9489, of 8th November).

Bolshevik Russia and Anatolia have therefore now effected a junction, held country up to gates of Ismidt and to front held by Greeks is under control of Forces hostile to Allies, and particularly to British. After Bolshevik-Kemalist successes, Nationalists will be still less disposed to accept any proposals made by Constantinople Government with a view to acceptance of Treaty of Sevres, and it may be taken for certain that their confidence in eventual success of their movement is greater than ever.

I am therefore reluctantly driven to the conclusion that whatever prospect previously existed of reconciling Nationalist leaders to accept treaty by pacific means has now disappeared and it becomes a matter for consideration whether events of past few days have not been precipitated by necessity for recourse to those means use of which High Commissioners

have hitherto deprecated, viz., employment of force, it did not [sic] necessarily imply a further advance of Greek army.

Objections to this advance have lost none of their cogency, but it is useless to disguise fact that Allied Great Powers have so weakened their own effectives as perhaps to leave no alternative.

Successive reductions in Allied contingents in Constantinople had already caused me serious uneasiness, and without wishing in any way to question our military policy I feel bound to represent to your Lordship my appreciation of situation here arrived at after full discussion with General Harrington. In a few days' time our force will consist of only two British and four Indian battalions. French have an equal number of troops, and there is a Greek division at Ismidt under General Harrington's orders.

I cannot but submit for your Lordship's most serious consideration whether forces so reduced can be regarded as sufficient to cope even with such local situations as may quite conceivably arise in view of fact that Turk, who only understands force and who fully appreciated our show of strength at time of occupation of Constantinople, now sees that with situation in Near East more uncertain than ever defence of our interests and enforcement of treaty are left to a few Allied battalions.

I do not, indeed, anticipate trouble in Constantinople itself under present conditions, but an anti-Ally reaction is possible should Kemalists, with Bolshevik assistance, develop an offensive movement against Greek division at Ismidt, or should main Greek army fall back on old line which their staff declare to be only alternative to a fresh advance up to Ada Bazar-Konia railway.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 207-208, No. 181*

*DBPT, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 174-175, No. 174*

No. 169

*Sir J. A. Tilley to Sir Basil Thomson.*

*No. E 13608/13608/44*

*Urgent.*

*Foreign Office, 12 November 1920*

Dear Thomson,

The Georgian Representative in London, M. Gambashidjé, told me yesterday that he has reliable information that there are now in London two agents of the Turkish Nationalists. These are Victor Vartalide, of Greek birth, and Mustafa Reis Zadé, a Georgian Mussulman, both staying at the Dean Hotel in Oxford Street.

2. Both men hold Georgian passports which they have given to him in order that a visa for France may be obtained. He is anxious to retain the passports in order to prevent the men from returning to Batoum whither the Nationalists may advance shortly from Armenia. He would like the men locked up safely here but I told him I did not think this was possible unless he could produce definite evidence that they are agents of Mustafa Kemal's.

3. But I promised to consult you in case you knew anything of them and can suggest what might be done about them.

FO. 371/5291/E. 13608

(Signed) J. A. C. TILLEY

No. 170

Sir B. Thomson, Director of Intelligence, to Sir J. A. Tilley, Foreign Office.

SCOTLAND HOUSE, LONDON.

12th November, 1920.

*Confidential.* ✓

Dear Tilley,

With regard to the two Turkish Nationalists, I would suggest this Machiavellian plan. Let Monsieur Gambashidzé hand over the passports to me by request and then tell them that the Police have impounded the passports (they will not know anything about Police processes in England) and advise them to apply to me at Scotland House.

An alternative would be for me quietly to warn the French not to give them a visa, but then they might go another way. I will see that they are turned inside out when they apply for their passports\*.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) B. H. THOMSON

FO. 371/5291/E. 13608

\* Bu yazının üzerine, elyazısıyla şu not düşülmüş :

"M. Gabashidze has seen Sir B. T. (Thomson) I have informed him of the latter's advice. D.G.O."

No. 171

*Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.*

ROME, November 13, 1920

*(Received November 16.)**(No. 894.)*

My Lord,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 481 of the 6th instant, I spoke to Count Sforza, on the eve of his departure for Rapallo, in the sense desired by your Lordship with regard to the intrigues being carried on by Italian agents in Turkey, Asia Minor and the Caucasus, and more especially with regard to the reported presence of an Italian Mission at Angora. Count Sforza was so pressed for time I was unable to discuss the question in any detail. His Excellency, however, denied in the most formal and categorical manner the presence of either a civil or military mission or of any Italian military agents at Angora.

Having in the meantime received your Lordship's despatch No. 995. Secret, of the 3rd instant, I took advantage of a conversation which I had this morning with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to revert to the subject. Since my conversation with Count Sforza I had, I said, received from another reliable source confirmation not only of the presence of Italian officers at Angora, but of the fact that military supplies of various kinds were being sent by Italians into Anatolia. I was, I continued, speaking quite unofficially and without instructions, and I was not for a moment impugning Count Sforza's good faith. It seemed to me, however, to be a matter of such importance to clear up the present misunderstanding that I thought it best to be perfectly frank with him. Were it really a fact, which I sincerely trusted was not the case, that Italian agents were giving both moral and material support to our enemies, I very much feared that the feeling of mutual confidence, so necessary to a loyal collaboration between the two Governments might be impaired. Was it possible, I asked, that some of these military agents were acting independently and behind the back of the Italian Government, and were engaging in intrigues of which the latter were ignorant.

Signor Contarini replied that he could only thank me for having spoken so frankly, and that he entirely shared the views which I had expressed. The enquiries which Count Sforza had made, after the conversation which I had with him, had convinced his Excellency that there was no truth in the reports which had reached me. It was therefore very difficult to explain how those reports had arisen. There were, it was true, certain

military commissions remaining over from the war, but Signor Giolitti had issued strict instructions that they were to take no action of any kind, unless authorised to do so by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He would cause searching enquiries to be made and let me know the result.

I may mention that I asked the French Ambassador yesterday whether the Italian Government had, in his opinion, cognisance of the reported every reason to believe that, when Count Sforza pledged his word of honour, activities of their agents in Asia Minor. M. Barrère replied that he had every reason to believe that, when Count Sforza pledged his word of honour, he was saying what he believed to be true. Many of the Italian agents in the East were, however, men who had been neutralists in the war, and who were inspired by anything but friendly feelings towards the Allies, and it was, therefore, quite possible that they were acting for interested motives without Count Sforza's knowledge.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

*FO. 406/44, p. 208-209, No. 182.*

No. 172

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

*(Received November 17.)*

*(No. 3433.)*

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the ratification of the Turkish Treaty and the despatch of a Turkish mission to Anatolia.

*Paris, November 16, 1920.*

*FO. 506/44, p. 210, No. 184*

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 172

*Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR sa note du 4 novembre, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu communiquer au Gouvernement français les informations qu'elle a reçues de son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople concernant les difficultés par le nouveau Gouvernement ottoman à la ratification du Traité de Paix.

La conclusion de cette note est qu'il y aurait lieu de notifier à la Porte que, à moins que n'intervienne préalablement la ratification du traité, les Alliés s'opposent au départ pour l'Anatolie de la mission de conciliation envoyée par le Gouvernement ottoman auprès des nationalistes à Angora.

Le Gouvernement français a été le premier à considérer que la ratification immédiate était indispensable au succès même de la mission en Anatolie. Il l'a fait connaître à plusieurs reprises à son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople ainsi qu'aux Gouvernements britannique et italien.

Il ressort, toutefois, des derniers renseignements arrivés de Turquie que le Gouvernement turc est décidé à ne ratifier le traité que dans un délai de quatre semaines. Tewfik Pachā s'engage à pratiquer la ratification, quel que (sic) soit le résultat obtenu par la mission.

Le Gouvernement français fait observer qu'il n'est pas possible d'interdire au Gouvernement ottoman de faire partir pour l'Anatolie une mission des hauts fonctionnaires ottomans. D'autre part, ayant notifié de la façon la plus formelle au Gouvernement turc les conséquences de la non-ratification, qui sont le refus d'envoyer les représentants alliés dans les Commissions internationales de Turquie et de laisser mettre à exécution par provision les clauses financières du Traité turc, il ne pense pas qu'il soit de l'intérêt commun de pousser le Gouvernement de Tewfik Pacha à la démission.

Dans ces conditions, la seule chose pratique à faire est de laisser partir la Commission ottomane pour l'Anatolie (bien entendu sans lui adjoindre des représentants français, anglais et italiens) et de prendre acte de l'engagement du Gouvernement ottoman de ratifier le Traité de Paix dans le délai de quatre semaines, quel que soit le résultat de la mission.

Pendant cette période, et quels que soient les inconvénients de la situation, aucune mesure ne sera prise par le Gouvernement français pour hâter la mise à exécution du traité ou venir en aide au Gouvernement ottoman, qui paraît se livrer à une manoeuvre dangereuse et sans profit. Les perspectives d'arrangement avec Mustapha Kémal sont, en effet, des plus faibles au moment où ce dernier a déjà réussi à intimider le nouveau Gouvernement dans son désir de ratification, et où, négligeant ses échecs de l'ouest et du sud, il n'a d'yeux que pour ses faciles succès sur les Arméniens.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,*

*le 15 novembre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 210-211, No. 184/1*



No. 173

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).**Foreign Office, November 19, 1920**(No. 1036.)*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 481 of the 6th instant, relative to the attitude taken up by the Italian Government in regard to the enforcement of the terms of the Turkish Treaty and to the general policy of the Allied Governments in Turkey, I have to inform you that on the 11th instant the Italian Ambassador called upon Sir Eyre Crowe and read out a telegram from Count Sforza recording his recent communications with yourself respecting the alleged presence of an Italian mission with Mustapha Kemal at Angora. He reiterated in the most emphatic manner that the whole story of this mission was untrue, and was obviously due to the imagination or deliberate invention of some interested Levantine agent. He added that it was of course quite conceivable that Mustapha Kemal himself should have made remarks calculated to produce a belief in his having the active sympathy and support of Italy.

2. Marquis Imperiali said he was glad that the opportunity had been taken of putting such a story to the test. He was strongly in favour of putting an end to the distrust which he was quite aware was felt in London against the alleged misdeeds of Italian agents in the East. He had suggested to Count Sforza that before relinquishing his post in London he should be authorised to enter into a general exchange of views with Lord Curzon on the subject of the Allied policy in the Mediterranean and in Turkey. He felt sure that in this way, and in this way alone, all misunderstandings and suspicions could be disposed of, and that harmonious co-operation between the Italian and British Governments be secured which it has been his ambition during the whole term of his Embassy to place upon a sure foundation. Having received Count Sforza's cordial approval, he accordingly proposed to ask Lord Curzon for an interview at an early date in order to arrive at a clear understanding.

3. The Ambassador proceeded to translate from the Italian a further long message from Count Sforza, indicating in somewhat greater detail the points on which Italy was anxious to clear the situation. The Ambassador promised to let Sir Eyre Crowe have a short summary of this telegram, although he explained he had no authority to furnish a copy, but had been directed to make a verbal communication only. A copy of this summary, since received from his Excellency, is annexed to this despatch.

4. Sir Eyre Crowe asked the Ambassador whether he had in his mind any particular proposals that he would submit to Lord Curzon. So far as Sir Eyre Crowe gathered the aims of Italian policy from the statement his Excellency had just made, he did not see any difficulty in recording a common view and understanding. Sir Eyre Crowe found the Ambassador's mind quite vague as to what suggestions or measures he could put forward, but his Excellency promised to think it over, and speak to Sir Eyre Crowe again.

5. He then made an urgent personal appeal to Sir Eyre Crowe to help to crown his activities as Ambassador in London by getting His Majesty's Government to enter into an engagement as regards Cyprus, by which the alienation of the island at any future date would be made dependent on the previous approval of Italy. Marquis Imperiali said he had received no instructions to renew this proposal, or, in fact, to allude to the subject in any way, but he felt he would be rendering his country a great service by obtaining such an assurance, which moreover imposed no sacrifice whatever on Great Britain. Sir Eyre Crowe observed that his Excellency evidently undervalued the importance of asking His Majesty's Government to restrict their liberty in regard to a matter of purely national and imperial concern. To his argument that we had already given an identical pledge to France, Sir Eyre Crowe replied that he would not be surprised if His Majesty's Government held that this was all the more reason for not tying their hands still further. Sir Eyre Crowe said he could not conceal from the Ambassador that the chances of his Excellency's suggestion being favourably entertained were very small. The Ambassador said he was aware that Lord Curzon felt very strongly on the subject, but he seemed to think it possible that his Lordship might stretch a point in order to oblige so warm a friend of England as the Ambassador personally.

I am, &c.

(For the Secretary of State),

J. A. C. TILLEY

FO. 406/44, p. 211-212, No. 186

D. B. F. P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 175-177, No. 176

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 173

*Summary of Conversation between the Marquis Imperiali and Sir. Eyre Crowe  
on November 11, 1920.*

(Translation)

IN connection with the conversation between Count Sforza and Sir G. Buchanan, the Marquis Imperiali is empowered to initiate conversations

with the Secretary of State for the purpose of arriving at frank and friendly explanations intended to clear the atmosphere created with regard to Italian policy in the Levant.

Confirming the statements made by Count Sforza to Sir G. Buchanan, the Marquis Imperiali pointed out that the aim towards which Italian policy tended could not be different from that pursued by the British Government, i.e., the speedy pacification of Turkey, and therefore that of Anatolia.

In order to attain this object, Italy has always considered the best course to be an attempt to arrive at an agreement with the leaders, and more especially with Nationalist leaders, in view of the danger presented by military action. The latter has not yet attained any positive result, since, notwithstanding the Greek advance, the Nationalist movement has not lost ground and is keeping the East in a state of ferment.

This point of view was upheld by Count Sforza at Spa, but did not prevail. Military action was, however, then decided on in which Italy could take no part, not only by reason of the trend of public opinion in that country, but also because, consistently with her policy, she did not and does not consider this to be opportune.

As it is, however, more important for Italy than for any other Power to resume economic relations with Asia Minor —where the privileges granted with regard there to by the Triple Agreement represent the only advantages obtained— she had necessarily to concern herself with the consequences which might have arisen owing to the Greek military operations in those regions. On that account Italy cannot completely renounce relations of contact with the Nationalist authorities remaining in the Italian zone, relations which it is the more expedient to maintain, as it is very desirable to avoid complications within that zone.

Italy has for that reason limited herself to mere relations as between neighbours, the scope of which has been exaggerated by the bad faith of the agents supplying such information and by the wish of the Turkish Nationalists to parade before the allies of Italy an alleged friendliness with the Italian Government. The latter is the more desirous of clearing up this point, as —although believing that the political situation in Anatolia might have been settled in a manner different from that adopted by the Allies— Italy has done nothing to hinder their intentions.

The Italian Government is not of the opinion, as it was before, that Italian interests in the Mediterranean coincide with those of England, and is always desirous of being able to follow a common line of policy which it considers to be the best guarantee of such interests. It is indispensable, however, that the British Government should keep Italian economic

requirements in view, and should therefore guarantee to Italy her loyal support of the economic action which the latter intends to pursue within her zone of Anatolia, and that more especially concerning the support requested with regard to the acceptance by Turkey of the Triple Agreement; in regard to railway questions in Anatolia; and in regard to the necessity of restraining Greek aspirations in the territory of Smyrna, as delimited by the treaty.

There can be no doubt that, on the basis of a community of Anglo-Italian interests in the Mediterranean (as to which Italy is sincerely convinced, and which she wishes to see materialised in loyal and friendly collaboration), it would be peculiarly desirable to dissipate in Italy the impression that England desires to favour Greek aspirations in the East in too wide a measure, without taking into account the losses which Italy would sustain in respect of the advantages assured to her by international agreements.\*

FO. 406/44, p. 212-213, No. 186/1

\* 15 Kasım günü Lord Curzon bu belge üzerine şunları not etmiştir:

"M. Imperiali puts every case on the ground of personal favour to himself. And what do we get in return? Absolutely nothing. Before I see him, let us get our case against the Italians from Ad. de Robeck - for they have been intriguing everywhere. But I am going to make no engagements about Cyprus except not to give it up to anybody in my time. C."

(D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 177, n. 5).

No. 174

*War Office to Foreign Office.*

*War Office, November 19, 1920*

*(Received November 20.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Office letter of the 10th November, 1920, on the subject of the relations existing between the Italian Government and the Turkish Nationalists.

In this connection I am to say, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, that the following reports on the above subject are in the possession of the War Office, in addition to those supplied by agents:—

1. Telegram No I. 8785 of the 14th June, 1920, from G. H. Q., Constantinople, to the War Office, copy of which is attached for the purpose of easy reference.

2. Extract from G. H. Q., Constantinople, Summary No. I. 6889, dated the 22nd June, 1920, stating that on the 29th April, 1920, Colonel Chiodelli, the Italian Officer Commanding at Scalanova, handed over large stores of food to the Nationalist Committee at Scalanova, and informed the British liaison officer there that before leaving he was further handing over 7,000 blankets.

3. A telegram from G. H. Q., Constantinople, dated the 15th September, 1920, to the effect that the Italian military attaché at Constantinople had stated in conversation with a British officer that the appointment of Signor Maissa to the governorship of Rhodes offered little attraction if regarded as an island governorship, but if regarded as the centre of the web of Italian political influence in Anatolia and the Mussulman world in Asia, could be regarded as being most important.

4. A report from the French War Office to G. H. Q., Egypt, through the French liaison officer, to the effect that—

- (a.) Presence of Italian Military Mission at Angora with Mustafa Kemal, amongst whom was Lieutenant Vlora, alias Safa Bey, an Albanian.
- ↳ (b.) Numerous barrels of petrol from Italian source have been sent from Adalia into the interior of Anatolia.
- ↳ (c.) Information from Nationalist source states that two field guns were disembarked at Adalia by the Italians for Mustafa Kemal.

5. And a confirmation of the above report from G. H. Q., Constantinople, dated the 29th October.

I am to say that the Council has caused telegrams to be despatched to G. H. Q., Constantinople, and G. H. Q., Egypt, asking that the accuracy of the above reports may be confirmed and the authorities for them fully quoted. As soon as replies to these telegrams are received, a further communication on the subject will be addressed to Lord Curzon.

FO. 406/44, p. 213-214, No. 187.

I am, &c.

B. B. CURRIE

## ENCLOSURE IN NO. 174

*General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.*C  
(Secret.)

June 14, 1920

(Telegraphic.) P.

[ONE group undecypherable] Norbaccia, well-known Italian contractor, visited my headquarters during the week with the suggestion that permission should be given him to repair the destroyed railway bridges within the Nationalist lines near Lefke.

FO. 406/44, p. 213-214, No. 187/1.

## No. 175

*Notes Presented to Earl Curson on Relations Between Bolsheviks  
And Turkish Nationalists.*

November 20, 1920

The Foreign Office have practically no original reports on this subject, all their information being received second-hand from the Military Secret Intelligence Service, but two very full and detailed reports, which cover the whole ground, have been drawn up in the War Office and India Office, entitled respectively:—

✓ ✓ “Examination of the Cause of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia” and “Mesopotamia. Causes of Unrest”. Copies of these are attached hereto. In view of the existence of these reports, it seems useless to attempt to draw up a third history of these events nor, indeed, has there been time to do so.

The general history on the broadest lines of the inception of the Bolshevik-Turkish Alliance by Enver Pasha and Lenin will be found on pages 8 to 13 of the War Office Report, while a history of the Nationalist movement is given on pages 49 to 63, of which paragraphs 7, 10, 11, 19, 31, 48, 54, 55, and 56 deal specially with Nationalist relations with the Bolsheviks. The various Treaties between the Bolsheviks and the Turks beginning with the original Bolshevik-Islamic Treaty concluded at the Moscow Meeting in May, 1920, will be found in Appendices 11 to 15 on pages 84 to 87 while Appendix 20 on pages 91 to 93 gives the proceedings of the Baku Congress of September, 1920.

An examination of these papers emphasizes the distinction between the Pan-Islamic or Unionist Party of Enver, Talaat, and Jemal and the Nationalist movement in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal. A full descrip-

tion of the Pan-Islamic conferences that took place during the early part of 1920 at Montreux, San Moritz, Moscow, Berlin and Munich, will be found in the War Office report, while a concise history of the initiation and development of the negotiations between the Nationalists and Bolsheviks up to the time of the first despatch of money, military supplies and forces to Angora will be found on pages 4 to 7 and 11 and 12 of Political Report C X/1205 of September 25th, to which is attached a translation of an article from an Angora newspaper giving an exchange of letters between Lenin and Mustafa Kemal in June of this year.

Definite evidence of Russian assistance to the Nationalists is very scanty owing to the fact that the majority of reports are those of anonymous agents, whose accuracy cannot always be vouched for but the following quotations from papers which are attached are fairly circumstantial:

A. From official reports of a debate in the Great National Assembly at Angora July 8th last, published in the national official gazette, it appears that SİRRI BEY of Ismidt stated: "A hope is coming from the East", "A force and a light are being prepared in the East for our help and enlightenment and the safeguarding of our independence. But for opposing circumstances this force would have reached us long ago".

Sheikh SERVET EFFENDI said: "A new life has just been born for the service of the common cause called Bolshevism..... what is certain is that, if we are to maintain contact with the Moslems in the East, we must join with the Bolsheviks. Our political situation compels such a course".

After other speeches Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the President of the Assembly, replied in a speech, in the course of which he said "We have sought out the Bolsheviks; we have exchanged official correspondence with the Soviet Government, the tenour of which you know, and the Soviet Government has promised us all manner of material help, arms, guns and money. Of late, the conflicts which arose in the Caucasus prevented the arrival of this help. We are on the point of eliminating such obstacles".

B. A proclamation issued by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on August 5th stated that the secret forces of Bolshevism which was holding out its hand to the Turks, would always assist the Turks and continued with more to the same effect, proclaiming that victory was to be attained through the Bolsheviks.

C. The Anatolian Agency, the official press bureau of the Great National Assembly of Angora, published the following statement on May 19th:

"The news of the conclusion of the Treaty between the Soviet Government and the Great National Assembly was received in Batoum with great satisfaction and enthusiasm".

D. The Constantinople Weekly Report No. 86 of September 15th states that the National ists continue to publish communiqués on the situation of the various Bolshevik fronts and also to emphasize the fact that they are receiving assistance in money and arms from the Bolsheviks.

E. An intercepted private letter from a Turk in Angora stated that Soviet organisations are being started everywhere, that money and materials were arriving from Russia and that communications between Russia and Anatolia had been established via Trebizond and Batoum.

F. Two telegrams from G.H.Q. Egypt to the War Office quoted reports from American and French sources respectively to the effect firstly, that 7,000 Bolshevik troops had reinforced Mustafa Kemal and been ordered to the Aintab district, that further Bolshevik troops were to follow and that the Bolshevik headquarters was moved to Erzeroum and, secondly, that Mustafa Kemal had been reinforced by 10,000 Russians and was prepared to invade Mesopotamia. These latter reports are, however, unverified.

Finally, there is attached an extract from the most recent Constantinople Intelligence Report of October 28th, covering the following matters:—

(1) An order issued by Mustafa Kemal on September 25th to the Commander of the Nationalist Armies regarding the forthcoming offensive in the direction of Kars;

(2) An outline of Nationalist plans, which included the obtaining of military supplies from Russia and, the seizure of as much Armenian territory as possible in order to confront the Entente with an accomplished fact and a winter invasion of Mesopotamia;

(3) A report by the official Anatolian Agency of the entertainment by Mustafa Kemal Pasha of the Soviet Mission in Angora, headed by ELIAVA;

(4) A telegram from KIAZIM KARABEKIR to Mustafa Kemal containing the Soviet Government's proposals to the Nationalists for the sovietisation of Turkey. These included the suppression of the Sultanate and Khalifate, two points which elicited anxious enquiries from the Crown Prince at Constantinople; and

(5) A report on the decisions of the Baku Congress of September last, from which it appears that it was there decided that direct communication should be established between Anatolia and the Bolshevik forces in the Caucasus — a decision which would appear to be responsible for the combined Nationalist and Bolshevik attack on Armenia which had been planned for the summer but had had to be deferred.

From the reports available of its recent execution, it would appear that there has been very little, if any, effective military cooperation by the



Bolsheviks from the North although they have despatched a small sum of money and an unknown quantity of military supplies for the use of the Nationalist forces. \*

FO. 371/5178/E. 14638

\* Bu notlara, el yazısıyla şu satırlar eklenmiştir:

Sir E. Crowe

This is the information asked for by the Secretary of State about the alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists.

Most of it is collected in a very convenient form in the red War Office volume; but Mr. Osborne has added some other... useful papers.

J. A. C. Tilley  
20.XI.20

No. 176

*Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.*

TIFLIS, November 22, 1920.

(Received December 13.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on recent events in Transcaucasia.

Almost simultaneously with my arrival at Tiflis at the end of September the Kemalists began the invasion of Armenia. There is little doubt that this invasion was the outcome of a joint Bolshevik-Kemalist plan, having for its aim the junction of their armed forces and incidentally to compel Armenia to sever all connection with the Allies. The success of this plan would, it was thought, not only strengthen greatly the Bolshevik-Kemalist combination against the Allies, but show the world that the Treaty of Sèvres remained a dead letter.

Being aware that the agreement concluded by the Armenian Government in August last with the Bolsheviks had somewhat impaired our confidence in their intentions, I visited Erivan and Kars at the beginning of October to ascertain for myself the attitude of the Armenian Government. I found not alone the Government, but all political parties and the people at large united in the determination to resist the Turkish invasion and not to accept Bolshevism.

About this time there were indications of the concentration of Bolshevik troops on the Azerbaijan frontier, and on the 13th October the

Bolshevik representative at Erivan presented to the Armenian Government a demand that it should denounce the Treaty of Sèvres and facilitate the passage of Bolshevik troops across Armenia in order that they might effect a junction with the Kemalists. Despite the fact that Armenia was now threatened simultaneously by two enemies, her Government decided to refuse the Bolshevik demand. At the request of the Armenian President, I proceeded once more to Erivan. I found the Armenian Government determined to refuse the Bolshevik demand, but anxious to defer giving a definite refusal in the hope of (a) prolonging negotiations until the advent of winter, which would greatly shorten their line of defence against the Bolsheviks, (b) securing a secret defensive military alliance with Georgia.

The Armenian Minister of War accompanied me to Tiflis in order to discuss the question of a military alliance with the Georgian Government. His efforts and my own, to convince the Georgian Government that its own interests demanded that they should make such an alliance, proved fruitless, and the Georgian Government refused to accept the suggestion. The reason given by the Georgian Government for its refusal was that a war undertaken by Georgia in support of Armenia would, unless Georgia were herself attacked, lack the support of the Georgian people. This argument is, in my opinion, not without some force owing to the deep mutual distrust existing between Georgians and Armenians. But other factors which probably influenced the decision of the Georgian Government are:—

- (a) The fear of Georgia that, if she supported Armenia, the Turks would retaliate by instigating risings among the numerous Mussulmans in Georgia.
- (b) The desire of Georgia not to jeopardise the result of negotiations then proceeding with Azerbaijan and the Bolsheviks for supplies of oil from Baku in return for merchandise from Georgia.

Having failed to obtain Georgian support, the Armenian Government replied to the Bolshevik demand in terms which they were convinced would be unacceptable, but which they hoped might prolong negotiations. The Bolshevik representative replied that the Armenian proposals would be considered, and on the 29th October left Erivan for Baku with the avowed object of obtaining a reply to the Armenian communication. Meanwhile, the Kemalists attacked the Armenians from another direction, viz., that of Igdir, and considerable fighting took place within 25 miles of Erivan. About the same time, i.e., the 28th October, the Kemalists began a general attack on Kars, which place they captured on the 31st October. The Armenian forces offered but a feeble resistance, and withdrew almost intact in the direction of Alexandropol. Two battalions of Armenians were captured by the Kemalists. These battalions had displayed Bolshevik tendencies

in May last at Alexandropol and are reported to have admitted the Kemalists into the defence of Kars without offering any resistance.

Strenuous efforts were made by the Armenian Government to reorganise their forces and re-establish their *moral* in order to defend a position a few miles west of Alexandropol, but even numerous summary executions of deserters failed to improve matters, and on the 7th November, at the request of the Armenian Commander at Alexandropol, an armistice was granted by the Kemalist Corps Commander, Kiazim Karabekir.

By the terms of this armistice the Kemalists occupied Alexandropol and the Armenian troops withdrew from the west bank of the Arpachai. On the 9th November the Kemalists presented an ultimatum, which had been telegraphed by Mustapha Kemal, demanding the surrender of a large amount of arms, ammunition and rolling stock, the withdrawal of the Armenian troops to a line running roughly from the north-west corner of Lake Gokeha to Araks station on the Alexandropol-Erivan Railway and control of the Alexandropol-Tiflis Railway, up to and including Sanain.

On the 10th November the Armenian Government received from Mustapha Kemal a telegram dated Angora, the 8th November, giving (a) the basis, (b) the terms, upon which peace could be concluded. The main points of (a) were:

1. Frontiers to be decided according to statistics and a plebiscite.
2. In disputed areas the population to self-determine whether to belong to Turkey or Armenia.
3. A mixed Turco-Armenian gendarmerie to be formed in the disputed areas in order to ensure complete liberty of voting.
4. In the interests of all, a peace conference to take place as soon as possible.

Mustapha Kemal expressed his fear that, in order to please the Western capitalists, and especially England, the Armenian Government would object to these proposals.

The main points of (b) were:—

1. Turkey agrees to allow her neighbour States to develop in complete security and liberty.
2. Turkey will, as far as she can, assist in supplying Armenia, and in re-establishing the latter's normal economic situation.
3. Turkey and Armenia agree mutually to afford complete liberty of passage on their railways and other means of communication of persons and goods.

4. Turkey agrees to repatriate all Armenians who emigrated from Turkey during the World War to their homes, and to grant them the same rights as are enjoyed in the most civilised countries by ethnographical minorities.

5. Turkey demands from Armenia effective guarantees for the security of Turkey.

The effective guarantees were not specified, and it is difficult to say what form such guarantees could take. Mustapha Kemal's message concluded by stating that the Turkish delegates would await the Armenian delegates at Alexandropol.

