

REVIEW  
OF THE  
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION  
OF  
MESOPOTAMIA.

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**NOTE.**

This paper gives an account of the civil administration of Mesopotamia during the British military occupation, that is to say, down to the summer of the present year, when, a Mandate for Mesopotamia having been accepted by Great Britain, steps were being taken for the early establishment of an Arab Government.

His Majesty's Government called for a report on this difficult period from the Acting Civil Commissioner, who entrusted the preparation of it to Miss Gertrude L. Bell, C.B.E.

INDIA OFFICE,  
3rd December 1920.

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**Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.**

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## Mesopotamia: Review of Civil Administration.

### CHAPTER I.—Occupation of the Basrah Wilayat.

In the spring of 1910, Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia was epitomised by a singularly competent observer, Mr. J. G. Lorimer, British Resident at Baghdad, in words which cannot be bettered. "The universal Turkish system of administration," he wrote in the Political Diary for the month of March, "is in almost every respect unsuitable to 'Iraq. The 'Turks themselves must recognise that it is a failure here, but probably few of them appreciate the cause, though that is sufficiently obvious. 'Iraq is not an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, but a foreign dependency, very much in the rough; and its government by sedentary officials according to minute regulations, framed at Constantinople for Western Turkey, can never be satisfactory. I had no idea before coming to Baghdad of the extent to which Turkey is a country of red tape and blind and dumb officialdom, nor of the degree in which the Turkish position in 'Iraq is unsupported by physical force. One cannot but admire, however, the dogged and uncomplaining resolution with which the Turkish civil bureaucracy and skeleton army persist in their impossible tasks, the former in that of governing according to code and paragraph, the other in that of maintaining a semblance of order."

This description outlines the conditions prevailing in the country at the outbreak of war, except that the intervening four and a half years of administration under the auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress had tended to exaggerate former evils while arousing hopes of improvement which could not be fulfilled. Encouraged by the catchwords of liberty and equality, the subject races of the Ottoman Empire began to formulate aspirations wholly contrary to the centralising spirit which animated the Committee even more than the régime it had replaced. Claims to local autonomy, which had first been heard in Syria, were enunciated there in more assured tones and found an echo in Mesopotamia, not only among the Arab population, but also among the Kurds, who had been no less alienated than the Arabs by a spasmodic assertion of authority which the Ottoman Government was powerless to maintain. It is not too much to say that the Mesopotamian Wilayats of Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul had reached the limits of disorder consonant with the existence, even in name, of settled administration. For years past British Consular officials had been accustomed to receive embarrassing requests from local magnates and tribal chiefs that the British Government should put an end to the intolerable chaos by assuming control of the country.

British maritime and commercial interests in the Persian Gulf, together with its political importance to the Government of India, had thrust upon us responsibilities there which we could not avoid. Our position with regard to the ruling Arab chiefs along its shores had gradually been consolidated. We had entered into treaty relations with the Sultan of Masqat, the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast and of the Island of Bahrain. Ibn Sa'ud, Ruler of Najd, who in 1913 had pushed his way down to the sea, was anxious to obtain our recognition and support; the Shaikh of Kuwait, always apprehensive of Ottoman encroachments, had been assured of our protection, and the Shaikh of Muhammarah, Arab by race though a subject of Persia, looked to us for help in maintaining his position against Sultan and Shah alike.

These alliances were a valuable asset when war was declared on Turkey on 29th October 1914, and it was of primary importance to make clear to the chiefs of the Gulf the causes of the breach with the Ottoman Empire and the scope of hostilities. Accordingly the Political Resident issued on 31st October, under the orders of His Majesty's Government, a proclamation to the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf and their subjects explaining that Turkey had entered into war at the instigation of Germany, to her own destruction, and that it seemed impossible to hope that the Ottoman Empire could be preserved. To the chiefs who had enjoyed the benevolent protection of Great Britain we promised that no act of ours should threaten liberty or

religion, and we required of them on their part that they should preserve order and tranquillity in their territories and should not allow the foolish among their subjects to disturb the peace of their dominions or to injure British interests. By pursuing this course they would emerge from the troubles which surrounded them stronger and freer than before. On 1st November a second proclamation of wider application was issued, touching the holy places in the 'Iraq.

With these assurances the chiefs of the Gulf were satisfied. During the whole course of the war we encountered from them no hostility, while the unwavering friendship of leading men, such as the Shaikhs of Muhammarah and Kuwait and the Ruler of Najd, proved of inestimable value not only to the British Government but also to the Arab cause.

On 6th November, the British-Indian force which had been concentrated in readiness at Bahrain, landed, under the command of General Delamain, at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and under cover of the naval guns, took Fao fort. On the same day Sir Percy Cox, who had accompanied the force from India as Chief Political Officer, issued a proclamation in which he reiterated the regret of the British Government at having been forced, by the unprovoked hostility of the Turkish Government, into a state of war. "But let it be known to all," the proclamation continued, "that the British Government has no quarrel with the Arab inhabitants on the river banks, and so long as they show themselves friendly and do not harbour Turkish troops or go about armed, they have nothing to fear, and neither they nor their property will be molested."

During the month of October the Turks had been clearing their encumbered decks for action. For the better part of 25 years the peace of Basrah had been rent and the slumbers of successive Walis disturbed by the activities of a member of the leading Sunni family of the district, Saiyib Talib, eldest son of the Naqib. In turn adherent of the Committee of Union and Progress and of its rival, the Liberal Party, Saiyid Talib's ambitions were centred on the hope of converting the Basrah Wilayat into an independent Arab amirate with himself as amir. For some years he and his associates had dominated the town of Basra, and held the local Ottoman authorities in defiance. Saiyid Talib was fully alive to the hazards he was taking, and in October 1914, when Enver Pasha pressed him to come to Constantinople, probably as the best means of getting rid of him, he made advances to us through the Shaikh of Muhammarah. In return for recognition as local chief, he offered to raise an Arab revolt. A reply was sent to him through Shaikh Khaz'al of Muhammarah, advising him to remain in Basrah and co-operate in our interest with the Shaikhs of Muhammarah and Kuwait and with Ibn Sa'ud. He was promised immunity from taxation for his date gardens, protection from Turkish reprisals and the maintenance of the hereditary privileges of himself and his father, the Naqib. Here negotiations halted, and before our forces reached Basrah Saiyid Talib's position there had grown too precarious. He fled to Kuwait and thence to Ibn Sa'ud, who interceded with us on his behalf. He ended by going to India in voluntary exile, and was permitted in 1917 to remove to Egypt, where he remained till February 1920, when he returned to Basrah.

The career of Saiyid Talib was, from our point of view, innocuous. The same cannot be said of the career of 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun. The most virile member of a family of Sunni landowners and tribal overlords in the province of Basrah, he was the bitter foe of Saiyid Talib, who in 1911 had decoyed his father into the hands of the Turks. Sa'dun Pasha was removed to Aleppo, where he presently succumbed to the climate of an Ottoman gaol. By a strange perversion, hatred of Saiyid Talib had thrown 'Ajaimi into the arms of the Turks, and it was upon him that they relied to assemble and lead the Arabs in a holy war against the infidel.

All through the Ottoman Empire a determined effort was made to rouse fanaticism by the preaching of a Jihad, and it met in Mesopotamia with some outward appearance of success. The religious forces of Islam were mobilised and the Shaikh of Muhammarah was urged by prominent mujtahids, the religious leaders of the Shiahs at Najaf and Karbala, to take part against us. He replied that it was his belief that the mujtahids acted under compulsion and that his obligations as a Persian subject enjoined neutrality. But the tribesmen of the Euphrates and Tigris, excited, it is to be suspected, more by hopes of boundless loot than by expectation of reward in another world, came flocking down the rivers to oppose our advance up the Shatt-al-'Arab—a wild and irresponsible horde which broke at the first onset. "As for the guns of the English," explained one of the combatants some months later to a

British resident in Basrah, "they filled the air with noise, tore up the earth and knocked down the palm trees. That, Sahib, is not war." After a brief experience of these unfamiliar terrors, the speaker had returned to the cultivation of his garden, contentedly accepting our administration.

On 11th November our outposts encountered and repulsed at Saihan a few hundred Turks of the Basrah garrison. On the 16th and 17th, engagements were fought at S'abil and Kut al Zain. The Turkish force was accompanied by Arab levies and 'Ajaimi was present in command of some 250 irregular horse, but he hung upon the outskirts of the battle, taking no part, and a large proportion of the tribesmen decamped before the action. 'Abadan, the refinery of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was henceforth safe, and from being an object the protection of which was one of the primary duties of the Force, it assumed for the rest of the war the rôle of purveyor of crude oil, kerosene and petrol to every branch of His Majesty's services. The record of its work is one of which all those associated with it, as well as with the distant oil fields on which it depends, may well be proud. The position of our good friend the Shaikh of Muhammarah, which had been one of considerable anxiety, was assured also.

After the defeat of 17th November the Turks retreated hastily to Qurnah, abandoning Basrah, while 'Ajaimi withdrew to Zubair. Basrah was left at the mercy of fleeing tribesmen and of its own liberal supply of cut-throats, who applied themselves with native ability to the task of looting the Custom House and the bazaars. Urgent messages from the local magnates as well as from the British Consul were sent to the Force, bidding it hasten, and we entered the town on 22nd November to find the Custom House in flames and the population in great anxiety. On the day of the occupation, Sir Percy Cox, in the name of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants that we bore them no enmity or ill will, and that we hoped to prove ourselves their good friends and protectors. "No remnant of the Turkish administration now remains in this region. In place thereof the British flag has been established, under which you will enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and to your secular affairs. I have given strict orders to my victorious troops that in the execution of the duties entrusted to them they are to deal with the populace generally with complete consideration and friendliness. It remains for you yourselves to treat them in the same way."

The town was placed under a Military Governor, who was shortly afterwards given two Deputy Military Governors, one for Basrah and one for the suburb of 'Ashar. The tribesmen along the Shatt-al-Arab, though they had figured, if they had done nothing more, in the Turkish forces, began at once to make advances to us. One of the first to come in was Shaikh Ibrahim of Zubair, the little oasis on the desert edge, some eight miles west of Basrah, standing on the site of Sinbad the Sailor's port. The Shaikh of Zubair had always been permitted by the Turks to hold a position of semi-independence, and his village, peopled mainly by Sunnis from Najd, has the appearance and atmosphere of Arabia rather than of Mesopotamia. It is one of those Beduin market places which are scattered along the frontiers of the settled lands, and as such echoes with tribal gossip and the politics of the interior desert. These high matters being discussed round the Shaikh's coffee hearth, he is the best local authority on all that concerns the Beduin, and he played the part of eyes and ears to the Chief Political Officer. More especially was his friendship of value when in the spring the Turks were concentrating on Shu'aibah, three or four miles to the north of him.

On 9th December we occupied Qurnah, at the confluence of the Tigris and the old Euphrates channel. The Shaikh of Qurnah had already sent down messages to Basrah and has since the occupation been unwavering in his attitude towards us—he became a familiar figure in the Basrah Political Office, with his restless and wary glance, his beard dyed red with henna, and his flow of eloquent periods. A bit of a scholar, he possesses a meagre library, and prides himself on a knowledge of history which covers a period extending, with lapses, to the days of Adam. The Shaikh of Harthah, between Basrah and Qurnah, was already to be counted among our friends. He was one of the first of the rural magnates to enter the service of the British Government. The connection had begun, as he is fond of recording, by his being picked up wounded on the battlefield of Kut al Zain, where he had been fighting against us. The intervention on his behalf of the Shaikh of Muhammarah procured his pardon, and the treatment he received at our hands won his lasting gratitude.

In February 1915 Lord Hardinge, then Viceroy of India, visited Basrah, and in reply to an address from the British community expressed the hope that though we could not without a full exchange of views with our Allies lay down plans for the future, we might be permitted to indulge in the confident assurance that thenceforth a more benign administration would bring back to the 'Iraq that prosperity to which her rich potentialities entitled her. His Majesty the King had received on the 1st of January a telegram signed by six of the notables of Basrah protesting their gratitude at being included under the British flag; nevertheless, in the spring of 1915 the stability of that flag was gravely threatened. To the west, hordes of tribesmen were gathering in the desert between Zubair and Nasiriyah. Undeterred by the military inefficiency of tribal levies, the Turks summoned all the leading men on the Euphrates and Tigris to take part in the Shu'aibah attack. Political Officers have frequently heard accounts of this expedition from shaikhs and sayids, many of whom subsequently occupied positions of trust under our administration. "What could we do?" one of these men observed. "The Turks bade us fight, and we were in their hands. But, Sahib, we did not fight. We got no further than Nukhailah (some 10 miles from Shu'aibah). And there, since the Turkish Commander had offended us, we rested. But when we saw the Turks in flight we made haste to depart, and came back by boat with all speed to our homes." They took no further active part in the world war.

The Turkish army consisted of between 6,000 and 7,000 regular troops, the Arab-tribal levies from the Euphrates, some 9,000 tribesmen under 'Ajaimi and his cousin, 'Abdullah al Falih, and over 1,000 Kurds. The tribesmen numbered in all over 18,000, of which the two Sa'dun contributed a good half. Their fighting value was nil. After the occupation of Basrah, 'Ajaimi had sent Sir Percy Cox several nebulous messages through friends to the effect that he wished to enter into relations with the British Government and meet Sir Percy. The latter replied that we had no quarrel with the Arabs of the 'Iraq or with their shaikhs, whom we wished to free from Turkish oppression. He expressed his readiness to meet 'Ajaimi at any appointed place, since it might be difficult for him to evade the Turks and come to Basrah. But to this definite offer 'Ajaimi returned no answer. Shortly afterwards 'Ajaimi renewed negotiations by sending one of his henchmen, Muhammad 'Asaimi, to see Sir Percy Cox. He was received with all friendliness and the former proposal was repeated. Finally on 30th January the Chief Political Officer wrote to 'Ajaimi a letter which was in the nature of an ultimatum. He recapitulated what had occurred, said he was still willing to meet 'Ajaimi and discuss matters, and offered him a safe conduct to any place of meeting, suggesting Shu'aibah. But he added that time was slipping away, and that 'Ajaimi must reply within three days. The only answer given was that 'Ajaimi feared that his reputation would suffer if he abandoned the Turks for no cause, but that he would find an excuse for leaving them. His difficulty lay no doubt in determining which side offered him the better prospect of personal advantage. He distrusted the Turks, but they had promised him a gift of all Sanniyah lands in the Basrah Wilayat, those Crown lands which 'Abdul Hamid in the days of his prosperity had shown so much judgment in acquiring. On the other hand, the British Government was an unknown quantity of very uncertain stability. So he hesitated, while the tribal hordes gathering before Shu'aibah strengthened his conviction that the time to leave the Turks had not yet come.

It was not only the Muntafiq confederation of tribes which the 'ulama were doing their utmost to urge to holy war. In January the son of the greatest mujtahid of Najaf, Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, arrived in 'Amarah to preach Jihad. The infection ran through the tribes of the Hawizah marshes into the territories of the Shaikh of Muhammarah, who began to express anxiety. But the concentration near Basrah was reaching a head and occupied all our attention. On 9th April Lieut-General Sir John Nixon landed at Basrah, and took over command of the Indian Expeditionary Force "D," and three days later the battle of Shu'aibah opened. The Turkish General, Sulaiman al 'Askari, had been wounded at Qurnah, and was carried on a stretcher. His second in command, 'Ali Bey, placed 'Ajaimi's men on the right flank and the other tribal forces on the left flank. They took little or no part in the battle. An unusually high flood had stretched a belt of shallow water between our position on the Shu'aibah ridge and our base at Basrah. Across this lake our transport worked as best it might, but a more difficult line of communication could scarcely have been imagined and defeat would have meant annihilation. The battle lasted for 72 hours. On the evening of the third day the regular troops began to fall back; the tribesmen had already fled, and 'Ali Bey begged Sulaiman al 'Askari to give orders for a general

retirement. Very reluctantly the general agreed, but before 'Ali Bey had gone a couple of hundred yards he heard the report of a revolver. Sulaiman al 'Askari had shot himself on his stretcher. He was buried at Nukhailah. But the Arabs were yet to take their share in the fight. The fleeing Turkish soldiery, as they toiled along the southern shores of the Hammar Lake, where months later the engineers of Nasiriyah railway traced the deep wheel-tracks of their transport, encountered an unexpected foe; the Arabs fell upon them, butchering and looting. It was with a mere remnant of his force that 'Ali Bey won through to Nasiriyah.

On the very day on which the battle of Shu'aibah was joined, 12th April, a mixed Turkish and Arab force attacked our tiny detachment at Ahwaz and was beaten off. The utmost success achieved by the enemy on this front was the temporary cutting of the pipeline from the oil fields by tribes roused to Jihad, but the steadfast attitude of the Shaikh of Muhammarah, combined with the effect of the victory at Shu'aibah, checked further secessions. The Turks were driven back across the Karkhah by Major-General Gorringe, who carried his advance northwards towards 'Amarah, while Major-General Townshend pushed simultaneously up the Tigris. 'Amarah was occupied on 3rd June, to the complete satisfaction of the leading Shaikhs of the powerful Albu Muhammad tribe, 'Araibi Pasha and Majid al Khalifah, who, though they had been obliged to join the Turks in their first resistance to us on the Shatt-al-'Arab, had returned to their homes before the fall of Qurnah and had taken the earliest opportunity of entering into correspondence with the Chief Political Officer.

The next step was to guarantee Basrah from any repetition of the Shu'aibah attack by occupying the western apex of the Basrah-Qurnah-Nasiriyah triangle. General Gorringe's advance up the Euphrates in the middle of July was a singular test of endurance on the part of the troops. In a pitched battle fought on the palm-fringed banks of the river, the Turkish force of 6,000 men was routed, losing all its guns and a quarter of its numbers killed, wounded and prisoners. Here, again, the the Turks got no help from the Arab tribes, and the heart of the Muntafiq country passed henceforth out of their hands.

With the capture of 'Amarah and Nasiriyah the first stage of the Mesopotamian campaign came to an end. Almost the whole of the Basrah Wilayat was now in British hands and its story belongs to the annals of peace rather than to those of war.

## CHAPTER II.—Organisation of the Administration.

The initial difficulties in setting up civil administration in the occupied territories were greatly enhanced by the fact that, except for a few Arab subordinates, all the former Turkish officials had fled, taking with them the most recent documents and registers. Nevertheless, immediately after our arrival in Basrah a beginning was made in establishing a system of government which should be consonant with the spirit of our proclamations. The British military authorities had at first no leisure to make any arrangements with regard to fiscal and revenue matters except in respect of customs, but towards the middle of January a Revenue Commissioner, Mr. Henry Dobbs, I.C.S., arrived in Basrah from India, and such records as had been left by the Turks were overhauled. They were mostly out of date and were lying mixed with masses of lumber on the floors of the Turkish offices, the only papers in any kind of order being the registers of title-deeds to land and registered documents. Their escape was fortunate, as their loss would have been a severe blow to landowners and traders of the province. The administration was confronted with the task of setting the whole of a strange and complicated system on its legs as quickly as possible without the aid of the most recent records or of the most experienced officials, while the remaining records took many weeks to reduce to order. At the same time the nearness of the enemy's forces caused a feeling of insecurity among the people, and made many of them hesitate to compromise themselves by helping the authorities and reluctant to pay their taxes. Moreover, the exactions of the Turks before leaving, the confusion into which the administration had for some months been thrown, and the dislocation of trade by the stoppage of commerce with Baghdad on the one side and with India and Europe on the other, coupled with an unusually bad date season, had

temporarily deprived the population of cash and credit. The administration of civil justice was in abeyance, so that the recovery of debts and rents, except by consent, was impossible. It was necessary to set up temporarily some sort of revenue and fiscal administration. To this end it was decided to keep intact the Turkish system, to which the people were accustomed, but to free it from corruption and abuses and increase its efficiency. The number of alien officials introduced was deliberately kept low. All other appointments were filled by the more honest of the ex-official people of the country, the large majority being Mussalmans. This would have been in any case inevitable, as the records of the departments were all in Turkish; the language of vernacular records and receipts, together with all other official business, was, however, changed to Arabic, a measure which satisfied local sentiment. One of the curses of the Turkish régime was the number of its officials; checks, counter-checks and delays being multiplied in order to provide occupation for fresh appointments. In consequence, no one did even half an honest day's work, and idleness pervaded every office. Under the British organisation only the minimum number of officials were re-employed.

On the whole the people adapted themselves with surprising alacrity to the new order. During the four months which elapsed between the capture of Qurnah and the crucial battle of Shu'aibah, in spite of the fact that a large Turkish force lay almost at the gates of Basrah, the life of the town went on undisturbed, the bazaars were busy and the streets safe. It was the best answer which could be given to Turkish propaganda and reflected no little credit on the native population.

The victory at Shu'aibah removed the pressure of immediate danger, and within three months the advance up the two rivers had more than tripled the area under our control. Military Governors under the senior local military officer were appointed to 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, and Assistant Political Officers were placed in charge of the political and revenue administration of the districts. The Assistant Political Officers were responsible to the Chief Political Officer for purposes of civil administration, and worked directly under the local military authorities for the purchase of supplies and in measures connected with the safe preservation of the line of communications.

The confusion which reigned in the Ottoman administration was due as much to a radically bad system as to the inefficiency of the Turkish staff. Financially, the budget of the two provinces of Basrah and Baghdad had, until two or three years before the British occupation, presented a deficit which had been converted into a small surplus, probably as the result, not of improvement in method, but of financial readjustments and increased taxation. How complicated were the existing financial arrangements may be judged by the fact that no less than five departments of government, apart from the general revenue, were independently collecting monies and remitting them to Constantinople. These departments were, firstly, the Régie, a foreign concession; secondly, the Auqaf, the department of Pious Bequests; thirdly, the Sanniyah or Crown lands, which since the constitution of 1908 had been administered as State lands; fourthly, the Ottoman Debt, to the service of which 12 petty taxes were allocated besides 3 per cent. on customs; and, fifthly, the International Board of Health, which collected so-called quarantine fees impartially from the dead and from the living. The net result of these five excrescences was that the normal life of the people was interfered with at almost every step and that no unification of system or taxation was possible. References to Constantinople on petty details of administration were incessant, and the hope of local autonomy which had come to birth in the Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire after the revolution of 1908 could not, even if it had received official approval, have taken practical shape.

There was a complete cleavage between the executive and revenue sides of the administration. The executive officers provided force for the collection of taxes, but they had no other concern with the revenue system. Taxes were collected usually by farming or by subordinate officials appointed annually to collect a specific tax. With few exceptions all demands were fluctuating. They were fixed each year by assessments or by counts of the objects subject to taxation, such as sheep, buffaloes and camels, or date and fruit trees, or, in the case of crops, by estimation of the yield. The greater part of this work was done by a temporary official, who had no interest in his particular employment beyond making the most of its short duration. There was no one permanently responsible for the probity of the collector in any area, and the system invited speculation and corruption. The invitation was seldom refused.

The Turkish administrative system was thus one of watertight compartments, each in separate correspondence with a head departmental office at Constantinople;



war conditions and the breaking off of relations with the Turkish capital made it easy to put at end to a scheme which was manifestly incompatible with efficiency. The Sanniyah or Crown lands were merged in the Revenue Department. The Régie, a hostile trading concern, ceased to exist, and the regulation of the tobacco trade, of which there was little till the occupation of Baghdad brought us into contact with tobacco-growing areas, fell under the direction of the same department, together with other miscellaneous revenues. Many of these miscellaneous revenues had been allocated to the public debt and collected by its officers; the administration of the debt was therefore allotted to the Revenue Department, until in 1917 the separate organisation of the debt was terminated. Quarantine, which may have had its uses in Turkish times in connection with the annual influx of pilgrims, chiefly from Persia, was no longer needed, since pilgrimage had been intermitted by the war and the port authorities dealt with arrivals by sea. In addition, Auqaf and Education were included, like Customs, in the Revenue Department. Such amalgamation was inevitable at first owing to the lack of British officers and of qualified Arab assistants, but it was not intended to be otherwise than a temporary expedient; and with the increase of staff and the development of administration, Customs, Auqaf and Education became separate units. The Revenue Department at Administrative Headquarters worked locally through the Political Officers of the district, which put an end to the former division between the executive and revenue branches of the administration. As for the methods of collecting taxation, the gradual extinction of the tax-farmer was the desired goal, together with the substitution of a fixed for a fluctuating demand, but neither aim could be achieved at once.

The name Revenue Department is perhaps misleading. A more correct impression of this branch of the administration would be conveyed if it were to be considered as the land agent of an estate, represented by the 'Iraq, the proprietor being the Government. This was, in fact, the Ottoman concept, and it underlay the agrarian system of the 'Turks. Mesopotamia was regarded by them as a conquered country, and all such lands as had not been allocated by the Government to private individuals belonged in theory to the State. State lands, Amiriyah, were controlled by the local Finance Department under the Daftardar, the chief financial officer of the province. Allocated lands came under the Daftardar for financial purposes, but another department, that of Tapu, or land registration, was charged with recording and verifying titles. Its decisions were not necessarily communicated to the Finance Department. 'Abdul Hamid's private property, Sanniyah lands, had been managed, as has been said, by yet another organisation, wholly independent of the Provincial Government. They were well cared for, and the cultivators enjoyed certain privileges, such as exemption from military service. But with the granting of the Constitution in 1908 they were converted into State lands, and known as Madawwarah, the converted. They were not, however, amalgamated with Amiriyah, but retained their separate organisation, though this was now detached from Constantinople and placed under the Daftardar. This change was unfortunate for the estates concerned, which were subsequently no better off than other institutions run by Turkish officials in the public interest. The administration of all these different forms of landed property was combined after the occupation of Basrah under the Revenue Department.

Practically all revenues other than those derived from land, except the taxes allocated to the Public Debt, had been controlled directly or indirectly by the Daftardar. Some of them, such as the military exemption tax and the Hijaz railway subscription, became a dead letter—it is typical of Turkish methods that the Hijaz railway subscription, which had been imposed to extinguish the debt on the Madinah line, continued to be levied although the debt had long since been paid off; some were abandoned, notably the income tax, which had been levied in the Basrah Wilayat with so little success that in 1903 it is known not to have produced a piastre. Beyond the Daftardar's authority, a Special Accounts Department had been set up in each wilayat at the beginning of the constitutional era (1908) as a result of the clamour, especially loud in the Arab parts of the Empire, against the policy of draining the provinces for the benefit of the central Government. There is an authentic story of a Turkish Mutasarrif in Syria, popular with his superiors if not with the people he governed, who boasted that his budget showed no expenditure at all. It consisted entirely of receipts. All the officials, from the Mutasarrif himself downwards, drew no pay, but lived on questionable perquisites, while repairs, maintenance, public works, &c., were simply neglected. Not all the official world had brought the Turkish art of government to so high a degree of refinement, but most of its members were skilful and willing students. The establishment of the Special Accounts Department was an

admirable measure, but in practice it was nullified by the fact that it was under the Wali, who could, and often did, "borrow" large sums to make up deficits in general revenues. It was abolished after the occupation.

It will be convenient here to describe the progress of Customs, Auqaf and Education under the Revenue Departments, together with the administration of the Public Debt until it was wound up in 1917.

On the occupation of Basrah the collection and assessment of Customs duty was undertaken by Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co., but after the fall of 'Amarah imports greatly increased and the firm asked to be relieved of the work. An officer of the Indian Imperial Customs Service, Mr. Watkins, was deputed to Basrah as Collector of Customs, a post which he continued to hold until he became Chief Collector of Customs to the Force and subsequently also Secretary for Commerce. He undertook the organisation of the Department with much zeal and efficiency. Customs were left under the supervision of the Revenue Commissioner and passed under that of the Revenue Board, which replaced the Revenue Commissioner in February 1917.

There is a distinction between land-borne and sea-borne Customs, because they are collected in different ways. Sea-borne Customs were collected in Basrah, where the Collector of Customs worked directly under the Revenue Board. In 'Amarah, 'Ali Gharbi, and, after the advance on Baghdad, at other stations where Customs were collected on land-borne imports, the duties were taken by officials under the Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers. In sea-borne Customs are included the export duties levied in Basrah. The Turks levied an import duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, of which 3 per cent. was allocated to the Ottoman Debt. In October 1914 import dues were raised by the Turks to 15 per cent. and at other periods during the war to 30 per cent. These arrangements were made without the consent of the Powers. With a few excepted articles the duty was reduced to 10 per cent. on the occupation and the allocation of a portion thereof to the Ottoman Debt was abolished. The Turkish export rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem* was at first abolished, but reimposed at a later period. The revenue from sea-borne Customs rose steadily, the figure for 1917-18 being nearly three times that of 1915-16. The general rate of 10 per cent. was subsequently raised to the former rate of 11 per cent.

In Turkish times a central Customs House, under a Director-General responsible to Constantinople, existed at Baghdad, taking dues on all goods entering the Baghdad Wilayat from Persia, either for local consumption or in transit, and on goods exported to Persia. Subordinate Customs Houses were situated at Khaniqin, Qizil Robot, Mandali, and Badrah, on the Persian frontier. These establishments were for the purpose of checking merchandise imported from and exported to Persia, and taking security up to the value of the Customs dues pending arrival in Baghdad, where the actual duty would be paid. An important function of the local Customs Houses was to control the pilgrim traffic from Persian to the Shi'ali Shrines. Each pilgrim was examined at the frontier, what he had with him noted, and a deposit taken from him. On return he was re-examined; if anything was missing he was compelled to pay duty on it, and his deposit was given back to him.

When we occupied Baghdad the frontier districts were not under our effective control, and with the exception of a certain amount of smuggled tobacco, trade had ceased. Pilgrim traffic was also in abeyance. It was obviously out of the question to expect a revival till conditions had settled down and traffic with Persia re-opened. At the same time cigarette and pipe tobacco was permitted to enter from Persia, subject to a uniform duty of 10 per cent. *ad valorem*, and a temporary Customs House was opened at Baghdad under the Revenue Board. All tobacco or goods coming in had to be declared to the nearest Political Officer. If he considered that such were for local consumption, he levied the dues himself, but as in the majority of cases the goods were destined for Baghdad, he sent them through on pass to the Customs there.

When Mandali was brought under our effective control a Customs House was opened there.

Export was prohibited for military reasons, and the entry of foodstuffs, in order to encourage import, was permitted free of duty.

Customs were separated from Revenue and organised as a separate Department in May 1918.

The Auqaf, or Department of Pious Bequests, remained under the control of the Revenue Department till the middle of the same year. Muhammadan sacred law permits the owner of immovable property to dedicate it in perpetuity to any pious purpose, whether it is connected with the Muhammadan religion or not. But in

practice the Turkish authorities did not recognise any corporation as competent to own real property except the Auqaf Department, which followed the Ottoman official creed and was therefore Sunni. The lands dedicated to Shi'ah shrines were held in a kind of private trusteeship, over the discharge of which neither the State nor the courts kept any watch. The Turkish Auqaf Department was opened in Mesopotamia some 60 years ago. Each Wilayat was in charge of a Mudir, who worked directly under the Ministry of Auqaf in Constantinople, and exercised direct control over all subordinate officials in the Wilayat. The chief duties of the Department were the management of Auqaf properties and the administration of the affairs of a large number of mosques and shrines.

These properties fall roughly into three categories, Auqaf Madhbutah, administered directly by the Department; Auqaf Mulhaqah, administered under the supervision of the Department by mutawallis or guardians for the benefit of special objects; and Auqaf Dhurriyah, which are held under a very effective kind of entail, the dedicator demising his property in trust for the benefit of his direct descendants, with remainder to a pious object, usually the sacred cities of Mecca and Madinah, should the direct line fail, an event of rare occurrence.

There were also properties dedicated to educational purposes (Waqf Ma'arif), and administered by a separate department, and charitable bequests (Waqf Iftah), of which the Mufti disposed at his pleasure.

The practice of the Turks was to ignore the special object of all Madhbutah dedications. They pooled the proceeds of agricultural lands and town properties, and by a kind of rough ecclesiastical commission, devoted them to the payment of the salaries of persons employed in the Sunni mosques, the building of new Sunni mosques, the repair of existing mosques and Auqaf buildings, and the pay of the establishment of the Auqaf Department. Any surplus was sent to the Ministry of Auqaf at Constantinople, and its ultimate disposal is unknown, except that considerable sums were transmitted every year to Mecca and Madinah. In the Basrah Wilayat there are large Waqf lands dedicated to the upkeep of the Mecca shrines which are not subject to the Auqaf Department, though the latter has often sought to get their administration into its hands. They are managed by negro eunuchs specially deputed from Mecca.

The Auqaf Department exhibited all the usual defects of Ottoman administration. The main object of the official staff was to remit as much money as possible to Constantinople, and to this end the employés were starved, agricultural property neglected, and mosques and houses allowed to fall into ruin. At the same time there was no complete register of Auqaf properties and large arrears had been allowed to accumulate. We found the Auqaf treasury empty and the estates suffering from years of neglect.

The first care of the Revenue Commissioner was to inspect and register urban and rural property, to provide for the payment of priests and other staff of the mosques from the date of the occupation, and to undertake such repairs as were urgently needed—the sanitary arrangements of the mosque required, in particular, immediate attention. The population was as astonished as it was gratified to see an Auqaf Department which attempted to fulfil its obligations. Small advances were made to occupancy tenants of date gardens to enable them to carry out the improvements for which they were responsible, and as soon as it was feasible the Turkish system of farming out town properties was abolished and direct control over the leasing of buildings substituted, to the advantage both of the Department and of the tenants. Efforts were made to oblige the mutawallis of Mulhaqah bequests to render faithful account of their charge so as to ensure the payment due to the Department of a quarter of the net savings after the maintenance and upkeep of the properties had been defrayed. Educational bequests were used for the purposes intended, and the monies derived from charitable bequests were handed over to the Moslem Poor Relief Fund. From the first all matters involving religious sentiment, such as the dismissal and appointment of priests and the repair of mosques, were referred to a Committee of leading Sunnis. An Auqaf Committee for the Basrah Wilayat received definite form in April 1917; the advice of its members was sought unofficially until, in February 1918, it was made official.

At the end of 1918, although the salaries of the priests and servants of the mosques had been raised, the Basrah accounts exhibited a surplus of nearly 2½ lakhs of rupees, nor could this sum be expended in developing Auqaf buildings owing to the scarcity of labour and the fact that building material was almost unobtainable. It was, therefore, held over until it could be employed usefully and profitably.

In Baghdad the condition of Auqaf properties at the time of the occupation was, if possible, worse than in Basrah. There was not a single Waqf garden in the Baghdad area which was as well kept as neighbouring gardens in private hands, and in many cases the Waqf land was a bare patch though flanked on both sides by thriving date groves. The Turks had carried away all recent records, and the Director and Chief Clerk of the Department had fled. A skeleton staff was engaged, and from the older records and other available information a fairly accurate account of the assets and liabilities of the Auqaf Department obtained. The local notables, spiritual and temporal, were invited to take a share in the organisation. At the request of the Chief Political Officer they elected a Mudir and showed their appreciation of the confidence reposed in them by choosing a man of undoubted honesty. A committee of five 'Ulama, well versed in Auqaf practice, was appointed to assist him. The system of administration was assimilated to that which had been adopted in the Basrah Wilayat. The Turkish arrangement, by which subordinate officials conducted local Auqaf affairs under the direct supervision of the Mudir at Baghdad, was abolished, and each Political Officer was placed in charge of the Auqaf in his district, general control being maintained by the Revenue Board.

The Auqaf of Baghdad possesses sources of income additional to those of the Basrah Wilayat. Peculiar to the Baghdad Wilayat is a due known as 'Uqr. It is property in land and consists of a right to a fixed proportion of the produce varying from  $\frac{1}{20}$ th to  $\frac{1}{30}$ th. Its origin is obscure; it was regulated by a commission convened by Midhat Pasha in 1872, and is registered in the Land Registration Department. It takes precedence of all other rights except those of Government, and in practice sometimes comes before Government rights also. 'Uqr is exempt from the ordinary law of real property and follows sacred law. It is not confined to Waqf land, and indeed is more usually found in State land, but wherever it exists it involves absentee landlordism, the holder of 'Uqr not being permitted to interfere in any way with the cultivation or management of the land. Secondly, there are many instances in the Baghdad Wilayat of the dedication of the revenue share on land. A Turkish Sultan would assign the Government dues in a given district to some pious object, and the Auqaf Department would thereby become possessed of that portion of the revenues of the State. Finally, Shi'ah Auqaf, which consist in Basrah almost entirely of private bequests uncontrolled by the official Sunni Department, have an important place in the Baghdad Department owing to the fact that the fees on burials in the Shi'ah holy places, all of which are situated in the northern wilayat, are paid into its coffers. It must be borne in mind that the Auqaf Department under the Turks was administered by Sunnis almost exclusively for the benefit of Sunnis. The Sunni Imam, who often had no hearers except the local officials, drew a salary from Auqaf, while the Shi'ah Imam, whose flock was the whole village, had to depend for his living on casual charity. In spite of the large sums derived from Shi'ah burial fees, very small allowances were made for lighting and cleaning the great shrines at Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimain and Samarra, and salaries were fixed at a much lower rate than in Sunni mosques. It was not on financial grounds alone that the Shi'ah community resented the levying by Sunnis of a tax on the burial of pious Shi'ahs whose remains were carried to one of their holy places for internment, but the financial grievance was keenly felt, and claims were raised immediately after the occupation that the salaries and allowances paid in respect of Shi'ah mosques and shrines out of Auqaf Department funds should be largely increased. The demand had to be refused, as to accede to it would have meant abandoning the rule, which economy had obliged us to lay down, that no salaries should be raised above the level prevailing at the time of the occupation until the solvency of the Department was assured. It was decided, however, to keep the Shi'ah and Sunni Waqf accounts separate, so that the establishment of an independent Shi'ah Auqaf Department, if found to be necessary, could easily be accomplished.

There are various properties held in trust for synagogues, churches and non-Musalman schools. The Auqaf Department exercises no control over these; they are managed by trustees under the deeds of dedication.

The Department of Education, like that of Auqaf, was merged with Revenue till the summer of 1918. Education in the 'Iraq had lagged far behind education in Syria. Being nearer to Europe, Syria has been more deeply affected by Western ideas, while the greater activity of various European Missionary Societies has resulted in the founding of schools, such as the American and French Jesuit Colleges at Beirut, which have not only been of great value to the students trained in them, but have also raised the general level of education in the country. The 'Iraq has felt

this wholesome influence far less than Syria. Such foreign schools as there were, *e.g.*, those of the Latin Fathers, the Alliance Israélite and the Church Missionary Society, confined their efforts almost exclusively to primary education, and in practice had little to do with any but non-Moslems. The education of Moslems in 'Iraq was, in the main, what the Turks made it; and so far as it exhibited any considered policy, it was devised to Ottomanize the Arabs.

Apart from the *maktabs*, or *mullas'* schools, which were generally held in the *môsqûes* and taught little more than a knowledge of Arabic script and of the *Qurân*, the only official schools maintained in the Basrah Wilayat were one normal school for teachers at Basrah, one secondary school at Basrah and eight primary schools in Basrah itself, at villages on the *Shatt al Arab* and in 'Amarah, *Nasiriyah* and *Suq al Shuyukh*. The principal language taught was Turkish, Arabic being treated as a secondary language. The teachers were mostly Turks, often with only a scanty knowledge of Arabic; they were men of bad moral character, highly paid and incompetent. The school buildings were dirty and insanitary, and the schools hot-beds of vice to which respectable Arabs hesitated to send their boys. No one who was not of the Sunni sect was recognised as a teacher, and this, in a population predominantly *Shi'ah*, discouraged attendance. The registers were filled with fictitious entries, but the total number of primary scholars was less than 500 for the whole wilayat. The *maktabs* or mosque schools were financed partly by the *Auqaf* and partly by the Education Department. No grants-in-aid were made to private teaching agencies, which comprised an excellent primary and secondary school run by the American Mission, and schools conducted by the Carmelite Fathers and by the Chaldæan Church, the teaching in the Carmelite school being in French.

The British authorities continued to support out of *Waqf* funds those mosque schools where the teachers had remained. As to secular education, it was clearly undesirable to maintain any of the existing schools, either in their former buildings or with their former staff, most of whom had in any case disappeared. On the other hand there was an urgent need of trained Arabs for Government service, and it was advisable from a political point of view that the British administration should not be open to the accusation of neglecting to further education. It was, however, necessary to proceed slowly, with the aim of getting a high standard of teachers, and of opening no school until suitable teachers could be found. All sections of the population wished their children to learn English for commercial purposes; indeed, if English had not been made a concurrent language from the lowest primary class, there would have been no bait to attract boys to the Government primary schools, since a purely Arabic education, sufficient to satisfy the meagre requirements of most parents, could be obtained in the schools of the *mullas*. Any scheme of higher education, though it might have captivated the public imagination, would have been premature until a sound basis of primary education could be established.

On these considerations it was decided that the medium of instruction should be Arabic throughout with English taught as a foreign language, that only so many primary schools should be opened as could be supplied with at least one trained English-speaking teacher, that no secondary schools should be started until the success of primary schools was assured, and that university education should not be considered until there were enough educated secondary scholars to feed a university. To secure teachers a grant-in-aid was sanctioned to the American Mission school at Basrah, an institution mainly concerned with the teaching of Moslems, the principal condition of the grant being that the school should provide immediately trained teachers for two primary schools, and should also open a normal class to turn out three good primary teachers every year. The American school also undertook the general supervision of the primary schools. Primary text-books were carefully selected from the official primary text-books in use in Egypt, and class-room furniture was purchased from abroad. Two primary schools were opened in October 1915, one in Basrah and one in *Abul Khasib*, a prosperous district lower down the river. The attendance was excellent from the first.

There were in Basrah a considerable number of Christians, mainly Oriental Catholics. From among these the clerks employed by the Turks and in commercial firms had mainly been drawn and were likely to continue to be drawn in the immediate future. They depended for their education chiefly on the Carmelite Fathers and the Chaldæan Church. Both these schools received grants-in-aid on condition that they should admit British inspection and that English should be the principal language taught. Secondary education continued to be provided for by the American schools only.

In the spring of 1916 a third school was opened at Zubair, which was a promising centre. The population is of a good type, mainly immigrants from Najd, of pure Arab race. The small market towns which, like Zubair, are scattered along the edges of the settled land, are usually due to the enterprise of central Arabia. Their founders are men of independent character and commercial instincts, who frequently amass considerable wealth in purveying for the desert, where they have much influence. They are eager to profit by every opportunity for advancement, and in Zubair were so desirous of learning English that before the opening of the school it was not unusual to find a boy of 10 and a greybeard of 60 sitting in the telegraph office, and struggling with the intricacies of the English tongue under the indifferent tuition of a Babu clerk. The Arab has a remarkable aptitude for languages, and before the school had been in existence for a year, the children were chattering in English, to the pride and admiration of their parents.

During 1917 and 1918 primary schools were opened at Nasiriyah, Suq al Shuyukh, Qal'at Salih, 'Ali Gharbi, Madinah on the Euphrates, and 'Ashar, a suburb of Basrah. It was a disputed point whether fees should be taken, but on the whole the advantage of making a small charge was considered to prevail, and a fee of one rupee per pupil was decided on. But a considerable elasticity was permitted, and if in the opinion of the Political Officer the parents were too poor to pay for the education of the child, the fee was not exacted. At Abu'l Khasib there was a demand for secondary education and a secondary section was started towards the end of 1917. Grants-in-aid were extended to the schools of the Alliance Israélite at Basrah, and to additional schools opened by the Carmelites and by the Catholic communities, Armenian and Chaldæan, in Basrah and Ashar, as well as to a girls' school started by the American Mission. The boys' school founded in 1912 by the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America, continues to be easily the best school in the Bāsrah Wilayat. The boys are well disciplined and carefully taught. The Bible is read daily in Arabic in every class, but Moslem parents exhibit no objection to instruction in the Book, and their children are even more punctilious than the Moslems in the respect they pay to holy writ. The American Director relates a story which illustrates Moslem feeling. One of the pupils, a Christian, lost his temper in the Bible class, threw his Bible down and refused to read further. He was reprimanded by the teacher, but the Muhammadan pupils were not satisfied; they came to the Director and begged that the Christian boy should be expelled for ill-treating a holy book.

In the Baghdad Wilayat the Turkish educational programme was more comprehensive than at Basrah. It comprised a school of law, a secondary school (Sultani), a normal school, a technical school, and 71 primary schools. The scheme, as set forth in the official Turkish Education Year Book, full of maps and statistics, might have roused the envy and despair of the British authorities of the Occupied Territories but for the knowledge that, provided a school were shown correctly as a dot on a map, the Turk cared not to enquire whether the pupils enrolled ever attended, or whether the system of education pursued in it was that of Arnold of Rugby or of Mr. Wopsle's great aunt.

These Government schools were by no means the only schools. They were identified in the public mind with Sunni Musulman tenets (not unnaturally, since they deliberately aimed at extending Turkish influence among the students and such religious instruction as was given was Sunni), and none but Sunnis attended them. The Shi'ahs, the Christians and the Jews provided schools at their own expense, the Special Accounts Department giving each of them, at least in theory, a grant-in-aid on condition that the grant was expended on the teaching of Turkish.

The Syrian, Chaldæan, Armenian, Protestant and Latin Catholic communities had each a private school, and there was a Ja'fari (Shi'ah) school for Shi'ah boys. The Jews had a number of schools for girls and boys, some controlled by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the others by local Jews.

With the departure of the Turkish authorities in March 1917, the law, sultani and technical schools ceased to exist as institutions, for nearly all the teachers were Anatolian Turks and left with the rest of Stambul officialdom, while in the case of the technical school the Turks blew up the machinery and burned the building. As to the primary schools, they were nearly all looted by the mob. If it took rather longer to open some of the Baghdad schools than might have been expected, the delay may be attributed to the people themselves, who looted all the furniture and equipment of the schools and carried off the doors, windows and other portable fittings. Most of the primary school teachers who remained were of an inferior type,

and there were no school books of any kind except a few in the possession of private persons, and these were all in Turkish.

These problems would have troubled us less had we been able to follow the policy adopted in Basrah, that of not opening any schools until good teachers could be provided. But whereas Basrah was more interested in dates than in education, Baghdad contained a fair proportion of people who prized education for its own sake—a relic, perhaps, of the time when Baghdad was a great centre of learning. A few days after the occupation, the headmaster of the only primary school which had escaped looting offered to carry on his work with a staff composed entirely of primary school headmasters, and this arrangement was accepted as a temporary measure. Teachers were also sent to carry on the Government schools in three provincial centres.

In order that popular opinion on the subject might be ascertained, an Education Committee was set up. It was composed of five men of education and influence. The Committee is advisory only and it is not given to originating policy, but its reports on questions put to it by the Revenue Board have been useful.

The most pressing need was for primary school teachers, and as there existed no school like that of the Americans in Basrah, which assured a small but steady supply of well-trained young men for the Government schools in the Basrah Wilayat, it was in April decided to open a training school where ex-teachers and any other fairly well-educated young men who might care to apply could receive a three months' course in general subjects and in school method. This period had to suffice, in the emergency in which we were placed, to make some of the partly trained material fit to carry on the work of primary school teaching until better was to be had. It was not easy to find instructors for the training school, but eventually four teachers were found—three Syrians and a native of Baghdad; another teacher was borrowed from the American school in Basrah for a few weeks to give lectures in school method. The school started with an attendance of 81. This included all the ex-teachers who wished to remain in the profession, for they were informed that it would be difficult for us to employ as a Government teacher anyone who had not passed through our training school. About a third of the students were promising; the rest, nearly all ex-teachers from little country schools, were unfortunately very poor material. A few of these persisted to the end, passed the examinations and were appointed as teachers, but the majority dropped off, finding employment in the Quran schools attached to the mosques, or elsewhere. Several young Shi'ahs entered the normal school, a phenomenon unknown in Turkish times.

The administration was fortunate in securing the services of a capable and energetic Syrian as headmaster of the teachers' training school. When he left to join the Sharif's army his place was taken by another Syrian, no less capable and energetic, who had served in many official capacities under the Turkish régime, including that of Director of Education. After the opening of the primary schools he worked for a time as Director of Education under the supervision of the Revenue Board.

With the 27 students who passed the qualifying examination at the end of the three months' session, we were able to open five primary schools in Baghdad and its suburbs, and two in the provinces. The successful students were too few to staff these schools completely, and a few supernumerary teachers chosen from the best of the remaining students were appointed, at lower rates of pay, to fill the gaps. These schools were classed as Government primary schools and supported entirely out of general revenues. We refused to defray out of public funds the cost of schools not staffed with trained teachers, but private efforts were encouraged with grants-in-aid. Similar grants were made to all the denominational schools in Baghdad, whether Shi'ah, Christian or Jewish.

Lack of school furniture was a serious difficulty. With regard to books, an appeal for help was addressed to the Egyptian Government, which responded with a handsome gift of books sufficient to equip 20 primary schools and one secondary school.

A small beginning was made in the direction of technical education. Except for a few ex-officers of the Turkish army, there were no local men capable of making surveys or taking levels. To supply this deficiency a school of survey was opened, the only qualification demanded being a fair knowledge of arithmetic and mensuration. Many applications were received, but, owing to the practical work to be done, the class had to be limited to 36. A 10 weeks' course was mapped out, at the end of which the students who passed the qualifying examination were attached to irrigation engineers for work and for further training.

The poverty in Baghdad resulting from three years' war, combined with the fact that in Turkish times elementary, technical and normal education was free, made it inadvisable that fees should be charged at first in the primary schools of the Wilayat. They were not introduced till 1919.

As regards the Ottoman Public Debt, the interests of the European bondholders were secured by allocating to the service of the Debt the revenues derived from no less than 12 distinct heads. It was at first considered whether these allocated taxes could be retained intact for the administration of the Debt, subject to adjustment at the end of the war. This was, however, found to be impossible. In the first place the continuance of the Tobacco Régie, an enemy company in the profits of which the Debt had a large share, was prevented by the war; secondly, it seemed essential to reduce the Customs duties; and, thirdly, the Turkish stamp tax, of which most of the revenues were earmarked for the Debt, was in abeyance, while the British authorities would, in any case, have been reluctant to enforce so vexatious and complicated a law. When ultimately it was re-enacted, it was given a modified form. It was therefore decided that the military authorities must retain full executive freedom of action as to the treatment of these allocated taxes. The officials of the department had fled from Basrah before our arrival; but in the Baghdad Wilayat they remained and continued at first to exercise their functions in a small way. Difficulties, however, arose which necessitated the abolition of some of the allocated taxes and alterations in the methods of collecting others. Ultimately the maintenance of the Public Debt administration as a separate entity seemed to be extravagant from the point of view of bondholders and burdensome from that of the people. It was therefore decided in June 1917 to close down the Public Debt administration as such, but orders were given that all sources of revenue pledged to the Debt should be administered separately with a view to rendering a careful account when it was called for. In most districts the collection of taxes allocated to the Debt is made through the ordinary Revenue staff. Only in Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul towns has it been found necessary to entertain a separate establishment. Opportunities of service have been given to Public Debt officials, who had been better paid than Government servants and had maintained a standard of efficiency and honesty well above that of the ordinary Turkish employé. Care has been taken to appoint them to positions approximating as closely as the altered circumstances permit to those they held before the occupation.

The re-establishment of judicial administration was subject to the same difficulty which hampered the civil authorities in other departments, namely, that practically all Turkish judicial officers had left their posts before the occupation of Basrah. Those who remained were not willing to continue their functions and no other staff which had experience of Turkish law was available. As the Capitulations had been abolished by the Turks at the outbreak of war no claim that they should be revived in the occupied territories, at all events during the war, was to be admitted. Alien enemy firms established in Basrah, exclusive of the indigenous population, which was regarded as friendly, ceased to do business on the occupation of the town, and their affairs were taken over by the Department of Hostile Trading Concerns, which was responsible to the Chief Political Officer.

In August 1915, for the purpose of providing for the administration of civil and criminal justice for the civil population, the Army Commander promulgated a code, known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code, which was based on the Indian Civil and Criminal Codes. Powers were taken therein to enforce any Indian law, as well as to introduce such amendments as might be necessitated by local conditions, and courts were started in Basrah.

The course pursued was open to objections, but it had the great advantage of providing without delay machinery which would not otherwise have been forthcoming, and without such immediate provision the activities of the community would in many directions have been brought to a standstill. The practice of the new courts was so far superior to that of the courts they superseded, and the Indian codes so much better and simpler than the Turkish, that no objection was raised to the substitution of the Indian for the Turkish judicial system. The people, accustomed to the dilatory processes of the Turks, were amazed and delighted with the expedition shown in the execution of justice.

Provision was made under the 'Iraq Code for the reference of any suit in which at least one party was a Moslem to the Shar'ah or sacred law. A native jurist by whom the case should be adjudicated was selected by the parties concerned, the



selection being made from any persons who were recognised by the people themselves as religious leaders. Cases referred to the jurists were those which in Turkish times would have come before the Qadhi in the Shar'ah Court; that is to say, they were mainly domestic, relating to marriage, divorce, breach of contract of betrothal, inheritance, and so forth. The decision of the jurist was confirmed by the British courts. The jurists received as emoluments half the court fees, and they worked well; litigants went before them willingly and accepted their decisions with respect. It is true that the Sunnis were deprived for a time of regular Shar'ah courts under a Qadhi; on the other hand the Shi'ahs, who formed 90 per cent. of the population, benefited under the arrangement by the fact that their jurists were accorded official recognition. Under Ottoman rule the Qadhi was always a Sunni and regulated the cases brought to him by Sunni Law, with the result that no Shi'ahs resorted to the courts. They settled their cases by reference to their own religious leaders, whose judgments had no official weight.

The bulk of the criminal work did not come into the courts. Serious cases were tried by Military Commissions, but there was a consensus of opinion that serious crime was remarkably rare, that which existed being mainly theft or robbery under arms. The Deputy Military Governors of Basrah and 'Ashar disposed of most of the criminal suits. Until after the occupation of Baghdad, no courts existed in the Basrah Wilayat outside Basrah town. In 'Amarah and Nasiriyah disputes of all kinds were decided by Military Governors, while in the rural districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. In all these cases limitations were set to the sentences which could be imposed.

The population of the 'Iraq is not litigious like that of India, and the people, or at least the lower classes, show greater probity than is common elsewhere. As a rule the defendant admits the facts of the case; evidence on oath is extremely reliable among the better classes, and the testimony of an oath on the part of the defendant is admitted by the plaintiff. The people are accustomed to settlement by arbitration and some 10 per cent. of the cases are thus adjusted. Arbitrators in Basrah are chiefly wealthy merchants or landowners, and may be trusted to do their utmost to come to an equitable decision.

Outside the towns the tribal population had not been wont to resort to the Ottoman courts, in spite of all attempts on the Ottoman Government to induce or force them to do so. In point of fact, over the greater part of Mesopotamia it was not the Turkish judicial authorities who had regulated the relations between man and man or assigned the penalties for breaches in their observance. Behind all legal paraphernalia lay the old sanctions, understood and respected because they were the natural outcome of social needs. The shaikh in his tent heard the plaint of petitioners seated round his coffee hearth and gave his verdict with what acumen he might possess, guided by a due regard for tribal custom; the local saiyid, strong in his reputation for a greater familiarity than that of other men with the revealed ordinances of the Almighty, and yet stronger in the wisdom brought by long experience in arbitration, delivered his awards on disputes grave or trivial, and the decisions thus reached were generally consonant with natural justice and always conformable with the habits of thought of the contending parties.

This system of local justice was recognised by us to be a strong weapon on the side of order and good conduct. Just as it was the habit of the British Military Governors when hearing cases to call in the mukhtars, the headmen of the town quarters, and ask them to take part in the proceedings, so the Political Officers turned to the shaikhs of tribe and village and obtained their opinion. This practice was extended by an enactment called the Tribal Disputes Regulation, issued with the approval of the Army Commander in February 1916. It was laid down herein that when a dispute occurred in which either of the parties was a tribesman, the Political Officer might refer it to a majlis, or tribal court, consisting of shaikhs or arbiters selected according to tribal usage. Unless the findings of this body were manifestly unjust or at variance with the facts of the case, the Political Officer would pass judgment in general accordance with it.

When, after 18 months' experience, the Political Officers of the Basrah Wilayat were asked to furnish a report on the working of the regulation, the results were found to be satisfactory. In some cases its provisions had developed in practice into institutions not originally contemplated, though in no way contrary to the spirit of the enactment. At Nasiriyah, Suq and Qal'at Salih a standing majlis had been formed composed of leading citizens, Sunni and Shi'ah. A shaikh of the Sabæans, a sect which had been much harried by their neighbours in Turkish times, was called in when any case involving a Sabæan was referred to the majlis. At Nasiriyah

and Suq disputes of a purely municipal nature were from time to time submitted to the majlis by an order of reference, and in this capacity its members formed a body of honorary magistrates. At Qal'at Salih almost every dispute arising outside the municipal limits had been referred to the majlis, which in most cases had returned a verdict; but sometimes, if both the parties were Moslems, the matter had been passed on for decision to a local Mufti, or, when both were Sabæans, to a Sabæan priest. At 'Amarah tribal disputes were usually referred to the head shaikh, who called on the other shaikhs of the tribe for advice when necessary, and dealt with the case in accordance with tribal law and custom; but if the issues involved more than one tribe, a special majlis of representative shaikhs would be convened. This procedure did not necessitate any interference by Government in tribal usage and was liked by the tribesmen. In Qurnah a majlis was appointed to consider important cases, but minor disputes were referred to the shaikh of the tribe in which they occurred, or to the native mayor if they fell within the limits of the municipality; while in a third class of cases, such as disputes between villages, a neutral arbitrator, usually the headman of the nahiyah, the sub-district, was selected. As a rule when the duties of the majlis had been clearly explained to its members at the beginning of the trial, their awards were honestly given, in accordance with what they thought right. Their decisions were interesting, helpful and usually sensible. The local majlis, with its witnesses on the spot, carried out the work allotted to it with greater expedition than would have been possible for a court at a distance, and in tribal disputes the prompt despatch of business is a great asset. The decisions of the Political Officer, based on the finding of the majlis, have invariably been accepted by the parties concerned, which shows that they had fulfilled tribal conceptions of justice. It was universally felt that the regulation had been the means of removing a heavy burden from the shoulders of Political Officers, whose decisions would not in any case have been as satisfying as those of the shaikhs, and it had the further advantage of raising the position and increasing the responsibility of the latter by conferring upon them small judicial powers.

In one respect tribal custom, as administered by the majlis, is not wholly satisfactory in our eyes. The tribesman regards the exaction of blood money payable to the relations of the murdered man as of greater moment than the punishment of the murderer, and is apt to be content with the fine without any further retribution. The regulation empowered Political Officers to increase the sentence within defined limits, but they judged it wise seldom to avail themselves of this permission and no doubt they were well advised. The sentences of the majlis, if they had been subject to frequent enhancement, would have tended to fall below the due standard of chastisement. In accepting tribal usage the Political Officer might find himself called upon to impose penalties which are foreign to British judicial tradition. Thus in cases of blood feud the tribes of the Euphrates almost invariably require the guilty party, in addition to the payment of blood money, to hand over a virgin to the family of the deceased; and they value this custom not only as a punishment, but also a safeguard, for, as they justly observe, the payment of fines does nothing towards allaying animosity, whereas inter-marriage provides a community of interests.

In disputes touching the ownership of land the jurisdiction of the courts had to be exercised with due regard to the Turkish laws and regulations touching Tapu, or land registration, which it was judged important to uphold. As already mentioned, the Ottoman Government considered the Iraq as a conquered province, and according to Turkish theory all land which had not been reserved definitely as private property was the property of the conqueror. Such reservation was made either at the time of the conquest, or at a later date by farman from the Sultan, or, since the land settlement of Midhat Pasha in 1871, by grants through the Tapu Department, which has become, under British administration, a branch of the Revenue Department. The original reservations and grants by farman were also registered by Tapu, but this was merely the recognition of an existing and absolute title. Midhat Pasha's land law provided for a Commission of land settlement which was to investigate all claims, whether based on purchase or on continuous occupancy or other title, but except in the Basrah district this work had not been completed.

Registration by the Tapu Department took the form of a sanad or title deed<sup>1</sup> which it was necessary to renew on the occasion of any transfer or devolution from

<sup>1</sup> Except in the case of reservation at the time of the Turkish conquest, or grants by farman, the holder of a Tapu sanad does not enjoy freehold rights, but has a restricted title best defined as a right of occupancy. Sanads of this nature may be more accurately described as occupancy certificates than as title deeds.

the original transferee. Technically, on every devolution or transfer Government resumed the grant and regranted the land. This system, though cumbrous, had the great advantage of preventing complications of title by secret mortgages and the like, since no such transaction was binding unless officially registered; but it must be borne in mind that in practice it was too inefficiently carried out to be of much value. It followed that the civil courts were precluded from enquiring into the facts of an alleged transfer unless it had been registered by the Tapu Department. They could grant compensation for failure to perform a contract to transfer, but they could not compel its performance. In certain cases a Tapu sanad could be set aside by the civil courts, *e.g.*, where a sanad could be proved to have been obtained by fraud; but the respective spheres of the Tapu Department and the civil courts are difficult to define, for the laws and regulations are not always clear and precedents for all varieties of procedure can be found. The Tapu Department was obliged to refer cases of inheritance to the Shar'ah courts and to abide by their decision as to the division of shares, and it could of its own free will refuse to grant a sanad until the applicant had obtained a decision from the civil courts on any point at issue. This was done if a difficult and complicated question arose which could not be decided satisfactorily by the comparatively summary enquiries of the Tapu Department.

Unfortunately the Tapu system, though it possessed signal merits, was, like all things Turkish, a theory rather than a fact. In practice a very large proportion of devolutions and transfers had not been registered, or they had been registered without proper enquiry into the facts, or obtained by bribing the Tapu officials. Moreover, it was only in the small area where the Commission of Land Settlement had finished its task that all claims anterior to 1871 might be presumed to have been investigated, and either rejected or validated by Tapu sanad; even that presumption, when Turkish methods are taken into account, would probably be a large one. When none of these objections arose and the Tapu sanads could be produced, they were found to be drawn with great inexactitude; no care had been taken in defining the boundaries of the estate in question, and an examination of sanads revealed cases where the boundary on all four sides was described as "the marsh," a line which was subject to seasonal as well as to permanent variations with every change in flood levels. The crowning example of Turkish methods was provided by a sanad referring to a garden near Basrah which was described as being bounded "qiblitan"—a vague term which may be taken to mean approximately S.W.—by the Red Sea.

Nevertheless, the Tapu Code was vital to the maintenance of the principles on which Turkish land tenure was based, and it remained under the 'Iraq Code the law of the land. The decision has proved valuable. The wealth of Mesopotamia has been in the past, and still continues to be, derived almost exclusively from agriculture. Any sudden change in Turkish procedure in a matter of such fundamental importance as title in land was to be deprecated. Moreover, Midhat Pasha's settlement was conceived, as will be explained later, on wrong lines. It was impossible to proceed to its immediate amelioration, but to have enforced it, as the courts would have been bound to enforce it, on purely legal reasoning must inevitably have resulted in political unrest. Reference to Tapu brought disputes into the cognizance of the Revenue Department, which was in a position to take a wider view of the issues involved, and had the advantage of exercising its authority locally through Political Officers, who were able to get first-hand evidence on the spot and to judge of and make allowance for the political significance of all claims that might arise.

Closely connected, from one aspect, with the land, that is to say with its capacity for production, is the provision of medical and sanitary facilities for the civil population. If man-power is the primary asset in the national economy of every community, in Mesopotamia the problems connected with its preservation and increase present themselves in an acute form. The vast development of which the country is capable waits upon a substantial addition to the number of its inhabitants. The introduction of foreign agriculturists and settlers, who by reason of differences of race or creed could not be absorbed by the existing society, would be attended by grave political risks, and might well result in active local protests and disturbances. On the other hand, it cannot be anticipated that settlers absorbable and therefore acceptable, Arab, Persian, or Kurdish, will immigrate to Mesopotamia in numbers sufficient to make good the deficiency, the available supply being too small. The population of the 'Iraq, though scanty, is prolific, but the absence of medical arrangements and an all-prevailing ignorance of the laws of health and sanitation have combined to keep it down. If infant mortality were arrested and children given a better prospect of

reaching adult life it might not improbably be doubled in the next thirty or forty years. Herein lies the safest assurance for the provision of agents who under favourable conditions will bring about economic progress.

From a military point of view care of public health and the sanitation of the towns were necessary precautions if the troops were to be kept free from disease. A civil dispensary was opened in Basrah immediately after the occupation, while the Deputy Military Governors took steps to secure the cleanliness of the town. A civil hospital was started in 1915, and additional dispensaries opened in 'Ashar. A Civil Surgeon superintended these establishments, and was put in charge of sanitary arrangements in Basrah, and an Army Medical Officer controlled the sanitation of 'Ashar. The sanitation of the gaol and the health of prisoners received careful attention. Lunatics could not be provided for locally and were sent to India for treatment. The attendance at the dispensaries and hospital was greater than was expected. The people accepted inoculation and other precautions against plague, and were eager for vaccination. After the occupation of 'Amarah, a hospital and dispensary were opened there under a British Army doctor, and they proved as popular as in Basrah. Similarly at Nasiriyah the services of a military doctor were lent to the civil hospital and dispensary. It would be difficult to give too much credit to the medical officers engaged in these duties, not for their zeal only, but for the tact which they exercised towards their patients; and no less praise is due to the Indian dispensers and medical staff. A morning visit to a dispensary was enough to explain how the timidity of children and tribeswomen had been overcome, suspicion allayed and prejudice conciliated.

The sanitary condition of the towns made a notable advance during 1916. Latrines and incinerators were everywhere in use, butcheries and markets inspected, a successful campaign was carried on against flies and rats and infectious diseases checked. In the villages of Qurnah, Qal 'at Salih and 'Ali Gharbi hospitals and dispensaries were served by the medical military officer of the station, usually with an Indian Sub-Assistant Surgeon, but at Suq, owing to the extreme shortage of medical staff, it was impossible to start regular medical work till 1917, and the absence of a dispensary was regarded by the inhabitants as a grievance, though no such institution would have been dreamed of in Turkish times. The readiness to submit to treatment in hospitals was very remarkable. The fame of the British doctors spread through the districts and patients came in from afar, willing to accept operation and even loss of limb when they were told that it was necessary. Among their other uses, hospitals and dispensaries provided a more convincing form of propaganda than any which could have been invented by the most eloquent preacher or the most skilful pamphleteer.

It may fairly be said that the extension of the administration usually succeeded in fulfilling a double function. Not only was efficiency increased, but close personal contact was established between the governors and the governed, and confidence grew correspondingly. A good example of the useful results which followed on more intimate relations between British officers and the people of the country, and did their share in turn in strengthening these relations, was the Shabanah. These tribal guards were enrolled and paid by the local Political Officer to help in the preservation of order and the protection of the lines of communication. They also carried messages, went on errands and served as a kind of bodyguard. They were enlisted through their shaikhs and organised under two grades of native non-commissioned officers, but the organisation of the force varied according to the requirements of the district. On the Tigris below 'Amarah, where the estates held by individual shaikhs are large and the principle of local authority well understood, each shaikh provided the men for his section of the river. As the force thus composed consisted of separate tribal elements, no single non-commissioned officer was put at its head. On the other hand, in the Hammar Lake, between Qurnah and Nasiriyah, where the tribal units were small and conspicuous for a prevailing anarchy, it was thought inadvisable to post Shabanah in their own districts as they were liable to be preoccupied by private feuds rather than to devote themselves to their official duties. Nor were the Shabanah organised on a tribal basis in the Suq district, where the main part of the force was kept at headquarters, but three small units were placed under friendly shaikhs near the town. Both Suq and Nasiriyah were provided with a body of tribal horse—originally enrolled at Nasiriyah under the military authorities.

The tribesmen showed no unwillingness to enlist either as Shabanah or in the irregular horse, service in both forces being regarded as honourable employment. Dismissal from Government employment entailed loss of esteem and was generally

regarded as a heavy punishment. The results were on the whole satisfactory, except with regard to the prevention of blockade running, where the temptations to overlook or abet evasions of the law were irresistible. The patrolling of traffic routes by these semi-military tribal levies was found to be an effective guarantee of security and service therein provided an outlet for restless spirits.

By the end of 1916 the Shabanah numbered something over 500. As the force improved it was given charge of the smaller posts along the Tigris line which had been occupied by British troops. British non-commissioned officers were lent for training purposes, and it would have been difficult to say whether they or the men they trained were more eager that the Shabanah should make a creditable appearance.

