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INTRODUCTION
This report looks at human rights in Syria during two decades of rule by President Hafez Asad. It also considers the rights practices of Asad’s predecessors, particularly the governments which emerged from the military coup d’etat of March 8, 1963, under the banner of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party.
Syria, a country with a population of twelve million, has been a key player in contemporary Middle Eastern politics. Despite limited oil revenues, the Asad regime has built a powerful army and security apparatus with the help of large foreign aid and a network of regional and international alliances. Such varied sources as the Soviet Union, Iran and Saudi Arabia have provided more than a billion dollars a year in subsidies to Syria. Recently, European countries have provided aid as well and relations with the United States had been warming rapidly over the past two years, even before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. That event, and the resulting shared hostility to the regime of Saddam Hussein has produced the most amiable relations with Syria during the Asad years.
In the early 1980’s, the Asad regime crushed its opposition with great violence, killing at least 10,000 citizens and jailing thousands more. Today, under a longtime State of Emergency, security forces routinely arrest citizens without charge, torture them during interrogation and imprison them without trial for political reasons. At least 7,500 political prisoners languish in Syrian jails.
Syria is also a serious rights offender in Lebanon, where since 1976, its army has controlled more than half of the country. Using Lebanese proxy forces as well as its own army and security services, Syria has been responsible for widespread political imprisonment, torture and massacres of hundreds of innocent civilians. The Syrian occupation, which effectively ended free expression in Lebanon, was an important factor in the demise of Beirut as the leading regional center of research, writing and publishing. Much international commentary falsely treats Syria as if it were contributing to Lebanese peace and stability, but overlooks the heavy price that has been paid by Arab society as a whole.
To secure its rule in Syria and Lebanon, the Asad regime relies on three institutions, in addition to the ordinary machinery of government. One is the Ba‘th Party—the "leading party" under the Syrian constitution—which has a virtual political monopoly in the country. It purveys the official ideology, censors opposing viewpoints, controls unions, professional associations and mass organizations and runs a large intelligence network.
The military is a second institution of rule. The Ba’thist regime came to power by military coup and many of its leading figures, including Asad himself, are military officers. The military remains a major constituency and power base. Important military units are deployed near the capital to protect the regime from its domestic opposition.
The third institution of rule in Syria is the security apparatus. Today, fifteen different security and paramilitary forces watch each other and insure the loyalty of the rest of the population. The security chiefs—almost all military officers from the ‘Alawi sect—are among the president’s inner core of advisors and, after Asad, are considered the most powerful people in Syria.
Syria’s constitution affords many rights protections and its legal code, modelled in part on French jurisprudence, affirms many rights principles. In practice, however, Syrian citizens enjoy few of these rights. The State of Emergency overrides legal protections and authorizes sweeping powers of censorship, arrest for reasons of "state security" and unlimited detention without trial. The regime ignores the civil rights afforded by its own laws, and its practices regularly violate United Nations Human Rights conventions to which Syria is a party.
Despite all this, critical thought has managed to survive in Syria. A strong human rights movement in the late 1970’s was testimony to the widespread longing in the country for the rule of law and democracy. And, after many years of authoritarian rule, a movement for human rights and political freedoms may be building again.
Sources
Syria’s human rights record has been difficult to document because of the lack of local rights monitors and the difficulty of gaining access to local sources. Syrian monitoring organizations sprang up in the late 1970’s but they were short-lived. In 1980, the government dissolved them all and threw their leaders in prison.
Throughout the 1980’s, Syrian authorities refused to allow international human rights organizations to conduct any kind of investigation in the country; they have even failed to answer inquiries from human rights organizations. For eleven years, from 1978 to 1989, Amnesty International received no answers from the Asad regime to any of its dozens of communications, nor were its representatives allowed to enter the country. The Arab Organization for Human Rights also sent many communications to the Syrian government and received no answers. Even the International Committees of the Red Cross had no access to provide humanitarian services to Syrian prisoners. During this time, the Syrian government did not even fulfill its basic reporting requirement to United Nations human rights committees.¹
Middle East Watch wrote to President Hafez Asad on October 6, 1989, requesting permission for a mission to visit Syria. Copies of this letter were sent to Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu*bi in Damascus as well as to Syria’s UN Ambassador Fathy al-Masri in New York and Syrian chargd d’affaires Bushra Kanfani in Washington. Middle East Watch received no response to this request or to several follow-up efforts. On November 29th, Middle East Watch spoke to a Mr. Kuttab, counselor in the Syrian embassy in Washington, who responded that further inquiry would not be useful. "Responsible officials in Damascus will deal with this and will do what is best," he said. "We are very busy and obviously cannot respond to every request of this kind that we receive."
Nevertheless, Middle East Watch was able to carry out extensive research on Syrian human rights for this report and even to make an unauthorized visit to Syria itself. The investigation also included interviews and documentary research in Egypt, Switzerland, France, Holland, Britain and the United States.