Captain Court's telegram giving the gist of Mustapha Kemal's message reached me in so mutilated a condition as to be undecypherable, and I have had to await Captain Court's arrival at Tiflis in order to ascertain its contents.

The Armenian Government replied to the Kemalist ultimatum of the 9th November by proposing a conference to discuss its terms. Kiazim Karabekir replied that he would reopen hostilities, which he did on the 11th November. By the 18th November, the Armenian troops had been driven out of Ani on the railway to Erivan and back to Amamli on that to Karaklis, and a fresh armistice was signed. A peace conference is to take place at Alexandropol.

During the past fortnight the Bolsheviks have more than once offered to mediate between the Armenians and Turks, but the Armenian Government has so far rejected these offers, in the hope that His Majesty's Government would see their way to act as mediators.

The failure of the Armenian army to offer any but a most feeble resistance is to be attributed, in my opinion, to the following factors:—

1. War weariness.
2. Swamping of an efficient minority of fighting material by a large untrained and therefore inefficient majority of recruits produced by a general mobilisation,
3. Lack of efficient leaders.
4. Lack of adequate supplies.
5. Winter conditions.

I consider it but just to the Armenian Government to place on record my conviction that it did its utmost in difficult circumstances to save its country, and that in the face of disaster it has remained faithful to its connection with the Allies. If it now accepts Bolshevik assistance to mitigate the terms imposed by its Turkish victors it will undoubtedly only do so as a last resort.

In conclusion, I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice the excellent work done during the period with which this despatch deals by Captain H. D. H. Court, R.E., attached to this mission, who has recently been acting as British representative at Erivan. He has sent me full and useful reports on the situation throughout, and remained at Erivan to the last possible moment—indeed, some days longer than was really intended by the instructions which I sent him.

I have, &c.

C. B. STOKES

FO. 406/44, p. 57-59, No. 36

No. 177

*British Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office.*

*November 22nd, 1920*

*(Received November 23.)*

No. CX/1011/V

Dear Gwatkin,

The following telegram has been received from our representative at Sofia:—

"I am closely in touch with personal friend of Mustapha Kemal named Achkoff an ex-deputy Bulgarian Parliament whose guest he has been occasionally.

Achkoff visited Kemal last March and is in a position to communicate with him at any time. He last received letter from him three months ago, but owing to recent events approached me yesterday probably on own initiative for interview with Minister to explain (word omitted here) aims of Kemal and views with reference to Bolsheviki and to indicate basis possible agreement and recommends direct secret negotiations. The Secretary here and I had joint conversation with him on which a report by letter is being sent to Constantinople by Legation. I am sending you full report by letter". \*

Yours sincerely,

FO. 371/5291/E. 14573

\* Bu belge üzerine İngiltere Dışişlerinde şu yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Sooner or later we shall probably have discussions with the Turks. But I venture to think that these discussions should be with the Porte and not with Mustafa Kemal. Over the Porte our military position at Constantinople gives us at any rate some ascendancy. Over Mustafa Kemal we have none. But the nationalist complexion of the present Turkish Government makes it certain that they are in touch with Mustafa Kemal. In discussing

with the Turkish Government, then, we should not only avoid putting Mustafa Kemal on a pedestal, but we should be giving the Sultan's Government some badly-need prestige. Moreover, if we deal direct with Mustafa Kemal, he will imagine that we measure him by his bluff and he will raise his price accordingly to cover Mesopotamia, Syria and perhaps Egypt, Tripoli an Albania. Such demands, however, would hardly be made by the Porte.

"Still more would the ideas of the Turks be inflated if we invited them to a discussion. They would think that we were indeed at the end of our resources and they would no longer labour under their present perplexity as to our intentions. Rather than invite them, we should leave it to them to seek our sanction to any modification of the Treaty which they succeed in extracting from the Greeks.

"I would submit, then:

- (i) That the Turks should be left to solicit any discussion of the Treaty.
- (ii) That it should be with the Porte.
- (iii) That it should, as we have always said, be conducted by the three Allies together and not — as this paper gives some reason to fear may happen — by us independently.

W. S. Edmonds  
24/11/20."

"Central Department.

Please let us see the Legation's report on this

D. G. Osborne  
24/11."

"I agree with Mr. Edmonds.

The natural way to communicate with Mustapha Kemal would be through the proposed mission from the Porte. But I gather that H.M.G. do not propose any action of the kind at present.

J. A. C. T. (illey)  
25.XI.

"H. M. G. are expressing no opinion pending discussions with France an Italy; after which a policy can be formulated.

25.XI.20."

No. 178

*Greek Minister in London to Earl Curzon.*

LEGATION DE GRECE, LONDON,  
22nd November, 1920

No. 5721/St/20.

My Lord,

With reference to my Note No. 5418/St/20 of the 3rd November, to which Your Lordship was kind enough to reply by his letter No. E. 13648/147/44, I have the honour to bring to your notice the following information which reached the Greek Government from the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople.

According to information provided by the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, the Turkish Prisoners of War actually in India number twelve thousand. Two thousand more have already embarked from India to be repatriated. Eight thousand are remaining in Constantinople. In relation to these latter, the British Commissioner in Constantinople addressed to the Greek High Commissioner, in the name of the three Commissioners of the Great Powers, a note, asking the authorisation of the Greek Government for them to return to their homes. The Greek High Commissioner explained to the British High Commissioner that next week it should be allowed to prisoners to return home among those originating from Thrace as well as those who originated from Asia Minor, for the latter as far as they were living in the zone occupied by the Greek Army there; but it was in the common interest of the Allies to forbid the repatriation of such prisoners originating from places on which the terrorist rule of Mustapha Kemal was extended.

Moreover, the High Commissioners of the three Great Powers, in Constantinople, although realising the importance of the argument put forth by the Greek authorities, were insisting on the repatriation of the Prisoners of War kept in Constantinople for reasons of security and health in the Capital.

It was understood that if the number of prisoners of war then remaining in Constantinople was not increased by others repatriated from India, the situation should be much alleviated in this matter.

The Greek Government should be much obliged to have any information on the differences existing about the number of Turkish Prisoners of War to be repatriated from India, and they ask very earnestly that such prisoners should not be allowed to be sent to Constantinople, as well as that no prisoners remaining now in the Capital should be authorised to return to places not actually occupied by the Greek Army, and submitted to the influence of Mustapha Kemal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. CACLAMANOS

FO. 371/5143/E. 14708

No. 179

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 23, 1920**(Received November 24.)**(No. 1234.)**(Telegraphic.)*

YOUR telegram No. 1103 of 17th November.

I have communicated substance of your telegram under reference to my French and Italian colleagues.

Italian Acting High Commissioner stated that he had received a telegram from his Government approving of reply proposed in my predecessor's telegram No. 1189. My French colleague has received a telegram from his Government to the following effect:—

Fact that Turkish Government will not immediately ratify treaty will give Mustapha Kemal impression that he has secured a real advantage over Constantinople Government, especially after success he has had in Armenia. But French Government do not think it possible to increase pressure directed to secure ratification of treaty, since such pressure might bring about fall of present Cabinet, which is well aware of consequences of delay in ratification.

French Government maintain their decision not to allow Allies to apply financial clauses of treaty before latter is ratified. On the other hand, French Government have no reason for opposing despatch of Turkish mission to Anatolia, but this mission must not include any Allied representatives. Whatever may be result of mission, it is essential that Tewfik's Cabinet should undertake in writing to ratify treaty by a fixed date — for instance, by 1st December.

My two colleagues and I deprecate addition, in form proposed by you, to threat contained in my predecessor's telegram No. 1189 of 10th November, as it might bring about fall of present Government, and it is difficult to see what Government would take its place.

We have also to bear in mind since despatch of Constantinople telegram No 1189 situation here has been rendered more critical by result of Greek elections and consequent uncertainty as to their effect on moral and temper of Greek troops in Asia Minor, as well as on policy of new Greek Government.

Italian Acting High Commissioner objected to mention of a date for ratification in proposed reply to Turkish Government. He also asked that new Italian High Commissioner, who is due to arrive to-day, should have



opportunity of examining proposed note before it is sent in. This will of course cause some slight delay.

We have asked our French colleague to draft note on lines indicated in our telegram No. 1189 of 10th November, whilst reconciling as far as possible our separate instructions.

FO. 406/44, p. 214, No. 188

No. 180

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1920

(Received November 27.)

(No. 1239.)

(Telegraphic.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called yesterday for first time.

He began by stating that police would be paid their October salaries. I should explain that delay in paying police was causing British military authorities some anxiety, and I had been pressing for their payment.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that messenger whom Turkish Government had despatched to Mustapha Kemal Pasha had returned, and had reported that latter was prepared to receive proposed mission from Turkish Government had despatched to Mustapha Kemal Pasha had returned, and had reported that latter was prepared to receive proposed mission from Turkish Government. Mission, which would be under Izzet Pasha, would start in two or three days. As I inferred that Turkish Government meant to await return of mission before ratifying treaty, I pointed out that there would be further delay of at least three weeks from now. I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had himself stated that Turkish Government would be prepared to ratify within a month or thereabouts. This month would be up about the beginning of December. I said that it was imperative that Turkish Government should put an end to present unsatisfactory state of things by ratifying treaty. They were living from hand to mouth now, but once they had ratified treaty they would know where they were.

Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that present was most unsatisfactory, and made an appeal for financial facilities to carry on administration.

I said that, although treaty had shorn Turkey of much territory, she was still a considerable State, which would become prosperous if her econo-

SECRET

mic resources developed and internal peace restored. I would do my utmost to contribute to this when once treaty had been ratified.

My impression is, however, that Turkish Government will attempt to delay ratification and return of mission.

*F.O. 406/44, p. 215, No. 189*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 190, No. 182*

No. 181

*Sir A. Peel (Sofia) to Earl Curzon.*

*SOFIA, November 24th, 1920*

*(Received November 26.)*

*(No. 175.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

Mr. Atchkoff, who was a member of Sobranye and is a well known man in this city, has represented to this Legation that he has been in close touch with Mustafa Kemal Pasha until last March.

He states that Kemal is convinced that Bolshevism can never take root in Turkish soil as religious (group omitted) are opposed to its teachings: that he is not opposed to existence of an independent and autonomous Armenia should latter not (? very much) exceed in extent present Republic of Erivan: that he would recognise and even guarantee racial minorities so long as they did not conspire against Sovereign State, and that he is not interested in Arabia.

Kemal attaches no great importance to support of France and Italy but would make great sacrifices to obtain support of Great Britain.

Atchkoff is of opinion, based on Kemal's declaration to himself, that if British delegates were sent to him secretly they would have no difficulty in arriving at an agreement provided Smyrna were not ceded to Greece, which country is object of hatred of Moslem population of Anatolia: that if Great Britain would resume her secular policy of support to a strong and independent Turkey, Kemal would reject collaboration of Reds and would be willing to agree to having an English Adviser to every Vali.

Atchkoff, while admitting that he has not seen Kemal since March (? last) has been receiving communications from him and is willing to give further information on these lines if desired. He points out that Great Britain would reap infinitely greater advantages from an understanding with Kemal than by any other means as effect of an agreement would be felt in Mesopotamia and throughout Middle East, and by it Great Britain would win over goodwill of entire population.

Atchkoff stated that he had been led to make this visit in mutual interests of Great Britain and Bulgaria which would be served by a lasting peace in the Near East, but an anti-Greek bias must be allowed for as Greek authorities in Thrace gave orders for his arrest on his return to Sofia from Constantinople on ground that he was acting as a Kemalist courier.

Repeated to Constantinople\*.

FO. 371/5291/E. 14768

\* Bu telgraf üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"Mustapha Kemal (according to Mr. Atchkoff) would not be prepared to accept the extension of the Erivan Republic into Ottoman territory with the southern boundry to be fixed, according to the Treaty, by President Wilson.

"His reported views on racial minorities, probably referring to the Greeks of Smyrna, Armenians and the Kurds, would seem to imply a regime short of autonomy, such as that provided for the Kurds in Section III Arts 62-63 and 64 of the Treaty.

G. H. Fitzmaurice. 27/11§20."

"According to this Mustafa Kemal's demands are very moderate, but we shall know more when the Turkish Mission under Izzet Pasha returns. It is due to start tomorrow. The advantages to us of an understanding with Turkey are undeniable.

D. G. Osborne.

27§11.

J. A. C. T.(illey)

27.XI"

"Apparently these views as to Mustapha Kemal's attitude are based on impressions gained by a Bulgarian who has not seen him since last month, but receives communications from him. I do not see how we can attach much value to Mr. Atchkoff's vague assurances.

E. C.(rowe)

Nov. 27

C.(urzon)

27/11"

No. 182

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1920  
(Received November 25.)

(No. 1246.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 1234 of 23rd November.

Following is translation of identic note which we are addressing to Porte:—

"High Commissioners have the honour to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that they have received from their Governments instructions as to

reply to be made to his note of 4th November (*i.e.*, note quoted in my telegram No. 1189 of 10th November).

“These instructions are to reiterate their former demand for ratification of treaty by Turkish Government. Accomplishment of this formality by Turkish Government is more urgent as it would imply on their part an indispensable disavowal of aggression against Armenia, which constitutes a violation in anticipation of treaty, and a marked act of hostility against Allies, which has produced a great and deplorable impression on public opinion of the world and is liable to induce most serious consequences for Turkey.

“Ratification is equally necessary in the interests of Turkish Government itself for reason already mentioned that, although Allied Governments, in their desire to furnish Turkey as soon as possible with means of improving her financial and economic situation, have agreed to allow Financial Commission contemplated in treaty, which is alone competent to elaborate and apply these means of beginning work after ratification by Turkish Government, they can go no further, but maintain principle that no financial assistance can be given except by Financial Commission, whose assumption of activities is inevitably contingent upon ratification of treaty by Turkish Government.

High Commissioners therefore request Turkish Government to ratify without delay, and expect that this ratification will in any case take place before expiration of period mentioned in note under reply. They would wish to receive a definite assurance in this connection.”

*FO. 406/44, p. 215, No. 190*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII. p. 190-191, No. 183*

No. 183

*Greek Minister in London to Earl Curzon.*

LEGATION DE GRECE, LONDON

*25th November, 1920*

*No. 5774/St/20.*

My Lord,

With reference to my note No. 5721/St/20, I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that according to a telegram from the Greek Government, the Greek Military Mission in Constantinople communicates that there is information from many sources that, according to fears expressed,

the Turkish Prisoners of War sent to their homes in Anatolia are enrolling themselves in the Army of Mustapha Kemal, either by force, or by fanaticism. There is also information that a Turkish Commission sent to Egypt is insisting upon the Turkish Prisoners of War who are to be repatriated enrolling themselves in the Revolutionary Army.

All this information is forcing the Greek Government to insist very earnestly on urgent steps being taken against the return home of Turkish Prisoners of War who should increase the ranks of the Kemalist Army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. CACLAMANOS

FO. 371/5143/E-14836

No. 184

*Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.*

ROME, November 26, 1920.

(Received December 1.)

(No. 929. Confidential.)

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 894 of the 13th of this month, I had the honour to report a conversation which I had had with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the alleged presence of an Italian Mission with Mustapha Kemal at Angora, and to the military supplies said to have been sent by Italians into Anatolia.

Signor Contarini now informs me, in a private and confidential letter, that, in reply to an enquiry which he had addressed to the Italian Embassy at Constantinople, Signor Arlotta had qualified these reports as false and scandalous. The latter had caused the most careful enquiries to be made by competent agents, without obtaining any confirmation of the alleged facts, and had, like Count Sforza, attributed these unfounded reports to the misplaced confidence of our military authorities in the information supplied them by their Greek agents.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

FO. 406/44, p. 217, No. 194

No. 185

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 26, 1920.

*(Received November 29.)**(No. 1250.)**(Telegraphic.) D.*

My telegram No. 1245 of 24th November.

After receipt of identic note, of which text is given in my above-mentioned telegram, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had an interview with my French colleague. He told latter that his intention was to send a delegation to Angora, and after calculating time delegation would take to reach that place and allowing three [group omitted] for discussions with Mustapha Kemal, to ratify treaty, Turkish Government did not think it politic vis-à-vis Nationalists to ratify treaty and then send their delegation.

FO. 406/44, p. 216, No. 192

No. 186

*Sir A. Peel (Sofia) to Earl Curzon.*

SOFIA, 22 November 1920.

*No. 510 Confidential.*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 175 of the 25th instant.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum of a conversation between Monsieur Dimitri Atchkoff, an ex-deputy, and Mr. MacKillop, which took place at this Legation on the 20th. inst. Mr. B. Gilliat-Smith's knowledge of the Bulgarian language was extremely valuable on this occasion, as the information conveyed and the opinions expressed by Monsieur Atchkoff would have lost any value they may possess, had it been necessary to have recourse to an unofficial interpreter.

Major Neate informs me that an anti-Greek bias must be allowed for on the part of Atchkoff, as the Greek authorities in Thrace gave orders for the former's arrest on his return to Sofia from Constantinople in March last, on the ground that he was acting as a Kemalist Courier. They even searched the train during its transit through Thrace, but Atchkoff eluded them by a ruse, and an unfortunate fellow-passenger was arrested and detained for some time in his name.

The present turn of affairs in Greece and in the Crimea would appear to lend interest to the statements of Monsieur Atchkoff on the occasion of his visit, the real motive for which, it may be conjectured in the absence of definite evidence, may not have been the disinterested altruism which he claims to have been its sole cause.

I am forwarding copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PEEL

FO. 371/5291/E. 15295

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 186

*Memorandum of interview with M. Dimitri Atchkoff on 20 Nov. 1920.*

1. *Personality*:—

M. Dimitri Atchkoff is an ex-Deputy, and sat in the Sobranje from 1903 to 1908 as a Stambulovist. This fact is vouched for by Mr. Elder, who knows Atchkoff personally. Now a merchant in Sofia, he claims to have met Mustafa Kemal Pasha originally in January 1916, when Kemal spent a month of leave from Gallipoli as M. Atchkoff's guest in Sofia. On the latter's discharge from the Bulgarian Army in 1917 for reasons of age, he claims to have renewed personal relations with Kemal, chiefly in Constantinople, and to have been in close touch with him until last March, since which time the two have not met. His visit to this Legation at this moment is, he states, due to the turn of events in the Crimea, and not to those in Greece. The bulk of his assertions, while based on declarations he has heard from the lips of Kemal himself, represent to a great extent his personal convictions and conclusions. He stated that he had been led to make this visit in the mutual interests of Great Britain and of Turkish independence, and in those of Bulgaria, which would necessarily be served by a lasting peace in the Near East.

Firstly, he is of opinion that Great Britain should negotiate with Kemal direct. The official Government is only a shadow, while Kemal is in a position to ensure immediate effect being given to his orders. If British delegates were sent secretly to Kemal, they would have no difficulty in arriving at a formula of agreement under which Great Britain would benefit more throughout the Middle East than ever she could with the assistance of Greece. Greece, not Great Britain, was the object of the hatred of the Moslem population of Anatolia, and so the way was clear for an understanding. He then proceeded to define Kemal's position in regard to:—

✓ 1. *Bolshevism :*

Kemal is deeply convinced that this can never take root in Turkish soil, religion and tradition being equally opposed to its teachings. Kemal would only continue to make use of the Bolsheviks to further the cause of an independent Turkey in the absence of other help. Should Great Britain resume her "secular" policy of support to a strong and independent Turkey, Turkish nationalism would reject the collaboration of the Reds.

✓ 2. *Armenia :*

Kemal was not opposed to the existence of an independent autonomous Armenia, should the latter not greatly exceed in extent the present Republic of Erivan. A large Armenia, including for instance Adana, "does not and cannot exist".

✓ 3. *Minorities in general :*

Kemal would recognize and even guarantee racial minorities, (so long as they did not conspire against the sovereign State) "in accordance with the custom of civilized States". Should they so conspire, these racial minorities would be treated "also in accordance with the custom of civilized States." (Atchkoff's exact words.)

4. *Arabia :*

Kemal is not interested in Arabia, but only in countries where the population is Turkish.

5. *Enver :*

Although they both seek to further Turkish nationalism, there is fundamental opposition between the policy of Kemal and that of Enver. During the War the former was consistently and entirely opposed to the orientation towards Germany, and he is still so opposed.

6. *France and Italy :*

Kemal attaches no great importance to the support of these two countries, but desires, and would make great sacrifices to obtain, the support of Great Britain.

✓ 7. *Smyrna :*

"Smyrna can never be in other hands than Turkish". So long as one Turk remained he would oppose its cession to any other country.

8. *Reforms.*

Atchkoff himself had suggested to Kemal that a certain way to guarantee reform would be to agree to have an English adviser to "every Vali of every Vilayet". This Kemal expressed himself as entirely willing to concede. (in March 1920.)



## CONCLUSION

Great Britain could reap infinitely greater advantages from an understanding with Kemal than by any other means. The repercussion of such an agreement would be felt in Mesopotamia and throughout the Middle East, and by it Great Britain would win over the goodwill of the entire population. The unnatural collaboration between Turks and Bolsheviks would at once end. If a formula could be reached assuring to Kemal the show of power, Britain could be in actuality the "Material lord of Constantinople."

M. Atchkoff is eager to give any further information on these lines which may be desired.\*

FO. 371/5291/E. 15295

\* Bu rapor üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şunlar not edilmiştir:

"This is an extended account of the interview described in tel. No. 175 (E. 14768) and is of considerable interest.

J. A. C. T.(illey)

11.12."

"This is the ordinary Turkish manoeuvre of pretending to make up to one of the allies, as against the other.

E. C.(rew)

Dec. 11

C.(urzon)

12/12"

No. 187

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 27, 1920.*

*(Received November 30.)*

*(No. 1253.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

IMPRESSION is general in Allied circles here that present situation must inevitably lead to considerable modification of Turkish Treaty.

Turkish Government cannot fail to entertain hopes that this will be so, but Ministers are careful not to hint at it except in form of "benevolent interpretation" without modification of text. Ministry for Foreign Affairs speaks of ratification in exactly the same way as before defeat of Venizelos. However paradoxical it may seem, it is within bounds of possibility that Government may now find Nationalist leaders willing to acquiesce secretly in the ratification, on theory that it would make things easier for Central

Government without incommoding Nationalists, whose position has grown so strong that they would count upon revision even after Central Government had ratified. It is obviously impossible to form clear estimation of probable developments in Turkey until Greek situation has matured. Nevertheless it looks as if, apart from any other developments elsewhere, defeat of Armenia must make partial revision necessary, and drastic revision will be unavoidable if Greek lapse in Smyrna area, whether as a result of withdrawal of Allied support consequent upon return of Constantine, of dissension and demoralisation which may set in among Greek forces even without return of Constantine, or of voluntary renunciation by Greece of her acquisitions in Anatolia. Need for entirely new policy may at any moment become so urgent that I venture, though with serious diffidence, to submit at once following appreciation of new conditions as viewed from Constantinople:—

If revision of treaty becomes inevitable, it appears to me object of Allies should be to find solution which will—

1. Accelerate pacification of Asia Minor;
2. Enable Allies to emerge from situation with minimum of damage to their credit in eyes of East, and Turkish Nationalists in particular; and
3. Secure future well-being of non-Moslem minorities, notwithstanding concessions which it will be necessary to make to Turks.

Unless Allies are willing themselves to undertake difficult military operations in interior, first of these objects can now only be attained by going a long way to meet Nationalists. Latter may be expected now to have more extravagant pretensions than ever, but if it is true that there is a growing tension between them and Bolsheviks, and that large section of them fear infiltration of Bolshevik principles in Turkey, it might be possible to satisfy majority by some compromise, *e.g.*, by including in future Turkey country up to old Russian frontier with local alteration only, converting Smyrna area from purely Greek zone into specially administered vilayet under Turkish sovereignty accompanied by international control, and by making non-territorial dispositions somewhat less stringent.

Second object can, unfortunately, only be attained most imperfectly. Allies, however, need not cut quite so sorry a figure if they can give themselves appearance of coming in as "honest brokers" between parties directly concerned in territorial settlement and if they could manipulate situation so as to figure as protectors of Islam against Bolshevism and drive further wedge between Kemalits and Bolsheviks.

Third object is very important. It can only be secured by retaining as much control as possible over Turkish administration generally, and especially gendarmerie. I fully realise repugnance which must be inspired by any idea of treaty to suit Nationalists.

Also realise that they may be so encouraged by recent developments as to be unwilling to come into line just now on any terms at all which Allies could accept, that reports of acute tension between them and Bolsheviks may prove false, and that it will be no easy matter to adapt any new settlement to arrangements amongst Allies themselves. My object in foregoing analysis is not to put forward concrete proposals, but to suggest possible line of thought in new and complicated situation.

FO. 405/44, p. 216-217, No. 193

DBFP, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 193-194, No. 186

No. 188

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 28, 1920.

(Received December 10.)

(No. 1573.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1246 of the 24th November, transmitting the translation of a joint note which has been addressed to the Sublime Porte regarding the ratification of the Peace Treaty, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of this note.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

FO. 406/44, p. 226, No. 199

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 188

*Joint Note addressed to Sublime Porte.*

POUR faire suite à leur note du 12 de ce mois, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères qu'ils ont reçu de leurs Gouvernements respectifs les instructions demandées en vue de la réponse à faire à la lettre de son Excellence Sefa Bey en date du 4 novembre 1920.

Conformément à ces instructions, les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés insistent sur leur précédente demande tendant à la ratification du Traité de Sèvres par le Gouvernement ottoman.

L'accomplissement de cette formalité est d'autant plus urgent qu'il impliquerait de la part du Gouvernement ottoman un désaveu indispensable de l'agression contre l'Arménie—agression qui constitue une violation anticipée du traité et un acte caractérisé d'hostilité contre les Alliés, qui a produit une grande et déplorable impression sur l'opinion publique mondiale et qui est de nature à entraîner les conséquences les plus fâcheuses pour la Turquie.

La ratification du Traité de Paix est également nécessaire dans l'intérêt du Gouvernement ottoman lui-même pour la raison, déjà indiquée précédemment, que si les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de donner le plus tôt possible à la Turquie les moyens d'améliorer sa situation financière et économique, ont bien voulu admettre que la Commission financière prévue par le Traité de Paix et dont dépend uniquement la recherche et l'emploi de ces moyens, pourrait commencer ces travaux après la ratification par le Gouvernement ottoman, ils ne sauraient aller au delà et maintiennent le principe que tout concours financier ne peut être donné que par la Commission financière, dont l'entrée en exercice est nécessairement subordonnée à la ratification du traité par la Turquie.

Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie invitent, en conséquence, le Gouvernement ottoman à ratifier sans retard le Traité de Sèvres et comptent que cette ratification aura lieu, en tout état de cause, dans le délai indiqué par son Excellence Sefa Bey dans sa lettre du 4 novembre.

Les trois Hauts-Commissaires attacheraient du prix à recevoir une assurance précise à cet égard.

A. DEFRANCE  
HORACE RUMLOLD  
M. ARLOTTA

*Constantinople, le 24 novembre 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 226-227, No. 199/1*

No. 189

*British Secretary's Notes of a Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, between Representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments, on Friday, December 3, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs; Mr. Philip Kerr; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. R. B. Howorth<sup>1</sup>, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr<sup>1</sup>.

*France*: M. Leygues, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires étrangères; M. Berthelot, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères; M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de la France à Londres; M. Kammerer; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: Count Sforza, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Marquis Imperiali, Italian Ambassador in London; SECRETARY, Signor Galli. INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in opening the proceedings, said that before the conference discussed the question of the Treaty of Sèvres it was necessary to consider an urgent matter emanating from Geneva, namely, a proposal that Armenia should forthwith be admitted to the League of Nations. This proposal had been brought before the League by two distinguished representatives, Lord Robert Cecil (who was one of the representatives of South Africa at the meeting of the assembly) and M. Viviani. These gentlemen were both endeavouring to persuade the assembly to admit Armenia into the League. At the present time the adoption of this course would be a very serious matter. The boundaries of Armenia had not as yet been defined, and he reminded the conference that under the covenant a member of the League was entitled to be guaranteed its boundaries. In the present case not merely was it impossible to give such a guarantee, but, even if given, the guarantee could not be enforced. In these circumstances the representatives at Geneva of the British Government had asked to be furnished with the views of the Government before committing themselves in any way. In his (Mr. Lloyd George's) view this was a matter on which it was essential that the Allies should take common action, and he would only say that, for the reasons he had given, the British Government were extremely doubtful as to the wisdom of admitting Armenia to the League at the present time.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the situation was really more serious than Mr. Lloyd George had indicated. According to information which he had just received, President Wilson was proposing to give Armenia considerably larger frontiers than she had herself demanded. Notably, President Wilson proposed to include Erzeroum and Trebizond in Armenia. Any guarantee of the frontiers proposed by President Wilson would involve the other members of the League in certain conflict with Armenia's neighbours, and the absurd situation would arise that the members of the League would have guaranteed frontiers which they themselves did not believe to be right and which they could not possibly maintain by force of arms.

<sup>1</sup> Note in filed copy: 'Only one British Secretary was present at a time'.

M. LEYGUES said that he entirely concurred with what he understood to be the opinion of Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon in this matter, namely, that Armenia should not be admitted to the League of Nations at the present time. Under article 88 of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey was obliged to recognise the independence of Armenia. As the Turks had not yet ratified the treaty, it was legally impossible for the members of the League to regard her as a free and independent State. In the view of the French Government the admission of Armenia to the League at the moment would be highly dangerous and imprudent.

COUNT SFORZA said that he quite agreed with the views which had been already expressed. He wished, however, to tremond the conference that it was important not to alienate the friends of Armenia by basing the decision on other than legal grounds. He therefore thought that the decision communicated to the League of Nations should be based on the legal difficulties under the treaty.

The conference agreed—

That the secretaries should draft a form of telegram,<sup>1</sup> and that, when the terms had been agreed, separate telegrams should be sent at once to the British, French and Italian delegates at the League of Nations, stating that the British, French and Italian Governments were opposed to the admission of Armenia to the League of Nations, on the grounds—

- (i) Of the legal difficulties arising out of article 88 of the Treaty of Sèvres.
- (ii) That the frontiers of Armenia had as yet not been settled.

and instructing the delegates to oppose the admission of Armenia to the League on these grounds.

