

SETTLEMENT OF
**THE KURDISH
PROBLEM IN IRAQ**

(Discussion and documents on the peaceful
and democratic settlement of the problem)

Ath - Hawra
publications

Institut kurde de Paris

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INTRODUCTION

Late in 1972, "ath-Thawra" — central organ of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) — carried a series on the serious obstacles impeding the implementation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem and jeopardizing relations between the ABSP and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Meanwhile, the paper presented constructive proposals for surmounting difficulties to speed up the implementation of the March Manifesto⁽¹⁾ and for restoring the alliance between the two parties on the basis of allegiance to the sovereignty and unity of the country and the dedication to the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and to genuine and fruitful cooperation for building a flourishing progressive Iraq.

"ath-Thawra" ventured upon running that series, which disclosed serious facts and figures that aroused deep alarm and concern both inside and outside the country, with the aim of enriching the dialogue then under way between the two parties and promoting it to the standard of the serious challenges facing the country. Indeed the situation in northern Iraq had presented a mounting danger at a time when the imperialist-Zionist alliance had been escalating its conspiracies against the Arab homeland. It was, therefore, inevitable to call upon the people "To Safeguard Peace and Consolidate National Unity" as mentioned in the title of the series.

Another important motive for publishing those articles was the need to acquaint the people with the real situation in order to further the new democracy [which has now developed into a popular National and Nationalist Progressive Front (NNPF) guided by an agreed National

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- (1) This is the agreement on the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem announced by the Revolution Command Council on March 11, 1970.

Action Charter and enjoying the full support of the overwhelming majority of the people] exercised in Iraq and to enable the masses play their decisive role in overcoming all difficulties and defending the aims and gains of the July 17 Revolution.

As a matter of fact, "ath-Thawra's" series meant to champion the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people as specified in the March Manifesto, which had been unanimously supported by the people. It also confessed shortcomings on the part of state and ABSP organs and welcomed constructive criticism.

While accentuating the necessity for full understanding and confidence as well as sincere cooperation between the ABSP and the KDP, the paper dealt with the nature and mission of the alliance between the two parties. It stressed the progressive essence of the alliance and showed how it could be revived so that the Kurdish movement could shoulder its responsibility in the development and progress of the entire country. In the light of practical experience, the paper pointed out how the KDP assumed the role of the "opposition" instead of acting as a faithful ally and referred to the reactions created by this contradiction.

Dealing with reciprocal commitments under the March Manifesto, "ath-Thawra" held a comparison between the commitments honoured by each party and explained why the remaining commitments had not been attained.

The paper stated the constitutional amendments and the laws enacted to confirm the Kurdish presence and guarantee the Kurdish national rights.

In the economic field, the paper showed how a special consideration was given to the Kurdish area. It also enumerated the development achieved in the social and cultural spheres.

As to the participation in government by the KDP, "ath-Thawra" disclosed the whole story and defined the ABSP's concept of the general basis for the full and

equitable participation of the Kurdish movement in accordance with the March Manifesto.

The paper also showed how the administration and the running of local affairs in the Kurdish area had been entrusted to the Kurds themselves.

"ath-Thawra" exposed the deterioration of the situation in the Kurdish area, pointing out that it had become the scene of dangerous and tragic incidents. It published statistics of the crimes being committed — including burning down villages, murder, robbery, sabotage etc. — and mentioned facts relating to the hinderance of state organs and the implementation of government programmes, including even services.

The paper dealt with the relationship between the KDP and the ruling reaction of Iran and warned against the grave consequences of that relationship which menaced the safety and sovereignty of Iraq.

Regarding the implementation of self-rule, the paper unveiled the intransigent attitude of the KDP, particularly towards the population census which is stipulated in the March Manifesto as indispensable for delineating the autonomous region.

Despite this, the paper presented realistic proposals for the implementation of self-rule and suggested the participation of representatives of other political parties and forces in the ABSP-KDP talks.

This book is a translation of the series run by "ath-Thawra". Relevant documents are also attached. An important document is the attached Autonomy Law.

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While this book is under printing, Comrade Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, Chairman of the Revolution Command Council (R C C), promulgated, on the prescribed date — 11/3/1974 — the "Law for Autonomy in the Region of Kurdistan".

The draft law for autonomy was originally formulated by the ABSP. It enjoyed broad democratic discussion before being finalized and endorsed by the NNPF in the light of the outcome of that discussion. On 11/3/1974, Comrade Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman of the R C C introduced the draft law to a final meeting called for by the Supreme Committee of the NNPF. The meeting, which was attended by over a thousand progressive national and nationalist personalities, unanimously confirmed the law.

Thus, the Revolution honoured its pledge and crowned its devoted efforts for the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people by the implementation of the last remaining clause of the March Manifesto — the historic agreement unanimously supported by all citizens.

The new Autonomy Law, which was spontaneously supported by the people of Iraq, was also hailed by the forces of good outside the country.

"ATH-THAWRA"

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1. WHY TO BE FRANK WITH THE MASSES ?

Lately, talks began between representatives of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to study the problems and obstacles encumbering the progress of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and marring relations between the two parties.

These talks are characterized by frankness and explicitness. It is indeed our belief that telling the whole truth to the masses, and acquainting them with all points of view pertaining to the difficulties and matters at issue, will greatly help bring these talks to a successful end. This will also help elevate the talks to the serious standard dictated by the nature of past experience and by the imperialist and reactionary menace converging on the homeland and on its militant national and nationalist forces. Furthermore, such an attitude will, eventually, promote the talks to a mature level that is compatible with the magnitude of the general responsibilities entrusted to both parties. Hence, keeping the people informed of all developments is a prerequisite to enabling them play their natural role in maintaining peace, cementing national unity and in defending their progressive and democratic gains.

In our estimation, discussing the Kurdish question, under all circumstances and on all occasions, is always useful; it is rather imperative. This fact remains valid whether the atmosphere is shrouded with clouds of passivity or bright with rays of positiveness. The Kurdish question was, and still is, one of our most outstanding national problems and, therefore, deserves perpetual study and analysis. The very nature of the development of this question and its concomitant host of complications and

conjunctures, before and after the 11th. March Manifesto, call for more of this attention.

We take this opportunity to admit that, since the declaration of the March Manifesto, we have not treated the question and its pertaining complexities and surroundings in the required scope—contrary to what the masses expected, and insisted upon.

However, it may be good to remind that, prior to the declaration of the March Manifesto, we had flunged our doors wide open for the discussion of the Kurdish question, expounded our views quite frankly, projected the obstacles that hindered attaining a peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem and published the list of the dialogue between our Party and the KDP . . . reminding of all this, we still find ourselves obliged to explain, now, the reasons that prompted taking such a stand, which contradicted our conviction of the permanent need for open exchange of opinions and overtures regarding all national issues so that the masses could give the first and final judgement on them.

Excluding limited exceptions impelled by certain circumstances and attitudes, we have observed what amounted to silence since the long period that followed the announcement of the March Manifesto. The point was to put to the test an idea shared by numerous nationalist forces and personalities. Their argument was this:

"The party leading power should always maintain wisdom, forbearance and long magnitude. The conjunctures and complications inherent in the Kurdish question demand a special consideration and a special treatment. Therefore, exchanging opinions through newspapers, however important and useful, is apt, in many cases, to create confusion, complicate matters and to retard the bona fide efforts exerted for the smooth navigation of the ship of the peaceful and democratic solution to the shores of safety."

Frankly speaking, a more than two and a half years' trial of that opinion proved it to be invalid .

On the one hand, abidance by that idea was one-sided—by the ABSP solely. For al-Taakhil⁽¹⁾ never ceased to pose what it considered as negativism, problems and obstructions hindering the attainment of the settlement. Besides, the publications of the KDP similarly dealt with the same subjects. All this was, of course, an expression and interpretation of the attitude of one party—the KDP.

On the other hand, information media abroad also never ceased to talk about problems facing the Kurdish question. Some of the material they circulated related to cases that actually took place and to statements attributed to leading sources in the KDP; and some were sheer fabrications and lies.

This material (authentic or concocted, quoting real or false sources, forged or true) expressed opinions and attitudes contrary to those of the ABSP and the revolutionary government .

All this motley information found its way, in full or in parcel, to citizens accross newspapers, publications and broadcasting services. It created, and still creates, a vast state of confusion, impairing constructive endeavours for a just settlement—far from contributing to pave their way.

In the wake of this eventful experience, it became evident that candid exchange of opinions does help the elimination of confusion and the elucidation of facts—provided this exchange originates from devotion to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question and from a genuine desire to solve all other problems in a fraternal spirit springing out of a deep belief in national unity.

(1) "al-Taakhi" is the organ of the KDP.

In our opinion, any talk, however frank and far-reaching, should not deviate, in form or substance, from the following principles:

1. Absolute faith in the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people within the framework of the Iraqi Republic and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood.

2. Absolute faith in the letter and spirit of the March Manifesto, and adherence to it under all circumstances and conditions.

3. Dedication to the maintenance of maximum understanding and cooperation between the ABSP and the KDP in the sphere of bilateral relations and in common activity within the framework of the 'National Front' — as advocated and specified by the 'National Action Charter'.

Should these principles illuminate their path, any deliberations will surely be positive, at least in their intentions.

On our part, we should like to emphasize not only our positive intentions but also the fact that any idea expressed by us is but a contribution and a point of view presented for scrutiny and discussion. We should also like to affirm that we are always ready to correct any fault committed by us, be it in theory or practice, in order to serve the public interest and the cause of this homeland and its militant people.

19.10.1972

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2. WHAT IS THE MARCH MANIFESTO?

More than two and a half years have now elapsed since the declaration of the March Manifesto. During that period, a lot has been written and said about the Manifesto, not only in Iraq but also in the Arab region and in the world at large.

Nevertheless, we think it may be useful to pose this question :

What is the March Manifesto ?

Raising this question should not imply that the Manifesto is ambiguous and needs explanation. Nor should it mean an attempt to give a new explanation to the Manifesto in the light of the happenings of the last two and a half years. The idea is only to set a basic criterion, or a number of basic criteria, to which all should refer when view points differ and when interpretations conflict. To this aim must be added a fact that is unavoidable to admit, namely : the political realities of our country, and of the Kurdish question in particular, always necessitate emphasizing axiomatic matters.

Then, what is the March Manifesto?

The elucidation we present here expresses our concept of the Manifesto before it was declared, at the time of its declaration, after its declaration and in future too.

This concept, in our opinion, formed the basis of the dialogue that passed between ourselves and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP before the declaration of the Manifesto. We also hold that our understanding of the Manifesto is identical to that reached by the Iraqi nationalist, national and progressive forces and by progressive friendly forces throughout the world.

To cut a long story short, we can sum up our concept of the March Manifesto in the following:

"The March Manifesto is a political document vide which the revolutionary authority binds itself before the people to realize the national legitimate rights of the Kurdish people, including self-rule, within the framework of the Iraqi Republic and to achieve the equitable and full participation of the Kurdish people in all the affairs of the country.

"On the other side, the document requires the Kurdish Armed Movement and the KDP, both led by Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani, to end the exceptional conditions that prevailed before the declaration of the Manifesto, together with concomitant effects, manifestations and establishments.

"It also requires functioning on the basis of the unity of the homeland, the country's constitution and legal institutions, the alliance between the ABSP and KDP and consultation between the two parties."

Immediately after the announcement of the Manifesto, on 11.3.1970, the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP announced their support to it and declared, before the people, their commitment to honour their part of the liabilities and responsibilities as stipulated by the Manifesto.

Therefore, one can say that the March Manifesto is comprised of these two very closely interlinked basic issues:

1. Guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Kurds.
2. Strengthening the unity of Iraq, that is, the unity of the people, the homeland and of the constitutional system in accordance with the logic of the supremacy of law and centralization of authority.

Thus, the Manifesto included certain responsibilities to be carried out by the Iraqi government alone and others to be shouldered by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP alone. In addition, it contained common responsibilities to be carried out by the two parties together, within the framework of joint action and mutual full adherence to peace and national unity.

It is common knowledge that the enforcement of the clauses of the Manifesto is no easy task. Many difficulties, problems and differences, naturally, stand in the way of this task. This is a reality that existed during the last two and a half years that followed the declaration of the Manifesto, and that continues to exist now. Therefore, it must neither be denied nor concealed.

The responsibilities entrusted to the government solely are tied up, in one form or another, with those bestowed on the Kurdish Movement and the KDP, and vice versa. There are, too, the tasks whose implementation requires joint action by both parties. All, and each, of these matters involve many interpretations, complications and varying view points.

That this is a tangible and agonizing fact, should not give rise to despair or lead us into a wilderness. However complicated the interpretations and disagreements might be, certain guiding basic criteria will always remain valid and handy. They can safely be relied upon in the judgement of failure and success and retreat and progress in all spheres.

We think that the principal criterion for measuring what had actually been realized from the targets of the Manifesto during the past phase, together with the targets that ought to be achieved now or tomorrow, is an objective and honest comparison between the commitments being attained by the authority of the Revolution and those being accomplished by the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP.

This is the really objective and fair criterion, we believe, because it emanates from the substance of the March Manifesto itself and from the nature of the peaceful and democ-

matic settlement to the Kurdish question whose success, needless to remind, is everybody's responsibility.

Should we be obliged to enumerate, today, the commitments we have honoured, this must not be construed as an act of boasting or as cornering the other side in a state of dereliction. Our intention is, simply, to expound our viewpoints and attitudes and to acquaint the people of the real situation in the country as we conceive it, simultaneously urging sincere citizens to speed up their efforts and conquer all obstacles to enable either party fulfil its obligations and responsibilities.

Likewise, we do wish that our brothers in the KDP follow suit and tell the people of the commitments and duties they had accomplished in respect to the Manifesto, which they had supported and adopted. Meanwhile, we do want to hear, and to have the people informed, of what the KDP and the Kurdish Movement think we are required to carry out of the Manifesto's stipulations today, or tomorrow.

Whatever the attitude of the KDP might be, the March Manifesto, in the conviction of the ABSP and the revolutionary authority, constitutes a commitment of principle and a policy that conforms with the total sum of the liberating, progressive and revolutionary line followed by them in leading the country.

The responsibility and commitment of the KDP towards the Manifesto can be judged by the role it plays, and intends to play in future, in its capacity as a partner in the political power, in the interest of the national cause of the Kurdish people . . . and in the interest of the entire country.

Below is a list of the commitments and duties pertaining to the Manifesto which, we believe, have been carried out by the government of the Revolution and by the ABSP:

1. Amending the Interim Constitution to affirm the national presence of the Kurds in accordance with the March Manifesto.

2. Taking legal measures to ensure the recognition of the Kurdish language, side by side with Arabic, as an official language in the areas where the majority of the population is Kurdish. (The Kurdish language has already become the language of instruction in these areas.)
3. Participation of Kurdish brothers in the government, public posts and in planning boards.
4. Appointment of Kurdish officials in the administrative units inhabited by a majority of Kurds, or by citizens mastering the Kurdish language.
5. Passing out new regulations for the Directorate of the Kurdish Scholastic Affairs as part of effecting comprehensive changes in the Directorate so as to make it competent of discharging its responsibilities.
6. Renaming schools after historic, geographical and patriotic Kurdish names.
7. Providing public libraries and schools with Kurdish books.
8. Appointment of large numbers of teachers in schools where teaching is conducted in Kurdish.
9. Creation of a Directorate for Kurdish Culture in the Ministry of Information.
10. Establishment of al-Tadhmon Kurdish Printing and Publishing House.
11. Publishing of a Kurdish magazine "Bayan" and a Kurdish newspaper "Hawkari" by the Ministry of Information.
12. Permitting the publication in Kurdish language of newspapers and magazines, such as "Brayati", "Berinoa", "Shams Kurdistan" and "Estera".

13. Increasing Kurdish programmes at the Kirkuk T.V. Station.
14. Licencing the Kurdish Cultural Society.
15. Founding the Union of Kurdish Writers.
16. Permitting the formation of exclusively Kurdish students, youth, women and teachers organizations.
17. Reinstating students who were dismissed, or compelled to leave school, because of violent conditions to their former schools and institutes, regardless of age restrictions.
18. Pardoning all prisoners (civilian and military) convicted by competent courts on account of the incidents of the North.
19. Appointment of teachers and dressers graduating from non-regular courses.
20. Reinstatement to the service of all Kurdish workers, officials and employees (civilian and military alike) without abidance with the cadre restrictions and regardless of the extent of their contribution to the acts of violence in the Kurdish area.

In addition to this, special orders were issued by the President of the Republic and by his Deputy reinstating, as an exceptional case, a large number of military and civilian personnel, despite the lack of any relation between their cases and the incidents of the North. This was in response to the personal wishes of the KDP and Mr. al-Barzani.

21. Allotment of pensions to the families of the martyre and the victims of the regrettable incidents of the North and payment of their salaries as from May 1971.

22. Exonerating all Kurdish military men, who deserted the service because of the incidents of the North, from responsibility for the weapons, equipments and supplies that were in their custody.
23. Exempting all Kurds who had participated in the incidents of the North from both conscription and cash payment in lieu of that.
24. Appointment of 6,000 demobilized Peshmirsas as frontier guards in 12 regiments. A special law was enacted, considering them as part of the Iraqi armed forces.
25. Allocation of ID.50,000 monthly to 5,000 demobilized Peshmirsas (ID. 10 each per month), pending absorbing them in suitable jobs.
26. Allocation of between 30-50 thousand Dinars, monthly, to the head quarters of Mr. al-Barzani.
27. Counting the worker's period of absence from duty, during the fighting, towards pension and social security. The period of absence of the officials and employees, both civilian and military, who participated in the incidents, was also counted towards increment, promotion and pension.
28. Passing a special resolution regarding the Kurdish farmers who failed to settle their debts to the agricultural bank because of the incidents of the North. Vide this resolution, they can be granted extra new loans (not restricted by the ordinary ceiling) which are sufficient to enable them settle their old debts and resume their agricultural activity.
29. Commencing agrarian reform in the Northern area, despite the obstructions placed in its way.

Agricultural and livestock projects have also been accomplished.

30. Drawing up the economic plan (centrally and self-financed) in a pattern ensuring the balanced development of the Iraqi backward regions, taking into consideration the standard of backwardness in the Kurdish area.
31. Formation of the North Development Committee, which was furnished with adequate funds for accomplishing projects that ensure compensating the Kurdish area for the damages it suffered during the past years. (This is over and above the projects approved in the economic plan.)
32. Completion of many projects, specially in the field of housing and services, to compensate the area for the damages and backwardness it sustained. 12,000 houses were built for those who lost their homes during the lamentable hostilities. Many primary and secondary schools, public clinics, health centres and hospitals were opened. Artesian wells were sunk, modern markets were established and many water and electricity projects were accomplished. Quite a number of tourist and summer resorts projects were constructed. Recently, approval was given for the establishment of a one-million-Dinar tourist grand hotel at Salah Adin.
33. Regarding the industrialization of the Kurdish area, five manually operated carpet weaving centres have been established in Arbil, Kwaisinjak, Rawn-dous, Dohuk and al-Amadiya. A centre for producing wool threads has been built in Arbil. A dairy produce factory has been developed in Arbil and the building of the Arbil carpentry factory has also been completed. The building of a beets sugar mill in Sulaimaniya will soon be completed. The Sarchinar cement factory will be expanded shortly. A tobacco blending factory in Sulaimaniya and a poultry farm in Arbil will soon be accomplished.

Furthermore, work is to begin soon on building a wool textile mill in Arbil, a Kurdish dress-making plant in Dohuk, a big canning factory in Hareer, a tomato paste plant in Dohuk and a factory for improved cigarettes in Arbil. The Ministry of Oil is soon to begin building fuel depots in Sarchinar to cater for the Northern area, particularly the Governorate of Sulaimaniya, with various kinds of fuel. A project for processing marble in Arbil will shortly be presented to the Planning Board.

It is common knowledge that the geographical distribution of the development projects, both centrally and self-financed, clearly shows that the per capita share of the projects in the North is higher than the national per capita share.

October, 18th., 1972

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3. ON THE ABSP-KDP RELATIONSHIP

One of the important points in the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem was the question of relationship between the ABSP and the KDP. At the time of the declaration of the Manifesto this relation was termed an "alliance".

The maintenance of close relations between the two parties is a natural matter, necessitated by numerous factors:

The ABSP is the party that leads the political power; and it was the ABSP, stemming from its doctrines and the resolutions of its national and regional conferences, that got moving, together with the revolutionary authority, in the direction of attaining a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question .

On the other side, the KDP is regarded as the main force in the Kurdish Armed Movement, which, together with the KDP, are headed by Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani.

Negotiations for settling the Kurdish question took place between the two parties. Accordingly, both parties now stand before their masses, and before the entire people, responsible for the implementation and the safeguarding of the Manifesto.

Moreover, the prevalence of close cooperation between the two parties constitutes an important stride along the path of founding a 'National Front' in Iraq. The ABSP firmly believes in and ceaselessly works for the establishment of this front; the KDP, too, advocates building a National Front.

But ,what does the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP mean? What are the basic rules that govern this allia-

nce? What are its limits? And what is its role in the nationalist and progressive National Front?

These questions were posed and discussed during the dialogue that passed between the two parties, prior to the declaration of the March Manifesto. But we must admit that they were not thoroughly scrutinized and that no clear cut agreement was reached about them.

The enthusiastic atmosphere that encompassed the dialogue contributed to the failure in reaching a specific agreement on these questions. The domination of a spirit of confidence and of team work, inspired by the will of the peaceful and democratic settlement, was considered capable enough of interpreting and defining these and many other issues.

But what came to pass during more than two and a half years was, in fact, far from these assumptions.

The relation between the two parties, which had been termed as an "alliance", went through different stages. At times there prevailed useful and fruitful cooperation. At others, there were disagreements that reached, in certain cases, a high degree of sharpness. Now confidence between the two parties has weakened to the extent that requires both of them, in their own interest and in the interest of the homeland, to work out distinct principles and criteria to govern their mutual relation.

While entrusted with so grave patriotic responsibilities, it is unbecoming to deceive ourselves, and our own people, by resorting to silence regarding hard realities or by veiling them with cliches that are no longer meaningful in practical life.

For our part, certain fundamental issues, relating to the nature of the relation between the ABSP and KDP, were clear right from the beginning. These issues, which we have elucidated to our brothers of the KDP time and again,

are, in our opinion, still valid. They can be summed up as follows:

1. The ABSP, from one angle, is a political party—just like any other political party. From another angle, it is the party that leads political power in the country. It is in the nature of things that the responsibilities, jurisdictions and relations of any party leading political power are not confined to its private affairs, its members and its supporters. They go beyond this to cover the entire country.

In other words, the party that leads political authority is held responsible, in one way or another, for every citizen, regardless of his ethnic, ideological, class or political affiliation. It is also held responsible for all national issues. This is what is actually taking place in all countries of the world, irrespective of the nature of their political systems.

2. It follows from the above point that the ABSP, which leads political power in the country, cannot (despite its devotion to its alliance with the KDP and its appreciation of the role and stature of this party among the Kurds) by virtue of its national responsibilities, surrender to the KDP absolute power over the Kurdish people in ideological, political organizational and other fields of authority

The extent of the KDP's representation of the Kurdish people is determined by the free will of the Kurdish masses, which can be expressed in various familiar ways

3. Besides, the political power led by the ABSP, by virtue of its national responsibility, is bound to secure legal protection and care to every Kurdish citizen, regardless of the nature of relations between the ABSP and the KDP.

Disputes between the KDP and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement on one hand and Kurdish individuals and groups on the other are the concern of the involved

sides as long as they remain within a purely peaceful and legal context. But the political authority is directly responsible to intervene in any dispute that assumes the form of an armed conflict or that disturbs security and breaks the law; it is required to resolve such a conflict in accordance with the established laws and recognized traditions.

Neither the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP, nor the March Manifesto, binds the authority to side in any disputes or conflicts of the sort.

Both the alliance and the Manifesto bind the ABSP and the revolutionary government to protect the Manifesto, the liberating and progressive achievements, the national sovereignty and the established laws against any conspiracy, infringement or abuse committed by either Arabs or Kurds.

The Party and the revolutionary government carry out this responsibility either directly or in cooperation with the KDP and the rest of the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces of the country, judging each case on its own merits and in accordance with the jurisdictions of state organs as prescribed by the laws and traditions

By virtue of its responsibilities, and by the nature of the functions of its various organs, the government is empowered to deal directly with any citizen, irrespective of his ethnic, political, class or ideological affiliation. This right does not constitute any violation of the principles of alliance or of cooperation with any political party in the country, however important that party might be and whatever the extent of that alliance and cooperation might be.

Naturally, there exists principles and traditions that govern such affairs. Should it be normal to make consultations regarding the appointment of a minister or a governor, it is neither normal nor essential to initiate, always, consultations between the two parties whenever it is proposed to appoint a sub-district officer, an engineer, a clerk, a police-

man or an office boy. If political parties in this country indulged in this field to such an extent they would have become employment bureaus—instead of being a vanguard and guide of the masses in their liberating, progressive and democratic struggle. The March Manifesto was alive to this fact. Clause 4 of the Manifesto says:

"In the administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority, government officials shall be Kurds or with a majority, government officials shall be Kurds or other citizens mastering the Kurdish language, provided the required number is available. Senior officials, such as the governor, district officer (Qaimaqam) director etc., shall be appointed. Immediate steps shall be taken to develop state organs in the area, in consultation with the High Committee entrusted with supervising the implementation of this Manifesto, in a way that secures proper implementation and enforces national unity and stability in the area".

4. In our opinion, alliance between the ABSP and the KDP must not preclude the establishment of any friendly relations and cooperation between the ABSP and any Kurdish citizen or any group of Kurdish citizens. In the same way, it should not at all rule out the creation of any cordial relations and cooperation between the KDP and any Arab citizen or any group of Arab citizens. This is necessitated by the nature of the unity of the people, the unity of the homeland, the deep-seated Arab-Kurdish historic relations and by the Arab-Kurdish common interests and objectives.

But the basic condition in such relations, which is dictated by the nature of the alliance between the two parties and by their mutual devotion to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question, is that they should not assume hostile forms against either party and that they should be restricted to patriotic individuals and groups alone.

Sure enough, we can see that the KDP maintained, before and after the Manifesto, relations with numerous Arab parties, groupings and personalities. Such relations should be considered normal as long as they do not adopt a hostile attitude towards the ABSP. Likewise, relations between the ABSP and Kurdish parties, groups and personalities should be looked upon as normal as long as they are not hostile to the KDP.

5. Apparently, the circumstances which surrounded the declaration of the March Manifesto, together with the term "alliance" used to describe relations between the ABSP and the KDP, have engendered a misunderstanding, which subsequently proved to be quite serious.

It may be recalled that, at the time of the issuance of the March 11 Manifesto, the ABSP was in power, single-handed. Then, the question of the nationalist and progressive National Front was under discussion and dialogue; but it was impeded by difficulties and obstructions.

Following the proclamation of the Manifesto, representatives of the KDP joined the government. This situation continued until May 1972, when representatives of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and two national independent personalities also joined the government.

During this period, many, specially among the ranks of the KDP, fell into a grave mistake when they envisioned that both the situation and the formula of our alliance meant "dividing" authority between the two parties—bestowing the ABSP as "guardian" of the Arabs and the KDP as "guardian" of the Kurds.

Upon this error many practical disposals were built, in contradiction to the essence of the alliance, which meant a "national concord" and never the "division of booty."

Even before participation in the government by other nationalist and national parties and forces, and despite the

temptation of the power of a ruling party and the concomitant opportunities for assuming special positions in government and the society, the ABSP has remained, and shall always remain, against isolationism, introversion and individualism. Again, despite its leading role, the ABSP will not, under any circumstances, monopolize popular representation, public posts or public responsibilities.

Government officials were never, and will never be, all Ba'athists—ABSP members. Even the key posts are not exclusive for Ba'athists. The criteria for assigning official posts and for relations with government officials will never be on a party basis.

Before and after the March Manifesto, and before and after the participation of the communists and the nationals in government, there have always been, and there will always be, non-Ba'athist ministers, under-secretaries, directors-general, chairmen of state organizations, army and police commandants, ambassadors and other senior officials.

A genuinely vanguard party must very vigilently guard against any tendency for monopoly.

What applies to the ABSP, which led the Revolution, and which is now leading the government, is supposed to be applicable to the KDP, whatever the role and influence of the KDP amongst the Kurds might be.