Medical facilities, integrity in the administration of justice, the gradual abolition of the tax-farmer, the stabilising of taxation on a fair basis, the repairing of mosque and village, together with a sympathetic handling of the tribes, these were the most effective means of meeting Turkish and German propaganda, but steps were taken to provide the reading public, a very small portion of the community, with news from sources less tainted than those of the enemy. A Government press was instituted at Basrah, and when the great initial difficulties in procuring material had been surmounted, a vernacular paper, both in Arabic and Persian, was published daily. The news conveyed was mainly derived from Reuter, but local well-wishers were encouraged to contribute; for example, valuable articles on the treatment by the Turks of the Shi'ah holy towns were received from a respected *saiyid*. If the circulation was not very large the paper reached a wider public than the numbers bought would seem to indicate, for in a population almost wholly illiterate it is the habit for one who has an acquaintance with letters to read the news aloud to the company gathered round him in the coffee shop, and one copy will therefore serve to instruct a group of listeners. As the press became better equipped, vernacular pamphlets and broad sheets, reproductions of important native documents, such as a petition against the Turks sent by the Shi'ahs of Najaf and Karbala to Persia, were issued from it. Besides the vernacular and English daily papers the press gradually accomplished more and more current official work, both civil and military, to the alleviation of offices where typists were permanently too few and stenographers almost unknown.

Arrangements were made for the circulation of reputable Egyptian vernacular papers, which were imported and distributed, for the most part, free of charge. They were appreciated by the very small public who read anything beyond the daily telegrams.

Occasionally a refugee from Baghdad would bring news of a copy of the *Auqat Basrah*, the *Basrah Times*, which he had found in a village, or even in an Arab tent, on his way down, showing that the voice of the Government press was sometimes heard beyond the limits of the occupied territories. The greater number of these refugees were indigent Jews, but in the spring of 1916, after the Turks had taken vigorous measures to break up and disperse the Liberal Committee in Baghdad, a few Moslems of well-known families succeeded in making their escape to Basrah. They brought us news of the hope that had been aroused in the breast of themselves and their colleagues when General Townshend's force reached Ctesiphon, and of the disappointment, enhanced by considerable personal danger from the Ottoman authorities, which had followed the retreat. They were given suitable allowances, and in due course, after the advance to Baghdad, they returned to their home.

Whatever care might be taken to keep the pressure of war conditions from the inhabitants of the occupied territories, so long as they observed neutrality, it was impossible to avoid the infliction of some inconveniences. Of these, perhaps the most pressing was the blockade, essential to prevent goods reaching enemy hands from the markets of Basrah, 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, which were now well stocked. It extended to Kuwait and Najd and into Persia, and thus, besides being a severe restriction on the population of the 'Iraq, threatened on several occasions to embroil us with trusted friends whose subjects could not forgo the tempting profits of illicit trade. A minor but galling grievance was the requisitioning of houses for military and civil use; more serious, but equally unavoidable, was the demand for native labour. Dykes, railways, roads, the work of the port, growing daily more considerable, the laying out of camps and other military necessities, obliged us to draw the agricultural population away from the palm gardens and arable lands, where the surplus available was smaller than the supply called for. Not many of these works were of public benefit, and some were even directly contrary to local interests, though

the exigencies of the campaign demanded them. All was done that could be done to lighten the burden by providing that the labourers should return periodically to their home after short terms of work, and by making arrangements for their being lodged in well-arranged camps, and adequately paid and fed. Arab labour when properly handled was found to compare favourably with that of the Indian labour corps employed in the country. Arab, Persian and Kurdish labour corps were formed under the control of British officers, who quickly learnt how to make themselves popular with the men under their command, and thereby to get the best work out of them. The organisation of labour, begun under civil auspices, was converted in 1916 into a military department, since most of the work required was for military purposes; but the task of providing labour through the shaikhs by persuasion or demand remained with the local Political Officer, who, while he recognised the inevitable requirement, sometimes groaned under it.

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### CHAPTER III.—The Pacification of the Tribes and Relations with the Shi'ah towns up to the fall of Baghdad.

From a political aspect the Turkish system was open to objections quite as serious as from that of administrative efficiency. Outside the immediate vicinity of the towns the whole population of the country is tribal. Larger or smaller units—sometimes combined into loose groups or confederations, sometimes existing at the hazard of chance alliances—till the irrigated land along the rivers and pasture their flocks in the intervening deserts. Some have been established in Mesopotamia from a remote period, others have come in during the last two or three hundred years, but all are originally nomads from the interior wilderness. The unbroken drift of her peoples northwards is one of the most important factors in the history of Arabia. The underlying causes were probably complex, but chief among them must have been a gradual change in the climatic conditions of the peninsula, involving slow desiccation, together with the pressure of an increasing population on a soil growing steadily poorer. To the hunger-bitten nomad, the rich pastures of the Syrian frontier, the inexhaustible fertility of Mesopotamia, offered irresistible attractions, and opportunities for expansion were found in the weakness and political exhaustion of the neighbouring northern States, whether they were Turkish, Byzantine, Persian or yet earlier empires. The long records of Babylonia enable us to trace the process in its earlier historical phases; a study of existing conditions shows that until a recent period it was still going on, and if a forecast may be hazarded, it will not be arrested in the future, though the nature of the immigration may be altered. Instead of devastating hordes, sweeping like locusts over cornfield and pasture, the surplus population of Arabia may find in a Mesopotamia reconstituted by good administration, not only abundant means of livelihood, but far-reaching possibilities of social and intellectual advance; and they will be received with welcome in a land of which the unlimited resources can be put to profit in proportion to the labour available.

The conversion of the wandering camel-breeder and camel-lifter into a cultivator of the soil, in so far as it has taken place in Mesopotamia, was an inevitable process. In their progress northward the tribes found themselves ultimately upon the limits of the desert; the wide spaces essential to nomadic existence no longer stretched before them, while the pressure of those behind forbade any return. They were obliged to look to agriculture as a means of livelihood. Thereby they lost caste with the true Beduin. Yet, though these last would scorn to intermarry with tillers of the earth, shepherds and herdsmen of buffaloes, they are nevertheless of the same blood and tradition, and not infrequently fragments of very ancient and famous Arabian tribes are present among the cultivators upon the outer limits of Arabian migration. Thus, in Mesopotamia the Bani Tamim, who are divided among various big tribal groups, were masters of the whole of Central Arabia before the time of the Prophet, and still form a large part of the oasis population—their first appearance in Mesopotamia dates from about the beginning of the Muhammadan era; and the Khazraj, now found chiefly on the Tigris above Baghdad, supplied by their martial exploits in the southern deserts much of the romantic stock in trade of the pre-Muhammadan poets.

It follows from the conditions under which settlement has been effected that the old tribes are often widely scattered along the edges of the cultivated land, large units

which once ranged over extensive stretches of desert having been split up and thrust apart by the intrusion of others. For example, the Jubur, a tribe now only half nomadic, are found along the Tigris as far north as Mosul, as well as on the Euphrates and the eastern frontiers of Syria, and the Zubaid are divided between Mesopotamia and the volcanic districts east of Damascus.

The transition from a nomadic to a settled life is always a slow process, and the very doubtful security offered by Turkish administration did not tend to hasten it. Except in the immediate neighbourhood of big towns, such as Baghdad and Basrah, tribal organisation has not been relinquished, tribal law and customs hold good, and tribal blood feuds continued until a couple of years ago to be a terrible scourge. A periodical reversion to tents is common, and even the reed villagers are semi-nomadic, shifting frequently from place to place. The puzzled map-maker may find his last addition to geographical knowledge removed, almost before his eyes, from the spot assigned to it in his survey and re-erected on another site. But the rising value of land tends to pin down these restless husbandmen, and no sooner do they settle than their numbers increase out of all comparison with those of their hungry if prouder brethren in the wilderness who neither plough nor harvest.

The tribal population of Mesopotamia exhibits every stage in the conversion of the Beduin into the settled cultivator of the soil; there are tribes still purely nomadic who have never yet put their hand to the plough, others who are concerned solely with the care of their palm gardens, corn and rice fields, others again who combine the occupation of agriculturist with that of shepherd, and yearly, with the coming of the winter rains, send half their number to pasture the sheep of the community in the desert. In the marshes small groups, as amphibious as their own buffaloes, live by fishing and the weaving of reed mats.

From the head of the Persian Gulf up to Qurnah, tribal organisation has almost died out, except that many of the peasants working in the date gardens belong to the tribes of our staunch ally on the Persian side of the river, the powerful Shaikh of Muhammarah, who has in the past maintained the right to mobilise them for his own tribal operations.

From near Qurnah almost to Baghdad a series of important tribes inhabit the Tigris lands, the Albu Muhammad up to 'Amarah, above them the Beni Lam approximately to Shaikh Sa'ad, then the Bani Rabi'ah round Kut and almost to Bughailah. Along the Euphrates from the Hammar Lake to half-way between Nasiriyah and 'Amarah both banks are peopled by the Muntafiq league of tribes.

Over these populations the shaikhs have such authority as their hereditary position or their personal prowess can command, but Ottoman officials could exercise little or no control on tribesmen who vanished at will into marsh or desert, whither it was impossible to follow them. Instead of utilising the power of the shaikhs, the Turks pursued their classic policy of attempting to improve their own position by the destruction of such native elements of order as were in existence. The wilayat of Basrah presented a comprehensive picture of lawlessness. On the Tigris an intermittent authority had been maintained by playing upon the hereditary enmities of the great tribal groups and the personal rivalry which existed between individual members of the ruling houses. To recognise local domination and yoke it to his service lay beyond the conception of the Turk, and the best that can be said for his uneasy seat upon the whirlwind was that he managed to retain it. In the Euphrates valley it may frankly be admitted that he had been dismounted. Yet if ever the delusive precept which connects empire with disunion might have held good, it was in a country parcelled out between a multitude of small units, well provided with ancient feuds. From Qurnah to Nasiriyah, marsh, rice swamps, palm grove and desert are occupied by some fifty distinct tribes of different origin, all of whom had at one time formed part of the Muntafiq league, under the once powerful Hijaz family of the Sa'dun, while most of them are still in name constituents of that famous confederation. The Sa'dun spring from a Mecca family closely related to the Sharif, a branch of which migrated to Mesopotamia towards the close of the 'Abbasid period, about the beginning of the 15th century. Themselves Sunnis, they established their authority over the Shi'ah tribes and played a considerable part in the stormy history of the land. In the case of one scion of the family who had rendered valuable service in Central Arabia, the Porte even tried the experiment of appointing him Wali of Basrah, but it proved a failure and was abandoned. Of late years the power of the Sa'dun as a ruling family has diminished owing to internal rivalries and dissensions, and the Muntafiq presented a fair field for the disintegrating policy of the Ottoman Government. Any shaikh who showed unusual capacity aroused official jealousy and

was countered by hostility and intrigue ; group was pitted against group, tribe against tribe, section against section, until in the welter which ensued neither Turkish tax-gatherer, nor merchant, nor traveller could secure safe passage. Each petty chieftain built himself a mud tower, from which he defied such part of the universe as came within his ken, or sallied forth in his light mashhuf to plunder by lake and canal his neighbours and the passing stranger.

At the root of tribal unrest lay the Ottoman agrarian system, conceived without regard for prescriptive rights which had been in existence prior to the Turkish conquest. The Arab tribes, in successive waves of immigration, dating back to a period long before the arrival of the Turks, had settled in the land, or if not settled, had marked out spheres of influence which each tribe considered to be, not its own particular property in the sense in which the Turks understood property, but at least an area on which none other than its members was entitled to graze or cultivate. These claims, which ran counter to the theory of the Ottoman conquerors, that all conquered lands are State property, were as far as possible ignored.

It is characteristic of the 'Iraq that no one district exactly resembles another as regards land tenure and the taxation derived from land, which is the principal source of revenue ; 'Amarah and Nasiriyah presented wide divergencies. On the Tigris almost all land was Sanniyah, Crown land, and is now State property let out in large farms for a term of five years. Theoretically, the choice of lessee was unlimited ; in practice it was difficult and dangerous to make over a country in the traditional occupation of one tribe either to the shaikh of another tribe or to a non-tribal townsman. The lessees were therefore, almost without exception, the leading shaikhs of the local tribe. Every chief, if he wished to maintain his position, was obliged to farm sufficient land to give employment to his dependants and followers, at the risk of seeing them disperse and offer their services to another lord. Profiting by this necessity, the Turks put up the leases to auction and encouraged the shaikhs to bid against one another until the amounts bid reached a figure far above the value of the estate. Both the Turkish officials and the farmers knew that they could never be paid, but the officials had the pleasure of exhibiting to the departmental heads at Stambul enormous demands from their province which were comfortably interpreted as being synonymous with enormous revenues, while they also enjoyed the satisfaction of receiving continual bribes from the farmers to induce them not to press for payment. The farmers had to be backed by merchant sureties who took from them large sums. Finally, when immense arrears had mounted up against the farmer, or he had attracted the private enmity of an official or the displeasure of Government, the whole erection would topple over. All arrears would be demanded at one blow ; the farmer, if a shaikh, would pass from rebellion to imprisonment or exile, the lands and houses of the surety would be confiscated, and the estate would be put up afresh to auction and farmed for a still higher and more impossible rent to the rivals of the supplanted man. Scarcely a year passed without conflict. The waterway of the Tigris, which was the main commercial thoroughfare between Baghdad and the sea, would be blocked by insurgent chiefs of the Albu Muhammad or the Bani Lam, who advertised their just grievances by holding up traffic and firing on the river steamers.

On the Euphrates the mistakes of the Ottoman Government were even more fundamental. The Muntafiq tribes had acknowledged the overlordship of the Sa'dun as long as the latter had contented themselves with tribute, military service and the honours of chieftainship, claims which the tribes, possessors of the soil from a remote antiquity, had recognised with varying readiness. But the relations of a tribal landowner with a traditional title to his traditional overlord did not fall within the four corners of the Ottoman definition of proprietary rights, and in 1871 Midhat Pasha, then Wali of Baghdad, effected a settlement on Turkish lines. The tribal lands were partitioned between the Crown and the Sa'dun and registered very imperfectly in Turkish title deeds. The tribes found themselves reduced to the status of tenants and the Sa'dun bartered their ancient prerogatives for the questionable satisfaction of official support in their new rôle of landlord. The tribes never acquiesced in this change. Acute agrarian unrest kept the Muntafiq district in constant rebellion, attempts to suppress the insurgents ended very commonly in the discomfiture of Ottoman arms, and after the weakening of the Central Government, consequent on the Italian and Balkan wars, neither the State nor the Sa'dun succeeded in collecting more than a fraction of their rents.

In the 'Amarah district the Turks had removed or destroyed all records, and there was nothing but one torn piece of paper in a corner of the Basrah offices to



show what had been the revenues of the Division or the nominal rent of the farms. When we occupied 'Amarah in June the spring crops had just been reaped and lay on the threshing floors. The shaikhs and farmers, who had none of them paid their rents for the spring harvest to the Turks, had already been informed by the Chief Political Officer that, subject to good behaviour, they would be continued in their farms by the British authorities. They were summoned to 'Amarah to discuss with the Revenue Commissioner the conditions of their holdings, and were in most cases induced to show their leases, though some pretended to have lost them. It was too hot to attempt a thorough inspection of the ground, but a rough estimate was made of the amount which the various estates could really pay, as against the nominal demand under the Turks. After all discoverable information had been submitted, the Army Commander sanctioned the reductions recommended. These were in many cases very large, amounting to as much as a half. The shaikhs were informed that the amounts fixed were temporary until more thorough enquiries could be made. At the same time the immense arrears standing in their names were remitted. After a more thorough inspection in the autumn and winter of 1915-16 further reductions were made, bitter boundary disputes between shaikhs were adjusted, and encroachments by private owners on State lands were investigated. The check to the British advance at Ctesiphon had made some of the chiefs doubtful, and the shortage of river boats had prevented them from selling their autumn crops to merchants. It was thought politic to insist as far as possible on the payment of dues, but it was difficult to put much pressure on the farmers, and in the end only about two-thirds of the reduced demand were collected.

Both here and in dealing with the Nasiriyah district the administration was well served by the Revenue Commissioner, Mr. Henry Dobbs. It was he who made the first study of agrarian conditions, and his acute eye, combined with a profound acquaintance with tribal custom, enabled him to discern and account for agrarian phenomena. The results of his observations, embodied in a series of brilliant memoranda, have formed the basis of all subsequent revenue work.

That the general lines of the policy adopted were wise has been proved by the result. We have never experienced any serious disturbance on the Tigris. Occasionally a handful of lawless and lordless marshmen would cut a telegraph wire or loot Government stores from a native boat tied up to the river bank for the night; one or two minor shaikhs yielded to Ottoman persuasion and went over to the enemy, but except in the case of chiefs who were in direct contact with the Turkish army the leading men stood firm in their allegiance to us. They accepted responsibility for the security of those reaches of the river which passed through their lands; they bore without undue complaint the restrictions which a state of war imposed upon them; they met the heavy demands for labour which military exigencies obliged us to make, even to the detriment of their own agriculture; and as they became better acquainted with the Political Officers of their districts, they gave them their confidence, and through them came to regard the Great Government as on the whole beneficent and well meaning. From time to time one or another would paddle down the Tigris in his mashhuf to see "Kokus"—so the Chief Political Officer was universally known in the 'Iraq—or, less fortunate, would be summoned to headquarters to receive a reprimand. Big men, abundantly nourished and richly clad, they brought the savour of their fat lands into the tiny dusty rooms where the Chief Political Officer and his exiguous staff struggled with a rising flood of office files. And they bore testimony to their satisfaction with those who had been placed in authority over them. "A good ruler," said an Albu Muhammad shaikh of his local Political Officer. "Never do I go into his house but he gives me a fair welcome." And encouraged by the treatment which had everywhere been meted out to him by the English, he brought down his sick brother, a man who had spent his life in active conflict with the Turks, to die, as it proved, in the arms of the British Government at Basrah.

On the Euphrates progress was not so rapid. War itself could scarcely enhance the prevailing anarchy, but the greater proximity of the Turks made war a more disturbing factor at Nasiriyah than at 'Amarah. Until the advance on Baghdad in 1917, the Turkish outposts lay within sight of Nasiriyah town; an active Turkish Commander, the Circassian, Mizhir Pasha, carried on from Shatrah, on the Hai canal, continuous relations with the tribes; and 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun, in the deserts to the south, provided a convenient focus for disaffection. Tribal opposition was for many months an irritating factor, and it made a heavy demand on the patience of the military authorities. Turkish intrigue, Turkish and German money, backed by prodigious promises for the future, maintained a constant if comparatively futile

effervescence among the tribes, resulting in small raids on the lines of communication, the cutting of telegraph lines, and such-like petty annoyances. Moreover, the tribesmen had real though unavoidable grievances. The strict blockade, essential in order to prevent traffic with the enemy, was galling to the population, and the huge profits to be gained by evading it were a lasting temptation. The production of the rice fields round Suq al Shuyukh had been seriously diminished by lack of water, due to the necessity of keeping open the waterway from the Hammar Lake, which was the sole means of access to Nasiriyah.

At first no attempt was made to gather taxes which for years past the Turks had been unable to collect. The Sa'dun landlords, who looked to us to exact the payment of dues which under the Ottoman régime they had been powerless to recover, were provided with subsistence allowances when necessary pending a just settlement of the rival claims of themselves and the tribes, which demanded detailed investigation and an agrarian survey. Gradually tribal anarchy was reduced to some sort of order. Influential headmen received recognition and were made responsible for their followers in return for a subsidy. Arbitration on the basis of tribal custom was encouraged, petty disputes over boundaries adjusted, and, with the help of shaikh and saiyyid, blood feuds were adjudicated and squabbles peacefully settled. Faithful dealing with individual disturbers of the peace was limited by the fear of rousing a hornet's nest which might have embarrassed military operations elsewhere, but on occasion a tower was knocked down and a malefactor handed over to justice, with no other force behind the civil arm than a band of tribal guards. A small body of tribal horse, enrolled under military auspices and subsequently turned over to the civil authorities, gave opportunity of suitable employment to the sons of shaikhs and to members of the Sa'dun family whose pride of birth and fighting traditions precluded them from taking any other part in the administration. After the lapse of a year the people began to appreciate the advantages of a Government which, though it might hold inconveniently clear-cut views on the payment of revenue, at least gave something in return. Bazaars rose from the ruin in which the Turks had been content to leave them, schools were opened, dispensaries started, encouragement and help were given in the building of necessary dykes, and the curbing of lawlessness permitted cultivator and merchant to go about their business undisturbed. Local freebooters were the first to admire the discernment which guided British Political Officers in maintaining and enforcing order. "There are among the Arabs," observed a chieftain who had himself been a thorn in the flesh of Ottoman officials, "a great number of liars and scoundrels, but our Hakim knows how to distinguish good from evil." The Arab, quick to draw conclusions, began to compare the constructive activity of the British with Turkish apathy. "They destroyed but you create," said a shaikh of Suq al Shuyukh. The building of the railway from Basrah worked marvels in the pacification of the tribes. As railhead drew near, townsmen and tribesmen rode out on visits of inspection, and when the line was open a permit to travel by train was a coveted privilege.

Before the operations had begun which resulted in the recapture of Kut and the occupation of Baghdad, the fruits of victory had been garnered no less on the lower Euphrates than on the lower Tigris. It may be that the leniency with which the tribesmen were handled resulted in putting a premium on their maintaining relations with the enemy, especially after the merciless treatment meted out by the Turks to the inhabitants of Kut when General Townshend was forced to surrender the town in 1916. It was from that time forth abundantly clear to the dullest-witted that to desert the Turkish cause meant death if the offender fell into Ottoman hands, or, at any rate, exile under conditions which were tantamount to a death sentence; whereas to break promises given to the British implied, at the worst, internment for a period of years in India in well-found camps.

But if we erred, we erred on the right side. We upheld steadfastly the theory—for it was at first little better than a theory—promulgated in the first proclamation issued on our landing on the Shatt al Arab, namely, that we were not at war with the Arab race, but were co-operating with them for their liberation from Turkish tyranny. As far as was consistent with a regard for the safety of our forces we shut our eyes to small offences and our ears to delators, and we found reward for our policy in the black days of 1915, after the retreat from Ctesiphon, and the blacker months of 1916 which succeeded the fall of Kut. Although the tribal leaders, who on our advance to Ctesiphon had made submission to us, reverted to the Turks on their reappearance; although the same inevitable story recurred after the fall of Kut, the tribes in the Occupied Territories who were removed from the immediate pressure of

Turkish arms were not perceptibly affected, our line of communications was never in danger, nor was the progress of civil administration disturbed.

Closely connected with our dealings with the settled and half-settled Shi'ah communities on the Euphrates were the relations which we maintained with the nomadic Sunni tribes of Arabia. First to come into touch with us was the small group of the Dhafir, nomads but not Beduin, who inhabit the deserts immediately south of the river and find pasturage during the summer along its banks. The southern portion of the tribe formed in the early part of 1915 a combination in our favour with two of the semi-nomadic Muntafiq groups against 'Ajaimi, and when the railway was built across their grazing grounds they were charged with responsibility for its security. The Dhafir occupy the fringe of the arid wildernesses which, broken by rare oases, extend over the Arabian peninsula. These oases are the headquarters of independent Arab rulers whose authority radiates over the adjacent nomads. Nearest to the Mesopotamian borders is the sturdy nation of the Shammar under Ibn Rashid, whose seat of Government is at Hail, some 300 miles to the south-west of Najaf. His forbears had been in alliance with the Ottoman Government, which regarded Hail as the Arabian outpost of Turkish influence, and he nourished a hereditary enmity with his great southern rival Ibn Sa'ud. Immediately after the outbreak of war Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, who during a previous residence as Political Agent at Kuwait had established a personal friendship with Ibn Sa'ud, was sent on a mission to the Ruler of Najd. The rivalry between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid had reached one of its periodic culminations, and, probably with the active encouragement of the Turks, the Amir of Jabal Shammar attacked his enemy and met him in battle in January 1915. Captain Shakespear, who was present as a non-combatant, was wounded by a chance bullet and killed in the charge of Ibn Rashid's cavalry. Ibn Sa'ud reported the disaster to the Chief Political Officer with genuine sorrow. "We fought against Ibn Rashid at Artawi," he wrote, "and a great battle ensued; alas that our cordial friend and rare well-wisher, Captain Shakespear, was hit from a distance and died. Please inform the exalted Government of my sorrow. We had pressed him to leave us before the fight, but he insisted on being present. He said: 'My orders are to be with you. To leave you would be inconsistent with my honour and the honour of my Government. I must certainly remain.'"

The success of Ibn Rashid, though it was not followed up, left Ibn Sa'ud in embarrassment. For the next year his attention was occupied by the revolt of the 'Ajman, one of the tribes over which he claimed authority. During the spring of 1915 he was hard pressed and could scarcely have extricated himself but for the help of Mubarak Ibn Sabbah, Shaikh of Kuwait. That staunch ally of the British cause, the ultimate success of which he had always predicted, died in the following November and was succeeded by his son Jabir, who, though he followed in his father's steps, could not hope to inherit his influence or his universal reputation as a master of Arabian statecraft. Jabir lived less than a year and was followed by another son of Mubarak, Shaikh Salim, a man of stronger character than Jabir, but a fanatical Moslem lacking Mubarak's singular breadth of vision.

Ibn Rashid, even if he had nothing to fear from Ibn Sa'ud, gave his Turkish allies no effective help, partly because of dissensions with his own tribe. An important section of the Shammar broke away from him in the spring of 1916, brought their tents and camels close to the Mesopotamian frontiers and entered into friendly relations with the British Administration. Ibn Rashid appeared on the confines of the Basrah Wilayat a few weeks later, returned no answer to the letters addressed to him by the Chief Political Officer through Shaikh Ibrahim of Zubair, and in combination with 'Ajaimi Ibn Sa'dun constituted some slight menace. But he retired in July, and his hostility for the remainder of the war took no more active shape, as far as the 'Iraq was concerned, than the smuggling and forwarding by his people of goods from Kuwait or the Euphrates markets to the enemy at Madinah and Damascus.

Late in October the treaty with Ibn Sa'ud, the preliminary negotiations for which had been the object of Captain Shakespear's mission, was concluded by Sir Percy Cox. A darbar was held at Kuwait, attended by the Shaikh of Muhammarah and the Ruler of Najd, in which the latter was invested with the K.C.I.E., and in a speech as spontaneous as it was unexpected pointed out that, whereas the Ottoman Government had sought to dismember and weaken the Arab nation, British policy aimed at

uniting and strengthening its leaders. Complimentary telegrams were exchanged with the Sharif of Mecca, then in the early stages of revolt against the Turks, though, in fact, Ibn Sa'ud has never regarded the King of the Hijaz with anything but dislike and suspicion, and neither on the Shaikhs of Muhammarah and Kuwait nor on public opinion in the 'Iraq did his rising produce any marked effect.

An attempt was made to reap immediate advantage from the striking exhibition of goodwill on the part of the three shaikhs which the Kuwait darbar afforded. When he visited Basrah a few days later, Ibn Sa'ud wrote to 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun and urged him to throw in his lot with his fellows in the upholding of Arab and Moslem liberties against the Turks. This letter drew from 'Ajaimi a decisive reply. "Oh my honoured brother!" he wrote, "it is known to me and is beyond doubt that my attitude is one which is necessary in order to earn the approval of the Most High God and the elevation of the name of the Arabs by the discharge of loyalty; and what greater loyalty is there than this, that I should carry out faithfully what God ordered me in his unchangeable book in regard to Jihad against non-believers, the enemies of God and of our religion. The 'blame of the blamer' cannot apply to me, who walk in the love of God and of his Prophet, and of our country, and in the protection thereof from the pollution of the infidel. I had great hope from your piety and your Arab zeal that you would approve my opinion and my action for the enhancement of the name of the Arabs in this my attitude, and this is not disaffection by the grace of God, rather it is a simple attitude. For if the Turkish Government be a protection to the purity of Islam, it is my helper and the helper of my tribes. And verily I am an absolute ruler by the order of God and the Government, and according to my conviction and belief I am walking in the true path, which pleases God and the Arab race, with constant and unremitting attention; and that is the spirit of Islam. This is the position, and I finish what I have to say by quoting the word of God: 'You cannot direct to the right path whom you like; it is God who directs whom he wishes.' If I had given any promise to them in the past or afterwards, I should have been bound to carry out my promise. But I gave undertaking for the service of my religion and my Government and my zeal. The great God is the best of helpers and co-operators, and if you argue on the score of religion, then the discharge of my duty should be according to the promise which I previously gave to my Government, and that is the first attribute of the Arabs. This is what had to be explained."

Whether he feared that his long hostility to the British had made it impossible for him to secure advantageous terms, or whether his personal sentiments had crystallised into the convictions expressed in his letter, his answer to Ibn Sa'ud left no doubt as to the course to which he had pledged himself, and no further attempt was made to move him from it. No pains had been spared to win him over, but even if in the early part of the war he had come to terms with us, it may well be doubted whether he would have remained in our camp. Proud as Lucifer, like all the Sa'dun, and with an over-weening estimate of his own importance, his ambitions must always have overstepped any favours which could have been accorded to him. His position in the desert as a free lance, allied with the Turks but beyond their control, exactly suited him. He drew large subsidies, which he did little to earn, and his dignity was sustained by titles of honour and windy promises. But at least it is to his credit that having chosen his part he held to it.

Our own experiences, no less than those of the Turks, go to prove that desert alliances are of negative rather than of positive value. It is essential to have a definite understanding with Arab rulers, whose wandering tribesmen haunt the edges of the settled lands, nor should this be difficult in times of peace. They depend for the necessities of existence, food, clothing, and the few domestic utensils which they may require, on access to their customary markets, and such access can be made contingent on their good behaviour. But as long as they respect the frontiers of civilisation, with which alone they come into contact, their obligations to society may be said to have been fulfilled. No administration can hope to control their actions within their own sphere, nor is their military co-operation of any value unless it is organised by European officers. It is safe to predict that subsidies and gifts of arms will rarely be used in the manner intended by the donor. They will be diverted to private quarrels, and even if the friendly chief succeeds in marshalling his forces against the enemy of his ally, the first success, attended by the urgent need of making off with the loot, will scatter his armies as effectively as any defeat.

With all the frontier tribes in our pay we never succeeded in dislodging 'Ajaimi, though his followers were at times reduced to a mere handful, and similarly the Turks, though they subsidised Ibn Rashid royally, never got him to fire a single shot against us. Ibn Sa'ud, after years of inactivity, advanced on Hail in 1918, and came within an ace of taking it, but he swerved off within sight of his objective, and the campaign resolved itself into the usual desert alarms. With the conclusion of peace there is fortunately no further need for attempting the impossible task of making practical military use of the Beduin, and we may rest content with alliances which regulate their relations to ourselves, and leave them free to conduct their own affairs in the manner which seems best to them.

In describing Ottoman methods of administration it has been made sufficiently clear that the Turks showed no consideration for the Shi'ah inhabitants of the 'Iraq. Yet from the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab to a line which may be drawn roughly about the latitude of Baghdad almost the whole of the rural population and a majority of the inhabitants of the towns are Shi'ahs. It is true that the Sunni element, apart from the support given to it by a Sunni Government, enjoys a social importance incommensurate with its size. It consists largely of great landowners and wealthy merchants inhabiting the towns and holding estates along the rivers. Sunnis from Najd control the desert markets; and on the canals, in the heart of Shi'ah communities, some shrewd trader of Najd origin, easily distinguishable by his finer features and superior education from the surrounding tribesmen, will be found presiding over the tiny bazaar which caters for the simple needs of the countryside. Nothing can exceed the comprehensive contempt with which the Sunni merchant in these small tribal markets regards his clients; even the well-to-do shaikhs, with their wide estates and hordes of armed retainers, are to him nothing but dogs of the riverside, with whom neither he nor his co-religionists, the poverty-stricken Beduin, would dream of intermarriage.

Nevertheless, neither official indifference nor the disdain of the local aristocrat can challenge the plain facts that southern 'Iraq is a Shi'ah province and the holy land universally venerated by the sect. Mesopotamia had declared itself for the hereditary right of the direct descendant of the Prophet, as against an elected Khalif, before the two divisions of Islam had taken definite form or name; when 'Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad, fought the armies of the Umayyad, Mu'awiyah, at Siffin, his Mesopotamian forces followed him, as the nearest relation of the representative of God and the father of his grandsons. When 'Ali was murdered at Kufah and his eldest son, Hasan, grandson of the Prophet, refused to claim his political inheritance, it was the people of 'Iraq who invited the younger brother, Husain, to seek their support. The strong infusion of Persian blood had introduced a Persian turn of thought into the former domain of the Sassanians, fostering the mysticism, remote from the Semitic mind, which underlies Shi'ah doctrines, and the religious colonies of Persians settled in the holy towns brought with them that spirit of political indocility which has always set the average Persian against existing secular authority.

It would be a curious historical study, if the materials for it existed, to trace the diffusion of Shi'ah doctrines in Mesopotamia. They have certainly spread, owing to the missionary zeal of Shi'ah divines, during the last hundred years. For instance, the large tribal group of the Zubaid, which stretches from river to river from a little north of Kut, half-way to Baghdad, was turned to Shi'ahism about 1830 by a famous mujtahid whose descendants still dominate the politics of Hillah. It is significant that the kindred tribes to the north, the Dulaim and 'Ubaid, a little further removed from the persuasive influence of the holy places, have remained Sunni. As far as can be judged the process is still going on. One of the nomadic tribes of the Muntafiq, the Shuraifat, are probably recent converts (the nomads tend to hold to Sunni tenets more than the settled cultivators); another, the Suhaiyim, are still partly Sunni, and there are examples of conversion in the Sunni family of the Sa'dun, who are Ashraf, akin to the Sharif of Mecca, and of the purest Sunni stock.

The sacred towns of the 'Iraq are four in number: Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimain and Samarra. Najaf contains the reputed tomb of 'Ali, while near by, at Kufah, is the mosque where that khalif was murdered. Karbala is built on the site of Husain's battle and holds his tomb, together with the graves of several of his followers. The sanctity of Kadhimain is of later date; it is based on the fact that the 7th and 9th Imams (direct descendants of 'Ali) are buried there. Samarra, at a yet later date, received the bones of the 10th and 11th Imams, while the 12th Imam disappeared

into a cave lying a few score of yards from the tomb. Neither Kadhimain nor Samarra gave the Turks much trouble in the past. At Kadhimain, though the population is mainly Persian, the proximity of the great Sunni and Arab centre, Baghdad, was a commanding factor. At Samarra, Sunnis have a yet more direct control; the Arab population is proportionately larger and the official guardians of the mosque are Sunnis. But Najaf and Karbala, more particularly Najaf, have from all time been the centres of religious fanaticism of a Persian type, centres also of hostility to existing authority, and will continue to be so whatever government obtains in the rest of the 'Iraq.

It is usually Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra which are the places of residence of the great divines of the Shi'ah world, the mujtahids, and the leading mujtahid of his time has always lived in one of these three towns, preferably Najaf. The Shi'ah mujtahid interprets sacred law, and herein lies the essential difference between the Sunni and Shi'ah forms of Islam. The former follow the interpretation of Muhammadan law laid down by the founders of the four orthodox Sunni sects, the Hanbali, Shafa'i, Hanafi, and Malaki, and this interpretation is immutable. The Shi'ah, on the other hand, follows the laws of the Quran as interpreted by the Imams, and these laws again; or at least some of them, may be interpreted or modified by the mujtahids as they think fit, though they seldom exercise this privilege. The mujtahid has the power of promulgating a religious order or Fatwah, whether it be a call to Jihad or a permit given to a sick person allowing him the use of alcohol when there is no other cure. He can, and indeed he has, obliged the Shi'ah Persian Government to rescind decrees; there was a famous instance in the matter of a tobacco monopoly given to a British company, when the great mujtahid of the day forbade Shi'ahs to smoke, on the ground that it was unlawful to give the monopoly to non-Moslems. The Shi'ahs obeyed and the Government was defeated.

Theoretically, all mujtahids are of one grade, but actually they fall into three recognised classes in accordance with the influence they possess and the number of those who follow them. There is no prescribed course of study by which a student of sacred law can become a mujtahid or pass from one grade to the next, nor is any official examination of his attainments required. To be recognised as a mujtahid, the postulant must obtain recognition of his claims from the greatest mujtahids of his time, who certify him to be reckoned among their number and competent to give a Fatwah. This is usually the reward for anything up to 25 years' study in Najaf under the great mujtahids only. During this time the character of the postulant must have been exemplary. Solitude is a necessity for the acquisition of the required reputation, and it follows automatically that no man of good family ever becomes a mujtahid. The next step of the certified mujtahid is to gather round himself learned men and to send them out to various parts of the world to preach his fame. His influence, if he is fortunate, gathers in volume like a snowball, until finally he is recognised by universal acclamation as one of the great mujtahids. Students then flock to attend his classes and pious Shi'ahs from all parts send him large sums of money to distribute among his pupils and among the poor of the holy town in which he resides. The descendants of mujtahids are not often mujtahids themselves, though they have influence and command respect on account of their birth.

There is always a small group of mujtahids of the highest grade resident in the 'Iraq, one of whom is recognised as the first authority in Shi'ah sacred law. The premier mujtahid is necessarily a man of years; when he dies the next most respected mujtahid, often as old as he, steps automatically into his place. The first duty of the successor is to issue a Fatwah permitting the Shi'ah community to celebrate the Friday prayers; without this order the principal orisons of the week would have to be suspended. The great mujtahids, absorbed in matters of religion, should not take any part in temporal affairs; if they concern themselves with politics, except in so far as politics affect the faith, they do so at the risk of loss of influence. At the time of the occupation the premier mujtahid was Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. He was pressed by the Turks to sign a Fatwah proclaiming Jihad, but held out for a considerable time and gave it to be generally understood that he did not consider that the circumstances called for holy war. His eldest son was active in preaching Jihad during the winter of 1914-15; the subsequent treatment of the holy towns by the Turks confirmed the father's attitude and modified that of the son.

Our connection with the Najaf-Karbala mujtahids had begun long before the war. Since 1849 the Indian Government had been in relations with both towns in connection with the Oudh bequest. A sum which, when all life interests had fallen

in, amounted to about Rs. 1,21,000 a year, had been bequeathed by Ghazi-ud-Din Haidar, King of Oudh, to be expended in benefactions to deserving persons in the two holy cities, and the Government of India, inheriting the responsibilities of the East India Company, found itself in the position of trustee. The distribution of the monies was the source of many difficulties, but in 1910 it was regulated by an arrangement according to which the British Resident at Baghdad disbursed the bequest through Charitable Committees of mujtahids and other respectable persons, one in each town.

Prior to the Constitution of 1908 the Ottoman Government had recognised that radical differences separated the holy towns from the rest of their dominions and had accorded them some privileges, the most prized being that of exemption from military conscription. It was, indeed, only reasonable that Persians should not be enrolled in the Turkish army, and the Arab population of the cities slipped through the fingers of the recruiting sergeant by a natural extension of the principle. But the doctrine of equality on the lips of the Committee of Union and Progress meant the levelling down of privilege so far as it touched non-Ottoman subjects, and even before the war the Turkish Government showed a tendency to ride roughshod over the susceptibilities of Najaf and Karbala. After the battle of Shu'aibah a number of fugitives from the regular army sought sanctuary at Najaf. The Turks announced their intention of hunting them down and threatened to impose conscription on the local population. It was reported, also, that they intended to appropriate the treasure belonging to the shrine for the purposes of Jihad. They proceeded to impress young men for military service, raided the houses at night, molested the women on the pretext that men were disguising themselves as women to escape conscription, and extorted large sums as the price of immunity from conscription. The people rose, barricaded streets and houses, and garrisoned the precincts of the shrine. The Turks turned their guns on the rebels, and, either by intention or accident, damaged the minarets of the shrine. Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi sent a telegram of protest to Constantinople, and was told in reply to mind his business as a darwish and not to interfere in Government affairs. Three days' fighting ensued, after which the Turkish troops surrendered and were disarmed by the mob. The Government buildings were pillaged and burnt, the Turkish Qaimmaqam's house demolished and he himself expelled.

Secular Najaf is divided into two tribal factions, mainly Arab by race, the Zuqurt and the Shumurt. In 1916 the leading men of the Zuqurt were Saiyid Mahdi ibn Saiyid Salman, whose father had occupied the same position, Haji 'Atiyah abu Qulal and Kadhim Subhi, both self-made men, Haji 'Atiyah being ex-smuggler and brigand, Kadhim Subhi, ex-coffee maker to Haji 'Atiyah in the early days of the latter's prosperity. The Shumurt followed Haji Sa'ad ibn 'Haji Radhi, who had begun life as a butcher and exhibited in his person and manners unmistakable evidence of low birth. These four men had authority respectively over the four quarters into which Najaf is divided, Saiyid Mahdi ruling the Huwaish quarter, Haji 'Atiyah the 'Amarah, Kadhim Subhi the Buraq, and Haji Sa'ad the Mishraq. After the disturbances in April the four shaikhs took over the control of the town in consultation with Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, who was represented by his son, Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali.

A month later, in June 1915, open dissensions broke out in Karbala. They seem to have originated in an attack on the town by the neighbouring tribe of the Bani Hasan, between whom and the citizens of Karbala there exists a jealous hostility which the Ottoman Government, on the principle of playing off faction against faction, did nothing to allay. On this occasion they reaped no profit out of hostilities which they probably provoked. The Bani Hasan burnt and looted the Sarai, the mob rose and turned out the Government, and the town shaikhs, led by the Kamnunah family, assumed the direction of affairs. Similar disturbances occurred at Kufah, Hillah and Tuwairij, and everywhere the Turkish garrisons and Government officials were forced to leave.

The situation on the Euphrates had become so serious that the Turkish authorities took another tack and resorted to conciliation. A commission of leading men was organised to settle affairs at Najaf, and brought about an agreement by which the Qaimmaqam was allowed to return, with an infinitesimal bodyguard. The honours remained with the insurgents. The Qaimmaqam was a puppet in the hands of the town shaikhs, and the soldiers of his bodyguard were openly mocked in the streets. At Karbala the Turks managed to re-establish themselves. At Hillah the townsfolk refused to pay taxes until the Ottoman Government brought reinforcements and obliged them to submit.

The pacification was a hollow victory for the Turks. No sooner had it been concluded than Haji 'Atiyah of Najaf, supported by Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, opened communication with the Chief Political Officer. In return for a guarantee that we would respect the shrines, he suggested that Najaf and the surrounding tribes were anxious to combine with us. In reply, the Chief Political Officer quoted the proclamations which had been issued at the outbreak of war as a proof that we had no quarrel with Arabs or with the Moslem faith. He pointed out that in spite of the war, Great Britain had not suspended payment of the Oudh bequest, wherever it was possible to make payments, and that clemency had been shown by the military authorities to any of the clergy or of their adherents who had fallen into our hands. The messenger was asked whether distress was prevalent in Najaf, and what steps we could take to relieve it.

Shortly afterwards, in September 1915, approaches were made on behalf of Karbala. A month later Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali, the head of the Kammunah Zadah, established relations with Sir Percy Cox, who was then at Kut, and after a preliminary exchange of letters, proposed that we should undertake to make him hereditary and autonomous ruler of a sacred province extending from Samarra to Najaf. We were at that moment engaged in the advance which preceded the battle of Ctesiphon, and it seemed probable that we might shortly be in close touch with Karbala. Sir Percy sent Muhammad 'Ali a friendly but colourless answer, together with a small present in money, for which he expressed effusive gratitude. There for the time the matter dropped, our withdrawal from Ctesiphon having changed the political outlook. We remained, however, in communication with Muhammad 'Ali, and from time to time sent him money to assist him in retaining his adherents and upholding his position at Karbala.

A liberal policy had been adopted by the military authorities in allowing food-stuffs to pass up and down the Euphrates to relieve distress. We did our best to transmit small drafts of money, and any accredited agents who could be sent to Nasiriyah received payments from the Oudh bequest.

In April 1916, the Turks made a second and more determined effort to subdue Karbala. Accusing Fakhr ud Din Kammunah, brother of Muhammad 'Ali, of having stirred up the Yasar shaikhs to aid the townsmen against the Bani Hasan, they surrounded his house and arrested him. Thereupon the town rose, and after a sharp conflict, during which the Turks trained their guns on the town of Karbala and inflicted some damage on the shrines, they were turned out and a local administration was re-established under the Kammunah brothers. Najaf and Hillah followed suit and the Turks lost hold on the Euphrates for the second time. Envoys were sent from Najaf to Basrah bearing an appeal addressed to the tribes and State of Persia in which the sufferings of Karbala were set forth. Among the signatories were several well-known mujtahids. The Chief Political Officer did not fail to give this document wide circulation.

Muhammad 'Ali Kammunah, who continued to exchange letters with us, repeatedly expressed his fear of the return of the Turks, and the anxiety of the holy towns received an acuter edge from the outrages which occurred at Hillah in November 1916. Turkish troops carrying munitions to 'Ajami appeared before Hillah and demanded passage. A deputation of notables, which was sent to arrange terms, was seized, and on the following day a number of leading men were hanged. The foremost divine, Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali Qazwini, narrowly escaped a like fate; the troops entered the town, wrecked, burned, looted and murdered, and further outraged Moslem feeling by sending women of respectable families to Baghdad and elsewhere to be distributed among the soldiery.

The Turks in their dealings with the Shi'ahs of the Euphrates must be reckoned among those whom the gods wish to destroy. The singular ineptitude of their conduct was proved by the attitude of the tribes towards ourselves after the occupation of Baghdad, but before that period they had expressed their friendly intentions. In the summer of 1916, the Chief Political Officer had sent a messenger to the paramount chiefs of the Khaza'il, a confederacy embracing many of the tribal groups on the two channels of the river below Kufah and Diwanayah, with letters and new sheets informing them of the Sharif's revolt against the Ottoman Government. The messenger returned with letters of a satisfactory character for the Chief Political Officer and Shaikh Khaz'al of Muhammarah. He had reached the Euphrates at an opportune moment. The Turks, through the medium of Saiyid Hadi Muqotar, a member of a wealthy family of Saiyid landowners whose estates lie in and near



Shinaiyah, had fomented ancient jealousies among the tribes. The Ottoman Government had always feared the authority of the Khaza'il Shaikhs, and partly by treachery towards the chiefs, partly by claiming their lands as crown property and settling other tribes more amenable to Ottoman control—such as the Fatlah—on these estates, the ruling family had been weakened and its influence curtailed. The Turks now urged the Fatlah to assist them in helping 'Ajaimi and in opening a passage for their reinforcements to him. In pursuance of this end, the Fatlah and their allies attacked the Khaza'il, but the latter, profiting by the bad odour which the Turks had acquired among Shi'ahs, organised a combination in their own favour and successfully resisted their opponents. Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi was called in to make peace between the two parties, which he did on the basis that neither should give active assistance either to the British or to the Turks, but that if the Turks attacked the Khaza'il, the other tribes should join in repelling them. The Khaza'il shaikhs were in dread of Turkish reprisals, and they begged that a small detachment might be sent by us to Samawah, on the appearance of which they undertook to raise the country on our behalf.

We were, however, engaged in concentrating our efforts on the Tigris line. It is unnecessary to give more than an outline of the capture, loss and recapture of Kut al 'Amarah, which were the central features of the Mesopotamian campaign. Shortly after the taking of 'Amarah our forces had advanced to 'Ali Gharbi, which was occupied in July 1915. This brought us into contact with the Bani Lam, who hold north of 'Amarah a position parallel and even superior to that of the Albu Muhammad to the south. The most famous of the Bani Lam shaikhs, Ghadbhan ibn Bunaiyah, who before the war had been in constant rebellion against the Turks, had been bribed by the Ottoman Government at the outbreak of hostilities with a promised lease of large estates, and had assisted in the operations against us at Ahwaz in April 1915. After the fall of 'Amarah he made submission to the Chief Political Officer and expressed his willingness to raise a force on our behalf when we advanced on Kut. There was, however, some delay, and meanwhile the Turks, after recovering from their flight from 'Amarah, pushed down the Tigris past Ghadbhan's encampment. He broke off negotiations with us, and we heard shortly afterwards that he had accepted a heavy bribe and joined the Turks. His defection made it possible to restore the estate recently made over to him by the Turks to the rightful lessee, Shaikh Juwi, whose interests were thus identified with our own, and we occupied Kut al 'Amarah in September without further trouble from the Bani Lam, though in October, when a body of Turkish cavalry cut in on our communications, two of the shaikhs, 'Alwan and Chitab, returned to Ottoman allegiance. Some of the shaikhs of the Bani Rabi'ah, the tribe round Kut, made us welcome, while some held aloof; the tribes further north, Zubaid and Shammar Toqah, proved on the whole friendly, and the move from Kut towards Baghdad took place under the best auspices, as far as tribal sentiment was concerned. But the retreat from Ctesiphon in November, in the face of vastly superior numbers, changed the political balance. The tribes, after their custom, backed the winner, whose subjects, it must be remembered, they were, and during the whole course of the operations round Kut those who were in immediate touch with the Turks hung like jackals round our troops, looted our camps, murdered our wounded, stripped our dead. Kut was invested on 7th December; the early months of 1916 were marked by unavailing efforts to relieve the beleaguered force, and on 29th April, after a siege of 143 days, General Townshend was compelled by starvation to surrender. We stipulated in the terms concluded with the Turkish Commander that those inhabitants of Kut who had perforce shared with General Townshend's men the horrors of the siege and had been submissive to his orders, should not suffer reprisals, but no sooner had the Turks entered the town than they seized and hanged some of the best known Moslem citizens, including the shaikh. All down the river, Arab and British alike listened to the tale with anger.

It was not till the end of 1916 that General Maude was able to begin operations for the recovery of Kut. After bitter fighting against an enemy strongly entrenched in a position of immense natural advantages for defence, he was able to dislodge the Turks. By 24th February 1917 they were in full retreat. Baghdad was occupied on 11th March.

Most of the partisans of the Ottoman Government, Turks or Arabs, had accompanied the retreating army, and we were received at Baghdad with enthusiasm by a population which had been terrorised for two and a half years and had passed the days immediately before our entry in acute fear for life and property. A certain amount of destruction had been effected by the Turks before their departure, and

during the hours of interregnum the riffraff of the town had been occupied in looting the bazaars, but the speed of General Maude's movements hastened the departure of the enemy before he could do much damage and gave little opportunity for robbery to the mob. The one irreparable loss was the beautiful gateway called the Bab al Talism, a monument of the 13th century. The door had been bricked up after the Sultan, Murad IV., the Turkish conqueror of Baghdad, rode through it in the year 1638, and legend had it that the gate would be reopened only to admit of the passage of another victor. The Turks had used it as a storehouse for explosives, and, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it was blown up before they left. A hole in the ground was all that remained to show where it had been; even such fragments of masonry as were scattered round the site were rapidly removed piecemeal by the natives for building purposes.

General Maude was instructed to issue a proclamation to the people of Baghdad announcing that our armies came into the country not as conquerors but as liberators, and pointing out that a long commercial connection had existed between Baghdad and Great Britain, that the British Government could not remain indifferent to what took place in Mesopotamia, and was determined not to permit again that which had been done in Baghdad by the Turks and Germans. "But you, the people of Baghdad," the proclamation continued, "whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideal. In the Hijaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Husain as their king, and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Najd, Kuwait and 'Asir. Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and the nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the earth and that it shall bind itself to this end in unity and concord. O, people of Baghdad! remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs, in collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the north, east, south and west in realising the aspirations of your race."

The 'ulama of Karbala and Najaf sent a telegram of congratulation to His Majesty the King, who replied, in acknowledging it, that his earnest desire was for the welfare of the 'Iraq and its people, the preservation of its holy places and the restoration of its ancient prosperity. For the first few days the office of the Chief Political Officer was crowded with visitors of all degrees, not excepting members of the most distinguished Moslem families. With the Naqib of Baghdad, the religious head of the Sunni community, Sir Percy Cox at once got on to good terms, and after receiving a visit from the Chief Political Officer, the Naqib paid his respects in person to the Army Commander. He had owed much to the Turks in the time of 'Abdul Hamid, when Sunni magnates stood in high account; but his susceptibilities had been outraged by the levity shown in religious matters by the Committee of Union and Progress, and he accepted the British administration as a preferable alternative. Age and the temperament befitting a darwish, as he is fond of calling himself, disincline him from compromising himself by the public expression of clearly-defined opinions on politics, but his goodwill has not failed us. He offered to the military authorities, under no further pressure than that of suggestion, his house on the river, in which he customarily lives; he has put up with personal inconvenience in small matters, expressing his conviction that the Chief Political Officer would do all that was in his power to spare him, and with a little persuasion he has shown himself ready to oblige, even in questions which touched the privileges of the mosque and

tomb of his 14th century ancestor, the Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir. It is to this revered object of Sunni pilgrimage that he owed his position. Its sanctity, together with his own reputation for learning, place him in the forefront of the religious world, and its rich endowments, which he administers, make him and his family some of the richest landholders in the 'Iraq. But his political influence is not great, and he is out of touch with the ways of thought of the younger generation.

On the heels of the Baghdad notables came the shaikhs of the small neighbouring tribes, somewhat bewildered by the sudden overthrow of the old order, and far from certain—as, indeed, which of us was certain?—that the new would prove to be lasting. Among the first to make their appearance from further afield were Muhammad 'Ali Kammunah from Karbala and Haji 'Atiyah from Najaf, with the other town shaikhs of Najaf following a little later. They were assigned allowances, and returned home with a mandate to maintain order until it was possible for us to deal directly with the affairs of the two cities.

The shaikhs of the Euphrates tribes formed the next band of visitors, together with the landowning *saiyids* who are a feature of the Euphrates channels. Some were men of reputation like the shaikhs of the Bani Hasan, Fatlah and Khaza'il; others were chieftains of remote tribal groups in the marshes or on the edges of the desert, these last half-nomadic. All alike had been non-submissive to the authority of the Turkish Government, and few had been wont to visit Baghdad, where the more distant were scarcely known. The country whence they came was almost unmapped, map-making not having been encouraged by the Turks; the course of the rivers alone was indicated, and even that very incorrectly. Some attempt had to be made to form a conception of whence these unknown visitors came, what their relations were to one another, and what was their respective importance, a matter difficult to determine since each man gave himself out to be a potentate superior in all respects to his fellows. They were entertained at the guest house of the Government, giving small presents in money and robes of honour, and sent back with injunctions to keep the peace and busy themselves with their cultivation. Gradually the stream diminished, and the rigours of an exceptionally hot summer, together with the lassitude induced by the fast of Ramadhan, combined to reduce the flow of visitors to normal proportions.

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#### CHAPTER IV.—Relations with Arab and Kurdish Tribes, and with the Holy Cities after the fall of Baghdad.

For the first six months after the fall of Baghdad we held in effective military occupation only the line of the Tigris up to Samarra, the Diyalah up to Ba'qubah (the further advance here began in the month of October 1917) and the Euphrates from the Hindiyah Barrage to Fallujah. We experienced at first a good deal of sporadic opposition from wild tribal elements; isolated officers and men were murdered, camps attacked and forts raided, less as a part of military operations than as acts of defiance. It was difficult for the tribesmen to believe, in the face of constant Ottoman propaganda, that the Turks would not come back. Even in Baghdad a long uncertainty prevailed as to the ultimate intentions of the Allies with regard to their return. Until the success of our offensive in the autumn of 1918, it was the general impression that the Central European Powers would win the war, or, failing complete victory, that they would bring about a stalemate. Those who prided themselves on their intimate acquaintance with world politics declared that the 'Iraq would be handed back to Turkey in return for the liberation of Belgium, and assurances to the contrary were secretly disbelieved. These feelings found their counterpart among the shaikhs, causing many of our firmest friends to waver, or at least to try to keep in touch with the enemy by the despatch of an occasional letter couched in amicable terms.

Great as was the strain which the rapidity of the advance imposed upon the army, it was no less serious to the civil administration, which found itself called upon, at a few weeks' notice, to take over an area as large again as the territory already occupied, and one in which the Turks had exercised more control than in the wilder and more remote wilayat of Basrah. The extension of internal administrative responsibilities was accompanied by a proportionate extension of external relations, not only with neighbouring Arab nomad tribes, but also with the Kurds on either side of the Persian frontier.

Nevertheless, in the course of six months the tribes under British administration were to a large extent pacified. During the operations which preceded the capture of Baghdad, the tribal cultivators along the Tigris had been systematically cleared out by the Turks, and those who remained had withdrawn before the British, the Shammar Toqah north-east to Balad Ruz and Mandali, the Zubaid to the Euphrates. But before the end of the autumn they had returned and were eagerly engaged, with official help and encouragement, in agriculture. The paramount shaikh of the Zubaid, 'Ajil Beg ibn 'Ali al Samarnad, maintained an attitude of veiled hostility and escaped to the Turks early in 1918, to return and sue for pardon after the armistice. Further down the river such shaikhs of the Rabi'ah and the Bani Lam as had taken active part against us remained outlaws for a year, but their sons or other suitable kinsmen, who had made submission, stepped into their place as lessees of State lands and leaders of the tribes, and the Tigris line gave no further trouble.

A profound impression was produced among the tribes by the rebuilding of Kut. This work, which partook of the nature of an act of piety in memory of those who had given their life in the defence of the town, Arab as well as British, was undertaken immediately after the occupation, and carried out with skill and judgment by the Political Officer, Major W. C. F. Wilson. When the Turks fled headlong before General Maude's armies, they left Kut completely deserted. It stood in tottering ruins among palm groves blasted by artillery fire, the streets were choked with mud or blocked by brick barricades, the houses pierced by shells and rifle fire, and honey-combed by dug-outs, the river front lined with trenches. By a miracle the minaret of the Sunni mosque still stood, though its summit had been shot away, but both Sunni and Shi'ah mosques were much damaged and filled with dug-outs. The bazaar had suffered badly, and the Sarai was wholly destroyed. The inhabitants began at once to return, and by the middle of May there were 2,000 people in the town. Houses were cleaned out as fast as possible and disinfected, rubbish was carted away, and a small temporary bazaar opened, to which the neighbouring tribesmen brought their produce. The battlefields were searched, and the dead buried or re-buried. General Townshend's British cemetery, which contained about 300 graves, had not been interfered with; it was carefully walled in, and a gardener was provided to keep it in order. It was clear that the expense incurred must be largely a Government charge, since it could not be borne by a populace of refugees. Besides the cost of public buildings, substantial help in the rebuilding of a number of private houses was given to the relations and dependants of the 70 men or more who had been put to death by the Turks after General Townshend's surrender, to the families whose male relations had been killed during the siege, to those who had received acknowledgment from General Townshend of claims for damage done to their houses by British troops owing to the necessities of war, as well as to the destitute poor. Rs. 50,000 in all were expended, but by the end of the first six months Kut had so far revived that Rs. 20,000 had been collected in revenue. Advantage was taken of the fact that many houses had been reduced to ruin heaps to widen and straighten the streets, but the crowning glory of the new Kut was an arcaded bazaar along the river front, which was completed by the middle of July. Thus before the oncoming of winter the refugees were lodged, and the town had become a more flourishing market than it had been before its destruction. The country-side saw in its regeneration, not only profit and advantage to themselves, but also a pledge that the new order, so solidly established, would be permanent.

On the Diyalah tribal difficulties were caused chiefly by the groups on the border line or beyond our sphere and vanished with our advance, but the country suffered from the fact that the canal heads were in Turkish hands until the autumn, as well as from prolonged devastation by Ottoman troops; and the re-settlement of the cultivators, together with the development of agriculture, was a slower process here than elsewhere.

On the Euphrates, west of Baghdad, the turbulent Zoba' tribe needed more than one lesson, and it was not until the fall of Ramadi in September 1917 that the principal shaikhs made full submission. The same victory brought in the most influential shaikh of the Dulaim, 'Ali ibn Sulaiman, who lives at Ramadi and could not, even if he had wished, have broken with the Turks as long as they occupied his estates. The Dulaim stretch far up the river, and a good part of the tribe remained until the following year in Turkish territory, but the conduct of 'Ali Sulaiman and the chiefs of other sections who were behind our lines was satisfactory, and they did useful service by holding up in the Jazirah, the desert between the two rivers, caravans from Mosul destined for the Turks.

On the middle Euphrates, from the Barrage to Samawah, the position was curious. Not a single British soldier was posted south of the Barrage till December 1917, nor did the tribes set eyes on a British military uniform; but the Hillah area, the centre of the supremely important grain-producing district of the Euphrates channels, could not be entirely neglected, and a Political Officer was posted there in May 1917. His authority did not extend far to the south, where the shaikhs, after their visit to Baghdad in the early summer, were perforce left pretty much to their own devices. Beyond occasional communications by letter and the appointment of some leading man to be nominally our agent in keeping the peace, we had no direct intercourse with those who lived south of Diwaniyah on the Hillah branch of the river, and Kifl on the Hindiyah branch. It was typical of our slender hold on the middle Euphrates that a minute Turkish force which found itself marooned at Diwaniyah held out until the end of August. It was commanded by a Circassian swashbuckler, Lieutenant Muhammad Effendi, who had hanged or shot his superior officers when they recommended a prudent withdrawal. He occupied a warehouse and caravansarai on the river's edge, and terrorised the townspeople, who scarcely knew whether to fear most Muhammad Effendi, with his bomb-throwing bravoes within their gates, or the tribes without. Finally a couple of aeroplanes convinced him that we meant to put an end to the business and were in a position to do so, and he surrendered with the thirty odd men to which the garrison had been reduced by frequent desertions. No sooner did he reach Baghdad than he contributed the last touch of comedy to the whole episode by offering to serve ourselves or the Sharif in any capacity. This suggestion was not accepted; he was sent to India as an officer-prisoner, and his remarkable career as a fighting man terminated for the duration of the war. A notable of Baghdad, Salih Effendi al Milli, who had in Turkish times been Mutasarrif of Diwaniyah, was posted there as Government agent.

The chief problem of the Euphrates was, not the tribes, but the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. The town shaikhs, as has been mentioned, returned from their visit to Baghdad with a mandate to carry on temporarily on our behalf the administration, if it can be dignified by that name, which they had set up after the final ejection of the Turks in 1917; for this service they were assigned allowances. Short of the appointment of a British officer with an adequate personal guard, a course which on military grounds was not feasible, this was the only practical alternative; but it was obviously merely a stop-gap. Before many weeks had passed it became evident that the arrangement was not satisfactory to the towns themselves. In Karbala the Kammunah Zadah were said to be using their privileged position to pursue their own schemes, and a growing dissatisfaction was apparent among the other town shaikhs, chief among them the 'Awwad family, represented by 'Abdul Karim al 'Awwad, a man much more typically Arab than the Kammunah, who are half Persian by descent, and connected with the ruling dynasty of the Kajar. Although the Kammunah were no doubt making hay during a period of sunshine, there would not appear to have been much justification for serious complaint, and on the whole Muhammad 'Ali ran the administration well and kept the town quiet. But from the point of view of the British authorities there was a more serious grievance against the brothers. A brisk traffic in supplies with the enemy was started from Karbala. Large caravans were reported to have come both from Damascus and Aleppo seeking foodstuffs, and the Turkish forces on the Euphrates received constant supplies. The men of the Kubaisah oasis, which was not in our territory, took a lively part in these enterprises. When, in June, we concluded an agreement with Fahad Beg, paramount shaikh of the 'Anizah, the largest Beduin confederation on our western borders, the transmission of goods by way of the desert was to some extent stopped, but with the connivance of the Kammunah the trade continued furtively along the Euphrates, through Mas'ud and Jannabiyyin country, where Fahad Beg could not establish control.

It was impossible that the Kammunah Zadah could be ignorant of what was going on; there was, indeed, abundant evidence to the contrary. Of Muhammad 'Ali the best that could be said was that he passively connived at the traffic, while Fakhri was an active participant. The town police, whom Muhammad 'Ali, as representative of the Government, had in his employment, were used to escort safely out of the town goods destined for the enemy, and two retainers of the Kammunah Zadah were accustomed to sign the necessary passes. Cloth, rice, wheat and coffee were the favourite exports. While the large profits to be derived from the levy of fees of 1*l.* and even 2*l.* on each loaded camel were probably sufficient in themselves to explain the Kammunah's behaviour, it is also possible that they had come to realise that under

British rule their grandiose personal ambitions stood small chance of materialising, and so were perhaps inclined to listen to the voice of the tempter. The Turks were undoubtedly carrying on extensive propaganda among the Euphrates tribes, coupled with promises of autonomy when the 'Iraq should be restored to the Porte; but from whatever cause it arose the supplying of Turkish troops on the Euphrates could not be permitted to continue.

On 7th September the Civil Commissioner, as Sir Percy Cox was now styled, summoned Fakhri to present himself at Baghdad on the 9th. He complied, and on arrival it was explained to him that his undoubted participation in and encouragement of trade with the enemy had made his presence in Karbala incompatible with military interests, and that he would be sent to India as an officer prisoner of war. He accepted with resignation a decision which could scarcely have been unforeseen by him. The following day Muhammad 'Ali also received a verbal summons from the Civil Commissioner, through the Intelligence Officer at Karbala, to come to Baghdad. He expressed himself willing to leave next morning, but subsequently, having received news of Fakhri's internment, he declined to go, though given Hadh wa Bakht (assurance of personal safety) by the Intelligence Officer. The Civil Commissioner therefore despatched to him a letter explaining the reasons for the action taken with regard to Fakhri, and adding that since, in view of what had happened, it was not considered to be in the interests of the administration that Muhammad 'Ali should continue to act as Government Agent, a British officer had been appointed as Assistant Political Officer. If Muhammad 'Ali, under existing circumstances, preferred to retire from Karbala, the Government would make arrangements for his residence in comfort in some other place or town in the 'Iraq to be agreed upon.

After some hesitation Muhammad 'Ali decided to obey the summons and came into Baghdad. In this decision he was largely swayed by the advice of Shaikh Husain Mazandarani, a leading mujtahid of Karbala, who urged him strongly not to disobey the orders of the Civil Commissioner, at the same time reminding him that the British Government in no way resembled the Ottoman, and that promises of security given by us might safely be trusted. The part played by Saiyid Muhammad Yazdi of Najaf was no less gratifying. In reply to an appeal from Muhammad 'Ali to intervene on behalf of Fakhri, he said that he had long since retired from the world; if they wished for his opinion on the word of God, he was prepared to give it, but he would not express any view on the affairs of State. Incidentally he observed that he had no intention of declaring a Jihad against aeroplanes and motor cars. He consented, however, to put in a plea that the office of Kiliddar, keeper of the keys of the treasury of the shrine, lately held by Fakhri, might not be removed from the family, and Muhammad 'Ali's son, Hamid, was left in charge.

A British Assistant Political Officer was installed at Karbala, and Muhammad 'Ali Kammunah elected to reside in Baghdad. The religious heads of the Karbala community were highly delighted at the removal of the Kammunah brothers, with whom, for the sake of their personal immunity from molestation, they had been obliged to keep on outwardly friendly terms, though the authority of the Kammunah was a source of jealous anxiety to them. The family was not, however, broken; Muhammad 'Ali remained in enjoyment of his properties, his son, as has been said, held the post of Kiliddar, and his brother, Shaikh Hadi, was appointed President of the Municipality. But in the autumn, Muhammad 'Ali was found to be implicated in the spreading of hostile rumours, and Hadi to be reaping more than permissible benefits from his position. The former was sent to join his brother in India, and the latter was tried and found guilty by a judicial commission. At the same time the office of Kiliddar reverted to a member of the family which had enjoyed it before; the Kammunah Zadah used their influence to obtain it for themselves.

