

KURDISTAN



ANNUAL JOURNAL OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS SOCIETY IN EUROPE

1976

Kurdistan

ANNUAL JOURNAL OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS SOCIETY IN EUROPE
VOL. XVIII

1976



Contents

Editorial: The Struggle Goes On	2
Constitution of the K.S.S.E.	4
K.S.S.E. News	5
The Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan	7
Iranian Kurdistan	10
Kurdistan in Turkey	13
Publication of a Grammar Book on the Kurdish Language	15
Kurdistan of Syria	16
Spanish Executions	17
May 11, Day of Iranian Political Prisoners	17
The Iraqi-Iranian Agreement – Another Treachery	18
Indestructible Kurds	20
Poems	24
Kurdistan in the Press	27
Books on the Kurds and Kurdistan	32

INSTITUT KURDE DE PARIS
BIBLIOTHEQUE
RESERVE



The Editor, H. Failey,
KSSE,
1 Berlin 11,
Postfach 110364

Opinions expressed by individuals do not necessarily reflect those of the Society/Editor.

The Editor apologises for the lack of photographs due to financial difficulties. We appeal to members and friends for donations to help with future issues.

An apology is also necessary for the late appearance of the magazine which is due to technical difficulties.

The Struggle Goes On

Ever since the signing of the Algiers Accord, the Iraqi Government has been carrying out a vicious policy of arabisation and deportation of the indigenous population of Kurdistan to the south of Iraq. Since the accord was signed 300,000 Kurds have been forcibly deported from their homeland in the mountains of Kurdistan to the Saline desert of southern Iraq. There they are treated as slaves, deprived of all possessions and of the simplest necessities of life. The Baathist designs are racial, their aim is the deportation of one million Kurds from their homes, and concurrently they are carrying out a policy of arabisation of many regions of Kurdistan – in the plains of Kirkuk, the main axis points between the principal cities and the border regions, and the frontier areas themselves.

Most Kurdish institutions have been abolished or suspended, including the Ministry of Northern Affairs, the General Directorate of Kurdish Cultures, many political and professional organisations, and the Department of Kurdish Studies of Baghdad University. History books are being reprinted in order to avoid all mention of Kurdistan and Kurdish place names.

Despite international news coverage of these outrages against the Kurds and the efforts of a few humanitarian organisations, the world in general has remained silent in the face of these attempts to exterminate the Kurds as a people, together with their heritage and their culture. Furthermore, the Baathist regime in Baghdad has the audacity to condemn similar racist policies elsewhere.

It was evident that one of the objectives of the Algiers agreement was to destroy the Kurdish movement as an effective political force in the region. But the Kurdish movement managed to resume the struggle in spite of this plan and continues its struggle for the just national right of the Kurdish people and for democracy in Iraq.

In this new phase, the first task of the Kurdish people was to expose the racist policies carried out by the Baghdad government. These sinister policies are carried out under innumerable disguises and justification which are frequently used by other racist regimes.

Meanwhile a number of Peshmerga groups, whose members had returned to their former livelihoods, have been forced to take up arms again. Their spontaneous action was the natural outcome of the racist policies of the Baathist rulers.

The Kurdish people are convinced that the only answer to the policies of arabisation and deportation which are

being inflicted upon the Kurdish civilian population is once more to take up arms against the tyrannical regime in Baghdad. The revolution has resumed. The following are some of its features:--

1. **May 1976. Amadiya district.** Several clashes between the Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces. 30 Iraqi soldiers killed. Bombing of Nero-Rekan area (on the Turkish/Iraqi border) by Iraqi Air Force.

2. **May 26th. Zino (near Haj Omran).** 8 Iraqi soldiers killed and 12 wounded in a clash between Iraqi forces and Peshmerga. Ex-Peshmerga battalion commander Seyid Abdulla killed in action.

3. **May. Sidekan (north of Rawandiz).** 2 Iraqi soldiers killed in an attempt by government forces forcibly to deport the inhabitants of Sidekan area.

4. **Late May. Choman.** One policeman and 1 Iraqi informer killed in a clash between Iraqi forces and Peshmerga during the forced evacuation of Choman.

5. **June. Rania.** 50 Iraqi soldiers killed during four clashes between government and Kurdish forces.

6. **Early June. Surdash (N.W. Sulaimani); Bamo (N. Khaneqin); Warte (near Rawandiz); Penjwin area.** Iraqi air force bombing attacks on villages in all areas.

It is gratifying to report that Peshmerga forces are being received by the population everywhere with expressions of support and sympathy, recognising in their action a revival of Kurdish dignity and identity which the Iraqi Baath are viciously seeking to destroy.

By declaring that the Kurdish national movement has been crushed forever the Baathist leaders have demonstrated yet again their total lack of understanding of the natural flow of history.

How do we see the new struggle?

The new war will differ from the previous war. Strategically, it is accepted that the struggle will be protracted. Tactically, it will involve small guerilla units, highly mobile and maintaining no military fronts. In size, the new Peshmerga force will not be comparable to its predecessor, as it will rely entirely on the support of the Kurdish population.

The Kurdish people realise the complications which arise from geo-political factors as they affect the Kurdish libera-

tion movement. The Kurdish people fully realise the hostility of the governments surrounding them, knowing that each in its own way is conducting a similar policy of extermination of them and their culture. This is nothing new, for such policies have been pursued against the Kurds for centuries. We therefore know that it is impossible to depend on any of our neighbours.

As the latest manifestation of this unholy encirclement policy of the Kurdish movement, two recent agreements have been concluded: –

- (1) The Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, which consists of the Tikriti clique, has ratified the Iraqi-Iranian Accord on 9 June 1976. Subsequently on 15 June, the Iranian Senate (which is a tool in the hands of the Shah) ratified the same agreement.

This treaty and its protocols includes a vital clause for the formation of a joint security committee under the name of the Military Intelligence Committee. The main purpose of the treaty and its supplements is the encirclement of the Kurdish liberation movement and the suppression of Iranian patriots and other progressive movements in the area.

- (2) The recent agreements concluded between Turkey and Iraq, the latest of which is related to the “security of the border”, which was signed in Ankara on 3 June 1976 by the respective Ministers of Interior of the two countries.

Thus we see the revival of the Saad Abad and Baghdad Pacts, which aimed at fighting the Kurdish nation and the peoples of the area.

Despite the slogans and claims of these different regimes, they all follow the same policies towards the Kurdish nation and in the suppression of their own people in their determination to stay in power at any cost.

In Iraq: The Kurdish people strive to form a national front on the widest basis, involving all Arab and Kurdish political parties and forces which stand up against dictatorship, chauvinism and imperialist influence in Iraq.

On the level of the Kurdish nation: The struggle depends on the support of the Kurdish people in Iran, Turkey and Syria, for though it may be limited in the initial stages, knowing that support from these source will be firm and genuine. The belief in the ability and the strength of our Kurdish nation is unshakeable.

In the Middle East: The Kurds strive to strengthen their ties with all peoples in the region, especially with the Arab nation. The revolution of the Kurds is allied to the liberation movements of Arabs, Turks and Persians against reactionary and chauvinist governments. All progressive Arabs are therefore called upon to support the Kurdish movement and to withhold their support from the repressive Iraqi regime which damages the honour and reputation of all Arabs through its racist policies directed against the Kurdish people.

On the international level: We call upon all progressive and socialist forces which believe in the national rights of oppressed people, together with all humanitarian organisations, to act in support of the Kurdish people in their just struggle for survival and their national rights, as well as in support of the democratic rights of the whole Iraqi people. This struggle repudiates all secret and open military alliances, such as the Iraqi-Iranian pact, the recent Iraqi-Turkish pact and the proposed Gulf Security pact envisaged by the rulers of Iraq and the Shah of Iran. All these pacts have the blessings of American imperialism.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS SOCIETY IN EUROPE

Founded 10th August 1956

Art. 1: The Name: The Kurdish Students Society in Europe.

Art. 2: **The Basic Aims:**

- A – To strengthen the relationship of Kurdish students in Europe and to help to solve their academic problems.
- B – Facilitate mutual aid between Kurdish students.
- C – To promote the national Kurdish Culture and to work towards the good of the people and its national question.
- D – To enlighten the world on the culture of Kurdistan, the condition of the Kurdish people, and its national problem.
- E – To strengthen the spirit of co-operation and friendship between Kurdish students and students of other countries, to make contact with students and non-student organisations, both national and international, and co-operate with them within the scope of our mutual aims and interests.
- F – To contribute towards the struggle of the divided Kurdish people, support all peoples in the struggle against imperialism, racial discrimination and dictatorial regimes for peace, democracy and liberty.

Art. 3: The Society's organ is the Magazine 'Kurdistan'.

Art. 4: **Membership:**

- A – Membership is granted to every Kurdish student or students from Kurdistan studying in Europe if the following conditions are fulfilled:
 - 1 – Accepts the constitution of the Society and endeavours to fulfil its basic aims.
 - 2 – Pays the annual subscription of three pounds (sterling) or its equivalent.
- B – The General Executive Committee or the Branch Committee accepts the application.
- C – The member is liable to the following procedural methods if he violates the constitution or commits a harmful act towards the Society or the Kurdish people:
 - 1 – Warning and then reprimand by the Branch Committee.
 - 2 – Suspension by the General Executive Committee.
 - 3 – Expulsion by the General Congress.

Art. 5: **The Organisation:**

- A – The General Congress:
 - 1 – It comprises all members present.
 - 2 – It is the highest authority of the Society; it can amend the constitution by a simple majority.
 - 3 – Is held once a year. An extraordinary Congress may be held on the request of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Society, or two-thirds of the members of the General Executive Committee. In both cases all the members of the Society must be notified about the date and place of the meeting a month in advance at the least.

4 – Only the General Executive Committee has the authority to appoint the place and the date of the General Annual Congress.

5 – A Committee should be elected among the members present at the General Annual Congress to lead the meetings before the discussions on the Annual Report of the General Executive Committee (G.E.C.)

B – The General Executive Committee (G.E.C.)

1 – The G.E.C. is the highest authority of the Society between two General Annual Congresses.

2 – The G.E.C. has seven permanent members and two candidates. They are elected annually by the Congress.

3 – The G.E.C. meets before and after the Congress. During its first meeting after the Congress, it elects from among its members a Secretariat of three members, the editor of the Society's organ, 'Kurdistan' Magazine. The Secretariat executes the decisions of the General Executive Committee between two meetings and the G.E.C. meets once every three months at the least.

4 – The G.E.C. prepares the Agenda of the General Annual Congress and presents it to all the members of the Congress for discussion during its first meeting.

5 – The G.E.C. meets within six months after the Congress.

6 – The G.E.C. is responsible to the Congress.

C – The Branch

1 – The Branch is established by the members of the society in a country and by a decision of the G.E.C.

2 – The Branch meets annually.

3 – The Branch elects a committee in its annual meeting.

D – The Branch Committee

1 – The Branch Committee has from three to seven members.

2 – The Branch Committee organises the activities of the Branch and has a leading role in fulfilling the aims of the society in their country of residence in a manner that does not conflict with the G.E.C.'s policy.

Art. 6: **The Finance**

1 – The finances of the society are from:

A – The Annual subscription fees

B – Contributions from members and the friends of the Society

C – From the Society's activities

D – The Branch Committees should provide half their annual income to the G.E.C. In case of aid The Branch Committee could demand support from the G.E.C.

*As approved by the
17th Annual Congress of
K.S.S.E. 27/8/1975. Berlin.*

K.S.S.E. NEWS

17th CONGRESS OF K.S.S.E.

The final communique of the 17th Congress of K.S.S.E. Berlin, 27-31 August, 1975.

After the setback of our armed struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan, due to the intrigues of fascist and imperialist forces in the area, our people now live in a critical situation. Thus it was in a sombre atmosphere that Kurdish student representatives met in West Berlin for the 17th Kurdish Students Society in Europe Congress under the slogan of 'Unity'. Also attending the Congress were some guests of the Society including representatives of Kurdish organisations and international humanitarian organisations.

In a democratic setting, congruent with the present situation, a thorough revision of the Movement's errors, and in particular, those of the Society, was undertaken. It was decided also that the Movement should continue to associate itself with the other progressive liberation movements in the world.

The Congress concluded its proceedings by passing the following resolutions:—

1. The Congress protests against the treacherous 6th March Agreement between the Shah of Iran and the Tikriti clique: a revival of the imperialist Saad Abad Agreement, the aim of which is to smash the Kurdish Movement as well as other progressive movements in the area, in order to sustain imperialist interests there.
2. The Congress protests against the Arabisation campaign in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Shekhan and Sinjar, as well as forcible displacement, transfer and arrest of the Kurdish people.
3. The Congress implores all patriotic and progressive forces in Iraq to unite in their struggle for a democratic Iraq in which true autonomy is given to Kurdistan.
4. The Congress urges the Kurdish people and all progressive forces in the area, to struggle hard to hold firm and maintain unity so as to be able to boldly confront the intrigues of imperialism and reactionaries.
5. The Congress protests against the assimilation policy carried out against the Kurdish people in Iranian Kurdistan, and support the struggle of the Kurdish people for their legitimate national right. The Congress also supports the struggle of all the Iranian peoples against the reactionary regime of the Shah, the puppet of imperialism, and implore all the progressive forces in Iran to unite and consolidate their struggle to defeat American design and expansionist policy in the area.
6. The Congress supports the struggle of the Kurdish people in Turkish Kurdistan for their national rights, and protests against the chauvinistic measures carried out against the Kurdish and Turkish patriotic and progressive forces. The Congress also expresses its solidarity with all the people in Turkey in their struggle against the chauvinists and reactionaries, and their imperialist military pacts, in order to establish a progressive democratic government in Turkey.
7. The Congress protests against the national discrimination under which our Kurdish people in Syria are suffering, through the implementation of the 'Arab Belt' plan which deprives more than 100,000 Kurds of their rights to citizenship as well as their rights to ownership and education, and other similar rights. The Congress therefore implores the Syrian government to bring an end to these oppressive measures which were planned by previous reactionary regimes, and to allow the Kurdish people to participate in the patriotic front in order to consolidate the struggle against imperialism and zionism, and to develop national unity on progressive principles.
8. The Congress implores all humanitarian organisations, as well as all the patriotic and progressive organisations of the world, to support the Kurdish people in their plight, and save the Kurdish refugees who are at present in Iran and suffering from poverty and lack of medical care, by:—
 - a. helping as many of these refugees as possible to be accepted in democratic countries where they may take refuge.
 - b. striving to obtain international supervision of the refugee camps in Iran.
 - c. helping Kurdish refugees who are students to find places in universities where they may continue their studies.
9. The Congress supports all patriotic liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who struggle against the imperialists and reactionaries, and the Congress emphasises the certainty of victory for the progressive liberation forces in the world who struggle for social progress, national independence and the maintenance of world peace.
10. The Congress supports and expresses solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab people against imperialist influence and in particular, the struggle of the Palestinian people for self determination in their own land (Palestine). The Congress also supports the armed struggle of the people of Dhofar and Oman against local reactionaries and protests against the interference of the puppet of imperialism, the reactionary Iranian regime.
11. The Congress protests against the oppressive and barbarous measures taken by the fascist Junta in Chile against the Chilean people and their vanguards, and demand the release of all political prisoners.
12. The Congress sends greetings to the people of Vietnam and Cambodia in their victory over American imperialism and hails this as a victory for all peoples who struggle against imperialism and colonialism in order to achieve self determination, social progress and peace.

13. The Congress supports the struggle of the Portuguese people in their struggle to consolidate democracy and to unite all the progressive forces in order to foil all the attempts by fascist and imperialist forces to smash their revolution.

14. The Congress urges the KSSE to strengthen its relationship with the IUS (International Union of Students), the DYU and with all progressive student organisations in the world.

15. The Congress urges all Kurdish students in Europe to unite under the KSSE banner and to struggle to maintain unity and the the implementation of its goals, so as to serve the Kurdish cause and to support the struggle of our people against the imperialists, reactionaries and to strive for a brighter future.

Activities abroad

6 March 1976 was a day that had many reasons to be observed by the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE).

