The Military Intervention in the 1990s

Auteur :

Éditeur : Routledge	Date & Lieu : 1992, London
Préface :	Pages : 198
Traduction :	ISBN : 0-415-06524-0
Langue : Anglais	Format : 155x230 mm
	Thème : Politique

Présentation	Table des Matières	Introduction	Identité	PDF
The Military Intervention in the 1990s: A new logic of war The first problem to consider in any ‘intervention’ study lies in the definition of the word. Within the literature there are expressions of caution that: ‘A definition of “intervention” wide enough to take in all the meanings attached to the word will be masked by imprecision’. The conclusion to be drawn from this truism is of the desirability of concentrating upon one aspect within the broad spectrum of coercive intervention. Within that spectrum, which includes many diverse forms, be they diplomatic, political, financial, economic or military, this work represents a study of the last of these: military intervention. But then, military intervention can be initiated for quite varied social (such as anti-drugs crusades), environmental, humanitarian and politicomilitary reasons. In addition, the form which military intervention may take is subject to further subdivision. One of the more obvious and arguably simpler forms of military intervention is that involving naval forces, as was apparent in the Gulf towards the end of the Iran/Iraq War. A blockade can be imposed either as an independent measure or as a part of wider measures. A clinical or surgical strike intervention is of the type which occurred against the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981 and which was launched unsuc-cessfully against Libya in 1986...



FOREWORD by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley Colonel Connaughton turned his attention to the subject of this book long before events made it topical. When he started writing it the Gulf War was not in sight; it had not yet illustrated that states must be geared to carry out multilateral military intervention in some circumstances if they wish to maintain international order. It remained far from certain, moreover, that the momentous but still negative advance that we call the end of the Cold War would be consolidated by the rise of what he calls a new collegiality among the leading states—by their acceptance of the need for the positive collaboration between themselves without which the resort to multilateral military intervention in the Gulf would have been impracticable. He is to be congratulated on his foresight in anticipating these developments. There are other reasons why his book is not only topical, but also of more than passing importance. The Gulf War has raised as many problems as it has solved. The collegiality which permitted it to be fought under the aegis of the Security Council may not be sustained, threats to international order are unlikely to decline; and it will become increasingly necessary to distinguish between those situations in which international action is proper and those in which it is not. Colonel Connaughton’s discussion of these and associated issues will repay the closest attention; and it is particularly to be hoped that his emphasis on the need for revision within the United Nations is not ignored. States in earlier international systems were beguiled by the maxim that if you want peace you must be prepared for war. The sentiment was sound enough, but in earlier international systems the absence of international machinery rendered the maxim self-defeating. Restated to meet the possibilities and the needs of our time, it acquires great force: if you want peace you must make sure that the Security Council is ready to act whenever international action is appropriate.