

KURDISTAN



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- * Presidents Message
- * Editorial
- * KSSE News
- * Arabisation in Kurdistan-Iraq
- * A study of the economic conditions in Kurdistan-Turkey
- * Letter from Syria
- * The Kurdish Revolution in the Iraqi juntas book of seasonal accusations
- * Kurdish Popular Organisations
- * Kurdistan: a new way of viewing the Middle East
- * Zarathustra The Mede
- * Industrialisation in Developing Countries
- * Kurdistan in the International Press
- * Qala Diza
- * The Ballad of Pesh Merga and other poems
- * 11th Congress of the I.U.S.
- * A Parable for Winter
- * Tribute: A.M.Hamilton
- * The Social Character and achievements of the Kurdish Revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq
- * A Paper on the Kurdish problem in Iraq
- * Memorandum on the situation of the Communists in Kurdistan
- * Kurdistan and the Kurds
- * Books on the Kurds and Kurdistan

Opinions expressed by individuals do not necessarily reflect those of the Society/Editor.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Our Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Iraq are today facing another barbaric military attack by the Baathist dictators of Baghdad, ravaging our towns and villages and murdering thousands of innocent civilians. The Kurdish people in other parts of Kurdistan remain denied their basic national rights, even their human rights are violated in some parts. At this crucial time in the history of our people, we, Kurdish students abroad must greatly increase our efforts in our Universities and colleges and in public meetings to break this wall of silence by the world media and governments about the gross violations of human rights and the genocidal war waged against our people.

KSSE, which was formed in 1956 by a number of Kurdish students, today has hundreds of members in 17 branches all over Europe. It has played an important role in conveying to world students and public opinion the plight of the Kurdish people in its divided country Kurdistan and the discrimination Kurdish students suffered. It has also succeeded in rallying behind it all the Kurdish students studying in Europe and has truly become an Ambassador of our people abroad. Through this long and difficult struggle KSSE has gained the admiration of our people and the respect of our friends. We must live up to this expectation and responsibility.

I take this opportunity to pay tribute, in the name of all our members, to our heroic Pesh Merga and our great leader Barzani.

I call upon the world student movement and all humanitarian and progressive organisations and individuals, in the name of all the Kurdish students abroad, to come to the aid of the Kurdish people and raise their voice against the crimes committed against humanity in Kurdistan-Iraq.

T. Akrawi

THE LONG MARCH

Iraqi Kurdistan is once again under the ravages of brutal war, waged by the Baathist regime of Iraq, with all the attendant suffering from the daily bombardment, and the Iraqi Army's terrorism and intensified racist measures against the Kurdish people. So ends a four-year truce between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Iraq's Baathist Government, making the 11th March 1970 agreement the latest in the series of promissory notes, issued by various Iraqi governments, which turn out to be duds.

PERFIDIOUS BAAATH

Some argued from the outset that to hope for a fundamental change of heart by the Baathist was expecting the leopard to change his spots. Nevertheless, the general expectation, in the wake of the agreement, was that the Baath would, if for no other reason than of self-preservation, change their aggressive stance. Alas, this turned out to be a chimera. For few can doubt that the events since March 1970 have conclusively proved the perfidious nature of the Baathist's approach to the Kurdish problem: the olive branch was a mere cover for their ultimate policy of destroying the Kurdish liberation movement.

During the four years specified, the substantive terms of the agreement remained unimplemented, namely the recognition of the Kurdish people as a free and equal partner with the Arab people in Iraq. The Baathist regime failed to implement the most fundamental principle of the accord, i.e. the carrying out within one year of an official census delineating the boundaries of one united autonomous region for Kurdistan. The regime failed to institutionalise the bi-national character of the country, treating the representatives of the Kurdish people such as the five ministers in the central government, as mere cyphers at the beck and call of the Baathist ruling clique, the so-called Revolution Command Council (RCC), a body which is self-appointed, consisting mostly of members of the Tikriti tribe, and accountable to no-one, with absolute executive, legislative and judicial powers over the whole country.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Furthermore the Baathist resorted to large scale and illegal measures to change the composition of some areas of Kurdistan; thus practising racial discrimination by uprooting large numbers of Kurdish families from their homelands, and by forcefully settling non-Kurdish families in their homes, especially in the

Kurdistani areas of Khanaqin, Sinjar and the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. On all social, educational and economic levels, discriminatory policies continued to be practised against the Kurdish citizens: barring Kurdish applicants for enrolment at military and police colleges; discriminating against Kurds in matters of public posts and the allocation of scholarships, and a severe shortage of medical and social services in the region. The regime even turned down in September 1970 a United Nations offer of \$100 million programme to build projects in Kurdistan.

It was during this period of 'peace' that the Iraqi army began to stockpile considerable quantities of poison gas and gas masks, with the avowed purpose of waging a genocidal war against the people of Kurdistan.

The Baathist strategy was to stall the implementation of the crucial terms of agreement, and at the same time planning to undermine the strength of the Kurdish liberation movement through tactics such as the carefully planned assassination plots against Barzani and prominent Pesh Merga and KDP leaders, which were posthumously blamed by President Bakir on their dreaded chief of the security, Nazim Kizzar. Their colonialist policies of divide and rule were aimed at fostering an appeasement faction within the Kurdish movement, which the Baathists hoped, would serve as their Trojan Horse in order to disintegrate its cohesiveness.

NEW PLAN

These treacherous policies culminated in the unilateral announcement on 11th March 1974 by the Baath of a Law of Autonomy, in complete breach of the original March agreement, which recognised the KDP as the essential party to any settlement of the Kurdish issue. The Baathist's plan is a fraudulent scheme to bamboozle the Kurdish people and world opinion. This plan fails to meet the genuine aspirations of the Kurdish people on many levels. No provision is made to take serious steps in order to ascertain the boundaries of the Kurdistan region, and also to put a stop to the process of Arabization. The plan does not permit any financial planning and budgeting powers for the regional administration. Furthermore, the regime rejected the idea of a permanent constitution restoring civil liberties and full democratic rights to all Iraq within one year, as proposed by the KDP. They are adamant at maintaining the absolute and monopoly powers of the RCC, and not allowing the representatives of the second nationality within the country to partake in the decision-making process of the state.

In effect the bodies to be created according to the Baathist plan for the autonomous region are just talking shops without any real powers of a genuine system of self-government. It was obvious, during the 'dialogue' between the two sides, that the Baathist plan was simply an empty gesture when the Tikriti hawks within the Baath, especially Saddam Tikriti, had already opted for the military campaign once again against the Kurdish people.

MORALS AND RE-APPRAISAL

There are certain hard facts which need stating concerning the new phase in the history of Kurdo-Iraqi relations. The first is that, to all intents and purposes, the March Agreement of 1970 is a dead letter by

now. Therefore there is an overriding priority for a complete re-appraisal of the position and policies of the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq, vis-a-vis the status of the central government of Iraq. Time is ripe for drawing clear-cut conclusions from the practical lessons of the movement since the early 1960's.

A major lesson is that Iraq as a state is totally unfit and incapable to solve the Kurdish question in a just and peaceful manner. The Kurdish movement has experienced numerous Iraqi regimes, of various political shades and colours, ranging from monarchical to the self-styled nationalist-socialist like the Baath. But the final outcome of the attempts to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with them have been almost identical – deadlock. This is due mainly to the unrepresentative nature of all the regimes so far, which have been mostly brutal and corrupt tyrannies, consisting of a handful of militarist rulers and their jailers, spies, torturers and gunmen. How can the Kurdish people put their destiny and security in the hands of such dictatorial regimes?

In fact Iraq as a state does not possess any legitimacy from the point of view of the inalienable right of the Kurdish people for national self-determination. Iraq is an artificial edifice, created by the victorious powers after the first World War. The reasons for its arbitrary creation were simply, economic exploitation and the carving-up of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence by the imperialist powers. The Kurdish people were thus the major victims in this charade, as Southern Kurdistan was annexed to the new state of Iraq finally in 1926. And although specific international provisions were declared, through the League of Nations, regarding the safeguarding of the Kurdish national rights, these pledges have never been honoured in practice. On the contrary the Iraqi state has always been an oppressive instrument against the Kurdish people in Iraq, denying Kurdish citizens ethnic, cultural, economic and political rights continuously.

During this new phase, the KDP is expected to set out fundamental guidelines for the future. In this context, two issues stand out: the first is the need to uphold the principle of national self-determination for the Kurdish people, and the outlining of plans, procedures and formats for translating this principle into reality, in a manner compatible with the interests of the people of Kurdistan, and reflecting the legitimate aspirations of the public after so many years of sacrifices and struggle. Impetus should be given to the social, economic and administrative aspects of development in the de facto autonomous administration simultaneously with the prime task of defending the liberated areas from Iraqi aggression.


Secondly it is important to lay down general principles and procedures for conducting any future negotiations with the central government, taking into consideration the lessons of the previous rounds of attempts at arriving at a settlement. It is vital that specific minimum conditions are presented and accepted by the central government before embarking on another round. The style of the previous negotiations resulted in vague and extremely elastic terms being declared, which were later a great help to the central government in its attempts to wriggle out of its obligations. Any formula for political settlement must ensure the mutual recognition and equality of the two nations in Iraq.

As to the environment under which future negotiations are to be conducted, it is advisable to hold them outside Iraq, with the full participation of international organisations, such as the U.N. This will

assist the correct atmosphere for a detailed discussion of the question, as well as preventing any possible dangers to the members of the Kurdish negotiating team — as it occurred in 1963, when the Baathis regime rounded up members of the delegation in Baghdad.

The Kurdish movement must also be wary of the role of certain elements who act as instant appeasers at any cost, at the first sign of a cue from the Iraqi side. Their role is totally exposed now. Some even argue naively that a regime, like that of Baath, can be placated with a certain amount of concessions. But like all appeasers-at-any-costs, they fail to heed the cardinal lesson of history that the more one appeases a brutal dictatorship, the more that regime becomes avaricious.

The overwhelming support given to the KDP by the Kurdish people is symbolic of the confidence of the Kurdistan public in the policies of the Kurdish leadership and its courageous upholding of the national rights of the Kurdish people and the struggle for democracy in Iraq. We are confident that the Kurdish national liberation movement will march forward, fulfilling those aims.



*When the oak is felled, the whole forest echoes with its fall,
but a hundred acorns are sown by an unnoticed breeze.*

THOMAS CARLYLE

16th CONGRESS OF KSSE

West Berlin 16-19th August 1973

The 16th Annual congress of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe was held in West Berlin from 16th-19th August, and was attended by more than 300 members representing all branches of the Society in Europe.

The Congress was attended by representatives of General Mustafa Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, besides representatives of the following organisations: Kurdistan Students Union, Kurdistan Democratic Youth Union, Kurdistan Union of Women, Kurdistan Union of Teachers, World Federation of Democratic Youth, Yugoslav Union of Students and others. Letters and telegrams of wishes of success and support were received from: Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria, Amir Kameran Bederkhan, Dr Ismet S. Vanly, Mr N.D.Zaza, National Union of Students (U.K.), Student Council (USSR), Students Associations of Romania, Socialist Union of Polish Students, IUS Secretariat, and VDS (West Germany).

The first session of the Congress was opened by an address by the representative of KDP, who outlined the grave situation in Kurdistan-Iraq and the Baathists' intrigues and preparation to launch another campaign against the Kurdish people. After this speech most of the guests took the floor and addressed the Congress. At the end of the session the president of the Society read the political report of the Executive.

During the second session, the organisational and financial reports of the G.E.C. were read, and a steering committee was elected. The work of the Congress was then divided between five committees; the Political Committee, Report of the Branches Committee, Constitutional Committee, Organisational Committee and the Financial Committee.

These committees held many meetings during which the various related matters were discussed and many important resolutions and recommendations were presented to the Congress for approval. The sessions of the political committee turned into a very interesting and useful debate, mainly due to the presence of political representatives from Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq.

The Congress adopted many resolutions in support of the Kurdish people's struggle in its country Kurdistan, and expressed its solidarity with the oppressed nations of the world in their struggle against colonialism, local reactionaries, and fascist-dictatorial juntas. The Congress declared its support for the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, and congratulated the Kurdish people on the 27th anniversary of the foundation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

The Congress further welcomed peace in Vietnam and efforts to ease world tension.

The discussion and plans of actions adopted at this Congress made it a turning point in the history of the Society.

The last session of the Congress elected the new executive committee and the Congress was closed with the Kurdish national anthem, Ay Raqeeb. In the evening of that day a social evening was organised for the members and their guests in which Kurdish dances and songs were presented.

SOME OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS

1. The Congress salutes the leader of our Kurdish people's national liberation movement, General Mustafa Barzani, and the heroic Pesh Merga.
 2. The Congress stands by the struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for the completion of their sovereignty and national independence; calls for the routing of the remnants of imperialism, and supports liberation movements throughout the world.
 3. The Congress calls upon all multi-national states to respect the rights of the smaller nations and national minorities, and not to differentiate and discriminate between them and the dominant larger nation; further denounces all forms of discrimination whether racial, national or religious.
 4. The Congress calls upon the governments which rule over the different parts of Kurdistan to put an end to their policies of oppressing the Kurdish people and to treat them equally with the peoples they co-exist with, and demands the recognition of the Kurdish peoples national, cultural and administrative rights and their realisation in practice.
 5. The Congress expresses its deep regret and surprise at the refusal to allow our Society to take part in the Tenth Festival of World Youth and considers it a diversion from the principles of solidarity and mutual respect, since our Society is a progressive student organisation with an honorable role in the history of the world student movement. Further instructs the G.E.C. to send a letter to the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students to express our Society's regret and question the true motives behind these moves.
 6. The presence of representatives of KSSE at international meetings has had good and improving effects on KSSE's external relations. Despite the fact that the struggle of the Kurdish people and KSSE enjoys support from many organisations in Europe, the previous Executive Committees had failed to avail themselves of the opportunities this support presented. Therefore, and in fulfilling the aims of KSSE, the Executive Committee, during last year, endeavoured to bridge this gap in its activities and have scored some success in this respect. We hope that the new Executive Committee will continue on this direction and will study the possibility of developing KSSE's external ties and consider attending international gatherings and seminars, taking into account the assistance which the branches can offer in this respect and electing a member of the Executive Committee to be responsible for KSSE's external relations. We also recommend that visits paid to European organisations be increased as much as resources permit.
- We would like to specially thank our friends the Yugoslav Students Union for their honest and wholehearted support of the Kurdish people and KSSE.

KSSE News

The following appeal was sent to many humanitarian organisations and heads of state:

The Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Iraq are being subjected to a ferocious fascist military campaign waged by the Iraqi government in an attempt to force them to give up their demands for their national rights. The victims of the air and land attacks are innocent children, women and the aged. The indiscriminate and concentrated bombing with napalm of peaceful Kurdish towns and villages is turning them and their inhabitants into ashes.

Bombing with napalm of the Kurdish town of Qala Diza on April 24th, destroying a school and killing 131 and wounding 120 innocent people, most of them school children, the destruction of over 100 houses and burying alive of their occupants in an air raid on Halabja on April 27th, and the bombing with napalm of Bolek, killing 40 and wounding 50 innocent people, are only a few examples of the terror bombing of the Kurdish civilian population by the armed forces of the Iraqi government. The imposition of total economic blockade on the Kurdish area is another aspect of the Iraqi government's policy of terrorizing the Kurdish population.

In the name of humanity, we appeal to you to use your good-will and influence to urge the Iraqi government to put an end to its terror bombing of the Kurdish civilian population and to abandon its racist policies against our peace and freedom loving Kurdish people.

*With our cordial greetings and best regards,
Secretariat of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe,
7th May 1974.*

KURDISH STUDENTS IN AMERICA

The Kurdish Students in the United States of America and Canada held their conference in New York from 10th-16th April 1974 to discuss ways of stepping up the campaign to stop the war of genocide against the Kurdish people in Iraq. The conference issued the following statement, which was sent to most of the news agencies and members of the U.S. Congress:

"We the representatives of the Kurds in the United States of America and Canada, gathered in convention in New York City on April 10th to 16th 1974, declare our full support to the Kurdish National Revolutionary Forces (Pesh Merga) led by General Barazani in Iraq.

"The Iraqi Baath regime is about to launch a genocidal war against our Kurdish people in Iraq. The Kurds are committed to democracy in Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan within Iraq.

"We have reliable information that the Baath regime intends to resort to the use of poison gas in its merciless war against the Kurds, a peaceful people, but committed to democracy and preservation of the Kurdish national identity. We appeal, in the name of the humane values treasured by all right-thinking people, that all those who believe in freedom and democracy use their good offices and influences to prevail upon the Iraqi government not to afflict Iraqis and Kurds with another bloody and unjust war."


Representatives from the conference met with several envoys to the United Nations to discuss the current Kurdish situation in Iraq. In the last day of the conference a small symbolic demonstration to protest against the latest Baath attempt to destroy the Kurdish entity in Iraq was held in front of the United Nations building.

Kurdish students address in USA and Canada:

*Kurdistan
P.O.Box 925
Redlands
California 92373.*

NEWROZ 74

Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations are usually the biggest of occasions in the branches. However this year it coincided with the resumption of a new military campaign against our Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Iraq, and the usual jubilant spirit of the new year turned into a feeling of anger and anxiety. Nevertheless, social evenings and cultural shows were organised at which many of our people's friends present to share with the Kurdish students their national day.



Newroz in Vienna

Baathists Execute 5 Kurdish Students

The latest military campaign by the fascist rulers of Baghdad against the Kurdish people has been accompanied by a wave of summary executions, which has been a glaring feature of their second Reign of Terror.

Leila Kassem (23) and her comrades:

Nareman Mesti (22)

Azad Sulieman (25)

Hassan Hama Rashid (23), and

Jawad Mamawendi (31)


were students at Baghdad University (except Jawad who was a part-time student at the University of Almustansiria in Baghdad). They were detained on a false charge of sabotage and were brutally tortured and then summarily executed. On that day their families were told to come and see them for the last time; instead they were given their mutilated bodies.

The Baathist junta had two aims by this murderous deed: first to spread a feeling of fear and terror among Kurds and second to arouse Iraqi Arab public opinion against the Kurdish people. It failed, the tumultuous support the Kurdish Revolution's rejection of the Baathist's 'autonomy plan' shocked the Baathists.

The Baathist wave of terror did not stop at that, in the town of Arbil 11 Kurds were already executed in mid-April, on 12th May five Kurds were tortured to death and their bodies were thrown outside police headquarters in Kifri and Jawala. Many Kurdish families in Baghdad and other large towns are packed in lorries and thrown out at the fire line.



Photos of the five Kurdish students,
Published in the Baathist organ ALTHAWRA (May 1st)



Another example of Baathist terror.
Majid Ahmed Hamid, A Kurdish sergeant
in the Iraqi Army, tortured to death
in the notorious Qasir Alnihaia prison
in 1972

"Iraq has received a great deal of equipment from the Soviet Union (and additionally a Soviet squadron of Tu-22 medium range bombers has been stationed in Iraq, the first time that this supersonic aircraft has been deployed outside the Soviet Union or in the Warsaw pact area)." according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1973 (p.44). A report in The Times (June 19th) said that "Soviet pilots were flying on combat missions with the Iraq Air Force."

It is also known that the Soviet Union has supplied Iraq with large quantities of poison gas (see press cutting elsewhere).

The other main contributors to the Iraqi arsenal are France and Britain.



DEMONSTRATIONS

The genocidal war against the Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Iraq sparked a wave of demonstrations in many of the Society's branches. The United Kingdom branch organised a public meeting after which members of the branch and their friends marched to the Iraqi Embassy. The West German and Sweden branches organised similar demonstrations.



Kurdish students demonstrating at the Iraqi Embassy in London



Demonstration in Bonn

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DENGÊ

KOMELÊ

جەمعیەتی پێشێڵی ئێزیدی و ئێزیدی

ARABISATION IN KURDISTAN-IRAQ

One of the major issues which led to the breakdown of relations between the Kurdistan leadership and the Baathist government was the latter's persistent pursuit of a racial and inhumane policy of Arabisation in some areas of Kurdistan in a South African style, exceeding it in savagery and ruthlessness. For the execution of this policy they have concentrated their efforts on the areas of Kirkuk, Khanaqeen, Sinjar and various districts within the provinces of Nineveh and Dihok, areas of Kurdistan which contain minorities like Turkumans, Assyrians and Arabs.

According to the 11th March 1970 Peace Agreement a census was to be carried out within a year to delineate the areas to be included in the autonomous region. The Baathist government, however, spread a wave of terror and intimidation, postponed the census and carried on its policy of Arabisation aiming at detaching these areas from the future autonomous Kurdistan.

One has only to follow the progress of this racial policy to see in use such measures as the bringing of Arab tribes from outside to settle them in Kurdistan, the deliberate creation of antagonism between the Kurds and the ethnic and religious minorities living in Kurdistan, the resort to terror and the arming and financing of mercenaries, the mass deportation of Kurdish families, and the pursuit of a definite policy of discrimination against the Kurds of these areas by refusing them government jobs and by arbitrarily transferring Kurdish civilian and military officials to the southern parts of Iraq. All this is done to make life miserable for the indigenous Kurdish population: of these parts and consequently to force them out. Furthermore, and among dries of implementing the Agrarian Reform Act, the authorities finance Arab landlords to purchase land and property from Kurdish landlords with the intention of forcing the migration of Kurdish farmers from these areas and replacing them with Arabs.

Below are villages which were subjected to Arabisation Policy, for the past four years:

A. NINEVEH PROVINCE - Sinjar District

These villages were subjected to intimidation by the military and were hit by artillery, with the intention of forcing out its Kurdish inhabitants:


- | | | |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| 1. Gireeshk | 9. Zor Ava | 17. Yourk |
| 2. Bisharko | 10. Shorkan | 18. Qarsi |
| 3. Qiheel | 11. Yousifa | 19. Qourmaq |
| 4. Chimi Jevra | 12. Torik | 20. Jevroq |
| 5. Rashid | 13. Sharef Eldeen | 21. Zoyani |
| 6. Qini | 14. Orva | 22. Jolan |
| 7. Qizel Qand | 15. Khizanok | 23. Qai Ebdî |
| 8. Hayali | 16. Hirke | |

Other villages which were partially destroyed by artillery shelling from the Iraqi Army:

- | | | |
|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. Herdan | 9. Bakhilif | 17. Tapa |
| 2. Zaqrada | 10. Bitwani | 18. Taheze |
| 3. Eldani | 11. Nissiri | 19. Qawasi |
| 4. Gari Zerga | 12. Du Holî | 20. Hassen |
| 5. Maheas | 13. Qecha Haji | 21. Sinoni |
| 6. Geri Mar | 14. Tel Qarach | 22. Bara |
| 7. Tanga | 15. Sideri | 23. Tel Khasab |
| 8. Ain Fati | 16. Qani Mengan | 24. Ain Gazal |

The number of people whose land has been expropriated in the area of Singar, has reached 366 who live in 30 villages and the area of this land that has been taken over by the Iraqi authorities reached 36955 dunums, and part of it has been marked for the building of a camp for the 29th Brigade. The rest of the land has been distributed among the landlords and other pro-government elements in the area. The villages are:

- | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Northern Qiwaishi | 11. Yousifan | 21. Eastern Gohball |
| 2. Qani Ebdî | 12. Shirebqa | 22. Southern Qini |
| 3. Chimi | 13. Western Gireeshk | 23. Herdan |
| 4. Ger Zeriq | 14. Bernana | 24. Bouriq |
| 5. Oshga | 15. Zerwan | 25. Qeney |
| 6. Gohball | 16. Southern Qiwaishi | 26. Sharef Eldeen |
| 7. Chimi Jevru | 17. Sana'n | 27. Bishargo |
| 8. Northern Qini | 18. Zo Mani | 28. Khizani |
| 9. Zor Ava | 19. Qezelgand | 29. Qocha Chimi |
| 10. Rashid | 20. Hireeqo | 30. Sin Och |



* Shaikan District

The village of Qani Qone was shelled by the Iraqi Army on 5th February 1973.

* Zamar District

On the 25th March 1973, the Iraqi Army surrounded the village of Chifri; however, the population sensed the coming danger and tried to evacuate the village. The Iraqi soldiers began by looting the properties of the peasants and finally shelling the village. Many people were killed and others were wounded in the attack.

* Mosul Centre

In March 1973 and at a time when Kurds were preparing to celebrate Newroz (Kurdish National Day) certain elements of the police and security men began to surround the headquarters of the Kurdistan Youth and Students organisations and fired on them.

Recently the government served notice to 30,000 members of the Goyan and Omeryan Kurdish tribes to leave their homes and go to Turkey.