If at Karbala the inevitable ejection of the town shaikhs was accomplished peacefully; at Najaf it took a more tragic turn. The materials in the latter town were much more inflammable, and a wild firebrand, Haji 'Atiyah, was there to set them alight. This man, who was a remarkable outcome of Turkish maladministration, had been for many years a triumphant outlaw, safely holding his court in the desert a few miles to the west of Najaf; then a fugitive; finally, immediately before the outbreak of war, a prisoner at Baghdad, where he had been submitted to physical torture of an angonising kind. The vicissitudes of his career had affected mind and temperament. The lawless and fearless bravo had been converted into a lawless and anxious neurotic, and his ungovernable passions had been yoked by experience to fear. He dominated his colleagues and the town of Najaf for eight months after the occupation

of Baghdad, and was doubtless at the bottom of much contraband trade with the enemy and in close touch with 'Ajaimi ibn Sa'dun, who, possibly with money and certainly with promises, tempted him to pursue the course natural to unstable political conditions and keep a foot in both camps. It must always be remembered that during these eight months not a single British soldier had been seen on the Middle Euphrates south of the Barrage, but a Government agent, Hamid Khan, a resident of Karbala, and cousin of the Agha Khan, had been sent to Najaf in July, at which date another native, in this case a Christian of administrative experience, was posted at Kufah. In October 1917, the pressure of food shortage created the first local disturbance. A shaikh of the wandering 'Anizah, our allies in the Syrian Desert, came in to Najaf with a letter from the Political Officer who was responsible for the desert borders, Colonel Leachman, to Hamid Khan, asking that the 'Anizah might be assisted in obtaining considerable supplies of grain. The shaikh was allowed to purchase his requirements, but as soon as the fact became known prices leapt up in the bazaar. Next day, as ill-luck would have it, Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, paramount shaikh of the eastern 'Anizah, sent in 1,200 camels for grain, on passes signed by himself. This was, in all probability, more than the town could afford to supply to the desert and the populace rose in protest. Such of the Beduin as had entered Najaf were hunted out, and on November 1st-2nd a demonstration was made by the townsfolk round the 'Anizah camp. It amounted almost to a free fight; some shots were fired, a camel was killed, three rifles stolen and a good deal of stuff looted. Hamid Khan, whose authority was unsupported by force, was unable to grapple with the situation.

Independently of the troubles at Najaf, the time had come when it was no longer possible to leave the Euphrates channels south of Hillah without closer supervision, if only because of the vital importance of collecting and controlling the coming harvest. A Political Officer, Captain (now Colonel) Balfour, was appointed to the Shamiyah, the rich agricultural district on the edge of which Najaf lies, and set out with a bodyguard of shaikhs to make a preliminary inspection of the whole region down to Samawah. There he met a second Political Officer, Captain Goldsmith, who, with a similar escort, had travelled from Hillah through a wild tribal country. Captain Balfour visited Najaf on his way down the river and arranged a settlement between the town shaikhs and the 'Anizah, but when he returned from Samawah a few days later he found that the terms agreed upon had not been carried out. Only two of the town shaikhs, Haji 'Atiyah and Kadhim Subhi, came to see him, and an attempt to put pressure on them led to a riot which was secretly incited by Haji 'Atiyah. Captain Balfour stood to his post until the Government office had been rushed three times by the crowd, and then consented to leave under the protection of the Kiliddar, to whose house, at some distance from the office buildings, he went. The riots did not cease with the looting of the Najaf office; later in the day similar disturbances occurred at Kufah, where the Government Agent summoned the local shaikhs and speedily got matters in hand, and at Abu Sukhair, lower down the river, where it was intended to place the headquarters of the Political Officer of the Shamiyah. No Government official being at Abu Sukhair to deal with the rioters, the office there was comprehensively gutted. Captain Balfour, still unsupported by any troops, turned to the great mujtahid, Muhammah Kadhim Yazdi, for help. On the advice of the latter, 'Atiyah and Kadhim Subhi asked for and were given pardon, and the town returned to normal conditions. In the rural district the leading shaikhs, who were actively engaged in cleaning out their canals with money borrowed from us, with a view to sowing grain which the British administration was ready to provide, were pledged to the existing order and upheld it. We were aided also by the adherence of most of the land-owning saiyids. As shi'ahs their sympathies had been alienated from the Turks by the treatment accorded by the latter to the holy towns, Karbala and Najaf, in 1915 and 1916, as well as by the sacking of Hillah in November 1916; as saiyids, their influence over the tribes was overwhelming, and when exerted on our side, almost inevitably turned the scale in our favour.

Meantime at Samawah the course of events had not run smoothly. The leading saiyid, Taffar, was from of old a friend, but the tribes were peculiarly difficult to handle. All were broken up into small sections which were divided by feuds; all had been accustomed to find a livelihood in plundering the river traffic. On the one hand, there was, therefore, no strong shaikh whose assistance could be sought; on the other, every petty chief and tribesman looked with disfavour on the introduction of order and settled government. Since an early period in the war, Samawah had been split into two factions, one chief being actively pro-Turkish, while the other, Saiyid

Taffar, was pro-British and had suffered on that account more than a year's confinement in 'Ajaimi's camp, close at hand in the desert. He was released and allowed to return to Samawah after the fall of Baghdad, but he could not, unaided, maintain order, and matters went from bad to worse. The Bani Huchaim defied all authority, and when Captain Goldsmith was sent down in November, unsupported by troops, an attempt was made to kidnap him. It was necessary to punish the worst offenders by destroying their mud towers, after which the district quieted down and the trade routes opened. Here, as elsewhere, we followed the policy of recreating tribal organisation where it had lapsed, by supporting the leading shaikhs and making them responsible for the behaviour of their tribesmen, and as at Hillah and in the Shamiyah, the hope of improvements in irrigation and agriculture came to our assistance.

While the urgent need of food supplies for the civil population, no less than for the army, gave the rich Euphrates basin an ever increasing importance, the danger of a serious attempt on the part of the Turks and Germans to recover Baghdad was diminishing and troops could be spared to complete effective occupation of the whole area behind our lines. The Civil Commissioner visited the Euphrates early in December, and on his advice small detachments were placed at various points on the river, but not in Najaf itself. The town, with its population of near 40,000 souls, would have demanded a large number of men, and it was anticipated that the presence of a mixed force at Kufah, seven miles away, would have, indirectly, the tranquillising effect required. During the course of his tour, Sir Percy Cox interviewed at Kufah the town shaikhs of Najaf, with the exception of Haji 'Atiyah, who held aloof, alleging his fear of treachery. He attempted to see the Civil Commissioner when the latter paid a brief visit to Najaf, but was told that he must now come to Baghdad. In spite of all reassurances, he was too greatly fear-driven to show his face there; and by this time, although it was not then known, he had probably hitched his car to 'Ajaimi, who had recently returned from a visit to the Turks at Hit, plentifully supplied with money, and had opened a vigorous campaign of propaganda.

On the morning of 12th January 1918, while the Indian cavalry, newly arrived at Kufah, were training in the plain outside Najaf, a band of some 150 of 'Atiyah's men opened fire on the troops from the walls, killing one man and wounding a second. The cavalry rode on without opening fire on the holy town. The officer in command of the troops, who happened to be in Najaf at the time, was escorted safely outside the gates by the shaikh of the Mishraq Quarter, Haji Sa'ad. The latter, with Saiyid Mahdi, the most respectable of the town shaikhs, and with others of less importance, visited Captain Balfour at Kufah on 14th January, and all were sent back to Najaf to maintain order. Next day Kadhim Subhi obeyed a command to come to the Political Officer at Kufah, and Haji 'Atiyah, finding himself isolated, escaped to 'Ajaimi in the desert. A fine of 500 rifles, or their equivalent in cash, was imposed on Najaf, and paid by the appointed date, 1st February, on which day an Assistant Political Officer, Captain Marshall, with a small bodyguard, took up his residence in a khan built and owned by Haji 'Atiyah immediately outside the east gate.

Captain Marshall was singularly well qualified for his difficult task. He had a fluent acquaintance with Persian, and had been for 10 months Assistant Political Officer at the Shi'ah holy town of Kadhimain, where he was universally beloved. He had hoped to return to England in the summer of 1918, in order to be married, but when the Najaf post was offered to him, he accepted with delight work of such great responsibility, and set about it with a tact which endeared him at once to the clerical population, to whom he had brought high credentials from their brethren in Kadhimain. Haji 'Atiyah, who had been outlawed, was in the desert, but without following. He was reported to have left 'Ajaimi, and to be not without hope of obtaining the pardon of our Government. His three sons, who had not accompanied him, two of them being children, agreed to move with the women of the family to Baghdad, but in the midst of preparations for departure they suddenly bolted, joined 'Ajaimi in exile, and were outlawed. The son of Haji Sa'ad, Karim, a criminal of pronounced type, had fled previously, and he, likewise, was outlawed.

The first and most necessary measure for the security of the town was the reorganisation of the police. The police force, hitherto recruited from Najaf, had been drawn from the town tribes, and was obedient to the shaikhs. A contingent of Shi'ah policemen was sent from Baghdad, another from Kut, and orders were issued for the recruiting of the remaining number from outside Najaf. At Captain Marshall's suggestion, the allowances which had been made to the town shaikhs when they were acting on our own behalf were discontinued. The measure was just and necessary. The shaikhs had failed in the discharge of their duties, and had been superseded by



a British officer. It was, therefore, highly important that they should no longer be accorded any privileged status. The payment of municipal taxation, extremely irregular for several years past, was put on a proper footing. The cleansing of the town, which was in a very bad sanitary state, was taken in hand, and a payment was made of such monies of the Oudh Bequest as it had not been possible to distribute owing to the war. By the end of the month Captain Marshall was considering the problem of supplying abundant drinking water to the town, which was the most urgent of its needs. In spite of many advantages, the imposition of decent government was not acceptable to all; the riffraff of the town tribes, and even some of the lesser *saiyids*, who had found profit in fishing in troubled waters, were covertly hostile; but the merchants, the rank and file of the poorer community, together with *Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi*, with his followers, were openly relieved at the breaking of the yoke which the town *shaikhs* had laid on them, and the return to orderly conditions.

Final settlement was, however, to suffer further delay. Turkish intrigue was more active than before. When, in March, the 15th Division took Hit and raided 'Anah, there fell into our possession the German liaison officer, together with all his papers. These documents demonstrated the existence in Najaf of an Islamic rebellion committee, the avowed object of which was to use Najaf as a centre for religious agitation among the tribes. Some hundred or more of the religious community were implicated, but among them were no men of first-rate importance, the chief being one of the Bahr al 'Uluḡ family, the son of a *saiyid*, who was an energetic preacher of the Jihad until the fall of Baghdad. The plan was well conceived, for it was clear that if the British Government took active measures against the sacred town the best material would be provided for future Turko-German propaganda. The town *shaikhs*, stripped of the privileges which they had used so ill, were a fertile field, and there is some reason to believe that a plot existed for the murder of the four Political Officers on the middle Euphrates. How far the German liaison officer was an accomplice was uncertain, and he was subsequently given the benefit of the doubt. The probability is that the explosion occurred prematurely in Najaf before the plan was fully laid, and, as a result, the British administration lost one only out of the four officers posted in those regions. Captain Marshall was murdered in his house outside Najaf by a band of some 12 assassins at dawn on 19th March. Two of the murderers were sons of Haji Sa'ad, three were disbanded police, the leader was a hired bravo. The chief movers in the plot were known to be Haji Sa'ad and Kadhim Subbi.

Public opinion in Baghdad, Karbala, Hillah and Kadhimain united in condemnation of the Najaf rebels. The tribes, all but two petty chiefs distinguished for lawlessness, who were believed with good grounds to have been implicated, remained quiet; but there was no doubt that all were eagerly watching Najaf, and any active measures taken against the holy city might, as the Turks intended, have called forth a certain amount of fanatical feeling. But the chief danger lay in the contrary direction: failure to punish the murderers of a British officer would have placed the lives of all his colleagues at the mercy of rascals like Haji Sa'ad, incited to action by Turkish gold. It was exceedingly fortunate that the successful advance to Hit and raid on 'Anah occurred at this juncture, not only on account of the information with which the captured papers supplied us, but also as demonstrating the military weakness of the 'Turks and removing them to so great a distance from Najaf and 'Ajaimi that neither the rebels in the town nor the Sa'dun chief could hope for any further assistance.

Steps were taken to reduce the rebels to submission while sparing the men of religion as much as possible, and avoiding any attack on the town which might imply risk of injury to the shrine and other holy sites within its walls. Najaf was surrounded by a cordon of troops, which cut off the supply of fresh drinking water, reducing the inhabitants to the somewhat unpalatable, if plentiful, water from the numerous wells inside the walls. Immediately outside the walls there are several mounds formed of earth excavated in preparing the deep substructures for which the houses of Najaf are famous. The Huwaish mounds overlooking the quarter of *Saiyid Mahdi*, who had remained loyal to the British Government and had given asylum to the Kut police, were occupied on 7th April, and during the next few days all the bastions of the walls were seized by our troops. During the course of these operations, not a shot was fired into the town itself, and constant friendly communications were kept up with the great *mujtahid*, *Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi*. By 10th April the surrender of the murderers and of men on the proscribed list of suspects

which had been drawn up by us had begun, and by 1st May, out of some 110 persons, 102 were in our hands. Haji 'Atiyah, attacked in the desert by 'Anizah friendly to ourselves, gave himself up at Samawah before the end of April, and on 4th May the blockade was raised. A court of three specially qualified officers was appointed to try the murderers, its proceedings being conducted in Arabic. Thirteen persons were condemned to death (in one case the sentence was commuted to transportation by the Commander-in-Chief), five were transported for life and two for shorter periods, in addition to the 100 suspects deported to India as prisoners of war. The death sentences were carried out at Kufah on 30th May.

On the same afternoon a meeting, wholly spontaneous, was held in the house of the Kiliddar of Najaf, and a sword of honour was presented to the Political Officer by a representative gathering of divines, citizens, and shaikhs of the district. Ten days later the Commander-in-Chief paid an official visit to the town, sheep were slaughtered at the gate as he entered on a scale unknown since the pilgrimage of Nasr-ud-Din, Shah of Persia, and a reception attended by divines, notables and shaikhs took place in the house of the Kiliddar. In the speech he delivered on this occasion the Commander-in-Chief instructed the Political Officer to form a municipality for the management of the town, and promised that the improvement of the drinking water supply should receive immediate attention.

So ended what was undoubtedly the most delicate situation which had occurred since the occupation. It was universally admitted in the 'Iraq that—thanks to the tact and skill with which it had been handled by the military authorities on the one hand, and the Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson (Sir Percy Cox was on his way to attend a Conference in England), together with Captain Balfour, on the other—we came out with flying colours. But both Najaf and Karbala continued to form a joint focus of political effervescence which could be excited just as easily by reflex action from Persia as directly by affairs in the 'Iraq itself. The sending of British troops to Persia for the purpose of opposing the advance of the Turks from Tabriz produced in the autumn of 1918 the usual signs of excitement in the holy towns—meetings of divines and flutterings of students from one place to the other. The neighbouring tribal communities, busy with their cultivation, paid no attention, though in the winter of 1918-19 the restless mujtahid element managed to rouse some of them, as will be related later, to a passing interest, of a nature unfriendly to the British Government, in current politics. How far the secular discontent of the Persian religious leaders in Karbala and Najaf could succeed in disturbing the equilibrium of the 'Iraq is as yet a doubtful factor in Mesopotamian problems; all that can be said is that it would tend to emphasise and give form to any local grievance, whether it were an unpopular regulation or a dry season, and to draw therefrom a moral unflattering to British statecraft. On the other hand, the longer peaceful progress is maintained, the more will the people of the country learn to value it in terms of cash, and the less disposed will they be to see it interrupted by the prejudice or indocility of any class, however holy.

In describing the course of events at Karbala and Najaf, allusion has been made to the co-operation and needs of the 'Anizah. This great confederation of Beduin range the Syrian desert from the Euphrates to the Syrian border. They wander north almost to Aleppo, and in these northern regions cross the Euphrates and occupy the rich pastures of the Bilikh and the Khabur, where a line of high Assyrian village mounds bears witness to the former wealth of the land. To the south the rolling sands of the Nufudh are the customary limit of 'Anizah migration, for the Nufudh is the winter grazing ground of Ibn Rashid's tribes, the Shammar. North-east also, wherever the 'Anizah cross the Euphrates into the Jazirah, they have the Shammar for neighbours (and incidentally for adversaries), but here the Shammar follow the Jarba' family, not the Bani Rashid. The reason for this sandwiching of the 'Anizah between slices of Shammar is to be found in the history of their migration from Arabia. In the middle of the 18th century the Shammar overflowed their borders on the northern edge of the Nufudh and washed over the Syrian desert, pushing the occupants of those grassy steppes before them, or thrusting them aside on to the flanks of the settled lands. Fifty years later the northern Shammar suffered a like fate at the hands of the 'Anizah, who, drifting northwards from their seat below the south-west corner of the Nufudh, where many of their sections still remain, pushed their forerunners across the Euphrates, and even there in the Jazirah denied them access to the Khabur and Bilikh. The Shammar of the Jazirah, separated from their kinsmen round Hail in Najd, took other chiefs, from the house of Jarba', but they remain theoretically one with Ibn Rashid's followers, and on occasion a shaikh from the Jazirah will go

down unquestioned to Arabian pasture grounds. On the other hand, wherever contact between Shammar and 'Anizah is established, explosion follows; feud between the two tribes is never entirely extinguished.

The 'Anizah in the Syrian desert and Jazirah may amount to a quarter of a million souls; the computation, it must be understood, is based on the slenderest data, no attempt to number the tents of the Beduin having been so much as proposed. They are divided, roughly, into three groups. The 'Amarat, who claim descent from a legendary ancestor called Bishr, occupy, under Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, the south-east angle of the Syrian desert and spend the summer near the Euphrates. The Ruwallah, under Nuri ibn Sha'lan, are opposite neighbours of the 'Amarat on the Syrian side, and just as the 'Amarat turn to Karbala and Najaf for supplies, so the Ruwallah turn to Damascus. The third group is composite and consists of the Fad'an and Saba', both descended, like the 'Amarat, from Bishr, and consequently frequently termed collectively the Bishr. The Fad'an follow the Muhaid family; among the Saba', Ibn Murshid and Ibn Qu'aishish are the leading shaikhs. Fahad Beg claims to be paramount chief of all 'Anizah, but whatever his *de jure* rights may be, *de facto* he has no shadow of authority over the Ruwallah; the Fad'an and Saba' give him a scarcely definable recognition, which never, or very rarely, amounts to obedience, and even his own 'Amarat shaikhs obey or turn a deaf ear to him as suits their convenience. Overlordship among the Beduin is a loose term. Nevertheless, Ibn Hadhdhal is the greatest nomad potentate on the western borders of the 'Iraq, and the Turks endeavoured to incorporate him into their administrative scheme by making Fahad's father Qaimmaqam of the desert between the Shithathah oasis and Karbala, where at the end of a canal running out from the Euphrates he owned a few acres of arable land, tilled by riverain fallahin. These his son inherited, together with the Turkish title. It was one of the boldest strokes of Ottoman make-believe, but it could not give the nomad shaikh the remotest resemblance to a Turkish effendi. Fahad Beg has no fixed dwelling place. In the late winter and spring he may be found in the shallow, grass-filled valleys of the Syrian desert, with a couple of hundred tents about him, widely scattered in complete immunity from attack. His camel herds wander for miles round his encampment, and his outpost camel riders, splendidly mounted, levy tribute from every caravan which comes that way. The old shaikh, seated on fine carpets in his guest tent, with his hawk and greyhound behind him, offers a picture of tribal dignity which the walled cities and lofty palaces of the central Arabian princes, and their troops of armed slaves, cannot rival.

A couple of months after the occupation, Ibn Hadhdhal visited Baghdad and was received with honour by the British authorities, who concluded with him an agreement on the customary lines. He was given a subsidy and undertook to preserve peace along our borders, to treat our enemies as his own, and to prevent the passage of merchandise across the desert. As regards active military co-operation against the Turks or their allies, the 'Anizah, owing to the imperfect character of tribal discipline, did little; but urged by the Political Officer of the Desert, Colonel Leachman, a far better leader of raids than any of their own chiefs, they held up a considerable number of caravans destined for Damascus or Hail, the value of the goods captured and handed over probably exceeding that of Fahad's subsidy. In the winter of 1917-18 the 'Anizah reaped full advantage from their friendly relations with the British administration. The threat of famine which hung over the 'Iraq could not have failed to bring starvation to the desert, but Fahad's people received from us regular allowances of corn and dates at a fixed price. The Saba' and Fad'an, on the borders of enemy territory, met with very different treatment from the Turks and Germans. Famished multitudes crossed the Syrian desert, and, ranging themselves under Fahad, were given, with his tribes, their stint of food. By January a hundred thousand Beduin were camped in the neighbourhood of Shithathah. Gentle and tractable, like their own famous breeds of dogs and horses, they created no disturbance, accepted with gratitude the provisions with which they were furnished, and in the spring, when the fresh grass filled the udders of their milch camels, drifted away from wadi to green wadi, and forgot, in the abiding interest of domestic feud, that the part assigned to them in the war was to play the adversary to the Turks.

Intercourse between settled Governments and nomad tribes has the trick of uniformity, and our dealings with the northern Shammar closely resembled those with the Syrian 'Anizah. The Turks, owing to their entire lack of sympathy with any of their subjects whose institutions fell outside the official Ottoman formula, had been equally unsuccessful in handling all Beduin; but the Shammar Jarba' were somewhat less fortunately situated than their rivals the 'Anizah. Their camping grounds

between river and river were less inaccessible than the wide Syrian desert, and intermittently the Turkish Government stretched out its arm and dealt a blow which did not miss. The last occasion had been in 1911, when a column sent out by Nazim Pasha, then Wali of Baghdad, and skilfully led by his Chief of Staff, rounded up the Shammar tribes with their chattels and their cattle great and small, and collected sheep-tax and camel-tax overdue for a decade. The ruling Jarba' house was, and is still, represented by the sons of Farhan al Jarba', 15 in number, and of varying activity and importance in the tribe. The eldest, Al 'Asi, "the rebel" (the name might suitably have been given by Farhan Pasha to all his progeny), a man advanced in years, was recognised as paramount shaikh, and made responsible for the good behaviour of the tribesmen. A younger brother, Humaidi, who had always been in close touch with the Ottoman official world, as go-between on behalf of the tribe, acquired the growing favour of the Turks, and after the occupation of Baghdad we found him definitely on their side. Al 'Asi, who was far away in the northern pasturages near Nisibin, prudently elected to remain there, and another brother, Faisal Beg, who had been for some time in Najd, had journeyed to Mecca to pay his respects to the Sharif.

The Shammar Jarba' were accustomed, if it suited them, to come down in winter to the warmer climate of the 'Iraq, and since there seemed to them no reason why a world war should affect their habits, they appeared among us to the tune of a thousand tents in the autumn of 1917. They were led by yet another son of Farhan, 'Abdul 'Aziz Beg, and close on his heels followed his son 'Ajil al Yawar, with a further thousand tents. Short of a standing military cordon from Euphrates to Tigris charged with the duty of shooting at sight all who approached, no power could prevent a tribal migration of this kind, which, like the ebb and flow of the sea, is obedient to natural laws; nor did we attempt to emulate King Canute. The Shammar were allotted pasture grounds, and food and small subsidies were accorded to them.

A week or two later Faisal Beg came back from Mecca with glowing letters of introduction from the Sharif. On the strength of these high credentials he was invited to join his brother and nephew, and concert with them a scheme of operations against the Turks in the northern Jazirah. But the re-united relatives lost no time in falling out, and in the early spring 'Abdul 'Aziz and 'Ajil withdrew with most of those who had accompanied them and returned to Turkish territory. Under no circumstances would they have remained through the summer, the climate of the southern Jazirah not being suited to them or to their camels. Faisal Beg, who was too closely identified with the Allies by his visit to the Sharif to venture north, was left behind with a few tents, protesting to all who would listen that he and he only was shaikh and leader of the Shammar Jarba'. 'Abdul 'Aziz and 'Ajil al Yawar, when they got back to the Turkish zone, promptly rejoined the Turks—they could, indeed, do no less—but they gave the Ottoman forces a ludicrously feeble assistance, and after the armistice they made submission once again to us.

Almost immediately after the occupation of Baghdad we came into touch with the southernmost Kurdish tribes. The relations of the Ottoman Government with the Kurdish tribes upon their eastern frontier may be summarised as having consisted in ineffective efforts to exercise control on the one hand, and rebellion on the other. Since the declaration of the Constitution in 1908, disorder had tended to increase rather than to diminish, partly owing to the high-handed dealings of the Committee of Union and Progress and partly to the political unrest engendered by the disappointment of those hopes which had been aroused by the constitutional movement. Both causes led to vague yearnings for a racial autonomy, which, if they never assumed a dangerously practical form, at least give a cadre embracing the general discontent with things Ottoman which was prevalent among the subject races in Turkey before the war. Ottoman military power in the Baghdad Wilayat was absurdly insufficient, nor were the Kurds the only insurgents who had to be coerced with the inadequate force available; and the disorders across the Persian frontier caused by the revolt of the Salar-ad-Daulah, from 1911 to 1913, added to the difficulties, while exciting the cupidity of the Turkish Government.

The principal tribes along the section of the frontier south of the Lesser Zab are the Hamawand and the Jaf, the former a sedentary people in the Sulaimaniyah district, the latter nomadic, ranging up the left bank of the Diyalah from Sallahiyah (Kifri) into Meriwan on the Persian side. Besides these the Bajlan, half Turkish and half Persian, must be taken into account, the Turkish sections being under the influence of Mustafa Pasha of Khaniqin, who is the most important political factor in that

district. At an early stage of the constitutional régime, the Ottoman Government succeeded in raising afresh the hostility of the Hamawand by its impolitic action with regard to Shaikh Sa'id Barzanji. The Barzanji family had become the most important in Sulaimaniyah; they enjoyed a high reputation as holy men, by right of descent, not of conduct, and thereby influenced all the tribes of the district. Shaikh Sa'id was a notorious tyrant and a disturber of the peace, but he had a far-reaching reputation for sanctity, and when, after a short period of exile in Mosul, he was murdered there, under circumstances never fully elucidated, in January 1909, the Hamawand rose to revenge his death. Feeble attempts to stop their depredations did no more than drive them across the Persian frontier, whence they continued to raid villages and Turkish convoys. In July 1910, Nazim Pasha patched up an agreement with them and accepted their nominal submission, but his policy of conciliation, which was based on a realisation of the extreme weakness of the forces at his disposal, was abandoned on his recall in April 1911, and by the autumn of that year the Hamawand were as turbulent as ever. A scheme was set on foot in 1912 for pacifying the country by enrolling the Kurds in frontier companies, on the model of the Hamidiyah levies of 'Abdul Hamid's time, but though a small number of Hamawand, Jaf, and Dizai enlisted, no substantial improvement was effected, and at the outbreak of war the Hamawand were still in rebellion.

As regards the Jaf, an attempt was made at the end of 1910 to extract from them a heavy annual tribute, for they had paid little or nothing in the way of taxes since the beginning of the constitutional era. One of the members of the family which once ruled the Jaf, Mahmud Pasha Beg Zadah, who had still some authority with the tribe, was called into Mosul and retained there for a year. This policy, which proved almost entirely ineffective, was then revised; Mahmud Pasha was allowed to return home, but further negotiations for the settlement of the tribe led to no result, and no headway was made during the years preceding the war.

Between Mustafa Pasha Bajlan and the Ottoman Government there was constant friction. Before the constitutional era he spent many years in exile in Constantinople, and has always been regarded with apprehension by the Turks on account of his pro-British leanings. In 1912 he was detained for a period in Baghdad as a political suspect.

Since the beginning of the war dislike of Turkish rule on the part of the Kurdish tribes had been greatly intensified, as, being unable to emigrate, they suffered severely under the impositions of the Government; while their religious leaders, to whom they hold with singular tenacity, were subjected to humiliation and extortion. In the early days of the war, before the Jihad campaign had been discredited, the Turks tried to draw from the Kurds levies of irregular horse. A small contingent went to Shu'aibah, but after serving well they were scurvily treated by the Turkish authorities. The Kurds then returned to their home and did not subsequently supply a single horseman against us, although the Turks worked ceaselessly to raise hostility to us. The lack of success which attended Turkish propaganda was largely due to the action of the religious leaders. They unanimously refused to preach the Jihad and proclaimed the war to be one of self-aggrandisement on the part of the Turks, who were, they pointed out, the hereditary enemies of the Kurds.

With the approach of the Russians another element was introduced into the situation. The hope of Russian co-operation on our eastern flank had seemed to be not unjustified when, after the fall of Erzerum in February 1916, Cossack forces advanced through Persia, reaching Kirmanshah in March. There, however, the energy of the Russian Generals suffered a decline and no attempt was made to second our efforts to relieve Kut by a diversion on the frontier along the Kirmanshah-Baghdad road. In June, after Kut had fallen, a small party of Cossack horse carried out a daring reconnaissance through the Pusht-i-Kuh, where the sympathies of the almost autonomous Persian ruler, the Wali, were Muhammadan and therefore Turkish, and appeared on the Tigris at 'Ali Gharbi, pretty well exhausted by thirst and by the heat. Three of their number paid a visit to Basrah, where they were decorated by the Army Commander and stared at by the populace—their astrachan kolahs and heavy cloth coats forming a striking contrast to the white cotton garments of the natives and the khaki of the British. But if they were the vanguard of the Russian army, they proved for the time to be also its rearguard, for except for a brief episode when Russian troops occupied Khaniqin for two hours, which they spent in looting the town, no more fur-hatted and long-coated men showed on our frontiers until in April 1917 they entered Qasr-i-Shirin, on the Baghdad road, and moved on once again to Khaniqin, within the borders of Mesopotamia. Their presence at Kirmanshah had

served to stabilise the position in Persia, where a network of German and Turkish intrigue had forced us to withdraw British officials from Isfahan and Shiraz in 1915—not early enough to prevent our Consul at Shiraz, Colonel O'Connor, from falling into the hands of hostile tribes and remaining prisoner for close on two years; but the advance on Khaniqin, whatever may have been its military value, upset the political situation in southern Kurdistan.

Before the war the attitude of the Kurdish tribes towards Russia all along the eastern frontier of Turkey was not clearly defined, but on the whole it may be said that while there existed a fundamental suspicion of Russia, resulting in a reluctance to respond to her overtures, Ottoman misrule tended to force the Kurds against their will into her arms. Thus chiefs in the Mosul area, such as the shaikh of Barzan, after holding out for several years against Russian invitations, were in the end obliged to seek refuge in Russian territory, and in the spring of 1914 it was rumoured that the Hamawand, Jaf and Dizai, despairing of receiving from the Ottoman Government the reforms they desired, were prepared to call in Russian aid.

These sentiments suffered considerable modification as the Russians drew near. Cossacks are apt to be a heavy charge on the inhabitants of any country which they occupy, and reports of the excesses committed at Rawanduz in 1915-16 were not reassuring to the southern Kurds. When, in March 1917, we entered Baghdad, it was taken for granted by the Kurds round Khaniqin that we should assume responsibility up to the Turkish frontier in that direction, and great satisfaction was felt. The Kurdish tribes generally believed that the opportunity had now come for asserting themselves as a race, and the idea of Kurdish autonomy, which had taken shape under the constitutional régime, revived and was greatly stimulated by the terms of our Baghdad proclamation to the Arabs, which showed a wholly different attitude towards racial susceptibilities and aspirations from that which had been adopted by the Turks. On our advance up the Diyalah and the Turkish retreat to the west of that river, the Kurds of the Kifri district evacuated the country occupied by the Ottoman forces and refused to furnish them with supplies, in the belief that we should without delay take over the whole region up to Khaniqin. From the moment of our arrival in Baghdad, and especially early in April, when we had effected contact with the Russians, then at Qasr-i-Shirin, the Chief Political Officer urged, subject to military possibilities, the political importance of our occupying Khaniqin in order to maintain our interests and influence with the Kurdish tribes who were already well-disposed to us. Such a course, however, involved a dissemination of force which military considerations were held not to admit of, and in these circumstances it was not possible to do more than urge Mustafa Bajlan, chief of Khaniqin, to do his best to keep order in the town and district of Khaniqin in our interest.

The Russians occupied the town in April, and the inhabitants, though they had aided the Turks to drive them back in 1916, refrained from opposition as soon as they understood that they came as the allies and with the consent of Great Britain. In a few days, however, news began to reach the Chief Political Officer that their treatment of the inhabitants was causing terror and consternation. Mustafa Pasha begged that a British Political Officer might be appointed to safeguard the interests of the town, and his representations were placed before Army Commander. But General Maude did not see his way to comply, fearing that friction with our allies might result from the inherent difference in our methods of treating the natives of the country. Letters and representations from the Bajlan, Jaf, Sharafbaini and Talabani tribes, as well as from the notables of Qizil Robot, continued to be received, all declaring that the behaviour of the Russians had aroused bitter resentment and was calculated to depopulate the country, as the inhabitants were migrating in alarm to territory occupied by the Turks. In the last days of April Mustafa Pasha himself came into Baghdad to lay the case before the British authorities. Incidentally he brought with him a letter, addressed to himself, from 'Ali Ihsan Beg, the Turkish Commander, in which the latter informed him that he had intercepted a communication said to contain information of military value sent by Mustafa Pasha to the British forces near Shahraban. He was charged with treachery and threatened with speedy retribution.

Mustafa Pasha stated that the Russian régime had proved to be far harsher even than that of the Turks. In Persian territory the inhabitants had not been molested, but the Turkish Kurds were being treated as enemies and all classes looted alike. He himself, in spite of the fact that he was in friendly relations with us, had been threatened with the whip, robbed of clothing, horses and foodstuffs, and had even had his watch and chain removed from his person in his own house. The Russians, if

they paid at all for the goods which they requisitioned, paid in notes which had fallen very low in value. The countryside had been denuded of flocks and herds, while all the crops round Khaniqin had been cut or destroyed and the people had been forbidden to tend their orchards. Wheaten-bread had become almost unobtainable, all but the wealthier classes were destitute, and there was an exodus to the Turks, at Kifri. The Kifri tribes, who had at first refused to supply food to the Turks, were producing their concealed stores, the news from Khaniqin and Qizil Robot having caused so much alarm that the Turks had come to be considered a lesser evil than the Russians. The change of sentiment brought about by the behaviour of our allies was exemplified by the fact that a body of some 400 men who had fled under 'Ali Akbar Khan, the leading chief of the Sinjabi, to the Bamu Mountain, about 50 miles north-east of Khaniqin, intending to come over to us, were contemplating active measures against us. Russian excesses had, in fact, proved of valuable assistance to the Turks; but we were ourselves rapidly losing prestige and sympathy among a race which had always been friendly to us, while the growing hostility to the Russians was rendering their position in southern Kurdistan untenable and throwing open the country to the enemy as far as Qizil Robot and Mandali.

Mustafa Pasha represented that the Kurdish tribes understood the need for the presence of our allies, but begged that they should be urged to cease from looting and violence and behave as an army of occupation. The Kurds were willing to do their best to feed the Russian force if irregular requisitioning were replaced by a system under a responsible head. In order to meet food requirements it would be necessary to allow the cultivators to return and carry on their work without hindrance. They again asked that a British representative, in whom the people would have confidence, should be appointed to take over the civil administration of the district and that a small detachment of British troops should accompany him. In return they undertook to preserve law and order in Khaniqin and Qizil Robot, as well as on the road between the two towns, to reassure the tribes on the Turkish flank, and raise from them such levies as we might require. They would also promise to bring in supplies from Mandali and Qizil Robot.

The fact was that the Russian force, which, owing to the upheaval brewing in Russia, was thoroughly out of hand, knew that they were only temporary visitors in the Khaniqin district and were not in the least concerned with what happened to it. For us, however, they had prepared a very unpleasant legacy. On these grounds the conditions disclosed by Mustafa Pasha's statement and by other information received, appeared to the Chief Political Officer, even with due discount for exaggeration, to be sufficiently serious to call for a reconsideration of the position. If from a sound military point of view it was impossible for us to occupy Khaniqin ourselves and inadvisable to send a British representative there, he was of opinion that His Majesty's Government should be informed of the actual state of affairs and of the political results which might be expected to accrue from it. He recognised that the position of a British Assistant Political Officer would be a difficult one, and that he might not be able to effect much directly, but he believed that his mere presence would tend to reassure the inhabitants and act as a check upon the license of Russian troops.

The General Staff doubted the accuracy of the Khaniqin reports and reaffirmed their opinion that the despatch of an Assistant Political Officer from Baghdad would create complications between the allies, while if the Russians were ultimately forced to retire, they believed that the association of a British officer with them would be harmful to our prestige. They considered that the step should not be taken without previously consulting the Russian Commander, and when consulted he replied that the moment was inopportune.

The situation, therefore, remained unchanged and petitions and complaints continued to be received from Kurdish chiefs and merchants of Khaniqin. Mustafa Pasha took up his abode in Baghdad as a guest of the British Government, while his family, escorted by a section of his tribesmen, fled from Khaniqin into the Baghchah Mountains to the south of the town, and his house was occupied by the Russians. He asked permission to bring in his womenfolk to Shahraban under a tribal escort, to whom a guarantee was to be given that the animals on which they rode were not to be seized by the Russians, but the request was refused by the Russian Corps Commander on the ground that the tribesmen who were to serve as escort had committed outrages on the roads in the Qasr-i-Shirin district, and that Mustafa Pasha himself was known to have taken part in action against the Russians (presumably in 1916) and to have commanded the Turkish frontier battalion.

Further information reached us in Baghdad that Khaniqin had been picked clean and most of the loot carried across the frontier. Two women had been killed and nine men, two of whom were Moslems and the remainder Jews, the latter, it was said, for their inability to change rouble notes. In the middle of May the General Officer Commanding the Russian forces made arrangements to safeguard the road between Qizil Robat and Kirmanshah, and traders desiring to travel eastward were notified that the road was open and that they should report themselves to the Russian Commandant at Qizil Robat for a safe conduct; but the Russian arrangements were inadequate and the country beyond Qizil Robat continued to be much disturbed. The position at the end of May was that the tribes of southern Kurdistan, who should have been under our influence and were acknowledged to be in our political sphere, had been thoroughly disappointed and alienated by the treatment they had received; and whereas they had at first been ready to prey upon the retreating Turks and had hidden their stores of grain in order to avoid meeting Turkish requirements, they had found it better policy to seek relief from Russian truculence by allowing the Turks to have access to their stores. The Turks were neither strong enough to impoverish them completely nor desirous of devastating permanently a rich food-producing area, whereas the Russians, as passing visitors indifferent to the future, destroyed everything. But though the Kurdish tribes resented their intrusion and had ranged themselves against them, there was reason to believe that they would still rally to us if they were given tangible evidence that we could support them.

At the end of June the Russians evacuated Khaniqin, withdrawing into Persia, and the Turks forthwith re-occupied the country down to and including the Jabal Hamrin. They held the outlets of the great canals from the Diyalah, the Mahrut, Khorasan and Khalis, on which the irrigation of the cultivated area south-west of Ba'qubah depends, and were able to interrupt the flow of water. They also obtained access to the valuable food supply of the Ruz and of Mandali. We occupied Balad Ruz in July and Mandali at the end of September, by which date we had secured command of the Diyalah canals. The occupation of a part of the Jabal Hamrin in October further strengthened our position.

The ravaging of Khaniqin, begun by the Russians, was completed by the Turks, and distress, owing to scarcity of food in Kifri and the neighbouring districts, was increasing. At the end of August, when the Ottoman troops evacuated Khaniqin, some of the inhabitants, who had taken up a strong position in the Baghchah Mountain and were prepared to defend themselves against Turkish attack, returned to the town, and the Bajlan began to come back to the cultivated areas to the north of Khaniqin and to sow maize there. The smaller tribes south of Kifri were said to be emigrating towards Mandali, Badrah, the Qarah Dagh and Shaikau. They had hidden their grain stores in the low hills and found themselves obliged either to reveal their stock or to starve. Their horsemen had joined the Talabani shaikh, Hamid, who had concentrated his tribe in the Gil district north-east of Tauq. The Daudi and Talabani, who were in close alliance, were sufficiently strong to keep open their grain stores without fear of the Turks. We got into touch with Shaikh Hamid and other chiefs towards the end of September and learnt that they had resisted all Turkish demands for assistance and supplies, and would continue to do so as long as there was any hope of our being able to come to their help. All their flocks had been sent north towards the Zab so as to be out of reach of the Turks. The latter had responded by meting out very harsh treatment to the people of Qizil Robat and Khaniqin. Several leading men, one of them a member of a distinguished family of Sulaimaniyah, had been executed. We were not in a position to give the Kurds any assurances which would encourage them to enter into offensive action against the Turks, nor were we able to do so until we occupied Khaniqin in December 1917 and Kifri in April 1918.

In no part of Mesopotamia had we encountered anything comparable to the misery which greeted us at Khaniqin. The country harvested by the Russians had been sedulously gleaned by the Turks, who, when they retired, left it in the joint possession of starvation and disease. The work of administration was at first little more than a battle with these formidable adversaries. It was directed by an officer, Major Soane, who besides being intimately acquainted with the district and its inhabitants, possessed the rare accomplishment of a fluent knowledge of Kurdish. For many months he laboured at a task which grew in direct ratio to the success achieved, for no sooner did the Kurds on both sides of the frontier hear that help was to be had, than they poured down the mountains, starving and typhus-stricken, to be brought slowly back to health, or else to die in our camps and hospitals. Nevertheless, before the early summer, when Major Soane, worn out by incessant toil, was

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forced to take a year's rest, the battle was won. His successor, Major Goldsmith, transferred from Samawah, found the maize crops springing from grain hastily brought up from Baghdad and the re-peopled villages rising from their ruins.

Politically, the Kurds in the Khaniqin district gave little trouble, and except for the occasional indulgence of atavistic predatory habits, they acquiesced and helped in the re-establishment of order; but when in the spring we began to open up the Persian road, the effects were felt of the deep hostility to the Allies which had been roused by the conduct of the Cossacks. 'Ali Akbar Khan, the most powerful man in the Sinjahi confederation of semi-nomadic tribes, harboured German and Turko-Persian intriguers, and constituted a menace to the British line of communications. His village in the mountains near Kermanshah was bombed by our aeroplanes, the neighbouring tribes declared against him, and he fled to the Turks.

The destruction of the Persian road exceeded, if possible, that of Khaniqin. The villages had been gutted by passing armies, Russian and Turkish, the roof beams and all wooden fittings torn out and used as fuel, and the rain and snow of the winter had completed the destruction of the unprotected mud walls. The fields lay untilled, and if any of the husbandmen remained, it was because they were too greatly extenuated by hunger to flee. But in fact there was no sure refuge for those who took flight. Not only Persian Kurdistan but the whole Persian empire was in the grip of famine; and General Dunsterville's force, on its way up the Caspian, beat its swords temporarily into soup ladles, and devoted its energies as much to the philanthropic effort to feed Persia as to an endeavour to save it by arms from a fresh invasion on the part of the Turks. As soon as the people had recovered sufficient strength to work, they found abundance of well-paid employment on the road and in the British camps. Forgetting their fears, they came down from their retreats in the hills and made friends with this surprising army, which distributed its surplus rations and paid in cash for what it took. The kindly, easy-going British soldier directed Kurdish labour parties, to the complete satisfaction of all concerned, in broken phrases of Hindustani and Arabic, mixed with English, all as incomprehensible to his hearers as their Kurdish and Persian were to him. He adopted starving orphans as willing boot-blacks and infants-of-all-work, who trotted by him on the march and passed the night rolled up in a bit of old blanket at the tent door. And he had an insatiable appetite for eggs, apricots, apples, and such-like country produce, together with an inexhaustible supply of small coins with which to gratify it. To those who travelled in the wake of our armies in the summer of 1918, the Persian road must recall indelible pictures, such as the children's soup kitchen at Hamadan, or the village of Sar-i-Pul, lifting its gaunt ruins, such as the Russians had left them, on one bank of the Alwand Rud, while on the other stood an incipient bazaar of ragged native tent-cloths and willow boughs, where returned Kurdish fugitives drove a roaring trade in cigarettes imported from Baghdad, or fruit ripening in Persian gardens, with every battalion that marched across the bridge.

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#### CHAPTER V.—The Occupation of Mosul.

The development of the Mesopotamian campaign was impeded in the spring of 1918 by the necessity of guarding northern Persia from Turkish attack. The defeat of the Turks at Gaza in the autumn of 1917 had put an end to the danger of a Turco-German offensive in Mesopotamia and made it possible to occupy Khaniqin in December. Early in May 1918 a further advance began. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Marshall, who had succeeded Sir Stanley Maude on the death of the latter in November 1917, hoped to reach the Lesser Zab before the hot weather set in, and from that favourable position to strike at Mosul in the autumn. Kifri, Tuz and Kirkuk were occupied successfully, and our troops were well received by the local population, which, except in Kirkuk, is mainly Kurdish. In the Kifri district the powerful influence of Hamid Beg Talabani was exerted in our favour. The inhabitants of Kirkuk are largely of Turkish blood, not Osmanli, but descendants of Turkish settlers dating from the time of the Saljuqs; yet nowhere was the establishment of the British régime effected more smoothly. The Christian element, which is considerable, greeted us with enthusiasm and the Moslems co-operated heartily in the organisation of the town. To the east, in Southern Kurdistan, a meeting of chiefs and notables was held at Sulaimaniyah, and it was decided to set up

a provisional Kurdish Government under the local magnate, Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji, and to adopt a friendly attitude towards the British. Shaikh Mahmud sent letters in which he claimed to represent the southern Kurds and offered to hand over to us the reins of government or to act as our representative. Alike to the military and to the civil branches of the Force it was a bitter disappointment when it proved impossible to take advantage of so promising a situation. The diversion of all available transport to the Persian road not only forbade advance but forced us to relinquish Kirkuk. The Christian population were given the option of seeking safety in Baghdad, and numbers availed themselves of the permission, leaving their lands and houses to be plundered by the Turks, who re-occupied the town after it had been evacuated by us. A small Ottoman force pushed on to Sulaimaniyah, where Shaikh Mahmud had been appointed British representative, put the town under martial law and sent the shaikh to Kirkuk. The Turks, however, did not venture to risk a universal upheaval among the tribes, with whom Shaikh Mahmud's influence as the head of a revered family was unique, and he was speedily set at liberty. Our withdrawal produced an inevitable shifting of equilibrium in Kurdistan, but the Turks were too weak to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them, and in October the victories of the Allies in France and of General Allenby in Syria restored the balance in our favour. The Mesopotamian force was still crippled by lack of transport, and a general advance on Mosul *via* Kirkuk could not be attempted, but a small column was sent up towards Altun Keupri to guard the flank of the main body which advanced up the Tigris. Kirkuk was re-occupied on 25th October, and after sharp engagement the Turks were forced out of their strong position in the Tigris gorge below Qal'at Sharqat. Their retreat having been cut off from the north, the whole force surrendered on 30th October. Meanwhile, the eastern column had driven the enemy across the Lesser Zab, and the Tigris column was within a few miles of Mosul. 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, was left in the city with a negligible number of troops. He had ordered the evacuation of all stores, records, &c., but on 1st November these orders were countermanded, and the records and officials returned from Nisibin and Zakho, whither they had been sent. After some days' negotiation as to whether 'Ali Ihsan Pasha was required to surrender by the armistice-terms, orders for his evacuation were received from Constantinople. Mosul was occupied by our troops, and the Union Jack was hoisted over the Sarai on 8th November. On the 10th 'Ali Ihsan left for Nisibin and Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman took charge as the first Political Officer of the Mosul Division. The political future of the Wilayat was uncertain; according to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which the French held to be binding notwithstanding the fundamental alteration of the conditions under which it had been concluded caused by the Russian revolution, the Mosul Wilayat almost in its entirety was to be in the French sphere of influence. Orders were therefore despatched by His Majesty's Government that the system of civil Government organised in the Baghdad Wilayat should not be extended to Mosul, which should be placed under a purely military administration. In the course of a few months it was tacitly understood that the agreement would be modified in respect of the Mosul Wilayat, and civil administration there was assimilated with that of the southern portion of the Occupied Territories.

Physically the Mosul Wilayat presents certain contrasts to that of Baghdad. North of the Jabal Maqbul, which is the continuation of the Jabal Hamrin, the Mosul road runs for long stretches over rocky ground, an agreeable change after the alluvial silt of lower Mesopotamia. On the right bank of the Tigris, in the Jazirah, the whole country is undulating plain, broken only by the mass of the Jabal Sinjar. On the left bank the plain extends for a varying distance from the river to the abrupt rise of the Kurdish mountains. The nearer ranges form the background of the landscape seen across the river from Mosul city—a sight welcome to the eyes of one accustomed to the southern Mesopotamian plains. The highest mountains of the Division do not rise above 7,000 feet, but they are extremely steep and sheer, the separate ranges forming narrow and isolated valleys between which the roads must either climb difficult passes or follow exiguous gorges. In the hills water is for the most part abundant and perennial; the valleys are filled with fruit trees, vines, walnut and almond trees and poplars, and the mountain sides covered with stunted oak; but in the Jazirah the only water is at Tal 'Afar, the springs which rise at the foot of the Jabal Sinjar, and a few springs, mostly sulphurous, which lie below the line of hills from Qaiyarah to Tal 'Afar. These springs make the fortune of Tal 'Afar. The small surplus of the Sinjar water which is not used in cultivation runs chiefly down the Wadi Tharthar, parallel with the Tigris, to lose itself in the

salt marshes north-west of Baghdad. The Wadi Tharthar and all the desert springs are and have been brackish from the earliest recorded times. On the right bank of the Tharthar stand the ruins of the ancient city of Hatra, a famous pasturing ground of the Shammar Jarba', with brackish springs round it. On the left bank of the Tigris some of the villages in the plains possess springs of sweet water which make summer cultivation possible, but the wealth of the left bank is due mainly to the affluents of the Tigris, chief among which are the Greater Zab and the Khabur. Along the banks of the rivers grow poplar and willow, but for the rest the plains are treeless. The date palm is not found north of the Fathah gorge. Oil, bitumen and coal are present in the Division, together with a soft grey marble easily cut and much used for building purposes, carved with an elaborate tracing, which is the architectural feature of the district; it adorns mosques, churches and the better houses.

In one respect the re-organisation of administration was easier in Mosul than it had been elsewhere. Whereas in Basrah and Baghdad we had found no previous records, and the Turkish Government officials had retreated with the army, in Mosul the records and most of the staff were available. By the end of November Colonel Leachman had visited Tal 'Afar, Sinjar, Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Bira Kapra and 'Aqrah. In all these places the Turkish flag was found flying, and in most of them there were Turkish troops and officials. The latter were cleared out, the flags hauled down, and Assistant Political Officers were placed in charge of the districts as we occupied them.

The Division as constituted was substantially the Ottoman Wilayat, less the Sanjaq of Sulaimaniyah. The population is more varied than in other parts of the 'Iraq. In the Tigris valley and the Jazirah desert to the west the inhabitants are Arab tribes, settled and half-nomadic cultivators, or Beduin of the tribes of Shammar and Tai. In the mountains east and north of Mosul the Arab race, dwellers in the plain, gives place to the Kurdish, and even in the desert to the west, where the long hog's back of the Jabal Sinjar lifts itself out of the level Mesopotamian world, its slopes and crags are the home of the Yazidis, who are found also north-east of Mosul.

Kurdish in speech, and probably also by descent, the Yazidis number some 18,000 to 20,000 in the Division. They have been admirably described by Sir Henry Layard, whose sympathies were roused by their continuous persecution by Moslems and Christians alike. They are popularly supposed to be worshippers of the Devil, whom they call Malik Taus, the Peacock King, but a truer description of them is that they are dualists deriving their beliefs from Zoroastrianism through the Manichees. They propitiate the spirit of evil, believing him to be a fallen angel who will in a future era return to his former state. They maintain, further, religious practices which can be traced to those of the Assyrians, and have grafted on to their composite faith fragments culled from Gnosticism, Christianity and Islam. Their great shrine, frequently destroyed by the Turks, is at Shaikh 'Adi, almost due north of Mosul, to which pilgrimage is made in the summer. Their religious and temporal head, or Mir, resides at Ba'idhra, while the High Priest lives at 'Ain Sifni, which, with Ba'shaikhah, is their most important centre after Shaikh 'Adi. They possess seven golden peacocks, one of which was lost in South Russia at the beginning of the war, which are yearly sent out to the various Yazidi centres for the purpose of collecting offerings for the Mir and the priests. Their hierarchy seems to consist of (1) the Mir; (2) the Pirs, spiritual dignitaries of great sanctity; (3) the Shaikhs, religious leaders and teachers; (4) the Qawwals, attendants of the sacred peacock images; (5) the Faqirs, dressed always in black, apparently a kind of lay brother. They are said to be divided into seven sects, all Yazidis belonging to one or the other. Each sect has a guardian angel, the names of five of which are (1) Shaikh 'Adi—his sect is the order of the Faqirs; (2) Malik Taus; (3) Shaikh Shams; (4) Malik Farah al Din, the moon; (5) Shaikh Sharaf al Din. Probably endogamy is practised as between the various sects. Other saints are Shaikh Hasan al Basri, whose descendants alone amongst all the Yazidis are permitted to read and write; Shaikh Muhammad Abu Dhiyak; Khatun Fakhrah, who keeps the gate of Paradise; and Shaikh Mand, whose descendants can pick up vipers. Amongst them are found "Kochak," diviners, dreamers of dreams. Somewhere in the Jabal Sinjar there is a bottomless crevasse, down which the priests throw yearly a tithe of all the crops to form a treasure for the use of Malik Taus when he returns again to earth.

The Yazidis have a spring fast of three days, one member of each family fasting for the others; their great feast is held at Shaikh 'Adi in the summer, and is frequented by Yazidis from all parts. They are said to possess a "Black Book."

This is generally supposed to be the Quran with the name of Shaitan blacked out wherever it occurs. It is believed that any Yazidi who pronounces the name "Shaitan" will be struck blind, and words containing the sh—t combination, such as shat, misht, &c., are avoided, as is the use of the word na'al, monastic. A tale was related by the Principal of the Monastery of Alqosh to a Political Officer, *à propos* of a lay brother there who was a converted Yazidi. "That man," he said, "used to be a Yazidi, and when a boy was one day out ploughing his father's fields. As he ploughed, all sorts of thoughts kept passing through his mind, until he happened to think of the prohibition against the word Shaitan and the penalty for breaking it. His curiosity got the better of him, until finally, focussing his vision on a stone, he said, very low, 'sh—sh—sh.' Nothing happened, and he ventured as far as 'shai,' and by degrees he progressed further and further, until at last, in a firm clear voice he said, 'na'al shaitan,' and found his vision unimpaired. Elated, he returned home, and to his father sitting in the house said, 'Father, I have said that which is forbidden, and I am not blind.' 'Aren't you?' said the father, reaching for his gun, 'then you soon will be!' and he came running with his father behind him until he took shelter with us and became a Christian."

Anxiety lest he should unwittingly give offence to the Devil is a constant factor in the Yazidi's daily life. A member of the sect visiting a foreign Consul in Mosul was specially struck by the spittoons in the Consul's office; for, said he, it was clear that these provided against a regrettable contingency, namely, that a man spitting might inadvertently spit at Malik Taus.

Outside the Mosul Division there are Yazidi communities in the neighbourhood of Mardin, Diyarbakr, Aleppo and in Caucasia. They are Kurdish speaking and seem to have played a large part in the history of the Bahdinan Kurds. They are entirely agriculturists. They are extremely tenacious of their peculiar faith, and conversions, even in the times of persecution, to which they have been frequently subjected, were rare. On the whole they appear tractable and amenable to control and whole-hearted supporters of the British régime. Their morals are loose, and they are notoriously addicted to strong drink. They profess a great sympathy for Christians and during the war sheltered a large number of Armenian refugees in the Jabal Sinjar. This, coupled with their raids on the lines of communication, led the Turks to take punitive measures against them in 1917. A considerable force, with guns, was sent out to the Jabal. The Tal 'Afaris and the surrounding Arab tribes were raised against them, and after their resistance had been easily overcome, their villages were destroyed and their stock driven off wholesale. They are hereditary enemies of the Shanmar, but appear to be on good terms with Shaikh Muhammad of the Tai.

Their religious and temporal head is the Mir, of the family of Chol Beg, living at Baidhra near the shrine of Shaikhan. The present Mir is Sa'id Beg. His cousin, Isma'il, had previous to the occupation of Mosul been in communication with us, had visited us in Baghdad, and had been instrumental in arranging a reconnaissance made by Captain Hudson to the Jabal Sinjar in 1918. We were therefore under obligations to him, especially as he had always stated that he was the head of the Yazidis and had been treated as such by us. As a compromise between the rival claims of Isma'il and Sa'id, it was arranged that three of the sacred peacocks (the possession of which carries with it the right to collect offerings from the faithful) should be given to Isma'il Beg. The arrangement, however, was unworkable, being similar to the existence of rival Popes at Rome and Avignon. Isma'il proved to be absolutely untrustworthy and unable to abstain from petty intrigue of every kind, and eventually it was found necessary to send him to Baghdad, Sa'id regaining the undivided headship. He is managed entirely by his mother, Maiyan, a masterful old lady whose personal interests do not always coincide with the best interests of the tribe. Soon after our occupation it was arranged that the Shar'ah cases of the Yazidis should be dealt with by Sa'id Beg, assisted by a council of elders. At first this worked well, but a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with his decisions is now manifesting itself. The recent death of Shaikh 'Ali, the Bab al Shaikh, High Priest and keeper of the shrine at Shaikh 'Adi, has removed a restraining influence from Sa'id Beg, who is trying to postpone indefinitely the appointment of a successor, which lies in his hands.

As a result of former persecutions the Yazidis seem to have lost large amounts of their lands. In one or two places, notably in 'Ain Sifni, feeling is very strong about this and it will be one of the most difficult problems confronting the land settlement in the Division.

In Jabal Sinjar, on our arrival, the leading man was found to be Hamu Sharu, an old man and a faqir. He was appointed Rais of the mountain, on a monthly salary, with a paid Wakil at Balad. Owing to its geographical position, thrusting out as it does into the middle of the Jazirah, and owing to the pronounced anti-Turk and anti-Arab proclivities of Hamu Sharu and the Yazidis, Jabal Sinjar forms an important strategical bastion, which should be of great use in dealing with the Shammar or with possible pan-Arab or Turkish movements.

In the fertile country round the city and east of the Tigris there are numbers of Christians, mostly Chaldæans, though there are also small Jacobite and Nestorian communities. The Chaldæan patriarch has his seat at Mosul, where the sect form the bulk of the craftsmen and artisans. Outside the town the Chaldæans are cultivators, famed for their skill, their villages being some of the largest and most prosperous in the Wilayat: In the interests of the Chaldæans and Syrian Catholics an Apostolic Delegate is maintained at Mosul and the Dominican Fathers have a school and hospital, both largely attended. There are also Syrian Catholic, Nestorian and Jacobite bishops, and the diversities of the Christian Faith are further enhanced by the presence of small congregations of Roman Catholics, Protestants and Greek Orthodox. The Roman Catholics and Uniate Churches (Chaldæans and Syrian Catholics) were under French protection, as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. There can be little doubt that the prospect of securing a European advocate with the Turkish Government was a powerful incentive to union with the Church of Rome. Our policy before the war had shown an inclination to protect the Nestorian Church as against its offshoot, the Chaldæan Catholic, partly because of the existence among the Nestorians of a small but admirable missionary body known as the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission to the Nestorians. On the other hand the presence of the Dominican mission with its good school and hospital in Mosul enhanced the tendency to look to France. The connection with Rome is strong and is likely to remain so, as the Chaldæan Church has practically no endowments and is financially dependent on Rome.

At Tal 'Afar, a big village on the edge of the desert between Mosul and the Sinjar, a large proportion of the population is Turkoman. They claim descent from Tamberlane's soldiery and the majority of them are Shi'ahs. But the Sunni sect prevails in the Division. There are only 17,000 Shi'ahs in Mosul district as against some 250,000 Sunnis, and no Shi'ahs at all in Arbil or to the north.

On the left bank of the Tigris between the river and the mountains are found the flotsam and jetsam of every invasion and immigration for the last 2,000 years and more. Besides Yazidis and Christians of every denomination, Turkomans, Arabs and Kurds stand in close juxtaposition. There is a large block of Shabak and Sarli, said to follow a secret faith or else to be Shi'ahs of an extreme type. They have some affinity with the 'Ali-Ilahis, who are found on either side of the Persian road between Qasr-i-Shirin and Kirmanshah. The Yazidi fringe runs all along the foothills, while the mountains themselves are entirely Kurdish, with a few Jewish and Christian villages—all that is now left of an extensive Christian population. The Jewish community in Mosul is small and possesses none of the wealth and importance which characterise the Jews of Baghdad. The town was full of Armenian refugees on our arrival, but the majority of these were evacuated to Baghdad. The number of Armenian residents is small.

Before the occupation of Mosul we had been in relations with the Shammar Jarba', as has been related in a previous chapter. The shaikhly house is composed of the 15 sons of Farhan Pasha, who died about 40 years ago. At his death the sons divided the shaikhship between them. The oldest, Al 'Asi, is the real head of the tribe. It is said of him that before the war he came to Mosul on a promise of safe conduct from the then Wali, but he was cast into prison, and on his release he swore by the oath of the divorce that he would never again set foot in Mosul. If the story is true it throws considerable light on his conduct during the last year. After Al 'Asi, the most prominent members of the shaikhly house are Hachim, his son, and Daham ibn Hadi, his grandson; Humaidi, Badr and the rest of Al 'Asi's brothers; the son of 'Abdul 'Aziz, 'Ajil al Yawar, with whom are generally associated the Aulad Shallal, Mutni and Mishal; Muhammad ibn Mutlam and 'Asi and 'Ubaid, the sons of Mijwal and Faris. They are hereditary enemies of the 'Anizah, and during the war there was considerable hostility between them and the Dulaim.

One or two of the chiefs have tried the experiment of cultivation. Thus, before the war, Humaidi and Badr cultivated the Farhatiyah Canal, near Balad; 'Ajil al Yawar was cultivating in partnership with Muhammad al Anjaifi, of Mosul, at Najmah

near Shurah. But the great majority of the tribe are entirely nomadic and live on their own flocks of camels, as well as by taking "huwah" or tribute from the sheep of other tribes, and from caravans, especially on the Nisibin road.

During the war the Shammar, with the exception of Faisal, whose habitat is near Mosul, and whose influence is small, were consistently on the Turkish side, which, considering their geographical position, can be understood. They took advantage of our advance up the river to join in looting the villages along the Tigris and also on the Nisibin road, but on being summoned by us to come in, Humaidi, 'Ajil al Yawar and 'Aiyadah ibn al 'Asi obeyed, Al 'Asi excusing himself on the ground of his great age. They were told that they must remain in Mosul until some arrangement had been made with regard to them, and they undertook to do so. After a few days, however, 'Ajil, who possesses great influence among them, either from fear or some other cause, left Mosul without permission. He was outlawed, and his camels and family, which were not far from Sharqat, were raided and captured, but the camels stampeded in a thunderstorm and escaped as they were being brought in.

Humaidi, meanwhile, had made his submission to Government, had undertaken to keep his sections, the 'Abdah and a portion of the Sayili, in order, and was given a monthly allowance of Rs. 500.

Al 'Asi remained in the neighbourhood of Nisibin, sending in offers of submission from time to time, which, owing to their vague nature, were not accepted. Hachim came in during the summer, but his overtures were rejected as he came alone. Robberies, said to be the work of the Shammar, occurred occasionally on the Nisibin road and elsewhere, but nothing on a grand scale till September, when a caravan was robbed of over T. 3,000*l.* at Abu Hamdhah on the Dair al Zor road. In retaliation for this the Shammar were raided with armoured cars, and a considerable number of their sheep captured. It was hoped to cut them off when the time came for their annual migration south, but our plans miscarried and they slipped through. However, Al 'Asi sent his grandson Daham into Mosul, with a letter saying that he had resigned the shaikhship to him, and also with declarations from Hachim, Mutlaq al Farhan and others, saying that they recognised Daham as their shaikh. Daham was informed that as a first step he must collect and hand over a sum of T. 3,500*l.* as a fine for the Abu Hamdhah robbery, after which he would be appointed Government Shaikh of Al 'Asi's sections. He agreed, and soon sent in T. 1,800*l.* He is believed to have collected the balance from the tribe when the Dair al Zor incident occurred, as will be related subsequently, and made him wonder whether he was backing the right horse. This caused delay in the payment, and sharifial propaganda delayed it yet longer. In April he paid up another T. 1,500*l.*, after which he moved north with his tribe and passed outside our territory.

The question of huwah was brought up almost immediately by the tribes from whom it had been extorted. This tribute was on a fixed basis, two sheep, four ewes, four lambs, and six majidis in cash being taken from every flock. The sons of Farhan had divided the right of collection. The taking of huwah from the smaller tribes of the Jazirah is not unreasonable; it is no more than a payment given in return for permission to pasture in Shammar grazing grounds. The Shammar were given to understand that they might go on taking it from the tribes on their sheep in the desert, but at revised rates, and that village cultivation was to be exempt. The right to take toll on caravans has not been recognised. The payment of huwah gives the payer a right to protection and at the present moment it is hard to see how we could prevent it.

Nevertheless the eternal antithesis between the interests of nomad and cultivator or trader is well illustrated by the position of the Shammar. They are a public pest, living on robbery and blackmail. Some of them in the last year have realised the profits which are to be made by working their camels for transport. This may prove a partial solution of the problem, as more money in their pockets will mean less incitement to robbery; but for the next few years at any rate our power over them will depend on our ability to close the road of their migrations north and south.

After the Shammar, the chief tribe of the Jazirah is the 'Tai, their shaikh being Muhammad 'Abdul Rahman. They range chiefly between Nisibin and the Jabal Sinjar and except for a few villages in Tal 'Afar district are entirely nomad. With the exception of one robbery on the Tal 'Afar road they have given very little trouble, and on this occasion the prompt seizure of a number of their donkeys which were working on pack transport near Mosul resulted in the return of the stolen goods. Their shaikh is on good terms with the Yazidis of Sinjar and appears to be on not very good terms with Al 'Asi.

The Mutaiwid and Juhaish extend along the southern base of the Sinjar towards Tal 'Afar, but are not tribes of great importance. The Hadidiyin are the shepherds of Mosul, the big sheep-owners giving them their flocks to tend. They have a reputation for cowardice and are looked down upon by the Beduin, who will not intermarry with them. There has been some trouble over the shaikhship of the Albu Hamad, who centre round Shurahi. The leading shaikh is Bulaibil Agha, by origin a slave and an engaging old scoundrel. The rival party is headed by 'Aqub, who is of the real shaikhly house and whose leadership over some of the sections we have been compelled to recognise. The Albu Hamad are at feud with the Jubur who cultivate along the river.

Relations with the Kurds have already been dealt with.

The British administration has preserved the Turkish administrative divisions of the Wilayat, the Assistant Political Officer of the District taking the place of the Qaimmaqam of the Qadha. In accordance with our practice elsewhere, the revenue and the administration have been amalgamated. Each district is divided into revenue Nahiyahs under Arab Mamurs Mal, the whole being under a Mudir Mal at the district headquarters. At the end of 1919, Hasan Bey, the head of the Sanniyah Department in Turkish times, was appointed Revenue Inspector for the Division, a post which had been held temporarily for two short periods by an Assistant Political Officer. Under Ottoman rule the headquarters of the Sanniyah administration for the whole of the 'Iraq had been at Mosul. As has been explained, the Sanniyah lands were under their own special organisation, which dealt directly with Constantinople and was independent of the provincial administration. To enable them to deal with petty cases on the spot, the Mamurs in the Mosul and Tal 'Afar districts have been given the powers of Third Class Magistrates, an experiment which on the whole has worked well.

In the Mosul Division, especially in the plains, where the social unit is the village rather than the tribe, the mukhtars or village headmen play an important part. They are responsible for maintaining order and cleanliness in their villages and for settling disputes according to custom and justice, for the apprehension of offenders in cases of serious crime, for the observance of the orders of Government, for the accommodation of Government officials and the safety of travellers and caravans spending the night in the village. They are also bound to assist Mudirs Mal in agricultural matters such as the estimation of crops. In return, customary dues may be taken by them, for example a percentage on goods sold by merchants in their village, and they may be given by Government a percentage not exceeding 3 per cent. on winter crops and vineyards. Mosul, like Baghdad and Basrah, returned four members to the Turkish Chamber; one of these, a Christian who is very popular in the town, has been appointed Political Attaché.

On our arrival the general condition of the province was very bad. The town was full of refugees and extremely dirty. Prices were exceedingly high, chiefly owing to commandeering for the Army and to the despatch of parcels home by German and Austrian troops. At least 10,000 persons are said to have died of starvation during the winter of 1917-18. In the districts all villages except those of the Christians had been depopulated by conscription. Transport and agriculture were almost at a standstill owing to the large number of animals which had been commandeered; 50 per cent. of the land was untilled.