2. M. LEYGUES said that he wished to give the conference the point of view of the French Government regarding possible revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. He pointed out that the treaty had as yet been ratified by none of the parties except Italy, and that therefore the Allies had a free hand in the matter. In influential French political circles there was a strong and growing demand for a drastic revision of the treaty. This, however, was not the view of the French Government, which thought that in the circumstances the better course was to maintain the treaty as a whole, but to amend it in certain respects to meet the new situation which had arisen in the Near East. He felt sure that all would agree that the re-establishment of peace in the Near East was a matter of the most supreme importance to the Allies. Only in this way could the Allies hope to save the growing burdens due to the maintenance of large forces in Asia Minor and elsewhere.

He wished to make his meaning perfectly clear. The provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, which had taken away from Turkey some of her fairest possessions, had deeply wounded the national pride of the Turks, and he felt confident that so long as Smyrna remained in the hands of the Greeks there could be no peace in Asia Minor. The Kemalists would continue active, and would provoke massacres and disorders, which would compel the Allies to keep large bodies of troops in Constantinople and in other parts of the old Turkish Empire. He did not advocate the return of Smyrna to the Turks in the sense that the Turks should resume their sovereignty over the place as in pre-war days, but he did think that Smyrna should be placed under some form of Ottoman sovereignty, being at the same time given some kind of local autonomy, or possibly being placed under international control. He did not mind about the precise form of such local administration, provided it was such as to ensure acceptance by the Turks, and consequently a return to a state of peace, which, in the view of the French Government, could not be attained so long as the present arrangements at Smyrna continued.

COUNT SFORZA said that the Italian Government and the Italian people were in no way prejudiced in this matter. They desired, first of all, to see the re-establishment of peace in Europe, as the surest barrier against the spread of Bolshevism. From some points of view it would be a definite advantage to Italy to have the Greeks in Smyrna, and he instanced the Tripartite Agreement, which he did not desire reopened in any respect. The broader question was, however, to secure a peaceable solution in the Near East, and he thought that some way out of the difficulty could be found without it being necessary to make concessions of substance to the "unspeakable Turks."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in the view of the British Government, any discussion of the question at the present time was premature. A great deal depended on the effect produced in Greece by the declaration just published by the Allies. If the Greeks, as was highly probable, took no notice of the warning, or if the effect of the warning was merely to increase the enthusiasm in Greece for Constantine, then it seemed to him that the problem solved itself. Constantine would return and would find himself in a cleft stick. Either he must carry out his pledges, demobilise the army and withdraw his troops from Asia Minor—in which case Mustafa Kemal would drive the Greeks out of Smyrna—or he must maintain the Greek army, in which case Greece would turn against him, as he would have given pledges about demobilisation which he could not redeem. Therefore, it seemed to him (Mr. Lloyd George) that it was essential to know what the Greek line of policy was going to be. In substance, the Allied declaration to

Greece was a notification to her that if she recalled Constantine the Allies washed their hands of all responsibilities for her in future. The situation had not however, as yet arisen. Quite frankly, he himself did not believe in the Turk, who had misgoverned subject peoples for generations, and was the curse of every land on which he had laid his hand. The Powers would be degrading themselves and civilisation also if they forced back under Turkish rule any of the lands which had been recently freed from Ottoman maladministration. In those districts where the Turks were in a majority it was, no doubt, necessary to allow Turkish rule to continue. But this was not the case in Smyrna, and he, for one, could not assent to any proposal which involved putting Smyrna again under the Turk, with Allied assistance. If the Greeks themselves liked to allow the Turk to get back into Thrace and Smyrna, then the responsibility and the infamy for the consequences must rest with them. Mr. Lloyd George added that he was no believer in international control, which, in fact, was no control at all. He instanced the failure of the international control of the Straits. This was due to many causes, one of which was the fact that the burdens were growing so great that the Allied peoples felt it impossible to incur new responsibilities. International control would mean that Smyrna would be invested by the Kemalists and other brigands, and that the Allies would send despatches to Mustafa Kemal which he would ignore, but the Allies would be unable to send any troops. He trusted, therefore, that no decision to modify the treaty would be taken until the Allies knew what the Greeks were going to do, and moreover, until the return of the mission which the Turkish Government at Constantinople was about to send to Mustafa Kemal. It was not proposed that there should be any Allied representatives on this mission, which, in his view, was a good thing, since the presence of such representatives would only lead Mustafa Kemal to imagine that the Allies were suing for peace. It was highly desirable to find out exactly what Mustafa Kemal's strength was, and precisely what his claims and ambitions were. Did he want to recover Thrace as well as Smyrna? This seemed not improbable, since Adrianople was a sacred Ottoman city, whereas Smyrna had nothing sacred about it except its revenues. If the Allies began pulling the Treaty of Sèvres to pieces without knowing what they proposed to put in its place they would be initiating a fearful conflagration in the Near East. The treaty had not only been signed, but the Turk had been got out of the provinces of which the treaty deprived him. President Wilson's views about Armenia could not possibly be accepted, nor could the Allies undertake to fight the Turk to enforce such a scheme.

COUNT SFORZA said that he only wished to make one remark about the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. He could not regard the return of Smyrna to the Turks, under proper safeguards, as amounting to an infa-



mous act on the part of the Allies. The Italian Government had no wish to return the Greeks there to Turkish rule in the pre-war sense, and he suggested that it might be possible to adopt the solution which in practice worked admirably at Shanghai, and allow Smyrna to be administered by some kind of body composed of the consular representatives. A solution of this kind would, no doubt, be acceptable to the British, French, Italian and Greek inhabitants of Smyrna, and was not likely to be rejected by the Turks.

LORD CURZON said that he was not certain whether the analogy of Shanghai, cited by Count Sforza, was quite perfect. He himself had visited the place on two or three occasions, and his recollection was that there were two towns, the European and the native, which were separated by a creek. The European town was divided up into concessions.

COUNT SFORZA said that now there was only one international concession.

LORD CURZON, proceeding, pointed out that the native [town] in any case was completely separate from the international concession, and there was no international jurisdiction over the native city; whereas in Smyrna, on the contrary, the native and foreign elements were all mixed up, and it would be difficult to put the Turkish population under the foreigners. For this reason he thought the analogy was not a very useful one.

M. LEYGUES said that he was quite certain that the Turkish administration would be bad, but he wondered whether the Greek administration would really be much better. They all remembered that when Thessaly was given to Greece<sup>2</sup> all the peasants at once left the country rather than submit to the harsh and fussy administration of the Greeks. Another case in point was Salonica, which, since it had become Greek, had completely lost its former importance. It seemed probable, therefore, that if Smyrna remained under the control of Greek sovereignty it would share the same fate. Mr. Lloyd George had said that he thought it would be better to take no decision until they saw more clearly what was likely to happen in Greece. He himself would like to wait, if it were possible, but he doubted this. During the last fortnight a considerable movement of rapprochement had been going on between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks. If these two hostile elements were to make common cause it would be the Allies who would have to bear the shock. He felt strongly that they must do all in their power to prevent this unholy alliance, and he thought it was most dangerous for Italy, Great Britain and France to take no steps to stop the junction of these two forces. He urged, therefore, that preventive measures should be taken at once, as if the alliance became a *fait accompli* the consequences would be infinitely more serious. A junction of the Nationalists and Bolshe-

<sup>2</sup> By the Convention of May 24, 1881.

viks would present a very grave situation, and military operations by the Allied forces would be most difficult, owing [owing] to the mountainous nature of the terrain. How, then, could they prevent this alliance? His own suggestion was that an honourable peace should be offered to the Turkish Nationalists. He did not wish to insist on any definite decision being taken that day, but he did urge that the situation in Asia Minor was full of the gravest perils, and he and the French Government felt that it was essential to make peace.

MR. LOYD GEORGE said that he feared the differences of view between himself and the French were rather more fundamental and deep-rooted than he had imagined. As regards Salonica, he did not think it quite fair to attribute to the Greeks what had happened there. Salonica had been under French and British control, and it was the French and British, therefore, who must bear the responsibility. He agreed that the administration was not satisfactory, but this was not the fault of the Greeks alone. As regards what M. Leygues had said about the emigration from Thessaly, there had always been emigration after every war. In regard to Smyrna, the British intelligence did not at all bear out the information which had been received by the French. A British officer who had always been pro-Turk and anti-Greek had recently returned to London from Smyrna, and he had said that the administration under the Greeks was undoubtedly better than it had been under the Turks. Further, the British information regarding Mustafa Kemal was absolutely opposite to that which was in the hands of M. Leygues. British agents reported that in the last few days the Bolsheviki had become convinced that Great Britain and the French were now engaged in stirring up Mu[s]tafa Kemal against them. The Bolsheviki believed that Mustafa Kemal intended to capture Georgia, Azerbaijan and Batum, and they were consequently sending troops to Azerbaijan, and it seemed quite likely that war would break out between the Bolsheviki and the Nationalists. Mr. Lloyd George, proceeding, said that in his view the Turkish idea was to carry out the old pan-Turanian scheme. They meant to extend to the East; they wanted their own old homelands, for instance, Turkestan, and they were not thinking of Smyrna and Thrace. Consequently they regarded the Bolsheviki as the danger and their enemy, as they stood between them and their Eastern ambitions. It was curious to see in Russia the old racial feeling once more emerge out of the Communism which had been imposed upon it. Everything seemed to point to Mustafa Kemal's ambitions being in the Eastern direction. He had already taken Armenia, and the Bolsheviki and the Nationalists were now rivals for an Armenian alliance. The Turks, as he had said, were thinking much more of Batum than they were of Smyrna. Supposing the Allies offered Smyrna, Adrianople, &c., to the Turks, no doubt

*What a Miss -  
"Leftism"!!!*

they would gladly accept them, but their mind was concentrated in the East. He sincerely trusted that at a time when the mind of the Turk was fully engaged elsewhere, the Allies would not ask him to turn back West. This, in his view, would be the greatest folly. They had spoken at that table of the treacheries of ex-King Constantine, but these treacheries were not in any way comparable to those of the Turks. For many years Great Britain and France had spent millions sterling in buttressing up the wretched Turkish Empire, and the Turks had then betrayed them shamefully in the last war. They had closed the Straits and they had shot down the French in thousands in Gallipoli. Nothing that had been done to imperil the success of the Allies was in any way comparable to the effect of closing the Straits, which had shut the Allies off from Russia and Roumania, and had eventually caused the collapse of those two countries as we had not been able to get munitions through to them. Were we now to say to the Turk: 'In spite of this, you are a fine fellow and a good friend, and a better man than the Greek?' This, Mr. Lloyd George said, seemed to him to be a strange doctrine, and he personally was not in the least disposed to ask Mustafa Kemal to turn back to the West when all his thoughts were concentrated on the East.

M. LEYGUES said that he wished to remove what was evidently a misapprehension in Mr. Lloyd George's mind. It was certainly not his wish to eulogize the Turk. There was absolutely no difference of opinion at all between the French and English view of the Turkish character. They were in complete agreement about this. He knew exactly what the Turk was worth. On the other hand, he had always had a sympathetic feeling for the Greek, and this feeling had in no way diminished to-day. He concurred in all that Mr. Lloyd George had said about the closing of the Straits. Had this not been done the war would have been over at least a year earlier. He was, however, far from forgetting all that they had suffered at Turkish hands, and, indeed, he had no intention of forgetting it. As regards what he had said about the approaching rapprochement between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks, he was speaking from knowledge derived from documents in his possession. It was true that a telegram had just come into his hands stating that M. Chicherin was protesting against the action of Mustafa Kemal, but this did not alter his view. If the Turks were really moving to the East, as Mr. Lloyd George thought, so much the better, and it would be all to the advantage of the Allies. He did think, however, that they were bound to prepare for all eventualities. If, as was the British view, the Bolsheviks and the Nationalists were on the point of coming to blows, so much the better for the Allies. It was no question of the French having particular sympathy with the Ottoman, or any special dislike of the Greeks, that underlay the proposals that he had put to the conference, but he

begged his colleagues to envisage all eventualities. He gladly admitted that the Greeks had fought on our side during the war, and that recently they had been fighting with great valour in Turkey. That was all he wished to say. He was only anxious to remove a misapprehension and to assure Mr. Lloyd George that there was no real divergence of opinion.

COUNT SFORZA said that M. Krassin had been to see him the day before and had bitterly complained that Italy would admit no economic representative of the Bolsheviks in Rome, and that the English still refused to return Russian prisoners, M. Krassin had said: 'I am all for peace, but you will not have peace, and you are forcing the Bolsheviks and the Turks to form an alliance against the *Entente*.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British information was, as he had said, that the Bolsheviks feared that France and Great Britain were stirring up Mustafa Kemal to fight them.

M. BERTHELOT said that there were elements of peril in both cases, but he thought that if the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks got into actual contact the situation would be dangerous.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not his view. He would now ask the interpreter to read out a French translation of a draft resolution which he had prepared.

(The official interpreter then read out the draft resolution (see Appendix I).

M. LEYGUES said that he would like to have time to study the draft at leisure and to reflect upon it. He thought that at their meeting that afternoon they ought to examine what measures it might be necessary to take supposing the ex-King Constantine were restored to the throne, so that in that event their plans might be cut and dried and in complete agreement. It would not then be necessary for them to meet again in a hurry in order to decide what to do.

COUNT SFORZA thought it would be better to wait upon events and to take no hard-and-fast decision.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that various other things might happen which might well stultify any decision they took now.

M. LEYGUES said that he was quite prepared to adjourn the discussion if his colleagues so desired, but he himself was in favour of their examining the measures to be adopted in the probable event of King Constantine being restored to the throne.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they would be quite prepared to discuss this matter at their meeting in the afternoon.

M. LEYGUES said that in his view it was most desirable that the conference should examine what steps it might be necessary to take supposing Constantine was proclaimed King next Saturday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the most serious decision in that connection which they would have to take would be whether or not to withdraw their respective Ambassadors [Ministers] from Athens.

3. With reference to minute I, M. Berthelot read out a French trans-  
*Armenia* lation of a draft identic telegram to be sent by the British, French and Italian Governements to their representatives at Geneva regarding Armenia. M. Berthelot said that there were one or two slight amendments which the French delegation desired to introduce, but they would like to consider the draft further and would submit their amendments that afternoon (see Appendix 2).

It was decided—

To adjourn the discussion until 4 p.m. the same afternoon at the same place.

2, Whitehall Gardens

December 3, 1920

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 841-848, No. 98

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 189

##### *Draft Resolution*

That it is undesirable to arrive at a final decision as regards the steps which ought to be taken to secure peace in Asia Minor until the Greek situation has further developed; but, in order to be prepared to take a decision, advantage should be taken of the mission of the Turkish Government to Mustafa Kemal to ascertain his aims and resources so as to be in a position to judge what further steps may be necessary with a view to the conclusion of a lasting peace with Turkey.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 848-849, No. 98/1

#### APPENDIX 2 TO No. 189

##### *Draft Telegram for Allied Delegates at Geneva*

The representatives of the three Governments, assembled in London, having considered the question which has been at Geneva of the admission of Armenia to the League of Nations, have come to the unanimous conclusion that it would be undesirable to take that step at the present stage. The main reasons which lead them to that conclusion are as follows:—

In the first place, the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Armenia is constituted an independent State, is not yet ratified. And, secondly, the boundaries of Armenia, as defined by President Wilson, are boundaries which, without close examination in the light of existing events, the Powers who belong to the League of Nations could hardly at the present moment accept the responsibility to guarantee or maintain.

You should concert with your French and Italian colleagues as to whether this view should be communicated to the League as a joint communication, or whether you should merely adopt the same line when the question is raised.

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. VIII, p. 849, No. 98/2*

No. 190

*British Secretary's Notes of a Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W. I, between Representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments, on Friday, December 3, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

**PRESENT:** *British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal; The Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (present during part of meeting only); **SECRETARIES,** Sir M. Hankey, Mr. T. Jones<sup>1</sup>, Mr. R. B. Howorth<sup>1</sup>, Mr. T. St. Q. Hill<sup>1</sup>.

*France:* M. Leygues, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires étrangères; M. Berthelot, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères; M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de la France à Londres; M. Kammerer; **SECRETARY,** M. Massigli.

*Italy:* Count Sforza, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Marquis Imperiali, Italian Ambassador in London; **SECRETARY,** Signor Galli.

**INTERPRETER:** M. Camerlynck.

**I. M. LEYGUES** suggested that the conference should consider the text of the Armenia telegram to be sent to the British, French and Italian delegations at Geneva on the subject of the admission of Armenia to the League of Nations. At his request M. CAMERLYNCK read out an English translation of the French text, which was in substantially the same terms as the English version, except that the provision respecting the boundaries of Armenia was more elaborately defined.

<sup>1</sup> *Note in filed copy: 'Only one British Secretary was present at a time'.*

*Handwritten:* 15/12/1918 = 15/12/18  
 10/12/18 = 10/12/18  
 10/12/18 = 10/12/18

COUNT SFORZA suggested that, as it was physically impossible to admit Armenia to the League of Nations, the text of the telegram should state that the Allies had reached a unanimous conclusion that it was absolutely impossible to take this step at the moment, because the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Armenia is constituted an independent State, is not yet ratified, and, moreover, because the boundaries of Armenia as defined by President Wilson are so extended that the Powers belonging to the League of Nations could not accept responsibility to guarantee or maintain them.

The conference agreed

That telegrams should be despatched forthwith to the British, French and Italian delegations at Geneva in the terms agreed upon.

2. LORD CURZON said that he wished to inform the conference that the Treaty of Sèvres mission from Constantinople to Mustafa Kemal was starting today, and, further, that the Turkish Government had announced its intention of ratifying the treaty three days after the date (say, the 14th December) on which the mission actually arrived at Angora. The Turkish Government thought it would be in a better position to negotiate with Mustafa Kemal if the treaty was ratified by them at once, because they could then tell Mustafa Kemal that the main provisions of the treaty must stand, and that it would be impossible to modify it except in detail. Further, the Turkish Government was hopelessly bankrupt and was anxious to get the Financial Commission working. This commission could only start operations after the treaty had been ratified.

M. LEYGUES enquired what would be the position if Turkey ratified the treaty but France did not ratify it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that France would then be at war with Turkey, and the position would be similar to that now existing between the United States of America and Germany.

M. LEYGUES said that the representatives of the French Government had come to London in order, if possible, to arrive at a full understanding with the British Government on the best course to follow in the difficult situation in the Near East. It would be most difficult for him to return to France and tell the French Parliament that no alteration of the treaty was possible and that no other course was open for France than to ratify the document which public opinion in France demanded should be amended so as to meet the new situation which had arisen. It was at least necessary for him to be able to say that the doors were not closed to possible adjustments, and that mutual concessions might have to be made so as to secure the lasting peace which everyone desired.

LORD CURZON said that in his view these adjustments and concessions could only properly be discussed after the result of the meeting between Mustafa Kemal and the mission from Constantinople was known. He had just received a telegram from Constantinople, the terms of which indicated clearly that Mustafa Kemal was most anxious to arrive at some *modus vivendi* with the Central Turkish Government. His anxiety was due partly to fear that Enver Pasha, his great rival, might supplant him and get control of the Government in Constantinople, and partly a genuine feeling of distrust and apprehension about the progress of Bolshevism. In these circumstances, Lord Curzon thought that any questions of concessions and adjustments to be made in the matter of the Turkish treaty by the Allies must be based on the terms of the agreement reached by the Turks themselves.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that if France refused to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, which had been made on French soil and with the French President in the chair, a very serious situation would arise. This treaty was in itself an accord between the Allies, and the French Government would have to face a very awkward situation if it was really true that the view of the French Chamber was that an accord made in one month could be torn up in another.

M. LEYGUES said that he was most anxious that there should be no mis-understanding in the matter. France did not for a moment refuse to honour her signature, but Parliament, the press and public opinion were united in thinking that a new situation had arisen which called for possible adjustments in a treaty made to meet very different conditions. He was very anxious to have joint action with the Allies, and he himself was opposed to any drastic revision of the treaty, but it would be of great assistance to him if the British representatives would admit the possibility in the future of making adjustments and concessions. The information supplied by Lord Curzon had not as yet reached the French Government, and it was possible that it did not correctly represent Mustafa Kemal's views. There was no prejudice in France against the treaty, and he (M. Leygues) feared that Mr. Lloyd George regarded him as a Turk and as holding more extreme views than the Turks themselves.

COUNT SFORZA said that the information supplied by Lord Curzon showed that the Porte was anxious to ratify the treaty, but was that equally true of Mustafa Kemal? Was it not very probable that he would be very hostile to ratification?

M. BERTHELOT said that if Mustafa Kemal, who was obviously ill at ease, could be persuaded to negotiate with the Allies, it might be possible to come to some amicable arrangement with him about Smyrna which would lead up to a general peace.



MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that it was a great mistake to think that Mustafa Kemal was mainly interested in the proceedings of the Allies. In point of fact, he was looking to the East and to the possibility of a revival of the historic enmity between the Russian and the Turk. Whenever the Turks had quarrelled in the past with Russia they had been forced to turn for assistance to the Western Powers. Mustafa Kemal was an Oriental, and must be treated as such. One of the great principles in dealing with Orientals was to let them make the first offer. He (Mr. Lloyd George) was all for concluding peace with Mustafa Kemal, but it would be fatal to proclaim this to the world, as the object of the Allies. If this were done, Kemal's price would immediately rise and his terms would become impossible. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had had luncheon that day with a person just back from Greece, whose views were worthy of attention, who had told him that in his opinion the effect of the Allied declaration issued yesterday would be that the Greeks would not vote for Constantine. If this was to happen, what would be the position for the Allies if in the meantime they had decided on arrangements which took Smyrna away from Greece? He had also just received a message from M. Gounaris, the dastardly participator in Constantine's villainies. Gounaris was most anxious to do anything to assist the Allies. He (Mr. Lloyd George) had contented himself with replying that he could not believe anything M. Gounaris said; but the mere fact that this man had communicated with him showed that he realised perfectly well that Constantine could not rule in Athens if the Allies were against him. He therefore urged once again that the Allies should wait and see what policy Greece proposed to adopt, and, secondly, what results (if any) followed from the meeting between the Constantinople mission and Mustafa Kemal. If as, he suggested, the mission went to Angora unaccompanied by Allied representatives, and if the Turks could arrange a settlement between themselves, he felt confident that the first step would have been taken towards a peaceable solution in Asia Minor.

M. LEYGUES said that he found himself in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George on nearly every point. He was particularly impressed with the necessity for the Allies keeping their proposals to themselves and leaving Mustafa Kemal to make the first offer. He also agreed with Mr. Lloyd George's opinion of Gounaris, who would betray the Allies on the first convenient opportunity. He felt the force of the contention that we ought to have full information about Mustafa Kemal, and he was prepared to accept the British draft proposal, subject to certain modifications.

COUNT SFORZA said that he also agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George, but he thought that the conclusion should read as follows:—

??

But they did not take the 16th

'That it is undesirable to arrive at an immediate decision as regards the steps to be taken to secure peace in Asia Minor until the Greek situation has further developed, and therefore the three Governments will meet together as soon as possible to consider what further steps may be necessary with a view to the conclusion of a lasting peace with Turkey.'

He would cut out the reference to Mustafa Kemal as possibly prejudicing the position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be impossible to obtain a lasting peace at the expense of the Greeks alone, and he warned the conference that if the settlement embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres was once reopened it would be necessary to reconsider everything, including zones of influence, &c. For example, Mustafa Kemal might take great objection to the provisions of the treaty respecting financial control, and might press for the modification of these provisions even more than for concessions to Turkey in the matter of territory. Financial control was a matter which every Turk strenuously resisted.

COUNT SFORZA said that if the Greeks were to remain in strength in Smyrna no one would object.

LORD CURZON suggested that the last sentence of Count Sforza's draft should read as follows:—

'The three Governments will, as soon as possible, decide together what further steps may be necessary with a view to the conclusion of a lasting peace in the East.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Count Sforza's draft as it stood looked as if we were prepared to support President Wilson's policy; in fact, it was an anti-Greek draft, and that is the interpretation which would be put on it outside. Let us suppose that the Greeks put up a strong fight at Smyrna. Were we to be dragged into fighting them instead of fighting Kemal?

M. LEYGUES then suggested an alternative draft to the conference:

'Before taking a final decision as regards the steps which ought to be taken to secure peace in the East, the three Powers agree that it is necessary to know the decisions of the Greek Government and of the Greek people, and, secondly, the result of the Turkish Mission to Angora. The Allies will then be in a position to judge what further steps it may be necessary to adopt with a view to the conclusion of a lasting peace with Turkey.'

M. BERTHELOT suggested that an agreement on these lines might be reached and kept secret between the Allies, and in the meantime, a camouflaged communication might be made to the press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British representatives agreed with the substance of M. Leygues' proposition, but were doubtful as to the wisdom of putting down in writing the reference to the Kemal Mission. If it were published it would put up Kemal's terms. The Allies could, instead, have an understanding.

M. LEYGUES agreed to strike out the reference to the Angora Mission, and said it would then be in a form which all could accept.

M. BERTHELOT said that if the reference to Kemal was suppressed there would be no objection to communicating the agreement to the press as it stood.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then asked that the text of the draft should be agreed by M. Berthelot and Sir M. Hankey, and circulated for final approval at a later stage. Mr. Lloyd George then invited M. Leygues to put forward suggestions for dealing with the situation which would arise in the event of ex-King Constantine being recalled to the Throne of Greece.

*D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. VIII, p. 849-853, No. 99*

No. 191

*Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office.*

*(Received December 6.)*

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to French policy in regard to Armenia begs to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum dated the 25th November, 1920, signed by General Gouraud, and received in response to an enquiry made by the General Staff from the French military attaché in London

*War Office, December 4, 1920.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 226, No. 198*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 191

*Note by General Gouraud respecting French Policy in Armenia.*

IL est exact que le général commandant l'armée du Levant a, non pas disloqué des formations arméniennes qui n'existaient pas, mais refusé des armes aux Arméniens d'Adana qui prétendaient se porter au secours d'Hadjin.

Précédemment, en effet, des armes avaient été distribuées aux Arméniens, soit pour défendre leurs villages, soit pour former des contingents auxiliaires adjoints aux colonnes françaises opérant en Cilicie.

Dans chaque circonstance, les Arméniens ont profité de ce qu'ils étaient armés pour se conduire à l'égard des Turcs précisément comme ils se plaignent d'avoir été traités par eux, pillant et incendiant les villages, massacrant les musulmans désarmés.

Quand, au contraire, on a fait appel à leur concours pour débloquer Tarsous, sur 2,000 volontaires promis, 17 se sont présentés pour marcher avec nos troupes. Il a fallu en conséquence désarmer les Arméniens; quant aux expulsions, elles ont été prononcées, non à la suite de la dissolution des contingents arméniens destinés à secourir Hadjin, mais à la suite d'une tentative faite le 4 août par les Arméniens d'Adana pour proclamer, à la faveur de l'exode des Turcs, la République arménienne en Cilicie. Elles se sont d'ailleurs bornées à sept agitateurs.

GOURAUD.

Paris, le 25 novembre 1920.

FO. 406/44, p. 226, No. 198/1

No. 192

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 6, 1920

Received (December 13.)

(No. 1606.)

My Lord,

THE mission of the Turkish Government to Mustapha Kemal left for Angora on the 3rd instant, proceeding overland from Haidar Pasha. It is headed by Izzet Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, and comprises five other members, including Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, and Husscin Kiazim Bey, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, besides a subordinate staff. Under an agreement with the General Officer Commanding the troops in Constantinople, the mission was accompanied by British officers over the section of the Haidar Pasha Railway controlled by the British authorities in order to ensure that it was not interfered with by the Greek posts.

2. If all goes well, the mission should reach Angora about the 6th or 7th December. The Nationalists, however, when defining the preliminary arrangements, intimated that representatives of the Angora Government would meet it at Biledjik, and it remains to be seen whether this will involve delay at that place. According to one report, which I give for what it is worth, the leaders of the Nationalist movement have no intention of allowing

the mission to proceed to Angora, and wish the negotiations to take place at Biledjik; but İzzet Pasha should, on reaching their capital, attempt some coup designed to unseat Mustapha Kemal and to bring the mission into relations with more moderate elements.

3. For the descriptions of the three members of the Cabinet included in the mission, I would refer your Lordship to my predecessor's despatch No. 1457 of the 26th October, 1920. The other members of the mission are Fatin Effendi, a khodja or member of the Ulema class, Djevad Bey, formerly Minister at Stockholm, and Munir Bey, legal adviser to the Sublime Porte. Fatin Effendi is practically unknown in European circles, but he was chosen presumably on grounds of religious influence, and he was brought to the notice of this High Commission some months ago as a person carrying great weight with Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, the Nationalist commander in the Erzeroum area. Djevad Bey, is well known in London, having been for some time Secretary at the Turkish Embassy not long before the war. He was subsequently Minister at Belgrade and Stockholm, but he has played no rôle since the armistice. He may be defined as a typical Turkish diplomat of rather more than average ability and Union and Progress sympathies. Munir Bey is an industrious official of no particular importance.

4. İzzet Pasha, accompanied by Sefa Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me on the 2nd instant. The former did not give me any indication of the line he was going to take with the Nationalist Party, but I took the opportunity to ask his Highness to do his utmost to secure the release of the British prisoners of war, both civil and military, at present held by the Nationalist forces. I sent him a list of these prisoners in so far as their names are known to this High Commission. I informed his Highness that questions of prisoners of war greatly affected public opinion in England, and that if he could secure the release of these prisoners he would invest the Turkish Government with prestige in our eyes.

5. In the course of conversation allusion was made to the success his Highness had obtained in pacifying the Yemen some years ago. I understand, however, that his success was due to the fact that he gave way to the demands of the rebels.

6. As I have already reported to your Lordship by telegraph, the professed intention of the Government is to give the mission time to enter into relations with the Nationalists and to explain to them the situation in Constantinople, and then to proceed with the ratification of the treaty, without awaiting the results of any discussion, much less the return of the mission to Constantinople. It would be rash to count with certainty on the fulfilment of this intention. If the Government act on it they will do so with the sole object of obtaining financial relief, and perhaps with the

idea at the back of their minds that the present course of events must end in the revision of the treaty, whether it is ratified or not.