In addition to the above basic principles and criteria, which must always be abided with, the fact that there are other Arab and Kurdish national and nationalist political parties, forces and elements (which neither belong to the ABSP nor to the KDP) must also be recognized. These parties, forces and elements are entitled for their nationalist rights, which were recognized by the National Action Charter that also specified the principles of their inter-relations and cooperation.

Just because Arabs, Turkman, Syriac and other citizens are not all Ba'athists, it is only fair to assume that Kurdish citizens are not all members of the KDP. Likewise, since the ABSP does not compell citizens to join its ranks and support it . . . and since it does not make the question of its joining and support a factor that determines the fate of citizens and their presence in the homeland . . . the KDP must adopt the same policy and must avoid making identification with its views and policies a matter that decides the fate of Kurdish citizens in the areas populated by a Kurd'sh majority.

Coming back to the question of public posts, the line pursued by the ABSP ought to be pursued by the KDP. It is not a must that every Kurd appointed as a minister, ambassador, under-secretary, etc., should be of the members of the KDP. There are also the communist, independent, and highly qualified Kurds who belong to the entire country, and who must, in no way, be overlooked or deprived from fair participation in all responsibilities.

An important question is representation in legislative, executive, popular and other organizations. The March Manifesto guaranteed to the Kurds fair participation in all these institutions, in proportion to their population ratio.

As the ABSP does not monopolize representation in these organs, the KDP should not monopolize representing all the Kurds therein.

The above are, in our opinion, the basic points of our concept of the relationship between our party and the KDP. Having presented them-with full candour and explicitness-we would like to accentuate two points:

Firstly, had we erred in the past when applying any of the above-mentioned criteria, we are fully prepared to admit our faults and quite ready to remedy them.

Secondly, we are also prepared to listen to any rational and sound view, which is motivated by faith in national unity, by the consolidation of the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish question and by re-inforcing the strongholds of the Revolution and its liberating, democratic and progressive gains. From the bottom of our hearts, we do hope that brothers of the KDP will follow suit.

October, 19th., 1972

* * *

4. HOW DID "AL TAAKHI" TACKLE THE QUESTION OF THE DIALOGUE ?

No two persons in our country can possibly disagree that the Kurdish question is one of the highly complicated issues and that work for its peaceful and democratic settlement is surrounded with various difficulties and impediments, numerous internal and external influences and with disparate, and often conflicting, assiduity. No two persons can rightly disagree that it is by no means easy to search for facts in the principal and secondary circumstances surrounding the Kurdish question. This much we have often stated before—indeed each time we discussed the Kurdish question and the March Manifesto. All those who are directly or indirectly connected with the issue are familiar with this fact.

Clear and concrete as this reality is, it does not at all imply the total absence of definite basic points and distinct essential criteria by which the right road can be explored to arrive at fair judgements and correct conclusions. Once we focussed our attention perpetually on basic points, and once we depended upon fundamental criteria, broad vistas will open up to us for comprehension, understanding and final settlement. The other aspects (complex, controversial and troublesome as they might be) will become secondary and soluble in the mainstream of joint action by the ABSP and the KDP, as well as in the joint action through the framework of the nationalist and progressive National Front and through the general march for democratic building and social progress in the entire country.

When we commenced publishing this series, entitled "To Safeguard Peace and Consolidate National Unity", our chief concern was to accentuate the basic points and fundamental criteria to whose importance we had already

referred. But before completing all we wanted to say, "al-Thaakhi" embarked on commenting on the same topic. Therefore, we preferred to wait until "al-Taakhi" had said its say to resume thereafter expounding our viewpoints and to debate what it might have raised in this subject.

We sincerely hoped that "al-Taakhi" would pursue a new approach in tackling the issues under discussion. But "al-Taakhi", in its latest series, followed the same traditional pattern, which is known to us and to everybody.

With the exception of the concluding article in "al-Taakhi's" series, published under the headlines: "For the Sake of Peace and National Unity . . . For the Sake o' Enforcing the March Manifesto", those articles were generally marked with :

1. Evading, hovering around or understating the importance of the commitments of the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP vide the March Manifesto. When "al-Taakhi" did touch upon this point, it confined it to "restoration of local administration offices to the areas where no such offices existed, reopening of police posts closed down during the years of fighting, absorption of the former Peshmargas in the Frontier Guards and the handing over of the broadcasting station and some heavy weapons to the authority."

Though these examples are by no means few and absolutely disproportionate to the commitments entrusted vide the March Manifesto to the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP throughout more than 2½ years (in addition to being incomparable to the commitments honoured by the revolutionary authority), "al-Taakhi" knows, before any body else, that these few examples were, from the outset and until now, void of any substance—as we had observed on previous articles. But we will deal with this again at the right moment.

The Peshmargas who joined the Frontier Guards regiments never carried out any of the normal duties of their

profession. On the contrary, they exploited their new "official" status as a shield for committing many practices outside the scope of the rule of law. This situation did not exist only when relations between the two parties were darkened with mists of negativism. It has always prevailed even during the period described by "al-Taakhi" as a model of good relations and fruitful cooperation.

As to the re-opened offices of local administration and police posts, brothers in the KDP and others informed of conditions in the northern area know that these offices do not exercise any of the normal functions of state organs in the areas where there are armed men of the Kurdish Movement. This situation did not arise out now; it had existed from the first day these offices were re-opened.

We shall deal with the question of the broadcasting station and the weapons later on.

2. Resorting to a line of justification aimed at washing hands off the commitments to which the Kurdish Movement and the KDP were bound under the March Manifesto, and at laying all the blame for the failure of the Kurdish side on the authority and the ABSP and on "circumstances", "atmosphere", "complications" and other similar phraseology. The faults committed by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP, including very basic and very serious mistakes, were passed off as "mere reactions" to mal-practices on the part of the authority.

This line represents, on the one hand, a major political error and contradicts the essence of the March Manifesto, the logic of national unity and the sense of responsibility towards the homeland, its interests and fundamental affairs. Discretions and attitudes might, sometimes, be governed by reactions. But reactions can not, always, govern the discretions and attitudes of political parties and movements that have a definite ideological and strategic line.

On the other hand, this line of thinking transforms the question of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem from the domain of national commitment on the part of all the concerned patriotic parties to the domain of demands—raised by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP and met by the authority. This also conflicts with the role which the KDP wants to assume in the Kurdish area and in the entire country.

3. The articles of "al-Taakhi" abounded in diverse sorts of attack and criticism against the ABSP, its policy, the way it exercises power, its relations with the masses etc.

While intending to deal with these questions in detail some time later, we should like to make some interim remarks now :

- a. The ABSP is a democratic revolutionary party. Therefore, it does not fear criticism. As a matter of fact, it exercises self-criticism before waiting to be criticised by others. Citizens are well aware how often the leaders of our Party had admitted mistakes and demanded their rectification. Those who are familiar with the internal education of our Party, including the leaders of the KDP who receive our internal publications regularly, know the extent of the efforts we are paying to purify the march of our Party and to rid our Party of any adulterations and defects.
- b. The ABSP inherited power from nobody; nor had it remained in power for over four years without justification. It came to power across lengthy political and ideological revolutionary activity amongst the broad rank and file of the masses for nearly 20 years.

The ABSP seized power by an armed revolution. During more than 4 years, the Party managed to attain liberating, democratic and revolutionary

achievements that warrant pride and self-confidence in the path it is following for leading the nation and in its vanguard role among the masses and within the nationalistic movement. Such being its nature, the ABSP will never fear criticism.

- c. It is customary for our brothers in the KDP to have recourse to severe criticism of the ABSP and the revolutionary government whenever they were called upon to honour their commitments under the March Manifesto and to fulfil their national commitments in general. This criticism, in certain cases, as in some paragraphs of the last series of "al-Taakhi", bordered upon down right provocation. However, we believe that this is not the right way to get to the truth or to enable every party carry out its responsibilities.

As to the question of provocation, we should like to assure our colleague, "al-Taakhi", that we will never be provokable. We will always stick to our objective attitude in tackling all matters related to the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question proceeding from a deep sense of duty towards the homeland (and towards this issue in particular) and from allegiance to our principles and the line pursued by the Revolution in attaining the liberating, democratic and progressive aims of the masses.

In its 5-article series "al-Taakhi" dealt with numerous questions, which we will comment on at the right time. It said, in a particular tone, in its second article published on 24.10.1972, that "The two essential and basic points are: (a) the delimitation of the Kurdish Zone and (b) the application of self-rule and the participation of the Kurdish nationality in power".

In response to the wishes of brothers in the KDP, we shall try to examine and analyse these two points.

19.10.1972

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5. *DELINEATION OF THE SELF-RULE ZONE.*

One of the basic points of the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is the delimitation of the Zone covered by self-rule.

The ABSP and the revolutionary government recognized the right of the Kurdish people to enjoy self-rule—within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the unity of both the political system and national sovereignty and the unity of the interests and aspirations of the Arab and Kurdish peoples.

This was confirmed in the Manifesto. But the Manifesto did not define the geographical zone to be covered by self-rule.

Nevertheless, the Manifesto did contain distinct bases in this respect. Article 14 says:

"After the proclamation of this Manifesto, necessary measures shall be taken, in consultation with the High Committee entrusted with its enforcement, to unify the governorates and administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority, as shown by an official population census to be carried out later on. The state shall endeavour to develop this new administrative unit and expand the exercising, therein, by the Kurdish people of all their national rights as a surity for enjoying full self-rule. Pending the realization of this administrative unity, co-ordination of Kurdish national affairs should be undertaken through periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area."

From the above article of the March Manifesto, which the KDP endorsed and recognized as a sound basis for the

settlement of the Kurdish question, it is evident that the road to the delimitation of the Self-rule Zone passes through "unifying the governorates and administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority — as shown by an official population census to be carried out in due course" .

As to the question of the census, we should like to point out some facts. During the talks that preceded the Manifesto, the representatives of the KDP declared that they did not recognize the legality of the 1965 census, conducted under the Arifite dictatorial regime, pointing out that that census had been guided by racism. We agreed with them upon ruling out that census as a basis for finding out the areas populated with a Kurdish majority. Instead, we proposed depending upon the 1957 census as a basis for the new census scheduled to be carried out after the declaration of the Manifesto.

This meant conducting a new population census in the areas whose Kurdish majority is disputed, provided that any population presence that took place in any of these areas after the 1957 census is not recognized.

After the announcement of the Manifesto, and in the course of the action taken to translate it into a reality, the question of commencing practical measures to delimit the areas populated by Kurdish majority was discussed.

Mr. Murtada Saeed Abdul Baqi, in his capacity as Chairman of the Peace Committee entrusted with the implementation of the Manifesto, conferred with Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani over the question of census. The latter told Mr. Abdul Baqi that he was not prepared to recognize the results of the proposed census if they indicated that the areas which he took for granted to be Kurdish were not so. He said literally: "Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan. If the population census shows that the majority of its inhabitants are not Kurds, I will not recognize this. I will not bear, before

the Kurds, the responsibility for relinquishing Kirkuk. May be this can take place after me"!!

This being the situation, the census became meaningless. Commencing it rather meant the resumption of fighting. Therefore, the Revolutionary Command Council preferred to defer the census and Mr. al-Barzani endorsed the postponement.

In the course of the current talks between the ABSP and the KDP, we presented the following other proposals :

"In view of the obstacles hindering the conduction of a population census, and because of the desire to speed up granting self-rule to the Kurdish-populated areas, we propose the re-arrangement of the administrative partition in the light of national reality as follows :

- a. Creation of national administrative units in the areas populated by Kurds.
- b. Amalgamation of the administrative units populated exclusively by Kurds (governorates, districts and sub-districts) into one administrative area; and this area shall be considered the Zone covered by self-rule.
- c. As to Kurdish nationals living in the mixed areas outside the Self-rule Zone, their cultural and administrative rights, within the areas where they live, shall be guaranteed on a par with the other ethnic groups living in the same units".

This is our stance towards the question of the delimitation of the Self-rule Zone. It originates from the following principles :

1. Belief in the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people.
2. Assuring the pre-requisites for exercising these rights.

3. Recognizing that the practising of these rights takes place only within the framework of one united homeland, namely, Iraq.

However, we have to state quite frankly that we do not feel that brothers in the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement view the matter from the same angle. This is no illusion. On the contrary; this is the result of many actual practices and real conditions. It is also proved by the internal publications of the KDP. These publications themselves are a very dangerous aspect, because internal indoctrination expresses opinions and attitudes of political parties more openly than does their public information media which are governed by many circumstances and considerations that prevent the surfacing of all harboured positions.

To clarify our opinion on this matter more precisely, we quote below this excerpt from an article entitled "What is Self-rule?" carried by "al-Kadir" (the internal theoretical magazine of the KDP), issue No. 14/15 for July/August, 1972 :

"The central objective of our KDP and the Liberation Movement of our Kurdish people, at the present phase, is the realization and practising of self-rule. The March Agreement specified certain measures and steps to draw the landmarks of the road leading to self-rule. But neither the substance nor the general guidelines of self-rule were spelled out in the agreement".

In the same article, we continue to read this passage:

"Self-rule is not a substitute for the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. But the objective realities of the development of the Kurdish Liberation Movement, together with the circumstances and conditions surrounding the Movement, necessitate raising the self-rule

slogan, so as to enforce the common struggle against the enemies of the two nationalities".

Now, what are we to make of this preaching ?

We believe, one does not need thoughtful analysis and lengthy scrutiny to arrive at this obvious conclusion :

"Self-rule is a central objective in this phase", "Self-rule is not a substitute for self-determination", "The objective realities and the surrounding circumstances and conditions necessitate raising the slogan of self-rule" ... These are indeed the essence of the Kurdish attitude; the rest of the phrases and words are secondary indications, meaning nothing stable and profound.

We wish to ask brothers in the KDP: What is the right for self-determination in your opinion?

As is well known, the right for self-determination is two-sided:

- a. Voluntary union.
- b. Separation.

To our mind, the KDP identified itself with the first side, namely voluntary union, by endorsing the March Manifesto. In our opinion, too, this is what is desired by the Kurdish masses.

Now, are we to understand from the sentence "self-rule is no substitute for the right to self-determination" that such a right is to be achieved in phases—the first being self-rule as implied by the sentence reading "The central objective of our KDP and the liberation movement of our Kurdish people, at the present phase, is the realization and practicing of self-rule" and by the other sentence saying "The objective realities of the development of the Kurdish liberation movement, together with the circumstances and conditions surrounding the movement, necessitate raising the

slogan of self-rule to enforce the common struggle against the enemies of the two peoples"?

The above quotations from the literature used by the KDP for indoctrinating its members is, on the one hand, more important than anything published by "al-Taakhi" in this respect for the reasons stated earlier. On the other hand, they shed sufficient light on the whole incidents, attitudes and points of view presented by the KDP ever since the proclamation of the March Manifesto. They also illuminate the source of this leadership's concept of the March Manifesto and the ways and means for implementing it as well as its attitude towards its own commitments regarding the implementation of all the clauses of the Manifesto and the restoration of normal life in both the northern area and the entire Iraq and regarding the establishment of self-rule and all its essential local and national institutions. (We will deal with these matters in detail later on).

In addition to all we have said, we reproduce here, by way of example, a large portion of an article published by "al-Kadir" magazine, in the same issue referred to above, under the title: "The Kurds and Kurdistan, Between the Arab Nation and the Arab Countries". This article sheds more light on the perspective of the leadership of the KDP of the subjects under discussion.⁽¹⁾

30.10.1972

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(1) See attached documents

6. PARTICIPATION OF KURDISH NATIONALITY IN GOVERNMENT

What is the correct image of the question of the participation of the Kurdish nationality in the government?

The ABSP and the July 17 Revolution absolutely believe, in principle, in the right of the Kurds for full and fair participation in government. This participation, in the concept of the Party and the Revolution, does not stop short within the boundaries of theoretical belief, but goes beyond that to the certitude that its achievement is inseparably connected with the very identity and progress of both the Party and Revolution. The ABSP can not be true to its ideals and aims, and, consequently, capable of playing its revolutionary and vanguard role, both at the domestic and pan-Arab levels, if it failed to concede this participation and to do everything within its power to secure its realization. Likewise, the July 17 Revolution can not attain its short-term and strategic objectives, drawn up by the ABSP's regional and national conferences and by the National Action Charter, if it failed to acknowledge this participation and to do all it could to fulfil it.

This being the case from an angle of principle, what then are the rules that define the whole question?

In our opinion, the participation of the Kurdish nationality in power must be fulfilled according to the following bases:

1. Participation in the legislative power according to the proportion of the Kurdish population to the whole population of Iraq.
2. Participation in the executive authority on the above ratio.

3. Contribution in the democratic and social organizations that have a patriotic and a representative quality in the same ratio—preserving, in the meantime, the unity of the toiling masses and the oneness of the principles of cultural guidance in a way that consolidates national, progressive and revolutionary orientation and that strengthens relations between the two peoples and the unity of their common destiny.

This, of course, is in addition to the powers of self-rule, whose entire institutions shall be composed of the members of the nationality inhabiting the Self-rule Zone.

As to the other state organs and institutions, it is neither necessary nor reasonable to observe specific ratios in each of these bodies. It is not necessary, for instance, that twenty per cent of the senior and junior staff of every ministry shall be Kurds. The ratio of Kurds might be above or below that figure, depending on pre-requisites and circumstances that have nothing to do with the core of the question of the participation of the Kurdish nationality in power. Two under-secretaries in a given ministry might be Kurds or Arabs or from other national minorities, or each from a different nationality. The determining factor, here, is qualifications, efficiency, service and other merits.

In the event of the President of the Republic having five advisers, it is not compulsory that one of them ought to be a Kurd. They might include one, two or three Kurds, or none at all. It is not a condition that the whole staff of the office of the Kurdish Vice-President ought to be Kurds; they might include Arabs, Turkomans, Syrians etc.

When an economic delegation is formed to conclude an agreement with a foreign state, it is not a condition that its composition should be according to the ratios of nationalities. This composition should be subject to

specialization and to the nature of the assignment of the delegation only.

Even in the army and security organizations, considered by brothers in the KDP as the instruments of real state power (as mentioned in the third article of al-Taakhi), it is unnecessary and abnormal to distribute responsibilities in accordance with the proportion of nationalities to the inhabitants of Iraq. In this way the need for applying scientific criteria in filling vacancies will be negated.

It is not a condition that the number of Kurdish officers in the army's General Staff should be in proportion to the Kurdish population ratio. Their number might be more or less than that ratio. It is also not compulsory to have specific rates of Kurdish officers in this army division or in that military section. The army is a national institution with a special character and special duties. Therefore, a qualified Kurdish or Turkoman officer might be considered by the state eligible for appointment as Chief of the General Staff, regardless of his ethnic origin.

Multi-national countries, we believe, pursue the same principles and criteria referred to above. For instance, there is no rule requiring that the Soviet Minister of Defence ought to be a Russian, with 15 deputies each representing one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union or with 100 deputies each representing one of the 100 nationalities of that country. There is also no such a rule in the security, economic and cultural institutions.

The above is also true even in the national universities, where students are not enrolled according to ethnic considerations; but due care is devoted for developing the standard of every nationality and for catering its needs for specialists. We do not think that the University of Moscow, for example, apportions its seats among Russian, Ukranian,

Azerbaijani and other national students in proportion to the size of their respective nationalities. Such matters should always be solved in the spirit of national unity and national interests. Solutions can also be found to relevant problems that have special character, without chaining them with calculated ratios.

The essential point regarding the participation of the Kurdish and other nationalities in the sphere of state organs is not merely the calculation of ratios in every organization and institution and the harassment of this business in a formal way. The essential point is the dedication for securing fair, full and effective participation of all citizens in all the affairs and institutions of the country, without any discrimination, and in a way that ensures the realization of the superior national interests, the assurance of equality among all citizens and the enriching of national life with production and sacrifice.

The March Manifesto dealt, in Article Two, with the question of the participation of the Kurds in government, saying:

"The participation by our Kurdish brothers in government, and the non-discrimination between Kurds and others in assuming public posts, including sensitive and important posts in the state—cabinet portfolios, army command etc. — has always been among the important goals sought by the revolutionary government. While confirming this principle, the government emphasizes the need to work for its implementation in equitable proportions, with due consideration to the principle of merit, the ratio of population and the deprivations suffered by our Kurdish brothers in the past".

As we have already mentioned, participation by the Kurdish nationality in the various organs of the state is a matter of principle for the ABSP, which demonstrated this

conviction in deeds before and after the declaration of the March Manifesto.

It is common knowledge that the ABSP embraces within its ranks great numbers of the best strugglers from other nationalities; some of them assumed the highest leading posts in the Party. Had the Party been pursuing a policy of discrimination against fraternalized nationalities, it would not have adopted this policy throughout its long and historic advance.

After the July 17 Revolution and before the March Manifesto, the Party depended upon patriotism, merit and honesty as the criteria for selecting candidates for official posts. Kurdish citizens and citizens of Kurdish origin were bestowed with important and senior ministerial posts, in addition to Kurdish personalities with political affiliation who assumed similar posts.

After the March Manifesto, the KDP nominated five personalities to hold ministerial portfolios—in accordance with the agreement reached during the peace talks. When the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was asked to nominate two candidates to the cabinet, one of the two citizens they named was Mr. Makram al-Talabani, a Kurd. The ABSP did not object to this. On the contrary it welcomed the nomination, which, as it were, increased the number of Kurdish ministers.

Strange enough "al-Taakhi" twice raised the question of the "reduction" of the number of Kurdish ministers. We had previously dealt with this question when replying to a commentary by "al-Taakhi" regarding the merger of the ministry of agriculture and the ministry of agrarian reform. Then, we noted that a tragic accident caused the death of the late Nafid Jalal, former minister of agriculture, thereby reducing the number of the KDP's representatives in the

government. Meanwhile, we invited the leadership of the KDP to nominate another personality in place of late Jalal. But strangely, again "al-Taakhi" raised the same issue in its recent series.

These are general points regarding the participation by the Kurdish people in the government. We concur with "al-Taakhi" and we do believe that the participation of the Kurdish nationality in power (should it receive its full national, democratic and social substance) must be achieved through the true political representatives of the Kurdish nationality — regardless of whether they came from political parties, groups or elements.

The participation in power by the KDP, as a main political force within the Kurdish nationality, will be dealt with in a special essay.

31.10.1972

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(7, 8, 9, 10)

KDP's PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT.

(The question of the KDP's participation in government was dealt with in articles Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 dated 1/2/5/6th. November, 1972 consecutively. Therefore, they have been compiled in this single article).

While affirming that participation in political power by any nationality must come through the true political representatives of that nationality (in order to provide that participation with its full national, democratic and social essence), there still remains a difference between the participation of the members of a given nationality in the government of the country where they live and the participation of this or that political party which belongs to that given nationality.

If the concerned state stipulates in its constitution and laws the right of a given nationality to participate in political power, this right becomes "universal". But, the definition of the individuals and political forces eligible to represent that nationality in power, together with the specification of the size of representation of each of them, is a matter that is governed by the nature of the political, economic and social system prevailing in the state, by the size of each of the involved political forces and by other questions determined by the domestic conditions of every state.

As we have repeatedly stated, the ABSP that leads political power in Iraq, "absolutely" believes in the full and fair participation of the Kurdish nationality in the government of the country. Such a participation was guaranteed in the Interim Constitution, in the March Manifesto and in

the established laws. Moreover it was incarnated by deeds ever since the March Manifesto.

One of the main problems in this issue is that the KDP mixes its own right for participation together with the size of its participation with those of the entire Kurdish population. The KDP also refuses to draw a dividing line between the nature of the two participations.

This should not imply an intention to overlook the KDP's right for participation in power. The KDP, on the one hand, is a main political force inside the Kurdish nationality. On the other hand, the regime set up by the July 17 Revolution rests on the participation in power by all the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces. But while the recognition of the right of the Kurdish nationality to participate in political power is absolute and unconditional, the participation of the KDP can neither be absolute nor unconditional.

The KDP's participation in the government of the country must come within the framework of the general criteria and commands necessitated by the nature of the regime existing in Iraq. Brothers in the KDP might argue that they do not recognize the criteria and controls specified in this connection by the ABSP. We do not deny them this right. But, while respecting it, we must not override the axiomatic general and basic criteria and commands that are no longer contested by the nationalist, national and progressive parties and forces in Iraq, which, by virtue of their political and social identity, can also be partners in the political authority.

Nor have the ABSP's efforts ended there. By formulating the draft National Action Charter, the ABSP sought to present a "common factor", so to speak, of the programmes of the political parties and forces that can join the authority of the national alliance. Through dialogue and scrutiny,

the ABSP works presently for reaching a common formula for the Charter that can be endorsed by all political parties and forces eligible to take part in government.

On this basis, the participation in power by the KDP, as a political party, will be determined in future in the light of the fundamental starting points of the March Manifesto and the principles embodied in the National Action Charter.

To cast light on the nature, attitudes and demands of the KDP, it is very necessary to study some aspects of the experience of the participation in government by this Party since the March Manifesto. This is equally very necessary for learning lessons from the mistakes of past experience in charting out a more correct road.

A. Participation or Confrontation?

The March Manifesto is devoted to settling the question of the national rights of the Kurdish people. It included no political, economic and social general programme that might provide common guiding lines for action by both the ABSP and the KDP in all political, economic and social spheres within a given period.

Consequently, pending agreement on a common programme of action, the KDP, which joined the government after the March Manifesto, has the right to express its own opinions and positions, through its own media, in all political economic and social issues. But exercising this right does not mean, automatically, playing the role of the "opposition" all through.

The sheer participation in any political authority presupposes a concern for maintaining a reasonable degree of conformity and accord. Otherwise, participation will not have any positive and constructive meaning. In fact, lack of cooperation will lead to exposing the authority to grave tremors hindering the performance of its basic domestic and national responsibilities.

In point of fact, the KDP understood the question of participation in government in the most strange concept. On the one hand, it takes participation as a "right", from the angle of "being the representative of the Kurdish nationality"; on the other hand it takes opposing the government as a "right" emanating from its being "a political party with its own views on political, economic and social affairs."

The KDP's participation in political power, viewed from the angle of its being a Kurdish party, is a legitimate right. But practising this right means, at the same time, a degree of commitments to the government and to the political system in which the KDP takes part. Otherwise, its "participation" nullifies its natural essence and becomes "dictation".

From a political angle, it is not at all possible to alienate the question of the Kurdish people's exercising their legitimate rights, including participation in power, from the nature of the regime that secured those rights.

This reality presupposes that the true representatives of the aspirations of the Kurdish people should be concerned for the safety of the regime that guaranteed those ambitions and should defend it in the face of the conspiratorial attempts directed against it by imperialists and reaction who have in the past, and are still, taking up ferociously hostile positions against the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people.

One need not cite examples to prove that the KDP has not, from the date of its participation in government up till now, shown any form of commitment to the political authority and the revolutionary regime prevailing in Iraq. Worse than this, leading elements in the KDP, acted, and still act, in collusion with internal and external, imperialist, reactionary and suspect forces to spin plots against the revolutionary regime.

Throughout this period, the internal and external institutions and organizations of the KDP missed no chance to scandalize the ABSP and the revolutionary power — using all ways and means, and during all “positive” and “negative” circumstances.

This fantastic and unique phenomenon—the dual state of opponent-partner — has become a mounting danger to the country's security and basic interests as well as to its march towards the attainment of the people's liberating, progressive and democratic aims and aspirations.

Whatever might be the extent of devotion to self-control, to awaiting the natural development of conditions and to the struggle for building democratic institutions, that phenomenon cannot be tolerated for ever, whatever its justification might be. Iraq is a country that inherited scores of complicated political, economic and social problems created throughout black centuries of enslavement and backwardness and by reactionary and dictatorial regimes. Further, Iraq lies in one of the most explosive and dangerous areas of the world.

These impending dangers include: the Zionist enemy's threat, with full and violent imperialist backing, to usurp the whole area and to enslave its entire population; the perpetual menace by the rulers of Iran to the sovereignty of Iraq and to the Arab Gulf area, which is nationally linked with Iraq, and which is strategic for the security and vital interests of Iraq; the fierce battle raging between the Iraqi people and Revolution on the one hand and the oil monopolies and imperialist states on the other (No two patriots can possibly quarrel over the fact that the oil battle is our most dangerous and complicated patriotic fight and over the need to mobilize all nationalist efforts and capabilities required for securing ultimate victory); the scores of basic tasks confronting the Revolution in fields of consolidating political and economic independence, assuring the basic interest of the masses of the people and attaining the

legitimate rights of all Iraqi citizens—including, of course, the national rights of the Kurdish nationality.