Many Syrian £migr£s agreed to be interviewed for this report, in some cases at considerable risk, since Syrian security forces have been known to harass or even assassinate opponents of the regime living abroad. Several who testified to Middle East Watch were especially concerned about the safety of those who remain in Syria, who can be placed at risk by insensitive use of rights information. This report, therefore, depended on mutual trust as well as mutual commitment to human rights. Thanks are due for this help and trust and also for the support and encouragement so vital to the completion of the project.
The report has also drawn on information and assistance from many non-Syrians: scholars, journalists, human rights experts, doctors, students, government officials, and others knowledgeable about the situation in Syria and Syrian-controlled Lebanon, as well as technical issues. Though the Syrian regime makes every effort to prevent negative information from getting out of the country, it has been only partially successful. Foreign press access has been limited (though some western journalists have been granted freer access to Syria over the past two to three years), and officially-sanctioned human rights research has been nonexistent; many foreign scholars, travellers and officials have been able to visit the country and travel around . with little, if any, restriction. Some 6migr£s also return to Syria for family visits and many -Syrians travel regularly to Europe. Middle East Watch was therefore able to draw on many diverse and well-informed personal observations on current conditions. In preparing this report, Middle East Watch is indebted to numerous people from many countries who generously gave of their time.
In addition to field work and interviews, the report has drawn on documentary literature on Syria and Syrian rights in French, German and Arabic as well as in English. Not least among these were documents, publications and newspapers of the Syrian government itself. Thanks are due to the libraries of Columbia University, New York University, the University of California and especially the New York Public Library for much great help and assistance.
Recognition is due to the late French scholar Michel Seurat, whose courageous and pioneering criticism of the rights record of the Asad regime was cut short by his kidnapping and death in Lebanon in 1985. The report would not have been possible without the documentary record compiled by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Committee for the Defense of Freedoms and Political Prisoners in Syria and especially Amnesty International, whose fine work has been an invaluable foundation for this project.
Finally, thanks are due to a number of readers, who carefully went over the text and provided many invaluable suggestions. While it would be gratifying to name them here, they prefer to remain anonymous, for obvious reasons.
Scope of Research
This report covers the traditional core of civil and political rights. Largely limited to the record of rights violations within Syria, it does not seek to analyze the causes of such violations, the social and economic context of Syria’s internal conflicts, or the regional conflicts that may sharpen rights problems.
By necessity, the report has been selective. Because of the need to concentrate on core issues and the inevitable limit on time, resources and access, the report has looked most closely at rights abuses in major urban areas; it does not explore the rights abuses faced by peasants in rural villages, except in cases of massacres (such as the one in Sarmada village in the northwest in July 1980) or when broad patterns of abuse are evident, as with the forced relocation of Kurdish villagers in the northeast in the 1960’s and ’70’s.
Whether to cover human rights in those areas of Lebanon under Syrian military occupation posed a problem in planning and conducting the research. At first, this report was going to concentrate solely on the rights situation within Syria, not only because Human Rights Watch reports usually concentrate on single countries, but also because of the difficulty of obtaining information on civil war-torn Lebanon. However, charges of Syrian rights abuses in Lebanon were so abundant and the rights violations in the two countries so interrelated, that it became necessary to integrate Lebanon into the text. For example, many political prisoners are arrested in Lebanon and interrogated there before being taken to Syria for long-term imprisonment. Many Lebanese disappear into Syrian prisons, never to reappear. Syrian security forces feed on the smuggling, corruption, drug money and violence in Lebanon. Only if one looks at rights abuses in Syrian-controlled Lebanon does the whole rights situation in Syria finally make sense.
Similar dilemmas arose with respect to the international operations of Syrian security agencies as well as Syrian support for international terrorist organizations. These are clearly rights issues, since the Syrian government has almost certainly been responsible for killing, injuring, restricting free speech, and otherwise violating the rights of persons outside of territory it directly controls.
However, direct responsibility in these cases is often difficult to determine. It was therefore decided that in the limited time available it was best to concentrate on rights abuses within Syrian-controlled territory, where Syrian government responsibility can be clearly established.
Given the limited access to Syria and the regime’s lack of cooperation in our research, some facts cannot be known with certainty. We do not know, for example, exactly how many political prisoners are currently held in Syria, how many have been tortured to death and how many have "disappeared." Combining many sources and reports, however, it has been possible to make conservative estimates. Throughout the report, the method and sources of these estimates will be clearly stated so readers can reach their own conclusions. Even in more open societies, facts of this kind are often hard to establish; so any uncertainties should not inhibit our understanding the circumstances under which Syrian human rights violations occur.
Summary of Conclusions
Right to Life
The regime has massacred a large number of innocent civilians and carried out many summary executions. This was especially common in Syria in 1978-82; since that time it has been a practice of Syrian forces in Lebanon. A disturbingly large number of persons have also died in custody, many as a result of torture. Over the past twenty years, the regime has killed at least 10,000 of its own citizens.