It was the first anniversary of the signing of the infamous Algiers Accord by the Tikriti regime of Iraq and the Shah of Iran.

The Iraqi government has since claimed that by the signing of this Accord the Kurdish problem in Iraq has ceased to exist. The Shah, for his part, has stated on a number of occasions that he considered the rebellion of the Kurds to be futile and that it was in the best interests of the Kurdish people themselves to end it.

But Kurdish students all over Europe have replied to these cynical statements in demonstrations of bitter anger in London, Bonn, Stockholm and Paris. Protests against the Algiers Accord and the policy of ethnocide against the Kurdish people were made to the Ambassadors of Iran and Iraq in all these capitals. The banners of the demonstrators bore slogans not only condemning the Accord and the Tikriti-Shah-Kissinger conspiracy against the freedom of the Kurdish people; but they also made clear that the Kurds are by no means defeated and that their struggle for freedom continues.

On 21 March, every branch of the KSSE celebrated Newroz (the Kurdish New Year) in the traditional manner of the Kurdish people for two thousand five hundred years. Newroz celebrations have often been banned in Kurdistan by ruling parties of the day. Nevertheless, regardless of threats and sacrifices, this has always been a day of significance and celebration for the whole Kurdish people. To observe Newroz in 1976 was for the students of KSSE an expression of their determination to preserve their national culture and traditions, whatever their circumstances might be.

The following protests were delivered to the respective embassies of Iraq and Iran.

We who have gathered in the Kensington Library on Saturday, 6th March 1976, wish to protest against the Iraqi Government's policy towards the Kurdish People.

We would request Your Excellency to forward the following to your Government:—

We wish to warn you that through your government's policy of terror and deportation, of killing and torture, and the use of false slogans, world opinion is no longer misled by the statements of Iraqi Baath with regard to the Kurds of Iraq. There is a sense of outrage expressed internationally, which we share:—

1. That your government, despite the free hand it has had since the collapse of the armed Kurdish resistance and the consequent opportunities to show goodwill and magnanimity, in accordance with its treaty assurances as a responsible members of the United Nations and a professed progressive socialist state, has nevertheless, through its actions, shown itself to be nothing more than another reactionary fascist regime.

2. That your government, through its repressive actions, unfortunately leaves the Kurdish people no option but to rebel against it, forcing us to adopt the only language you appear to understand, namely that of force and violence.

3. These actions have proved that your government is not, as it alleges, taking action against the Pesh Merga forces alone; it is clearly directing its evil intentions against the Kurdish culture and the whole Kurdish nation — women, children and old people who have done nothing to warrant the inhuman treatment they are now receiving.

IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT
THROUGHOUT OUR LONG HISTORY IT HAS
BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO QUENCH OUR KURDISH
SPIRIT. WE HAVE WITHSTOOD TERROR AND
SUCCESSIVE REPRESSIVE REGIMES. NO
AMOUNT OF BRUTALITY FROM A FASCIST
TYRANNY WILL PREVENT US FROM
STRUGGLING FOR OUR JUST RIGHTS AND
PRESERVING OUR HISTORIC CULTURE.

We who have gathered in the Kensington Library on Saturday, 6th March 1976, wish to protest against the Iranian Government's Policy towards the Kurdish People.

We would request Your Excellency to forward the following statement to your Government:—

On 6th March 1975, your Government signed the shameful Agreement with Iraq. It was carefully planned and carried out in order to eradicate the Kurdish struggle which had been continuing for fourteen years to obtain the legitimate national rights for the Kurdish people.

It was not surprising that a government which is one of the most reactionary in the area should stab a poisoned dagger in the heart of a liberation movement. Indeed, what was more surprising was that it should ever have helped them!

The collapse of their movement taught the Kurds nothing they did not already fully know about the Iranian regime; what it has done is to stir the impulse of all Kurds to begin a struggle for their rights throughout Greater Kurdistan.

The Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan

The Aftermath of the Algiers Accord

The Algiers Accord was concluded between Iraq and Iran on March 6th 1975. At that date there were 150,000 refugees in twelve camps over the border in Iran, and 200,000 displaced and homeless people in the liberated areas of Iraqi-Kurdistan.

After the Algiers Accord there was an exodus from Iraq to Iran of an additional 100,000 Kurdish refugees which resulted in there being one quarter of a million Kurds in all taking refuge in Iranian camps.

The situation facing the people in Iraqi-Kurdistan at that time was extremely confusing and grim, for the rapid succession of events and the ultimatum of two weeks, left very little time for them to make the difficult choice of either surrendering to the Iraqi authorities or seeking refuge in Iran. Heavy snowfall and rain added to the difficulties of making this choice.

In addition, the main access road from Badinan into Iran, the Hamilton Road, was blocked off by the Iraqi Army two days after the ceasefire on 13th March, and the only route remaining, one through mountains along the Turkish border, was one prohibitive to vehicles, and on foot or by mule would take more than two weeks' journey for people already suffering from lack of food, clothing or medical care.

When the amnesty had run its course, a second amnesty was announced which has since been periodically renewed and extended until 1st September. During this period 155,000 refugees gradually returned to Iraq expecting to go back to their homes under the amnesty.

Conditions for Returnees

Every returnee was obliged to answer a detailed 72 point questionnaire which was designed to expose that individual's role and that of other activists, in the Kurdish Movement. Despite the Government amnesty, some Kurds were executed at Mosul Prison. There are over 200 specific instances of Kurds being killed by the Iraqi authorities since the amnesty has been officially declared, most were executed by hanging, but some were shot. While some of these were returnees, some were suspected sympathisers of the KDP who were captured before 6th March, including a member of the Iraqi-backed Legislative Assembly of Kurdistan, a lawyer in his early thirties, Raouf Mustafa.

Government Plan

Despite the amnesty, which promised to reintegrate the Kurdish returnees into Iraq, the following quotation is self-explanatory as regards the Iraqi authorities' actual attitude in their policy dealing with the Kurds. In an interview with the *Financial Times*, 14th July 1975, by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Minister of Information: "They committed a crime against the Iraqi people and Iraqi sovereignty and they have to pay a political price." The *Financial Times* of that date also stated: "According to foreign observers who recently returned from the north, more than 20% of the original Kurdish population is in place."

Without exception, all the returnees are forbidden to join any of the existing political parties, or professional organisations, including the puppet Kurdish organisations. Political discrimination is also evident in the way the Baathist authorities have banned all political activities in villages in Kurdistan, even by their nominal partners in the so-called National Front.

Racial and cultural discrimination amounting to ethnocide, is also part of the actual policy dealt out to the Kurds by the Government, as this statement in *Al Thawra*, the Iraq Baath Party's official newspaper, by Michel Aflaq, the 'founder leader of the party' clearly expresses: "Kurds are Arab Muslim citizens, like any other Muslim Arabs, there is no difference between them."

The Treatment of Returnees

Ex-members of the Iraqi Armed Forces, who defected to the Pesh Merga, have been sent to concentration camps in Diwaniya in numbers estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000. The choice of the area emphasises the provocative nature of their treatment as a large percentage of Iraqi soldiery originate from there. There is constant danger of friction and hostility toward the Kurdish returnees by the inhabitants who have lost members of their families during the war.

Former inhabitants of Sinjar, Shekhan, and the oil-rich areas of Khanaqin and Kirkuk, who returned from Iran to Iraq, have not been allowed to return to their homes. Furthermore, Security Forces evicted the Kurdish indigenous population from these areas and transported them by army lorries and dumped them homeless in Cham Chamal near Sulaimani, under the pretext of national interest.

Members of the Iraqi Civil Service, who were employed in the Kurdistan Region prior to the resumption of hostilities in March 1974, were not allowed to return to work as expected. They were demoted and transferred to the Arab south.

Political leaders have been under surveillance up to the end of August in Baghdad, e.g. the KDP Central Committee members. Most of them have been ordered to take up nominal positions immediately, which in effect amounts to forced exile. Other Kurdish politicians, who have not been active during the war, have been similarly sent into exile, e.g. Hamza Abdullah, the former Secretary General of the KDP.

The 'Autonomy Law' in Reality

In theory, the Iraqi Government still adheres to the principles of the March 1970 Agreement signed with the KDP, the crux of which was Article No. 14, concerning the conduct of the census: "... to unify the provinces and the administrative units with majority Kurdish populations in accordance with an official census to be carried out. The State will strive to develop this administrative unit and deepen and expand the Kurdish people's exercise of their rights in this unit to ensure that they enjoy self-

government.” This census has still not been carried out. The Government therefore continue to exclude large areas from the autonomous region, e.g. Kirkuk, Shekhan, Sinjar and Khanaqin, as confirmed by section B. of Article 1. of the Autonomy Law of 1974: “The Area shall be so defined as to be populated by a majority of Kurds and the general census shall specify the demarcation of the area in accordance with the provisions of the March 11th Manifesto and the general census records of 1957 shall be the foundation of defining the national nature of the absolute population majority in the places where general census is to be conducted.”

The post of Vice-President of Iraq according to the constitution is designated to be held by a Kurd. However, the present occupant has not been allocated any specific function within the framework of the State.

Despite the fact that today in Iraq ministerial posts do not carry decision-making functions, as the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the State are vested in the Revolution Command Council (RCC), only one out of the five Kurdish ministers has been allocated a specific ministerial department by the Government, i.e. the Ministry of Municipalities. The other four are redundant, and without any portfolio.

The Ministry of Northern Affairs has been abolished, and an Arab Baathist has been appointed to the post of Minister in charge of co-ordinating the activities of the autonomous region with that of the central Government.

The Tobacco Monopoly organisation, which was the mainstay of economic activity and employment in Kurdistan, has been disbanded. Its various departments have been dispersed and merged with the other ministries.

The Legislative Assembly, referred to in the Autonomy Law, and decreed in June 1974, had its first and only meeting on October 5th, 1974 inside a secondary school in Arbil as no building has been allocated for this purpose. No staff had been allocated and the Assembly has since been effectively suspended. In April 1975, members were notified that they were to return to their former jobs, held before June 1974 when they were appointed. Several of the 72 members were outrightly dismissed.

The name ‘Kurdistan’ is mentioned in the Autonomy Law, but never thus included in Government publications, instead, rather anonymously referred to as the ‘Autonomous Area’.

Kurdish Language expression, directly in contradiction to the Autonomy Law, Article 2, which states: “The Kurdish language shall be the official language beside the Arabic language in the area”, and “The Kurdish language shall be the language of education for Kurds in the area . . .” After 1970, the then three Governors of Sulaimani, Arbil and Dihok, initiated a programme to implement this principle in their provinces: the first step was to start evening classes for Government employees in the correct usage of the Kurdish language in official correspondence, but this programme was hastily halted by the RCC in a decree banning the implementation of this crucial clause. This essence of Kurdish partnership with Arab people in Iraq was denied and continues to be so.

In Sulaimani University, 70 members of staff have been transferred, and now all the faculties are headed and predominantly staffed by Arabs. The faculty for Kurdish Studies in Baghdad has been abolished, and Kurdish has been banned from schools in Sinjar, Khanaqin and Kirkuk. Furthermore, broadcasting in Kurdish has been severely curtailed since March 1975, by a reduction of 70%, and in Kirkuk, television programmes in Kurdish are practically non-existent.

Three pro-Government Kurdish newspapers have been closed down. The General Directorate for Kurdish Culture has been abolished. A definite assimilation policy has been confirmed by RCC decree which offers 500 Iraqi Dinars to any Kurdish citizen who wishes to marry an Arab and vice versa.

The Governorates of the ‘autonomous area’ are administered as military zones by Baathist military personnel.

There are no normal civil or criminal courts for Kurds to have recourse to other than the so-called ‘Revolutionary’ courts, in which Kurdish citizens are subject to arbitrary arrest and trial. The charge ‘Co-operating with reactionary forces’ is an offence which, by a law passed in October, imposes the death sentence.

Those Kurds residing in Arab cities such as Baghdad, are obliged to register with the Security Forces, and are forbidden to move house without consent of the authorities.



An innocent victim of napalm bombs – one of the Baathist atrocities against the Kurdish people.



A bomb-damaged house at Galala.

Lord Kilbracken. Camera Press.

The Executive Council of the Autonomous Area is an organisation with no power, departments or budget. Even functions like forestry and tourism are excluded from its jurisdiction.

Arabisation and Forcible Deportations

The Arabisation policy has been in existence and has been documented for many years now. This policy which has been intensified since the end of the war, aims at depriving Kurdish indigenous inhabitants of their homes and land, and bringing in Arab peasants, from the south as well as half a million from Egypt, to replace them. This anti-Kurdish racist policy is implemented under such disguises as 'progressive agrarian reform' and the building of 'modern villages' in the areas of Kirkuk, Sinjar, Shekhan and Khanaqin. Kurds from these areas are forcibly transported from their homes by Security Forces to the Cham Chamal area.

In the town of Kirkuk, no Kurdish citizen is allowed to purchase house or land, and those in possession of property are denied land registration certificates and documents relating to their properties. This deportation policy affects thousands of Kurdish citizens. The policy is openly admitted under the term 'safe hamlet policy'.

During the war, the Government announced that the

rights of Assyrians and Turkomans were recognised, but, since March, they too have been discriminated against to the same extent.

There are many social, psychological and health problems resulting from the aftermath of the war, and the subsequent movement of the population in Kurdistan. No international humanitarian organisation is allowed to enter, assist or observe the situation. Even the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, which is headed by Izzat Mustafa, Minister of Health, and member of the RCC, has not played any role in this respect.

Comment

The above situation raises many questions. The existence of the Kurdish nation as a separate entity in Iraq remains in jeopardy. There is a distinct Iraqi Baathist strategy to implement this policy. In this process, boosted by the vast oil revenues at their disposal, they are using deceptively attractive slogans and methods in order to mislead the world.

In effect, the Kurdish people, alongside the Turkomans and Assyrians, are treated as second class citizens, and many devices and devious means are used by the Baathist authorities to deprive them of their culture and national identity.

Iranian Kurdistan

Extracted from the Kurdistan 76, published by KSSE (French branch)

I

Iranian Kurdistan covers an area of 125,000 square kilometres, stretching from Mount Ararat to the south of the Zagras mountain chain. The Turkish-Iranian borders and the Iraqi-Iranian borders are also the borders of Iranian Kurdistan, with the Turkish and Iraqi areas of Kurdistan to the west.

II

The Iranian government has divided it into four provinces; only the central region of Sina (Sanandja) is officially called Kurdistan. The region in the north is called Western Azerbaidjan and those of the south Kermanchal and Loristan.

The Iranian government, regarding the Kurds as 'pure Iranians/Arians' and consciously confusing the Iranian term with the Persian term, has never published the statistics of the national composition of the population. However, the calculations based on the data of the 'National Census of Population and Housing' (Nov. 1966-Teheran) and the 'Monthly Bulletin of Statistics' (Nov. 1971, U.N. New York) show that there are at present 5.5 to 6 million Kurds in Iran, 16.5% of the total population.

III Social Structure

The destruction of the tribes, which began at the beginning of the century, has now achieved its final phase. The rapid extension of the interior market, brought about by the growth of capital, the setting up of the agrarian reform, however irradical it may be, and the rural exodus, added to other social-cultural factors, has led to the downfall of the tribal society in Iranian Kurdistan. Nomadism no longer exists, but there are, however, a few semi-sedentary tribes which live in the villages in winter and move with their herds towards mountain pastures in the spring.

The society is 70% rural, and of the 30% of the urban population, a third work in the oil and construction industry and two-thirds are in the services sector. Agricultural production supplies 80% of the national income, 45% of which is animal production and 35% from vegetable crops.

Half of the rural population is made up of agricultural workers and peasants without land, working on land owned by those in the small and middle income brackets, who together represent the other half of the agrarian world. The Shah's regime hopes to find support from these classes. The age of the great landowners, who controlled most of the workable land, disappeared at the onset of agrarian reform.

There is very little industry in Iranian Kurdistan as this country seems unable to take advantage of the present efforts at industrialisation in Iran. The industrial proletariat is evolving very slowly and is dependent either on the Persian or Azerbaidjan bourgeoisies, who themselves rely on either foreign capital or the government sector. Unemployment presents a very real problem.