Under such conditions and circumstances, is it permissible to shut one's eyes to that phenomenon and to "dissociate" the question of the KDP's participation in power from the dangerous circumstances and practices surrounding it and to portray the matter as a "legitimate demand", which the revolutionary authority does not want to meet?

B. Relations with Ruling Iranian Reaction:

The close relations, existing for years and in all spheres, between the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on one side and the ruling reactionary regime in Iran on the other side are one of the most dangerous problems that have been arousing serious anxiety amongst nationalist quarters in Iraq .

They constitute a very serious obstacle that impedes the creation of any real cooperation or alliance between the KDP on one hand and the ABSP and the rest of the nationalist political parties and forces on the other. In no way can this dangerous relationship be ignored when discussing the KDP's participation in power, and, indeed, when examining its role in the life of the entire country.

The severance of these relations was upper most of the conditions presented by the revolutionary authority and the ABSP to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement during the talks that preceded the March Manifesto. The leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement undertook to end these relations, justifying their past existence by the economic siege imposed on the areas controlled by the Kurdish Movement during the years of fighting

Although we were not convinced by that justification, we sincerely anticipated the severance or the gradual curtail-

ment of these relations immediately after the declaration of the March Manifesto and the beginning of the practical implementation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question.

But events and evidence came one after the other to prove that, far from being severed or curtailed, those relations continued to be consolidated and expanded. Our arguments, demands and appeals have all gone with the wind, despite the fact that this case, and its everyday ramifications, have been the principal point in the agenda of every meeting held between the ABSP and the KDP, and despite their being our basic condition in respect to the commitments we held the KDP must undertake.

Now, more than two and a half years since the declaration of the March Manifesto — now, after the revolutionary authority has covered a long distance on the path of implementing the clauses and provisions of the Manifesto, ... now, we find ourselves facing the following realities :

1. The flow, in substantial quantities, of Iranian arms into the northern area, specially during the intensified strife between the Iraqi Revolution and the reactionary Iranian government. It was obvious that this flow was accelerated, and concentrated, following the historic Nationalization (of the Iraqi Petroleum Company "IPC") Act of 1st Jun, 1972.
2. The delivery by foreign sources, via Iran, to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement of heavy and light weapons together with a new broadcasting station.
3. The military training in Iran of a great many members of the Peshmirga, specially in heavy weapons .
4. The dispatch of some Kurdish students, from the members of the KDP, to join the Iranian military colleges and institutes.

5. Communication of military information, concerning the Iraqi army, by certain elements of the KDP to the Iranian authorities for onward transmission to an Israeli liaison officer. These elements hold prominent positions in the KDP, and they are well known to the KDP's leadership.
6. The siding of armed members of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement with the Iranian armed forces in certain frontier clashes. Indeed, this collaboration reached the extent of some Kurdish "frontier guards" and armed members of the KDP enabling armed Iranian forces occupy part of Iraqi territory in the Khanaqin area.
7. The reception, sheltering and guiding inside Iraqi land (by a number of KDP's members, quite known to the party's leadership) of some Iranian intelligence agents who committed acts of espionage and sabotage inside Iraqi territory.
8. The flooding of the northern area by Iranian and Israeli commodities. This resulted in a very strong Iranian economic influence in the region and reached the extent where the public sale of Iranian goods has become an ordinary affair in markets in the areas controlled by the KDP.
9. The circulation of counterfeit Iraqi currency printed by Iranian intelligence with the intention of destroying the Iraqi economy.
10. The transfer of patients, particularly party officials, to Iran for medical treatment in hospitals there.
11. The facilitation of the exit of a number of persons, via Iran, in contravention of the government's orders banning travelling abroad in accordance with the austerity measures taken after the nationalization of IPC.

12. The aggravation of the influence of the Iranian intelligence, in the areas controlled by the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, to the degree that enabled it to kidnap and kill ordinary citizens and members of the armed forces.
13. The admission of foreigners to the northern area, via Iran.
14. The handing over to Irani authorities of Iranian patriots, including members of the Iranian KDP, who escaped from the Iranian reactionary rule. Other Iranian patriots were also either imprisoned or killed by elements of the KDP.
15. The exchange of visits between leading elements of the KDP and Iranian officials.
16. The smuggling of certain Iraqi Jews to Iran, in preparation to their onward escape to Israel.

Wrong Manifestations

The above are some aspects of the menacing relations prevailing between the KDP and the Kurdish Movement on one side and the Iranian reactionary rule on the other. They keep confronting us every day during the persevering and devoted work for laying the foundation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question.

In discussing these relations, perhaps it is useful to mention the following two points:

1. An analysis of the political and theoretical documents of the KDP does not reveal any "ideological" agreement between the KDP's doctrine and that of the ruling Iranian reactionary class.
2. The ruling reaction in Iran does not belong to the Kurdish nationality. It rather denies the great many Kurds (much more than Iraqi Kurds) the

simplest national and political fundamentals and savagely and ruthlessly persecutes them.

Since there is no "ideological" or "national" relationship between the two partys, why, then, should there be such a broad and serious relation between them? We will not reply to this question, leaving the answer to brothers in the KDP - members and cadres - because we failed to hear any reasonable or acceptable justification from their leadership. They are responsible, before the Kurdish poeple in particular and the Iraqi people in general, to answer the question.

* * *

"National duty" is upper-most of all commitments to be shouldered by any political party participating in power in any independent country. This is a matter of course; no two persons anywhere in the world can possibly disagree about it, regardless of one of them being a socialist, a national capitalist or an internationalist. No independent country in the world can tolerate or agree to the creation of political, military and economic relations between any of its political parties or categories and a foreign state.

In this connection, we must not forget that the relationship between the KDP and the ruling reaction in Iran, basically contradicting as it is with the principle of national commitment, continued and flourished at a time when the reactionary Iranian authority committed acts of aggression against the sovereignty of Iraq. Examples: the abrogation by Iran of the 1937 boundaries treaty; the Iranian military aggression against Iraqi frontiers; the all out Iranian collaboration in the conspiracies and plans designed to overthrow the revolutionary regime of Iraq; the aggression against the legitimate national rights of the Arab people — the brothers of the Kurdish people — by the Iranian military occupation of Arab islands in the Arab Gulf.

From the above we can see how the country has suffered, for more than two and a half years, from the phenomenon of the political party that is "participating" in political power and, simultaneously, "opposing" that power as it suffered more bitterly from the phenomenon of the party that is "participating in the nationalist political power" and, simultaneously, "collaborating to the maximum with a foreign state that is hostile to the country and to its government".

Rather than embarking on tackling these dangerous phenomena in a spirit of responsibility, national unity and national duty . . . rather than displaying concern for positive cooperation with the revolutionary regime that managed to realize many of the aspirations of the Kurdish people and many of the targets of the national movement of Iraq.. rather than doing this, the leadership of the KDP insists upon escaping from its prescribed responsibilities, demands more "participation" in power and expounds its demands as "rights" which the authority hesitates to meet. Moreover, they deliberately link all this with the attitude towards the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people, including Kurdish fair participation in political authority. Here is another very important aspect of this question :

Now, we do not intend to enter into a debate with our brothers in the leadership of the KDP regarding their concept of "nationalism" and their "ideological" positions. But, in the meantime, we can not grasp a very serious contradiction in their everyday practical attitudes.

This contradiction dramatically presents itself in their dealing with the Kurdish national question in Iraq. Here in Iraq, we find the utmost "national" stiffness, clinging to "land" and devotion to the interests and rights of the "nation". Simultaneously, the leadership of the KDP cooperates, on a very large scale, with the rulers of Iran, who persecute the Kurds of Iran and deprive them from their simplest human national and political rights. It should be

pointed out that this cooperation reached the extent of striking at the roots of the Kurdish movement inside Iran. the handing over of militant patriots taking refuge in Iraq to the Iranian authorities and the murdering of some of them.

Is it possible to divide nationalism and national sentiments ?

If we were to understand this phenomenon from the angle of political expediency, we can only arrive at the following conclusion :

"Adoption of a political tactical line based on cooperation with a reactionary government that absolutely denies the national rights of the Kurds and that violently and savagely persecutes them only to bring pressure to bear on a nationalist and progressive government whose constitution and established laws recognize the national rights of the Kurds and in whose territory the Kurds enjoy the broadest national and democratic rights"!...

What a wonderful tactic!!

We do hope from the bottom of our hearts that our brothers in the KDP will provide answers to these questions and to the other major and grave issues. We equally do hope, along with all sincere citizens, (Arabs, Kurds and fraternized minorities alike) that the leadership of the KDP will liquidate and put an end to this abnormal situation once and for all, because the destiny of many fundamental issues depends upon this.

* * *

To cement the unity of the homeland, preserve the major national institutions, deepen the feelings of national unity, ensure the supremacy of law, facilitate the execution of the tasks of the central authority and to cooperate with the government in the discharge of its central national

duties are some of the basic responsibilities of any political party participating in government.

As we have said earlier, the March Manifesto comprised two closely interlinked basic points, namely:

1. Safeguarding the legitimate national rights of the Kurds.
2. Consolidating the unity of Iraq, i.e., the unity of the people, of the homeland and of the constitutional system, within the framework of the supremacy of law and centralization of authority.

Since the announcement of the March Manifesto, representatives of the KDP participated in political power and held various important posts in the state. In addition, members of the KDP occupied both the senior and junior administrative posts in the Sulaimanya, Arbil and Dohuk governorates and in the other districts and areas populated by a Kurdish majority - thus becoming the administrative authority of the area.

Therefore, brothers in the KDP and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement are required to work, side by side with their Ba'athist and other comrades, and in cooperation with the responsible authorities, to normalize conditions in the area in order to secure the objective conditions needed for transition to the exercising of self-rule and for providing the basic services and interests of the Kurdish masses related to national rights (such as schooling) and to economic, security, health and other similar requirements.

Aware of the fact that the northern area had suffered, throughout the long years of fighting, severe pains that bred many difficult problems . . . aware of the special conditions of the area and the clan, tribal and factional relations playing an important role therein . . . aware of the long time and strenuous efforts required to transform the area into a stable and normal state ... realizing all

this, we had hoped that the KDP, by virtue of its moral and political influence and force, would prove to be an element of stability, rather a vanguard force leading the region speedily towards stability and eventual normalcy and fighting against any quarter attempting to retain the extraordinary conditions for futile action and unlawful gains and benefits.

But, while appreciating some positive steps taken by leading elements of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement in that direction, the outcome of an experience of more than two and a half years pointed to a totally contrary direction. Indeed, the conditions of the area deteriorated to a very grave state. Below are a number of aspects that bear witness:

1. Right from the beginning, we sensed among our brothers in the KDP a wrong tendency, against which we repeatedly, earnestly and sincerely warned. This tendency was that every member of the KDP, who assumed any post in the government, instead of acting as a responsible official, behaved with the same mentality and in the same ways that governed his dispositions during the fighting.

As a matter of fact such a phenomenon might emerge in all political parties that shift from extremely passive resistance to the seat of government. But such parties, usually, exert intensified ideological efforts to remedy the situation by striking a balance between one's identification as a struggler and one's duties as a responsible government official. But past experience, however, explicitly proved that brothers in the KDP made no effort whatsoever in this respect. On the contrary. The KDP's leadership encouraged this wrong behaviour and very strongly protected those who committed it.

This dangerous state of affairs was escalated to the heights of defaming the Kurdish officials who exercise their duties in accordance with the laws and regulations and labelling them as "stooges of the government". Thus, the loyalty of Kurdish officials to the KDP has come to be measured by the extent to which these officials go in defying the government, breaking the law and committing offences.

2. We have earlier touched upon the question of the "frontier guards force"; and there might be no objection to coming back to it.

In the meetings between the ABSP and the KDP that preceded the declaration of the March Manifesto, it was agreed to form, after declaring the Manifesto, "frontier guards" regiments manned by members of the Peshmirga. Sure enough 12 such regiments were formed and provided with the necessary equipment and supplies by the authorities concerned.

We can not escape the fact that all of them were fighters in the ranks of the Kurdish Movement and that their loyalty remained to this Movement. Nor do we have any objection to this. But matters did not end there.

These "frontier guards" continued to act, in all cases and occasions, as "Peshmirgas" — never subjecting in any way to the administrative authorities. Using their newly-acquired status of an official armed force, they have been intervening, by the force of arms, in tribal disputes, imposing tributes and, sometimes, committing rape.

What meaning, then, remains for agreements? Where is the commitment of the KDP and

the Kurdish Movement to undertake the restoration of normal life to the area?

3. The army is a national institution shouldering a sacred responsibility in the defence of the sovereignty and independence of the homeland. Had it been hurled in the past into a fight between brothers, it should not be held responsible for those hostilities. All the responsibility rests with the regime, whose policies the army was simply carrying out.

Although it is the right of the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement to "guard against" any "developments" (which are actually sheer illusions created by the poisonous propaganda of the imperialists and the reactionary who are hostile to the Kurdish people and to the entire people of Iraq), yet it is not right to assume, all along, a negative attitude towards this principal national institution. How could the Revolution enrich the inculcation of the principles of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question amongst the ranks of the people that include the army at a time when incessant atrocities are committed against the army and its establishments? How could it do so after the situation deteriorated to the extent of machination to blow up certain military bases, to prevent the armed forces from training and stationing in certain areas of the homeland and to forbid the passage of troops through other areas?

That the Revolution did not retaliate by force is due solely to a deep concern for the high interests of the homeland and for peace.

Another very important point is connected with "serving the flag". "Al-Taakhi" complains that the ABSP monopolizes for itself political work within the ranks of the army and demands that the KDP be accorded similar opportunities. But "Al-Taakhi" ignores the atrocities committed against the principles and basic rules upon which this national institution rests. We had previously posed this issue for discussion, and it might be useful and relevant to deal with it again.

In the talks that preceded the promulgation of the March Manifesto, brothers in the KDP requested that Peshmirga members be absolved from doing military service.

They said the Peshmirkas numbered 21,000. Despite being positively sure that this figure was very much exaggerated (a fact which was frankly stated to the KDP), we gave our consent as a sign of goodwill and genuine desire to surmount all obstacles coming in the way of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question. But, more than two and a half years after the declaration of the Manifesto, the number of persons furnished by the KDP with certificates testifying that they were Peshmirkas (for the purpose of exemption from military service) rose to more than 121,000, including large numbers of Arab citizens. Repeatedly, we complained of this to brothers in the KDP and drew their attention to the fact that matters had gone beyond the scope of helping Peshmirkas to another state jeopardizing the very principle of serving the flag. But our complaints have always gone with the wind.

One more very important point is related to deserting the army. It has become customary to

instigate a number of Kurdish soldiers to desert their units to go to the areas controlled by the KDP — one time under the pretext of "strained conditions" and another time under the allegation of "the arrest of Kurdish soldiers". This state of affairs endangers the standards of military discipline and obedience, specially so when certain KDP's elements resorted to inciting non-Kurdish soldiers to desert the army.

The military authorities can not possibly allow such acts to go unpunished. But brothers in the KDP considered these acts as a political issue and insisted either upon absolving the soldiers concerned from the punishment they deserved or retaining them in KDP's areas.

It is known that a dialogue was commenced between representatives of the ABSP and the KDP on 23rd September, 1972 ... Ever since, desertion from the army continued. We have drawn the attention of brothers in the KDP to the seriousness of these acts, but to no avail.*

4. During the years of fighting, the Kurdish area lived under very hard conditions. Numerous Arab and Kurdish circles — in the government, in the Kurdish Movement and in the area as a whole — have exploited those hardships to secure unlawful benefits. Though they agreed to champion the national rights of the Kurdish people, the Kurdish Armed Movement and the KDP also contained undercurrents and factions which are widely divergent —

*Ath-Thawra published a list of the names of 195 military men, who deserted the army between September 30 and October 5, 1972.

rather contradicting in their political inclinations and class interests .

Combined together, these circumstances led to an abnormally turbulent state in the conditions of security in the area. Consequently, the Kurdish masses suffered the severest pains; the economy deteriorated; many development projects came to a standstill; and highly complex and complicated conditions ensued.

In addition to assuring the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people, the March Manifesto came to serve the realization of stability and national concord in the area and to herald a new era where people could live in peace and tranquility .

Nobody ever doubted that the realization of this dear objective, which is surrounded by difficulties and obstacles, needed much time and energy.

But, we were confident that the sincere cooperation between the ABSP and the KDP would help surmount all these difficulties and obstacles and shift the area, progressively, to the cherished state of stability, the sovereignty of law and national accord.

But, in spite of the wide and bright optimism we felt upon the declaration of the March Manifesto and despite the sincere efforts made towards solving certain problems, we began to sense, gradually but increasingly, certain dangerous aspects (exceeding the limits of mistaking) in the conduct of leading and prominent members of the KDP.

All these aspects, whatever different shapes they had taken, centred on one constant obsession for the preservation of the abnormal conditions and the state of lawlessness. Under this obsession, it was only natural that various crimes could be committed, wilfully or unintention-

ally. At times, this lust was cloaked with exaggerated, rather suspect, concern for the Kurd's national rights. At others, it was shielded under the pretext of the need for the retention of strong surities by the KDP and the Kurdish Movement. At all times this obsession justified its deeds by errors on the part of the organs of the authority or by alleged faults and excesses committed by these organs.

In order to understand the whole truth and to place matters in their real perspective, we must analyse these aspects and discuss all the ideas and possibilities revolving around them.

The central point at issue in the whole affair is not action and reaction. In other words, the basic point is not to find out who started the abuse. This leads into a closed road. Indeed, the experience of more than two and a half years did prove that this was a closed road along which many valuable efforts and countless sincere endeavours were wasted together with scores, even hundreds, of attempted investigations and fact-finding that went astray in its labyrinth.

If we hang on the rational of action and reaction, the situation would remain as it was for long years. There shall always be an ignorant, foolish, isolationist, self-seeking or even an agent government official who will commit atrocities or abuses detrimental to the rights of the Kurdish people or of elements of the KDP. Such a person might or might not be detected in a year or in many years. Likewise, there shall always be an ignorant, foolish, isolationist, self-seeking even an agent member of the KDP. He will commit atrocities and abuses against the Iraqi people, the government or the ABSP and he may, or may not, be discovered in a year or in many years.

And so on actions and reactions will continue to rotate for ever.

The main point, therefore, is how the political leadership views the matter and its basic attitudes towards it. Only the political leadership, by virtue of its influence and role, can either put an end to abnormal conditions and lead the area into stability or perpetuate these abnormal conditions.

As far as the ABSP and the revolutionary authority are concerned, the concept of the political leadership of the situation can be explained in the following basic points:

The attitude of the ABSP and the authority of the Revolution towards the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and towards the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question does not stem from temporary or tactical considerations. It is prompted by a principled and strategic policy, distinctly expressed by the party's principles and the documents of the party's regional and national conferences. Simultaneously, their attitude towards the KDP and the Kurdish Movement does not emanate from transitory considerations. It is based on a realistic appreciation of the role of this leadership.

Any authority, alive to its national responsibilities, takes effective care of the supremacy of stability and normal conditions throughout the country. Any deviation from this line is a dual offence perpetrated against both the authority and the quarters directly harmed. The basic stand of the authority can not, in any way, be for disturbing the peace and the spreading of turbulence.

The Major domestic and national responsibilities shouldered by the ABSP and the authority of the Revolution demand, first and foremost, solid national unity, a complete state of stability and popular mobilization throughout the homeland.

These are the basic motives of the attitudes of the ABSP and the revolutionary authority.

But, how do brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement look upon the matter under review?!

As a result of the nature of the composition of the KDP and Kurdish Movement and because of their inherent under currents and contradictions, their view of these acts is marked with confusion and fluctuation .

Nevertheless out of this discordance, the following obvious tendencies can be diagnosed:

- * Certain leading and executive members of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement consider the supremacy of law and stability and the prevalence of normal conditions in the area as a manifestation of "the supremacy of the central authority". Therefore, they take up a bargaining position, deliberately refusing to change their minds before the implementation of all the clauses of the March Manifesto.

- * Other influential elements go beyond this logic to the extent of believing that the maintenance of the supremacy of law, stability and normal conditions in the area weakens the influence of the KDP and the Kurdish Liberation Movement which depended for a long time upon the state of crisis and tension.

- * A third group of influential executives goes farther more and holds that the maintenance of the rule of law, stability and normal conditions in the area would lead to a "relaxation" in the ranks of the Kurdish Movement and, consequently, to the loss of the state of alert needed for encountering "emergencies".

- * The influence of clan, tribal, class and family relations in major parts of the Kurdish Movement and the reliance of leading personalities of the Movement on these relations for consolidating their own political,

social and military positions (together with other factors including the theory of agglomeration that characterized the KDP's policy since the declaration of the March Manifesto) all combined to make numerous quarters in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement align themselves, justly or unjustly, by the side of their followers who commit offences, regardless of how grave the offences might be.

This is in addition to the evil elements connected with foreign quarters who will not hesitate to commit any crime. These evil elements are well known to us and to brothers in the KDP as well; but the latter screen their offences and save them for the state of "emergency"!!

If we were to summarize all these tendencies, we shall find out that their common denominator, despite variation in motives, intentions and appraisals, is the preservation of abnormal conditions in the area.

The question which every Kurd and every member of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement must put to himself, and to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, is this: Who suffers from the continuation of this unhappy state of affairs? Who suffers from the crimes of murder, kidnapping and usurpation committed everyday?

Should anyone entertain the narrow and unpatriotic view that "the authority" alone suffers from these offences, he would be committing a serious error. The organs of "the authority" suffer but comparatively limited harm from these offences; and the authority, in the meantime, has adequate ways and means for protecting itself and for compensating the injured party.

The party that is directly harmed and that suffers agonies from the perpetuation of the sad situation is the broad masses of the Kurdish people, who sustained long years of pain, bitterness and homelessness and who crave for a life of

peace and stability under the shade of a regime that guarantees their dignity, freedom and national rights. It, therefore, behoves those who come forward to achieve the interests and rights of the Kurdish people to care, before anybody else, for sparing the Kurdish masses any agony or calamity.

Despite all this, and notwithstanding the revolutionary authority's national accomplishments and other achievements pertaining to the March Manifesto, the northern region still remains the scene of the most dangerous incidents and turbulence that arouse alarming anxiety among the Kurds and the entire people of Iraq. Below are just a few examples :

- * The organizations of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, in the areas under their control, prevent government officials (such as the staff of the ministries of finance and agrarian reform) from performing their official duties. This is true even to public health officials.

- * The murder, kidnapping and arrest of citizens who disagree with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement. As we have mentioned earlier, this leadership has its own prisons and concentration camps, which include: the Khalan and Rayat prisons in the governorate of Arbil and the Tawila Mawot and Chwarta prisons in the governorate of Sulaimaniyah.

They also have detention posts of which we cite the following:

1. Butwata, the District of Rania, the Governorate of Sulaimaniyah.
2. Barzanja, the District of Chawarta, the Governorate of Sulaimaniyah.
3. Belola, Bembo Sector, the District of Khanaqin, the Governorate of Diyala.

4. Sartak Bemo Sector, the District of Khanaqin, the Governorate of Diyala.
5. Halshar, the District of Bashdar, Sulaimaniyah.
6. Hereo, the District of Bashdar, Sulaimaniyah.
7. Jafaran, Qarada, Sulaimaniyah.
8. Salusikain, Qaradar, Sulaimaniyah.
9. Sangow, Kirkuk.
10. Bamerni, the headquarters of Asad Khoshoi, Amadia, Dohuk.
11. Hiran, Arbil.
12. Nazarbin, Arbil.

The number of inmates of these prisons and concentration camps has recently exceeded 200 detainees.⁽¹⁾

* The wide-spread crimes of rape committed against Kurdish victims by Peshmargas and Aghas who support the KDP and the Kurdish Movement.

* The burning down and artillery shelling of Kurdish villages whose inhabitants do not line up with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement.

* The expulsion of Kurdish citizens who do not support the KDP from the areas where they live and forbidding the tribes who migrated from their areas during the fighting from returning to their former homes.

Of such poor soles, nearly 34,000 citizens live in the governorate of Nineveh. Some of them are roofless. All of them suffer the most miserable wretchedness. And scores of innocent children have died of want.

(1) A list of their names was published by "ath-Thawra"

* The stationing of Peshmargas (who were supposed to have been demobilized and to whom the state pays subsidies) in Kurdish villages and their parasitic living there — at the expense of villagers.

* The engagement in contraband and other illicit activity, together with assaulting (sometimes killing) customs officials.

* The exertion of various sorts of pressure against members of national minorities in the northern area, coercing them to side with the KDP, preventing them from exercising their national rights that were guaranteed by the laws enacted by the Revolution, (except within frameworks and formulas specified by the leadership of the KDP) and impeding the implementation of the resolution ensuring Syriac-speaking citizens their administrative and cultural rights .

Below are official statistics of the crimes committed in the period between the date of issuance of the March Manifesto and the date of the commencement of talks between representatives of the ABSP and the KDP on 23.9.1972:

379 murder

219 Kidnapping (these involved 566 victims of whom 499 were civilians, 47 military men and government officials and 20 Iranian patriots)

157 Rape

419 assaults

29 robbery.

Over and above these, 11 acts of sabotage were performed against railways and trains, 6 against electricity installations, 3 against roads, bridges and dams and 25 against miscellaneous public property.

When the dialogue began on 23rd September, 1972, between representatives of the ABSP and KDP, brothers of the KDP said there was need to take joint measures to improve the atmosphere and pave the way that leads the dialogue to the desired positive results. Representatives of our party confirmed that definite orders were given to the responsible authorities in the area to observe strict self-control and non-reaction, warning that severe punishment would be inflicted upon anyone who infringed those orders. They also confirmed that those orders had been complied with and requested the KDP to state any violation thereof.

Yet, in addition to what we had previously mentioned regarding the desertion of a large number of service men from their units after the dialogue, more than 10 murder, 30 kidnapping and 18 raping and assault crimes were committed in the area against Kurdish, Arab and other Iraqi citizen - military and civilian alike.⁽¹⁾

We wonder what the value of commitments is? To whose interest are these deeds committed? Who suffers from them? Why? Why?

* * *

(1) Details of these crimes were published in "ath-Thawra".

11. GUARANTEES FOR THE PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

Brothers in the KDP always rightly raise the question of the "guarantees" that ought to be secured to them before the stabilization of normal conditions in the area, the assurance of the supremacy of law and before the practising by government authorities of their normal duties.

This is a perfectly legitimate demand that is unquestionable from a point of principle. The KDP and the Kurdish Movement fought a war that lasted several years. Therefore, it is neither wise nor realistic to require them relinquish, all at once, all their previous positions and institutions, simply because of the declaration of the peace manifesto and their participation in government.

The legitimacy of this demand is justified by several factors, including both the characteristic of caution that must necessarily mark the conduct of those who happened to be engaged in fighting for so many years and the sharp tribal and factional conflicts in the area that have often taken the form of armed violence. Another factor that can not be ignored is the question of the pre-requisites (such as practical and gradual formulas and measures) of the shift from conditions of fighting against the government to a state of cooperating with it.

The basic point in this issue, however, is the sort of "guarantees" contemplated by brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement against "the possibility of the authority using military force against them".

We did, and still do, thoroughly understand and fully appreciate these justifications and misgivings in a realistic spirit. We have known all along that underestimating them would not help the achievement of the peaceful and democ-

ratio settlement of the Kurdish question and the enhancement of national unity.

That is why the March Manifesto contained clear-cut provisions assuring the guarantees demanded by brothers in the KDP. These included: the formation of a 6000-strong frontier guard battalion, all enlisted from Peshmargas (practically this is a "military surety" for the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement); the deferment, until the final stages of the implementation of the March Manifesto, of the handing over to the authority of the heavy weapons possessed by the Kurdish Movement (these weapons not only remained in the hands of the Kurdish Movement but have also been alarmingly augmented).

Ever since the declaration of the March Manifesto, the leadership of the Revolution pursued a fully realistic line towards this issue. It raised no objection to many manifestations of armament, albeit exaggerated, maintained by the leadership of the KDP and by KDP's leading and distinguished personalities.

But, when the "guarantees" clinged to by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement exceed normal and legitimate limits, they bring about a totally abnormal state of affairs that practically nullifies the commitments of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement under the March Manifesto and towards national unity. Furthermore, such a state constitutes a dangerous obstruction to the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and to the establishment of normal cooperation between the KDP and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement, on the one hand and the ABSP, the revolutionary authority and the rest of the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces on the other .