B. KIRKUK PROVINCE

1. In 1967, the Iraq Petroleum Company dismissed 2500 workers from the oil fields of Kirkuk. After the nationalisation of this company in 1972, many of these workers were reinstated, except the Kurdish workers. In their place the government appointed Arab workers brought from other parts of Iraq, leaving hundreds of the provinces Kurdish workers unemployed.

2. Six new quarters have been built in Kirku, namely:

- | | | |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| El Karama | El Huriya | 14th Ramadan |
| El Wahda | Yarmouk | El Andalus |

These were all settled by Arabs brought from outside the province.

3. Many Kurdish quarters were bulldozed since 1963 in this town.

4. Falsification of birth certificates, registering new comers in the 1957 census.

5. Before the government declared their so-called autonomy plan in March of this year, hundreds of Kurdish workers were expelled from the oil fields.

* Dibis District

The following villages were evacuated by the army of its inhabitants, and although there was an agreement that the original population should be returned to them, the authorities refuse to allow them to go back to their villages. These are:

- | | | |
|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Amsha | 9. Sheraw | 17. Gir Qachal |
| 2. Qara Erbat | 10. Ismail Awa | 18. Sai Qaniyan |

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| 3. Mari | 11. Melhi | 19. Sona Golai |
| 4. Qotani | 12. Gara | 20. Qargato |
| 5. Hinjeerah | 13. Qara Dara | 21. Bajwah |
| 6. Chouplicha | 14. Qoush Qaya | 22. Elyawa |
| 7. Gormail | 15. Qotani Gawri | 23. Pencha Ali |
| 8. Yaroli | 16. Khaneqa | 24. Idris Babouj |

* Kifri, Tuz and El Dawida Districts

1. The Kurdish populations of the following villages were evacuated under the policy of Arabisation:

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Greater Dolis | 5. Elbou Sirach | 10. Kerimiya |
| 2. Hashisha | 6. Eli Baili | 11. Said Wali Said |
| 3. Compos | 7. Tapa Bassal | 12. Elbou Mohammed Eli |
| 4. Sai Qanyan | 8. Smaller Dolis | 13. Zanqar |
| | 9. Tel Raba | |

2. The land in these areas is taken away from their owners either by temptation or intimidation and such land is then given to members of Arabs tribes brought to settle there.

3. The Agrarian Reform Office refuses to give the Kurdish farmers the right to cultivate their lands in order to force them to leave the area.

4. The hiring of mercenaries in the area of Tuz in order to assault the Kurdish farmers in this area and the neighbouring villages in order to force to leave.

5. In the area of Sigiqli, on the cross roads to Kirkuk and Koi, the government has taken over big stretches of land under the pretext of the requirement to build a new military camp.

6. The destruction of two town quarters in Kifri days before the government declaration of its so-called autonomy plan.

C. KHANAQEEEN AND MENDELI AREAS

1. The Agrarian Reform Office refuses to hand over land ownership certificates to Kurdish farmers while generously distributing them among Arab farmers who are strangers to the area.

2. The population of these areas have been deported in thousands to Iran, others have been terrorised and forced to flee to the liberated areas.

Facts of history and geography prove that these areas have always been, and will certainly continue to be part of Kurdistan, besides, the 1957 census categorically showed that the Kurds constitute the majority of the population in these areas.

The above mentioned facts and examples clearly show the extent of this racial policy which has resulted in thousands of Kurdish families being made homeless refugees, and others thrown out to neighbouring states (70,000 faili Kurds to Iran in 1972).

No doubt the recent developments in Kurdistan-Iraq and the resumption of a new military campaign against the Kurdish people will certainly intensify this hateful policy of Arabisation.



Young Pesh Mergas - 'a gun and a pencil'. Photo J.R.Wilton/SIPA Press

A Study of the Economic Conditions in Kurdistan-Turkey by M.J.

The present article (based on a research report written for the University of Helsinki, Finland) treats the economic and social conditions prevailing in Kurdistan-Turkey. However, the study covers only the major part of, but not the entire, area of Kurdistan-Turkey, namely the province of Adiyaman, Agri, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Erzincan, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Tunceli, Urfa and Van. Kurdistan-Turkey covers a larger area than the area of these provinces. But because of the fact that the rest of Kurdistan-Turkey constitutes parts of contiguous provinces, and because data in Turkish publications are given for whole provinces, this study concentrates on the aforementioned provinces only.

The total area of these provinces (henceforth called the region) is 157,137 sq.km., i.e. 20.3% of the area of Turkey.

An attempt is made here to show that there exists a gap between the region's resources, both exploited and potential, and its 'share' in the economic and social development generating activities, and that this gap is very wide and it tends to widen rather than bridge or narrow. Many explanations have been put forward to account for this disparity or inequality. However, the one plausible explanation seems to lie in the fact that the region is inhabited by a people who are ethnically culturally and linguistically (i.e. nationally) different from the dominant population - Kurds v. Turks.

The situation of national, or ethnic, differences giving rise to 'anomaly' locations and industries has also been observed by geographers and economists (cf. R.J.Chorley and P.Hagget, p. 368).

THE REGIONS RESOURCES

1. AGRICULTURE. 83% of the region's active population was engaged in agriculture in 1965 (compared with 72% in the rest of the country). Among other things, this difference of 11 percentage points reflects the fact that the economy of the region is more underdeveloped than that of the rest of the country since the more developed a region or country, the smaller the percentage of its population engaged in agriculture. Besides, four-fifths of the total active population in this sector are redundant during the lowest activity month of January and over one-tenth in the highest activity month of July (First Development Plan).

The region's share in the agricultural production of a number of produce is shown in Table 1. This share is substantial, to say the least. It meets part of the domestic needs of the country and, in addition, some of it is exported, thus constituting a source of foreign currency for Turkey.

TABLE 1. Agricultural Production of the Region as % of total production in Turkey in 1966 and 1969*

	1966		1969	
	Production as % of total in country	Quantity	Production as % of total in country	Quantity
Wheat	14.2	1,358,900	10.3	1,078,900
Barley	13.2	502,400	13.4	503,000
Millet	65.8	39,500	66.3	37,100
Lentils	52.3	52,300	50.1	53,700
Grapes	14.5	541,000	18.0	655,000
Nuts†	15.5	17,153	17.7	19,331

* Compiled from Agricultural Structure and Production 1966 and 1969

† Includes pistachios, almonds and walnuts.

cultural development planning in Turkey (namely, the State Planning Organisation) has of late shown some interest in introducing modern creameries, albeit on a small scale, into the region in order to increase dairy production in the region for the main purpose of meeting increasing demands for an acute shortage of these products in the central and western parts of Turkey.

TABLE 2. Livestock in the region, 1969*

Livestock	Number	% total in Turkey
Sheep	8,066,570	22.2
Goats	4,678,855	23.1
Cattle	2,817,907	19.6

* Compiled from Agricultural Structure and Production 1969.

3. MINING. The raw materials being exploited in the region are petroleum, chrome, copper, lead and zinc. The search is active for other resources, such as natural gas.

a. Petroleum. From 1955 to 1972, the region had produced about 27 million tons of crude oil, production rising from 178,000 tons in 1955 to 3,600,000 tons in 1969. Besides meeting parts of Turkey's domestic needs, some oil products are exported thus earning for Turkey some foreign currency: exports amounted to \$2.5 million in 1971 and planned to have reached £10 million in 1972.

b. Chrome, copper, lead and zinc. Turkey is the world's second largest producer of chrome; Turkey's and the world's largest and richest chrome mines are found in the region. Chrome production reached 916,000 tons in 1971. It earned Turkey \$17.5 million in 1971 and planned to have been \$20 million in 1972. Copper production from the region has been 1,200,000 ton/year mineral and 130,000 tons/year concentrate, according to the Second Five Year Development Plan. According to the same source lead production has been 8,000 ton/year (concentrate) and zinc production 6,000 tons/year (concentrate). These minerals earn for Turkey substantial amounts of foreign currencies.

4. ELECTRICITY. The Keban Dam, located in Elazig in the region, the construction of which began in 1965 to be completed in 1975, has the biggest hydro-electric plant in Turkey. Its initial capacity is 620,000 Kws rising to 1,250,000 Kws on completion. It has double the entire present electric power generation capacity in Turkey. But, however, "the power generated (in the plant) will go first to the industries of the north-western part of the country" (The Middle East and North Africa p.746).

5. POPULATION. The population of the region was 3,693,246 in 1965 (Census of Population pp.5-6) and estimated at 4,160,414 in 1973 (Under-development p.119). The region's population constituted about 12% and 11% of the total population of Turkey in 1965 and 1973 respectively. The region's population had been increasing at the rate of 3% per year (between 1946 and 1965). However, a critical situation has arisen recently. Half of the natural increase of population, since the second half of the 1960's, has been migrating from the region to the west of the country (Confidential Report, p.11).

According to the 1965 Census of Population, 258,909 persons born in the region were residents of areas situated outside the region. They have either migrated from or were forced by the authorities to leave the region. More than four-fifths of them had moved to Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Izmir.

The main reason for the increasing east-west migration is the lack of employment opportunities in the region due to it being more underdeveloped than the rest of Turkey, largely because it has been neglected by the central authorities.

6. CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURS. Though specific data about capital formation and movement and entrepreneurs are not available, a

2. LIVESTOCK. The region is quite rich in livestock as well as dairy products, despite the fact that techniques and technology used in production and processing are very out-dated. The region's richness with livestock is shown in Table 2. The central organisation responsible for economic, social and

quotation from the Turkish Five Year Plan indicates that most of the region's savings and entrepreneurs flow and move to the west of Turkey. The Plan states that "today even the meagre funds accumulated with difficulty in the socially and economically underdeveloped regions (mainly the region under discussion) are flowing into the developed region, together with the enterprising people. This flow increases the poverty of these regions and widens the great differences existing between the developed and underdeveloped regions" (The First Five Year Plan, p.49).

Compared with the region's exploited substantial human and natural resources and those awaiting discovery and exploitation is a sad situation of lack of economic, social and cultural development, both of the development instruments (such as manufacturing and building industries) and development goals (such as health, education and cultural services:

1. MANUFACTURING. The active population employed in the manufacturing sector of the region represented 2.7% of the total active population of the region, whereas the counterpart percentage for the whole country was 7.1% in 1963. (For lack of data, data on this section could not be brought up to date; most probably the situation has not changed substantially since then). In that year, there were in the region 27 large manufacturing establishments (LME) (Employing 10 workers or more), representing a mere 0.9% of the total number of LME in Turkey. The 'share' of the region in LME has been steadily declining; at the end of World War II, 1.7% of LME of Turkey was located in the region; 1.3% of the LME built during the war years was located there; and only 0.7% of the LME built between 1945 and 1963 was located in the region.

Most of the LME in the region are light, consumer goods producing firms. Of the 27 LME located in the region in 1963, 18 were tobacco, food, beverage and textile producing establishments. Apart from the LME there are a large number of small "industrial" firms in the region. However, they are very small and of little, or no, consequence for the development of the region.

2. HEALTH SERVICES. These services are very inadequate in the region and are by far lower there than in the rest of the country. The government is to blame for the inadequacy of health services in the region, because, according to the country's constitution, the government is obliged to provide health services and improve health conditions of the population all over the country. Discrimination against the region and its population in the field of health service is revealed in Table 3.

TABLE 3. Number of Population per 'Unit' of Health Services in the Region and in Turkey in 1965*

Area	Physician	Dentist	Nurse	Hospital Bed	Pharmacy	Health Centre	Infirmary
Region	6,667	100,000	10,000	1,200	100,000	500,000	500,000
Turkey	2,680	16,667	6,667	600	20,000	125,000	333,333

* Compiled from the Statistical Yearbook 1968, pp.69-95

N.B. The provinces of Adiyaman and Tunceli had no dentist and Hakkari and Tunceli had no pharmacy in 1965.

3. EDUCATION. Educational services in the region are very deficient and are much lower there than in the rest of the country.

a. Illiteracy. The rate of illiteracy in the region is much higher than in Turkey as a whole. The rate was about 60% for the male and 90% for the female population in 1965, one province having a rate of 99%, three provinces the rate of 97% each and four the rate of 96% in the countryside for the female population. In contrast, the rate of illiteracy in Turkey as a whole was 36% for the male and 63% for the female population in 1965 (Census of Population, pp. 270-281). Even though the rate of illiteracy in the region has been dropping, the actual number of illiterate persons had increased from 1,984,896 in 1950 to 2,703,456 in 1965. The rate of illiteracy in Turkey has been estimated at 90% by Rivkin (p.61) and 89.5% by the Area Handbook (p.127) in 1927. Assuming for the sake of illustration that the rate of illiteracy in the region was then 100%, the gap between the region and Turkey was 10 percentage points in 1927. The gap became 22% in 1965 (the rate of illiteracy in the region being 73% and in Turkey 51%). It is noteworthy that the gap was about 20% in 1960.

More indicative is the percentage of the population by last graduated school in the region in comparison with the rest of Turkey and with some other areas of the country. The inequality (in terms of differences) between the region and the rest of Turkey was between 2 and 5 times in disfavour of the region as Table 4 indicates.

TABLE 4. Population by last graduated school (11 years old and over as per cent of the population in respective area 1965*

Area	Primary School	Secondary School	Lycee School	Vocational School	High school & faculties
Region	8.2	1.0	0.2	0.5	0.2
Rest of Turkey	20.9	2.8	1.0	0.9	0.6
Aegean Region	25.9	2.3	0.7	0.9	0.4
Ankara Province	24.4	4.8	3.1	2.1	2.5
Istanbul Province	33.8	8.0	4.7	1.9	2.3

* Compiled from Census of population, pp. 294-297

4. OTHER INFRASTRUCTURES such as roads and railways, housing, drinking water, urban amenities, are insufficient and much lower in the region than in the rest of Turkey. (cf. e.g. Under-under-development).

Social services and per capita incomes in the region are much lower than in the rest of Turkey. For example, if the agricultural per capita income in Turkey is assumed to be 100, it amounts to between 41 and 65 in the region (First Five Year Development Plan, p.49) (refer to Under-underdevelopment).

5. HUMAN RIGHTS. Human rights covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 are being flagrantly violated by the Turkish authorities in the region. Moreover, security of the person and way of life in the region is being constantly threatened by these authorities.

Threats to the person and way of life in the region and violations of basic human rights are reflected in the following facts:

- i) constant threat to the region's population, as a distinct nation to either adjust (i.e. be assimilated) or face elimination (as had happened to the Armenians) (cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze, p. 346).
- ii) threat of use of force against the region and its inhabitants if they do not comply with the wishes and policies of the central authorities (cf. Dagens Nyheter Nov. 11 1960).
- iii) ban on the use of the Kurdish language by Kurds imposed by the central authorities (cf. e.g. Hostler, p.112)
- iv) the imposition of second - or lower class status on the Kurdish population (cf. Hostler p.112, and Ghassemliou p.20).
- v) ban on all cultural material in the Kurdish language of foreign origin in any form (cf. Official Gazette No. 12527 of February 14th 1967).
- vi) harassment and prosecution of authors and works by Kurds or on the region (cf. e.g. Kurdish Journal 1969 and File on Turkey, for some case studies).
- vii) constant pressure on the region's and Kurdish population to change their way of life in order to be able to 'participate in modern Turkey' (cf. Fisher p.517).
- viii) constant pressure on the region and the Kurdish people to deny, renounce and hide one's ethnic identity and national origin and pretend to be a "pure Turk" in order to have a chance to "pass" and be accepted by the dominant Turkish community (cf. Area Handbook p.77 and Vanly p.50).
- ix) Recurrent occurrence of semi-famine situations in the region and central authorities' reluctance to relieve the victims (cf. Kinrane p.34 and Kinross p.92).
- x) Limited scope and spatial coverage of social security schemes (cf. Plan p.101 and Statistical Year Book p.138).
- xi) denial of the rights to self-determination as far as the Kurdish people are concerned (this basic human right is both recognised and emphasised by the two Covenants and the Declaration referred to above as well as by the United Nations Charter).

Prevailing conditions in the region (and in Kurdistan-Turkey in general) and the relationship between the region and the central

authorities (centre) is a typical case of Friedman's "centre-periphery relationship" which "may be described as essentially a colonial one". The emergence of such relationships is normally "accompanied by a series of displacements from the periphery (region) to the centre of the principal factors of production, labour, capital, entrepreneur, foreign exchange and raw materials in unprocessed form (Friedman, Regional Development Policy, pp.12-13)

On the one hand, all factors of production have been and still are, flowing from the region to the centre (or exported). These include: labour, capital, entrepreneurs, technocrats, raw materials (such as petroleum, chrome, copper, lead and zinc), livestock and dairy products and agricultural produce and electric power. On the other hand, economic and social development, generating projects and services are very meagre. Basic services, such as education, health, urban amenities, road and transport etc. are inadequate in the region and are much lower than in the rest of Turkey.

Power relationships between the region and the centre are characterised by domination by the latter over the former. All decisions, even minor ones, concerning local and regional questions, whether political, economic, social, cultural or administrative, are made by and at the centre. The region has, thus, virtually no power-over-itself, i.e. it lacks autonomy. According to Galtung, autonomy means power-over-oneself, while domination is lower-over-others. (Galtung, The European Community, A Superpower in the Making).

This colonial relationship, both in terms of expropriating the region's resources by the centre for its own development at the expense and to the detriment of the region's development, and in terms of wielding next to absolute power by the centre over the region, is accompanied by what Van Nieuwenhuijze calls the "ominous choice", which "choice" leaves the Kurds as losers either way, of either "adjust or be eliminated". (Van Nieuwenhuijze, p.346).

Faced with such a formula offered by the Turkish authorities and being and living under such harsh conditions, the Kurdish people in Kurdistan-Turkey are, indeed, in a very difficult situation. On the one hand, they can neither exercise their basic rights nor are they able to exert any political pressure to bring about or lobby for changes in or modifications of their present situation. This is so due to to what the Area Handbook summarises as the Kurdish people in Turkey "suffer many social disabilities and are often viewed with cautious suspicion." (area Handbook p.80). On the other hand, the options open to them for regaining their rights and improving their conditions are very limited.

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Pesh Mergas at the battle front near Gali Ali Beg. Photo Lord Kilbracken

LETTER FROM SYRIA

Many Kurds, including all the members of the central committee of the Kurdish Democratic Party, are still in prison. The Baath newspaper (July 8th 1973) stated that a committee had been formed to resettle the inhabitants of the villages which are to be submerged in the new lake created by the Euphrates Dam. The resettlement of these Arab villagers is to be made in the Jazireh area, whose Kurdish villages were informed to vacate their villages and move to special reservations in the south of the country.

The background to these measures, which are designed to destroy the Kurdish entity in Syria, is outlined in the Baathist racial 'Arab Belt' plan. This policy was initiated by the government that seized power after the break between Syria and Egypt in September 1961. On 28th August 1962 this government issued a legislative decree (No. 93) for an extraordinary census in the Kurdish region (Jazireh), in order to fabricate statistics for the implementation of this plan. The results of this census caused the expulsion of thousands of Kurds in October 1966, more than 100,000 Kurds were deprived of their citizenship because they were not registered in the civil records before 1924, and Kurds were summarily arrested for no reason other than to spread a wave of terror and force them to leave Syria, as was the case on 21st August 1966 when 150 Kurds from all walks of life were imprisoned and tortured for more than nine months without any charges or trial.

Today the situation is more or less the same and the Arab Belt plan seems to reach its final stages as the latest measures show. Kurds remain to be treated as second class citizens and are not allowed to work in governmental departments or join trade unions. Hundreds of Kurdish teachers were dismissed from their jobs in 1972 and many of them jailed without having been released to this date.

These are but a few examples of the Syrian regime's 'socialist' and 'progressive' measures against the Kurdish people.

THE KURDISH REVOLUTION

in the Iraqi Military Junta's Book of Seasonal Accusations

by M. KAWA

Since the creation of the state of Iraq in 1920, Southern Kurdistan and the Kurdish people have been in constant revolution; they have also been nationally oppressed by various governments of Iraq, whether colonial or native. The colonialists have annexed Southern Kurdistan to the newly created state because of the presence of petroleum in the area. The present Baath regime II is carrying out a policy of colonisation of certain areas of Kurdistan (as a first phase in a much more ambitious scheme) by various means; because oil has been exploited or discovered in them. This colonisation takes the form of forcible expulsion of the native Kurdish population of the said areas and encouraging with attractive incentives and bringing Arabs from mostly the southern part of Iraq and settling them in these areas.

The policy of colonisation has two basic aims. Firstly, it aims at increasing the proportion of the Arab population in these areas as a first step to claiming that they belong to the "Arab homeland". This situation leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Baath Regime II does not genuinely believe in and is not concerned with preserving Iraqi unity or territorial integrity, because if such a belief and concern exists at all, resort to such policy of colonisation would be absurd. Secondly, it aims at inciting animosity between the Kurds (who are predominantly Sunni Moslems) and the Arab population of the South who are Shi'a Moslems, and are, like the Kurds, deprived of any say in the affairs or running of the country. (The power holders in Iraq are Arab Sunni Moslems from an area forming a triangle having one apex at Baghdad, the second at Mosul and the third at Anah. The small provincial town of Tikrit of about 10,000 inhabitants, being the place from which the present top Baath leadership come from. The population of this triangle constitutes only about a quarter of the population of Iraq.) In this way the Baath regime II hopes to keep the Iraqi people busy fighting each other.

Concomitant with the pursuit of this policy of colonisation, Baath Regime II is striving to give a semblance of legitimacy to its policy by accusing the Kurdish national movement and leadership of anything and by decreeing a "law" which it does not intend to carry out. (It is noteworthy that despite the passing of more than three months, the so-called "law of autonomy" or any part of it has not been implemented).

By accusing the Kurdish national movement and its leadership of being "agents of imperialism", "Collaborators with Israel" etc. the regime hopes to legitimize its policy of colonisation by pretending to be trying to defend and preserve the interests of Iraq against an external threat rather than a domestic dispute. But in doing so, the regime is actually internationalising the Kurdish question in Iraq and bringing an external element into it. The regime is, however, extremely opposed to such an internationalisation of the problem. In this way the regime has put itself in an unenviable position, a position of its own making.

A careful look at the accusations made by the regime against the Kurds shows that they are not new and have been levelled against the Kurds previously prior to the conclusion of the March Agreement of 1970 between the Kurdish leadership and the present regime. The very fact that the Baath regime II has concluded an agreement with the Kurdish movement's leadership and has had five Kurdish ministers in its government render all these accusations empty, because if the regime had ever believed that these accusations have any basis, how could it justify coming to terms with them and give them five portfolios. If it did ever believe these accusations to be true, agreement with the Kurdish leadership would have meant endangering and betraying the interests of Iraq. If it did not believe them to be true, then using the same accusations now means only that the regime is hypocritical, and this is what it fundamentally is. The whole issue reflects the regime's hypocrisy and reveals its real objective. This objective has been and still is, the destruction of the national movement of the Kurdish people in Iraq by first eliminating its leadership;

When the Baath Regime II's use of force to achieve the said objective had failed twice, (in 1963 and 1969) it thought of another method - that of hypocrisy and conspiracy. This should not come as a surprise since conspiracy is actually in the

nature of the present leadership of the Baath party, as has been observed by independent scholars. As G.H. Torry puts it, the new brand of leaders of the Baath party are men "who have increased and organised the party's conspiratorial mentalities and tendencies and who are ruthless. Many of these are the men who have spent years underground in conspiracy and carried out political assassination. (G.H. Torry "The Baath Ideology and Practice" Middle East Journal 23, No 4, p.470).

When conspiracy alone, like war alone, failed to achieve its objective, the Baath regime has decided on a combination of both conspiracy and ruthless war together in an all-out drive to 'crush' the Kurdish national movement in Iraq and its leadership. To justify and legitimize the new drive the Baath Regime II had no other option but to retreat into its old position, the position of levelling accusations against the Kurdish movement and its leadership, against their yesterday's partners in the government. (It is interesting to note in passing the dilemma of the Baath present position: the dilemma is how does the regime explain the fact that it has had until the beginning of March 1974 five Kurdish ministers representing the Kurdish leadership in its government who have been accepted by it and according to its own standards as "progressive", "patriots" and "honest" and have been entrusted with state secrets and given a say, albeit nominal, in the affairs of the state until they resigned, but as soon as they resigned the same regime accused them and still does, of being "reactionaries", "agents of imperialism" and "collaborators with Israel".)