Kurdistan also has an expanding commercial bourgeoisie, but it is the 'petite' bourgeoisie which plays an important political role.

IV Standard of Living

According to statistics published in 1966, more than 50% of the families (consisting of approximately six persons) lived in a single room. More than 80% of the houses were make-shift constructions lacking drinking water and electricity supplies. Average working hours in the towns are 54 hours a week and life expectancy is between 22 and 24 years. Malaria, tuberculosis and trachoma prevail in Kurdistan and in several regions. There is only one doctor to 20,000 inhabitants.

Apart from the strategically placed railway joining Iran to Turkey there is not a single kilometre of track in Kurdistan and the Iranian government has no projects on this matter for the future. A single asphalted road is at present under construction.

V Education

The Kurdish language is officially forbidden in Iran, and there is no Kurdish school within the area. However, there are several radio stations which broadcast in the Kurdish tongue. This is a means of political propaganda for the regime of the Shah. The programmes themselves also try to rob the Kurdish language of its originality by presenting it as a dialect and even as a subdialect of Persian.

The percentage of illiteracy is 70% in the towns and more than 85% in the country. A question mark must certainly be placed after the Shah's declaration about "this year of knowledge".

VI The National Kurdish Movement

As the recent armed struggle of Iraqi Kurds has taken the fore on the Kurdish scene recently, one hears little about the Kurds in Iran. However, the national feeling is very strong here and it is the will of the people to resist such an oppression. After the incessant revolts of Simko between 1920 and 1930, he was able to take under his control a large part of the Kurdish territory, but was assassinated during the declarations of peace by the Shah's generals. After the revolts of Jafar Sultan in the thirties, the nationalist fever seems to have lapsed mainly because the repression had been so brutal and murderous.

There was, however, the Kurdistan republic in Mahabad created in 1946 outside the zones of allied occupation in the heart of Kurdistan; it lasted for only a year. It drowned in blood shed by the Kurdish people, who were brutally massacred by the Shah's troops helped by the Anglo-American forces who saw this Democratic Republic as a dangerous example for the people.

In spite of its ephemeral existence, the memory of successes in cultural and educative fields, conquests in numerous liberation movements and achievement of social and democratic rights all remain engraved in the collective Kurdish memory.



Above and right
Qazi Mohamed – President of the Kurdistan republic
Mahabad – hanged during 1946/47.



Six years after the fall of this republic, at the 1952 elections, the Kurdistan Democratic Party's candidate (DKP) won between 80% and 90% of the votes in these Kurdish provinces. Needless to say, these elections were cancelled and the government nominated a priest from Tehran as deputy in this part of Kurdistan.

In the same year, an important peasant uprising led by the PDK broke out at Bikan and spread quickly over Kurdistan. The army spent several months stamping it out.

We must note that at the time of the campaign for the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1953, Dr. Mossadegh's government found strong support in Kurdistan which on 3rd August 1953 voted unanimously for the limitation of the Shah's power. In the town of Mahabad, out of 5,000 voters, only two people voted for the monarchy showing the extent of the unpopularity of the Shah's regime.

Since the coup d'état on the 16th August 1953, organised by the CIA to put the Shah back in power,

repression is practised on a large scale with the use of considerable resources. All the democratic and national organisations are persecuted.

In spite of, or maybe because of, the strength of the repression, uprisings are prevalent in Iranian Kurdistan. In 1956 the Kurds of Djouenroj investigated a movement near the Iraqi border. The Shah's tanks and planes together with the Iraqi forces completely destroyed this region. There were thousands killed and wounded. The Djouenroj fort, a symbol of Kurdish liberty, was completely obliterated. In spite of their heroic resistance, the Kurdish peasants had to evacuate their villages and take refuge in the mountains.

At the beginning of 1967, another uprising broke out in the region between Mahabad and Sardachke. This peasant guerrilla warfare, directed by the PDK in Iran, struggled to resist the Shah's troops for 18 months, despite the absence of a safe base and all external aid. The Shah's regime mobilised dozens of thousands of soldiers, helicopters and

tanks against several hundred guerrillas, and finally terminated this revolt against the oppression.

The repression is still raging; a hundred Kurdish militants have been killed and there are at present in the Shah's jails, together with Azerbaidjanis, Persian Arabs, and Baloutch patriots, thousands of Kurdish political prisoners. Among them are two leaders of the PDK who have already served twenty years in these prisons: Ghani Boulourian and Aziz Youssefi.

The format of the Shah's regime is well-known and there is no need to elaborate on it. But one must remember that it plays the role of the police dog of imperialism in this region, that it is tied by a bilateral military pact to the USA and that thousands of American advisors control the army, the police and the Savak.

This is a one-party regime with no trace of freedom or democracy. All opposing political organisations, all unions, all professional and even religious organisations are banned and the freedom of speech and press is non-existent. Parliament and Senate members are nominated by the Shah, the legislative and executive committees and the justices are subjected to his orders, and the Savak (Secret Police) has the upper hand in all affairs. This regime is comparable with that of the Russian Csars of the last century.

VII

Kurdistan, more than any other part of Iran, is militarised. All authority is exercised by army officers, the police and the Savak, and any movement in the population is seriously controlled. Each Kurdish peasant who goes to another village must warn the mayor of the two villages in advance and these in turn must inform the police of any foreign movement.

The national oppression is exercised over the whole of Iranian Kurdistan. The Shah's regime absolutely refuses to recognise the Kurdish people as a race who are not Persian and who belong to a nation stretching beyond to the neighbouring countries. Any request, even that of a minimum of the national rights is repressed with the greatest severity. The policy of assimilation into the Persian nationality which started at the time of the present Shah's father has become increasingly intensified.

This policy of national oppression is carried out in those

regions inhabited by the Baloutchis, Arabs and Azerbaidjanis. Their Persian nationalities make up the majority of the Iranian population, but the Shah's regime refuses them their national rights. For him the national problem does not exist in Iran.

The national struggle of the Kurdish people in Iran is organised by the PDK of Iran. Created in 1945, this party is extremely popular with the Kurdish masses. Hunted down, persecuted and shot down on several occasions, this forbidden party is at present one of the main forces fighting the Shah's dictatorship, and the only one undertaking activities in Iranian Kurdistan. Established in the country for more than 30 years, inspired by progressives, this party can be defined as the "revolutionary party of the Kurdish people in Iranian Kurdistan including in its ranks, revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals".

"It fights against the Imperialism, and the reactionary monarchy regime, for the liberation of the whole of Iran and for the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination." Their maxim is "autonomy to Iranian Kurdistan within the framework of a democratic Iran". After their third congress (September 1973) the party proposed to other progressive Iranian forces to form a democratic united front in order to fight against this dictatorship and ultimately overthrow the Shah.

VIII

As a result of the Shah's deceitfulness to the Iraqi Kurds, the hatred towards him and his regime has grown among the Iranian Kurds who, in spite of their disagreement over the Iraqi Kurdish movement's leadership, have done everything within their capacity to help their brothers in the fight for national rights. They even suspended their own struggle in Iran for a while for the sake of the Iraqi movement. With this clever tactical move on the part of the Shah (i.e. exploiting by supporting the Iraqi Kurds, to serve his own interests and at the same time taking advantage of the suspension of the Kurdish movement in Iran) and also because of the political myopia and the tragic mistakes made by the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, the Shah managed to use them as a payment in his deal with the Iraqi government and to bring a fatal blow to their movement at an opportune moment.

Kurdistan in Turkey

Turkish Kurdistan represents the largest and most populated region of the Kurdish homeland and includes 18 departments (wilayats) of Eastern and South-Eastern Turkey. It consists of 30% of Turkey, an area covering 230,000 sq. km. and extending from Mount Taurus to the Iranian borders, and from the USSR borders to those of Syria and Iraq. The main towns are Antep, Diyarbakir Mardin Erzurum, Malatya, Urga (Edesse) and Van. This region is irrigated by the Tigris and the Euphrates, which have their source here before continuing into Mesopotamia.

Population

Although the word 'Kurdistan' is forbidden, and the Kurds have no officially recognised status in Turkey, the census of October 1970 admitted the existence of 8,500,000 "citizens whose native language is Kurdish" in Turkey (cf. census of population, Ankara, 1972). About 7 millions of them lived in Kurdistan, while the rest was made up of emigrated workers or those deported and working at the most wretched jobs in the Turkish industrial centres.

Economy

Kurdish society is still largely agrarian; 72.2% of the population make their living in rural surroundings from agriculture and stock breeding. The means of production are archaic and considerably behind the rest of Turkey: 39% of the ploughs operating in Turkey are used in Kurdistan and only 3% of the agricultural machines work on Kurdish soil.*

Stock breeding is an important occupation; Kurdistan is the main supplier of goats, cattle and sheep in Turkey, Russian Armenia and even certain states in the Near East.

There has been a rapid increase in urbanisation in recent years: 27.8% of the Kurdish population live in towns of which six were shown in 1970 to have more than 100,000 inhabitants.

The private sector does not exist in industry, which involves only 5.5% of the active population, and the government only invests in the extracting industries: chrome, iron, copper, oil, phosphate, lignite, lead etc. In 1964, approximately 5.6% of the Turkish industrial companies were in Kurdistan.

The rest of the urban population is employed in trade, cottage industries and in the services.

Trade is a true reflection of the Metropolis-colony relationship which operates between the Turkish Metropolis and Kurdistan: the latter 'exports' agricultural and acts as a market for the diverse equipment manufactured by Turkish industry, which is in turn run by the multi-national companies.

Social Structures

Despite the extent of the interior market and the penetration of capitalist relations in Kurdistan, the feudal structures have not yet disappeared; Turkish authorities

have taken care not to begin any agrarian reform or to liquidate feudalism. Ankara has tried instead to integrate feudalism into the regime so as to gain firmer control over the Kurdish masses.

The peasant class is by far the largest in Kurdistan, but it is not homogenous: 38% of the peasants are share-croppers or agricultural workers possessing no land, 45.4% are small owners and control 27% of the workable land, 14.2% are landowners themselves controlling 4% of the land, while at the top of the pyramid 2.4% consists of 'squires' possessing 33% of the land.

The working class is a numerically small (5.5%) and relatively privileged sector of society, enjoying social security, paid holidays, and the right to strike and to join Unions. It is present in the construction and extractive industries.

There is also a trade bourgeoisie, associated to the system and its privileges. It is especially the urban petite bourgeoisie which both numerically and politically plays the leading role in Kurdish society. Relatively well educated, in touch with modern ideas and aspirations and living with the jolts and contradictions of a rapidly transforming Kurdish society, it is this class which at present dominates the Kurdish political scene. Because of the poor living conditions of the seasonal workers, the unemployed and outcasts of the towns, the bourgeoisie are particularly akin to them and their arguments are especially influential.

An Historical Outline

Following the First World War, the right of the Kurds to self-determination was recognised by the International Treaty of Sèvres (10th August 1920), signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Forces. However, as it was conducted by the feudal chiefs to whom honour and religion were of prime consideration, they decelerated their national cause and used their forces in battling for the liberation of Turkey, convinced that having proved victorious their right to a national existence would be recognised, as promised by Mustapha Kemal, the then Turkish Head of Government. Due to the unlimited devotion of the Kurdish people, Turkey was freed from foreign occupation and the Republic was proclaimed in 1923. The promises made by nationalistic and chauvinistic Turkish leaders were not adhered to. They were themselves descended from a dominated, oppressed and humiliated race and tried in turn to dominate the Kurds and dilute them into the Turkish body.

At this time of raging and outrageous nationalism, it was decreed that "the Turks are the noblest nation on Earth" and "a Turk is worth the whole Universe". The Kurds were obliged to remain silent. A theory was even created stating that the Kurds were simply "mountainous Turks" who, through contact with the Persians and Arabs, had forgotten their original tongue and adopted another. Since then all publications having any dealings with the Kurds or their language have been prohibited, and even the words 'Kurd' and 'Kurdistan' are officially outlawed.

* These figures come from a study by a Turkish sociologist I. Beciki *Structures de l'Anatolie Orientale* (in Turkish). E. Yayinlari, Istanbul 1969.

These chauvinistic and humiliating practices provoked justifiable outrage amongst the Kurds. Between 1925 and the Second World War there was a series of revolts, during which Kurdish blood flowed freely. There were more than a million and a half victims. These revolts, often spontaneous and localised reactions to the brutalities of the Turkish troops who behaved as if on conquered territory, failed through lack of organisation and co-ordination as well as political, tactical and military errors committed by feudal leaders. The alliance divided Kurdistan between the governments, and complicity between British and French Imperialists also contributed to these defeats.

Since the Second World War, the traditional Kurdish society has undergone great transformations. The land-owners, previously national, have become the main instruments in the Turkish domination. They have parliamentary seats in the name of the Kurdish people and enjoy certain privileges alongside the Turkish bourgeoisie.

Following parliamentary illusions, and particularly the difficult changeover in political direction, there have not been any uprisings in Turkish Kurdistan for thirty years.

However, this does not imply that the national conscience has been extinguished. On the contrary the national Kurdish Movement has become more vigorous following the relative democratising of the Turkish regime by the Constitution in 1961, the fruit of a long and arduous battle. The Iraqi Kurdish Movement has undoubtedly played an important role in this revival which is essentially the result of socio-economic transformations taking place in Kurdish society. This movement is directed by the urban petite bourgeoisie, but it has a growing audience in the country. At the time of the 1971 to 1974 Diyarbakir martial court trials, the majority of Kurdish political prisoners were poor peasants, small landowners or the village 'scholars'.

Regarding organisation, the Kurdish movement in Turkey operates in different ways. Before the dispersion of the Kurdish left, the majority of militant Kurds worked from the centre of the Turkish Workers' Party (P.O.T.) which in 1970, for the first time in Turkish history, voted to recognise the existence of the Kurds in Turkey, the legitimacy of its democratic claims etc. The Party was accused of separatism and therefore banned.

At present there are a large number of Kurdish militants directing the leftist progressive groups and parties which have freed themselves of their secular nationalist conditioning and proclaimed the rights to Kurdish autonomy. There have been attempts to create secret Kurdish parties in Turkey, inspired by those operating in Iraq and Syria. However, following the failure of the armed struggle in Iraq and the growth of the Kurdish petite bourgeoisie due to the critical condition of the country's economy, and with awareness of the extent of the national oppression, it appears that the Leftish tendencies are becoming dominant.

National oppression

a. Any Kurdish culture in Turkey is totally prohibited. There are no Kurdish schools, and no papers or radio programmes in the Kurdish language. Moreover, the Kurdish people are being denationalised by the Turkish regime by

the changing of Kurdish place names into Turkish, based on a supposedly historical theory which claims to prove that the Kurds' roots lie in Turkey. Also everything related to the history of Kurdistan has been destroyed, and Kurdish literature is distorted. M. Besikci, a Turkish sociologist, was sentenced to 12 years in prison for making a study of Kurdish tribes. A Kurdish publicist was given a sentence of 10 years for having "drawn on national feelings" by publishing a Kurdish literary work of the 17th century.

b. Kurdish language is also forbidden in administration or trade relations. Courts of Justice use interpreters when trying Kurdish peasants, which undoubtedly contributes to many injustices, and vexations, the majority of Kurds knowing only their native tongue. According to a study by M. Sükrü Koç, a Turkish deputy in Aydan, which appeared in the daily Istanbul newspaper 'Cumburiyet' (31st July 1965), 91% of the population of Mardin, 87% of Siirt, 81% of Hakkari, 67% of Diyarbakir and 68% of Bingöl cannot speak a word of Turkish. These are the main provinces in Turkish Kurdistan.

c. Not satisfied with outlawing everything concerned with the Kurdish problems, the Turkish government also decreed in an official paper (25th January 1967) that "the introduction into Turkey of any publication, record or tape in Kurdish or referring to the Kurdish culture" was prohibited.

d. Article 57 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that "the programmes, statutes and activities of the political parties must respect the principles of the Republic, based on the rights and liberties of Man, and of the indivisibility of the Fatherland and Nation."