7. The prospects of the mission achieving any success with the Nationalist on the basis of the acceptance of the treaty in its present form are almost nil. The most that can be said is that they are a little brighter now than they were a couple of weeks ago, owing to the strain to which the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists have been subjected by recent developments in Armenia. It is possible that if this strain continues to make itself felt, and if the new Greek Government carries on more or less decidedly and successfully the Veniselist policy in Asia Minor, İzzet Pasha may find the Nationalist leaders at Angora in a relatively sober mood.

8. Of these two factors, the Greek alone could not possibly be conclusive, for, while the discovery that the fall of M. Veniselos did not necessarily entail the collapse of the Greeks in Asia Minor might discourage the Kemalists, it would leave them with their bitterest grievance and their strongest appeal to the mass of people intact. The other factor may prove to be of supreme importance if matters come to a breach between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks. Mustapha Kemal has already had no little difficulty in reconciling many of his followers to the Bolshevik alliance. If İzzet Pasha and men of his way of thinking are sincere in anything it is in their apprehension that the infiltration of Bolshevism spells danger for Turkey, both because it is irreconcilable with Turkish ideas and traditions, and because the Bolsheviks must eventually stand for the old Russian Imperialism. This will be the strongest argument they can use in any attempt to convert or to isolate Mustapha Kemal, but it is unlikely to be successful unless the idea of collaboration with the Bolsheviks has already struck on concrete causes of quarrel such as Armenia or Batoum.

9. In the conversation which I have mentioned above İzzet Pasha himself spoke of the Bolshevik factor, and said that his information was that the Kemalists, though in relations with the Bolsheviks, were not committed to them.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 406/44, p. 227-228, No. 200*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 196, No. 189*

No. 193

*British Secret Intelligence Services to Foreign Office.*

6.12.1920

No. CX1011/V

THE ATTITUDE OF MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

Mr. Bland.

The attached report from Sofia, dated 22.11.20. is submitted in continuation of my letter to Mr. Gwatkin, CX/1011—V., dated 22.11.20.

FO. 371/5291/E. 15358

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 193

SOFIA, 22/11/20

Report from Sofia, No. 30. ✓

## POLITICAL

"KEMALISM"

Ref. my telegram C.XGO7 of 21/11/20, & your letter C.X1058 of 5/10/20.

I have established friendly relations with a gentleman named DIMITRI ATCHKOFF who was a Stambolovist deputy in the Bulgarian Parliament from 1903 to 1908. He is now ostensibly in business and out of politics as far as the internal affairs of this country are concerned, but he is a personal friend of MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA and an ardent "Kemalist", and in all probability his agent and propagandist in Bulgaria. I have had one or two conversations with M. ATCHKOFF and have visited him in his house (No. 7, Rue Stefan Karajia) where he showed me a signed photograph and a sword which had been presented to him by Mustafa Kemal. He told me that he was working in the mutual interests of Kemalist Turkey and Bulgaria, which he declared to be in line with the true interests of Great Britain. His motives would appear to be partly his patriotism, strongly coloured with a hatred of Greece and a predilection for the Turks, partly his friendship for Kemal, and partly the material advantages that would accrue to him from the success of the cause. I do not know if he actually received any money. In answer to a question of mine he emphatically denied that there was any secret agreement between Mustafa Kemal and the present Bulgarian Government (See your letter No. C.X.1058 of 5/10/20).

He told me that he first became a friend of Mustafa Kemal when the latter was the Turkish Military Attaché in Sofia, and in January 1916,

after the battle of Anafarta when he had taken over the command of the Turkish Army at Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal came to Sofia on a month's leave and stayed with him as his guest. At a later date they were together again in Constantinople, where Mustafa Kemal's mother is at present. Then in March of this year M. Atchkoff obtained permission from the French Authorities to proceed to Asia Minor "for purposes of business", and paid a visit to Mustafa Kemal, in the course of which he had conversations with him that apparently form the basis of his statement given below. M. Atchkoff returned to Sofia on hearing of the intended occupation of Constantinople, having had difficulties with the Greeks who wished to arrest him en route. He says that he has since communicated with Mustafa Kemal and last received a letter from him about three months ago. He can get a letter through at any time, but would not specify the means or method of communication.

On the 19th November M. Atchkoff approached me with a view to obtaining a private audience with the British Minister. He said that what he wanted to say was of a strictly confidential character and related to Turkish politics. The Minister did not consider it advisable under the circumstances to grant a personal interview, but recommended a conversation with the Secretary who could make a report on it for his information. Accordingly I arranged it on the following day that he made his declaration to the Secretary, Mr Mackillop, and myself, and Mr Gilliat-Smith, the Vice-Consul, acted as interpreter.

After stating that he was a personal friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, whom he had visited in Asia Minor in March of this year, M. Atchkoff went on to say that his only motive in paying this visit to the British Legation was his regard for the mutual interests of the Kemalists, Bulgaria and Great Britain. He had come on his own initiative in view of the events in the Crimea (he told me on another occasion that he had last received a letter from Mustafa Kemal about three months ago), and he had not previously communicated a similar statement to the British Authorities in Constantinople.

First, as regards the methods adopted by the British in dealing with Kemal and his followers, viz that they ignore his provisional government and only deal through the official government in Constantinople, M. Atchkoff insisted that Great Britain should deal directly with Mustafa Kemal, as the official government was only a shadow. Mustafa Kemal was in a position to carry out and enforce his administration. If British delegates could be sent secretly to treat with him, an agreement would soon follow which would ensure a lasting peace in the Near East. Mustafa Kemal had told him his views and aspirations. He desired above all to come to an



agreement with Great Britain - other countries, France, Italy, etc, did not count. The hatred of the Moslem population in Anatolia, which under the circumstances would normally be directed against Great Britain, was directed against Greece, and the ground was clear for an understanding.

Mustafa Kemal was not interested in the Arab question, but only in territories where the population was Turkish. In March he expressed himself as willing to agree to an autonomous and independent Armenia - roughly speaking the Republic of Erivan but not to an Armenia that included Adana. His views, continued M. Atchkoff, might have changed since then, but he was convinced that Kemal would recognise and guarantee racial minorities, so long as they did not conspire against the sovereignty of the Turkish state. An independent Turkey *must* exist and Great Britain should return to this policy.

As regards Bolshevism Mustafa Kemal's attitude was this. Bolshevism could take no root in Turkish soil: religion and tradition alike were against it. But he would readily make use of its assistance in order to attain the ideals of Turkish nationality. The policies of Enver Bey and Mustafa Kemal Pasha should on no account be confused. They both aimed, it is true, at Turkish nationality, but their methods were quite different, indeed fundamentally opposed. Kemal was, and had been even during the war, one of the strongest opponents of German policy in the Near East: he entirely condemned the political strategy of Enver and Talaat.

In conclusion he explained that Great Britain would derive infinitely greater advantages from an understanding with Mustafa Kemal and his Government than from one with Greece. It would put a stop to the unnatural collaboration between the Turks and the Bolsheviks and secure the friendship of the Turkish people. Smyrna could never be anything but Turkish. Great Britain could in actuality remain "Mistress of Constantinople", granted that a formula of agreement with the Kemalists could be achieved, Atchkoff had suggested to Mustafa Kemal that a good method of reform would be the appointment of an English adviser to each Vali. In this suggestion he had concurred. In short, *if an agreement could be found which assure to Mustafa Kemal and his Government the show of power, its substance could remain in the hands of Great Britain.*

I understand that this Legation is sending a report on the above statement of M. Atchkoff to Constantinople for their information. It seems certain, however, that M. Atchkoff made it purely on his own initiative in view of the present situation in Greece and the Crimea. Even so it has its interest as being probably a very fair reflection of the attitude of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. I should add, as it perhaps throws a side-light on the motives

The same objections may be raised as to the agreement with Greece to the agreement with Great Britain - other countries, France, Italy, etc.

of M. Atchkoff, that the latter mentioned in the course of a talk I had with him that he was ready at any time to convey a message through to Kemal Pasha or himself to conduct a messenger to him.

*FO. 371/5291/E. 15358*

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 193

*Minutes on Relations With Mustapha Kemal.*

Sir A. Peel's despatch No. 510 in E 15295 contains an account of the same interview with Atchkoff. There can be little doubt that this is a feeler from Mustafa Kemal. Consideration for Armenia and Greece has made it impossible to entertain previous advances from the Young Turks. But now Armenia has taken affairs into her own hands and Greece seems likely to do so. It is therefore possible that we may soon have a basis for agreement with Mustafa Kemal.

The danger of making any terms with him or of modifying the Treaty in favour of the Turkish Government, is that the Turks, having gained so much, may go back on their word and use their increased power to further an Islamic agitation against our rule in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Palestine. There is no doubt that the chief political force in Turkey is still the C. U. P., the extremists in which are of the same calibre as the Bolshevik extremists, while its moderate members belong to the moderate section of the so-called nationalists. But although there is a danger that Talaat, Enver and the C.U.P. extremists will return to power in Turkey, and use her prestige to further an anti-British, pan-Islamic campaign, we cannot insure against this danger by continuing to hold the Nationalists at arm's length. By refraining from coming to terms with them we might only drive them further under Bolshevik influence without hindering their present anti-British designs - e.g., in Mesopotamia.

The Nationalists will not be content to remain at Angora, but as long as they are there they will lend themselves to every kind of anti-British agitation. Apart from the few extremists, they do not really expect to get back Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, etc., but they will agitate in these places until they have brought us to terms about the smaller issues of Anatolia and Thrace. If, however, having got what they want as regards Armenia, they reach a compromise with the Greeks over Thrace and Smyrna, and with us over certain other parts of the Treaty where we can perhaps afford to meet them (especially as the new Greek attitude may not enable us to coerce them), Angora will have no further purpose and will be merged in Constantinople. Turkey, though shorn of all Arab speaking districts, will have plenty of scope for all the Turks who count - whether

patriots or place-hunters. She will be bound to turn to France and ourselves for help in reconstruction, and to that extent we shall be in a position to mitigate any anti-British agitation and to help the Greeks and Armenians in the interior. Javid Bey (the former Minister of Finance whom the French have been nursing at Paris) will no doubt return to Turkey with a view to enlisting the aid of foreign finance, and if the Turks commit themselves to a policy of cooperation with European capital this will in itself be some guarantee against Bolshevik penetration. Both as Moslems and as proprietors the Turks have now a good deal of reason to be shy of the Bolsheviks, and if we encourage the establishment of a moderate Young Turk Government containing such men as Marshal Izzet Pasha and Javid Bey, and depending on British and French support, we shall have taken a step towards the exclusion of Bolshevism and extreme Young Turks like Talaat, Enver and Dr. Nazim. No such compromise, however, can be effected unless the Greeks fail to hold what the treaty has given them.

The points on which we might come to terms with the Turks seem to be the following:—

1. *Armenia.* We can endorse any concession the Armenians have themselves made.

2. *Smyrna.* We can endorse any concession the Greeks choose to make. (under compulsion or otherwise)

3. *Thrace.* It is possible that the Turks will be found to attach greater importance to Thrace than to Smyrna. Jewish influence will be in this direction because of the Jewish interest in freeing Salonica from the Greeks. The Turks will probably ask for some sort of autonomy for the Moslem bloc between Dedeagatch and Cavalla, regarding this as a stepping stone to Salonica. It would be regrettable to restore their rule north of Chatalja, but some kind of international control of Thrace might satisfy them and not be unacceptable to ourselves. Balkan developments might in a few years indicate more clearly the proper successor to the Turk as ruler of Thrace.

4. Those military clauses of the Treaty which limit the size, character and distribution of the future Turkish army are so vexatious that the Turks will never comply with them voluntarily (even if they undertake to), and if we cannot coerce Mustafa Kemal now, we cannot hope to compel the Turks to execute these clauses in the future. We may as well let them go and trust to the influence of Allied officers in Turkish service. As Sir H. Rumbold has pointed out, this is our best way of keeping the Turkish army from excesses.

5. The occupation of Constantinople would cease when the Turks carried out our terms. With it would go:—

- (i) Allied control of police and sanitation.
- (ii) Allied control of press and telegraph censorship.
- (iii) Allied control of passports.

6. The majority of the 120 *Turks at Malta* will not be wanted for prosecution. They could be released (as soon as Colonel Rawlinson and others are released by the Nationalists).

7. *Mustafa Kemal*. Once he accepted our terms we might let the Porte know that we should not object to his inclusion in the Cabinet. If he became, say, Minister of War, it would at the worst bring him somewhat under our control. At the best, it would be the end of the Nationalists. It would also have the advantage of increasing the rivalry between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.

According to some reports, the Nationalists will ask for a revision of the clauses concerning the Straits, financial control and the capitulations.

As regards the *Straits*, we do not want to give way, and shall probably be in a position to insist on the execution of most of the provisions. Even if the Italians do not send their military contingent, it will be useful to have the formal right of garrisoning the Straits.

The *Financial Clauses* are likely to constitute our most real hold on Turkey, since the Turks will need our financial help. We shall have whole-hearted French support for the application of these clauses, and need not consider their revision.

The *Capitulations* are to be replaced as soon as possible by a new judicial system elaborated in consultation with the Turks themselves (Art. 136). We do not want to extend our ex-territorial privileges but to replace them by a system more satisfactory both to ourselves and to the Turks. This should be answer enough for the Turks.

On the hypothesis of a Greek defection, then, we seem to be able to offer enough to wean moderate Turks from Bolshevik influence and to bring them back from Angora to Constantinople, but for reasons which I ventured to advance on E. 14573, it would, I submit, be a mistake to make any advance to the Turks or to deal with Mustafa Kemal rather than with the Porte. In any case, we must first see what the Greeks mean to do.\*

FO. 371/5291/E. 15358

W. S. Edmonds 9. 12. 20

\* *Mr. Edmonds'in bu servis notuna İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanlığının daha yüksek yetkilileri el yazısıyla şunları eklemişlerdir :*

I do not think we should wait on a hypothetical Greek "defection" to formulate a policy. M. Leygues has informed the French Senate Committee that the Treaty should be

modified, not revised. Meanwhile the Nationalists are attacking the Greeks at Smyrna. We should agree at once on what modifications we are prepared to make and at the same time try and bring about a fusion of the Constantinople and Angora Governments into one body with which we could discuss modifications. The Bolshevik terror of any rapprochement with Mustafa Kemal shows that it is the right policy.

D. G. Osborne.

10/12.

I think Mr. Edmonds is on the whole sound. It is well to remember that insistence on the Treaty will give the C.U.P. and pro-Bolsheviks the upper hand in Turkish Councils whereas revision of the Treaty somewhat on Mr. Edmond's lines will probably split Nationalists from Bolshevists. As to Thrace we have Bulgaria to remember and the possibility that if she gets access to the Mediterranean she may be brought into the anti-Turk camp. As to Armenia we may have trouble with the U.S.A. over a proposal to leave her to her fate even after what has happened.

J. A. C. T(illey)

10.12.

Sir E. Crowe points out that the above minutes are incompatible with the policy now laid down.

As the information about M. Atchkoff has been (?) before the S. of S. in another shape.

J. A. C. T.

11.12.

No. 194

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.*

PARIS, December 10, 1920

(Received December 11.)

(No. 3676.)

My Lord,

THE Senate Commissions of Finance and Foreign Affairs, sitting together, heard on the 8th instant the testimony of General Gouraud and of M. Leygues on the affairs of Syria and Cilicia. The following is an account of what passed, taken from newspaper reports:—

General Gouraud said that the difficulties in Cilicia had been caused firstly by the insufficient number of troops employed there at first, after the withdrawal of the British forces, and secondly by the unfortunate policy followed of opposing Armenians to the Turks. This had, he said, largely caused the Kemalst movement. The situation there was now far better, and the use of Armenians had been discontinued. Syria, he said, was quite calm, though there was still a certain amount of intrigue among Faisal's partisans. The menace to the tranquillity of the country came mainly from the Nationalist Turks in the north, and, in a less degree, from the Bedouins.

He quite recognised what a burden the administration of these countries was to France (1,200 million fr., of which 800 millions for military expenses), and how important it was to lighten it. Withdrawal from Syria he regarded as disastrous, not only locally but all along Northern Africa. The remedy he advocated was to placate the Turks by conceding them adaptations of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was not France's affair if the Greeks were unable to hold Smyrna and Thrace. Under such a policy he thought it would be withdraw troops from Syria and replace them by locally recruited bodies.

M. Leygues said that Syria was essential to France's whole policy in the Mediterranean and was the base for all her action in the East. As to Cilicia, France was there only to protect minorities in accordance with the mandate received, and to cover the position in Syria. France would not stay in Cilicia.\* The Government was most anxious to reduce its commitments. To effect this, the policy he recommended was to suppress the Kemalist movement by amending (not revising) the Treaty of Sèvres so as to spare the susceptibilities of the Turks and give them an honourable peace.

On the subject of Greece, M. Leygues expressed himself as highly satisfied with the result of his visit to London to meet your Lordship. The three Governments entirely agreed as to a financial blockade of Greece, and the recent Greek operation would not be recognised. He felt convinced that complete agreement would be reached over the Turkish Treaty by bringing about not its revision but its amendment.

The "Temps" of to-day's date contains the best report of these proceedings, and I have the honour to transmit a copy of it herewith.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSURST

FO. 406/44, p. 452, No. 302

\* Lord Hardinge, 21.12.1920 günlü, 3786 sayılı yazısıyla da Lord Curzon'a şunları bildirmiştir:

"... Syria and Cilicia also formed the subject of discussion by the Financial Committee of the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, and M. Leygues was again called upon to furnish explanations on these questions. He observed that France had a definite mandate in Syria and would carry it out (...)

The situation in Cilicia was, M. Leygues pointed out, different. France owed her presence in that province to treaties and conventions, and she was bound to ensure the protection of the oppressed nationalities, and particularly the Armenians. 'On the day when we have a satisfactory peace with Turkey - and the Turkey one cannot but include the large portion of the country over which Kemal exercises so great an influence - a peace which will give every security to the Armenians respecting our rights; on the day we shall be very glad to evacuate Cilicia.'"

(F.O. 406/44, p. 473, No. 313-

## ENCLOSURE IN NO. 194

*Extract from the "Temps" of December 10, 1920.*

## LA FRANCE EN ORIENT.

M. Georges Leygues, président du conseil, et le général Gouraud, haut-commissaire en Syrie, ont été entendus, hier, par les commissions sénatoriales des affaires étrangères et des finances réunies, sous la présidence de MM. de Selves et Milliès-Lacroix, sur l'action de la France en Syrie et en Cilicie.

## DECLARATIONS DU GENERAL GOURAUD.

M. de Selves ayant posé au nom de ses collègues les questions suivantes: "Qu'avons-nous fait en Syrie et Cilicie? Qu'y faisons-nous? Qu'entendons-nous faire? Quel est le coût prévu en hommes et en argent?" le général Gouraud a pris la parole.

Le général Gouraud, dans un rapide historique, fait connaître les difficultés qui nous ont été suscitées en Syrie par l'émir Faïçal, lequel a couronné sa manoeuvre en nous attaquant au cours de nos négociations. A la suite de cette trahison, nos troupes ont dû marcher le 23 juillet, et se sont emparées de Damas après un combat de cinq heures. L'apaisement n'a pas tardé à se faire, grâce à l'excellente discipline de nos troupes, qui ont détruit par leur bonne conduite, toutes les légendes semées contre elles.

En Cilicie, nous avons occupé le pays, d'accord avec les Anglais, dès l'armistice, comme gage de cet armistice. Les troupes anglaises s'étant retirées, nous avons dû les remplacer, avec des effectifs beaucoup plus faibles. Cette insuffisance des effectifs, et la présence dans nos forces de bataillons arméniens, à cause de la haine violente des Arméniens et des Turcs, et aussi la présence des Grecs à Smyrne ont déchaîné la crise kemaliste. De là les événements que l'on sait. La défense française a été très belle, le commandement très remarquable.

A l'heure présente, en Syrie, la situation est très calme, bien que les intrigues des partisans de Faïçal n'aient point complètement cessé. Les autres dangers qui menacent la paix et nous obligent de maintenir des forces suffisantes sont la menace kemaliste, et celle, moins grosse, des Bédouins.

En Cilicie, la situation s'est également très améliorée, le général Gouraud ayant abandonné la politique qui consistait à irriter les Turcs en leur opposant les Arméniens. Au point de vue administratif et économique, la Syrie a été divisée en quatre Etats: 1- le Liban, devenu Grand-Liban par l'adjonction des cantons de Tyr et de Sidon d'une part, et du canton de Tripoli d'autre part; 2- et 3- Etats d'Alep et de Damas; 4- les Nohalains.

Le général Gouraud donne des détails sur l'organisation administrative de ces divers Etats. Au point de vue économique, ces pays, qui sont très civilisés et comptent de grandes villes de 350,000 habitants, telles que Damas et Alep, et une infinité d'écoles, peuvent produire de grandes richesses en céréales et en cotons.

Comment réduire nos dépenses, qui sont, sur un chiffre de plus de 1 milliard, d'environ 800 millions en ce qui concerne les dépenses militaires?

On ne saurait proposer l'évacuation, qui constituerait une immense faillite morale et aurait de graves répercussions dans l'Afrique du nord. Il faut faire un accord avec la Turquie, acceptable pour elle. Si les Grecs ne peuvent faire l'effort militaire et financier pour se maintenir à Smyrne et en Thrace, ce n'est pas notre affaire. Il faut adapter le traité de Sèvres pour le rendre acceptable aux Turcs, qui ont été longtemps nos amis, qui ont été des ennemis loyaux et braves; tandis que les Allemands détruisaient tout, jamais les Turcs n'ont tiré sur les bateaux-hopitaux.

La paix étant faite avec la Turquie dans des conditions qui ne heurtent point le sentiment national, on pourra diminuer nos effectifs, et, d'autre part, établir le recrutement local.

En attendant, il convient de donner au général les sommes dont il a besoin et qui lui sont nécessaires dans la situation actuelle.

M. de Selves a remercié chaleureusement le général Gouraud de son exposé et lui a exprimé les sentiments de respect et de reconnaissance des commissions pour les glorieux services que partout et toujours il a rendus à la patrie.

#### DECLARATIONS DE M. GEORGES LEYGUES.

Après que le général Gouraud eut exposé ainsi la question militaire, le président du conseil, M. Georges Leygues, du point de vue politique, présenta les observations suivantes:

En ce qui concerne la Syrie, nous y sommes allés, non seulement parce que nous avons à soutenir une longue tradition et des oeuvres nombreuses, mais pour une raison plus haute encore. La France est une nation méditerranéenne, l'axe de sa politique est dans la Méditerranée, et, si son rôle s'y amoindrissait, son prestige en recevrait un échec grave. Tous les gouvernements sans exception l'ont ainsi pensé. Mais, si la France était confinée dans le bassin occidental de cette mer, elle serait très diminuée; il nous faut établir en Syrie les bases de notre action orientale. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement revendique la zone syrienne et Alexandrette, qui sera, avant trente ans peut-être, un des plus grands ports de la Méditerranée.

La Cilicie? Nous n'entendons pas y rester. Nous y sommes allés pour les raisons suivantes: 1- mandat reçu d'y protéger les minorités: 2- les



bataillons qui y sont servent de couverture à la Syrie. Il faut que les magnifiques résultats obtenus en moins d'un an en Syrie par le général Gouraud ne soient plus mis en question. Cela dit, allons-nous rester en Cilicie? Non. Le gouvernement a le plus vif désir de réduire les charges du pays. Pour cela il faut supprimer le mouvement kemaliste, et, dans ce but, non pas réviser, mais modifier le traité de Sèvres, en faisant une paix qui ménage la susceptibilité musulmane. Le président a l'intime conviction que l'on s'accordera avant peu pour donner à la Turquie une paix honorable.

## I.A. DISCUSSION.

M. de Selves remercie le président du conseil. Plusieurs commissaires réclament quelques précisions: M. Lucien Hubert, au sujet de l'état sanitaire du corps d'expédition; M. Paul Doumer, M. Lucien Cornet, M. Victor Bérard, qui trouve trop élevée la dépense permanente qu'il nous faudra supporter; MM. Ribot, d'Estournelles de Constant.

On peut inférer des réponses du président du conseil et du général Gouraud que la situation sanitaire en Syrie est redevenue bonne, que les relations entre les bolchevistes et Kemal sont, à l'heure présente, assez embrouillées, que le gouvernement entend, tout en restant en Syrie, réduire les dépenses au minimum.

## LES QUESTIONS GRÉCQUE ET TURQUE.

Estimant que la question de Syrie est liée au problème turc, lequel l'est lui-même à la situation grecque. M. Antonin Dubost demande au président du conseil de s'expliquer sur ce dernier point.

M. Leygues répondit qu'en ce qui concerne la Grèce, il n'a eu qu'à se louer de ses conversations de Londres avec l'Italie et l'Angleterre. Ces deux gouvernements sont entièrement d'accord avec nous pour faire le blocus financier de la Grèce. D'autre part, le récent emprunt grec ne sera pas reconnu. Sans préjuger les conversations en cours, M. Leygues affirma qu'il a, non pas encore la certitude, mais la ferme conviction qu'un accord interviendra complètement au sujet de la Turquie et qu'on aboutira, selon toute probabilité, non pas à la révision, mais à la modification du traité de Sèvres.

Le président du conseil sera entendu samedi par la commission des finances spécialement sur les crédits (1 milliard 200 millions) demandés pour l'occupation militaire et les services civils de la Syrie et de la Cilicie.

No. 195

*Letter from Sir J. Tilley, to Sir G. Buchanan, Rome.**Foreign Office, December 10, 1920*

For your private information I may tell you that we have received a secret report that on September 5th a letter was sent to Mustapha Kemal by Ghalib Kemali Bey, his agent at Rome. It is believed to have been taken either by the Albanian Vlora or by Fago, who was at Angora in the summer.\*

According to the report the letter contained an account of the visit paid to Ghalib Kemali by the Chief of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The letter is reported to have stated that the Italian Government favoured a strong Turkey to counter-balance certain States which had been unduly enlarged. The present Italian Government, he said, like the preceding one, had given proof of their goodwill by supporting Turkey at the Peace Conference and by bringing to their own way of thinking certain other Powers who only pursued economic advantages in the East. They had appointed an Ambassador to Constantinople before the Turkish Treaty had been ratified; they had chosen for this post Garroni, who had been their Ambassador before the war; and they had at least connived at the help given by Italian business men and artisans to the Nationalists. These things proved their sincerity.

The Chief of the Political Department continued that the Italian Government greatly regretted to see Turkey weakened by internal divisions. He urged that the Turks should face the facts and limit their claims to what they might reasonably expect. The Italian Government were again and for the last time, prepared to show their friendship to Turkey and to Moslems in general by mediating between the Constantinople Government and the Nationalists and, after effecting this reconciliation, by mediating between

\* *Vlora* adlı Arnavut'un İstanbul'daki Arnavut Kulübü üyesi olduğu, Türk-İtalyan Dostluk Cemiyeti'nin de onun aracılığıyla çalıştığı belirtilmektedir. *Fago* adlı İtalyan subayı hakkında ise İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri 22.11.1920 günlü, 1232 sayılı telgrafında şunları yazmıştır:

"Although Italian representatives here have been ostensibly scrupulously correct in their attitude throughout, whole Italian atmosphere has been pro - Kemalist and there is no doubt that Italian agents have had dealings with Nationalists. Specific cases are difficult to adduce but reference may be made to visit to Angora in June last of Lieutenant Colonel Fago who made proposals to Kemalists i.e. to supply war material, arrange to export grain and raw materials from Anatolia to Italy, discuss economic concessions which were wanted by Italian Commercial interests and to provide further support to Nationalists..."

(D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 182, No. 180)

the Turks and the Entente. At the same time the Chief of the Political Department asked that Garroni should be informed of the position and plans of the Anatolian forces and of their final terms for the conclusion of agreements, firstly with the Central Government, and secondly with the Entente.

In conclusion, the Chief of the Political Department is reported to have told Ghalib Kemali to come to him if he had any difficulty in communicating.

Ghalib Kemali is said to have advised Mustapha Kemal to take advantage of the Italian offer.

You will agree that if this story is genuine it is a remarkable revelation.  
*D.B.F.P., 1919-1939, 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 200-201, No. 193.*

No. 196

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 10, 1920*

*(Received December 21.)*

*(No. 1623.)*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1266 of the 2nd December, summarising a note which I had received from the Sublime Porte regarding the ratification of the Peace Treaty, I have honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of this note.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
 HIGH COMMISSIONER

*FO. 406/44, p. 233, No. 206*

ENCLOSURE IN No. 196

*Note Addressed by Sefa Bey to High Commissioner.*

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
 Le 1er décembre 1920*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la note collective qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser le 24 novembre, conjointement avec leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires de France et l'Italie, pour

me faire savoir que, conformément aux instructions reçues de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, elle et ses collègues insistent sur la ratification du Traité de Sèvres par le Gouvernement ottoman dans le délai indiqué dans ma lettre du 4 de ce mois.

Ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de l'exposer à votre Excellence dans cette dernière lettre, la Sublime Porte ne se refuse pas à satisfaire au désir des trois grandes Puissances alliées. Si elle a demandé à surscoir à la ratification, c'est parce qu'elle est convaincue de la nécessité de n'y procéder qu'après sa prise de contact avec l'Anatolie pour les motifs que j'ai eu occasion de soumettre longuement à l'appréciation de votre Excellence, tant de voix que par écrit.

En fixant un délai d'au moins un mois, la Sublime Porte espérait que ce contact aurait pu être établi entre-temps. Cependant, des difficultés matérielles imprévues ont fait que ses délégués n'ont pu jusqu'ici se rendre en Anatolie. Le départ de ces derniers devant avoir lieu vendredi prochain, visé ne tardera plus à être atteint.

Je crois donc devoir prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre en considération les circonstances susvisées et consentir à ce que ratification du traité soit effectuée après que les délégués du Gouvernement auront pris contact avec l'Anatolie.

Veillez agréer, &c.

SEFA

FO. 406/44, p. 233, No. 206/1

No. 197

*War Office to the Cabinet.*

*Secret.*

## THE SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

### MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

I circulate the enclosed memorandum on the Situation in Mesopotamia by General Radcliffe, the Director of Military Operations. This memorandum is concurred in by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

I ask that this paper shall receive consideration by the Cabinet, if possible, on Monday. I have to introduce the Supplementary Army Estimates on Wednesday, and it will be necessary to review the entire situation in Mesopotamia.