The staple crops of the Mosul Division are wheat and barley, a far larger proportion of wheat being grown than in the southern Wilayats. Baghdad has always been accustomed to look to Mosul for its wheat supply, as well as for such fruits, nuts and vegetables as flourish better, or even exclusively, in the foot hills. The closing of the Mosul road from March 1917 to November 1918 was, therefore, a real hardship and contributed to the shortage of food supplies in Baghdad during 1917. The winter crops in the Mosul Division are all rain-grown, but owing to the lack of summer water in the plains the summer crops are almost negligible, except along the rivers where irrigation by lift is feasible or in such villages as possess perennial springs. In the valley of the Greater Zab only is irrigation practised on a large scale. In the mountains, on the other hand, the summer crops of rice, tobacco, and fruit are much more important than the winter grain. Agricultural methods are primitive. The wooden plough is drawn by a yoke of mules, oxen, or donkeys. Normally about half a man's holding is under crop and a half is left fallow. As soon as the year's seed is sown, last year's stubble is cross-ploughed and then left fallow during the summer. In the autumn after the first rain it is single-furrowed and is then

ready for the seed. Manuring is practised by the best farmers. The average seed rate is about 120 lb. to the acre and the average yield is seven to eight fold. After the occupation immediate steps were taken to restore agricultural prosperity, and in the first year some 550 plough cattle and Rs. 1,50,000 in agricultural loans were distributed to cultivators, besides large quantities of Turkish grain taken over by us and released.

There are indications that the bulk of the land in the Division was originally in the hands of peasant proprietors, each man tilling his own land; but at present most of the land has passed into the hands of large proprietors, who are generally inhabitants of Mosul. They hold by right of Tapu sanads. Complaints as to how this process was effected are frequent. It is said, for instance, that a peasant would be offered for his land 25 per cent. of its value, and on his refusal to sell, he would be cast into prison on a trumped up charge of murder, to remain there for years unless he changed his mind. The introduction of Tapu seems to have given the city magnates opportunities of defrauding the peasants of large quantities of land by means of spurious documents of sale and the like. Mortgages were another favourite weapon. The Tapu owners are often absentee landlords who have never set eyes on their estates. Their rights vary in different localities according to the fertility of the land and the agreement made with the cultivators. The rate ranges from a quarter of the crop to a sixteenth, an eighth being the most usual. On summer crops the Tapu owner takes a half, as the lord of the water rights. The position of the cultivator is obscure. It is sometimes said that the reason so few build decent houses is that they may be evicted at any moment; and in theory there seems to be no reason why, if the Tapu owner asked for an agreement raising the amount of his share and the cultivators refused to comply, he should not evict them and bring others in their place. The man who has more land of his own than he can cultivate himself, but who wishes to farm it direct, employs a "murabba'ji," so-called because once upon a time he used to get a quarter of the harvest of the land he tilled. Now he gets an eighth and is frequently so heavily in debt to his master that he is to all intents and purposes a serf attached to the land.

Similarly in the mountains the land has in many cases passed from the peasants into the hands of the Aghawat, but often for slightly different reasons. The cultivator there was exposed to the raids and attacks of all who preferred to live on the efforts of other people rather than their own. He could not live without protection and he obtained it from the local big man at the price of a tithe on his land, out of which the lord paid as taxes to the Government the smallest sum which he could persuade the Turks to accept.

It appears that at one time a considerable quantity of the land round Mosul was held on that kind of feudal tenure called Timar, by which a man held his land on condition of providing so many men for military service when called upon. When Tapu was introduced by Midhat Pasha, this was compulsorily abolished and the land registered in the name of the cultivator. The owners were compensated by a charge upon the land, which charge decreased annually until it was extinguished.

In Tal 'Afar the population is divided into clans, headed by their respective Aghawat, who are spoken of as owning the land. In practice the cultivators have never paid them Tapu though they have contributed small aids for entertainments, &c.

The need for land settlement is very pressing in the Mosul Division. The Tapu registration there was probably no worse than elsewhere, but it was extraordinarily bad. In the Tal 'Afar and Sinjar District there are known to have been a great number of fraudulent entries which are being steadfastly opposed by the victims. In many cases on the left bank, especially in the Yazidi settlements, are found villages divided into, say, 271 shares. Of these some 193 are the property of a Tapu holder, and the remainder are the property of the villagers. The boundaries of the shares are not recorded and are untirely unknown. The disputes which arise from a case of this sort may be readily imagined.

It is noteworthy and surprising to find that on the plains the Christians alone have succeeded in keeping their lands out of the clutches of the Mosul landlord. The reason is probably that whereas the Muhammadan villages had no means of obtaining protection and obtaining the ear of the Government, except by attaching themselves as clients (at a price) to the city magnates, the Christians had their Patriarchs and Bishops who were their natural and ready protectors and spokesmen, and, in the case of the Catholic Churches, they could appeal to a foreign Power.

As a general rule the Government share of the grass crop in the Mosul Division is a tenth. To this had been added the various cesses introduced from time to time,



which brought the total demand up to 12½ per cent. The reason why the rain-cultivated lands of this Division should pay less than the irrigated lands of Baghdad is that the average yield is less, while there is always greater uncertainty in the case of crops which depend on rainfall. Pests of various kinds take their toll, locusts being specially dreaded, and in the prairie-like country of which much of the Division consists, covered with grass which has been parched by the sun, fires spread with terrible rapidity. In the summer miles of grass may be seen ablaze.

The Ottoman Government made many experiments in tax collection. The usual practice was to collect by farming, the Government share from each village being put up to auction and sold to the highest bidder. The larger landlords generally bought in the shares of their own villages at rates which allowed a considerable margin of profit. There was also a class of professional multazims, whose sole means of livelihood was the annual buying up of the taxes of the smaller villages.

The means to be adopted by us were the subject of anxious deliberation. It was at first intended to estimate by eye and then collect direct. It was found, however, that, apart from other difficulties, we should not be able to find the requisite staff of estimators whose results could be relied on. Land measurement was out of the question owing to the very large areas involved. It was eventually decided to continue the method of *iltizam*, with the precaution of a preliminary estimation of the unthreshed heaps, a method of estimation which was well known in the Sanniyah lands of the Division. This enabled us to put a reserve price on each village, leaving us free to collect direct if it was not realised. The people of each village were also given the option of buying in their own taxes at the highest bid if they wished to do so. The results were satisfactory. There is reason to suppose that, in the main, the Government got neither less nor more than its proper share. Our option of direct collection was exercised in one or two cases—to the chagrin of the Tapu owner, who was deliberately underbidding in the hope that we should weaken and accept his offer—and in several cases, though there were not as many as might have been hoped, the cultivators bought in their taxes themselves. Results showed the estimation to have been in the main fairly exact, and in future, in some areas at any rate, taxes will be collected direct on estimation of this kind, as was done in 1910 for a good deal of the summer crops.

Kodah, the dues paid on sheep and cattle, is an important tax in the Mosul Division. In Turkish times the rate was 9½ piastres per head. It was fixed by us this year at eight annas per head for sheep and Re. 1 for buffaloes. The count was carried out by the Mamurs themselves with no extra staff. It is customary for the sheep to be taken from the right bank to the left in March and April, and, as in Turkish times, advantage was taken of this to have all sheep checked as they crossed the bridge. The total number counted was 803,731, which is in advance of the Turkish counts. In several cases, tribal shaikhs were appointed assistant counters and received 3 per cent. of the sheep of their tribe which were counted. The Shammar sheep were not, and could not be, counted, since they roam over an area which extends beyond our boundaries. A number of the big Muslawis keep their sheep with the Shammar and these also escaped the tax.

The Sanniyah lands of the Division are extensive. In 'Abdul Hamid's time they were well administered, and owing to their immunity from the descents of gendarmes and other advantages, cultivation therein was popular. Under the new régime the success of their administration declined, and at our occupation they were as badly off as the rest of the division.

If transport difficulties can be solved there would seem to be much greater opportunities in this Division than in the rest of 'Iraq for the use of agricultural machinery. Before the war several of the larger landowners possessed reapers, and the large areas of rain-land not intersected by irrigation canals present none of the obstacles found elsewhere to the use of machinery. The Tapu share on the Sanniyah lands is almost always 7½ per cent., with the exception of a few villages in Zakho district, which it is proposed to bring into line with the others.

Especially on the Jazirah side, there are large quantities of land said to be *Mahlul*, that is escheated. It appears on investigation that the decision in almost every case has been made the subject of an appeal which has never been heard, and when the settlement comes it is doubtful whether the Government claim will be upheld.

A beginning has been made towards the development and re-stocking of Government forests which had been ruthlessly destroyed to supply the Turkish army. They should ultimately prove a very valuable property. Baghdad in normal times depends

almost entirely on the northern mountain regions for wood. Rafts called kalaks, made of logs borne on inflated skins, such as may be seen depicted on the Assyrian reliefs in the British Museum, are floated down the Tigris carrying brushwood or other merchandise. When they reach Baghdad, the rafts are broken up, the logs sold, and the deflated skins loaded on to donkeys and carried back to serve anew. Wood and charcoal taxes are a feature of the Mosul budget.

A British officer was appointed in June 1919 to take charge of the Customs; import duties on goods coming from Syria and Turkey were levied, and the old Tobacco Régie organisation having been wound up at the end of 1918, the Customs officer collected the duties on tobacco also. It is taxed in Mosul at a flat rate of 8 annas per kilo, and placed in a bonded warehouse.

Although the city of Mosul has a bad reputation, there has been remarkably little crime. In the districts highway robberies and the theft of domestic animals are the chief offences, and several gangs of thieves have been rounded up. Raids by the nomad tribes on caravan routes were constant in Turkish times and are difficult to cope with, but on the whole it may legitimately be said that public security has greatly improved during the last year. The police force of the city is locally raised; it is smart and efficient, and service in it is popular. A large proportion of the Turkish gendarmerie was in existence at the time of the occupation; it was taken over to provide for immediate necessities, and has been very successful in district police work. But it is not suited for any form of military duty, for which purpose a body of Levies or Military Police is about to be formed. On the disturbed Kurdish border a small striking force of this kind is indispensable.

Municipal affairs in Mosul itself had been run by an elected Municipal Council. The municipal revenues were insignificant, corruption was rife, and the town was in an indescribable state of filth. Drastic re-organisation was imperative, and it was inevitable that the Mayor and Council should become figure-heads which gradually faded from view until they ceased to exist. Now that re-organisation has been successfully completed, plans for a slightly modified Municipal Council are under discussion, and it may be hoped that it will exhibit a progressive spirit, for such was not wholly lacking even before the war. During the war the Turks had begun to cut main streets through the town, as at Baghdad. In Baghdad the work was completed, and has proved an inestimable boon, since there was before the war no thoroughfare wide enough to permit of any but the most restricted amount of wheeled traffic.

At Mosul the two new streets running at right angles to one another had been begun, but were not finished before the occupation, and were brought to completion during the year 1919. They will be well worth the money spent in compensation and construction, though this necessitated a large grant-in-aid to the municipality. The old bridge still exists. It has the peculiarity of stopping short in mid-stream, the portion nearest the town being composed of pontoons. This part is left permanently open when a high flood threatens, lest it should be carried away, and as in this contingency the land at the eastern end of the bridge is commonly submerged, the piers are left standing idly, if picturesquely, in the midst of the flood. A new bridge is in course of being built, and plans for the laying on of a water supply are under consideration. The town is now clean, and those who retain a mental picture of such spots as the slaughter-houses at the old bridge-head in Turkish times will have difficulty in recognising the Mosul of to-day as the same town.

At Tal 'Afar, the Assistant Political Officer had an advisory council of local Aghawat to help him in municipal affairs. Other municipalities exist at 'Aqrah, Dohuk, Zakho, and Tal Kaif, but in each case the work falls mainly on the Assistant Political Officer.

Education was taken in hand very soon after our arrival in Mosul. At present there are seven Government schools in Mosul, three for Muhammadan boys, one each for the Chaldæans, Syrians, Jacobites, and Jews. There are also two schools for Muhammadan girls. The attendance figures are most instructive. Seven-eighths of the population of the city are Muhammadans, and yet, whereas the attendance at the Christian schools is 791, there are in the Muhammadan schools only 259 pupils. The streets of the city are full of idle and undisciplined children; stories as to the bad manners and worse morals of the young men are constantly repeated. The leading Muhammadans admit with affected regret the facts, but can suggest no suitable remedies. They all agree that the fault does not lie in any way with the conduct and administration of the schools. The Christian schools seem to be alive and progressive. The attendance at the Muhammadan girls' schools is 149. It is not a large number, but compares favourably, all things considered, with the attendance at the boys' schools.

In the various villages round Mosul Muhammadan schools have been started in five different places and Christian in 11. There are also five Government schools, the largest being at Tal 'Afar with an attendance of 80 boys. It is noticeable that at first there was a considerable reluctance to send the boys to school at Tal 'Afar, on the grounds that they would become "effendis," *i.e.*, members of the effete Turkish official class.

The education of the Yazidis is complicated by the fact that the tenets of their religion forbid reading and writing to all except one family of Shaikhs, the Bait al Basri. When the school was started at Balad Sinjar, the more progressive decided to send their sons there. Unfortunately, soon afterwards heavy rain caused a great flood in the Wadi which swept away and drowned four of the children who had been attending the school. This caused a reaction to the side of the conservatives, and at present there are only four Yazidi boys in the school.

Of all the advantages conferred by Government, probably none are more popular than medical treatment, or have more valuable political results. Great advance has been made in this respect. The old Red Crescent Hospital has been expanded into a civil hospital with both male and female wards. The Civil Surgeon has been aided by an assistant British doctor, a matron and two British sisters, a staff of Armenian nurses, and two or three native doctors. The Armenian nurses have turned out, on the whole, very well, and have been of the greatest value. The native doctors are capable and well trained, one of them having had a thorough medical education in Paris. Dispensaries have been opened at all district headquarters, and in some cases valuable aid is given by the military doctors on the spot. Malaria is the most serious medical problem in the hill districts; in places, the local population is terribly affected and the rate of infantile mortality due to this cause is abnormally high. The Ottoman Government distributed quinine free of charge as a sanitary measure. The gravity of the malarial problem is in itself sufficient to justify the provision of medical aid in the districts wherever it is possible.

Communication with Baghdad has been greatly facilitated by running the railway up to Qal'at Sharqat, seventy miles from Mosul, and metalling long stretches of the intervening road from Sharqat, but the completion of the railway to Mosul is greatly desired by the native population, and would have the signal advantage of bringing the two Wilayats into much closer connection.

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## CHAPTER VI.—The Kurdish Question.

The occupation of the Mosul Wilayat brought the British Administration into direct relations with the Kurds. On either side of the Turco-Persian frontier the mountains from a little south of Khaniqin to Ararat are inhabited by Kurdish tribes, which extend eastward into Persia and westward through the highlands of Asia Minor to Cilicia and the confines of Syria. Anatolia, the bridge between Europe and Asia, has borne the attack of many invaders, its mountain ranges have provided inaccessible vantage ground for diverse peoples, and offered asylum to communities driven out of the Mesopotamian plains by successive waves of conquest. The inhabitants exhibit a great variety of race and creed, among which are the Armenian Christians, remnants of an ancient empire, the Kurds, possibly descendants of the Medes, professing Muhammadanism in several forms, Sunni, Shi'ah, and other sects only half assimilated to Islam, and the Turks, almost exclusively Sunni, whose presence dates from the Saljuq and Ottoman invasion or from the nomadic penetration of Turkoman tribes which began even earlier than the Saljuq era. In the south-east angle of the mountains dwells the small but valiant Nestorian or Assyrian nation, who are the descendants of the Christian subjects of the Sassanian Empire.

Towards the middle of the 19th century the Ottoman Government began a serious attempt to establish its rule over the Kurds, the most independent as well as the most turbulent element of the empire. The Turks rightly diagnosed the root of the difficulty to be the power of the tribal chieftains, who combined a ruthless mediæval authority with a plentiful supply of rifles. They were a scourge not only to the Christian population and the Government, but also to their own settled tribesmen, who were little better than serfs, ground down by their overlords, the

Aghawat. The Turks proceeded to deal with these gentry after Turkish fashion, using one to undermine the power of his neighbours, laying stealthy hands on another, subsidising a third till his power waxed and called for correction. In this fashion they scattered over the empire the Baban family of Sulaimaniyah, in southern Kurdistan, while in the north they brought the Badr Khans of Jazirat ibn 'Umar to Constantinople, subjected 'Abdul Qadir, the head of the ruling house of Shamsdinan, to intermittent exile, favoured Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli, east of Aleppo, and then encouraged his rivals to fall on him and destroy him. Military pressure in wild mountain country was seldom within the capacity of the Ottoman army, or if undertaken rarely led to anything but Pyrrhic successes. The Sultan 'Abdul Hamid conceived the idea of turning the fighting qualities of the Kurds into approved channels by raising (and at intervals paying) a body of irregular horse known as the Hamidiyah. Under better organisation the scheme might have been productive of considerable advantage; even in Turkish hands the Hamidiyah were sometimes useful to the Government. But a systematic attempt to exterminate the Armenians, begun in 'Abdul Hamid's time and continued by the Committee of Union and Progress, added official persecution to the other forms of disorder which racked Anatolia. The Kurds were used as agents of destruction. Though when left to themselves the Aghas treated the Christians little worse than they treated their own people, the prospect of personal profit, lands, women, and miscellaneous loot, to be acquired by themselves and their followers by fulfilling the orders or hints of the Government, and at the same time following what they conceived to be the teaching of Islam, was too advantageous to be neglected. The war brought the Armenian policy to a climax. The massacres of 1896 and 1909 were not comparable to the slaughter carried out with the tacit encouragement of the Germans in 1915 and the succeeding years. The Kurds inherited the villages and lands of their dead fellow countrymen, but they did not go entirely unpunished. Armenian refugees and Armenians of the Russian Caucasus joined the Russian Army, and wherever the Russians crossed the Turkish eastern frontier, the Armenians took occasion to retaliate on the Kurds, doing as they had been done by. The Kurds affirm that their losses amount to 400,000 as against a million or more Armenians; for example, at Rawanduz, in 1916, the Russian and Armenian forces when they retreated left the town and district a desolation.

The Turkish Nestorians, or, as they prefer to be called, Assyrians, had not been comprehensively massacred, but a neighbouring Kurdish Agha, Simko, chief of the Shikak tribe, between Van and Urumiyah, murdered their Patriarch in 1916. In revenge they attacked him. When they found themselves too hard pressed they migrated in a body and joined their Persian co-religionists in the Urumiyah plain. Together they offered a stout resistance to the Turks and Kurds until 1918, when the whole community, men, women, children and cattle and such household goods as they could carry, abandoned the position and marched south-east to Hamadan. Here they were taken in hand by the British authorities and sent on to Ba'qubah, near Baghdad, where a refugee camp was prepared for them. They numbered about 40,000, added to which there were 10,000 Armenians from the Van district who had escaped with the Assyrians.

On the victory of the Allies in 1918 there were thus two distinct problems to be considered in connection with the Christians, both concerned almost solely with northern Kurdistan; firstly, what reparation could be made to the Armenians, and secondly, what measures could be taken to repatriate the Assyrians. The first question was the larger and the more complex, and it was unfortunate that the benevolent intentions of the Allies towards the Armenians should have been formulated and widely circulated without full certainty as to whether it would be possible to carry them out. The Armenians themselves embarrassed the issue by talking openly of their high hopes for the formation of an Armenian State, comprising an area which was variously defined, but not infrequently included the six Anatolian Wilayats in which Armenians are, or were previous to 1915, to be found: Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput (Mamurat al 'Aziz), Diyarbakr, Bitlis and Van. The Kurds, who are in an overwhelming majority in these districts, took alarm, and the strong nationalist sentiments which already existed among them were enhanced by the fear that the Western Powers contemplated putting them under the yoke of the despised Armenians. The prospect of being forced to return to the survivors of the outraged nation gains which could obviously not be regarded as legitimate, and of paying penalty for hideous crimes which had been registered against themselves, changed

the attitude of the Kurds from one of friendship towards Great Britain to a keen anxiety lest we or any other Western Power should obtain a mandatory authority which might be used to enforce justice towards the Armenians. This fear made northern Kurdistan a favourable theatre for Turkish propaganda, and during the long and disastrous delay which occurred between the armistice and the conclusion of peace with Turkey, the latter had full opportunity to exploit the advantage offered by local conditions. At the same time the honour accorded to our Arab allies in Syria, and the fact that European engagements, combined with Arab sentiment, dictated the establishment in December 1919 of an independent Arab State, uncontrolled, and also unaided, by any Western Power, gave force to propaganda from the Syrian side. With the growing dissatisfaction of the Sharifian party and the Syrians with the conduct of Europe and America towards themselves, emissaries from Syria promulgated a doctrine increasingly hostile to the West in general and Great Britain in particular. Thus in our dealings with the Kurds we found gradually arrayed against us a series of formidable prejudices, pan-Islamism stirred from Constantinople, racial pride, cupidity and the arrogance of the Kurdish agha, who feared the possibility of a strong European control far more than he feared the Turks. Once again, as so often in his painful history, the Turk profited by the errors arising out of the impossibility of reconciling European claims to protect or dominate portions of his empire. A section of the Kurdish national party at Constantinople, led by 'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan and the Badr Khans, was probably anti-Turk and in favour of an autonomy controlled by the West, preferably by Great Britain. But events in the Smyrna district gave to Ottoman propaganda some justification for the contention that however many Points might be published in America or Declarations issued in Europe, the secret intention of the West to subjugate the East, regardless of national aspirations, remained unshaken. And behind the Turks lay Russia in revolt, with Bolshevism ready to lend its aid to all who had a grievance against the existing order of the world, and to proclaim (not without reason) that it had proved inadequate for the regulation of human affairs.

These dangers were less prominent in southern Kurdistan, where the Christian problem is almost non-existent, than in the north, and it was southern Kurdistan which first came into our political sphere. As has been related, in the winter of 1917 we had occupied Khaniqin and found no difficulty in organising administration. Before the final advance in 1918 we knew that the Kurdish chiefs in the Kifri district, the Talabani family and the religious leader, Saiyid Ahmad Khaniqah, were pro-British, and we had already been in relations with the leading man of Sulaimaniyah, Shaikh Mahmud. Shaikh Mahmud is the great grandson of a Kurdish holy man of high reputation, Kaka Ahmad, who lies buried in a shrine at Sulaimaniyah, formerly much resorted to by Kurdish pilgrims. His descendants, the Barziuji family, have relied exclusively on the merit acquired by their ancestor, and it has proved sufficient to procure for them a predominant influence. Shaikh Mahmud's position, except for his religious prestige, depended chiefly on the reign of terror he had imposed before the war and the wholesale murder and rapine done in his name. His sinister power was proved by the fact that Sulaimaniyah under his direction had been one of the most turbulent parts of the Ottoman Empire; it was to him that the Mutasarrif and the Turkish garrison surrendered in the autumn of 1918, leaving him in sole authority. By the hand of two representatives he sent letters to Baghdad appealing earnestly to His Majesty's Government not to exclude Kurdistan from the list of liberated peoples. Since he was the most powerful factor in local politics, it would have been impossible to neglect him; his friendly attitude facilitated the extension of administration to the Sulaimaniyah district, where there was a widespread desire for our presence in order to check anarchy and ruin, and made it possible to dispense with a garrison, troops for which were not available.

Accordingly, Major Noel, who had had much experience in Persia and among the Bakhtiari, was entrusted with a mission to southern Kurdistan, the instructions given him being as follows:—

“You have been appointed Political Officer, Kirkuk Division, with effect from November 1st. The Kirkuk Division extends from the Lesser Zab to the Diyalah and north-east to the Turco-Persian frontier. It forms part of the Mosul Wilayat, the ultimate disposal of which is under the consideration of His Majesty's Government. For the present it must be considered as falling within the sphere of military occupation and administration of this force, and you should proceed on this assumption in your dealings with local chiefs, bearing in mind that it is improbable

that the military authorities will see their way to detach troops permanently to Sulaimaniyah or to other places east of our present line. It should be your object to arrange with local chiefs for the restoration and maintenance of order in areas outside the limits of our military occupation, for the exclusion and surrender of enemy agents, and for the supply of commodities needed by our troops. You are authorised to incur such expenditure as may be necessary to this end, subject to previous authority, where practicable, in cases of large sums, and on the understanding, which should be made clear to the chiefs, that any arrangements you may make are of necessity provisional and subject to reconsideration at any time. You are authorised to appoint Shaikh Mahmud as our representative in Sulaimaniyah, should you consider this expedient, and to make other appointments of this nature at Chamchamal, Halabja, &c., at your discretion. It should be explained to the tribal chiefs with whom you enter into relations that there is no intention of imposing upon them an administration foreign to their habits and desires. Tribal leaders will be encouraged to form a confederation for the settlement of their public affairs under the guidance of British political officers. They will be called upon to continue to pay the taxes legally due from them under Turkish law, modified as may be found necessary, for purposes connected with the maintenance of order and the development of their country."

The question of creating a southern Kurdish autonomous province had been raised in June 1918 by General Sharif Pasha in conversation with Sir Percy Cox, whom he met at Marseilles. Sharif Pasha, by origin a Kurd of Sulaimaniyah, had been absent from his native country from boyhood, and having been exiled by the Turks, had for some time been resident in Paris. In 1914 he had offered us his services in Mesopotamia, with a view to winning over the Kurds, but we were not then in contact with them and the offer could not be accepted. When the Peace Conference met in Paris he constituted himself the spokesman for Kurdish interests, though the fact that he had been long out of touch with his countrymen gave his opinion too academic a flavour.

Major Noel reached Sulaimaniyah in the middle of November and was received with acclamation. He found the district incredibly wasted and impoverished by the Turks, the town half ruined and trade at a standstill. He proceeded to introduce a temporary system of government which would be acceptable to the people and satisfy their aspirations for a Kurdish administration. Shaikh Mahmud was nominated Governor of the district, and for each of the minor sub-divisions Kurdish officials were appointed to work under the guidance of the British Political Officers. At the same time, whenever possible, Turkish and Arab officials were at once removed and replaced by natives of Kurdistan, while the Turkish officers and troops in the town were evacuated to Baghdad. The system adopted was practically a feudal one; each chief was made responsible for the correct government of his own tribe. The tribal chief was thus recognised as a duly appointed Government official, the whole being controlled by British officers. Steps were taken at once to import foodstuffs, seed grain and articles of merchandise, not only to cope with the immediate danger of famine, but sufficient to allow to a certain extent the revival of trade. At the same time the religious wants of the peoples were not neglected; arrangements were made for the repair of the principal mosques at Government expense, while a grant was conceded to allow the carrying out of religious observances.

Signs were not wanting that the northern parts of southern Kurdistan up to Arbil and Rawanduz, which form the limit of the dialect of Kurdish spoken in Sulaimaniyah, were anxious to share in the peace, and above all in the financial assistance offered by the British Government, by entering the southern Kurdish confederation under Shaikh Mahmud, but the chiefs of Kirkuk and Kifri emphatically denied any intention of acknowledging him as an overlord and asked for direct British administration.

On 1st December 1918 the Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson, visited Sulaimaniyah and held a meeting which was attended by about 60 leading chiefs of southern Kurdistan, including representatives of Persian tribes from Sennah, Saqiz, and Aoraman. He had several conversations with Shaikh Mahmud, and explained the political situation, so far as it concerned them, to the assembled chiefs. The Kurds had suffered alike from Russian and Turkish methods, and while there was an absolute unanimity amongst them as to their firm intention to resist to the last any attempt on the part of the European Powers to allow the Turks to return, there was a general recognition of the need of British protection if they were to prosper in the future. There was, however, hesitation on the part of some of the chiefs as to the

wisdom of placing Kurdistan under effective British administration, while others claimed that Kurdistan must be separated from 'Iraq and be run direct from London, which in their eyes had now replaced Constantinople.

After some discussion a document was drawn up in the following sense :—

His British Majesty's Government having announced that their intention in the war was the liberation of the Eastern peoples from Turkish oppression and the grant of assistance to them in the establishment of their independence, the chiefs, as the representatives of the people of Kurdistan, have asked His British Majesty's Government to accept them also under British protection and to attach them to the 'Iraq, so that they might not be deprived of the benefits of that association, and they have requested the Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia to send them a representative with the necessary assistance to enable the Kurdish people under British auspices to progress peacefully on civilised lines. If His British Majesty's Government extend its assistance and protection to them they undertook to accept His British Majesty's orders and advice.

In return the Civil Commissioner signed a document stating that any Kurdish tribe from the Greater Zab to the Diyalah (other than those in Persian territory) who of their own free will accepted the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud, would be allowed to do so, and that the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above areas on behalf of the British Government whose orders he undertook to obey. The tribes and townspeople in the Kifri and Kirkuk divisions were not willing to come under Shaikh Mahmud, and the latter agreed not to insist on their inclusion. Kirkuk subsequently become an independent Division.

It was explained to the representatives of the Kurdish tribes in Persia that our public engagements precluded us from agreeing to their inclusion in the south Kurdistan confederacy under British protection, and that they must remain loyal Persian subjects, keeping on friendly terms with the confederation. They accepted the position cheerfully.

Shaikh Mahmud further asked for British officers for all Government departments, including officers for Kurdish levies, stipulating only that the subordinate staff should, wherever possible, be Kurdish, and not Arab.

After the meeting many tribes came into the confederation, and when on 1st January 1919 Major Noel went to Rawanduz, he found the population there to be apparently favourable to Shaikh Mahmud. As Major Soane observed in his administrative report on the Sulaimaniyah Division for 1919, so anxious were the Kurds at that time for peace, so reduced by privation, that they were ready to sign any document or make any statement to procure tranquillity and food. Thus tribe after tribe which hitherto had been barely cognisant of Shaikh Mahmud, or at best had known him as an unworthy descendant of a good man, signed the stereotyped memorial praying for inclusion in the new State under Shaikh Mahmud, a condition which they imagined the British Government to have made essential, for reasons of its own. At the same time his appointment as British representative was regarded with suspicion, and there was considerable scepticism as to the defeat of the Turk; owing to the proximity of Ottoman garrisons and the activity of Ottoman officials on the other side of the frontier.

Political Officers were appointed to Keui Sanjaq and Rania, and the system of government introduced at Sulaimaniyah was extended to these areas and to Rawanduz. Rawanduz was in a terrible state of starvation; successive waves of advancing Russians and Turks had reduced the country to abject desolation, while in the town itself, out of an original total of some 2,000 houses, only 60 remained standing. In the surrounding districts cultivation had for the last two years been completely suspended, and the population had been reduced by about 75 per cent. of its pre-war figure. So severe was the famine that in some districts the inhabitants were living entirely on herbs and the few acorns which were left, and had been constrained to devour cats and dogs, and even in some cases human flesh.

Steps were taken at once to deal with the famine; grain was imported from Arbil, poor relief started, agriculture encouraged, and a measure of law and order secured.

The question of bringing the country north of Rawanduz under effective administration was found to be one of great difficulty, for although the tribes and the population are small, they are well armed and rent by bitter and continuous blood feuds. Rugged mountains preclude the possibility of effective military action against offenders, for to send gendarmes into such a country, even in considerable force, is merely to offer a bait to the tribes, and to run grave risk of a rebuff to which there is

no effective reply. But the tribes, owing to the prestige of the British, showed themselves willing to comply peacefully with our ideas, to avoid highway robbery and looting, and generally to behave better than might be expected considering the remoteness of any effective force. In this district difficulties were increased by the fact that it marches with the area of the Turkish occupation in the north-west, while to the north-east is the Persian frontier of Azerbaijan, a province which was in a state of complete chaos.

In Urumiyah, and indeed throughout Azerbaijan, the situation with regard to Persian rule was one which could not fail to arouse grave misgivings, and serious disorders there were almost certain to be reflected in the areas which were nominally under our control. So great was the confusion existing there that it was difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion as to what was actually occurring. There seemed to be little doubt that two main factors were reacting on the situation: firstly, a feeling of intense hostility to the return of the Assyrians and Armenians, fostered by some kind of pan-Islamic movement centred on Tabriz, and probably stimulated to a certain extent by Persian officials; and secondly, an intense dislike by the Kurds of the emasculated Persian rule, which was incapable of producing any form of law and order.

On the Turkish side of the frontier a movement towards Kurdish independence had been reported in January 1919. It was born of fear of a return of the Christians and fed by Turkish propaganda, which tended to give it a tinge of pan-Islamism. The notorious Simko was the chief local factor, possibly in alliance with Saiyid Taha, hereditary Shaikh of Shamsdinan and grandson of Shaikh 'Ubaidullah, who was famed for having led an attack on Persia in 1881.

In the north-west corner of the Mosul Wilayat pro-Turkish and anti-Christian propaganda began to meet with considerable success; the position of the Christian villages between Zakho and Jazirat ibn 'Umar became one of considerable danger, while in some cases anti-Christian disturbances actually took place. On 19th March letters were intercepted from 'Abdul Rahman Agha, chief of the Shernakh Kurds, north-east of Jazirat ibn 'Umar, urging the expulsion of foreigners and stating that the movement had the support and recognition of the Turkish Government, whose efforts were being seconded by individuals and committees in Constantinople, Cairo, and apparently Paris, working for an independent Kurdish State. Turkish officers at the same time visited Shamsdinan with Turkish propaganda, but were coldly received, while one of them penetrated into the Mosul Wilayat with the same object.

The local centres of the evil were undoubtedly Jazirat ibn 'Umar and Shernakh, both of which have been noted for anti-Christian feeling in the past and were conveniently placed for any movement supported by the Turks. The actual instruments were the Goyan, an unruly and turbulent tribe, situated for the most part just outside our administrative border, to the north of Zakho. During the first week of April, Captain Pearson, Assistant Political Officer, Zakho, proceeded on a visit to this tribe to restore order and to make arrangements for the safety of the Christian villages in the future. While actually in the company of certain of the Goyan chiefs, he was treacherously ambushed and murdered on the march under circumstances which left little doubt as to the complicity of some of his companions.

When first anti-Christian disturbances took place, military action had been asked for, as it was recognised that in dealing with uncivilised mountain tribes trouble of this nature, unless nipped in the bud, is extremely liable to spread. But difficulties of communication precluded military action and aeroplanes were not at the time available. With the murder of a British Political Officer, the need for drastic action was immeasurably increased. During the latter part of the Turkish régime, the Turks had not failed, if their officials were assaulted, to take the most drastic measures. Under our rule this was the first case which had occurred, and the tribes naturally looked upon it as a test of the vigour and strength of our Government and as a measure of the extent to which we could be defied with impunity. It was suggested, therefore, that military measures should at once be undertaken in the shape of an expedition against the Goyan, coupled with the immediate occupation of Jazirat ibn 'Umar. The latter movement would have attacked the root of the evil at the last-named place and at Shernakh, would have turned the worst of the ranges protecting the Goyan country, and finally have isolated that tribe from support.

But the Goyan were situated outside the administrative border of the Mosul Wilayat, and this, coupled with the difficulty of the country and the lack of supplies, was held to outweigh the political necessity and preclude the possibility of military action. It had been suggested that as the country to the north of our administrative



border was in the area of Turkish occupation, the Turks might be called upon to take action against the offenders and to arrange for the maintenance of order on their side of the border in the future. But as the troubles on the frontier were largely due to Turkish intrigue, intervention by them could hardly be expected to be either wholehearted or effective. It might, indeed, be dangerous, for not only were the Turks in sympathy with the anti-British movement, but the mere fact that we called upon them to act in the case of an offence against us would demonstrate to the tribes our military weakness in the district and our inability to protect our own interests in the mountains on the frontier.

It was decided, therefore, to abandon the proposal for Turkish action, and, aeroplanes having become available, a bombing raid was arranged for by way of reprisals. It was unfortunately ineffective owing to bad weather and the difficulties of the country, and the results of our inaction soon made themselves evident in the spread of unrest, the attack on a gendarmerie post, the ambushing of a military convoy, and the fact that not only the Goyan, but other tribes in the neighbourhood began to assume a defiant attitude. We were forced, therefore, to continue bombing raids on a larger scale. These were more successful; the good results were immediately evident, and the attitude of the tribes underwent considerable improvement.

Meantime affairs were not running smoothly in Sulaimaniyah. From the first a certain anxiety had been visible among the aghas lest British control should lead to awkward questions as to land ownership, there being in most cases no title except forcible possession. Though the power of agha and saiyyid was contrary to the interests of the bulk of the population, it was impossible at the moment to put a curb on it, and in order to allay the fears of the ruling class the Tapu registers were not sent to Baghdad, where they would have been subjected to inconvenient scrutiny, but allowed to remain temporarily at Sulaimaniyah. By the end of December doubts were beginning to arise as to the wisdom of allowing the power of Shaikh Mahmud to increase to too great an extent. His record in Turkish times was not one to inspire confidence, but apart from any reference to the previous history of the family, the question with which we were now faced was one of practical politics. The influence of Shaikh Mahmud undoubtedly existed, and we had recognised it. Without the full measure of co-operation and assistance which he was giving us, it would have been necessary to bring in a strong garrison, which at the time was out of the question. From the political point of view it was of great importance that we should maintain order in the area, and at the time should avoid the appearance of using force for this purpose.

It was hard to tell how far a national movement for independence existed and how far it was an artificial product of the personal ambitions of the Kurdish leaders, who doubtless saw in Kurdish autonomy an unequalled opportunity for furthering their own interests. To many independence meant freedom from all law or restraint and permission to indulge in unrestricted rapine and license. Their ambitions had to be kept in check by continual reminders that His British Majesty's Government, if it accepted the responsibility for Kurdistan, did so only on the strict understanding that the people and those whom they chose as their leaders, would conform to the regulations and principles requisite for the maintenance of order, the administration of justice and the assurance of progress and development. A connection with Baghdad was dictated by the inexorable logic of geography and was further a matter of everyday convenience, if not of necessity, but there was no reason why it should interfere with the development of the country on national lines.

It was explained to the people that the personnel of the administration was to be as far as possible Kurdish. Kurdish levies were to be organised under Kurdish officers, while the Kurdish tongue was to be the official language of Government. Laws would be modified to conform with local custom and usage, and a system of revenue collection and taxation devised to meet the needs of the people. In dealing with the tribes, existing custom and law would be respected and the recognised chiefs would be allowed to carry on the tribal administration of their clansmen as heretofore. As regards finance, the country would have its own provincial budget, and the taxes collected would be devoted to the administration and development of the country, but a contribution would be paid towards the expenses of the parent administration at Baghdad. On the other hand, the association with Mesopotamia would assure material advantages of great importance; education, public works, agriculture and communications would all derive their main inspiration and impetus from Baghdad.

Shaikh Mahmud's ambitions were not, however, consonant with this programme. To quote again Major Soane's report :—

“ While southern Kurdistan was offered an autonomous condition under British supervision and the help of British officials in organisation, Shaikh Mahmud, the most powerful personality of the country, at once conceived the possibility of constructing with our assistance a State which should be free from the obligation of administration directly controlled from Baghdad, and which should—so far from being the vehicle of emancipation and instrument of reconstruction of a ruined country—widen the circle of his personal influence and power till he should become the despot of all lands from Khaniqin to Shamsdinan and from the Jabal Hamrin to within the borders of Persia.”

He was known to be in communication with the hostile centre at Shernakh, and it was clear that steps would have to be taken to prevent his influence spreading to regions where it was unnecessary or objectionable and where it offered a possible menace to peace in the future. Furthermore, there was a definite party even in Sulaimaniyah itself in favour of direct British administration, which could not fail to be more attractive to the merchant and trading classes than any system based on Kurdish leadership.

But Shaikh Mahmud was not prepared to accept from us, any more than he had accepted from the Turks, a limitation of his authority. He was surrounded by interested sycophants who filled his head with extravagant ideas and encouraged him to style himself ruler of the whole of Kurdistan. He interfered constantly in local administration and flooded the administrative departments with his relations and hangers on. He represented the interests of the aghawat, potent, if mainly potent for evil, and as a religious leader of wild tribesmen he was a power which had to be reckoned with. No sudden alteration could be made in our attitude towards him, yet it was evident that peaceful progress and the general good could not be achieved unless the jinn which had been let loose from the Sulaimaniyah bottle could be corked down.

In the middle of March 1919 Major Soane, whose knowledge of southern Kurdistan is unrivalled, was appointed Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah with a view to reducing Shaikh Mahmud to a position consonant with his merits. Major Soane had recently returned from a year's sick leave. On his way to his post he studied carefully the situation at Kifri and Kirkuk, decided on the line to be adopted, and towards the end of April reported from Sulaimaniyah that Shaikh Mahmud's influence was declining fast, to the satisfaction of the countryside. As order increased and the benefits of a sound administration grew more obvious, the tribes became increasingly dissatisfied with Shaikh Mahmud's rule. Accordingly Major Soane removed the large Jaf tribe from under him and placed an Assistant Political Officer at Halabja, east of Sulaimaniyah, to deal with the Jaf directly. As soon as it was understood that we had no intention, as we had declared from the first, of forcing Shaikh Mahmud on reluctant elements, his adherents diminished; many who had been terrorised by him into a declaration in his favour shook themselves loose, and, except in the immediate neighbourhood of Sulaimaniyah, he was rapidly sinking into a position of comparative innocuousness.

Nevertheless the situation was not wholly reassuring. Shaikh Mahmud's personal ambitions were such as to urge him to active measures in order to prevent the final disappearance of his power; he was in touch with the Goyan and knew that the outrages committed by them in the Zakho district had not been effectively punished, and he was fully aware that we had no force at Sulaimaniyah capable of suppressing disorder on a large scale. The Kurdish levies led by Kurdish officers were ready to support Shaikh Mahmud, to whose influence they owed their appointment. Anxiety was justified when, on 20th May, Shaikh Mahmud organised a *coup d'état*. He drew his chief support from Kurds on the Persian side of the frontier, notably from the Aoraman and Meriwan tribes, situated respectively about 40 miles south-east and east of Sulaimaniyah, but he obtained assistance from the districts immediately to the north and north-east of the town, and also from the armed riff-raff of Sulaimaniyah itself.

The outbreak was sudden and unexpected. The small force of levies on the spot were quickly defeated and dispersed, and the political and military officers were confined to their houses, but were not maltreated. One motor driver was killed. Shaikh Mahmud at once assumed entire control of affairs, appointed his own Qaimmaqam, seized all Government records and the treasury, and cut telegraphic communication with Kirkuk. A convoy proceeding from Kifri to Sulaimaniyah with

treasure, rifles and horses was captured by his adherents, and doubtless provided a welcome accession to his strength.

Simultaneously with the movement against Sulaimaniyah matters became critical at Halabja. On 25th May the Assistant Political Officer reported that his gendarmes were deserting, and on the 26th Shaikh Mahmud's men took possession of the town, while an aeroplane which flew over was fired upon. Both townsmen and tribes were, however, in a state of indecision, and, taking advantage of this the Assistant Political Officer and his staff were able with some difficulty to withdraw to Khaniqin. He had been aided by the constant support of that remarkable woman, 'Adlah Khanum, whose authority is second to none in Halabja. She is one of several Kurdish ladies whose distinguished descent and personal qualities have given them a commanding position over Kurdish tribes either in Turkey or Persia, and she has exercised her power wisely. Her services on behalf of the maintenance of law and order on this occasion were suitably recognised by the British Government after the Sulaimaniyah rising was ended.

Immediate military action was essential, but so difficult were the problems connected with supply, and with the safeguarding of lines of communication, that some delay was inevitable. The rebellion, however, did not spread. In northern Kurdistan Simko of the Shikak, and Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan, the nephew and bitter rival of 'Abdul Qadir, were jealous of Shaikh Mahmud's influence, and had, prior to the rising, declared him to be growing too powerful. Saiyid Taha happened to be in Baghdad on a visit to the Acting Civil Commissioner when the rebellion broke out. He expressed his complete disassociation from Shaikh Mahmud, and returned on 25th May, *viâ* Rawanduz, to Neri, his home in Shamsdinan, having undertaken to use his influence against the rebel. His action exemplifies the lack of unity and fellow-feeling between northern and southern Kurdistan; even the dialects employed by the inhabitants are mutually incomprehensible.

In Sulaimaniyah dissension was arising. Shaikh Mahmud did not pay his levies and was short of ammunition. By 11th June, in spite of a success gained over a British reconnaissance party, he was ready to negotiate; but matters had gone too far, and on 18th June we defeated his forces on the Bazian Pass, between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah, and he himself was wounded and taken prisoner. Our cavalry were in Sulaimaniyah the same night, to the great relief of the inhabitants. Shaikh Mahmud and Shaikh Gharib, his brother-in-law, who had been captured at Bazian, were brought to Baghdad and committed to trial for insurrection. Shaikh Mahmud was condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief to ten years' imprisonment, while Shaikh Gharib was given five years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000.

The unsubstantial character of Shaikh Mahmud's rebellion was proved by the fact that out of a potential backing of many thousands, his active supporters numbered no more than 300. Since his removal the administration of Sulaimaniyah, while retaining an individuality which differentiates it in some details from that of the average Mesopotamian Division, conforms in essentials with the principles of civil government which have been adopted in the 'Iraq. Care has been taken to appoint Kurds, not Arabs, to official positions under the British staff. In July the enlistment of Kurdish levies was sanctioned and by the end of December the numbers had increased to over 300. The officers are all men who have seen commissioned service with the Turkish Army. Some of them have valuable military experience, but all have proved ready to learn British military methods. Under a British non-commissioned officer from Baghdad the police force has immensely improved, not only in efficiency but also in status. The progress made in public security is witnessed by the fact that in the autumn of 1919 pilgrim traffic from Tabriz began to pass through Sulaimaniyah for the first time for many years. Great pains have been taken to afford educational facilities and to conform in religious questions to local prejudice.

Most striking is the progress which has been made in the town itself. When we occupied Sulaimaniyah in November 1918, out of a normal population of some 6,000 not more than 2,500 were alive. Corpses were lying in the streets and sewers, and famine and disease were fast killing the survivors. Few habitable houses were standing. By the end of 1919 the population had risen to over 10,000, and in spite of the lack of masons and building material, numbers of houses have been reconstructed, and there are as many shops as there were before the war. The boom in trade is such that the rents of business properties increased 300 per cent. in the last five months of 1919, and owners are constantly receiving offers in advance at enhanced rates from prospective tenants who wish to secure shops and office room.

As regards the prosperity of the district, our agricultural loans were too late in 1918 to do more than save the population from famine, but they had the effect of producing a crop sufficient for immediate wants. In the following year sowings increased  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times. Main roads, which are as vital to economic advance as they are to the administration, are being constructed on a permanent basis from Sulaimaniyah to Kirkuk by the Baziau Pass and to Halabja over the mountain spurs of Gwezha.

With prosperity has come peace. There are now no serious agents of disruption in the district, and unless disorders in other parts of Kurdistan upset the balance and arouse the ambitions of the Aghas, equilibrium is likely to be maintained.

When we occupied Sulaimaniyah, immediately after the armistice, the ramifications of the Kurdish question were as yet unknown and unforeseen, nor indeed did they develop fully until the following year. Kurdish national aspirations had been put forward in November by General Sharif Pasha, and in January a Committee of Kurdish Independence formed in Egypt appealed to us for help in the setting up of a Kurdish State.

In northern Kurdistan, soon after the signing of the armistice, the Kurdish movement broke into fresh activity. It was perhaps fostered by prominent Turks, such as 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, who commanded the Turkish 6th Army at the time of the armistice, and by the Committee of Union and Progress, with the object of embarrassing the Allies. In January, members of the Committee of Union and Progress were in Kharput, urging the Kurds to claim independence at the Peace Conference. 'Ali Ihsan visited Kurdish chiefs and supplied them with money, arms and horses to use against the British if they should attempt to occupy the country. His relations with the Kurds dated from before the war, when he was one of the chief instigators of the massacre of the Christians in Bitlis and Van. Towards the end of January he was actively employed at Diyarbakr in suppressing any expression of anti-Turkish feeling.

In the course of January Sir Mark Sykes, who was then at Aleppo, sent an emissary to the Kurds of the Tur 'Abdin, a highland district north of Nisibin, to find out whether they were likely to resist the British and also to prevent them from providing 'Ali Ihsan with supplies. There was found to be a party which desired British protection, but where 'Ali Ihsan had successfully tampered with the tribes they were anti-foreign. At Diyarbakr and at Mardin a similar anti-foreign agitation had been set on foot, but at Sairt, 75 miles south-west of Lake Van, the Kurds rose against the Turkish garrison and drove them out, in spite of efforts on the part of 'Ali Ihsan to bribe the chiefs. At Bashqalah, further south, there was a movement in favour of Kurdish independence which found sympathy in Persian Kurdistan, the leading figure being Simko, chief of the Shikak.

At the beginning of March the chief men of Severek, between Diyarbakr and 'Urfah, visited the Turkish authorities and the leaders of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, and decided to organise the Turkish forces and the tribes in order to offer resistance to foreign occupation. They released Shaikh Mahmud, paramount chief of the Milli Kurds east of 'Urfah, who was in prison on a charge of disloyalty to the Government, and ordered him to call up his tribe and co-operate in driving the British out of 'Urfah. In return the Turks promised to recognise his position with the Milli, and to make him the most powerful Kurdish chief west of the Euphrates. The help he gave after his release amounted, however, to nothing, for he was unable either to rouse the Kurdish tribes or to keep them together even in his own district, nor could the Turks openly support him in flagrant breach of the armistice, and by May the loose confederacy he had tried to create had collapsed. No greater success attended the efforts of emissaries despatched from Constantinople by the group led by 'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan, who was a member of the Turkish Cabinet and also President of the Committee of Kurdish Independence.

In Diyarbakr and Mardin the Kurdish Club was already organised and at work. It was composed, according to a subsequent report by Major Noel, mainly of corrupt and degenerate notables who, for motives of self-interest, had been active supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress. With the defeat of Turkey they were faced with the possibility of the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, and joined the Kurdish national party at the instigation of the Turks, who held out to them the bait of Kurdish autonomy under Ottoman auspices. The Club was directed against British intervention and against the Armenians, and stimulated the fears of the Kurds that the appearance on the scene of any Western Power must inevitably lead to the subjugation of Moslem to Christian interests. It contained some members who were

actuated by a genuine desire for the welfare of Kurdistan as a whole, but even these more moderate men were handicapped by having been implicated in the massacres of 1915, by which they had profited materially.

Although, as has been described, the status of Mosul had not yet been decided, the Wilayat, ravaged by the war, could not be left without administration or assistance, and as soon as the military occupation had taken place, Colonel Leachman was appointed Political Officer. When preliminary organisation had been completed, officers were despatched east and north to 'Aqrah and Zakho in order to get into touch with the Kurds and ensure peace on our borders. Beyond the armistice frontier the situation was exceedingly obscure, and towards the end of March it was considered essential to ascertain the trend of feeling in the Turkish zone, not only because, without exact knowledge, it would be impossible for the Peace Conference to come to a decision concerning the future of Kurdistan, but also because the unrest there had already been reflected in Zakho, as was witnessed by the disturbances which culminated early in April in the murder of Captain Pearson. Agitation had been started in Jazirat ibn 'Umar at the beginning of February by 'Ali Ihsan, whose efforts here as elsewhere were directed against British occupation. Influential Arabs and Armenians were detained without cause as prisoners, traffic on the Tigris was impeded, and the enrolling and arming of the Kurds were carried on without hindrance, orders from Constantinople that the terms of the armistice were to be enforced being disregarded by the Kurds with the connivance of the local Turkish authorities. A Turkish officer visited Shamsdinan to spread Turkish propaganda, but was coldly received, while another entered the Mosul Wilayat on a similar mission. 'Ali Ihsan was removed towards the end of February, but in March representatives of the Kurdish National Committee at Constantinople passed through Mosul on their way to Sulaimaniyah with letters urging the Kurdish tribes to rise against the British. The Zakho disturbances were not, therefore, a spontaneous local growth; they were engineered by the Turks through men who had the advantage of first-hand local knowledge and all the backing which could be provided by the state of ferment which existed in the Ottoman Empire.

On 1st April Major Noel left for Nisibin with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Force, General Allenby, and from Nisibin he went on to Diyarbakr. The gist of his reports was that there was an active pro-Turkish party which was anti-British and supported by pan-Islamic elements, but side by side with these irreconcilables a pan-Kurdish party, the aim of which was the complete independence of Kurdistan. The latter he described as not definitely anti-British, though it was alienated from us by the fear that we intended to pursue a vindictive policy on behalf of the Christians. The Kurdish Club, which had at first been fairly subservient to the Ottoman Government, had shown an increasingly independent spirit. "The tantalising version of President Wilson's doctrine that "everyone should do as they liked," Major Noel wrote, "has slowly dawned on their "horizon, with all its alluring possibilities, and Turco-Kurds are now convinced that "if they shout loud enough President Wilson will hear and allow them to mis- "manage Diyarbakr by themselves, and to continue to fatten on the Christian "property that they stole during the massacres, without even having to share the "spoil with the Turks." The Ottoman Government regarded the Club with growing disfavour, and finally decided to liquidate it.

"The events which led up to this occurrence," continued Major Noel, "are not without interest, in that they give a typical example of the many undercurrents of intrigue which are flowing here, and the methods to which the Turks are having recourse. When news of the occupation of Smyrna was received, the Turks were not slow to turn it to their own uses. News was spread of a massacre of Mohammedans by Greeks, and the British were represented as having brought in the Greeks. The Kurds were invited to apply the analogy of Smyrna to Diyarbakr; the English would come first and occupy the town, which would be but a prelude to the arrival of Armenian troops. All these measures had their natural effect. A good deal of fanaticism was aroused among the common herd, and the old reactionary and corrupt townsmen, who were now so-called members of the Kurdish Club, and who dreaded an enquiry into their misdeeds of 1915, hoped for another massacre which would destroy the last remaining witnesses of their past, and would effectually confuse the issues. By this time the Christians were thoroughly frightened. A deputation was sent off in hot haste to me at Mardin to ask for British intervention. The Government also began to have its qualms, for its propaganda had slightly miscarried. Feeling was to have been worked up against the British, not against the

Christians, while the inopportuneness of another massacre was fully realised. However, a neat way out of the difficulty suggested itself. The Kurdish Club was to be made the scapegoat, which could be done with a show of justice owing to the activities of its more corrupt and fanatical members. Under the guise of protecting the Christians an inconvenient organisation opposed to Turkish sovereignty could be suppressed. The Christians were accordingly told that it was the Kurds, instigated by the Kurdish Club, who thirsted for their blood. After their experiences of the last few years they were always ready to believe the worst, and it was only natural that they should have given full credence to this new presage of disaster. From words the Government proceeded to deeds. Guns were mounted on the citadel to overawe the town, the military were called out, the leaders of the Kurdish Club were arrested, and finally the Club itself was closed on the 4th of June. The Government had saved the situation, the situation of its own creation!"

Major Noel was convinced that until fear of Christian predominance was allayed it would be impossible to counter the agents of fanaticism and unrest. He believed that many of the cultivators desired to settle down to the pursuit of agriculture, and, given a sound policy in dealing with them, they might gradually cease to be a menace to their neighbours and develop into a comparatively peaceful community. It must be borne in mind that their sense of national existence does not imply a sense of national unity. The tribes are divided from each other by almost impassable mountains, and each one is swayed by immediate personal interests, while their chiefs are bitterly jealous of one another. They are all alike abysmally ignorant, and one of their principal grounds for hating and fearing the Armenians is that the higher attainments of the latter would give them the advantage officially and commercially, though numbers and superior fighting qualities are on the side of the Kurds.

Major Noel recommended that a reassuring proclamation should be published with regard to massacres carried out by the Kurds at the instigation or under the direct orders of the Turks, together with a formal declaration that we should insist on the restoration of immovable property only. Failing this, he thought that a verbal assurance from himself, if he might be permitted to give it, would be sufficient. In point of fact, by our silence with regard to our ultimate intentions we were allowing our adversaries to stir up hostility against us and to charge us with harbouring future intentions which, as was daily becoming more evident, it would never be in the power of the Allies to carry out even if on consideration they were approved. It was not only our credit in Kurdistan or our position on its borders which was imperilled by the agitation which was spreading through the country; such Armenians as had survived were in fear of renewed massacres which we should be powerless to prevent, and their anxiety was shared by American missionaries on the spot. The danger was greatly enhanced by the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, which had created a new situation in the whole of the Turkish Empire. It is significant that when in the autumn an American Commission was sent to Asia Minor to form an opinion based on personal observation, the majority of its members came to the conclusion that it would be impracticable to establish an Armenian State in Kurdistan.

With the approval of General Allenby and of the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, Major Noel was directed on 4th May to announce a general amnesty on the lines he had proposed in respect of Kurds within the Mosul Wilayat, and in a subsequent telegram he was authorised to give any verbal assurances he thought necessary in conformity with these instructions, with the proviso that the duty of insisting on the return of abducted persons and stolen property would not be renounced. The High Commissioner in Constantinople had pointed out on 1st May that there were three courses open to us. We might disinterest ourselves in whatever happened outside the limits of our occupation, leaving the Christians to their fate; or we might ask the Turkish Government to take action, which they were little likely to be able or even willing to do; or we might make use of such elements among the Kurds as were anxious to stand well with us. The Acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad thought that the third course offered the best hope for the pacification of the country, and proposed on 12th May that we should give full assurances, as far as His Majesty's Government was concerned, regarding amnesty and freedom from Armenian domination in areas predominantly Kurdish. Before an answer could be received in London, Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan arrived at Baghdad, his visit coinciding, very fortunately, with the outbreak of disturbances in Sulaimaniyah. Saiyid Taha is a man of considerable influence, political and spiritual, in north-east Kurdistan. His grandfather, Saiyid 'Ubaidullah, was famous for an attack which he led in 1876 against Urumiyah in Persian territory, where the family owns large properties.

'Ubaidullah was interned at Constantinople with his son 'Abdul Qadir, who is the leader there of the Kurdish national party. Another son, Sadiq, who remained in Kurdistan, was a well-known oppressor of the Christians. His son, Saiyid Taha, had been before the war the honoured guest of a Russian Consul, and there was at one time an idea that he might be used as the figurehead of a nominally independent Kurdistan under Russian auspices; nevertheless, he managed to keep in good odour with the Germans, and the Russians, mistrusting him, destroyed his house at Neri where they crossed the frontier in 1916. He is related by marriage to Simko, chief of the Shikak, and is on good terms with him. Simko has fought in turn the Russians, the Turks and the Armenians, and is notorious for having murdered in cold blood the Assyrian Patriarch, Mar Shim'un. The two men, Saiyid Taha and Simko, are opportunists of the kind which Kurdistan breeds in plenty, remorselessly pursuing their own advantage. The Christian problem touched Saiyid Taha little, but Simko is determined not to yield up an iota of the gains which he has acquired at the expense of the Christians during the war. The geographical position of both among mountains where means of communication are non-existent, makes it difficult to see who would be prepared to coerce them.

Saiyid Taha's object in visiting Baghdad was to press for a united Kurdistan under British auspices, including the Kurds in Persian territory. When it was explained to him that he could expect no help from us in realising this project as far as the Persian Kurds were concerned, he expressed great disappointment and observed that the separation of Persian Kurdistan from Persia was certain to come, even if we withheld our consent. Nevertheless, he accepted the position and declared his willingness to help us in every way possible in order to establish in Kurdistan the régime which he and his friends desired, but he asked to be satisfied on the following points: firstly, that a general amnesty would be proclaimed; secondly, that no attempt would be made to set up a single chief in Kurdistan, but that the country should be organised in large autonomous groups; thirdly, that the repatriation of Christians should be conditional upon an undertaking on our part that the Kurds should not be placed under Armenian or Nestorian domination; and fourthly, that His Majesty's Government would be ready to provide the same material assistance as in the 'Iraq.

As the Sulaimaniyah rebellion was threatening the peace of the whole Kurdish frontier, it was advisable that we should make use of Saiyid Taha's friendly sentiments, and the Acting Civil Commissioner gave him a letter in Persian, of which the following is a translation:—

“I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to assure you personally that His Majesty's Government have no intention of adopting a vindictive policy towards Kurds in regard to acts committed during the war, but are prepared to grant them a general amnesty. This will not prevent the representatives of the British Government from using their friendly endeavours to make peace between Armenians and Kurds in regard to their personal affairs, and they will also use their best endeavours to settle between the two parties questions relating to land in a friendly manner without resort to armed intervention. His Majesty's Government wish me to assure you that the interests of the Kurds are by no means being lost sight of at the Peace Conference.”

The purport of these assurances was communicated to Major Noel, who on 23rd June issued a notification in the Kurdish areas which were under his charge, saying:—

“The future of the country variously known as Armenia or Kurdistan is a question which must be decided by the Peace Conference. No one need doubt that the Peace Conference will decide in accordance with its often expressed principle that nations have the right to determine their own government. The British Government has given its assurance that the interests of the Kurds are not being overlooked at the Peace Conference. Until the decision is made known it is the duty and the interest of all nationalities and classes in Kurdistan to preserve peace and order. With regard to the massacres of Armenians which resulted from the orders of the Turkish Government, civilisation demands that the officials guilty of issuing such orders should be severely punished. Armenians responsible for the massacre of Moslems will be dealt with in the same way. Armenian women and girls shut up in Moslim houses must be released, and lands or houses forcibly taken from Armenians must be restored to their lawful owners. On the other hand, the British Government so far as it is concerned has no intention of pursuing a vindictive policy towards

Kurds in respect of acts committed during the war, and is prepared to grant them a general amnesty. It is necessary that the two races occupying the same area should leave their wrongs in the hand of Government, should relinquish private grudges and recriminations and prepare to live together in mutual toleration and goodwill. The British authorities desire only this, and will severely punish any such unjust acts or false accusations as lead to perpetual hostility or promote unrest."

The notification had a good effect among the leaders of the Kurdish national movement, while to the letter given to Saiyid Taha may be attributed the fact that no disturbances have occurred in his district. It would have been too much to expect that he should have broken off relations with Turkish emissaries, nor is it probable that he did so, but he has been of use in keeping the tribes quiet round Shamsdinan and Rawanduz, and he seems to have done his best to limit Turkish propaganda. In the early summer it was proposed to him that he should undertake the government of the north-eastern portion of the Rawanduz district, together with the fertile lowlands of Dasht-i-Harir, and administer this region in addition to Shamsdinan and possible extensions on behalf of the British Government. He was to receive an allowance and to undertake not to intrigue in Mosul or against the Persian Government. He gave no definite reply; on the one hand, he may have hesitated to embrace a rôle which seemed not dissimilar from that which had been assigned to Skaikh Mahmud, with results which were unencouraging; and on the other, the fact that the British Assistant Political Officer at Rawanduz was withdrawn to Batas, a few miles to the west in July, owing to events at Amadiyah presently to be related, may have aroused in his mind misgivings as to the permanence of our occupation. In August, as he had not accepted the proposal, it was withdrawn, without, however, any interruption of cordial relations, and he is reported to have become more and more anti-Turk.

Simko made overtures to us in May. He wrote in friendly terms to the Acting Civil Commissioner, whom he had known before the war. A personal grievance, which was from our point of view a side issue, pre-occupied him. One of the ill-wishers, of whom he has many (on this occasion it was a Persian official), had conceived the idea of sending him a bomb wrapped in a parcel. His indignant description of the episode cannot be better recorded than in his own words: "I barely had time," he complained, "to throw it at my brother when it went off." In retaliation he attacked Urumiyah in June. His hostility to Persia, with which country we concluded an agreement in August, which put an end to any lingering hope that we would favour a national union between the Turkish and Persian Kurds, together with his fear of reprisals on account of his treatment of Christians, tended to throw him increasingly into the arms of the Turks.

As for other Kurdish leaders, Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniyah had been eliminated by the failure of his rebellion; Shaikh Mahmud of the Milli was a candidate for the hypothetical post of ruler of a united Kurdistan; in Constantinople 'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan was ready to assume the same rôle, and the claims of the Badr Khan, formerly rulers of Bohtan, were no less than his own; while at a later date Sharif Pasha in Paris notified his election as head of a future Kurdish State, though there is no evidence to show that he was chosen by anyone but himself. In February the Grand Vizier had been prepared to let 'Abdul Qadir or his son go to Kurdistan on a mission of pacification. The scheme never materialised, but a rumour which reached his nephew and rival, Saiyid Taha, to the effect that 'Abdul Qadir was to tour Kurdistan under our auspices, probably enhanced Saiyid Taha's inclination to keep a foot in the Turkish camp.

Towards the end of June Major Noel was sent to Constantinople to discuss the situation with the High Commissioner on behalf of the Acting Civil Commissioner. They agreed that the most salient feature was the break between the Kurds and the Turks, and the High Commissioner suggested that Major Noel should be entrusted with a second mission to Asia Minor, and that selected members of leading Kurdish families should be allowed to join him and travel through the country, with a view to impressing on the tribes the necessity of maintaining order and protecting the Christians. He thought that if they were enjoined not to seek nationalist ends they would have nothing to fear from the Ottoman Government, notwithstanding the fact that the nationalist movement was regarded with suspicion by the Turks. Mustafa Kamal, a Turkish General whose activities were beyond the control of his own Government in Constantinople, though he was in close touch with the Committee of Union and Progress, stood for Turkish interests in Asia Minor against all comers. A League of Eastern Anatolia had been formed under his auspices in defence of Ottoman rights, its leading principle being the integrity of Turkey, with the



corollary that no Greek or Armenian State should be established within its limits; at the same time the rights of non-Moslems were to be guaranteed and a mandatory Power which would respect Turkish nationalist feelings would be welcomed. The central Government, it was stipulated, should be based on the will of the people and a National Assembly should be convoked. A meeting of the League was held at Erzerum in August, but subsequently Sivas was chosen as the headquarters of the nationalist committee, which was to all intents and purposes a Soviet. Its influence was sufficient to bring about the resignation in October of Damad Farid's cabinet, which it decried as non-national. When 'Abdul Ridha Pasha succeeded Damad Farid as Grand Vizier, the new Minister of Marine went in person to Trebizond to interview Mustafa Kamal and brought back to Constantinople a representative of the Sivas group.

In September Major Noel left Aleppo in company with two members of the Badr Khan family, Kamiran and Jalabat. He reported that from 'Aintab to Malatia the Kurds, who formed from 70 per cent. to 80 per cent. of the population, were strongly imbued with Kurdish nationalist doctrines, but, unlike the Kurds of Diarbakr and Mardin, they were anti-Turk. He attributed this attitude to the fact that they were mostly Shi'ahs and to the absence of the crucial Armenian problem, the number of Armenians having always been very small. The Defence League took alarm at the mission, on the ground that Major Noel was trying to create disturbance by working for an independent Kurdistan which should be free from Ottoman control. They accused Damad Farid's Government, which had consented to his journey, of treachery to the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and Ahmad Jevdet, who was in command of the 13th Army Corps, attempted to arrest the two Badr Khans. The situation threatened to become difficult, and Major Noel and his companions were recalled from Malatia by the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Force. The Kurdish National Society in Constantinople protested against the action of the Turks and declared the Malatia incident to be an affront to Kurdish honour and national sentiment. The breach between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalist parties has since then become more pronounced. Mustafa Kamal's adherents have closed all Kurdish clubs in the provinces, and, according to reports, have taken severe measures against all who were known to favour Kurdish independence. Among Turks also, the Defence League seems to be overreaching itself. The Anatolian peasant is growing weary of calls to arms even when they are made in the name of the fatherland, and is beginning to see in Mustafa Kamal an impediment to the restoration of tranquillity and prosperity rather than a patriot. But such sentiments are as yet in embryo.

These cross currents of intrigue and the hostilities which they engendered reacted on our relations with the Kurds on the confines of the Mosul Wilayat and were partly responsible for the outbreaks at Amadiyah and 'Aqrah in July and November. It was the desire of the British authorities to provide for the repatriation of the Assyrian refugees to their home in the Tiari Mountains. The nearest and most convenient approach lay through Amadiyah, and with this end in view British administration had been extended in that direction. In January a detachment of troops was placed 4 miles from Amadiyah, and an Assistant Political Officer was appointed in the following March. The Kurds were treated with great liberality as regards agricultural advances, and no distinction was drawn between them and the Christians; but the Assistant Political Officer set himself to establish order and the basis of administration, and it brought him into inevitable collision with Kurdish chiefs, who saw their misused independence threatened. The town of Amadiyah was rent by a standing feud between two of its leading citizens, a feud in which all the inhabitants were accustomed to take an enjoyable hand, to say nothing of the aghas and sayids of the adjoining tribes. British administration was not distasteful so long as its activities were confined to the distribution of advances and grants, without which the ruined villages could not start agricultural operations, but when it took the direction of collecting taxes and curbing the lawless tyranny of the aghas it appeared in a less pleasing aspect. The Turks had taken an easier view of their official obligations, though they had been backed by a stronger military force than was maintained by us. Moreover, it was common knowledge that we contemplated repatriating the Assyrians, and the Christians of Amadiyah did not fail to draw the attention of the Moslems to the fact that their day had dawned at last. There were outside influences ready to exaggerate talk of this nature.