Article 89 of the law referring to the political parties states very clearly: "political parties cannot claim the existence of minorities with a different national or religious culture or a different language on the territory of the Turkish Republic. Political parties cannot defend the development or diffusion of a culture or language other than that of the Turks, and cannot tolerate minorities which aim at the destruction of the National unity on Turkish soil."

This requires no further comment — the Kurdish 'minority' of 8.5 million strong has absolutely no right to political or cultural expression.

Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish penal code, adopted from Mussolini's code, complete this legal arsenal.

e. Turkish police and military repression in the Twenties and Thirties took the form of massacres and deportations, but these are difficult to repeat under present conditions and this repression now takes other forms. Between 1959 and 1954, nearly 600 intellectuals, students and eminent nationalist figures were deported, placed under house-arrest or imprisoned. From 1925 to 1965 Kurdistan was a military region forbidden to foreign visitors, and even today military occupation is extensive.

Since 1966, units specialised in anti-guerrilla warfare, disguised as arms researchers, carry out 'cleaning up' operations over the whole of Kurdistan. Peasants are collectively and/or individually tortured. There have been scores of

killings and executions. These operations, intended to terrorise the population and dissuade any nationalist feeling like that of the Iraqi Kurds, have doubled in intensity since last summer. For example, between October and the end of December, 10,000 of these 'commandos' have investigated and scoured the whole Kurdish province of Hakkari on the pretext of arresting a dozen 'outlaws'. The number of victims of this persecution is uncertain, but we know however, that since the summer of 1975 about 40 Kurds have been slaughtered by these 'commandos' at Viransehir, Dogu, Beyazit and Diyarbakir.

Finally, to end this brief look at repression on a happier note, there are at present about 200 Kurdish political prisoners in Turkish prisons. From 1971 to 1974, there were nearly 2 million.

f. The population has reacted strongly against this

repressive and oppressive policy. The cultural demands of the Kurdish people have been publicised in the main towns of Kurdistan, where, since 1967, many meetings, marches and public demonstrations have taken place. It is the first time in the history of Kurdistan that the masses have retaliated in this way.

The events of June 1975 at Diyarbakir, are an indication of the extent of this fight. Colonel Türless, the Turkish vice Prime Minister and also the head of the Fascist Party for National Action, was unable to utter a word in the face of the massive and hostile reaction of the population and was forced to escape to avoid being lynched. The presence of several thousand partisans, from distant Anatolian villages and the military 'quadrillage' in the Kurdish capital have **not** been able to prevent the people from expressing their anti-Fascist anger.

PUBLICATION OF A GRAMMAR BOOK ON THE KURDISH LANGUAGE

The 15 May 1976 issue of Istanbul's *Son Havadis*, a strong supporter of the Justice Party, carries an article entitled 'The leftists have really gone to the limit'. The article shows a photocopy of a newspaper advertisement by 'Kava Publishing House' for a book entitled *Zmane Kurd-Kurt Dili*.

The photocopy of this advertisement reads as follows: "... has begun publication activities with the grammar book 'Zmane Kurd - Kurdish Language' prepared by K. Bedirxan and S. Sivan, for the first time in Turkey, for those who do not know Kurdish or know Kurdish but cannot read or write it.

"Readers and booksellers should apply to the following address for copies: Post Office Box [number obliterated accidentally or on purpose - translator's note] Sirkeci (in Istanbul)."

Son Havadis's comment is as follows (full text of item given here): "Leftists who intend to divide and destroy the Turkish Republic, the latest independent, free, and democratic Turkish state in which 40 million of the 150 million Turks in the world live, have recently gone beyond all restraint to overtly engage in Kurdish nationalist propaganda in a number of advertisements in leftist papers.

"The advertisement shown in the cutting we show above has appeared in yesterday's issue of a newspaper. This says the following: 'Zmane Kurd - Kurt Dili has begun publication activities with the grammar book 'Zmane Kurd - Kurdish language' prepared by K. Bedirxan and S. Sivan, for the first time in Turkey, for those who do not know Kurdish, or know Kurdish but cannot read it or write it.

'Readers and booksellers should apply to the following address for copies: Post Office Box . . .'

[The translation of the advertisement in question, both from the published photocopy of the cutting and as its contents appear in the body of *Son Havadis*' comment, reflects - as accurately as possible - the peculiarities of spelling and syntax of the original. It is quite noticeable that the name of the first co-author of the advertised book contains the letter 'x' which does not exist in the Turkish alphabet, indicating that the person concerned is not a citizen of Turkey.]

"It is necessary to immediately point out that certain of our fellow citizens who live in the Eastern part of our country have nothing to do with Kurdism. Nor is there a language called Kurdish. Nor has there been even a principality in this name - let alone a state - that has ever existed in any period in history. The language that passes for Kurdish is an Anatolian dialect which is a mixture of Turkish (and pure Turkish), Persian, Arabic, and Suryani.

"These being the facts, the meaning of preparing and publishing a grammar of the Kurdish language as if such a language existed becomes quite clear: the Leftists are determined to separate from us some of our fellow citizens - fellow citizens who are of absolutely pure Turkish stock - and to divide up our country. There is no doubt that the Turkish nation will disdainfully reject such a provocation, Turkish laws will successfully tackle such extreme leftist initiatives irrespective of what guise they appear under, and - in the words of great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk - "they will be crushed wherever they appear."

Kurdistan of Syria

*Extracted from the Kurdistan 76, published by KSSE
(French branch)*

There are about a million Kurds in Syria (14% of the whole population of Syria). They live mainly on Kurdish territory in the north of the country adjacent to Turkish Kurdistan. There are also some Kurdish communities spread throughout Arab Syria. There are for example about 20,000 Kurds in Damascus.

On the whole, these Kurds are peasants (80%) and by working hard, they have made Djazirah, Syria's wheat granary. The rest are made up of citizens inhabiting the five Kurdish towns and certain Arab towns. They live on small trade and cottage industry.

These Kurdish territories were part of the Ottoman Empire. Their annexation to Syria arises from the Franco-Turkish agreement in London (9 March 1921) which demarcated the borders between Kernalist Turkey and Syria under a French mandate. The Kurdish people were not consulted at the time of this cynical and artificial position. During the French mandate, the Kurds were allowed to publish books and papers in their language. They took advantage of this to revive their culture. But these rights were withdrawn afterwards to the point where nothing remains today.

A policy of oppression and arabisation in Syrian Kurdistan has been underway since 1963. In the previous year the Baathists (a pan Arab chauvinist fraction of Arab nationalism) came to power following a coup d'état. After having established their military foothold, they abolished democratic liberties and wildly set apart the Kurdish Djazirah, so saving arabism.

In accordance with their plan which intended cutting off

any possibility of joining this Kurdish region to a unified and independent Kurdistan, the frontier with Turkey as well as with Iraq had to be evacuated by force. Arab Bedouins or 'fellahin' were brought in from other regions and installed in Kurdish villages. Thus a strip of fertile land 280 km long and 15 km wide was inhabited by Arabs, hence creating the so-called 'Arab belt'.

The Kurds had no choice but to emigrate to other countries or be forcibly deported to the Arab region of Al-Radd or other desert areas.

This racist plan was enforced in 1967 resulting in 150,000 Kurds being deprived of the right of citizenship. Later that year, another Baath faction came to power. However, the injuries committed against these Syrian Kurds have never been repaired. They vegetate in shanty towns in Arab cities without identification papers and searching for work, but scorned by Arab officials. The Kurdish national feeling is very strong amongst the Syrian Kurds whose only demand is for the right to conserve and develop their national identity. At this very time when the chauvinist repression is at its worst, when books, music and Kurdish folklore are banned, when thorough searches are frequent, when the administration is purged of its Kurdish officers, when to call oneself a Kurd is a crime, the Kurds have clandestine political organisations which strive to resist and put an end to such oppressive measures. Other than the nationalist parties, Syrian Kurds tend to militate in the ranks of the Syrian progressive parties (In fact, the first President of the Syrian Communist Party, Mr. Khaled Bagdach is a Kurd).

Leaders of the Syrian Democratic Kurdish Party (founded 1957) are at present in a Syrian prison together with thousands of other Kurdish patriots.

SPANISH EXECUTIONS

November 1975

The recent executions carried out by the Franco regime in Spain have led to a wave of protests on both the public and official levels in Europe. Almost all European governments, East, West and Neutral, have expressed their shock, regret and deep indignation at these executions of Spanish opposition and Basque nationalists.

With full understanding of the conditions which compelled these patriots to resort to the use of arms – by lack of democratic channels – and with sympathy and support of the efforts exerted to bring about democracy and freedom in Spain and the right of self-determination of the Basques, one cannot fail to notice that this forceful official indignation on the part of the European governments is both both very selective and, in a very real sense, hypocritical.

In the present-day world, it is obvious that there are many countries whose governments are as, if not more, dictatorial, tyrannical and violent than the Spanish government; these governments commit the most flagrant violations of 'human dignity' and 'human rights' and the right to a fair trial and defence. Yet none of these 'indignant'

governments raises a voice of objection, not even a whisper. One example is the government of Iraq which is reported by an international organisation to have carried out more than 139 executions and tortured to death 43 more for political reasons within less than a year ending in January 1975 – the names of these victims are provided by this organisation.

Of course, it would be naive and unrealistic to expect political reaction to events to be caused by such ideals as 'human rights', 'human dignity' or 'fair trial'. What really counts is how much reaction to injustice and violation of these ideals would or could affect the more material interests and creature comforts of the governments expressing 'indignation'.

The similarities between the nature, structure, and methods of the regimes of the 'author of Guernica' and that of the 'author of Qala Diza' are only too obvious; their treatment of political oppositions may be different but very harsh and violent: their economic co-operation, political ties and military relationships are as best and as friendly as could be expected. Yet this inconsistency in the European reaction to their violence and terror: in the one case, there is a great deal of vociferous 'indignation' and protest where-

as in the other there is only a great deal of 'great silence'. This situation may be accounted for by the following realities:

1. Iraq is a major producer of oil — Iraq has many oil-producing 'sister' states — which can hit back and retaliate — it can impose an embargo on the export of oil to those who object; thus the 'dead silence'. Spain, on the other hand, cannot; there is no possibility of an embargo on anything; thus the 'indignation' and protest.

2. Iraq has petro-dollars with which it can buy commodities these European governments are yearning to sell; this can help their balance of payments troubles; Spain does not have and cannot help.

3. Spaniards are fellow Europeans and co-religionists; the Iraqi democratic forces and the Kurds are neither.

Naturally, the above is not intended to mean nor imply a defence of the Franco regime; on the contrary this regime is seen as dictatorial, anti-democratic regime, having the closest affinity to its 'sister' regime in Iraq. What the above is intended to mean is that European official 'indignation' and protestation are only too obviously selective and thus hypocritical in their essence. This is very regrettable as

far as the Kurds are concerned because they are one of its foremost victims, even in their most tragic situation.

Brader

The following letter of protest was sent to the Spanish Government

To: The Spanish Government
c/o The Spanish Ambassador
London

October 1975

We, the Kurdish Student Society in Europe, express our total abhorrence and condemnation of the death sentences carried out against Spanish patriots.

We know how it is to have our brothers and countrymen killed, for we suffer in the same way as the Spanish people in general, and the Basques in particular, and thus protest against the dictatorship, and the internment of political prisoners.

We express our solidarity with the Spanish people in their struggle for democracy in which the rights of the Basque people will also be ensured.

General Secretary U.K. Branch
On behalf of
The General Secretariat Committee

MAY 11, DAY OF IRANIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

by ODYSI

Every year on Ordibehesht 21 (May 11), the Iranian patriots commemorate the Day of Iranian Political Prisoners. The annual commemoration of May 11 dates back to 18 years ago when Khosrow Rouzbeh, the Iranian National Hero was arrested, tortured and executed on the Personal order of the Shah.

Recourse to violence in all fields of life, lawlessness, banning of all democratic political parties, suppression of political freedoms, press censorship, in other words, open terror — these are the main features of the Shah's regime.

The Iranian regime channels its repressive activities through its infamous secret police organisation, known as SAVAK, with the direct participation of American and Israeli advisers. Its chief is appointed by the Shah and is directly responsible to him. He is, by law, one of Iranian prime minister's deputies. SAVAK employs more than 60,000 full-time and part-time 'experts' and agents, its budget swallowing up millions of dollars.

Estimates of political prisoners in Iran vary from forty to one hundred thousand. More than ninety per cent of them have either never been convicted or remain in jails despite the fact that their term of imprisonment has long expired. To quote the Iranian military prosecutor:

"Those prisoners who are still young and in good health will leave the jail after they have become old and disabled. In the case of the older ones, their dead bodies will be carried out of prison."

Ghahremani, Hadjari, Keymanesh, Amuyi and Shaltuki have been kept in captivity for almost three decades.

Mohammadzadeh, Razmideh, Zarghani, Djafari, Gudarzi,

Sharifi, Pakzad and Mortezaifar are only a few of prisoners who have long served their sentences and are still held in Shah's jails.

Prisoners are confined to small, dark, damp and unheated cells. They are fed with little more than bread and water. They are subjected to the most degrading methods of harassment on the part of the prison officers and criminals.

In Iranian prisons the most ruthless forms of torture are used to extract 'confessions'. The methods used include cigarette burns on the body, breaking limbs, indecently assaulting women prisoners, and passing electrical currents through the body.

The SAVAK tortures are keen on steadily improving their methods and employing the most 'modern' equipment and tools. Two French lawyers who recently visited Iran speak of a kind of 'toaster' which the accused will be forced to sit on. Afterwards, it will be switched on and the prisoner's bottom 'toasted'.

In recent years, the Iranian regime, fearing further public outcry, does not even bother to hold its typical sham trials. Instead, for instance in the case of Djazani and his fellow-fighters, it often resorts to their physical extermination.

On the occasion of May 11, 1976, the Day of Iranian Political Prisoners, the Organisation of Democratic Youth and Students of Iran (ODYSI) appealed to all international organisations and foreign personalities to express their profound concern over the continuing and overt violation of human rights, including the institutionalised practice of torture in Iran. It urged, especially youth and student organisations the world over, to demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Iran.

THE IRAQI-IRANIAN AGREEMENT – ANOTHER TREACHERY

by the C.D.I.P.

After four years of capitalising on the 'peaceful solution' of the Kurdish problem, the present Baath regime waged the fifth and most savage war against the Kurdish people. The regime has revealed its premeditated plans to annihilate the Kurdish liberation movement and to bring about the "final liquidation" of the Kurdish issue in Iraq. The present war is an unjust, chauvinist war waged by an undemocratic, corrupt regime against our Kurdish people whose only crime was their struggle for their legitimate national and democratic rights.

Suppression of democracy

The Baath regime prevents the Iraqi people from exercising their rights to democratically elect any representative body, organisation and government. The Iraqi people want a democratic government which will represent them. A government which will express democratically their aspirations to solve the social, economic and nationality problems. However, the dictatorship of the ruling clique has made of the state apparatus a tool for repressing the whole of the Iraqi democratic and progressive movements.

Due to the dictatorial nature of the ruling Baath group in Iraq, the principal problems suffered by Iraqi society remained unsolved. One of these problems is the Kurdish issue. The nationality problem is part and parcel of the whole question of democracy. A regime hostile to democracy is historically unable to solve the nationality problem. It is therefore natural that the present regime failed to solve the Kurdish issue democratically.

Autonomy, a democratic demand

Events which followed the signing of the 11th March (1970) agreement between the Baath regime and the leadership of the Kurdish movement – on which we will dwell later – emphasised the correct thesis that the Kurdish issue in Iraq is inseparable from the issue of democracy and can only be solved within the democratic framework. The realisation of this, which begins with the formation of a national democratic coalition government will create a suitable atmosphere for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. A solution based on autonomy for the Kurdish people.

Events have also revealed the false allegations of the present regime regarding its readiness to grant the Kurdish people their national rights. The intense savage war proves the absolute futility of achieving autonomy for the Kurdish people under the present regime.