As stated above, the basic point in the question of "guarantees" is "the fear of the KDP and the Kurdish Move-

ment of the possibility of being hit with military force by the authority"!

The whole truth in this respect must be revealed; and this matter should be discussed quite frankly to dispell any illusions and to give the full picture to every citizen in this land, and to the entire world.

At the out set, we must point out that the possibility of a preemptive military blow by the authority against the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, or the possibility of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement's rekindling the fires of fighting, is not governed by invisible, ambiguous or abstract intentions. To be sure no political party or state can devoid intentions and isolate them from the objective grounds that govern them. Relying on abstract intentions is but a wilderness leading to the worst conclusion, and not to any clear and stable conclusion. The main issue, therefore, is the objective factors that govern intentions or at least decide their general structures.

Consequently, in the interest of an objective study of the legitimacy, or other wise, of the apprehensions of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, it is necessary, in our opinion, to begin with tackling this question: "Why did the ABSP and the authority of the Revolution take the initiative, early in 1970, to announce the March Manifesto and the relative agreement with the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement regarding the settlement of the conditions of fighting and the solution of the Kurdish question in a peaceful and a democratic way"?

For the sake of a comprehensive examination of this question, we need to retrace our steps a little backwards.

Following the triumph of the July 17 (1968) Revolution, representatives of the KDP participated in the government that ruled between 17-30 July 1968, in spite of the fact that the then premier, namely Abdel Razzaq al-Nayef, had

declared, in his official capacity, his non-recognition of the June 29 (1966) Declaration which represented, at the time, the basic and pressing demand of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement.

Therefore, the ABSP was astonished by the decline of the KDP to participate in the Cabinet that was formed after the July 30 (1968) Uprising — the Uprising that ousted the rightist elements and the suspect and reactionary heads that had attempted to contain and deviate the course of the revolution

But in spite of the passive attitude assumed by the KDP, the ABSP vigorously strained to convince it reconsider its mind and participate, positively, in responsibility. And, despite the continued passive stand of the KDP, the ABSP remained always willing to enter into negotiations with it.

But the KDP and the Kurdish Movement did not stop short within the boundaries of passive stands. They escalated the tension to a dangerous height when, under the supervision of certain members of the KDP's Politburo, they blew up the oil pipe-lines. This offence explicitly exposed the intentions of the KDP. It proved that the KDP was not prepared to settle matters peacefully. Worse than this, organs of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement continued their acts of sabotage—blowing up railway lines and committing other offences endangering public security and the national economy .

Thus, the revolutionary authority faced but two choices: either keeping silent about these acts, thereby endangering the security and safety of the state, or choosing the hateful way and retaliating to preserve the unity of the homeland and the prestige of the state. There was, naturally, no other way but to choose the latter alternative.

From these facts, it is quite apparent that the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement are alone responsible for driving events towards the renewal of fighting.

In spite of the state of hostility urged by the attitude and behaviour of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, the Revolution continued to proceed from a certainty that the settlement of the Kurdish question on a sound basis can not be attained before remedying the causes that essentially led to taking up arms.

The ABSP expounded its views regarding this question in the documents of its conferences and in its press, emphasizing that the road to a just peace must be via the recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people.

Although the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement had confined their demands to the points contained in the June 29 Declaration (which can not match against the rights and gains secured by the March Manifesto), the revolutionary authority adopted, even under the state of fighting, such resolutions and measures that ensured more national rights for the Kurds than those recognized by the June 29 Declaration. Examples:

- * Recognition of the cultural rights of the Kurdish people.
- * The creation of a Kurdish Academy of Letters.
- * The creation of the University of Sulaimaniya.
- * The creation of the Governorate of Dohuk.
- * Designating March 21 (Nowros Day) as a national day.

Those and other measures represented, in their essence, part of a political programme drawn by the July Revolution for the settlement of the Kurdish question, which was given official expression in the March 11, 1970 Manifesto.

In the second half of 1969, about one year from the outbreak of the Revolution and a few months from the deter-

they were warned against relying upon those machinations. This confirms the concern of the ABSP for the continuation of a meaningful dialogue.

****** After the negative attitude assumed by the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement towards the July 17 Revolution and the ABSP, and following the deterioration of relations to the extent of armed clashing, a major and important wing of the KDP (led by Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed, Mr. Jalal al-Talabani and several other patriotic Kurdish elements) sided with the revolutionary authority in both the political and military arenas. In addition, scores of thousands of armed Kurds (from the Kurdish tribes that opposed the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement) also took sides with the Iraqi armed forces.

****** By testimony of all fair-minded fellow countrymen—partisan and independent, military and civilian—the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement was in neither a political nor a military position to "dictate" any terms of settlement on the authority. On the contrary. It was in a serious state of alienation and exhaustion. Its Armed elements were cut off in isolated, remote and hardly accessible positions, whose total area did not exceed one fifth of the region inhabited by a Kurdish majority in the north of the homeland. Everyday witnessed the desertion of scores of these elements to take refuge under the government.

From the above, it can be seen that the ABSP and the revolutionary authority, in proceeding towards a dialogue with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement and, subsequently, towards the declaration of the March Manifesto that provided the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, neither acted out of temporary and tactical motivations nor from a position of

weakness. As a matter of fact, proceeding from a firm political and military ground, they were motivated by their own principles and their deeply seated conviction of the need for a peaceful and democratic settlement.

Through measures taken directly by the authority, with its consent, or in cooperation with it according to the provisions and the spirit of the March 11 Manifesto, the following gains were secured to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement by the March 11 Manifesto and the concomitant circumstances and conditions:

1. The official recognition by the state that the KDP constitutes a principal force within the Kurdish national movement.
2. The inclusion of 5 representatives of the KDP in the Cabinet.
3. The appointment of KDP's members and supporters, nominated by the KDP itself, in most of the senior and junior administrative posts in nearly all the regions populated with a Kurdish majority.
4. The creation of frontier-guard regiments, comprising 6,000 guardsmen — all drawn from Peshmigas — and catering all their requirements.
5. The re-instatement to their former posts of the dismissed military and civilian politicians belonging to the KDP and the Kurdish Movement with conditions over-ruling the normal government routine, procedure, together with considering their services uninterrupted for the purposes of promotion and pension.
6. The payment of monthly remunerations to all demobilized Peshmigas (actually not demobbed), pending their employment.
7. The opening of offices for the KDP throughout Iraq and the KDP's publishing of newspapers.

magazines and pamphlets in both Arabic and Kurdish.

8. The free traffic of fully armed leaders and followers of the KDP and the Peshmirga in all the towns and villages of the northern area .
9. The payment of monthly allocations to the leadership of the KDP.
10. The achievement of reconciliation between the KDP and the Kurdish Movement on the one hand and the Kurdish section led by Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed and Mr. Jalal al-Talabani on the other; and the joining of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement by a number of "horsemen" (Furan) who had hitherto been fighting against the leadership of the former organizations.

The above gains were secured to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement after the issuance of the March Manifesto. They are other than the gains secured to the Kurdish people, as previously specified.

Now, what did the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement lose from the "guarantees" they enjoyed prior to the declaration of the March Manifesto?

Any fair-minded judge will fully realize that the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement has achieved plenty and substantial gains after the declaration of the Manifesto, simultaneously retaining all that it had possessed prior to the Manifesto such as its members, weapons, broadcasting station, offices far deep in high mountains and a headquarters only several kilometers away from the Iranian borders !

In the national field, since the declaration of the Manifesto, the Revolution attained, with ABSP's initiative, the following important accomplishments:

1. The proclamation of the National Action Charter, and presenting it for democratic discussion. During the year that followed its proclamation, the Charter was debated by the nationalist, national and progressive forces and personalities. This public debate is now drawing to its close, yielding an agreement on a unified formula. The KDP, alone, stayed away .
2. The realization of national exploitation of oil on 7.4.1972.
3. The conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty on April 9, 1972 and the consolidation of relations with the Socialist Camp - in a very large scale .
4. The appointment of representatives of the Iraqi Communist Party and of the nationalist current in the Cabinet.
5. The expansion and strengthening of relations with progressive Arab and international forces.
6. The nationalization of the operations of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). By so doing, the Revolution attained the greatest hope of the national movement in Iraq and the Arab homeland, waged a battle that most badly needed national unity and a progressive front, laid the firm foundation for the country's political and economic independence, dealt a decisive blow to imperialism and opened up wide vistas for the struggle against imperialism and its allies as well as for the democratic and revolutionary struggle mounted by the broad masses of the people in Iraq and everywhere in the Arab homeland and the entire area.

Having gone all that much, is it possible, or logical, for the Revolution to go back on the peaceful and democratic

settlement of the Kurdish question and to surprise the KDP and the Kurdish Movement with a blitz??

The question, as we have previously pointed out, is not a matter of "intentions". Basic attitudes are always governed by the obtaining objective conditions. Consequently, do the objective pre-requisites of the conditions now reigning in Iraq (specially after the nationalization of the IPC) indicate the possibility that the revolutionary authority will give up its democratic and revolutionary commitments and tasks, in both domestic and national spheres, and head to "assault" the KDP and the Kurdish Movement??

We do not claim that the ABSP and the authority of the revolution have attained "all" the liberating, democratic and progressive tasks upon which the slogans and programmes of the nationalist, national and progressive parties and forces agree. Nor do we claim realizing "all" the domestic and national hopes and aspirations of our people.

Equally, we do not deny the right of any citizen or any nationalist and progressive party to criticise any fault we commit and to demand that we accomplish this or that assignment in this or the other way. This is part of the texture of the experience of the July 17 Revolution.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Revolution, led by the ABSP, has managed (over a period of only 4 years and a few months and with a display of immutable revolutionary determination and unshakable faith in the people and the unity of their progressive forces) to cover long and important distances up the road of achieving liberating, democratic and progressive transformations which represent the hopes and the aspirations of our people demanded over scores of years by the progressive political parties and forces.

Iraq, once a mire of reactionary domination, a launching pad for conspiracies against the Arab revolutionary

movement and an example for internal division and tearing, has now become a centre of radiation emitting rays of freedom and progress in the entire area and a scene of positive activity for the alliance of the progressive forces, which is looked upon with admiration and esteem by all progressive quarters in the region and in the world at large.

Cannot brothers of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement find in all this a guarantee for them and for the national rights of the Kurdish people??

We have earlier stated that it is the right of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement to demand, and retain, guarantees. We said: This remains logical as long as it remains within normal and reasonable boundaries consistent with the KDP's and the Kurdish National Movement's commitments under the March Manifesto and harmonious with their obligations towards national unity, the national interests of the country and the demands of the battle now raging between the people and their revolutionary forces on one side and monopolies, imperialism and reactionary forces on the other side.

But, what course are brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement taking to acquire guarantees against the 'Illusion' — the 'suspect slogan', to be precise — fomented by some elements regarding "the possibility of being surprised with a military attack by the authority of the revolution" ?

We take leave to put these questions to our brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement:

Do the wide-spread relations with the reactionary Iranian government constitute a guarantee for them, and for the Kurdish Movement? Do the relations with local and regional reaction and with the band that is widely engaged in treachery, like Abdul Ghani al-Rawi and Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef, provide those guarantees? Does the hunting for opportunities to weaken the revolutionary regime and

to scandalize the ABSP internally and externally constitute a guarantee for the KDP and the Kurdish people? Does the state of anarchy that dominates many regions of the northern part of the mother-land (where the state machinery is unable to exercise its normal duties, where no citizen feels that his life is safe, where crimes of murder, imprisonment, kidnapping, illicit forcing of tribute, opening of frontiers with Iran, smuggling and circulation of counterfeit currency etc.) constitute a guarantee for the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement? ... and for the Kurdish national rights??

All we have mentioned, together with other matters regarded by brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement as "guarantees" and "previllages" solely confined to them and not applicable to any other political party, are by no means "guarantees" and "previllages" for a popular, nationalist and democratic movement. They are but traps offending the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, solely. They are a danger that threatens to torpedo peace and revert conditions to their former state—before the March Manifesto.

Should anybody still insist that they are "guarantees", then they are surely not guarantees for the liberating, progressive and democratic substance of the Kurdish national movement! Further, if confidence has been lost to the extent that entitles brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Movement to retain the aforementioned "guarantees", we might as well ask: what are the "guarantees" they provide to the Revolution and to the people of Iraq assuring their dedication to peace, national unity and the March Manifesto??

10.11.1972

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(12 & 13)

THIS IS THE QUESTION

Articles 12 and 13, published on 12th. and 13th. November, 1973 have been compiled in this single article because they deal with the same subject.

The series recently published by "ath-Thawra", under the heading "For Preservation of Peace and Consolidation of National Unity", aroused wide-spread interest and anxiety and posed important queries amongst popular quarters in Iraq.

In the pan-Arab and international sphere, those articles also stirred similar concern and questions. Many circles indulged on interpreting their motives and consequences in the light of their own affiliations and commitments. In so doing, they proceeded to various destinations.

For instance, one Lebanese newspaper, basing its story on the visit paid by the President of the Republic to the 5th KDP Branch on the occasion of the blessed Fasting Bairam (Id al-Fitr), wrote: "President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr personally intervend to stop the conflict between the ABSP and the KDP". The newspaper, however, ignored two important points: The first is that President al-Bakr is the Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP. The second point is that the President's call at the KDP's Baghdad Branch is a traditional courtesy visit paid on every Id (Bairam).

The allegations of the Lebanese newspaper also included a denial of the democratic experiment in Iraq — one of whose glimpses is reflected by the current series of articles published by "ath-Thawra" and "al-Taakhi" on this controversial issue.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, at home or abroad, of the real state of affairs in our country, we deem it necessary to elucidate a number of points. And having said what has occurred to us, we believe it is also necessary to put forward the following important question: What is to be done?

To begin with, perhaps it is better to refer the reader to the opening article of this series in which we explained why we preferred to follow this line of debate and to draw his attention to the subsequent two installments dealing with the essence of the March Manifesto and the reciprocal commitments under its provisions and with our concept of the principles that must govern the relationship between our Party and the KDP.

The reader will also remember that "Al-Taakhi" came up with its replies before we completed our series and that we postponed publishing our views until it finished expounding its case.

As mentioned in article 4 of this series, we found "al-Taakhi's" articles rather disappointing. They were generally marked with "evasion", wandering around or belittling the commitments of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement under the March Manifesto. They followed a line of justification to find excuses for avoiding those responsibilities and for laying the blame on the authority and the ABSP. They also abounded with all sorts of diatribe and criticism against the ABSP, its policy, the way it exercises power and its relationship with the masses.

All this made us believe that an attempt was underway to provoke us and, consequently, to drive the debate between the two papers outside its positive scope. Thus, we were obliged to stress, quite clearly, that we could not be provoked and that we would stick to our objective course in tackling all questions pertinent to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question.

It has now become essential to say this: despite the many articles we have published and the serious information we have disclosed, we have neither released all the relevant details nor spoken of other questions that are not less important than the matters we had exposed. Therefore, should it be necessary, or should we be have to, we reserve the right to come back to those same questions and to disclose more details and new cases.

The reactions and queries set off by our articles can be summed up in the following points:

1. The serious information we published aroused, amongst faithful patriotic circles, a degree of alarm warranting them to sincerely wonder if the ABSP finds itself in a position necessitating the revision of the March Manifesto and the doctrinal foundation upon which it had been based.

Although our previous articles have expounded our attitude towards this issue, we might as well reaffirm, in a definite and unequivocal way, that the attitude of the ABSP regarding the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and, consequently, regarding the March Manifesto is a strategic stand of principle. Therefore, it can not be affected by temporary influences, however grave they might be. Let us get this clear: it can not also be affected by the attitudes and behaviour of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement.

Yet, we must admit that the points of principle and the concepts upon which the March Manifesto had been based were not equally deep-rooted and clear in the minds of all citizens. In spite of the fact that all the nationalist and progressive political parties and forces, including the ABSP, had adopted clear-cut attitudes of principle towards the Kurdish question, quite many patriotic and loyal quarters

viewed the question from different angles with varying standards of consciousness.

While appreciating that it is the duty of our Party and the other progressive nationalist political parties and forces to strain maximum and continuous efforts for educating the masses on the principles of fraternity and equality between nationalities, we can not help overlooking the fact that dangerous attitudes and conduct, such as those committed by certain quarters in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, do harm this noble cause, hamper efforts for education and create isolationist prejudices and malicious reactions.

More serious than that: in such circumstances, matters entwine and intermingle, making it, in many a case, difficult to distinguish (within those showing reactions and effects to the attitudes and conduct previously mentioned) the sincere and honest citizen from that prejudiced and associated with re-action and imperialism. This is an important fact that should, in no way, be underrated. In the circumstances now facing Iraq, this matter assumes an increasing importance, and reaches a serious degree of sensitivity.

During the revolutionary social changes now unfolding in the country, during the rage of the fierce battle with the monopolies and the imperialist forces that are backing them, in the ebb of retreat and the advance of the influence of the right and imperialism in the area . . . under such extraordinary state of affairs, there becomes graver the danger of confusing the attitudes of the good and honest people with those of vindictive, reactionary and puppet elements there becomes greater the dangers of the possibility of hiding behind excuses having a well-meaning surface but, actually, of wicked intentions and really hostile to the movement of liberation and progress.

Bearing in mind the concrete conditions facing us now . . . and realizing that it is part of our duty and that of the

rest of the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces to spare no effort to settle matters in the interest of national unity and the movement of liberation and progress . . . we believe that the greater part of this responsibility lies on the shoulders of brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement. As they advocate the national rights of the Kurdish people, they should be fully aware of the concrete conditions in the country where they live and of the volume of reactions created by their attitudes and ways of conduct.

Certainly, the cause of the national rights of any people living with others in one country can never be served or made attainable by rough courses created by attitudes and behaviour similar to those mentioned earlier. The attainment of such a goal requires not only initiatives by the political parties concerned and actions by the authority, but also a firm belief amongst all ranks of citizens and a sound psychological mood enriching relations between all citizens of the same homeland.

2 The alarming information we had published on the conditions in the northern area and the attitudes and disposals of the KDP re-staged on the political theatre a question that used to be posed before the declaration of the March Manifesto regarding the use of cooperation and accord with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement. After the declaration of the Manifesto, that same question reflected doubts as to the soundness of the Manifesto as a political step. In the opinion of wondering quarters, including well-meaning sections, the Manifesto will amount to nothing but just one more truce, like those often sought in the past by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement to secure certain benefits and revert to their previous practices whenever new opportunities occurred .

These quarters found in the information we published grounds and evidence supporting their point of view. Their

voices rang louder after having faded for a time as a result of some of them reconsidering their previous conclusions. As stated in the previous point, in the whirlpool of events, appraisals and analyses made on bona fide bases came to be confused with those stemming from viciousness and association with imperialist and reactionary schemings. Some quarters have even beaten the drums of war!

Our reaction to all that was restricted to reaffirming that the March Manifesto did not only represent a sound principled and strategic position but also a realistic concept of matters. The positions taken up by the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, extremely serious and grave as they might be, can not at all change this fact. The March Manifesto, in essence, is not a contract concluded by the ABSP and the revolutionary authority on the one hand and the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand, thus remaining valid as long as relations between the two parties remained good and automatically falling null and void when those relations become bad. The March Manifesto is a political solution of principle to the Kurdish question—formulated by the ABSP and the authority of the revolution. The fact that it has been associated, in the timings and procedures, with the agreement with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement was due to two considerations:

The first was the genuine desire to spare the country the state of strife and fighting and to save all efforts for carrying out the nationalist, progressive and, also, the nationality tasks.

The second was the realistic appreciation of the role played by this leadership within the ranks of the Kurdish Movement.

But, in our opinion, the role of the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement inside the Kurdish Movement, and, indeed, in the national life of Iraq, is not a

static and final state. It is a mobile state impersonified in given conditions, attitudes and positions. Should this be also maintained by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, its role will continue to be associated with the Manifesto, and a positive factor therein. Otherwise, this leadership will have to confront a state of being alienated from both the Kurdish movement and the national life.

In all cases, the question to be asked does not centre on the soundness of the Manifesto from a political viewpoint, but rather on the nature and volume of the role played by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement in implementing the Manifesto. Since the March Manifesto is a new formula that is different from previously concluded armistices, the ABSP and the revolutionary authority will remedy problems that crop up during its implementation with new ways and means—altogether different from past methods .

3. Besides questioning once again the soundness of the March Manifesto as a political stance—which we reviewed, and on which we expounded our distinct and clear-cut viewpoints — there surfaced again another query, which ran as follows: "Knowing, as you do, all these facts about the composition of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement and about the relations between some important elements of these organizations and the ruling reaction in Iran plus reactionary forces at home and elsewhere in the region, how durst you conclude an agreement with them? ... and co-operate with them? ... Were these facts not known before the declaration of the March Manifesto ? "

This is our answer : "We were aware of these facts prior to the announcement of the Manifesto; and we have frankly discussed them with our brothers in the KDP in the course of the dialogue that preceded the Manifesto. The analysis worked out and agreed upon by us and the rest of the nationalist political parties and forces held this : agreement

with the leadership of the KDP (within the framework of a comprehensive peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, joint national action and the reinforcement of the liberating progressive and democratic struggle of the entire country) would provide objective conditions for alienating the reactionary and suspect elements in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement who pretend to sympathize with the Kurdish cause and would also create a favourable climate enabling the trimming off of the internal alliances of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement inside both the Kurdish nationality and the whole of Iraq together with breaking off their relations with ruling Iranian reaction.

As a matter of fact, when reaching an agreement with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, it was never our intention to create a situation where reactionary pockets within both of them, together with elements associated with Iran and other reactionary states and imperialistic quarters, can have a semblance of legality under the banner of the March Manifesto. Nor was it our intention to move them from their positions within the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement to positions within the framework of the state and the Revolution under the cloak of the Kurdish people's participation in power!!

Prior to the March Manifesto, and since its declaration, we have made it clear to brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement that the conditions of peace and the democratic settlement of the Kurdish question must be taken as a historic opportunity for re-arranging the positions of numerous elements and pockets in a way ensuring their renunciation of obstructing and contradicting the national movement of the Kurdish people and the ideals of the Revolution, without which there could not have been a March Manifesto.

Accordingly, we, and the state's "sensitive" organs, refuse to provide such pockets and elements with a cover of

legality and protection under the cloak of the national rights of the Kurdish people at a time when the Revolution is taking a firmly resolute stand against similar elements among Arabs and other countrymen. Time and again we talked the matter over, making it clear to them that we understand the national rights of the Kurdish people as a question of a liberal and progressive essence. As such we recognize them and work for their fulfilment, flatly refusing to recognize any representative of the Kurdish people who does not answer patriotic and progressive specifications.

While recognizing the soundness and the legitimacy of the right of the Kurdish people to participate in all walks of life in the country, and while striving for the attainment of these rights, it does not follow that there should be within the country two policies and two orientations towards certain major issues—such as the struggle against colonialism and reaction and their pillars in the region, the building of close relations with the progressive forces in the Arab homeland and the rest of the world and with the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Regarding such issues, there should be one policy and one orientation, specified by the Revolution within the framework of the 'national alliance' which, in turn, should be a liberating, progressive and revolutionary coalition.

This relative important point must be clarified: In dealing with such matters, we do not stick to the letter of the criteria that prevailed prior to the March Manifesto. Rather, we stick to the criteria brought about by the new conditions — by the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, the national alliance and by the escalation of the struggle for liberation and progress. This is because abnormal situations tend to create abnormal conditions and abnormal consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the situation as soon as a normal climate prevails. This rule applies with equal validity to our

relations with other political forces, such as the Communist Party, for example.

Under former circumstances, and indeed in the initial stages of the Revolution, certain progressive forces raised the slogan of overthrowing the regime; some of their wings even took up arms against the Revolution, causing bloodshed. This compelled the Revolution to take very drastic deterring measures. But the state of collision and the tensions it leaves behind can not be made applicable to all conditions and circumstances, particularly when new conditions and formulas ensue. The type of passive relations and the state of affairs that existed in the past between ourselves and the Communist Party do not represent, now, a hindering factor impeding the building of genuine cooperation under altogether new conditions and in utterly new tasks.

4. We must admit that the experience of the relations between the ABSP and the KDP since the issuance of the March Manifesto, due to the grave atrocities committed by certain elements of the KDP and to the strange attitudes directed by those elements against the core of our Party and the core of the Revolution's authority, has created bitterness in the hearts of no few members and cadres of our Party. We can not hide the fact that many of these members and cadres have lost a good deal of their zeal for fostering relations between the two parties and for the implementation of the provisions of the Manifesto in the best and speediest way. Nor can we conceal the fact that a mood of this kind must leave its imprint on the entire national relations in the country — at least to a certain degree.

Extensive and incessant efforts have been, and still are, exerted by the leadership and the senior cadres of the Party for inculcating in the ranks of the party a thorough understanding of the doctrinal motives upon which the March Manifesto is based, for restraining and rectifying improper reactions, for disseminating sound and wise

orientations and for displaying a high sense of responsibility and strict compliance with the Party's strategic line.

This matter might appear as if it were our own headache and, as such, we are alone held responsible for remedying it. Indeed, so it is. But it must be viewed with the concomitant fact that the ABSP is the Party that stands at the helm of power and that its cadres and members shoulder responsibility in many sensitive posts within the state and the mass and professional organizations. Therefore, the feebleness of their enthusiasm for any affair does not inflict loss on the Party alone but also on the entire country.

Is it not a pity that we find ourselves called upon to pay extraordinary efforts in matters that are supposed to have been done with long ago? Such efforts ought to have been spared for dealing with so many and so grave liberating, progressive and democratic tasks on both national and nationalist levels.

However, in spite of all the difficulties that confront us, we are required to live up to our principles and our responsibilities before the people and history, by always marching along the right path - the path of revolutionary and progressive struggle - however dearly the cost and however hard the task might be.

The above is a glance at the reactions we felt at the time of publishing this series. They are not all brand new; some were entertained before the running of our articles by those who knew a certain degree of the realities of the situation.

Apart from this, there were and still are the reactions originating from the imperialist and reactionary camp. Their main characteristic is having a double-face — the exaggerated and, naturally, suspect concern for the national rights of the Kurdish people on the one hand and the fomentation of tendencies for isolationism as well as hostility to the Kurdish

people among the Arabs on the other hand. Although we do not underestimate these reactions, yet we did not deal with them in detail, because their intentions and ways and means are obvious and because the rank and file of our people, of our party and of the other nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces are mature enough to expose, encounter and fight them.

One might ask: Were you surprised by those reactions? And how come you to embark on publication without taking them into account?

Our answer is this: We did anticipate those reactions. When starting our series, we were fully appreciating its concomitant reactions and consequences.

But, we were convinced that the extent of the deterioration in the relations between our party and the KDP, coupled with the alarming degree reached by the behaviour and attitudes of the brothers of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, did not at all permit any more concealment of facts from the people—however bitter and alarming those facts might be. Further, we were fully convinced of the futility of keeping the issue confined to bilateral meetings and discussions. This is why we decided to present the problem for the widest possible debate. As a matter of fact we have explained our reasons in the beginning of the first article of this series.

Nor did we stop short at that limit. We proposed to brothers in the KDP that representatives from the Communist Party and from the nationalist and the national progressive forces and elements join our dialogue.

While fully appreciating the concomitant reactions and results of our articles, we had to adopt this style of projecting facts neither for provocation or defamation nor for breaking off relations or for justifying such an action. As a matter of fact, we had to resort to this pattern of

information while the dialogue between the ABSP and the KDP was in its preliminary stages.

Before publishing our series, and in the course of the dialogue between the two parties, the Regional Leadership of the ABSP addressed a detailed memo to the leadership of the KDP.* We had to send that memo in spite of being previously told by brothers in the KDP that they were not in favour of the exchange of memos and that they preferred direct talks. We did so because we preferred communication through notes so that matters may be well defined and specific and lest the truth be lost in the welter of verbal debate.

The Central Committee of the KDP's reply to our memorandum, which was published in "al-Nahar" newspaper of Beirut before reaching us, is now being studied and we shall state our views about it in due course.

From the facts and viewpoints previously stated, one can perceive our intention from making facts known to the people on the widest possible range, regardless of any negative out-come that might arise from disseminating the truth. We were motivated by the conviction that acquainting the public opinion with all facts enables it pass a fair judgement on our own attitudes and conduct and that of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement. We also meant to transfer the controversy from the narrow margin represented by the dialogue between the two parties to a national public scope with the aim of elaborating the peaceful solutions to the matters under study and of mobilizing the broadest massive forces to safeguard peace and cement national unity.