A glance at the accusations made reveals the fact that they have been repudiated (whether explicitly or implicitly) and levelled by the very same individuals and groups. Premier Qassim was the man who let the Kurdish leadership return from exile. When he felt they were no longer an element for his remaining in power, he turned course and accused them of being "separatists", "agents of colonialism", "bandits" and "robbers". His allies called them and the movement "reactionaries" and "a desperate adventure by Kurdish nationalists". Qassim was overthrown and replaced by the Baath regime I. This regime came to terms with the Kurdish leadership, thus repudiating the accusations made by Qassim against this leadership. However, as soon as the Baath regime I felt that the Kurds were no longer a factor for their staying in power, they as well turned course accusing the Kurdish leadership of being "separatists", "agents of world communism" and "shu'ubis" (anti-Arab). Baath regime I was removed and President Arif I assumed all power. He in turn reached an accord with the Kurds, repudiating the accusations made by the Baath regime I against the Kurdish leadership. Once again, when Arif I felt that the Kurds are no longer an element for his continuing in power, he accused the Kurdish leadership of being saboteurs, and of "misleading" the Kurds. His brother, the then Acting Chief of Staff (and soon to be President Arif II) claimed on 16th November 1965 that "arms captured from the Kurdish rebels bore the Israeli star insignia". However, he never produced evidence. Arif I was killed in a suspicious air crash and was replaced by Arif II who was in turn overthrown and replaced by Baath regime II. Baath regime II has followed exactly the same "procedure".

When planning their July 17th 1968 coup d'etat, the Baathists contacted the Kurdish leadership and asked them to take part in the would-be coup, through the present President Bakir and Salih Mehdi Ammash, Abd Allah S. al-Samarra'i and Anour Abd al-Qadir al-Hadithi. The Kurdish leadership rejected the request because of the bitter experiences the Kurds had with the Baath regime I in 1963. In retaliation, the Baath regime II, after it had come to power, staged a series of "confessions" aiming at discrediting the Kurdish leadership. On December 4th 1968 Radio Baghdad broadcast the "confessions" of 3 Iraqis, one of whom was Abd al-Hadi al-Bajjari. He told of a group he formed with CENTO backing to supply information to CENTO and certain neighbouring countries and to "reactivate the Kurdish movement in the North", a veiled accusation that the Kurdish movement and its leadership was co-operating with CENTO. On May 17th 1969, President Bakir said that "Barzani's guerilla movement" was an attempt to force a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the Israeli front, a barely veiled accusation that this movement was co-ordinating its operations with Israel. On June 7th 1969, former mayor of Baghdad "confessed" to have been CIA agent and said that "the Kurdish rebels under Barzani were receiving aid and arms from

the U.S." - a direct accusation that the Kurdish movement was supported by the Americans. Not only this. During the same period, the Baath regime II was insisting on the same Kurdish leadership to start negotiations with it in order to reach a solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq, thus implicitly admitting that all the accusations it had made or made on its behalf against the Kurdish movement and leadership were baseless.

However, negotiations started and the March Agreement was concluded between the Kurdish leadership and the regime. Thus the regime explicitly admitted that all the accusations made against the Kurdish movement and leadership were absurd and void of any substance and meaning and thus made a fool of itself before the whole world. Everything seemed to have been settled, but as soon as the Baath Regime II came to feel that it had become well entrenched in power and that hypocrisy and conspiracy have failed it in its basic objective of destroying the Kurdish national movement, it, like all its predecessors turned course and returned to the same old "procedure" which the Kurds hoped had been abandoned. Present day accusations are exactly the same old ones, only some ideological seasoning has been added to them. The Kurdish movement and leadership have suddenly become again "reactionaries", "agents of imperialism", "collaborators with Israel", "separatists" and "bandits". However, the "Red Mulla" and "agents of world communism" have been kept in store this time because of political expediency, since the Baath regime II says that it is "progressive" because it has "good relations with the Soviet Union".

By levelling these accusations against the Kurdish movement and leadership and by making Iran a country that has "progressively retreated behind its own Iron Curtain making it exceedingly difficult for Westerners to interpret events in that country with accuracy and fairness" (Phebe Ann Marr, Middle East Journal 23, No.3, p.394), Baath regime II is trying to deceive world public opinion and isolate the Kurdish national movement.

From the above expose emerges a pattern that has been followed by all Iraqi governments since the creation of the State of Iraq. Iraqi governments newly assuming power or planning a coup to come to power try at least to neutralise the Kurds in return

for some vague, general commitments. Once they are well established, they go back on their commitments by accusing the Kurds of being this or that depending on political expediency. In other words, no Iraqi regime or government has been willing able or capable of really solving the central problem in and of Iraq, i.e. the Kurdish Question, because of the afore-mentioned procedure they all follow. In addition, it is inconceivable that any Iraqi regime coming to power through a coup d'etat, can be genuinely willing to accept or capable of carrying out the Kurds' demand for autonomy in Kurdistan-Iraq (real not paper autonomy). This is so their rule and remain in power, since all of them refuse the very idea of elections and parliament and other democratic institutions. Besides, Kurdish Autonomy means the creation of a second centre of power. This centre will, when founded, inevitably come into conflict with the primary centre of power in Baghdad because the latter must wield total despotic power to remain in power, as mentioned above, and because it reasonably thinks that the secondary centre of power will be a real threat to its very existence, since around the secondary centre of power will gravitate all the other political forces in the country that are oppressed by the primary centre of power. An additional factor at play is the Kurds' insistence on linking the success and continuation of their autonomy with democratic rule in Iraq. The primary centre of power in Baghdad, where power is over-concentrated, views any demand for democracy, elections, parliament, free press, freedom to all political parties etc., as threats to and attacks on its power basis (i.e. force) and thus its continuation in power.

To conclude, there seems to be available the following options for a permanent solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq:

- 1) To accept the Kurds' demand for autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq.
- 2) To accept the Kurds demand for autonomy for Kurdistan guaranteed by some international body or bodies.
- 3) To continue the present war of terror against the Kurdish civilian population and achieve a Hitlerite "final solution".
- 4) To force on the Kurds the same decision forced on Bangladesh.

Kurdish Popular Organisations



1. KURDISTAN STUDENTS UNION

The Kurdistan Students Union (KSU), which represents the students of Kurdistan-Iraq, was founded in 1953 to serve the interests of Kurdish students who were suffering from the national discrimination the Kurdish people suffered generally in Iraq. It has continuously fought to increase the number of Kurdish University students and the establishment of a Kurdish University (Kurdish students represented a minute percentage of government scholarships which were sent in hundreds abroad since 1958).

Until the 11th March 1970 Peace Agreement, KSU had to work secretly because of the ban on all Kurdish political and popular organisations, when it was officially recognised. It has stood

steadfastly during those dark hours when the enemy's onslaught ravaged Kurdistan, justly deserving our leader BARZANI's famous words: "Our students are the spearhead of the Revolution".

During the peace years (1970-74) KSU organised summer campaigns in the countryside of Kurdistan where thousands of its members converged upon the rural areas during the summer vacation to live with the peasants, exchanging ideas and knowledge and helping them to eradicate illiteracy, and general farm work.



KSU members helping villagers at harvest time during one of the summer campaigns.

The 7th Congress was held in Sulaimani, Kurdistan-Iraq, on 30th March 1972 and lasted for four days. 465 delegates, besides representatives of Kurdistan Youth, Women and Teachers organisations and progressive student movements from many parts of the world, including a delegation from the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE) attended the KSU Congress.

With the resumption of yet another military campaign against the Kurdish people by the fascist Baathists, KSU could no longer operate openly and has to work secretly in the towns under government control. However, its main work has lately been in the liberated areas of Kurdistan where thousands of students have joined the Revolution, including most of the staff and students of Sulaimani University which was occupied by government tanks.



KURDISTAN WOMEN FEDERATION

Historically women have always been prominent in Kurdish society and their role expanded greatly in the wake of Kurdish nationalism.

In 1945 the Revolutionary Society of Kurdish Women was founded in Kirkuk of women whose husbands and sons have joined the Barzan rising to organise help. In 1946 and during the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, the Kurdistan Democratic Federation of Women was established and also a women organisation in Sulaimani. In the forties and early fifties Kurdish women worked within the secret youth society which included Kurdish students studying in the colleges and schools of Baghdad.

However, these organisations did not live very long under the difficult conditions and oppression the Kurdish peoples were subjected to, until the founding of the Kurdistan Federation of Women which held its first Congress secretly in December 1952. KWF played a great role in enlightening Kurdish women and took an active part in the struggle of the Kurdish people for their national rights in the September 1961 revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq. During the period of the March agreement (1970-74) it held its second Congress openly after the victory of the Kurdish Revolution and in April 1972 held its third Congress putting forward an extensive programme to curb illiteracy among Kurdish women in the towns and rural areas besides a plan for the establishment of domestic training centres and medical and family advice and planning bureaux.

In the face of many obstacles put in its path by the government

sponsored women organisation (Baathist) it kept its autonomous character and managed to achieve many rights for Kurdish women.

KWF is today playing a very important role in the liberated areas of Kurdistan. Many of its members have become nurses helping Kurdish doctors and organising relief for refugees and families who have become homeless as a result of extensive bombing of the villages and towns of Kurdistan in the latest Iraqi government campaign against the Kurdish people.

A European committee has been established among Kurdish women studying abroad to co-ordinate work and help between KWF and European women and humanitarian organisations.



KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC YOUTH FEDERATION (KDYF)

The first Kurdish youth society was formed in 1933 which issued a pamphlet called Diari Lawan, and in 1946, during the Mahabad Republic, Kurdish youth became active in the new-born state.

The present Kurdistan Democratic Youth Federation (KDYF) was established in 1953 and rapidly gathered around it the youth of Kurdistan, where it played an active part in rallying support among youth for the Kurdish Revolution which culminated in the victory of the 11th March Agreement of 1970 recognising autonomy for Kurdistan within a democratic Iraq. KDYF was now officially recognised as the only representative of Kurdish Youth and held its first Congress openly in Shaqlawah in July 1972.

It has participated in many international youth festivals, the last of which was as part of the joint Iraqi delegation to the 10th International Festival of Youth and Students in East Berlin in 1973.

The new developments in Kurdistan-Iraq and the convergence of thousands of Kurdish youth to the liberated areas, and the Baathist government banning of all political and mass organisations outside their so-called front, transferred the centre of activities of KDYF to these areas and is today doing its share in the Kurdish people's struggle for survival and freedom.

KDYF has recently announced its withdrawal from the General Federation of Iraqi Youth in protest against the latter's pro-Baathist stand.

Photo David Graeme-Baker/SIPA Press



KURDISTAN: A New Way of Viewing the Middle East



Mr Elon Ahlback is a pastor in the Swedish church (Katarina församling, in Stockholm) was born in 1935 near Gothenberg, and has studied at the Universities of Lund in Sweden, Hamburg and Geneva. He is a member of the Christian Social Democrats International Committee. Was invited to Kurdistan in 1970 to attend the 8th Congress of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. He is married and has two children, Shereen 8 years and Kahan 6 years.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) opened its eighth congress in the rocky, moon-resembling area of Nawpredam in Northern Iraq close to the frontier of Iran on July 1st 1970. I found myself there with no other company but a group of foreigners invited. On an occasion like this one is, of course, overwhelmed with new impressions. One of the questions that came to survive in my mind was whether a congress like this could not give a new point of view on the problem of the Middle East: a point of view we might need here in Sweden.

So I have asked myself, for example, if our customary way of approaching the Orient does not suffer from a kind of one-sidedness. It is surely only reasonable that all attention should be directed towards the conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis as long as these offer the keenest menace to world peace. But it would be unreasonable to set forth that all the problems of minority groups and injustice will be solved the very minute peace is made. I shall maintain that the Kurds, no less than ten million souls, are by no means an unimportant nationality problem that could not later on touch world peace and us.

Here I wish to draw attention to the threshold-making effect the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours seems to have had on our debate about the Middle East. Far too sure opinions have been expressed formerly about the Israeli and Arabs and consequently discussion has become stagnant and we have been unable to penetrate the problems of the Orient any deeper. I am thinking of those who from motives at bottom religious have backed Israel and thus let the Arabs remain outside as well. Or I am thinking of those who have driven the attention of the Eastern block to the matter; closed their eyes to the religiously coloured motives of the Arabs in struggle against Israel and favoured a "scientific" view of the problems while the Israelis have remained outside. With this one-sidedness of thinking, nearly all other problems of the Orient have also gone beyond the horizon. In this context, there are some glimpses of debate I should like to mention. If it were said in certain circles that the Israeli State has been founded for not only religious and humanitarian causes but also by the force of political opinion to which the Arab world should remain scattered, low and open to exploitation, it would mean the risk of calling one Per Ghattori or even something worse. Or if, in some other circles, the bloody war the Arabs have waged against the Kurds in Iraq has been brought forward, the answer has been a question, pronounced with deep indignation: Is it really true that the Kurds wage war against the Arabs (in this case the same as true allies of the Soviet Union)? In both cases discussion has stopped short. Twice better then that some change towards growing realism has been seen in debating and not least during the last few years. As far as I understand, both SSU and FPU congresses have become to a kind of compromise thinking when it has been seen that both sides in conflict work for demands really justified. Thereupon they have gone over the threshold and the door has opened for the problems of the Orient in general.

Let me try to illustrate, how the states of the Orient, how the Great Powers, how the United Nations, how the unallied states of the world may seem from the point of view of the Kurds.

The Kurds inhabit mainly a rocky district, partly inaccessible, that covers parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and a small enclave in the Soviet Union. It is not said too much if we say that they live there like people of a second or third class, in

deep isolation, their standard of living being one of the lowest in the world. Nearly all capitals of countries populated by the Kurds come out as enemies of the Kurds. The case was driven to extremities in the East-allied Iraq before 11th March: after a sensationally successful struggle for freedom the Kurds then forced the peace treaty upon the enemy. Today the position of the Kurds is worst in the West-allied Turkey where the governing people quite recently stated that the six million "mountain Turks" are an even more dangerous enemy than the Soviet Union. Those well-informed in Eastern politics will know that such statements usually begin a new chapter and, indeed, we now have plenty of reports telling about attacks the Turkish gendarmerie and units have exposed the "mountain Turks" to. There can be no doubt whatsoever about the Turkish government intending to smash down every effort the Kurds will make to follow the example given by their Iraq kinsfolk. For people in Kurdistan this means that it is the Great Powers they will have to wrestle with to reach rights of citizenship. Whether the Kurds fight against Ankara or Teheran, it is the American weapons they see directed towards them. Whether they fight against Baghdad or Damascus, it is the Russian weapons they see directed against them. Kurdistan has not got the ambiguous pleasure of being backed by only one of the great block. They are being attacked by both East and West. From beginning to end the game of the Great Powers has contributed to weakening the position of the Kurds. It is by the command of the Great Powers that the Kurds have been scattered in all these diverse countries which for their own part tear each other by the hair and have turned out to make their Kurdish minority seem traitors, agents of the hostile block. Few years were needed for the Kurds of Iraq to be accused of being now footmen of communists, now agents of imperialists. Amidst all this the U.N. has turned out to be unable to listen to the cries for help uttered by the Kurds. The U.N. is by its decree bound to function more as a governmental club - even if the governments were not backed by the nations. The Kurdish problem is not something one could have come to grips with for the problem has not existed in formal constitutional meaning. The Kurds have had their struggle for life while fighting all the possible powers; during that time they have been kept even more scattered, lower and open to exploitation than any other now existing people in the Orient, the Arabs included. You may put your hand on your heart and ask what the unallied states have done for the Kurds. Is it so specially much? The game of Great Powers has settled on the way and who would quarrel with the Great Powers only to help a national minority in trouble? Also U.N.'s formalistic views have put obstacles on the way. We have already spoken about other kinds of thresholds of debate difficult to break through. The final result has been that the Kurds have had no real support from any side. A common phenomenon, but frightening in its concrete forms.

What conclusions would the Kurds like to draw from this background? It is only in one country, that is Iraq, that the Kurds by way of peace treaty have been capable of political activities on an officially acknowledged level so that they have also been able to draw some conclusions from their bloody past for the future. The peace treaty, or the Declaration of March 11th as they also call it, met the demands of the Kurds on surprisingly many points, at least as far as they are written on the paper. The Kurdistan Democratic Party enjoys official recognition as the main party - and I think it is essential that these circumstances are given attention here in Sweden if not when the KDP looks for contact with us. One of the Vice Presidents of Iraq will be a Kurd sent by the KDP congress. Five Kurds sent by the KDP congress belong to the government of Iraq. In Baghdad flats have been provided to form a political centre and main editorial office of Takhi. I have myself had a chance to visit both of them. Northern Iraq will be governed by the Kurds while the Arabic part of Iraq is correspondingly ruled over by the Arab Baathist Socialist Party, the KDP's coalition partner in the new government. The guerrillas of Kurdistan, Pesh Mergas, have the status of regular soldiers, their function being to maintain order in the "frontier parts of the north". Pesh Merga troops form such a unique kind of armed force that I think it a pity if other small countries, like Sweden for instance, neglected studying it closer. Their peace decrees further that the Kurds shall have their share of national oil income in proportion to their population. They have also agreed about free elections in the whole of Iraq: the KDP must be more concerned about this than the Baathist party can be. It goes without saying that the peace treaty makes a great strain upon social reforms in general.

The KDP congress of July 1st-7th fulfilled the peace program but also sharpened many of its points. First I shall only mention that Nawpredam, the meeting place of the congress, distinguishes itself by the ferro-concrete building where the negotiations for peace took place last winter: it was then people started calling the building "Palace of Peace". Bearing in mind the oriental instinct for symbols it looks no coincidence that the congress was to meet in this very place. We had a congress in a real spirit of peace although the rocky terrain was all encircled by watchful Pesh Merga troops armed to the teeth. From the opening ceremonies on July 1st I have committed to memory three things I should call political events par excellence. The self-evident number one will be that this congress generally took place in this open form with the KDP as an officially recognised party. Number two is without doubt the register of speakers that adorned the ceremonies. First of all spoke Mullah Mustafa Barazani, chairman of the KDP, generally respected as one of the most legendary champions of liberty, then spoke Doctor Mahmoud, a strong man in the party. A civil representative of the former enemy, the Baathists who had sent a delegation to the congress, spoke about newly won friendship. Then there were representatives of the Iraq Liberal Party (minor parties live underground in the south but can speak freely here in the north) of the Democratic Association for Youth, Students Association, Womens Association (all three of Kurdistan), the Democratic Party of the Syrian Kurdistan, the Democratic Party of the Lebanese Kurds, the Lebanon's Youth Association, the KDP's European Organisation (speaker: architect Jamal Alemdar, Stockholm), Kurdistan's Association for Teachers and two Palestinian guerilla organisations represented in Baghdad: Arab Socialist Movement and Al Fatah. From all directions respect was expressed for the successful struggle for liberty of the revolutionaries of the KDP and Kurdistan. (Kurdish Students Society in Europe = KSSE that will arrange the congress of the year in Stockholm on August 1st-5th).

The political event number three was a report sent to the congress by the leaders of the party: it was marked last on the list of speakers. That the report would emphasise the points that appeared in the declaration of March 11th we knew to expect. Judging from the politics of the oriental states as well as from the game of the Great Powers. It goes without saying that polite words were uttered both towards the East and West but a real loud onrush was directed towards the unallied states of the world. I shall be able to revert to this tendency later on in connection with the interviews I had with I had with leading Kurds. Orientation towards unalliance if not towards what we call neutrality, was being constantly reinforced. Efforts seem to be based above all on assurance that the past very dangerous isolation must be broken. After all the years of war and blockades one now seems willing to develop new relations over boundaries as well with humanitarian as cognate political organisations: this naturally all the time holding the balance which is required not to fall out with the coalition brothers in Baghdad. What is interesting here are comprehensibly the foreign relations one can rely on and that may be for help in future construction. That the society of Kurdistan must be modernised administratively, socially and industrially, is a fact that cries out up to the skies. Schools, hospitals and means of communication show frightening defects. One finds it impossible to believe that a nation can subsist on such a low level, from the point of view of pure technology, while natural resources of earth and rocks are so great. Oil is already being exploited by a foreign company whose yearly profit amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars while the Kurds have no share whatsoever. But also iron, copper, gold, and much else can still be found unexploited, Kurdistan could be a well-to-do area on this globe if only its development took place in a favourable manner to the people living there.

During the congress one came to see how the foreign powers today observe the KDP. Interest shown by the West was moderate. "Voice of America" allowed one mention to the congress. Besides I saw few Western journalists. The East showed somewhat keener interest. One Russian and one East-German news agency had sent reporters. During the congress telegrams of good wishes arrived from practically all communist parties led by the Soviet Union. This would have been impossible before March 11th. The congress, however, strove to discretely repel interests of both East and West. We do not need to be surprised at that. The State of Iraq offers a good example of how the Great Powers may intervene with their interests. The economy of the country seems to be totally domineered by the capitalist oil-interests of the West, to which Iraq will be tied by a slave contract at least until the year 2000. The military powers, on the contrary, as well as political jargon seem to be domineered by what so many like to call Eastern imperialism. What kind of forms this may take is best illustrated by the war which is over now. According to many

opinions the Baathist Socialist Party has waged its fiasco-coloured and mildly said costly war (it has swallowed up 38% of the national budget) against the Kurds, nota bene, by order of the oil companies (!), while weapons and apparatus of propaganda have been provided by the Eastern block. This is generally considered as a situation very disgraceful for a free and sovereign state and judging from all it builds up a strong motive for the KDP to direct itself towards people of the third stand-point: the unallied. Surely there is a question to pose: how are the unallied going to expel the present fumbleers from Kurdistan? Must we fear that nothing but pessimistic anticipations can be made.

The congress also made it possible to study the KDP's ways of making manoeuvres on the stormy sea the Middle East politically forms. Friendship from a proper distance seems to be the slogan. With the Arabs we are brothers - as long as peace reigns., the Kurds say. I asked General Barzani how he judges the problem of Israel. He asked me not to pose that question to him but to those who take care of the Arab-Israel problem: Kosygin, Nixon and Heath. The Kurds will not get mixed up with other people's problems while there is so much to look after at home. In this context I noticed that the Kurds would like to influence their neighbours. Peace by way of discussion is the only solution because war only creates new complications.

Increased freedom for the Kurds in the states of the Orient among which Kurdistan is situated would have influence upon the political efforts of other people - not least the Arabs - and lead up to increased realism. In other words, growing influence of the Kurds among the oriental kinsfolk should result in more emphasised efforts for peace in the Middle East. The statement is well-based as long as it is the peace-loving forces that are predominant in the liberty movement of Kurdistan. My impression has been that Kurdistan is a power like that although I have met among the leaders of the KDP political chatterers who create tension over the whole field from East to West. Likewise it is my conviction that the KDP and its political programme come very near democratic socialism. The KDP is not ready to do business either for East or West in any matter of vital importance. While fumbleers are cast out to the unallied world in order to have development aid, it seems that one should not receive any binding help from East or West if a new war broke out with Baghdad. That is why Pesh Merga defence forces are kept in a state of preparedness in case new hostilities break out. Besides it is emphasised that the inside political and military forces of their own are the only one can rely on if struggle begins again. The Kurds have said to me that there are examples to be seen in the world where such inside power has not developed but struggle for freedom has been entrusted to foreign hands which has only led into catastrophe. Even if it is with sorrow, not to say melancholy, the Kurds look back upon the offering their struggle for freedom has cost, it is with pride that one sees afterwards that the struggle has been made through the media of one's own and made successfully in spite of superior powers one had ahead. Every people's right to live at liberty very comprehensively forms a cornerstone of ideology of the Kurds. In spite of all this firmness many question marks remain if we think about the social surroundings. To what extent is the KDP really going to influence the militant Baathist junta that dictates Iraq's foreign policies on the whole through the nominal administration?

During the KDP congress I had a chance to discuss with two of the representatives of these Palestinian groups. They explained to me that they had always given support to the struggle for freedom of the Kurds "because our organisations give support to the struggle for freedom of any nation for ideological reasons." I asked why it came out now that the Kurds had had their fighting and done it by themselves. It took a moment until the answer came. Then they said that their organisations had not wanted to quarrel with the Baathist regime for "ideological reasons ..."

As I flew home from the summer congress of the Kurdistan Democratic Party on July 7th, I was convinced that it was the unallied states of the world - and Sweden is surely one of them - which owe a special response to the people of Kurdistan. The Kurdistan or Iraq is susceptible for development aid which at present may be arranged on an administrative level. There can be no reason to deny such help from the Kurds of Iraq. It is possible that one country like ours cannot accomplish very much. But it would be a good deed, if Sweden, within the compass of relations of foreign politics we have, took part in a multi-national development programme and at the same time cultivated new political contacts and that, I believe, would mean giving support to powers working for democracy, peace and progress in the whole Middle East.

STOCKHOLM JULY 1970

Zarathustra

The Mede

93 years ago, Friedrich Nietzsche began to make notes for his book "Thus Spake Zarathustra" and portrayed himself as the modern version of the ancient philosopher. HAZHIR TEIMOURIAN, a Kurdish journalist living in London, looks at the original Zarathustra and the development of his church.

To what land shall I flee? Where bend my steps?