The new war policy

A military coup in July, 1968 brought the present Baath rulers to power at the height of the Iraqi democratic upsurge. The task of the military takeover was, as it had been in 1963, to put an end to this upsurge. Due to its unpopularity and complete isolation the regime was practically unable to continue its war against the Kurdish people. The regime needed most a breathing space, a ceasefire. This was necessary to gain complete control of the state, to liquidate

the Iraqi patriotic movement, to isolate the Kurdish liberation movement and to build up its armed forces. These considerations were behind the ceasefire and the agreement of 11th March, 1970, between the regime and the Kurdish leadership. In this agreement, autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan was promised by the rulers of Baghdad within four years.

Consequences

Events which followed the signing of the agreement revealed the real intentions of the Baath. They concerted their efforts to crush the patriotic forces in Iraq by mass executions and terror. The regime went a long way in its attempt to isolate the Kurdish nationalist movement. This movement, with which the regime signed a ceasefire, was not spared! Attempts were made to assassinate its leaders and to break it from within. In addition huge sums of money were diverted into the police and army which were brought into readiness.

The new war

Thus, in the spring of 1974, the Baath rulers were able politically, economically and militarily to commence with the other part of its policy, that of total liquidation of the Kurdish movement.

On the 11th March, 1974 the regime declared the so-called 'Autonomy Law'. A few days later the armoured and artillery divisions and the air force of the Iraqi army launched a massive offensive against the villages and the cities of Kurdistan. Over 100,000 Iraqi troops were plunged by the regime into the present unjust, chauvinist war. The general offensive was aimed at occupying the fortified regions of the Kurdish liberation movement and uprooting it. This the offensive failed to do as the war dragged on for almost a year. The policy of war was thus defeated and the regime began to totter.

Manifestations of the defeat

- Increased tension in the ranks of the army and amongst the people, as the number of dead and wounded reached thousands. This has led to a growing rebellion within the army as the awareness of the futility of the war, into which they had been plunged, grew.
- More than I.D. 1,500 million*, which represents half the oil revenues of 1974, was spent on this war. This amongst other things, crippled the national economy.
- The regime has recalled for National Service all men born between 1944-1950. This has led to the depletion of manpower from many industrial and agricultural projects, which are vital to the national economy.
- The devastation of Kurdistan by bombing and burning by napalm has brought the agriculture in that region into ruins. This, in addition to the regime's negligence of the irrigation projects in the Euphrates valley, has devastated Iraqi agriculture.

* I.D. 1 500 million = £1.4 million

Rapprochement with the Shah

Failing in its unjust war the regime resorted to a number of measures. Efforts were made through various channels to approach the Iranian regime for help to suppress the Kurdish people. The Baathists did not hesitate to compromise the sovereignty of Iraq. The expansionist policy of the Shah found its opportunity in the readiness of the isolated regime to compromise.

The desperate situation of the Iraqi regime finally led to the signing of the treacherous agreement of the 6th March, with the Shah, in Algeria. This underlines the readiness of the ruling clique to go to any lengths in order to stay in power.

Clauses of the Iraqi/Iranian agreement

- Iraq officially and for the first time conceded the right of Iran to eastern and southern Iraqi territories.
- The setting up of a joint working committee to revise the 500 mile Iraqi/Iranian border. As Iraq has no claims to Iranian territories, this will result in further territorial concessions to the Shah.
- Shatt Al-Arab was divided. Iran was given the right of a deep water channel in Shatt Al-Arab, which means that the Eastern half of the channel is now Iranian. This river has always been a part of Iraqi territory, a fact which has been emphasised in all previous international agreements. However, the Shah in 1969, shunned all these agreements, when he annexed half of Shatt Al-Arab.
- The two sides agreed to prevent “infiltration and acts of sabotage” across the border. The main aim of which was to encircle the Kurdish movement and the Iranian patriotic movement, so as to facilitate the dirty work of the two dictatorial regimes.

These are the declared clauses of the agreement. The consequences of the undeclared parts will most likely hit at the aspirations and struggle of the Omani people and the just cause of the Palestinian people.

On the same day as the signing of the agreement the regime stepped up its offensive and a new episode in the war started.

The plight of the Kurdish people

The indiscriminate bombing of Kurdish civilians, of their homes and villages and the fear of genocide, have forced thousands of refugees – men, women and children, to face the long tortuous trek to the refugee camps of Iran. The

number of Kurdish refugees who have fled to Iran, in the most adverse winter conditions, without adequate food, clothing or shelter has been placed at around 250,000 persons.

The plight of the Kurdish prisoners of war is equally horrifying. A statement made by War on Want expressed concern about Iraq's policy on prisoners, “Since fighting in this campaign began on March 13th, 1974 foreign welfare missions working from Baghdad have been unable to trace any Kurdish prisoners of war”. – *The Guardian*.

The ruthlessness and savagery of the Baghdad dictators is felt not only by the Kurdish people but also the Arab people. The remainder of the Iraqi nation must send its sons, brothers, fathers and husbands as forced cannon fodder, to satisfy the needs of the unjust war of the Baathist regime. The Iraqi army had already suffered “10,820 dead and 17,500 wounded up to the end of 1974” – *The Guardian*, Friday March 14th.

Hypocrisy

The cynicism and hypocrisy of the regime is shown clearly in a letter from the Iraqi Ambassador to the *Times* (March 7th), in which the Ambassador writes, “The Times’ interest in the agreement between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran to negotiate a solution to the outstanding problems between the two countries . . . bespeaks an awareness of the importance of this tendency towards the peaceful handling of issues between two countries in an area which is closely connected with the peace and welfare of the world. There is no doubt that this important development will have far reaching effects that will be welcomed by all peoples of good faith who take a sincere interest in the well-being of peoples and subscribe to humanitarian values.” -- In all sincerity, can the Baath regime lay any claim at all to “peaceful handling of issues” or put itself on a par with people who subscribe to say the least, to “Humanitarian values”!

In support of the Iraqi peoples

All people who truly subscribe to humanitarian principles, who indeed value peace, freedom and democracy should condemn this unjust war and the treacherous Iraqi/Iranian agreement. Support the Kurdish people in their national rights. Add your voice in protest against the vicious, anti-democratic Ba'ath regime and in support of the joint Arab and Kurdish struggle for democracy in Iraq and autonomy to Kurdistan!

Committee for the Defence of the Iraqi People

The Kurdish nation has maintained its identity through a centuries-long defence of its isolated mountain homeland. Last year an agreement between Iran and Iraq brought the latest upsurge of Kurdish nationalism to an end. John Stathatos was in Iraqi Kurdistan at the time and writes here of the events leading up to this humiliation.

Indestructible Kurds

by John Stathatos

Reprinted from The Geographical Magazine.

In an age which looks with sympathy and approval on the struggle for independence of even the tiniest communities, the Kurds are probably the largest national group to have been denied consistently the right of self-determination. A large and distinct nation of Aryan stock with their own language and culture, they have inhabited the mountainous areas of the Middle East south-east of the Black Sea since time immemorial.

The Kurds were wild and unruly nomads as much given to intertribal fighting as to indiscriminate raiding at the expense of their lowland neighbours, and their reputation for fighting and the inviolability of their mountain strongholds have allowed them to survive for centuries under a succession of mostly nominal administrations. It was only in this century that they developed any nationalist feeling in the political sense. Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, provision was made by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres for 'a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia . . . and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia', but this was repudiated by Kemal Ataturk, and the Treaty of Lausanne which Kemal negotiated with the Allies in 1923 following his victory over Greece made no mention of the Kurds.


There followed in the 1920s and 1930s a series of Kurdish uprisings in Turkey, all of them abortive and all crushed with considerable violence. The demand for autonomy spread to the Kurds of the newly created state of Iraq, and in 1932 the large Barzani tribe rose in rebellion under Mullah Mustapha Barzani. The attempt proved abortive, but it signalled the appearance on the scene of Mullah Mustapha who was destined to become the major Kurdish leader of the century.

In 1941 Britain and the USSR occupied Iran; most of the Kurdish area came under the USSR zone, and in 1945 the Russians promoted the formation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. The experiment proved short-lived, for the Russians withdrew from Iran in March 1945 and the Republic was in no position to defend itself, falling to the Iranian army at the end of the year. The Republic's leaders were executed, with the sole exception of Mullah Mustapha, recently promoted General and commander of the minute Mahabad 'army'; he fled to a ten-year exile in the USSR.

From the 1950s onwards, the focus of Kurdish nationalism switched to Iraq. The Kurds claim that they represent a figure of 2,500,000 out of a total population of 9,500,000, while the 1967 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* estimates 1,500,000. Nomadic and pastoral throughout their history, the Kurds began to give up that way of life

towards the end of the last century. Today, Iraqi Kurds subsist on a largely self-contained agricultural economy; tobacco is the principal cash crop where conditions permit its cultivation. Life in the mountains is extremely harsh, and food consists mainly of dairy products, rice, fruit and bread; meat is a luxury. Surpluses are traded in the more prosperous lowlands for wheat, sugar, tea and barley for animal feed. Because of the almost continual unrest and the deliberate neglect of the government, there has been little economic development of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the few projects which have been initiated proved of benefit primarily to the Arab south. Communications are primitive, and medical care, except where organised by the revolutionary administration, almost non-existent.

Although the Arbil and Kirkuk oilfields should have provided employment for the Kurds, it is primarily Arabs who are employed there, and the same applies to the me-





Homeland of the Kurds is in forbidding mountains southeast of the Black Sea on the Iraq-Iran border. Their struggle for self-determination came to a head last year when Iran withdrew support from the Kurdish Pesh Merga force. Hamilton Road, winding up the Balak valley (above) was the only Kurdish link with the outside world and tiny villages became key bases.

3 per cent of Iraqi industry located in Kurdish areas. However, until the government began its policy of general repression, there was a small but steady outflow of young Kurds to the south in search of employment. Despite official discouragement many of these detribalised Kurds became successful in their fields and formed the basis of an urban Kurdish intelligentsia.

Thanks to the geography of their area and above all the weakness of the Iraqi state, the Kurdish tribes maintained a certain amount of *de facto* independence. Kurdish national aspirations grew slowly, and in 1954 General Barzani was in his absence co-opted chairman of the newly formed United Democratic Party of Kurdistan (UDPK), rebaptised Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1958. After the Kassem coup abolished the monarchy in July 1958, the new government tried to negotiate with the Kurds, and Barzani was allowed to return to Iraq.

Relations between the government and the Kurdish leaders became worse and in 1961 Barzani took to the mountains where he led some short, sharp and victorious campaigns against his old tribal enemies, the Lolanis and the Zibaris, not incidentally confirming his dominant position in the mountains. Uneasy at his growing power, the government moved against him in September, launching the revolt which was to smoulder on till 1970.

The first government offensive failed as Barzani and the KDP put together the first standing Kurdish force, as opposed to the purely tribal levies with which the Kurds

had hitherto fought: calling themselves Pesh Merga, or 'they who face death', the Kurdish irregulars rapidly developed a method of dealing with the larger and better equipped Iraqi forces. As successive governments followed in Baghdad, offensives were launched against Barzani and his Pesh Merga, in June 1963, April 1965, May 1966, January 1969 and August 1969. All ended in either stalemate or outright victory for the Kurds over the Iraqis.

By the end of the decade the war-weary government was finding the economic, social and above all political cost of the war more than it could bear, and after prolonged negotiation a fifteen-article peace agreement was signed in March 1970 which guaranteed Kurdish autonomy and the essentially bi-national nature of Iraq. The end of the war found Barzani, by now undisputed leader of the Iraqi Kurds, in complete control of the KDP despite increasingly bitter clashes which had led to open warfare between himself and elements of the Party Politburo in 1964 and 1968-69. Furthermore he was in physical control of more than half of Iraqi Kurdistan and his army remained intact.

The peace agreement was to have been implemented by March 1974. Unfortunately, things did not go according to plan, and when the government unilaterally announced implementation of its 'Law of Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan' on March 11, 1974, it was immediately denounced by the KDP, which objected on three main grounds. One, that under the Law the Kurdish administration was to be appointed from Baghdad rather than elected;



Kurdish troops survey the Rawanduz front. In the attack which followed the agreement between Iran and Iraq 11,000 of the Pesh Merga held off for a week three heavily armed Iraqi divisions until the Iranians negotiated a ceasefire.

two, that the promised Kurdish participation in the national government would not take place; and, most seriously, that areas which under the peace agreement were to have been part of the Kurdish territory were excluded. These were the oil-producing areas of Kirkuk, Sinjar and Khanakin, all with a Kurdish majority. In recognition of the importance of these areas, the Kurds had been prepared to leave the oil wells under government control, and asked merely for a share of the revenue proportional to the Kurdish population.

Despite its watered-down nature, the Autonomy Law still offered a degree of independence, and, assuming always that the government could be trusted to implement it honestly, the KDP must have been tempted to go along with it. Barzani rejected it out of hand, and within a few days the Kurds were once more on a war footing. A major reason for this decision emerged a year later when Barzani gave an interview a few days before leaving Iraq; he claimed that the Kurds had been encouraged actively to resume fighting by Iran. The Iranian involvement was kept a close secret. Towards the end of the fighting it consisted of fifty pieces of artillery manned by Iranian troops and a smaller quantity of anti-aircraft guns. Supplies and ammunition also were passed on to the Kurds, and refugees as well as wounded Pesh Merga were evacuated to Iran.

The fighting began successfully for the Kurds who were able to capture Rawanduz. But by autumn they had been forced back into the mountains by a major Iraqi offensive. Three fronts had developed; Badinan province in the north, Qalat Diza in the south, and Rawanduz, which was the most important. Most of the Iraqi efforts were directed against

Rawanduz since by forcing up the Balak valley they could destroy the KDP administrative posts on the Hamilton Road and cut the liberated areas in two.

Fighting was not the only concern of the KDP; it was responsible for the civilians behind its lines, and from a partisan army with a slim infrastructure it had become the *de facto* government of the liberated area. An efficient administration had developed under the KDP Political Bureau's eight departments: internal affairs, finance, information, judiciary, public works, agriculture, education and health. Finances depended mostly on the sale of the tobacco crop and on individual donations, the information department, among other activities, operated daily radio broadcasts, and the running of the Chouman POW camp was the responsibility of the judiciary. Perhaps the most impressive performance under the circumstances was that of the education and health department. Concerned at the high rate of illiteracy, the KDP organised impromptu schools even in the remotest villages; these were conducted with considerable enthusiasm despite the total lack of proper facilities, classes often being held in the open for fear of strafing. Medical care was of primary importance for civilians and the Pesh Merga and was provided in the face of enormous difficulties. Most fortunate in this respect was the Balak Valley area which included the major hospital at Kawerte, even though this was subject to daily air attack. Medical teams operating near the front line would send back the more gravely wounded to Kawerte, and cases judged beyond the hospital's competence faced a three-hour drive over the border to the Iranian hospital at Piranshah. The problem was graver in Badinan due to the pressure of

extent of the Iranian *volte-face* became clear. The party leadership delayed coming to a decision, worried about the fate of the civilians; already refugees were moving out of the Balak Valley into Iran, and 50,000 more families were refugees; Dr Nabarro of the Save the Children Fund (SCF) who visited the area in March reported that there were only twelve doctors, fifty para-medics and few medical supplies available.

As the year wore on, the life of the Kurdish civilians became grimmer. An unusually hard winter was rendered less tolerable by the Iraqi Air Force's constant strafing and bombing of civilian targets in which napalm and phosphorus projectiles were used. The refugee problem caused the greatest misery. The government had initiated a campaign of terror against the hitherto uninvolved urban Kurds, and these fled from the south to the liberated areas. Every subsequent army offensive brought a new wave of civilians north. According to the Iranian Red Lion and Sun, the number of refugees to reach refugee camps near the border between March 11, 1974, and April 5, 1975, was 146,792. In a sense, the increasing administrative responsibility which the KDP, partly thanks to Iranian assurances, found itself assuming proved an Achilles heel. The old methods of guerrilla warfare could no longer be used extensively, since to withdraw from a sector meant abandoning committed civilians to government reprisal. Furthermore the KDP establishment in the Balak Valley acquired unwonted symbolic value, so that the valley could not be abandoned in the face of a heavy offensive without damaging morale. The result was that the Pesh Merga were committed increasingly to fighting front line battles along fixed positions against a larger and more powerful regular army. Given the superior skill and motivation of the Kurdish partisan, this was still possible at Rawanduz with Iranian support.