This should not infer that we suspend disagreements in a vacuum. Far from this; we have a thorough analysis of the situation and its remote and close eventualities. We

did explain to brothers in the KDP our concept of the roads leading to the creation of sound cooperation between our party and the revolutionary regime on the one hand and the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand. This concept may be summarized in the following :

1. The Application of the principle of the supremacy of law and the constitutional institutions of the state, together with the prohibition of any exercise of power outside competent constitutional and judicial state institutions.
2. The relationship between the ABSP and the revolutionary authority on one side and the KDP on the other must be governed by the basic interests of the Revolution and its forces; it must not be achieved at the expense of undermining ties with any progressive force, category, or group backing the Revolution in the northern area. The reason is that the Revolution does not accept to curtail its commitments towards the Kurdish people or to reduce them to a one-sided relation maintained only with the KDP. Generally speaking, no political party can be a substitute for the people, though it can prove, by deeds, to be their vanguard.
3. The KDP must undertake to sever relations with the ruling Iranian reaction, to seal the borders and to hand over the frontier posts to the army.
4. The KDP must undertake to cease animosity against Iranian patriots and give up handing over Iranian fugitives to the authorities of the Shah.
5. The KDP must undertake to break with the reactionary and suspect elements that are hostile to the Revolution and to give up maintaining dual relations simultaneously with the Revolution and its enemies.

6. Condemning political assassination and classifying all crimes that break the peace as extraordinary crimes—well outside the boundaries of routine offences.
7. Condemning and fighting against all deeds and practices that lend justification to the activities of the chauvenist and isolationist elements aimed at inciting disorder and sedition.
8. Giving up endeavours for winning over the reactionary and for imposing their domination over the masses; and abiding in political relations by the principles of revolutionary democratic struggle.
9. Banishment of Kurdish chieftians who constitute a danger to the peace in the northern area to Baghdad or to any other town. Alternatively, appropriate conditions must be assured to enable them live in their homes, meanwhile subjecting to trial any one who breaks the law or order, or who attempts at instigating quarrels or sedition.
10. The KDP must undertake not to encounter the armed forces discharging their duties, and not to encounter the security and intelligence organs operating in the northern area, because such atrocities can emanate only from a mentality of detachment from the authority and of fighting against it, in addition to being inconsistent with the spirit of the March Manifesto.
11. The KDP must undertake not to assault elements supporting the Revolution, not to kidnap, torture or kill citizens and to close down all KDP's prisons and concentration camps together with setting free all inmates.
12. The KDP must acknowledge the fact that agreement with it on solving the Kurdish question.

neither means its monopoly of all state organs in the northern area nor its monopoly of representing the Kurdish people in the main organs of the state.

13. The practical policy of the KDP should be steered in the course of cementing peace and national fraternity and safeguarding national unity and the unity of struggle.

It is impossible to tolerate the perpetuation of the KDP's policy that is based solely on its private interests in detachment from the country's basic interests. Nor is it possible to relagate the country's basic interests to a second class status.

14. All administrative staff labelled as KDP members must enforce the laws and regulations of the country and must create conditions assuring the unity of national sovereignty.
15. The KDP must undertake to prevent the state of armament in the areas inhabited by Kurds and to stop searches carried out on public roads by armed members of the KDP.
16. The KDP must undertake to provide all the prerequisites enabling the state to conduct investigations in all crimes of assassination and kidnapping. It must also undertake to hand over to competent state organs all elements hostile to the Revolution and to refuse shelter and protection to all criminals, wanted persons or military service dodgers.
17. The KDP must undertake to proceed along the path of consolidating the gains of the Revolution and to resist counter-revolutionary currents. It is not permissible that the KDP converts its official offices throughout Iraq into shelters for reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements. These elements

neither restored peace to the northern area nor are they concerned for the historic March Manifesto. As such, nothing meaningful justifies the maintenance of a relationship with them.

18. Agreement should be worked out to remove administrative elements appointed in the northern area on the recommendation of the KDP who proved to be insubordinate to the central authority and who actually refused to carry out the orders of the government.
19. The resettlement of all Kurds in their former places, regardless of whether they deserted their homes before or after the March Manifesto.
20. Forbidding KDP's organizations from interfering in the daily affairs of government.
21. The formation of a judiciary body, enjoying the support of the nationalist forces, to be entrusted with investigating accusations of offences endangering the security and safety of the state.
22. No obstacles should be placed in the road of implementing the resolutions of the Revolution concerning granting cultural and administrative rights to national minorities.
23. The enforcement of the Agrarian Reform Law should not be obstructed in any way.
24. Effective contribution to the prevention of smuggling and the infiltration of foreigners and foreign intelligence elements through the Iraqi northern frontiers.
25. Handing over heavy arms to the authority.

* * *

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14. BROAD DEMOCRATIC DEBATE INVITED.

The Kurdish question is one of the principal issues facing the Iraqi national movement. It is dialectically associated with the progressive and democratic struggle of our people and with their basic interests. It is also connected, in many ways, with the struggle of the entire Arab people against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Since the triumph of the July 17 Revolution, our Party's efforts to solve this question were always interlinked with the struggle for achieving progressive and democratic tasks and with the struggle for attaining the fundamental Arab aims, particularly the struggle against the Zionist enemy and its imperialist and reactionary allies.

It is true that the process of embodying, in explicit and comprehensive frameworks and formulas, the link between the Kurdish problem and some other basic issues (specially the question of building a nationalist and progressive "National Front") has taken quite a longer time than the practical steps taken by the Revolution towards settling the problem — particularly the announcement of the March 11 Manifesto. But this was not due to either a one-sided view of the Kurdish question or to a desire to keep the matter confined to just two sides. It should rather be attributed to the complicated circumstances that governed relations between all parties of the nationalist, national and progressive movement in our country. Those circumstances necessitated exceptional efforts and a relatively long time to promote relations to the level of a progressive 'Front' guided by a definite and agreed programme of joint action and by genuine and fruitful devices for common cooperation. Perhaps we are not exaggerating if we say that any fair analysis of the essence of the progress of the July 17 Revolution will bear out what we have just said.

Now that we have projected our view to the people and to their nationalist, national and progressive political

parties and forces through publishing what information and conclusions we deemed necessary to disclose, (concerning relations between our party and the revolutionary authority on the one hand and the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand and concerning the obstacles coming in the way of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question) we believe that the next right step is to open a national debate on the problems under review.

The issues raised in our previous 13 articles are so serious and so critical that they need the participation of all — the political parties, all the nationalist, national and progressive forces, all the thinkers and writers and all the popular and professional organizations, federations and societies — in their debate and in proposing their best solutions. They are, undoubtedly, issues concerning the whole homeland and the whole people. They are not of any private character warranting confining their discussion and disagreement or even agreement upon them to ourselves and brothers in the KDP solely.

We appeal to all citizen - political parties, organizations, societies, thinkers and writers - to express their opinion on the issues raised by us. We are ready to publish in this newspaper, "ath-Thawra", all views received in this respect, including, of course, those which contradict and disagree with our ideas and views and those which criticize our deeds and procedures.

We should like, also, to propose to the nationalist organizations to arrange for open discussion circles for this purpose. We are fully confident that such patriotic and free discussions will ensure optimum conditions for tackling the difficulties coming in the way of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, for the isolation of suspect currents and trends and for consolidating the positions of the bona fide forces that believe in Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and in the progressive and democratic principles of the July 17 Revolution.

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DOCUMENTS

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THE MARCH MANIFESTO

Declaration of the Revolution Command Council on the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish Question

The primary *raison d'être* of the July 17 Revolution was that it represented both the denunciation by all Arab masses of the causes of the June defeat and those responsible for it and the consensus of the popular opinion of Iraq on condemning the former dictatorial reactionary rule for contributing, by its defeatist attitude, to that national ordeal. That was because the former regime was completely isolated from the people and absolutely incapable of solving the national issues that had always gnawed at the root of the national structure and whose settlement was a precondition for determined endeavours to mobilize human and material energies in Iraq and commit them where they belong — in the frontlines of the battle of the destiny of the Arab nation.

This being so, the Revolution laid before its eyes, right from its very first days, the duty of realizing the national unity of the people of Iraq without any discrimination on account of sex, language, religion or social origin, side by side with assuring all political, social and economic conditions required for this unity. In this way, it should be possible for Iraq to direct all of its energies and possibilities to the nationalist battle of destiny which, in the opinion of the Revolution, represents the summit of the bitter historic strife between colonialism, Zionism and their evil designs in the Arab homeland on the one hand, and the interests of the liberation of the Arab nation and its struggle for the achievement of its human progressive aims on the other.

In spite of the legacy of myriad complicated problems which confronted the Revolution from the day of its inception, the Revolution proceeded with firmness and faith up the road of liberating Iraq from the residues of colonialism,

national betrayal and political oppression and for providing all prerequisites to build a new Iraq where actual equality in rights and obligations and equal opportunities shall effectively be established and wide horizons shall be opened to the masses of the people by means of collective loyalty to the unity of the homeland, to the unity of its people and to the unity of its major goal — national unity, liberty and socialism.

The settlement of the Kurdish issue in Iraq stood in the forefront of the national issues which the Revolution faced. This was particularly so as the incapability of the former regimes to comprehend that issue, even the lack of genuine desire to tackle it and suggest proper solutions to it in those eras, side by side with the concomitant exploitation of the resulting circumstances by imperialism, its collaborators and its agents, have all combined to further complicate the issue to the extent of rendering it something almost forbidding and insoluble. The situation had further been aggravated as the result of the substitution of violence for brotherly and objective democratic dialogue which is required by the nature of this national issue and by the legitimate and just rights it involved for a section of the Iraqi people.

From its very first days, the Revolution proceeded to deal with this national issue in an atmosphere permeated with a sense of self-responsibility and revolutionary principles.

The Revolution, which is inspired by the theoretical fountainhead of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, believes that nationalist rights are, in their essence, democratic rights. They have, among their aims, reviving cultural heritage, language and tradition, as well as putting free will into practice. The consolidation of such rights among various nationalities, particularly those of the same homeland, requires the realization of ways and means for organizing relationships between those nationalities in a manner conducive to their collective uplift.

Any plans aiming for undermining ties between them or sowing the seeds of dissension can be of no service to their collective interests. Meanwhile, the organization and cementation of national and human ties between them and steering such ties to the service of progress, will systematically assure the means of the unity of national life in an atmosphere abounding in national fraternity and peace.

Imbued by these principles, the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, which convened late in 1968 and early in 1969, took steps to delineate the Party's ideological and theoretical positions on this national issue and to chart out a settlement of the issue for the Revolution and the revolutionary authority. The resolutions passed by that Conference, had this to say, among other things :

The Conference has stressed the conviction that the question of the nationalist ambitions of the Kurds of Iraq comes in the forefront of the problems facing the Arab revolutionary movement. Years have now passed by without arriving at a sound settlement of this issue. Consequently, unspeakable calamities and tragedies came to be inflicted on both Arabs and Kurds as a result of arbitrariness in approaching the issue. The forces of imperialism and reaction and the detachment of agents and opportunists readily put the situation to their own advantage and used the failure of solving the issue as a vehicle for meddling in Iraq's affairs, bringing pressure to bear on it, spinning conspiracies against the rights of both Arabs and Kurds and for inflicting the greatest possible damage on the progressive and democratic nationalist gains they had won at a high cost of self-sacrifice and common struggle.

The Conference further stressed that our Party, which in its militant struggle and policy has always stemmed from its nationalist, humanistic, socialist and democratic ideology, has consistently held in high respect the national ambitions of the Kurdish masses as embedded in their own progressive national substance and viewed them as legitimate humanistic rights.

The Conference well appreciated the strong ties between the realization of those ambitions and the vigour and soundness of the advance of the popular masses in Iraq up the road of liquidating the legacies of colonialism so as to have Iraq's hand free for engaging in the current battle of destiny in Palestine and keeping up the historic struggle for the achievement of Arab unity, liberty and socialism.

The Revolution, sincere to the principles and resolutions of the Party, has recognized for the Kurdish citizens their entitlement to their national rights and to developing their national characteristics within the framework of the unity of the people and the homeland and the country's constitutional **system**.

As the Arab nation is engaged in a large-scale conflict with imperialism, Zionism and local reaction — a conflict placing it in the frontline of the struggle of the peoples of the Middle East, (it being understood that the struggle of the people of Iraq is closely linked with the struggle of the Arab nation for democracy and for combating the forces of reaction on both world-wide and local levels) — the Revolution considers that the first prop of the Arab-Kurdish national unity in Iraq lies in the fact that the Kurdish national unity, like its Arab counterpart, is a democratic movement directed against the same forces of reaction. In Iraq, it is tied up to the Arab liberation movement by the unity of struggle against imperialism and its reactionary allied forces. It is also tied up to the struggle of the Arab people by the traditions of historic fraternity, the unity of economic interests and the concerted evolution of the Arab and Kurdish nationalities. Any breach of this harmony will, of necessity, inflict immense damage on the common struggle and on the progressive national resurgence in general.

Imperialism has long realized that the unity of Arab-Kurdish struggle has the effect of reinforcing the Arab-Kurdish liberation movement and enabling it to occupy important positions in the face of the imperialistic-Zionist-Israeli aggressive schemings in the region, particularly in

regard to the national battle of destiny currently raging in Palestine and the surrounding Arab countries. As such, the imperialistic and hireling quarters have been trying madly to break chesion and fraternity between the Arab and Kurdish masses with the purpose of undermining the front of the revolutionary national struggle of Iraq.

The Revolution, understanding the national issue as an integral part of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, will necessarily abide, in every step taken towards settling the Kurdish national issue, by measures conducive to cementing and consolidating national and nationalist struggle against those inhuman forces combined.

From this it follows that the exercising by the Kurdish masses of their national rights and the achievement of equal opportunities of free development, constitute the two paths leading to the unification of Iraq's national struggle against the enemies of the people and the enemies of the Arab nation and of the people of Iraq, namely imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

It was by no means a coincidence that the imperialistic-Zionist-reactionary conspiracies on the Republic of Iraq occurred at a time when signs of peace began looming large on the horizon of our beloved North, thanks to the meaningful endeavours exerted by the Revolutionary Government and to the sincere response on the part of the leadership of Mr. Mustafa Al-Barzani.

It is public knowledge that the Revolution had taken all necessary measures for the re-es'tablishment of calmness and peace throughout northern Iraq.

The following steps have also been taken :

A) Recognition has been given to the legitimacy of the Kurdish nationality, this being in accordance with the Resolutions of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and the official and press statements issued by the revolutionary authority. This fact shall be

enshrined in a lasting manner in the Interim Constitution and the Permanent Constitution.

B) The Revolutionary Command Council has approved the establishment of a university in Sulaimaniyah and the establishment of Kurdish Academy of Letters. It has also recognized all cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish nationality, prescribing that the Kurdish language be taught in all schools, institutes, universities, teachers training institutes, the Military College and the Police College. The Revolutionary Command Council further prescribed the wide dissemination of Kurdish literature — scientific, literary and political—expressive of the national and nationalist ambitions of the Kurdish people. It ordered measures to be taken to help Kurdish authors, poets and writers to form a federation of their own, get their works printed and afford them all opportunities and possibilities for developing their scientific and artistic talents. The Revolution Command Council also ordered arrangements to be made for founding a Kurdish publishing and printing house and a directorate general of Kurdish culture, publishing a weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine in Kurdish and expanding Kurdish programme on the Kirkuk TV Station, pending the construction of a TV station broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish .

C) In recognition of the rights of the Kurds to revive their traditions and national days and to make it possible for the whole of the people to join in the observance of national days, the Revolution Command Council has decreed Nawrooz Day as a National Day in the Republic of Iraq.

D) The Revolutionary Command Council has promulgated the Governorates Law which provides for the decentralization of the local administration and for the creation of the Governorate of Dohuk .

E) The Revolution Command Council has issued a general amnesty for all civilian and military personnel who

had joined in acts of violence in the North so as to do away with all vestiges of former negative and exceptional conditions and lay the new national life on solid foundations of pervasive security and national fraternity.

The Arab Kurdish masses of Iraq received with acclamation and welcome the acts and measures of the Revolution Command Council, thereby setting the stage for proceeding with the realization of the aims which have become the object of popular consensus and on which the will and unity of the word of the people came to be centred.

In view of the above, the Revolution Command Council established contacts with the leadership of Mr. Mustafa Al-Barzani, Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and viewpoints were subsequently exchanged. All were convinced of the necessity of accepting and implementing the contents of this Manifesto. The Revolution Command Council reiterates its determination to deepen and broaden the effective measures made with the object of achieving the means of the cultural and economic uplift and the general development of the Kurdish area, aiming in the first place, at enabling the Kurdish masses to exercise their legitimate rights and secure their actual participation in the national build-up and the struggle for the realization of the great nationalist objectives of the homeland.

* * *

The Revolution Command Council has thus decreed the following :

1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic language, be an official language in the areas populated by a majority of Kurds. The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. The Arabic language shall be taught in all schools where teaching is conducted in Kurdish. The Kurdish language shall be taught elsewhere in Iraq as a second language within the limits prescribed by the law.

2) It has been one of the main concerns of the revolutionary government to secure participation by our Kurdish brothers in Government and eliminate any discrimination between Kurds and other nationals in regard to holding public offices including sensitive and important ones as cabinet ministries, army commands, etc. While endorsing this principle, the revolutionary government stresses the need for endeavouring to have the principle achieved in fair proportions with due care to considerations of merits, the population ratio and the deprivations experienced by our Kurdish brothers in the past.

3) In view of the backwardness experienced in the past by the Kurdish nationality in the cultural and educational domains, a plan should be worked out for the treatment of this backwardness. This is to be achieved through:

(a) Implementing expeditiously the resolutions of the Revolution Command Council in regard to the language and cultural rights of the Kurdish people and tying up the preparation and direction of special programmes on Kurdish national affairs in the radio and TV network to the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information.

(b) Reinstating students who were dismissed or had to leave school because of former conditions of violence in the area. These students should be allowed to return to their respective schools regardless of age limits or else have a convenient remedy suggested for their problem.

(c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of education and admitting, at a fair rate, Kurdish students to universities and military colleges and granting them scholarships.

4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority, government officials shall be appointed from among Kurds or persons well versed in the Kurdish language as long as these are available. The principal Government functionaries — governor, district officer (Qaimuqam) director of police, director of security, etc. — shall be drawn from among the Kurds. Steps shall immediately be

taken to develop state organs in the area in consultation within the framework of the High Committee supervising the implementation of this Manifesto in a manner ensuring its proper enforcement and consolidating national unity and stability in the area.

5) The Government recognizes the right of the Kurdish people to set up student, youth, women and teachers organizations of their own. These organizations shall be affiliated in the national counterparts in Iraq.

6) (a) The validity of paras (1) and (2) of the Revolution Command Council's Decree No. 59 dated August 5, 1968, shall be extended to the date of the issuance of this Manifesto. This shall cover all of those who took part in hostilities in the Kurdish area.

(b) Workers, government functionaries and employees, both civilian and military, shall go back to service without this being subject to cadre considerations. The civilian personnel shall be posted to the Kurdish area within the limits of its requirements.

7) (a) A committee of specialists shall be formed to speed up the uplift of the Kurdish area in all respects and provide indemnities for the affliction of the past number of years, side by side with drawing up an adequate budget for all of this. The committee in question shall be attached to the Ministry of Northern Affairs.

(b) The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way as to ensure equal development for various parts of Iraq, with due attention to the backward conditions of the Kurdish area.

(c) Pension salaries shall be made available to the families of members of the Kurdish armed movement who met with martyrdom in the regrettable hostilities as well as to those rendered incapacitated or disfigured. This shall be regulated in a special legislation patterned on the existing laws of the land.

(d) Speedy action shall be taken to bring relief to aggrieved and needy persons by means of building housing units and other projects ensuring work to the unemployed, offering appropriate aid both in kind and in cash and granting reasonable indemnities to aggrieved persons who stand in need for help. This shall be the responsibility of the High Committee, with the exception of those specified in the above paras.

8) The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be repatriated to their places of habitation. As to villagers whose villages lie in areas requisitioned by the Government for public utility purposes in accordance with the provisions of the law, they shall be settled in neighbouring districts and shall be compensated for whatever loss they might have incurred as a result.

9) Steps shall be taken to speed up the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish area and have the Law amended in such a way as to ensure the liquidation of all feudalistic relationship, handing out appropriate plots of land to all peasants and waiving for them agricultural tax arrears for the duration of the regrettable hostilities.

10) It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows:

(a) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution recognizes the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all nationalities within the framework of the Iraqi unity.

(b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: "The Kurdish language shall be, beside the Arabic language, an official language in the Kurdish area.

(c) This all shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution.

11) The broadcasting station and the heavy arms shall be given back to the Government — this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of the agreement.

12) One of the Vice-Presidents of the Republic shall be a Kurd.

13) The Governorates Law shall be amended in a way conforming with the contents of this Manifesto.

14) Following the issuance of the Manifesto, necessary steps shall be taken in consultation with the High Committee supervising its enforcement to unify the governorates and administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority as shown by the official census to be carried out. The State shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the Kurdish people's process of exercising their national rights as a measure of ensuring self-rule. Pending the realization of administrative unity, Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated by means of periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As self-rule is to be established within the framework of the Republic of Iraq, the exploitation of the natural riches in the area shall obviously be the prerogative of the authorities of the Republic.

15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative power in proportion to their ratio of the population of Iraq.

Kurdish Countrymen !

These accomplishments achieved by the Revolution are nothing more than a step up the ladder of attaining your national objectives in the shade of this beloved homeland and the unity of its great people. History will bear witness that you never had and never will have as dependable brothers and allies as the Arab people.

Masses of our great people !

It is your will for national unity which will triumph in the end. All attempts made to undermine your militant cohesion shall get smashed up on the rock of your maturity and your determination to live up to your historic responsibilities. Your struggling masses are today shaking off the dust of the intrigues spun by the enemies and greedy elements and are proceeding hand in hand vigorously and resolutely for backing up the major cause of the Arab nation, namely, Palestine, and for realizing your sublime objective in respect to unity, liberty and socialism.

Masses of our struggling Arab Nation !

A page of the history of this struggling country is thus folded out and a new bright one is opened by the Revolution and by all free militant strugglers of this homeland. On this beloved soil, the bonds of affection, peace and fraternity are rejuvenated between two nationalities that are held together by a long record of common struggle across history. Today, tomorrow and for ever, they shall have endless honour across history. Today, tomorrow and for ever, they shall have the honour of reviving common struggle for vanquishing the enemies of the two nationalities and the enemies of peoples and humanity in its entirety, namely, Zionism, imperialism and backwardness. They shall have the honour of joint contribution to backing up man's struggle for liberation and progress and for consolidating the civilization of the age on foundations of right, equality and justice among all peoples.

Forward for common struggle, common hopes and common nationalist and human victories !

The Revolution Command Council

11/3/1970

* * *

ABSP's MEMO TO KDP

*The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party
(One Nation with Eternal Mission)*

The Central Committee of the KDP,

Dear Brothers,

Greetings to you and to all members of your Party.

Addressing this memorandum to you at a time when our relations are suffering a serious break down, we are hopeful that this initiative will help expedite forestalling any further deterioration in our relations and facilitate the reconstruction of these relations on permanent rules emanating from a firm conviction that the single and sole basis of the alliance between our two parties and of maintaining national brotherhood among the masses of our Arab and Kurdish people is the common dedicated struggle for cementing the oneness of the national sovereignty of the Iraqi Republic and for the preservation of the unity of its land and people under the banner of and within the aims of the glorious July 17 Revolution that managed to secure so major progressive gains — the most important and distinguished of which is the historic March 11 Manifesto.

The causes of the deterioration of our relations are, of course, known to both of us. In fact, they had already been repeatedly discussed with the majority of the members of the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the KDP, particularly with Mr. al-Barzani.

That we resort to present once more (in a written message now) matters that arouse our anxiety is because we want all your comrades to have a full picture of our views and of the objective causes of the deterioration — which is yet remediable.

Furthermore, we want the masses of our two parties to be fully aware of the factors endangering the process of the reconstruction of peace. This will enable them play their positive role in the efforts being paid for rebuilding the alliance between our two parties on a strong, nationalist and comradely foundation and in the provision of the favourable atmosphere needed for commencing and promoting a relationship based on full confidence and aimed at serving the best interests of the Arab and Kurdish people and of a flourishing progressive Iraq.

This has become particularly essential, because the absence of a serious response to the need for transcending passive matters is constituting a danger to the security of the state and to our future cooperation.

There is no doubt that candour, objective confrontation with points of disagreement and contradiction, allegiance to the truth and loyalty for the unity of this homeland and the future of its people are the only criteria that can be relied upon in discovering the real causes that brought about the cracking of our relations. This will, in turn, lead to working out practical and effective solutions to a great many of the problems and difficulties we are now suffering.

Should there be a genuine desire, we believe (we are rather absolutely certain) that the ability to solve and transcend whatever major and grave difficulties and problems will always remain most powerful, most effective and most useful.

To get to know the real causes of the deteriorating conditions, we need to refer to the near past so as to comprehend the meaning of events within their objective and historic perspective. This is necessary to forestall any possibility for putting the clock back.

To us, it may be useful to remind once more of certain facts. One of these is that the Revolution did not stand on a weak or a negative position when it initiated a dialogue

with you for reaching a settlement to the Kurdish question. On the contrary, it approached you from a firm and positive position — the position of unwavering commitment to: its humanitarian and revolutionary ideals; its adherence to the principles of independence, national unity, democratic pattern and advanced social changes; its dedication to founding Arab-Kurdish brotherhood on a firm basis of peace and progress through a perfect settlement capable of presenting a resolute answer to factors of division and fighting between brothers of the very homeland.

It is evident that this attitude of the Revolution was neither the outcome of a coincidence nor the result of temporary and private factors and circumstances. It stemmed from a principled and strategic line driving from the belief of both our Party and the authority of the Revolution in the legitimate rights of the Kurds within the proper patriotic framework that ensures the fundamental requisites for cementing the unity of the Iraqi Republic in all spheres and at all levels.

Right from the beginning, our Party has embodied its concept of the Kurdish question in its statements and resolutions. Examples are the Statement of the National Leadership on the June 1966 Declaration and the Statement of the 1969 Seventh Regional Congress, etc., etc.

Our Party, the Party of the Arab revolution, totally condemns the national persecution consolidated by colonization and believes in the need for national fraternity amongst nationalities and minorities of the same homeland and the same state.

In a country like Iraq, where several national affiliations co-exist, the question of guaranteeing national rights represents the corner stone of the safety of national unity.

Inspired by the aforesaid ideas, together with an objective sense that you represent a main force affecting, positively

and passively, the present and the future of the Kurdish cause, the Revolution opened talks with you.

By taking the course of purposeful constructive dialogue, the Revolution expressed its desire for attaining enduring peace in the northern part of the homeland, on the basis of guaranteeing the enjoyment by the Kurdish people of their right for self-rule within the framework of national and popular unity and the unity of the national sovereignty of Iraq - as resolved by the 10th National Congress of our Party.

The fact that the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question came some time late after the outbreak of the July 17 Revolution should not imply that the settlement was not foremost of the tasks of the Revolution. One might recall that a number of positive relevant preliminary measures had heralded the declaration of the historic March 11 Manifesto. The dialogue opened with you regarding your participation in government, on the basis of the June 29th Declaration, was the first step taken by the Revolution on the road for the intended settlement.

Perhaps it is also useful to remind here that your demands then did not go beyond the provisions of the June 29th Declaration, which we considered an insufficient recognition of the national rights of the Kurds, thus incapable of guaranteeing hearty fraternity and strong relations between Arabs and Kurds within this country.

On the very first day of its triumph, the July 17 Revolution announced that it has fully adopted the June 29th Declaration, thereby endorsing its previous attitudes which you had known during our pre-Revolution meetings that resulted in your participation in the 17-30 July 1968 government.

But we were regrettably surprised by the lack of your readiness to participate in the government formed after the 30th July Uprise, despite the fact that the Uprise was essen-

tially directed against the elements of the right and the reactionary and suspect heads, who attempted to frivol with the Revolution and deviate it, and that it succeeded in resolving the matter in the interest of the masses and the cause of their national, national and social liberation.

Nevertheless, our many strains to convince you change your attitude and participate effectively in the shouldering of responsibility were in vain. Still, despite the continuation of passivism, we maintained our readiness to enter in a dialogue with you with the aim of understanding the deep reasons behind your said attitude.