W. S. C.

THE WAR OFFICE,  
10th December, 1920.

1. General Haldane's telegram No. X 767 (Appendix A), of 28th November, reviewing the situation in Mesopotamia and Persia asks for a clear statement of the policy to which his troops are to give effect, and adds a serious warning as to the danger of precipitous and premature reductions in the strength of the British garrison.

2. The British forces in Mesopotamia and Persia at the present time amount to 17,000 British and 85,000 Indian troops, the annual cost of which to the British taxpayer is well over 30,000,000 l.

This force includes the reinforcements — approximately equal to two divisions— sent from India during the recent emergency, prior to which the garrison comprised 13,000 British and 67,000 Indian troops, costing 24,000,000 l. annually.

The latter strength has always been considered by the General Staff as the minimum required to control the vilayets of Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul, and to maintain the existing forces in North-West Persia. This view was consistently maintained during the early part of the year when great pressure was being brought to bear on the military authorities to reduce the garrison below this figure, while at the same time His Majesty's Government was unwilling to relinquish control of any portion of the three vilayets above mentioned, or to withdraw from North-West Persia.

3. This conflict of views led to a situation which —whatever its aspect from the point of view of the taxpayer— was as regards the Army equivocal and unfair. For in Estimates, 1920-21, only enough money was taken for half the necessary garrison for a whole year or, alternatively, for the whole force for six months only; the intention being to ask for a Supplementary Estimate in six months time, should the views of the General Staff have proved correct, and it had been found impracticable to reduce the garrison in the interim.

That the estimate of the General Staff was not an exaggerated one has been amply proved by the events of this summer and autumn. On the contrary, it is clear that we ran things too fine and that a great disaster was only narrowly avoided, thanks to the energy, courage and devotion of the British soldier and his Indian comrade.

4. This uncertain and questionable policy has resulted in great hardship to the troops, for whom no proper provision has been made in the way of cantonments of the plea that the occupation was only temporary. They have consequently been exposed indefinitely to one of the most trying climates in the world, with no better protection than tents or the flimsiest of hutments. Separated for long periods from their families, they have lacked all the ordinary amenities of life and that reasonable accomplish-

ed, the Tiflis — Baku railway and its extension to Alexandropol will be at Russia's disposal, and she will be free to move troops to the old Turkish frontier as in 1914.

5. *The situation in Persia and Trans-Caspia* has been dealt with in many papers and it is unnecessary to do more than repeat that we must anticipate the eventual reinforcement of the Russian forces on the southern shores of the Caspian and a possible advance into Persia from Enzeli, Tabriz and Astarabad, which it is probable the British force in North-West Persia has momentarily prevented.

## II. — PRESENT SITUATION IN TURKEY IN ASIA.

6. The Turkish Government has delayed ratification of the Peace Treaty, and in the meantime three important events have occurred, namely, the defeat of Armenia, the elimination of Wrangel, and the political overthrow of Venizelos. The Turks must now be elated, and are represented by a body of able and persistent adventurers who will not fail to turn to full account any opportunity which is offered. It may be instructive to remember in this connection Enver's return march to Adrianople in 1913. This he was able to make owing to the outbreak of hostilities between the erstwhile allies Greece and Bulgaria.

7. The two militant parties in Turkey which are working for the revision of the Turkish Treaty are—

(a.) The Committee of Union and Progress, headed by Enver and Talaat.

(b.) Nationalists, headed by Mustafa Kemal.

The former have, since they saw there was no hope of influencing the terms of peace, for the time thrown in their lot definitely with the Bolsheviks, while the evidence in our possession appears to warrant the conclusion that the Nationalists, though anxious to secure Russian arms and ammunition, to intrigue, to obtain assistance from Italy, and to use Russian forces to recover Armenia, are not unanimously in favour of allowing the Bolsheviks to penetrate into Anatolia.

8. In dealing with the Turks it will be well to remember that Mustafa Kemal and Enver are rivals, that Enver has already been discredited by the Entente, and that his influence is probably greater in Russia than in Turkey itself. Any arrangement that is made with Turkey will have to be carried through with a representative Government, and this can only be obtained by amalgamating "Young Turks" and "Old Turks." A new head will be necessary, and it seems probable this will best be provided by Mustafa Kemal himself,\* whose recognition should have the effect of driving Enver

\* İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkililerinden D. G. Osborne, buraya el yazısıyla şu çıkmayı yapmış: "Or, perhaps better, İzzet Pasha" (Veya, belki daha iyisi, İzzet Paşa).

and Jemal into obscurity or finally into the arms of Russia to carry on their intrigues and personal ambitions in Central Asia, thus eliminating their influence on the Turkish problem proper.

### III. — EXISTING MILITARY RESOURCES OF—

#### A. — RUSSIA.

#### B. — TURKEY AND TRANS-CAUCASIA.

##### A. — Russia.

9. *The relative military resources of Russia and her neighbours are compared in the following table. Relative strengths are expressed for convenience by numbers representing rifle and sabre fighting strengths as the size of the formations vary, and, therefore, a comparison by formations is apt to be misleading. It should be noted that whereas the fighting strength figure of the Soviet Red Army is 396,000, the feeding strength of military personnel in the Army is about 1,000,000:—*

Neighbouring States.				Soviet Army. Available reserve.
—	Rifles and sabres.	Fronts.	Present group- ing on respect- ive fronts.	
Finland . . . . .	60,000	} North-Western Front	14,600	} 220,200
Esthonia . . . . .	20,000			
Latvia . . . . .	28,000			
Lithuania . . . . .	22,000			
Poland . . . . .	145,000	} Western Front ..	52,500	
Roumania . . . . .	120,000			
White Russian . . . . .	19,000			
and	(to be raised to 45,000 by December). (?)			
Ukrainian Movements.	30,000			
*Georgia . . . . .	30,000	} Caucasian . . . .	46,900	
*Armenia . . . . .	40,000			
		Grand total west of Caspian	334,000	
		Trans-Caspia . . . .	23,200	
		Siberia . . . . .	38,500	
Total . . . . .	514,000	Grand total . . . .	396,000	

\* In certain conditions which are discussed later these forces, or a portion of them, may have to be added to the resources of the Russian Bolshevik Government.

10. From the above table it appears that so long as the Red Army remains loyal the Russians, profiting from natural jealousies and the war weariness of her neighbours, have sufficient military resources to attack at least any one of their hostile neighbours between the Baltic and the Caspian Sea with a reasonable prospect of success.

11. As regards Trans-Caucasia, there are great natural obstacles to be overcome in military operations, and these are even more important military factors than the actual number of troops which might be available. Generally speaking, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Government could enforce its will on Afghanistan by military operations in the face of real national resistance on the part of the Afghans. It should, however, be quite practicable for it to employ sufficient forces to occupy and control the whole of Northern Persia, in view of the fact that the Persian Government has practically no armed force at its disposal.

12. It would appear that the Soviet Government can only maintain itself in power by force of its army. The Red Army, by reason of its nature, must be kept in full employment, otherwise it will re-act on the Government. Hence we may expect to see that army in perpetual activity until the ambitions of Russia are satiated. In this connection a most important point to be considered with reference to the Russian Army is the want of clothing and boots. This disability during the coming winter, if maintained, will do more to render the forces innocuous in the coming spring than any shortage of arms and ammunition. Every endeavour should consequently be made to prevent stocks purchased by Russia from reaching their destination.

#### B. — *Turkey and Trans-Caucasia.*

13. The Nationalist Army in Turkey may be divided into two portions:

- (1.) The Eastern Army under Kiazim Kara Bekir.
- (2.) The Western Army under Mustafa Kemal.

Mustafa Kemal is nominally Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies, but he is believed to have little power over Kiazim Kara Bekir, who appears to represent the faction which is in closest alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks. Kiazim Kara Bekir's Army is tied up in Armenia and presumably could not yet be withdrawn without risk of a fresh rising on the part of the Armenians.

14. In the Western Army under Mustafa Kemal there are available to meet the Greeks or to threaten Lieut.-General Harington's command on the Ismid front three Turkish Army Corps or about 28,000 combatants,



which might be reinforced from the corps in the Sivas-Samsun and the corps in the Diarbekir area. The state of the communications and the necessity for keeping troops in these latter areas limit the numbers available for reinforcements, and it is believed that the maximum force which could be employed by the Nationalists in the west can for the present be put at 30,000 regulars and 10,000 irregulars.

15. Turkey also has forces operating against the French in Cilicia and concentrating against the British in the neighbourhood of Jezireh on the Tigris. The function of these forces is probably rather to keep alive the Arab hostility to France and Great Britain for the present, than to undertake any direct operations on their own account, but they will inevitably seize any opportunity which may be offered to profit by the situation.

#### IV. — PRESENT SITUATION OF THE ALLIES AT CONSTANTINOPLE AND IN TURKEY IN ASIA.

16. *The French and British troops* in the neighbourhood of Constantinople amount at present to 15 battalions, plus one cavalry regiment, and will shortly be decreased by the departure of three battalions, so that the Entente is dependent on the Greek Army in Asia Minor, which recently amounted to eight divisions or 110,000 rifles and sabres and is holding a line from the Black Sea, north of Ismid, to the southern end of the Smyrna enclave. These formations were in course of reduction before the Greek election ending in the overthrow of M. Venizelos, a reduction, which although on a scale that would not have endangered the position of the Entente at Constantinople, was inevitable in view of the financial situation of Greece. It is impossible to say what effect the elections may have in the Greek Army or Greek policy, but it is certain that we must reckon with the probability that any formed Government may find itself unable to maintain the Army in anything approaching its present strength or indeed that the Army may disrupt itself automatically from reactionary causes due to aftermath of war.

#### V.—FUTURE CONETINGENCIES.

17. *As regards the Baltic States* it has been shown that Russia must eventually absorb these completely or reduce them to the position of provinces of Russia. No vital interests of the British Empire appear to be threatened by such action and it does not appear to be an issue which the Empire should pledge a single company of soldiers to influence.

18. *As for Poland*, in contrast to the situation in the Baltic States, the British Empire cannot stand aside without making an effort to maintain

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its independence which is a vital condition of the Treaty of Versailles. It appears certain that the Soviet Republic will sooner or later attack Poland, and the Allies will be called upon for assistance. The present resources of the British Army are not sufficient to add its quota to Allied armed assistance even if the people of Great Britain would tolerate it. Further, in the opinion of the General Staff the procedure should be confined to influencing the situation by endeavouring to remove the causes which are most likely to induce Russia to attack. The steps recommended to this end are the following:—

- (a.) Assist Poland to make herself strong by giving her permission to buy such stores and material in Allied countries, or even Germany, as she can pay for.
- (b.) Use every means to prevent Poland from adopting an aggressive and consequently foolish policy.
- (c.) Discourage Polish assistance to the White Russian and Ukrainian movements.
- (d.) Prevent or impede the re-equipment of the Bolshevik armies.

19. *In the Caucasus* the Russian Bolshevik Government, if it decided to pursue such a scheme and to diminish its commitments in other directions, is in a position (*vide* Part 2) to re-establish its previous frontier. Through communication by sea with Trebizond could be prevented by the Entente navies, and land communications west of the Nakhichevan-Kars railway are poor in the winter, aggravated by climatic conditions, there appears to be no reason to think that the Bolsheviks could not then establish themselves even at Erzeroum or on a line west of Erzingan through the Gioaur Dagh to the Black Sea, which they reached in 1917, unless the Turks can be persuaded to oppose them with united forces.

FO. 371/5232

No. 198

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.

PARIS, December 12, 1920  
 (Received December 13)

(No. 3688.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1386 of the 10th December informing your Lordship of the intention of the French Government to send M. Declaussières as French Financial Commissioner to Constantinople, I

have the honour to inform you that I referred to the subject this morning in conversation with the President of the Council. He told me that orders had been given to M. Declausières to proceed at once to Constantinople, and that he would probably arrive there simultaneously with the Italian Commissioner, so that the Commission would be able to set to work with the least possible delay.

It is practically certain that as soon as M. Declausières arrives in Constantinople he will claim the presidency of the Financial Commission, to which we have already agreed, but in view of the refusal of the French Government to recognise General Harington as president of the Inter-Allied Military Commission, I would recommend that we should not recognise M. Declausières as president of the Financial Commission until a similar status has been accorded to General Harington. If your Lordship approves of the idea, the question remains whether this should be told to the French Government now or on the arrival of M. Declausières at Constantinople. I would suggest the former alternative as a step of a more friendly character.

Your Lordship's telegraphic instructions of the 8th December point to the possibility of an early ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Ottoman Government, and imply that the Allies are also of opinion that advantages would accrue to them from immediate ratification. I therefore asked M. Leygues this morning what his views were on the subject. He replied with some vehemence that nothing would induce the French Government to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres as it stands. Though there might be twenty French Governments succeeding each other, not one of them would be allowed by the Chamber to ratify the treaty. He had impressed upon the Committee for Foreign Affairs and the French press that he and his Government were opposed to revision, but that they favoured adaptation or modification of the treaty, and he maintained that in this view he was in agreement with His Majesty's Government, and that in two or three weeks' time he would meet members of His Majesty's Government and discuss with them such modifications as might be necessary to make in the treaty to meet the new situation created at Athens. He strongly urged the necessity of making these modifications without undue delay and before events forced the Allied Governments to take hasty and, perhaps, what might prove rash decisions. He continued that the creation of Soviets in Armenia, the appearance of Bolshevik agents at Tehran and the attempts of the Bolsheviks to make terms with Kemal, who was showing unwillingness to join with Bolshevism against the Allies, made it imperative for the Allies to come speedily to terms with Kemal and thus to prevent a homogeneous Bolshevik policy in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, and that it was only by coming to terms with Mustapha Kemal in connection with Smyrna that this would be achieved.

There is no doubt that feeling in French official circles is entirely opposed to the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres in its present form, and that to help them in their commitments in Syria and Cilicia, an agreement with Kemal on the basis of the restoration of Smyrna to Turkish sovereignty is regarded as essential to their foreign policy.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

FO. 406/44, p. 228-229, No. 201

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 201-202, No. 194

No. 199

Sir H. Rambold to Earl Curzon.

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1920

(Received December 20.)

(No. 1633.)

My Lord,

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that the Grand Vizier came to see me on the afternoon of the 8th instant.

2. Tewfik Pasha began by saying that he had known my father, and this personal touch made the interview less formal than it might otherwise have been. After a recapitulation of past events we turned to the various subjects which are of interest to the Turkish Government and to this High Commission.

3. I enquired whether the Turkish Government had received any message from their mission to Angora, as the press generally stated to be the case. The Grand Vizier replied that they had received no word from their mission since it left on the 3rd instant. He was afraid that the Greeks were perhaps holding up the cypher telegrams from the mission to the Government. As such telegrams would pass over the sector over which General Harington exercises control, I said that I would immediately make enquiries, and see that orders were given that any telegrams from the mission to the Central Government should be allowed to go through. I have since ascertained that there is no reason to believe that any telegrams are being this held up. I am letting the Minister for Foreign Affairs know this and am adding that, in any event, fresh instructions have been sent to the Greeks not to interfere with the transmission of such messages.

4. His Highness then categorically repeated the assurance given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish Government meant to

ratify the treaty. I told the Grand Vizier that they would be well advised to do so quickly, if only for the sake of getting their finances put on a proper basis.

5. We then referred to the subject of the difficulties now being experienced in finding money with which to pay the balance of the salaries due for October. I pointed out that the High Commissioners were doing their utmost to get this money for the Turkish Government, but that they were meeting with difficulties of a material character. The High Commissioners could not force the banks to lock money up in the form of a long-term advance to the Turkish Government, on stocks which could only be sold slowly, and I alluded to the economic crisis which was taking place in Constantinople and was imminent in Western Europe. Tewfik Pasha informed me that the Ottoman Bank had suggested to him that if a sum of £ T. 250,000 in gold, now lying in the vaults of that bank (*i.e.*, the portion of the total sum originally intended for the service of the Internal Loan, as to which the Government claim that no dispute founded on the Treaty of Versailles really arises), and on which an embargo had been placed by the High Commissioners, were released, the bank would advance a sum of about five times this amount, in paper, to the Turkish Government. I replied that this matter had been recently discussed by the High Commissioners, who were of opinion that as the embargo had been placed on this gold in consequence of the receipt of instructions from the Allied Governments, a further reference would have to be made to those Governments before anything could be done.

6. I took this opportunity of telling the Grand Vizier that the task of the High Commissioners in endeavouring to obtain money for the Turkish Government would be facilitated if they were able to assure their Governments and the banks that the provisional control which had been established over the revenue and expenditure of the Government was operating effectively and completely, which was at present far from being the case. I sketched out the measures which the Public Debt delegates considered necessary to improve the control, and His Highness promised to speak to the Finance Minister on the subject. I left nothing unsaid which might induce them to agree to the centralisation of all receipts without exception in a single account, and to a system of control of expenditure which would make it possible for the delegates to guard against irregular and wasteful disbursements, and to secure priority for such expenditure as was most urgently necessary for the continued working of the Administration.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

No. 200

*General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.**Secret.**Paraphrase**December 14<sup>th</sup>, 1920*

I. 9649 cipher December 14th.

Strained relations between Nationalists and Bolsheviks are indicated by all recent information. Bolsheviks have assisted Soviet Armenia fearing an advance of Nationalists into Azerbaijan. In Angora Mustapha Kemal? has denounced Turkish-Communist party and on account of leader in favour of Bolsheviks has closed the Yeni-Gun newspaper. Kiazim Karabekir undoubtedly working well in with Nationalist Government.

No news from Izzet's Mission at Angora has been received as yet.  
C.3. (Ciphers) Copies to etc. etc.

FO. 371/5179/E. 16088

No. 201

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Fontana (Beyrout).**Telegram**No. 75**Cypher**Foreign Office**15th December, 1920*

Italian Ambassador has communicated information that Mustapha Kemal has sent the ex-Senoussi to Mardin in order to create unrest and disturbances\*.

FO. 371/5041/E. 15678.

\* Bu telgrafın orijinaline aşağıdaki not eklidir :

"The Italian Chargé d'Affaires read to me today a telegram from Count Sforza, who wished to have the information communicated to Lord Curzon, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had sent the ex-Senoussi to a place in northern Mesopotamia, Mardin, in order to create unrest, and disturbances.

"I thanked Signor Preziosi.

E. Crowe.

Dec. 13"

No. 202

*British Secret Intelligence Services to Foreign Office.*

December 15, 1920.

No. CX/1011/V

(Received December 17.)

## TURKEY

THE ATTITUDE OF MUSTAPHA KEMAL

Mr. Bland.

The attached report from Sofia, dated 6.12.20., is submitted in continuation of my memorandum No. CX/1011/V. dated 6.12.20.

FO. 371/5291/E. 15753

ENCLOSURE IN No. 202

*Report from Sofia, No. 34.*

## POLITICAL

## "KEMALISM"

SOFIA, 6/12/20.

(See also my Report No. 30 of 22/11/20)

About two weeks ago the son of DIMITRI ATCHKOFF (See my Report No. 30 entitled "Kemalism") left suddenly for Varna, and on his return on the 29th November came to see me with a message from his father begging me to call on him as soon as I conveniently could. I visited him in his house last Thursday evening (2nd December). His son who speaks English, acted as interpreter.

M. Atchkoff opened the conversation by asking if there was any political news from London, or any sign of a revision of the Allies' policy in the near East. He then produced a letter written in Turkish from a "high political personage" in Constantinople (He would not give his name, but I might mention that at this point he said a few words aside to his son, among which I caught the name "Izzet Pasha"). The writer of this letter, he said, had been in touch with Mustafa Kemal Pasha only 5 days previous to sending it. M. Atchkoff had produced the letter to illustrate how quickly a communication could get through. He guaranteed that, if he were permitted by the British to go direct, he could leave Constantinople and return there with a reply from Mustafa Kemal and the authority to act for him within 15 days. He would require to take with him as secretaries his son and his nephew, who had graduated at a Turkish university. He would

have no difficulty at the frontier. As soon as he met a Kemalist patrol he would give the password and straightway be conducted to wherever Mustafa Kemal might be.

M. Atchkoff urged that action should be taken with electric(?) speed. Now was the time. In March Kemal had told him that when the Kemalists were in such and such a position, they would be ready to come to an arrangement with the Entente. In M. Atchkoff's opinion these aims were now approximately realised. And there was another reason for instant action. The Bolsheviks were approaching a narrow gauge railway which would put them in direct contact with Mustafa Kemal. He might then become blinded to other considerations by the immediate advantages of collaborating with them, and the present opportunity for Great Britain to make an agreement with him would be indefinitely postponed. Mustafa Kemal was linked up both with Europe and India, but his relations with India were not fully developed as yet. I remarked at this point that the French Press were recommending a policy of reconciliation with Mustafa Kemal, and asked if M. Atchkoff was aware of any secret negotiations on the part of the French. He replied that he was ready to sign a declaration to the effect that the French and Italians were already in unofficial communication with him. The initiative had not come from Mustafa Kemal. He himself had no knowledge of the gist of any proposals that might have been made, but what had become of the ammunition that had been left in charge of the French at Constantinople? Where had it gone? And had not British men-of-war intercepted ships bound for the Gulf of Adalia with stores?

M. Atchkoff then reverted to the subject of the conditions which Mustafa Kemal would be prepared to accept. He was not interested in the Arab question. While M. Atchkoff was with him last March he received several letters from Arab chiefs asking for his protection and assistance. He always refused. The question for him was purely a Turkish question. A line drawn on a latitude just to the north of Aleppo would give the southern boundary. In March he had expressed approval of the idea of an autonomous Armenia, but it was possible that his views had changed since then. M. Atchkoff remarked that it should be borne in mind that owing to the great decrease in their numbers the Armenians were now actually less numerous than the Turks and Kurds. He went on to say, I don't know whether it was merely his own personal idea or not - that as a matter of fact it would serve the interests of Great Britain and Turkey if Batoum were to be included in the latter's territory. One of the first things that Mustafa Kemal would demand would be the release of FETHI Bey, Kuleli and Raouf Bey, who had been arrested by the British in the Turkish Chamber itself. This had made a bad impression.



I asked M. Atchkoff whether he had ever approached the French with a view to persuading them to use him as a channel for secret negotiations. He replied that he had not, though he had better opportunities with them than with the British, as he was personally acquainted with some of their officials. He was convinced, however, that the best policy for the Kemalists was an agreement with the British. He himself, while primarily a Bulgar patriot, was Turkophil and a strong Kemalist. His idea in approaching the British was that, as he was a great friend of Mustafa Kemal, who, indeed, had often acted on his advice, he would have the influence to direct him at this critical time into the road of an agreement with Great Britain. It would be the normal tendency of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to take this line, but M. Atchkoff was afraid of the immediate influences that were at work to sway him in other directions.

It seems practically certain that M. Atchkoff sent his son to Varna (a fact that I learnt from another source) with the special object of receiving the letter, referred to in the second paragraph of this Report, from some messenger from Constantinople, and that his desire to see me had some direct relation to its contents. For this reason I thought it worth while reporting our conversation at some length. \*

FO. 371/5291/E. 15753

\* Bu belge üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında aşağıdaki yorumlar yapılmıştır:

"There can be no doubt that Atchkoff makes these advances under instructions from Mustafa Kemal. Although Mustafa Kemal could easily repudiate them there are some indication of his attitude.

1. His demands stop short of Aleppo and he wants no Arabic-speaking districts.
2. In much he was prepared for an autonomous Armenia.
3. He would like Batoum.
4. He is anxious for the release of his colleague Rauf and of Fethi.

"At the same time this is an insidious attempt to inveigle us — apart from our Allies — into direct negotiations with Mustafa Kemal, instead of with the Porte.

W. S. Edmonds  
18/12/20.  
D. G. Osborne  
18/12  
C.(urzon)  
18/12."

No. 203

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 16, 1920.

*(Received December 17.)**(No. 1307.)**(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram No. 1266 of 2nd December.

Turkish Government are again showing signs of disinclination to ratify treaty notwithstanding definite promise of Minister for Foreign Affairs that as soon as Izzet Pasha Mission reached Angora Government would merely wait a few days necessary to allow mission to explain situation to Nationalists, and would then ratify treaty whether Nationalists acquiesce or not.

Explanation offered by Government is that no news has been received from mission since it left. This is apparently true so far as any official news is concerned. There is, however, no doubt that mission reached Angora over a week ago. Real reason for Government's continued failure to ratify is their desire to wait on events in Greece and elsewhere, especially in view of indications in press from Allied capitals that Allied statesmen have definitely made up their minds that treaty must be modified. French Premier's statement to Senatorial Commission on 8th December has had particularly unsettling effect. I continue to press for ratification. I have said that I know nothing of any intention to modify treaty, but that even if there were to be modifications they can only be effected after much consideration; that chance of such modifications constitutes no valid reason for delay in fulfilment of promise mentioned above; and that, on the contrary, Turkish Government should on its side proceed at once with ratification both in order to prove good intentions and to pave the way for institution of Financial Commission, which can alone afford permanent relief in the now desperate financial situation.

I spoke generally on those lines to Grand Vizier on 13th December, and I caused explicit statement in same sense to be made to Minister for Foreign Affairs later on same day. Grand Vizier spoke as though he acquiesced, though he gave me no further definite promise. Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that situation had entirely changed and that French Premier's statement made it difficult to ratify without exposing Government to damaging crisis. He did not deny obligation to fulfil promise previously given, but he urged that we should not press Government too hard.

My French colleague and Italian appear to be working on same lines as myself, and I do not despair of obtaining ratification. Prospects are, however, not very encouraging.

*FO. 406/44, p. 229-230, No. 202*

*D. B. F. P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 203-204, No. 196*

No. 204

*Foreign Office to War Office*

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
December 17th, 1920.

*E 15678/2/44.*

Sir,

I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of the Army Council that in conversation with Sir Eyre Crowe on December 13th, Signor Preziosi stated that Count Sforza desired the information to be communicated to Lord Curzon that Mustapha Kemal had sent the ex-Senoussi to Mardin in order to create unrest and disturbances.

2. A similar letter has been addressed to the India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. A. C. TILLEY

*FO. 371/5041/E. 15678*

No. 205

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 17, 1920.

(Received December 19.)

(No. 1308.)

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram No. 1307 of 17th December.

Turkish Government attribute lack of news from mission to defective communications and seem sincerely anxious to get into touch with Angora. There are, however, reports of increasing frequency and consistency that mission have gone over to Nationalists. It is even reported from Ismid on authority of traveller from Angora that Izzet and two other members of mission have accepted posts in Nationalist Government. These stories may

merely be what [? group omitted] wish to be believed, nevertheless it is pretty clear that no progress is being made in direction of reconciling Nationalists to views held by Allies, and at least professed by Government, and that causes other than defective communications are responsible for continued absence of news.

Another report which I give with even greater reserve is that Nationalists are in touch with Europe through General Gouraud, with a view to settlement of Anatolian question without reference to Constantinople. Alleged presence in Rome of Jami Bey, former Minister of the Interior in Angora Government, has also attracted attention.

*FO. 406/44, p. 230, No. 203*

No. 206

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 18, 1920.*

*(Received December 22.)*

*(No. 1314.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram No. 1308 of 17th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day, 18th December that Izzet Pasha's mission reached Angora 8th December.

I gather that this message reached Porte through Italians and that no other official news has been received. Minister for Foreign Affairs regards message as disposing of rumours which have been afloat to the effect that mission has either gone over to Nationalists or is held prisoner by them.

These rumours do, indeed, seem fantastic, but version that members of mission had been won over and had even accepted posts in Angora Government seems to have been for some reason or other deliberately encouraged by Nationalists.

*FO. 406/44, p. 234, No. 208*

No. 207

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 18, 1920.

*(Received December 24.)**(No. 1660.)*

My Lord,

SEFA BEY, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me on the 16th instant, and I took the opportunity of his visit to speak to him again at length on the question of ratification.

2. His embarrassment at not being able to fulfil the undertaking he had given to the three High Commissioners, both in writing and verbally, to ratify the treaty once the Government Mission had entered into contact with the Kemalists was evident. He pleaded for still further delay to allow the Government to hear from their mission. He explained that the Government had sent two urgent telegrams, through French and Italian agencies respectively, to their Mission to ask for news of the same.

3. Sefa Bey freely admitted that events in Greece had altered the situation. He explained that if the Turkish Government were to ratify the treaty now the Kemalists would reproach them with having created a fait accompli at a moment when there was every chance of the treaty being modified. I replied that the Turkish Government seemed to be proceeding on the assumption, which as far as I knew was baseless, that there was a good chance of the provisions of the treaty being modified before that instrument was ratified. I said that the Turkish Government were under a complete delusion in imagining that any of the Allied statesmen had said anything which would indicate a readiness to waive the demand for the ratification of the treaty. It was true that there had been talk in the press of such modifications, and there had been a pronouncement by the French President of the Council on the subject. But if any modifications of the treaty were in contemplation at an ulterior date ratification would not necessarily hinder such modifications. On the contrary, the Turkish Government would be giving proof of goodwill if they ratified the treaty immediately. They were more likely to create a favourable impression by acting as I suggested, whereas, further procrastination could only produce an unfavourable impression in the minds of the *Entente* Governments.

4. Sefa Bey admitted the justice of these remarks, but again emphasised the difficult position in which the Turkish Government would be placed vis-à-vis public opinion both in Constantinople and in Anatolia.

5. I then dwelt on the disastrous consequences to Turkey from a financial point of view if ratification were delayed. I pointed out that the High Commissioners were experiencing the greatest difficulty in obtaining an advance on the Turkish Government stocks, which advance if obtained would only be sufficient to pay the balance of the October salaries and a portion of the November salaries. In fact the Government would be faced in a few days by a still more acute financial crisis, and it was impossible to see whence relief was to come. The only solution of the crisis lay, therefore, in the ratification of the treaty, which would admit of the constitution of the Financial Commission.