The Agreement of March 6, 1975, signed between Iran and Iraq at the Algiers OPEC conference, hit the Kurds with no warning. Iraq would accept a number of Iranian claims for border adjustments in the Shatt al-Arab estuary and elsewhere; in return, Iran undertook to seal its frontier against 'all subversive infiltration'. Within twenty-four hours the Iranians had withdrawn their artillery and the Iraqis flung three divisions (38,000 men) as well as large quantities of armour against the Kurdish positions at Rawanduz.

Despite the additional handicap of unseasonably mild weather, the Kurds once again achieved the impossible during the next seven days by stopping the Iraqi assault at Rawanduz as well as on the other two fronts, Shekan and Arbat. Fighting ended on March 13 with a ceasefire negotiated by Iran. The jubilation which followed the ceasefire quickly evaporated as Iran announced that the border would be sealed off on April 1, after which date no supplies would be allowed to reach the Kurdish enclave, nor would any more refugees be allowed into Iran. The Iranian attitude was that the Kurds could choose between accepting the amnesty offered earlier in the year by Iraq or exile in Iran.

During the first few days after the ceasefire, it had been considered axiomatic that the Pesh Merga would resume

fighting after April 1, but this became less certain as the trekking in over the snowbound mountains from Badinan. A further blow came on April 19 when Baghdad refused a KDP offer of negotiations.

In an atmosphere of gathering confusion and despondency, Barzani, just back from a secret visit to Teheran where he tried to persuade the Shah not to abandon the Kurds, announced that the KDP had decided not to fight on. During the next few days, embittered and bewildered Kurds, soldiers, party cadres and civilians drifted up the Hamilton Road to Haj Omran and the Iranian refugee camps; Barzani himself left on April 23 for house arrest in Teheran. The Iranian doublecross, inexplicable at first in the light of the basic hostility between Iraq and Iran, was undoubtedly the result of many different pressures and considerations: OPEC pressure on the two countries to normalise their relations; US pressure on Iran to defuse the Kurdish situation in view of the increasing risk of direct confrontation between the two countries in the politically delicate area of the Gulf; increasing Iranian fear that a united and successful Kurdish movement might spill over into Iran to affect Iranian Kurds; and Baghdad's increasing restlessness under USSR influence which led it to make certain concessions to Teheran which in turn would allow Iraq to dispense with the USSR aid hitherto necessary for the prosecution of the war.

By April 1 when the Iranian border was closed, the revolution was clearly at an end, and although some elements of the leadership, primarily those associated with Ibrahim Ahmed's old left wing dissidents, announced they would continue resistance in the mountains, this does not so far seem to have happened. The rank and file in the Iranian refugee camps were told in April by Barzani's son Idris that the struggle was for the time being at an end, and were left to make up their own minds as to whether or not they wished to take advantage of the Iraqi amnesty and return home. Homesick and deeply mistrustful of Iranian intentions, which seem to have involved the assimilation of the refugees and their integration in the Iranian work force, many families have elected to return. Conscious of world opinion, the Iraqi government seems so far to have avoided mass reprisals, and most returnees are allowed to return home after interrogation.

Another chapter of the Kurdish tragedy ended in March but it is unlikely to be the end of the story. The Kurds are a tough, stubborn people, deeply convinced of the justice of their cause and capable of learning from their mistakes. By the nature of the situation, Kurdish nationalism is certain to raise its head again in Iraq, particularly while the government remains in the hands of the repressive and undemocratic Ba'ath party. Whether following renewed conflict under the direction of a new KDP leadership to emerge from the present intensive reappraisals taking place among party cadres in the Middle East and Europe, whether as the result of further political developments and shifts of alliance in an area of increasing international importance, or, as it is hoped, as the result of a change for the better in the internal politics of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds will continue to fight for a place in the sun.

Gesht le Hewraman A Tour in the Hewraman

(The Ballad of Peshmerga)

1 Diymen y Rhêgaw Ban

Komelhe shaxêk, sext u gerdinkesh,
Asman y shiyny girtot e bawesh,
Serposh y luwtkey befr y zor spiy,
Be daristan rhesht nawdolh y kipy.
Coge y awekan têtayda qetiys maw
Her erhon, naken pêch y shax tewaw.
Hawar u haje y kef, chirhiyn y chem
Bo tenyayi' shew laylaye y xem.
Tuwle rhê y bariyk tuwnawtuwn piskin
Rhêbwar exat e endêshe y bêbin;
Nawrhêga teqteq, larihê berd y zil
Ke hêshita gerduwn pêy nedawe til.
Ga serewjuwre, ga serewxware,
Talhiy w shiyriyniy' dinya y rhêbware.

2 Dê

Kam berberhochkey zor basefaye
Cheshn y dilh y shad dêye, awaye.
Xanu w y begzade le sa y drexta
Aram y buwke le kosh y bexta.
Xanu w y ehaliy'sh, zoryan duw nihom,
Hendê qincu qiyt, hendê laru kom,
Yek leser yektir berew lutke y kêw
Bo asman echin wek pêpilke y dêw.
Le dêda kam cêt gewre ber chaw kewt
Malh y Aghaye w xaneqa w mizgewt.

3 Jiyn y Diywexan

Ke geyishtyt eber derga y gewre
Her xizmetkare u lêt eda dewre.
Rhêt piyshan eden taku diywexan
Iytir diywane w mer-heba y miywan.
Deste y xizmetkar, fiyshekdan le mil,
Be chefte w mishkiy ser u teple zil,
Des leser xencer, chawerhê y firman
Chi bo serbirhiyn, chi bo nan da nan.
Hech kesê taze b'êt e diywexan
Kirnuwshêk eka be ser da newan.
Germe diywan y shew y Begzade,
Têkelh u pêkelh, babet u made.

1 View of the Open Road

A mountain mass, wild and defiant,
Has gathered blue heaven in its embrace;
The mantle of its peak very white snow,
Dark with forest its silent dales.
Waters imprisoned in their runnels
Flow on, nor cease their windings round the hills;
The roar and hiss of foam, the shrill song of the brook,
Lullabies for grief in the solitude of night.
The narrow footpath, feeling its way from tunnel to tunnel,
Throws the wayfarer into anxiety without end;
On the track rocky stairways, on the side great boulders
That heaven has not yet sent rolling down.
Now it is up hill, now it is down hill,
The bitter and sweet of the wayfarer's world.

2 Village

Whatever sunny nook is very lovely,
Like a merry heart, there is a hamlet, a village.
The Begzada's mansion in the shade of trees
Is the repose of a bride in the lap of bliss.
The peasants' houses too, many two-storeyed,
Some straight and erect, some leaning and bulging,
Rising in tiers to the crest of the hill,
Lead up towards heaven like the demons' stair.
Any place in the village that stands out for size
Is the house of an Agha, the hospice or the mosque.

3 Life in the Guest Hall

When you reach the threshold of the great gateway,
There's a bustle of retainers, and folks gather round,
They guide you through to the hall,
Then all is hospitality and welcome to the guest;
The corps of retainers, bandoliers slung on shoulders,
Heads and hats swollen with bright silken turbans,
Hands upon daggers, awaiting their orders,
Be they to chop off a head or bring in the dinner.
Each newcomer as he enters the hall
Makes a reverence, bowing his head.
The Begzada's evening gathering grows warm
With lively exchanges, ideas and facts.

4 Mela y Dê le Diywexan

Lejêr mêzera mela y nushtawe,
Rhiyshy bo sersing pirsh u bilhawe,
Qiyafet perhpuwet wek ktêb y kon,
Zimany shiyyryn, seruchawy mon,
Baz y rhoth y chesh be shyir y edeb
Belham shêwe y zuw y Ecem u Ereb.
Bo miywan bibê maye y tesella
Le korh y shewa melaye w mela;
To w mela w shyir u felsefe y Islam.
Gö rha girtin y tawtaw y ewam
Bê ziyadu kem d'ênête pêsh chaw
Serinc y kôran le name y nuwsraw.
Ke diywan cholh buw chuyt enaw cêga
Des ekeyt emil xew y pash rhêga.

5 Beyan

'Ellhahu Ekber!' Melabangane,
Tariyku lêlhiy' ber y beyane.
Mang y becê maw le sefer y shew
Zerde le tirs y qaspeqasp y kew.
Esterê y meghryb wek qetre y emel
Kizkiz etkêt enaw befr y serkel.
Le rhê y ewber y shax deng y zeng d'ê,
Le shôn y rhawker teqe y tfeng d'ê.
Wa be tewawiy dinya rhuwnake,
Her husn y rhuwte sirusht êstake.
Le drect eda shine y ba y seher,
Cirmu cuwlhyety cheshn y sewda y ser.
Leser coge y ash qaz u mirawiy
Chawerhê y rhojin helh b'ênê chawy,
Belham ta xulhky neka chêshtengaw
Nayêt enaw dê pirshing y hetaw.

6 Mizgewt

Binchiyne y mizgewt nyshtot enaw chem,
Rhuw berew qyble, pisht le cehenem.
Mizgewt y kat y chêshtengaw y chol
Wek mirduw kifn y bédengiy le kolh.
Suwre chinar y liqu pop drêj,
Sêber eka bo xew y berdenöj.
Carcar Imam y tenya y goshe y hewz
Sersing mach eka rhiyshy be wenewz.
Kesê bang eda, eshlheqênê gom,
Imam helh esê, dar be des, pisht kom.
Ta tewaw ebê 'Ellhahu Ekber!'
Peng exwatewe lafaw y nöjker.
Nöj betalh ebê, cemaet bilhaw,
Chend piyrêk ebin be xilhte y lafaw,
Suwchêk germ eken be rhaz y cwaniy,
Ax be ba eden bo dinya y faniy.

4 The Village Mulla at the Hall

Beneath a spreading turban see the bowed Mulla,
His beard unkempt scattered over his breast,
His face all wrinkled like an ancient tome,
His tongue full of sweetness, his aspect glum,
A hawk unhooded in verse and letters
Though in the old fashion of Persian and Arab.
If for the guest there be a source of consolation
In the evening circle it is the Mulla, the Mulla —
Thou and the Mulla and verse and doctrine of Islam.
The fitful attention of the common herd
Exactly demonstrates, neither more nor less,
The degree of the heed of the blind for the Scripture.
When the hall is cleared and you go to your chamber
You take in your arms the sleep that follows the long road.

5 Morning

'God is most Great!' It is the call to morning prayer
In the dim twilight of early dawn.
The laggard moon on her nightly round
Is pale with fear of the partridge's call.
The evening star like a drop of hope
Grows dim and slips into the snow on the peak.
The sound of caravan-bells comes from the road behind the hill,
From the hunter's hide comes the crack of a rifle.
See, the world is now all bright,
Nature is beauty unadorned.
The soft breeze of morning stirs the trees,
Their shimmering like the tingle of headache.
On the mill-race geese and ducks
Wait for the day to open his eyes,
But not until breakfast-time invites them
Will the sun's rays come into the village.

6 Mosque

The mosque's foundations sink into the stream,
Its face towards Mecca, its back turned on hell,
The empty mosque of breakfast time
Like a corpse wrapped in the shroud of silence.
A plane with spreading bough and branch
Casts its shade for a nap on the smooth prayer-flags.
Now and then the Imam, alone at the corner of the cistern,
Nods for his beard to kiss his breast.
Somebody calls and sets the pool a-rippling.
The Imam stands up, staff in hand and shoulders bent.
'God is most Great!' The call is hardly finished
Before the spate of worshippers banks up to overflowing.
And now the prayer is over, the congregation scatters,
A few old men, the sediment of the flood,
Warm up a corner with the secrets of youth,
And heave sighs over this transitory world.

Kurdistan 1975

There were thousands
On the snowy mountain slopes
Far, far from here.
For so many years
They had resisted and fought,
Never losing heart.


For the love of Kurdistan
They had left all that belonged . . .
Their wives, their children,
Their homes.

Last men of true nobility
In a faded world,
They fought . . . they fought.
Children they were
To believe in such words
As Brotherhood, Generosity,
Courage and Liberty . . .

Lost knights of this earth,
My brothers of the noble hearts,
I weep for you
For I too shared your hope –
Your fool hope.

Hope today is dead,
Crushed by betrayal and by force.
My brothers, my friends,
When will we once more
See the shining light of liberty
In Kurdistan?

Yvette Ibrahim



Kurdistan in the Press

The Times, 7.9.74

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE KURDS

While the world's attention has been concentrated on the military operations in Cyprus, fighting just as fierce and much more prolonged has been in progress in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraq Government offensive which has been in progress since early August is generally agreed to be the biggest ever launched against the Kurdish autonomists led by General Mustafa Barzani. According to Radio Baghdad, "revolutionary Iraq has finally and unequivocally decide to liquidate this treasonous clique" and is "prepared to face all eventualities and consequences regardless of the price". According to Kurdish sources 90,000 regular troops and 30,000 reservists are involved on the government side as well as hundreds of Soviet-made tanks and bombers — Tupolevs, Sokhoys and Migs. On the Kurdish side are some 60,000 Pesh Merga ("those who face death")—irregular forces with only light weapons and a few old anti-aircraft guns and field pieces.

The great advantages of the Kurds are the traditional ones of a mountain people defending its homeland: knowledge of the terrain and consequent mobility, combined with extraordinary phy-

sical toughness and moral determination. Even so, they admit that the present offensive is the severest test to which these qualities have ever been put. Vice-President Saddam Husain Takriti, the "strong man" of the Iraqi Baathist regime, has clearly made up his mind to "solve" the Kurdish problem once and for all, and not to be deterred by the heavy losses which a regular army is bound to suffer when it makes a frontal attack on a mountain stronghold.

The Kurds have had to fall back as the government troops penetrated into areas where they had never ventured before, using earth-moving equipment to clear a passage for their tanks and covering their operations with day-and-night shelling. At the same time the civilian population of General Barzani's "liberated area" has been driven from its villages by intensive bombing. Some crops have been destroyed and many more have simply not been planted because the farmers were hiding in the hills. This may well result in a serious famine by the end of the winter. Already the population is suffering severely from lack of shelter and adequate medical resources.

Seventy-two thousand refugees have already crossed the border into Iran, and many more are likely to do so if the bombing continues. The Shah of Iran, who has been giving discreet support to the Kurds for some time, is now apparently being drawn further into the conflict. Clashes between Iranian and Iraqi border guards were reported last week. These were presented by Iraq as "the Iranian regime's attempt to save the clique of its agent Mullah Mustafa". An alternative explanation is that the Iraqi regime provoked them in order to make the war look more like a defensive struggle against Iran and so make it more acceptable to the Iraqi population.

Vice-President Husain has about two months left in which to crush General Barzani's forces before snow makes large-scale fighting in Kurdistan impossible. The Kurds are confident that he will fail, and that this will destroy his credit both with the Iraqi armed forces and with the Soviet Union which has so far supported him generously. But whether he succeeds or fails, yet another international relief effort is going to be needed to help the suffering Kurdish civilians.

Iraq planes 'kill 15 in raid on Iranian village'

Teheran, Sept. 6—Fifteen people, including nine children, were killed today when Iraq aircraft bombed two Iranian border villages, the Government-owned Pars news agency said here.

Iran delivered protests Notes holding Iraq responsible for the "grave consequences" of the attacks, the agency said, and Iran's representative at the United Nations was instructed

to protest against Iraq's "bloody aggression."

Two Iraq aircraft dropped four bombs on the village of Kohne-Lahojan, killing 15 people, including nine children aged less than 12 years, wounding three, and destroying and damaging homes, according to the agency.

Two bombs were dropped on Ghaleh-Tarash, but there were no casualties, the agency said.

Last week Iraq accused Iran of massing troops on the border and launching a night attack in which an Iraq frontier guard was killed.—Reuter.



New Printing House Square, London, WC1X 8EZ. Telephone: 01-837 1234

IRAQ'S POLITICAL POTENTIAL

While the most immediate and drastic effects of the agreement between Iran and Iraq have been felt by the Kurds, its possible repercussions in other parts of the Middle East should not be ignored. It is a long-standing paradox that Iraq, which is the most populous oil-exporting Arab country and, after Saudi Arabia, the one with the largest oil reserves, has played only a marginal role in inter-Arab politics and has made little or no impact on public opinion outside the Middle East. The contrast with Libya, a country with relatively small oil reserves but a more central geographical position and a much more flamboyant leader, is particularly noticeable.