But matters did not remain within the boundary of a passive attitude. You have deliberately escalated the situation to a more dangerous range when, under the supervision of members of the politbureau of your Party, you have blown up oil pipe lines. This revealed to us that you were no longer ready to solve problems in peaceful ways.

You have actually continued committing some acts of sabotage, such as blowing up railways lines in addition to numerous offences aimed at destroying the national economy. No authority that respects its responsibilities could have tolerated such offences.

Therefore, we found ourselves facing only two alternatives: either to keep silent, thus endangering the security and safety of the state or to forcibly retaliate in protection of the prestige of the state and the country's unity. Of course, it was imperative to have recourse to the second choice, regardless of its bitterness.

Under those conditions fighting broke out again in spite of our hate to follow that path as we were fully convinced that peace was the required atmosphere for a perfect settlement of the Kurdish question and for a radical remedy of the causes that led to the war.

You are no doubt aware that a great number of Kurdish citizens, particularly the faction of your party led by Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed and Mr. Jalal al-Talabani, had sided with the government when the fighting had been resumed.

Nevertheless, we still remained assured that the settlement of the Kurdish question could not be built on a sound basis prior to the settlement of the problems that primarily led to taking up arms.

In this respect, "ath-Thawra" newspaper, the organ of our Party, ran a series of articles entitled "How to Solve the Kurdish Question?" which explained our Party's stand in an unequivocal manner - leaving no room for any ambiguity.

"ath-Thawra" expounded our assured belief that the road for a just peace is via the recognition and the implementation of the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people and that any national persecution, whatever shape it took, would inevitably intensify the continuation of lawful struggle to end this persecution.

In spite of the state of fighting, the revolutionary authority maintained its conviction of the legitimacy of the national rights of the Kurds, as embodied in the June 29th Declaration. As a matter of fact it transcended the provisions of that Declaration.

It is common knowledge that the Revolution, during the state of fighting, had announced certain resolutions concerning the national rights of the Kurds that were not included in the June Declaration. Examples:

- * Recognition of the cultural rights of the Kurdish people.
- * The creation of a Kurdish Academy of Letters
- * Establishing the Sulaimaniyah University
- * Establishing the Duhuk Governorate.

- * Designating March 21st. (Nowros day) as a national day - for all and throughout Iraq.
- Declaring amnesty, several times, covering all those involved in the incidents of the north.

The above resolutions, mentioned by way of example only, were carried out before the announcement of the historic March 11 Manifesto. In essence, they were part of a comprehensive political programme drawn by the Revolution for the settlement of the Kurdish question. The March Manifesto is but the practical incarnation of that programme.

Needless to say that the broad lines of that programme were vivid in the vision of our Party before it came to power. That is why the renewal of fighting, which took place in the North after our Party's taking over power, did not shake our belief in the necessity for reaching a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question. Issues of principle, in our opinion, should not be affected by temporary events.

Despite all happenings, a trend for resuming talks with you has crystalized because we do not deny that any settlement, which ignores you as a political party, might result in planting hurdles on the road for the application of the national rights of the Kurds and for the realization of stable peace. Likewise, the alienation of a main force of the Kurdish Movement from taking part in the restoration of peace will hinder the mission of peace and constitute a distinct loophole in the settlement.

Under those circumstances, the 10th National Congress of our Party convened between 1-10/3/1970. It re-examined the Kurdish question and the national aspirations of the Kurdish masses in Iraq and acquainted itself with the outcome of the dialogue between the revolutionary authority and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement. The Congress emphasized that the announcement of a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, on the basis of self-

rule within Iraqi unity and with the best terms for cooperation and solidarity between the Arab and Kurdish nationalities, must be the first and foremost accomplishment of the Party

It is known that, from the beginning of our talks in search of a settlement, the points of fundamental disagreement were not related to the national rights of the Kurds. They centred mainly on the future of the relationship between the government and the faction of Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed and Mr. Jalal al-Talabani and on the government's future relations with the ex-leaders of al-Fursan.

You are no doubt aware that you did not raise the question of self-rule during our talks with brother Dara Tawfik. Then you only raised phased-demands. It was we who drew your attention to the fact that your demands did not cover everything. Our vision had originally surpassed those demands and rested on the certainty that a radical solution to the Kurdish question was the only solution that could not be substituted by semi settlements and interim truces.

Regarding your then raising the question of the relationship with the other faction of the KDP, we held that the issue was indeed secondary. We never imagined that you would consider it as more important than the question of the peaceful and democratic settlement - which is the cause of the entire Kurdish people.

We have maintained that it was not permissible to burden citizens - in either the second faction of your Party or in the Fursan - with the liability of an action whose responsibility lied on all parts, including the government. We also held that the maintenance of peace required the provision of the necessary atmosphere for national unity and for the universal enjoyment of safety by all nationalist contingents, Arabs and Kurds alike. Furthermore, we were of the opinion that the accomplishment of the peaceful and democratic

settlement was meant to guarantee the rights of all Kurdish masses - and not of one of their categories.

True to our policy of avoiding falling into points over which we disagreed, we accepted your views and expressed our desire for bringing about a national reconciliation between you and your Kurdish opponents - who could never be other than Kurds, who must never be branded as traitors merely because they disagreed with your views and towards whom you should assume an attitude consistent with the situation that would arise out of the peaceful settlement.

It was sad that we received no positive reply. On the contrary; you lacked any readiness to hear anything on the subject.

A shortwhile after the innouncement of the March Manifesto, we received news to the effect that a concord had been reached between Mr. al-Barzani and his Fursan opponents and that the former presented arms and money to the leaders of the Fursan who had visited him!!

A little later, you began contacts with the leaders of the other faction of your Party with the aim of realizing a reconciliation.

While genuinely and sincerely desirous of the liquidation of all problems, passivity and grudges existing between you and your Kurdish and other opponents, we could not interpret your rejection of all our efforts for realizing an accord between you and your antagonists, together with your carrying out the mission alone, except as a sort of maneuver driving at giving the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question the character of victory and imposition of solutions - and not the character of a democratic national concord .

That was the first clue that revealed the passivity of your intentions, your ignoring our positive and permanent stands for the attainment of a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question and your portraying the settlement as a victory of your own.

Therefore, we began to feel uneasy about the sincerity of your intentions. The course you have taken did not indicate the availability of a genuine desire for building a faithful and firm national alliance.

We have wondered, and we might well ask now: if the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question is indeed a common patriotic victory and a triumph of the political authority that is accomplishing the settlement, why then did you resort to alienating that authority from its positive relations, particularly with Kurdish quarters outside your Party? Doesn't this mean an attempt to sow complications fettering the regime entrusted with the application of the settlement? Is it in the interest of the Kurdish Movement to make the Revolution sense that the troubles you are creating for it are similar to those faced by previous governments during the state of fighting - as if peace and war and a sound settlement or no settlement of the Kurdish question were one and the same?

It is indeed surprising that any person is classified as a patriot or a stooge according to the type of his relationship with your Party only - apart from the Revolution and the general conditions it introduced in favour of the Kurdish Movement. It is also really astonishing that you cast an unobjective look upon any one related to the authority, even though you are part of the authority and take part in its various organizations.

It is a pity that all these happenings took place after, and not before, the March Manifesto and without differentiation between the authority that launches national persecution against the Kurds and the authority that is honestly committed to the national rights of the Kurds and that undertakes the responsibility for surpassing all hurdles and obstacles in order to stabilize peace.

Lest major issues be submerged by the presentation of minor questions, it is imperative to state matters once

again, candidly and conspicuously, hoping that your time will allow a serious and careful study of our remarks.

We are both agreed that the March Manifesto comprised two closely inter-connected basic issues, namely:

- A. Guaranteeing the legitimate national rights of the Kurds.
- B. Consolidating the unity of Iraq, i.e., the unity of the people, of the homeland and of the constitutional system in accordance with the logic of the supremacy of law and the centralization of authority, without which logic it is impossible to have or to perpetuate Iraqi unity.

We enumerate below the rights prescribed in the March Manifesto which had been implemented after the announcement of the Manifesto:

1. Amending the Interim Constitution in a way affirming the national presence of the Kurds in accordance with the March Manifesto.
2. Taking legal measures to ensure the recognition of the Kurdish language, side by side with Arabic, as an official language in the areas where the majority of the population is Kurdish.

The Kurdish language has already become the language of instruction in these areas.

3. Participation of Kurdish brothers in the government, public posts and planning boards.
4. Appointment of Kurdish officials in the administrative units inhabited by a Kurdish majority, or by a majority mastering the Kurdish language.
5. Passing out new regulations for the Directorate of Kurdish Scholastic Affairs as part of intended comprehensive changes enabling it discharge its duties competently.

6. Renaming schools after historic, geographical and patriotic Kurdish names.
7. Provision of Kurdish books to public libraries and schools.
8. Appointment of large numbers of teachers to schools where teaching is conducted in the Kurdish language.
9. Creation of a Directorate for Kurdish Culture in the Ministry of Information.
10. Establishment of "al-Tadhmon Kurdish Printing and Publishing House".
11. Publishing a Kurdish magazine "Bayan" and a Kurdish newspaper "Hawkari" by the Ministry of Information .
12. Permitting the publication of Kurdish-language newspapers and magazines such as "Brayati" "Berineoa", "Shame Kurdish" and "Estara".
13. Increasing Kurdish programmes in the Kirkuk TV Station.
14. Licencing the Kurdish Cultural Society.
15. Founding the Union of Kurdish writers.
16. Permitting the formation of exclusively Kurdish student, youth, women and teachers organizations.
17. Reinstating students, who were dismissed or compelled to leave school because of violent conditions, in their former schools and institutes, regardless of age restrictions.
18. Pardoning all prisoners (civilian and military) convicted by competent courts on account of the incidents of the North.

19. Appointment of teachers and dressers who graduated from non-regular courses.
20. Reinstatement in the service of all Kurdish workers, officials and employees (civilian and military) without abidance with the cadre and regardless of the amount of their contribution to the acts of violence committed in the Kurdish area.

In addition to that, special orders were issued by the President of the Republic and by his Deputy re-instating, as a special case, a large number of military and civilian personnel to the service, despite the lack of any relationship between their cases and the incidents of the North. This was in response to the wishes of your Party and Mr. al-Barzani.

21. Allotment of pensions to the families of the martyr and victims of the sad incidents of the North as from May, 1971.
22. Exempting all Kurdish military men, who had deserted the service because the incidents of the North, from responsibility for the weapons and equipments that were in their custody.
23. Absolving all Kurds who had participated in the incidents of the North from both conscription and cash payment in lieu of that.
24. Appointment of 6,000 demobilized Peshmigas as Frontier Guards in 12 regiments and the enactment of a special law for them together with classifying them and considering them as part of the Iraqi armed forces.
25. Allocation of 50,000 Dinars, monthly, as consolidated allotments to 5,000 demobilized Peshmigas (ID. 10 per month each) pending absorbing them in suitable jobs.

26. Allocation of between 30-50 thousand Dinars, monthly, to the headquarters of Mr. al-Barzani.
27. Counting the workers period of absence from duty during the fighting towards pension and social security. The period of absence of officials and employees, both military and civilian, who took part in the incidents, was also counted towards increment, promotion and pension.
28. Passing a special resolution regarding the Kurdish farmers who failed to settle their debts to the Agricultural Bank because of the incidents of the North. Accordingly, they can draw new extra loans (not restricted by the ordinary ceiling) which are sufficient to enable them pay their old debts and to resume their agricultural activity.
29. Commencing agrarian reform in the northern area, despite the obstructions laid on its way.

Agricultural and livestock schemes have also been accomplished.

30. Drawing up the Economic Plan (centrally and self-financed) in a pattern ensuring balanced development of the various Iraqi regions, taking into consideration the standard of backwardness in the Kurdish area.
31. Formation of the North Development Committee, which was furnished with adequate funds for accomplishing projects that ensure compensating the Kurdish area for the damages it suffered in the recent years. (This is in addition to the projects approved in the Economic Plan).
32. Completion of many projects, specially in the field of housing and services, to compensate the area for the damages and backwardness it sustained. 12,000 houses have been built for those who lost

their homes during the lamentable hostilities. Many primary and secondary schools, public clinics, health centres and hospitals were also opened. Artezian wells were sunk, modern markets were established and many electric and irrigation projects were constructed. Roads, bridges and wire communications were built. Quite a number of tourist and summer resort projects were established. Recently a grand tourist hotel, costing one million Dinars, was approved at Salah Addin .

33. Regarding the industrialization of the Kurdish area, five manually operated carpet weaving centres have been established in Arbil, Kwaisinjak, Rawandouz, Dohuk and al-Amadiya. A centre for producing wool threads has been built in Arbil. A large dairy products factory has been developed in Arbil and the building of the Arbil carpentry factory has also been completed. The construction of a beet sugar mill in Sulaimaniya will soon be completed. The Sarchinar cement factory will shortly be expanded. A tobacco blending factory in Sulaimaniya and a poultry in Arbil will be established. Furthermore, work is to begin soon on building a wool textile mill in Arbil, a Kurdish dressmaking plant in Duhok, a large canning factory in Hareer, a canning and tomato paste plant in Duhok and a factory for improved cigarettes in Arbil. The Ministry of oil is soon to begin building fuel depots in Sarchinar for supplying the northern area, particularly the Sulaimaniya Governorate, with various types of fuel. A project for processing marble in Arbil will shortly be presented to the Planning Board.

It is common knowledge that the geographical distribution of the development projects, both centrally and self-financed, clearly shows that the per capita share of these

projects in the northern area is higher than the national per capita share

Regarding the clauses of the Manifesto which have not been enforced, we enumerate them hereunder, together with the reasons that prompted delaying their accomplishment:

1. Participation of Kurds in the Legislative Power:

We recognize the participation of the Kurds in the legislative power as a natural right, which the revolutionary authority is endeavouring to realize in the nearest opportunity. At the very beginning, we have told you our concern for the creation of a National Council in the shortest time. But, you will agree with us that the intended Council ought to be an organization of national concord - and not a platform for passive contradiction - so that it could effectively contribute towards gathering and mobilizing all capabilities for enforcing the positions of the Revolution and for deepening the gains of the masses.

Therefore, our estimation, which was conveyed to you at the time, was that the formation of the Council ought to succeed agreement on the National Action Charter. As to the powers of the Council, we are still committed to the already agreed relevant clauses of the March Manifesto. Should you have any opinion to the contrary, we are prepared to study all proposals submitted by you in this respect.

2. Appointment of the Vice President of the Republic:

It is your right to nominate your representative; but, in the selection of superior state members, we should not be cornered in a critical situation. We named two prominent Kurdish personalities - one of them being a member of the Central Committee of your Party; but we have not yet received your answer.

However, we are prepared to enforce this clause of the Manifesto in consultation, as stipulated by the Manifesto itself.

3. Appointment of Directors
of Security :

While re-affirming our concern for the participation of our Kurdish brothers in all state institutions, including the security organs, we can not ignore the fact that the present conditions dominating the Kurdish area and the nature of the relations and connections of the Kurdish Movement do not encourage the prompt application of this clause. As soon as appropriate conditions for application render themselves available, we shall not at all hesitate to do so.

4. Amending the Governorates' Act :

We are prepared to take the necessary measures for amending the Governorates' Act in harmony with the essence of the Manifesto. We are simultaneously ready to consider all proposals presented by you in this respect.

5. The Population Census :

We are still prepared to enforce the clause of the Manifesto pertaining to carrying out a population census in the mixed areas to determine those populated with a Kurdish majority. We have discussed with you the question of postponing the census only after Mr. al-Barzani had told Comrade Murtadha al-Hadithi that you were not prepared to recognize the results of the census if they indicated the presence of an Arab majority in the enumerated areas.

Nevertheless, we are still prepared to carry out the census when the obstacles standing in the way are removed, on condition that the 1957 census be consi-

dered as the criteria for determining whether or not a citizen is a resident of these areas and provided that operations of settling Arab and Kurdish citizens in the mixed areas are stopped.

6. Implementation of Self-Rule :

Although the period for the attainment of self-rule has been limited to 4 years, or to the realization of unity between Iraq and any other Arab country, we consider that achievement of self-rule in the shortest time is an embodiment of the will of our Party and an execution of one of the important decisions of the 10th Congress of our Party.

Furthermore, we consider it an expression of our Party's belief in national equality and of its dedication to Arab-Kurdish fraternity and to national unity.

Therefore, while straining to provide all the prerequisites ensuring its attainment, we re-emphasize that the enforcement of self-rule, as envisioned by the Revolution, is a matter of principle, morality and strategy, and that it depended upon your attitude in as much as that attitude speeded it up or slowed it down.

Being the main quarter shouldering the responsibility of self-rule, you must, naturally, be required to honour all the commitments that help driving matters in a positive manner towards attaining that goal in the shortest possible time.

Dear brothers,

While reminding of what has actually been enforced and what remains to be enforced of the March Manifesto, we cannot forget your discouraging attitude together with the circumstances previously referred to and the misunderstanding that marred the relations between your Party on the one hand and our Party and the revolutionary authority on the other. Had our relationship risen up to the stand-

ard of the essence of the March 11 Manifesto, it would have already been possible to enforce all the provisions of the Manifesto.

Regarding Clause 2: "Sticking to the Unity of Iraq, i.e., the unity of the people, the unity of the homeland and the unity of the constitutional system", we do not depart from the truth when we say: "You have not taken a single step along this path":

First and foremost of the questions that have always constituted a gross violation of the simplest fundamentals of national unity and the oneness of the sovereignty of the Iraqi Republic is, perhaps, the external relations connecting your Party with the ruling reaction in Iran

If the leadership of your Party could manage a self-justification for past relations with the Iranian reactionary government, it is in no way acceptable to continue that relationship after the March Manifesto. Such a relationship can not take place because of the exigencies of the Kurdish national struggle. As a matter of fact, it is an insult to this struggle.

Nevertheless, the least that is supposed to have been done was severing this relationship for ever following the declaration of peace and the progress attained by the Revolution in the stages of implementing the March Manifesto - particularly so, because Iranian reaction was the first to conspire simultaneously against the Revolution and the Kurdish masses in order to prevent the attainment of peace and to forstall the birth of the March Manifesto.

Hereunder we enumerate some aspects of this relationship :

1. The flow of Iranian arms, in substantial quantities, into the northern area, particularly during the escalation of the intensity of strife between the Revolution and the Iranian reactionary government.
2. The arrival of heavy and light weapons to your forces via Iran; and the arrival of a new broadcasting station.
3. The training of many Peshmargas in Iran on various weapons, particularly heavy arms.
4. The despatch of some Kurdish students, who are followers of your Party, to military colleges in Iran.
5. The communication of military information concerning the Iraqi army by certain elements who assume certain positions with you, and whose connections with Iran are known to you.
6. The siding with the Iranian armed forces in certain frontier clashes. Indeed this collaboration reached the extent of enabling certain Iranian armed forces occupy part of the Iraqi territory in the Khanaqin area.
7. The reception, sheltering and guiding (inside Iraqi land) by quite known political and armed members of your Party of some members of the Iranian intelligence service.
8. The entry into the northern area of contraband Iranian and Israeli goods, which created a very strong Iranian economic influence.
9. The circulation of counterfeit Iraqi currency printed by Iranian intelligence with the aim of destroying the Iraqi currency.
10. Sending patients, particularly officials of your Party, for medical treatment in Iranian hospitals.

11. The facilitation of the exit of some citizens, via Iran, in contravention of the Revolution Command Council's resolution banning travelling abroad after the historic oil nationalization decision.
12. The aggravation of the influence of Iranian intelligence, in the areas under the influence of the Kurdish Movement, to the degree of being able to kidnap and to kill ordinary citizens and members of the armed forces.
13. The admission of foreigners into the northern area, through Iran.
14. The handing over to the Shah's government of Iranian patriots fledging from the Iranian reactionary rule, in addition to imprisoning and killing some of them.
15. The exchange of visits between certain members of the leadership of your Party and Iranian officials.

Certain people might allege that this situation ensued after the deterioration of our relations; but we can prove that this attitude of yours had prevailed and continued to prevail under the most positive conditions.

Regarding the illegal practices that constitute a violation of every undertaking not to assume the role of the authority and that represent a shouting encroachment over state functions, we can give the following summary:

1. Refusal to hand over frontier posts situated along the border with Iran to the armed forces to enable defending and controlling them.
2. Preventing the armed forces from training and stationing in certain parts of our homeland and declaring other areas out of bounds, even to any member of the government machinery.

3. Preventing government officials from performing their official duties in the areas under the influence of the Kurdish Movement. This included such officials as those of the agrarian reform and even sanitary teams rendering precautionary and medical care to Kurds.
4. Arresting and imprisoning citizens and even "executing" them.
5. Establishing prisons.
6. Imposing taxes.

In short, the following is an approximate number of the crimes committed by followers of your Party:

Murder 379; kidnapping 219, with 566 victims (comprising 499 civilians, 47 military men and government officials and 20 Iranian militant patriots); assault 419; extortion 157; robbery 29. In addition to the acts of sabotage previously mentioned, 11 acts against railways and locomotives, 6 against electric installations, 3 against bridges dams and roads and 25 miscellaneous acts were committed.

Regarding the security and safety of the state, we quote below cases which at least prove how your Party is not concerned for their consolidation and strengthening, if they fail to prove that the contrary is your concern.

1. Harboursing elements and groups hostile to the Revolution, supplying them with money and arms and assigning them to commit acts endangering the safety and security of the state. These culprits included Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and others.
2. Maintaining links with neighbouring Arab and foreign countries for machinations against the Revolution and collaborating with the forces that exercise conspiratory activity against the Revolution from abroad. These acts are being committed

by the most distinguished members of the polit-bureau and the central committee of your Party.

3. Continuing the distribution of light arms, grenades and mines to members of your Party and to your supporters.
4. Opening training camps on heavy arms, at a time when it was agreed that all heavy arms used before the March Manifesto be handed over to the government.
5. Forming new contingents of Peshmargas.
6. Abetting military men to desert the service upon the occurrence of any negative phenomenon. This began to adversely affect discipline and made Kurdish soldiers feel that they were secure against punishment when committing irregularities and breaking discipline. This is in addition to encouraging Kurdish soldiers to write reports on the activities, plans and weapons of the army and the consequent leakage of this serious information to foreign hostile quarters.
7. Attempting to blow up the oil pipe lines during the ultimatum served to the oil companies in May 1972.
8. Attempting to explode certain air bases.
9. Blowing up railways lines.
10. Fabricating problems and stirring riots and disorder (Khaniqin, Bashiga, Sinjar incidents etc., etc.)
11. Attempts against the life of administrative officials.
12. Assaulting security and intelligence organs.

Regarding the safety and life of citizens, the following cases can be cited:

1. Kidnapping, torturing and killing citizens whom your Party suspects as sympathizing with the revolutionary government.
2. Large scale raping acts committed by Peshmirga members against Kurds within the areas controlled by you.
3. Burning down villages whose inhabitants are known to be loyal to the authority; and shelling citizens in those villages with gun fire in pursuit of the current line of your Party which is based on vengeance humiliation of dissidents and on response to the call of grudge.
4. Driving Kurdish citizens out of their villages.
5. Throwing explosives and grenades into the houses of certain Kurdish elements who do not obey your orders.
6. Threatening citizens whom you suspect as loyal to the government.
7. Camping of Peshmigas (who are supposed to have been demobilized) in many Kurdish villages and their parasitic living at the expense of villagers in addition to their imposing taxes upon their forced hosts.

In talking about the unity of the course of the authority of the Revolution, we can affirm that the northern area is proceeding in accordance with a logic that is far away from the spirit and policy of the Revolution. The following is the evidence:

1. Insubordination of many Kurdish administrators, who are members of your Party, to the central authority.
2. Non-compliance of frontier guards with the administrative orders given by competent authorities and

their refusal to carry out their duties and assignments. Moreover, you use them in the tribal fightings and disputes, for assaulting citizens and for collecting tribute.

3. Hindering the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Act. Evidence:

- A. Deliberate obstruction of agrarian reform operations by members of your Party and by the demobilized Peshmargas. This reached the extent that disabled agrarian reform organs enforce the law in certain areas of al-Sulaimaniya on the border with Iran.
- B. Collecting agricultural tax (in the name of collecting "Zakat") ⁽¹⁾ from Kurdish and Arab peasants and cultivators in the northern area through Peshmargas; and continuously preventing official circles from collecting this tax.
- C. Continuously confronting with land expropriation and distribution committees and with the surveys teams operating in the area.
- D. Kidnapping certain officials of the agrarian reform and conducting an investigation with them with the aim of intimidating them in order to pass the matters you want during their implementation of the reform.
- E. Refusing to help the search committees in identifying the peasants to whom it was intended to distribute land, with the objective of obstructing their work, particularly in Duhok Governorate.

1. "Zakat" is a religious tax levied by Islam, in a certain percentage, on Mohammadens

F. Despite all this, "al-Taakhi" advocates and demands the accomplishment of the agrarian reform.

4. Placing difficulties along the path for the implementation of the cultural rights of national minorities.

In the sphere of the general policy of the KDP, we could safely say that your Party is playing the role of the opposing political parties - the Opposition - at a time when it is participating in the government. The following illustrative examples bear witness to this:

1. Issuing statements and instructions containing many equivocations and incorrect news about the authority of the Revolution.
2. Issuing internal instructions insinuating reservations against the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty.
3. Failure to cable support for the oil nationalization on the part of Mr. al-Barzani and the political bureau.
4. stirring certain issues indicating an isolationist attitude, such as raising the question of the North's share in the nationalized oil by "al-Taakhi" daily.
5. Adopting a negative stand concerning the building of the progressive 'National Front' and agreement on the National Action Charter.
6. Ignoring the repeated Iranian aggressions on our border and taking no trouble to condemn them even in your newspaper, "al-Taakhi".
7. Raising demands and other question that portray your party as an 'opposition' and doing so in delicate and critical circumstances when the country is exposed to imperialist and reactionary dangers. 'al-Taakhi' is full of examples in this respect.

As to your concern for the Revolution, we confirm that the KDP has continued to deal with the Revolution as if the KDP were a party aiming only at gaining supporters at any cost - even through illegitimate means and at the expense of the Revolution itself. Evidence:

1. Presenting many names of Kurdish prisoners, convicted for ordinary crimes, alleging that they were involved in the incidents of the north.
2. Presenting the names of approximately 120,000 citizens alleging that they were demobilized Peshmigas in order to have them exempted from military service. The majority of these citizens were proved to have no relationship whatsoever with the Peshmigas, and included many Arabs.
3. Converting your Party's offices from centres for the political enlightenment and education of the masses into instruments of interference in the day to day functions of government offices, in a way that is inconsistent with the acknowledged rules of relations between any state and its citizens.
4. Presenting many names of false martyrs so that their families could be granted undeserved pensions.
5. Adopting the cases of the Kurds who support you regardless of their being fair or foul.

With regards to your concern for the enforcement of the March Manifesto, we should like to mention the following :

1. Refusal to hand over the weapons agreed upon. Only one installment of quite used up weapons was handed over. In fact, these weapons have not been used by you during the regrettable incidents.
2. Failure to enable displaced families return to their

former homes which they deserted because of the incidents of the North.

On the contrary; thousands of citizens were repatriated after the March Manifesto. And thousands of Kurdish families are still shelterless because of the policy of persecution exercised by your Party against elements unwilling to comply with your orders.

3. Withholding cooperation with the committees and bodies set up to investigate the information you presented regarding the attempted assassination of Mr. Al-Barzani. As a matter of fact obstacles were created to foil their mission.
4. Enabling feudalists usurp the lands and farms of peasants in certain Kurdish-populated areas.

Concerning your dedication to Arab-Kurdish fraternity and the consolidation of the unity of the struggle of the Arabs and Kurds, it is just enough to register the following facts:

1. The isolationist policy exercised by your Party in mass education as advocated in your internal publications, your Party's internal magazine "al-Kadir" and in your public magazines and newspapers, such as "Shams Kurdistan" and "Baraiti"
2. Exercising a policy of discrimination between Arab and Kurdish government officials in the northern area, and shooting trouble with Arab officials working there.
3. Circulating false accusations alleging the Arabisation of certain mixed areas, and using this as a screen for Kurdishing these areas together with others inhabited by Arabs.

Now we come to your open adversary stand towards the Revolution in the external field. All known positions taken

up by your Party's abroad organizations were, without the least exception, by the side of the enemies and opponents of the Revolution. Nothing proves this more than the campaigns of defamation and false accusations launched by the abroad Kurdish student societies that have close relations with your Party and which, to be specific, are guided mainly by your Party's external organizations. This is in addition to the embarrassment caused by your Party to the Iraqi government before other states by your arresting, even "executing", citizens of other countries.