I am thrust out from family and tribe;

I have no favour from the village to which I would belong,

Nor from the wicked rulers of the country:

How then, Lord, shall I obtain thy favour?

Zarathustra Spitama, or Zoroaster, the philosopher-prophet of ancient Central Asia, is thought to have been born in the Zagros highlands of Western Iran, or Eastern Kurdistan, in 630 B.C., when our ancestors, the Medes, were at the zenith of their power. The religion he founded later became the state religion of the Persian Empire, and the doctrines he formulated travelled far. Plato, in the 4th century B.C., had a particular reverence for Zoroastrianism and borrowed his duality from it. A quick glance at Judaism, Christianity and Islam, too, reveals the many ideas they have in common with, and probably borrowed from, Zoroastrianism. The essential oneness of God, His triad manifestations, the opposition of the Devil, the Day of Judgement, Heaven and Hell, etc. are too numerous to be due to chance. It can be seen, therefore, that Zarathustra deeply influenced the course of Western civilisation and continues to shape the lives of many of us now. Yet, most people in the West have never heard of him, and those who have, wrongly identify him with Nietzsche.

According to Professor R.C. Zaehner of Oxford, the traditional date assigned to Zarathustra's major achievement, the conversion of King Vishtaspa, is 258 years before Alexander, which from the Iranian point of view means the death of Darius III in 330 B.C. When Zarathustra converted the king of Chorasmia in North East Iran, he was 42 years old. We may therefore conclude that he was born in 630 B.C.

However, Zarathustra prefers not to speak of himself in his poems and our knowledge of his life is very limited. We know, for example, that he was forced to emigrate from his homeland before he found favour with the court of Chorasmia, but we do not know exactly in what district he was born. He does not say whether his father had been a landowner, soldier, or like himself a priest, but he does complain of his own lack of wealth and power:

I know, O wise one, why I am powerless:

My cattle are few, and I have few men.

To thee I address my lament: attend onto it, O Lord,

And grant me the support which friend would give to friend,

As Righteousness; teach the possession of the Good Mind.

One may be tempted to conclude from the above poem, which shows him to have enjoyed co-operative influence, that he suffered from greed and a taste for power, but in the light of other evidence, that would seem a mistaken view. His sincerity and dedication were proved by his many years of exile and isolation, and his will to power resulted from his painful discovery of the connection between wealth and influence. He knew that his principles would find earlier acceptance if he were rich and for this reason he even wished to become a horse breeder:

This I ask thee, O Lord, answer me truly:

Shall I receive for my wage, through Righteousness,

Ten mares with a stallion and a camel,

Which were promised to me, O Wise One,

Together with Thy gift of Integrity and Immortality?

Successful religions or sects, it seems, have had inherent in them at their beginning the ideology of a new political force, class or nation. In order to find acceptance, the founders have had to be the ideologues or spokesmen of an emergent economic grouping. In other words, a new successful religion or sect has always been the spiritual arm of a new political order. Viewed from this angle, whose voice and spokesman was Zarathustra? A study of his poems, which are all that remain of him, and also a geographical study of Central Asia as it was then, show that he was the voice of agricultural settlers who represented a higher stage of civilisation. For over three thousand years before his time, the setting up of feeble but permanent farming

settlements had become common practice in that part of the world, but such communities had never enjoyed peace and security for long. The countryside was the roaming ground of numerous nomadic tribes whose swift horsemen plundered the villages and took their young workers into slavery.

At the time of Zarathustra, the number of settlements had increased further, but due to general sparseness of population, they were still too small and far apart. The armies of the war-lords in the market towns could extend no protection to them either, specially since each market town had its own hierarchy of deities and the consequent religious-economic rivalries resulted in their frequent wars and general weakness.

What Zarathustra brought to the people was a new, unifying mythological system. He did not have to invent a new system of ethics. That had come into being with agriculture itself and Zarathustra merely had to give it formal expression. What was most needed now consisted of a supergod, with a revised body of laws, capable of uniting all the settlements and directing their militancy towards the common enemy. Zarathustra achieved this by preaching a God of Light and Righteousness, called Ahuramazda, and a Spirit of Evil and Darkness, called Ahriman. The two were locked in battle, and every human being had the duty of participating on the side of his creator, Ahuramazda, who would be the ultimate victor.

Every Zoroastrian had to constantly remember his three principal slogans: good thoughts, good words, good deeds. These slogans had important practical applications. For example, they made the telling of lies a deadly sin, which in turn made outcasts of merchants and shopkeepers: Zoroastrians could not believe it possible to be a merchant and avoid telling lies in praise of one's own goods. They also believed that God had created the world in six stages, in the last stage creating the Original Man, Gayumart, in His own image. Gayumart and the rest of Creation were permeated by the so-called element fire. Therefore Zoroastrians revered fire as a symbol of God and His work, in the same way that Christians revere the cross.

A more basic deduction depicted farmers, cattle raisers and craftsmen as friends of Ahuramazda, while it portrayed the roaming, parasitic hordes of the steppe as having joined hands with the Devil, Ahriman. No one could remain neutral in this holy war. A man either chose the Good Life and earned eternal bliss, or else, trod along the wrong path towards the horrors of Hell.

The propagation of these heretic ideas caused Zarathustra to be expelled from his family and tribe, but he was convinced he would eventually succeed and herald in a new era, when all mankind would be civilised, settled to honest toil, and united in its love for Ahuramazda, the God of Righteousness. For years therefore he endured isolation, poverty and humiliation, until at last a war-lord called Vishtaspa was able to see the capabilities of the new religion in extending his kingdom by making him, Vishtaspa, the champion of all farmers. Thus Zarathustra attained respectability and acquired the resources of a prominent war-lord for the implementation of his ideas. However, it took many centuries before Zoroastrianism reached the zenith of its influence under the Sassanid emperors. Persia was then engaged in almost constant warfare against Byzantium and Zoroastrianism was given the important role of being a spiritual bulwark against Christianity and the Roman cultural influence.

The greater sophistication of the new Sassanid society, the long wars against the Romans and the consequent heavy taxes, the increasing corruption within the empire's administration and some other factors all combined to cause widespread disillusionment among the people with the Zoroastrian church. In other words, the church became wholly identified with the corrupt, tyrannical state, and a stream of other sects and religions began to appear in the various corners of the empire, which spread from Armenia and Syria to the shores of the Indus in India. Although the Persians respected the established churches of other agrarian societies under their suzerainty, the new emergent religions were all crushed by the emperors' armies until the tide turned with the Arab invasion in the 7th century A.D. and the Sassanids were easily overthrown. Many historians have noted that discontent among the Persians had reached such a level that the majority welcomed the Arabs as possible saviours.

The Zoroastrian church still survives with over 250,000 adherents who are gathered in small pockets in such commercial centres

KURDISTAN

in the International Press

Japan Times September 4, 1973

Destiny of the Kurds

By IBRAHIM NOORI
LONDON (Kyodo-Reuters) — Iraq under a peace agreement has been no fighting in northern Kurdistan. The Kurds, who for decades have been fighting for an independent Kurdistan, are probably destined to "remain a race" between the 75-year-old Mulla Mustafa and the ruling Baath Party Government. The agreement was caused by sabotage. Perhaps this was because the Kurds did not wish to lose their sympathy in the West. The Kurds might accept a difficult peace is from The Observer March 31, 1974

Defiant Kurds are ready for war

from GWYNNE ROBERTS: Kurdish rebel headquarters, Northern Iraq, 30 March

KURDISH leader General Mulla Mustafa Barzani this week revealed plans to proclaim autonomy unilaterally within Iraq or possibly even take more drastic measures if the crisis with Baghdad worsens.

Self-proclaimed autonomy would be in defiance of the Iraqi Government decision announced this week to go ahead with its own version of self-rule for the Kurds with the formation of an 80-man legislative body in Arbil, Northern Iraq.

In a midnight interview at his secret mountain headquarters, the 70-year-old Kurdish leader

described this move as an attempt to impose fake autonomy and said it was totally unacceptable.

Shortly after the interview, the General ordered a full-scale war alert and imposed a daytime curfew of 'unlimited duration' throughout Iraqi Kurdistan.

Partisan troops in the northern mountains were put on an intensified alert and businesses and offices allowed to open only at dusk. This followed reports from Baghdad that a surprise attack by Iraqi jets may be imminent.

About 100,000 Kurds have

flocked to the rugged region held by the General's 40,000-strong Guerrilla army. Barzani's aides describe this exodus as 'a turning point in the history of the Kurdish revolution.'

'Kurds ran out of the cities of Kurdistan to fight for their rights,' the General said. 'The whole Kurdish people is ready to make sacrifices for real autonomy.'

The Kurds are angry about the Iraqi plans for Kurdish self-rule. They say the plans fall far short of their demands, enshrined in a March 1970 agreement signed by General Barzani and Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein, and would amount to no more than decentralisation giving only limited control of local affairs.

General Barzani, a man of near legendary stature within Kurdistan, said the Kurdish leadership was studying the question of a unilateral declaration of independence. *Helsingin Sanomat* May 25, 1974

Kurdien asia YK:hon

Irakin kurdikysymys viedään lähimmän kahden viikon aikana Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien talous- ja sosiaalineuvoston käsiteltäväksi. Näin sanoi Mohammad Abdul al-Rahman, entinen Irakin hallituksen ministeri lehdistötilaisuudessa Helsingissä perjantaina.

Kurdit käyttävät al-Rahmanin mukaan kaikkia mahdollisia keinoja saadakseen asiansa käsiteltäväksi. He syyttävät Irakin hallitusta kurdien joukkomurhasta.

Al-Rahman kertoi, että tähän mennessä on Irakin hallituksen toimeenpanemissa pommituksissa kuollut 1120 ihmistä ja noin 3000 on loukkaantunut. Irakilaiset lentokoneet ovat pommittaneet noin 200 kylää Kurdistanissa. Hallitus on hirttänyt 22 ihmistä, joukossa mm. 11 opiskelijaa.

Kurdit sanovat hallituksen käyttävän mm. napalmia siviili-kohteita vastaan. Pommituksien uhrien sanotaan enimmäkseen olleen naisia ja lapsia.

Kurdien sissiarmeija Pashmerga on pakottanut Irakin armeijan joukot vetäytymään suurimmasta osasta Kurdistanin vuoristokaupunkeja. Pääasiassa taisteluja käydään kukkuloilla Kirkukista Slaimaniaan, Kirkukista Rawonderziin ja Mosulista Zakhoon lähellä Turkin rajaa johtavien pääteiden ympärillä.

The Washington Post March 22, 1974

The Plight of the Kurds

Scotsman (Edinburgh)

April 29, 1974

Iraqi air attacks on Kurds

ANKARA, Sunday. — Iraqi jet fighters violated Turkish air space three times today during raids on Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq, according to a senior Turkish official in the border area.

He told a correspondent that the MIG fighters had been bombing so close to the frontier that fragments of shell had scattered into Turkey and farmers had fled from the fields.

Iraqi air raids have intensified as an armoured Government relief force has pushed closer to the frontier town of Zakho, where the rebels are bombarding a 1000-strong garrison. — Reuters.

AL-HAYAT March 13, 1974

Western Mail, Cardiff

April 20, 1974

WAR IN IRAQ: Kurdish rebels have declared all-out war against the Iraqi Government. Kurdistan radio accused the Baghdad regime of the cold-blooded execution of 11 prominent Kurdish figures.

بغداد: امه لندا
الكراد ١٥ يومًا

Iraq poison gas plan alleged

BY RICHARD JOHNS, MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

THE Iraqi Army is stockpiling Soviet-made poison gas for possible use against the dissident Kurds in the north of the country, according to the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

The allegation, for which the KDP claim to have irrefutable evidence, emerged at a closed meeting of the political committee of the Kurdish Students Society in West Berlin last month which was attended by two members of the Party's Central Committee.

This serious charge coincides with the outbreak of fighting between the Iraqi Army and the Pesh Merga, or Kurdish irregular forces. The renewed conflict was triggered off by the Army's occupation of a village called Asriya on the Syrian border on August 17 and has subsequently spread to the Kirkuk area. The Kurds claim that some 60 Iraqi troops, including a number of officers, have been killed.

The KDP says that the gas is of two kinds: one designed to penetrate the respiratory system causing fatal illness and another that can cause temporary unconsciousness for a period of 48 hours or more. It can be disseminated either by rocket or from the air.

KDP intelligence says that the gas is stored at the headquarters of Army's Second Division in Kirkuk and the Fourth Division in Mosul, as well as at the Taji base camp near Baghdad. It is added that eight Soviet advisers

have been supervising special training programmes in its use and that gas masks have been supplied for soldiers who may be called upon to launch it.

The new crisis in Baghdad-Kurdish relations has been brought about by a combination of factors, in particular the Government's attempts to pressurise the KDP into joining the National Front that was formed this summer between the ruling Baath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party; its continued attempts to "Arabise" the oil-rich Kirkuk area in advance of the referendum that should have been held under the March 1970 agreement to ascertain whether this *liwa*, or province, should be part of the planned autonomous Kurdish region; and its failure to implement the accord.

Four KDP members were hanged by the regime in Baghdad last month, seemingly in retaliation against the KDP's refusal to join the National Front. When asked again to do so, the KDP presented a memorandum outlining in greater detail than before its ideas about the form which regional autonomy should take. It was rejected by the Government.

THE TIMES

MONDAY APRIL 8 1974

Kurdish-Iraq war 'is inevitable'

By Our Foreign Staff

Iraq Government troops have withdrawn from some areas of Kurdistan and are consolidating along a conventional military front, according to Mr Shafiq Qazzaz, the information secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Led by General Mustafa Barzani, the party is struggling for a bigger and more autonomous Kurdish state within the Republic of Iraq. General Barzani rejected the limited autonomy decreed by the Baathist Revolutionary Command Council in Baghdad on March 11.

Mr Qazzaz, who left Kurdistan last week, is making a tour of Western countries to publicize the Kurdish cause and to make contact with humanitarian organizations. He said help was needed for the hundred thousand Kurds who had fled from Government-controlled areas into the "liberated" area under the Pesh Merga (Kurdish guerrilla forces).

Mr Qazzaz said the Government still controlled the main towns and the roads leading to them, but the Pesh Merga held sway over much of the surrounding hill country.

The Government had appointed new Kurdish governors to run the towns since March 11, but several of these already had deserted to the insurgents. His latest information was that the University of Sulaymaniyah had moved en bloc to the "Liberated" areas. Both students and professors were now in the mountains, and lectures were carrying on as planned.

In the same area, a unit of 80

Arab soldiers had deserted to the Kurdish side with all its weapons. Early last week an Iraq motorized and armoured column, advancing along the Sulaymaniyah-Dukan road, had been halted by the Pesh Merga and had suffered heavy losses.

Mr Qazzaz did not think these operations could yet be described as full-scale war, but he thought such a war was now virtually inevitable. It looked as though the Iraqi Army was preparing to reconquer Kurdistan by a steady advance along a selected front, relying on the

superior weapons supplied to it by the Soviet Union.

He emphasized that reports from Turkish sources suggesting that the Pesh Merga controlled the whole Turkish-Iraq border were much exaggerated.

"In fact, we have no interest in controlling the frontier," Mr Qazzaz said. Most contacts between liberated Kurdistan and the outside world were through Iran. He admitted that the Kurds were getting help from Iran—"and we are grateful for it"—but denied that the aid included weapons.



The Financial Times

April 29 1974

'Hundreds killed' in fighting in Iraq

By Gwynne Roberts

IRAQI jets have killed hundreds of civilians during the last few days in large-scale bombing attacks throughout Kurdish-held areas of northern Iraq, according to Kurdistan Democratic Party sources.

One of the worst-hit areas was around Qaladeza where 100 people, mainly women and children, were said to have been killed and half the town reduced to rubble.

KDP officials alleged that Iraqi aircraft dropped napalm bombs there on Friday, severely damaging a modern secondary school apparently before children had time to evacuate the building and escape to nearby air-raid trenches.

The Kurds originally planned to use this very building to house the projected University of Kurdistan, where about 600 students scheduled to begin studies on May 1. Kurdish leaders subsequently ordered the closure of all schools throughout Iraqi Kurdistan.

Thousands of Kurds have been arriving in Qaladeza recently to

join the guerilla army of General Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The town also houses one of the regional headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Iraqi bombers have also attacked the Kurdish-held town of Halabja near Suleimaniya destroying 100 houses.

Daily Express

May 10 1974

Town destroyed

ANKARA, Thursday — Iraqi troops were today burning down the predominantly Kurdish town of Zakho, according to a Turkish report.

«الشورى الكردية» لم تطالب بالانفصال
بل بالديموقراطية لمجموع الشعب العراقي

ديموقراطية بغداد

أنفسهم عناء البحث قليلا في هذا الادعاء وتحليله في ضوء الحقائق التاريخية والجغرافية ، فإن الثورة الكردية لم يسبق لها الطلب بانفصال كردستان - العراق عن العراق ، ولم يسبق لأي مسؤول في الحزب والثورة وأي بيان صادر عن حزبنا الديمقراطي الكردستاني ان طالب بذلك وذلك لتفهمننا مصلحة شعبنا

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Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)
May 27, 1974

'Hittills hårdaste slaget i kurdkriget'

TT-AFP. VAN, söndag.
Kurdiska styrkor har dödat 250 irakiska soldater och skjutit ner två flygplan i det största slaget hittills i kriget mellan kurderna och regeringen i Bagdad, uppgav Kurdistans radio, som avlyssnats i östra Turkiet.
Slaget i Heblområdet har rasat i flera dagar och pågår än. Radion har tidigare rapporterat att den irakiska armén kastat in 100 stridsvagnar, 500 militärfordon och åtta plan i detta slag.

Kurderna spådde redan 1972 att kriget skulle komma — förr eller senare. Man såg allt fler illavarslande tecken: Irakiska divisioner koncentrerades till slätterna runt de kurdiska bergen; när kriget till sist kom, rörde det sig om sex förstärkta divisioner. Redan våren 1973 tycktes kriget ofrånkomligt.

Omedelbart efter sammanbrottet den 11 mars inleddes så den stora kurdiska folkvandringen i krigets skugga. Över 100 000 människor har lämnat sina hem och sina ägodelar och flytt upp i de kurdiska bergen. Bland dem: 4 000 lärare, 5 000 poliser, 10 000 skolelever, hundratals ingenjörer och de få kurderna som fått läkarutbildning. Det går en läkare på 250 000 människor och hälsosituationen är även i normala tider helt otillräcklig i Kurdistan. Under kriget kan bara de enklaste operationer genomföras.

Kurderna i Stockholm upp-
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Och man utesluter inte att
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RICHARD HAAS

Civila drabbas värst av kriget i Kurdistan

Civildöden i norra Irak drabbas hårt av det krig som nu rasar mellan kurder och araber i området. Över 1 100 döda och 3 000 sårade rapporteras från kurdiska städer och byar som utsatts för bomb- och napalmattacker av irakiska flygplan.

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Svenska Dagbladet May 24, 1974

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Page 4 WELSH NATION, Friday, March 29th - April 4th, 1974

The Kurdish struggle takes a new turn

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RICHARD HAAS



New Printing House Square, London, WC1X 8EZ. Telephone : 01-837 1234

CIVIL WAR RETURNS TO KURDISTAN

Northern Iraq is not an area to which the world's news media have easy access. But it is by now clear that Kurdistan is once again in a state of insurrection against the Baghdad Government, and that the scene is set for a renewal of heavy fighting, if indeed it is not already taking place.

So ends a four-year truce between General Mustafa Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Arab Baathist regime of General Hassan Al-Bakr and Vice-President Saddam Husayn. On March 11, 1970, the Baathist leaders drew the logical conclusion from the inability of the Iraq armed forces, after nine years of intermittent warfare, to overcome the resistance of the "Pesh Merga", or Kurdish guerrillas, in the mountainous heartland of Kurdistan. A 15-point agreement was signed, recognizing the national rights of the Kurds and their autonomy "within the framework of the unity of the Iraq Republic". A mixed higher committee was set up to supervise the application of the agreement over four years. Five Kurdish ministers were brought into the Iraq Government, and soon afterwards a new Constitution was proclaimed which explicitly recognized Kurdish national rights.

But a number of crucial points were left unresolved by the agreement. In particular, the degree of autonomy to be conferred on the Kurds was not clearly defined; nor was the

geographical area within which they were to enjoy it. The KDP has consistently demanded a fully federal system and has insisted that the Kurdish state must include the province of Kirkuk. The Baathists have been willing to concede a more limited autonomy and have been determined to exclude Kirkuk from Kurdish control because it is the centre of the country's largest oilfield. They have not been satisfied with the KDP's suggestions that oil should be a central government responsibility but that the Kurds should get a share of the profits in proportion to population. Instead they have tried to "Arabize" Kirkuk and other peripheral districts of Kurdistan, both on paper by arguing from an out-of-date and inaccurate census and in practice by encouraging transfers of population. This has inevitably sharpened Kurdish resentment and mistrust.

Mistrust is profound on both sides. The KDP has accused senior officials of the Baath party of organizing two unsuccessful attempts on the life of its leader. Its militants are convinced the Baathist military regime can never sincerely accept a compromise, and that the only valid guarantee of Kurdish autonomy would be the introduction of "real democracy" in Iraq as a whole—the effect of which, they believe, would be to break the Baath's monopoly of power.

On the Baathist side there is the suspicion that the KDP's demand of autonomy for Iraq

Kurdistan is only the prelude to the dismemberment of Iraq and the formation of an independent Kurdish Republic (as envisaged by the Treaty of Sevres after the First World War), in which the 2½ million Iraq Kurds would join up with the five or more million in eastern Turkey, the 4½ million in Iran, the six hundred thousand in Syria and perhaps even the hundred and fifty thousand in the Soviet Union. Even if this danger seems remote, there is the fear that the KDP is a tool of "reactionary forces", whether in the United States, Iran or Israel, seeking to overthrow Iraq's "progressive" regime and reverse both its nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its alliance with the Soviet Union. General Barzani has occasionally made remarks which lend some colour to these suspicions, and the Iraq Communist Party, for long his close ally, has now drawn away from him and accepted an honorific but largely powerless position alongside the Baath in a "Progressive National Front".

It seems however that General Barzani's forces are still in control of most of Kurdistan and that the Government will not be able by conventional warfare to impose acceptance of the "autonomy" which it has unilaterally announced. There are rumours that it has plans to do so by unconventional means, notably the use of poison gas. There should be no doubt what the reaction of world opinion would be if these rumours were verified.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Times

March 19 1974

Civil war in Kurdistan

From Mr.

Sir, We are most grateful to *The Times* for having raised the issue of Kurdish survival in the leader of March 16. There is a real danger of genocide if poison gas is used against the Kurds. This would be dangerous, not only to the population in the border areas, but also to those who have been fleeing from the cities in Iraq.

We only want to live in peace with our neighbours, and are very fearful that, after five unsuccessful extended military campaigns, designed to suppress the Kurds, they might this time use unconventional terror

methods; hence our fear of the poison gas. This would run contrary to the basic principles of humanity, as well as to agreed rules of international law.

We know that two different types of Russian-supplied poison gas have been imported with 40,000 gas masks. They have been stored in the Taji military camp near Baghdad, in the

second division in Kirkuk, and in the Mosul headquarters, the fourth division, where special commando units were trained in the use of gas. We also know that an eight and ninth division have been established for the special purpose of conducting "unconventional" surprise warfare against the Kurds.

While the Kurds were negotiating for a peaceful form of autonomy, our leaders became painfully aware of military operations being made in readiness for a major military attack. It is hoped that the Baghdad Government will use the new found wealth for other purposes than to kill members of a small nation, and that the peace of the Middle East should not be upset by this military adventurism which can hurt Arabs and Kurds alike who have recently begun to live in peace.

Yours sincerely,

Secretary,
Kurdish Students' Society in Europe,
United Kingdom branch,
43 Cumberland Road, W3.
March 17.

DAVID HIRST reports from the war zone of 'liberated' Kurdistan

The lesson for Qala Diza

AT 9.45 on the morning of April 24 two Sukhoi fighter-bombers of the Iraqi Air Force swept low over the town of Qala Diza not far from the Iranian frontier. Its population, normally 10,000, had risen in the previous few weeks to 15,000 or 16,000.

Many of the newcomers were children and students, for it is to Qala Diza that the University of Suleimaniyah, the Kurds' one seat of higher learning, was transferred on the outbreak of hostilities between the rebel forces and the Iraqi Army. The Kurdish leader, Barzani, little instructed himself, has always favoured over the education of "future generations."

Qala Diza's only anti-aircraft gun was a solitary Russian-built Doushke. The pilots, secure in this knowledge, came right down ("twice the height of the telegraph poles," witnesses recall), and as they passed over the centre of the town, strafed, bombed, and rocketed it.

