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AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The United States and the Middle East are at a critical moment in their individual and common histories. The first international crisis of the post-Cold War era culminated in war. But despite the flood of instant information and analysis provided by television and the press during the course of the Gulf War, most Americans remain ill informed about the history of the region, the policies that brought Iraq, Kuwait, and the U.S.-led coalition to confrontation, and the complex problems that will shape the postwar Middle East. The United States has embarked upon a qualitatively new involvement with the region—a commitment that raises important questions: What is the proper role of U.S. power in the world today? Can it be guided by moral precepts, or is realpolitik and the balance of power the only choice for policymakers? What are the root causes of instability and discontent in the Middle East? Can lasting peace be brought to that tormented part of the world by the forcible intervention of outside powers? Are there other, less violent ways of resolving the disputes among the countries and peoples of the region? Can America’s foreign policy be more tightly tethered to democratic debate and control? And what about the “peace dividend” and the pressing priorities back home?
Such questions (and many others besides) suggest that there are numerous lessons to be learned. The passions, interests, and acts that led— directly and indirectly—to the Gulf War will continue to haunt not only those future historians who will ponder whether this war was necessary or inevitable, but also those policymakers and citizens who wish to prevent such crises from occurring again. Moreover, we have yet to know just how many Iraqis—civilian and military—were killed, and the full extent of the Gulf War’s political, economic, and environmental repercussions. Now that the great military confrontation has ended with the shattering defeat of Iraq’s military forces, the temptation to avoid sober contemplation of the causes and consequences of the Gulf War will be great. A revival of American hubris may be upon us. It is our hope that this book will enrich and deepen the debates that are to come.
Putting together a reader such as this would have been impossible without the cooperation and hard work of many people. We should like to take this opportunity to thank especially our mutual friend Victor Navasky who was instrumental in bringing us together. Christopher Hitchens and Lewis Lapham also played seminal roles, for which we are grateful. We also would like to thank Eric Alterman, William Arkin (and his colleagues at Greenpeace who issued daily “Situation Reports” on the war), George Black, Tom Burgess, Steve Cobble, David Corn, Elsa Dixler, Deborah Foley, Robert I. Friedman, Josh Goren, Mitchell Ivers, Andrew Kopkind, Carolyn Lee, Suzanne Levine, Susan Luke, John McGhee, Rich McKerrow, Peter Osnos, Naomi Osnos, Tony Platt, David Rosenthal, Stanley Sheinbaum, Virginia Sherry, Jamie Sims, Della Smith, Geoff Stephens, Joe Stork and Martha Wenger (and the editorial staff of the indispensable Middle East Report), Jon Wiener, Janet Wygal, and JoAnn Wypijewski for their friendship, encouragement, and advice.
Special thanks are due to Linda Amster and Bill Effros—as well as Andrew Cohen, Adlai Hardin, Matt Hem and the other long-suffering Nation interns—who helped enormously with the research; to Sydney Wolfe Cohen, who has turned indexing into an art form; to Cheryl Moch, who masterminded our permissions blitzkrieg; and to Nancy Inglis, our production editor, and Andy Ambraziejus, our copy editor, whose speed and precision made the timely publication of this book possible.
The writers included here are, of course, the real creators of this book; we wish to thank them all for their kindness and cooperation. We would also like to take this opportunity to recommend to interested readers several essays we sought to include, but for which we were unable to obtain permission: Alexander Cockbum’s “The Press and the ‘Just War’ ” (The Nation, February 18, 1991), William Pfaff’s “Islam and the West” (The New Yorker, January 28, 1991), and Milton Viorst’s “The House of Hashem” (The New Yorker, January 7, 1991). We want also to acknowledge our debt to Marcus Raskin and the late Bernard Fall, editors of The Vietnam Reader, and to Marvin Gettleman, who edited Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis; their works, published a generation ago, were the inspiration for this Reader.
We are especially grateful to Ed Victor, our literary agent, who negotiated our contract in only slightly more time than it took General Norman Schwarzkopf to obliterate the Iraqi army; to Andrew Shapiro and Karen Larsen Meizels, who contributed selflessly, and sleeplessly, to every stage of the editorial process; and to Leslie Lieman-Sifry, without whose love and support one of us, at least, might never have undertaken this project.
And finally, our heartfelt thanks to Steve Wasserman, editorial director of Times Books, who saw merit in our project, who skillfully guided us through the unenviable task of trimming 800 pages of “uncut table” manuscript down to a manageable size, and whose vision, unflagging energy, and unerring editorial skill improved our book immeasurably.
Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf
New York City March 4, 1991
Roots of Conflict
Imperial Legacy
Phillip Knightley
The new crusaders from the United States and Europe, along with their Arab auxiliaries, are gathered again in the Middle East. But their chances of a lasting victory are slim. No matter what happens to Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, there will be no peace in the area until the world faces up to these historical facts: the West lied to the Arabs in the First World War; it promised them independence but then imposed imperial mandates; this ensured Arab disunity at the very moment when the West created the state of Israel.
In January 1919, Paris was a city of pomp and splendor. The most ghastly war in history had ended two months earlier in triumph for the Allies: Britain, France, and the United States. Now diplomats from these countries, grave, impressive men flanked by their military advisers, had arrived for the peace conference that would decide the fate of Germany and divide the spoils of victory.
Each night the best Paris hotels, ablaze with light from their grand chandeliers, buzzed with conversation and laughter as the delegates relaxed after their duties. In this colorful, cosmopolitan gathering, one delegate stood out. Restaurants grew quiet when he entered, and there was much behind-the-scenes jostling to meet him. For this was Lawrence of Arabia, the young Englishman who had helped persuade the Arabs to revolt against their Turkish masters, who were allies of Germany. This was the brilliant intelligence officer who had welded the warring tribes of the Middle East into a formidable guerrilla force.
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Phillip Knightley, a journalist, is author of The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia and The First Casualty, a history of war reporting and propaganda. This article appeared in the November 1990, issue of M Inc. magazine, under the title “Desert Warriors.”
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