The obstructions and problems caused to the Iraqi army when carrying routine training and manoeuvre are alone sufficient to unveil your concept of self-rule.

If this is the reality of today, we might well wonder what sort of self-rule your Party is really after.

Facing the many issues raised in this message, you might say that the ABSP is trying to acquit itself from any responsibility for contributing to the deterioration of the situation or that the ABSP did not care to remind others of its own share in the responsibility for the worsening of conditions.

But, while mentioning these issues, we do not claim that we committed no faults. Nor do we aim at provoking you into a competition over who should be held more responsible. We do so only because we want everything to be more vivid now than what it was any day before so that a common appreciation of the size of problems afflicting us can be elaborated. We believe that the stability of the peaceful settlement and the realization of the patriotic objectives behind it depend on surmounting these impediments.

Dear brothers,

We fully realize that the forces harmed by peace will throw all their weight to blow up the March Manifesto; and we equally realize that the chauvinist and isolationist forces will not hesitate to use any means for renewing the fighting.

Meanwhile, we do not deny that there are elements in the state apparatus who are not up to the standard of the historic March Manifesto and who are incapable of comprehending the depths of the national rights of the Kurds. Some of these elements could have found excuse in your aforesaid disposals to practice similar acts by way of retaliation to your illegal behaviour and acts.

In the first hours that followed the announcement of the Manifesto, we made it clear to you that attaining peace is a simple matter, and that the preservation of peace is a major responsibility, needing great minds and souls that are indeed of the great standard of the great event. We have also made it clear then that the March Manifesto was a trust and a responsibility on the necks of all those who are committed to the unity of Iraq, the security of its future and to the rights of its people.

We do not deny that certain ABSP and state organizations have made some mistakes. But we have remedied many of them on time; and we still continue to put right any fault we make. We knew that mistakes were apt to be committed, because several years of fighting would inevitably leave behind negative effects on the relations of the Kurdish Movement and the executive organs. As you are no doubt aware, the current executive machinery is not formed essentially for the implementation of the programmes and schemes of the Revolution; it had been previously set up essentially to carry out programmes and policies which the Revolution came to liquidate.

It is only natural that the Kurdish Movement might fall into many mistakes. There should be no fear from these mistakes as long as there is a sincere desire for putting things right, and provided adequate measures are taken to deal with and punish those who made them.

But it is quite unnatural to allow mistakes increase and to find excuses for the culprits instead of deterring them.

We cannot understand the reasons for the escalation of the chart indicator of atrocities and the failure to deal with culprits (rather the protection and the encouragement of the culprits to commit more atrocities) except as a proof of the absence of concern for the preservation of both peace and national unity.

It is axiomatic that mistakes committed by the Kurdish Movement are apt to drag corresponding similar mistakes. Though we do not agree with the validity of balancing a mistake by another mistake, yet the realities indicate that many of the mistakes committed by certain state organs were actually reactions to the mistakes made by the Kurdish Movement.

Your perpetuation of making mistakes and the accumulation of these mistakes resulted in a disability to differentiate between those driven to react and those who deliberately commit sabotage. In addition, this has caused us an embarrassment that made our responsibility for remedying faults and suppressing acts of sabotage a hard and a difficult task, because it is not easy to carry out such a responsibility properly in a public and broad atmosphere of insults and atrocities committed against government officials and citizens.

It may be useful to point out here that the Kurdish cause used to enjoy a great sympathy within the ranks of our Party and amongst the Arab masses as well. You have, yourselves, felt the warm feelings of the Arabs, headed by the ABSP, towards the question of the national rights of the Kurds and the restoration of peace in the northern part of the country. This stand is not unfamiliar; what is indeed strange is not to take such a stand.

The historic links binding our people - Arabs and Kurds - and the fraternal bonds of struggle that embodied the Arab-Kurdish relationship are the motives that made both Arabs and Kurds feel their unity of destiny and feel joy for any victory won by either or both of them.

Loyalty for our concern for Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and for future relations with you urges us to be frank with you and to point out to you that the wisdom of maintaining an alliance with you has now become questionable within the ranks of our Party.

Though this new situation cannot, in any way, shake our dedication to the national rights of the Kurds within national unity, yet it might impel a re-adjustment aiming at differentiating between the Kurdish Movement and your Party and between your Party and the Kurdish national question. We should also not conceal from you the fact that your disposals and mistakes are arousing confusion and anxiety amongst citizens and represent a rich hotbed for chauvinist tendencies and thoughts.

Perhaps the growing passive attitude of the Kurdish masses towards your Party is no longer unknown to you. The grip of armed organizations cannot conceal it. Anxiety began to overwhelm these masses since the early months of the March Manifesto, because of the increasing excesses and violations committed by your Party's organizations against the rights and freedoms of the Kurds.

In addition, Kurdish citizens began to feel afraid of the growth of your relations with the Iranian re-actionary regime that exercises all various sorts of persecution against the Kurds of Iran and that draws plans for renewing the fighting and for destroying the gains won by the Kurds under the March Manifesto.

Your detachment from the masses harms the position of the Revolution among these masses, because you are one of the allies of the Revolution.

It is unavoidable to emphasize a very clear axiomatic point : the March Manifesto is neither the outcome of the struggle of the KDP alone, nor is it the outcome of the struggle of Kurds alone. It is the outcome of the common struggle of both the Arabs and Kurds. It is rather the out-

come of the struggle of all the forces of good who believe in the legitimate rights of the Kurds and in the importance of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood. We believe that it is not in the interest of the Kurdish Liberation Movement to lose its ally in struggle - the Arab people. It is also not in the interest of the KDP to lose its allies among the patriotic and progressive forces because of its political relations with the Iranian reactionary government which (relations) can never be in the interest of the homeland or of the Kurdish struggle for liberation itself.

The leadership of the Kurdish Movement, in our opinion, shall commit a very grave mistake by holding that the solution of the Kurdish issue can be attained through weakening the ABSP and the Revolutionary authority. From such a trend of thinking, it shall reap nothing but evil. This is true, simply, because the authority of the Revolution cannot be affected by anything of the sort.

However, we might wonder: If it is really following the line of attaining the national rights of the Kurdish people within national unity, what are the gains that the Kurdish Movement will win through weakening a nationalist progressive government of the country? What authority, other than that of the Revolution, is really capable of meeting these right?

Should any one within the ranks of the Kurdish Movement entertain the idea that he can impose a certain type of authority over Iraq, he is certainly mistaken. The good and conscious elements in the Kurdish Movement are required to curb such tendencies. They have to prevent such playing with fire, because it is not in the interest of peace to allow it grow or to give it the reigns.

In dedication to the unity of this people and to the defence of the national and democratic gains achieved by our people, Kurds and Arabs, we call upon the KDP to reconsider its erroneous attitudes and start new relations,

expressing full concern for the unity of destiny, the unity of common struggle, the unity of the people and the unity of the homeland, which cannot be forsaken however exorbitant the cost might be.

While reviewing the outcome of past experience, we aim at nothing from enumerating faults but arriving at the right road.

By projecting the real situation, our aim is neither to give directions nor to preach sermons. We are only presenting a point of view, emanating from sincere convictions, which we believe is suitable as a basis for liquidating passive atmospheres in a way that reassures the feelings of the masses who are already worried about the future relationship between the ABSP and the KDP.

In our opinion, commencing new relations, similar to those created after the March Manifesto, depends upon the following conditions:

1. The true meaning of the March 11 Manifesto, and of the peace that is supposed to stem from it and to be stabilized through it, is the supremacy of the rule of law and the state's constitutional and judicial institutions. Unless our two parties agree to maintain strict allegiance to the respect of the rule of law and to the prevention of any violation thereof ... unless it is fully agreed that the exercise of power, in any form, is not permissible except by the competent constitutional and judicial institutions ... unless all this is strictly complied with, the cause of peace will remain endangered. Therefore any excesses against or breaking of these rules must be drastically dealt with .
2. Your relationship with our Party and the authority of the Revolution must be governed by the basic interests of the Revolution and its forces. Meanwhile, it cannot be achieved at the expense of

undermining ties with any progressive force, categories or (ethnic group) backing the Revolution. This is because the Revolution does not agree to curtail or to reduce its commitments towards the Kurdish people to a one-sided relationship with the KDP alone.

All political parties the world over, including, of course, our Party and yours, can not, at their best, be a substitute for the people; yet they can be a vanguard of the people — if their deeds qualified them.

3. The KDP must undertake to sever relations with the ruling Iranian reaction, to seal the borders and to hand over the frontier posts to the government. It is quite impossible to continue a relationship with you based on solidarity and common action at a time when you are maintaining relations, in all spheres and at a large scale, with a foreign country. To this essential point should be added the fact that the said state assumes a hostile attitude towards Iraq and the Arab nation and towards the Kurdish people living within its borders.
4. The KDP must cease animosity against Iranian patriots and stop handing them over to the Shah's authorities.

Should you be asked by our Arab and Kurdish masses of the reason why you prefer the Shah's authorities to the patriotic Iranian elements, we wonder what the answer of your Party (which claims to be anti-imperialist and anti-reaction) would be.

5. The KDP must undertake to break with the reactionary and suspect elements that are hostile to the Revolution. It must also give up dual relations maintained, sumultaneously, with the Revolution

in one form (through the participation of KDP ministers and senior civil servants) and with the enemies of the Revolution in another form (through aids inflaming conspiracy). Furthermore, you should avoid "tacticization" and changing political affiliations at the expense of the strategic interests of the Revolution and the masses.

6. Condemning political assassination and classifying all offences leading to breaking the peace as extraordinary crimes that do not lie within the narrow limits of routine offences and that should be looked upon as crimes exposing the state's security and safety to danger.
7. Condemning and fighting against all deeds and methods that lend justification to the activities of the chauvinist and isolationist elements aimed at inciting disorder and sedition.
8. Renunciation of endeavours for winning over the reactionary and for imposing their domination over the masses; and depending in political relations upon the principles of revolutionary democratic struggle.
9. Banishment of Kurdish tribal leaders, who constitute a danger to the peace in the northern area, to Baghdad or any other chosen town. Should you not agree to this proposal, the alternative, in our opinion, should be the provision of the circumstances that enable all to live where they are together with taking action against any person who breaks the law and order or who tries to stir trouble and sedition.
10. The KDP must undertake not to encounter the armed forces discharging their duties and not to encounter the security and intelligence organs operating in the northern area, because such

atrocities can emanate only from a mentality of detachment from the authority and of fighting against it in addition to being contrary to the spirit of the March Manifesto. No state anywhere in the world can tolerate any dealing with her central machinery with such a mentality. Nor can it agree to excesses against any of its organizations whatever the reason might be.

11. The KDP must undertake not to commit offences against elements supporting the Revolution and not to kidnap, torture or kill citizens and to close down all KDP's prisons. The powers your Party is conferring upon itself are quite unnatural - alien to the nature of the state and to the commands of mutual relations and undertakings. This question must be reconsidered in a radical manner.
12. The KDP must acknowledge the fact that agreement with it upon solving the Kurdish question neither means its monopoly over all state machinery in the northern area nor its monopoly of representing the Kurdish people in the main state organs, because, as we have said, the Kurdish people and the Kurdish Movement are larger and more comprehensive than your Party.
13. The practical policy of the KDP must be jeered in the direction of cementing peace and national fraternity and of safeguarding national unity and the unity of struggle. It is impossible to allow the perpetuation of the KDP's policy that is based, solely, on its private interests in isolation from the country's fundamental interests. Nor is it possible to relegate the country's basic interests to a second class status.

Self-rule is subject to definition and analysis and it exists as a real experiment in many countr-

ies of the world (particularly in the socialist countries). This means that self-rule is subject to programming and that it must not express itself in the language of expropriation, hostility and blowing up positive positions. Nevertheless, your Party appears, in many of its disposals, as if it were not caring for the demands of national brotherhood and the requisites of the preservation of national gains.

14. All administrative staff labelled as KDP members must enforce the laws and regulations of the country. They must also create the conditions that assure the unity of national sovereignty in a way that makes national sovereignty the centre of the prime concern - ranking above all in theory and practice.

Since the authority of Revolution and the Kurdish Movement are fully agreed on the national rights of the Kurds, and since they are both agreed, to a great extent, upon the ways and means for their implementation, is there any objective reason to refuse the laws and systems of the said authority, which (laws and systems) are channelled by the Revolution to embody the national rights of the Kurds? Is your Party (with its own interpretations) the substitute? and where on earth can such a substitute take place?

15. Your Party must undertake to prohibit the state of armament in all areas inhabited by Kurds.
16. Your Party must admit that state organizations are alone responsible for exercising state authority over all the affairs of citizens. This acknowledgment must be embodied in practical activities and behaviour. It is impossible to suppose another image, because the other image means nothing

but the plurality of positions of authority which will eventually result in underrating the authority of the state and the weakening of its role in the protection of the interests of all the masses-Arabs, Kurds and national minorities in Iraq. The plurality of positions of authority means crumbling and strife, which is the exact opposite of the principle of national brotherhood and of the conditions and aims of the historic March 11 Manifesto.

17. Your Party must provide all the pre-requisites enabling the authority conduct investigations in all crimes of murder and kidnapping. It must also undertake to hand over to the competent organs of the state all elements hostile to the Revolution and to refuse sheltering and protecting all criminals and wanted persons in addition to military service dodgers.
18. Your Party must undertake to proceed along the path of consolidating the gains of the Revolution and to resist counter-revolutionary currents. It is not permissible that the KDP converts its official offices throughout Iraq into shelters for reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements. These elements neither restored peace to the northern area nor are they concerned for the historic March Manifesto. As such nothing meaningful justifies maintaining so strong a relationship with them.
19. Agreement should be worked out to expel administrative elements appointed in the northern area on the recommendations of the KDP, who proved to be insubordinate and who refused to carry out the orders of the central authority.
20. The repatriation of all Kurds to their former places, regardless of whether they deserted them before or after the March Manifesto.

21. Forbidding KDP's organizations from interference in the daily affairs of the government. The administration alone is responsible for solving the daily problems of citizens, within revolutionary formulas that are unyielding to imperialist tendencies or personal wishes.
22. Regarding the issues that endanger the safety and security of the state in the northern area, we think it is essential to set up a judiciary body, composed of Judges known for their integrity and honesty and enjoying the support of the patriotic forces, to be entrusted with investigating all relative cases.
23. Setting free all inmates of your prisons and concentration camps.
24. Handing over heavy weapons to the authority.
25. Liquidating the state of armament and forbidding the searching carried out by your Party's armed members on public roads.
26. Creating no obstacles for the implementation of the Revolution's decisions granting cultural and administrative rights to national minorities.
27. The enforcement of the Agrarian Reform Law must not be hindered in any way.
28. Contributing effectively towards the prevention of smuggling and the infiltration of foreigners and foreign intelligence agents into Iraq through the country's northern borders.
29. The following is our view regarding the Frontier Guards :
 - A. They should belong to the Ministry of Defence and receive orders from it.

- B. They shall be trained by Kurdish officers and NCOs of the Iraqi Army — to be selected by agreement and appointed in the Peshmirga regiments.
- C. Their duties must be strictly confined to guarding the Iraqi frontier; and they must be subject to the acknowledged military laws and regulations.

This means :

- 1. Absolutely forbidding them from wearing Peshmirga uniform.
 - 2. Forbidding them from going to towns with their arms.
 - 3. These regiments should be subject to inspection by Brigade Commanders of the Iraqi Army stationed in the same area.
 - 4. Forbidding the Regiment Commanders from leaving their Regiments except with the permission of the Brigade Commander i/c.
 - 5. The Peshmirga regiments must undergo training on the same lines as the Iraqi Army.
30. Permitting all patriotic and progressive forces that support the Revolution to perform their activities freely. Since "Democracy for Iraq" is the slogan continuously hoisted by you, it is only logical that "Democracy in Kurdistan" should be upper most of all the slogans you ought to raise and put into practice.

It is incredible to propagate democracy as a general slogan, meanwhile freezing it in the Northern area. Nor is it permissible that your Party

monopolizes political and organizational activity in all areas populated with a Kurdish majority.

Patriotic and progressive currents and organizations must also be allowed to function in conformity with the substance of the March Manifesto and the National Action Charter and on a par with what is taking place in Arab-populated areas. It is intolerable that you assume an adverse attitude towards the exercising of political activity by certain patriotic forces in the area inhabited by a Kurdish majority at a time when the offices of your Party's branches are open in Baghdad, Basrah, Wasit, al-Hai, Zeeghar, Babil etc., with our agreement and without presenting any provocation to the Revolution or to us.

31. Regarding the delineation of the self-rule Zone,... Because of the obstacles preventing carrying out a population census and because of a desire to speed up granting self-rule to the area inhabited by Kurds, we suggest the following adjustment of the administrative boundaries in the light of practical national conditions :

- A. Creation of national administrative units in the areas inhabited by Kurds.
- B. Amalgamation of administrative units (governorates, districts and sub-districts) exclusively populated by Kurds into one Administrative Area. This newly established area shall be the 'Self-rule Zone'.
- C. As to Kurdish nationals living in the mixed areas outside the Self-rule Zone, their cultural and administrative rights shall be guaranteed on a par with the other ethnic groups living in the same units.

Dear brothers,

Hoping that this memorandum, in which we have presented our views on the various controversial issues, will receive your attention, we should like to express our readiness for commencing a positive and purposeful dialogue between our two parties for reaching maximum mutual understanding and for defining ways and means for securing national unity and the legitimate rights and aims of our people - Arabs, Kurds and national minorities. We are also prepared to reconsider any wrong stand that might appear during our proposed study and discussion and to accept every mature and sound idea.

In conclusion, please accept our greetings.

Regional Leadership

23.9.1972.

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Institut kurde de Paris

QUOTATIONS FROM 'AL-KADIR'

HOW DOES THE KDP INDOCTRINATE ITS MEMBERS ?

This is a portion of an article published by "al-Kadir" — theoretical magazine of the KDP — issue No. 14/15 for July/August 1972 .

The March Agreement is the welcome outcome of many contacts and a thorough and frank dialogue between the two negotiating parties. During these deliberations, the ABSP had shown a sound and realistic understanding of the original motives of the conflict, of the rights of the Kurdish people and of the Kurdish cause in general.

The Agreement expressed the readiness of the rulers of the country to recognize the national reality of Iraq and the national rights of our Kurdish people. This revived optimism not only about future relations between the Arab and Kurdish people of the Iraqi state but also about the future relations of the two nations.

The openness demonstrated by the leadership of the ABSP had greatly helped in dispelling the suspicion and mistrust shrouding the relationship between the Kurdish revolution and Iraqi governments and in creating an atmosphere of confidence between the leadership of the ABSP — who are the actually ruling power — and the leadership of the Kurdish revolution.

But, unfortunately, the regained confidence, which is a pre-requisite for any useful work, is now menaced by continuous and daily mounting instability. The abundant initial stuff for building national unity, which is stocked in the March agreement, is dispersed to the perils of winds, exposed to loss and damage. Suspicion and mistrust replaced confidence and reassurance.

This unhappy state of affairs is mainly due to the lack of practical mutual recognition and respect of the legitimate national rights, interests and feelings of the parties concerned and to the failure to continue a progressive policy aiming at genuine equality, in rights and duties, between the two major Arab and Kurdish nationalities.

There is no doubt that the greater part of the responsibility for the set-back lies upon the government, its staff and its spokesmen. To prove this we cite the following examples:

During the dialogue and negotiations of the March Agreement, our Party expressed its frank, detailed and reasoned opinion on the Article concerning the identity of Iraq which appeared in all constitutions proclaimed after the July (1958) Revolution to emphasize that Iraq is a part of the Arab nation. Despite its different wording in all these constitutions, that same Article had always insisted that today's Iraq, with its Arabs and Kurds (with its Arab Iraq and its southern Kurdistan, which lies within its boundaries) is nothing but a part of the Arab nation.

Before and after the March Agreement, the leadership of the Kurdish revolution pointed out to the negotiating ABSP's leaders how dangerous and harmful that definition of Iraq's identity was. Our Party had previously explained the same thing to Abdel Karim Qasim. In 1960, our Party announced its frank opinion on this question (in its organ Kha Baat newspaper, issue No. 381) when we exposed the contradiction between the Article in question and the historical and geographical realities and warned against the dangers that contradiction presented to Arab-Kurdish fraternity.

Accordingly, the leadership of the Kurdish revolution demanded from the Ba'athist comrades amending the disputed Article in unequivocal terms — leaving no room for any mistrust or misinterpretation—so as to reassure our Kurdish citizens and, simultaneously, realize the legitimate desires of our Arab brothers.

We proposed amending the Article to mean: "The Arabs of Iraq are part of the Arab nation".

The Ba'athist leaders agreed that our demand was fair; but they preferred not to include the amendment in the Interim Constitution lest this be exploited by chauvinists and the enemies of the peaceful settlement. In appreciation of their motive, we responded to their request hoping that they would practically prove their disapproval of the Article and do their best to remove, or lighten, its harmful effects, because the situation persistently urged joining ranks and cementing the unity of the struggle of the Arabs and Kurds — not only as two peoples embraced by the Iraqi Republic but also as two torn nations joined together by common sufferings and objectives, by an ancient history and by common long borders.

Now, let us see what practical course matters had actually taken.

This Article, which had been agreed upon in the March Agreement, had been included in the Interim Constitution:

"The people of Iraq are composed of two main nationalities, namely, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution accedes the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within Iraqi unity".

This is a perfect and pretty statement. But, once read with that part of Article I of the Constitution (which stipulates that the Iraqi people are a part of the Arab nation), it loses all its perfectness and prettiness and stands as a naked falsehood.

Article I faces every Kurd with this bitter reality: In the Iraqi Republic — the Republic of both Arabs and Kurds — and after nine years of hard and bloody struggle . . . and in the post -March Agreement era . . . with and after all this, the Kurdish people are considered, in open and unequivocal terms, as a part of the Arab nation.

This means: instead of advancing forward, we have retreated to a constitutional state worse than ours during Qasim's rule. Then, the ambiguity surrounding Article II, the presence of Article III on Arab-Kurdish partnership in the homeland and the brotherly and democratic atmosphere that reigned in the beginning all combined to spread good faith and dispel suspicion and mistrust to a great extent.

But the clear words of the new Article I dissipated good faith and restored the horrible idea which we had fought to keep away from all minds.

It appears that all our criticism of Article II during Qasim's rule was not heeded for during the Ba'athist era except for removing its ambiguity (which was quite agreeable in comparison to the ugliness of clarity) and revising the Article to mean, in letter and spirit and in the most explicit terms, that the inhabitants of the Iraqi Republic — Arabs, Kurds and other ethnic groups — are "a part of the Arab nation". Not only this; it seems that the Article, which the leadership of the ABSP and ourselves had agreed to include in the Constitution to confirm and explain the rights of the Kurdish people, had been substituted by another Article confirming that "the Iraqi people are a part of the Arab nation".

Our party sensed, at the time, the bad exploitation of its good trust and knew that the Articles in question of the Interim Constitution meant injustice against the national rights of our Kurdish people and drove at fusing their presence in the mould of the Arab nation.

That we refrained from expressing our grievances then is not due to conceding this injustice. Our silence was due to sincerity and concern for peace and adherence to the terms of the March Agreement. In the meantime, we entertained the hope that the whole situation was due to the cautioning raised by the Ba'athist brothers during the negotiations. Then they told us that, while fully concurring

with our objections against Article 1, they feared to amend it lest the matter be exploited by the enemies and the chauvinists for hindering and harming our efforts. Accordingly, we awaited their deeds and disposals to express the understanding and open spirit shown by them during the negotiations.

It is regrettable that their deeds and disposals were contrary to our expectations. They rather came to support the anticipations of those who mistrust the ABSP.

The steps and actions taken by the authorities against our Kurdish people and the members of our party in the areas of Kirkuk, Khanaqeen and Sinjar indicate clearly the existence of a studied plan for liquidating the Kurdish presence in these areas or for turning the Kurds therein into a minority.

In pursuance of this plan, the government launched a fierce campaign against our Faillian brothers and deported scores of thousands of them outside the Iraqi borders despite the fact that most of them were Iraqis, possessing all the conditions entitling any other person in Iraq to enjoy the Iraqi citizenship in a natural manner. The government justified this action by the need to purge the country of spies and agents. But the immense number of those exiled coupled with the Anti-Kurdish official policy in the aforesaid areas prove how insignificant and false this justification is.

Moreover, the ABSP had frankly and explicitly announced that they have a plan for what we can call the "cultural Arabisation" of all the nationalities living in the Iraqi State. The Draft National Action Charter, proclaimed by the President of the Republic late in 1971 says :

"The exercising by the Kurdish masses of national rights, including self-rule, takes effect within its natural framework — national political unity and the unity of the land and the political system of the Iraqi Republic — and on the basis of the recognition and belief of these Kurdish

masses that Iraq is an inseparable part of the Arab homeland".

In other words, the exercising of national rights by our Kurdish masses depends on, and takes place on, the admittance and belief that Iraq (including our homeland — southern Kurdistan) is part of the Arab homeland. Without this recognition and belief, there is no existence for what is called the national rights of the Kurdish people and, consequently, there is, naturally, no room for exercising these rights. It is funny that the condition does not end with a "recognition" only, which alone can bind the party avowing it, and goes on to demand that faith and belief should accompany that recognition. We really do not know how it shall be possible for us to prove our belief; nor do we know how our Ba'athist brothers shall judge or ascertain the existence of this belief in our hearts in order to permit us to exercise our national rights.

To sum up: the national rights, for whose establishment and enjoyment, we waged a bloody and bitter fight . . . the national rights which (as we were told or as we said to ourselves) we achieved through blood, sweat and tears . . . the national rights which we managed to include in the historic March Agreement . . . these rights are nothing but a conditional gift from our Ba'athist brothers. We can retain and enjoy them on condition that we admit and believe that our Kurdistan — the part of Kurdistan situated inside the Iraqi state — is part of the Arab homeland and that we, ourselves, are also Arabs (by virtue of our belonging to one of the two main nationalities comprising the Iraqi people) because the Iraqi people, who are composed of these two nationalities, are part of the Arab nation in accordance with the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution.

It is evident that this method of remedying national problems of multi-nationality states endangers national unity, contravenes modern scientific methods and explicitly means integration and fusion or "ideological Arabisation".

Our party had expressed its disapproval of the above paragraph of the National Action Charter in a memo addressed to the leadership of the ABSP. We thought our brothers would rectify this unfriendly fault and cancel this incredible condition, which requires a recognition and belief that are impossible for any Kurd to avow, in order to preserve the unity of the ranks of the nationalist forces. We also expected our Ba'athist brothers to work for the formation of a genuine 'front' of the nationalist progressive forces of the country.

But the statement of our brother, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership, in the interview he gave to 'al-Nahar' of Beirut and 'Le Monde' of Paris, overwhelmed us with matters that made us forget what was written in the National Action Charter. He was asked by the two correspondents:

"Do you consider the Kurdish area as a part of the Arab nation" ?

Mr. Saddam Hussein replied :

"Iraq is within the map of the Arab homeland. [When we say so, it is because this does not clash with the national minorities] existing in the Arab homeland who must be given their rights.⁽¹⁾ If a land is delineated to these minorities, this shall mean that they want separation from the Arab homeland; and this we can not tolerate. Because what is required is to give man a new useful thing, we do not say that the Kurds are a part of the Arab nation; [we say Iraq is part of the Arab nation"]⁽²⁾

The correct Sentences as stated are :

1. When we say so, [it is because this does not clash with the legitimate aspirations of the national minorities].
2. [We say Iraq is part of the Arab homeland].

Before commenting on the answer of brother Saddam, we can not help expressing our astonishment of the great importance he attaches to "the map". Being a distinguished leading personality in a political party standing for unity, liberty and socialism and continuously advocating the eradication of imperialism and Israel and the liquidation of division and tearing (aims that can not be realized except through "altering the map" of the entire area), how could he permit himself to make the existence of southern Kurdistan within the map of Iraq his first and last strong reason for considering Kurdistan as part of the Arab countries? How could he justify this when all those who are acquainted with general international affairs, particularly the militant amongst them, know what real value maps have?

Who planned and drew most of the maps of the Middle East area? We wonder what revolutionary struggle itself is after, if it is not for altering "maps", regardless of whether these maps are political, geographical or otherwise. History tells us that maps, which are contrary to the aims, desires and interests of the masses of the people and to the progressive course of history, have always been torn asunder.