A whole quarter — shops, houses, a school, and part of a hospital — was demolished. They came back and did it a second time. At least 130 people died. They included 80 children and one soldier. When I left Kurdistan they were still digging for bodies.

Qala Diza was the first major strike in what Barzani describes as the "genocidal war" waged by the "wild-beasts in Bagdad." Between April 19 and May 4, according to the Kurdish radio, there were 281 air attacks in which 367 civilians died.

Kurdish doctors cite a number of napalm cases. Medical facilities — a six-bed central hospital and field clinics — are rudimentary.

According to the Ba'athists Barzani is a "reactionary, feudal, imperialist stooge" who represents no one but himself. The most striking refutation of this claim is the extraordinary, largely spontaneous, migration of Kurds from the cities and villages of the plains to liberated Kurdistan.

It has never happened on anything like this scale before. Whereas previously perhaps five doctors offered their services, today — according to official estimates —

— there are about a hundred.

There are also 100 lawyers, 300 engineers, 600 high-school teachers, 5,000 primary-school teachers, 5,000 Government employees, 4,000 soldiers and policemen, 10,000 workers, 10,000 students — and the entire staff and student body of Suleimaniyah University.

THE GUARDIAN July 1973

AND now there are three. President Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq heads one of the most secretive ruling systems in the Arab world. The real meaning of the weekend's attempted putsch — if that is what it was — has yet to emerge. Rumours abound. One is that Bakr is under house arrest. Another is that Vice-President Saddam Hussein was the evil genius of the affair.

What is sure is that in the Revolutionary Command Council, the highest authority in the land only three Takritis remain where there were four and that the assassination of the Defence Minister, Hamad Shihab, is an upheaval which must have deeply shaken the strongest rule that Iraq has known since the overthrow of the monarchy 15 years ago.

Takrit is a provincial town, thoroughly drab and undistinguished up the Tigris about a hundred miles from Bagdad. For the past five years, it has in a sense become the new capital of Iraq. A town of 20 to 30 thousand people it has taken over a country of about eleven millions.

It is said that Saladin was born there but when I visited it two years ago I found that its citizens took a greater and more self-interested pride in other famous sons — such as President Bakr, Vice-President Saddam Hussein, Foreign Minister Murtada al-Baqi (though his Takriti origins are officially denied), and Defence Minister Hamad Shihab. At that time Takritis also filled such posts as Mayor of Bagdad, Commander of the Bagdad Garrison, the Republican Guard and the Air Force.

It is not known just how many Takritis or people from nearby towns like Ana and Rawa have found their way into authority. They try to hide their origins by changing their names — but Iran's Arabic radio station once hit on a telling propaganda line when, without any commentary, it simply listed the names of 75 Takritis who, it said, occupied prominent positions in the ruling hierarchy.

Defence Minister Shihab was buried in Tawrit yesterday. Once there had been five. For before Shihab, another member of the RCC, Vice-President Hardan Takriti had died by an assassin's bullet.

Both fell victim to the endemic violence and medieval intrigue of Iraqi politics — a violence which these self-same



President Bakr (above) and assassinated Defence Minister Hamad Shihab

The Arab Mafia

DAVID HIRST on the endemic violence behind Iraq's recent upheaval



Takritis carried to unprecedented lengths, the only difference is that Shihab, target of a conspiracy against the regime, was consigned to his native earth with full honours, while Takriti, disgraced, exiled, and finally liquidated by the regime, was shovelled into it at dead of night.

Whatever the achievements of five years of Ba'athist rule, its methods are such that the temptation to describe it as an Arab mafia remains irresistible. If President Bakr — "struggler-president" Bakr — is the godfather, the apparently benign father of the party, in Saddam Hussein he has a most dynamic and efficient "consigliere." Basically what this most talented, dedicated, and ruthless of Takritis has succeeded in doing, alone among Arab rulers who came to power through the familiar military coup, is to subordinate the

army to the party, or at least to integrate the two in a viable combination. He himself, a civilian, rose exclusively through the party. He is utterly fearless — he first made his name when he participated in an attempted assassination of General Kassam.

According to his own account, he extracted a bullet from his leg with his own hands and escaped to Syria on 18 hours a day. He is anxious to better himself — he took a university degree after his seizure of power. "With our party methods," he says, "there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the Government. These methods have gone."

The party methods that have replaced them are an elaborate system of surveillance, intimidation, and selective terror.

✱ ناضل من اجل مبادئ الشعب الكردي احقه في الحكم الذاتي ضمن الجمهورية العراقية .

✱ ناضل من اجل انهاء الاوضاع الاستثنائية وتثبيت حكم ديمقراطي منتخب من الشعب وتحقيق اعماق التحولات الاجتماعية

✱ ناضل من اجل استكمال مستلزمات قيام جبهة وطنية حقيقية .

التميز: ٥٠ فلسا

دهنگ و وشهوه... دوزمن بهره و هلدگیری رسوا کردن راو
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 دهنگ و وشهوه... دوزمن بهره و هلدگیری رسوا کردن راو

70

partner to discussions rather than under Henry Kissinger's one-man diplomacy. The other was that the Soviets, by playing up to Syria, were trying to balance their declining influence with Egypt as their chief Arab ally.

In Cairo, President Anwar Sadat last week publicly told a joint meeting of the Parliament and the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's lone political organization, just how strained relations were between Egypt and Russia. In terms clearer than ever before, Sadat announced that Egypt would no longer depend solely for arms on Moscow as it has done for nearly 20 years. The Soviets, said Sadat, had not been generous with their arms after the war. Indeed, Egyptian aircraft losses have still not been made up by the Russians; tank replacements have come from Yugoslavia and Algeria. Henceforth, Egypt would shop around. Said Sadat, "I have taken a decision in agreement with our armed forces that we should have diversified sources of arms. This decision has been put into effect."

Spartan State. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy will have to take into account not only Cairo's increasingly independent role, but also the continuing unsettled political situation in Israel. Even while they watched the Golan Heights last week and alerted reservists to defend it, Israel's political leaders were busy trying to agree on a successor to Premier Golda Meir, who resigned two weeks ago. Labor Party leaders had a choice of selecting someone else, if the right supporting coalition could be found, or of asking Golda to continue with a caretaker government. In either case, the job would be only temporary since it would terminate in national elections in the fall.

Whoever accepts the post will have to deal not only with the handicaps of a short-term government but also with increasing Israeli discontent. Israelis are upset at the idea that having fought the war, they now have to keep their forces activated like some kind of 20th century Spartan state. There is thus a powerful impetus for making peace with Syria in order to have army reservists discharged and the economy return to normal. Another burr of discontent—and spur to negotiations—is the desire to get back the 65 Israeli prisoners, plus the jet pilots shot down last week.

That may be a long way off. In addition to their problems with Syria, Israelis are angry about the growing number of guerrilla incursions into Israel. Last week, in response to the attack on Qiryat Shemona two weeks ago in which rampaging guerrillas killed 18 Israeli civilians, there were violent incidents in which Jews attacked Israeli Arabs in a frustrated attempt to revenge the deeds that other Arabs had committed. Such outbursts only helped to make the Middle East situation, as Henry Kissinger descends on it again, about as frosty as the snow atop Mount Hermon.

MUSTAFA BARZANI (TOP); INSURGENT KURDS

TIME, APRIL 29, 1974

IRAQ

Kurds in Combat

The Kurds are a fiercely independent people who inhabit the rugged mountains of northern Iraq as well as parts of Turkey, Syria, the Soviet Union and Iran. Many of them have long yearned to have an independent nation, called Kurdistan, and in 1970, after years of bruising clashes with the Iraqi army, they finally won an agreement that guaranteed regional autonomy by March of this year. As the date approached, neither side could agree on what autonomy meant, and when the pact finally came unstuck, a key problem was a familiar Middle East issue: oil. The Kurds took literally violent exception to Baghdad's plans to keep control of the oil-rich region around Kirkuk, a heavily Kurd-populated city.

Suddenly the underground Kurdish army re-emerged from a four-year furlough. Supply lines to several Iraqi army garrisons were cut, and other military units were surrounded. Last week the Kurds began shooting at helicopters resupplying the food-short garrisons. According to the Kurdish radio, the Iraqis responded by bringing their Soviet-built bombers into action for the first time, laying waste to eleven Kurdish villages.

Muslims but not Arabs, the baggy-

trousered, occasionally blue-eyed Aryan Kurds of Iraq make up about one-fourth of the country's population of roughly 10.4 million. The Kurdish guerrilla army, called Pesh Merga (which means "facing death"), is led by a tenacious nationalist, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, 75. It numbers about 40,000 regulars. Iraq can draw on a 90,000-man army that is well equipped and advised by the Soviet Union: Defense Minister Andrei Grechko flew to Baghdad for consultations soon after the negotiations between the government and the Kurds broke off.

Bitter Repeat. Iraq charges that the Kurds are supplied with sophisticated equipment by the U.S. and Iran. TIME's Joseph Fitchett, who returned from a 13-day trip to Iraq last week, saw no evidence of this. The Kurds have only a few heavy weapons—notably World War II-vintage antiaircraft guns. But Iran, long at odds with the far-left Iraqi government, may well be providing the Kurds with small arms. The rifles carried by Barzani's bandoliered troops are mostly Czech-designed, Iran-manufactured Brno rifles.

"To the south of the Kurds' mountainous, 10,000-sq.-mi. redoubt," reports Fitchett, "are Kurdish valleys where villages have been largely deserted. Fearful of air raids, entire families have taken to living in caves. Even in towns farther back in the mountains, almost all activity occurs at night, including grammar school for pupils, who carry flashlights to get to their classes. The foothills are now a contested no man's land that has already been the scene of several skirmishes." Among other triumphs, the Kurdish radio claims that the Pesh Merga killed one Iraqi general in combat and shot down one of the Iraqis' Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers.

Neither side seems eager for an all-out civil war. One reason the Baathist (Arab Socialist) government in Baghdad has been able to hold on to power since 1968 is that it recognized the need to compromise with the Kurds and thus de-



TIME
THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



QALA DIZA

***will add another
chapter to the
murderous
history of the
bloodthirsty
Baathists of
Baghdad***



A man rushing his child to safety



The school in which 80 children died

Qala Diza, a town of 20,000 inhabitants in Kurdistan-Iraq, was savagely bombed by the Iraqi Air Force in the morning of April 24th. The town was unusually crowded, as thousands of people from neighbouring areas under Iraqi Army control took refuge there. Also the majority of the staff and students of Sulaimani University who were going to re-establish the University after it was occupied by government tanks.



*A total of 130 people were killed,
including 80 school children.*

ta ner 3 000 soldater!

**Journalisten
Louis Malka
(lilla bilden)
bevittnade det
första stora
slaget i den
kurdiska kam-
pen för frihet,
som nu blossat upp i de ira-
kiska bergstrakterna! 3 000
soldater hamnade i kurdernas
bakhåll. Bara ett fåtal fångar
togs . . .**



aktuellt-reportage: Louis Malka — Bertil Lagerström/
översättn

■ ■ ■ Marsnatten var ljum och utan måne, en natt då folk kunde röra sig utan risk att upptäckas från luften. I gryningen var bakhållet klart. Ingenting kunde avslöja det, man kunde ingenting se, ingenting höra. Den dalsänka som på turkiska heter Geyli Alibey — Alibey-passet — skulle bli en kyrkogård för 3 000 soldater.

Det irakiska ÖB-kommandot — som vanligt dåligt underrättat — hade sänt in trupper i Kurdistanens vidsträckta berglandskap för att undsätta två garnisoner, som blivit kringrädda av kurdiska stamkrigare. I Bagdad beslöt man att statuera ett exempel, som kurderna inte skulle glömma i brådrasket. I den irakiska generalstabens ögon var kurderna rebeller, en hop illa utrustad och dåligt beväpnat slödder. Chefen för de 3 000 man som sändes mot kurderna hade klara order: Utrota dem, visa ingen barmhärtighet!

● Denna marsmorgon 1974 låg jag på en klippshylla med utsikt över dalsänkan. Jag såg inte till en levande själ, förutom de två kurdiska officerare som var i mitt sällskap. En ensam rovfågel hängde orörlig i den klara luften. I landskapet nedanför syntes inte en rörelse. Kanske just detta borde ha varnat de självsäkra officerarna som förde sina män rakt in i dödsfällan. Cirka 1 000 meter

framför dem och 150 meter ovanför dem på båda sidor liksom bakom dem hade man gillrat ett bakhåll med hjälp av de bäst utrustade och hårdast tränade soldaterna i världen. De kurdiska soldaterna utgjordes verkligen inte av något slödder, som man trodde i Bagdad utan bestod av elitförband som nu var redo för befrielsekriget mot Irak.

● Regeringstrupperna från Bagdad avancerade sakta tills de befann sig helt inne i dalsänkan. Då hördes uppifrån berget en fågels gälla skrik. På några sekunder förvandlades den fridfulla dalgången till ett helvete av eld och död när kurderna reste sig som en man och öste granater och kulor över sina fiender där nere. De irakiska styrkorna greps genast av panik och allt blev kaos när soldaterna sprang om varandra för att söka skydd. Många slängde helt enkelt ifrån sig sina vapen för att kunna springa fortare, andra bara kastade sig ned kanske i förhoppning om att bli tagna för döda.

De som vände och rusade framåt möttes av en mördande eld uppifrån bergssluttningarna. De som försökte undkomma samma väg de kommit, fann reträttvägen avskuren.


I två timmar rasade denna kamp. Så ljud över stridslarmet en trumpetsignal. Omedelbart upp-



Sex kurdiska frihetskämpar fritogs ur fängelset!

hörde eldgivningen och kurderna drog sig tyst tillbaka. På slagfältet kvarlämnade de ungefär 3 000 döda och sårade iraker. Regeringstrupperna hade fått ett dräp-slag och de drog sig tillbaka i panik. Den läxa de skulle ha lärt kurderna hade de själva fått ta emot. Irakerna fick klart för sig att kurderna inte var det slödder man hade antagit. Missdådare som man kunde hänga upp och tortera efter behag.

● Jag befann mig på plats i egenskap av observatör medan den kurdiska och irakiska regeringen förhandlingsvägen försökte komma till en uppgörelse om Kurdistans framtid. I Bagdad hade jag fått höra att kurderna önskade bli helt självständiga och att man under inga förhållanden kunde gå med på detta. Men när jag kom till Kurdistan fann jag att denna uppfattning inte stämde med verkligheten. Kurderna önskar visserligen självstyre men vill stanna kvar i den irakiska staten. Regeringen i Bagdad erbjöd så sent som i februari en viss frihet, men dessa medgivanden var så njugga att de stolta kurderna tillbakavisade anbudet. Det var då som man i Bagdad beslöt att med våld kuva kurderna på samma sätt som man gjort tidigare. Man tog beslutet trots att man visste att man var i taktiskt underläge. Irakerna måste strida i kurdernas eget land som är vilt och bergigt, en terräng som gjord för gerillakrigföring.



Ingen tränger ostraffat in i kurdernas berg!

● Under den månad som jag gästade kurderna fann jag, att varken mångårigt förtryck eller hotet om total utplåning på något sätt plågade dem. De har motstått sina fiender i söder sedan tidernas morgon och har aldrig underkastat sig några herrar för någon längre tid. Man berättade för mig om det stora upproret 1946, då kurderna bildade den självständiga staten Kurdistan av stycken av norra Irak, västra Iran och östra Turkiet. Jag fick också höra talas om hur kurder gång efter annan hade massakrerats, men att de alltid hade hämnats på dem som var ansvariga för massakerna.

● Kurdernas område - Kurdistan - är ett bergland som alltså ligger innanför Turkiets, Irans och Iraks gränser. Men det bor också kurder i Transkaukasien, som tillhör Sovjet, och på berget Aragats slutningar i den sovjetiska delrepublik Armenien. Kurderna är ett folk på mellan två och tre miljoner. Av dessa finns en miljon i sydöstra Turkiet, 750 000 i nordvästra Iran och drygt en miljon i nordöstra Irak. Det är ett delvis nomadiserande folk med persiska som modersmål.

Kurdernas rätt till nationellt oberoende erkändes av fredskonferensen i Paris efter det första världskriget, men i fördraget i Lausanne 1923 nämndes inte ens kurdernas anspråk. Spänningen ökade då och kurderna startade ett befrielsekrig mot turkarna. Det slutade med kurdernas nederlag och 48 av deras stamhövdingar hängdes. År 1930 utbröt ett nytt uppror, som också krossades, och 1946 ledde Mullah (präst) shejk Mustafa Barzani en revolt.

● Kurdistan reser sig plataliknande över de omgivande stora slätterna, och landets stora hjärtegestalt är just Mustafa Barzani. I århundraden har strider försiggått här och mycket blod har flutit. Tyvärr tyder allt på att så kommer det att bli också inom den närmaste framtiden. Kurderna betraktar bergen som sin "mur".

Den muren hejdade ryssarna under första världskriget och den har ofta stoppat turkarna.

Kurderna avskyr araberna. De gör ingenting för dem, menar de. De hyser också stark antagonism gentemot Storbritannien och USA, eftersom dessa stater, enligt kurderna, gav bort deras land till just araberna.

Under det senaste decenniet har en ny beslutsamhet vuxit fram i Kurdistan och nu hotar man irakerna med samma bittra medicin som dessa en gång tvingade på kurderna när dessa var försvarslösa. Det hände när kurderna var oeniga. Men nu har man funnit att enighet ger styrka och man har kunnat enas under den gemensamma ledaren shejk Barzani.

● I mars i år utbröt så det största upproret hittills. Barzani bestämde taktiken, som gick ut på att man skulle undvika att döda men däremot till varje pris hämnas fiendens alla övergrepp.

När oljekrisen bröt ut och araberna började använda oljan som påtryckningsmedel vände sig kurderna väster ut med en enkel begäran: Hjälp oss så ska vi ge er all den olja ni behöver! Faktum är att Barzani har makt att sätta bakom orden och om västmakterna beslutar sig för att hjälpa honom, kommer Irak inte att ha något annat alternativ än att ge Barzani vad han och hans folk begär.

Vi behöver västmakternas hjälp för vårt förföljda folk, sa Barzani till mig. Han erkände att man fått hjälp från Israel, men tillade att "en som håller på att drunkna griper efter hjälp var han än kan finna den". Iran har också sänt varor och förnödenheter till kurderna och den irakiska Baath-regimen erbjöd dem en del av vad man får in på oljan. Och nu nalkas vi pudelns kärna. Ty orsaken till den relativa givmildheten från Bagdads sida är oljefyndigheterna i Kirkuk, som shejk Barzani hävdar ligger på kurdisk mark! I februari hotade kurderna att angripa och förstöra oljefälten i Kirkuk om inte Bagdad blir mer frikostigt mot kurderna. Detta hot har upptagits allvarligt i Bagdad, ty de kurdiska stridskrafterna Persh Merga - är väl utbildade och har i dag god utrustning. Irak kan visserligen möta kurderna med en många gånger större numerär styrka, men detta behöver ej bli utslagsgivande i en eventuell kraftmätning, något som de senaste månadernas strider har visat.

● Kurderna håller sig med en raffinerad underrättelsetjänst uppbyggd enligt samma modell som den tyska och brittiska under det andra världskriget. Långt i förväg visste de, att 3 000 man irakiska trupper skulle lämna Erbil och försöka undsätta de belä-



Mustafa Barzani leder sitt folks kamp mot irakerna.

rade garnisonerna i Ruwandiz och Zebar. Vad irakerna inte kände till var att kurderna hade full kontroll över Alibey passet ända sedan den 11 mars i år. Inte ens de irakiska spaningsplanen, som dagligen flög över området, hade kunnat avslöja den saken, eftersom de kurdiska stridskrafterna var så väl camouflerade.

● Den irakiska regeringen kände inte heller till att kurderna hade fått veta att Irak importerat gift gas från Sovjet tillsammans med 40 000 gasmasker och att man tränade personal för att använda detta vapen mot kurderna.

När shejk Barzani fick kännedom om dessa barbariska planer, vände han sig till västmakterna för att förmå dem att ingripa mot Irak att inte använda vapnet. Han yttrade att insättandet av ett sådant vapen bara skulle skärpa den kurdiska motståndsviljan och att kurderna skulle slåss till absolut sista man. Irakerna har all anledning att vara rädda för Barzanis soldater som anfaller under motot "Vi möter gärna döden!" Enligt kurdisk soldatmoral är det en ära att stupas för saken.

● I november förra året tillfångatog irakiska styrkor sex kurdiska frihetskämpar och dömde dem till döden för att de var rebeller. Fyrtio andra kurder fick då order att rädda sina landsmän. Det visade sig omöjligt att få ut dem från den fästning där de satt. Men irakerna tänkte göra ett propagandanummer av avrättningarna och göra dem offentliga.

Den morgon då exekutionerna skulle äga rum bevakade omkring 200 irakiska soldater det torg där galgarna var resta. Tusentals människor hade kommit till platsen för att se rebeller dö. Men omedelbart innan snarorna skulle läggas om de dömdas halsar öpp-

Forts sid 56

Kurdit iskivät rajusti hallituksen joukkoihin

Ankara (Reuter) Pohjois-Irakin kurdisissit ovat aiheuttaneet raskaita tappioita Irakin hallituksen joukoille, turkkilainen uutistoimisto Haber ilmoitti maanantaina.

Uutistoimiston mukaan sissit hyökkäsivät Geyli Albeyn solassa 3000 miehen vahvuisen Irakin armeijan osaston kimppuun sen ollessa matkalla auttamaan kah-ta sissien saartamaa varuskun-taa.

Ruwandiin ja Zebarin vuoris-toalueella sijaitsevista varuskun-nissa tilanne sissien saarrettua ne oli "epätoivoinen" kertoivat Tur-kin rajalle tulleet tiedot.

Haberin mukaan jonkin verran taistelua käytiin edelleen Kir-kukin ympärillä ja strategisessa Alibeyn solassa, jota kurdit ovat pitäneet hallussaan maaliskuun 11. päivästä lähtien.

Uutistoimiston ilmoitus vahvis-ti tiedot jotka kurdien oma ra-dioasema Kurdistanin ääni esitti maanantain vastaisena yönä.


Uutistoimisto Haberin kuule-massa lähetyksessä sanottiin, et-tä satoja irakilaisotilaita oli surmattu ja 230 oli antautunut sisseille Alibeyn solan alueelle tehdyssä hyökkäyksessä.

Kurdien omia tappioita ei ra-diolähetyksessä ilmoitettu.

Kolme konetta pudotettu

Lisäksi kurdit olivat ampuneet alas kolme hallituksen lentoko-netta, joista kaksi oli kuljetta-massa sotilaita Kirkukin öljykes-kukseen ja kolmas oli pudotta-massa tarvikkeita Gallalan lä-hellä sijaitsevalle Irakin armei-jan prikaatille, Kurdistanin ääni kertoi uutistoimisto Haberin mu-kaan.

Kurdisissit käyvät 76-vuotiaan mulla Mustafa Barzanin johdolla taistelua itsehallinnossa Poh-jois-Irakin vuoristoalueella. Hei-dän vaatimuksenaan on että runsaita öljyvaroja omaava Kir-kukin alue tulisi kurdien hallin-taan.



Pohjois-Irakissa puhjenneissa taisteluissa kurdisissijä komentaa hei-dän pitkäaikainen johtajansa mulla (herra) Mustafa Barzani.

Bagdadin hallitus asetti 15 vuorokauden määräajan, jonka kuluessa noin puoleentoista mil-joonaan nousevan kurdiväestön oli määrä hyväksyä hallituksen saneleamat itsehallintoehdot.

Sovinnosta ei tietoa

Määräaika päättyi maaliskuun 26. päivänä, mihin mennessä so-vinnosta sissien ja hallituksen välillä ei ollut tietoakaan. Sil-minnäkiöiden mukaan Irakin kurdiväestö on määräpäivän um-

peuduttua ollut varustautumassa sotaan.

Uutistoimisto Haberin mukaan kenraali Barzanilla on tätä ny-kyä komennossaan lähes 50 000 kurdia. Hallituksen joukkojen lähestyessä Kirkukia Barzani määräsi myös 17-vuotiaiden ikä-luokan armeijansa vahvistukseksi.

Letter from Iraqi Kurdistan

BY JIM HOAGLAND

HAJ OMRAN, IRAQ.

Like the Babylonian, Assyrian and other empires that have risen and fallen on the timeless plains of Mesopotamia, the 20th century has been unable to invade the forbidding mountain lands of Kurdistan. Change has been forced to sneak in through the mountain passes, usually on the back of war.

Village life of the ruggedly handsome Kurds whose soft eyes glow in laughter like dark pearls, still revolves around the rifles that are this society's main status symbol, the goats and cattle that are often given one of the best rooms in a herder's earth and stone house, and the carefully tended fields of apricot trees and vegetables.