6. Finally, I asked Sefa Bey to impress on his colleagues three points. viz.:—

(1.) The fact that the Turkish Government had engaged themselves formally to ratify the treaty as soon as their Mission had entered into contact with the Kemalists, and there could be no doubt that the Mission had in effect done so;

(2.) That it was an utter mistake to imagine that the Allied Governments had waived their demand for ratification; and

(3.) That ratification was the only means by which the Turkish Government would avert the most serious financial embarrassments.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD  
*High Commissioner.*

*FO. 406/44, p. 234-235, No. 210*

No. 208

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 21, 1920.*

*(Received December 24.)*

*(No. 1321. Confidential.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram No. 1307 of 16th December.

I again spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about ratification. I gave him translation of statement which I had noticed in English papers of 11th instant defining attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Turkish Treaty, and stating that three Allied Powers were acting together in absolute union. I also read him his note of 1st December enclosed in my despatch No. 1623 of 10th December, promising ratification after Government delegates had entered into contact with Nationalists.

I said that Mission had now at Angora for twelve days. Time had therefore come for Turkish Government to redeem their promise.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that situation had changed since above-mentioned note had been written, and he repeated arguments against acting hastily in the matter of ratification. He instanced statement made by French Prime Minister, as also a report he had seen that Count Sforza had stated that it would be more easy to modify Treaty of Sèvres as that instrument had not been ratified.

I observed that I knew nothing of any such statement on the part of Count Sforza.

The Minister said that if Turkish Government were to ratify now, such a proceeding might result in irretrievable disaster and throw Nationalists into the arms of Bolsheviks. Ratification would produce a deplorable effect. He therefore pleaded for a still further delay to enable Government to enter into communication with their mission, and he hinted that there was prospect of that mission coming to satisfactory agreement with Nationalists.

I said that elements who would be further estranged would be only extremist elements who had already burnt their boats, and I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that my own impression was that Turkish Government were making ratification depend on acquiescence of Nationalists and that Government were not serious in their declarations that they would ratify. Minister for Foreign Affairs disputed this view but I am nevertheless convinced that Turks are pursuing a Micawber-like policy in this matter, I cannot shift Minister for Foreign Affairs from his position with result that three Allied Governments must consider how long they are prepared to wait for fulfilment of definite promise by Turks to ratify after their mission had entered into contact with Nationalists.

In view of importance attached by Turkish Government to utterances of French Prime Minister and to press statements regarding probable modification of treaty, and in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I think it would be very desirable that my colleagues and I should be again definitely instructed that prompt ratification is indispensable. Such instructions appear to be all the more necessary inasmuch as French High Commissioner must naturally be somewhat embarrassed by pronouncement of French Prime Minister, and has become rather lukewarm in applying pressure to Turkish Government to ratify.

It is worth considering whether Turks should not be summoned to ratify by a certain date.\*

*FO. 406/44, p. 235-236, No. 211*

*D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 206-207, No. 198*

\* Sir H. Rumbold'un bu telgrafına Lord Curzon aşağıdaki cevabı gönderdi:

*Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold.*

*Foreign Office, December 26, 1920*

*No. 1190.*

*(Telegraphic)*

Your telegram No. 1321 of 21st December:

Ratification of Treaty of Sevres.

Pending the clearing of the situation in Greece, it will be better to make no further representations in favour of immediate ratification.

*(F.O. 406/44, p. 236, No. 212)*

No. 209

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 21, 1920.*

*(Received December 22.)*

*(No. 1322.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

My telegram No. 1321 of 21st December.

My French colleague called this morning and gave me an account of an interview he had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs two days ago on the subject of the ratification of the Turkish Treaty. My French colleague reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of the latter's note of 1st December promising ratification when once Government mission had entered into contact with Nationalists, and said that Turkish Government must now act up to their promise to ratify. He dwelt on the bad effect which would be produced if they failed to ratify, and appears generally to have spoken in very energetic terms.

I therefore wish to correct the impression I conveyed in my above-mentioned telegram that my French colleague is somewhat lukewarm in this matter.

*FO. 406/44, p. 234, No. 209*



No. 210

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 21, 1920.**(Received January 3, 1921.)**(No. 1679. Secret.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of Intelligence Reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople) for the week ending the 9th December, 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD  
*High Commissioner.*

FO. 406/45, p. 27, No. 9

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 210

*Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week ending December 9, 1920.*

TOWARDS the end of last week the tedious preliminaries between the Sublime Porte and Angora concerning the commencement of official negotiations were terminated, and on the 3rd December a delegation from the Central Government left Constantinople for Angora. The delegation was expected to arrive in Angora by the 6th or 7th December, but some time must elapse before any definite result can be obtained. Some considerable difficulty seems to have been experienced with regard to the establishment of telegraphic communications between Constantinople and Angora, partly owing to the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to afford facilities for the transmission of telegrams through the zone occupied by the Greek forces. In addition to the steps which have been taken for the restoration of order in Anatolia, the Government has also been making efforts to reap some benefit from the recent changes in the domain of foreign affairs by the appointment of Chargés d'Affaires abroad. In this connection Ghalib Kemali Bey, who recently returned to Constantinople from Rome, submitted a report to the Cabinet, which is summarised below, and which throws some more light both upon his own activities and upon Italian policy. With regard to conditions in Anatolia, it would appear that the Nationalists, in defence to their "allies", are continuing to enact measures for the protection of "workers", but it is improbable that these measures are intended to have any other effect than that of hoodwinking the Bolsheviki. The latter appear to have definitely vetoed the original

Nationalist plan for seizing Batoum, and it would now seem that more intricate methods are being pursued with the assistance of the Moslem population of the disputed area.

*1. Turkish Affairs.*

(a.) The foreign situation was explained to the Council of Ministers held on the 27th November by Sefa Bey, and more especially with regard to the meeting of *Entente* statesmen in London. In Sefa Bey's opinion the London Conference would result in a complete change in the situation, but, as the Allied High Commissions in Constantinople had no information as to the progress of the deliberations, it was impossible for them to give any reply to the Sublime Porte's overtures regarding certain modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres. He thought, therefore that it would be as well for the delegation to Anatolia to postpone its departure for a few days until the situation had been cleared up. Mustapha Arif Bey emphasised the necessity of sending a diplomatic agent to London and proposed that, if it were not possible to send someone to London at once, the mission should be entrusted to someone already in Europe. The Council agreed to this proposal and Izzet Pasha was requested to sound the Allied representatives with regard to their views on the subject, while Sefa Bey, with the President of the State Council and the Minister of Commerce, would deliberate as to who should be sent to London and what instructions should be given.

(b.) Ghalib Kemali Bey's views on Italian policy were embodied in a report submitted to the Ministerial Council, in which he admitted that, after the advent to power of Damad Ferid Pasha in April, he had acted as the official representative of the Nationalists in Rome. In his opinion, both France and Italy were dissatisfied with the Treaty of Sèvres, but had been unable to take independent action. If, however, unity could be established in the Turkish administration, he felt sure that the two Powers would give all the assistance in their power so far as a benevolent application of the peace conditions was concerned. He had made various communications to the Angora Government to this effect, and had even counselled the latter to make certain sacrifices in the interests of a reconciliation. As a result of his investigations, he was satisfied that Italian public opinion considered that the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres was essential to the re-establishment of peace in the East, and he felt certain that their friends would assist them to obtain every advantage from the situation created by recent developments in Greece. Various highly-placed personages had expressed their confidence that matters would take a turn for the better if Turkey pursued a discreet and firm policy. The Italian Government was anxious that order should be restored in Anatolia in order to deprive Turkey's enemies of any grounds for interference, and he had received

assurances from the Italian Government that, if order were restored, it would support Turkey's just cause. He had met Jami Bey and Muhieddin Rushdi Bey in Italy before he left, and they had asked him to communicate the Nationalist point of view to the Italian Government and to the Sublime Porte. These interviews had confirmed the result of his own private investigations to the effect that the National Assembly would not negotiate with the Sublime Porte until the latter had obtained some guarantees that the Peace Treaty would be modified. The Central Government, by acting as a mediator between the Nationalists and the *Entente* Powers, would secure the sincere support of those Powers interested in the maintenance of Turkish independence. He had also had interviews with certain Greek personages in Rome, and had been given to understand that there was some possibility of an understanding between Turkey and Greece now that the Opposition had come to power. He thought it would be of great advantage to establish direct contact with the new Greek Government, and begged to add that no time should be lost. Documentary evidence was attached to the report.

(c.) The negotiations with the Nationalists were the principal concern of the Ministerial Councils held on the 25th November and the 1st December, at the former of which Izzet Pasha stated that the only obstacle to the immediate departure of the official delegation was the reserved attitude of the Allies. He proposed that the instructions drawn up by himself should be immediately submitted to the Sultan for sanction. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, opposed this on the ground that it would be advisable to wait until the Allies had defined their attitude. To this the Council agreed. Sefa Bey was instructed to approach the Allied authorities with regard to the difficulties that had arisen in the re-establishment of telegraph communications by reason of the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to permit the repair of the wires and other matters in the Ismidt district.

On the 27th November the Council was informed that Zekki Pasha would be unable, for reasons of health, to accompany the delegation to Anatolia, which was therefore composed as follows:—

*President.*—Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior.

*Members.*—

Hussein Kiazim Bey, Minister of Commerce.

Jevad Bey, newly-appointed Minister to Berne.

Munir Bey, Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry.

Fatin Khoja, Astronomer Imperial.

Jevad Bey and Munir Bey were included at the instance of Sefa Bey, who is apparently anticipating complications on account of the foreign of engagements made by the Nationalists.

At a later stage of the same deliberations, the Minister for War was asked whether he had any information with regard to an offensive by the Nationalists against the Greeks. The reply was that there was no official information, but that it was believed the Nationalists would transfer some of their troops from the Eastern front for the purpose of a general attack against the Greeks, but nothing was known as to the progress of the operations. Izzet Pasha thought that a success on the part of the Nationalists would facilitate matters between the Central Government and the Allies.

On the 1st December the Council was informed by Sefa Bey that the Allies had no objection to the departure of the delegation, which could therefore leave at once. Izzet Pasha then read a communication, dated the 20th November, from Mustapha Kemal, in which the latter stated that he had received the key to the cypher, and had repeated the orders for the transmission of telegrams from Constantinople addressed to the President of the Assembly; as the Assembly was prepared to meet the Government delegation, it was requested that the date of the latter's departure should be notified forthwith, together with the names of the members of the delegation; it was considered that the inclusion of Izzet and Salih Pashas would be of great advantage.

Salih Pasha signified his willingness to accompany the delegation, and the War Minister stated that Staff-Major Hassan Bey had been selected in place of Zekki Pasha. Finally, it was decided that the delegation should leave on the 3rd December, and Izzet Pasha was requested to communicate with Angora at once in order to settle the route to be followed. A communication to the Sultan was then drawn up and signed by all the members of the Cabinet, in which the attributions and purpose of the delegation were defined and the Imperial approval was requested. With regard to certain foreign personages accompanying the delegation, Izzet Pasha stated that, although they would have no official status, and although he himself saw no obstacle, the matter depended entirely upon the decisions of the Angora administration. At a later stage of the same deliberations a telegram arrived for Izzet Pasha from Fevzi Pasha, the Nationalist Commissioner for War, in which it was stated that, owing to the bad state of the roads between Zungulduk-Ineboli-Samsun, the delegation should travel by the land route by rail and motor-car; all measures had been taken, and two officers had already been sent to Eski Shehir to await the delegation.

A further meeting was held on the same evening at the house of the Grand Vizier, at which the members of the delegation were all present and were given the following instructions:—

- (1.) The principal object of the delegation was to secure the submission of the Nationalists to the Central Government, in order that the latter could adequately represent the entire nation and afford satisfactory guarantees for the execution of engagements made. The utmost efforts were to be made to abolish the dualism which had arisen in the Administration.
- (2.) After having fully explained the political situation and emphasised the disastrous consequences that would ensue if the restoration of order in Anatolia were delayed, the delegation would endeavour to ascertain the final terms of the Nationalists.
- (3.) Replies should be communicated to the Central Government with all speed, and further instructions should be awaited before any engagements were made.
- (4.) The Central Government would not require the abolition of the National forces until the question of peace had assumed a definite form, but during the negotiations of the Central Government with the Entente Powers no movements should be undertaken contrary to the Government's policy. Assurances should be requested to this effect.
- (5.) The delegation would require the Nationalist Administration itself to draw up the project for the negotiations with the Allies in order that there might be no subsequent dispute.
- (6.) After a general agreement had been reached, a special commission would be formed including Nationalist members for the purpose of settling other details.
- (7.) In accordance, the Central Government will cite all persons implicated in the Anatolian movement before civil tribunals, but will adopt the principle of non-responsibility of individuals, and, if need be, will proclaim a general amnesty.
- (8.) The Government promises neither to approve nor ratify any engagements unendorsed by the National Assembly to be convoked after the conclusion of an agreement.
- (9.) The Government will make every endeavour to consolidate the advantages obtained by recent actions on the part of the Nationalists.

(d.) A communication from Mustapha Kemal to the Sultan is said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government emissary to Angora, Captain Neshet Bey. Mustapha Kemal is said to have protested the absolute loyalty of the Nationalists to the Sultanate and also to the Sultan himself personally; they had never entertained the idea of trying

to replace him, and all such stories, circulated by traitors, were the inventions of the enemies of the country; the sole purpose of the Nationalists was the salvation of the nation and the Khalifat; the prestige of the Khalifat would be restored by the union of Islam, for the achievement of which great assistance was being accorded by a Power that was the declared enemy of Imperialism.

(e.) Nationalist measures for the protection of labour was the theme of an article published in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gun" on the 30th October. After a somewhat bombastic foreword, the article detailed the following conditions which are added by order of the Economy Commissioner to concessions for the exploitation of forests:—

- (1.) The contractor to pay an indemnity of not less than £T. 150 to all workmen incapacitated by malaria, pleurisy, dysentery, or other complaints requiring lengthy treatment, syphilis, or by injuries arising from accidents.
- (2.) Contractors shall submit their wages accounts once a month to the Government Forests Department. Employees are to be regularly paid, and the decision of the Commission of Economy will be binding in all disputes.
- (3.) In the event of a breach of these conditions, the concession will be cancelled and the contractor will not be entitled to any compensation whatever.

It was added that the Economy Commissioner had given orders that concessions were to be divided in such a manner as to permit the small capitalists to participate and to prevent several concessions being obtained by one person.

(f.) The tax for exemption from military service has been very strongly condemned by the "Yeni Gun" newspaper, of Angora, which affirmed that the country was not like the estate of a rich man for whom a crowd of slaves did all the work, &c. "What had vile pelf to do with the spirit of nobility and sublimity?" The exemption tax should be abolished and no payment should be accepted in lieu of service.

(g.) A clue to Nationalist policy in Georgia has been afforded by an article published in the Batoum paper "Islam Gurjistan" on the 19th November. It will be remembered that, according to previous reports, the Nationalists had been very busily agitating in the Batoum region, and it was believed that an attempt was to have been made to attack Batoum. This project now appears to have been abandoned, possibly as a result of Bolshevik pressure, and more oblique methods adopted. On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of nego-

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 tiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajaristan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and M. Chekengelli came into power. M. Chekengelli was the Transcaucasian delegate in 1918 during the negotiations with the Turks, and agreed to the cession of the three sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum to the latter. The article mentioned above concerned the proceedings of a meeting of the General Assembly of Moslems in Georgia held in Batoum on the 16th November, in the course of which the president stated that the independence of Ajaristan would be incorporated in the charter of the Georgian Constitution, which was then being discussed in the Georgian Parliament. It was decided after debate that a constitutional commission would be elected after the constitutional charter, which was being drawn up by the Parliamentary Commission, had been approved by the Council. At a later stage of the proceedings, on the suggestion of the president, it was agreed that the Presidential Committee should be reduced from thirteen to five members. The five members selected, who are all notorious Turkish agents, were as follows:—

Mehmed Abashidze.  
 Ismet Kadizade.  
 Suleiman Abashidze.  
 Suleiman Varshanidze.  
 Jemal Kikava.

## 2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.

(a.) Interest at present centres in the advance of the Turks into Armenian territory and the fall of Kars. Reports state that the Bolshevics had not expected such a rapid collapse of the Armenian forces, and had hoped to have effected a coup d'état in Armenia before the Turks actually invaded Armenian territory. Failing to achieve this coup in time, they are now said to have sent a note to Mustapha Kemal demanding an instant cessation of hostilities. The question of the moment throughout Transcaucasia is whether the Turks will cease the offensive, or whether they will push farther into the Erivan district and reach the Azerbaijan frontier. The general opinion is that in the latter case the whole of Azerbaijan would rise against the Bolshevics, and that a general conflagration would take place throughout the Caucasus. There is no doubt but that the Moslems of the Caucasus are anxious for a Turkish advance, but the question is whether the Bolshevics will be able to insist on a cessation of hostilities. Rumour is rife concerning the alleged split between the Bolshevics and the Nationalists. The general opinion is that the Armenian question may result in an open breach between the two forces, though it is realised that everything possible will be done to prevent such an event occurring.

the rapid collapse in question was directed by KAZIM KEMAL, generally by allied MILITARY TACTICS.

(b.) The attitude of the Georgian Government towards contemporary events can best be described as that of the reed bending before the storm. Georgia realises that she lies between two forces much more powerful than herself, and she endeavours to prolong her independent existence by keeping on good terms with both of them. She has assimilated so many Bolshevik principles that there is little ground for the Soviet authorities to harbour hostile designs against her. As regards the Turks, on the other hand, she has declared that, as a large proportion of her population is Moslem, Georgia cannot but consider herself a natural friend of Turkey. The Georgian Government have latterly brought forward a proposal to establish Moslem autonomy in Adjарistan. This step would have the double effect of pacifying the demands of the local Moslems in the Batoum province and also of taking the wind out of the sails of the Turks, who have latterly been showing every sign of taking early measures to occupy the Batoum province.

(c.) Anti-Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be aid to be any serious movement on foot against the Soviet authorities. Until recently the leading spirit in the revolt was Imam Najm-ud-Din Gotsinsky. The latter has now retired from the scene of active insurrection, and his place has been taken by a grandson of the Imam Shamil. The insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands, out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns, which are in consequence at the mercy of the insurgent raiding bands. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily liquidate the trouble. Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks and longs for Turkish intervention. In this respect the feeling is the same as in Azerbaijan, and there is little doubt but that, should the Turks show any definite intention of advancing into the Caucasus, the Moslem population would rise in their favour to a man.

### 3. *Egyptian Affairs.*

The ex-Khedive is reported to be extremely depressed over the news of the sale of his properties in Egypt, which has been definitely ordered by the British authorities. As he regards this as the death-knell of his hopes of being restored to power in Egypt, he proposes to devote himself in future to a life of pleasure and personal interests in Switzerland. He therefore intends to sever his connections with Constantinople, although he may return here for two or three months in the year to visit his mother, Amina.



No. 211

*Consul Fontana to Earl Curzon.*

BEIROUT, December 21, 1920.

(Received January 13, 1921.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report upon the present situation in the Grand Lebanon, and in the region comprised in the vilayet of Aleppo as it existed before the war.

In the late summer of 1915 the Lebanon mountains were visited by a great swarm of locusts, which ravaged the whole district and consumed every green thing. In 1916 the people of the Lebanon, which was then occupied by a Turkish division, began to feel the pinch of hunger, and in 1917 and 1918 famine desolated the whole region. Supplies of grain were sent by the Turkish Government to be distributed for the relief of the people, but these supplies were so manipulated by Mutessarifs, kaimakams, and others, who in many cases sold the grain at exorbitant prices, that the relief afforded was entirely insufficient. Over-one-third of the inhabitants of the Lebanon died of famine during those years, and in 1918 hundreds of people died of starvation in the streets of Beirout and other towns of the littoral. After the British occupation a great number of Lebanese who possessed the means to travel emigrated to America so that not more than one-third of the original inhabitants of the Lebanon now remain in the country. I have visited various villages in the mountains which before the war were prosperous and full of life, but their present aspect is most desolate. The few inhabitants remaining live mostly upon money received from relatives in America, and there is very little sign of husbandry or activity of any kind. In every village there are a number of deserted and roofless houses, the owners of which, before perishing, demolished their roofing in order to sell the timber with which it was constructed, to buy bread. Many other houses, although still intact, stand empty or deserted, and buildings commenced shortly before the war still remain in the condition in which they were left when work was abandoned. Labour is so scarce and expensive that the work of construction cannot be resumed. The French authorities prohibited, some months ago, emigration from the Lebanon, but would-be emigrants have no great difficulty in evading the regulation by bribery.

At Beirout the economic situation is by no means good. There is a quantity of cloth and piece goods on the market for which there is now little demand, and of which the importers are eager to dispose even at a

heavy sacrifice. The banks are reluctant to grant credit, and trade with the interior is at a standstill. The fluctuation and fall in the value of the Syrian piastre, the only currency now recognised as legal tender, tends to hamper both local and foreign trade. The Beirout customhouse is described as corrupt from top to bottom, and importers are submitted not only to monetary extortion but frequently even to distribution of a portion of the goods received among the customs officials. Civil functionaries and the middle-class generally are suffering from the high cost of living and venality among the former, when Syrian, appears to be the rule rather than the exception. Certain French officers and officials are also accused of receiving and expecting liberal presents for services rendered by them.

In the Aleppo region the military situation is as follows: There is a large concentration of Turkish troops at Ourfa under command of Mustapha Kemal Pasha whose headquarters are, or are to be, at Diarbekir. One Turkish division is in Aintab, another a "division volante", composed probably of Turkish regulars and local "chetas" or bands, is operating between Aintab and Kilis. A French division is beleaguering Aintab, but the town does not appear to be cut off from communication with outside. Another French detachment "volant" is said to be moving in the Aintab district. Idlip has been raided by Kemalists who killed some French soldiers, and carried of a considerable sum in gold from the Konak. In the Antioch region one Ibrahim Hannano has risen against the French and collected a large band of followers. He is acting in unison with the Kemalists, and on the 2nd instant marched from Harim and seized Djisr-esh-Shogour (where he installed a Nationalist kaimakam), after defeating a force of gendarmes sent from Aleppo to arrest him who suffered severe losses. A company and a-half of French troops were assailed and almost surrounded in a defile east of Ain Cherkia by a force of Alaouites, but managed to withdraw with a loss of several killed and wounded. In the Alaouite territory generally the situation is at present unfavourable for the French, the chiefs having thrown in their lot with the Kemalists.

At Aleppo itself there are very few French troops, and the chetas are active to the north and east of the town. People refuse to go for business to villages only 10 miles distant, through fear of the bands. A French camel caravan which started recently from El Bab for Aleppo was obliged to return when only two hours out, the chetas being seen scouring the countryside. At Tel Ahmar the "shahtours", or ferry boats have been seized by the rebels. I have talked with two Englishmen who returned a few days ago from Aleppo, one of whom has passed many years in the country, and also with a third who returned from there later. They all state that the general opinion at Aleppo is that Mustapha Kemal can take the town when he

pleases, but is holding back until the worst of the rains are over. The opinion prevails that he will be in Homs before the spring, and he has declared that he will blow up the railway between there and Beirut before the end of February. The inhabitants of Aleppo, both Christian and Moslem, are bitter against the French, and would almost welcome the return of the Turks. The Administration is very weak and corrupt, the Governor-General senile and a mere puppet of the French. His relative, Muhammed Bey Shayef, has been appointed Mutessarif of Aleppo, and another of his family is director of the post and telegraph office, having formerly been employed there and dismissed for breach of trust. The high administrative posts have been divided between members of the Shayeb and Koutsi families, all of whom are mere instruments in the hands of the mandatory Power. The post office is in great confusion, letters are opened and replaced in wrong envelopes, or lost, and correspondence is greatly retarded and much inconvenience caused to business men, especially those corresponding with abroad. Telegrams also are inexcusably delayed in transmission. Great venality prevails among certain high French officers in the Administration, as well as among native officials. According to the statement of a firm of Aleppo bankers, a French officer left Aleppo after some months residence with 50,000 fr., which had accumulated in the bank during that period. Three other officers also left with large fortunes, having apparently none on their arrival.

The three sons of the late Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Aleppo towards the end of November, fugitives from the Turks, after, it is said, cutting off the noses of certain Turkish officers at Veran Shehr. They applied to the French for money and troops to fight the Kemalists, and were well received.

*-(Leader - Kurdish MILLY tribe*

Muchhem Bey returned to Aleppo in November from his disastrous expedition to Rakka and Der Zor. He travelled by the desert road, as he was unable to pass through Rakka, where his cousin Hashim Bey is now holding the country with Turkish troops, and has sent back to Aleppo the Government officials appointed by the French. On his return, Muchhem applied for a strong force of troops to eject his cousin and the Turks from Rakka, and impose his authority at Der Zor, where the inhabitants are either pro-Turk, pro-British, or in favour of decentralisation. But no attention was paid to his representations, and he is now living incognito at Aleppo.

There is marked and general dissatisfaction with French mandatory rule both at Beirut and in the Lebanon as a whole. Even the Maronite community, the largest of the various Christian sects, and considering themselves as Catholics to enjoy the special favour of the French, speak of the present régime with strong disfavour. Unanimous regret is expressed

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at the withdrawal of the British from Syria, and many people say that they were better off under the Turks than now. Various causes have combined to produce this public dissatisfaction. The one is that the French Government, after the enormous sacrifices and expenditure of the war, are unable to sink money in Syria as lavishly as the inhabitants expected. This the Syrians resent, and still more so the increase of taxation in the old Lebanon, where a merely nominal tax was before levied on real property. It is calculated that more than one-half of the landed property in the Lebanon mountains belongs to the monasteries of different orders, which are numerous and hold the finest positions. No account is taken of the fact that, in spite of this increase, taxation remains relatively very low. The French are accused of exploiting the country to their own profit, and the detriment of the Syrians. Another cause of complaint lies in the nomination of French "conseillers" to every department of the Administration, whose approval is required before action can be taken. It is urged that the native officials have no power in their hands, and that the French are virtually colonising the country. The blame for the corruption prevalent among officials is imputed to the French, as owing to the enormous rise in prices sums now expended in bribery have to be far larger than before the war. And the fact of certain French officers and officials being venal is so magnified as to elicit sweeping condemnation of local French officialdom. A third pretext for dissatisfaction is the defective lighting of Beirout, and relative paralysis in public works in the town itself, the malcontents overlooking the fact that they themselves loudly deprecate the increase of taxation necessary to render such works possible. French officers, moreover, have for some reason rendered themselves temporarily unpopular among ladies belonging to the higher native society at Beirout, and the existence of a large lay school under French masters, which is largely attended by Jews, is looked upon askance by high native ecclesiastics. The French are accused of looking down upon the Syrians, and the words *sale Syrienne* or *sale Syrien*, dropped by individual Frenchmen, are resented as a national insult.

The French, on their side, are embarrassed by the great military expenditure called for owing to the unsettled state of Syria and Cilicia, and by the comparatively modest military forces at their command. Military officers, nevertheless, hold posts in the Administration which would be better occupied by French civil functionaries of experience, whose number is wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the moment. At Aleppo French officers are at present holding nearly all the posts intended ultimately to be filled by French officials. The French functionaries, moreover, besides being relatively few, have not always been wisely selected. The secretary of the acting High Commissioner told me that M. de Caix, when in France last year, did his utmost to recruit competent officials, with or without

colonial experience, for Syria, but the gaps left by the war and disinclination to accept service in the Near East rendered his efforts almost fruitless. The lack of higher education among the Syrians, and the ignorance of any but Turkish methods of administration unfit them at present, in the opinion of the French, for administrative posts without foreign supervision; and thus the system of "conseillers", against whose decision appeal can only be made to the High Commissioner, has been evolved as a "temporary measure" to remain in force until the Syrians have acquired the art of self-government. Unfortunately, for the reason I have indicated, these "conseillers" do not always possess the tact and ability requisite for their functions. The sensitive vanity of the educated native, and his proclivity to intrigue and peroration rather than to action, call for more indulgence and patience than the average French official is likely to possess.

The sacrifices made by the French in blood and money for the pacification of Syria, and the excellent carriage roads suitable for motor traffic constructed by them throughout the greater part of the Great Lebanon and elsewhere in Syria, seems to elicit no word of appreciation from the Syrians themselves. Damascus is now accessible by motor in four hours from Beirout, and Aleppo in ten hours. Hundreds of motor cars and lorries now exist where none existed before. But the Syrian in general, disinclined to sustained action other than commercial, and respecting above all things wealth, in whatsoever way acquired, is naturally prone to criticism of western methods dissimilar to his own, however beneficial they may ultimately prove; and to impatience, under a foreign mandate, of any but the shortest road leading to his own aggrandizement and affluence. It is therefore safe, perhaps, to discount a large percentage of Syrian dissatisfaction with the French mandate, as likely to have evinced itself even under other and far more favourable conditions. Still it is to be feared that if General Gouraud's budget is disapproved of, and any serious retrenchment in Syria is insisted upon by the French Government, the military situation may get entirely out of hand and the Christians join with the Moslems in anti-French demonstrations. In local French circles it is surmised that the return of ex-King Constantine to the Throne of Greece may lead to the restitution of Smyrna to the Turks, and to an understanding with Mustapha Kemal Pasha whereby he shall cease military operations against the French in Syria and in Cilicia.