But the repatriation of thousands of families to a rugged alpine region beyond our control was not a task to be undertaken lightly, and as the spring advanced it became evident that the return of the refugees must be postponed. There was,

therefore, no advantage to be gained in keeping troops so far from the base, especially as the lines of communication were difficult, and in June they were withdrawn to the Suwarah Pass, 18 miles west of Amadiyah. This left the Assistant Political Officer, Captain Willey, alone in the town, with Lieut. Macdonald and Sergt. Troop in charge of Kurdish levies and a couple of Indian telegraph clerks—confident, as the Englishman is apt to be, and more often rightly than wrongly, that his personal authority is sufficient protection. The malcontents saw their opportunity, and during the night of 15th July the leaders of the town factions, with the tacit connivance of the tribes, enlisted the services of the local gendarmerie and murdered the whole party. There can have been no question of personal unpopularity. Captain Willey, who was an experienced officer, had only recently been appointed to Amadiyah, while Lieut. Macdonald was zealous, efficient, and well liked. The outbreak was a demonstration against British authority and definitely anti-Christian in character. The Christian villages of the Amadiyah district were systematically raided, and though the loss of life was small, crops and sheep were everywhere destroyed and lifted. The Goyan, who had been responsible for the murder of Captain Pearson in April, and the Guli to the north of them, took part in the rising with the Barwar tribes of Amadiyah, and when the British punitive column approached the town the murderers fled to Goyan country. We entered Amadiyah on 8th August and captured some of the minor offenders after having dealt with the insurgent chiefs in the villages of Lower Barwari. Our troops drove the Upper Barwari tribes from the mountains north of the town and then turned their attention to the Goyan and the Guli. Two battalions of Assyrians, trained at Ba'qubah, were attached to the expedition and acquitted themselves well. Operations were concluded in September, and though the tribesmen, whose lifelong business and pleasure is guerilla warfare, had eluded us in the mountains (as they used to elude the Turks before us), we had yet succeeded in inspiring them with a wholesome fear and a conviction that the rising had been a mistake and that they had been fairly beaten on their own ground. By October all sections and, with few exceptions, all the leading offenders, had tendered their submission. They were dealt with leniently, the punishment which had been meted out to them by our troops having been sufficient. We appointed our own nominees to Amadiyah and Barwari, and, having provided them with means to maintain their authority, withdrew in December to Dohuk, half-way between Amadiyah and Mosul. The district has been quiescent since our withdrawal.

The year was not to close without a further loss of valuable lives which the political service could ill spare. Shortly after the armistice, an Assistant Political Officer had been sent to 'Aqrah, which lies north-east of Mosul near the edge of the plain about half-way between Amadiyah and Rawanduz. The mountains which separate 'Aqrah from the Greater Zab are the home of the Zibari Kurds, while on the opposite bank of the river are the territories of the Shaikh of Barzan. Barzan had had a stormy history in Turkish times. The Shaikh, 'Abdul Salim, had suffered at the hands of the Ottoman Government, and in 1909 the Turks sent an expedition against him with very moderate success. Nazim Pasha, who was placed in 1910 in supreme charge of the three Wilayats of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, patched up a peace, but when Nazim fell in 1911 all settlement which he had succeeded in adjusting crumbled, and at the outbreak of the war the Shaikh of Barzan was contemplating being forced in self-defence to accept the overtures which the Russians had frequently made to him, and seek protection from them. There was a bitter feud between Barzan and Zibar, and the Turks, following familiar lines of procedure, made use of Faris Agha of Zibar, and with his aid entrapped and hanged the Shaikh of Barzan. His successor, Shaikh Ahmad, inherited his feuds but not his wits. When British administration was established in the district, he keenly resented being placed under 'Aqrah, which he regarded as coloured by Zibari influence, and was at one time anxious to move into the Rawanduz district, but the project met with no encouragement from us. Faris Agha was, however, forbidden to cross the Zab into Barzan territory. The attempt to hold the balance antagonised both parties and gave a promising field for Turkish propaganda, which was being skilfully conducted from Van by an ex-governor, Haidar Beg. Reports were current in the early winter that Enver Pasha had arrived at Van with reinforcements consisting of Turks and Russian deserters, and that he was in active correspondence with Situ Agha of Oranar, north of Amadiyah, the Barwari, and other malcontents. Through Turkish mediation the quarrel between Faris Agha of Zibar and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan seems to have been adjusted temporarily. Agents from Syria were engaged at the same time in disseminating doctrines to which the Aghas turned a favourable ear, for they offered the prospect of a distant and ineffective Islamic control under which the Aghas would

be left with the real authority, but the tribal cultivators, who would be forced to remain in complete subjugation to their chiefs, did not appear to view the matter in the same light.

Colonel Leachman had been succeeded as Political Officer at Mosul by Colonel Bill, who combined long experience with singular capacity as an administrator. Being new to the Division, he wished to make himself personally acquainted with it, with a special view to forming conclusions on the Kurdish question. He visited 'Aqrah at the end of October, imposed a fine on Faris Agha and a second Zibari chief, Babakr Agha, the followers of both having sniped our gendarmerie, and on 1st November crossed the Zab in order to inspect the levies of a local chief. The two Zibaris, enraged at having been called to order and fined, communicated with Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan, who sent his brother with some 20 men to their assistance. These, with Faris, Babakr, and their followers, amounting in all to about 100 men, ambushed the returning British officers close to Bira Kapra, Babakr's village, and shot them. They were accompanied by four gendarmes. Two were killed; one of these was an Assyrian, the other an 'Aqrah man who tried to defend his officers. The other two were Zibaris and went over to the enemy. All evidence goes to show that the murder of the two British officers was not planned beforehand, but was due to one of the sudden fits of anger which are typical of Kurdish temperament, but once accomplished it gave the signal for rebellion. The Zibaris and Barzanis attacked and looted 'Aqrah, and the British gendarmerie officer with difficulty escaped to Mosul. Within a day or two the tribes quarrelled among themselves over the loot, and the Barzanis went home. Several of the local tribes sent us offers of help and protests of friendship, and when, on 9th November, Captain Kirk, Assistant Political Officer at Batas (Rawanduz), made his way into 'Aqrah accompanied only by Kurdish levies, he found the townsmen praying for the return of the British administration. On the arrival of a punitive column in the Zab valley, most of the villages flew white flags and appeared to be in genuine fear of their aghas and to welcome protection against them.

Our troops burnt the houses of the Zibar chiefs, and crossing the Zab inflicted the same penalty on Barzan; but following the practice enjoined on them in the Amadiyah expedition, the villagers were not molested. The rebels were unable to rouse the neighbouring tribes, largely owing to the loyalty to us of the leading man near 'Aqrah, 'Abdul Qadir Agha of Shush, and no resistance was offered to our advance; the four culprits, Faris and Babaker of Zibar, Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan and his brother, escaped into the hills and were outlawed. No sympathetic disturbance took place in Amadiyah, and Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan refused to listen to the suggestion of the Qaimmaqam of Neri, where the Turks kept a small garrison, that he and Situ of Oramar should co-operate on behalf of the Zibaris. His attitude caused the Qaimmaqam uneasiness as to his own safety and he left Neri and retired north to Bashqal'ah. When operations were concluded it was decided that we should draw in our frontier to 'Aqrah and make no further attempt to hold the Zibar country between 'Aqrah and the Zab.

Thus by the end of the year we had ceased to administer the mountain borders of northern Kurdistan so far as we had engaged in that task. From Rawanduz the British outpost had been removed some 18 miles south-west to Batas; thence the line ran to 'Aqrah and Dohuk, excluding the mountain system which flanks the right bank of the Greater Zab, and leaving Amadiyah and Zibar outside our zone. Our arrival in the first instance had been in every case welcome because we provided means to combat the ruin and famine left by the Turks. We distributed relief with complete impartiality to Moslems and Christians, and it is probable that the help we extended saved what remained of the agricultural population. But we made no secret of our intention to repatriate the Christian refugees who had sought our protection and were continually pressing on us their desire to return to their home, and this just design furnished the subject-matter of the propaganda directed against us. That we could have avoided rousing the hostility of the aghawat was from the first impossible. "The position of the average Kurdish agha," observed Colonel Nalder in commenting on the Zibari rising, "is incompatible with our own or any other Government. Like "a feudal baron of the middle ages, he keeps a body of armed retainers and tyrannises "over the cultivators at his will. The lands owned by Faris Agha and his brother "would not assure them an income of Rs. 1,000 a year; their wealth depends entirely "on extortion from the villages and their influence from the fact that they spend the "money thus acquired in maintaining the armed bands which enforce their authority. "Such men cannot but view the advent of any form of settled government with

“concern, and when to this prejudice anti-Christian sentiments and extensive Turkish ‘propaganda are added, the present feeling on the border of northern Kurdistan is ‘sufficiently explained.’”

The justice of this description receives further proof from the existing state of affairs in southern Kurdistan. Shaikh Mahmud’s rebellion led to the elimination of an authority which exactly corresponded with Colonel Nalder’s summary. The population of Sulaimaniyah district have shown no sign of regretting him and the country is fairly established in the path of prosperity, whereas in northern Kurdistan, where the aghawat have beaten the administration, anarchy prevails. Besides Sulaimaniyah, the Arbil plain presents another satisfactory feature. The district, which is easily accessible from Mosul, is not at the mercy of chieftains who require mountain strongholds from which to conduct operations with safety. The people value administrative union with the more civilised valley of the Tigris, and have no wish to terminate a connection with Mosul and Baghdad which is equally profitable to either party. Arbil, including Keui Sanjaq and Rania, has been given the status of a Division.

The position of affairs at Amadiyah continues to be tranquil. Our nominee, ‘Abdul Latif Agha, has succeeded in maintaining his position. At Rawanduz the young Isma’il Beg ibn Su’aiyid Beg has our support and the backing of a detachment of our Kurdish levies. The arrangement has proved eminently satisfactory.

#### CHAPTER VII.—Development of Administration. The Revenue Department.

The addition of the Baghdad Wilayat to the occupied territories had given the work of administration a new significance. As the rich basins of the Euphrates and Diyalah came under control and the probability of a Turkish offensive diminished, administrative responsibility tended to outstrip in importance military considerations. At the same time new political factors were introduced, not the least of them being provided by the town of Baghdad. It is essentially a capital and regards itself as such. Although Basrah and Mosul were organised by the Turks as independent Wilayats, Baghdad was, in fact, the seat of Ottoman sovereignty in the ‘Iraq, and it remains the source of political inspiration.

Long before the armistice the force in Mesopotamia was called upon to solve administrative and political rather than military problems. The importance of this aspect of the campaign was recognised by His Majesty’s Government. In July 1917 the status of the Chief Political Officer was raised to that of Civil Commissioner. His duties were thus defined :—

“The civil administration must be carried on under such military supervision as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief considers essential, with due regard to local conditions and prejudices, if only to prevent disorder which might necessitate the detachment of troops urgently required elsewhere. For the present only such minimum of administrative efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary for the maintenance of order and to meet the requirements of the Force; the amendment of laws and the introduction of reforms should be kept within the narrowest possible limits. His Majesty’s Government do not wish large or controversial administrative questions raised or referred to them until the danger of Turkish attack is passed . . . . .”

The Civil Commissioner was given the right of direct correspondence with His Majesty’s Government; he was told to address his reports to the Secretary of State for India, and it was henceforth in the name of the Secretary of State that the instructions of His Majesty’s Government on other than military matters were issued. Mesopotamian administration benefited very greatly from being placed in direct connection with the India Office, where its needs and difficulties were the subject of careful attention. Sound advice and judicious support and help, as far as the India Office could supply them, were never lacking during the difficult years before civil government came into being.

On the occupation of Baghdad a separate organisation was maintained in the Wilayat of Basrah under a Deputy Chief Political Officer working in close touch with the Chief Political Officer in Baghdad. The boundaries of the Wilayat were the same

as in Turkish times, except that the Turkish Qaimmaqamliq of Kut was transferred to Basrah. The southern Wilayat consisted of five districts, Basrah itself, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, 'Amarah and Kut, each administered by a Political Officer, with local Assistant Political Officers under him. The towns of Basrah, Nasiriyah and 'Amarah were controlled by Military Governors, whose office became steadily more civil than military though the title remained unchanged.

In Baghdad Wilayat, Political Officers were appointed as the occupied territory was extended. By the end of the year 1917 they were 10 in number, placed at Baghdad, Samarra, Ba'qubah, Khaniqin, Aziziyah, Ramadi, Hillah, Karbala, Shamiyah and Samawah.

After a year of trial, it was decided to allow the distinction between the two Wilayats to lapse, and the whole work of administration was co-ordinated under the Civil Commissioner at Baghdad. This change was carried out in September 1918. The 14 divisions of which the two Wilayats had been composed remained unaltered till 1919, when Diwaniyah was separated from Hillah and given the status of a division, including Samawah; Karbala was merged with Hillah and Aziziyah with Kut. The advance of 1918 brought two more divisions into being, Sulaimaniyah and Mosul. In 1919 Kirkuk was separated from Sulaimaniyah and Arbil from Mosul, both becoming independent divisions, while Khaniqin and Ba'qubah were rolled into one in 1920.

To the Revenue Department the occupation of Baghdad brought some modifications. At the end of 1916 a Revenue Board composed of two officers had taken the place of the Revenue Commissioner. The two members of the Board divided the work between them, each being responsible for specified branches. When Baghdad fell, the First Revenue Officer took charge of all revenue work in the northern Wilayat, while his colleague did the same by the southern. The First Revenue Officer, Mr. Garbett, I.C.S., remained in charge till July 1918, and with his assistants, at first one, then two in number, grappled with the very heavy work of initial organisation in the Baghdad Wilayat. The difficulties of the task were aggravated by a severe shortage of food supplies, to remedy which he proposed a bold scheme of agricultural development which will presently be described; it was approved and carried out by the military authorities, with Mr. Garbett as Executive Officer and representative of the Revenue Department. He fell ill in July 1918, and after intervals of renewed work left the country on sick leave in December.

Changes had already been introduced into the scheme of the Department. The Basrah office was closed on the amalgamation of the two Wilayats and the records brought up to Baghdad. At first a Revenue and Finance Secretary assumed charge of the combined Department, but in the summer of 1919 the duties were divided into Revenue Department and Financial Department, with a Secretary at the head of either.

Beside the Agricultural Development Scheme, which was in charge of the military authorities, Departments of Irrigation and Agriculture were formed respectively in February and July 1918 as military units working under a Board of Agriculture. The Board was presided over by the Deputy Quartermaster-General and composed of five members, the Directors of Irrigation and Agriculture and the Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief representing the military side, the Revenue and Financial Secretary to the Civil Commissioner and the First Revenue Officer, who acted as Secretary to the Board, representing the civil side. This division of authority in matters which touched the administration of the civil population closely, though inevitable at the time, was not without its difficulties. For example, local irrigation officers possessed the power of inflicting small punishments, without reference to the local Political Officer, for breach of irrigation regulations or failure to fulfil orders with regard to embankments, &c.; yet the delinquent might be a man whom it was advisable from a political point of view to handle with caution, and in any case the existence of separate organisations issuing orders was confusing to the native mind. It speaks well for the manner in which the military and civil authorities worked together that the arrangement was carried out smoothly till 1919, when progress towards peaceful conditions permitted the handing over of irrigation and agriculture to the civil authorities, who were now in a position to assume these responsibilities.

From the point of view of an outgoing enemy Government the Turkish system possessed one admirable feature. All the records were centred at headquarters and the persons who knew anything about revenue work were remarkably few. It was possible to destroy the records and remove personnel. This was done. When we

reached Baghdad there was no revenue demand statement for a single tax on which collection could be made, and there were no officials remaining at their posts. There was a general idea prevalent among the people that the Turks would return, and there was the history of Kut affording an effective warning to many who might otherwise have volunteered their services. Not only were there no registers left, but the land records had been taken away.

There was need for rapid decisions. The First Revenue Officer reached Baghdad on 22nd March. The harvest begins on 15th April, and before it is ripe crop inspection should be made and demand statements issued. The collection of the Government share on the crop was considered important for two reasons. In the first place the provision of foodstuffs locally would lessen the tonnage required at a time when freight was particularly precious; and secondly, payment of revenue would have a moral effect in so much as it was the outward and visible sign of the Arabs' alleged submission. Payment of revenue is considered the measure of allegiance. Revenue, therefore, had to be collected, and a system had to be devised which, while in accordance with the fiscal policy of the late Government, should be acceptable to the people and speedy in operation.

The easiest plan would have been to fall back upon the farming of taxes, but there were two great objections. In the first place, the class of Baghdadis who usually bid at such auctions were uncertain both as to the temper of the tribes and as to the extent to which the new administration would enforce their rights. In the second, important as it was to assert the existence of peaceful conditions by the actual collection of revenue, the crops generally were small, and it was still more important to gain the confidence of the cultivator so that measures for future development should be welcomed. For this development the acquisition of detailed information was immediately necessary, and the farming of taxes would in no way help towards that end.

The system of collection from a single shaikh, which had proved so convenient in parts of the Basrah Wilayat, was impossible, for the practice of farming large estates (*muqata'ahs*) to tribal leaders, to which it was a sequel, had not been adopted in Baghdad. There were, therefore, neither shaikhs accustomed to take the responsibility nor records from which any just assessment could be made. The Turkish Government had collected its dues from the landlord only in the case of such lands as were both proprietary and situated in what may be termed the submissive area. On Government lands and areas in which control was not strong, they had collected direct from the sub-lessee, the *sarkal*. It seemed necessary for the new system also to work down to the *sarkal*. The bringing of Government into direct relations with the *sarkals* had an advantage and a danger. The smaller the unit with which we work the more accurate is the information we obtain, and the greater, therefore, the assistance that we can afford. The danger is lest the already rapidly moving process of disintegration be accelerated, and the power of the shaikh be weakened. It was felt that this danger could be averted by insisting, wherever possible, on the responsibility of the shaikh for his *sarkals* and by giving him a financial interest in the collection of revenue in his area. In pursuance of this policy certain rebates of the Government share were made in such a way as to give the shaikh a share.

The best managed estates in 'Iraq had been the Sanniyah, or Crown lands. It was, therefore, decided to adopt the Sanniyah system tentatively and apply it for land administration to the province as a whole. As each district came under control a Political Officer was appointed to it. Sub-divisions of the districts were made, following the lines of *mudirates* and other known divisions where these existed, and permanent *mamurs* were appointed, together with a permanent staff, for the management of canals and granaries and for carrying messages. The area of a *mamurat* depended on the density of cultivation. In the Hillah district there were eight; in 'Aziziyah, for an equally long strip of territory, there were at first only two. Over the *mamurs* in each district a *Mudir Mal* was appointed, whose duties are to act as revenue assistant, to collect and check accounts, and generally to furnish the Political Officer with knowledge of local conditions in revenue matters.

The agricultural situation with which the Political Officers and their newly-appointed *mamurs* were faced may be summarised as follows:—

On the Tigris from Samarra to the vicinity of Baghdad all cultivation had been destroyed. The actions in the neighbourhood of Balad and Istabulat had been fought at a time when the crop was ripe. What the Turks had not eaten they had destroyed. Nearer Baghdad the rain and flood had failed. This was the third bad

season in succession, and stocks of vegetable seeds, cereals, and, most important of all, fodder, had been reduced to a minimum. The feeding of agricultural stock throughout the summer proved a most serious problem. From Baghdad to Kut there was no cultivation except on a few lifts and an area in the Jazirah, where the ground was still moist from the flood of 1915. Cultivation on flood lands such as this is known as Chibis. The Turks had deliberately removed the tribes from the river banks and forbidden agriculture. On the Diyalah, in the Ba'qubah area, military operations resulted in the destruction of many acres of green crops, and when in September the head works of the canals came into our possession, roads and railways were laid down so rapidly that a very large number of watercourses had to be blocked. In Khaniqin the Russians and the Turks had devoured all that there was, so that at the time of the British occupation the land was in the grip of famine. On the Euphrates the inundation canals north of Musaiyib were badly silted and yielded a very small harvest. In the Musaiyib and Hillah districts there had been very heavy sowings in the area commanded by the canals; but the barrage not being under control, and the rainfall having been scanty, the yield of the mature crop was lighter than usual. Karbala and the lands round it had been flooded. Many houses had fallen down and large swamps formed where before there were gardens. On the Daghara there seemed to have been a good crop, but the grain there was in the hands of two or three of the cleverest and strongest men in the 'Iraq, and the full wealth of the district was for long kept concealed. The breaching of the Saqlawiyah dam had so reduced the waters of the Euphrates that twice the rice crops sown in the Shamiyah district failed to mature, while the third sowing was only partially successful. In the Diwaniyah district the pumps that existed in the main channel were useless for lack of oil; the canals had silted up years before, when the Hillah channel diminished.

These were the material conditions. The tribal aspect also presented difficulties to agriculture. The Turkish authorities, their attention concentrated on the war, had found little time to compose quarrels between those hereditary enemies, the town landlord and the tribal cultivator. Hillah had been openly in revolt, and the landlords did not dare to venture near their properties. Where land was cultivated it was cultivated by the tribes without any reference to the proprietors.

The admitted discrepancy between Turkish law and Turkish practice was an added complication. Many of the anomalies of the Turkish land system had been mitigated by the laxity of the executive; but British officials were frequently expected to apply a law which in the 'Iraq, at any rate, had often been a dead letter.

The first essential was a revenue system that would enable the authorities at headquarters to understand and remove the immediate difficulties of the cultivator. Capitalist farming on a large scale was impossible; the problem was to ascertain the requirements of a holding of 10 or 15 acres, and to multiply such holdings up to the limits of the cultivable land.

The next step was the remission of such portion of the Turkish demand as seemed excessive. All cesses, except on the date tax, which was a fixed tax per tree, and, compared with current prices, extremely low, were suspended, and the Government percentage was reduced in areas in which the rate was abnormally high.

A great portion of the agricultural land in the Baghdad Wilayat is irrigated by permanent canals, and the necessity of controlling irrigation was at once apparent. Many canals are privately owned. In peace time it was incumbent on the proprietor to maintain an overseer, whose wages were about £T.1 per mensem, and whose duty was the distribution of water. Canal clearance had also to be arranged, and for this local engineers were engaged. Pending the establishment of an irrigation staff, these duties were at first undertaken by the revenue officials.

By far the most important irrigation work which claimed attention was the great dam at the offtake of the Hindiyah channel from the Euphrates below Musaiyib. This division of the stream into two channels makes the fortunes of the Hillah and Shamiyah Divisions, but for lack of control the distribution of water between the Hindiyah and the Euphrates has been subject to destructive fluctuations. The Hindiyah branch is of very ancient date. Sir William Willcocks believes it to be the Gihon of Genesis<sup>1</sup> and the Pallacopus of Alexander's time. Periodically the Hindiyah scours its bed, and threatens to draw off all the Euphrates water. This was probably what was happening when Alexander conceived the idea of making Babylon the capital of his world empire, and he set himself to secure the water supply of the

<sup>1</sup> "From the Garden of Eden to the Crossing of Jordan," page 14.

city by the construction of a new head to the Pallacopus. The same conditions recurred at the beginning of this century; the Hindiyah took more and more water, flooding the country through which it flowed, while the Euphrates shrank, until Hillah, the modern Babylon, was waterless in summer. The Ottoman Government entrusted the construction of the barrage to Messrs. Jackson, after Sir William Willcocks had represented the urgent necessity of the work, and it was completed shortly before the outbreak of war. British engineers visited it in May 1917, and found that it had suffered insignificant damage, but the Turks had failed to complete the subsidiary works on which its utility depended, namely, two canals, which take off, one on either side of the Hindiyah, above the barrage. One had not even been begun, the other was only partly finished. The completion of the work was put in hand by us in May, the work being undertaken by the tribes, under the supervision of Shaikh 'Umran al Sa'dun of the Bani Hasan, and paid for by the Political Officer of Hillah. As the military irrigation service extended, the Revenue Department handed over control here and elsewhere. Water flowed down the two loop canals in time to permit of the winter sowings of wheat and barley, and the country on either side of the Hindiyah, after having lain barren for several years, was in January 1918 covered with springing barley. On the Diyalah the 'Awaijah dam, which makes possible the distribution of water from that river, was till September dominated by the Turkish position, but after a number of failures the Political Officer at Ba'qubah diplomatically arranged for its reconstruction by Arab labour. The Dagharah canal was first visited by British officers in September, and an irrigation district was created here in November. This important canal, taking off from the Euphrates between Hillah and Samawah, feeds what was and is one of the most fertile areas in Mesopotamia—the Babylonian City of Nippur lies in its basin. For years the Turks had had no authority in this region; the canal was lined with the mud forts of the shaikhs, and for some months after we took over tribal feuds continued to menace the British peace; but in 1918 the tribes voluntarily determined to destroy their forts, and within a few weeks they had carried out this remarkable repudiation of their former habits. In the Shamiyah, a wonderfully productive district below Najaf, there was no irrigation staff till the end of December; the construction of bunds and clearance of canals was supervised by the revenue manurs. Here also tribal conditions quickly exhibited a remarkable improvement. The Turks had encouraged on the two branches of the Hindiyah (for the channel sub-divides below Kifl, to reunite in the Shinafiyah marshes) the settlement of purely agricultural tribes, more amenable to their authority than the half-nomadic Khaza'il and Bani Hasan confederations. There was constant trouble between the newcomers and the older possessors, in addition to which wild tribal groups, such as the Shibil, south of Najaf on the edges of the desert, were so fortunately situated between marsh and open wilderness that the Ottoman Government had been unable to coerce them into a semblance of submission. The expectation of advantage to be derived from the help which was given to cultivation led gradually to peace and obedience. But the Shamiyah presented irrigation problems which have not yet been solved satisfactorily, and the district benefited less than the upper Hindiyah or the Hillah district and was consequently not so well contented.

In addition to work carried out on the regular canal systems, advantage was taken of facilities for occasional irrigation. North of Fallujah the Saqlawiyah depression extends from the Euphrates to the 'Aqarquf marsh and thence to the Tigris south of Baghdad. The head of this valley, to quote once more Sir William Willcocks, has been for all time dammed, lest the Euphrates waters should scour the channel and be diverted into the Tigris. Xenophon's account of the campaign of the 10,000 would seem to indicate that Artaxerxes entangled the army of Cyprus in the overflow of the Saqlawiyah by cutting the dams after the battle of Cunaxa; and with the object of flooding Baghdad and thereby hindering our advance, the Turks resorted to the same method. They came within an ace of success, as far as Baghdad was concerned. The flood water filled the Hor 'Aqarquf and lapped against the Baghdad-Samarra railway embankment. The Fallujah road was endangered and the flood was, therefore, headed up by a bund, on the other side of which were a military road and railway, and beyond them again a cultivable area that required only water and cultivators to produce a crop. The authorities were approached and sanction was eventually given to construction by the Arabs of culverts at spots selected by the road engineers in communication with the railway authorities, while one Arab mamur was appointed to allot the areas for cultivation and another to see that damage was not done to the embankment.



From the crops so grown, 516 tons of fodder were cut green and supplied to the army at the end of July, and altogether a harvest worth some 40,000*l.* was raised. Grass sprang round the edge of the retreating flood, and as the site of the depression is Government land, a portion was reserved to be made into hay. Arab mounted guards were asked for, but the proposal was modified and footmen only were sanctioned. Nevertheless 2,800 tons of hay were preserved and brought in. The cost of the watchmen was more than repaid by the fines levied from trespassing cattle. But the diminution of water in the Euphrates, caused by the cutting of the Saqlawiyah bund prior to the occupation, was felt as far down as Nasiriyah, to the detriment of cultivation.

Previous to the posting of an officer to Hillah it was believed that the crops on the Euphrates were heavy; but in June 1917, when for the first time correct information was forthcoming, it became apparent that the harvest there too had been below normal, and that only by the expenditure of considerable capital and the careful organisation of labour could the country be restored to prosperity. The situation in that month led to the decision that such expenditure could be justified only as a military measure, and should be embarked upon to the extent necessary to produce the grain and fodder required for military purposes, over and above the normal food supply of the country. The First Revenue Officer accordingly drew up in July the scheme previously alluded to. It was officially termed the Agricultural Development Scheme, and its object was to extend the irrigation programme on the Euphrates channels so as to include the clearance of all canals, Government or privately owned, as well as the provision of means to make cultivation possible throughout the commanded area. These means comprised both political control, so that the tribes should remain tranquil and cultivators should be forthcoming, and financial support, so that seed and cash for the purchase of cattle and ploughs should be available. Some six times the cropped area which had matured in the preceding year was required, but famine threatened, and the price of grain was so high that holders were tempted to sell or eat their seed stores. To make certain that the scheme would succeed it was necessary, therefore, to be able to advance seed for the area over and above that which the cultivators would normally sow.

The scheme received administrative sanction on 14th August and final approval on 19th September. The First Revenue Officer was appointed Administrator under the Civil Commissioner, and it was laid down that the machinery to be used should be the existing revenue system, supplemented, to begin with, by two political officers and such other Arab staff as might become necessary.

Though the scheme was at first confined to a specific area on the Euphrates, the further advance of the British in September made it possible to extend operations to areas—still, however, strictly defined—on the Tigris and the Diyalah. Later, on 28th November, sanction was accorded to the development of all cultivable area in both Wilayats which had not for military reasons been left vacant. At the same time the Administrator was directed to report to the Deputy Quartermaster-General instead of to the Civil Commissioner, and he acted as liaison officer responsible both to the civil and military authorities.

When the scheme had been sanctioned, a meeting of landowners in Baghdad and Hillah was held and the intention of Government stated. They were invited to co-operate and offered assistance, but at the same time they were warned that no one who neglected his lands would be entitled as of right to the landlord's share in the next harvest. A tour was then made of the tribal areas and all the sarkals at each centre summoned and the scheme explained. The forthcoming improvement of the canal system and the necessity of preserving seed was impressed on them. The Chief Political Officer had authorised the grant of certain concessions to the leading shaikhs in return for their co-operation, and as a result the provision of seed for almost all the Hillah canals was guaranteed without further assistance from Government.

The custom of the country ordains that the fallah is primarily responsible for seed. If he cannot provide it from his sowings he must borrow it. When seed was advanced to the cultivators of Sultan 'Abdul Hamid's extensive private estates, the cultivator repaid at harvest only weight for weight. When seed was borrowed from private sources, the lender secured the best terms he could, sometimes a percentage of the fallah's share of the crop, amounting possibly to five times the value of the seed received at sowing time. It was necessary that the fallah should sow as much of his own seed as possible. Whether the scheme was to accomplish all it aimed at or not, the new crop would be a heavier one than its predecessor, and prices, which had soared to an unprecedented height, were bound to fall. Everyone, therefore,

who could obtain seed on easy terms from Government would sell his own and sow what he borrowed.

This was the first year of our government, and the agricultural population was anxious to be considered as having the right to possession of as much land as possible. Tapu owners, *i.e.*, owners of freehold titles, by the terms of their title deeds, can be called upon to forfeit whatever land they have neglectfully left uncultivated for three years. Landowners in general were warned that if they did not cultivate their estates Government would take over the management of them, and no guarantee would be given as to the time at which or the terms on which the lands would be restored. If they claimed that they had no seed, seed would be provided at current market rates, to be repaid at the rates prevailing at harvest.

These measures, combined with the promise of future profit that was held out by high prices, succeeded in inducing cultivators to sow all available seed; so much so that the problem in many districts, particularly Samarra, Baghdad, Hindiyah and parts of Ba'qubah, was to keep the fallahin and their cattle alive till the harvest.

When it became obvious that all their own seed had been sown, our terms were modified by the insertion of two conditions, the first reducing the price of the seed grain supplied to a level below market rates, and the second stipulating that at harvest in no case would less than grain for grain or more than two grains for one be taken.

The provision of an irrigation staff and the offer of advances of seed and money required by the cultivators were not in themselves sufficient to secure cultivation. Irrigation demands co-operation, and combined effort is possible only where there is control. Three years of war had left tribal cultivators more independent than ever. There were tribes, such as the Jubur, on the Hillah channel below Hillah, split into sections, the sarkals of which were disinclined to recognise any shaikh. There were others, such as the Albu Sultan on the opposite bank, who recognised their shaikh, but were openly disobedient. It was, therefore, a point of policy to restore the power of sarkals and shaikhs, and the Agricultural Development Scheme was most successful in areas where this control was most firmly established.

Inter-tribal jealousies were another danger. The Juhaish and Mu'amarah tribes, whose area extends along the north of the Hillah and south of the Musaiyib districts, were at feud; but for the composition of their differences by political action a large area would have been thrown out of cultivation.

Another tribal trouble that lost to us the Abu Ghuraib lands west of Baghdad during 1917 was due to the war. The Zoba' tribes were pro-Turkish until the fall of Ramadi brought them definitely under our control; after they had made submission they paid their revenues, and work proceeded satisfactorily, but too late to be more than of very little use for the spring crop.

It would be difficult to estimate the proportion of the crop of 1918 which was due directly to the Agricultural Development Scheme combined with the operations of the Irrigation Department, but the army was able to procure between 50,000 and 60,000 tons of grain from the spring crop, and the needs of the civil population were supplied also. The cost of importing this amount of grain from India would have been close upon 1,000,000*l.*; but, apart from the financial aspect, the continuance of food shortage and high prices must inevitably have led to political unrest, while agricultural development was the strongest weapon we possessed in the pacification of the tribes. Not only was Mesopotamia safeguarded from famine, but by releasing the grain which had been stored against another lean year we were able to feed the Bedouin, and thereby to keep them in order, and to succour the Kurds on both sides of our frontier. Added to which India was progressively relieved of the task of supplying Mesopotamia, and transport difficulties were lightened correspondingly.

The fruit and vegetable gardens round the towns are irrigated almost always, not by flow, but by lift. Before the war a number of oil pumps had been introduced into the country and eagerly bought by the cultivators. Arrangements were made for their examination by mechanics sent out by the Revenue Department; they were registered by the local Political Officer, and necessary repairs were executed in the military shops. The provision of oil was a difficulty. In the middle of 1918 a scheme was brought into effect whereby, through the co-operation of the military authorities (particularly the Inland Water Transport Department), the agents of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Political Officers, a supply at a reasonable price of the minimum quantity of oil required for irrigation pumps was assured. The scheme was made to work so satisfactorily that two months later it was extended to the Basrah Wilayat also.

Prior to the establishment of the Military Directorate of Agriculture as a branch of the Board of Agriculture, a military agricultural organisation was in existence which took charge of all Government farms, gardens and other cultivation carried out by or for the benefit of the Force. The Deputy Director, together with his staff, were placed at the disposal of Mr. Garbett, the Administrator of the Agricultural Development Scheme, and by giving advice to Arab cultivators, as well as by assisting military units to start vegetable gardens, they stimulated the production of vegetables, so necessary to the health of the Force. Dairy farms and grass farms grew up during 1918 under military supervision, and an experimental cotton farm, controlled for the military authorities by the Administration of the Agricultural Development Scheme, was established.

In a previous chapter the Tapu Department, organised by Midhat Pasha for the purpose of registering rights, has been mentioned. Tapu was placed, under British administration, in the control of the Revenue Department, but so imperfect and confused was the Turkish system that for seven months after the occupation of Basrah the Tapu office was closed to permit of the reduction of its archives to some sort of order. When it was reopened it dealt only with urban and garden properties and was forbidden to register transactions in agricultural lands, since questions of ownership in the latter went to the root of the Turkish agrarian system and could not be decided till the relative claims of tribal occupant and landlord had been determined. Nor was any attempt made to enforce registration, a measure which had never been taken by the Ottoman Government. By the end of 1919 Tapu offices had been opened in five other towns in the Basrah Wilayat and in all the Divisions of the Baghdad Wilayat, while in Mosul the Turkish office, within the above-mentioned limitations, continued its functions uninterruptedly after the occupation. The Tapu Department is organised under a Director responsible to the Revenue Secretary, assisted by an Arab adviser and two Arab inspectors. The headquarters office is at Baghdad, with sub-headquarters at Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Sulaimaniyah, each of which has, or will shortly have, a special Tapu officer. Each Division has a staff of mamurs and clerks distributed among the towns of the Division as required; they work under the Political Officers on lines indicated by Tapu headquarters.

The registration of town properties is well advanced; in all the larger towns lists of properties have now been completed. That the work is not terminated is due partly to the absence of many property owners and the loss of large numbers of documents during the war. Advantage has been taken by some of the more intelligent owners to verify and correct their Turkish deeds on the new record maps. No new deeds are now issued unless the property is recorded and checked on the maps. Among the cases where applications have been received for copies of entries in the old Turkish registers, it has been found occasionally that the site indicated did not exist, or that only a portion of the property is registered. The decision that the Auqaf Department should register all its property in Tapu will enable many tiresome questions to be settled. The Auqaf Department was required by the Turkish regulations to register, but it never did so, and there was thus no recognised practice to show the way through the rather conflicting regulations regarding the payment of fees. It was finally decided that the Auqaf Department was liable, but that, as its failure to register in Turkish times was largely the fault of the Tapu authorities, fees on the initial registration would be levied at a lower rate than usual and arrangements would be made for payment by instalments.

The rapid progress made in the mapping of the towns of the 'Iraq has been due largely to the assistance of the Air Force. Air photographs, as adjusted by the Department of Surveys, have made it possible to compile maps of towns which must otherwise have gone unmapped for years.

While a Tapu sanad does not confer an absolute title, the fact that no sanad issued by the Baghdad Tapu Department since the occupation has been cancelled by a court, and that a decrease in the number of cases in the courts relating to freehold property has been noticed since the Tapu Department began its work, may be taken as a fair indication that the Tapu sanad gives the holder a good *primâ facie* case. The complete register of properties is an ideal which may some day be attained, but the closer the problem is examined the further the goal recedes. If every owner or possessor of real property had a title-deed guaranteed by Government, the land registration system of the 'Iraq would be perfect, but the Shar'ah law of succession alone makes this almost impossible. It has resulted in a subdivision of property so minute that there is a case on record where a single date tree and the land just

sufficient to support it are owned by 21 persons in partnership. There are many cases where the denominator of the fraction indicating the respective shares of the partners is a figure of many millions, and this denominator is not constant. Every death in a property-owning family involves a readjustment of shares, always of some and sometimes of all the partners. This is only one—though it is the most weighty—of the considerations which make it unwise to impose a legal penalty for the non-registration of all properties. The confidence which the reorganised Tapu Department is inspiring has already had its effect; it is possible that a reduction in the rate of fees would be even more effective.

Until a general survey of agrarian rights could be instituted it was inadvisable to register transfers of agricultural land officially, lest such registration should be regarded as confirming claims which might afterwards be proved untenable. In all tribal areas the question at issue is practically the same, namely, the conflicting claims of Tapu owners, usually townsmen holding Ottoman title deeds, disputed or undisputed, and of the tribal occupiers of the land.

There was a further consideration of importance. It was feared that Arab proprietors might be tempted by war conditions, whether they took the form of temporary impoverishment or a sudden rise in the value of real property, to part with their estates, either to local non-Arabs or to foreigners, and that consequently when the time for resuming civil government returned the administration might be faced with a vast and not necessarily beneficial change in the composition of the landed class. Accordingly a notification was issued in November 1917, stating that "owing to the defection of many officials of the Tapu Department and the destruction of records, and for other administrative reasons, the alienation of immovable property situated within the occupied territories of Mesopotamia to persons other than Arabs of the occupied territories will not be recognised, unless the previous sanction of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, or some other person authorised by him on his behalf, has been obtained in writing."

Apart from measures necessitated by special conditions, which were dealt with by the Agricultural Development Scheme, the organisation of revenue work in the Baghdad Wilayat followed much the same lines as in Basrah. The cultivated area is, however, larger, and the questions that presented themselves for solution were more numerous. The Turk has a genius for lack of uniformity, and he applied his peculiar gifts with notable success to every branch of his revenue system. Not only did the methods of assessment present great variety, but the dues claimed differed with a bewildering frequency, and no study could discover an underlying principle to serve as a clue in this labyrinth. But it may be assumed that the demand of the Ottoman Government exceeded any figure which could truthfully be set down as receipts, or which anyone expected so to be set down. In the Baghdad Wilayat agriculture is carried on by a fallah, who is the servant of the sarkal or sub-lessee. Whether the Government or a private person is the landlord, the unit of cultivation is almost invariably the sarkal. In settled areas, where the power of the proprietor was strong and his rights enforceable in the law courts, the Government looked normally to the owner for the payment of revenue; but if the owner chose to contract with the farmer that he should pay revenue, Government dues were collected from the latter without reference to the proprietor. If a sarkal defaulted, the ordinary procedure was to send a posse of gendarmes to live with him as his "guests" until he had paid his revenue in full. This course was only possible in areas in which the Turkish Government was strong enough to enforce its rights. Elsewhere a bargain was more or less deliberately struck with the tribes, who agreed to pay just so much revenue as would suffice to make the movement of troops to recover the balance unremunerative.

The ability of a landlord to collect his rent depended partly on his relations with the local executive authorities and partly on his power of bargaining with the shaikh. If the executive desired to assist, they would lend gendarmes and treat debtors of the proprietor as if they were debtors of the State. More usually a bargain was entered into with the shaikh, who, it is asserted, often succeeded in wringing from the landlord half the amount collected from the fallah.

Pending an agrarian settlement, the British administration encouraged owners and cultivators to come to a compromise in the matter of the owner's share, and the number of complaints received by Political Officers was small. Nevertheless, as was pointed out by the officer in charge of the Hillah Division, even though the Ottoman rule had been there something better than a fiction, the cultivator had paid far more, alike to Government, Tapu owner, and 'Uqr holder during the year following the

occupation than at any previous time. The good prices paid in markets encouraged him to acquiesce, but as settled conditions became established it was inevitable that we should be faced with a demand from owners of their full pound of flesh and that a definite policy would have to be laid down. Examples were not infrequent where the Baghdad landlord holding a Tapu sanad had never in Turkish times ventured to visit his estate or received more than a small fraction of his rent from the tribal cultivators, who snapped their fingers at his title deed; yet when British administration had made the roads safe and passable he would go himself to his lands and put in claims for dues which it was certain the tribes would never recognise. Another very grave issue was the right of the Tapu owner to eject tenants at will when those tenants were the ancient tribal possessors of the soil. There was danger that the exercise of such rights would lead first to tribal unrest and consequent disturbances of the public peace, and later to the rapid dissolution of the tribal system without the provision of a proper substitute. Cases of doubtful claims involved a different set of difficulties no less urgent.

The long delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which prevented a definite pronouncement as to the future of Mesopotamia, affected the administration harmfully at every point. Temporary measures, which were bearable during the first year, were apt to become irksome in the second and intolerable in the third. Nowhere was the need of a definite settlement more pressing than in matters connected with land; indeed, it was impossible entirely to postpone it.

When more than two years had passed since the occupation of Baghdad, the Revenue Secretary, Colonel Howell, came to the conclusion that in a matter of such vital importance as title in land it was impossible to carry on from hand to mouth any longer. In May 1919 a circular was issued outlining the land policy which should be adopted by the British administration and detailing the lines on which an agrarian survey should be carried out. Colonel Howell quoted the weighty words pronounced in 1839 by Sir James Thomason, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, and called on all officers engaged in the survey to remember "that the object of investigation is not to create new rights, but to define those that exist." In Colonel Howell's view, action was imperative in the Divisions of Baghdad, Basrah, Hillah, and Mosul, where the land is mostly held by owners of Tapu sanads and the Tapu Department, as a record of rights, is at its best. "If we succeed," he wrote, "in making it a proper registry of title here, we shall be able to do it elsewhere. If it proves impossible here, it will be more impossible elsewhere. In India the record of rights in land maintained by the Revenue Department is in no sense a register of title. It is merely a record of possession, and the entries in it give no more than presumption in favour of the person named, which is at any time liable to be challenged and rebutted in a court of law. The record is, in fact, more useful to the collector of land revenue than to anyone else. So far as I have been able to ascertain, it was the sheer difficulty of maintaining an accurate record in a country where holdings are minute and tenancies complicated, that prevented the Indian Government from attempting the more ambitious task of maintaining a registry of title. In this country the Turks were apparently of opinion that the thing could be done, and kept their Tapu Department to do it. This being so, although it cannot be denied that the Tapu Department was a failure, we have, I think, no choice but to take over the Turkish machine and so improve it that we shall succeed where they failed, and where the Indian Government has not ventured to try. If we can succeed, the freedom from the incubus of unending litigation, which is the curse of Indian rural life, will be ample reward."

Colonel Howell's opinion was supported by Colonel Wilson, Acting Civil Commissioner, and during the winter of 1919-20 a beginning was made by appointing a Settlement Officer and staff to two of the four Divisions where decisions were urgent. But the completion of the agrarian settlement must be a matter of several years, and it will be necessary in many districts to find temporary solutions. Perhaps the most difficult to deal with is the Muntafiq (Nasiriyah) Division, where the divergent claims of landlords, mostly of the Sa'dun family, and that of the tribes have already been described. In 1919 a temporary arrangement was tried whereby, when the parties had been unable to come to terms, Government should collect 30 per cent. of the crops and surrender to the owner, if his position as owner had previously been admitted, half the amount realised. In such cases the owner would have no right to interfere in the management of the estate. Where, however, the so-called owner had come to terms with the tribes, the agreement

between them, whether attested by an Assistant Political Officer or not, should be understood as made with his consent and enforced, unless it was obviously grossly unfair, either through undue influence exerted at the time of completion or by reason of subsequent calamity. Repudiation of contract should only be allowed in very rare cases, especially where the contract had been ratified by the Assistant Political Officer.

This decision was announced at a public meeting by the Revenue Secretary, and stress was laid on the point that it was intended as a provisional measure to apply to the winter and summer crops of 1919 only. It was received at the time with satisfaction by the tribesmen and by most of the smaller Sa'dun. The more influential Sa'dun accepted it as a reasonable compromise for temporary use, but expressed the hope that it would not be made permanent.

The result has been that Government has collected from the tribes, in cases falling under the first head, a revenue demand of 30 per cent., and in cases falling under the second head at the 15 per cent. rates. The tribes have paid in full.

Having collected a large sum of money for payment to Sa'dun and other landlords, Assistant Political Officers were confronted with the task of investigating claims. The difficulties besetting this work can only be realised from actual experience. In many cases deeds were acquired in the most irregular manner, and not in accordance with the provisions of the Tapu law; added to this, the wording of the title deeds is extremely vague. Tracts measuring thousands of acres are shamelessly recorded as being two or three donums in extent, merely to avoid the payment of full registration fees to Government. The boundaries of holdings are given in the vaguest terms—quite incapable of practical interpretation on the spot. A map, prepared on the basis of information contained in the title deeds, would be a mass of criss-cross boundaries impossible to unravel. Vast areas, stretching as far as the eye can see, and supporting thousands of tribesmen, thus form, as it were, the fiefs of various branches of the Sa'dun, who for many years have not ventured to force an entry upon the land they claim. It is in these circumstances that Assistant Political Officers are called upon to decide the matters at issue.

In Suq district, where the agrarian problem is more acute than elsewhere in the Division, over 200 claims are pending investigation. When it is remembered that Suq district covers an area of 2,750 square miles and that it is one of the most thickly populated districts in Iraq, it is unnecessary to add that the Assistant Political Officer has been able to make only slow progress in the work involved. It has been found necessary to send a special officer to Suq to cope with it.

Though the landlord under the scheme carried out in 1919 has received in most cases a sum much larger than he has ever yet been able to obtain, the Sa'dun are deprived of the full rights of possession which they claim. Nor are the tribesmen satisfied. They have represented from the first that their position with regard to the Sa'dun was forced on them by the Turkish Government and that for years they have paid only what they were willing to pay, which in some districts had, for the ten years before the British occupation, amounted to nothing. They fear any scheme which shall give official sanction to rights which they deny. The Sa'dun family numbers from 5,000 to 7,000 souls, and as a class also they must be considered; yet it would be fatal to reinstate them on their lands. A land settlement commission is to begin work in the autumn of 1920, but agrarian legislation will be needed if a final solution is to be reached.

In the Hillah and Kut Divisions, where similar problems are rife, the policy forced by circumstances upon the local officer has been to levy the revenue demand on the tribal occupant, who alone can keep the land cultivated and protected from flood; to shield him from eviction at the will of the absentee landlord and to leave the latter to make his own arrangements for the recovery of his share of the crop. No other policy was feasible, but it would be idle to contend that this has been wholly satisfactory. Indeed, it is only the general rise in prices and the extension of the cultivated area, by which the Tapu holders have been able to draw rents larger than they ever got before, which have kept them quiet. It is in the construction of new canals that the hope of solution lies in the Hillah region. If there is land enough and to spare for everyone, and if Article 68 of the Turkish Land Law—under which Tapu land left uncultivated for three years continuously without excuse escheats to the State—can be rigorously applied, the problem will solve itself. In Kut, at least upon lands along the Tigris, where the Tapu holder is less commonly an absentee, Government is attempting to deal directly with him. It remains to be seen how this will work.

Settlement work has been begun in the Baghdad and Hillah Divisions. Some of the difficulties attending it are well described in the first report of the Settlement Officer for the Baghdad Division :—

“The response to the call for claims and documents was at first scarcely encouraging, and I have no doubt that even now a certain number of documents are being withheld. Our work was regarded with apathy, not untinged with suspicion, but the efforts of the Inspector and Assistant Settlement Officer have not been without effect, and landowners are realising more and more, not only that the settlement is really going to have some result, but also that we are going to record rights and not to destroy them, and to follow existing laws and custom instead of introducing new methods of our own devising. Even so, a searching local enquiry is necessary before all documents are produced, and in a good many cases it is an undoubted fact that no documents exist to support rights which cannot be disputed. This is noticeably so in Zuwiyah, the peninsula south of 'Alumiyah, which is a mass of exceedingly small holdings for which in the majority of cases no separate documents exist. One reason for the non-existence of Tapu documents is clear. The holdings are so small that the expenses of procuring a Tapu sanad bear an altogether unreasonable proportion to the value of the holding. One owner of a small plot, which he valued at Rs. 200, pointed out that it would cost him Rs. 51 to get a Tapu deed. If this is the state of things to-day, it is scarcely surprising that in Turkish times sanads were not taken out for small freeholds. In spite of this there is one instance of a document for a single tree. But the absence of documents is not the only difficulty. Disputes are not more frequent where they do not exist than where they do. In fact, the only dispute I have at present dealt with in which the claimant can produce no documents is one in which any documents that may exist to support his claim would be in the possession of his opponents. The difficulty of interpreting documents when they are produced is even greater than might have been expected. Even where no dispute existed, and the facts of the case are quite clear, both from existing possession and from the history of the land as revealed by local enquiry, combined with a study of older documents, the present Tapu sanads can rarely be made to fit the ground. At the outset it is necessary completely to disregard the points of the compass as given in the sanads. Even the river itself is more often than not incorrectly placed. The most glaring instance of incorrect orientation I have yet come across is in Zambaraniyah, outside the area at present under settlement. Here a line of hills lying on the north-west of the property is described as the eastern boundary in the Tapu sanads, and the western in the 'Uqr sanads. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the points of the compass are more often incorrectly than correctly stated. Nor is the description of the boundaries much better, owing, in the first instance, to the absence of any attempt to keep them up to date. If the eastern boundary of a property is shown as 'the garden of Haji So-and-So' in the document 100 years old, it will almost certainly be the same in the most recent document, though Haji So-and-So's garden has changed hands many times in the interval. A striking example is one of the Dabbaghiyah sanads, which gives the boundaries as follows: east, north, west and south, Haji Hasan Beg's garden. Unfortunately, no one knows which is the garden of Haji Hasan Beg. A similar set of boundaries is given in the case of one property the ownership and boundaries of which are both in dispute. Nor does any attempt ever seem to have been made to co-ordinate the documents of the neighbouring properties. Having found that the garden of Zaid is bounded on the east by the cultivated land of 'Umr, one turns hopefully to 'Umr's sanad, hoping to find Zaid's garden given as his western boundary. As a matter of fact, if Zaid's garden is mentioned at all, it is probably in the north or south. In many cases it is not even mentioned. A striking instance of this lack of co-ordination is to be found in the sanads for Jaibachi and the surrounding miri lands. Zuraijiyah, Hulaijah, 'Awairij, and Kuwairish all have Jaibaichi as one of their boundaries, but no single one of them is mentioned in the Jaibaichi sanad. The Jaibaichi title deed and the miri sanad refer without doubt to exactly the same area; not one single boundary mentioned in the one appears in the other. Areas are practically never mentioned. Where mentioned, they are without exception incorrect, often to an incredible extent. Length and breadth measurements are sometimes given, but they again are always inaccurate. Enough has been said to show that Auqaf deeds of gift and Tapu sanads are alike practically useless in the case of a boundary dispute. Their only real value is to assist in determining the shares of the various partners in a property, and very few freehold sanads are up to date in this respect.

“Minor boundary cases in cultivated areas give little trouble, though they may take a good deal of time. The chief difficulty has been in settling boundaries between freehold properties, a very large portion of which has either been uncultivated for a long time or has been cultivated by persons other than those whose sanads entitle them to the land. The best instance of this is the dispute with regard to the outer boundaries of Kadhim Pasha's estate in Fahamah. This estate runs from the river to the Darb al Manazil (*i.e.*, out towards the desert), and so, according to their documents past and present, do the estates on both sides. Only a comparatively small portion of this area is, however, cultivable from the karads (water lifts), and the smaller owners had no means of getting water to their outer lands. Kadhim Pasha, with the aid of water from the Waziriyah canal, and later on from a canal which he dug himself from the Daudiyah, cultivated the outer portion of his neighbours' lands as well as his own. No objection was raised at the time, except by the owners of the Bad'at Rashidiyah, partly because of Kadhim Pasha's influence, but still more because the original owners had never cultivated the outer land themselves, and had no prospect of being able to do so. Nor is it likely that they would have raised any objection to the continued adverse possession of their outer lands. When, however, they saw what the present settlement really meant, they not unnaturally relied upon their sanads to give them a right which they have never exercised. The position has been further complicated by the absence of any legal representative of Kadhim Pasha's heirs, and as regards part of the land it has only been possible to pass a temporary decision.”

Scarcely less important than the definition of rights is the determination of the revenue demand. The policy of the Revenue Department is to aim, wherever possible, at a fixed demand, but, in the absence of all data on which it can be calculated, progress must necessarily be slow. “In the 'Iraq,” Colonel Howell explains in his latest annual report, “the Turkish theory of land revenue has been modified under the influence of Quranic precept and pre-existing custom into a system of sharing on a decimal basis. On unirrigated lands the State share was one-tenth. If water was supplied by flow a second one-tenth was demanded in return for the water. Where water was obtained by lift no charge was made for it, and the land was treated for assessment purposes as if it were unirrigated. This treatment affords an indication that in fixing the shares demanded by them the Turks were, at least sub-consciously, affected by some consideration of the net assets of the cultivator. It is, however, flow lands that are the important factor in Mesopotamian agriculture. On this the rates of demand (one-fifth) was so universal and so well established that in popular parlance ‘Khums-al-miri’ (the Government fifth) is widely used to denote the Government land revenue demand. But in addition the Government generally regarded itself as the owner of miri and Sanniyah lands, and in some regions, especially on the Euphrates, claimed an owner's share as well as the tax. The basic fact seems to have been that in a country where land is unlimited and cultivators few, where the silt brought down by the river entails heavy annual labour in the clearance of canals, and the annual flood necessitates even greater toil on the erection and maintenance of flood banks, a population of nomadic origin could not be brought to cultivate at all unless the cultivator, the fallah, the actual pusher of the plough, were secured at least a half-share in the proceeds of his labours. Thus two fractions became, and still remain, rigid—one half, or 50 per cent., to the fallah and 20 per cent. payable as tax to Government. The remaining 30 per cent. has always been debatable. Two-thirds of it, or 20 per cent. of the gross produce, are commonly regarded as the owner's share, whether that owner be a private person or the State or the Sultan. The remaining 10 per cent., with or without a slice of the owner's share, is the perquisite of the tribal headman, who alone is in a position to organise labour for common purposes and alone could give protection against aggression.

“The advantages of taking a fixed annual sum as the State share,” he continues, “are so obvious, that it is cause for surprise how seldom the Turks actually arrived at this arrangement in the 'Iraq. In Basrah and part of Qurnah an assessment at a fixed rate per jarib of land under date trees was worked out 50 years ago in the days of Midhat Pasha. In 'Amarah the country is parcelled out into large tracts (muqata'ahs), mostly much too big for one man to look after, which in Turkish times used to be put up to auction amongst the tribal shaikhs for a term of five years. In many parts of the country custom prescribes a fixed quantitative or monetary demand on each bucket in a water lift. With these exceptions the whole



“ agricultural land of the country is under what would in Indian parlance be called fluctuating assessment, the State taking each year a proportion of the gross produce. That proportion itself varies from place to place according to local conditions. In these circumstances, with no pressure of population on the soil, it is not remarkable that improvements should be conspicuous by their absence and that bad husbandry should be almost universal. Agriculture in Iraq is an uncertain business, and yet not so uncertain as to make a fixed demand generally impossible. It is certainly generally desired by the holders of flow lands. After considerable enquiry and thought I am driven to the conclusion that the Turks deliberately avoided a fixed demand, partly through fear of the tribes and desire to avoid anything which might tend to foster the tribal sense of prescriptive right in the lands occupied by them, partly because the annual pickings which crop estimation and assessment afforded their revenue staff were congenial to the officials and saved the Treasury some expenditure on salaries.” But a bewildering variety in rates resulted necessarily from the Turkish system.

Similarly with regard to the date tax. “The rate of tax varies in different parts of the country,” to quote again Colonel Howell’s report, “not according to the prevalent species of trees, proximity to markets, means of irrigation or any other apparent reason, but perhaps in accordance with the measure of the ability of the Turkish Government to collect. The highest rate in force in 1919 was seven and a half annas per bearing tree on certain sanniyah lands in Musaiyib (Hillah Division), and the lowest was two annas per bearing tree in the Abu Sukhair District of the Shamiyah Division. The latter figure is remarkable, in that the dates there are peculiarly fine, with a ready market at hand in Najaf, where the desert tribes come to purchase their requirements, and the land is claimed as Sanniyah, which is usually more highly taxed than other classes of land. The explanation is said to be that the local growers were inclined to dispute the acquisition by Sultan ‘Abdul Hamid of the gardens which they had planted, and could only be got to acquiesce in it by the rate of their tax being left unaltered at the old miri figure.”

It has not been possible as yet to make any considerable changes, but as information accumulates the tax will, it is hoped, be put on a more uniform basis, and some steps to this end have already been taken.

The cultivation of the date palm will play a considerable part in the settlement and civilisation of the tribes, for the owner of a date garden takes root simultaneously with his trees. Moreover, the importance of the date as a foodstuff increases in the markets of the world, and Mesopotamia, with its peculiar material advantages in water soil, and climate, must reap a rich benefit from the extension of date growing.

An Agricultural Department, started by the military authorities, became a branch of the Revenue Department in March 1919, and has done valuable experimental and research work. Most important among its activities have been experiments in cotton growing. The quantity of cotton grown before the war did not exceed a few hundred bales, and was insufficient to meet local demands. It has now been shown that in various parts of Mesopotamia cotton can be grown in quantity equal to the best produced in Egypt and America, and that the yields are high. The country has been visited by representatives of the British Cotton Growing Association, and as a consequence of their visit arrangements have been made to cultivate cotton on a commercial scale. But the demands of local growers have been restricted as far as possible till 1921, by which time trustworthy conclusions will have been obtained from the experimental cotton farms.

The production of silk was formerly a cottage industry, but with the war the import of eggs ceased. Eggs have now been imported from France and distributed among former silk growers on the Diyalah, as well as to some farmers near Baghdad. Different varieties of wheat have been imported and ordered; there is an eager local demand for improved seeds, besides which the Government farms provide an object lesson to local cultivators. Studies of disease and of injurious insects have been carried on diligently.

The Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah has taken up with great energy the task of increasing the area of tobacco cultivation. At the request of the civil administration, an agent was sent out by the British American Tobacco Company. He toured all the tobacco growing districts, but reported that unless radical improvements were made in growing, drying, and baling, Mesopotamian tobacco would never be fit for export.

With regard to miscellaneous taxes under the Revenue Department, it may be noted that the Turkish Stamp Law was revived, with certain modifications, in

December 1919. It is working smoothly and brings in a satisfactory revenue with very little trouble.

In March 1919 a set of rules relating to opium was published. They were slightly amended in June. The objects aimed at were:—

- (1) To prohibit the cultivation of the poppy in 'Iraq after the current year.
- (2) To permit importation of certain qualities on license, and tax scientifically, *i.e.*, by the imposition of Customs duty, graduated if necessary, on imported opium.
- (3) To issue retail licences on nominal fees, so that the retail vendor would not be driven to push the sale of his wares.

The scheme for taxing opium scientifically by the levy of import duty failed. In Baghdad no applications were received for licences to import opium for consumption in the country, though consumption went on unchecked. In Basrah only small quantities passed through the Customs while the opium habit spread. In Kut and 'Amarah difficulties arose over opium grown in Pusht-i-Kuh. Its importation into Kut and 'Amarah could not be prevented and thence it found its way to other areas. The opium regulations have now been revised, and an improvement in control can be predicted.

The Turkish income tax has not yet been reinstated. A preliminary difficulty lies in the fact that before the war foreigners were exempt under the capitulations; but the real problem—and it is one which was never solved by the Ottoman Government—is that of assessment in a country where commercial records are scanty or non-existent. Preliminary enquiries have, however, been instituted with a view to re-establishing the tax when the status of the 'Iraq is settled. Divisional and municipal councils have been consulted and are generally averse from it, partly from interested motives, partly because the Turkish law had led to grave abuses. But the increasing wealth of the commercial classes, who have gained much during the war, makes it more than ever imperative that they should take a greater share in the burden of taxation.

All heads of revenue on the produce of the land included, the incidence of taxation works out at Rs. 8. 1 per head of the rural population, which, as the Revenue Secretary observes, is more than double that of the Punjab. He is careful to point out that the analogy is not quite a fair one for two reasons. In the first place, the normal run of prices and wages and the cost of living is from two to three times that which obtains in India; and secondly, in the Punjab practically all lands are on a fixed assessment, which was worked out before the war and had brought about a great rise in the price of grain, while in the 'Iraq the whole of the land revenue demand varies not only in accordance with the area under cultivation, but also to some extent according to current prices. The second factor of variation appears because the land revenue demand, though generally calculated in grain, is collected in cash. The conversion rate is based on wholesale prices in the local market, and in 1919 and 1920 has been so fixed as to give a wide margin to the revenue payer. The British administration has borne in mind that the Turkish rates were theoretical and were seldom actually collected; wherever they were seen to be excessive they were reduced, and it is noticeable that where it has been possible accurately to measure crops there has usually been a general reduction in the rates of demand. Thus although the nominal share of the Government may have been 30 to 40 per cent. of the gross crop, this amount has nowhere been taken; where the yield is estimated by eye, by examination of the standing corn, or the stacks on the threshing floor—and these are the customary methods—there is an inevitable bias against exactitude. Everyone is concerned, for reasons good and bad, in keeping the figures down. The result is that a demand supposed to represent 30 per cent. of the crop will in reality be little more than half that fraction. But we have succeeded, where the 'Turks failed, in collecting the full amount of the formulated demand; that is to say, that persons called upon to pay Rs. 100 have actually paid Rs. 100 into the treasury. This is in itself a sufficiently surprising contrast to conditions as we found them. The country has paid more in taxation than it used to pay, even if it has paid nothing approaching the theoretical demand of our predecessors. Bearing in mind Lord Cromer's famous precept that light taxation of the peasantry is the basis of sound administration, Colonel Howell concludes that exactitude in determining the Government share will have to be accompanied by considerable local reductions in the rate of demand.

Two more aspects of the work of the Revenue Department must be mentioned, both immediately connected with war conditions: the management of sequestered

estates and the acquisition of land for Government purposes. With regard to the first, the Revenue Secretary in his latest report (April 1920) says:—

“During the war many estates were sequestrated, the owners of which were known to be actively siding with the enemy and resident in territory occupied by the Turks. The object of this action was twofold: to prevent the remittance of the income to enemy territory and to ensure that production in general and Government revenue in particular should not be prejudiced by neglect in the cultivation of the estates. Except in Baghdad city and Basrah, where town property was managed by the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns, the local Political Officer was responsible for the management of these sequestrated estates and for the keeping of a separate account for each.

“During the year 1919 most of the sequestrated estates were returned to their owners, usually with the mesne profits less 10 per cent., which was retained to cover the expenses of management. In two or three cases where the owner behaved treacherously during the war, first making his peace with the British authorities and afterwards going over to the enemy again, we retained the whole or part of the mesne profits.

“The 10 per cent. retained for expenses of management is credited to the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns in respect of estates which have been entirely under his control. Where the management has been in the hands of the Political Officer only 2½ per cent. is credited to the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns for keeping the accounts; the balance goes to general revenues.

“A few sequestrated estates are still in our hands, mainly because the owners have not applied for their return, or because there has been difficulty in ascertaining who the shareholders are or in finding agents for absentee landlords. It is expected that during the course of 1920 the last of these sequestrated estates will be handed back.”

Land acquisition is a more delicate subject. Though pertaining naturally to the Revenue Department, it was not transferred to the control of the latter until November 1919. Colonel Howell outlines the present position as follows:—

“The acquisition of a large area of land at Ma'qil required for port development, had been decided upon in 1918, and on the 25th September 1918 a Land Acquisition Proclamation, designed to suit local conditions at Basrah, was issued. This proclamation, drafted in haste and subject to the defects of extemporised legislation, was applied also in Baghdad when land acquisition there too became necessary. The proclamation, which is based on the Indian Land Acquisition Act, was revised in March 1919 and again after the end of the year, but without substantial modification of its principles. Under the powers defined in this proclamation the Commander-in-Chief is able to acquire land compulsorily for a public purpose, which has to be specified in the preliminary notice. The price to be paid is either market value on the date of the occupation of Basrah by His Britannic Majesty's Forces, or if the land has since changed hands, the price last paid, plus a solatium not exceeding 25 per cent. and graduated according to circumstances. The price is fixed by a specially appointed officer whose awards have to be confirmed by a committee, on which it has been customary for a local representative or two to sit. When the first acquisition proceedings began, the scheme was that the land should be acquired by His Britannic Majesty's Government and be paid for by the Home Treasury. It would have been obviously unfair to make the British taxpayer put down a price which included compensation to the expropriated person for the enormous increment in land values, due solely to the presence of His Majesty's forces in the country and the prospect of decent government, both of which have already been paid for by him. Whether the same argument applies with the same force when the acquisition is effected for the Mesopotamian administration and paid for from Mesopotamian funds (as is now being done in all cases) may be open to question. It was not, however, possible to make a radical alteration in principle and procedure while acquisition was in full swing; this may hereafter be necessary with retrospective effect. On the other hand, most of the expropriated persons have accepted the sums awarded without serious demur. Nevertheless, the extensive programme of acquisition on which we have been compelled to embark for military needs, railways, port development and the needs of the civil administration are an unpopular feature of our régime, the more so because of the boom in land values round Basrah and Baghdad and the inflated prices which have been demanded and paid in private transactions.”

In the period of little over five years during which British revenue officers have been at work in Mesopotamia, an exceedingly valuable body of information has been collected and recorded. The material thus provided gives a solid basis for all revenue administration which may be undertaken in the future. More than this, the archives of the Revenue Department throw a searching light on the social development of the country, which is so closely inter-related with the agrarian that the one cannot be understood without studying the other. Thus, the tribal system as we find it in Mesopotamia, that is to say, settled or half-settled agricultural communities, rests at bottom upon an economic basis controlled by agrarian conditions. Such matters the Turkish administration rarely attempted to fathom. By turns they would coerce or cajole the tribes, and they exhibited considerable skill at the game; but they were content to let the root of the evil alone, even where they had recognised, as in the Muntafiq country, that there was an underlying cause for disturbance. Whether with the means at their disposal they could have carried out the comprehensive agrarian settlement which can alone solve the problems for which their system has been largely responsible, may be gravely doubted. Any administration which succeeds them must bring to the task, if it is to be accomplished, singular integrity and diligence, combined with a just comprehension of the conflicting claims of different classes of the population. It must also command the confidence of the people so as to secure the co-operation of public opinion, without which so complex a tangle could not be unravelled.