Now, in a small but politically significant group, Kurds educated abroad are beginning to trickle back to Kurdistan and promote limited modernization. In an area where men have survived for centuries through banditry and hunting, Community Development is being given a hesitant try.

The village guest house is still the center of community activity in this land where those strangers trusted enough not to be shot on sight are welcomed royally. The status of the Agha, or village chieftain, depends directly on the lavishness of the hospitality he provides for the wayfarer.

The visitor who comes to see Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish guerrilla general and nationalist leader for half a century, naturally receives the most elaborate spread Kurdistan can offer here in Barzani's summer headquarters, which is a small village surrounded by the white canvas military tents of Barzani's traveling retinue and black goat hide tents of nomadic herdsmen.

Barzani spears and presses on his guest pieces of chicken from the groaning table laid with steaming platters of rice, kebab, eggplant soaked in a rich tomato sauce and kibbeh. It is washed down with the local watery yogurt drink or, as a dispensation for the outsider, Baghdad-bottled Orange Crush.

Honey brought in directly from a nearby hive is one dessert. Barzani prefers the apricots, plums and peaches grown here. Strong, heavily sugared tea follows the meal.

Barzani expresses disappointment in not having been able to play host to Western visitors since early 1972, when relations with the Iraqi government turned bad again and Baghdad began refusing outsiders permission to make their way to the general's mountain lair. Arrangements for trips now have to be made through a sort of Kurdish underground railroad.

"We see only those whom we don't want to see now," Barzani says sourly, referring to the stream of Russian and other Communist diplomats and journalists that Baghdad has sent to mediate with the rebellious Kurds.

Barzani has mellowed little in his 70 years. He has left one part of the guest house, damaged by grenade explosions and riddled by bullets two years ago during an assassination attempt, exactly as it was on that day. He points to blackened particles that cling to the ceiling and says that those are the only re-

mains of the men who blew themselves up while trying to get him, on Baghdad's orders.

Asked about his family, Barzani says he has nine sons, the youngest three years old, and seven daughters. A question about the age of his oldest son brings a sudden explosion of anger from the general that clearly unsettles the aide who is translating his answers from Kurdish into English.

"There were ten sons but only nine are my sons now. There is a dog who was my eldest son, who went over to Baghdad and is now living in Algeria. He has become an enemy of mine and of my people," Barzani slams the subject shut.

No one else is willing to provide information about the son, who evidently defected to the Iraqi side more than a year ago.

Constantly at Barzani's side are his sons Idriss, 29, and Massoud, 27. Fresh faced, eager and as quick to laugh as Barzani is to scowl, they ask a visitor about Watergate and Pompidou's health. When they are not scribbling orders on notebook paper to the army and local government departments, they find time to listen to foreign radio news broadcasts.

Idriss is the heir apparent to leadership in the Kurdish movement. The conventional assessment of diplomats, journalists and other Middle East watchers is that he may not be strong enough to hold the movement together after Barzani. But like so much conventional "wisdom" in this unpredictable region, it could be dramatically wrong. Idriss moves and talks more gently than Barzani, but with the same kind of authority. And he has had the advantage of firsthand observation of Barzani practicing his speciality-- surviving in the rough and tumble of Kurdish life.

Shakhawan Shwan has been in the Community Development business for two months. Before returning to Kurdistan, he received a degree in architecture in East Germany.

Now he and six assistants-- all working under a total budget for \$1,500 a year -- travel around Kurdistan, patiently sitting under walnut trees and telling villagers why they should build corrals and move the cattle and goats out of their houses.

"The health programs we have in mind won't do much good unless we can get the villagers interested in changing the basic conditions of village life" the 35-year-old architect explained after a meeting in Khoshkan, home of 200 persons, 300 goats and 150 head of cattle. "Then we can begin building public baths, starting literacy campaigns and other programs."

Khoshkan is tucked deep in the Sakran mountains, on a boulder-strewn dirt track that is mounted, with bone-jarring difficulty, by one of the Kurds' few Landrovers. Beyond Khoshkan, a bubbling spring fed by the melting snows of the mountains surges across the cuts and cuts the road in this season.

The chief physician at the small but immaculate hospital in nearby Nau Pirdan has also returned to Kurdistan from East Germany in the past year. An even more recent arrival is Shafiq Qazzaz, who spent the last 12 years in Washington, earning a doctorate and working on a Kurdish-English dictionary.

Qazzaz, who is to head a new Information Department for Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party, says that educated Kurds are being drawn back by the traditional leadership's new willingness to give them meaningful jobs.

Citing Barzani's successful nine-year civil war against Baghdad and the Iraqi government's promises of full autonomy, Qazzaz said "It is clear that this movement is here to stay and that the time has come for those of us who have lived abroad to come back to contribute to it." - The Washington Post.

Islamic Seminar

prima di definire un atteggiamento.

G. N. Tale «personalità», il governo pakistano venne a trovarlo in Belucistan.

IRAK - Un popolo diviso tra cinque Stati e da dieci anni in lotta per l'indipendenza

La libertà dei Curdi si chiama petrolio


5 LUGLIO 12, 1974

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Il Giornale nuovo

In Russia doveva essere...
basi di un «vertice» fra Sadat e il segretario generale del Pcus, Breznev. Il summit avrebbe dovuto eliminare, secondo le stesse parole di Sadat, «interiori malintesi» fra i due Paesi.

Il gesto sovietico deve aver irritato notevolmente Sadat e il capo della diplomazia egiziana, anche alla luce dell'invito, rinnovato proprio oggi da Breznev al capo palestinese Arafat, a visitare l'Unione Sovietica. Questo viaggio, dovrebbe comunque precedere quello di Fahmi, rinviato a ottobre. Si presumerà che la Conferenza per la pace in Medio Oriente, prevista in linea di massima in settembre a Ginevra, subirà un rinvio di qualche mese. Non è infatti pensabile che essa possa riunirsi prima che si sia giunti a una coordinazione della posizione dell'Egitto (e del resto del mondo arabo) con l'Urss.

L'Unione Sovietica — sottolineano gli osservatori — intenderebbe «veder chiaro» nelle tendenze politiche mondiali e del mondo arabo, prima di decidere nuove iniziative. Il rimascolamento di carte verificatosi in questi ultimi mesi ha scompaginato la pur organizzata ed efficiente diplomazia di Mosca. Da una parte, dopo la firma della «Nuova Carta atlantica», è stato registrato un consolidamento dei rapporti fra Europa e Stati Uniti. Dall'altra, si assiste a una decisa tendenza del mondo arabo a dialogare con la Comunità economica europea. L'ultima indicazione di questa volontà la si è avuta ieri con l'unanime decisione, adottata in un quar-



Le parti in grigio indicano le zone abitate dai curdi

In questi ultimi mesi non hanno ormai la metà del territorio curdo, da Kirkuk a Mosul, dalle alte valli del Tigri alla città di Zakho, vi- delle forze irachene), e della aviazione sono impegnate a dar la caccia ai guerriglieri: migliaia di villaggi sono stati bombardati e distrutti, centinaia di persone risultano uccise, oltre 80.000 profughi sono riparati in Iran e Turchia. Ma la guerriglia continua. Le forze di Bagdad con-

Per adeguarsi alla «tattica elastica» dei guerriglieri, le truppe di Bagdad sono state costrette allo sparpagliamento, sicché l'aviazione — la loro arma più efficace — per questa sorta di promiscuità tra iracheni e curdi, non può più svolgere un'azione combattiva. A poco a poco i peschmerga, nonostante le smen- tite di Bagdad, hanno avuto la meglio in numerose cittadine. A Spille hanno costretto 5.000 soldati a barricarsi entro un forte, raggiungibile ormai solo in elicottero; a Zakho — secondo La voce del Kurdistan, la stazione radio dei «ribelli» — le forze irachene si sono dovute ritirare, abbandonando anche la città di Nawperdam (a 30 Km. dal confine con l'Iran), attualmente la base-santuario dei peschmerga.

Il quartier generale vero e proprio essi l'hanno nella vicina città di Galala, nella l'ha definita in un comunicato radio Idriss Barzani, il quarantenne figlio maggiore di Mustafa. Idriss, che alle- sce notevoli capacità organizzative e una vasta conoscenza delle leggi internazionali sulle minoranze etniche, è l'uomo che procura le armi al suo popolo, che cerca alleanze all'estero per la causa curda. Le armi che per ora ha ricevuto sono i fucili automatici russi Kalashnikov, i cannoni contrae-

rei Duchka, ma spera presto di poter disporre di un'artiglieria a lunga gittata per poter meglio difendere il territorio dagli attacchi dei Mig-21 e dei Sukhoi-7 sovietici acquistati dall'aviazione irachena.

L'attitudine di Idriss Barzani è però soprattutto diplomatica. E' lui ad aver steso il Memorandum inviato dai curdi all'Onu per la loro autonomia, ma che sarà probabilmente osteggiato dai Paesi arabi legati a Bagdad e al capo del governo Saddam Hussein. In seguito all'attesa lenza Urss-Irak, Idriss Barzani ha anche cercato l'appoggio degli Stati Uniti, ma si è attirato le critiche della frazione di sinistra del Ppk, i cui capi — Aziz Akrawi e Djemal Talabani — l'hanno accusato di voler favorire «l'insediamento imperialistico Usa» nell'Irak. «E' la stessa accusa che mi muove Saddam Hussein», ha dichiarato Idriss Barzani. «A sentire lui, si dovrebbe credere che lo stesso Kissinger verrebbe a farci visita tra le nostre montagne!». Un detto siriano non è stato però stato escluso, come riferisce Al Taakhi, il principale quotidiano in lingua curda, per accelerare il processo di pacificazione e di democratizzazione della regione.

Serge Mannucci e Martine Royot

«البحار» ناطق باسم البارزاني: الوزراء العراقيون الجدد لا يمثلون الشعب الكردي

لندن - ٩ نيسان - رويتر - قال السيد شفيق القزاز الناطق باسم الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني ان ١٠٠,٠٠٠ كردي تركوا المدن واعتصموا في جبال كردستان خلال الاسابيع الاربعة الاخيرة .

وأضاف في مؤتمر صحفي عقده في لندن أمس ان بين هؤلاء اطباء وعلماء وخبراء من منطقة كركوك النفطية التي تعتبر نقطة الخلاف الرئيسية بين الحزب الذي يتزعمه الملا مصطفى البارزاني وحكومة حزب البعث في بغداد .

وقال القزاز سكرتير الحزب الكردستاني للمعلومات الذي يقوم بجولة في أوروبا سعياً وراء كسب تأييد لمطالب الحزب ان هناك ٥٠ طبيباً في كردستان الآن في مقابل ستة كانوا فيها قبل ١١ اذار الماضي عندما نشب الخلاف بين الاكراد والحكومة العراقية .

واعتبر القزاز ان الوزراء الخمسة الذين عينوا قبل يومين لا يمثلون الشعب الكردي . وأضاف ان السيد عبيد الله مصطفى البارزاني احد الوزراء الخمسة هو ابن للملا مصطفى « خرج عليه منذ سنتين وانضم الى البعثيين » .

ورأى في تعيين الوزراء الخمسة « محاولة لاقامة واجهة تستطيع حكومة البعث من ورائها انشاء حكم

يوهين لا يمثلون الشعب الكردي » . وأضاف ان السيد عبيد الله مصطفى البارزاني احد الوزراء الخمسة هو ابن للملا مصطفى « خرج عليه منذ سنتين وانضم الى البعثيين » .

ورأى في تعيين الوزراء الخمسة « محاولة لاقامة واجهة تستطيع حكومة البعث من ورائها انشاء حكم

Uprooted by the civil war between rebellious Kurds in Iraq and the forces of the Baathist Government, this old Kurdish woman and her grandson have taken refuge in the mountains of Kurdistan. For them the conflict means uneasy days and nights in strange surroundings.

THE OBSERVER 2 JUNE 1974



DAVID GRAEME-BAKER

Lord Kilbracken

The north is ours, says Kurds' chief

By Lord Kilbracken, who returned yesterday from the Kurdish rebel-controlled area of northern Iraq.

THE INSURGENT Kurds in Iraq have established a *de facto* independent state in their northern mountain region, General Mustafa Barzani, their 71-year-old leader, told me last week at his military headquarters. Much more autonomy had already been achieved than was contained in the Baghdad Government's offer last month which he rejected. "I shall shortly be making an official declaration of complete autonomy in the area under our control and influence," he added.

This embraces about 80 per cent of an area about twice the size of Wales where the Kurds are in an undisputed majority. But it does not include such major centres as Arbil, Kirkuk and other garrison towns where perhaps half of the estimated 2,500,000 Kurds in Iraq are under Government control.

The conflict is of significance to Western powers because the oil-rich centre of Kirkuk is the core of the dispute. Although predominantly Kurdish, it was excluded from last month's offer. The unforeseen strength of the Kurd's reaction is an embarrassment to the hard-pressed Baath regime in Baghdad. General Barzani, who carries his years lightly, left me in no doubt that his claim to Kirkuk "would never be relinquished." His men are within eight miles of the city, but it is strongly defended and he seemed to accept that no further advance would be possible.

He was planning "no major offensive," he had not the resources to attack the lowland regions. But Government forces are in peril in several towns surrounded by his army of 40,000 *pesh mergas* ("those who face death"), including Souleimaniya and Zakho.

Three factors combine to place the insurgents in a far stronger position than before and give them justification for claiming that self-rule has been achieved:

1. The *pesh mergas* are better equipped, although General Barzani denied the claim last week by Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Vice-President, that "massive" aid was reaching them from the United States via Iran.

2. Recruits to the movement after rejection of last month's offer of limited autonomy totalled about 200,000, including many educated Kurds from major cities as far away as Basra. Among them were 60 doctors, 4,500 teachers, 30 professors, 5,000 policemen, 160 engineers and more than 100 army officers to constitute an élite never before available. The offer, which the Government expected would divide the Kurds, has instead united them.

3. A six-minister civilian administration has been set up for the *de facto* autonomous region, replacing army rule. It hopes to function successfully because so many with administrative experience have joined the revolution and those who gained practical knowledge of government by holding ministries in Baghdad under the terms of the 1970 truce have offered their services.



General Barzani, photographed at his secret headquarters

INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune

Published with The New York Times and The Washington Post

*R

PARIS, MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1974

Established 1887

Austria	10 B	London	10 B
Belgium	10 B	Luxembourg	10 B
Denmark	10 B	Madrid	10 B
France	10 B	Netherlands	10 B
Germany	10 B	Portugal	10 B
Greece	10 B	Spain	10 B
India	10 B	Sweden	10 B
Iran	10 B	Switzerland	10 B
Italy	10 B	Turkey	10 B
Japan	10 B	U.S. Military	10 B
Lebanon	10 B	Yugoslavia	10 B



RUBBLE—Villagers at Elitaroun, Lebanon, search ruins of homes after Israeli raid.

Heavy Fighting Reported

Iraqi Tanks and Planes Move On Kurd Stronghold in North

KURDISH FRONT, Northern Iraq, April 14 (AP)—Iraqi jets and tanks moved today against insurgent Kurdish forces near the oil center of Kirkuk, witnesses reported today.

Iraqi armored columns from Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah converged on strongholds of the 20,000-man Kurdish Army, known as Pesh Merga, cutting the main road to Chamchal. But the Iraqi Army was turned back with scores of casualties, witnesses said.

There were no reports of the fighting on Baghdad radio or from the Iraqi News Agency. Kurdish leaders claimed that Pesh Merga advance lines were well forward of the main mountain strongholds where the Kurds withstood Iraqi Army assaults in the mid-1960s.

Witnesses reported that an Iraqi garrison was encircled by Pesh Merga units at the edge of the Arbil Plain. They said that the Iraqis had abandoned many posts and were remaining in some defensive positions, where they were being resupplied by helicopters.

No Estimates

Kurdish leaders gave no estimates of their own casualties. Clashes have occurred in recent weeks near the Dukan Dam, Rawanduz and Zakho Area. Tension has been high in northern Iraq since Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani rejected a Baghdad plan for Kurdish autonomy last month, offered by Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

Iraqi Vice-President Saddam

Hussein said last week that government forces "are determined to put down their mutiny by force if political methods fail to end the disorders."

As the fighting broke out today, Gen. Barzani said that he has renewed his appeal to the United States for military support for the Kurds. He claimed that the United States already was giving large amounts of arms to the Kurds. But the U.S. State Department issued a statement denying that any assistance had been provided.

Fresh Weapons

Apparently bracing for fresh fighting, the Pesh Merga was freshly supplied with automatic weapons, mainly copies of rifles manufactured in the Middle East. Residents here said that they saw numerous Iraqi Army deserters, mostly Kurds, who were joining the Kurdish ranks in the front lines.

Kurdish villages near the front lines were deserted. Inhabitants had fled to the hills. Daily rain during the last 30 days grounded jets and bogged down tanks until Friday. Oil is at the heart of the dispute between the Ba'athist-dominated Iraqi government and the Kurds, who are demanding a share of national spending proportional to their population, as well as autonomy. The Kurds say that they constitute a quarter to a third of Iraq's population of 10 million and want from 20 to 25 percent of Iraq's 1974 budget. To date, their party says, it has never received more than 10 to 12 percent.

The budget draws heavily on Iraq's big oil revenues, which are based mainly on the oil fields around Kirkuk.

"Kirkuk is Kurdistan," Gen. Barzani has said. "We have told the government that many times." He also has said that his forces would consider attacking Iraqi oil installations in Kirkuk. "It was breaks out, there are possibilities. We should use them," he said.

Without fanfare, Iraq has been helping the Kurds with supplies, and provisions have been reaching Kurdistan across the Syrian and Turkish borders.

Top Gaullists Urge Single Candidate

PARIS, April 14 (UPI)—Four Gaullist cabinet ministers and 39 members of parliament last night urged jointly that all Gaullist candidates for the May presidential election pull out and rally behind a single standard-bearer.

Gaullist political sources and the news media said the move was initiated by Interior Minister Jacques Chirac in a new bid to kill the candidature of former Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas.

(However, Reuters reported that those who signed the statement said the multiplicity of candidates is perhaps understandable but above all "deeply regrettable.")

The move, newspaper commentators said, risks driving a new wedge into the ranks of the Gaullist movement, which began

● François Mitterrand, the Communist-backed Socialist candidate, has a modernized image and confidence. P. 6.

losing its cohesion soon after President Pompidou's death April 2.

Mr. Chaban-Delmas, 59, official candidate of the UDR, the main Gaullist group, ignored the appeal, as did Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 49, whose Independent Republican party is an associate of the UDR in the ruling coalition.

The appeal for the nomination of a single Gaullist candidate was signed by Justice Minister Jean Taittinger, Information Minister Jean-Philippe Lecat and State Secretary for Relations with Parliament Olivier Styrn, in addition to Mr. Chirac. The four cabinet members and the 39 National Assembly and Senate members already had twice vainly tried to stop Mr. Chaban-Delmas and other candidates by urging the nomination of Prime Minister Pierre Messmer.

Mr. Messmer entered the race briefly on Tuesday but pulled out eight hours later when Mr. Chaban-Delmas refused to step down. The authors of last night's appeal did not indicate whether they would put forward the name of their own candidate before midnight Tuesday—the deadline for the registration of candidates for the May 5 election. It is no candidate wins a straight majority on May 5, the two leading candidates will fight it out in a run-off May 19.

Battle Is Seen As Bloodiest Since Truce

TEL AVIV, April 14 (UPI)—Israeli planes, artillery and infantry battled Syrian forces on strategic Mount Hermon today in what the military command termed the bloodiest fighting on the Golan Heights front since the October war.

The command reported that 17 Israeli soldiers were wounded, some of them in the first hand-to-hand combat since the war. It was the highest number of casualties in a day on either the Egyptian or Syrian front since the 18-day October war and the 34th straight day of fighting on the Golan front.

Israeli planes attacked Syrian positions on the mountain intermittently for four hours, the command said. It declined to identify the planes and reported no attempted interception by Syrian fighters or surface-to-air missiles.

'Intense Fighting'

(The Syrian command said Syrian gunners shot down four Israeli planes and ground forces killed and wounded 50 Israeli soldiers in "intense fighting" on Mount Hermon and the Golan Heights today, the Associated Press reported from Damascus. Only one plane was identified, a French-made Mirage fighter-bomber.

[Twelve Syrian soldiers were killed and eight wounded in artillery and tank duels that erupted at sunrise and covered the "entire length of the front," a Syrian communiqué said.]

(Several Israeli military installations, fortifications and armored-vehicle emplacements were destroyed by artillery fire, the communiqué said.)

Claims Denied

The Israeli command denied claims by Damascus that four of its planes were shot down. "All our planes returned safely" following strikes across the truce line at Syrian artillery batteries providing cover fire for the mountain assault, the command said. The National Radio's military correspondent reporting from the front, said "significant hits" were made on Syrian forces.

It was the third time Israeli warplanes were called into action on the northern front since the war. The first time was a week and a half ago.

Yesterday Israeli planes struck at Syrian units that crossed the Golan Heights cease-fire line, hours after Syrian missiles were fired at patrol planes over Israeli air space, the Israeli Army command said.

A spokesman denied a Damascus statement that a plane was shot down by Syrian missiles.

An Israeli military source said the Syrians are trying to build a road to the summit in an attempt to retake Mount Hermon.

U.S. Agrees on Arms, Training for Saudis

WASHINGTON, April 14 (AP)—The United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement today under which Washington will supply the Saudi Army with \$335 million worth of modern arms and teach the troops how to use them. Riyadh radio reported.

The arms include tanks, artillery batteries and self-propelled assault guns, it said. The agreement is part of a technical and military cooperation accord announced last month, the radio said.

Kissinger Meets Syrian, Israeli; Golan Front Fighting Escalates



BRIEFING—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan gives details of raid into southern Lebanon by Israeli troops. At left is acting chief of staff Yitzhak Hoff.

Talks Called 'Very Useful, Constructive'

By Richard Harwood

WASHINGTON, April 14 (WP)—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continued negotiations with Syrian and Israeli officials this weekend over the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. The secretary referred to the talks with Syrian officials as "very friendly... very constructive" and an Israeli official suggested that the Syrians had shown a new flexibility.

After voicing encouragement, yesterday following talks with Syria's chief of military intelligence, Brig. Gen. Hikmat Khalil Chehab, Mr. Kissinger met this afternoon with Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz.

The secretary is acting in a go-between role in the discussions. Yesterday, Mr. Kissinger met in the morning and at night with Gen. Chehab, and appeared optimistic about progress in the talks.

'Very Useful'

He told reporters yesterday: "I consider the talks to have been very useful. They were conducted in a very friendly and very constructive atmosphere."

Gen. Chehab, speaking through an interpreter, agreed. After today's meeting with Mr. Kissinger, Ambassador Dinitz told newsmen that a Syrian proposal for disengaging troops on the Golan Heights, which Mr. Kissinger received yesterday, "definitely has room for give and take."

He would not go into details of the Syrian plan and said that he and the secretary did not discuss Israel's stated position of standing fast in Golan territory taken during the 1967 war.

Mr. Dinitz said that the next step would be Mr. Kissinger's trip to the Middle East soon. He said that Jerusalem believes this trip will bring "fruitful talks" with the Syrians.

'Willing to Stop'

Newsmen asked whether Mr. Dinitz thought the fighting on the Syrian front might undercut the mediation efforts, and Mr. Dinitz replied, "No, we hope not. We have not initiated the fighting in the north and as far as we are concerned we are willing to stop it right away."

But Israel, he said, would cling to its position that "any change in the cease-fire lines will only result out of negotiations and not out of Syrian military action."

Asked if he was more optimistic now, he replied: "I was not pessimistic before about the negotiations and I am not more optimistic now."

He said that Mr. Kissinger had rejected the substance of his talks with the Syrians and also passed on a Syrian plan and map for troop separation.

These would be passed on immediately to his government with an explanation provided by Mr. Kissinger, the ambassador said.

Selassie Names Grandson Acting Crown Prince

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, April 14 (Reuters)—Emperor Haile Selassie, 81, today announced that he has made his grandson, 20-year-old Prince Zare Yakob, acting crown prince.

In an Easter Sunday statement at the Jubilee Palace, the emperor told the government that the prince, now studying at Oxford University, had superseded his father, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, 37.

Constitutional experts said the action could mean that on the emperor's death or abdication, Prince Zare Yakob might become regent, aided by the Crown Council, until the death of his father, when the prince would inherit the throne.

Prince Asfa Wossen suffered a severe stroke in January, 1972. He is now in Switzerland and little is known here of his condition other than that he is understood to be partly paralyzed.

The spokesman said that the prince would like to seek the endorsement of the Ethiopian people before making any public statement.

It reflected a new policy, he said, which was designed to bring pressure on Lebanon to curb the terrorism emanating from its soil. "We were trying to explain that we are not the police of Lebanon," he said.