In view of rumours which have been prevalent in native circles as to the intention of the French to withdraw from Syria, a notice has been issued and published by the acting High Commissioner, a copy of which is annexed hereto.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA

No. 212

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 24, 1920.**(Received January 3, 1921.)**(No. 1688. Secret.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the week ended the 2nd December, 1920.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

*High Commissioner.*

FO. 406/45, p. 32, No. 10.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 212

*Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week Ending December 2, 1920.*

SOME further information has come to hand during the past week with regard to the nature of the Nationalist reply to the overtures of the Central Government, and, if this information was accurate, it would not seem that Mustapha Kemal has in any way modified his original attitude with regard to the Treaty of Sèvres, although he was quite accommodating in other respects. The general trend of Turkish public opinion in the capital seems to be in the direction of the belief that recent developments have provided an opportunity for a reconciliation with Great Britain and France, and the resumption by Turkey of the rôle of a buffer against Russia. This was, at all events, the theme of an article which was to have been published by the Reconciliation Committee formed by Lutfi Fikri Bey during the administration of Damad Ferid Pasha (see summary dated the 14th October), but which was suppressed by the censor. With regard to the communications between the Central Government and Angora, it would appear that Captain Neshet Bey, the Government courier, is closely associated with Damad Ismail Hakki Bey on what is known as the "Palace Staff", which consists of four or five officers of the Sultan's entourage. The purpose of this staff is that of a liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. Damad Ismail Hakki Bey, however, is a Nationalist partisan and has always been a fervent Unionist. It is believed that he has always been in constant communication with Angora, and has on more than one occasion served as an intermediary for communications between the Sultan

A KURD FROM DER SIM

and the Nationalist leaders. Some interesting items of information have also been obtained with regard to certain influences that have been exerted from Europe in regard to the negotiations between the Sublime Porte and Angora. The Italian Government would appear to be anxious for a peaceful settlement of the problem, but Talaat seems to be endeavouring to persuade both the Nationalists and the Central Government to maintain an intransigent attitude towards the Allies. So far as can be judged from the somewhat scanty information available with regard to the situation in Anatolia, the Nationalists are still endeavouring to reconcile their repugnance for undiluted communism with the necessity for making some show of applying revolutionary principles in the administration. The point was illustrated by the article published recently in the "Yeni Gün" and by a speech of Mustapha Kemal, summarised respectively in the summaries for the 4th and 11th November. A further interesting illustration is afforded by an article published in the official Nationalist organ "Hakimet-i-Millie", according to which it would appear that the Nationalists are contemplating the division of the electorate according to trades and callings instead of by constituencies. It would nevertheless appear that the plans for military co-operation between the Bolsheviks and the Nationalists are being proceeded with, and that Soviet officials and missions are continuing to arrive in Anatolia. Finally, some indication of the effect upon Caucasian Moslems of the recent Turkish successes in Armenia may be gathered from the tone of an article published in the hitherto anti-Nationalist newspaper of Tiflis,

#### 1. *Turkish Affairs.*

(a.) A Communication from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Sultan was said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government courier, Neshat Bey, and handed to the Sultan by Marshal Fuad Pasha. The object of this communication was to ensure the Nationalist point of view being placed before the Sultan without any possibility of its being distorted, and to reiterate the expression of loyalty on behalf of the population of Anatolia. Captain Neshat Bey is attached to the palace staff, formed at Yıldız for purposes of liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. The chief of this staff is Damad Ismail Hakkı Bey, a son of Tewfik Pasha and fervent Unionist and Nationalist partisan.

(b.) Outside influences are being exerted, to a certain extent through the intermediary of Ghalib Kemali Bey, who was sent to Rome on a special mission by Ali Riza Pasha and remained there as an informal representative of the Nationalists. Ghalib Kemali Bey recently returned to Constantinople, but, before leaving Rome, it is said that he had an interview with Talaat, who gave him a message for Izzet Pasha, urging the latter to maintain a firm attitude towards the Allies, and to avoid by every possible means the

ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was further reported that after Ghalib Kemali Bey's departure from Italy, Talaat left for Rhodes, where he remained for three days, and met a number of Nationalists who had been sent for the purpose from Angora by Mustapha Kemal. From another source it was reported that the Italian Government is still anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the Central Government and Angora. In a letter from Rome on the 25th October to the Nationalist Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Ghalib Kemali Bey is reported to have stated that he had been visited by the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who intimated that, if the Nationalists would adopt a reasonable attitude, the Italian Government would do its utmost to obtain a modification of the peace terms. This communication is said to have reached Angora on the 3rd November, and a courier was sent to Rome with special instruction for Ghalib Kemali Bey.

(c.) The reply of Mustapha Kemal to the Government overtures, as brought by the Government courier, Neshet Bey, was communicated to the Cabinet by Izzet Pasha on the 22nd November. According to Neshet Bey, the Nationalists were convinced that, as a result of recent developments in Greece, the Crimea and Armenia, the Central Government was in a position to negotiate upon much more favourable terms with the Allies, and could thus obtain considerable concessions. If the Allies were prepared to make certain concessions, the Nationalists would undertake to meet them in every possible way, both as regards the application of the treaty and as to the general policy of the Allies in the East. Izzet Pasha states that the Nationalist point of view had been made sufficiently clear, and that there were only two lines of action open to the Government; either to resign if the Nationalist conditions were regarded as impracticable, or to send a delegation to Angora at once if it was thought that the Nationalists could be persuaded to modify their conditions. He personally did not regard those conditions as impossible, although he admitted that some were exaggerated. At the same time, no practical decision could be taken until the attitude of the Allies had been ascertained in view of recent developments. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that a note should be sent to the Allies asking them to communicate their views in the name of peace in the Near East. The following is a summary of the letter sent by Mustapha Kemal:—

After a short preface, Mustapha Kemal stated that the following decisions had been approved by a majority in the Great National Assembly:—

- (i.) The Assembly considered it to be its duty to second the efforts of the Central Government in all its efforts to re-establish national unity.
- (ii.) Before negotiations could be commenced with the Central Government, however, the latter must obtain assurances that the



Treaty of Sèvres will be modified, in principle if not in detail, in accordance with the principles of Wilson.

- (iii.) After proof had been obtained that the *Entente* Powers would repair the injustice that had been committed, the Assembly would afford the Government every facility with regard to the negotiations.
- (iv.) The Assembly would thereafter undertake to pursue a policy in conformity with the interests of peace and the interests of the *Entente* Powers in the East.
- (v.) The organisation of the Nationalist would be retained until normal conditions had been established, when it would either be totally dissolved or transformed into a political party.
- (vi.) The Government of Commissioners had already been authorised to correspond with regard to the arrangements for the negotiations, but for the present cyphered telegrams could only be sent through the intermediary of the President.
- (vii.) Until the conclusion of negotiations, the Government of Commissioners would continue its functions, but, in the event of a favourable issue, affairs of State would be brought under one administration.
- (viii.) After coming to an agreement with the *Entente* Powers, the Central Government will approve wholly, or partly, the political and financial measures taken by the Great National Assembly for the safety of the nation.
- (ix.) A general amnesty without restriction was to be promulgated.

The above points were to form the basis of negotiations, and any delegation arriving to discuss matters on this basis would be gladly welcomed and all facilities would be accorded to it.

The Cabinet then considered the question of the despatch of the delegation, and came to the conclusion that, as it was impossible to send the persons originally chosen, a new delegation would have to be chosen. This was finally agreed upon as follows:—

Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior.

Hussein Kiazim Bey, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture.

Fatin Hoja, Astronomer Imperial.

(d.) A declaration of policy, as favoured by the Reconciliation Committee formed by Lutfi Fikri Bey (see summary dated the 14th October), was embodied in an announcement that was to have been published in the press, but which was suppressed by the censor. The following is a digest of the article in question:—

The Reconciliation Committee had been formed for the purpose of terminating the duality that was causing so much harm to the country. Attention was drawn to three important recent developments, viz.: (a) the occupation of Armenia by the National forces; (b) the defeat of Wrangel; and (c) the result of the Greek elections. In consequence of these events, it was considered that the settlement of the great problem was no longer a domestic question, but a matter of foreign policy. If the western Powers would show the same spirit as when they drew up the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the entire nation would desire nothing better than peace. The confidence which has been reposed in Turkey as the guardian of eastern Europe had been lost by the war, but it was hoped that, as a result of recent developments, that confidence might be restored. The "children of the nation" were therefore begged, "at a moment when the star of hope was appearing on the horizon," to maintain the national dignity, and the Allies were begged to accord their powerful aid to restore peace. Turkey, helped by the Great Powers, might become the intermediary between Europe exhausted by war and Russian in revolt. Under such circumstances, discord would spontaneously disappear.

(e.) "Election by Workers" was the title of an article that appeared in the official Nationalist organ at Angora, the "Hakimet-i-Millie," on the 23rd October. The object of the article was to explain a scheme that apparently already had been announced, and which was in some way connected with the electoral system. After a brief preface to this effect, the article stated that the object of representation by workers was "to transfer the whole administration to working men" ("Emekji"). Those who were not workers would not have the right to vote, but in order to ensure the proper exercise of the franchise by the workers, the latter should be organised as in other countries in accordance with the nature of their callings. A law would therefore be enacted ordering the formations of trade unions throughout the country, and all workers would be obliged to join one of these unions. The old guilds ("Esnaf Lonja") really embodied the same principle, and one of the most useful objects of these organisations was to ensure better service. In other countries there had been considerable overlapping of callings and, if the same confusion were produced in Turkey, the organisation of the unions would be difficult. On the other hand, if the organisation were the spontaneous result of certain callings coming into being, there would be no necessity to invent one. The following were the principal callings existing in Turkey: (i) farmers, (ii) merchants, (iii) sailors, (iv) miners, (v) builders, (vi) liberal professions, (vii) bankers, (viii) officials, and (ix) soldiers. Some of these were generally distributed, others were local. An organisation would be formed wherever the calling existed, and would be represented even though in an electoral minority. Some callings

would in time develop in districts where they did not exist at present, as for instance with the miners. Divisions would be made in consideration of the common nature of various callings. Each calling, however, would have its own organisation. Thus the professions of law, medicine, painting, teaching, &c., would each have a separate organisation, and would together form a federation of Liberal professions. In the course of time some callings would be sub-divided and others would disappear. Thus the vocation of railway employees would soon be developed, *whilst that of merchant would disappear*. With regard to the functions of the organisation, each union would have two duties:

- (i.) To organise, conduct and administer the special business of the calling.
- (ii.) To perform certain public duties.

The first comprised the ordinary functions of the European trade unions, *and in this respect the principles of Bolshevism would be accepted*. The second duty would be connected with the conduct of elections, and under this head the following points should be taken into consideration. "As in Russia, the unions would be permitted to concern themselves with politics, but each individual was free as to his personal political creed." Each individual would be registered in the records of his union, and would vote with his comrades in that calling. "The Assembly would be chosen by this means, and would constitute a general federation of workers' unions." The private business of the various callings would not be regulated by one great organisation, but by nine centres, which would fulfil both public and private functions.

(f.) A mixed war council at Angora was to have been held on the 15th November, according to information from a Nationalist source. Besides Nationalist representatives, this council was to have consisted of Bolshevik and Azerbaijan delegates and a delegate of the Executive Council of the Moslem Eastern Committee of Baku. The object of the council, which was said to have been formed at the request of the Bolshevik Commissary for War, was to decide the nature and scope of the assistance to be accorded by the Bolsheviks to the Nationalists. It was also reported that preparations were being made for a general offensive on the western front. From another source it was reported that the Intelligence Department of the Turkish War Office had recently received a communication from Angora, dated the 17th November, to the effect that the Nationalist Government had been informed by Moscow of the departure from Novorossisk for Trebizond of a mission consisting of twenty members. It was further stated that the object of the mission was propaganda, but it is possible that this object was in reality connected with the council mentioned above. According to further

information said to have been received by the Turkish Intelligence Department, and dated the 18th November, the Soviet representative Legrand had left Erivan for Baku on the 6th November to obtain further instructions from Moscow in connection with his negotiations with the Armenian Government. During his absence from Erivan one Adesselin was acting Soviet representative. The same report stated that the Nationalists were pursuing their plan of pushing forward to Delijan in order to establish contact with the Moslem Eastern Committee at Baku, of which Enver had been appointed president. Finally, it was stated that in accordance with the agreement with the Soviet Government, Bolshevik consulates were being established in various parts of Anatolia.

(g.) The attitude of the Georgian Moslems towards the Nationalists appears to have undergone a transformation, for the tone of an article, summarised 5th November, was decidedly favourable to the Nationalists. The article was entitled "The Result of an Enterprise."

Although six months had elapsed since the Greeks had opened fire upon the Turks in Anatolia, there was no sign of an end. M. Veniselos was going to settle the matter in a very short time by means of Greek cartridges, but his words had not been fulfilled. There was also dissatisfaction in Greece regarding the policy of the Greek Government, but the movement against the Veneselist administration had been met by imprisonments and deportations. Matters of life and death cannot be settled by bayonets, and the Greek bayonets could only settle the Turkish problem by annihilating the entire nation, which was more than either M. Veniselos or Mr. Lloyd George could achieve. The problem could only be solved by the Turkish nation itself, and to exert force would only be energy thrown away.

## 2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.

(a.) As was to be expected, the French authorities have been unable to cope with the overwhelming numbers of Russian refugees at Constantinople, and have found it impracticable to enforce their original intention of allowing no military elements on shore. It had been decided that all military must be kept on ships until they could be sent down to one of the two concentration camps at Lemnos or Gallipoli. In practice, however, several thousand Russian officers and other ranks have succeeded in leaving their ships and coming ashore, until the town is packed with them. The great majority of them are penniless, and have no hope of obtaining either employment or shelter. The Russian authorities in Constantinople are helpless to deal with the situation. The danger lies in the fact that large numbers of these men are armed. Cases have already occurred of officers selling their revolvers, and there have even been cases in which machine-guns were

similarly disposed of. It is understood that the Allied police authorities intend taking measures to enforce the disarmament of all Russians on shore.

There is a considerable amount of anti-British propaganda being conducted in Constantinople at the present moment, the main object being to disparage Britain in the eyes of all people and cause ill-feeling between the British and French. The source of this propaganda is partly German, though the Bolsheviks are also actively engaged in the work.

(b.) According to an unofficial but reliable Armenian source, interesting developments have taken place in the relations between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks. The successful advance of the Turks and the fall of Kars caused no little apprehension to the Bolsheviks, who feared that the presence of Turkish troops in the vicinity of the Azerbaijan frontier might quite conceivably cause a Moslem rising in that province. Rumour has it that Chicherin despatched a note to Mustapha Kemal, in which he insisted on a cessation of hostilities against the Armenian Republic, the integrity and independence of which had been recognised by Soviet Russia, and also declared that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would no longer be considered binding as between the Turks and Bolsheviks.

Whether there be any truth in the above report or not it is impossible to say, but the fact remains that the Turkish advance was watched with enthusiasm by the Moslems of Georgia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, and from all accounts, had the Turks succeeded in pushing right through to Georgia and Azerbaijan, a Moslem rising would have been inevitable on a very large scale.

The fact of the matter is that the Bolsheviks wish to maintain an alliance with the Turkish Nationalists because, firstly, it gives them considerable prestige and a theoretical right to style themselves the friends of Islam, and secondly because it gives them a footing in Turkey with the possibility of eventually establishing their control over the country and attaining their ultimate object of obtaining possession of the Dardanelles.

There have been many unconfirmed reports but little definite information concerning the real state of affairs in Armenia. It is known that the late Government have been replaced by a new one which, at all events, is not Bolshevik, and which, according to some reports, is moderate in policy. The President is said to be Vratsian. It would appear that the Turks have shown no inclination to adopt Bolshevik principles in so far as their occupation of Armenian territory is concerned. They have prevented excesses, and have effected no changes in the internal structure of the existing administration. The general opinion appears to be that the Bolsheviks and Turks are afraid of quarrelling over the Armenian situation, and for the time being Armenia is benefitting thereby.

The attitude of the Georgian Government towards the events going on around her has been one of neutrality. She has throughout maintained an attitude of neutrality towards the events taking place around her. She has adopted the safe policy of bending to a possible coming storm, even though the latter may blow from two directions. In so far as the Bolsheviks are concerned, Georgia may be said to have met them halfway, and, by adopting a regime of extreme socialism which in many ways differs very little from the regime of Soviet Azerbaijan, she has removed all possible grounds for a quarrel with her eastern neighbour. Since the Turkish successes against Armenia, Georgia has shown a marked inclination to curry favour with the winning side, and one has heard much of the strong pro-Turkish sympathies of the Georgian people, a considerable portion of whom are Moslems. Georgia appears fully alive to the possibility of a conflict between the Turkish forces and the Bolsheviks, and wishes to maintain good relations with both parties until it becomes evident which side is likely to win. For the time being the Turks appear anxious to have the friendship of the Georgians, and have appointed a representative to Tiflis in the person of Kiazim Bey. Georgia fears, of course, that should Turkish ambitions carry the Nationalists further than their present limits, they will endeavour to link up with the North Caucasus - in which case, of course, Georgia would immediately become the theatre of operations. The Georgians are also considerably alarmed at the possibility of a Turkish occupation of the Batoum province, and the draft scheme for the new constitution of Georgia contains a clause providing for the establishment of an autonomous Moslem Georgia.

(c.) Anti-Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be said to be any general movement on foot against the Soviet authorities. The two leading spirits in the present revolt are Imam Najm-ud-Din Gotsinsky and a grandson of the Imam Shamil. In the opinion of a responsible individual who was recently in Daghestan, the insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns. Thus the town of Khunsakh, some 30 miles south-west of Temir Khan Shura, was besieged by the insurgents, who appeared sufficiently strong to prevent reinforcements being sent from Temir Khan Shura. According to the last reports, the Bolshevik garrison were still holding out after a three weeks' siege. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily

liquidate the trouble. Some reports state that Gotsinsky has given up the struggle and abandoned the leadership to Shamil.

Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is already thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks, with their endless requisitioning and repression. It is exactly the same story as in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and the general opinion is that the Bolsheviks are laying up very serious trouble for themselves in the not distant future. They are admittedly far too strong to be ousted by anything but a general movement throughout the North Caucasus, and the only impetus for such a movement could come from the Turks. Many of the saner Bolshevik leaders must perceive the danger growing in the distance, but the Bolshevik press has so far been completely silent on the subject.

*FO. 406/45, p. 32-37, No. 10/1*

No. 213

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan, (Rome).*

*Foreign Office, December 29, 1920, 3.55 p.m.*

*Telegraphic*

*No. 547.*

(Suggested discussion with Mustapha Kemal.)

Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople has told his British and French colleagues that he has suggested to the Italian Government despatch of a representative to discuss with Miustapha Kemal exercise of Italian rights at Adalia and Heraclea. British and French High Commissioners pointed out to Marquis Garroni that this would mean recognition of Mustapha Kemal and was therefore objectionable.

French Government have instructed the French Ambassador in Rome to remind the Italian Government that at the recent Allied conference it was agreed to act only in concert; that the strength of the Allies depended on their agreement while independent action would only prejudice joint negotiations without benefitting anybody; and that the Allies would deal with the Turkish problem as soon as they knew the attitude of the Greek Government and the result of the mission sent by the Turkish Government to Mustapha Kemal.

His Majesty's Government fully endorse the views of the French Government. Please support the representations made by your French colleague.

*D.B.F.P., 1919-1939, 1st. series, Vol. XIII, p. 210, No. 203.*

No. 214

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.*

PARIS, December 29, 1920

*(Received December 31.)**(No. 3862.)*

My Lord,

NABY BEY, the newly appointed Turkish delegate to the Peace Conference, arrived here a few days ago and paid his official visit to me this morning. I had known him previously many years ago when we were colleagues at Bucharest.

I asked him if he had any news of Izzet Pasha's mission. He replied that so far he had heard nothing, although he had expected to receive some information by this time. The delay caused him some anxiety, and he feared that the concessions asked for by Mustapha Kemal were beyond what Izzet Pasha would be in a position to offer. I asked him, therefore, what he considered would be the demands of Mustapha Kemal. He replied that they would apply primarily to the question of Smyrna. I remarked to him that this question was already settled by the Treaty of Sévres, and the Allied Powers were now awaiting its ratification by Turkey. The Greeks were in possession of Smyrna, and for the time being there was no reason for any modification by the Powers of the decision at which they had arrived in connection with the régime established there, and certainly no Power had any intention of taking forcible action to expel the Greek forces. Naby Bey replied that he had discussed with Tewfik Pasha the concessions which the Turkish Government were anxious to obtain in regard to the Treaty of Sévres. They are two in number. They would like very much if it were possible to establish by a special statute an autonomous province of Smyrna on the lines of the constitution of the Island of Samos. They are opposed to international control, as they had daily before their eyes proofs of how badly international control was working at Constantinople. He felt that such control could have no permanent basis. The other modification which the Turkish Government would like to secure would be the withdrawal of Greece to the Enos-Midia line. These, he said, are the two concessions which Tewfik Pasha is anxious to obtain. I gave him no encouragement, and told him that I saw no prospect of any modification of the Treaty of Sévres; but I venture to report to your Lordship this conversation, as it may be of interest to know what is passing through the mind of the Grand Vizier.

I have, &amp;c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST



No. 215

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 29, 1920**(Received January 1, 1921.)**(No. 1339.)**(Telegraphic.) R.*

GRAND VIZIER has informed my French colleague that he has instructed mission to Mustapha Kemal by telegraph to return to Constantinople, as he considers mission has been at Angora quite long enough.

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Turkish Government had received private information from a person just arrived from Angora that Izzet Pasha had announced to him his intention of starting for Constantinople on 29th December.

*F.O. 406/45, p. 27, No. 8**D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII., p. 209, No. 202*

No. 216

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.*PARIS, *December 30, 1920**(Received January 3, 1921.)**(No. 3882.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the "Echo de Paris" of to-day publishes an account of an interview granted to one of its correspondents by a member of the Senatorial Commission on Foreign Affairs.

The writer of the article states that he enquired whether it was true that M. de Selves, the president of the commission, had written to M. Leygues a letter calling attention to the discrepancies between the statements regarding Eastern affairs, made by Mr. Llyod George in the House of Commons, and those of the President of the Council in the Chamber, and asked M. Leygues to explain these differences to the Senatorial Commission. In reply to his question, the writer declares that he was informed that M. Antonin Dubost had on the previous day expressed a wish that M. Leygues should again appear before the commission. As a result, M. Leygues, at the request of M. de Selves, came to the Senate and declared, as he had already done, that there was no disagreement between Mr. Lloyd

George and himself regarding Eastern affairs, but that the British Premier did not desire that the question of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres should be publicly discussed. It would indeed be maladroit, at the moment when negotiations were about to begin, to appear to admit the necessity of an agreement with Kemal Pasha, especially as Izzet, accompanied by a mission, was at present with him.

In these circumstances the commission had considered it better, for the moment, not to enter into a public discussion of Eastern affairs and of the military burden which they still impose upon France, but, on the contrary, to leave full liberty of action to the Government. M. d'Estournelles de Constant, who had prepared an interpellation, had accordingly consented to put it until a latter date.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

FO. 406/45, p. 37-38, No. 11

No. 217

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 31, 1920*

*(Received January 10, 1921)*

*(No. 1707. Secret.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the week ended the 16th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER

FO. 406/45, p. 39, No. 14.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 217

*Summary of Intelligence Reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for week ending December 16, 1920.*

*(Secret.)*

BEYOND a bare statement to the effect that the Government delegation had arrived safely in Angora, the week under review has been practically void of important developments in the local situation. Pending a definite

issue of the negotiations now in progress at Angora, all other matters seem to be held in suspense so far as the Central Government is concerned.

Several interesting items of information have come to hand, however, with regard to recent developments in the Anatolian and Pan-Islamic situation. All the evidence goes to show that, whatever may be the consensus of opinion with regard to Bolshevism, the Nationalist Administration is busily drawing up and applying various measures obviously intended to appeal to the Bolsheviks as being based upon the principles of the Third International. The proposed scheme of electoral reform, mentioned in last week's summary and further elucidated below, is a striking illustration of this policy. Further, for the first time, there is a hint to the effect that in certain circles amongst the Nationalists the idea of repudiating all financial liabilities is being entertained.

With regard to Pan-Islamic activities, an interesting account of the speeches recently made by Mustapha Kemal and the Sheikh of the Senussi at Angora has been obtained. Certain passages in Mustapha Kemal's peroration clearly indicate that the sheikh is to be utilised for some scheme in connection with the Pan-Islamic campaign which the Nationalist leaders are directing. The exact nature of the scheme is not clear, but it is worthy of note that the Sheikh of the Senussi was mentioned as a candidate for the Khalifat by a reliable informant who returned from Angora with a valuable report in August of this year (see summary dated the 19th August).

#### 1. *Pan-Islamic Affairs.*

(a.) The proposed electoral reforms in Anatolia, mentioned in last week's summary, were the subject of further comments in the official Nationalist newspaper, "Hakimet-i-Millie," of the 1st November, which stated that the proposals had been received with general enthusiasm. The article cited arguments in support of the scheme published by the "Euyud" newspaper of Konia, which had previously criticised Mustapha Kemal's proletarian programme (see summary dated the 14th October), and had stated that any changes which resulted in special privileges being granted to one particular class would cause serious harm. A resolution effected by a single class always involved disastrous consequences. The Anatolian people were so docile that just representation could never be obtained, either by the present electoral scheme or by universal suffrage, and representation by callings was therefore the best solution of the difficulty. The effect of such a system would be that the council of the nation would be influenced only by the nation's vital interests and not by party considerations. (Report HC/1559).

(b.) The official constitution of the Turkish Communist Party in the Great National Assembly was announced in the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of the

1st November. This party is probably a development of the "People's Party" or "Green Army" (see summaries dated the 19th August and the 14th October), and is led by the Nationalist Finance Commissioner, Ahmed Ferid Bey. The announcement stated that the party had recently published its statutes and, although this publication has not yet been seen, it is most probably identical in nature with the statutes of the "People's Association" (see summary dated the 14th October), since it was also stated that the party programme had been modified in conformity with the principles of the Third International. (Report HC/1555.)

(c.) The Repudiation of the Public Debt was stated to be one of the advantages that would accrue from the success of the Nationalist cause in an article devoted to finance, published in the "Yeni Gun" of Angora on the 9th November. After discussing the Treaty of Sèvres, the writer asked why Turkey should contribute to the cost of the European war, and stated that by rights Turkey should be indemnified by Europe. The whole world had been grossly beneath the imperialism and capitalism of England, and both the Russians and all Asiatic nations were in league with the Turks against Western tyranny. Of the many important results that would ensue from the triumph of the Nationalist cause, two were particularly to be considered — the country would be saved from ruin and slavery, and the debts contracted under the Imperialist régime would be cancelled. The realisation of these ideas, however, was dependent upon the complete destruction of imperialism and capitalism. (Report HC/1551.)

(d.) Commissions in the Nationalist army were recently awarded to 102 officers at Angora. According to the "Yeni Gun" of the 1st November, the form of oath which the officers were required to take began with the usual Moslem formula, "I swear by Allah," and consisted of an undertaking to serve only the Khalifat and Sultanate and the nation; to respect all the military laws and regulations; and to cherish military honour above all personal considerations. (Report HC/1556.)

(e.) A letter from Talaat was recently received by a Unionist agent in Constantinople in which it was stated that Talaat would shortly be proceeding to Moscow or Anatolia; a complete understanding had been established with the Bolsheviks; extensive plans had been devised and were being applied for the development of the Eastern campaign; Jemal in Tashkent and Enver in Baku were in charge of important operations in connection with the Eastern scheme. Informant stated that Talaat seemed to emphasise the cordiality of the agreement with the Bolsheviks. It was also stated that "the same persons would soon be in power again in Germany," but whether this referred to the Hohenzollerns or not was not clear.

Intelligence is the source of information during the war.

It is worthy of note that the above statements have been amply borne out by the contents of recently-intercepted wireless telegrams. Jemal, however, is at present in Kabul. (Report HC/1558.)

(f.) The Bolshevik mission in Angora has already been reported as consisting of Shava Eliava, formerly Bolshevik High Commissioner in Tashkend, as Ambassador, and a certain Obmavil, as principal secretary (see summaries for the 9th and 16th September and the 28th October). It would now appear from an article published in the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of Angora on the 1st November that the full and correct name of the first secretary is Obmal Angarski. The article in question consisted of an account of an interview with this person, who made certain statements concerning regular communications with Russia, the military situation, and economic measures. With regard to communications, Angarski stated that the Embassy had had no courier from Moscow since his departure from Moscow three months before (?). The wireless installations were not working properly and messages were mutilated, but this would shortly be remedied, and there would be direct communication with Moscow. The military situation was satisfactory and, although the armistice with Poland was being violated through capitalist intrigues so that guerilla fighting was still in progress, an army was being prepared for the annihilation of Wrangel's forces. Semanoff's forces in Siberia had been badly defeated and were retreating with the help of the two Japanese divisions in Manchuria. The economic situation was also improving; mines were being worked again at Archangelsk and elsewhere; motor ploughs were being utilised to remedy the shortage of horses. In reply to a question as to the date of the Ambassador's arrival, Angarski said he had no news.

It should be noted that the above statements contain two inaccuracies, wilful or otherwise. Reference to the previous summaries mentioned above will show that Angarski certainly left Moscow more than three months previous to the interview, and Eliava had certainly already arrived in Angora in October. It is possible, however, that the "Ambassador" had left Angora later on some special mission. (Report HC/1554.)

(g.) Further evidence of animosity between Nationalists and Bolsheviks was provided by an announcement published by the official Anatolian News Agency on the 2nd November, emphatically contradicting a statement that had been published in the "Yeni Dünya" on the 26th October to the effect that the Turkish eastern army had been reinforced by a Bolshevik force of Tartars. This statement was denounced as "erroneous and groundless." The "Yeni Dünya" newspaper in question is published at Eski Shehir, and is the special organ of the Turkish Communists led by the notorious Sherif Manatoff. (Report HC/1553.)

(h.) Bolshevik aims in the East were said by the "Yeni Gun" of Angora of the 1st November to be concentrated upon India. Photographs of Enver, Jemal, Comrade ("Yoldash" — lit. travelling companion) Lenin and Mustapha Kemal, were published with statements to the effect that Enver had been given a command in the East, and Jemal had gone to Afghanistan. (Report HC/1552.)

(i.) The Sheikh of the Senussi was entertained to a banquet on the 25th November by the Great National Assembly, upon which occasion Mustapha Kemal made a long, laudatory speech concerning the importance of the sheikh as a leader of the Pan-Islamic movement. The most significant part of the speech, however, consisted of certain passages at the close, in which Mustapha Kemal stated that all the movements of renaissance in Islam would need leaders distinguished for nobility and virtue. "The Sheikh of the Senussi," he said, "is one of the most prominent and sacred figures in Islam, and the services which he has rendered will be crowned by the services which he will render hereafter. By them he will have helped to consolidate the Turkish Empire, which is the fulcrum of the whole Moslem world. I express to his Excellency Seyid Ahmed el Senussi, both in my own name and in that of the Great National Assembly, my thanks for his future services." The sheikh made a short speech in reply, praising the "Jihad," or Holy War, which was being waged by the Turks, and terminated by saying that he was ready at all times to devote himself to one cause — the union of Islam.