Right to Protection against Torture, Mistreatment or Degrading Punishment
Torture and severe mistreatment are the security services’ standard methods for interrogating political prisoners. Since 1984, an estimated one to two thousand persons—including those held by Syrian forces in Lebanon—have been tortured severely during interrogation each year.
Right to Decent Penal Conditions
Syria’s prison conditions are horrible, especially for political prisoners. Cells are overcrowded and food rations inadequate. Many prisoners are not allowed any visits and face continual harassment and physical abuse. Long-term prisoners commonly develop chronic health problems such as heart conditions, paralysis and loss of hearing and eyesight. Medical care in the prisons is almost nonexistent.
Right to a Fair, Speedy and Public Trial
Virtually no political prisoners are put on trial. They are never charged, are held incommunicado during interrogation and never have access to a lawyer. Trials, when they do take place, are often in special courts which follow no established procedures or rules of evidence.
Freedom from Collective Punishment
On many occasions, the Asad regime has massacred neighborhoods, towns and even cities as "collective punishment" for the acts of a few dissidents. Within Syria, the worst cases date from 1980-82. Today, Syrian security forces employ collective punishment in Lebanon.
Right not to be Subject to Ex Post Facto Laws
In 1980, the regime passed a retroactive law making membership in the country’s largest political organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, a capital offense. A person could be punished for current or prior membership, unless he or she confesses and asks for amnesty. This law is still on the books.
Freedom of Expression
The government owns and controls all mass media. It regularly imposes censorship on broadcasting, all publications including books, public lectures, and all other forms of expression. Those who violate official limits and taboos are often harassed, fired from their jobs and blackballed, and sometimes interrogated and imprisoned.
Freedom of Association
The regime does not let any organization exist that it cannot control to a substantial degree. Virtually all opposition political parties are banned; those who belong to or cooperate with them may be arrested, interrogated and imprisoned. Membership in the Muslim Brothers is punishable by death. In 1980, when trade unions and professional associations called for democracy, the regime shut them down, imprisoned their leadership, and named new leaders.
Right to Democratic Participation in Government
The regime presents only one candidate in presidential elections: Hafez Asad. Most other elections—for People’s Assembly, Muhafazat (local) Councils, trade unions and other bodies—offer only one slate of candidates, which has been closely screened by the ruling Ba'th Party. Syrian citizens fear their government—for good reason—and are almost completely excluded from any participation in it.
A Note on Transliteration
Common English usage has been used wherever possible. Where several different forms are in use in English, we have opted for the form that most closely represents the original Arabic: thus Ba'th rather than Baath and Nasir rather than Nasser. Otherwise, transliteration has been simplified as much as possible, with only ayns signified by diacriticals.
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Background
Land and People
Syria lies east of the Mediterranean, stretching south from the mountains of Turkey toward the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. In the northwest is a Mediterranean coastline, in the center a wide uninhabited desert and in the east the great Euphrates River, which descends from the mountains ofTurkey to the plains of Iraq. Syria’s land area—71,500 square miles—is about the size of Norway or the states of New York and Pennsylvania.
More than a third of Syria’s people live in two big cities: Aleppo in the northwest, a center of trade and industry, and famed for its vast old suqs or markets; and Damascus in the southwest, center of government, and one of the world’s oldest cities, with numerous handsome mosques and public buildings.¹ Many Syrians also live in a half dozen or so mid-sized cities: the Mediterranean ports of Lataqia and Tartus, Homs and Hama in the agriculturally-rich Orontes River Valley, Dar'a and Suwaida in the south near the Jordanian border and Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hassaka in the Euphrates-Khabir River Valley to the east.
Today, fewer than half of all Syrians live in the countryside and that proportion is declining steadily. These country -dwellers are mostly poor peasants. Over half work their own land and many have benefitted from land reforms. The rest till the land of others, including absentee landlords.² Though the government has brought roads, electricity and schools to many rural villages, peasants have a hard life.
Since the I950’s (and especially in the early Ba’thist years) the Syrian government has nationalized banking, industry and trade, so that the state now controls much of the Syrian economy. It maintains low prices for bread and other basic commodities, rations key food items, and provides many social services.
Syria is not plagued with the crushing urban poverty found in many countries in the region; there are virtually no shantytowns around its cities and malnutrition is rare. But its society is far from egalitarian. Many top government officials and private merchants own valuable enterprises such as hotels, factories, farms and construction companies; they live in elegant mansions and drive European luxury cars. The rest of the population, including most members of the middle class, lives very simply.
Further, the economic underpinnings of Syrian society have been steadily eroding over the past decade. In the early 1980’s, Syria received as much as $2 billion annually in foreign aid. It now gets $1 billion or less and the sum may fall still further. The Soviets have other priorities, Iran is giving less, and the Saudis have cut their support as well.
Though foreign companies have recently made promising new oil finds, oil revenues will probably never be large enough to sustain the economy. Oil export revenues peaked at $1 billion in the early 1980’s when prices reached their earlier highs.
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