The Rebel Kurds

part three



Left: A Kurdish soldier wears a gas mask near the battlefield. Right Pesh Mergas guarding a strategic pass.

Mass return of educated exiles

ON BOTH my previous visits to the rebel-held area in Iraq, in 1966 and 1969, there had been virtually no educated Kurds amongst those I met, apart from members of the Central Committee of the KDP and a few army officers. There was only one doctor for a million people—and he happened to be a senior member of the Political Bureau—Dr. Mahmoud Osman. The revolution was almost wholly confined to peasants and pesh mergas.

It was vastly different now. Only a few weeks earlier, there had been an astonishing and spontaneous exodus of an estimated 200,000 Kurds from areas controlled by the Government to the de facto autonomous region. What made this of special significance was that these included, for the first time, large numbers of men and women with professional and academic qualifications: 60 doctors, 4,500 teachers, 30 professors, 5,000 policemen, 160 engineers, 100 army officers, many judges and lawyers, 1,500 students, and nearly all the Kurdish administrative officers from towns such as Kirkuk and Arbil.

They had made their way over the mountains by foot or on mules—often a journey of 14 days or more—to join the revolution. Some had come from as far away as Basra beside the Persian Gulf.

Now, wherever I went, I met people who spoke English where previously there had been only three or four. When I visited the well-equipped hospital at headquarters, there were five highly qualified doctors on duty—including a surgeon and a gynaecologist—not to mention two trained nurses.

MASS EXODUS

This mass exodus had started a few days before the Iraqi President, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, made his offer

Exclusive
report and
pictures
by Lord
Kilbracken

Right: A pregnant mother at Naoperdan Hospital receives treatment from a trained nurse who, along with over 60 doctors, has recently joined the Kurdish revolution.



of limited autonomy for the Kurdish region on March 11—the deadline set by the treaty exactly four years earlier. It was already well-known by all the Kurds that his offer could never be acceptable. First and foremost, no census had taken

place (as had been promised) to decide whether Kirkuk would be included. But also it was correctly anticipated that an inadequate degree of self-rule would be proposed. Al-Bakr certainly thought his offer would divide the Kurdish people in Iraq—just

as the Treaty in 1921 had divided the Irish people. He imagined that large numbers, weary after 13 years of intermittent warfare, would prefer to accept the inadequate compromise he put forward to returning to strife and hardship. Instead it united

the Kurds to a degree that surprised even the K.D.P.

I myself found it remarkable that this single pronouncement had brought over so many tens of thousands who had previously accepted life under Arab domination. Again and again I put the question to new arrivals from Baghdad, Souleimaniya, Kirkuk: "Why now?" Often they found it hard to explain.

But the general feeling was that they knew well the terms would be rejected by Barzani: that the revolution was stronger than ever and needed them; that this time they could win the impending struggle and free their homeland—perhaps not by force of arms, but by hastening the overthrow of the hated Baathist regime and replacing it with a democracy for all Iraq, within which the Kurdish people would have the rights they demanded.

NEW ELITE

The influx of this new elite has altered the whole face of the revolution. Without it, Barzani could hardly have claimed, as he did when speaking to me, that a de facto independent state had now been established in the area under his control and influence. For it has made it possible to set up an effective civil administration, besides greatly strengthening the revolutionary pesh merge army.

I had one more long meeting with Barzani before beginning the long trek homeward. Having received "information" that a major attack might be imminent in the area, he was moving early next morning to a new secret hideaway. We talked and smoked for hours, then sat down to a memorable feast at which I counted over 20 different dishes on the table.

Fighting has intensified ever since. News of it is reaching the outside world through the powerful "Free Kurdistan" radio station, which began operating shortly

before my arrival and can be picked up as far away as Beirut and Teheran. Its daily news bulletins in Kurdish, Arabic, Persian and English are being widely disseminated by the Western press.

A new level of bitterness was reached 10 weeks ago, when the Baathists executed 11 prominent Kurds on the sole ground that they were K.D.P. members. The K.D.P. retaliated by shooting 19 Arab army officers held prisoner.

SUCCESSOR

On the night before my departure, I attended a full meeting of the 21-man Central Committee, the body responsible under Barzani's chairmanship for governing the area and directing military policy. Barzani himself was absent, but his two sons, Idris and Mahsoud, were prominent in the discussions. Also members are the five who held ministries in Baghdad under the terms of the 1970 truce; all had resigned in March and made their way back to rebel HQ.

A triumvirate heading the Committee are accepted as being the leaders, and one or other would probably succeed Barzani: Habeeb Karim, K.D.P. General Secretary; Mahmoud Osman, Minister of Health, and Mohamed Abdul-Rahman, Minister of Education. But Idris and Mahsoud are growing in prestige and power and may one day be contenders.

However no-one even likes to consider the possibility of Barzani proving mortal.

The time came for me to leave. Such is the hospitality of the Kurds that I had not spent a single dinar during all my visit. At first light next morning, Ali and the Landrover were waiting.

Farewells all round. Then I was heading back towards the snow-covered pass and the level plains beyond.

CONCLUDED.

THE TIMES

Tuesday April 23 1974

No 59,071 Price 6p



The old rebel : Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who at 76 is leading an army of 20,000 Kurds against the Iraq regime.



The Women's Spring

A spring walled about with stone -
A girl goes in, a girl comes out.
In the village this is the women's spring,
Passion's Mecca for lusty swains.
At evening, group after group, the curly-haired lads
Block the road, hot-headed and impatient.
As oft as is heard the tinkle of a maiden's girdle
From the nest of their mouths flies out 'Mercy on us!'

The Girls

Girl of Hewraman, bejewelled from head to foot;
Fragrant with cloves* and balm;
Elegant beyond words; arrayed in bright colours;
Graceful of figure; soft and yielding of body;
Her side-long glance a smile from the star of hope;
The lilt of her speech the song of birds;
Her life the springtime of youth and love;
The parade for her beauty the orchard pathway to the spring!

* A piece of jewellery commonly worn by Kurdish women is the mēxekbend - a perforated locket containing cloves.

The Road Through the Orchards

Before you reach the village of your desire
The snake-like path glides in among the orchards.
The soft breeze in the shade of walnut and mulberry
Dries the sweat from the weary traveller's brow.
'Be not weary!' The hail from this bower and that bower
Eases the tedious road from orchard to orchard.
'Peace be upon thee, uncle beneath the walnut-tree!'
The weary one's greeting to the feeble and old.
'Welcome, on my eyes, my curly-haired boy*,
My squirrel on the tree, my lively youngster'.
You march on and on, from terrace to terrace;
Then at last you reach the margin of the houses.

* The young bloods of many parts of Persia and Kurdistan wear the hair 'bobbed' at the level of the neck and brushed up in a curl at the back from under the hat; this is the 'kakolh'.

Song

Courting at evening on the spring road
Lets loose across the valley a blaze of song.
The sun goes down, darkness descends on the valley.
The music of 'Kina Leyl'* goes on unending.
The moon comes up, the crag is bewitched by her beams;
And still persists the plaint of 'Kina Leyl'.
Dark eyes! Dark eyes!
A paradise for courtship, this Hewraman.
Every stick and stone of Hewraman
A tribute is to its graceful girls.
Dark eyes! Dark eyes!
Hewraman is the home of the dark-eyed beauties.

* The title of a song: the meaning in the Hewrami dialect is 'Maiden Beloved'.



11th CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, MAY 7 - 14, 1974

The 11th Congress of the International Union Of Students was held in Budapest, Hungary, from 7th to 14th May 1974. Our Society, which has been a full member of the IUS since 1964 was represented by a five member delegation and actively participated in the sessions of the Congress. After the executive committee's report many organisations took the floor expressing their views on the work of the Secretariat and the struggle of their organisations and role as students in their people's struggle for peace, democracy and progress. Many delegates felt that a need existed for widening the scope of IUS to include many other student organisations who are still staying out. During the discussions the need for a review of the constitution of the IUS was proposed by some organisations. However, this was postponed.

In its speech the Kurdush delegation conveyed to the Congress the urgent plight of the Kurdish people in Iraq who were once again subjected to another military campaign by the Iraqi regime. It also criticised the Secretariat for not fulfilling its duties regarding the implementation of the 10th IUS Congress resolutions in support of the Kurdish people's struggle for their national rights, and its partial stand in the conflict in Iraq. The Kurdish speaker strongly protested against a statement in the Executive Committee's report recognising a 'peaceful' solution to the 'Kurdish problem'; while a war was waged on Kurdistan-Iraq since the end of March.

The Congress adopted many resolutions in support of 'liberation movements' all over the world. It called for 'unity and solidarity among the world student movement in the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, and for peace. However the Congress stopped short of the Kurdish struggle and failed to adopt a resolution in support of the Kurdish people's fight for their national rights.

In a resolution hailing 'the achievements of Iraq' the Congress welcomed the 'granting of autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan'.

The KSSE delegate addressing the Congress after this resolution was adopted said that he expected this result (50% of the delegates did not take part in the voting, stunned at the undemocratic way in which the KSSE amendment was handled by the chair. There were also five abstentions.), but regretted that '... this Congress has been made party to, and has condoned, a savage war of aggression and genocide waged against the Kurdish people in Iraq'.

In addition publications of KSSE were not allowed to be displayed in the Congress, and many other obstacles were put in the way of our delegation. However, it was able to draw attention

of our delegation. However it was able to draw the necessary attention and concern among many delegates. It is ironic that KSSE which was elected as a member of the financial committee and commended for its 'role in the International Student Movement' in the 10th Congress of IUS in 1971, should be today branded as a supporter of the 'right-wing elements' in the Kurdish Revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq and the sufferings and cries of the Kurdish people and students cast aside for the time being.

President Hassan Albakir
Republic of Iraq,

We the undersigned, meeting during the 11th International Union of Students Congress held in Budapest from 7th-14th May 1974, protest against the summary execution of five Kurdish university students: Leila Kassim and her comrades, who were tried by a military court and not given the chance to defend themselves in a public civilian court and were submitted to inhuman treatment.

West African Students Union (WASU)
Student Union of Nairobi University (SUNU) - KENYA
Yugoslav Union of Students (YUS)
Union Generale des Etudiants de Tunisie (UGET) - TUNISIA
NSU - NORWAY
Australia Union of Students (AUS)
National Union of Zambia Students (NUZS)
SHI - ICELAND
Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE)

The Secretariat
I.U.S.
Praha 2
Vocelova 3
CSSR

Dear Friends

We acknowledge the receipt of your telegram concerning the recent events in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Although we appreciate your concern about the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, we are very surprised at the one-sided and biased tone of your telegram.

Our Society includes in its ranks all those who have come to Europe for the purpose of studying, from all parts of Kurdistan, regardless of their political views and affiliations. We are deeply disturbed by the hasty manner in which you have expressed your views regarding recent events in Iraqi Kurdistan. As a member organisation directly concerned with the issues under discussion, our society KSSE is surely entitled at least to be consulted, before IUS commits itself to such definite views as expressed in your telegram, which we look upon as having been prompted by malicious and distorted sources of information. Furthermore, this kind of action on your part does not contribute in any way to the task of reconciling and cementing relations between patriotic and progressive forces in Iraq.

The situation urgently requires the active participation of democratic organisations and individuals in the sincere efforts to remove the root causes of the incidents which have arisen between the progressive parties in Iraq; especially since the declaration of the joint statement by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) on 20th November 1973.

We note with regret the existence of a carefully stage-hostile propaganda campaign inside Iraq and outside against the Kurdish Revolution and its leadership. This campaign is naturally looked upon with glee by the enemies of the Arab and Kurdish peoples of Iraq: imperialism, chauvinism, militarism and dictatorship.

We on our part continue to implement and express the genuine wishes of our members, as so overwhelmingly confirmed by the 16th Congress of our Society (August 1973) i.e. solidarity with the just struggle of our people in Iraqi Kurdistan and complete confidence in its leadership, Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by Mustafa Barzani.

The cornerstone of this leadership has always been, from the outset of the Kurdish Revolution in September 1961, that all democratic forces in Iraq should be able to exercise political activities freely in Kurdistan and that they would be given active aid and shelter in order to escape the oppression committed by successive Iraqi governments. A prime example of this was in 1963 when the Iraqi Communist Party was subjected to a physical campaign of liquidation, when most of its leadership was wiped out including the Secretary General of the Party. The remainder of the Communist Party escaped to the area under Kurdish control, and was thus able to rebuild its organisation and resume its activities. This situation prevailed until recently, when elements of the Communist Party were able to involve their party in plans which are contrary to the fundamental beliefs of the Kurdish Revolution and of the Iraqi democrats.

Their provocative actions manifested when some of their members in Kurdistan received arms and ammunition from the Iraqi Army, explicitly aimed at setting up special power centres in Kurdistan which can be used in conjunction with the regular units of the Iraqi Army against the Kurdish Revolution.

The KDP has done its best to persuade the Iraqi Communist Party about the folly of this sinister step by certain elements of the Party. So far, instead of desisting from the provocative acts, these elements have intensified their efforts in that direction.

It is the duty of all progressive organisations in the world to persuade the Iraqi Communist Party to isolate those elements which are attempting to involve their Party in plans which are diametrically opposed to the basic interests of the Arab and

Kurdish peoples of Iraq. The real task of all progressive forces is to deplore such diversionary tactics, fomented by certain chauvinist elements in the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and concentrate on the need for struggle in order to attain autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq.

Finally we propose to form a joint mission to visit Iraqi Kurdistan in order to ascertain all the facts.

We take this opportunity to convey our fraternal greetings.

The Secretariat of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE)

SHORT STORY

A PARABLE FOR WINTER

by Kurdo

A large room with a low ceiling, which had a window with many broken panes, its glass replaced by pieces of cardboard, constituted the first year class of the 'KAWA' primary school in one of those remote villages of Kurdistan.

About two-dozen boys garbed in an assortment of woollen clothes of faded colours from age and dirt, dishevelled but healthy looking, the back of their heads flat, a common feature of Kurds, they sat on all shapes and manners of objects, from old rusty petrol cans, timber blocks and bricks; improvisation is the first law of nature among the peasants of Kurdistan and these young ones were no exception, as desks, heating and lighting and other commodities common in the town schools were non-existent for them. Nobody cared, the administration in the far away cities and towns didn't even feign sympathy to their plight. Certainly not since the great uprising began. They had had their share of napalm and paid their toll in blood with the rest of the villages of Kurdistan.

It was some years ago, during one of those truces that followed every time a new dictator grabbed the reins of power down South and wanted to bide his time till ready for yet another campaign of terror, that a detachment of Pesh Mergas came hurriedly down to construct the school; four large rooms of no definite shape or design, made of limestone quarried from the nearby hills. Three teachers, young and enthusiastic party members, uncommonly resourceful for townsmen living in the country. The teachers and the rooms were a gift from the party. The rest was up to the villagers.

Little Symko always liked to sit near the window although the coldest part of the room in this cruellest of all winters, because whenever his boredom turned to exasperation he would steal a few hasty glances to the beautiful landscape outside and traverse with his imagination into magic journeys along the valleys and gorges, down the glaciers and ravines. His dreams often ended with a sharp rebuke from the teacher amidst the boisterous shouts and laughter of his fellow pupils.

Today was Thursday and this was the last lesson. Symko was impatient. He wanted to be home to play in the snow with his cousins, to watch his two domesticated squirrels at their fiendish and hilarious games, to be away from this dark and miserable room, and as his unfocused eyes gazed steadily at the blackboard, reflections of that bitter night swayed in front of his eyes; pictures of that evening last summer when darkness was just descending upon the hamlet, the first of the stars twitching into view and everything lay quiet and still.

Suddenly dogs barked, men ran out and, in the distance along the ridge to the south, men and mules appeared scudding along at a rapid pace. When reaching the outskirts of the village there was a commotion. Suddenly everyone surged forward, towards their house. Ahead of the crowd the new arrivals walked firmly with a long narrow box high above their shoulders, and Symko's uncle, an old shrivelled man, whispered to him "Your father has gone to heaven".

Early next morning a large crowd from his and nearby villages buried his father. The Pesh Mergas from his father's battalion were all present as their voices rose lamenting the death of a comrade. Women wailed and men wept. The ballad ended with those haunting words which he had since memorised:

Don't weep for the valiant martyrs
Alive forever in our hearts they shall remain
The setting sun will remind us of their blood at every dusk.

It was a week later that his mother told him about his father's last words: Symko must go to school and become a doctor. Sometime later he knew why his father had ordained such: his life could have been saved if a doctor had been present to extract the pieces of shrapnel from the wounds, but there was none. In those days in the whole of the free zone there were only two or three.

Awakened from his contemplations by the shuffles of feet and the rush to the door, it was the end of the lesson and everyone was hurrying outside. Great shouts and shrieks emerged from the boys as they threw chunks of snow at each other. Symko walked slowly to the door stuffing his exercise books into a cloth knapsack. He pulled his thick woollen socks over his baggy trousers, tightly, and rolled his new blue scarf around his neck and head. Then with little hurried steps he went to the further end of the school yard where his conveyance was pre-occupied with the bale of hay that was laid out on the snow before it. Symko untied the donkey, brushed the flecks of snow off its back, stroked its ears and whispered "Let's go home".

As he rode out one of the teachers called to him "Be careful. Don't rush the beast and avoid the "over-hang".

Symko replied shyly in the affirmative and down the slippery narrow road he rode.

As he reached the stone bridge just outside the village an old grizzled man, carrying a bundle of wood on his back, called to him asking about his uncle and then warning him not to venture by the over-hang.

Darkness was fast settling, a blizzard was in the making as Symko reached the foot of the great snow-covered mountain. On the other side lay his village, his home, a fire, a bowl of hot broth, his two playful squirrels. As he ascended the cold, vicious wind was sweeping down, burning his face. He put a handful of raisins, that his mother gave him every morning for his journey, in his mouth; not because he was hungry but because he thought he must keep his jaws moving.

A very little later he was at the fork, one path rising gently to the peak, the other a steep and treacherous route direct to the top.

Symko stood still for a moment and then kicked away furiously and shouted at his donkey. With a sudden vigour he came to life and was unfrozen. Up they went, the boy and the beast, towards the overhang. The wind blew angrily, whistling through the cracks and crevices. A huge rock, sticking out just off the peak, covered with a mountain of snow and lying directly over the pass was the dreaded overhang.

The storm was angry. The snow stirred - then it came down.

Symko sensed the avalanche an instant before, he dismounted and hurriedly turned the ass around but it was too late.

Next morning the storm was gone and nature stayed quiet as dogs barked and men with lanterns shouted. They had been searching since dawn. Then they too suddenly became quiet and still. They had found what they were looking for. Buried beneath the snow was a dead donkey and a lifeless boy, hugging the beast for warmth that never came.

A.M. HAMILTON

THE PRAGMATIC IDEALIST

The name Hamilton is stamped permanently upon the topographical face of Kurdistan: the famous Hamilton Road, which runs from the Arbela of Alexander past the home of Saladin to the Iranian plateau. Hamilton, the man is as well remembered by the people of Kurdistan as his wonderful engineering feat through their country. Not surprisingly, a Hamilton cult was developing even among the new generation of Kurds. To all his friends the untimely death of Mr Hamilton, on 18th November 1973, deprived them of an authentic friend, who was immensely admired for his pioneering works and for his abundant human qualities.

Mr Hamilton's love for Kurdistan and for its people was one of the greatest things to him. This love for the rugged and beautiful mountainous country came from his birth and his ancestry. He was born in 1898 at Waimate in the South Island of New Zealand, a land of snowy mountains, deep gorges and rushing rivers as well as fertile pastoral plains. His ancestors were Scots, renowned for a sturdy independent character as the the Kurds. As an engineering student in New Zealand he was called on to do survey work in the mountains. At times he would be told to place a survey pole on the summit of a mountain four or five thousand feet high before breakfast. All this prepared him to contend with the extremely difficult terrain where in 1928 he was sent to build a road through Kurdistan. It also fitted him to compete with the Kurds on their own mountains when he was invited to take part in their hunting or cave explorations. He was always proud that he could keep up with a Kurd on a mountain, and could handle a firearm with a skill and accuracy equal to that of their best shots.

The story of his achievement in driving his road through the gorges and bridging the rivers with the help of local work force is told in his book "Road Through Kurdistan", first published in 1937. There too will be found the account of his relationship with the people of the area, and the reader will understand why it was for the rest of his life Mr Hamilton continued his friendship with the Kurdish people. From the second edition of his book in 1958, can be discovered how his experiences in Kurdistan led to his life's work in designing and constantly improving standardised steel bridging which, because of the novel features incorporated, has since been used extensively throughout the world. It was Mr Hamilton's proud boast that well over a thousand of his bridges have been erected, yet not one has failed in use. They range from foot bridges over England's motorways to the giant Mangla bridge over the Irelun tributary of the Indus in Pakistan. And it was because of the need for such bridges, made of light parts, easy to erect, yet capable of a wide variation in strength and span, for the river crossings of the Rawandiz Road, that the principles of this design were worked out in Hamilton's mind while he blasted his way through the gorges.

Whenever a chance arose Mr Hamilton would try to promote the Kurdish cause with whose ideals of an autonomous Kurdistan, able to use for its own development its fair share of the royalties from the oil wells in Kirkuk, he was deeply sympathetic. Thus he wrote in the Daily Telegraph (May 30th 1968) "The most famous of the Kurds Saladin's claim to lasting fame - exactly like that of the present Mulla Mustapha Barzani - rests not so much in his being a competent commander in war but that unlike so many before and since, he fought with chivalry; leaving women, children and prisoners unharmed. This quite undisputed characteristic of the Kurds made a deep appeal to all British soldiers and airmen who at times fought them. Western purchase of oil, bringing wealth beyond dreams to the Arabs of today, makes the destruction and misery in Kurdistan surely as undesirable and unnecessary as anything in the age could be. Even to vary the prescription Iraq should try something else - to let Mulla Mustapha put into motion his autonomous Kurdistan with the Kurdish population's share of oil royalties that are their due, and scrap the war completely - just to see how it works out - is something he would underwrite. Why not try it?"

Mr Hamilton would attend the Newroz - Kurdish New Year - celebrations staged by the Kurdish community in London every year. He could be seen, surrounded by students, conducting an animated conversation ranging from personal news to a vigorous discussion on the current situation in Kurdistan. The empathy and kindness he showed towards the Kurdish people knew no bounds.

Mr Hamilton's devotion to the Kurdistan cause was exemplified by his reaction to the tragic news of the death of his son, at the age of 19, a student at Aberdeen University, in a climbing accident in Scotland. Mr Hamilton wrote to Aberdeen University asking for a scheme for Kurdish students to study at the University in memory of his son.

Hamilton loved Kurdistan and he was loved and will always be honoured by Kurdistan.

H.Z.

The Hamilton Road. Photo Lord Kilbracken



The Social Character and Achievements of the Kurdish Revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq

by Shwan

INTRODUCTION

The geographical position of Kurdistan in the heart of the Middle East has historically often made it a battle ground for many invasions, way back to Alexander the Great. The first nominal division of Kurdistan, into spheres of influence between the Turkish and Persian Empires, came about in 1639. However the Kurdish people's independent character and love of freedom stood defiant over the centuries and have never been assimilated by successive conquerors. Kurdish principalities remained autonomous until the fall of the Turkish Empire after the First World War, when Kurdistan was divided and annexed to the modern states of Turkey and Iran and the newly created ones of Iraq and Syria.

This state of affairs and the continuous war against foreign invaders and corrupt central governments was a major hindrance in the way of a social and economic advancement and evolution of the Kurdish society. Even after the First World War, the governments which ruled over the different parts of Kurdistan preferred to exercise their power through corrupt tribal and feudal chiefs to exploit the peasants and suppress any national tendencies. This naturally caused Kurdistan, although rich and wealthy in natural resources, to lag behind the neighbouring areas and is today the most underdeveloped region in the Middle East.

It was against this background and conditions that many revolts flared up in Kurdistan demanding a recognition of the Kurdish people's national rights and a share in their country's wealth, which was exploited by the central governments and treated as a colony, a supplier of raw materials, and a market.

THE SEPTEMBER 11th 1961 REVOLUTION

On 11th September 1961 the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani led the Kurdish people's revolt against the new military dictatorship in Baghdad under Kassim, which refused to recognise and implement Kurdish national rights outlined in the provisional constitution, and waged a military campaign on Kurdistan.

The Kurdish revolution's programme stressed the need for


curbing illiteracy among the peasants and an immediate land reform to shift power from the big landlords, who owned about 64% of the land. It organised crash courses for students who have joined the revolution to prepare teachers for the illiteracy schools and also trained nurses and medical assistance to help the few doctors who struggled in their modest clinics in the mountains to treat air bombing victims. This social programme of the Kurdish Revolution rallied behind it all the peasants who became the back-bone of the Revolution, and it is interesting to observe that throughout the years of the armed struggle, the landlords who lost their lands often went to the government's side and were greatly financed to gather mercenaries up to this day, where a so-called 'progressive' government claims to be implementing land reform in Iraq.