If Iraq now succeeds in freeing itself from the fear of war with Iran, and in "solving" the Kurdish problem or at least reducing it to "an acceptable level of violence" (this level being probably a good deal higher in Iraq than in Northern Ireland), it will almost certainly begin to play a bigger role in inter-Arab affairs, and perhaps also in those of OPEC and the world community in general. It will also, in the nature of things, become less dependent on the

Soviet Union (which may have been one of the considerations that led the Shah of Iran to sign the agreement).

What sort of foreign policy will it adopt? On past form it could be a very radical one which would make life uncomfortable, to say the least, for many other governments in the Arab world. The first to tremble would be Kuwait, which was threatened with forcible absorption by Iraq in 1961, and with invasion as recently as 1973. Other governments farther down the Gulf must be asking themselves questions. Does the agreement imply that Iraq now has a free hand to encourage socialist revolution in the various shaikhdoms? Will the Iranians now withdraw the troops which have been helping Sultan Qabus of Oman against the rebels in Dhofar? Or does it on the contrary mean that Iraq will now turn a blind eye to any Iranian adventures in the Gulf? Neither conclusion would be very comforting for the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, or even Saudi Arabia.

Another government which has cause for concern is that of Syria. The Iraqi regime still enjoys the sympathy of some members of the Syrian Baath

Party, including some officers in the armed forces, and President Assad has shown signs of being worried about his position in recent weeks. If he were to be overthrown, or forced to toe an Iraqi line, President Sadat's peace strategy might in turn become untenable. And further trouble could be caused if Baghdad were to sponsor an extremist rival to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It drew back from doing that before the Rabat Conference last autumn, but perhaps only because it needed Soviet support and Arab neutrality, if not better, against the Kurds and Iran—precisely the constraints which it now hopes to remove.

On the other hand, the radicalism of Iraqi foreign policy in recent years has been essentially the verbal radicalism which a weak government often uses to atone for its impotence. A Baghdad government with genuine power in international affairs might also discover genuine responsibility. Certainly its latest actions have been deliberately reassuring to other Arab states: the OPEC summit saw not only the agreement with Iran but also a less publicised rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. It remains to be seen whether this new policy is tactical or strategic.

Kurds force change of Iraq policy after clashes

By Edward Mortimer

Renewed outbreaks of fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan in the past three months have forced the Iraqi Government to reconsider its policy of dispersing the Kurdish population to other parts of Iraq, according to reports reaching London.

In a directive published by the Baghdad daily *Al-Iraq* on July 5, Mr Saddam Husain, the Iraqi Vice-President and "strong man" of the Baathist regime, admitted that the authorities had "taken several measures, such as changing the residence of people of some border villages and strategic areas, as well as changing the residences of some individuals such as civil servants, workers and others".

He added that "some other people have been transferred to other parts of the republic", and confirmed that the Kurdish refugees who returned latest from Iran had been resettled in southern and central Iraq.

However, he added, "it has been decided to stop such measures completely". But this apparently refers only to mass deportation, because in the next sentence Mr Husain refers to the possibility that "such measures" may still be necessary in individual cases, and directs that in future they must be carried out only with the permission of the "Higher Committee of Northern Affairs".

The reason given by Mr Husain for the change of policy was that "national unity, security and stability have now been established in the area", after the defeat of the Kurdish revolt.

But Kurdish leaders in Europe say that on the contrary the past three months have witnessed the first armed clashes in Iraqi Kurdistan since the revolt collapsed and that the biggest of these occurred on July 1, just before Mr Husain issued his directive.

This was an attack by Kurdish "Pesh Merga" (guerrilla fighters) on three military outposts between Dohuk (capital of the Badinan region near the Turkish frontier) and the summer resort of Sarsang. The Pesh Merga claim to have surprised the outposts and temporarily occupied them, killing 25 Iraqi soldiers and wounding another 40 or so. The Government then had to close the road and forbid tourists to go to Sarsang, while the wife of Mr Naim Haddad, the Youth Minister and a senior figure in the Baath Party leadership, had to be flown out of Sarsang by helicopter.

A week later, it is claimed, there was a further substantial clash between the Pesh Merga and the Army in the mountains of Bamo, which is right at the opposite (south-eastern) end of Iraqi Kurdistan. A smaller one occurred in the central area on Mount Safin, which is only 25 miles from the town of Arbil where the government-sponsored "autonomous area" has its capital.

These outbreaks, according to usually reliable Kurdish sources, are the result of a deliberate decision to resume armed struggle by the "provisional leadership" of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. This is the party which conducted the previous revolt under the leadership of General Mullah Mustafa Barzani (now exiled in Iran) but has since been undergoing a searching process of self-criticism and reconstruction.

As a result of their "betrayal" by Iran last year, the new leaders have resolved not to trust the governments of any of the countries bordering Iraq but rather to rely on the support of the Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iran and Syria.

The Guardian, 17.6.76

moved from the Makhmour district on the plain of Irbil.

Villages and towns containing about 100,000 Kurds in the key oil area around Kirkuk had been sent to Nasiriya and Muthanna. Out of 15,000 people from Sinjar in North-west Kurdistan some had been dispersed to Irbil, Mosul, or Sulaimaniya or gathered into collective villages south of Kirkuk. From the Zanner area west of the Tigris another 40,000 people from 60 villages have been either sent to the south of Iraq or regrouped near Mosul.

Another example of suppressing the Kurdish identity cited was the closing earlier this year in Bagdad of the Kurdish newspaper *al-Ta'akhi* and its replacement by one predictably called *al-Iraq*.

The Kurds, he said, were reorganising politically on a clandestine cell basis within the North and were feeling increasingly constricted in such a way that the only outcome could be a renewal of armed resistance. He said that this repression had an international dimension and quoted as an example the ratification in Iran's Senate of the March, 1975, agreement. This contained provisions for cooperation in both intelligence and security.

In a separate statement the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan said that members of the Akow tribe had earlier this week clashed with Government forces in resisting the deportation of the population of Hajj-Omran. One Kurd had been killed and two others wounded.

The wounded had been taken secretly to Iran for treatment but had been discovered by the Iranian security forces and handed back to Iraq.

Iraq disperses 300,000 Kurds

By ANTHONY McDERMOTT

The Central Government of Iraq has moved about 300,000 Kurds from the Kurdish areas in the North since the collapse of their revolt in the spring of last year, according to a senior member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

He said that this was the main part of an Arabisation policy aimed at depriving the Kurds of their own identities.

Most of these people have been either dispersed within Kurdistan or deported to the south of Iraq to such places as Nasiriya, Diwaniya, Ramadi, and Muthanna. Housing for an additional 10,000 families has recently been built in Ramadi in the expectation of new arrivals.

The KDP official detailed the population moves. By last November more than 50,000 had been moved direct from refugee camps in Iran to Nasiriya. About 15,000 had been moved from the Zakho area of the Turkish border to the South. Another 20,000 had been evacuated from 30 villages between Derbandikhan and Khanakin in Eastern Kurdistan. A similar number had been

The agony and the irony of being Kurdish in 1975

It's hard to be born a Kurd. Kurds are close enough to Europe to have been early influenced by ideas of nationalism; they may even be educated enough to have heard of all those pious phrases issued by the United Nations. The Kurds, though, have the wrong sort of colonialists. It is their colonizers who sit on the decolonization committees and who decide to whom the pious phrases apply.

During 13 years of war between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, the United Nations kept silent, preferring to pass over the matter in silence rather than disturb the equilibrium and the strident verbiage of the Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish Iranian or Soviet delegates. It's not fashionable to be killed by third world governments. The Kurds have chosen the wrong sort of oppressors.

It's confusing to be born a Kurd. If you are born in Turkey – the most likely, statistically speaking – you are told that you are a Turk, not quite a proper Turk, a "mountain Turk". Culturally and racially you must be part of the great Turkish Nation. You are actively discouraged from wearing Kurdish clothes, speaking Kurdish or reading Kurdish. There is a strong folk culture in Turkey and that culture is Turkish, not Kurdish. It's embarrassing to the Turks that the Turkish and Kurdish languages are not in any way similar. It's better not to be born a Kurd in Turkey.

If you are born a Kurd in Iran – the next most likely statistically speaking – then you can be proud of being an Aryan. Your ruler, the Shah, glories in the title of 'light of the Aryans'. You may keep your own language and have your own radio stations. The Iranians approve of Kurdish because, as they say, it's like Persian, their own language. In this case, the scholars agree.

It's best not to inquire too closely into the policies of the 'light of the Aryans'. At one moment the Kurdish leader in Iraq was the 'lion of the Aryans' and the next moment he was a refugee. The 'light of the Aryans' had sold the fate of the Kurds in Iraq, whom he had been supplying with massive military equipment, for his legal rights over five miles of half a waterway. If you are a Kurd in Iran, it's best to enjoy the benefits of the oil boom and become a contented part of that happy Empire.

If you are born in Iraq or Syria, then it's best to be born Arab. Both these governments take their Arab nationalism seriously. Of the two it's better to be an Iraqi than a Syrian Kurd. There has been a lengthy civil war in Iraq so the government knows that as a Kurd you have been troublesome and might become so again. During the war you were granted what was called an "autonomous region". It may not have any power, its members may all be chosen by the government in Baghdad, but still your existence as a Kurd is officially recognized. You can send your children to Kurdish schools, even to a Kurdish university.

In Syria, there are none of these blessings. There, the Kurds live in the desert and not in mountain strongholds, or did until the government discovered they were too close to its national borders. Then it dispersed them forcibly, to keep the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic as Arab as its title.

A Kurd born in the Soviet Union is just plain lucky. There aren't enough Kurds to be any sort of threat. There are just enough of them to be worth studying. The Kurds get the benefit of the liberal Soviet policy towards minority cultures. In three Soviet Universities there is a subject called 'Kurdology'.

Another advantage of being a Kurd in the Soviet Union is that you can know exactly how many of you there are – 89,000 in 1970. If you are in Turkey, you are indeed counted but as a strange statistical anomaly. The number of Kurdish speakers there has been sharply declining, while

according to official figures, the population has been rising. What's more, the areas where you are most likely to be born a Kurd in Turkey are precisely those areas where the population has been rising the fastest, as is usual in places where the central government does not bother to build roads or establish factories. In Syria, Iraq and Iran, there is no separate count of Kurdish population.

The plight of the Kurds has been described in a report by that virtuous organization, the Minority Rights Group, in its report *The Kurds* (Martin Short and Anthony McDermott, Minority Rights Group Report No. 23 at 45p).

It is a pity that the authors of the report did not have more first hand experience of the Kurds and the Kurdish war which they set out to explain but they succeed, in 30 pages, in giving a bird's-eye view of the awfulness of being a Kurd. The report came out too early to cover the debacle that followed from the agreement between Iran and Iraq in March. The authors of the report, like everybody else, failed to foresee that with the end of the Shah's support the war in Iraq would collapse.

Nobody outside Iraq knows what is happening there now that the fighting is over. There were 200,000 people in the Badinan region, all desperately short of food, waiting for the Iraqi army to "liberate" them. According to the Iraqi News Agency, they have been welcoming the army with open arms. As at least half these people had suffered considerable deprivation in order to escape that same army a few months before, a certain cynicism must greet the news agency announcements.

These days, when remote islands of tiny populations are being decolonized, when national rights are taken for granted, it is hard for the Kurds to accept that the chances of an independent Kurdistan are less now than they were in 1918. There are enough of them – some 10 million – to make a sizeable country. But unless there is some remarkable turn in Middle East politics, it seems unlikely that the four countries who have divided Kurdistan between them can ever let it join up again.

Nationalism is all very well and good for those with a chance of achieving their ends. For those without a chance, it is a political altar on which many lives can be sacrificed and nothing achieved.

Andrew Murray

Translation from Le Monde 18.5.76

The Kurds and the Right of Minority Peoples

Since the settlement, more or less globally, of the colonial question, one problem has not ceased to take an important place, notably among the afro-asian countries: that of oppressed minorities; South Sudanese, Biafrans, Eritreans, Baloucis, Pachtus, Berbers of North Africa, etc. Ethnic, linguistic or ethnic-religious minorities, lay claim to the right to be themselves, to control their destiny, remembering that they are the majorities on their own territory and sometimes, when they are scattered, demanding at least to preserve their identity.

The diversity of such situations call for various solutions: independence, autonomy within a federated structure, or simply the preservation of a cultural identity. The right of self-determination, legally recognized by international agreement (Resolution 2625/XXV of the UN General Assembly of 24 October 1970) is in point of fact rejected, sometimes in the principle itself, sometimes on its practical application. As for cultural rights, which should be the minimum prescribable, these are denied to minorities in a considerable number of countries, notably among those which have achieved their national liberation from dominant occidental countries.

It is true, even if the argument may seem shocking to some, that it has been more easy in the last two decades, to seize independence from the western colonial powers than to see autonomy being granted by the third world states, where these problems occur; such countries, either out of concern for centralisation or because of the nationalism of the majority group, are unwilling to give up any of their prerogatives. In this context, the Kurdish people retain the privilege without doubt to be the only community which exceed 15 millions which has not acquired the right to a national existence, despite the wars which have stretched out over a number of decades. (In actual fact, of the 153 sovereign states of the world, fewer than one-third have a population which exceeds that of Kurdistan).

Is it acceptable in our time that millions of human beings should be deprived of the right to use their native language in school, in publications, in dealings with the administration, even though most of them know no other? This is the case of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria. Is it acceptable that this problem cannot be considered by international bodies insofar as these only take account of states or at best of movements which have the active support of states. Is it acceptable that a campaign in support of the Kurds cannot be mounted in the West (or in support of all other oppressed minorities) without their claims being presented as those of terrorists in the media which so readily feeds such scandals.

In Iraq, there the Kurdish national movement was, for reasons of history and demography, the strongest, and where the Kurds had won during the period of the British mandate a minimum of cultural rights, the situation has been deteriorating systematically from the time of the crushing of their armed resistance just a year ago.

Autonomy, it is true, had been given them by the Iraqi Baathist government at the end of a war lasting nearly ten years. But this autonomy, before even being applied, was being pared away thus provoking the resuming of hostilities in 1974. In March 1975 the national Kurdish movement was snuffed out by an accord between the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi government. It is undeniable that this defeat of the Kurds is also the fruit of the inadequacies of the national movement directed by general Barzani, demonstrating the weight of a traditional society and its practices, and of a narrow political vision too bound up with tactics and leaning towards arguable alliances (notably that with the Shah which must have shaken the movement).

Over the year, the Iraqi government has proceeded with its arabization by transferring the population from the oil bearing regions and the frontier areas until now peopled with Kurds (Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sindjar). This deportation has affected, according to Iraqi sources, 50,000 people (the Kurds put the number at two hundred thousand) and must in the near future reach far higher numbers. Internment camps have been created in the south of Iraq (Diwanya and Nasriya) where tens of thousands of Kurds, notably those refugees from Iran who took refuge there after the collapse of the armed movement and who now have returned to Iraq to escape the internment camps of Iran. Two hundred and fifty patriots have also been executed (Mosul, Abu Graib, etc). On the cultural level the deterioration is seen in the closing of the Faculty of Kurdish Arts in Baghdad (founded in 1959), the suppression of the Directory General for Kurdish Culture, as well as of the Ministry for Northern Affairs, the dismissal of 70 Kurds of the teaching faculty in the university of Sulamaniya and their replacement by Arabs of Baathist origin.

The Iraqi Kurds see this time as the most difficult period of their history since the creation of the Iraqi state by Great Britain. These events are being unfolded in the midst of a silence which is the result of a dearth of information, by connivance in the interests of the State and by public indifference. Even the few open-minded ones, when watch-

ing the Kurds – like many other problems of minorities – have a reservation which is often bordering on disapproval, for their claims seem insufficiently justified and the context of their struggle too complex. This is an omission in which the core of the argument lies primarily in the refusal to allow minorities to be oppressed, and in the reaffirmation of their absolute right to preserve their cultural identity. Yet this is the minimum right, even preceding the right to self-determination (which might result either in federation or, eventually, in secession). It is important to shake off conformism with ritualised formalities, and the attitudes and mentalities with regard to the type of problem of which the Kurds are one of the most tragic illustrations.