#### CHAPTER VIII.—Judicial Administration.

During the years 1918 and 1919, more especially after the armistice, the organisation of civil administration made great progress. To govern the three Wilayats by hand to mouth methods would have been impossible; the increasing claims of the community would not have been met, nor could our responsibilities have been discharged. Alone among countries which had been directly involved in the war, the civil life of Mesopotamia had not suffered any grave interruption. Districts which remained in Turkish hands after the fall of Baghdad, such as the eastern frontiers and the Mosul Wilayat, were seriously reduced by famine and by Ottoman depredations, but Baghdad itself and the whole area occupied by General Maude's advance were saved by the energetic measures taken during the latter half of 1917. By 1918, agriculture and commerce were reviving in the Baghdad Wilayat. In Basrah, 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, the war scarcely produced a check, and the rapid diffusion of security and order, coupled with the unlimited market offered by the needs of the British Army for labour and local produce, gave rise to conditions of prosperity unexampled in Turkish times. A developing community calls for the development of administration, and small as was the staff of Political Officers, they fulfilled the demand, aided by the efficient co-operation of the military authorities. Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall, when he took over the command in November 1917, at once recognised the importance of the administrative branch of his force; under the wise guidance of himself and his Chief of Staff, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, the military and civil establishments worked together in complete harmony. Sir William Marshall's successor, Major-General Sir George MacMunn, himself a distinguished administrator, carried on the same policy and was able to give much valuable assistance and advice. These relations, as rare as they are fortunate, greatly facilitated the task of the Civil Commissioner and allowed the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia a fair field for advancement.

On the occupation of Baghdad the political staff could not immediately be increased in proportion to the increased field of its work. A number of varied functions, such as Education, Auqaf and Customs, had previously been grouped under the Revenue Department, and to these was added the preliminary organisation of the machinery of justice. Explicit instructions had been received from His Majesty's Government that under no circumstances was the 'Iraq Code, based on Indian law, which had been applied at Basrah, to be extended to Baghdad. Mr. Bonham Carter (now Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, K.C.M.G.), head of the Sudan Legal Department, was appointed Senior Judicial Officer in Baghdad. Until his arrival provisional arrangements alone were called for.

A few days before the occupation the judges of Turkish race had fled, taking with them several of the staff and the more recent records of the courts. The judges who remained were neither legally competent nor sufficient in number to form courts, and the courts ceased sitting. In the interval between the withdrawal of the Turkish force from Baghdad and its occupation by the British forces, the riff-raff of the town broke into the court building and rifled its contents. Hence the British authorities, on taking over the administration of the country, found no courts in operation, and owing to the defection of a large proportion of the judicial staff the immediate re-opening of courts was impracticable. A Court of Small Causes and a Mohammedan Law Court were re-opened at Baghdad in the month of July, and Mohammedan Qadhis were appointed at Hillah and Ba'qubah. Political Officers in the districts were invested with powers sufficient to deal with urgent cases, and a Board of Arbitration was established at Hillah. Subject to these exceptions, the law courts were closed from the departure of the Turkish rulers to the end of the year, and there was no way of enforcing civil rights by action. The administration of criminal law was placed in the hands of the Military Governors and Political Officers.

The Baghdad Small Cause Court was established under a proclamation dated 2nd July 1917. It was directed to administer the existing civil law of the land. The Mohammedan Law Court followed the Shar'ah law of Islam. A former deputy judge of the Mohammedan Law Court was appointed to serve as judge in the Court of Small Causes. As Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court, a member of a well-known religious family of Baghdad was selected. The almost complete absence of petitions against the decisions of the latter is sufficient proof of their justice and of the high respect in which he is held. A small executive office was attached to the two courts. The proceedings were everywhere conducted in Arabic, whereas under the Ottoman régime they had been in Turkish.

Sir Edgar Bonham Carter reached Baghdad in 1917. After a couple of months' study of the Turkish judicial system he produced an admirably lucid preliminary report, in which he described the position before the occupation, as well as the course which, in his opinion, should be pursued.

"Under the Turkish rule," he wrote, "the judicial system in the Baghdad Wilayat, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, comprised two main classes of courts, the Mohammedan Law Courts (Mahakim Shar'iyah) and the Civil Courts (Mahakim Nizamiyah).

"The Mohammedan Law Courts date from the early days of Islam, and originally had general jurisdiction both in criminal and civil cases. But their jurisdiction has been gradually much curtailed, until in modern times it has become limited to questions of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, guardianship, majority, wills and successions, Mohammedan charitable endowments (waqf) and a few other matters of minor importance. The law which these courts administer is based on the Quran, and on the traditions of the Prophet and of his immediate successors. On this basis, during the second and third centuries of the Mohammedan era the Sunni system of law was built up by four so-called schools of eminent lawyers, some of whom, it may be suspected, had an indirect knowledge of some of the principles of Roman Law. The four schools of Sunni Mohammedans are called after their founders the Hanafi, Malaki, Hanbali and Shafi. The differences between them relate only to minor points, but the traditional view is that, while it is open to a Mohammedan ruler to adopt the law as expounded by any one of these schools, he must follow the ruling of the school adopted in its entirety. The courts of the Ottoman Empire follow the Hanafi school.

"The law laid down by the four schools at an early date became fixed, and although fairly adequate for the society for which it was formed, proved incapable of development to meet the needs of later more complicated societies.

"At various times modifications were introduced by Turkish rulers in parts of the law, and in particular in the criminal law, but until the nineteenth century these were of small importance. During the nineteenth century the legal system was submitted to far-reaching reforms. The jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Law Courts was limited to questions of personal status and the like. A new system of Civil Courts, known as the Nizamiyah Courts, was established, with an organisation and procedure based on French models. Commercial and Penal Codes were adopted from the Napoleonic Codes and promulgated. And finally the judiciary was completely separated from the executive.

"The organisation of the Mohammedan Law Courts conformed to the administrative divisions of the Wilayat. For administrative purposes the Wilayat was

divided into three districts (Liwahs), and each district was divided into sub-districts (Qadhas). A Mohammedan Law Court was established in every Qadha, presided over by a single Qadhi. There was also in each Qadha a Mufti, a juriconsult whose duty it was to issue opinions on legal questions referred to him by the Qadhi, and to give advice to Government Departments and to the public on questions of Mohammedan law. As already stated, the jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Law Courts was in practice limited to questions relating to personal status, charitable endowments and a few other matters.

“An appeal lay from the decisions of the Mohammedan Law Courts to the Shaikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople.

“The organisation of the Nizamiyah courts in the Baghdad Wilayat, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, was as follows: there was a hierarchy of courts conforming, generally speaking, to the administrative divisions into which the Wilayat was divided.

“In each Qadha, other than a Qadha which was the headquarters of a Liwah, there was a Court of First Instance, having general jurisdiction in civil cases and jurisdiction in criminal cases, to hear any case of ‘delict’ or ‘contravention’<sup>1</sup> committed within the Qadha. The Qadha Court was composed of a president and two judges.

“At the headquarters of each Liwah there was a court composed of six judges and two assistant judges. A section of the court, sitting as a Court of First Instance, had jurisdiction to hear any civil or commercial case arising within the Qadha within which the court was situated. Sitting as a court composed of five judges it had jurisdiction to hear any case of ‘crime’ committed within the Liwah. In addition it had powers of appeal from the judgments of Courts of Qadhas within the Liwah in civil and commercial cases of a value of more than £T.50. In practice the Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court was usually a member of this court and acted as president of the civil section.

“At Baghdad the Court of First Instance before the war was divided into three sections—a penal section dealing with ‘delicts’ committed within the Qadha; a civil section; and a commercial section.

“The Court of Appeal at Baghdad was the Supreme Court of Appeal for civil and commercial cases arising within the Wilayat. It heard appeals from judgments in cases of ‘delicts’ coming from Courts of Liwahs, and sitting as a Court of First Instance heard all cases of ‘crimes’ committed within the Liwah of Baghdad. Before the war it was composed of two presidents, eight judges and two assistant judges, and sat in two sections, a civil section and a penal section. But owing to several of the judges having been called up for military duties, at the fall of Baghdad the number of judges had been reduced to a president, four judges and two assistant judges.

“There were in all 12 Qadha Courts, four Liwah Courts and the Baghdad Court of Appeal. The staff of judges reached the large number of about 80.

“From judgments of the Baghdad Court of Appeal in commercial cases between Ottoman subjects an appeal lay to the Commercial Court in Constantinople. If the interests of foreign subjects were involved, the appeal went to the Mixed Commercial Court. There was no similar appeal from judgments of the Baghdad Court of Appeal in civil cases not of a commercial nature.

“Against the final judgment of any court, whether in civil, commercial or criminal cases, appeal lay to the Court of Cassation at Constantinople. This court examined cases brought before it, and either rejected the application or annulled the judgment, returning the case to the competent local court for re-trial or revision of judgment. It had not itself any power of revision. The appeal was heard on the record of the case and the written statements of the parties. Judgments in cases of ‘crime,’ in which a sentence of imprisonment of three years or more was passed, were referred to the Court of Cassation for examination, even if no appeal was submitted.

“A Public Prosecutor (Procureur Général) was attached to the Baghdad Court of Appeal, and a Deputy Procureur Général was attached to each Liwah Court.

“During the war the Turkish legislators established a new set of civil courts called Peace Courts, for the trial of small causes of a less value than £T.50 and of

<sup>1</sup> Under the Ottoman Penal Code, as under the Napoleonic Code, criminal offences are divided, according to the gravity of the punishment to which they are subject, into (1) crimes, (2) delicts, (3) contraventions.

petty offences. The law (of the 30 Jamadi-al-Awal 1331) by which these courts were established and are regulated, is a competent piece of workmanship, and the procedure of the courts is in some essentials a decided improvement on that of the older established courts. A special Judge of the Peace was appointed for Baghdad. In other Qadhas the Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court or one of the members of the Nizamiyah Court undertook the duties of the post.

“The procedure of the Nizamiyah Courts in civil matters is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure published in the year 1880, which follows in general the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1807. Considerable amendments of the Code, which were much needed, have been recently effected. The criminal procedure of the courts is regulated by the Criminal Code of Procedure, which was published in the year 1879, and which differs but little from the French Criminal Code of Procedure.

“Commercial suits between Ottoman subjects were heard in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, but, if one of the parties was a foreigner, the Code of Commercial Procedure, which had received the assent of the Powers, was followed.

“The substantive law administered by the courts consists of (1) the Majallah, (2) the Commercial Code, (3) the Marine Commercial Code, (4) the body of Ottoman Legislation.

“The Majallah or Ottoman Civil Code is a Code published in the year 1869 of Hanafi Mohammedan Law. The principal subjects dealt with are sale, letting and hiring, suretyship, transfer of obligations, pledge, deposit, loan, gift, wrongful taking and destruction, inhibition of persons who are legally incompetent from dealing with their property, pre-emption, joint ownership, servitudes, partnership, agency, compromise and releases. It also contains sections relating to actions, evidence and the duties of a judge. A code of law which had remained unchanged for a thousand years cannot be a satisfactory instrument for determining legal rights at the present time. The best that can be said of it is that it is surprising how often its provisions are in agreement with modern law. So far as commercial transactions are concerned, it has been superseded by the Code of Commerce, and its provisions as regards actions have been replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure and later amendments. Unfortunately its provisions as regards evidence are still in force.

“The Code of Commerce is a translation with some omissions of the sections of the French Code of Commerce relating to partnerships and companies (*sociétés*), bills of exchange, and bankruptcies.

“The Marine Commercial Code is based principally on French law. The Baghdad Courts have little concern with it.

“The general body of Ottoman legislation down to the year 1906 can be consulted in Mr. George Young's admirable *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, a work which has greatly facilitated the task of British lawyers and administrators in this country. Legislation subsequent to that work exists at Baghdad only in the Turkish originals.

“It will be gathered from the foregoing summary that the organisation of the Nizamiyah Courts was logical and complete and more than adequate for the needs of the country. It erred indeed in being over-complicated for the state of society in this Wilayat and for the personnel who administered it. The procedure of the courts, with the exception of the provisions of Majallah as regards evidence, is not unsatisfactory, though, being based on old models, it requires amendment to bring it up to date, and is also over-complicated for local conditions. And, subject to some reservations, the codes and the Turkish laws provide a body of law sufficiently modern and complete to enable cases which come before the court to be decided in a reasonable and just manner.

“Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the administration of justice was extremely unsatisfactory. Like so many other Turkish administrations, the courts presented a fair appearance on paper, but failed seriously in working. The principal causes of this failure are obvious.

“In the first place, the salaries paid the judges were quite inadequate. A judge of a Court of First Instance received the wretched pay of from £T.7½ to £T.10 monthly. An ordinary judge of a Court of Appeal received £T.15 monthly. The President of the Court of Appeal received £T.35 monthly. The clerical staff was paid on a still more inadequate scale. The salaries were neither adequate to attract men of sufficient ability for the duties of a judge nor to maintain a standard of efficiency or honesty amongst judges or subordinate staff. Few of the judges were men of any

general education or had had any sort of legal training beyond such as they acquired in subordinate positions as clerks of the court.

"Secondly, the procedure of the courts is over-technical. And, as usually happens when a technical business is administered by persons of narrow education or of inadequate professional knowledge, this fault of the procedure was accentuated in practice.

"Thirdly, all the proceedings of the courts were conducted in Turkish, a language unknown to the mass of the population.

"To complete the survey of the courts existing under Turkish rule in the Baghdad Wilayat, mention must be made of three other classes of courts which existed in the Ottoman Empire, namely, the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Christian and Jewish Ottoman Communities, the Mixed Tribunal at Constantinople, and the Consular Courts of Foreign Powers having extra-territorial jurisdiction under the capitulations.

"It was estimated before the war that the population of the Baghdad Wilayat comprised some 50,000 Jews and some 6,000 Christians. The Jewish community in the city of Baghdad is a very important section of the community, outnumbering the Sunnis or Shi'ahs. It is presided over by a Grand Rabbi. The principal sects represented amongst the Christians are Chaldæan Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Catholic and Gregorian Armenians and Roman Catholics. The Patriarch of the Syrian Catholics resides at Baghdad.

"Mr. Young, in his *Corps de Droit Ottoman* (Title XXI), published in the year 1905, stated that the authorities of the non-Musulman Ottoman communities had exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions concerning members of their community relating to marriage, including dowry, marriage gift, alimony and divorce, and that certain communities also had the right to settle questions concerning wills, and that judgments rendered by such authorities within their competence were executed by the Ottoman authorities. He added that since the last reorganisation of the judicial system in 1879 a tendency on the part of the Porte had manifested itself to restrict as far as possible the privileged jurisdiction of the non-Musulman communities. In the Baghdad Province the jurisdiction of the authorities of the non-Musulman communities as courts of law has in practice been reduced to narrow limits, and, unless exercised with the consent of all the parties, does not go beyond the granting of divorces, the certifying of legitimacy, marriage and relationship, the granting of maintenance allowance payable to a wife, and in certain communities the certifying of the validity of wills. Disputes as to rights of succession were habitually entertained by the Mohammedan Courts and decided in accordance with Mohammedan law.

"The Mixed Tribunals of the Ottoman Empire were courts for the trial of civil and commercial suits (other than suits relating to immovable property) between Ottoman subjects and the subjects of foreign Powers who possessed extra-territorial jurisdiction, or between such foreign subjects. No such tribunal existed in the Baghdad Wilayat. Such cases were heard by the commercial section of the Baghdad Court of First Instance, with the addition of two temporary judges of the nationality of the foreign parties to the action. The dragoman of the Consulate of the party to the action attended the sitting of the court and signed the record, but otherwise took no part in the proceedings. As already stated, an appeal lay from the decision of this court in a mixed case to the Mixed Commercial Court at Constantinople."

"The Consular Courts of foreign Powers possessing extra-territorial jurisdiction under the capitulations, at Baghdad as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, had exclusive jurisdiction as regards criminal offences committed by the subjects of such Powers. They also heard all disputes relating to questions of personal status of their subjects.

"After the outbreak of war the Turkish Government issued a declaration cancelling the capitulations. The Mixed Tribunals were abolished; and the jurisdiction of Consular Courts was no longer recognised."

On Sir Edgar Bonham Carter's advice a further proclamation was issued by the Commander-in-Chief at the end of December 1918, providing for the establishment of a Court of Appeal at Baghdad and of Courts of First Instance at Baghdad and elsewhere as required. The right of appeal to the Court of Cassation in Constantinople was abolished, and in its place a power of revision similar to that exercised by an Indian High Court was given to the Senior Judicial Officer and the Court of Appeal.



The continuation of the Peace Court and the Shar'ah Court which had been opened in July was sanctioned, and similar courts were to be set up wherever they were needed, but the jurisdiction of the Shar'ah Courts was not the same as it had been under the Turks. It was limited to suits concerning Sunni Mohammedans arising out of marriage, divorce, guardianship, succession or wills, charitable endowments or pious bequests, while the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the Sunni Shar'ah Courts over Shi'ahs, Jews, or Christians was transferred to the civil Courts of First Instance, and is exercised in accordance with the personal law of those concerned, or any custom applicable to them. The courts were authorised to refer this type of case respectively to a Shi'ah religious priest or to the Christian or Jewish religious authorities.

The civil courts continue to administer in general Turkish law, subject to such additions and amendments as have been made by proclamation issued by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, while the procedure is governed by the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure and subsequent amending laws.

As regards criminal jurisdiction, Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, in his annual report for 1918, wrote as follows :—

“ According to the theories of International law, upon the occupation of an enemy country, local criminal law should be continued, if this is possible and consistent with the welfare of the Army of Occupation. In Iraq this was obviously impossible, both because few British officers are acquainted with Turkish and because Ottoman Law requires a multitude of courts, enquiring magistrates and prosecutors, much in excess of what could be provided, whether from the army, or from the officials of the former Government. But apart from this, the Ottoman Penal Code is ill-arranged, incomplete and difficult to interpret, while the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code, however suitable an instrument it may be for other more advanced and populous parts of the Ottoman Empire, is over-complicated and ill-adapted for application amongst the backward rural and nomad population of Mesopotamia.

“ To replace the Ottoman Penal Code and the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code, Codes have accordingly been published, entitled respectively the Baghdad Penal Code and the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations. Explanations of the sources and objects of these Codes having been given in the prefaces to these Codes, I shall confine myself here to repeating one or two observations.

“ Both these Codes have been prepared to meet the conditions under which the country is now being administered, and are intended as temporary laws. They will no doubt be replaced, after the conclusion of peace, by more finished and fully considered legislation.

“ The Baghdad Penal Code is based on the Ottoman Penal Code, which at the date of occupation was in force in Baghdad as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Penal Code is itself based on the French Penal Code, but contains important divergences from that Code. It was published in the year 1859, and has frequently been amended. Such amendments have usually been clumsy. The result is that the Ottoman Code as it now stands is unscientific, ill-arranged and incomplete. It was necessary, therefore, to make very considerable amendments and additions to the Ottoman Penal Code. These have mostly been taken from the Egyptian Penal Code, which is also based on the French Penal Code, or from other Egyptian sources. The local conditions in Egypt and this country have so many resemblances, that provisions which have been found to work well in that country are likely to be suitable here. While large additions and amendments have been made, and provisions from Egyptian sources have been substituted bodily for some of the most unsatisfactory parts of the Ottoman Code, a complete revision has not been attempted.

“ The Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations are based on the Sudan Criminal Procedure Code, which was prepared under the instructions of Lord Kitchener after the re-occupation of the Sudan, and has proved very suitable to that country. The Sudan Penal Code is itself in the main based on the Indian Penal Code, but draws important provisions as regards constitution of courts, confirmation and appeal from British military law. The Regulations also adopt certain provisions from the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code, the ultimate source of which is the French Code of Criminal Procedure.

“ Four classes of Criminal Courts are constituted by the Regulations, namely :—

“ (1) Courts of Session.

“ (2) Courts of Magistrates of the First Class.

“(3) Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class.

“(4) Courts of Magistrates of the Third Class.

“Political Officers and British Judges are Magistrates of the First Class.

“An Assistant Political Officer is a Magistrate of the Second Class.

“The Civil Commissioner may appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second, or Third Class.

“A Court of Sessions is a court consisting of three magistrates, inclusive of at least one magistrate of the first class. In districts where a British judge is stationed, he will ordinarily be appointed President of the Court of Sessions.

“Findings and sentences of Sessions Courts require confirmation by the Civil Commissioner. Findings and sentences passed by magistrates do not require confirmation; but, if the sentence exceeds that which the magistrate can pass summarily, an appeal lies against it, either to the Political Officer or to the Civil Commissioner.

“In addition to the powers vested in them as regards cases which are brought before them by way of appeal, Political Officers and the Civil Commissioner have powers of revision. A Political Officer may call for and revise the judgment of any magistrate subordinate to him, while the Civil Commissioner may call for and revise the judgment of any Criminal Court.

“Mention may be made of two leading principles followed in the Baghdad Criminal Procedure.

“In the first place ample provision is made that crimes should be tried locally, and without unnecessary delay. This principle is important in every country, but it is especially important in Mesopotamia, where the camel and the donkey are still the principal means of conveyance for the people, and where large parts of the population are in a backward condition. The bringing of accused and witnesses long distances for trial is often in itself a serious hardship. Further, an accused person who has an honest defence can make it most easily in his own country where he is known; while a dishonest defence, which would not be plausible at the place of the crime, may pass muster if advanced in a distant district. Witnesses will speak the truth more readily in their own districts, where the evidence will at once reach the ears of their neighbours, than amongst strangers in a court remote from their home. And a long journey affords opportunities for communication between witnesses, and even between witnesses and accused, which not infrequently lead to evidence being concocted.

“A second feature of the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations is that it provides adequate machinery by means of appeal and confirmation for the supervision of criminal justice throughout the occupied territories. The Political Officer of a Division is given powers of revision of cases tried by magistrates within his Division. The Civil Commissioner, for whom the Judicial Secretary will exercise functions similar to a Judge Advocate-General, confirms all cases tried by Sessions Courts, and has power to revise any case tried by a magistrate. On the other hand the system avoids the principal objections which are incident to a system of appeals to a formally constituted court. There should be a minimum of delay and little room for the upsetting of decisions on purely technical grounds.”

The opening of the Baghdad Courts coincided with the termination of the moratorium, which had been extended from time to time by the Turks, subject to the payment of instalments of the debts. In accordance with the advice of local merchants it was determined that no further extension should be granted. The decision proved to be wise. With the opening of the courts, creditors realised that delay was no longer in their interest; the majority paid up or came to a fresh agreement with their creditors, with the result that the number of cases brought into the courts was comparatively small. The ease with which the moratorium disappeared was a remarkable proof of the prosperity which the British occupation had already brought to the mercantile community.

Two important changes in judicial administration came into force on 1st January 1919. In the first place the system of justice in force in the Baghdad Wilayat was extended also to Basrah, and the 'Iraq Code, based on the Indian Codes, which had been in force since 1915, ceased to exist. It was desirable, both on administrative and on political grounds, that this amalgamation should be effected; it permitted the staffing of the courts of the southern Wilayat with Arabs much more freely than had hitherto been the case, and substituted a procedure and law with which litigants were familiar for one which was foreign to them. The courts of the Mosul Wilayat were

also brought under the same system. The Mosul Court of First Instance is the only court which was taken over as a running concern from the Ottoman régime. Though several of the judges left with the Turks, it was possible to reorganise it at once. The number of judges was reduced and their salaries increased.

At the same time a Judicial Department was formed under an administrative head, the Judicial Secretary, who is responsible to the Civil Commissioner for the administration of justice and exercises no judicial functions. Sir Edgar Bonham Carter was appointed to the post. "Some explanation of this change," he wrote, "may be of interest. Great Britain, unlike almost every continental nation, has never possessed a Ministry of Justice. The absence of such a Ministry cannot be justified on logical grounds, but is due to historical causes. The British system has been adopted in most British Colonies and Dependencies, without the justification of the historical reasons which exist in Great Britain. It is arguable that even in Great Britain the administration of justice would benefit by the establishment of a Ministry of Justice. However that may be, for building up a system of justice there are undoubted advantages in placing the courts under an administrative head, who, forming part of the central administrative staff, is familiar both with the policy of the Government and the tendencies of the courts, and who is open to the criticism of his colleagues and of the public. The efficient administration of justice is dependent not solely on the correct decision of isolated cases, with regard to which judges under any system must be absolutely independent, but on questions of administration. This is especially the case where, as in this country, two sets of courts, the Civil Courts and the Shar'ah Courts, exist side by side, and where there are considerable districts the population of which are not sufficiently advanced for a highly developed and rigid judicial system."

The Judicial Secretary in his annual report for 1919 described the organisation of the courts as existed at the end of that year. "The Civil Courts," he writes, "which replace the civil and commercial jurisdiction of the Turkish Nizamiyah Courts, have general jurisdiction except in cases which are within the jurisdiction of the Religious Courts.

"They are of three grades:—

"(a) The Baghdad Court of Appeal; (b) Courts of First Instance; (c) Peace Courts.

"*Court of Appeal.*—The Court of Appeal, which sits at Baghdad, is the supreme Court of Appeal for the whole of the occupied territories. It replaces the three Turkish Courts of Appeal for the Baghdad Wilayat, the Basrah Wilayat, and the Mosul Wilayat. But whereas the decisions of those courts were subject to revision by the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the decisions of the present Court of Appeal are final.

"The Court of Appeal is at present composed of a British President and two Arab judges. The Turkish Court of Appeal was normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab judges. The present Arab judges of the Court of Appeal receive a salary of Rs. 1,000 a month. The President of the Turkish Court of Appeal received £T. 35 a month, and an ordinary member of the Court of Appeal £T. 15 a month.

"An appeal lies from every judgment of a Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeal.

"According to the Turkish system, judgments of peace judges were not liable to appeal, but were liable to revision, or, to speak more correctly, to be set aside, by the Constantinople Court of Cassation. Now applications for revision from judgments of peace courts lie to the Baghdad Court of Appeal, which, in addition to the powers possessed by the Turkish Court of Cassation of setting aside the judgment and ordering a new trial, can, if it has the necessary facts before it, give a final judgment in the case.

"*Courts of First Instance.*—Under the Turks there was a Court of First Instance at the headquarters of each Liwah and of each Qadha. At the headquarters of Liwahs and in the more important Qadhas, the Court consisted of a President, who received a salary of £T. 16 a month, and of two members, who received £T. 10 a month. At Baghdad the court comprised a Civil Chamber and a Commercial Chamber. In less important Qadhas, the Qadhi of the Shar'ah Court was President, and the two members were local inhabitants without legal training, who received a small allowance. In the Wilayats of Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul, there were altogether 10 Liwah

Courts of First Instance, and 40 Qadha Courts of First Instance. It is obvious that there were far too many courts and that, having regard to the salaries paid, the majority of these courts were incompetent.

“These courts have been replaced by the following courts :—

- “ (i) Court of First Instance, Baghdad, consisting of a British President, an Arab Vice-President and four members. The court sits in two chambers, one presided over by the British President and one by the Arab Vice-President.
- “ (ii) Court of First Instance, Hillah, consisting of a British President, an Arab judge, and of the Qadhi of the Sunni or Shi'ah Shar'ah Court.  
“The President goes on circuit and holds courts also at Najaf and Karbala.
- “ (iii) Court of First Instance, Ba'qubah, consisting of a British President, an Arab judge, and the Qadhi of the Sunni Shar'ah Court.  
“The President also holds courts at Khaniqin and Mandali.
- “ (iv) Court of First Instance, Basrah, consisting of a British President and two Arab judges.
- “ (v) Court of First Instance, Mosul, consisting of a British President and two Arab judges.  
“The President also holds courts at Arbil.

“The Arab Vice-President of the Baghdad Court receives a salary of Rs. 800 a month, and most of the judges of Courts of First Instance receive a salary of Rs. 525 a month. Having regard to the high cost of living, it will be necessary in due course to increase the salaries of the latter.

“If the number of Courts of First Instance under the Turks was excessive, the present number is insufficient, and must be increased as suitable staff becomes available.

“*Peace Courts.*—These courts on their civil side were small cause courts having jurisdiction to hear cases up to £T. 50. They had been established a short time before the outbreak of the war, and existed as separate courts only in two or three places in Mesopotamia.

“Since the occupation, Peace Courts have been established at Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, 'Amarah and Kirkuk. Elsewhere Judges of Courts of First Instance and Qadhis officiate as Peace Judges in addition to their other duties. And in places where there are no other courts, Political Officers, Assistant Political Officers and other Government officials also officiate as Peace Judges with varying powers.”

Some 30 Sunni Mohammedan law courts have been appointed in the occupied territories. In place of the Court of Revision at Constantinople, to which there was appeal from the judgments of the Qadhis in Turkish times, a Court of Revision consisting of three Sunni judges has been established in Baghdad. Shi'ahs can now refer cases relating to personal status between Shi'ahs to Shi'ah judges who have been appointed where there has been a demand for them; while for the Christian and Jewish communities, ecclesiastical courts with a limited jurisdiction in matters of marriage, legitimacy in family relations continue to exercise their former functions. The appointment of Shi'ah Mohammedan law courts has been fully justified. The Government has been fortunate in securing the services of widely-respected men as judges. Owing to the difficulty of forming a Court of Appeal which would meet with acceptance throughout Mesopotamia, none has yet been established, and it is therefore the more satisfactory that complaints or petitions against the decisions of the judges have been rare. The appointment of Shi'ah judges at Najaf and Karbala presents special difficulties because of the privileged position of the mujtahids in those towns; some part of their authority has been derived from the fact that the Shi'ahs have been accustomed to submit disputes to their arbitration rather than to the Turkish courts. An appointment has, however, recently been made for Karbala.

An interesting note is appended to the report on the work of the Court of Appeal by the President, Mr. H. F. Forbes :—

“The Court of Appeal reflects the gradual settling down of 'Iraq to peace conditions both in the constitution of the court and in the constant increase of work consequent on the reopening of the courts generally throughout the country. A review of the past year's work would therefore be incomplete without a reference to

the former Turkish judicial system and the gradual and successful progress achieved in making the courts self contained and independent of Constantinople.

“Up to the outbreak of war there were combined civil and criminal Courts of Appeal or Courts of First Instance with limited appellate powers in Basrah, Baghdad, Ba'qubah, Karbala, Kirkuk, Muntafiq, Mosul and Diwanayah. Their decisions were final save that a further petition might be presented to the Court of Revision at Constantinople. This right of revision was very necessary owing to the composition of the benches. These were composed largely of men of straw, many of whom had little or no knowledge of law and were, in fact, little but dummies, useful only in recording and enforcing the views of the President. The President was usually a Turk, and the work of the court was entirely in his hands. If he were energetic and honest the outturn was excellent, but if not the dummy tail could always be trusted to enforce his views by their majority vote. As a result, every case which was appealed was taken on to the Court of Revision as a matter of course. The Court of Revision, however, had not power to issue a decree. It could confirm or set aside a decree directing the Court of Appeal to issue a fresh decree. In this way cases usually took years to decide, and the whole bench had frequently changed when the case finally returned to the Court of First Instance.

“By the issue of the Appendix to the Code of Civil Procedure in A.H. 1328 compelling the appellant to appeal his case as a whole and not piecemeal as he had done previously, and by the promulgation of the Peace Judges' Law in A.H. 1329 restricting the right of appeal to sums over 50*l.* the Turks had effected a much needed reform. The full effects of these changes, however, were not yet evident when war broke out and practically put an end to all litigation. The Courts of Appeal had been overburdened with such a mass of arrears that even in Mosul they had not been worked off in six years from A.H. 1329-35.

“Our present court has a considerable advantage in thus starting with a fairly clean slate, which, indeed, was made cleaner by the destruction of the court records generally throughout Iraq by the retreating Turkish Army. The enforcement of the new laws should make one bench sufficient to hear all appeals from Iraq for some time to come. It is further to the advantage of the litigants that they should be able to employ the Baghdad Bar in their appeals, as the Bar outside Baghdad is for the most part of very mediocre quality. The whole country will benefit by the reduction in expenditure caused by combining eight Courts of Appeal into one. The opening up of communications will remove any hardship the litigants may find in coming to Baghdad. The formation of a strong and independent bench—unlike the dummies of the past—will, I trust, more than compensate for the loss of the right of revision.”

“The Criminal Procedure Regulations,” continues Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, “and the Penal Code, although intended only as temporary laws, to be replaced by more fully considered and finished laws on the conclusion of peace, have worked satisfactorily and have proved suitable for the requirements of the country. Many of the magistrates have little previous experience of criminal law, but cases have been tried carefully and the punishments awarded have in general been lenient.

“As the country settled down to peace conditions and the judicial staff increased, it was possible to arrange that most serious crime should be tried by Sessions Courts composed of a British and two Arab judges. This has the double advantage of providing a court of trained judges, and of associating Arabs with the British staff in the administration of justice.

“A considerable number of Arabs have also been appointed magistrates of various classes.

“The administration of criminal law in this country is difficult and demands in the magistrates not only the possession of an intimate knowledge of the language and ideas of the people, but judicial experience and the exercise of much care. In many classes of cases the evidence is very unreliable. Perjurers may be divided into three main classes. First there is the witness coming from the large uncivilised and uneducated classes, who has no knowledge of the value of evidence and fails to distinguish what he has himself observed from what he has been told or has inferred.

“Secondly, there is the witness who, having satisfied himself, very likely without adequate grounds, that the accused is guilty, considers that the end justifies the means and attempts to add to the value of his evidence by invented details. This

class of evidence frequently occurs in cases of murder of which the motive is revenge or a tribal feud. Such murders are usually committed under circumstances which prevent the certain identification of the offender by any person present. It is known to the friends and relatives of the murdered man that the murderer is one or other of a few individuals, and after a few hours' discussion all present at the murder are prepared to swear to the identity of murderer or murderers. To men brought up under the tribal custom that the tribe is responsible for a murder committed by any member of the tribe, it must seem of comparatively little importance which member of the tribe committed the murder.

"For the two forms of perjury already described, some excuse may be found in the ignorance and customs of the people. No such excuse can be offered for the downright malicious perjurer. He is, perhaps, less common in this country than in some countries which are usually considered more advanced. But an exception must be made in the case of persons who are themselves accused of a crime. The obtaining of evidence by the offer of free pardons to accomplices seems to have been a usual method adopted by the Turkish police. The result is to give rise to a popular belief that the safest course for an accused person is to incriminate someone else. The evidence of accomplices, which in all countries is unreliable, is here especially so.

"Considering the unsatisfactory state of public order under the Turks, and that periods of war are usually followed by a considerable increase in crimes of violence, the amount of crime has been less than could have been expected, and is a striking testimony to the efficiency of the administrative work of political officers. Public order has been well maintained. For some time after the occupation the Diyalah Division was disturbed by some daring highway robberies; and the same crime has been not uncommon in the Mosul Division. The capture and condemnation of the principal criminals in the Diyalah Division has re-established order there.

"In Mosul Division the conditions are more difficult, but public order has been steadily improving.

"During the year the death sentence was carried out on 28 individuals.

"There are two forms of crime which are regrettably common and are so ingrained in the habits of the people that they will be difficult to eradicate. The first is murder from motives of revenge or from a grudge. Such murders are often accompanied by circumstances of great brutality. A man will lie in wait at night at the door of his enemy's house and shoot him as he comes out of his house. Or a band of men will make their way at night to the house of their victim and shoot him while he is sleeping in his bed in the midst of his family.

"The second is murder by her family of a girl or married woman who has been unchaste. Amongst tribal Arabs in this or in other countries there is no pity for the girl who has lapsed from the strict path of virtue. She has put a stain on the family honour that can only be washed out by her blood. But in Mesopotamia this feeling extends beyond the limits of tribesmen proper. And if the cases which have come before me during the last year are characteristic, the custom in this country differs discreditably from that observed by Arabs elsewhere. For here it would seem that the members of the girl's family do not, as elsewhere, risk their lives by meting out to the girl's lover the same fate as to the girl herself.

"The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations provides a procedure for the trial by a Tribal Majlis appointed by the Political Officer of offences committed by tribesmen and for their punishment approximately in accordance with tribal law. The Regulations are valuable in enabling Political Officers to deal with cases between tribesmen who, owing to their inaccessibility, or for other reason, are not under strict Government control and with regard to whom the Government is not prepared to accept full responsibility for law and order; as also with cases between tribesmen, when the evidence is not sufficient for trial by an ordinary Criminal Court, but the facts are well known within the tribe and can be dealt with by a Tribal Majlis which has sources of information which are not open to a law court. The punishments which may be awarded under the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations are limited to fine and imprisonment. A death sentence cannot be passed except by the ordinary Criminal Courts.

"According to tribal law, minor offences are punishable by compensation and fine. For murder, the law is a life for a life. It is the duty of the relatives of the murdered man to avenge his death, but they may compound the crime by accepting a fine, and in this country are usually willing to do so. The object of vengeance is not limited to the murderer. If the murderer and murdered man belong to different families in

the same sub-tribe, the relatives of the murdered man have the right to kill any one man of the murderer's family. If the murderer and murdered man belong to different sub-tribes, vengeance lies against any one man of the murderer's sub-tribe. If the murderer and murdered man belong to different tribes, vengeance lies against any one man of the murderer's tribe. So also the fine is payable not solely by the murderer, but by his family, sub-tribe, or tribe, as the case may be. For murder or other serious crime, a tribesman may also be banished from his tribe.

"Tribal law is not an effective deterrent to crime, in that the liability to punishment lies not on the individual who commits the crime, but the family, sub-tribe, or tribe to which he belongs. The share of a blood fine which the actual criminal in fact pays may thus be insignificant. There was a tendency in some Divisions for Political Officers to make use of its provisions in cases which could be more effectively dealt with by the ordinary courts. A circular was accordingly issued pointing out the limits within which the use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations should be confined."

At the close of his report Sir Edgar draws an interesting comparison between the courts set up since the occupation and those which they have replaced:—

"The existing courts," he observes, "follow Turkish procedure, and, with the exception of a few British judges, are staffed by Arab judges and clerks. How far, then, are they superior to the old Turkish courts? Without attempting to be exhaustive, one may draw attention to the following considerations:—

"(1) The work of the court is conducted in Arabic, and all the records of the civil court are kept in Arabic, instead of, as formerly, in Turkish, a foreign language in Mesopotamia.

"(2) The judges of the civil courts are honest. The dishonesty of the Turkish courts is proverbial in the East, and anyone who takes the trouble to make enquiries from residents in this country who had means of knowing cannot fail to be convinced that their evil reputation in this respect was well deserved.

"It is said that during the last 40 years before the occupation there were only two Qadhis of the Baghdad Shar'ah Court who were honest. There are men living at Baghdad who in the course of a few years' tenure of a poorly-paid Qadhiship advanced from extreme poverty to wealth. I had occasion recently to read the reports and accounts of the administrator of the estate of a British subject domiciled in Baghdad, who died a few months before the war. In the course of the administration, it became necessary to register some documents in the Qadhi's court. A visit was paid by the administrator to the court, and he was assured by the Qadhi that the work was straightforward and would give rise to no difficulty. The heirs attended the court on several occasions, but were constantly put off. One of them, realising the cause of the delay, had an interview with the Qadhi, and promised him a commission upon the completion of the work. No further postponement was then necessary, and the accounts of the estate in the records of the British Consulate contain the entry:—'To the Qadhi for his trouble, £T.15.' The work in this case being non-litigious, no wresting of justice was involved. But bribery was not confined to non-litigious work, nor to the Qadhi's court. I have been informed by merchants of standing that they could never obtain justice without paying for it.

"(3) Cases are heard with reasonable promptitude both in the Courts of First Instance and in Appeal. The inordinate delays to which the Turkish system of appeal, both in civil and criminal cases, lent itself, is a thing of the past.

"(4) By reducing the number of the courts, by careful selection of the judges, and by increasing their pay, the status of judges has been raised and a higher degree of competency has been obtained.

"On the other hand, the civil courts are still hampered by mediæval rules of evidence and antique laws."

The main difficulty, as he has elsewhere stated, in providing the country with sufficient law courts lies in finding British judges who are Arabic scholars and Arabs who are trained lawyers. A step has been taken towards the training of native lawyers by reopening the Baghdad School of Law in November 1919. It was the

only higher school in Mesopotamia in which the teachers were well paid, and it had therefore a certain reputation. Founded in 1908, it was closed on the outbreak of war. Those students who had completed a period of the four years' course were unable to finish their studies or to obtain a diploma. The Judicial Secretary judged it necessary to remove this hardship as soon as possible, and though lack of housing accommodation and of teachers forbade the immediate re-establishment of the school on the pre-war scale, provision was made for all former pupils to finish their studies in one or two years. Some 50 students availed themselves of this opportunity. One fundamental difference exists between the new school and the school it replaced: whereas under the Ottoman Government all teaching had been conducted in Turkish, under British auspices it is wholly in Arabic. The reopening of the school was well advised. The administration would have been subject to just criticism if it had not made an effort to provide at least such facilities for higher education as existed under the Turks, especially when the education in question is such as will enable natives of the country to occupy posts of importance by qualifying themselves for practice at the bar or for judicial appointment. Nor is the utility of the Law School confined to the courts, for men who pass through it will also be well fitted for many administrative posts.

The Auqaf Department, after its separation from the Revenue Department, was placed under the Judicial Department. With the exception of a British Director, it is staffed entirely with natives of the country, the Deputy Director being one of the notables of Baghdad. In accordance with a scheme contemplated but never put into execution by the Turks, the Department has been divided into an administrative and a learned branch, the latter controlled by a committee of leading Sunnis, to whom all matters connected with religious regulations and appointments are referred. A large measure of autonomy in dealing with local Auqaf is exercised at Basrah by means of a council of local magnates.

The development of Auqaf properties has gone steadily forward. Care is taken that Auqaf lands should be profitably leased—a striking example of what can be done in this direction is provided by a rich palm-growing area above Baghdad, which brought in no revenues in 1917, but in 1918 yielded Rs. 38,000.

Owing to a large portion of the Auqaf records having been burnt by the Turks after their evacuation of Baghdad, it was necessary to carry out investigations in many districts to ascertain Auqaf rights in properties. As a result of these investigations, which were carried out by inspectors of the Department, a rental roll has been compiled. In many cases, properties that had been fraudulently converted to the use of individuals have been recovered. In consequence of the increased demand for business premises and the new urban property constructed by the Department, as well as increased rents from agricultural lands, there is at present a surplus of over five lacs which can be applied to the repair of properties and religious foundations. A very large sum is necessary for this purpose, the Turks having left many of the mosques in a very dilapidated condition.

The revenues accruing from burial fees levied in the large Shi'ah shrines have been set aside for the upkeep of these shrines. In addition to sums already expended on repairs, there is a surplus of over one lac, which will be devoted to this object.

There is also a large class of Auqaf the revenues of which were dedicated to the Haramain (Mecca and Madinah). These also were neglected by the Turkish Government, and large sums are required to bring the properties into good condition. At present the accounts of these Auqaf show a surplus of two lacs, part of which will be devoted to the improvement of the properties, and part will be available for remitting to the Haramain.

A department is charged with the duty of auditing the accounts of Mulhaqah Auqaf, which are pious gifts administered by a trustee (Mutawalli). If a trustee's accounts are not satisfactory, he is dismissed and a new trustee appointed by the Qadhi.

A delicate though necessary task was that of careful enquiry into the detail of miscellaneous expenditure in mosques, which revealed many irregularities, and resulted in the saving of Rs. 60,000 in 1918 alone. These enquiries were prosecuted by the native officials of Auqaf, many of whom were diligent in the detection and suppression of abuses.

It is an interesting sign of the times that there is a considerable pressure of opinion amongst the younger and more advanced men, many of whom are free-thinkers, against the system of Auqaf expenditure inherited from the Turks. They



would like to divert monies dedicated by testators to specific objects, and apply them to ends which they hold would be more beneficial to the community, higher education being that which they have specially in view. The complaint they raise is that in matters of Auqaf British administration has proved more conservative than that of the Turks. From some points of view it is not improbably the case, since a non-Moslem Government must walk warily in dealing with purely Moslem institutions. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that higher education benefits a class which rarely coincides with the stratum of society for which Auqaf bequests were generally intended, when they were not dedicated to purely religious objects. Pious founders provided for the poor, and if their bequests should be applied in the future to educational purposes it is to primary schools rather than to colleges that they could justifiably be devoted. Where Auqaf funds have been bequeathed to higher education, the Department has done its best to see that they are used to advantage. For example, the Moslem college at Mu'adhham, the burial place of the founder of the Hanafi branch of Sunni Islam, has been reorganised and provided with an adequate teaching staff and a reasonable curriculum and time-table.

In another respect the Auqaf Department has a duty to perform. It is the greatest landlord in Mesopotamia, and as landlord and religious body combined, so far as it is not restricted by Shar'ah law, it should set an example. It should not seek to drive the hardest bargains, but it should bear in mind the general interest of the community and the educational value of generous policy in a tribal country where the relations between landlord and tenant are still in embryo. Agrarian content will be largely dependent on their right definition, and it is here that the Department of Pious Bequests may lead the way.

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**CHAPTER IX.—Organisation of the Education Department, Levies and Police, Civil Medical Service, Department of Commerce and Industry, Public Works, Railways, Finance, and Establishment.**

**EDUCATION.**

A Department for Education was organised in the summer of 1918, with Major H. E. Bowman (lent by the Egyptian Ministry of Education) at its head. No immediate change was made in the general principles which had guided the Revenue Department, but the burden of work had become heavy and demanded a special staff.

Among the most important points which called for decision was the difficult question of religious instruction. The Turks had made provision for Sunni teaching only, thus discouraging all but Sunnis from attending their schools. Our aim was to make it possible for boys of all creeds to attend the Government schools, and when the first primary schools were opened in Basrah it was determined provisionally, after careful consideration, not to have formal religious teaching, but to close the schools on two days a week, Sundays and Fridays, in order to give parents the opportunity of obtaining for their children the religious instruction which they preferred. It was found, however, that the general feeling among Moslems in favour of religious teaching in the Government schools was so strong that it resulted in a tendency to withdraw the boys from our schools and send them to the mullas' schools, inadequate though they were. An arrangement was made, therefore, by which an hour was set aside weekly for religious instruction in Government schools, such instruction being given, not by Government teachers, but by special teachers appointed for the purpose and paid out of other than Government funds. Sunni teachers, recommended by the Auqaf Committee, were appointed by the Education Committee, subject to the approval of the British officer responsible for the Education Department, and paid out of Waqf funds; while the Christian, Jewish, and Shi'ah communities were invited to send teachers to give instruction to the boys of their respective creeds at the appointed time. But no definite syllabus had been drawn up and practice varied in different schools. In some cases the boys still went to the local mulla. One of the first acts of the Education Department was to introduce religious instruction as a definite part of the school curriculum. In each school a religious teacher was appointed who belonged to the community of the majority. The minority are exempt and are allowed facilities to obtain instruction in their own faith where these exist. The Department, however, does not undertake to place a religious teacher of the minority on the establishment unless its numbers reach a certain proportion of the total attendance. To make full provision for several religions in one school is often

impracticable. It is not claimed that the solution is completely satisfactory, but it is the one which gives the nearest approximation to justice. With the exception of one Jewish and three Christian schools in Mosul, which before the war were maintained largely by funds from France and Rome, but which have recently been taken over by Government to save them from financial disaster, the majority of boys in Government schools are Mohammedan. Several Government schools are now attended by Jewish boys, who are taught their faith by religious teachers of their own community. The Jews of Kifri recently abandoned their own school to attend that of the Government, and a Jewish religious teacher has been appointed to the Maude Memorial School, 'Amarah, to which the Jewish community subscribed liberally. The religious syllabus, adopted in those Government schools in which the majority of boys are Mohammedan, was drawn up as far as possible to meet the views of both Sunnis and Shi'ahs; but in response to a special request from certain of the Shi'ah centres, a religious syllabus based on purely Shi'ah lines has recently been introduced into a few schools such as Karbala and Najaf, where the pupils are entirely composed of Shi'ahs. In other places the original syllabus, which was admittedly a compromise, has been received without demur.

The Education Department has persisted steadily in the task of establishing throughout the Occupied Territories an adequate provision of primary schools of elementary and higher type before embarking on a system of secondary education on a large scale. The Annual Report for 1919 recorded that 21 new schools of this type had been opened during the year, bringing the total number up to 75.<sup>1</sup> Four of these are denominational schools at Mosul, three Christian and one Jewish. These retain their special character, but are directly controlled by the Department, the staff and part of the equipment being maintained out of Government funds. Besides these schools, most of the Christian villages of any importance in the Mosul Wilayat possess schools, the main object of which is to give instruction in the liturgical language, Syriac or Chaldean, as the case may be. They also provide elementary instruction in Arabic, reading and writing and arithmetic, and are thus a long way ahead of the Islamic mullas' schools. Some of the village priests have been educated in Beyrut or Rome, or else in the French school at Mosul, and their services as teachers are not without value. An annual sum has been assigned from the budget of the primary schools to assist these schools in the Christian villages.

Grants-in-aid continue to be given in annually increasing amounts to the schools founded before or since the war by various religious bodies. In return for this the schools are placed under the supervision of the Department, and accept certain conditions which, while conceding complete liberty in religion, involve greater control than was at first possible or desirable. In addition to the American Mission school in Basrah, the Alliance Israélite schools in certain of the larger towns, and the schools for boys and girls controlled by the various Christian communities, those receiving a grant-in-aid include the Shi'ah school in Baghdad, elementary Persian schools in Baghdad and Karbala, and a Sunni school, known as the Madrasat Ahaliyah, recently started by private enterprise in Baghdad. It is satisfactory to record the marked progress in the comparatively short period, since the grants were first made, of certain of these denominational schools.

Steps are being taken to revive the regulations, strictly followed in Turkish times, by which private or sectarian schools must obtain a licence from Government. There is no desire to check private enterprise, but it has been found that schools are often opened, sometimes by undesirable persons, without due thought being taken either for their necessity or their future upkeep.

An educational system cannot be created in a day. Barely 6 per 1,000 of the population were registered in April 1920 as pupils of Government schools and denominational schools in receipt of a grant-in-aid, and the average daily attendance fell considerably below that figure. At certain seasons of the year parents withdraw their children to work in the bazaars and fields, urged by the high cost of living and tempted by the correspondingly high rate of wages. Compulsory education would be impracticable, since it would commit the Department to obligations which it could not at present fulfil, owing to financial stringency, the shortage of teachers and the difficulty in obtaining suitable accommodation and furniture. As war conditions disappear, these difficulties will be gradually overcome, but it will be long before the

<sup>1</sup> By April 1920 there were 85 boys' schools of all types and five girls' schools.

number of adequately trained teachers will be sufficient to meet the needs of the community.

The language question, perhaps unexpectedly to those who think of Mesopotamia as a purely Arab province, presents problems of its own. In the 75 primary and elementary schools which were in existence at the end of 1919, teaching was being conducted in Arabic in 56 schools, in Turkish in 11, for the benefit of the Turkoman colonies scattered along the Eastern frontier from Mandali to Arbil, and also at 'Tal 'Afar; in six schools it was given in Kurdish, in one in a Kurdish dialect called Shebek, which is spoken near Mosul, and in another in Persian. Fallahi, or modern Syriac, is the medium of instruction in the Chaldean and Syrian denominational schools of the Mosul Wilayat, though Arabic is generally learnt and used as the written language in the more advanced schools.

Under the Ottoman Government, when all teaching was given in Turkish, this complication was avoided, but times are changed and our object is to teach the children in a language they can understand. In the syllabus issued in May 1919, it is laid down that the language of instruction shall be the local vernacular. Arabic is taught as a foreign language in Kurdish and Turkoman schools, and Persian in a few schools where local conditions make it desirable. English has been introduced only in those places where a real need for it exists. Some conflict of opinion has arisen over the teaching of English in certain schools, and it has been difficult, if not impossible, for the Department to lay down a hard and fast rule on the subject. In principle the general policy has been that English should be confined for the present to the larger towns, where a knowledge of the language is likely to be of practical value. Even here its study is much hampered by the lack of competent teachers, and it is a regrettable fact that, owing to more competent teaching of the language in the denominational schools, English is as a rule better known by Jewish and Christian boys than by Moslems.

Kurdish as a medium of instruction is handicapped by the absence of a formulated grammar and orthography. Major Soane, Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah, and Captain Farrell, Education Officer for that area, have undertaken to provide a grammar and an elementary Kurdish reader.

In the Training College at Baghdad the difficulty in dealing with the variety of languages is felt acutely. The few students who have entered from Kurdish or Turkoman districts have as a rule been returned to their native towns owing to their inability to follow the teaching and their reluctance to learn Arabic. This difficulty can only be solved by setting up Training Colleges in those districts where Kurdish and Turkish are spoken, but for the present the College at Baghdad has to meet the needs of the whole country. One satisfactory feature worth recording is the large number of students from the provinces. In April 1920, out of a total of 68 students attending the Training College, no less than 44 were from outside Baghdad, and of these the majority are boarded and lodged at Government expense. The general tone of the College is good. Sunnis, Shi'ahs and Christians work, play and live together in a spirit of camaraderie and good fellowship, which a few years ago would have been thought impossible. There is a reluctance on the part of the Jews to attend this institution, but it is probable that this prejudice will be overcome in time.

Physical and manual training are included in the official curriculum and the boy scout movement is making headway in the towns.

One British and three native Inspectors assist the Director of Education, and the native inspectorate will shortly be increased. The salaries of teachers have been more than doubled and fixed in a series of grades according to qualifications. The system is sufficiently elastic to allow of higher rates when budgetary provision can be made. It is hoped that better pay and more definite prospects will attract a better type of man to the teaching profession. More satisfactory supervision will be attained by greater decentralisation. Sub-departments, each under a British Education Officer, assisted by a native Inspector at Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, have been formed, and this scheme will be extended shortly to Hillah and Kirkuk. The channel of communication on educational matters is the Political Officer, and through him the Assistant Political Officer who controls and supervises the schools in his district. In places where an Educational Officer is stationed permanently, the schools are placed under his direct control, but he keeps in touch with the Resident Political Officer, so that full consideration may be given to local conditions.

The Education Committee, composed of local representatives with advisory but no executive powers, continues to meet at Baghdad. In the near future, it is proposed

that its powers should be enlarged and that similar committees should be appointed in each area.

A beginning has been made in the matter of female education. A few girls' schools existed in Turkish times, but were not well considered, mainly because of the unsatisfactory reputation of the teachers. Apart from this, however, the position with regard to the education of women is curious. Men of religion of the old school are secretly opposed to it, while with the younger generation it has become a kind of catchword. Men whose mothers never leave the house and who would be horrified at the suggestion that they should walk in the bazaars, even closely veiled, point to the emancipation of women in Constantinople as a proof that the Turks have rightly understood the female problem and have thereby laid the foundation for national greatness; and the implication that the British administration has been laggard in the 'Iraq is not absent. They do not recognise that a proper teaching staff will take time to form, and that without it schools are of no value.

Five Government girls' schools had been opened by the beginning of 1920, two at Mosul, one at Baghdad, one at Karbala, and one at Diwanayah. The Baghdad school is in charge of an English Directress, who has had long educational experience in India, and who came to Mesopotamia in the autumn of 1919. Some of the school mistresses employed in Turkish times have been re-engaged; they are supplemented by girls trained in the American Mission College at Mardin. The teacher at Diwanayah until recently could neither read nor write and confined herself to giving sewing lessons and instruction in the Quran. A better educated woman, an Armenian, has lately been appointed. The Christian and Jewish communities still do most of the work of educating girls and are likely to maintain this position for some time to come.

This is also the case with regard to secondary education, which is still in its infancy. There are at present secondary sections in Baghdad and Mosul for boys who have completed the primary course. They are not well attended—the numbers at the end of 1919 were seven in Baghdad and 27 in Mosul, 18 of the latter being Christians. There are boys who should attend them and do not, possibly because they do not think them institutions of sufficient importance. These might be attracted by a more imposing organisation, but in fact the number of boys who have been well enough grounded to benefit by a secondary school is not great. The institution referred to previously, the Madrasat Ahaliyah, is called a secondary school but is in fact hardly above the standard of a Government primary school.

The only higher schools in the country in the time of the Turks were the Law School and the Training College in Baghdad. These are both now open and are well attended. In addition to these, a Commercial School has been opened under a British principal, where the course is three years and where the student can receive a good general education in economics and prepare himself for Government service or a business career. It is mainly attended by Jews, and there is a tendency for the students to leave before completing the full course; but it is at any rate the germ of another faculty.

A Technical School on a small scale has been opened in Baghdad, and is shortly to be developed. A Survey School, begun immediately after the occupation of Baghdad, was closed for a few months in 1919 and reopened under better auspices. It is the germ from which it may be hoped that an Engineering College will spring. A School of Agriculture will be opened shortly, a good site having been selected on the Diyalah.

Little further progress in the direction of technical education can be made until a body of teachers has been trained, but its importance in the development of a country like Mesopotamia is obvious. All forms of higher education have hitherto been sought mainly in Constantinople, since before the Constitution of 1908 it was almost impossible for parents to send their children to Europe. Medicine is a study to which boys of good family are apt to turn, and the School of Medicine in the capital had a deservedly high reputation. Similarly the Military and Law Schools of Constantinople were famous all over the Turkish Empire, and the French and American Colleges there drew many pupils. The Sultan 'Abdul Hamid founded a Shaikhs' College, to which, under some pressure from the Turkish authorities, sons of tribal chiefs were sent; but its frankly Ottomanizing tendencies detracted from its popularity. Boys went also to the American and French Colleges at Beyrut, and it may be hoped that they will continue to go there until facilities are provided at home.

The cry for secondary and higher education is likely to be louder than the demand for technical education. The Nationalist Intelligenzia value higher education

as the only road to independent Nationalist institutions, since they believe that it alone can create a body of men capable of filling responsible offices of state. Failure to satisfy them might well be regarded as a deliberate effort on the part of Government to hold the people back in the path of national progress. It may therefore be advisable to erect some of the superstructure in the 'Iraq before the substructure is complete in every part; and if this process presents disadvantages, it will at least be wholly to the good that the generation now nearing manhood, on whom the Mesopotamian Government must draw in the course of the next few years for an official class, should as far as possible be educated at home. Nor is there, in the opinion of those who have been longest acquainted with the Arab of Mesopotamia is to be trusted, any very salient danger of creating a large class which will look only to official appointments as a means of livelihood. The 'Iraqi is a money-maker, whether he be cultivator or trader; under an equitable administration there will be a better prospect of acquiring wealth through agriculture or commerce than in Government service, especially if the country develops according to reasonable expectation. If technical education, with schools of commerce, agriculture, engineering, and so forth, goes hand in hand with that of a higher literary type, the attractions of the first may be trusted to balance those of the second.

#### ARCHÆOLOGY.

As a preliminary measure, archæology has been placed under the charge of the Education Department. Shortly after the occupation of Baghdad, a proclamation was issued in the name of the Army Commander providing for the preservation of ancient monuments and antiquities, as well as for the prohibition of traffic in forged articles. It was based on the Turkish law and forbade the destruction or defacement of any ancient monument or site and the sale of antiques except under licence. The German excavations at Babylon were visited by a Political Officer; such antiquities as were found in Professor Koldewey's house were carefully sealed up and guards were placed in the ruin field to prevent the depredations of visitors.

In the spring of 1918 a short period of work was undertaken at Abu Shahrain, the ancient Eridu, and at Tal al Lahm by Captain Campbell Thompson on behalf of the British Museum, and in the following year Mr. H. R. Hall was sent out from London by the British Museum, and worked for a few weeks at Tal Muqaiyir, the ancient Ur, at Abu Shahrain and at Al 'Ubaid.

All antiquities resulting from these excavations were sent to the British Museum. Mr. Hall's finds at Al 'Ubaid were of the utmost importance. They are of the Sumerian period and date from not later than 3000 B.C. Owing to their fragile nature it would have been impossible to retain them in Mesopotamia; when once they had been taken out of the ground they would have perished immediately without expert treatment, which could not have been supplied. It is exceedingly doubtful whether they could ever with safety be lodged in a museum at Baghdad, where the extremes of climate would prove injurious to them. For the present, therefore, the collections have been retained by the British Museum.

His Majesty's Government, impressed by the danger to which objects so valuable and delicate would be exposed, decided that further excavations should be prohibited until an adequately staffed Department of Archæology had been created by the Mesopotamian Government. No further work has in consequence been done.

In the spring of 1920 Mesopotamia was visited by Professor A. T. Clay, who holds the Chair of Assyriology and Babylonian Literature in Yale University. His immediate purpose was to establish in Baghdad an American school of Oriental research, in accordance with the terms of the will of the late Dr. William Hayes Ward, whereby, subject to certain conditions, a valuable Babylonian library was bequeathed to Baghdad. Almost at the same time Professor Breasted, of the University of Chicago, brought out a small expedition and visited a number of ancient sites. Returning by Aleppo they examined at Salihyah on the Euphrates a frescoed church of great antiquity which had just been brought to light.

The immediate need in Mesopotamia is an archæological authority on the lines of that which exists in Egypt or that which has been founded in Palestine. It will be the guardian of all ancient sites and monuments, and to it will fall the duty of granting to suitable persons or societies the permission to excavate, in accordance with regulations previously determined. A comprehensive archæological survey should be undertaken under its auspices. A museum must be provided in Baghdad as soon as funds are available, but discretion must be used in the retention of antiquities. Such

objects as are likely to suffer from the climate should not be left in Baghdad, nor such as in the interests of archæological research should be available to students in more accessible centres.

#### LEVIES.

The organisation of natives of the country for semi-military and police duties passed through several stages.

In the early part of the war Arabs and Kurds were seldom employed as supplementary and auxiliary to the army of occupation. A force of 40 mounted men was raised at Nasiriyah by Major Eadie under the Intelligence Branch for the collection of intelligence, military and tribal, as advanced scouts in front of military patrols, and as guides. They were known as the Muntafiq Horse and proved themselves of considerable value to the 15th Division at Nasiriyah. They afterwards formed the nucleus of the present 5th Euphrates Levy.

Other forces under civil control were raised, as has been described in a previous chapter, for the purpose of guarding the lines of communication of the army. In June 1915, after the fall of Kut, when the relieving army was at Sunai'at, a corps of guards for the river and telegraphic line between Qurnah, 'Amarah and Basrah was recruited. This force was divided into two sections in June 1916, to correspond to the political divisions, and placed under the control of Assistant Political Officers. By April 1917 its strength was 109, and from it have developed the present 3rd Tigris Levy at Qal'at Salih and the Qurnah District Police, respectively.

In July 1917 the Army Commander sanctioned a total maximum strength of 900 Shabanah in the Baghdad Wilayat, 500 mounted and 400 dismounted. His views with regard to native levies had been laid down in May of that year, when he informed the Chief Political Officer that he was "not in favour of their employment, his policy "being to keep the Arab population as quiet as possible and to avoid their being "drawn into the operations," but he was prepared to make an exception in places where we should derive from them obvious advantages. With the cessation of hostilities, the risks attached to the employment of armed Arabs were greatly reduced, while the need for local executive forces for the civil authorities continually increased, and this policy was relaxed. Though the principle, that one of the main duties of Shabanah was the relief of military guards, continued to be complied with, the Shabanah forces during 1918 and 1919 passed into a second stage. Controlled by the civil authorities, they were used as nondescript forces maintained to supply the executive needs of the civil administration, as police, qolchis and messengers. But they were commanded by military and not police officers, and such training as was possible proceeded on a military basis. The possibility of training and using Shabanah as striking forces, the possible nucleus of an Arab army, was increasingly advocated, till it became evident that a policy of compromise between police and military duties was no longer possible, but was likely to lessen their usefulness in both capacities.

The direct relations of Shabanah with Political Headquarters at Baghdad necessitated a central organisation to deal with questions of equipment and pay, though their control remained decentralised. For some time this was carried out by the Civil Commissioner's office, but in March 1919 an Inspecting Officer of Arab Militia was appointed. The Shabanah were now officially recognised as Militia and were organised as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Euphrates Militia, with Headquarters at Ramadi, Hillah, Abu Sukhair, Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Tigris Militia with Headquarters at Samarra, Kut, Qal'at Salih and Qurnah, and the Basrah and Ba'qubah Militias. In July 1919 the designation of the force was again changed to that of Levy, and levies at Dair-al-Zor, Khaniqin, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah, and gendarmerie at Mosul were included under the general organisation.

In August 1919 the control of levies and the duties of the Inspecting Officer and Commandants were re-defined. Levies were now placed at the immediate disposal of Political Officers, who were directed to issue orders to the nearest officer in charge of levies, whether British or Arab, and not direct to the men. The general administration of the force was placed under the supervision of the Inspecting Officer. The Inspecting Officer's duties were laid down as the supervision and inspection of levies for the Civil Commissioner and the direction of Political Officers and Commandants as to the administration, organisation and training of their units. Commandants were now to deal direct with the Inspecting Officer in regard to matters of training, discipline, clothing, equipment, pay and accounts, while remaining responsible to the Political Officer for the training, discipline, efficiency and interior

economy of their commands. When carrying out duties on behalf of the military authorities, however, the Political Officer was to take his instructions from the Military Commander of the area, and to be responsible to him for the efficient performance of these duties, and in the event of definite hostilities he was to come under the control of the Area Commander.

The result of these orders was considerably to increase the administrative duties of Levy Headquarters, since its function, which had hitherto been confined to equipment, inspection and report to the Civil Commissioner, was now widened to include direct administration. In September the Headquarters office was reorganised and divided into "A" and "Q" branches.

The development of this force, especially in the Middle Euphrates divisions, had now reached a stage when it became imperative that a reconstitution should be made. Proposals were therefore submitted to the Civil Commissioner in September by the Inspecting Officer for the division of the existing levies into:—

- (a) A striking force of levies at local headquarters.
- (b) District police.

But it was decided to confine this policy to the divisions of Hillah, Diwaniyah and Shamiyah in the first place, as an experimental measure.

The division took place in January 1920. The forces hitherto known as the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Euphrates Levies were organised as the 2nd Euphrates Levy with permanent detachments at Diwaniyah and Abu Sukhair. The force was given six months for training, free of all duties except its own guards, and was placed at the disposal of Political Officers after that period for minor military operations and punitive expeditions considered by them to be beyond the scope of the District Police and not sufficiently serious for the employment of regular troops. It consisted of Mounted Infantry, trained for mobility and rapid action, mounted on Government horses and armed with British rifles. All duties previously found by levies in these Divisions were now to be found by District Police, with the exception of guards and escorts on treasure and on Divisional Political Officers. Men were to be enrolled (on an official form) for two years with the option of re-enlisting for a further three years with a bonus of two months' pay.

This experimental force has now been under training for six months. The discontent which had prevailed previously has disappeared with the sanction of increased pay and improved and definite conditions of service. The general improvement in training, discipline and *esprit de corps* of the levy represents a very hopeful achievement in so short a time, and effectually disposes of the criticism that Arabs will not submit to discipline and military life. During the first three months the strength of the force has risen from 360 to 480 total Arab ranks.

The same principle is now being applied throughout the Occupied Territories with the exception of the existing forces in the Dulaim, Mosul and Sulaimaniyah Divisions, which, owing to political circumstances and difficulties of communication, and in order to avoid dual control, have been placed under the full administrative and financial control of the Political Officers concerned. The reconstituted levies are now organised on a military footing and will be controlled from Levy Headquarters. The establishment of levies under the direct control of Levy Headquarters will total 3,075 Arab ranks, that of gendarmerie and levy, controlled by Political Officers, 1,786 Arab and Kurdish ranks, making a total of 4,861 Arab and Kurdish ranks, on a military footing in the Occupied Territories. Levies at Kirkuk, Samarra and Qurnah have been transferred to District Police, and District Police established at Hillah, Diwaniyah, Shamiyah, Kut al 'Amarah, 'Amarah, Nasiriyah, Diyalah and Arbil. The reconstituted levies are disposed according to political divisions, and though liable to service within the Occupied Territories and frontier zone, are normally intended for use as divisional striking forces within their own divisions.