It is worthy of note that the Sheikh of the Senussi has been mentioned as a possible candidate for the Khalifat. There is also good reason to believe that the Nationalists are carrying on a careful but energetic campaign against the present Sultan. There is not at present sufficient evidence available, however, to permit the exact nature of the part to be played by the sheikh in the Pan-Islamic schemes of the Nationalists. (Report HC/1567.)

## 2. *Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.*

(a.) Statements made to the Georgian press by Kiazim Bey, the representative of the Grand National Assembly in Tiflis, give the impression, as they are doubtless intended to do, that the Turks are sincerely desirous of improving their relations with the Georgians.

Hitherto the attitude of the Tiflis Government towards the Turks has been one of grave mistrust, based, of course, on the fear that the Nationalists were contemplating an attack on the Batoum province. After the collapse of Armenia, the Georgian Government were gravely alarmed at the Turkish advance, and appeared desirous of maintaining friendly relations with Turkey, bearing particularly in mind the fact that a large number of the

population of Georgia are Moslems. It is more than probable, however, that the protestations of friendship made by the Turkish representative are merely intended to deceive the Georgians into believing in a false state of security from which they will shortly be awakened by a fresh Bolshevik coup. (Report HC/1553.)

(b.) Details are now to hand concerning the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia. Peace between the Turks and Armenians was actually signed at Alexandropol on the 3rd December. The Bolsheviks had been actively organising a coup d'état for some weeks past and commenced to act immediately after the signing of peace. Soviet detachments under the command of a Russian Bolshevik named Silin advanced into Armenia from the north, and their arrival was the signal for the proclamation of a Soviet in each of the larger towns, including Erivan. Revolutionary committees were established, and Armenia was proclaimed an independent Soviet Republic. The movement appears to have been accomplished without any conflict or bloodshed in the earlier stages, and the situation is similar to that in Baku at the end of April last.

The Armenian Revolutionary Committee arrived by train from Baku, and included as President Kassian, and as members Moravian, Gabrelian and others. On arrival, the new authorities observed the usual procedure, and immediately issued an order forbidding all officials to leave their posts "until the arrival of Soviet officials from Russia." The latter will, of course, include the inevitable "Chrezvychaika" and the other usual Bolshevik institutions. The Armenian General Dro has been temporarily placed in command of the Armenian forces. The districts of Nakhichevan and Zangezour have been incorporated in Armenian territory and as such will enjoy just as much independence as that enjoyed by the "Independent Azerbaijan Republic!"

Following the proclamation of the Soviet, Kiazim Kara Bekir is said to have sent a telegram of congratulations to the new Government, declaring that now there could be no further cause for hostilities between the Turks and Armenians, since the two peoples were now as brothers. It is generally believed that, apart from his congratulatory telegram which he could hardly avoid sending under the circumstances, Kiazim Kara Bekir is very far from satisfied with the turn events have taken, and it is reported that he protested strongly against the interference of the Bolsheviks' emissary Legrand in the peace negotiations at Alexandropol. The latter, in his opinion, were matters which concerned only the combatant parties, and did not call for outside interference. The Turkish commander is now thought to be in a very difficult position from a military point of view. It will be almost impossible for him to maintain his force in the Kars high-

lands owing to the extreme cold and lack of provisions. The most natural scheme would have been for him to have advanced into the Erivan or Elizavetpol lowlands, and it is generally believed that this was his original plan of campaign. In any case, the fact of Kiazim Kara Bekir's having been thwarted in the continuation of a campaign in which his own personal aims were prominently concerned will scarcely tend to increase his friendship with the Bolsheviks.

The opinion is held by many people that the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia must shortly be followed by a similar event in Georgia. The Bolsheviks acted with promptness and decision in Armenia so soon as it became a question of forestalling the Turks. They will in all probability act with equal promptness again should the Turks continue to betray designs on the Batoum province. (Report HC/1562).

### 3. *Egyptian Affairs.*

(a.) A letter has recently been sent by Zaghul Pasha to Shefik Pasha, dated London, the 11th November, in which he states that a disagreement has arisen between the delegation and Lord Milner over the question of English advisers being retained in the Ministries of Finance and Justice. He therefore proposes to leave the delegation to work out its own plan of action and not to return to Egypt with it, but to remain in Paris. (Report HD/1564.)

(b.) A meeting of Egyptian Nationalists was caused by the receipt of a letter by Dr. Amin, the Egyptian, son-in-law of Dr. Essad Pasha, from his sister in Egypt, in which she stated that the Egyptian cause was being destroyed by their quarrellings. The meeting condemned the behaviour of the Egyptians, whom they regarded as unstable and half-hearted, and proposed to support Zaghul as being their only hope. A Watanist pamphlet, written in Arabic and sent from Berlin, was circulated during the meeting and contained false statements regarding the Milner-Zaghul draft agreement (Report HD/1565).

(c.) An emissary from the ex-Khedive to Mustapha Kemal recently returned to Constantinople, bringing a letter from the latter in answer to one sent by him by the hand of an Egyptian who left for Angora on the 22nd November, 1920. In this letter the ex-Khedive compliments Mustapha Kemal on his recent victory over the Armenians, and assures him of his whole-hearted collaboration with him. He counsels him to continue his offensive on the Brusa and Smyrna fronts, and assures him that the press of Egypt, Syria and Arabia is being well propaganded. With regard to the Government delegation the ex-Khedive begs him not to receive it or enter into any negotiations with it, as by doing so he would be furthering



British policy, and it is only by continued fighting that the Ottoman Empire will be completely freed from the fetters of the occupation. We have no actual proof that the contents of the letter have been accurately reported, though informant's reputation is good. If genuine, the letter indicates that the ex-Khedive is now to be reckoned definitely on the side of our enemies. (Report HD/1569).

(d.) Information is now to hand that the French Government is thinking of subsidising the Arabic newspaper "El Adel," which is published by Mohamed Safa in Constantinople weekly. Mohamed Safa came to Constantinople after having been prosecuted by the Egyptian Government for writing slightly about Queen Victoria, and about twelve years ago started the publication of "El Adel." It is a paper of pronounced Pan-Islamic tendencies, was used during the war as an organ for propaganda, its paper being supplied by the Germans, and is now said to penetrate all parts of the Moslem world. The Italians have more than once used its columns to publish inspired articles on Tripolitan affairs, and have paid for the distribution of numerous copies in Tripoli. Safa is anxious to secure French support, as he considers England to be the enemy of Mahommedans and France their friend. He has approached Commandant Labonne, Director of the French Bureau du Levant, pointing out the advantage the French would gain from having the support of a paper with such a large circulation. Commandant Labonne has so far confined himself to promising to subscribe for one year to the paper, but has asked for information regarding the paper's connection with India. (Report HD/1563.)

*F.O. 406/45, p. 39-43, No. 14/1*

No. 218

*Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 31, 1920.*

*(Received January 7, 1921.)*

*(No. 1708.)*

My Lord,

THE close of the year finds the Turkish Government in a more difficult situation than ever.

2. It now seems practically certain that the mission to Mustapha Kemal has failed, the Nationalists having adopted an unyielding attitude. There are persistent rumours that the mission is on its way back, but, beyond the fact that it has failed, it is unlikely that the Turkish Govern-

ment will be willing to give detailed information as to what passed at Angora. Matters have therefore, politically speaking, reached a deadlock.

3. The financial situation has gone from bad to worse. A large proportion of the officials have only received 75 per cent. of their salaries for October, and nothing either for November or December. At the present moment the three High Commissioners are engaged in a struggle with the Turkish Government regarding the question of effective control over the Turkish finances, this control being bound up with the disposal of any sum which may be advanced by the banks on the stocks belonging to the Ottoman Government, including the £T. 252,000 in gold, the release of which our respective Governments have authorised.

4. In reply to the note which the three High Commissioners addressed to the Grand Vizier on the 17th December, the Turkish Government have sent us a long note explaining their view of the nature of the control which they are willing should be exercised by the provisional Financial Commission, and putting forward certain proposals in this connection.

5. I have had two long interviews, separately and alone, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance on this question, and I have pointed out the flaw in the Turkish proposals. These, as formulated, would enable the Minister of Finance to continue the system of paying a percentage of their salaries to all Government employees impartially, whereas, having regard to the insufficiency of the receipts to meet the monthly expenditure, the provisional Financial Commission is insisting, in the interests of law and order and of the proper collection of the customs revenues, on the necessity of making payments in order of their importance. The provisional Financial Commission holds, and is supported in that view by the three High Commissioners, that services such as the police, customs, prisons and hospitals should constitute a first charge on the revenues. It is admitted that this system operates with great hardship on the employees of the other administrations. But there is no help for it, and, given the crisis, the three High Commissioners are driven to have recourse to expedients. At the present moment it has not been found possible to reconcile the views of the Finance Minister, who, with his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is fighting this question, with the view held by the High Commissioners. In the meanwhile the Turkish Government are living mainly on the receipts from the vilayet of Constantinople and on the customs receipts, which show signs of falling off owing to the fact that the fall in the value of the lira has acted as a check on importation of articles of luxury. It may be that financial distress will eventually drive the Turkish Government to agree to the form of control on which we are insisting, and even to ratify the treaty. This remains to be seen.

6. An interesting point of my conversations with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance was the attempt of these two Ministers to enlist my sympathies on their side by agreeing that the police should be paid regularly. This proposal was, in reality, equivalent to a bribe, and I rejected it, as I pointed out that other administrations were almost, if not quite, as important to the State as the police. I informed the two Ministers, in short, that, speaking for myself, I would only raise the embargo on the £ T. 252,000 in gold if, and if, and when, the provisional Financial Commission expressed themselves as satisfied that they had obtained effective control over the Turkish finances. There the matter rests for the moment, pending the examination by the provisional Financial Commission of the latest proposals of the Turkish Government. The controversy over this matter may last for some little time.

7. In the meantime the struggle with the Turkish Government over this question of control is really invested with a political character. It has become evident for some time past that the Turkish Government are pursuing a policy of passive resistance and are almost arrogant. I have had to take up two cases which savoured of political persecution, but I have not troubled your Lordship with these cases. It will be sufficient to say that one of the cases concerned Mustapha Pasha, who, as president of the court-martial which had been set up by the late Government to try Turks who have committed atrocities during the war, had incurred the enmity of the Nationalists and their sympathisers. No sooner had the present Government come into office than they arrested Mustapha Pasha and his three colleagues on a technical charge of contravening judicial procedure in one particular instance. In reality there was every reason to believe that their prosecution was due to motives of revenge. I am hopeful of settling this and the other case in a manner satisfactory to this High Commission, but the attitude of the Turkish Government in these two cases, as well as their attitude in the matter of the control of the Turkish finances, indicate an attempt to see how far they can go in resisting our demands.


8. The general outlook is very obscure and unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD  
High Commissioner.

FO. 406/45, p. 38-39, No. 13.

D.B.F.P., 1st series, Vol. XIII, p. 213-214, No. 206



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# DİZİNLER





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# TIPKIBASIMLAR



Le 30 Avril, 1920  
Angora,

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'à la suite de l'occupation injuste et injustifiée de la Ville de Constantinople par les forces alliées, la nation ottomane considérant Son Khalif et ainsi que Son Gouvernement comme prisonnier, a eu recours à la réunion d'une Assemblée Suprême Nationale et a fait des élections sur une large échelle. L'Assemblée Suprême Nationale dans sa séance d'ouverture du 23 Avril 1920, a déclaré par une vote solennelle prendre en main les destinées présentes et futures de la Patrie, tant que Son Khalif-Sultan et sa Ville éternelle restent sous la domination et occupation étrangère.

L'Assemblée Suprême Nationale n'a fait l'honneur

à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires

Etrangères *de la Grande-Bretagne*

*Londres*

Tıpkıbasım ı

T.B.M.M. Başkanı Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon'a mektup. Paşa, İstanbul'un işgali üzerine Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin toplandığını ve bu Meclisin, ulusun kaderini eline aldığı Curzon'a bildirmektedir  
(Belge 23'ün tıpkıbasımı)

de ne charger de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence la protestation énergique de ses membres contre cet acte arbitraire et contraire aux stipulations de l'Armistice qui a, une fois de plus, confirmé la nation ottomane dans son pessimisme sur le résultat de la Conférence de la Paix. Le parlement, sanctuaire sacré et reconnu comme tel, par toutes les nations civilisées a été violé en pleine séance; du sein de la Chambre les représentants de la nation ont été enlevés par la police anglaise comme des malfaiteurs malgré les vives protestations de la Chambre, des sénateurs, des députés, des généraux, des hommes de lettres ont été arrêtés dans leurs domiciles avec des menottes aux mains et déportés; enfin nos établissements officiels et privés furent occupés par la force des baïonnettes en se basant simplement sur le droit du plus fort.

Le peuple ottoman, vu la violation de tous ses droits et l'atteinte portée à sa souveraineté a, par l'ordre de ses représentants réunis à Angora, élu un Comité Exécutif du sein même de l'Assemblée, qui a pris de suite en main le gouvernement du pays.

En soumettant à Votre Excellence ce qui précède j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer les desiderata de



la nation exprimée et adoptés à la séance du 23 Avril, 1920.

1- Constantinople siège du Khalifat-Sultanat ainsi que le gouvernement de Constantinople est considéré par la nation ottomane comme prisonnier des Alliés et par conséquent les ordres et les Fetvas émanants de Constantinople occupée, ne peuvent avoir aucune valeur légale et religieuse et tous les engagements contractés par le soi-disant gouvernement de Constantinople sont considérés par la nation comme nuls et non avenue.

2- La nation ottomane tout en gardant son sang froid et modération est résolue à défendre ses droits sacrés et plusieurs fois séculaires comme état libre et indépendant, et déclare son désir pour la conclusion d'une paix équitable et honorable tout en reconnaissant qu'à ses propres envoyés le droit de prendre des engagements en son nom et pour son compte.

3- L'élément chrétien ottoman ainsi que les éléments étrangers établis dans le pays, restent sous la sauvegarde de la nation; cependant ils ne doivent rien entreprendre contre la sécurité générale de la Patrie.

Dans l'espoir d'un accueil favorable aux justes

réclamations de la nation ottomane, je prie Votre  
Excellence de vouloir bien agréer l'assurance de la haute  
considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre  
Excellence le plus humble et dévoué serviteur

Au nom de l'Assemblée Suprême Nationale

Ottomane et par son ordre

Le Président de l'Assemblée

Moustapha Kemal

## اخبار خارجية

### تركيا

يجلس الوزراء ليحلل جساتهم في مسج  
المعادة التركيه

تقابل تحولا للتجرب والانتعاش  
على بعض اعيان الحكومة والشيخ والتوب  
بدموع دلتهم مصطفى كمال باشا  
وان قد اتهمه جعفر الطيار باشا قد  
قطع الدلائل مع الاستماع واستعد الدائم  
عنها مع رئيس الحركة المليه كمال باشا  
وقد توجه لذلك

وان الحالة مع الشرق سيدي نظر  
فظلم خصوصا البراق وهورا وعابرة  
العرب واخذوا بالمرءة منهم مستخدمين للدفاع  
عن الاستانة بالاستعداد النعالي غير انهم  
منتظرون آخر حركة من خطه الانجليز

نحو دار الخلافة وقد اعان الاتاق منهم  
كل من الاعمال والتركتان واليه وسلموا  
الهند وكل مسلم على البسطة  
عجاس ابوقان

ارسل الى جميع المجالس انبيايه  
باوريا مشروط الصالح الى عن ان يقبلها  
من تركيا وهي منه صخرة كمت واد  
من جهتها الملقى ثوب تركيا والى ان  
الى اصبح حالها مسلمين متهمين

الطريق لحوار على بسوا من امر  
الذليل للبرهان بالهروج سريبا  
امير باشا

اصبح شعلا شاعرا لوفى السياه  
على اختلاف اجناسها وقد بلغ ما حده  
هو رعد خليل باشا ولعه توري باشا  
١٥٠ الف حديا وان اليك باشا  
عزيمه حيا وسفله حديثه وقولت كبيرة  
وانذوا بصادقته سيك نيلته بالقول  
الذي يسمونه لحيته الذي يقوده رجال  
من اللطيفين بانوا انفسهم واموالهم في  
سبيل الله

### تركيا والمعادة

يترسل الدوايه الدايه مندوبين الى  
باريز لاخذ حيرة معاده السلاح وعربها  
على التمتع التركي لاهواء ربه فيها تم  
الباب العالي التراسحات اعترى على الدول  
فان لم ينالوا وفدت تركيا توقيع المعاهدة

### الغلبه

عقد الله بالاستانة اتفاقا ثانيا بينه  
زهرة شاههم عند لورد اتل بادره تدل  
على تفهيد برنامج انصكاته الاخير

( رئيس الحركة الوطني معطفي كمال باشا )  
مرح لرامال حبرهده ابوكا اتالطيش  
الوطن لا ينادر مكانه الا انا تحفتت جميع  
الاب للاب التركي راء اذا غادره نانا بادره  
متعدا الى الامام لخلق براده والنوه

### التأثير والازك

اكدت الأكراد لدى الباب العالي  
شدة تمادها برش الخلفه وتذيب الشاعث  
اتصالهم عن المعونة التركيه المراسلها  
بعض المنسدين



### الجهاز

اشتبك المقاتلت بين شريف منه  
وبن امير نجد وامام اليمن ومصلحتين  
المرتين الشريفين بن يدمسين العجاج وتسليمه

لتركيا كما هو عين فتمدد كل مسلم وقد  
صادق هذا مادة بن مواد وطلب مسلمين  
الهند التي عرضت على اتخاذه اخيرا  
ولا تزال رضى العرب دائره بين ذا وذا

### الذلل

صدر اول عدد من جريدة (الذلل)  
فترهوا له مساحا جنتا وشاكا واتبارا  
لصاحبها القائل عبد الله مندى باتون

Tipkibasım 2

Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının Kuzey Afrika'da yankıları. Trablusgarp'ta çıkan "Rakib" gazetesinin 4.5.1920 günlü sayısında Türkiye haberleri. Gazetenin bir sütunu sansür edilmiştir (Belge 29 eki aslının tipkibasımı)

<p style="text-align: center;">T. U.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">TURKEY. 119</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">E 11702 SEP 22 1920</p>
<p>Registry Number } E 11702/345/44  <b>FROM</b>  <u>S. I. S.</u>          No. CX/676          V          Dated Sept. 22nd 1920.          Received Sept. 22nd 1920.</p> <p><b>Z. Turkey.</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Relations between Bolsheviks and Nationalists.</u></p> <p>Report on the progress of Bolsheviks in Anatolia under the efforts of the C.U.P.; divisions in the Nationalist party; attempts of C.U.P. to capture the Nationalist movement; attitude of Prince Abdul Medjid &amp;c.</p>	
<p><b>Last Paper.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">E 10592</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Print.)</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(Minutes)</p> <p>(See within.)          Eyub Sahin reported activities on papers and go to show the conviction of releasing political prisoners at Malatya until after ratification.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">E. U. M. Assurance. 22/9.</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">(How disposed of.)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">This shows that there are two parties in Anatolia &amp; not only one. The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal &amp; the Nationalists, who, inspired by patriotic &amp; religious motives, have been, &amp; are, endeavouring to resist the Peace terms &amp; the resultant dismemberment of Turkey &amp; reduction of the prestige of the Ottoman Khilafate. They have failed &amp; their adherents are going over to the other &amp; far more dangerous party, that of Enver &amp; Talaat &amp; the C. U. P. - Jew-German-Bolshevik combination. The latter are not</p>	
<p>(Action completed.) (Index.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">10</p> <p style="text-align: center;">M</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Next Paper.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">E 11979</p> <p style="text-align: center;">FO 371/5178/E 11702</p>	

Tıpkıbasım 3

Türkiye'de Bolşevizm akımı konusundaki bir gizli istihbarat raporu üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında yapılan yorumlar (Kısmen). Anadolu'da Kemalistler ve İttihatçılar olmak üzere iki kuvvet bulunduğu, Bolşeviklerle işbirliği yapan İttihatçıların daha tehlikeli oldukları görüşü (Bkz. Belge 92'nin notları)

# EASTERN.

1920

E 11047  
101  
8 300

## TURKEY.

Registry Number } E 11047/106/44  
**TELEGRAM FROM**  
Greek General Headquarters  
War Office.  
No O.S. 519  
Date Sept. 6th 1920  
Received Sept. 8th 1920

### Movements of Greek troops in Asia Minor.

Reports that General Paraskevopoulos leaves for Athens for a few days on September 7th, and that during interview he discussed possibility of solving difficulties by Mustapha Kemal's becoming Grand Vizier.

Reason to suppose that Manissa division is about to move to Panderma for Ismid and that Greek General Headquarters will shortly move to Athens.

E: Turkey

Last Paper.

E 1091P

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

Mustapha Kemal "meeting" rather than "becoming" Grand Vizier sounds a more likely, reasonable. If M. R. Gemmel, agrees to respect the Turkish signatures on the Treaty, many difficulties wd be solved. The six weeks extension would presumably refer to ratification.

G. H. Lawrence  
8/9

If Mustapha Kemal accepts the Treaty difficulties might certainly be solved. I suspect the word is really "becoming". But I do not believe that Mustapha Kemal, if he does become Grand Vizier, will really change his spots. He will merely be a Bolshevik who pretends

Tıpkıbasım 4

Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Sadrazam olması halinde Türkiye sorununun çözümlenip çözümlenemeyeceğinin İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında yorumlanması (Bkz. Belge 108'in notları)

to accept the Treaty at once, so as to  
to make all the trouble he can for  
Great Britain. He will continue to  
work hand in hand with the Arabian  
Sultans until he can overthrow  
Mesopotamian independence - unless by  
good luck we can manage to set up an  
Arab government in Mesopotamia  
which will be friendly to us & looking  
for our support.

W. E. D. L.  
- 8/9

It is not possible for Mustafa Kemal  
to become Grand Vizier at present. There is  
a price on his head.

K.

TURKEY. 138

E 14573

Registry Number } E 14573/14573/1  
FROM S.I.S.

No. CA/1011

Dated 22.11.1920.  
Received 23.11.1920.

E: Turkey.

Negotiations with Mustafa Kemal.

Transmits telegram received from Sofia representative reporting conversation with a certain Achkoff a personal friend of Mustafa Kemal and an ex-deputy of Bulgarian Parliament.

Last Paper.

(Minutes)

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Action plotted?

(Index)

Next Paper.

Some or later we shall probably have  
discussions with the Turks. But I venture  
to think that these discussions should be  
with the Porte & not with Mustafa Kemal.  
Over the Porte our military position at  
Constantinople is at any rate some  
weakened. Over Mustafa Kemal we  
have none. But the retrograde complexion  
of the present Turkish government makes  
it certain that they are in touch with  
Mustafa Kemal. In discussion with

Tıpkıbasım 5

Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın şahsî dostu olan eski Bulgar mebusu Achkoff'la görüşme konusunda alınan bir istihbarat raporu üzerine, İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında yapılan yorumlar. Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile gizli görüşmelere girişilmesi konusunun tartışılması (Bkz. Belge 177'nin notları)

The Turkish govt, then, we should not only avoid  
putting Mustafa Kemal on a pedestal, but we  
should be giving the Sultan's government some  
badly-needed prestige. However, if we are  
direct with Mustafa Kemal, he will imagine  
that we measure him by his shield & he  
will rise to his feet accordingly to come  
head-on to us. Such a situation, however, would  
hardly be made by the Party.

Still more would the ideas of the <sup>m</sup> Turkish be  
inflated if we invited them to a discussion.  
They would think that we were indeed at the end  
of our resources & they would no longer  
behave under their present helplessness as to

MU



105

our intentions. Rather than invite them, we should leave it to them to seek our sanction to any modification of the treaty which they succeed in extracting from the Greeks.

I would submit, then :

- (i) That the Turks should be left to solicit any discussion of the treaty.
- (ii) That it should be with the Porte.
- (iii) That it should, as we have always said, be conducted by the three Allies together & not - as this paper gives some reason to fear may happen - by us independently.

V. S. Edmonds

24/11/20.

Central Dept.

Please let us see the Legation's report on this. D. F. D'Erve  
24/11.

Lapse with the demands.

The natural way to communicate with Mustafa Kemal would be through the proposed mission from the Porte. but I gather that H. M. I. do not propose any action of the kind at present.

to Diphant (answ)

Jav  
25 XI

They are expressing no opinion pending discussion with Dancy & Draly; after which a policy may be formulated.

Hanmerstein

25. XI. 20.

Jav  
26 XI

Tıpkıbasım 5'in sonu

Decypher. , - Sir A. Peel (Sofia) November 24th, 1920.

D. 8 p.m. November 24th, 1920.

R. 8.20 p.m. November 26th, 1920.

No. 175.

.....

Mr. Atchkoff, who was a member of Sobranje and is a well known man in this city, has represented to this Legation that he has been in close touch with Mustafa Kemal Pasha until last March.

He states that Kemal is convinced that Bolshevism can never take root in Turkish soil as religious (group omitted) are opposed to its teachings: that he is not opposed to existence of an independent and autonomous Armenia should latter not (? very much) exceed in extent present Republic of Erivan: that he would recognise and even guarantee racial minorities so long as they did not conspire against Sovereign State, and that he is not interested in Arabia.

Kemal attaches no great importance to support of France and Italy but would make great sacrifices to obtain support of Great Britain.

Atchkoff is of opinion, based on Kemal's declaration to himself, that if British delegates were sent to him secretly they would have no difficulty in arriving at an agreement provided Smyrna were not ceded to Greece, which country is object of hatred of Moslem population of Anatolia: that if Great Britain would resume her secular policy of support to a strong and independent Turkey, Kemal would reject collaboration of Reds and would be willing to agree to having an English Adviser

to

Tıpkıbasım 6

İngiltere'nin Sofya Elçisi Sir A. Peel'den Lord Curzon'a şifre tcl. Eski Bulgar mebusu Atchkoff'un, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile İngilizler arasında gizli görüşmeler yapılması için arabuluculuk girişimi (Belge 181'in tıpkıbasımı)

to every Vali.

Atchkoff, while admitting that he has not seen Kemal since March (? last) has been receiving communications from him and is willing to give further information on these lines if desired. He points out that Great Britain would reap infinitely greater advantages from an understanding with Kemal than by any other means as effect of an agreement would be felt in Mesopotamia and throughout Middle East, and by it Great Britain would win over goodwill of entire population.

Atchkoff stated that he had been led to make this visit in mutual interests of Great Britain and Bulgaria which would be served by a lasting peace in the Near East, but an anti-Greek bias must be allowed for as Greek authorities in Thrace gave orders for his arrest on his return to Sofia from Constantinople on ground that he was acting as a Kemalist courier.

Repeated to Constantinople.

E.

E. 14768

TURKEY. 141

NOV 27 1920

Registry Number } E 14768/14573A

TELEGRAM FROM Sir A. Peel (Sofia)

No. 175.

Dated 24.11.1920. Received 27.11.1920.

E: Turkey.

Last Paper.

814573

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Action completed

(Index.)

Next Paper.

815295

Negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.

Reports interview with Mr. Atchkoft who represented that he was in touch with Mustapha Kemal. He stated that Mustapha Kemal attaches no great importance to support of France and Italy but would make great sacrifices to obtain support of Great Britain. Atchkoft gave details of terms of Mustapha Kemal. States that anti-Greek bias in statements of Atchkoft must be allowed for, as Greek authorities in Thrace gave orders for his arrest on his return to Sofia from Constantinople.

(Minute)

*File*  
Mustapha Kemal (according to Mr. Atchkoft) would not be prepared to accept the secession of the Provisional Republic into Ottoman territory with the southern territory to be freed, according to the Treaty, by President Wilson. His reported views on racial minorities, probably referring to the Greeks of Smyrna, Armenians and the Kurds would seem to imply a refusal short of autonomy, such as that provided for the Kurds in Section II, Arts 62-63 and 64 of the Treaty.

G. H. Widdowson, 27/11/20

According to this Mustapha Kemal's demands are not insubstantial, but we shall know more when the Turkish Mission under Bekt Pasha returns. It is due to start tomorrow. The advantages

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to us of an understanding with  
Turkey are undeniable.

D. G. Osborne


27/11.

Just  
27/11

Apparently these views as  
to Mustafa Kemal's attitude are  
based on <sup>impression gained by a Bulgarian</sup>  
~~statements made by him~~  
who has not seen him since last  
~~he was seen in Sofia~~  
March, but receives "communications" from  
him. I do not see how we can  
attach much value to Mr. Ataköpi's  
vague assurances.

ATK  
Nov 27

27/11

5/	E.	E 15753
	TURKEY. 158	
Ministry Number } E 15753/14573/4 <b>FROM</b> <u>Secret Intelligence Staff.</u> No CX/1011/V.  Dated 15th Dec;1920 Received 17th Dec;1920  E :Turkey  Last Paper.  6 15358	<p>Negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.          Refer to report communicated on Dec. 6th          (E 15358/14573/44)          Transmits copy of report dated Dec. 6th from          Sofia giving account of further interview with          Dimitri Atchhoff regarding his offer to negotiate          with Mustapha Kemal.          M. Atchhoff stated that the French and Italians          were already in unofficial communication with          Mustapha Kemal.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Minutes.)</p> <p><i>There can be no doubt that Atchhoff makes          these advances under instructions from          Mustafa Kemal. Although Mustafa Kemal          could easily repudiate them they are some          indication of his attitude.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. His demands with respect of Aleppo &amp;          he wants no Arabic speaking districts.</li> <li>2. So much he was prepared for an          autonomous Armenia.</li> <li>3. He would like Baku.</li> <li>4. He is anxious for the return of his          colleague Ruff &amp; of Petri.</li> </ol>	
(Print.)		
(Has disposed of)		
(Action completed) (Index.) 		
Next Paper.		

40-371/5201/E-45753

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Tıpkıbasım 8

Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın talimatıyla arabuluculuk girişiminde bulunduğu sanılan Atchhoff'la ilgili bir istihbarat raporu üzerine, Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile gizli görüşmelere girişme konusunun İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında yeniden yorunlanması (Bkz. Belge 202'nin notları)

at the same time this is an unadvised attempt to  
involve us - apart from our allies - into direct  
negotiations with ~~himself~~ Kemal, instead of with the  
Porte.

W. S. Edwards

18/12/20.


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Mr. C. H. ...  
Kemal

18/12





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