Dictatorship exercised in the name of nationalism of the majority justified by the interests of the state, when it is not in the name of revolution or socialism, remains an intolerable injustice when the right is denied to minority peoples to develop and enrich their culture.

Gerard Chaliand

The Times, 19.7.76

Prisoners of conscience. Syria: Daham Miro

The Kurds, who have their own language and culture, have lived in the same area for the past 3,000 years. A tough, resolute people they have outlasted many of the great imperial races in their corner of the world. Yet today they are scattered through Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, the Soviet Union, Iran and Syria as minorities whose rights are few and who, more often than not, are persecuted. Estimates of their number range from six million to 16 million.

The world has recently become again aware of the Kurdish problem through the bitter fighting in Iraq and on the border with Iran, yet the Iraq regime has been one of the more liberal in dealing with the Kurdish minority.

The situation has not been so good in Syria where the Kurdish population is put at between 320,000 and 600,000. The Kurdish Democratic Party has been declared illegal and its leader, Mr. Daham Miro, jailed.

Mr. Miro has been in jail since 1973 when he sent a memorandum to President Assad protesting against his "Arab belt" policy, which has been described as a "plan for the establishment of model state farms". This involves, essentially, the transfer of the entire Kurdish population from the border areas, especially in the north, to the south without compensation.

As most of the Kurds living in the border areas are farmers, this means that they have lost their means of livelihood. Many have been reduced to begging.

The policy was initiated in the north-eastern Djezirah area from where, it is reported, about 12,000 Kurds have already been removed. The policy is apparently to replace them with Arabs.

Mr. Miro, who is the chairman of his party in Syria, has never been charged or brought to trial and his people are still denied cultural, linguistic or educational freedom.

Yet the Syrian Government publicly says that the Kurds should be enabled to take part in the development of the state and believe that this is best achieved by increasing Arabic education in their areas.

They justify the "Arab belt" policy because, they say, the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq seek to incorporate the Kurdish areas of Syria into an independent Kurdistan. Kurds have been intimidating and driving out local Arabs so that they could take over their land, the authorities say.

Mr. Miro has suffered from rheumatism and eye troubles because of alleged previous ill-treatment. Recent reports say that his health has sharply deteriorated. He has been transferred to a civilian hospital in Damascus.

David Watts

Books on the Kurds and Kurdistan

- ABBAS, Hilmt: Altkurdische Kampf – und Munchen 1964
- ADAMSON, David: The Kurdish War. London 1964
- AJASIME, Jeli: Les Ecrivains Kurdes en USSR. Yerevan 1954
- ALDRIDGE, James: The Diplomat. London 1950
- ARFA HASSAN: The Kurds. Oxford University Press, London 1966
- BACHMANN, Watter: Kirchen und Moscheen in Armenien und Kurdistan. Leipzig, 1913
- BALSAN, F.: Les Surprises du Kurdistan. Suisse 1946
- BARTH, Frederick: Principles of Social Organisation in Southern Kurdistan. Oslo 1953
- BEDIR-KHAN, Jaladat: Grammaire Kurde. Damas 1933
- BEDIR-KHAN, Kamuran: La Question Kurde. Paris 1959
- BEDIR-KHAN & HERBERT, Oertel: Der Adler Von Kurdistan. Potsdam 1937
- BEKO, Tcherkes: Kurdish Russian small Dictionary. 14,000 words. Moscow 1957
- BENNETT, J.G.: Gurdijeff a very great enigma. Coombe Spring Press. London 1966
- BERLINER, R. & BORCHARD, P.: Silberchmiedarbeiten aus Kurdistan. Berlin 1911
- BEYAZIDI, Mahmoud: Moeurs et Coutumes des Kurdes. Moscow 1963
- BINDER, H.: Au Kurdistan, en Mesopotamie et en Perse. Paris 1887
- BISHOP, I.L. BIRD: Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan. 2 Volumes. London 1891
- BLAU, Joyce: Le Probleme Kurde. Bruzelles 1963
- BLAU, O.: Die Stamme des nordostlichen Kurdistan. Leipzig 1958-62
- BOIS, Thomas, O.P.: Connaissance des Kurdes Khayyats edit Beyrouth 1965
Les Kurdes (Histoire, folklore)
L'ames des Kurdes a la lumiere de leur folklore, Beyrouth 1946
- BRAIDWOOD, Linda: Digging beyond the Tigris
- BRANI: Notes of a journey through a part of Kurdistan in the Summer of 1838. London
- BURCHARD, Brentjes: Zu einigen problemen der Geschichte der Kurdischen Nationalbewegung. Aus der Widdenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther Universitat, XIII Jg Heft 9/10. Halle-Wittenberg 1964
- CHAILAND, G.: Le Question Kurde Francois Haspero. Paris 1961
- CAMPANILE, G.: Storia della regione di Kurdistan edile sette de religione-ivi esistenti. Naples 1818
- CHANTRE, Ernest: Les Kurdes. Lyon 1897
- CHARMONY, F.: Cherof-Nameh on fastes de la nation Kurde. 4 vols. St Petersburg 1868-75 (Arabic edition: Bidlisi. Sharaf Khan Al-Sharaf Nama. Baghdad 1952)
- CHRISTENSEN, Nerthus und Dieter: Notizen Zur Kurdischen Topferei (Baschler - Archir, Neue Folge) Berlin 1960
Tanzlieder de Hakkari – Kurden (Jahrbuch fur musikalische Volks-u. Volker-Kunde, Sonderdruck aus Band 1/1963 (Berlin 1963)
- CHRISTOFF, H.: Kurden und Armenier. Heidelberg 1935
- CYAVANDOV, C.: Kurdish-Armenian Dictionary. 27,000 words. Yerevan 1957
- DEMCHENKO, P.: Irakski Kurdistan Wagne. Moskva 1963
- DOUGLAS, W.O.: Strange Lands and Friendly People. London 1951. Deutsche Ausgabe (Gaerender Orient, Zurich 1954)
- DRIVER, G.R.: The name 'Kurd' and its philological connections in J.R.A.S., p.393-403. 1913
Dispersion of the Kurds in Ancient Times, in J.R.A.S. p. 563-572. 1921
Studies in Kurdish History in B.S.O.S., II p. 491-513. 1922.
The Religion of the Kurds in B.S.O. II/II. p. 197-215. 1922.
- EAGLETON, William: The Kurdish Republic of 1946. London 1963
- EDMONDS, C.J.: Kurds, Turks and Arabs. London 1957
Some Ancient Monuments on the Iraqi-Persian Boundary. British School of Archaeology in Iraq.
- EIKSTEDT, Egomvon: Turken, Kurden und Iraner seit dem Alter tum. Stuttgart 1961
- ELPHINSON, W.G.: The Kurdish Question (International Affairs. January 1st) London 1946
- FARIZOV, I.O.: Russko-Kurdiski Slovar. Moskva 1957
- FOWLER, S.: Drei Jahre in Persien und Reiseabenteuer in Kurdistan. Aachen 1842
- FOSSUM, L.O.: A practical Kurdish grammar. Minneapolis 1919
- FRASER, J.B.: Travels in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, 2 vols. London 1840
- FUAD, Kamal: Kurdischer folklore in Literarischer uberlieferung. Wizz Z, Humboldt-Univ. Berlin Ges-Sprachw W.R. XIV Berlin 1965
- GARROD, D.A.E.: The palaeolithic of Southern Kurdistan. 1930
- GARZONI, M.: Grammatica e vocabolaria della lingue Kurda. Roma 1787
- GAVAN, S.S.: Kurdistan – Divided nation of the Middle East. London 1958
- GHASSEMLOU, Abdul Rahman: Kurdistan and the Kurds. Prague 1965
- HADANK, Karl: Boti und Ezadi. Berlin 1938
Kurdische-Persische Forschungen (Abteilung III, Band IV). Berlin 1932
- HAMILTON, A.M.: Road through Kurdistan (2nd ed.) London 1958
- HAMMER: Ueber die Kurdische Sprache und ihre Mundarten aus dem II. Bande der Reisebeschreibung. Evlias Wen 1814
- HANDEL-MAZETTI: Zur Geographie von Kurdistan – Peterm-Mitt 1912
- HANSEN, Henry H.: The Kurdish woman's life. Kobenhagen 1961
Daughters of Allah. Copenhagen 1960
- HARALDSSON, Erlender: Med Uppeisuarmonnum i Land in Aufstand, Kurdistan. Hamburg 1966
- HARTMANN, Martin: Der Kurdische Divan des Scheich Ahmet von Gezirat ibni Omar Genannt, Melai Giziri. Berlin 1904
- HAY, W.R.: Two years in Kurdistan 1918-20. London 1921
- HUBBARD, G.E.: From the Gulf to Ararat through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. Edinburgh 1916

- HUTTEROTH, W.D.: Bergnomaden und Yaylab bauern in mittleren Kurdischen Taurus, Humburg 1959
- IVANOW, W.: The Truth Worshippers of Kurdistan. Holland 1953
- JABA, A.: Recueil de notices et extraits Kurdes. St Petersburg 1879
- JABA et JUSTI: Dictionair Kurde-Francais. St Petersburg 1879
- JAFAR, Majeed R.: Under-Underdevelopment: A Regional Case Study of the Kurdish Area in Turkey. Helsinki 1976
- Painoprint Oy on behalf of the Social Policy Association in Finland. (Study No. 24).
- JUSTI, Ferdinand: Uber die Kurdischen Spiranten, Marburg 1873
- Kurdische Grammatik. St Petersburg 1880
- KARABUDA, Barbro: Oster om Eufrat; Kurdernas Land. Stockholm 1960
- KHALFIN, N.A.: Barba za Kurdistan. Moskva 1964
- KINNANE, Derek: The Kurds and Kurdistan. London 1964
- KLAPROTH, Various Studies on Kurdish. Wien 1808
- Kurdisches Wortverzeichnis. Wien 1814
- KURDOYEV, K.K.: Kurdiski Yazik. Moskva 1961
- Grammatica Kurdska Yazika (Kurmangi). Moskva 1957
- Kurdsko-Russki Slovan. Moskva 1960
- Development of Kurdology in USSR. Moscow 1960
- LAZAREV, M.S.: Kurdistan i Kurdskaia Problema. Moskva 1964
- LERCH: Forschungen uber die Kurden, 2tle. St Petersburg 1857-1858
- LESCOT, R.: Textes Kurdes Genthner 1940-42. 2 vol.
- MACKENZIE, D.N.: Kurdish Dialect Studies (I,II) London 1964
- The Origin of Kurdish. Oxford 1964
- MANN, Oskar: Kurdish-Persische Forschungen (Abteilung IV)
- Kurdische Dialekte, Band I-II. Berlin 1906-09
- MAUNSELI, F.: Kurdistan. London 1894
- MAURIES, Rene: Le Kurdistan ou la Mort Laffont. Edit. Paris 1967
- McCARUS, Ernest N.: A Kurdish Grammar. New York 1958
- MILLINGEN, F.: Wild Life Among the Kurds. 1870
- MINORSKY, V.: Kurdistan and Kurds (Encyclopaedia of Islam) Vol.II. London 1927
- The Guran. In B.S.O.S. 1943
- MOLTKE, H.: Das Land und Volk der Kurden in Vermichte. Schriften zur Orientalische Frace. Berlin 1892
- MULLER, Friedrich: Kurmangi-Dialekt der Kurden Sprache. Wien 1864
- MULLER, G.J.: Einbruch ins verschlossene Kurdistan. Reuthingen 1937
- NIKITINE, Basil: Probleme Kurde (Politique etr ungere) Paris 1946
- Les Kurdes - Etude Sociologique et historique. Paris 1956
- O'BALLANCE, Edgar: The Kurdish Revolt 1961-70. London 1973
- PAUL: Marguerite, Lusie ey Bedir-Khan, Kamuran: Proverbes Kurds. Paris 1936
- PERCY: Turkish-Kurdistan in Proceedings Royal. 1st. G. Britain XVI 640
- PRADIER, Jean: Revolution silencieuse, Durod edit. Bordeaux 1968
- PRYM, E. und SOCIN, A.: Kurdische Sammlungen. St. Petersburg 1887-90
- RAMBOUT, L.: Les Kurdes et le Broit. Paris 1947
- RICH, C.J.: Narrative of a residence in Kurdistan and account of a visit to Shiraz and Persepolis (2 vols) London 1880
- Notes on Koodistan. London 1836
- ROMANETTE, I.: Le Kurdistan et la question Kurde. Paris 1937
- RUDENKO, M.B.: Mem u zin. Moskva 1962
- SAFRASTIAN, A.: Kurdes and Kurdistan. London 1948
- SCHMIDT, Dana Adams: Journey among Brave Men, Little Brown and Co. Boston USA 1964
- SIVAN, Emmanuel: The Kurds: Another Perspective. Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Vol. 2.
- SOANE, E.B.: Elementary Kurmanji Grammar (Sulaimania district). Baghdad 1912
- Grammar of the Kurmanji or Kurdish language. London 1913
- Elementary Kurdish Grammar. Baghdad 1919
- To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise (2nd ed.) London 1926
- SOCIN, A.: Die Sprache der Kurden, ni Grundress der iranischen Philologie. Bd I Bdt. 2, S.249-286 Hrsgb W. Geiger und E. Kuhn. Strausburg 1898-1901
- SPEISER, E.A.: Southern Kurdistan in the annals of Ashurnasirpa land today. 1928
- STATHATOS, John: Indestructible Kurds. London 1976.
- The Geographical Magazine (January 1976)
- SYKES, M.: The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire, London 1908 in J.R. Anthropol Inst.
- TANBERG, (OI of G) RASTGELDI, S.: Det Glomda Kriget Rapport fran Krakiska Kurdistan. Solna Stockholm 1967
- TAUBINGER, L.M. von: Suffering and Struggle of the Kurds. Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey. Vol. I. The Hague, 1975. Martinus Nijhoff.
- VANLY, Ismet Cheriff: Interview sur la question Kurde. Berlin 1960
- The War of Liberation of Iraqi Kurdistan in Revolution. Vol.I Nos. 4-5. Aug-Sept. 1963
- The Kurdish Problem in Syria. Published by C.D.K.P.R. 1968
- The Persecution of the Kurdish People by the Baath Dictatorship in Syria. 1969
- VIENNOT, Jean-Pierre: Le Movement National Kurde. Paris
- VILCHEVSKI, O.: Kurd v Vedenya etnicheskyny istoryu Kurdsko narod. Moskva 1961
- WAGNER, M.: Reise nach Persian und Land der Kunden. Leipzig 1852
- WAHBY, Taufiq: The Rock Sculptures in Gunduk Cave. Baghdad 1949
- The Remnants of Mithraism in Hatra and Iraqi Kurdistan. London 1962
- The Origin of the Kurds and their language. London 1964
- Kurdish English Dictionary. Clarendon Oxford Press 1966 (co-author with C.J. Edmonds)
- Kurdish Studies, published by Kurdica, London 1968. Part I
- WAHEED, A.: The Kurds and their Country. Lahore 1955
- WIGRAM, W.A. and F.T.A.: The Cradle of Mankind; Life in Eastern Kurdistan, 2nd ed. 1922
- WIKANDER, Stig.: Recueil de textes Kourmandji. Uppsala 1959
- WILHELM, Eugene: La Langue des Kurdes. Paris 1889
- WOODSON, LeRoy, Jr.: We Who Face Death. National Geographic. Washington, DC. Vol. 147, No. 3, March 1975
- WUNSCH, J.: Meine Reise in Armenien und Kurdistan. Wien 1883
- ZIKMUND, M. Hanzelka: Kurdistan. Czechoslovakia 1962
- ZUKERMANN, I.I.: Elements de grammaire Kurde. Moscou 1962
- Bibliografia po Kurdovedenyu akademii nauk SSSR Institut narodov. Moskva 1963