A chain of forces on a military footing and organisation was in being by the spring of 1920 from Nasiriyah to Abu Kamal on the Euphrates, and from Qal'at Salih to Mosul on the Tigris, while on the more inflammable frontiers a screen of forces in the Dulaim, Mosul, Arbil, Sulaimaniyah and Diyalah Divisions was established, from which frontier posts were or were intended to be found. These forces are experimental and in embryo, but there is every reason to suppose that they will fulfil in the course of a year the promise they have given hitherto.

The type of recruit, especially in the reconstituted 2nd Euphrates Levy, is improving in class and physique. As a general rule recruitment by tribes or sections of tribes has been avoided as likely to perpetuate a class spirit which *esprit de corps* should replace. The problem of the supply of officers in the Arab levies has been a

difficult one. Normally men of the shaikhly class have either not been forthcoming or have been unsuitable as officers when obtained. The abrupt transition from the traditionally free and debonair life of the desert shaikhling to the arduous discipline of a military career is hard to bridge, and too hard in most cases for them to accept readily. The majority of Arab officers in Arab levies are therefore promoted rankers, whose training, experience and discipline is normally so little in advance of that of the men they command that their prestige and powers of command are small.

The Sulaimaniyah Levy, the Arbil Levy and the greater part of the Mosul Gendarmerie are almost entirely Kurd. Without the mercurial temperament and quick intelligence of the Arab, the Kurd has more stolidity and has shown himself amenable to training and discipline in Sulaimaniyah, where alone systematic training has been possible. Of these forces also the tribesmen have generally fought shy. Kurds of the ex-official class have been freely employed as officers, and on the whole have justified employment. There is no lack of intelligent and well-trained ex-officers in Kurdistan whose employment is politically desirable; they bring to these levies, along with traditions of the Turkish officer class, which are probably not ineradicable, habits of discipline and command which are invaluable to so young a force. While the Arab effendi is generally disliked and distrusted by the rank and file, the Kurdish official is, on the whole, respected. The two classes of officers in Arab and Kurdish levies are therefore widely separated in race, tradition and status.

The Kirkuk Levy has been transferred to District Police, but the Turkomans of Kirkuk have drifted into levies outside the Division. They take more kindly to officialdom, discipline and exile from their home than the Arab or the Kurd. Both Kurds and Turkomans are to be found in Arab levies in the 'Iraq. At Hillah a Kurdish troop has been formed. Racial feeling is small and the experiment has so far been successful. British ranks have been supplied by a fortuitous engagement of officers and other ranks from regular or temporary units. The bulk of these are temporary officers and non-commissioned officers, of whom a few of the former and most of the latter are demobilised. All ranks serve on the general list of the civil administration.

For minor punitive expeditions and for arrests this force has proved itself a valuable weapon in the hand of Government. It is for work such as this, and not for major operations, that it is at present trained. On several occasions, however, they have unavoidably been involved in serious disturbances for which they were unfitted to cope, for all of which military columns had subsequently to be despatched. It should be recorded to their credit that they put up a fair fight at 'Aqrah in November 1919. Though they were outnumbered and forced to retire after a few hours, their presence was useful as blockading the Mosul road and providing a reserve for a loyal but nervous Kurdish ally. Again, when Dair al Zor was taken by Ramadhan al Shallash in December 1919, the levies were employed by the Political Officer during the first two days as patrols, and in every case returned bringing valuable information. When the barracks were attacked by a rabble of tribesmen and townsmen numbering over 2,600, 20 out of the total of 60 men in the levies stood by the Political Officer. Except on one occasion, their conduct has been uniformly good when employed in small operations against tribal forces, or for the arrest of persons wanted by the Government, and more than once they have been specially commended for gallantry. If grave offences must be recorded against them at Amadiyah and Tal 'Afar, their gallant defence of their officers at Shahraban in August 1920 must not be forgotten, nor the steadfastness of the levies at Hillah. The relations between native officers and men and British officers and non-commissioned officers are normally so good as to merit special remark. The British staff show a most encouraging enthusiasm and confidence in their task, and the levies are beginning to take the utmost pride in their own attainments and achievements.

#### POLICE.

On the reconstitution of the Levies the police force took over such Shābanah as had not been incorporated into the new striking force. Many of them were not found suitable for police work; new recruits had to be enlisted and trained, which put a considerable strain on the force, but its strength is now almost complete.

The police force had had small beginnings. On the occupation of Basrah the police employed in the arms traffic blockade in the Persian Gulf were transferred



temporarily to Basrah under their Indian subordinate officers, who were acquainted with the language, and a local police force trained, though it was difficult at first to make careful selection and the stamp of men who enlisted was not always satisfactory. As the system of town police was extended to provincial towns such as 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, it was an almost insoluble problem to find a sufficient supply of Arabs suitable for employment as officers. The Turkish police had had a bad name; men of good family would not willingly enter the service, nor was it advisable to draw on men who had been employed as police by the Turks. A small detachment of police from Aden were of great assistance; Egyptian police who were serving as a Labour Corps in Basrah were used in Baghdad after the occupation, but they were accused locally of unnecessary roughness and were got rid of.

The regular police is now a centralised force, controlled and administered by the Inspector-General of Police at Baghdad, with a Deputy Commissioner at Basrah and Baghdad and Assistant Commissioners at 'Amarah, Samarra, Kirkuk and Shamiyah. In these divisions, the town and district police form part of the same force. In the Mosul and Arbil Divisions regular police are in charge of the towns. This force is controlled by an Assistant Commissioner stationed at Mosul. In the divisions in which the regular police are located they are not independent of the local Political Officer, who, as head of the division, is responsible for the law and order of the division, and for this purpose controls the police, leaving the administration and interior economy to the care of the Assistant Commissioner. In the remaining divisions the district police are at present under the sole control of the Political Officers in charge of the divisions.

There is, in addition, a railway police service, which extends over the whole railway system. This is controlled by an Assistant Commissioner of Police and forms part of the regular police. Here the position of the Director of Railways is similar to that of the Political Officer in other police forces.

The Criminal Investigation Department, with branches at Basrah and Baghdad, conducts political and technical enquiries, and includes the Finger Print Bureau and Passport Department. Both branches are under an Assistant Commissioner.

The higher branches of police work are being developed. Training schools have been opened at Baghdad and Basrah, where all recruits are trained. All inspectors are passed through these schools and have also a thorough training in law and procedure, investigation, finger prints, &c. Several young Arabs have been trained as inspectors; they have developed remarkably well and have shown detective ability of a high order. As the efficiency and experience of the Arab staff has increased, it has been possible to reduce the number of British sergeants. With the exception of a small number of British officers and other ranks, and a few Indian inspectors and clerks at Baghdad and Basrah, the whole force is locally recruited.

The expansion of the police force has demanded rapid recruiting and training; it would be surprising if it did not include some undesirables, but great care is taken to discover and discharge them and a better type of recruit is coming in. Promotions from the ranks to inspectorates are made with satisfactory results and are an incentive to good service. The organisation of police in oriental countries is admittedly one of the most difficult problems of administration, opportunities for corruption and petty oppression being both numerous and difficult to trace, while complaints brought against the native police are usually of too vague and general a character to be followed up.

The increase in public security which was, perhaps, the most salient feature of the three years of British administration since 1917 was, however, due only in part to such organisations as levies and police. The fundamental cause was the presence of the British Army of Occupation. As Nazim Pasha recognised in 1911, no permanent improvement in the preservation of law and order can be expected until the tribes are disarmed. A beginning had been made in this direction, and by March 1920 some 50,000 rifles had been collected in the Wilayats of Baghdad and Basrah. When this had been accomplished, arms regulations were issued which forbade the carrying, possessing or dealing in arms without a licence. A gradual application of these regulations was contemplated, but it had barely begun before the outbreak of disturbances in the summer of 1920.

#### CIVIL SERVICE.

During the process of demobilisation by which the army of occupation was reduced to a peace footing, it became incumbent on the civil administration to take

over functions which had hitherto been exercised wholly or in part by the military authorities. This was a task of considerable magnitude. On the one hand, the army had been responsible for important branches of the administration; on the other, the organisation of the country had reached an advanced stage. The conditions presented peculiar difficulties. Demobilisation was rapid, and men who had long been out of England wished to avail themselves of the earliest opportunity to return home. Owing to distance and lack of transport, leave had been less easy to obtain here than in France, and many who intended to remain in the country were reasonably desirous of a few months' absence. Moreover, officers who had been lent to the civil administration by India or Egypt were urgently recalled by their respective Governments, which, no less than Mesopotamia, were faced with the problems resulting from demobilisation and the re-establishment of peace conditions. But in Mesopotamia a further embarrassment had to be overcome. No civil service could be constituted until the conclusion of peace with Turkey made it possible to define the form of government which would ultimately be set up; no assured future could therefore be offered to men who wished to stay in Mesopotamia rather than return to their former posts. Many were obliged reluctantly to go, and the civil administration was thus shorn of senior officers who had learnt Arabic and become familiar with local habits and ways of thought. The people, on their side, disliked the removal of officers whom they knew and trusted. Such men are always difficult to replace, and their withdrawal threw an additional burden on those who remained. More than once a complete breakdown in the administration seemed imminent. To Colonel A. T. Wilson (now Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E.), whose discrimination had been one of the chief factors in calling the service into being, is due the credit of having inspired it with the determination to carry the work through and of using his materials to the best advantage. His own labours were never intermitted, and he exhibited unflinching resource in dealing with the many and varying problems which arose. The immediate difficulty of personnel was partly met by re-engaging demobilised officers or engaging new recruits on a year's contract. As the formation of departments proceeded the group of competent men placed in charge at headquarters relieved the Acting Civil Commissioner and provided him with a body of expert opinion on which he could rely.

#### MEDICAL.

It was of the first moment to assure the continuance of an adequate health and medical service when the military authorities could no longer give the assistance which they had formerly rendered. By the middle of 1918 there was a civil hospital or dispensary in each military station of any importance. Either a civil surgeon was in charge or an officer of the Indian Medical Service who undertook civil work in addition to his military duties; with the help of an assistant or sub-assistant surgeon, usually a native of India drawn from the military staff. Native doctors, many of them Armenians, who had been trained at Constantinople, Beirut, or other medical colleges, were employed whenever they were available, and after the armistice the return to Baghdad of some Turkish doctors, who had long practised in the town, was a boon to the native population. But on the whole native practitioners are so imperfectly trained that their sphere of usefulness is somewhat limited. In several of the larger towns, such as Basrah and Amarah, the civil surgeon was responsible for public health and sanitation; in Baghdad the duty was performed by a medical officer and assistant lent by the military, assisted by a military sanitary section, until the spring of 1919. One of the pioneer sanitary sections—a London territorial section—took charge of the city work in 1917, and the varied accomplishments of its highly trained civilian personnel found ample scope for employment and filled the gap which existed, due to want of any municipal organisation for health matters. The inferior staff at the disposal of the civil authorities, both in the hospitals and for sanitary work, was very small, and all medical and surgical equipment was supplied by the military stores. The civil institutions had not been co-ordinated, owing to the absence of any central organisation, but in August 1918 this was remedied by the appointment of a civil Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services, who worked in the office of the Military Director of Medical Services and acted as a liaison officer. In February 1919 he became administrative head of the Civil Medical Department, and in March, with the more complete organisation of the Health Department, he was appointed Secretary for Health. There were then in existence some 50 civil hospitals and dispensaries, three-quarters of which were run by a civil staff; though in nine of these supervision was undertaken by military medical officers. Arrangements had been made with the

base medical stores before the end of 1918 to maintain sufficient supplies to meet all the requirements of the civil Medical Service for the year 1919, and the nucleus of a civil medical depôt had been formed in Baghdad. By arrangement with the Red Cross Society, which demobilised in March 1919, this depôt had the first option on all the Red Cross stock in the country. As regards sanitary work, locally trained inspectors and gangs replaced sanitary sections in the towns in which they had been employed, and the care of public health began to pass everywhere into civil charge. It includes the inspection of prisons, markets, noxious trades and slaughter houses, the provision of chlorinated water, measures to ensure general cleanliness and the destruction of rats, mosquitoes and flies. The Civil Surgeon of a provincial town, who is also Health Officer, is overwhelmed with administrative work in addition to his medical work, and it is only by unceasing labour that he can accomplish his task. The devotion shown by the officers of the Medical Service, and their tact and skill in handling the native population, have been beyond praise.

Immediate steps were taken to enlist what medical personnel was available in Mesopotamia and to recruit at home such additional staff as was required, with the result that it has been possible to supply urgent needs. There are now hospitals and dispensaries in every town which is a divisional headquarters, besides hospitals in most of the smaller provincial towns and dispensaries in a number of villages. In Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul, nursing sisters tend the civil hospitals, and both Baghdad and Mosul have hospitals set apart for women and children. The women's hospital in Baghdad has an interesting history. It is lodged in an excellent building, which was in Turkish times the civil hospital of the town. A small staff of French nuns had been employed by the Ottoman Government as nurses; they had endeared themselves to the people, and their community had earned our lasting gratitude by the services they had rendered to British prisoners during the war. It was decided to ask the nuns to continue to serve in the hospital under the new arrangements, and employment was offered to an additional number of trained sisters who are being brought from France. To see these admirable women carrying on their work with every advantage that the British Medical Service can supply carries conviction that all is not wrong with the world.

In Basrah, where the house used as a civil hospital is not suitable, a new building will be erected out of funds subscribed voluntarily by the inhabitants in memory of General Maude. Nasiriyah also boasts a Maude Memorial Hospital. The British and French nursing sisters undertake the training of native girls, not only to serve in the hospitals, but also with the object of creating a body of trained nurses to work among the native population. The better class women of Baghdad readily admit the need of trained midwives, for, as they observe, the existing midwives bring disease instead of combating it.

Depôts for medical stores have been instituted both at Basrah and at Baghdad, and in the latter place, besides the women's hospital, there is a civil hospital for men, an isolation hospital, an X-ray institute taken over from the army, a dental institute, two dispensaries, a nursing home for officers and their wives, and a venereal hospital for women. The terrible scourge of venereal disease receives special attention at other centres. The prevention of infectious diseases is being dealt with effectually, perhaps the most gratifying achievement having been the checking of an epidemic of plague in 1919 by a whole-hearted resort on the part of the local population, male and female, to inoculation with plague vaccine. Over 80,000 people were inoculated. A vaccine lymph depôt, started by the military authorities at Amarah, was taken over by the civil authorities in February 1919, and ensures a supply of calf vaccine throughout the Occupied Territories. In the Mosul Wilayat the most serious problem which confronts us is the universal presence in the hills of malaria of a violent type. The condition of the villages is deplorable; some, indeed, are reported to be uninhabitable. The efficiency of the local gendarmerie is impaired, and the disease is a threat to the civil staff. The free distribution of quinine in these areas was one of the sanitary steps taken by Turkish Government and will be reverted to by ourselves; but the problem is grave, and it is only by accumulating knowledge of local conditions that any solution can be found. Already in most areas occupied or traversed by our troops careful malarial surveys by specialist officers have been made, and it is hoped soon to preserve these records by making them available in a condensed printed form so that they be accessible to all concerned.

Danger of infectious disease is notably increased by the influx of pilgrims to the Shi'ah shrines. During the war the pilgrimage was necessarily intermitted; permission to renew it was given in 1919, and exceptionally large numbers availed

themselves of it. An average of 7,000 pilgrims a month passed through the frontier town of Khaniqin. No attempt has been made to imitate the Turkish quarantine arrangements, which were as burdensome as they were inefficient, but careful measures are taken to ensure the cleanliness of Khaniqin, and a dispensary for the treatment of pilgrims will be opened at railhead. In the holy towns the pilgrims entail much additional sanitary work, but the precautions which have been taken cannot yet be considered to suffice. At Kadhimain a small hospital has been opened for pilgrims. "After a prodigious journey in inclement weather," writes the Civil Surgeon, "subsisting upon a minimum of food in the shape of chupatties, slaking his thirst with impure water and, as a result of his diet, weakened by enteritis and a form of scurvy, the pilgrim arrives at the holy town at last, with the wish to die there as his sole sustaining force. He proceeds to die in the street or in the mosque, and it is to make the end of these pilgrims more comfortable, or even to give them a chance of recovery, that in December 1919 a small twelve-bedded hospital was set up to take in the dying pilgrim and do the best for him. As regards statistics, the just way to look at the figures is to say that about 50 per cent. recovered."

The Health Department takes charge not only of living pilgrims but also of the dead, whose bodies are brought for burial to Karbala and Najaf. The existing quarantine regulations conform with Turkish practice, which had been regulated by an international commission and was controlled through the International Quarantine Board. Corpses must have been buried for at least three months, and those brought from Persia are examined at the frontier. The Turks permitted immediate burial at the shrines of local corpses, subject to the absence of infectious disease and of nuisance from advanced decomposition. This privilege was somewhat extended during the winter of 1919-20, the sending of fresh corpses from Baghdad to Najaf or Karbala having been allowed. This was mainly on account of the possibility of motor transport, but it was recognised that it might have to be modified in the summer, and the permission was limited to the period up to 31st March. The question of regulation of pilgrim and corpse traffic is a difficult and delicate one with many side issues, and will demand in future very careful scrutiny and consideration at the hands, it is hoped, of a committee in which various interests, such as railways, political and medical, will all be represented.

It may be said with assurance that in few directions has more rapid progress been made since the occupation than in the case of public health. In Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul the increase in the number of beds is as notable as is the increased efficiency of the present hospitals compared with those that existed in Turkish times. But it is perhaps in the provinces that the greatest change has been effected. Provincial hospitals and dispensaries were rare under the Ottoman régime, and even where they were to be found they were of little value. At Nasiriyah, for example, the staff consisted of a single doctor, who frequently shut the dispensary and went away, leaving all work at a standstill. The Turks made no attempt to win the confidence of the tribesmen, and the bulk of the population was thus left without medical aid of any kind. In the villages sanitary precautions were non-existent and in the provincial towns they were grossly insufficient. The efforts of Political Officers and Civil Surgeons have brought about improvements which are indeed remarkable. Let those who knew Mesopotamia before the war revisit Hillah or Kirkuk and recall, if they have the courage, sights and smells which are now an evil memory.

#### DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

A Department of Commerce and Industry was organised in 1919 which included Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Stores and Transport and the Government Press. The Chief Collector of Customs is Secretary.

As regards Customs, duty is collected on imports and exports by sea at Basrah and at Baghdad, the dutiable importations at the latter place being restricted to goods on a through bill of lading; this provision is necessary to enable the volume of trade dealt with in Baghdad to be limited to the quantity for which Customs accommodation is obtainable. There is a Collector of Customs at each of these places. Their decisions are subject to appeal to the Chief Collector of Customs, who is Chief Customs authority and whose office is in Baghdad.

The Collector of Customs, Baghdad, has charge of the land Customs frontier stations, of which the principal are at Tirauq (near Khaniqin on the Persian frontier), Mosul and Sulaimaniyah, at each of which places there is a Deputy Collector.

The following table indicates the total value of imports and exports to and from Baghdad and Basrah for the years from 1910 to 1919 inclusive :—

Lacs of Rupees.			Lacs of Rupees.				
1910	-	-	395	1916	-	-	404
1911	-	-	428	1917	-	-	625
1912	-	-	398	1918	-	-	1,110
1915	-	-	94	1919	-	-	1,840

The figures for three pre-war years are taken from consular reports, and are converted from sterling at the rate of Rs. 15 to the £. Any tendency towards inflation owing to higher world prices must be largely balanced by the increased exchange value of the rupee, in 1919 at any rate. Although there are thus certain difficulties in making comparisons, the figures may be taken as giving a correct indication of the growth of the volume of imports into the country. In 1919 the imports were approximately four and a half times greater than the average in the three pre-war years dealt with.

According to the latest trade report issued in 1920 from the office of the Civil Commissioner, it is estimated that from one-half to three-fourths of the imports by sea eventually find their way to Persia, and it cannot therefore be emphasised too much that the trade of Mesopotamia is closely allied with that of Persia or with that portion that can be reached with ease *viâ* Baghdad.

The marked increase in imports during the last two years has been due :—

- (1) Very largely to the almost complete cessation of imports into Persia *viâ* the Caucasus ;
- (2) The largely increased spending power of Mesopotamia owing to the presence of troops ;
- (3) The depletion of stocks in Mesopotamia and Persia due to inability to obtain freight and supplies—in fact, due to war conditions.

To maintain the increase in prosperity it is essential to increase production and to stimulate the transit trade by reducing to a minimum freight, handling charges, Customs and Port dues, and, equally important, delay in transit. It will be necessary for steamers and railways to reduce their charges so far as possible, and for manufacturers to pay as much attention to Persian requirements as to those of the population of Mesopotamia.

The same report contains a section dealing with Basrah port facilities, from which the following may be quoted :—

“ One of the benefits, and perhaps not the least, which the inhabitants of Mesopotamia will reap as a result of the war, and the taking over by Great Britain of mandatory powers for the country, is the provision of a ready-made and well found port.

“ Prior to the war no facilities existed, and ships depended entirely on their own gear and native craft for the landing and shipping of cargo.

“ The very large quantities of war material, however, which were poured into the country made it necessary to provide adequate wharves, capable of accommodating deep steamers, fitted with up-to-date cranes and laid out with railway sidings and other cargo-handling appliances capable of effecting the rapid transport called for. Under the military administration, suitable sites were selected, and wharves, well built and well found, were laid down capable of dealing efficiently with the then very great volume of traffic.

“ By the Proclamation cited as the Port of Basrah Proclamation, 1919 (Provisional), by the Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty's Forces in Mesopotamia, dated 8th October 1919, the port, on its present footing, was brought into being, and its areas, organisation, duties, powers, &c., defined. As a natural development of peace conditions the port was transferred from military to civil jurisdiction on 1st April 1920, its organisation and development remaining in the hands of the existing Port Directorate, assisted by an Advisory Board consisting of representatives of the military and civil administrations, Basrah Chamber of Commerce and local notabilities.

“ Peace time requirements do not call for the same extensive provision as was required during the war period, but it is satisfactory to find that under the civil administration to which the port has been transferred, a carefully thought out scheme which does not overlook probable future development will absorb a very great proportion of the military port lay-out and plant.

“ The military will thereby recover a substantial portion of their forced expenditure, while the country benefits by coming into immediate possession of an

up-to-date port, which will only require some comparatively minor adaptations to make it fit to deal efficiently with all probable requirements for many years to come.

“Organisation is necessarily still in a state of transition, but steady progress is being made to place the port on a sound commercial footing, affording full facilities to trade and at the same time making it self-supporting. With the latter object in view a provisional schedule of dues and charges was compiled and put into force on 1st November 1919, subject to revision, and since confirmed by the civil administration for the ensuing year. Charges have as far as possible been fixed in keeping with services rendered.”

The postal service of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and Persian Lines of Communication was transferred to civil authority and placed under the Commercial Secretary in May 1919. In the following year the Post and Telegraph Departments were amalgamated under a single Director.

The Department of Civil Stores imports and issues such supplies as may be necessary for official requirements and is catering for private needs until local enterprise is sufficient to cope with them at reasonable prices. Furniture, even of the simplest kind, is at present almost unobtainable in the native bazaars.

The duty of the Transport Department is to provide motors and motor launches for official use and to see to their upkeep and repair; to engage and supply drivers and also to train them. Local drivers have been under training since the beginning of 1920 and are proving fairly satisfactory. Political Officers in the districts are dependent on motor transport, whether by land or water, and without it would find it impossible to keep in touch with their work.

The Government presses at Basrah and Baghdad are now able to undertake most of the work required by military and civil departments besides a certain amount for business firms. A small press was installed at Najaf in 1918 and another at Sulaimaniyah in 1919. English daily papers are published at Baghdad and Basrah and vernacular papers in Baghdad, Basrah, Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul. The need for official vernacular papers is, however, coming to an end, and already at Baghdad and Basrah they have been replaced by papers privately run. Illustrated supplements dealing with pilgrimages to the holy towns and an illustrated book of the Shrines of the Iraq have been issued from the Basrah press. Local labour is employed as far as possible, but is difficult to obtain owing to the high rates of pay which are given in business firms; local compositors in particular, even if their knowledge of English is rudimentary, are at once attracted elsewhere.

#### PUBLIC WORKS.

As regards public works, organization is tending towards a single department for combined civil and military works. It will be manned by civil or military officers as may be selected and will eventually, it is hoped, be run as a civil department. The Irrigation and Survey Directorates have already been handed over to it.

Irrigation, formerly a military department, was transferred to the Civil Commissioner in April 1919, and placed in charge of the Revenue Secretary. It passed under the control of Public Works in June 1920. But since it must always be closely connected with the Revenue Department, and consequently with the Political Officers of Divisions who are the local revenue authorities, the organisation secures the closest connection between Irrigation, Revenue and Political Departments.

The chief duties of the Irrigation Directorate are flood protection, a heavy item with rivers which have a spring rise of 20 feet or more; the control and conservancy of rivers and canals; the provision of an adequate water supply at the heads of water-courses, and the distribution of water as between different watercourses, but not detailed distribution below that point. Demobilisation resulted in a large reduction in the establishment of the Directorate which had to be met by amalgamating and cutting down the number of responsible posts. No large projects have been taken in hand, but on existing canals many small improvements have been carried out, in the light of the experience which has been gained during the preceding years. Several canals have been re-aligned or extended, the new lands commanded by them being eagerly taken up. An important piece of work is now in progress between two of the Euphrates channels which it is hoped will bring back into cultivation large tracts which have long lain barren, including the Fawwar region south of the Babylonian city of Niffer. The project has been received with enthusiasm by the tribes, who are supplying the necessary labour.

Under the organisation set up during the war, roads and bridges, other than those at Baghdad and Basrah and those maintained by the Army for military purposes, were generally in the charge of the Irrigation Department. In the transition period,

before a comprehensive Department of Public Works came into being, roads and buildings, as a part of the duties of the Irrigation Department, were looked after by the Revenue branch of the Civil Commissioner's office. During 1919 a number of roads which had been kept up by the military were made over to the civil administration. Those bridges which the civil administration required, and of which the Army were ready to surrender control, were also taken over, financial adjustment being provisionally made on the lines suggested in Sir John Hewett's report.

#### RAILWAYS.

On 1st April 1920, the civil administration assumed responsibility for the railways in Mesopotamia.

Subject to the exigencies of military conditions and the prior importance given to military traffic, the department is organised according to the ordinary procedure of commercial railways and run on the departmental system.

The transfer from the Army was effected under orders from the War Office at a few days' notice; the railway organisation had therefore to be taken as it was, still dependent on the Army for medical supply and other services. These services are now in process of organisation, but the Railway Department is not yet self-contained or entirely independent of the Army.

The system as it existed on 1st April consisted of the following lines:—

<i>Metre gauge main lines</i> :—	Miles.
(1) Basrah to Baghdad West - - - - -	352·28
(2) Baghdad East to Quraitu on the Persian frontier - - - - -	130·09
(3) Kut to Baghdad East - - - - -	108·00

<i>Metre gauge branches of the above</i> :—	
(4) Zubair to Jabal Sanam, a line built to get access to the stone quarry at Jabal Sanam - - - - -	23·55
(5) Ur to Nasiriyah - - - - -	9·75
(6) Qaraghan to Kingarban near Kifri - - - - -	33·46
(7) Lines in the Port of Ma'qil near Basrah aggregating - - - - -	35·72
(8) There was also under construction a line connecting Baghdad East and Baghdad West, including a wagon ferry for taking loaded trucks across the Tigris. This is expected to be in operation in early September - - - - -	5·97

Total metre gauge lines - - - - - 697·82

*Standard gauge (4 ft. 8½ ins.) lines* :—

(1) Baghdad West to Sharqat on the Tigris. This line includes the Baghdad-Samarra section built by the Germans - - - - -	185·9
(2) Baghdad West to Baghdad South - - - - -	2·1

Total standard gauge lines - - - - - 188·0

*Light lines of 2 ft. 6 ins. gauge* :—

(1) Baghdad South to Fallujah on the Euphrates - - - - -	37·94
(2) Hillah to Kifl on the Euphrates - - - - -	21·00

Total 2 ft. 6 ins. lines - - - - - 58·94

There also existed a 60-centimetre tramway system connecting the various camps and supply depôts at Ma'qil, Makinah, and 'Ashar, which aggregated some 20 miles. This line is shortly to be taken up and handed over to the army for use elsewhere.

The system enumerated above was not in any sense complete either as regards construction or equipment of rolling stock.

The military policy was to do nothing that was not essential to meet the military requirements of the moment; stations, goods sheds, and quarters for the railway staff were non-existent, while the engines and rolling stock were mostly old and partly worn out.

The civil Government of Mesopotamia will therefore have to face a heavy outlay during the next few years before the railways begin to show a return on the capital invested in them.

The personnel of the Railway Department numbered on 1st April 1920 approximately 24,928 of all grades. Of these approximately 80 per cent. were Indians, 3 per cent. Europeans, and the rest inhabitants of Mesopotamia, including Arabs, Kurds, and Jews. The demand for labour, both skilled and unskilled, is and will be for some time to come far beyond the local resources of Mesopotamia, and it is inevitable that for a considerable period of time the railways of Mesopotamia must be dependent to a large degree on outside sources. It must be borne in mind that Turkish railway systems, whether in the Arab provinces or in Asia Minor, were staffed mainly, as regards the higher grades of the service, by Greeks and Armenians, not by Turks and Arabs. In Mesopotamia the Armenian population is small and Greek practically non-existent.

This, in fact, will be one of the limiting factors in any railway development in Iraq during the next few years, and for the moment the problem is the more difficult as the railways, owing to the policy of economy, cannot even offer decent housing accommodation as an attraction to service.

The problem would in any case be a difficult one, for it is interesting to note that whereas India after 70 years has approximately one mile of line per 11,000 of her population, Iraq, which five years ago had practically no railways, has now one mile per 4,500 of her population. No country in a similar state of civilisation to that of Iraq could be expected to man its railways at such a rate.

#### FINANCE.

Touching the financial side of the administration, a note by the Financial Secretary may be quoted:—

1. Except on its purely technical side, financial administration may be regarded as an aspect of the general administration of public affairs, an account of which has already been given. I propose to confine myself to two main groups of questions: firstly, how much money was spent on the civil administration of Mesopotamia from the end of 1914 to the end of financial year 1919–20, and where did it come from; and secondly, what currency was used, and why.

2. Public accounts were imperfectly kept during those strenuous years, in the early part of which the civil administration at headquarters was conducted by about three officers, who divided the bulk of the clerical work between them. But comparatively complete summaries of estimates of receipts and expenditure were prepared in expectation of super-audit in India and are tabulated below.

#### RECEIPTS.

Main Headings.	1915–16.	1916–17.	1917–18.	1918–19.	1919–20.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1. Land Revenue and General Taxes on Agricultural Produce, Sheep, Cattle, &c.	25,55,976	21,86,555	79,34,295	217,47,430*	198,27,290
2. Customs - - -	18,34,497	57,64,400	67,38,000	65,00,000	220,24,000
3. Judicial - - -	1,18,528	1,05,820	1,57,720	3,46,500	5,00,000
4. Medical - - -	—	—	17,400	95,800	3,50,000
5. Education - - -	—	3,330	3,500	15,000	1,82,000
6. Posts - - -	—	—	—	—	32,75,650†
					(received from the public 8,00,000).
7. Telegraphs and Telephones -	—	—	—	—	20,74,500
					(received from the public 2,25,000).
8. Jails: charges for labour supplied.	—	3,600	20,109	1,02,000	2,84,200
9. Departmental Receipts, Government Stationery Depôts, Newspapers, Transport, &c.	—	—	1,54,500	4,31,650	9,40,870
10. Miscellaneous; including principally fines, also refunds, &c.	59,641	44,545	2,26,524	74,800	78,000
Totals	45,68,642	81,08,250	152,52,048	293,13,180	495,36,510‡

\* Inclusive of revenue grains supplied to Army valued at 60 lakhs.

† The accounts of a small Civil Post Office maintained for local needs prior to 1919 were sent to India.

‡ Excludes contribution for levies from military.



## EXPENDITURE.

NOTE.—Financial Year is from 1st April to 31st March.

Main Headings.	1915-16.	1916-17.	1917-18.	1918-19.	1919-20.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1. Headquarter Administrative Expenditure, including salaries of Gazetted Officers, Secret Service, subsistence allowances, cost of sea passages, telegrams, stationery, depôt and Press, &c.	5,54,230	11,83,425	24,18,253	33,90,100	81,26,270
2. Political Officers, Revenue Establishments.	5,55,392	9,19,085	51,89,233	93,21,690	78,17,470
3. Customs - - - -	1,11,898	3,85,800	5,80,350	6,75,000	17,40,550*
4. Judicial - - - -	1,20,207	1,27,295	2,14,983	3,73,000	8,92,320
5. Medical - - - -	61,345	87,180	1,39,887	4,63,750	28,75,600
6. Education - - - -	—	23,530	35,500	1,80,000	9,89,250
7. Police - - - -	1,99,146	2,86,975	8,90,163	12,04,080	19,36,940
8. Public Works - - - -	—	1,05,450	4,61,400	8,74,700	66,11,720
9. Jails - - - -	20,126	44,460	98,517	1,67,400	7,47,830
10. Posts - - - -	—	—	—	—	31,46,500
11. Telegraphs - - - -	—	—	—	—	14,26,450
12. Survey - - - -	—	—	—	—	1,44,230
13. Land Settlement - - - -	—	—	—	—	1,00,460
14. Irrigation - - - -	—	—	—	—	52,25,000
15. Agriculture - - - -	—	—	—	—	7,16,270
16. Levies - - - -	—	—	—	—	32,02,890†
17. Transport - - - -	—	—	—	—	50,62,280
18. Stores - - - -	—	—	—	—	2,24,500
19. Land Acquisition - - - -	—	—	—	—	12,01,250
Totals - - - -	16,22,344	31,63,200	100,28,286	166,49,720	521,87,780

\* Includes refunds of Rs. 12,00,000 for goods imported and subsequently exported.

† Nett: excluding services on account of military.

3. The figures (which relate to civil revenues and expenditure only) illustrate the growth in the extent of occupied territory. Up to the end of 1916 we took revenue only as far north as 'Ali Gharbi. In 1917 the Baghdad Wilayat was added and proved an expensive possession, in which our liabilities seemed at first sight greater than our assets. By the end of the financial year 1918-19, Mosul Wilayat was under our provisional administration, which thus embraced the whole area of what was formally the 'Iraq province of the Ottoman Empire.

4. The statements illustrate also the gradual progress of expenditure designed for the direct benefit of the inhabitants. In 1915-16, with the exception of a couple of lakhs on police, a little more than a lakh on a judicial service, an insignificant sum for medical assistance, and a few grants in aid of education, the whole expenditure was devoted to the machinery of administration. In 1916-17, expenditure on the above three objects of direct public benefit was higher, and a modest beginning was made towards the establishment of a department of education. A lakh was spent also on public works, including communications.

In the following year, 1917-18, this tendency developed, and expenditure on objects of direct public benefit increased, that on police being trebled, while four times as much as in the previous year was spent from civil funds on Public Works.

In 1918-19, when Baghdad Wilayat had been added, a further large increase took place in the provision allotted to objects of public benefit.

5. But perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the first four years is the relatively large surplus regularly accruing. Military law enjoins upon an occupying Power the obligation of collecting the revenues ordinarily levied by the dispossessed Government, and of carrying on the normal functions of government. It will not be claimed, however, that the items on which money is shown to have been spent during the four years from 1915-19 cover all the normal objects of public expenditure.

In 1915-16, for instance, expenditure on education was limited to a few grants in aid, and the total spent on this vital subject during the four years was only some three lakhs, whereas the Turks spent annually a large sum. Up to the end of 1918-19, practically the only expenditure from civil revenues on irrigation, that primary and

indispensable means of conserving and developing the wealth of countries with scanty rainfall, was a sum of 15 lakhs in 1917, on the Hindiyah Barrage. Apart from the grant of loans to cultivators, nothing was spent before 1919 on the improvement of local agricultural methods, though this is a commonly accepted function of modern Governments. The important services of posts and telegraphs were not undertaken by the civil administration until 1918 and 1919 respectively; and expenditure on public works was on a scale much below the ordinary requirements of the country, in communications and other works of public utility.

6. This appears to be a somewhat grave indictment of the civil administration, but the phenomenon of unemployed surpluses, so suggestive at first sight of undue parsimony, can be sufficiently explained.

At first, undoubtedly the principal factor conducive to underspending was lack of staff. With very few exceptions officers were not sent out expressly for the civil administration; they were merely lent from military service from time to time as the demand for them became more and more insistent. The supply was constantly behind the demand, and only the barest essentials of administration could be attempted. Several normal functions of civil government thus remained in abeyance; while some of them, being required no less for the benefit of the Expeditionary Force than for the needs of the civil population, were undertaken by the military authorities and paid for by military funds (*i.e.*, by the British taxpayer). Communications, for instance, including transport by road, river and rail, and postal and telegraphic facilities, were entirely in military hands, and indeed the military demand was so great that there was little opportunity for the civil population to benefit by those services. It was not until 1918 that a small civil branch of the Postal Service was organised for the carriage of civilian mails, and for military reasons any considerable use of public communications by the local population was not practicable.

In the matter of the improvement of cultivation the Arab taxpayer was fortunate in finding military objects coinciding generally with his own interests, and he profited considerably by the agricultural development scheme initiated in 1917 under military auspices, on which a sum of not less than a million sterling was spent.

7. The determination of the precise extent to which military and civil interests respectively were involved in the various proposals for expenditure arising during the war provided much material for correspondence of the kind in which ingenious brains in Government secretariats delight to engage; and if the solution offered after much analysis of the problem on a variety of hypotheses did not entirely set at rest the doubts of those engaged in audit and other sceptical pursuits, this is no doubt because the subject was not susceptible of clear-cut definition. The oracle which eventually, after one or two preliminary utterances, issued from Simla in 1918, for guidance of those authorities who were vested with power to incur expenditure chargeable to the civil revenues of Mesopotamia, and who wanted to know what was so chargeable, affirmed as follows:—

“If the immediate necessity for the measure on which the expenditure was incurred arises primarily from military considerations, we have held that the expenditure should in its entirety be charged in the accounts of the military force, though the measure may also benefit the local administration either immediately or ultimately. If, on the other hand, the immediate necessity for the measure arises primarily from considerations connected with the administration of the occupied territory, we have held that the expenditure should in its entirety be charged to the revenues of the occupied territory, even though it may help materially the military operations, directly or indirectly.”

This announcement, which reaffirmed with somewhat greater precision the rule laid down in 1917, was somewhat too late to be of much use in exercising powers of sanction to expenditure, and that it was not completely satisfactory as a guide to subsequent adjustments appears from the fact that Sir J. Hewett, in his exhaustive and lucid report prepared for the War Office early in 1919 on military expenditure in Mesopotamia and its allocation between military and civil funds, was compelled to adopt an arbitrary division of the respective interests.

8. It may be left to the various audit offices to wrangle over the precise apportionment of expenditure incurred during the campaign in Mesopotamia. The broad principle remains that the value of works of lasting benefit to the population, such as roads and bridges, railways, the Port at Basrah, which were constructed at the expense of army funds, will eventually be repaid by the civil Government. The

excess revenues, therefore, of the first few years of our occupation are, in fact, held in trust for the discharge of those obligations which, in normal times, would have been met year by year. The works of public benefit, indeed, bequeathed by the army of occupation to the civil administration much exceed in value the aggregate surpluses which accrued during the war (their sale value may perhaps be put at about six millions sterling), and will constitute a charge on the revenues of the country for many years. To this extent, the financial liabilities of the country have been largely determined by military exigencies, which led to the early, and in some cases, almost premature, institution of many works and services beneficial to the civil population.

9. The question of the kind of currency employed by the civil administration of Mesopotamia, and the reason for its adoption, can be dealt with very briefly. The subject of foreign exchange does not really arise in this connection, and readers who are unacquainted with the details of Turkish coinage will find all the information they require in such standard works of reference as Tate's *Modern Cambist*.

10. The statement attached in para. 2 shows that in the five years ending 31st March 1920 the aggregate civil expenditure was approximately eight million sterling (at the present rate of exchange), while the receipts amounted to about 10 millions. On both sides of the account a considerable, and a progressively increasing, share consisted of book transactions. At a rough estimate, a total of nearly one million may be deducted on this account, in addition to which a further two millions or so stand to the credit of the administration with His Majesty's Government. The amount represented by cash disbursements was thus about seven millions. The medium by which these transactions were effected was Indian rupee notes and silver.

11. The introduction of an alien currency, leading to the virtual exclusion of the indigenous system, has been criticised in some quarters as contravening the principles regulating the administration of occupied territory. But the critics probably overlook the fact that Indian money was introduced in the first place to meet military requirements, to enable the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force to make local purchases and payments. There was no currency available in anything approaching the quantities required by them except rupees imported from India. Up to the end of 1917 nearly one hundred million rupees (about two-thirds paper and one-third silver), or the equivalent of 10,000,000*l.* at the present standard rate of exchange, had been imported from India to meet needs of the army; and the two succeeding years saw further importations, though not on nearly so large a scale. As the army acted at first as treasurer to the civil administration, it was almost inevitable that the currency employed by the latter also should have been Indian.

12. A further contributory cause was the fact that revenue did not begin to come in for several months, and though it was certainly not levied on a scale in excess of that enforced under Turkish rule, even that small demand would probably not have been forthcoming if there had been no medium of payment except Turkish money. The Turkish authorities were busily putting gold out of circulation, and substituting for it Government paper issued for war purposes only, which never had its face value and rapidly depreciated to about a quarter of its nominal value.

13. Further, even assuming the possibility of using local currency for all purposes of civil administration, the fact that the army was, by the very extent of its needs, dependent on Indian money would have resulted in a dual official currency consisting of liras (gold and paper), rupees (paper and silver), medjidis, piastres and the smaller Indian and Turkish coins, besides the pre-war admixture of sovereigns and krans—a currency pandemonium such as, later, was experienced in Syria and other occupied territories, with a consequent obligation on the authorities to fix ratios between the various constituents.

14. The introduction of Indian currency did not, during the war, have very important consequences on external exchanges. Trade with Persia (except from the north) had previously been mainly with India and the United Kingdom, and was consequently always effected by rupee and sterling exchange. Exchange with Persia was no doubt difficult during the period under review, but that was due chiefly to the stoppage of trade with and *viâ* Russia, and to the heavy local purchases within Persia for the forces operating there. On the other side, *i.e.*, with other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, trade was of course prohibited during the war, and exchange difficulties did not arise until a part of those provinces came under British occupation. Then, in some quarters, a demand was made for uniformity of currency throughout the occupied portions of the Turkish Empire; but, though the general question is under consideration, it is unlikely that the future currency policy of this country will

be determined solely with reference to the requirements of countries with which trade relations are at present on so unimportant a scale.

15. Looking at the question as a whole, I think it will be agreed that the introduction of Indian currency was practically inevitable, and was not injurious to the interests of the occupied territories. Whether the future currency of the new 'Iraq State' will be based on the Indian rupee is a question for the future to decide.

16. Less justifiable, perhaps, from a purely currency point of view, were the measures taken to restrict the use of Turkish currency. Turkish paper was definitely demonetized for political reasons by a proclamation issued at the end of 1916, and it was only in 1920 that the prohibition was partially withdrawn in favour of debtors whose debts were expressed in terms of paper. A proclamation of August 1917 fixed a ratio between liras and rupees for the settlement of obligations, viz., 1 lira = Rs. 14, though the fact that the lira was not legal tender made it inexpedient to treat it otherwise than as bullion, the market rate of which was fluctuating, or to attempt to give it a standard value in relation to rupees, except in the comparatively few cases where the administration was compelled to accept payments in liras of revenue expressed in rupees.

#### ESTABLISHMENT.

The attached return shows roughly the position of the civil administration of Mesopotamia on the 1st August 1920, excluding Railways:—

Officers all over Rs. 600, and all Personnel drawing pay from Civil Administration are counted, even though Sick or on Leave.						Officers drawing less than Rs. 600.			
No.	Name of Department.	British.	Indian.	Arab.	Remarks.	British.	Indian.	Arab.	Total.
1	Central Administration -	5	—	—		55	62	6	123
2	Revenue - - -	8	—	—		2	13	7	22
3	Finance - - -	18	—	—		2	130	22	154
4	Judicial - - -	14	—	10		1	7	238	246
5	Jails - - -	2	—	—		26	2	2	30
6	Customs - - -	12	—	—		9	23	75	107
7	Health - - -	74	—	—	Includes 25 Nurses.	32	36	195	263
8	Engineering - -	22	—	—		21	72	19	112
9	Executive Staff, Divisions	106	—	4		28	316	862	1,206
10	Agriculture - -	11	—	—		4	22	7	33
11	Repatriation - -	20	—	—		18	13	—	31
12	Education - - -	11	—	—		1	7	479	487
13	Posts and Telegraphs	33	3	—		138	868	303	1,309
14	Waqf - - -	2	—	1		—	—	13	13
15	Police - - -	22	—	—		56	17	2,397	2,470
16	C.H.T.C. - - -	1	—	—		—	1	1	2
17	Printing and Publishing	4	—	—		8	74	82	164
18	Stores - - -	14	—	—		7	20	23	50
19	Transport - - -	5	—	—		61	12	389	462
20	Port - - -	28	—	—		8	380	39	427
21	Levies - - -	37	—	—		33	17	2,987	3,037
22	Irrigation - - -	42	4	3		1	110	178	289
23	Cypher - - -	4	—	—		—	—	—	—
24	Survey - - -	7	—	—		—	1	66	67
25	Tapu - - -	2	—	2		—	2	147	149
26	Veterinary - - -	3	—	—		4	4	9	17
27	Railways - - -		Excluded				Excluded		
	Total - - -	507	7	20	25 nurses	515	2,209	8,546	11,270

It may be convenient to analyse the return, which appears at first sight to involve the employment of an unusually large number of officers.

In the first place, officers employed in connection with repatriation of refugees, the control of hostile trading concerns, together with some 15 officers, shown under "Executive Staff, Divisions," employed in Persia as Political Officers with troops, and some five whose services have been lent for duty in the Gulf Ports: total, 41. These appointments are of a purely temporary nature arising out of the winding up of the war in the Middle East, and cannot be considered as part of the civil administration proper.

Officers employed in Cypher Department, Survey Department, Land Registration (Tapu) Department, Veterinary Department, and Printing and Publishing Department total 20. These hold highly technical posts, for which in each case they have special technical qualifications.

Under Printing and Publishing are included the British editor of the *Baghdad Times* and his colleague in charge of the *Basrah Times*. Negotiations have been undertaken for the transfer of these organs to private enterprise, but owing to the disturbed state of the country it has not yet been possible to arrange this, and in the meantime it is considered necessary to publish these papers in English both for the benefit of the public and the troops, amongst whom they command a ready sale. The journals are self-supporting and no cost falls on the State in connection with these papers, the receipts from which suffice to pay the cost of the editors.

The Superintendents of the Government Presses at Baghdad and Basrah are technical experts with long pre-war records in this branch of industry. Printing business, involving, as it does at Basrah, the care and maintenance of a quantity of valuable machinery, which prints books in half a dozen languages, and with apparatus for preparing half-toned lined blocks, coloured by three-colour process, and at Baghdad the custody and issue of all stamps and stationery for all departments, is certainly not overstaffed.

The Survey Department is a predominantly military organisation, which has for the past year devoted most of its time to meet military requirements. The cost is met partly by military and partly by civil funds according to the amount of work done. In no department has more pains been taken to train local personnel. The department produced on the spot all maps required by the military forces of the Crown, lined blocks, plans and reproductions in colour of every sort required by an army in the field. Its operations are an essential preliminary to any future development in this country, whether by irrigation or otherwise. It prepares maps required for the Railway Department and the Irrigation Department. Almost all of the officers have been borrowed from the Government of India at considerable inconvenience to that Government, and it may be said without fear of contradiction that this department is short of superior personnel.

The Tapu (Land Registration) Department deals with land registration for the whole of Mesopotamia. With the exception of two officers, the staff is entirely local. Few, if any, departments touch the daily life of the people more closely. Remembering that it is necessary to make some provision for leave and sickness, and for the head of the department to tour areas to inspect the work of subordinates at other centres and to check operations of surveyors working under his orders in the larger towns, it will be clear that the provision of two officers for this department is not excessive.

The Cypher Department consists of four officers. This highly confidential work by the custom of the service cannot be entrusted to persons not enjoying the status of an officer; and in point of fact, of the four officers shown one is a senior cypher officer of experience from India; of the remaining three all are ex-officers of the army, of whom two have been partially incapacitated by wounds received in action. The working hours of this department are 18 hours.

The Veterinary Department consists of three officers. This department undertakes the purchase of all remounts required for the Arab Levies, and for officers of all grades of the civil administration; provides for periodical inspection of stables, with training of personnel in shoeing, and maintains veterinary hospitals at Baghdad and Basrah. It maintains stocks of serum against rinderpest, and is responsible for training local veterinary assistants for inoculating cattle in affected areas. The successful operation of this department in a single district, or the economy effected by the approved purchase of horses in a single year, more than pays for the cost of the whole establishment.

Engineering services account for some 42 British officers in the Irrigation Department and 22 in the Engineering Department. Nearly 25 per cent. of the Irrigation Department is already Indian or Arab, and there is no reason why this percentage should not before long be substantially increased, provided men now under training turn out well; but considerable difficulty has been experienced in practice in inducing qualified inhabitants of the country to leave Baghdad, where opportunities for public service in such branches as irrigation are comparatively

limited. Nor is local personnel always popular amongst the tribes, as has already been pointed out. The engineering staff are scattered all over the country and are responsible for all civil public works in the country, for all roads, whether military or civil, and for the guidance of municipal enterprise in engineering matters. In many places they undertake, in addition to their civil duties, the execution of minor work on behalf of the military authorities. The total amount of military work so executed is estimated during the present year at 50 per cent. in the case of the Engineering Department, 25 per cent. in the case of the Irrigation Department.

The 74 officers shown under Public Health include doctors, nurses (25), medical storekeepers, chemical analyst and quarantine officials; and are responsible for all the civil hospitals in the country, one in each Division; for quarantine, for public health in the larger towns, vaccination, dentistry, for the care of wives and families of civil officials, and for multifarious duties directly connected with the military authorities, such as, for example, the joint maintenance of X-ray apparatus, water analysis and the like. Financial considerations alone preclude the administration from employing a much larger number. The shortage of doctors is such that it has been impossible to induce local practitioners to enter the civil administration on any terms which the administration could possibly offer.

Posts and Telegraphs account for 33 British officers. 10 per cent. of the department is Indian. 75 per cent. of the work of this department is at present military and is paid for by the army. It is for the most part of a highly technical nature. All superior posts in this department were before the war held almost exclusively by non-Arabs and non-Turks. Considerable progress has been made in training local personnel for the junior grades, but it is difficult to see how the personnel can be found for the superior grades within a short space of time. The work is for the most part, not only highly technical, but very laborious.

Jails in Mesopotamia, three large jails at Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul respectively, and about 12 smaller ones, are under the control of the Inspector-General of Jails and his assistant, who is also responsible for the maintenance of juvenile reformatories and for the custody of lunatics. The Inspector-General himself, Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Lane, C.I.E., C.B.E., is an officer of great experience in Indian jails with a wide and human outlook on life, and it can scarcely be doubted that the appointment has not only justified itself, but that the maintenance of jails without some such expert supervision would lose half their value.

The Port, Basrah, accounts for 28 officers. This is virtually an independent entity of the administration with its own budget and its own revenues. The number of officers over Rs. 600, having regard to the amount of traffic passing through the port, compares favourably with any Indian port if allowance be made for (1) the unhealthiness of the climate, which makes it necessary to have a larger percentage in reserve to provide for men sick and on leave, and (2) for the large amount of temporary military work now being performed. The total includes harbour masters, pilots, engineers, and all responsible executive staff.

The Civil Stores and Civil Transport Departments, staffed by 14 and 5 officers respectively, require some explanation. Civil Stores Department is responsible for the ordering, handling, custody and issue of all requirements of all civil departments. Owing to the incomplete nature of communications in Mesopotamia it is a matter of unusual difficulty to guarantee safe arrival of any given consignment to an out-station, and owing to the difficulty of sea transport and river transport at present it is necessary to maintain larger stocks than would ordinarily be the case. The plan of delegating a portion of this work to commercial firms has not been wholly successful. Owing to the uncertainty of political conditions in Mesopotamia, firms have as a rule been unwilling to maintain large stocks, and it has generally been found cheaper and more expeditious for the administration to make its own arrangements. In course of time, however, a reduction of about 50 per cent. will probably be possible in this department.

Revenue, 8; Finance, 18; Judicial, 14, plus 10 Arabs; Agricultural, 11; and Education, 11, may conveniently be considered simultaneously. The number of officers in these administrative departments must depend upon the general policy to be adopted with regard to the administration of the country. It would not be difficult to defend the numbers in each department separately, and it may be noted in particular that the Finance Department, responsible as it is for the audit of a number of departments quasi-military in nature, is probably considerably larger now than will

be necessary in two years' time. Moreover, an immense amount of work is thrown on this department temporarily, of a non-recurring nature, *e.g.*, the settlement of accounts between military and civil in respect of departments handed over from the army, or of a quasi-military nature, and the initiation of fresh accounts arrangements consequent on the separation of Mesopotamian administration from the general military organisation, and from the audit of the Government of India.

The same is to a great extent true of the Revenue Department, which is still engaged in laborious spade work, and will for many years to come be engaged in detailed settlement operations which require much knowledge and patience and cannot be unduly hastened. To stint this department in officers would be very bad economy.

The same is to a great extent true of the Agricultural Department. The value of research into plant diseases, and of the pest of cotton, wheat, flax, &c., and other technical enquiries, are by common consent part of the duties of any civilised Government, and their worth has been proved wherever they have been systematically undertaken. Results are not immediately visible, but it can scarcely be doubted that the department is one which will justify its existence.

The numbers of the Judicial Department, which is nearly half Arab, are as low as is consistent with the due execution of justice in a country the communications of which are so undeveloped, but will probably be susceptible to gradual reduction in the future.

It remains to consider the executive staff of Divisions, 106 officers. These officers represent, along with the Revenue Department, the "Hukumah" to the vast majority of the inhabitants. Scattered over some 15 Divisions, over an area of nearly 150,000 square miles, with some 15 of their number employed in Persia and about 20 constantly sick or on leave, the actual number throughout the country has seldom exceeded 70. It may be possible in time to reduce the number, but not unless the whole system of government is radically changed. The total numbers are certainly considerably less than that of superior Turkish officials employed before the war in similar capacities in Mesopotamia.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that at the time of the armistice personnel of the civil administration, and of the military departments which it has since taken over, had practically without exception been continuously at work in Mesopotamia for from two to five years without leave home, and it was absolutely necessary that all personnel should, with a few exceptions, get a spell of leave at home of not less than three months during the two years following the armistice.

In order that this might be possible without a very serious breakdown, it was necessary to maintain temporarily a larger reserve to provide for leave and sickness than is normally required. In practice it has not been possible to build up this reserve, and nearly all departments have been actually greatly under-staffed during this period.

The difficulty of the position was accentuated by the great delay in obtaining passages home and out and the length of time spent on the journey. For the first 18 months after the armistice the journey to England on the voyage took two months each way, and thus an officer on three months' leave was in practice away for seven months. It is unnecessary to emphasise the effect of this on cadres.

Since the armistice more than 50 per cent. of the personnel of the civil administration has been changed. Some 60 officers belonging to other Government services have reverted to their permanent employments at the urgent requests of their own Governments. About 100 were demobilised at their own request and reverted to their pre-war occupations, and about 50 from various departments, mostly Government of India, reverted to India and were replaced by other officers. This process, which is not yet complete, involves the retention on the books of the administration during the period of transfer, for some months, both of the officer relieved and of the relieving officer, and as in most cases the relieved officer was entitled to some months' leave at the expense of the administration, and the relieving officer was recruited in England, it follows that double staffs were maintained in respect of many appointments for a period of six or eight months.

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## CHAPTER X.—The Nationalist Movement.

Before the armistice the people of Mesopotamia had accepted the fact of British occupation and were resigned to the prospect of British administration. Sections of the inhabitants were more than resigned; they looked forward with satisfaction to a future in which they would be able to pursue commerce and agriculture in profitable security with a strong central authority preserving peace and order, and this frame of mind was probably most prevalent where British rule had been longest established. As early as 1917 the inhabitants of Basrah made public declaration of their contentment with a condition of affairs which allowed them to engage in business with the certainty of advantage. They observed with truth that their town had made almost incredible progress, and they recognised gratefully that the comfort of their lives had been increased beyond all anticipation. They added, however, that the demands of the Government on labour were too heavy for the district to bear without injury to agricultural interests, and they begged that the supply might be sought in India. There can be little question that they had in their mind some system of indentured labour, and that they did not contemplate the settlement of colonies of the natives of India in the 'Iraq.

Grievances such as the labour and housing questions no doubt there were, and the longer they endured the harder they pressed, but on the whole it was recognised that they were due to a state of war and that the British civil officials were as anxious to see their disappearance as were the people themselves. Throughout the country there was a conviction, which frequently found open expression, that the British meant well by the Arabs, and coupled with this an appreciation of the material prosperity which had followed in the track of our armies—notwithstanding the food shortage and high prices of war—together with a hope that the advent of peace would bring about instant improvements.

Roughly outlined, such was the temper of Basrah, 'Amarah, Hillah and the country districts generally. Baghdad, which is a far more active centre of political thought than any other part of the 'Iraq, had not spoken. As for the holy cities, Kadhimain, like Baghdad, had been voiceless; in Karbala any difficulties which had arisen had been purely local, while in Najaf the troubles of 1917 and 1918 had been fostered by Turco-German intrigue and allayed by the defeat and withdrawal of the enemy and the removal of turbulent local elements.

A new turn was given to the native mind firstly by the publication in the official Mesopotamian newspapers on 11th October 1918 of President Wilson's 14 points, which, though declared to the Senate on 8th January<sup>1918</sup>, were unknown in the 'Iraq till they appeared in Reuter's telegrams; and secondly, on 8th November<sup>1918</sup>, of the Anglo-French declaration which stated that it was the intention of the two Governments to establish among those peoples who had long been oppressed by the Turks "national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the free choice of indigenous populations." "Far from wishing to impose any particular institutions on these lands," the declaration continued, "the two Governments have no care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the governments and administrations which they have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to foster the spread of education, and to put an end to the divisions so long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories."

This announcement of a policy in accordance with the principles on which the war had been waged did little but reiterate the intentions which had already been announced on the occupation of Baghdad, but it differed from the former pronouncement in one important particular, namely, that whereas the Baghdad proclamation had been issued while the upshot of the war was still extremely doubtful, and for that reason had been regarded as mainly a war expedient, the Anglo-French declaration was published after the victory of the Allies had been achieved and commanded belief. If, previous to its appearance, the people of Mesopotamia had been as a whole content to accept the decision of arms, the declaration opened out other possibilities, the nature of which was not clearly understood, nor indeed was it likely to be understood, by the people to whom the declaration was addressed. Some regarded it merely as an indication of the uncertainty of its authors as to the future, and proceeded to canvas any insignificant incident or act on the part of the authorities with a view to discovering whether it might not imply a hidden intention of handing



the country back to the Turks, a prospect which was regarded with mixed feelings, but suggested at least the instant need of hedging; others went to the opposite end of the scale and interpreted the expressed wish of the Allies to set up an indigenous government in Mesopotamia as a recognition of the capacity of Arabs to embark on native administration without assistance or control. In Baghdad, where political ambitions are more highly developed than elsewhere in Mesopotamia, within a week of the publication of the Anglo-French declaration the idea of an Arab Amir of the Iraq was everywhere being discussed, and in Mohammedan circles it met with universal approval. But there was no consensus of opinion as to the person who should be selected to fill the post. At first the choice wavered between a son of the King of the Hijaz, a member of the family of the Sultan of Egypt, and a magnate of Mosul; the Naqib of Baghdad was mentioned, and once a preference for a republic was expressed. But the idea of a republic was not agreeable to most Moslems, and the Naqib showed some reluctance to accept high office of State.

Debate in the town took almost at once a sharply controversial colour, and this was due partly to the fact that a new element had been imported into Baghdad after the armistice. According to the terms arranged with the Turkish Commander, all men of Arab birth who had been in Ottoman employ, whether civil or military, were permitted to return to their home. A proportion of these were men who of free choice had accompanied the Turks when they retreated before General Maude's victorious army, and were *ex hypothesi* unlikely to entertain kindly feelings towards the continuance of British control, however liberally it might be exercised. Moreover, the Turkish system of administration was based on the multiplication of small posts which gave employment to a horde of petty officials, more or less, and more rather than less, unworthy of office. A number of these had fled with the Turkish army after the occupation of Baghdad and had been given sinecures in the Mosul Wilayat pending the recapture of the capital. We found the public offices choked with salaried persons having no visible duties; unemployed, and to a great extent unemployable, they returned to Baghdad and formed a nucleus of discontent and hostility.

The Jewish community, which is the most wealthy in Baghdad, and comprises considerably more than a third of the population of the town, took alarm at the windy and violent oratory in the coffee shops, and sent in a unanimous petition asking to be allowed to become British subjects if an Arab Government were set up in Mesopotamia; the Christians, a small body, about one twenty-fifth of the whole population, were equally perturbed and declared that the attitude of the Moslems towards themselves was becoming truculent.

Meantime instructions had been received from His Majesty's Government by the Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson, to ascertain the views of the local population in the areas affected upon the following points:—

- (1) Whether they were in favour of a single Arab State under British tutelage extending from the northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayat to the Persian Gulf?
- (2) If so, whether they considered that the new State should be placed under an Arab Amir?
- (3) And in that case whom would they suggest?

✕ In the light of experience it may be doubted whether any such enquiry carried out under official or other auspices would have been likely to elicit answers which might serve to guide the questioner. The bulk of the people to whom the questions were addressed had no definite opinion and were not in a position to form one. It was clearly impracticable to pursue the enquiry among the rank and file of the tribesmen, the shepherds, marsh dwellers, rice, barley, and date cultivators of the Euphrates and Tigris, whose experience of statecraft was confined to speculations as to the performances of their next-door neighbours. They would in any case have done no more than re-echo by command the formula prescribed by their immediate chiefs, and it was just as profitable, besides being more expeditious, to refer the questions to the chiefs only. Accordingly, in the country districts and provincial towns it was the shaihs and men of a certain importance who were asked for their views.

On one point there was unanimity; all considered that the Mosul Wilayat should be united to the Wilayats of Baghdad and Basrah. In other respects, in the 17 distinct enquiries which were set on foot the most definite reply was received from

the Hillah Division, where the population, guided largely by the advice of the leading Saiyid, Muhammad 'Ali Qazwini (who, it will be remembered, had narrowly escaped execution by the Turks in November 1916) declared whole-heartedly for the continuance of British administration, and refused to yield to nationalist or other propaganda. In six more divisions British government without an Amir was requested, and in four cases it was desired that Sir Percy Cox should be nominated as High Commissioner. A similar reply was received from yet another five divisions, with the difference that an Amir was regarded as the ideal if any person could be fixed upon, and as a possibility in the near future; twice a protest against an Amir chosen from the Sharifian house was raised. In the Ba'qubah Division there was a sharp difference of opinion; the inhabitants of Ba'qubah town, influenced by Baghdad, wished for an Amir of the Sharif's family, probably with the implication that no foreign control was needed, while the tribesmen asked for British administration. In Najaf and the Shamiyah Division, in which Najaf lies, public opinion made more than one *volte-face*, but on the whole it could be gathered that a Mohammedan Amir under British protection was generally favoured, and the family of the Sharif was mentioned in this connection. In Karbala and Kadhimain the mujtahids forbade believers to pronounce in favour of anything but an Islamic government, and controversy ran so high that enquiries were broken off, after which several petitions in favour of British administration were received, bearing the signature of shaikhs and townsmen of standing. Last of all, the decision was taken in Baghdad. The Qadhis of the Sunni and Shi'ah sects were asked to select 25 notables of their respective creeds, the Grand Rabbi 20 leading Jews, and the heads of the Christian communities 10 Christians. The Qadhis, either by intent or under religious and political pressure, did not execute their task loyally. With considerable difficulty they produced a packed assembly, in which the heads of the leading Moslem families declined to take part on account of its advanced tendencies; the Jewish and Christian elements withdrew from it for the same reason, while the assembled Moslems signed a petition in which they expressed their preference for an Arab State headed by a Mohammedan king who should be one of the sons of the Sharif. Nothing was said about foreign protection, but it was known that the extremists desired to exclude it. The Jews and Christians presented separate petitions in which they plumped for British administration, and in the following days a number of similar petitions were received, signed by the heads of leading Moslem families and merchants, all of whom had refused to take part in the assembly. It is worthy of note that the Naqib had forbidden any of his family to attend it.

The extremists had in fact overshot the mark. Men who had at first welcomed the idea of an Arab Amir were alarmed by the wild talk and the excitement which had been aroused, and rejected an alternative the mere discussion of which had given rein to passions dangerous to the political stability of the country. At the request of some of the principal citizens, seven of the agitators, all of them ex-Turkish officials, who had taken a leading part in anti-British propaganda, were sent to Constantinople *via* India and Egypt; the rest relapsed into quiescence. X

During the ensuing year some progress was made towards the establishment of native institutions. From the first it had been the practice of the administration to employ Arabs as much as possible; if Englishmen directed the conduct of the work, the subordinate establishment was locally recruited. This principle applied equally to political and revenue work, to the Auqaf Department, which was run entirely by Arabs with a British Director, and to the Education Department, which, except for the British Director and his immediate assistants, was wholly Arab. In the Judicial Department, Arab judges had sat in the Shar'ah and Peace Courts from the first, and as the courts increased in number Arabs were placed in most of the newly-created posts. As conditions became more settled natives of the country were advanced to positions of greater responsibility. Arab Political Assistants were appointed to the Political Officers of Divisions, and in many cases the British Assistant Political Officer was replaced by an Arab Deputy Assistant Political Officer, who ran his district directly under the headquarters of the Division. These innovations were not always attended by success. Regrettable instances occurred when the rising murmur of complaint against the practices of the Political Assistant or the Deputy Assistant Political Officer grew so loud as to demand attention; a judicial prosecution would be instituted, and the evidence brought before the courts would precipitate the officer in question from his too advantageous seat. An incident of this kind would be followed by a reiteration of native advice given in private to Political Officers, to the effect that

our administration should be kept clear of Arab officials, who were constitutionally incapable of honest dealings, let alone that they had been corrupted by Turkish communications. To take a recent example, a petition from the shaikhs of the Bani Sa'id, Muntafiq Division, received in March 1920, runs as follows:—"Now that we are under the protection of Great Britain we beg to request that our affairs may be dealt with directly by the Assistant Political Officer of Shatrah. We have suffered enough from Arab Mamurs, and therefore we hope that Great Britain will not refuse us justice, and will refer our affairs direct to the Assistant Political Officer."

A further difficulty lies in the fact that the sources of supply from which native officials can be drawn exist almost exclusively in the towns of Baghdad and Basrah, and mainly in Baghdad. Even provincial centres such as Hillah and 'Amarah are not rich in a comparatively educated class which can provide personnel for Government employment, while among the tribal population of the country districts no one but a chance sayid or the secretary of a shaikh can read or write, the shaikh himself being usually illiterate. Yet the inhabitants of the provincial towns are jealous of the Baghdadi, and resent his being placed exclusively in authority, and the tribes still more profoundly dislike and mistrust the "effendi," a term which on their lips has almost the exact significance of "Baghdadi," the educated classes of the capital being to them the epitome of effendi-ism. The gulf between Baghdad and the provinces is wide. The townsman of the official class is reluctant to serve in provincial posts, and the Baghdad landlord in nine cases out of ten has never set eyes on his estates outside the town—he leaves them to be mismanaged by an agent. But it is not only the landowning class which is unconcerned by the interests of the cultivator; the *intelligenza* from top to bottom neither have any knowledge of rural conditions nor have they begun to realise that these must be studied and known; and those who talk loudest in the coffee-shops concerning Arab liberties have in their mind only the liberties of the frequenters of coffee-shops. Except for the families of tribal descent, of which there are a considerable number in the town, the Baghdadi knows little about tribal organisation, the position and influence of the shaikh for good or ill, or the characteristics and customs of the various tribes; and he regards the whole tribal population, on which the economy of Mesopotamia ultimately rests, with a mixture of fear and disdain. It is not, therefore, remarkable that the tribesman on his side has no warm feelings for the townsman. This sharp differentiation between the urban and the rural classes of the population complicates the problem of government in more ways than one, but notably in the selection of native officials.