One further aspect of the Revolution is its democratic nature which was clearly manifested in the Congress of the People in Koi in 1963, to discuss the peace negotiations with the new government in Baghdad, the non-existence of ranks among the Pesh Mergas (Kurdish Revolutionary Army) and the elections of the village councils. The national and religious minorities in Kurdistan are respected and treated equally, and every minority has a representative in the Council of the Revolution.

THE 1970-74 PEACE

On March 11th 1970 the Kurdish people scored a great victory by the recognition of the Iraqi government of autonomy for Kurdistan.

The Kurdish Revolution being also a social movement depends both on the support of the Kurdish masses and the translation of its achievements into tangible services for the people of Kurdistan. Having suffered many years of official neglect and lack of development, the Kurdish community has remained plagued with many social and economic ills, which require immediate and full attention. More than 75% of the people of Kurdistan remain illiterate, a situation which was aggravated by the constant disruption of education due to the absence of peace and the lack of educational facilities in the liberated areas. All this has led to the growth of a whole generation of Kurdish children



Refugees from Iraqi Army devastation. Photo Lord Kilbracken



Refugees from Arbil get a welcome lift from a truck soon after entering the liberated area at Galí Ali Bég. Photo Lord Kilbracken

without any education.

To say that tuberculosis and kidney diseases are rampant throughout Kurdistan is to demonstrate in only few examples the constantly deteriorating health conditions in the area. The picture grows gloomier when we realise that health and sanitation facilities for the treatment and prevention of various diseases exists on a very limited scale. To effectively demonstrate this lack of medical care, one has only to state the fact that there is only one doctor for every 250,000 of the inhabitants and there is a small supporting group of dressers and nurses.


Although the March Agreement promised the reconstruction of Kurdish villages, destroyed by air bombardment, and extend medical care to all, this did not go beyond show-piece projects in the large towns and official neglect of the rural areas continued. Therefore, the heavy task of enhancing the welfare of the people once again fell on the shoulders of the Kurdish Revolution, which laid down, in these obscure peace conditions, a vast programme of community development. Village councils were elected, medical centres were established and a Department for Community Development (Komelaiati) was formed to carry out this programme with the help of the village councils.

The programme was basically orientated towards achieving two goals: first to promote development in the form of public projects like town and village planning, various streams, spring and canals are cared for, the building of schools and hospitals and measures that will offer better and immediate services to the people such as setting certain sanitation and price standards in the shops, hotels and market places. Building public parks, shops, and providing clean water and electricity were two other major concerns that were given attention. The second main task of community development programme was to work jointly with the village communities to help improve their own conditions while the department provided certain services. Among the important tasks in the field of co-operation was to continue the campaign to eradicate illiteracy.

Another issue was the introduction of some sanitary measures, where citizens were asked, for example, to build their own

septic tanks according to specifications, which prevent the building of such facilities on or close to rivers and springs. Efforts were also made to eliminate the health hazards created by the close habitation of man and animal. For this purpose the practice of keeping livestock and other animals within or close to the family's living quarters was discouraged and the inhabitants of individual villages were being asked to make a collective effort to build one large animal shelter, where the entire village's livestock would be kept. Through the co-operation of the Kurdistan Students Union some members of the students' summer camps were to spend part of their time in some villages working with villagers in building these animal shelters.

In the Health Department a veterinary unit was established to advise villagers on animal care. A special centre for artificial insemination was opened in order to improve local kinds of animals and to have a good generation.



Cultural activities in the liberated areas




The Health Department had also many clinics in various areas and has lately opened a new medical centre to eradicate tuberculosis in Kurdistan. During epidemics special teams are sent to the countryside for vaccination and treatment.

THE NEW WAR IN KURDISTAN

The signs of a new military campaign by the Baghdad regime converged into the liberated areas of Kurdistan an exodus of more than 200,000 people, including hundreds of engineers, teachers, doctors, civil servants, students and workers. The new situation and the extensive bombing by the Iraqi Air Force halted for the time being, the normal activities of the above mentioned departments and efforts were concentrated on helping victims of air raids and finding shelter for the thousands of refugees. The Revolution reorganised itself into several new departments: health, public works, education, agriculture and land reform, youth, and others, to make use of the great number of professional people and students in its programme. The new economic blockade prevented food and medical supplies from reaching the Kurdish area. Women, Youth and Student organisations play an active role in these social services and the staff and students of Sulaimani University who joined the Revolution re-established their university in a school in Qala Diza - savagely bombed on April 24th, killing 80 schoolchildren and students.

One would observe that the ambitions and aspirations of these departments by far exceed their means, for the problems are those of a society which has remained poor and underdeveloped for too long. The fact that the political question remains unsolved, and that for more than a decade the Kurdish people have had to put everything else aside and to pick up arms in order to defend its existence, all these are factors which have prevented the Kurdish Revolution and its various organs from keeping the economic and social conditions of Kurdistan from further deteriorating, let alone trying to keep pace with the basic and increasing needs of the Kurdish society.

Naoperdan Hospital. Photo Lord Kilbracken



A Pesh Merga teaches his child.
Photo Gerard Klijn

A Paper on the KURDISH PROBLEM in Iraq

This paper was presented to the delegates of the United Nations Seminar on the Rights of National, Ethnic and other Minorities, held in Ohrid, Yugoslavia from 25th June - 8th July 1974.

Friends,

In the name of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, we would like to convey our fraternal greetings to you, participants of this Seminar.

As the terms of reference of the Seminar do not allow for representatives of national minorities other than those from member states to take part, we deemed it appropriate to address your meeting in this manner.

As you are well aware, the Kurdish question in Iraq is of direct relevance to the topic of your Seminar. There are three million Kurds out of 10.5 million total population of Iraq, constituting an indigenous ethnic region with an area of 72,000 sq.km. out of 451,000 sq.km. of Iraq which has been known as Kurdistan.

According to the Treaty of Sevre, 1920, the Kurdish people were given the right of self determination on an equal basis with the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire, but unfortunately the treaty was never implemented. Consequently in 1925 the Mosul Wilayat (Kurdistan Iraq) was annexed to the newly created state of Iraq under British mandate. Britain specifically pledged to the League of Nations that it would ensure that the Kurds must enjoy their national rights, this having been made a condition of the annexation, which was carried out without the consent of the inhabitants of the region concerned.

Ever since, the people of Kurdistan-Iraq have struggled to secure their national rights in the form of an autonomous Kurdistan within a democratic state of Iraq. But this struggle has met with many obstacles, namely these created by elements whose raison d'être is to continue a policy of national oppression and exploitation against the Kurdish people in Iraq. Thus the Kurdish citizen in Iraq is not merely treated as a second class citizen, but has been positively discriminated against in all aspects of life.

The following are some facets of this policy:

1. Citizenship

- a. Tens of thousands of Kurdish individuals have been deprived of their Iraqi citizenship since 1961, and have been summarily expelled with all their possessions confiscated by the Iraqi authorities, many of these affected have done their national service in the Iraqi Army.
- b. The law regulating the affairs of aliens in Iraq (Law No. 36, 1961 and its recent amendments) excludes all Arabs from any parts of the world from the category of aliens whereas Kurds who have been living permanently in Iraq since before the creation of the State of Iraq in 1922 are considered aliens. Thousands of families were forced to abandon their dwellings, hundreds of villages in Kurdistan have been evacuated by force from their inhabitants and replaced with Arab tribesmen from the South in order to change the ethnic composition of the region.
- c. According to a law passed by RCC, No Iraqi who marries a foreigner can be employed in the public sectors of the country (which in Iraq constitute 90% of public employment), but if that foreigner happens to be an Arab he or she is not considered as a foreigner regardless of the country of origin. However, Kurds from neighbouring countries are considered to be aliens.

2. Education

Within the following Kurdish provinces of Sulaimaniya, Duhok, and Arbil, the percentage of students attending school is the lowest of all Iraq.

For the last ten years no Kurds have been accepted in the Air Force College.

Number of Kurds accepted in the Military and Police Colleges is between 2-5% (with the last figure being true only for 1970 following the March Agreement).

Rarely any Kurd is accepted at the Military Staff College.

Since 1961 the percentage of Kurds receiving scholarships has not exceeded 3-4%.

There is no permanent or specific budget for education in Kurdistan and the allocation of funds is left to the discretion of the Ministry of Education in Baghdad.

Even when Kurdish schools exist in such provinces as Nineven, Diyaleh and Kirkuk, Kurdish children are discouraged from and even threatened against enrolling in such schools.

Due to the low standard and quality of education provided rarely Kurdish students are accepted at the College of Medicine, Engineering and Dentistry.

Obvious discrimination is practised in the case of Sulaimaniya University through the procedure of centralised registration which is controlled from Baghdad. This procedure was put into force after the creation of the Sulaimaniya University, and this has led to the sending of fewer Kurds while more and more Baathist students attend this institution. Furthermore, Kurdish professors are often discouraged from joining the faculty of the University.

3. Government

The only decision-making body (political, economic, administrative etc.) is the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) whose decisions carry the power of law. The RCC membership is not to exceed 12 and qualifications for membership are that one must be a member of the Regional Command of the Baath Party and hence a definite obstacle in the way of any Kurd into the RCC. Furthermore, the Regional Command of the Baath is treated as the sole political leader in Iraq and it thus undermines the political and the recognised leadership of the Kurds in Iraq.

a. Ministry of Defence

Of all the top staff of the Ministry including commanders of divisions, battalions etc. there are only two Kurds.

b. Foreign Affairs

There are no Kurds even at the level of Head of Section or Director-General. Out of about 80 ambassadors there is only one Kurd. Out of 500 diplomats there are only 10 Kurds.

c. Ministry of Oil

Although 70% of Iraqi oil comes from Kurdistan there are no Kurdish Director-Generals either in the Ministry, the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) or at Kirkuk. There were some Kurds among the staff of the IPC but recently 560 of them were expelled.

d. The Cabinet

Out of 23 cabinet posts there are only 2 so-called Kurdish ministers and 3 Ministers of State who have no power at all. Out of 23 Deputy Ministers there are only 3 Kurds. Out of 250 Director-Generals there are only 15 Kurds.

In general no Kurds are accepted within the security and intelligence branches of the Iraqi government.

All of this constitutes a violation of Article 2 of the March 11th 1970 Agreement which states that "The participation of our Kurdish brothers in the Government without discrimination between Kurds and non-Kurds in appointments to public posts, including important and key posts in the State, such as Cabinet Ministers, Army Commands, and other such posts, had been and still is one of the important points which the Revolution Council aims to achieve. While approving of this principle the Revolution Government re-iterates the need for work to apply it in just proportion taking into consideration qualifications, population proportion and the deprivation which our Kurdish brothers have suffered in the past."

4. THE ECONOMY

While Kurdistan is the richest area of Iraq (endowed with oil, minerals, tourism, adequate rainfall, favourable conditions for agriculture) budgetary allocations for the development of the area, even during the last 4 years of peace and agreement, have remained at the low and fluctuating rate of 7-12%.

- In 1970 a decision was made to build an oil refinery, and

even though Kirkuk is the oil-producing area, the refinery project was moved to Hammam 'Alil and this led to a cost increase of 20%. This was done simply to deprive Kurdistan of the benefits from the existence of this project.

- While raw materials for iron and steel industry come from Kurdistan (iron ore from Sulaimaniya and gas from Kirkuk) the government has arbitrarily moved these projects to Basra in the south.
- During the last four years many road-building projects were approved for Kurdistan; however all these have been stopped including those which were already in progress. For the next two 5-year economic plans for Iraq there are provisions for only two roads in Kurdistan: one from Kirkuk-Mosul-Makhumur bypassing Arbil and it is built mainly to facilitate the Arabisation policy; the other is Mosul-Zahko which is being built for military reasons.
- In general there seems to exist a decision for not building roads which will lead to the establishment of a network of communication for Kurdistan. For example, to go from Galala to Qala Diza (a mere distance of 50 km), one is forced to travel close on 400 km.
- Out of 150 industrial projects in Iraq there are only 4 in Kurdistan.
- Out of 25 members on the Economic Planning Board there is only one Kurd.
- Tobacco constitutes a major cash crop in Kurdistan. As a monopoly of the government, the examination of the crop and its final purchase is used as a means of economic pressure on Kurdistan through arbitrary and discriminatory methods of purchase, lack of adequate subsidies, timing and quantity of the product purchased.

Although Kurdistan is the main source of water for Iraq, the general design is to take this water and build irrigation projects in the south. For example, the Kirkuk Irrigation project which cost nearly 200 million dollars is designed to irrigate areas south and southwest of Kirkuk where Arab tribes are brought in and settled. During negotiations for the final implementation of autonomy for Kurdistan the Government remained adamant refusing to give Kurdistan any power concerning irrigation planning.

5. POLICY OF TERROR

During the last two years 83 members of KDP and others were arbitrarily arrested and have been killed without the benefit of a trial or investigation. Among those who died under torture were Police Col. Hussain Shirwani and Majeed Haji Qadir.

- An assassination attempt was made on the life of General Barzani on September 29th 1971. A second attempt was made on Barzani's life on July 16th 1972. An attempt was made on the life of Abdul Wahab Atrushi in Spring 1972 and while he was serving as Governor of Arbil.

An attempt was made on the life of Idris Barzani in December 1970 while he was in Baghdad to congratulate President Bakr on the occasion of the Muslim Feast.

An attack was carried out against the KDP headquarters in Mosul on April 14th 1970.

- In October 1971 the Kurdish citizen Mustafa Jamil was arrested and asked to provide information about some Kurdish leaders. Under torture he lost his toes and was forced to walk on broken glass.
- It was obvious that some of the eleven Kurds who were recently executed had been severely tortured. Some had their limbs torn out and others their eyes gouged.

6. GENOCIDE

On June 9th 1963 (while the Baath were in power) and in the city of Sulaimaniya, 128 persons were rounded up at night and transferred to the outskirts of the city where they were executed en masse and dumped in a mass grave.

- Around the end of June 1963 and in the Kurdish town of Key Sanjaq six people were tied to telephone poles and executed.
- In July 1963, Taha al-Shakarchi (who in February 1974 was appointed Commander of the 8th Division in Arbil) was commanding officer of an Iraqi Army unit near Key Sanjaq. Near the village of Chinarc he rounded up 15 Kurdish NCO's in his unit, forced them into a tea house and using his tanks he demolished the house over them. Six months later and after the collapse of the Baath regime, the bodies of the NCO's were discovered.
- In Spring of 1966 at the village of Saruchawa close to the town of Raniya, and while an Iraqi Army unit was approaching, the village elders led by the village Mulla (religious priest) holding out a Koran

appealed for mercy on behalf of the village community. In response they were all mowed down by machine guns and buried in a mass grave.

- On August 19th 1969, the village of Dakan within the Shaikan district (Mosul province) fell into the hands of an Iraqi Army unit. The children and women of the village had already taken refuge in a close-by cave. Under direct order and supervision of the Commander of the Fourth Division and the Commander of the Shaikhan district, the Iraqi Army surrounded the cave and burned alive the 67 women and children trapped inside the cave. On October 9th 1969 a Kurdish representative met the President of the UN General Assembly at New York where he presented a memorandum supported by documents and photographs condemning the Baath government's dastardly act at the village of Dakan.
- On April 26th 1974, the town of Qala Diza, about 100 km north of Sulaimaniya, was heavily bombed with napalm. One hundred and thirty civilians were killed, most of them children attending school.
- On 30th April the Iraqi Army entered the town of Zakho and set fire to the town.

Friends,

The rights of national, ethnic and other minorities are an integral constituent of a just and peaceful world. We are of the opinion that international organisations, such as the United Nations and its agencies can play a vital role in bringing about appropriate solutions to these problems.

With best wishes for a constructive and successful seminar,

World War I when various parts of Kurdistan were added to the territories of the modern states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. At present, therefore, Kurdistan can be said to form the north-western part of Iran, east and south-eastern part of Turkey, north-western part of Syria, a sliver of Soviet Armenia in the U.S.S.R., and north and north-eastern part of Iraq.

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A Kurd may best be characterised as a mountaineer well-adapted to the terrain and climate of his homeland. Kurdish peasant women enjoy greater freedom than their Turkish, Persian and Arab neighbours. A number of women have been prominent in local politics and even armed revolts. The environment is thus favourable for female emancipation and Kurds have been eager to take advantage of any opportunity for modern education which the oppressive governments ruling over Kurdistan denied them.

Judging from their rich folklore, the Kurds are a people very fond of music, dancing and poetry. Ahmed i Khane, Haji Qadiri, Koyi, Piramerdi, Mawlawi, Goran, Hajar and Bekas are only few among many poets and literary figures. These people had a marked effect on enhancing Kurdish nationalism, particularly Ahmad i Khane and Haji Qadri Koyi.

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Further the Kurdish Revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq had a great influence in breaking these ties, as a land reform programme was carried out during the years since the revolution began in 1961.

HISTORY

From the dawn of history the Kurds have rarely submitted to conquerors or raiding armies which frequented the Middle East. Kurdistan was always a confederation of principalities and Kingdoms and the Median Empire was the greatest single Kurdish state in history.

After the Islamic conquests in the 7th century A.D., the Kurds like the rest of the peoples of the area, adopted Islam, leaving their old Zoroastrian religion and, along with the Arabs, Persians, and Turks, played a leading role in extending and expanding the Islamic civilisation. Kurdish power reached its height in the 12th century when Saladin (a Kurd) regained the Holyland from the invading crusaders.

With the rise of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds, like the Arabs and Armenians, were weakened considerably and although the Ottoman military campaigns never succeeded in occupying and subduing Kurdistan, it resulted in the disintegration of the bigger Kurdish principalities into tribal and feudal systems and, by the middle of the 19th century the last of the Kurdish principalities in Botan crumbled under the attacks of the Ottomans.

The modern history of Kurdistan begins with the rise of nationalism and the establishment of modern political parties aiming at national rights and self-government. At the turn of the century and during the latter half of the nineteenth century a series of uprisings and revolts by Kurdish leaders against the Turkish and Persian rule were crushed severely.

KURDISTAN AFTER WORLD WAR I

World War I marks an important turning point in the history of the struggle of the Kurdish people for self-rule. Their aspirations were encouraged by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and by Point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson's "program of world peace" (January 1918) which stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be assured "of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development". A delegation representing the Kurdish patriotic societies

attended the peace conference. The Treaty of Sevres* signed in August 1920 by representatives of the allies and of the sultan, provided for the recognition or creation not only of the three Arab states of Hejaz, Syria and Iraq, but also of Armenia and to the south of it, Kurdistan, which the Kurds of the Mosul vilayat (Kurdistan-Iraq), then in British occupation, would have the right to join. (In 1925 the League of Nations sent a commission to southern Kurdistan to decide the 'future' of the vilayat of Mosul.

The commission reported to the council of the League that seven tenths of the population of the vilayat of Mosul are Kurds and that "the Kurds are neither Arabs, Turks or Persians They are different and clearly distinguishable from the Turks and still more different and remote from Arabs". The commission further recommended that instead of including the vilayat in Turkey or Iraq "an independent Kurdish state should be created".)

However, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified due to the rise of Ataturk in Turkey and the new interests of the French and British in the area. Thus the Treaty of Lausanne (1921), which superseded it, made no mention of Kurdistan. Hence, southern Kurdistan was included in the newly created Iraqi Kingdom, western and northern parts to Turkey and Syria, and Persia gained the eastern parts.

KURDISH STRUGGLE TAKES A NEW TURN

The Kurds were disappointed and disillusioned after many promises and statements of policy by the Western powers, whom they had never been in contact with before, and felt cheated, resorted to the only means of retaliation in their power: armed revolt. The first revolt was in Kurdistan-Turkey in 1925, initially successful, the uprising was repressed ruthlessly and brutal measures of reprisal were taken. Many Kurdish intellectuals and political leaders were hanged. By 1929, another revolt broke out establishing its control over large parts of Kurdistan-Turkey, but after prolonged struggle the uprising was crushed by the Turkish Army. Here it is worth noting J.L.Nehru's "Glimpses of World History" (Vol.II, Allahabad 1935, p. 1108) in which he wrote: "So the Turks, who had only recently been fighting for their own freedom, crushed the Kurds In 1929 there was another revolt of the Kurds and again it was crushed, for the time being at least. But how can one crush forever a people who insist on freedom and are prepared to pay the price for it?"

True to Nehru's prediction, the sufferings inflicted upon the Kurds only increased their resistance and resolution and all the repressive measures did not stop or slacken Kurdish revolts in all parts of Kurdistan.

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD


The autumn of 1942 saw the formation of the Komala party. In 1946 Qazi Muhamad, who had joined the Komala in 1944 and became prominent in its politics and a leading figure in Kurdistan, declared the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad which included most of Kurdistan-Iran. The most progressive aspect of the Kurdish government was its educational and social welfare programme. This new republic was dependant on the U.S.S.R. for help to develop its own force to stand the dangers threatening it by the Iranian government which was backed by the British and Americans. But, while the Kurds prospered under the new Kurdish administration, their fate was already decided by the super-powers in the Yalta conference when Stalin agreed to leave Persia a British sphere of influence in return for help during World War II and some oil concessions later. So after only 11 months of existence the colonial powers dashed the hopes of the Kurdish people once more.

SOUTHERN KURDISTAN

In Kurdistan-Iraq the situation was more or less the same and a series of revolts broke out. The biggest was the one led by Sheikh Mahmoud in 1919. In 1930 a revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed which provided for an end to the mandate in 1932. Disappointed by the absence of any specific safeguard for Kurdish rights, the Kurdish nationalists campaigned for a boycott of the general elections for a new parliament which would be asked to ratify the Treaty. In the course of a demonstration, soldiers of the Iraqi Army fired on the crowd at Sulaimani, injuring more than 200 people and killing 45. Sheikh Mahmoud rose again demanding Kurdish autonomy. It was eight months before Sheikh Mahmoud surrendered to the Iraqi Army, backed by the RAF. The Treaty was passed and in due course Iraq became an independent state. As a pre-condition for its membership in the League of Nations, Iraq agreed to grant the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of Iraq.

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"The Kurdish problem as part of the present-day worldwide stream of national liberation movements is undoubtedly one of the generally recognised and highly stringent issues of the struggle waged by the oppressed people for national self-determination and independent political, economic and social development, at the same time, however, it remains in its essence almost unknown."

COUNTRY

Although Kurdistan is seen today as only parts of the territories of many states in the Middle East where international frontiers cut across the land and the people, geographically and ethnically these parts continue to form one homogeneous and contiguous unit.

The country consists mainly of mountainous terrain and fertile valleys watered by many rivers. Kurdistan includes some of the highest mountains in the world, known through their biblical connections, namely Mount Ararat (5000 meters) and Mount Judi, as the places of rest of Noah's Ark. In fact the country enjoys one of the outstanding scenic beauties of the world, besides being rich in many natural resources, mainly oil and other minerals. Agricultural products include wheat, barley, rice, tobacco and fruits. Dairy products, wool and forestry are other economic resources of Kurdistan.

Kurdistan has undergone two major fragmentations, one during the 17th century when it was divided into areas of influence between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and more recently after

World War I when various parts of Kurdistan were added to the territories of the modern states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. At present, therefore, Kurdistan can be said to form the north-western part of Iran, east and south-eastern part of Turkey, north-western part of Syria, a sliver of Soviet Armenia in the U.S.S.R., and north and north-eastern part of Iraq.

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period from 1930 to 1943 marked a series of ill-fated rebellions in Kurdistan-Iraq led by Mustafa Barzani who had a leading role in Kurdish politics and revolts since then.

The last seven decades were full of uprisings and revolts by the Kurdish people to secure their national rights. Their failure was due mainly to: the complex political situation in the area and the conflicting interests of the big powers. Another reason being the absence of strong political organisation and co-ordination between the Kurds themselves. However, the 1961 revolution in Kurdistan-Iraq marks a turning point in the Kurdish struggle. The effectiveness of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and its experienced president General Mustafa Barzani, in the present revolution, militarily, politically and ideologically, makes this struggle different from the previous uprisings.

The new campaign by the Baathists has once again focused world attention on the area, and the extensive reports in the international press show this clearly. Undoubtedly, the Kurdish movement has gained more and more recognition and its effects are spreading to all other parts of Kurdistan initiating more humane policies towards the Kurdish people.

Notes

* The text contained two Articles affecting the Kurds. Article 62 providing for local autonomy in a part of Eastern Anatolia where they constituted a majority of the population, and Article 64 reading as follows: "If within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty, the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan; which hitherto have been included in the Mosul vilayat."

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The Kurds: A Nation without a State
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 Kurdischer Studentenverein in Osterreich
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