The statements of our militant brother, Saddam, aroused regret and sadness among all the Kurds who believe in Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and in the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP and who rightly recognize him as the hero of the March Agreement.

This is because these people, who are faithful to the cause of the Iraqi people — Arabs, Kurds and fraternalized minorities — wonder: if this is brother Saddam's concept of the home of the Kurds, what could be the opinion of the apponents of the March Agreement and those who primarily deny the presence of the Kurdish people and Kurdish rights? These Kurds can not imagine that brother Saddam does not know how and when southern Kurdistan was annexed to Arab Iraq (!), or Mesopotamia, by British imperialism that formed from both the Iraqi Kingdom in order to achieve and

protect its colonial interests, to control the sources of wealth, particularly oil, to dominate what was then called the Indian Road and to obstruct and crumble the two Arab and Kurdish liberation movements.

The study of thousands of documents and deeds (carried out during the dispute over the Mosul Wilayat — province — between the Turkish government on the one hand and the British and Iraqi governments on the other hand) by the special committee set up by the League of Nations to investigate the situation in the Mosul Wilayat absolutely proved that the name 'Iraq' had never been given to either Shahrzoor or Mosul Wilayat prior to the founding of the Iraqi state with its present boundaries and that Kurdistan — wholly or its part situated within the Iraqi state — had never been considered as part of the Arab countries.

Throughout history, Kurdistan, or part of it, fell several times as part of an Islamic state — as was the case with many countries of the area. But it had never been considered as part of any other country, simply because it is not so. Moreover, historical documents prove that the presence of the Kurds in the area of Kurdistan and the Middle East is older than the presence of most of the peoples of the area in their current homes. However, there is not the least doubt that the Kurdish presence is much older than the arrival of the first Semitic wave at this area.

The endeavour of the Kurdish people to connect their struggle with that of the brotherly Arabs of Iraq, their demanding no forthwith separation from the entity created by colonization, their common struggle with the Arab people in Iraq for the eradication of imperialism and the realization of democratic freedoms and for the attainment of their legitimate national rights through self-rule within the Iraqi state . . . all these should not be taken against us. Nor should our silence imply that we accept to be a part of the Arab nation and agree that our country, Kurdistan, is a

part of the Arab countries. This stance on the part of our people indicates only the maturity of their liberation movement, the correctness of their analysis of their real enemy (colonization) and the rightness of their course of struggle — the common struggle against the common enemy and for the achievement of the common aspirations and interests of the two Arab and Kurdish peoples.

While explaining these facts to our Arab brothers, we should like to point out that we are motivated only by our deep concern for a genuine union of the two Arab and Kurdish peoples and by our desire to protect the brotherly comradeship of their ranks and to forestall any cracking in the two nations' front for the resistance of imperialism and reaction. We do not need any recommendation or recognition from any person or quarter of whatever status to affirm our presence, strength, rights and the preservation of our land and people. Our support and strength are derived from the struggle of the masses of our people and their high spirit that loves freedom and adores the homeland.

Brother Saddam, in his statements referred to earlier, said in his reply to a question by the journalists on "the Kurdish area":

"If a land is delineated to these minorities, this shall mean that they want separation"

We do not need to show how this statement implies a denial of the existence of a part of Kurdistan within the state of Iraq. This statement rather denies even the existence of a defined area called "the Kurdish Area" and considers this a desire for separation. Thus, the government reverted to the same stand assumed by Qassim towards the name of Kurdistan. We do not know how it would be possible to reconcile the desire for achieving the national aspirations of the Kurdish people and the building of national unity on the basis of self-rule or the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP with the understanding that delimiting a land for the Kurdish people (fully represented

in calling that land Kurdistan) is a proof that we are after separation from the Arab homeland.

Answering a question by the same journalists, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP said :

"The Kurds are our people. Along with their social development, we should give consideration to their private psychological circumstances".

Do such statements represent a consideration by our Ba'athist brothers to our psychological circumstances? Indeed, this is a consideration of a new kind and we only hope that it will not lead to accusing us of ingratitude this time also.

Before concluding this essay, we should like to emphasize this fact : when we so stubbornly defend our belonging to the Kurdish people and our homeland's name — Kurdistan — and when we refuse to become a part of the Arab or any other nation and to allow our homeland to be a part of any other country, we are neither motivated by chauvinism or national arrogance and conceit nor by considering our nation and homeland above all. No. Nothing of the sort exists in our imagination. We are only defending right and reality. That the right we are defending concerns our homeland and our nation does not in the least belittle the importance and value of our struggle. We do not think that loyal citizens of any nation or country do not do the same as ourselves. Perhaps they are doing more against those who try to deprive them of their homeland and nationality through tyranny and oppression. Excepting this, we cherish every esteem and respect to all nations and their countries, particularly the sisterly Arab nation with whom we are connected with the closest links and ties.

In conclusion, we repeat what we had said in the beginning of this essay :

1. The mutual recognition and respect of the rights and interests of all peoples living in one state, the pursuit of a policy of genuine and complete equality in rights and duties and the provision of the appropriate atmosphere for each and all of these peoples to struggle and work for the achievement of common public aims and for the realization of private aims which are not harmful to the interests of all of them is the corner stone in the building of a strong national unity for a state that is really interested to outlive any future dangers. This is the sound basis for building a strong, free and flourishing society.

2. The greater part of this responsibility, which is very essential for the preservation of the entity of multi-nationality states, lies on the shoulders of the rulers who belong to the predominant nationality. Will the leaders of the ABSP — who are the rulers of Iraq in the name of Arab nationalism — prove more competent in this respect than what they have so far shown and thus save the country and the Iraqi people calamities and disasters useful to no one except colonization and its internal and external agents? We hope so, to the benefit of all.

* * *

ABSP's CONFERENCE AND THE KURDISH QUESTION.

Below is the chapter on the Kurdish issue of the Political Report of the 8th. Regional Conference of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) held in Baghdad between 8—12 January, 1974. The Report was announced on 5/3/1974 by Comrade Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP and President of the Republic :

The ABSP's concept of the Kurdish question and its endeavours for working out appropriate ways and means for settling it stemmed from the following basic considerations :

1) Notwithstanding certain historical conjunctures that accompanied it, and despite certain shortcomings and isolationist reactionary tendencies it contains — which, in part, are maintaining flagrant relations with the imperialist and reactionary circles — the Kurdish movement in Iraq is fundamentally and essentially a national movement. Within the limits of demanding the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people (with self-rule in the forefront) within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, it has a concrete and ideological *raison d'être*. And in this context it is a main part of the national movement of Iraq.

2) The ABSP is a national, humane, democratic and socialist Party. As such, it is only natural that the ABSP fully appreciates the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and struggles for securing and safeguarding them. Leading the Revolutionary Regime in the country since 17—30 July 1968, the ABSP bears the basic responsibility for guaranteeing these rights in constitutional, legal and executive formulas.

3) The permanent and basic policy followed by the ABPS for securing and safe-guarding these rights is peaceful and democratic action through sincere positive cooperation with the national and progressive forces of good among the Kurdish masses and within the framework of common national action embodied by the National, Nationalist and Progressive Front (NNPF).

For all these considerations, using all available ways and means since 17—30 July 1968, the ABSP kept endeavouring to solve the Kurdish question, which had reached a high degree of complexity and intricacy for numerous factors that included: many interventions, particularly foreign intervention; the arbitrary and chauvinistic stands taken up by the reactionary and dictatorial regimes against the Kurdish masses and their legitimate aspirations; the long years of fighting; and the private conditions of the Kurdish movement itself.

As a matter of fact, the Kurdish question was the most trying and complicated problem that faced the ABSP and the Revolution during the past few years. The party had to work out a theoretical and scientific formula conforming with the national ambitions of our Kurdish masses, the integrity of the country and the unity of its national and progressive movement, and simultaneously not conflicting with the objectives of Arab struggle.

The Party did manage to find a sound and complete formula, which was right from all theoretical, political and practical aspects, and embodied it in a great historic document — the March 11, 1970, Manifesto that represents a turning point in the history of the struggle of our Kurdish masses and their legitimate national aspirations and in the struggle of our entire people in Iraq for building a flourishing progressive democratic society.

However, this point must be recorded. When the leadership of the ABSP decided to cooperate with the

leadership of the KDP in accordance with the provisions of the March Manifesto, it never overlooked the erroneous policies pursued by certain factions of the KDP and their suspect association with imperialist and reactionary circles as well as their isolationist tendencies. In fact the ABSP's leadership took its historic decision despite being fully aware of these realities and what consequences and magnitudes they meant. It has based its stand on a sound analysis that can be summed up in this :

"By virtue of its composition and the standard of its development, the Kurdish movement comprises various tendencies. As such, it should not be judged in an absolute manner through one of its faces. Accordingly the ABSP and the nationalist forces are rather required to provide the objective conditions and pre-requisites for developing the Kurdish movement on a sound line based on a firm commitment to national unity and the progressive national and democratic policy of the country. The conditions of peace, the persevering work for the implementation of the provisions of the March Manifesto and the elimination of the painful consequences and effects of the years of fighting, the realization of a speedy comprehensive development in the northern area and common action within the programmes of a "front" — rallying all progressive, national and nationalist forces of the Arabs, Kurds and fraternalized minorities — will combinedly provide the conditions and prerequisites just referred to".

But the progress of the March Manifesto did not proceed the way the ABSP hoped for. In the dealings with the KDP, mistakes were committed by ABSP and state machinery. Foremost of these mistakes was, perhaps, the plurality of the organizations and centres that dealt, most oftenly without coordination, with the various affairs of the Kurdish question. In the course of a long period, this led to losing central control over events and developments and to drowning into secondary

and minutely detailed questions at the expense of fundamental envisionments. It also often led to a disability for comprehending the reality of the events and conjunctures taking place and for drawing a dividing line between the mistakes committed by the organs of the state and the acts of sabotage performed by elements of the KDP. In addition, some elements in the state machinery, particularly in the Northern Area, did not fully understand and comprehend the March Manifesto—in spirit and substances. They kept behaving out of wrong considerations and passive reactions identified with standards, conditions and experiences of the post-March Manifesto stage.

On the other hand, the leadership of the KDP, most oftenly, did not behave out of considerations of national unity and the sincere alliance with the ABSP, which (alliance) was created after the declaration of the March Manifesto. Many of the leading elements of the KDP viewed the March Manifesto and alliance with the ABSP from a tactical and transitional outlook with the aim of securing the maximum possible positions and gains pending any suitable opportunity for raising further demands. It is indeed regrettable that, since the very first days of the March Manifesto, we did not feel the fair dealing we expected from the leadership of the KDP, or at least from the influential current in this leadership. On the contrary, we felt that this leadership kept intensifying emergency formulas in its dealings with the government and in establishing suspect relations with foreign forces.

During the last period, the influential, reactionary, agent, suspect and secessionist elements and currents in the leadership of the KDP did not become weak to the degree expected before and after the March Manifesto.

They committed large scale subversive acts and launched information campaigns hostile to the Party and the Revolution both inside the country and abroad. They remained, and continue to be, a centre polarizing all forces hostile to the Revolution among the Arabs and Kurds.

Furthermore, they collaborated with those conspiring against the Party and the Revolution and offered them protection in the areas under their control. And until today, they are quite openly cooperating with the reactionary states of the area and with the imperialist powers to weaken, rather to conspire against, the Party and the Revolution. In short, these currents and elements represent today the main reserve of the imperialist and counter-revolutionary forces in Iraq.

But the Kurdish question should not be judged according to the stands and disposals of these currents and elements whose reality is already known to all in Iraq, the Arab homeland and in the world at large. It is a national question, whose responsibility should be shouldered by the entire homeland and by all its forces of good — headed by the ABSP that is leading the Revolution and its political power.

The ABSP is the leader of the Revolution. It is primarily responsible for the unity of the country and the interests and rights of the people — Arabs and Kurds. It is also responsible for safe-guarding the independence of the country and for providing the requirements of its progress. Therefore it was, and remains to be, the first responsible quarter, within the NNPF for solving the Kurdish question in a durable and firm manner resting on a sound political and ideological basis.

We must confess that the mistakes committed in the past stage had inflicted great damage on the progress of the Revolution. Had it not been for them, we were supposed to have covered a longer distance on the path of the implementation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question in addition to realizing, through sound political ways and means, the maximum possible weakening of the evil elements that have been trying to exploit the legitimate aspirations of the Kurdish masses for ends contrary to the interests of both these masses and the basic interests of the entire masses of Iraq.

In spite of the mistakes and passivities together with their concomitant damage just referred to, the general peaceful and democratic line followed by the ABSP in remedying the Kurdish question proved to be right and bore positive important fruit.

During the past four year, the Revolution has managed to honour all its obligations specified in the March 11 Manifesto — notwithstanding the behaviour and stands of the leadership of the KDP and despite the abnormal circumstances dominating the area.

Following four years of diligent struggle along the path of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, the general political, economic and psychological tendencies of the Kurdish masses are no longer what they had been prior to the March Manifesto. Broad sectors of Kurdish masses have now found more safety and security for their lives than at any other time in the past. They have also directly felt the results of the Revolution's policy for meeting their legitimate rights and improving their standard of living in all fields. Meanwhile, the state of peace that reigned during the last four years has created new economic conditions in the Northern Area. Thus, there became greater the number of Kurdish citizens involved in agricultural and industrial production and in other business activities associated in varying degrees with the economic life of the whole country. The stability and firmness of the regime, together with its success in accomplishing many industrial, agricultural, irrigation, tourist and services projects in the Northern Area, have created objective circumstances ultimately in favour of peace.

Thus, the task of the elements who instigate mutiny and subversion has become far more difficult. As a matter of fact, the attempts of these elements have often collided with the passive response of our Kurdish masses in spite of using all methods of agitation, provocation, intimidation and deception.

* * *

AUTONOMY LAW

On 11.3.1974, President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr announced the Law enacted by the Revolution Command Council for the implementation of autonomy in the Region of Kurdistan. He also announced the pertinent constitutional amendments.

Below is the text of the President's statement and the text of the Autonomy Law :

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT

AHMED HASSAN AL-BAKR :

In the Name of God,

Great People,

Masses of our Glorious Nation,

In confirmation of the bonds of citizenship and the historical brotherhood between all the sons of Iraq — Arabs, Kurds and fraternal minorities ...

In compliance with the democratic principles of the July 17 Revolution and in fulfilment of its pledge ...

In application of the March 11, 1970 Manifesto ...

In adherence to the National Action Character ...

In consolidation of the common struggle and the common interests of all the sons of the people ...

In realization of what the progressive national and nationalist forces demanded and struggled for ...

The Revolution Command Council decided to apply autonomy in the Region of Kurdistan.

The application of autonomy, on a democratic basis, in the Region populated with a Kurdish majority provides the adequate means for our Kurdish people to exercise their full legitimate national rights within one homeland and under

relations of brotherhood, equality and common responsibility.

It also consolidates national unity and the gains secured by the Revolution in all fields for the benefit of the masses and wards off the intrigues of imperialism and reactionary forces.

Furthermore, the exercising of their full rights by the sons of our Kurdish people in national organs together with the guarantee of cultural rights to the fraternal minorities (in accordance with the laws promulgated by the July 17 Revolution and under the Revolution's democratic principles and institutions and within the framework of the joint national action of the National and Nationalist Front) are capable of removing the injustice inflicted on the sons of our Kurdish people and on the fraternal minorities during dictatorial and reactionary regimes that pursued chauvinistic and tyrannic policies. This will also enable introducing an extensive economic, social and cultural development in the Region of Kurdistan and opening wide horizons to all sons of the people to advance forward, in a firm confidence and a spirit of security and constructive work, on the path of progressive democratic transformations to the ultimate goal of building socialism.

LAW No. 33 OF 1974,

AUTONOMY FOR THE REGION OF KURDISTAN :

PART ONE

FUNDAMENTALS OF AUTONOMY

Chapter One

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE ONE :

A) The Region of Kurdistan shall enjoy autonomy and be called "the Region" whenever it is mentioned hereinafter.

B) The Region shall be so defined as to be populated by a majority of Kurds and the general census shall specify the demarcation of the Region in accordance with the provisions of March 11 Manifesto and the general census records of 1957 shall be the foundation for defining the national nature of the absolute population majority in the places where general census is to be conducted.

C) The Region shall be considered an integral administrative unit, enjoying a juridical personality and autonomy within the framework of the legal, political and economic integrity of the Republic of Iraq, and the administrative divisions therein shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Governorates' Law, with due consideration to the provisions of this Law.

D) The Region is an integral part of the Iraqi territory and its people is an integral part of the Iraqi people.

E) The city of Arbil shall be the Chief-Town for the administration of autonomy.

F) The administrative organs of autonomy shall be part of the administrative organs in the Republic of Iraq.

ARTICLE TWO :

A) The Kurdish language shall be the official language, beside the Arabic language in the Region.

B) The Kurdish language shall be the language of education for Kurds in the Region, and the teaching of Arabic shall be compulsory in all stages and institutions of education.

C) Educational institutions shall be established in the Region for the Arabs , wherein education shall be in Arabic and the Kurdish language shall be taught in a compulsory manner.

D) All citizens in the Region shall enjoy the option

to join the schools for their education, regardless of their mother tongue.

E) Education shall be subject, in all stages in the Region, to the general educational policy of the state.

ARTICLE THREE :

A) The rights and liberties of the Arabs and minorities in the Region shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, laws and resolutions promulgated in that connection, and the autonomy administration shall be bound to guarantee their exercise.

B) Members of the Arab nationality and minorities in the Region shall be represented in all autonomous bodies, in proportion of their ratio to the population of the Region, and shall participate in assuming public civil service posts, in accordance with laws and regulations governing them.

ARTICLE FOUR :

Judicature shall be independent and void of any other control of the law and the legal formations in the Region shall constitute an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of Iraq.

Chapter Two

FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE FIVE :

The Region shall constitute an autonomous independent financial unit, within the financial integrity of the state.

ARTICLE SIX

a) The Region shall have a special budget within the consolidated budget of the state.

b) For the preparation and compilation of the budget of the Region the same rules and principles of compiling the consolidated budget of the state shall be adopted.

ARTICLE SEVEN :

The budget of the Region shall consist of the following components :

- 1) The ordinary budget.
- 2) The annual investment budget of the Region.
- 3) The budgets of productive institutions and administrations of a local character established in the Region.
- 4) The budgets of local administrations and municipalities in the Region.

ARTICLE EIGHT :

The budgetary resources of the Region shall consist of the following components :

- (a) Self resources, comprising :
 - 1) Revenues from taxes and duties specified for municipalities and local administrations under relevant laws.
 - 2) Values of sales and charges of services.
 - 3) The share appropriated from the profits of administrations and institutions covered by the budget of the Region.
 - 4) Basic and additional estate tax within the Region.
 - 5) The agricultural land tax and share of agrarian reform from proceeds.
 - 6) Government (dead-hand) land tax.
 - 7) Estate tax.
 - 8) Estate registration duties.

- 9) Charges and fines imposed by courts of justice.
- 10) Revenue stamp duties.
- 11) Car registration and title-deed transfer charges.

b) Appropriations from the ordinary budget of the state, the annual investment programme and the national development plan, to cover the expenditures of the budget of the Region, so as to guarantee its balanced growth and development in consistency with all other parts of the Republic of Iraq.

ARTICLE NINE :

Accounts of the Region shall be subject to the supervision of the Board of the Supreme Auditing and Financial Inspection.

PART TWO

AUTONOMOUS ORGANS

Chapter One

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

ARTICLE TEN :

The Legislative Assembly is the legislative organ elected for the Region, and its formation, organization and process of work therein shall be defined by law.

ARTICLE ELEVEN :

A) The Legislative Assembly shall elect a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary from amongst its members.

B) Meetings of the Legislative Assembly shall be convened by the presence of the majority of its members, and its decisions shall be adopted by the majority of the present members unless otherwise provided for in this law or in the law of the Legislative Assembly.

ARTICLE TWELVE:

The legislative Assembly shall exercise, within the definition of the Constitution and laws, the following competences :

- A) The formulation of its articles of association.
- B) The adoption of legislative decisions required for the development of the Region and promotion of its local social, cultural, constructional and economic affairs within the framework of the general policy of the state.
- C) The adoption of legislative decisions connected with the development of culture and the nationalist characteristics and traditions of citizens in the Region.
- D) The adoption of legislative decisions related to semi-official departments, institutions and administrations of local character after consultation with the competent central authorities.
- E) The ratification of projects covered by detailed plans drawn up by the Executive Council on the economic, social and developmental affairs, as well as the educational and health affairs, and the discharge of activity in accordance with the requirements of the general central planning of the state and prerequisites of its implementation.
- F) The proposition of the special budget of the Region.
- G) The adoption of final statements of accounts, following their auditing by the Board of the Supreme Auditing and submitting them to the Legislative Power for ratification.
- (H) Amendments to the special budget of the Region after their ratification within the scope of amounts allotted thereto and purposes allotted therefore, provided that such measures shall not contravene with the laws and development plans of the state.
- I) Discussion with and questioning of the Executive

Council members on the affairs covered by their fields of competence.

J) Withdrawal of confidence from the Executive Council, or one or more of its members, and those from whom confidence is withdrawn shall be relieved. The confidence withdrawal decision shall be adopted by the majority number of the Legislative Assembly's members.

Chapter Two

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

ARTICLE THIRTEEN :

A) The Executive Council is the executive organ for the administration of autonomy in the Region.

B) The Executive Council shall consist of the chairman, Vice-chairman and a number of members equal to the number of administrations referred to in Article (14), or two members more.

C) The President of the Republic shall entrust one of the Legislative Assembly's members to preside over and form the Executive Council.

D) The chairman-designate shall select the vice-chairman and the Executive Assembly's members from among the members of the Legislative Assembly or from among those who enjoy the qualifications of membership therein, and shall submit to the Legislative Assembly, for confidence. Upon realization of confidence by the majority of the Assembly's members, a Republican ordinance shall be promulgated to the effect of calling the Executive Council.

E) The chairman and members of the Executive Council shall hold a grade of minister.

F) The President of the Republic may dismiss the Chairman of the Executive Council from his position, in which case the Council shall be considered as dissolved.

G) In the case of dissolving the Executive Council, or withdrawing confidence therefrom, the Council shall carry on with the discharge of current affairs only, pending the formation of a new council provided that this shall take place within a maximum period of fifteen days.

ARTICLE FOURTEEN:

A) The governorates of the Region shall be annexed to the chairman of the Executive Council.

B) The Executive Council shall seek, in the exercise of its powers, the assistance of the following bureaux:

1— The Executive Council Bureau.

2— The Follow-up and Inspection Bureau.

3— The Statistics and Planning Bureau.

C) (i) : The following administrations shall be affiliated with the Executive Council :

1— The Education and Higher Education Administration.

2— The Works and Housing Administration.

3— The Agricultural and Agrarian Reform Administration.

4— The Internal Affairs Administration.

5— The Transport and Communications Administration.

6— The Culture and Youth Administration.

7— The Municipalities and Summer Resorts Administration.

8— The Social Affairs Administration.

9— The Economic and Financial Affairs Administration.

10— The State Property Affairs Administration.

(ii) : The powers of the following administrations shall be defined in the following manner :

1— The Internal Affairs Administration: police, civil defence and civil affairs.

2— The Social Affairs Administration: health, labour and social affairs.

3— The Economic and Financial Affairs Administration: financial departments, and local, trade and industrial facilities.

D) Responsibility in the administrations provided for in the Para above shall be undertaken by Executive Council members, called "the Secretaries-General" each of whom shall have a Vice Secretary-General appointed to a special grade.

ARTICLE FIFTEEN:

The Executive Council shall exercise the following powers:

A) Securing the implementation of laws and regulations.

B) Abiding by the provisions of Judicature.

C) Realization of justice security and public order, and protection of national and local public amenities and the state public and private properties.

D) Promulgating decisions on all that is required for the implementation of the provisions of the local legislative resolutions.

E) Drawing up projects under the detailed plans for the economic, social and developmental affairs, as well as the educational, health and labour affairs, in accordance with the requirements of the general central planning of the state and prerequisites of its implementation, and submitting the same to the Legislative Assembly for ratification,

F) Supervising the local public amenities and institutions in the Region.

G) Appointing officials for the autonomous administration, whose appointment does not require the promulgation of a Republican ordinance or approval of the President of the Republic, in accordance with the service and personnel laws. Provisions of the laws applied to the civil servants of the Republic of Iraq shall apply on them, provided that the civil servants in the administrative formations where a Kurdish majority resides shall be Kurds or those who are well-versed in the Kurdish language, with due consideration to Article (3) thereof.

H) Implementing the budget of the Region in accordance with the laws and principles adopted in the accounting system of the state.

I) Preparing an annual report on the conditions of the Region, to be submitted to the President of the Republic and to the Legislative Assembly.

PART THREE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE SIXTEEN :

With the exception of the powers exercised by the autonomous bodies in accordance with the provisions of this law, the exercise of authority in the entire parts of the Republic of Iraq shall revert to the central bodies or their representatives.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN :

A) Police, security and nationality formations in the Region shall be attached to their directorates general at the Ministry of Interior and their staff shall be subject to the

provisions of the laws, regulations and instructions applied in the Republic of Iraq.

B) The President of the Executive Council or his authorized representatives from among the Council members may assign to the formations mentioned under Para (a) of this Article duties within the Region, within the scope of their duties and within the framework of the general policy of the state.

C) The directors of the formations mentioned under Para. (a) of this Article shall be appointed and transferred by order of the Minister of Interior after consultation with the head of the Executive Council.

D) The ranks of police shall be transferred within the Region by the order of the Secretary-General of the Interior Affairs Administration or his authorized representatives, with due compliance with the provisions of Para. (C) of this Article.

(E) The ranks of the formations mentioned under Para (a) of this Article shall be appointed and transferred according to the rules and instructions valid in the Republic of Iraq with due compliance with the provisions of the previous paragraphs.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN :

A) The offices of the central authority in the Region shall fall under the ministries they are attached to and shall discharge their duties within their jurisdictions. The autonomous bodies may submit reports on them to the respective ministries they are attached to.

B) The central authority may within the scope of its jurisdiction make general guidance to the local administrations mentioned under Article 14 of this law.

C) The central authority shall appoint a minister of state who will coordinate between the activities carried out in the Region by both the central authority and the auto-

thous organs. He may attend all meetings of such organs. The central authority may delegate any other minister to carry out such a mission.

D) The decisions of the autonomous bodies shall be conveyed to the minister of state as soon as they are taken.

E) The head of the Executive Council shall attend the cabinet meetings.

ARTICLE NINETEEN :

(a) Control of the legality of the decisions of the autonomous organs shall be exercised by the Cassation Court of Iraq through a Special Committee made up of the chief judge of the court and other four members selected by the members of the Cassation Court from among themselves for a period of three years renewable for one period only.

(b) The Minister of Justice or the Minister of State may object to the decisions of the autonomous organs before the control committee mentioned under the previous paragraph in case they violate the Constitution, laws or regulations within 30 days from the date the Minister of State is notified of them.

(c) Objection to the decisions of the autonomous bodies before the supervisory committee shall suspend their implementation pending the result of the settlement.

(d) The supervisory committee shall give a ruling on the objection within a maximum period of 30 days from the date such objection is submitted to it and its decisions shall be final.

(e) The decisions of the autonomous bodies which the supervisory committee rules as non-legal, shall be considered as wholly or partly abrogated from the date of their

issue and all legal consequences resulting therefrom shall be null and void.

(f) The supervisory committee shall submit its decisions to the objecting authority and to the head of the Legislative Assembly and the head of the Executive Council and the decisions shall be published in the Official Gazette.

ARTICLE TWENTY:

(A) The President may dissolve the Legislative Assembly in case it is not possible for the Assembly to exercise its authority due to the resignation of half of its members or due to failure of securing the legal quorum within 30 days from the date it is called for a session or due to failure in getting the confidence stipulated under Para (D) of Article 13 of this law for more than two successive times or due to its failure to comply with the decisions of the supervision committee stipulated under Article Nineteen of this law.

(B) In case the Legislative Assembly is dissolved, the Executive Council shall continue exercising its Assembly until the election of a new Legislative Assembly in a maximum period of 90 days from date the Republican ordinance has been issued to dissolve it.

ARTICLE TWENTY ONE:

This law shall come into force from the date it is published in the Official Gazette.

Taken in Baghdad this day the 17th of Safar 1394 the 11th day of March 1974.

Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr,

Chairman of the Revolution Command Council.

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