Nevertheless the system of employing natives of every denomination and of training them for future employment has been adhered to. Doubtless their inefficiency and other delinquencies constitute a charge on the public, but in the long run it will pay the public to stand the native official class its education. Nor, indeed, is there any alternative.

Opportunities for public service were found also in the municipalities. Under the Turkish régime, a municipality was established in every town or hamlet of any size. Nominally they existed to provide sanitation, policing and lighting; actually to furnish salaries to the leading man of the town and his office staff, as well as to form a source of communal income wherefrom to defray the expense of entertaining officials on tour. The expense to the public of the actual services rendered in the smaller municipalities may be judged by scrutinising an Ottoman municipal budget. For example, at Ghammas, a small town on the Euphrates, the total yearly receipts amounted to Rs. 1,810; the expenditure was Rs. 1,510 and was made up of Rs. 1,302 in salaries to the officials and office expenses, and Rs. 208 for sweeping, lighting, burying and the upkeep of roads.

Municipal income depended in most cases on ferries, many of which were distant from the municipality, building taxes, brokerage on every kind of transaction which took place within municipal limits, and half the proceeds of the slaughter house tax. In the larger municipalities taxes were levied on shops and houses, noxious trades and other small items. Revenues were derived also from license fees, rents of municipal lands and buildings, and from fines. The Turkish administration had made no attempt at uniformity, and our first care was to simplify and systematise taxation. The larger municipalities were placed in the charge of Political Officers, who were assisted by informal councils which could develop later into municipal bodies. In smaller centres the Ottoman system of local management by the townsfolk was re-created but placed on a better footing. In a few cases where the expenditure side of the budget showed little but the pay of the president and his clerk, and the municipality was

obviously unable to rise above this level, it was abolished. There are now 80 municipalities most of which perform valuable public services, of which lighting and sanitation are the minimum. Cleanliness has everywhere made notable improvement and interest is taken in municipal affairs. In many cases important improvements have been effected at the suggestion of the Political Officer; streets have been widened; pits, dug long ago in brick-making and left to fill with water and become breeding places for mosquitoes, have been levelled up; municipal gardens have been begun, bridges built, bazaars roofed and their floors covered with bitumen; flights of steps have been constructed down the river banks to the water—a small matter, but important where all the water for household use has to be brought from the river by the womenfolk—and raised pathways edged with brick have been made to form a road where in muddy weather there was nothing but a quagmire.

At first most municipalities had to be subsidised from general revenues, but nearly all are now self-supporting and most are making a contribution towards the cost of medical services, education and police. Many towns are embarking on municipal enterprises, such as electric lighting, water supply, and flour mills. A few of the municipalities have taken over water and electric plant from the military authorities, and in at least one case an electric lighting plant has been acquired by a local company in which the municipality holds a quarter of the shares. It has been necessary to put some restraint on premature ambitions, but where the scheme seems sound, and the municipal funds cannot provide the whole of the capital cost, the municipality has sometimes been given a loan from general revenues, repayable in three or four years.

That it was not our intention to rest content with embryo municipal bodies, even though the delay in concluding peace with Turkey postponed the setting up of civil government, was announced by the Acting Civil Commissioner in a speech delivered at a banquet held at Baghdad in honour of the King's Birthday on 29th May 1919. "The British Government," said Colonel Wilson, "has already declared its intention of assisting in the establishment in the 'Iraq of a form of administration calculated to be agreeable to the population, whilst at the same time ensuring equal justice, economic development, and the spread of education. You may like to know what we are already doing towards introducing a system of government which will enable the inhabitants of 'Iraq to take a share from the first in managing their own affairs. Mesopotamia has been divided into several divisions (liwahs), e.g., Basrah, 'Amarah, Muntafiq, Kut, Baghdad, and the Euphrates. In each of these provinces it is proposed to set up as soon as possible a Council of Notables, who shall assemble periodically to advise Government as to matters of provincial concern, such as education, agriculture, irrigation, roads, and the like. The President of the Council will be the Political Officer of the Division, the Secretary will be an inhabitant of 'Iraq, who will generally be the adviser (mushawar) of the Political Officer. The advantage will be that this will enable local opinion to be thoroughly ventilated. In various Departments of State, e.g., Revenue, Education, Justice, it is intended to appoint an inhabitant of 'Iraq of suitable qualifications to act as adviser to the head of the Department, and it is hoped by this means to initiate an increasing number of 'Iraq officials and non-officials into modern methods of administration, and at the same time to ensure that the administration will be in touch with local feeling and ambitions. These measures are first steps, and must be regarded as such and as an earnest of our intentions rather than as a considered scheme of government, but I would remind those who would be glad to see more ambitious schemes set up forthwith that 'Iraq needs expert guidance and foreign assistance if it is to escape the fate of neighbouring countries and to fulfil its high destinies. It needs time to educate its sons in the ways of modern administration. It is well known that amongst those people who have developed self-government the kernel of development has commonly been the city with its autonomous institutions. So then in Baghdad, Basrah and 'Amarah the control of municipal affairs will, subject to the general supervision of the Divisional Political Officer, forthwith vest in the Municipal Council, chosen by Government in receipt of remuneration for its services."

In fulfilment of the undertakings here given, the first step that was taken was the remodelling of the municipality of Basrah. In place of the existing advisory body a Municipal Council was created, which consisted of a British President, an Arab Vice-President, British and Arab technical advisers and 20 members, one of whom was a British subject representing the Chamber of Commerce, while a second represented the Associated Indian Trades. As regards the remaining 18 members, opinion

in Basrah was not in favour of recourse to general election, and a mixed scheme was agreed to combining nomination with election.

The project of forming a Municipal Council for Baghdad was under discussion in November 1918, and had been laid before the existing Municipal Advisory Committee. The most important point to be decided was the manner in which the Council should be selected. The Committee, composed of representatives of all sects, was unanimously in favour of some form of election, but equally divided between direct election according to the old Turkish law, which provided for a property qualification of 2,500 piastres annual value (about Rs. 212), with certain classes, such as convicts and foreigners, ruled out; or election by a college composed of some 500 to 600 electors selected from each quarter by the mukhtar, or headmen, subject to the approval of a central scrutinising body. It is, however, to be noted that only one Moslem member of the Committee voted against adhering to the Turkish method. There was also unanimity in opposing the inclusion of any local nominated members, but it was agreed that the Military Governor should be President and that the two Deputy Military Governors should sit as members exercising votes.

It must be borne in mind that although under the Turks the Municipal Council was elected on a wide franchise its powers were limited. The budget and all schemes and projects for works, &c., had to be approved by the Municipal Assembly, which was formed by the union of the Municipal Council and the Administrative Council. As the latter was composed chiefly of officials, the Ottoman Government could always obtain an official or semi-official majority in the Assembly. Thus, while seeming to place the management of municipal affairs on a popular basis, the Turks in reality maintained complete control of all important matters.

The formation of an elective Municipal Council for Baghdad was delayed by the party feeling which was aroused by the self-determination enquiry. In the early summer it was again the subject of careful consideration, and it had already been decided to take the first step towards self-government in the town by appointing an assistant to the Military Governor; the latter had been a political appointment since the end of 1918, though the name of Military Governor was maintained. At this juncture there arrived in Baghdad from Aleppo, early in June, Naji Effendi Suwaidi, who was offered the post, and took up the work on 3rd July. Naji Effendi is a member of a distinguished family of Baghdad, said to be descended from the 'Abbasids. His father, Yusuf Effendi, was known for his pro-Arab sympathies, and was exiled from Baghdad to Constantinople in 1915 when the Turkish Government broke up the Liberal Party in the town. The whole family fell under a cloud. One of Yusuf Effendi's sons, who held office in Diyarbakr, was murdered on account of his refusal to obey official commands in respect of the massacre of Armenians. Naji, who was also in office, remained at Constantinople till the armistice, after which he went to Syria, and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Aleppo. When he came to Baghdad in June 1919 he let it be understood that he was prepared to take office in Mesopotamia. He was offered the choice of two posts, Adviser to the Judicial Secretary or Adviser to the Military Governor, and chose the latter. It was intimated to him that it would be his first and most important duty to assist the Military Governor in working out the new administrative arrangements for the city. The schemes and notes with regard to the proposed municipality, which had been put forward after a close study of Turkish methods by the Judicial Secretary and other heads of departments, were laid before him; but without giving himself time to weigh them thoroughly, he drew up and presented on 7th July a scheme on somewhat different lines, salient divergences being that the body should be elected by universal suffrage, and that no British officer, with the exception of the Officer of Health and the Municipal Engineer, should be a member.

The Acting Civil Commissioner, at the request of the Military Governor, Colonel Balfour, appointed a committee under the presidency of the Judicial Adviser, consisting of two British officers, four notables of Baghdad, including Naji Effendi, and an Arab secretary, to consider these proposals; but on 14th July, before the Committee had had time to meet, Naji Effendi resigned office. In the letter tendering his resignation, he stated that his "mauaging the administration of the municipality and directing its affairs before the election of the council and the completion of the organisation will neither secure the success aimed at nor derive the intended benefits," and this somewhat shadowy explanation was the only one which he offered. He left for Aleppo in the following month and resumed his former appointment there; but before leaving, and in subsequent letters, he declared that he would be willing to return at any future time if he were needed.

The post vacated by him in Baghdad was accepted in a somewhat modified form by another leading Sunni, who became Mayor of Baghdad, while a Shi'ah notable was made mudir of Karkh, the smaller section of the town situated on the right bank of the Tigris. The Military Governor formed a committee consisting of these officials: two representatives of British firms and nine leading men of the town, Moslems, Jews and Christians, and invited them to consider a scheme drafted by the British heads of departments. The scheme approved by them provided for a Municipal Council selected by a system of electoral colleges. The primary electorate was to be composed of property owners over 21 years of age paying house tax of not less than Rs. 41 a year. These conditions limited the number of voters to 762, which in the eyes of the Baghdad notables was sufficient for a population of nearly 200,000. Similarly in Mosul, a town of from 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants, when an elective municipality on the basis of the Turkish municipal law was set up in the summer of 1920, the electorate, on the qualifications approved by the local committee of notables, worked out at about 450.

With regard to Divisional Councils, the first to be organised was in Basrah in November 1919. Others were formed during the winter and spring of 1919-20 in Kirkuk, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Samarra, 'Amarah, Diyalah and Ramadi Divisions. The Baghdad Council was delayed till after the first municipal election, which has not yet taken place owing to difficulties in preparing the register.

Informal advisory councils composed of townsmen and shaikhs had from the first existed in several divisions, and the new councils did not differ from them in principle. Members representative of different classes and interests, urban and rural, were selected by the Political Officer, who himself acted as President. When a decision had been reached on the subject under discussion it was forwarded to the Civil Commissioner, with whom lay the final ruling. The debates have covered a wide field, including railway and irrigation schemes, agrarian settlement, local agricultural questions, the preservation of law and order, &c. At Basrah, where the members took a lively interest in the proceedings, the management of Auqaf funds has been subjected more than once to criticism. The setting up of the councils was generally welcomed, and at Hillah the first act of the newly constituted body was to re-affirm the petition of January 1919 in favour of British administration.

No attempt has as yet been made to apply a system of election to local councils. In Turkish times the Administrative and General Councils of the Wilayat were both elected, the first on principles which the Turkish law characteristically does not indicate, the second by the secondary electors of the preceding Parliamentary election. For the election of these secondary electors the franchise included all male taxpayers over 24 years of age who were not disqualified by other causes. Each group of 500 electors chose one secondary elector. In a country like Mesopotamia, where all but an infinitesimal fraction of the population is illiterate and wholly ignorant of public affairs, the Turkish system was little better than a fiction. The elections were in fact run by the Committee of Union and Progress, which indicated candidates suitable for election. The choice made by the Committee was, however, usually a reasonable one. How to create and foster popular institutions which shall have a real significance and enjoy a real responsibility is the problem of the near future. The Divisional Councils as created by the British Administration were intended only as a temporary measure. Apart from the question of election, they had no direct responsibility, without which they could not satisfy popular ambition or maintain vitality. In one case, that of the Shamiyah Division, the members of the newly appointed council resigned in a body after the first meeting on the ground that till the future of their country was decided they did not feel themselves at liberty to give their opinion freely. This incident, which took place in February 1920, was directly connected with the course of events in Syria.

In October 1918 an Arab Government had been set up from Aleppo to Damascus, practically independent, as far as administration was concerned, though it was under the general control of the British army of occupation. At its head was the Amir Faisal, who had served as a general under Lord Allenby. Most of the leading men in Faisal's army were of Mesopotamian origin, many of them being Baghdadis. They had always contended that they fought the Syrian campaign for the liberation of their own country, and as early as the winter of 1917-18, during the hostilities before Ma'an, they formed a society called the 'Ahd al 'Iraqi, the object of which was to secure the independence of Mesopotamia from all foreign control and its close union with an independent Syria, under the family of King Husain of the Hijaz. This

society, led by the Baghdadi, Yasin Pasha, when at the fall of Damascus he was taken prisoner and exchanged his high position in the Turkish army for that of Chief of Faisal's General Staff, was responsible for the rapid acceleration of nationalist ambitions in Mesopotamia. It is doubtful how far it had the support of Faisal himself, who was more embarrassed than aided by the chauvinism of its political principles. On several occasions he has denounced actions which were unquestionably engineered by the League; but since, through the participation of Mesopotamian officers, it commanded the army, he was powerless to control it.

At the date of the armistice the frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia had not been defined. Under Turkish rule the Baghdad Wilayat had embraced the Qadha of 'Anah, which extended up the Euphrates to a few miles above Qaim. Between Qaim and Raqqah, the southernmost town in the Aleppo Wilayat, lay the Mutasarrifiq of Dair al Zor, which was included in neither Wilayat, but was directly dependent on Constantinople. For a short period before the war these administrative divisions had been altered and the province of Dair had received a large increase to the south, including 'Anah.

After the retreat of the Turks a British Assistant Political Officer was sent to 'Anah. So far as the authorities at Baghdad were aware, no arrangements had been made with regard to Dair, but towards the end of November the inhabitants requested the Political Officer at 'Anah that an officer might be sent to Dair in order to preserve law and order. The matter was referred to His Majesty's Government who on 13th December agreed that, as a temporary measure, pending the decision of the Peace Conference, a British officer should go to Dair in a purely military capacity. While the question was under discussion a telegram was received from the High Commissioner in Cairo intimating that the Arab Government at Damascus claimed that the Mutasarrifiq of Dair should be administered from Damascus; he therefore urged that a decision should be taken as soon as possible.

As soon as the permission of His Majesty's Government was received, a qualified officer was despatched from 'Anah to Dair, but when he reached Albu Kamal he found that a Qaimmaqam, representing the Arab Government, and sent by order of the Governor of Aleppo, with a subordinate staff and some forty gendarmes, had arrived there on 23rd December and had instructions to occupy 'Anah. An Arab Mutasarrif was already on the way to Dair, and when he reached his post he proceeded to appoint large numbers of officials and to enrol gendarmes at a rate of pay far higher than was offered in the British zone. The Civil Commissioner was in complete ignorance as to whether the Military Governor, who was said to have issued the orders, was an Englishman, a Frenchman, or an Arab. On reference to Aleppo he was found to be Shukri Pasha al Ayyubi, who declared that the Arab officials had proceeded to Dair and Albu Kamal contrary to instructions and ordered their immediate withdrawal.

The incident remained obscure. It is not impossible that the original orders for the occupation of the Mutasarrifiq of Dair may have been given in all good faith by Faisal before he left for Paris, or they may have been issued by the League without his knowledge. But for the request from the inhabitants for a British officer, the British Administration in Mesopotamia would have been reluctant to extend their responsibilities as far up the river as Dair; indeed, the Commander-in-Chief declined to undertake military protection upstream of Qaim. Though the question was settled amicably it left an impression of rival and incompatible ambitions, of which the Mesopotamian League did not fail to make use. In February and again in July 1919, an agent of the League, who was ascertained later to have been Ramadhan al Shallash, canvassed the tribes of Dair and obtained documents in favour of the Arab Government. Ramadhan was himself by origin a mukhtar, or headman, of one of the local tribes, the Albu Sarai, cultivators and sheep breeders above and below Dair. He had been an officer in the Turkish army and had deserted at Madinah to the Sharif.

The propaganda carried on by the League was not confined to Dair. Continuous correspondence was carried on by the 'Iraqis in Syria and their relatives and friends in Mesopotamia, the purport of which was to urge the latter to combine with Syria in demanding complete independence. Funds were sent from Syria to help the Mesopotamians in the diffusion of these views.<sup>1</sup>

Experience gained by administering Dair convinced the civil authorities in Mesopotamia that the frontier should be drawn so as either to include the whole of the Dair Mutasarrifiq or to exclude all tribes directly dependent upon Dair, the arbitrary division of tribal groups being a sure means of generating friction and

misunderstanding. Military considerations made it advisable to exclude Dair and its tribes from Mesopotamia. Troops could not be maintained at a point so distant, and with the exception of two armoured cars, the Assistant Political Officer relied entirely on Arab levies. A provisional boundary proposed during the summer of 1919 by His Majesty's Government, namely, a line crossing the Euphrates some miles below Dair at the mouth of the Khabur, and following up that tributary, was not held to accord with local conditions. The same tribes occupy both banks of the Khabur, and in the interests of peace it was essential that they should be placed under a single mandatory. Nevertheless, in the conversations between Great Britain and France in September 1919, it was decided provisionally to maintain the Khabur as a frontier. The Amir Faisal was at that time in Europe, and was present at some of the conferences, but it is not certain whether he was aware of the exact nature of the decision which was reached, though he undoubtedly knew that it was the intention of the allied Governments to exclude Dair from the Mesopotamian State. The impression in Syria seems to have been that Great Britain would evacuate the whole of the Mutasarrifiq, the southern boundary of which could be variously stated as being at Qaim, the old Turkish administrative frontier, or below 'Anah at the point temporarily adopted by the Turks.

It was of importance that when the evacuation took place the incoming authority, whether French or Arab, should be installed by us with due ceremony in order to avoid misapprehension and tribal disturbance. In the absence of any official pronouncement, great uncertainty as to the future was felt at Dair, nor was it diminished by an incident which occurred on 4th November, immediately after the evacuation of Syria by the British forces had begun. The Assistant Political Officer heard that a Turkish Qaimmaqam had arrived at Hasaqah, on the Khabur, north-east of Dair; at the same time letters were circulated among the tribes announcing the immediate return of the Turks. Captain Chamier went to Hasaqah, interviewed the Qaimmaqam, and at the suggestion of the latter went on to Ras al 'Ain, where he telephoned to the Turkish Commandant at Mardin, and asked for an explanation. The Commandant replied that he had understood that we had evacuated Dair, but since that was not the case he would recall the Qaimmaqam.

On 19th November a telegram from the High Commissioner at Cairo was received in Baghdad, intimating that Ramadhan al Shallash had left Aleppo with instructions to proceed to Dair. He reached Raqqah early in December, and began actively to intrigue among the tribes, styling himself Governor of the Euphrates and Khabur. Unfortunately the orders of His Majesty's Government, which were on their way, had not been received, when on 10th December the Assistant Political Officer, Captain Chamier, heard a rumour that an Arab force was moving down from Raqqah to attack Dair. Accompanied by the officer in command of the armoured cars, he made a reconnaissance by motor along the Raqqah road, and found no trace of any unusual movement, but on his return he was ambushed and fired at by tribesmen. With difficulty the two officers got back to Dair. Even then Captain Chamier did not believe that a serious attack on Dair was intended, but he telegraphed to Baghdad announcing serious trouble, arrested the mayor, whom he suspected of connivance, made such dispositions for the peace of the town as were possible, and withdrew with the Arab levies to the barracks. Early in the morning of 11th December Dair was entered by tribesmen from the south, and, together with the townsmen, they raided the hospital, church, one or two mosques, and the Political Office, where the safe was broken open and its contents taken. The petrol dump was blown up, with some 90 casualties among the assailants, and all prisoners were released. An armoured car, which went out to make a reconnaissance in the town, was fired at and badly damaged, and later in the morning fire was opened on the barracks. The machine guns, which had been mounted on the roof, replied, but were soon put out of action by the enemy's fire. Shortly afterwards Captain Chamier was invited to come down to the town for a conference. His position was difficult, as he had neither food nor water in the barracks to withstand a siege; accordingly he thought it best to comply with the invitation, and taking with him his Arab personal assistant he went to the house of the mayor, where he met the leading citizens. They seemed anxious to make a truce, and it was evident that, having got the tribesmen into the town, they found themselves

<sup>1</sup> Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi told Saiyid Talib Pasha in July 1920 that he had received in all 16,000*l.*, and complained of the inadequacy of a sum which had to be divided "among so many." Another 3,000*l.* is known to have been received by Shaikh Sa'id Naqshbandi.



unable to control them. In order to put a stop to the wild firing which still continued, Captain Chamier, together with the mayor, walked through the town to show that there was no war between the British and the Arabs. On his return to the mayor's house he met the shaikhs who had led the rebellion; they were in a great state of excitement and exhibited fanatical hostility. Their general view was that, having gone so far, they might as well kill the British officers and staff, and they would possibly have acted on this threat but for the fortunate appearance of two aeroplanes from Mosul, which proceeded to machine-gun the town. The shaikhs changed their note at once, and begged Captain Chamier to stop the bombardment. When the aeroplanes had left they concluded an armistice for 24 hours.

Ramadhan Shallash reached Dair in the afternoon and sent immediately for Captain Chamier. He produced a number of letters which he said had been written by the Shaikhs of Dair asking him to take over the district on behalf of the Arab Government. He observed that just as the British had been invited in December 1918 to come in and preserve peace and order, so they were now invited to leave. Captain Chamier replied that he had had no instructions to vacate Dair, but that as he was unable to make any resistance he was willing to leave if Ramadhan al Shallash would undertake to preserve order and not to take action against the Arab officials who had served under the British administration, or against the Christians. There were a number of Armenian refugees in Dair, as to whose fate he felt a justifiable anxiety. Ramadhan al Shallash agreed to these conditions, but during the night he changed his mind and asked Captain Chamier to guarantee that after his safe arrival in the British lines Dair should not be attacked by land or air. This promise Captain Chamier was unable to give, but he agreed to attract the attention of an aeroplane and induce the pilot to land. He did so in the course of the day—no small praise being due to the pilot for venturing to land—and a message was sent to the British authorities explaining that the British in Dair were held there as hostage for the safety of the town.

Once he had entered Dair, Ramadhan's propaganda consisted in giving appointments to everyone who came to his assistance, the salary to be fixed at a later date. He informed the tribal shaikhs that it was the intention of the Arab Government to initiate local institutions under the shaikhs themselves. A number of mukhtars of the tribes along the river and the majority of such shaikhs of the 'Anizah as were hostile to our staunch ally, Fahad Beg, came in to visit him, but though they professed loudly that it was necessary to raise the tribes against the British and even to carry the war into India, all the more important shaikhs, after they had received gifts of money and gauged the situation, returned to their tents and took no further action. There is no doubt that Ramadhan was badly misled as to the extent of support which he would receive from the tribes. One of the leading shaikhs of the 'Aquadat, to which tribe Ramadhan's own section, the Albu Sarai, belongs, remained in active co-operation with us till in May we withdrew from his territory, when he was obliged to come to terms with the Arab Government.

Meanwhile, the shaikhs of the Dulaim, lower down the river, had placed themselves at the disposition of the British Government, and Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, paramount chief of the 'Anizah, had expressed his readiness to help us, while the leading shaikhs of the Shammar Jarba' promised to co-operate with the Dulaim.

The Amir Faisal was in Paris, but on being told of the hostilities at Dair he sent a telegram to his brother and deputy at Damascus, the Amir Zaid, repudiating in the strongest terms the action of Ramadhan al Shallash and ordering the Arab officials to withdraw from Dair. He added that all who were responsible for what had occurred would be punished as rebels. This message was dropped in Dair by our aeroplanes on 22nd December, together with a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, requiring Ramadhan to send the British officers and men in safety to Albu Kamal, otherwise action would be taken against Dair. Ramadhan was no doubt aware that the seizure of Dair could not be justified, though he supported it by claiming that Dair had been assigned to the Arab Government by the Peace Conference. He was also undeniably anxious as to Turkish movements, a natural anxiety seeing that he was a deserter from the Ottoman army. On 19th December he told Captain Chamier that the Turks were concentrating in Ras al 'Ain; he added that he had no wish to make war on the British Government, and asked whether, in the event of a Turkish attack, we would support him, at any rate with money. Throughout the period of Captain Chamier's imprisonment he was treated by Ramadhan with unbroken courtesy.

On 21st December, two officers arrived from Aleppo, Rauf Beg and Taufiq Beg, the latter being the Aide-de-Camp of Ja'far Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo. Rauf Beg brought a letter from Ja'far to Captain Chamier, which he was not allowed to communicate to him until two days after his arrival. In it Ja'far asked the British officer to consult with Rauf as to the best means of restoring order. Rauf informed Captain Chamier that he had instructions to dismiss Ramadhan from his post as Qaimmaqam of Raqqah and to send him under arrest to Aleppo. But as the representatives of the Arab Government had no power to enforce these orders, and as Ramadhan alone stood between the British officers and the fanaticism of the local tribesmen, Captain Chamier suggested that action would be postponed, and that Lieutenant Taufiq with one of the British officers should go to Albu Kamal to interview the British authorities. The Acting Civil Commissioner happened to be in Albu Kamal when Lieutenant Taufiq arrived there, and was informed by him that Ramadhan al Shallash had disclaimed allegiance to the Arab Government. Lieutenant Taufiq begged the British administration to eject him, but in reply was told that we had never desired to hold Dair except to maintain order, and that as Ramadhan had produced the existing state of anarchy, it was the duty of the Arab Government to right matters. Orders from His Majesty's Government with regard to withdrawal to the Khabur had by this time been received, and Lieutenant Taufiq was given a letter to Ramadhan saying that by agreement between the British and Arab Governments the frontier had been drawn provisionally at the Khabur, and that this boundary would be observed by us. Lieutenant Taufiq promised to do his best to induce Ramadhan to comply with the decision of higher authorities. A letter to the same effect was also dropped by aeroplane in Dair, and it was intimated to Ramadhan that if the British officers and men were sent in safety to Albu Kamal within 48 hours, Dair would not be touched. The prisoners were released on 25th December, and left after receiving assurances that no harm should come to the Christian population of the town.

The Arab Government at Damascus in a telegram to Cairo protested, on 12th January, against the provisional Khabur boundary, using the same argument that had been urged six months earlier from Baghdad, namely, that it split tribal units. They asked that Mayyadin and Albu Kamal should be included in the Arab zone. The methods adopted by Ramadhan al Shallash were more direct. He took up from the first an attitude of defiance to the Amir Faisal's orders, declared that the British must withdraw to the Hauran valley, some 50 miles below 'Anah, and asserted that this was the frontier adopted by the Peace Conference. Incidentally he announced his intention of going on to Mosul. He collected taxes wherever he could within British boundaries, encouraged the tribes to rob and raid, sent threatening messages to the Political Officers at Albu Kamal and inflammatory letters to the shaikhs in British territory. To these letters he received replies of a discouraging character, but he had greater success in his efforts to excite such sections of the 'Aqaidat as had joined him. The prospect of unlimited highway robbery was very much to their taste, and they were ready enough to raise any cry, religious or political, which justified looting. The situation was regarded in a different light by the merchants of Baghdad, who were engaged in buying gold in Syria and transporting it at great profit to Mesopotamia. Their tales of the danger of the road and the losses they had experienced usually ended with a description of their heartfelt satisfaction when they reached Albu Kamal, a British garrison and safety.

Official protests against Ramadhan's acts of hostility were conveyed by aeroplane to Mayyadin and Dair. He was warned that if he continued to trespass within the British boundary the Commander-in-Chief would be forced to make reprisals, and that any representations which he had to make on the subject of the frontier should be addressed to his own Government, which was in amicable discussion with the other Governments concerned. He replied by denying that he had been informed of the agreement which had been reached, and the windy threats with which his letter ended were followed on 11th January by a determined attack on Albu Kamal, carried out by his tribesmen, who entered the suburbs, looted the houses of Arabs who were in British service and violated their women. Nor were matters improved when, in the middle of January, Ramadhan left for Aleppo and was superseded by Maulud Pasha al Khalaf, who had previously been in command of a division in Damascus. Like his predecessor, Maulud was a Mesopotamian (he hailed from Mosul) and a prominent member of the Ahd al-'Iraqi. His first step on assuming command was to write to the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, informing him that the Khabur frontier was

impossible to maintain for tribal reasons, and urging immediate withdrawal to the Wadi Hauran—an alternative which would have been equally open to objection, since it would have involved the arbitrary division of the Dulaim tribe. At the same time he suggested the reopening of post and telegraph services.

No answer to such letters as these was possible except that which had already been given to Ramadhan, namely, that the boundary had been provisionally agreed to in Europe and could not be discussed except through the usual diplomatic channels. Reinforcements were despatched to Albu Kamal; but, in order to avoid unnecessary friction and bloodshed, the territory up to the Khabur was not occupied. We continued to assume that the Arab Government was not responsible for what was done by its officers and that a state of war did not exist, but it was an assumption increasingly difficult to maintain. Maulud was as actively engaged in hostile propaganda as his predecessor. His letters reached the shaikhs as far down as 'Amarah, and he appeared to be amply supplied with funds, which he distributed among such tribal leaders as he thought capable of causing disturbance within our sphere. Our forbearance strained the loyalty of our own supporters, who were unable to understand why the British Government did not deal summarily with an enemy as insignificant as Maulud and his handful of marauders, and why we did not extend immediate help and protection to those within our boundaries who were ready to stand by us if they were assured against reprisals. With a view to stabilising this position, we advanced at the end of January to Salihyah, half-way between Albu Kamal and the Khabur. Maulud made this advance an excuse for fresh hostilities, declaring that he was unable to restrain the fury of the tribes. Led by Arab officers, the tribesmen attacked Albu Kamal in the middle of February, while British lines of communication as far south as Qaim were subject to continuous raids.

Maulud was reported to have left for Aleppo before the attack on Albu Kamal, but to him or his representative the following letter was despatched by the Commander-in-Chief on 20th February:—

“I write to point out to you that troops under your command have occupied Mayyadin and disturbances have occurred in the area down river of that place, which I can only conclude, from the terms of your own message to me and from other evidence, to have been instigated by you or by other persons under your orders, and this although the provisional boundary fixed by the two Governments crosses the Euphrates above Mayyadin. I have given instructions to my troops that they should not attack and reoccupy Mayyadin, although that place is within the area in which my Government has directed me to enforce and maintain order, because it is not desired to establish a state of hostilities between the British and the Arab Governments. My only desire is that peace and friendliness with the representatives of the Arab Government should be maintained, and, whilst questions of areas and boundaries are left to be settled by our respective Governments, to maintain order in the area in occupation of my forces, and to co-operate with you in similar action in your area. It has, however, been clearly proved that tribesmen under your control and troops actually in the pay of the Arab Government have attacked British convoys and troops in the area assigned to me by His Majesty's Government; I have, therefore, to notify you that Mayyadin will be attacked by air should any disturbance be caused or fomented by troops or tribesmen sent from Dair al Zor or Mayyadin. Any assembly of tribesmen with an apparently hostile intention in the area down river of Mayyadin will be liable to attack, and if any aeroplane be fired on it will reply to this hostile action by fire and by bombs. My commander on the Euphrates has been instructed not to take action on the above lines against Mayyadin before the 27th.”

At the same time Damascus was informed by His Majesty's Government that they would be held responsible for any encroachment on the provisional boundary by tribes or officials under Maulud, and that the continuation of the subsidy which was being paid to the Arab Government by Great Britain would be dependent on its ability to impose its orders.

Their expostulations were as vain as those which had preceded them. Ramadhan Shallash was permitted, or ordered, to return to Dair. Maulud brought back with him small reinforcements of regular troops from Aleppo, and an 'Iraqi noted for his anti-British sentiments was appointed Governor of Mayyadin. Propaganda of a fanatical character issuing from these sources reached Karbala and Najaf.

While Maulud was issuing incitements to Jihad on the Euphrates, the Amir Faisal returned to Damascus from Paris. Early in March he despatched letters to Cairo expressing his regret for what had happened at Dair al Zor, coupled with an

assurance that he was taking steps to prevent further occurrences of a like nature. But he pointed out that the provisional frontier line cut across tribal lands and divisions, and was likely to give rise to misunderstandings and disorder. He therefore suggested that a mixed commission of British and Arabs should be appointed to modify the arrangement which had been reached in January. The British authorities in Mesopotamia agreed readily to this proposal, the more so as at the moment Maulud's attitude seemed to be growing somewhat more reasonable. Ramadhan Shallash, who had come down to Mayyadin, was recalled at the request of the Commander-in-Chief and returned to Dair, where he fell out with Maulud and went back to his tribe at Tibni, above Dair. Early in May, after exacting fines and tributes from the hostile tribes round Salihyah, the British advanced position was moved back to Albu Kamal.

Before the meeting on the Euphrates took place, a Syrian Congress assembled in Damascus, and on 11th March proclaimed Faisal King of Syria, while a second body, purporting to represent Mesopotamia, composed of Mesopotamian officers in Syria, appointed his brother, the Sharif 'Abdullah, Amir of the 'Iraq. The Mesopotamians in Faisal's army, who were at the root of the Nationalist agitation, were doubtless finding their position in Syria a difficult one. There was a growing tendency on the part of Syrians to claim for themselves the important posts held by men whom they regarded as foreigners, and the Mesopotamians saw their prospects in Syria diminishing without, as they thought, any hope that their services would be acceptable in their own country should the British Government be entrusted with the mandate. A Mesopotamia free from British control seemed alone to offer them hope of office,

The meeting proposed by the Amir Faisal took place at 'Asharah, 15 miles below the mouth of the Khabur, on 5th May. Maulud pleaded ill-health and was represented by two officers of the Arab army. It was agreed that Albu Kamal should revert to the Mutasarrifiq of Dair, to which it had previously belonged, and the frontier was fixed provisionally immediately above Qaim, some 70 miles below the Khabur and 50 miles above 'Anah. The Arab Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Damascus informed Field-Marshal Lord Allenby that the evacuation of Albu Kamal by British troops had made a remarkably good impression on the Arab Government, and would be accepted by the people of Syria as a sign of cordiality on the part of His Majesty's Government, but no similar spirit was apparent on the Euphrates. Tribal raids and attacks on convoys continued unabated, together with political propaganda of a violent and menacing kind and requests that the frontier should be withdrawn to the Hauran. Faisal was again informed of the situation of His Majesty's Government, and warned that if raids continued below the frontier agreed upon we should reserve to ourselves the right to take counter-measures.

The willingness of the British administration to yield on the Euphrates to any proposal which offered a reasonable hope of satisfying the claims of the Syrian Government was discounted by the Mesopotamian League and its agents by our obvious difficulty in maintaining a long line of communications against the attack of irregular forces. A conciliatory attitude was regarded as a sign of military weakness, and as such proved an incentive rather than a sedative. The account of hostilities given in the Syrian native press, preposterous as it was, commanded belief. It was said that the British army had been turned out of Dair, had been forced by the Arabs to evacuate Albu Kamal, and awaited staggering a last and decisive blow at 'Anah which could be dealt by the Amir 'Abdullah at the head of invincible forces. While the Baghdad coffee-shops echoed with these rumours the desert took action.

The Shammar of the Jazirah, hereditary robbers of the Mosul road, needed little encouragement to revert to their secular traditions. They were joined by the northern sections of the Dulaim on the Euphrates. In March small raids began to occur on the railway and road between Baghdad and Mosul. On 21st April the first caravan which for some time had got through from Aleppo arrived at Mosul *via* Dair, and its appearance inaugurated a fresh period of sedition in Mosul itself. Nationalist meetings were held and anti-British notices bearing the seal of the Mesopotamian League were posted on the walls at night. Raids on our line of communications increased, culminating in the burning of a train near 'Ain Dibs on 24th May, and all information pointed to the imminence of an attack on Mosul. News was received of a concentration at Fadghami, on the Khabur, under a native of Mosul, Jamil Beg; who was an officer in the Syrian army. He was said to be drawing munitions down the Khabur, *i.e.*, from Turkish territory, and letters subsequently captured showed that he was in close touch with the ex-Qainmaqam of Jazirat ibu 'Umar. The latter

was a well-known source of hostile propaganda. His activities among the Kurdish tribes had been the subject of formal protest. He had thereupon been dismissed by the Turkish Government at Constantinople, but he continued to exercise his functions.

On 2nd June the Assistant Political Officer reported that a Nationalist meeting had been held at Tal 'Afar, an isolated village west of Mosul, inhabited by a mixed Turkoman, Kurdish, and Arab population. Two days later some tribesmen rode into Tal 'Afar and gave the signal for the rising. The plot had been carefully laid. Jamil Beg's intention was that all British officers and staff should be made away with by the gendarmerie before his arrival. The notables and townspeople, though they were not directly implicated in the murders, must have been fully aware of what was going on. The gendarmerie officer, Captain Stewart, was shot by one of his own officers. The three remaining members of the British staff, an instructor, a clerk, and a machine gunner, held out on the roof of their house until Jamil's band arrived, when they were killed by a bomb. The Assistant Political officer, Captain Barlow, who was touring in the district, was seized and brought in to Tal 'Afar. As he neared the town he caught sight of two armoured cars which had been sent out on reconnaissance from Mosul. He made a dash for them and was shot. The cars were ambushed and none of the crews escaped.

The fall of Tal 'Afar gave the signal for a general rising of the tribes in the district. The Shammar and other tribes on the borders of the desert were originally involved in the plot, but more or less sedentary tribes were carried away with the tide. Yazidi and Christian villages east of the Tigris were attacked and repeated raids were delivered on the railway and the road, but in every case the raiders were beaten off and suffered considerable losses. Before Jamil Beg had time to concentrate for a march on Mosul he was surprised by a British column and fled with his officers to Dair. The tribesmen melted away without resistance. Tal 'Afar was occupied by a strong detachment of troops, civil administration restored, and all concerned in the disturbances adequately punished. The ease with which the insurgents were dispersed pricked the bubble of sedition in Mosul, where great stress had been laid upon the impotence of the British Government owing to the alleged insignificance of the garrison and shortage of ammunition. But if the counter blow had not been both rapid and successful the town and the Wilayat would have been given over to anarchy and the safety of the large Christian population gravely threatened.

When news of these events reached Damascus, the Arab Government in a telegram to the High Commissioner expressed its regret for the burning of the train and dissociated itself completely from the activities of the extremists in Mesopotamia. The Prime Minister, who signed the telegram, went on to say that Ramadhan al Shallash had been summoned to Damascus and gave assurances that the Syrian Government could take all possible measures to prevent the recurrence of revolutionary movements. Early in July, Maulud Pasha was removed from Dair and replaced by a Syrian official of moderate views.

But already the centre of propaganda had been transferred from Syria and the Euphrates to Baghdad. The dissatisfied element of ex-Turkish employees had received considerable reinforcements during the 18 months which had elapsed since the armistice. Among their numbers were officers who had served in the Arab army and had witnessed the course of events in Syria. But whether they were pro-Arab or pro-Turk they were usually averse from foreign control. They received under the British administration a proportion, never amounting to less than a quarter and sometimes the whole, of the pension to which their services would have entitled them if the Ottoman Government had continued. The payment of pensions was not an obligation recognised in other occupied territories, and in so far they were better off in Mesopotamia than in Palestine, but the sum was small and with the universal rise in the price of living the recipients could barely maintain themselves. The problem which they presented might have been partly solved if a native army, in which they could have found employment, could have been set on foot irrespective of the long-delayed peace with Turkey and the granting of the mandate, as had occurred in quite different circumstances in Syria. The contrast between the two Arab provinces which had been freed from Turkish rule gave point to the complaints of the malcontents, and led them to disbelieve in the genuineness of official declarations. They argued that the creation of the Syrian State was due to the victory of Arab arms and that similar liberties in Mesopotamia could be gained

only by a successful resort to force. This was the point of view which underlay the mistaken and disastrous political programme of the Mesopotamian League, and it gained ground as the weakness of the British garrison became apparent.

During the course of the winter of 1919-20 a group of the younger men of Baghdad, some of whom had been well educated in Constantinople or Europe, began a movement for the rapid extension of facilities for higher education, with the implication that the administration had not given sufficient attention to the subject. Their object was in itself irreproachable, and secured a limited amount of financial support from the magnates of Baghdad, with the result that an independent secondary school was opened in January 1920. Its teaching staff was composed of ardent young nationalists, mostly of the ex-official class, and it numbered some sixty to seventy students. Its standard was very little above that of the Government primary schools, but so far as it went it was unobjectionable, and the Education Department saw no reason to refuse to it the grant-in-aid which was subsequently requested. But it speedily became much more significant from a political than from an educational point of view, and by the spring it was the headquarters of the extreme nationalists.

The announcement that Great Britain had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia was made on 3rd May. It was accompanied by a carefully considered explanation of the duties of a mandatory Power, in which stress was laid upon the fact that the ultimate goal was the development of independent institutions. The announcement spurred the nationalists to fresh activity. The claim to immediate and complete independence on the Syrian model, though it commanded the sympathy of members of the upper classes who looked to taking a leading part in the Arab State, and of men out of a job who hoped to gain a livelihood from the same source, did not make much headway in rousing the mass of the population. To that end an argument was needed which would be understood by the most ignorant and it was found in an appeal to religious fanaticism. For some time past it had been obvious to the nationalists that it would be necessary for them to present a united Islamic front. The deep prejudices which separate the Sunni and Shi'ah sects were temporarily overcome. The first symptom of a rapprochement occurred in the summer of 1919, when on two occasions Sunnis attended the religious meetings which were held in memory of the deceased Shi'ah mujtahid, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. But it was not till the following month of Ramadhan, which began on 19th May 1920, that the political significance of the reconciliation became apparent. Services known as Mauluds, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were held in every Sunni and Shi'ah mosque in turn, members of both sects attending by invitation of the authorities in charge of the mosque or the heads of the quarter in which it was situated. On some occasions the reading of the Maulud, which is distinctively a Sunni celebration, was followed by a Ta'ziyah, the Shi'ah ritual condolence on the martyrdom of Husain, but in all cases the main features of these gatherings were the political speeches and recitations of patriotic poetry which followed the religious ceremony. The Arab is peculiarly susceptible to high-flown oratory, and the frantic appeals which were made to religion, patriotism and to the Amir 'Abdullah, urging him to hasten the advent of his holy kingdom, roused extreme enthusiasm. Prominent in one of the first Mauluds was a young employee in the Auqaf Department, who indulged in a speech which was judged dangerous to public order. His arrest was made the excuse of a meeting the avowed object of which was to arrange for his release by force. A couple of armoured cars were sent to patrol the main street of the town, and on one of them being attacked a few shots were fired over the head of the crowd. It dispersed with all possible celerity. The casualties consisted of one blind man, who was accidentally knocked down and run over.

The leaders of the movement and organisers of the Mauluds were men of varying status and capacity. The ablest among them were two Shi'ahs, Saiyid Muhammad al Sadr, a member of a renowned family of Shi'ah divines, and Ja'far abu Timman, a Shi'ah merchant. Chief among the Sunnis were Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi, Shaikh Ahmad Daud, and 'Ali Effendi Bazirqan.

This group was officially warned that no breach in the peace would be permitted, but the civil administration considered it inadvisable to resort to extreme measures of repression. The Mauluds were allowed to continue, and those who viewed with disfavour the holding of political gatherings in mosques were afraid to refuse subscriptions to defray the expenses incurred or to fail attendance, lest they should be labelled as infidels and traitors to Arab liberty. Rumours of impending

disturbance were circulated mainly through the agency of teachers in the nationalist school, with the result that the bazaar was repeatedly closed and the normal life of town interrupted. The progressive drawing in of our frontier on the Euphrates, and the attacks on Tal 'Afar and the Mosul road, gave substance to the belief that our military position was not such as would enable us to hold the tribes if they could be roused. Early in June one of the most consistent of our supporters among the tribal shaikhs near Baghdad sounded a grave note of warning, and at the same time, on the Euphrates, the paramount shaikh of the Dulaim, who had turned a deaf ear to the propaganda which had been addressed to him, solemnly declared that unless we could score some striking success he could no longer answer for his tribesmen. He urged the reoccupation of Dair ; but whatever might have been the merits of the scheme, it was far beyond our powers of performance. While well-wishers were alarmed at our failure to put an end to tribal disorder, and by the sufferance accorded to the antics of the extremists, debates in the House of Commons and articles in the English papers were quoted by the latter as evidence that the mandate was as unacceptable in London as in Baghdad.

It was under these unfavourable conditions that a declaration of future policy was made. In April a small committee of Political Officers, presided over by the Judicial Secretary, had drawn up a scheme for the setting up of Arab institutions. It provided for a provisional constitution, including both a Council of State composed of British and Arab members with an Arab President appointed by the High Commissioner, and a Legislative Assembly chosen by election. Within a period limited to two years, the Legislative Assembly was to draw up an organic law for the permanent settlement of the country. The Acting Civil Commissioner was under no illusions as to the reception which would be accorded to this project by the extremists, but he hoped that its publication might strengthen the position of the moderates, and he was anxious that it should be issued before the fast of Ramadhan increased the existing tension. His Majesty's Government did not, however, consider that a declaration of this nature was justifiable until the terms of the mandate had been framed.

But if the scheme was not officially published, its details were universally known before the middle of Ramadhan, and the opposition which had been anticipated was not lacking. A self-chosen committee of 15 persons, styling themselves Mandubin, *i.e.*, appointed delegates, of Baghdad and Kadhimain was formed to resist the mandate and asked for an opportunity of laying their views before the Civil Commissioner. A large body of sober-minded opinion doubted the wisdom of the programme and disapproved of the methods which had been taken to advertise it, and when, on 2nd June, Colonel Wilson invited the Delegates to meet him he extended the invitation to some 25 other persons, all of whom were leading notables of Baghdad, including several Jews and Christians, neither of which communities were represented among the Delegates.

He opened the proceedings with a speech in which he expressed his regret that circumstances beyond our control had delayed the establishment of civil government in Mesopotamia, but he warned the Delegates that in encouraging disorder and inciting the population against the existing régime, they were rousing forces which would prove too strong for native institutions while in their infancy. He alluded to the proposals which had been submitted to His Majesty's Government and were already known to most of those present, and undertook to transmit to London any representations which the Delegates should make.

The Delegates presented a document in which they demanded the immediate formation of a Mesopotamian Convention elected in conformity with the Turkish electoral law, with a view to drawing up proposals for a national Arab Government as promised in the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918. By this means, they stated, the people of Mesopotamia might attain independence. They asked, in conclusion, for complete freedom of the press.

Colonel Wilson, in reply, promised that he would urge His Majesty's Government to expedite matters as much as possible, and in communicating the results of the meeting to London he proposed that the idea of a provisional Government should be discarded, and that as soon as the terms of the mandate had been formulated steps should be taken to summon a Constituent Assembly to consult on the future form of Government.

With the approval of Sir Percy Cox, who was in Baghdad for two days on his way from Tehran to London, an official announcement in this sense was sent to the leading delegates on 20th June. It ran as follows:—

“His Majesty’s Government having been entrusted with the mandate for Mesopotamia, anticipate that the mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the mandate to Great Britain; that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an organic law to be framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia, and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a self-governing State until such time as it can stand by itself, when the mandate will come to an end.

“The inception of this task His Majesty’s Government has decided to entrust to Sir Percy Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn and will resume his position on the termination of the existing military administration as Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia.

“Sir Percy Cox will be authorised to call into being, as provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab President, and a General Elective Assembly representative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia, and it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.”

The Delegates replied on 30th June by repeating their request for the immediate formation of a General Council for the Iraq. It is to be noted that this was the last occasion on which they figured as a united body. Dissensions among themselves became increasingly frequent. The rapid development of tribal disturbance detached the more moderate of the group, who were alarmed by the results of the agitation they had started and were unable to control. Even when united, the claim of the Delegates to represent the Iraq, or even to represent more than a section of Baghdad opinion, was manifestly untenable. The members of the Divisional Council at Basrah had on 22nd June condemned their action unanimously and expressed confidence in the British Government. In Amarah efforts had been made to secure support for a petition in favour of independence, but no signatories could be found and the petition was torn up. Mosul also was unrepresented. A further announcement made on 12th July had the advantage of bringing these neglected elements into play, while making provision for the immediate discussion of the Turkish electoral law, which was admittedly inapplicable to existing conditions. The announcement ran as follows:—

“His Majesty’s Government has authorised the Acting Civil Commissioner to invite the leading representatives of various localities to co-operate with the Civil Administration in framing proposals under which election to the General Assembly will, in due course, be held, and in making the necessary arrangements for electoral areas, the preparation of the registers of electors and other matters preliminary to the election of the General Assembly. And inasmuch as there are at present in the Iraq individuals who were the representatives of the Iraq in the Turkish Senate or the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, and who therefore have experience in matters relating to elections and in the discussion of public affairs, all these ex-Senators and ex-Deputies have been invited by the Civil Commissioner for the above-mentioned purpose. . . . This Committee will be invited to elect a President from among their number, and to co-opt additional members from areas which, owing to the absence or death of the former Deputies, or from some other cause, are not already represented.”

Among the ex-Deputies was the most prominent figure in Basrah, and perhaps in Mesopotamia, Saiyid Talib Pasha, eldest son of the Naqib of Basrah. He had returned to his native land in February 1920, after spending the years of the war in voluntary exile in India and Egypt. His renown was due largely to the determination with which he had pursued political ends under the Turkish regime, but he had undoubtedly figured before the war as the spokesman of national aspirations and had been so regarded by the Nationalist Party in Syria. Since his return he had lost no opportunity of testifying to his conviction that the welfare of Mesopotamia was dependent on the acceptance of the British mandate. Together with the other ex-Deputies of Basrah and elsewhere in Mesopotamia, he did not hesitate to comply with the invitation. Nor did the ex-Deputies in Baghdad refuse to attend the Committee, though two had signed the petition of 2nd June as Delegates.



The Committee held its first meeting on 6th August, and, after a formal opening by the Civil Commissioner, elected Saiyid Talib Pasha as President. At the second meeting on the following day they proceeded to the co-option of additional members, and included among the number Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi, Saiyid Muhammad Sadr, and other persons known to hold extreme views. Thus constituted, the Committee could not be accused of being unrepresentative of any brand of opinion.

But the two leaders of the Delegates refused the invitation, and at the same time it became known that they intended to make a final appeal to the Baghdad mob by holding a Maulud in one of the principal mosques, followed by a demonstration in the town. Serious disorder and violence could not have failed to have resulted, and an order was issued for the arrest of Yusuf Suwaidi, Shaikh Ahmad Daud, Ja'far abu Timman and 'Ali Bazirgan. All except the second succeeded in making their escape, but the action of the Government, accompanied as it was by a proclamation forbidding the holding of further Mauluds and by strict maintenance of peace and order, restored confidence instantaneously. The occupation of Damascus and Aleppo by the French on 25th July may have contributed something to the collapse of the agitation in Baghdad, but its ultimate effect cannot yet be gauged.

The flight of the three principals redounded to their discredit. Their followers had anticipated that they would glory in imprisonment in the cause of liberty, and were disconcerted by their unwillingness to assume the martyr's crown. When their houses and the nationalist school were searched, documents were brought to light which proved that the funds collected for the school had been used for the purpose of hiring assassins with the object of removing prominent Arab personages who were opposed to their political views. The stalwart attitude of the Arab police in Baghdad and the steadiness of most Arab officials in the civil administration were most encouraging features in these difficult days.

The danger of the revolutionary tactics which had been adopted lay not, however, in Baghdad, but in their effect upon the tribes. Beyond the immediate confines of the towns the population of Mesopotamia is composed of nomadic and semi-nomadic confederations, which have offered a secular resistance to ordered government. Tribal organisation is a centrifugal force adverse to the formation of a unified State. The Turks had contented themselves with holding the balance by playing off one group against another and had thus succeeded in preventing any dangerous combination against themselves. The policy we pursued was to reconstruct and support the power of the shaikh, making him in turn accept responsibility for his tribe. But the measure of obedience to central authority which we demanded was far greater than that which had been expected by our predecessors. At the same time we did our best to heal the feuds and settle the ancient disputes which wrecked local peace. Thus hereditary animosities by which the Turks had profited were to a great extent, at least temporarily, extinguished.

The policy of backing the shaikh had its drawbacks. (He is a petty tyrant whose misdeeds reflect on the Government which supports him.) He resented any check imposed on the rapacity which he had been given a fair field to exercise, and he and his tribesmen alike resented the attempt to enforce upon them the obligations of citizenship, the preservation of order and the payment of taxes, which in the past they had successfully evaded. Nevertheless, the nature of their organisation made it little likely that the tribes would take concerted action on their own initiative. It remained for the nationalists to weld together their individual grievances and their predatory instincts into a common purpose. The first successes in arms facilitated the task. The tribes witnessed the withdrawal of British administration and were convinced that their efforts would, as they had been assured, drive the British out of Mesopotamia. This conviction spurred on those who had already risen and won over the half-hearted, who could not risk being left on the losing side.

The end in view was an Islamic Government, but apart from the wave of nationalist feeling, which was a world-wide consequence of the war and should not be discounted, it made a different appeal to different sections of the community. To the Shi'ah mujtahids it meant a theocratic state under Shar'ah law, and to this end they did not hesitate to preach Jihad; to the Sunnis and free-thinkers of Baghdad it was an independent Arab State under the Amir 'Abdullah; to the tribes it meant no government at all. It was significant that when the shaikhs on the Tigris were pressed to join the movement they replied that they must be assured that under the new order they would not be required to pay any government dues. There is no lack of evidence

to show that a league of conspiracy, organised by the Bolsheviks in co-operation with the Turkish Nationalists, had been long in touch with extremist Arab political societies, with the object of exploiting the common ground of religion—the only unifying bond between these various elements—in order to undermine the British position in the Middle East.

The effect of propaganda from Syria and Baghdad was first apparent in the Shamiyah, where the theocratic influence of the holy towns is strongest. Rumours to the effect that an Arab Government under 'Abdullah was imminent and that the British were about to withdraw from the country disturbed the political equilibrium and suggested to tribal shaikhs and landowning sayids the advisability of declining to pay official dues to a Government which was about to disappear. The same feeling of uncertainty brought about the resignation of the members of the newly constituted Divisional Council. Before open agitation in Baghdad had begun, the Shi'ah religious element in the holy towns was busily engaged in intrigue. The death of Saiyid Muhammad Kadhimi Yazdi had placed the chief religious authority of the Shi'ah world in the hands of the aged Mirza Muhammad Taqi, who was guided entirely by his son, Mirza Muhammad Ridha. The latter, an active and restless politician, bitterly opposed to the Anglo-Persian agreement, set himself to work against the British Government in the 'Iraq. He was in touch with the Bolsheviks, who in an open telegram proclaimed him to be the head of the movement of liberation from the British; he was also in receipt of money from the Turks. Though he had no religious status and was not even recognised as an 'alim, he enjoyed the respect which is accorded to the family of the premier mujtahid, and his influence with his father enabled him to work the supreme oracle. In the autumn of 1919 the discovery of a plot against the life of British officers and employees in Karbala had led to arrests, but the suspects were released on a guarantee from Mirza Muhammad Taqi and reverted at once to their former courses. The episode encouraged rather than checked intrigue. Early in March 1920 Mirza Muhammad Taqi was said to have issued a fatwah declaring service under the British administration to be unlawful. The Political Officer at Diwaniyah reported that the corpse of a member of the levies was not accorded the usual burial rites by a Shi'ah priest and that resignations from Government service were increasing. After the proclamation of 'Abdullah in Damascus on 9th March, the shaikhs of all the Euphrates tribesmen were asked to sign a document asking him to take possession of his Kingdom, and a petition in that sense was, it is believed, sent to him from the Shamiyah. As the agitation in Baghdad took shape, the efforts of the Karbala group increased. Innumerable letters bearing the seal of Mirza Muhammad Taqi reached the tribes and the provincial towns, informing them that the moment had come for a united movement on constitutional lines in favour of Islamic government, and inviting them to send delegates to Baghdad. Nor was direct incitement to rebellion absent. The leading shaikhs of the Hillah Division held out against this agitation, but expressed the gravest fear that if it were allowed to continue they would not be able to control their tribes. Symptoms of growing lawlessness began to appear. On 16th June an unsuccessful attempt was made to derail a train near Hillah. Two days later a section of the Bani Tamin, one of the Baghdad tribes, attacked a caravan of the friendly Dulaim, against whom they had an old grudge. The shaikh of the Bani Tamin urged that this breach of the peace should not be overlooked, and himself accompanied the cavalry who were sent out to round up the culprits. On the same day Persian pilgrims were attacked and robbed on the Hillah road near Mahmudiyah. The tribesmen implicated resisted the police, worsted a body of levies sent out against them from Hillah, and were finally dispersed by regular troops. Robberies on the Persian road in the Diyalah Division became frequent, but a deliberate attempt to reproduce in Ba'qubah the methods of agitation which had been resorted to in Baghdad was nipped in the bud by the arrest of Sayid Salih, at Hilli, who had been sent to Ba'qubah to hold Mauluds.

Towards the end of Ramadhan the bazaar at Hillah was placarded with notices urging the people to rise against the Government and insulting all who were friends of the British. At a public meeting a speaker who was closely in touch with the Baghdad group, announced that the British would withdraw from the country at the 'Id, the festival which follows Ramadhan, and similar information was strewn broadcast among the tribes, who were urged to precipitate matters by rebellion and pillage. At Karbala the same tactics were pursued, coupled with a strenuous attempt to collect signatures to a covenant by which the Mesopotamian tribes bound themselves.

to stand by one another in order to secure their rights. The position was rapidly becoming critical, and on 22nd June Mirza Muhammad Ridha, the son of the Mujtahid, was arrested with nine adherents at Karbala, following on the arrest at Hillah a few days previously of six minor personages who were the leaders of the agitation there. The prisoners were treated with all consideration, and sent to Henjam, where careful arrangements for their comfort had been made. Most of the 'Ulama had refused to associate themselves with Mirza Muhammad Ridha's plan of campaign, and few letters of protest or intercession were received, but at the request of the Persian Government he was released after about a month's confinement and allowed to go to Tehran. It is not without significance that Mirza Muhammad was mentioned by name in a wireless message issued by the Bolsheviki at Resht as "working for the Bolsheviki cause at Karbala."

In the Hillah Division the arrests relaxed the tension. The most important shaikh, 'Umran, of the northern Bani Hasan, brought to the Assistant Political Officer the covenant he had signed under pressure and tore it to pieces. But in the Shamiyah the position became increasingly delicate. It was, however, at Rumaithah, in the Diwaniyah Division, that the first outbreak took place.

The tribal group of the Bani Huchaim, which extends from Rumaithah to Samawah, and down the Euphrates to Darraji, had never been submissive to civil control. When we occupied Samawah in December 1917, they presented a complete example of tribal disintegration. Most of the units were not only at feud with one another, but were broken up into warring sections. For many years before the war Ottoman authority had been set at defiance, and if we effected a partial pacification order was never completely established. Though the assessments were lighter than in other parts of the Diwaniyah Division, crop measurements were resisted and the payment of Government dues was frequently in arrears. Below Samawah restlessness was partly due to natural conditions. The Sufran and the Barkat sections of the Bani Huchaim occupied lands which had gone out of cultivation owing to changes in the river. Their tribal organisation was breaking up, and, as is usual during such processes, they sought a livelihood by pillaging their neighbours. Their depredations were carried out chiefly on peaceful cultivators and sheep-breeders on the tail of the 'Afaj canal and in outlying regions on the Gharraf. It was incumbent upon the administration to protect the interests of these people.

But Shaikh Ma'jun of the Sufran refused to come in to Samawah or to comply with any demands of Government. The Political Officer feared an outbreak of tribal disorder which would be difficult to allay, and in September 1919 action was taken against Ma'jun's villages. This resulted in a split in the tribe. The opposition to Ma'jun was headed by his brother Nahi, and the experiment was tried of recognising the latter as shaikh. He proved to have no hold on the tribe. The majority of the tribesmen remained defiant, refusing either to pay revenue or to bring in the fine of 500 rifles, which had been imposed. Nahi fell back on Government support, and requested that a few Arab levies might be sent to live in his tents. The Arab officer, with mistaken zeal, took a hand in collecting rifles from a section of the tribe which had remained loyal to Ma'jun, whereupon a conflict occurred in which two of the levies were killed. Though this entailed a further fine as blood money, Ma'jun in February 1920 sent in his son to say that he would accept the terms of Government, and it was decided to reinstate him. There, however, matters remained. Ma'jun neither came in nor showed any serious intention of collecting the rifles. Our commitments elsewhere made it impossible to deal with him, and his attitude reacted on the neighbouring tribes. Lawlessness spread to the Barkat, whose territory lies next to that of the Sufran, from the Barkat to the Antar, a section of the Jayyash, and thence through the Jayyash. They held up the Assistant Political Officer while he was engaged in estimating crops, while thefts and acts of violence were frequent in railway camps and stations. The principal Shaikh of the Jayyash complained that he could not be expected to keep his tribe in order while the Sufran were left unpunished. The trouble had now spread up to Rumaithah, where the 'Ajib, who had paid little or no attention to the disarmament order issued in the previous year, attacked their neighbours, the Abu Hassan, who had surrendered their arms pretty completely.

It was not till towards the end of May that aeroplanes were available. Two days before operations were begun Ma'jun died a natural death, though this was not known till later. After a few days of intermittent bombing, which resulted in some

20 casualties in killed and wounded, together with the destruction of about 100 sheep, the Sufran and the Abu Jayyash submitted, but no permanent settlement was effected, and the position remained unsatisfactory. Punitive action by air had not brought a decision, and no other methods were available.

Meantime intensive propaganda from Baghdad and Karbala was spreading through the Shamiyah into Diwaniyah. A definite plan for revolt seems to have been formulated when at the 'Id, in the middle of June, many shaikhs and notables made a pilgrimage to Karbala. Late in June a tribal gathering was reported to have been held at Shomali, on the Euphrates north of the Dagharaḥ canal, at which the leading shaikhs from Hillah to Shinafiyah were present and unanimously determined to follow the lead given by Yusuf Suwaidi and Saiyid Muhammad Sadr. One of the most active in imbuing the Diwaniyah Division with this programme was Haji Mukhif, a wealthy landowner of 'Afaj on the Dagharaḥ Canal. He was a man of considerable ability and had a wide reputation as a good Moslem. He had dominated the 'Afaj district in Turkish times and found himself since the occupation shorn of an authority which had been exercised to the detriment of his less powerful neighbours. When his activity in preaching armed resistance to the existing government had been ascertained beyond question, he was arrested and sent to Basrah where he was allowed to remain at liberty on a security.

It was perhaps unfortunate that, on the occasion of the 'Id, well-wishers in Diwaniyah Division should have conceived the idea of re-affirming the pronouncement which had been made in favour of British rule in the previous year. The names of four of the leading notables were absent, and the publication of these addresses from Diwaniyah, 'Afaj and Budair, followed almost immediately by far-reaching disturbance, gave ground for doubting the spontaneousness of the sentiments expressed. The shaikhs of 'Afaj and Budair did, however, suit their deeds to their words. They stood by the Assistant Political Officer till the British forces withdrew from Diwaniyah, and the leading shaikh of Budair accompanied the column to Hillah. Their attitude was largely determined by fear of the return of Haji Mukhif to power, for it was only under the British administration that they had found protection from his tyranny.

Haji Mukhif's arrest did nothing to stop the movement. Rebellion was encouraged by assurances that under the terms of the mandate Great Britain was precluded from using military force, and that she had in fact withdrawn her army from Mesopotamia. The news fell on fertile soil among the Bani Huchaim. The immediate cause of the rising was trivial. The shaikh of the Dhawalim, who had failed to repay an agricultural loan of the preceding year, was sent for by the Assistant Political Officer at Rumaithah on 2nd July, and exhibited so much truculence that he was placed in the sarai, with the intention of sending him to Diwaniyah. Following an example which had been set at Samawah a few weeks earlier, the Dhawalim broke into the sarai and released him. The neighbouring tribes to the north did their utmost to prevent the Dhawalim from entering their territory, but the latter had received definite orders from the Shamiyah to rise. The railway was cut in three places, below Samawah and above and below Rumaithah, isolating both towns. Samawah could be relieved with comparative ease by river, but a relief train went down from Diwaniyah to Rumaithah was captured and burnt, and though a company of infantry succeeded in getting through, they could do no more than join the besieged political and railway staff. The strength of the tribes was underestimated, and a small column despatched from Hillah was forced to turn back without occupying Rumaithah. It was not till 20th July that a strong force pushed its way through, after encountering serious and organised opposition. The tribes were well entrenched and their tactics revealed a familiarity with Turkish military methods which pointed to their being led by ex-officers of the Turkish and Arab armies who had joined them from Baghdad and Dair al Zor. The course of events at Rumaithah was eagerly watched in the Shamiyah. Every day's delay made the position there more critical, and finally on 13th July the Mishkhab tribes below Najaf, led by 'Abdul Wahab of the Fatlah, marched on Abu Sukhair immediately to the south of Kufah. Next day the southern Bani Hasan were out under 'Alwan al Sa'dun, brother of Shaikh 'Umran, and the influential shaikhs of the Khaza'il, who had assured the Assistant Political Officer at Umm al Ba'rur that they would stand firm, signified to him that he had best leave under safe conduct for Kufah. He held on for a day or two till he had convinced himself that he could do no more to stem the tide and then went in to Kufah. The garrison from Abu Sukhair also arrived safely at Kufah, partly with the help of certain sections of the tribes.

The tribes still seemed to be wavering. 'Umran had not yet thrown in his lot with the insurgents, and on 19th July accompanied the Assistant Political Officer at Tuwairij to their camp opposite Kufah where a cessation of hostilities was arranged. But next day the shaikhs raised their demands and negotiations were dropped. The Barrage and Musaiyib were evacuated on 24th July, on information that the uncertain fealty of 'Umran had at length given way. An unlucky reverse occurred on the same day. Three companies of the Manchesters, who had been sent out to form a post on the road to Kifl and Kufah, ran short of water, and exhausted by heat, were obliged to return in face of an attack which, though not strongly pressed, cost them half their numbers in prisoners. This incident, which was greatly exaggerated by rumour, gave the signal to the whole of the country west of the Hillah channel to rise in arms. On the left bank the tribes still hesitated—Shaikh 'Addai of the Albu Sultan, in particular, did his best to preserve peace—while on the Tigris the equilibrium was maintained.

No active steps could be taken till the Diwanayah column, which represented practically all the troops in the country available for punitive measures, got back to Hillah. Their retirement was a fine performance; mending the railway line as they went, they brought in rolling stock, non-combatants, wounded, and military stores, and inflicted heavy losses on the tribesmen who attacked them. The Kufah garrison was not hard pressed and before it was relieved communications with Baghdad were assured and the Barrage re-occupied.

Nevertheless anarchy gained ground. Outside the perimeter of the Baghdad defences order could not be maintained. The tribes were out for loot and attacked indiscriminately native merchants and British officers. Colonel Leachman fell a victim to the personal rancour of the principal shaikh on the Fallujah road, to whom he had paid a visit. His host's son ambushed and murdered him as he left the tents. But the Dulaim under Shaikh 'Ali Sulaiman and the 'Anizah under Fahad Bey and his son Mahrut, with whose help Colonel Leachman had held the Euphrates from Fallujah to 'Anah, remained faithful to the government which he had represented. On the Diyalah a handful of men of the insignificant Karkhiyah tribe cut the railway and attacked Ba'qubah. An initial lack of success in dealing with them convinced them that British military weakness had not been exaggerated, and the whole district was roused in an orgy of plunder. Ba'qubah was abandoned to the mercy of the mob, and the villages higher up the river cut off. The tragic massacre of the administrative staff at Shahraban, after a defence of three days in which the Arab levies stood loyally by their officers and fell with them, was repeated at Kifri. Elsewhere, as the skirts of the revolt widened, successive Political Officers were held in custody by the insurgents, but not otherwise molested.

The rising in Diyalah made a painful impression on the notables of Baghdad, most of whom have large estates on the Diyalah canals. The tribes did not hesitate to lay hands on their grain stores and fruit, proceedings which led to a remarkable revulsion of feeling among those who had taken part in the early stages of the nationalist movement. The Naqib of Baghdad was not far from expressing public opinion when he observed: "We have seen what has never been seen before, and we have learnt from it."

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